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U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform - Mandate
 CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORIZATION
The bipartisan U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform was authorized by
Section 141 of the Immigration Act of 1990.  The Commission expired on
December 31, 1997.  The mandate of the Commission was to review and evaluate
the implementation and impact of U.S. immigration policy and to transmit to the
Congress reports of its findings and recommendations.
In particular, the Commission examined the implementation and impact of
provisions of the Immigration Act of 1990 related to family reunification,
employment-based immigration, and the program to ensure diversity for the
sources of U.S. immigration. The Commission examined:  the effectiveness of
efforts to curb illegal immigration; the impact of immigration on labor needs,
employment, and other economic and domestic conditions in the United States; the
social, demographic, and natural resources impact of immigration; the impact of
immigration on the foreign policy and national security interests of the United
States; and various numerical limitations in the selection and adjustment of status
of immigrants, asylees, and non-immigrants.
The Commission's first interim report U.S. Immigration Policy: Restoring
Credibility, presented to Congress on September 30, 1994, focused primarily on
controlling illegal immigration with unanimous recommendations for border
management, work-site verification, program eligibility, and impact aid for states
affected by illegal immigration.
The Commission's second interim report Legal Immigration: Setting Priorities was
presented to Congress in 1995.  Whereas the previous report focused on illegal
immigration, this report presents near unanimous recommendations on family and
employment-based immigration, refugee admissions, and
naturalization/Americanization.
The Commission made two final reports to Congress in 1997:  U.S. Refugee
Policy: Taking Leadership; and Becoming An American: Immigration and
Immigrant Policy.
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REPORTS TO CONGRESS
The executive summaries and full reports are available in text or PDF format. 
BECOMING AN AMERICAN: IMMIGRATION AND IMMIGRANT POLICY 
1997 (232 PAGES) 
Executive Summary (PDF format, 280Kb) 
Executive Summary (HTML text) 
Full Report to Congress (PDF format, 584Kb) 
Full Report to Congress (Separated in short PDF files) 
Available from: 
U.S. Government Printing Office 
Superintendent of Documents 
Mail Stop SSOP 
732 N. Capitol Street, N.W. 
Washington, DC 20401-0003 
U.S. REFUGEE POLICY: TAKING LEADERSHIP 
1997 (72 PAGES) 
Full Report to Congress (PDF format, 231Kb) 
LEGAL IMMIGRATION: SETTING PRIORITIES 
ISBN 052-003-01456-4 
1995 (245 PAGES) 
Executive Summary (HTML text) 
Executive Summary (PDF format, 105K) 
Available from: 
U.S. Government Printing Office 
Superintendent of Documents 
Mail Stop SSOP 
732 N. Capitol Street, N.W. 
Washington, DC 20401-0003 
U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY: RESTORING CREDIBILITY 
ISBN 0-16-045373-9 
1994 (250 PAGES) 
Executive Summary (HTML text) 
Executive Summary (PDF format, 69K) 
Available from: 
U.S. Government Printing Office 
Superintendent of Documents 
Mail Stop SSOP 
732 N. Capitol Street, N.W. 
Washington, DC 20401-0003
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 COMMISSION RESEARCH PAPERS
Averting Immigration Emergencies. 
Kathryn C. Lawler. Refugee Policy Group. 1994. 24 pages. 
Paper available in PDF format, 141Kb.
The Challenge of Mass Asylum. 
Charles B. Keely. Georgetown University. 1994. 20 pages. 
Paper available in PDF format, 129Kb.
Desertification and Migration: Mexico and the United States. 
Michelle Leighton Schwartz and Jessica Notini. Natural Heritage Institute. 1994. 51 pages. 
Paper available in PDF format, 1289Kb.
Employer Sanctions in France: From the Campaign Against Illegal Employment to the
Campaign Against Illegal Work. 
Mark J. Miller. University of Delaware. 1995. 48 pages. 
Paper available in PDF format, 245Kb.
Environmental Degradation and Migration. 
Natural Heritage Institute. 1997. 46 pages.
Estimates of the Financial Costs of Refugee Resettlement: The Current System and Alternative
Models. 
David S. North. 1997. 52 pages. 
Paper available in PDF format, 268Kb.
Illegal Mexican Migration and the United States/Mexico Border: The Effect of Operation Hold
the Line on El Paso/Juarez. 
Frank D. Bean, Roland Chanove, Robert G. Cushing, Rodolfo de la Garza, Gary P. Freeman,
Charles W. Haynes, David Spener. Population Research Center, University of Texas at Austin.
1994. 132 pages. 
Paper available in PDF format, 630Kb.
Immigrant Quality and Assimilation: A Literature Review. 
T. Paul Schultz. Yale University. 1995. 16 pages.
Paper available in PDF format, 126Kb.
Immigration Emergencies: Learning from the Past, Planning for the Future. 
Gretchen Bolton. Refugee Policy Group. 1994. 42 pages. 
Paper available in PDF format, 198Kb.
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Immigration�s Impact on U.S. National Security and Foreign Policy.
Kenneth J. Franzblau. 1997. 48 pages. 
Paper available in PDF format, 214Kb.
The Impact of the Immigration Act of 1990 on U.S. Immigration. 
Michael J. Greenwood and Fred A. Ziel. 42 pages. 
Paper available in PDF format, 175Kb.
Impact of the Federal Welfare Reform on Immigrants. 
Dolores Acevedo-Garcia, Robin Omata, Deborah Ringel, Sharon Carothers, Christine Lee, Amy
Westpfahl. 1997. 41 pages. 
Paper available in PDF format, 163Kb.
Potential Sponsorship by IRCA-Legalized Immigrants. 
Karen A. Woodrow-Lafield. Center for Social and Demographic Analysis, University at Albany,
State University of New York. 1995. 40 pages. 
Paper available in PDF format, 208Kb.
Temporary Migrants in the United States. 
Edited by B. Lindsay Lowell. Articles on temporary workers, foreign students, and exchange
visitors by Jagdish Bhagwati, Barry R. Chiswick, Gregory DeFreitas, Jacqueline Hagan, Charles
Keely, Philip Martin, Susana McCollom, Frank L. Morris, Sr., David North, Demetrios
Papdemetriou, Miland Rao, and Michael P. Smith. U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform.
1996. 287 pages. 
Paper available in PDF format, 881Kb.
U.S. Immigration and the Environment: Scientific Research and Analytic Issues. 
Ellen Percy Kraly. Colgate University. 1995. 82 pages. 
Paper available in PDF format, 400Kb.
Western European Strategies to Deter Unwanted Migration: Neither New Barbarian Invasions
Nor Fortress Europa. 
Mark J. Miller. University of Delaware. 1994. 38 pages. 
Paper available in PDF format, 209Kb.
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 MEXICO - U.S. BINATIONAL MIGRATION STUDY REPORT
The executive summary and full report are available in PDF format. 
BINATIONAL STUDY: MIGRATION BETWEEN MEXICO AND THE UNITED STATES  
ESTUDIO BINACIONAL: MIGRACION ENTRE MEXICO Y LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS  
1997 (80 PAGES)  
Executive Summary (PDF format, 98Kb)  
Full Report to Congress (PDF format, 333Kb)  
BACKGROUND  
After a meeting of the Migration and Consular Affairs Group of the Mexican-United States
Binational Commission in March 1995, the governments of Mexico and the United States decided
to undertake a joint study of migration between the two countries. Research teams in each country
studied each of five aspects of migration within their country and collaboratively analyzed the
findings. National coordinators were designated for each country with the Commission on
Immigration Reform coordinating the work of U.S. researchers. The main objective of the
Binational Study is to contribute to a better understanding and appreciation of the nature,
dimensions, and consequences of migration from Mexico to the United States. It also provides an
opportunity to identify options to respond to these movements.  
NATIONAL COORDINATORS AND STAFF 
U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform 
Susan Martin, Executive Director, National Coordinator 
B. Lindsay Lowell, Senior Research Analyst
Deborah Meyers, Program Analyst
Mexican Coordinators 
Enrique Loaeza Tovar, Coordinador Nacional de México, Secretaría de Relaciones
Exteriores 
Carlos Planck, Coordinador Adjunto, Secretaría de Gobernación 
Remedios Gómez Arnau, Secretaria Técnica del Estudio Universidad Nacional Autónoma
de México 
1. Quantification of Migration
Frank D. Bean, University of Texas at Austin*
Rodolfo Corona, El Colegio de la Frontera Norte*
U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform - Mexico-U.S. Binational Migration Study Report
binational.html[6/13/17, 3:06:10 PM]
Rodolfo Tuirán, Consejo Nacional de Población
Karen A. Woodrow-Lafield, Mississippi State University
2. Characteristics of Migrants
Jorge Bustamante, El Colegio de la Frontera Norte*
Guillermina Jasso, New York University*
Edward J. Taylor, University of California at Davis
Paz Trigueros, Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana
3. Factors that Influence Migration
Agustín Escobar Latapí, Centro de Investigaciones y Estudios Superiores en Antropología
Social*
Philip Martin, University of California at Davis*
Katharine Donato, Louisiana State University
Gustavo López Castro, El Colegio de Michoacán
4. Effects of Migration
Marta Tienda, Princeton University*
Gustavo Verduzco, El Colegio de México*
Michael J.Greenwood, University of Colorado
Kurt Unger, Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas
5. Responses to Migration
Francisco Alba, El Colegio de México*
Sidney Weintraub, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C.*
Rafael Fernández de Castro, Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México
Manuel García y Griego, University of California at Irvine
* Core Group/Member Lead
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 BINATIONAL RESEARCH PAPERS
The Mexico/United States Binational Study on Migration was a joint effort undertaken by twenty
scholars from both countries who worked together in teams on five subject areas: quantification
of migration; characteristics of migrants; factors that influence migration; effects of migration;
and responses to migration. These researchers wrote background research papers and individual
team reports, whose information and conclusions were collaboratively condensed and compiled
into a joint summary report published under the title The Binational Study on Migration Between
Mexico and the United States, available elsewhere on this web site. Available here is the three-
volume publication, titled Migration Between Mexico and the United States: Binational Study. It
consists of the individual team reports (Volume 1) and background research papers and materials
(Volume 2 and Volume 3) that were prepared as part of the Binational Study and were the basis
for the joint summary. 
Volume 1 - Cover and Table of Contents 
Available in PDF format, 35Kb.
The Quantification of Migration between Mexico and the United States 
Frank D. Bean, Rodolfo Corona, Rodolfo Tuir�n and Karen A. Woodrow-Lafield
Paper available in PDF format, 333Kb.
Characteristics of Migrants: Mexicans in the United States 
Jorge A. Bustamante, Guillermina Jasso, J. Edward Taylor and Paz Trigueros Legarreta 
Paper available in PDF format, 183Kb.
Factors that Influence Migration 
Agust�n Escobar Latap�, Philip Martin, Paul S. Davies, Gustavo L�pez Castro and Katharine
Donato 
Paper available in PDF format, 250Kb.
Impacts of Migration:
U.S. Impacts of Mexican Immigration 
Michael J. Greenwood and Marta Tienda 
Paper available in PDF format, 366Kb.
Impacts of Migration in Mexico 
Gustavo Verduzco and Kurt Unger 
Paper available in PDF format, 137Kb.
USCIR - Binational Research Papers
binpap-v.html[6/13/17, 3:06:12 PM]
Responses to Migration Issues 
Sidney Weintraub, Francisco Alba, Rafael Fern�ndez de Castro and Manuel Garc�a y Griego
Paper available in PDF format, 197Kb. 
Volume 2 - Cover and Table of Contents 
Available in PDF format, 36Kb.
QUANTIFICATION OF MIGRATION
Estimating Unauthorized Mexican Migration to the United States: Issues and Results 
Jennifer Van Hook and Frank D. Bean 
Paper available in PDF format, 107Kb.
Estimating Underenumeration among Unauthorized Mexican Migrants to the United
States: Applications of Mortality Analyses 
Jennifer Van Hook and Frank D. Bean 
Paper available in PDF format, 51Kb.
The Mexican-origin Population of the United States in the Twentieth Century 
Jennifer E. Glick and Jennifer Van Hook 
Paper available in PDF format, 40Kb.
Emigration: Implications for U.S. Immigration Policy Research 
Ellen Percy Kraly 
Paper available in PDF format, 86Kb.
Estimating Authorized Immigration 
Karen A. Woodrow-Lafield 
Paper available in PDF format, 631Kb.
Viewing Emigration at Century�s End
Karen A. Woodrow-Lafield 
Paper available in PDF format, 34Kb.
CHARACTERISTICS OF MIGRANTS
The Process of Acquiring Citizenship and/or Nationality at Birth in Mexico and the
United States 
Jorge A. Bustamante, Guillermina Jasso, J. Edward Taylor and Paz Trigueros Legarreta 
Paper available in PDF format, 12Kb.
The Selectivity of International Labor Migration and Characteristics of Mexico-to-U.S.
Migrants: Theoretical Considerations 
Jorge A. Bustamante, Guillermina Jasso, J. Edward Taylor and Paz Trigueros Legarreta 
Paper available in PDF format, 30Kb.
Data Sources 
Jorge A. Bustamante, Guillermina Jasso, J. Edward Taylor and Paz Trigueros Legarreta 
Paper available in PDF format, 92Kb.
Immigrant Characteristics from U.S. Data Sources 
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Jorge A. Bustamante, Guillermina Jasso, J. Edward Taylor and Paz Trigueros Legarreta 
Paper available in PDF format, 59Kb.
Mexico-to-U.S. Migrant Characteristics from Surveys Involving Samples Drawn in
Mexico 
Jorge A. Bustamante, Guillermina Jasso, J. Edward Taylor and Paz Trigueros Legarreta 
Paper available in PDF format, 25Kb.
Mexico-to-U.S. Migrant Characteristics from Mexican Data Sources 
Jorge A. Bustamante, Guillermina Jasso, J. Edward Taylor and Paz Trigueros Legarreta 
Paper available in PDF format, 105Kb.
Some Thoughts on Perceptions and Policies 
Jorge A. Bustamante 
Paper available in PDF format, 591Kb.
Volume 3 - Cover and Table of Contents 
Available in PDF format, 36Kb.
FACTORS THAT INFLUENCE MIGRATION
U.S.-Mexican Migration
Philip Martin
Paper available in PDF format, 7Kb.
Mexican Immigrant Workers and U.S. Food Expenditures 
Philip Martin 
Paper available in PDF format, 16Kb.
Guest Workers: Past and Present 
Philip Martin 
Paper available in PDF format, 52Kb.
Proposition 187 in California 
Philip Martin 
Paper available in PDF format, 16Kb.
Mexican Migration Project Data 
Katharine Donato 
Paper available in PDF format, 239Kb.
Coyotes and Alien Smuggling 
Gustavo L�pez Castro
Paper available in PDF format, 30Kb.
Factores de la Migraci�n y Redes Migratorias
Jean Papail 
Paper available in PDF format, 65Kb.
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The Participation of Mexican-born Households in Means-tested U.S. Welfare Programs 
Paul S. Davies and Michael J. Greenwood 
Paper available in PDF format, 139Kb.
Labor Market Implications of Mexican Migration: Economies of Scale, Innovation, and
Entrepreneurship 
Michael J. Rosenfeld and Marta Tienda 
Paper available in PDF format, 65Kb.
The U.S. Labor Market Impacts of Low-skill Migration from Mexico 
Paul S. Davies, Michael J. Greenwood, Gary L. Hunt, Ulrich Kohli and Marta Tienda 
Paper available in PDF format, 123Kb.
Mexican Immigrants and Mexican American Political Assimilation 
Michael J. Rosenfeld 
Paper available in PDF format, 48Kb.
Transferability of Skills and the Economic Rewards to U.S. Employment for Return
Migrants in Mexico 
Steven S. Zahniser and Michael J. Greenwood 
Paper available in PDF format, 55Kb.
Impactos de las Cambios Econ�micos en el Agro Mexicano y en la Migraci�n: Un
An�lysis Micro-multisectorial
Antonio Y�nez Naude
Paper available in PDF format, 79Kb.
Las Remesas de los Migrantes Mexicanos en Estados Unidos: Estimaciones para 1995 
Fernando Lozano Ascencio 
Paper available in PDF format, 69Kb.
RESPONSES TO MIGRATION
The Bracero Program 
Manuel Garc�a y Griego
Paper available in PDF format, 23Kb.
Mexico�s 1982 Economic Crisis
Francisco Alba 
Paper available in PDF format, 15Kb.
IRCA and the Facilitation of U.S.-Mexico Migration Dialogue 
Sidney Weintraub 
Paper available in PDF format, 15Kb.
The Riverside Incident 
Rafael Fern�ndez de Castro
Paper available in PDF format, 19Kb.
Selected Court Cases on Immigration Enforcement 
U.S. Court Decisions 
Paper available in PDF format, 19Kb.
On the Unrenounceability of Mexican Nationality 
Sidney Weintraub 
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Paper available in PDF format, 6Kb.
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 CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY
LISTING OF TESTIMONY INCLUDED IN FOLLOWING PAGES:
August 3, 1994. B. Jordan. Senate, Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on
Immigration.
August 9, 1994. B. Jordan. House of Representatives, Ways and Means
Committee, Subcommittee on Human Resources.
 September 29, 1994. B. Jordan. House of Representatives, Judiciary Committee,
Subcommittee on International Law, Immigration and Refugees.
January 26, 1995. L.H. Fuchs. House of Representatives, Ways and Means
Committee, Subcommittee on Human Resources.
February 24, 1995. B. Jordan. House of Representatives, Judiciary Committee,
Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims.
March 3, 1995. R. Hill. House of Representatives, Judiciary Committee,
Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims.
March 7, 1995. R. Hill. House of Representatives, Committee on Government
Reform and Oversight, Subcommittee on Government Management, Information
and Technology.
March 14, 1995. S. Martin. House of Representatives, Judiciary Committee,
Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims.
March 27, 1995. S. Martin. Senate, Committee on Finance.
March 29, 1995. B. Jordan. House of Representatives, Committee on
Appropriations, Subcommittee on Appropriations for the Departments of
Commerce, Justice, State, the Judiciary and Related Agencies.
March 30, 1995. B. Jordan. House of Representatives, Judiciary Committee,
Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims.
 May 17, 1995. S. Martin. House of Representatives, Judiciary Committee,
Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims.
June 28, 1995. B. Jordan. Joint House of Representatives Judiciary Committee,
Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims and Senate Judiciary Committee,
Subcommittee on Immigration.
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December 7, 1995. R. Estrada. U.S. House of Representatives, Judiciary
Committee, Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims
December 13, 1995. B. Jordan. House of Representatives Judiciary Committee,
Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims
 February 6, 1996. S. Martin. U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on
Immigration.
February 22, 1996. H. Ezell. U.S. House of Representatives Committee on
Economic and Educational Opportunities.
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It is both
a right
and a
responsibility
of a democratic
society
to manage
immigration
so that it
serves the
national interest.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform was created by Con-
gress to assess U.S. immigration policy and make recommendations
regarding its implementation and effects.  Mandated in the Immi-
gration Act of 1990 to submit an interim report in 1994 and a final
report in 1997, the Commission has undertaken public hearings,
fact-finding missions, and expert consultations to identify the major
immigration-related issues facing the United States today.
This process has been a complex one.  Distinguishing fact from fic-
tion has been difficult, in some cases because of what has become a
highly emotional debate on immigration.  We have heard contradic-
tory testimony, shaky statistics, and a great deal of honest confusion
regarding the impacts of immigration.  Nevertheless, we have tried
throughout to engage in what we believe is a systematic, non-
partisan effort to reach conclusions drawn from analysis of the best
data available.
Underlying Principles
Certain basic principles underlie the Commission’s work.   The Com-
mission decries hostility and discrimination against immigrants as
antithetical to the traditions and interests of the country.  At the
same time, we disagree with those who would label efforts to con-
trol immigration as being inherently anti-immigrant.  Rather, it is
both a right and a responsibility of a democratic society to manage
immigration so that it serves the national interest.
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Challenges Ahead
The Commission believes that legal immigration has strengthened
and can continue to strengthen this country.  While we will be re-
porting at a later date on the impacts of our legal immigration sys-
tem, and while there may even be disagreements among us as to the
total number of immigrants that can be absorbed into the United
States or the categories that should be given priority for admission,
the Commission members agree that immigration presents many
opportunities for this nation.  Immigrants can contribute to the build-
ing of the country.  In most cases, they have been actively sought by
family members or businesses in the U.S.  The tradition of welcom-
ing newcomers has become an important element of how we define
ourselves as a nation.
The Commission is mindful of the problems that also emanate from
immigration.  In particular, we believe that unlawful immigration
is unacceptable.  Enforcement efforts have not been effective in
deterring unlawful immigration.  This failure to develop effective
strategies to control unlawful immigration has blurred the public
perception of the distinction between legal and illegal immigrants.
For the Commission, the principal issue at present is how to manage
immigration so that it will continue to be in the national interest.
• How do we ensure that immigration is based on and supports
broad national economic, social, and humanitarian interests,
rather than the interests of those who would abuse our laws?
• How do we gain effective control over our borders while still
encouraging international trade, investment, and tourism?
The
credibility of
immigration
policy
can be
measured
by a simple
yardstick:
people
who should
get in,
do get in . . .
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• How do we maintain a civic culture based on shared values
while accommodating the large and diverse population admit-
ted through immigration policy?
The credibility of immigration policy can be measured by a simple
yardstick: people who should get in, do get in; people who should
not get in are kept out; and people who are judged deportable are
required to leave.
During the decade from 1980 to 1990, three major pieces of legisla-
tion were adopted to govern immigration policy—the Refugee Act
of 1980, the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, and the
Immigration Act of 1990.  The Commission supports the broad frame-
work for immigration policy that these laws represent: a legal immi-
gration system that strives to serve the national interest in helping
families to reunify and employers to obtain skills not available in
the U.S. labor force; a refugee system that reflects both our humani-
tarian beliefs and international refugee law; and an enforcement
system that seeks to deter unlawful immigration through employer
sanctions and tighter border control.
The Commission has concluded, however, that more needs to be
done to guarantee that the stated goals of our immigration policy
are met.  The immediate need is more effective prevention and
deterrence of unlawful immigration.  This report to Congress out-
lines the Commission’s recommendations in this area.
In the long term, immigration policies for the 1990s and beyond
should anticipate the challenges of the next century.  These chal-
lenges will be substantially influenced by factors such as the restruc-
turing of our own economy, the establishment of such new trade
relationships as the North American Free Trade Agreement [NAFTA],
and changing geopolitical relations.  No less importantly, immigra-
tion policy must carefully take into account social concerns,
. . . people who
should not
get in
are kept out
. . . and
people
who are
judged
deportable
are required
to leave.
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demographic trends, and the impact of added population on the
country’s environment.
Finally, current immigration is the first to occur in what economists
call a post-industrial economy, just as it is the first to occur after the
appearance of the modern welfare state.  The Commission’s report
to Congress in 1997 will cover these issues in assessing the impact of
the Immigration Act of 1990.  The present report reviews the progress
of the beginning implementation of this legislation.
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RECOMMENDATIONS
Serious problems undermine present immigration policies, their
implementation, and their credibility: people who should get in find
a cumbersome process that often impedes their entry; people who
should not get in find it all too easy to enter; and people who are
here without permission remain with impunity.
The Commission is convinced that unlawful immigration can be
controlled consistent with our traditions, civil rights, and civil liber-
ties.  As a nation with a long history of immigration and commit-
ment to the rule of law, this country must set limits on who can
enter and then must credibly enforce our immigration law.  Unfor-
tunately, no quick and easy solutions are available.  The United
States can do a more effective job, but only with additional financial
resources and the political will to take action.  Our recommenda-
tions for a comprehensive, effective strategy follow.
Border Management
The Commission believes that significant progress has been made
during the past several years in identifying and remedying some of
the weaknesses in U.S. border management.  Nevertheless, we be-
lieve that far more can and should be done to meet the twin goals
of border management: preventing illegal entries while facilitating
legal ones.
Land Borders
Credibility is a problem at U.S. land borders, given the ease of ille-
gal entry and various obstacles to legal entry.  These problems are
particularly prevalent at the U.S.-Mexico border, as the Commission’s
visit to San Diego and El Paso demonstrated.  The Commission
Far more
can
and should
be done
to meet
the
twin goals
of border
management:
preventing
illegal entries
while
facilitating
legal ones.
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believes that an underlying principle of border management is that
prevention is far more effective and cost-efficient than the apprehen-
sion and removal of illegal aliens after entry.  At the same time, the
Commission believes that legal entry should be facilitated in order
for the country to benefit from cross-border trade and tourism.
The Commission supports the strategy,
now being tested as “Operation Hold the
Line” in El Paso, that emphasizes preven-
tion of illegal entry at the border, rather
than apprehension following illegal entry.
Prevention holds many advantages: it is
more cost-effective than apprehension and
removal; it eliminates the cycle of volun-
tary return and reentry that has character-
ized unlawful border crossings; and it re-
duces potentially violent confrontations on
the border.  The Commission recommends:
• Increased resources for prevention, including additional staff,
such improved technology as sensors and infrared scopes, data
systems that permit expeditious identification of repeat offend-
ers, and such additional equipment as vehicles and radios.
• Increased training for border control officers to execute strate-
gies that emphasize prevention of illegal entry.
• Formation of a mobile, rapid response team to improve Border
Patrol anticipation of new smuggling sites and to augment
their capacity at these locations.   The Immigration and Natu-
ralization Service [INS] must develop a capacity to respond
quickly to changing patterns of unlawful immigration along the
land border.  Also, contingency plans should be developed to
San Diego border patrol
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address increased boat arrivals that may arise from improved
land border enforcement.
• Use of fences to reduce border violence and facilitate enforce-
ment.  However, the Commission does not support the erec-
tion of extraordinary physical barriers, such as unscaleable
walls, unless needed as a last resort to stop violence when
other means have proved ineffective.  Fences have been used
effectively in San Diego to reduce border violence, deter illegal
aliens from running across the interstate highway that leads
from Mexico, and facilitate enforcement.
• Systematic evaluation of the effectiveness of any new border
strategies by INS.  The typical measurements of Border Patrol
effectiveness—apprehension rates—have little meaning in assess-
ing a prevention strategy.  INS should develop new evaluation
techniques that measure the effects of border management ef-
forts in terms of the flow of unauthorized aliens and their im-
pacts on U.S. communities.
The Commission supports efforts to reduce potentially violent con-
frontations between Border Patrol officers and those believed to be
seeking illegal entry into the U.S.  Such confrontations were re-
duced, for example, during “Operation Hold the Line,” in terms of
both reported human rights violations against suspected illegal aliens
and attacks on Border Patrol officers.
The Commission supports efforts already underway to address com-
plaints about human rights violations, including:
• Increased training and professionalism of Border Patrol offic-
ers to enable them to respond appropriately to potentially
violent situations;
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• Improved procedures for adjudicating complaints of Border
Patrol abuses;
• Mechanisms to provide redress or relief to those subjected to
improper actions; and
• More effective protection of Border
Patrol officers from violence directed
at them.
The Commission believes that port of
entry operations can be improved.  Le-
gal entry at the border should be facili-
tated as the United States benefits from
trade, tourism, family visits and con-
sumer spending.  More specifically, the
Commission supports:
• Additional resources for inspections at land border ports
of entry.
• An expedited adjudication and issuance process for the Border
Crossing Card [BCC].  Mexican nationals are required to have a
visa (unlike Canadians).  Because of the volume of BCC appli-
cations on the Mexican border, the Commission encourages ne-
gotiations between the U.S. and Mexico to amend the bilateral
treaty to permit collection of fees to be used exclusively to expe-
dite the issuance and adjudication of the card.
• Further steps to better ensure that the BCC is not misused by
legal crossers who engage in unauthorized employment after
entry.  Each BCC should contain the legend indicating it is “not
for work authorization,” as currently appears on INS-issued cards.
Congestion at El Paso
port of entry
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• Development of a land border user fee to pay for needed im-
provements in the inspection of border crossers, with fees to
be used exclusively to facilitate land border management.
The Commission supports increased coordination on border issues
between the governments of the U.S. and Mexico.   The Commission
views favorably the discussions underway between the U.S. and
Mexican governments.  These discussions promote greater coopera-
tion between the two governments in solving problems of mutual
concern.  In particular, the Commission encourages:
• Continued cooperation in antismuggling efforts to reduce
smuggling of people and goods across the U.S.-Mexico border.
• Bilateral discussions that take into account both U.S. entry
and Mexican exit laws in devising a cooperative approach to
regulating the movements of people across the U.S.-Mexican
land border.   Mexican law requires that Mexican nationals exit
Mexico through official inspection stations.  Thus, unauthorized
migration into the United States generally violates not only U.S.
law, but Mexican law as well.
• Cross border discussions and cooperative law enforcement ef-
forts among federal, state, and local officials of both countries to
develop cooperative approaches to combat violent crimes and
auto and cargo theft along the border.
• Continued U.S. cooperation and support for Mexican efforts
to address the problem of third-country nationals crossing
Mexico to come to the United States.
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Airports
Each year about 50 million citizens and aliens enter the country
through airports.
The Commission supports a combined facili-
tation and enforcement strategy that would
prevent the entry of unauthorized aliens while
facilitating legal admissions at U.S. airports
as efficiently as possible, including:
• The use of new technologies to expedite
the inspections process and improve law
enforcement, including more efficient pro-
cessing of travelers with Machine Readable
Documents.
• Programs that enhance the capacity of airline carriers to iden-
tify and refuse travel to aliens seeking to enter the U.S. on
fraudulent documents, including the Carrier Consultant Pro-
gram and other coordinated efforts to maintain complete, accu-
rate, and reliable Advance Passenger Information System [APIS]
data and improved lookout data systems.
• Continued government-airline industry discussions on improv-
ing inspections that have led to innovative proposals.
• Development of a system for mitigation of penalties or fines
for those carriers that cooperate in screening and other pro-
grams and demonstrate success in reducing the number of un-
authorized aliens they carry.
• Making INS, not the carrier, responsible for the actual physi-
cal custody of inadmissible air passengers.
Immigration Inspection,
O'Hare International Airport
[INS Chicago District photo]
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Interagency Coordination
The Commission expresses its dissatisfaction with the past lack
of coordination between the Customs Service and the INS at ports
of entry.  This has hampered effective border management by
both agencies.
The Commission recommends implementation of initiatives to
improve coordination between INS and Customs, as recommended
by the General Accounting Office [GAO] and the National Perfor-
mance Review.  The Commission will monitor these efforts to
improve coordination of border management, particularly as they
relate to immigration matters.
If these efforts prove ineffective, the Commission will recommend
more extensive action, such as creating a new immigration and
customs agency or designating one agency as the lead agency
on inspections.
Alien Smuggling
Organized smuggling operations undermine the credibility of U.S.
enforcement efforts and pose dangers to the smuggled aliens.
The Commission recommends an effective
prevention strategy that requires enhanced
capacities to combat organized smuggling
for commercial gain.  Possible enhancements
include:
• Expanded enforcement authorities, such
as Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or-
ganizations Act [RICO] provisions, wire-
Aliens on the ship
Chin Lung Hsiang
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illegal
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tap authority, and expanded asset forfeiture for smuggling aliens;
and
• Enhanced intelligence gathering and diplomatic efforts to
deter smuggling.
Worksite Enforcement
The Commission believes that reducing the employment magnet
is the linchpin of a comprehensive strategy to reduce illegal immi-
gration.  The ineffectiveness of employer sanctions, prevalence of
fraudulent documents, and continued high numbers of unauthorized
workers, combined with confusion for employers and reported dis-
crimination against employees, have challenged the credibility of
current worksite enforcement efforts.
Verification
A better system for verifying work authorization is central to the
effective enforcement of employer sanctions.
The Commission recommends development and implementation of a
simpler, more fraud-resistant system for verifying work authoriza-
tion.  The current system is doubly flawed: it is too susceptible to
fraud, particularly through the counterfeiting of documents; and it
can lead to increased discrimination against foreign-looking or for-
eign-sounding authorized workers.
In examining the options for improving verification, the Commis-
sion believes that the most promising option for secure, non-
discriminatory verification is a computerized registry using data
provided by the Social Security Administration [SSA] and the INS.
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The key to this process is the social security number.  For decades,
all workers have been required to provide employers with their
social security number.  The computer registry would add only one
step to this existing requirement: an employer check that the social
security number is valid and has been issued to someone authorized
to work in the United States.
The Commission believes the computerized system is the most
promising option because it holds great potential for accomplishing
the following:
• Reduction in the potential for fraud.  Using a computerized
registry, rather than only an identification card, guards against
counterfeiting of documents.  It  provides more reliable infor-
mation about work authorization.
• Reduction in the potential for discrimination based on na-
tional origin and citizenship status, as well as inappropriate de-
mands for specific or additional documents, given that employ-
ers will not be required to ascertain whether a worker is a citi-
zen or an immigrant and will have no reason to reject docu-
ments they believe to be counterfeit.  The only relevant question
will be: “What is your social security number?”
• Reduction in the time, resources, and paperwork spent by em-
ployers in complying with the Immigration Reform and Control
Act of 1986 [IRCA] and corresponding redirection of enforce-
ment activities from paperwork violations to knowing hire of
unauthorized workers.
The Commission recommends that the President immediately ini-
tiate and evaluate pilot programs using the proposed computerized
verification system in the five states with the highest levels of il-
legal immigration as well as several less affected states.  The Presi-
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dent has the authority to do so under Section 274A(d)(4) of the Im-
migration and Nationality Act.  A pilot program will: permit the
testing of various approaches to using the proposed verification
system; provide needed information about the advantages, disad-
vantages, and costs of the various approaches; develop and evaluate
measures to protect civil rights and civil liberties; and ensure that
any potential obstacles, such as the quality of the data used in the
registry, are addressed prior to national implementation.  Assuming
the successful results of the pilot program, Congress should pass the
necessary statutory authorities to support more effective verification.
Pilot program features should include:
• A means by which employers will access the verification
system to validate the accuracy of information given by work-
ers.  We have received conflicting testimony about the
best way to check the applicant’s identity.  We have heard
proposals for a more secure social security card, a counterfeit-
resistant driver’s license, and a telephone verification system
that does not rely on any document.  The pilot program presents
an opportunity to determine the most cost-effective, fraud-
resistant, and nondiscriminatory method available.
• Measures to ensure the accuracy of and access to the specific
data needed to ensure that employers have timely and reliable
information when seeking verification of work authorization.
Improvements in the Social Security Administration and INS da-
tabases must be made to ensure that these data are available.
Procedures must be developed to ensure timely and accurate
entry, update, extraction, and correction of data.  The Commis-
sion strongly urges INS and the Social Security Administration
to cooperate in this endeavor, as the proposed registry would be
built upon and—once implemented—would support the primary
missions of those agencies.
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• Measures to ensure against discrimination and disparate treat-
ment of foreign-looking or -sounding persons.  The Commis-
sion believes that the least discriminatory system would have
the same requirements for citizens and aliens alike.  To reduce
the potential for discrimination and increase the security of the
system, the Commission also believes that employers should not
be required to ascertain immigration status in the process of
verifying authorization for employment.  Their only requirement
should be to check the social security number presented by each
employee against the registry and record an authorization num-
ber to prove that they have done so.
• Measures to protect civil liberties.  It is essential that explicit
protections be devised against use of the database—and any
card or any other means used to gain access to it—for purposes
other than those specified in law.  The uses to be made of the
verification system must be clearly specified.  We believe the
worksite verification  system could be used, without damage to
civil liberties, for verifying eligibility to receive public benefits
[see p. 22].  However, it should be stipulated that no one should
be required to carry a card, if one is used, or to present it for
routine identification purposes.  There also should be penalties
for inappropriate use of the verification process.
• Measures to protect the privacy of the information included
in the database.  The Commission is aware of the proliferation
of databases and the potential for the invasion of privacy by
both government and private agencies.  There need to be ex-
plicit provisions for protecting privacy; the resultant system
should incorporate appropriate safeguards regarding authorized
users’ access to individual information.  In establishing privacy
safeguards, it is important to take into account that, while
access to any one piece of information may not be intrusive,
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in combination with other information such access may
violate privacy.
• Estimates of the start-up time and financial and other costs of
developing, implementing and maintaining a national system in
such a manner that verification is reliable.
• Specification of the rights, responsibilities, and impact on in-
dividual workers and employers, for example: what individu-
als must do; how long it will take for newly authorized workers
to get on the system and to correct inaccurate data; and what
will be required of employers and at what expense.  Provisions
must also be developed to protect both workers from denial
of employment and employers from penalties in cases where
the information provided by the computer registry may be miss-
ing or inaccurate.
• A plan for phasing in of the system.  The Commission recog-
nizes that the proposed verification system will result in
financial costs.   The system should be phased in to lessen the
immediate impact.  The pilot programs should test various phase-
in procedures.  Given the required levels of accuracy, reliability,
and convenience required, the evaluation should help measure
the cost of phasing in the system nationally.
The Commission recommends evaluation of the pilot programs to
assess the effectiveness of the verification system.  The evaluation
should include objective measures and procedures to determine
whether current problems related to fraud, discrimination, and
excessive paperwork requirements for employers are effectively
overcome without imposing undue costs on the government, em-
ployers, or employees.  The evaluation should pay particular atten-
tion to the effectiveness of the measures used to protect civil liberties
and privacy.
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The Commission supports INS efforts to improve its Telephone Veri-
fication System/SAVE [TVS/SAVE] database—but only as an interim
measure.  The improvements are essential for improving the data
needed for the new, more effective verification process.  The Com-
mission is aware of the inadequacies of the current INS data that
would be used in the proposed system.  The Commission does not
endorse the TVS/SAVE program as a long-term solution to the veri-
fication problem because use of TVS/SAVE requires the inadequate
mechanism of self-attestation by workers as to their citizenship or
alienage, thus making it easy for aliens to fraudulently claim U.S.
citizenship.  It also imposes requirements on legal immigrants that
do not apply to citizens.  Nevertheless, improve-
ments in this database, as well as the Social Se-
curity Administration database, are essential to
the development of a more secure, less poten-
tially discriminatory verification system.
The Commission also recommends action that
would reduce the fraudulent access to so-called
“breeder documents,” particularly birth certifi-
cates, that can be used to establish an identity
in this country, including:
• Regulation of requests for birth certificates through stan-
dardized application forms;
• A system of interstate and intrastate matching of birth and
death records;
• Making certified copies of birth certificates issued by states
or state-controlled vital records offices the only forms ac-
cepted by federal agencies;
False documents
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• Using a standard design and paperstock for all certified
copies of birth certificates to reduce counterfeiting; and
• Encouraging states to computerize birth records repositories.
To address the abuse of fraudulent documents, the Commission
recommends imposition of greater penalties on those producing or
selling such documents.  Document fraud and counterfeiting
has become a lucrative and well-organized operation that may in-
volve international networks that conspire to produce and sell the
resulting fraudulent products.  These documents are used in smug-
gling and terrorist operations, as well as for work authorization.
RICO provisions designed to facilitate racketeering investiga-
tions should cover conspiracy to produce and sell fraudulent docu-
ments.  Criminal penalties should also be increased for large-scale
counterfeiting activities
Antidiscrimination Strategies
The Commission is concerned about unfair immigration-related
employment practices against both citizens and noncitizens that may
occur under the current system of employer sanctions.  A more re-
liable, simpler verification system holds great potential to reduce
any such discrimination because employers will no longer have to
make any determination as to immigration status.  Nevertheless,
mechanisms must effectively prevent and redress discrimination.
The Commission recommends that the Office of the Special Counsel
[OSC] for Immigration-Related Unfair Employment Practices in
the Department of Justice initiate more proactive strategies to iden-
tify and combat immigration-related discrimination at the work-
place.  OSC should target resources on independent investigations
and on programs to assess the incidence and prevalence of unfair
immigration-related employment practices.
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The Commission also recommends a methodologically-sound study
to document the nature and extent of unfair immigration-related
employment practices that have occurred since GAO’s 1990 report.
The new study should  measure the effects of immigration policy—
as distinct from other factors—on discrimination at the worksite.  As
noted above, the pilot programs should be evaluated to determine
if they substantially reduce immigration-related discrimination at
the workplace.
Employer Sanctions and
Labor Standards Enforcement
The Commission believes that enforcement of employer sanctions,
wage/hour, child labor, and other labor standards can be an effec-
tive tool in reducing employment of unauthorized workers.  The
Commission finds, however, that current enforcement efforts are in-
adequate.  In addition, the Commission expresses its concern that
current coordination efforts between the Immigration and Natural-
ization Service and the Department of Labor are insufficient.
The Commission supports vigorous enforcement of labor standards
and enforcement against knowing hire of unauthorized workers as
an integral part of the strategy to reduce illegal immigration.  La-
bor standards and employer sanctions should be seen as mutually
reinforcing.  Specifically, the Commission recommends:
• Allocation of increased staff and resources to the enforce-
ment of labor standards to complement employer sanctions
enforcement.
• Vigorous enforcement, increased staff and resources, and full
use of current penalties against those who knowingly hire
unauthorized workers.  If the new verification system proposed
by the Commission substantially reduces inadvertent hiring of
unauthorized  workers—as  we  believe  will  occur—Congress
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should discontinue paperwork pen-
alties and evaluate the need for in-
creased  penalties  against  violators
and businesses that knowingly hire
or fail to verify work authorization
for all employees.
• Targeting of investigations to
industries that have a history of
using illegal alien labor.
• Enhanced enforcement efforts targeted at farm labor and other
contractors who hire unauthorized workers on behalf of agricul-
tural growers and other businesses.
• Application of employer sanctions to the federal government.
At a minimum, the President should issue an Executive Order
requiring federal agencies to abide by the procedures required of
other employers.  Alternatively, legislation should stipulate that
federal agencies follow the verification procedures required of
other employers and be subject to penalties if they fail to verify
work authorization.
The Commission urges the Attorney General and the Secretary of
Labor to review the current division of responsibilities between the
Departments of Justice and Labor in the enforcement of employer
sanctions and labor standards.  INS and the Department of Labor
have signed a Memorandum of Understanding [MOU] that spells
out each agency’s responsibility for enforcing employer sanctions
and labor standards.  Preliminary evidence indicates that few warn-
ings have been issued to employers under the MOU.  The imple-
mentation of the MOU should be closely monitored over the next
twelve months.  Should the monitoring demonstrate that the joint
Garment industry violations
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efforts have not resulted in effective enforcement, it may be neces-
sary to designate a single agency to enforce employer sanctions.
The Commission recommends enhanced coordination mechanisms
to promote cooperation among all of the agencies responsible for
worksite enforcement.  Strategies to promote coordination at head-
quarters and in field operations include:
• Establishment of a taskforce in Washington, D.C., to review
and set policy;
• Local taskforces of worksite investigators to coordinate field
operations; and
• Continued joint training for worksite investigators from all
applicable agencies.
Education
Thousands of new businesses begin operations each year.  New
workers enter the labor force each year as well.
The Commission recommends coordination and continuance of  edu-
cational efforts by the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the
Office of Special Counsel, and the Department of Labor regarding
employer sanctions, antidiscrimination provisions, and labor stan-
dards.  The Commission calls upon these agencies to develop and
communicate a single message to all employers and employees.  The
Commission also recommends the development of new strategies,
including the enhanced use of technology, to inform employers and
workers of their rights and responsibilities under the law.
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Benefits Eligibility and
Fiscal Impact
The Commission believes a clear and consistent policy on immigrant
eligibility for public benefits is needed.  The Commission also be-
lieves that the federal government has a responsibility to mitigate
the impacts of unlawful immigration on states and localities, par-
ticularly through renewed efforts to reduce illegal entries.
Eligibility
The U.S. has the sovereign authority to make distinctions as to
certain rights and responsibilities of various people subject to its
jurisdiction—illegal aliens, legal immigrants, and U.S. citizens.  Poli-
cies regarding the eligibility of aliens for public benefits should be
consistent with the objectives of our immigration policy.
The Commission recommends that illegal aliens should not be eli-
gible for any publicly-funded services or assistance except those made
available on an emergency basis or for similar compelling reasons to
protect public health and safety (e.g., immunizations and school lunch
and other child nutrition programs) or to conform to constitutional
requirements.  Illegal aliens are now eligible for few benefit pro-
grams.  The Commission firmly believes that benefits policies should
continue to send this message: if aliens enter the U.S. unlawfully,
they will not receive aid except in limited instances.  Federal legis-
lation should permit states and localities to limit eligibility of illegal
aliens on this same basis.  Should illegal aliens require other forms
of assistance, their only recourse should be return to their countries
of origin.
• The pilot programs on work authorization also should test
new procedures for verification of benefit eligibility.  Verifica-
tion of eligibility for federally-funded benefits is an essential
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part of the overall strategy for maintaining a credible benefits
enforcement policy.  Many of the shortcomings of the eligibility
verification process are parallel to those for employment.  The
proposed pilot programs will provide an opportunity to test
new approaches to benefit eligibility verification.
• An equitable policy based on immigration status must be ad-
hered to in cases of mixed households (households in which
some members are legal residents and/or citizens and others
are illegal aliens).  Regardless of a family’s economic situation,
only citizen members or those legally authorized to reside and
work in the U.S. should receive routine benefits.  Some benefits
could be prorated in order to provide them only to eligible re-
cipients in a household.
The Commission recommends against any broad,
categorical denial of public benefits to legal
immigrants.  The United States admits legal im-
migrants with the expectation that they will
reside permanently in the United States as pro-
ductive residents.  Therefore, the Commission
believes that:
• The safety net provided by needs-tested
programs should continue to be available
to those whom we have affirmatively ac-
cepted as legal immigrants into our com-
munities.  U.S. immigration law bars the entry of those who are
likely to become a public charge [see below].  However, circum-
stances may arise after entry that create a pressing need for
public help—unexpected illness, injuries from a serious acci-
dent, loss of employment, a death in the family.  Under such
circumstances, legal immigrants should be eligible for public
benefits if they meet other eligibility requirements.
Migrant healthcare
[photo copyright
1992 Alan Pogue]
U.S. COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION REFORM
1 9 9 4
executive
summary
- xxiv -
• Sponsors should be held financially responsible for the immi-
grants that they bring to this country.  In particular, the
Commission believes that the affidavits of support signed by
sponsors should be legally enforceable, with contingencies made
if the sponsor’s financial circumstances change significantly for
reasons that occurred after the immigrant’s entry.  Mechanisms
should be developed that would ensure that sponsors actually
provide the support they have promised.  This would protect
recent immigrants and close a loophole in current policy wherein
the sponsor’s income is “deemed,” or taken into account, in cal-
culating the immigrant’s eligibility, regardless of whether such
support is actually available to the immigrant.
• A serious effort to enhance and enforce the public charge
provisions in immigration law is needed to ensure that legal
immigrants do not require public assistance within five years of
entry for reasons that existed prior to entry.  The Commission
recommends modification in the procedures for deporting
such individuals.  The sustained use of public benefits for rea-
sons that existed prior to entry should become the basis for de-
portation.  Current practices are unreasonable: the government is
required to show that the benefit program requested repayment
of the aid under a specific statute and that the immigrant has
refused repayment.
The Commission recommends that comprehensive categories of aliens
in the U.S. be defined in the Immigration and Nationality Act
to simplify determination of eligibility for public benefits.  The
Commission believes that benefit eligibility determinations are com-
plicated by the myriad legal statuses now afforded to individuals
within this country.   While the rights of lawful permanent residents,
refugees and asylees have been spelled out in the Immigration and
Nationality Act and/or benefit laws, it is also true that the Congress,
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Executive Branch, and the courts have created various other statuses
that may or may not denote benefit eligibility.  The Commission
recommends:
• Establishment of statutory categories of aliens according to their
eligibility for work and benefits.  Such categories could include
those who are authorized to work and eligible for needs-tested
benefits, subject to public charge and sponsorship provisions;
authorized to work and eligible only for benefits that
accrue from employment; not authorized to work and not eli-
gible for any but a circumscribed list of benefits.
• Placement of every alien who is permitted to remain in the
country on a temporary or permanent basis (whether by legis-
lation, court order, or administrative order) in one of the des-
ignated categories.  The categories should reflect whether an
alien has been affirmatively admitted to the United States, is
awaiting a final decision on deportability, or has already been
determined deportable and is awaiting removal.
Impact on States and Localities
Difficulties in enforcing U.S. immigration laws have created fiscal
impacts that would not have occurred had enforcement strategies
been more effective.  The ineffective enforcement has been due,
in some measure, to a lack of political will on the part of decision-
makers, including officials and representatives of states now heavily
affected by illegal immigration.  Nevertheless, the federal govern-
ment clearly bears a responsibility for alleviating these impacts, par-
ticularly through renewed efforts to reduce unlawful immigration.
The Commission supports in principle a short-term authorization
of impact aid to offset at least a portion of the fiscal burdens of
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unlawful immigration until such time as better enforcement mea-
sures are in place.  Any such aid should be provided contingent on
the following conditions:
• Better data and methods to measure the net fiscal impact of
illegal immigration.  The Commission finds that weak data make
it difficult to determine the extent of these burdens.  The autho-
rization of impact aid should follow a concerted effort to
develop better data on such impacts, with impact assistance
provided only to the extent that actual net costs are accurately
identified.
• Provision of any impact aid authorized in a manner commen-
surate with the interim period of regaining control over
unauthorized immigration.  Impact aid mechanisms should
be temporary and designed to ensure that governments do
not become dependent on impact aid as a continuing source
of funding.
• Appropriate cooperation of state and local governments re-
ceiving impact aid with federal authorities to enforce the im-
migration laws of the United States.  The type of cooperation
will vary depending on the assistance programs covered by
impact aid and should be consistent with the federal laws and
regulations that apply to the program in question.  For example,
law enforcement officers may be asked to provide information to
identify convicted or arrested illegal aliens, whereas school offi-
cials would not be required to transfer information obtained from
their pupils.
The Commission supports an immediate authorization of impact
aid aimed specifically at criminal justice costs.  The Commission
believes impact assistance for criminal justice and law enforcement
is justified where there is a high incidence of illegal aliens in the
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criminal justice system.  Specific costs attributable to the incarcera-
tion of illegal aliens can be reliably ascertained if state correctional
departments cooperate with INS in identifying deportable illegal
aliens in prisons.  The federal government should assume responsi-
bility for the costs of incarcerating illegal aliens through reimburse-
ment, by incarcerating them in federal facilities, and/or by
negotiating with foreign governments to accept and incarcerate their
nationals who are criminal illegal aliens.
The Commission recommends further investigation of the costs of
education and emergency medical assistance.  The data currently
available do not provide reliable estimates of the number of illegal
alien children and the proportion of emergency medical assistance
specifically associated with illegal aliens.  While the Commission
accepts in principle the need for enhanced federal funding to assist
localities with the costs of providing elementary and secondary edu-
cation to illegal alien children and of emergency medical care under
Medicaid to illegal aliens, the Commission does not recommend
that such a program be instituted until there is a workable method
for accurately establishing actual costs.
Detention and Removal
of Criminal Aliens
An effective procedure for prompt removal of aliens ordered de-
ported is an essential part of a credible deterrence policy.  If unlaw-
ful aliens believe that they can remain indefinitely once they are
within our national borders, there will be increased incentives to try
to enter or remain illegally.  The Commission is reviewing the full
range of issues raised by U.S. exclusion and deportation procedures
and plans to issue a separate report on this subject in FY 1995.  For
the present, the Commission limits its specific recommendations to
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the removal of criminal aliens who represent the most serious threat
to public safety and national security.
The top priority of enforcement strategies should be the removal of
criminal aliens from the U.S. in such a way that the potential for
their return to the U.S. will be minimized.  To help ensure the prompt
and effective removal of criminal aliens, the Commission recommends:
• Increased resources for INS investigations to identify and ini-
tiate deportation of criminal aliens.
• Enhanced use of the Institutional Hearing Program [IHP]
as an effective mechanism to ensure that criminal aliens are
identified and receive final orders of deportation while still
serving their sentences.  The IHP is cost-effective in that crimi-
nal aliens can be deported directly from state and federal pris-
ons, alleviating INS’ need to detain them during deportation
proceedings.  The Commission commends the negotiations tak-
ing place between INS, the Executive Office of Immigration
Review [EOIR], and state correctional departments to enhance
their efficiency.
• In the case of Mexico, repatriation of deported criminal aliens
to the area of Mexico from which they came, rather than sim-
ply to the border.  Removals should be done in coordination
with Mexican authorities who may then determine if there is a
warrant for the arrest of the criminal alien for crimes committed
in Mexico.
• Use of bilateral treaties encouraging the transfer of criminal
aliens to serve sentences in their own countries.  The Depart-
ment of State should monitor these cases to be certain that sen-
tences are served.
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Immigration
Emergencies
Since 1980, emergency circumstances in
their home countries have prompted the
migration of large numbers of people
to the U.S.  Their arrival, in turn, has
created emergency circumstances within
the United States.  The exodus of Hai-
tians and Cubans are only the most
recent examples.  An emergency can
overwhelm resources and create
massive problems that far outlast the
emergency.
The Commission believes that a cred-
ible immigration policy requires the
ability to respond effectively and hu-
manely to immigration emergencies.
Specific recommendations regarding
emergencies will be the subject of a
separate report in FY 1995 that will
include discussion of contingency plan-
ning, interdiction, safe havens, refugee
processing, asylum procedures, tempo-
rary protected status, aid to communi-
ties experiencing emergency arrivals of
aliens, and other issues.
An emergency
can overwhelm resources
and create massive problems
that far outlast the emergency.
Haitian migrant interdiction
[Official U.S. Coast Guard photo]
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Curtailing Unlawful Immigration
at the Source
Migrants enter and remain unlawfully in the United States for a
variety of reasons.  Few migrants take the decision to leave their
countries lightly.  Generally, a combination of “push” and “pull”
factors contribute to these movements.  Many of the recommenda-
tions in this report aim to reduce the pull of both jobs and of
ineffective immigration enforcement.  On the push side, lack of
employment, low wages and poor working conditions, separation
from family members, political, social and religious repression, civil
conflict, and other problems motivate people to leave their homes.
Any effective strategy to prevent unlawful migration must address
these causes.
The Commission recommends that the United States give priority in
its foreign policy and international economic policy to long-term
reduction in the causes of unauthorized migration to the U.S.  More
specifically, the Commission supports:
• The recommendations of the Commission for the Study of
International Migration and Cooperative Economic Develop-
ment related to trade with, and investment in, immigrant-
sending countries.
• Adoption of quick and effective strategies targeted at alleviat-
ing migration pressures in communities producing large
numbers of illegal aliens.
• Strengthening intelligence gathering capacities to improve early
warning of unauthorized migration patterns.
• Coordinated efforts by the United States and other countries
to address pressures for unlawful migration.  The Commission
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recommends a strengthening of those multilateral
coordination efforts that prove effective in averting
unauthorized migration, particularly within the
Western Hemisphere.
Improving Data
Throughout the Commission’s own inquiry, we have
found it difficult to assess the effects of immigration
policy and of immigration itself because of inadequa-
cies in the data.  The Commission commends the work
of the InterAgency Working Group on Immigration
Statistics that is seeking to reform data collection efforts
within the federal government.  Reliable data is a
necessary ingredient for credible policy and its
implementation.
The Commission supports improved data collection
efforts in four major areas:
• Matching administrative data on immigrants collected by the
INS, Social Security Administration, and other agencies to ob-
tain a more accurate profile of their experiences in this country;
• Developing a methodology for better measuring the size of
the illegal alien population and the flow of illegal aliens en-
tering the United States;
• Developing new methods for estimating emigration from the
United States; and
• Improving the estimates of the costs and benefits associated
with people of different immigration status.
Reliable
data
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policy
and its
implementation.
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District photo]
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Naturalization ceremony
[INS photo]
THE IMMIGRATION ACT
OF 1990 AND LEGAL IMMIGRATION
The Immigration Act of 1990 [IMMACT], which provided for the most comprehensive change
in the legal immigration system since 1965, aimed to:
• Establish overall limits on legal
immigration through adoption  of
a flexible cap on total numbers;
• Permit continued reunification of
close family members (allowing
increases above the cap if higher
numbers of immediate relatives
of U.S. citizens seek entry);
• Meet labor market needs by
increasing the number of immi-
grants admitted for employment-
based reasons and giving higher
priority to the entry of profession-
als and others who are highly
skilled; and
• Provide greater diversity through new opportunities for migration from countries with
relatively small numbers of immigrants to the United States.
IMMACT Effects on Migration
The principal provisions of IMMACT were not implemented until 1992, and with only two
years worth of data, there is little experience to use in determining its effects.  The Diversity
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Category of Admission   Average                    Projected
1987-1991    1992   1993    1994
Subject to the Numerical Cap 511,427 655,541 719,701 683,350
Family-based immigrants 439,614 502,995 539,209 512,600
Immediate relatives of U.S.
citizens and children born
abroad to alien residents 227,551 237,600 257,089 252,900
Family-sponsored immigrants 212,062 213,123 226,776 225,300
Legalization dependents      NA   52,272   55,344   34,400
Employment-based immigrants   58,341 116,198 147,012 128,750
Diversity programs   13,473   36,348   33,480   42,000
Not Subject to the Numerical Cap 131,926 155,094 160,313 150,100
Refugees and Asylees   98,858 117,037 127,343 131,000
Other   33,068   38,057   32,970   19,100
Total 643,353 810,635 880,014 833,450
Excludes persons granted legal permanent resident status under the provisions of the
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986.  Categories are arranged according to the
limitations specified in IMMACT.
Table 1.
Immigrants Admitted by Major Category
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Program will not go into effect until FY 1995.  The following analysis,
therefore, must be considered preliminary at best.
As Table 1 shows, overall levels of legal immigration increased from
an average of 640,000 during the five years preceding IMMACT
implementation to an average 840,000 for the past three years.  The
immigrants fall into two major categories: those whose numbers are
subject to an annual statutory cap and those whose numerical limits
can change each year.
Statutory Cap
IMMACT established a flexible worldwide level of 700,000 family-
based, employment-based, and diversity immigration visas for FYs
1992-1994.  This limit can be “pierced” if the number of immediate
relatives of U.S. citizens, for whom there are no numerical limits,
exceeds 239,000 (FYs 1992-1994) and 254,000 (FY 1995 and after).
• Family-sponsored immigration increased modestly since passage
of IMMACT, largely because of an increase in the number of
immediate relatives of U.S. citizens.  Waiting lists that number
more than one million persons continue in the categories under
which spouses and minor children of permanent residents and
siblings of U.S. citizens enter the United States.  Much of the
growth in the backlog for spouses and children is attributable to
the large number of legalized aliens who are now seeking to
reunify with their families.
• Employment-based immigration represents a sizeable increase
over the 58,000 average employment-based immigration pre-
IMMACT.  Nevertheless, employment-related admissions under
the new legislation have been well below the statutory ceiling of
140,000.  Many of those who entered, particularly in 1992, were
U.S. COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION REFORM
1 9 9 4
executive
summary
- xxxvi -
in the backlog of individuals who had applied prior to IMMACT.
In addition, Chinese nationals who adjusted status under the
provisions of the Chinese Student Protection Act were counted in
this category.  The economic recession may have led employers to
petition for fewer immigrant workers than allowable under the
IMMACT ceilings.
• Diversity immigration has not yet begun in its permanent form.
The diversity transition program averaged 34,000 in FY 1992-93.
As of FY 1995, 55,000 visa numbers will be available for the
permanent diversity program.
Immigrants outside the Statutory Cap
The number of immigrants considered in the categories outside
the statutory cap varies each year, largely depending on the
number of refugees admitted in prior years who adjust to permanent
resident status.  Refugees are initially admitted under conditional
status and may adjust to permanent resident status after one year.
Because of the increase in refugee admissions from the former Soviet
Union that began in 1988, the 1990s have seen an increase in refugee
adjustments.
Characteristics of Legal Immigrants
INS maintains data on the countries of origin, age, gender, occupa-
tion, and place of intended residence of new immigrants.
• Places of origin.  IMMACT has not changed the regional origins
of immigrants significantly.  Asia accounts for more than 40
percent of new admissions, while North America, including
Mexico, accounts for another 30 percent.  Mexico appears to have
almost doubled its number of new arrivals since IMMACT passed,
largely because of the legalization dependents program and the
U.S. COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION REFORM
1 9 9 4
executive
summary
- xxxvii -
elimination of per-country limits for some second preference
family visas.
• Age and gender.  The median age of immigrants admitted in
FYs 1992 and 1993 was 28.  About 54 percent of the immigrants
were female and 46 percent were male.  By contrast, during the
1980s, men and women were equally represented.  The trend
toward more women admitted as legal immigrants began prior
to IMMACT.  It is likely to be reinforced by the entry of the
family members of aliens legalized under IRCA.  Very high pro-
portions of young adult legalized aliens were men, many of
whom have already petitioned for their wives.
• Intended residence.  Immigration follows much the same pat-
tern as in the 1980s regarding intended residence.  Approxi-
mately 70 percent of the immigrants intend to live in the six
states of California, New York, Texas, Florida, New Jersey, and
Illinois.  More than 25 percent of immigrants intend to live
either in New York City or Los Angeles.  Other metropolitan
areas with significant immigrant arrivals are Chicago, Miami,
Washington, D.C., and San Francisco.
• Occupation.  Among those who reported an occupation, the
percentage of immigrants of working age who were profession-
als or executives increased slightly from 15 percent in the two
years before IMMACT to 17 percent in fiscal years 1992 and
1993.  Every other occupation group declined, except for opera-
tors, fabricators, and laborers, which increased from 9.2 to
9.7 percent.
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Looking to the Future
Much has changed in the U.S. and the world since passage of
IMMACT—for example, the end of the Cold War, cutbacks in many
defense industries, and such new trade arrangements as NAFTA and
the most recent round of GATT.  Commission recommendations must
take into account this changing context, along with the changes
brought about by IMMACT.
Future Commission activities will include:
• Exercising the Commission’s mandate to assess the impact which
the establishment of a national level of immigration has upon
the availability and priority of family preference visas.
• Developing an understanding of both the long- and short-term
interconnections between immigration and the U.S. economy
and labor market with an eye toward formulating sound
immigration policy.
• Examining the effects of our immigrant population on social and
community relations, as well as the effects of American life on
immigrants.  A further area of interest is the civic integration of
immigrants, including participation in local, state, and national
political affairs, development of political constituencies, and other
manifestations of civic involvement.
• Looking at data and analyses regarding population pursuant to
IMMACT’s instruction to determine and report on the effects of
immigration on demographics and natural resources.
• Analyzing and reporting on the relationship between immigra-
tion and the environment as mandated by IMMACT.
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• Examining the interconnections between U.S. immigration and
international trade and foreign policy.
Plans for FY 1995—FY 1997
The Commission will launch a new research program to gauge the
effects of IMMACT upon the size and characteristics of the incom-
ing immigrant population and to evaluate the impacts that legal
immigration poses for family reunification, the U.S. economy, social
relations, demographics, the environment, foreign policy, and
national security.
The Commission will also develop further recommendations to
address two of the issues touched on in this report—removal of
deportable aliens and handling of immigration emergencies.
The Commission plans to continue its schedule of public hearings,
roundtable consultations and fact-finding missions.  The
Commission’s assessments will be discussed and recommendations
offered in future reports.
Future
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THE NATIONAL
INTEREST
A properly regulated system of legal immigration is in the national
interest of the United States.  Such a system enhances the benefits of
immigration while protecting against potential harms.
Immigrants often create new businesses and other employment-
generating activities that promote the renewal of city neighborhoods
and commercial districts.  Immigrants also can strengthen America’s
economic and political ties with other nations and, thus, enhance our
ability to compete in a global economy and provide leadership in
international and humanitarian affairs.  Properly regulated immigra-
tion further strengthens American scientific, literary, artistic and other
cultural resources.  It promotes family values and ties, important
components of good schools and strong communities.  At a time of
troubling ethnic strife in many parts of the world, an effective Ameri-
can immigration policy can demonstrate to other countries that reli-
gious and ethnic diversity are compatible with national civic unity in
a democratic and free society.
Legal immigration, however, has costs, as well as benefits.  Immi-
grants with relatively low education and skills may compete for jobs
and public services with the most vulnerable of Americans, particu-
larly those who are unemployed or underemployed.  Jobs generated
by immigrant businesses do not always address this problem.  Con-
centrated and/or rapid entry of immigrants into a locality may
impose immediate net costs, particularly in education funding to meet
the additional and special needs of newcomers.  Concentration of
new immigrants can exacerbate tensions among ethnic groups.  Cer-
tain legal immigrant populations may impose other costs: refugees
often need special health and other services, making per capita re-
settlement more costly than overseas solutions; elderly new immi-
grants are more likely to draw upon public services than elderly
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United States.
Such a system
enhances the
benefits of
immigration
while
protecting
against
potential
harms.
-ii-
1 9 9 5
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
U.S. COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION REFORM
Category of Admission 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
SUBJECT TO THE NUMERICAL CAP 535,993 537,010 655,541 719,701 662,029
FAMILY-BASED IMMIGRANTS 448,640 455,415 502,995 539,209 497,682
Immediate Relatives of U.S. citizens 231,680 237,103 235,484 255,059 249,764
Spouses and children 171,491 173,527 170,720 192,631 193,394
Parents 60,189 63,576 64,764 62,428 56,370
Children born abroad to alien residents 2,410 2,224 2,116 2,030 1,883
Family-sponsored immigrants 214,550 216,088 213,123 226,776 211,961
Unmarried sons/daughters of U.S. citizens 15,861 15,385 12,486 12,819 13,181
Spouses and children of LPRs X X 90,486 98,604 88,673
Sons and daughters of LPRs X X 27,761 29,704 26,327
Married sons/daughters of U.S. citizens 26,751 27,115 22,195 23,385 22,191
Siblings of U.S. citizens 64,252 63,462 60,195 62,264 61,589
Legalization dependents X X 52,272 55,344 34,074
EMPLOYMENT-BASED IMMIGRANTS 58,192 59,525 116,198 147,012 123,291
Priority workers X X 5,456 21,114 21,053
Professionals w/ adv. deg. or of advanced ability X X 58,401 29,468 14,432
Skilled, professionals, other workers, (CSPA) X X 47,568 87,689 76,956
Skilled, professionals, other workers X X 47,568 60,774 55,659
Chinese Student Protection Act (CSPA) X X X 26,915 21,297
Special immigrants 4,463 4,576 4,063 8,158 10,406
Investors X X 59 583 444
Professionals or highly skilled (Old 3rd) 26,546 27,748 340 X X
Needed skilled or unskilled workers (Old 6th) 27,183 27,201 311 X X
DIVERSITY PROGRAMS 29,161 22,070 36,348 33,480 41,056
Diversity transition X X 33,911 33,468 41,056
Nationals of adversely affected countries 20,371 12,268 1,557 10 X
Natives of underrepresented countries 8,790 9,802 880 2 X
NOT SUBJECT TO THE NUMERICAL CAP 120,118 166,995 155,094 160,313 136,365
Amerasians 13,059 16,010 17,253 11,116 2,822
Cuban/Haitian Entrants 710 213 99 62 47
Parolees, Soviet and Indochineese X 4,998 13,661 15,772 8,253
Refugees and Asylees 97,364 139,079 117,037 127,343 121,434
Refugee adjustments 92,427 116,415 106,379 115,539 115,451
 Asylee adjustments 4,937 22,664 10,658 11,804 5,983
Registered Nurses and their families 2,954 3,069 3,572 2,178 304
Registry, entered prior to 1/1/72 4,633 2,282 1,293 938 667
Other 1,398 1,344 2,179 2,904 2,838
TOTAL 656,111 704,005 810,635 880,014 798,394
Note: X = Not Applicable.  Excludes persons granted LPR status under the provisions of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986.
 Source:  Immigration and Naturalization Service, Statistics Division
Immigrant Admissions by Major Category:
FYs 1990-1994
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native-born Americans or immigrants who came to the United States
at a younger age.
The recommendations in this report strongly affirm the value of a
properly regulated immigration system.  They seek to maximize the
many positive opportunities that legal immigration presents to our
nation.  At the same time, the recommendations will help mitigate
potential negative impacts, particularly on disadvantaged U.S. work-
ers.  Finally, the Commission's recommendations support effective
Americanization of new immigrants, that is the cultivation of a shared
commitment to the American values of liberty, democracy, and equal
opportunity.  These recommendations should help ensure that our
legal immigration system will continue to serve the national interest
of the United States.
Origin and Destination of Immigrants
FY 1994
Others*
Vietnam
India
Poland
Ukraine
El Salvador
Ireland
United Kingdom
Canada
Korea
Russia
Cuba
Jamaica
Haiti
Iran
Colombia
Taiwan
*Inclues immigrants from more than 180 countries
Source: Immigration and Naturalization Service, Statistics Division
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FRAMEWORK FOR
IMMIGRATION
REFORM
The Commission supports the basic framework of current policy—
family unification, employment-based immigration, and refugee
admissions.  We considered alternative frameworks, particularly a
point system, but rejected these approaches.  We believe that a sys-
tem that relies on formulas and bureaucratic procedures for deter-
mining which immigrants meet the ability criteria for admission is
not as effective in serving the national interest as one that relies on
the judgment of American families and employers within a frame-
work that protects U.S. workers from unfair competition.  At the
same time, the Commission is convinced that our current immigra-
tion system must undergo major reform to ensure that admissions
continue to serve our national interests.  Hence, the Commission
recommends a significant redefinition of priorities and a reallocation
of existing admission numbers to fulfill more effectively the objec-
tives of our immigration policy.*
*See Appendix for Commissioner Leiden’s dissenting statement.
The Commission supports
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and refugee admissions
—but is convinced that
our current immigration system
must undergo major reform
to ensure that admissions
continue to serve our national interests.
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PRINCIPLES FOR A
PROPERLY REGULATED
IMMIGRATION POLICY
The Commission believes that our immigration system should rest
upon certain basic principles.
Clear Goals and Priorities.  Sound immigration policy must set
out clear goals and give priority to the admission of those im-
migrants who best meet those goals.
Enforcement of Immigration Limits.  An effectively regulated
immigration policy establishes limits on the number of immi-
grants that are consistent with the goals of the various catego-
ries under which immigrants enter.  Moreover, these limits must
be enforceable and enforced.  We underscore our commitment to
curtailing illegal immigration as embodied in our 1994 recom-
mendations.  We will continue to monitor progress toward their
implementation until the expiration of our mandate in Septem-
ber 1997.
Regular Periodic Review.  An effectively regulated system re-
quires some flexibility with regard to numbers so as to permit
adjustment as circumstances in the United States change.
Clarity and Efficiency.  Immigration policy should not be overly
complex, and the mechanisms used to implement immigration
policy should be efficient and comprehensible.  The terms used
should be as clear and self-explanatory as possible.  The number
of visas allocated to various immigrant categories should be
sufficient to ensure the expeditious entry of those of highest
priority.  Backlogs in high priority categories undermine the
-viii-
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purposes of immigration policy, while backlogs in lower prior-
ity categories give false hope to individuals whose admissions
are of lesser national interest.
Enforcement of Sponsor Responsibility.  A properly regulated
immigration policy will hold sponsors accountable for keeping
immigrants from becoming burdens on the American tax-
payer and enforce that accountability through legally binding
obligations.
Protection of U.S. Workers.  A properly regulated system will
also provide protection to American workers against unfair com-
petition arising from immigrant categories that are designed to
enhance U.S. economic strength.  A higher level of job protec-
tion should be made available to the most vulnerable in our
society.
Coherence.  Both temporary and permanent admissions catego-
ries must be seen as integral parts of a coherent legal immigra-
tion policy.  Temporary student, worker, and humanitarian
categories are linked to permanent immigration.  Inefficiencies
and inconsistencies in the procedures for determining admissi-
bility in permanent categories frequently lead employees, em-
ployers, and even family members to use temporary categories
to gain entrance when the immigrant’s true intention is perma-
nent residence.
Americanization.  Immigration policy is not credible without
attention to English language training, civic education, and prepa-
ration for naturalization and effective citizen participation.
Americanization—by which we mean cultivation of a shared
commitment to the American values of liberty, democracy, and
equal opportunity—is desirable and possible regardless of the
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nationality, native language, or religious background of immi-
grants and their children.
A Transition Period.  Fundamental immigration reform, as pro-
posed by the Commission, requires a period of transition to get
from the present system to the new one.  We recommend pru-
dent, measured steps to make that transition possible.
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RECOMMENDATIONS
The following recommendations will contribute to a more account-
able and credible application of our immigration policy:
The Commission supports a tripartite immigration policy that per-
mits the entry of nuclear family members, professional and skilled
workers, and refugees and other humanitarian admissions.  In addi-
tion, the Commission urges Congress to take steps to address the
continued aftereffects of the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control
Act [IRCA] that provided legal status to formerly illegal aliens.
The Commission proposes a core immigration admissions level of
550,000 per year, to be divided as follows:
Nuclear family immigration 400,000;
Skill-based immigration 100,000;
Refugee resettlement  50,000.*
The Commission further recommends that Congress authorize 150,000
visas annually for the admission of the spouses and minor children
of legal permanent residents who have been awaiting entry until
such time as this backlog is eliminated.
The Commission recommends that admission levels be authorized by
Congress for a specified time period (e.g., three to five years) in order
to ensure regular periodic review and, if needed, change by Congress.
These recommendations represent fundamental reform of U.S.
immigration policy.
These
recommendations
for entry of
nuclear family
members,
professional
and skilled
workers, and
refugees
—with steps to
address the
aftereffects
of IRCA—
represent
fundamental
reform.
*Not including other humanitarian admissions, such as asylum adjustments.
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Current Proposed
Category
Nuclear Family Admissions
Skills-based Admissions
Refugee Resettlement*
Diversity
TOTAL
    Numerical
  Limits
480,000
140,000
Variable
55,000
   Transition
   (5-8 years)
550,000
100,000
50,000
0
700,000
       Core
400,000
100,000
50,000
0
550,000
FY 1996
Projected Use
480,000
100,000
90,000
55,000
725,000
Legal Immigration Levels
*Does not include asylum claimants or other humanitarian admissions.
 **50,00 is a target that can be exceeded in an emergency or with direct and affirmative participation by Congress.
 **
 **
Legal Immigration Admissions
Includes refugees who have adjusted to lawful permanent resident.  Does not include IRCA legalization beneficiaries.
Source: Immigration and Naturalization Service, Statistics Division
Admissions: FY 1980 to FY 2005
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Nuclear Family Immigration
Immigration supports the national interest by promoting strong and
intact nuclear families—that is, the basic social unit consisting of
parents and their dependent children living in one household.  Im-
migration contributes to this national interest by permitting the entry
of close family members of U.S. citizens and permanent residents
who otherwise may be separated for years.  Immigration policy also
can contribute to the strength of U.S. families by ensuring that immi-
grants receive any needed financial support from their own relatives
and, thus, impose no financial burdens upon the taxpaying public.
The Commission recommends:
A prioritization of family relationships to determine who will
be admitted through family-based immigration, with admission
numbers going to those who are of the highest priority.  Only
to the extent that visas are available after the demand in higher
priorities is met should visas be made available to lower priority
categories.  Following this reasoning, the Commission makes
further recommendations.
n Spouses and minor children of U.S. citizens should con-
tinue to be admitted as the first priority.  Also to be
admitted under this priority are the small number of adult
children dependent on U.S. citizen parents because of a
mental or physical disability.  This policy permits the
expeditious entry of the closest family members while
reinforcing the notion that citizenship confers additional
benefits on those who become fully participating mem-
bers of our polity.
n Parents of U.S. citizens should be admitted as the sec-
ond priority.  This permits adult children to sponsor their
Immigration
policy can
promote
 strong and
intact nuclear
families
—while
ensuring that
family
unification
poses no public
financial
burdens.
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-
parents, most of whom are past working age.  However,
the Commission is mindful of the potential negative im-
pacts that the entry of parents may pose for the U.S.
taxpayer if these individuals utilize Supplemental Secu-
rity Income, Medicaid, and similar programs.  Therefore,
the Commission believes that continued admission of par-
ents should be contingent on a legally enforceable affida-
vit of support.  The affidavit should ensure that parents
who are unable to work enough quarters to
become eligible for Social Security or Medicare do not
become a burden to taxpayers through use of SSI, Med-
icaid, or equivalent state and local services.  Further, the
Commission recommends that affidavit signers (petition-
ers and, if necessary, coguarantors) should provide:
Verifiable assurance that they indeed have the capac-
ity to provide what may be a lifetime of financial
support to the parent immigrants; and
Verifiable assurance of the purchase of what may be
lifetime health coverage for the parent immigrants
(obtained either privately or through buying into
Medicare, which the government should make avail-
able at an actuarially fair price).
n Third priority should be allocated to spouses, minor
children, and adult physically or mentally dependent
children of legal permanent residents [LPRs].
The Commission further recommends sufficient additional numbers,
on an interim basis, to eliminate the backlog in the category for
admission of spouses and minor children of LPRs.  We believe that
this backlog, which results primarily from the  Immigration Reform
and Control Act, can be cleared without creating another waiting list.
The backlog in
nuclear family
admissions,
which results
primarily from
IRCA, can be
cleared without
creating
another
waiting list.
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By the end of this fiscal year, 824,000 spouses and minor children of
aliens legalized under IRCA will be waiting for visas.  The number
of new applications has fallen to only a handful for this group.
However, since the filing of applications by the legalization benefi-
ciaries, a backlog of 279,000 (or about 80,000 per year) spouses and
minor children of other LPRs has developed.  Under our current
system, it would take more than a decade to clear the backlog, even
with substantial naturalization.  In the meantime, when an LPR spon-
sors a spouse and/or minor child, that individual goes to the end of
the waiting list of 1.1 million.
We believe that priority for clearance of the backlog should go first
to the spouses and minor children of LPRs who entered lawfully
under the regular immigration preferences.  Only afterwards should
expedited admission be offered to the spouses and minor children of
LPRs who entered under one of the legalization provisions of the
Immigration Reform and Control Act.
The Commission recommends this separate treatment of the family
members of those who became permanent residents through regular
immigration and those who legalized under IRCA because:
n The circumstances are different for the two sets of spouses
and minor children.  Many of the families of the immi-
grants who legalized under IRCA are in the United States
and, under the Family Unity provisions of the Immigra-
tion Act of 1990, have a quasi-legal status that permits
their continued presence and work authorization.  Many
of the families of the other legal immigrants are sepa-
rated, with their spouses and/or minor child(ren) living
outside the United States.
n The legalized have already received special treatment in
obtaining amnesty.  To further reward their earlier illegal
-
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CIR RECOMMENDATIONS
CATEGORIES ADMISSIONS ADMISSIONS
  (Transition)        (Core)
First priority up to 400,000 400,000
Spouses/Minor (current
Children of USCs usage about
200,000)
Second priority 400,000 400,000
Parents of USCs less number less number
admitted admitted
under first under first
priority priority
(current
usage about
55,000)
Third priority 400,000 400,000
Spouses/Minor less number less number
Children of LPRs admitted admitted
under first under first
and second and second
priorities priorities
plus 150,000
for backlog
clearance
TOTAL      550,000         400,000
Family-Based Immigration:
Categories and Admission Numbers
CURRENT LAW
CATEGORIES USAGE
          (FY 1994)
Unlimited
Spouses/Minor Children
of USCs 193,394
Unlimited
Parents of USCs  56,370
First Preference
Adult Unmarried Sons/
Daughters of USCs  13,181
Second Preference 115,000
2A-Spouses/Children of
   LPRs (88,673)
2B-Adult Unmarried Sons/
   Daughters of LPRs (26,327)
Third Preference
Adult Married Sons/
Daughters of USCs  22,191
Fourth Preference
Brothers/Sisters
of USCs  61,589
TOTAL 461,725
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entry by giving equal or higher priority to the entry
of their relatives sends the wrong message at a time
in which the U.S. must obtain greater control over
unauthorized entry.
n As of December 31, 1995, most legalized aliens will be
eligible to naturalize.  As citizens, they will be able to
expedite the admission of their spouses and minor
children without using the additional visas earmarked
for LPRs.
The Commission believes that the addition of 150,000 visas will per-
mit the elimination of the regular LPR beneficiary backlog within
three years and the legalization beneficiary backlog in five to eight
years.  Thereafter, the entry of all spouses and minor children of
LPRs should be possible within a year of application under the pro-
posed 400,000 admissions ceiling on family-based immigration.
Elimination of the Backlog: Spouses
and Minor Children of Legal Immigrants
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The Commission recommends elimination of other family-based
admission categories, including:
Adult, unmarried sons and daughters of U.S. citizens;
Adult, married sons and daughters of U.S. citizens;
Adult, unmarried sons and daughters of legal permanent
residents; and
Siblings of U.S. citizens.
The Commission acknowledges that many individuals in these
categories have contributed to U.S. society.  Nevertheless, it is
necessary at this time to emphasize the reunification of nuclear
families.  The elimination of these categories should take place
one year after the date that legislation is enacted to accomplish
this purpose.  In this way, the plans of U.S. families that are on
the verge of reunifying with their foreign siblings and adult chil-
dren will not be unfairly disrupted.
The Commission recommends elimination of these categories
for several reasons.
n The numbers now used to admit these individuals in
more extended family relationships could be used in-
stead to reduce the waiting time for closer family mem-
bers without raising the overall levels of immigration.
n Elimination of these preferences will remove extraordi-
nary backlogs that now undermine the credibility of our
policy.  Credible immigration policy should not give false
hopes to applicants.  An individual now applying under
the sibling category, for example, could not expect to
enter the U.S. legally for more than a decade.  Applicants
1 9 9 5
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from the Philippines face the longest waiting period—as
much as forty years for those applying today.
n Unless there is a compelling national interest to do
otherwise, immigrants should be chosen on the basis of
the skills they contribute to the U.S. economy.  The Com-
mission believes that admission of nuclear family mem-
bers and refugees provide such a compelling national
interest.  Reunification of adult children and siblings of
adult citizens solely because of their family relationship
is not as compelling.
The Commission recommends amendment of Section 201(c) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act [INA] to provide that otherwise
unused immigrant visa numbers for a fiscal year be made available
to people who have a priority date that would entitle them to pro-
cessing in that year but who were not issued visas.
Given the large backlog of spouses and minor children, all efforts
should be made to ensure their expeditious entry by fully utilizing
authorized visas.  Under current policy visas unused because of ad-
ministrative delay or personal reasons are lost.  Allowing such un-
used visas to be made available to otherwise eligible immigrants
after the end of that fiscal year ensures that all the visas allocated for
family-sponsored immigrants would be used and charged to the given
fiscal year.  The new fiscal year visa numbers would not reflect an
increase in visas allocated over the annual worldwide limit for
family-based immigration.
For example, if 400,000 visas were allocated for family-sponsored
immigrants in FY 1997, and during that year only 390,000 visas were
issued because 10,000 immigrants were delayed beyond the end of
the fiscal year, the remaining 10,000 visas could be issued to the
delayed or other eligible aliens during the next fiscal year but would
-xx-
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count toward the original year.  Under the proposed amendment, the
Department of State could charge to FY 1997 all visas allocated in
that year even though the visas themselves might not be issued in FY
1997.  As the recommendation affects only aliens already entitled to
a visa, annual number limitations would not be exceeded.
The Commission further recommends that the INA be amended to
address better the aging-out problem of certain aliens.  One unfortu-
nate side effect of waiting lists is the aging-out of minor children who
become adults while awaiting their already approved petition.  This
issue, which arises particularly in the case of the minor children of
legal permanent residents, will become even more of a problem with
the elimination of admission opportunities for adult children.  For
example, the minor child of a legalized alien may have been granted
Family Unity status with the understanding that eventually a visa
would be available.   Under current law, a child who has aged-out
would rarely be deported but is no longer eligible for permanent
residence as a minor child.  A provision stating that “a person en-
titled to status at the time a petition is approved shall continue to be
entitled to that status regardless of his or her age” would allow such
applicants to retain their eligibility for immigrant visas.
Skill-Based Immigration
Immigration can support the national interest by bringing to the U.S.
individuals whose skills would benefit our society.  It also can help
U.S. businesses compete in the global economy.  This national interest
in the competitiveness of business must be balanced by an equally
compelling national interest in developing a U.S. workforce that has
the skills necessary to compete in the global economy.  Immigration
policy can contribute to this national interest by:
The benefits of
immigration
for U.S. global
competitiveness
must be
balanced with
policy that
develops a U.S.
workforce with
the skills
necessary to
compete in the
global
economy.
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n Focusing on the admission of highly-skilled individuals;
n Giving employers access to a global labor market when they
cannot identify U.S. workers with knowledge and expertise
required for a specific job or when they demonstrate a labor
shortage that cannot be filled through short-term training
programs;
n Helping companies conducting business, both in the United
States and internationally, to reassign personnel as needed to
maintain their competitiveness;
n Encouraging entrepreneurial activities and other investment
in the United States aimed at creation of jobs;
n Providing a means of ensuring that U.S. workers are not
displaced or otherwise adversely affected by the entry of
foreign workers; and
n Providing incentives or penalties to help ensure that employ-
ers in the U.S. engage in serious recruitment of American
workers (for example, national rather than local recruitment
where appropriate) and contribute significantly to the train-
ing of the domestic U.S. workforce.
The Commission recommends that the preferences for the admission
of skill-based immigrants be reorganized to establish two catego-
ries: those subject to a labor market test, which we would expect to
be the norm; and those who, for significant and specific policy rea-
sons, should be exempt from such a labor market test.  Labor market
testing requires a demonstration that a business has a bona fide need
for the skills of a foreign worker and cannot find a qualified U.S.
worker or one who could be readily trained for the intended job.
Offers of
employment to
foreign workers
should be
conditioned on
an appropriate
test of the
domestic labor
market to
ensure that
qualified
American
workers are not
displaced or
otherwise
adversely
affected.
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CIR RECOMMENDATIONS
Categories
CURRENT LAW
21,053
14,432
46,269
7,946
444
90,134TOTAL TOTAL
LABOR MARKET TEST EXEMPT
Aliens with Extraordinary Ability
Multinational Executives and Managers
Entrepreneurs
Ministers and Religious Workers
(Limited to current usage, about 8,000)
LABOR MARKET TESTED
Professionals with Advanced Degrees
(Including professors and researchers
who do not meet the definition
of "extraordinary")
Professionals with Baccalaureate Degrees
Skilled Workers
(5 years specialized experience)
Admissions
(proposed)
Usage
(FY 1994)
Categories
Skills-Based Immigration:
Categories and Admission Numbers
FIRST PREFERENCE
Aliens with Extraordinary Ability
Outstanding Professors/Researchers
Multinational Executives and Managers
SECOND PREFERENCE
Professionals with Advanced Degrees
THIRD PREFERENCE
Skilled Workers
    (2 years training/experience)
Professionals with Baccalaureate Degrees
FOURTH PREFERENCE
Ministers and Religious Workers
FIFTH PREFERENCE
Investors
    (Entrepreneurs)
Up to 100,000
(current usage
about 30,000)
100,000
less number
admitted in
exempt
category
(current usage
about 60,000)
100,000
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Exempt workers should include those individuals whose entry will
generate economic growth and/or significantly enhance U.S. intel-
lectual and cultural strength without undermining the employment
prospects and remuneration of U.S. workers.  The following indi-
viduals should be exempt:
Individuals at the very top of their chosen field whose extraor-
dinary ability in the sciences, arts, education, business, or
athletics is demonstrated by sustained national or international
acclaim and whose achievements have been recognized through
extensive documentation, or individuals who have demonstrated
the potential for extraordinary achievement in their chosen
field through extensive documentation, including the receipt of
internationally-recognized prizes and the testimony of appropri-
ate experts;
Managers and executives of international businesses whose
expertise contributes to U.S. global competitiveness.  Greater safe-
guards must be put in place to ensure that only bona fide interna-
tional businesses benefit from this policy;
Entrepreneurs whose active investment in new commercial
enterprises generate a significant number of jobs for American
workers in the United States;
A limited number of individuals ordained by a religious de-
nomination and other religious workers who have carried on
the religious vocation abroad during the two years immediately
preceding the application for admission and who are members of
a religious denomination having a bona fide nonprofit, religious
organization in the United States that sponsors them.
Labor market-tested foreign workers permitted to immigrate to the
United States under these categories should include only those
-xxiv-
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who have attained a baccalaureate or higher academic degree or
those who are needed to fill jobs that require a high level of spe-
cific skills above the entry or journeyman level.  Categories that
would require a test of the domestic labor market include:
Professionals with advanced degrees, including professors and
researchers who do not meet the definition of “extraordinary;”
Professionals with baccalaureate degrees, and skilled workers
with a minimum of five years of specialized work experience,
whose admission should be scrutinized strictly to ensure that
they will have no adverse effect on similarly qualified U.S.
workers.
The Commission recommends the elimination of the admission of
unskilled workers.  Unless there is another compelling interest, such
as in the entry of nuclear families and refugees, it is not in the na-
tional interest to admit unskilled workers.  This is especially true
when the U.S. economy is showing difficulty in absorbing disadvan-
taged workers and when efforts towards welfare reform indicate that
many unskilled Americans will be entering the labor force.
The Commission is not satisfied with current labor certification pro-
cedures because they are neither timely enough to meet the needs of
employers with a bona fide interest in hiring a foreign worker nor
effective in protecting the interests of U.S. workers.  We seek to
replace a failed and expensive regulatory system with one that is
market-driven.  (The cost to the federal government was about
$70 million in 1992 and is estimated to be about $60 million in 1995.)
The Commission recommends replacing the labor certification proce-
dure with a more timely and effective labor market test.
To demonstrate the bona fide need for a foreign worker and to
increase the competitiveness of U.S. workers, an employer should
We see little
justification
for admitting
unskilled
foreign
workers into
an economy
that must find
job
opportunities
for millions of
unskilled U.S.
workers.
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be required to pay a substantial fee, that is, make a substantial
financial investment into a certified private sector initiative
dedicated to increasing the competitiveness of U.S. workers,
for example through education and training.   Employers seeking
to hire foreign workers already incur substantial financial costs
and face lengthy processing delays.  Under the Commission's
proposal, the fee would go towards developing a well-trained
U.S. workforce rather than supporting costly bureaucratic pro-
cesses.  To ensure that the employer, and not the foreign worker,
pays the fee, penalties should be imposed upon violators.
Employers should demonstrate that they have engaged in
appropriate attempts to find a qualified U.S. worker using
normal company recruitment procedures that meet industry-wide
standards and offering wages that are at least 5 percent above the
prevailing wage.
The resulting permanent resident status so obtained should be
conditional for a two-year period.  Conditional status would be
removed at the end of that period if the foreign worker is still
employed by the same employer at the same or higher level and
if the employer demonstrates that the attested wage has been
paid.  The law should specify conditions under which the foreign
worker could obtain a waiver of the two-year requirement.  For
example, it could be waived in situations where unanticipated
circumstances, such as layoffs or business failure, occur or where
an employer's unfair labor practices would render the foreign
worker subject to abuse.  To prevent both fraud and abuse against
workers, penalties should be authorized.
To provide greater flexibility and allow for market adjustments, the
Commission recommends that skill-based visas not used in a fiscal
year be carried over to the next year’s skill-based numbers.
-xxvi-
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Refugee Resettlement
The Commission strongly affirms that the United States should con-
tinue its commitment to resettle refugees as one of several elements
of humanitarian protection for the persecuted.  Refugee admissions
fulfill a humanitarian commitment to provide protection and assis-
tance to those who otherwise would be persecuted or endangered.
The Commission recommends that, on an interim basis:
The U.S. should allocate 50,000 admission numbers each year
to the entry of refugees from overseas (not including asylum
adjustments);
Other than in emergency situations, refugee admissions could
exceed the 50,000 admissions level only with more direct and
affirmative participation by Congress than occurs in the current
consultation process;
In the case of an emergency, the President may authorize the
admission of additional refugees upon certification of the emer-
gency circumstances necessitating such action.  The Congress may
override the emergency admissions only with a two-house veto
of the Presidential action.
Allocating a set number of refugee admissions, with provisions to
exceed this number in case of an emergency or other changed cir-
cumstances, ensures a continued U.S. commitment to resettlement,
particularly following the expected closure of the current refugee
programs in Southeast Asia and, possibly, the former Soviet Union.
These two programs account for almost 80 percent of current resettle-
ment (about 87,000 out of 112,000 admissions in FY 1994).
Reform of the current consultation process is needed to ensure Con-
gressional oversight of decisions made to exceed the 50,000 limit.
Refugee
resettlement
and other
humanitarian
admissions
fulfill a
commitment to
provide
protection and
assistance to
those who
otherwise would
be persecuted or
endangered.
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Current consultations are often pro forma and occur very late in the
planning process.  As discussed below, the Commission will provide
recommendations on mechanisms for decisionmaking on numbers in
a forthcoming report.
The U.S. should take leadership in generating international responses
to refugee crises, with particular focus on international burdensharing
and regional solutions.  Future policies also must take into account
the relative weight to be given resettlement versus the other avenues
open to the United States to help protect and assist refugees world-
wide, including support for repatriation of refugees to their home-
lands when conditions permit.
The Commission recommends a thorough assessment of the criteria
used to admit refugees for resettlement and the procedures for their
admission.  The contexts for making future policy regarding refugee
resettlement are in flux.  The refugee resettlement program must be
revamped to meet the needs of a post-Cold War world.  Today ex-
treme nationalism and ethnic conflicts produce massive population
displacements while resolution of other conflicts is permitting large-
scale voluntary repatriation.  Resettlement criteria should take into
account the protection of refugees who otherwise would be endan-
gered in a country of origin or asylum and who would have no other
alternatives.
The Commission is reviewing a variety of issues related to refugee
resettlement, including: the priority system; in-country refugee pro-
cessing;  country-specific legislation; procedural issues; congressional
and Executive Branch roles, including the consultation process; the
role of international organizations; parole authority; and domestic
assistance, including the role of the state and local organizations (e.g.,
nongovernmental organizations and voluntary agencies).
The U.S.
should take
leadership in
generating
international
responses to
refugee crises,
with particular
focus on
international
burdensharing
and regional
solutions.
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Specific recommendations on refugee resettlement—which may in-
clude modification of the above interim recommendations—will be
included in a future Commission report.  This report also will include
recommendations related to immigration emergencies.
Nonimmigrant Admissions
The Commission believes that both permanent and temporary
(nonimmigrant) admissions must be considered as part of an
integrated immigration system.  Although we are deferring specific
recommendations on most nonimmigrant issues until we have com-
pleted a comprehensive review, we do note two areas of particular
interest.
Temporary Workers and Foreign Students.  The Commission
intends to examine in depth the nonimmigrant temporary worker
and foreign student systems and their relationships to permanent
immigration.  In particular, we will be looking at ways to sim-
plify and achieve greater coordination in these systems and to
make recommendations as a result of this study.  A high percent-
age of applicants for permanent skill-based admission are al-
ready in this country on temporary work or student visas.  Busi-
nesses that intend to petition for permanent visas for new hires
frequently obtain temporary visas first because of long delays in
processing.  In addition, a significant number of individuals ad-
mitted for temporary study or work seek permanent jobs during
their stay.  As noted above, these categories of temporary admis-
sion must be seen as integral parts of a coherent legal immigra-
tion policy.  The Commission will address these specific issues in
a later report.
The categories
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admission
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Agriculture Guestworker Program.  The Commission believes
that an agriculture guestworker program, sometimes referred to
as a revisiting of the “bracero agreement,” is not in the national
interest and unanimously and strongly agrees that such a pro-
gram would be a grievous mistake.
First, the Commission is highly skeptical of the need for an ag-
ricultural guestworker program at this time or in the near future.
Proponents of such a program have failed to demonstrate that a
labor shortage is about to occur or that there are no means other
than a guestworker program available to agricultural producers
to obtain sufficient employees in their industry.
Guestworker programs effectively expand rural poverty.  More-
over, guestworker programs are predicated on limitations on the
freedom of those who are invited to enter and work.  Experience
has shown that such limitations are incompatible with the values
of democratic societies.  For that very reason, “temporary”
guestworkers tend to become permanent residents, de facto or
even de jure.  The inconsistency between the stated intent
of guestworker programs and their actual consequences can-
not be ignored by policymakers who seek credibility in a
reformed system.
Americanization
The Commission supports effective Americanization of new immi-
grants, that is the cultivation of a shared commitment to the Ameri-
can values of liberty, democracy, and equal opportunity.  The United
States is one of the most successful multiethnic nations in history.  It
has united immigrants and their descendants from all over the world
around a commitment to democratic ideals and constitutional prin-
The
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ciples.  Those ideals and principles have been embraced by persons
from an extraordinary variety of religious and ethnic backgrounds,
partly because they permit and protect religious and cultural diver-
sity within a framework of national political unity.
Religious and cultural diversity does not pose a threat to the national
interest as long as public policies ensure civic unity.  Such policies
should help newcomers learn to speak, read, and write English effec-
tively.  They should strengthen civic understanding in the teaching of
American history for all Americans.  They should lead to the vigor-
ous enforcement of laws against hate crimes and of laws to deter
and to punish discrimination.  Of course, such policies should
encourage the naturalization of immigrants as the path to full civic
participation.
At the same time, immigration to the United States should be under-
stood as a privilege, not a right.  Immigration carries with it obliga-
tions to embrace the common core of the American civic culture, to
become able to communicate—to the extent possible—in English with
other citizens and residents, and to adapt to fundamental constitu-
tional principles and democratic institutions.
In its further deliberations, the Commission will consider other pub-
lic policies that are believed by some to encourage ethnocentrism in
the name of multiculturalism or to promote political separatism in
the name of civil rights.  For example: Do bilingual education and
affirmative action as applied to immigrants and their children pro-
mote or diminish civic unity?  Now that immigrants come from more
than 160 nations and many more ethnic groups, it is extremely im-
portant that public policies facilitate, not inhibit, the Americanization
of newcomers.
American
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Naturalization is the most visible manifestation of civic incorpora-
tion.  At present, there is greater interest in naturalization than there
is a capacity to act upon this interest.  Large backlogs must be over-
come so that the nation can benefit from the growing commitment of
immigrants to become American citizens.
The Commission strongly recommends that INS adopt and imple-
ment as a strategic goal the reduction of processing time and back-
logs for naturalization while maintaining rigorous standards in
processing applications.  The Commission also urges Congress to
appropriate sufficient resources to support the implementation of this
strategic goal.  Applicants for naturalization pay a fee designed to
cover the costs of the application process.  The fees go into an ac-
count dedicated to use for examinations.  The Commission believes
that naturalization applicants have the right to receive the timely
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service that their fee represents.  Naturalization fees should not sub-
sidize other activities.  Nor should an efficient naturalization proce-
dure require a reallocation of resources from other priority functions.
If the current fee is not adequate to cover the full costs of timely
naturalization, it should be increased appropriately.  Further, the
Commission urges INS to:
Set a standard reasonable time frame for processing natural-
ization applications.  The time frame should permit timely re-
view of applications without lowering the standards for civics
and English language knowledge or compromising the required
background checks.   The INS also should improve processes and
policies, as well as allocation of resources, to establish a level of
efficiency that can withstand fluctuations in volume.
Continue to recruit national and community-based organiza-
tions, both public and private, as well as employers, to assist
in facilitating smooth operation of the processing of natural-
ization applications.  These organizations have proved very
helpful in prior partnerships with INS in: overseeing proper
completion of applications; taking security check fingerprints;
serving as testing sites for the required English and civics exami-
nations; briefing applicants on procedures; providing less intimi-
dating final interview sites; and reviewing files before interviews
to make certain that examiners need spend time only on substan-
tive interview issues.
Ensure that there are adequate numbers of personnel to com-
plete naturalization processing efficiently. To reduce waiting
periods in districts with backlogs, INS should reassign person-
nel and, where appropriate, designate examiners who will do
naturalization interviews exclusively.  In instances where an in-
terview can be waived, INS should permit naturalization appli-
-xxxiv-
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cations to be filed, reviewed, and approved at one of its four
Regional Service Centers.
Carefully scrutinize the naturalization applications of all Spe-
cial Agricultural Workers [SAW] to assure that their original
SAW status was properly granted.  Reports of widespread fraud
in this program require such special attention to applications for
U.S. citizenship by SAW legalization beneficiaries.
The Commission urges both the public and private sectors to assist
legal immigrants in their preparation for naturalization.
The Commission urges private industry, churches, community
groups and individual volunteers to redouble their efforts to
provide English language instruction and civics education to
immigrants.   The current increased interest in naturalization
presents an opportunity to use instruction in English, U.S. his-
tory, and civics to help immigrants participate more fully in the
life of the community.  Private sector initiatives would fill current
gaps in such services.  These programs also would benefit the
providers, particularly businesses, who would gain from a
workforce better able to communicate in English.
The Commission supports targeted outreach programs aimed
at informing eligible immigrants about the requirements for
naturalization.  Outreach programs are critical to civic incorpo-
ration.  They encourage immigrants to want to become citizens
and help ensure awareness of opportunity and equitable access
to information about naturalization.
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CONCLUSION
These interim conclusions and recommendations on legal immigra-
tion to the United States are a first step in the Commission's exami-
nation of the implementation and impact of our legal immigration
system.  Together with our earlier recommendations on illegal immi-
gration, they seek to restore credibility to our immigration policies.
This report defines the national interest in immigration.  It outlines
mechanisms that permit the expeditious entry of those who are of
highest priority for admission while mitigating potential harmful
effects on U.S. communities and vulnerable populations.
The Commission continues our longer-term investigation of the im-
pact of legal immigration on the United States.  Based on the results
of these studies, the Commission expects to make further recommen-
dations on legal immigration in our final report to Congress in 1997.
This report outlines mechanisms
that permit the expeditious entry of those
who are of highest priority for admission
while mitigating potential harmful effects
on U.S. communities and vulnerable populations.
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June 5, 1997
The Honorable Newt Gingrich,Speaker of the House of Representatives
The Honorable Richard A. Gephart, Minority Leader of the House of Representatives
The Honorable Trent Lott, Majority Leader of the Senate
The Honorable Thomas A. Daschle, Minority Leader of the Senate
On behalf of the U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform, it is my pleasure to submit
our interim report on U.S. refugee policy.
This Commission was mandated by the Immigration Act of 1990 [Public Law 101-649]
to examine and make recommendations regarding the implementation and impact of
U.S. immigration policy.  Refugee admissions, mass migration emergencies, and asylum
constitute important components of U.S. immigration policy that must be considered in
the context of both their domestic and international ramifications.
To learn about the domestic effects of U.S. refugee policy, the Commission held public
hearings and consultations in such diverse sites as Seattle, Washington; Orange County
and Fresno, California; St. Louis, Missouri; Lowell, Massachusetts; and Miami, Florida.
To better understand the international aspects of our policies, the Commission under-
took site visits to Bosnia, Croatia, Germany, Haiti, Cuba, and Kenya, in addition to
holding discussions with representatives of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees
[UNHCR] and the International Organization for Migration [IOM] in Geneva and in
field offices.
The U.S. is entering an era that requires changes in our refugee policy.  The end of the
Cold War has ushered in new challenges along with new opportunities to promote
policies that address the causes and consequences of refugee movements. The recom-
mendations in this report promote a comprehensive and coherent U.S. refugee policy
that will permit the U.S. to assert international leadership and implement responsible
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domestic programs.  The U.S. government must have the capacity to detect the causes
of the movements early on to better prevent them through political, diplomatic, and
economic initiatives; to assist in caring for and protecting the refugees overseas who are
forced to leave their countries; to resettle effectively the few for whom U.S. resettlement
is the only or best option; to adopt a viable plan to respond to mass migration emer-
gencies that immediately affect our own nation; and to operate an effective asylum
system that protects the bona fide refugee while deterring those who are not.  Because
domestic and international policies affect and are affected by each other, this report
emphasizes the need for White House leadership in coordinating and overseeing
decisionmaking on refugee policy throughout the federal government.
The Commission could not have produced this report without the cooperation of the
Executive Branch and both Houses of Congress.  We look forward to working with the
Senate and House subcommittees responsible for immigration and refugee policy, as
well as the federal agencies responsible for administering our refugee programs.  The
Commission also thanks the many representatives of state and local government and
private agencies who shared their experiences and perspectives regarding refugee pol-
icy and its implementation.
Our special thanks go to the UNHCR and IOM for making our overseas site visits so
productive.  The field staff of these international agencies, along with the nongovern-
mental agencies with whom they work in providing assistance to refugees, displaced
persons, and returnees, truly exemplify professionalism and competence, often under
the most trying circumstances.  We hope these recommendations will help them in their
important work.
Sincerely,
Shirley Mount Hufstedler
Chair
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Somali “women at risk,”
Kakuma refugee camp in Kenya
[Photo: CIR staff]
Destroyed home, Sarajevo
[Photo: CIR staff]
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INTRODUCTION
Since its very beginnings, America has been a refuge for the persecuted—
a “city on the hill” beckoning the victims of political, religious, ethnic, and
other forms of repression.  That tradition continues to this day.  Through
both our admissions policies and, equally importantly, through our
support for international protection and assistance, the United States
leads the world in responding to refugee and related humanitarian
crises.
On its overseas site visits, the Commission witnessed the desperate
plight of those forced to flee their homes.  Existence in refugee
camps is often tenuous.  The Somali women of Dadaab, Kenya refu-
gee camp, for example, face frequent rapes and assaults; many
Sudanese adolescent males are dying from malnutrition-caused ane-
mia; youngsters are forcibly recruited for military service; children
born and raised in refugee camps have little hope for the future.
We also observed the daunting challenges faced by refugees able to
return to their home countries.  Though the Dayton Accords sig-
naled the formal end to conflict in the former Yugoslavia, many
refugees’ homes, local schools, and medical facilities were destroyed;
others are no longer welcome or safe in their old neighborhoods
because a different ethnic group has taken them over.  Haitian refu-
gees have returned to greater political freedom, but their problems
are far from over as their government tries to address the damage
done by years of exploitation and neglect.
As new emergencies arise, and as new possibilities to avert or re-
solve refugee crises emerge, U.S. leadership faces new challenges
and new opportunities.  With the end of the Cold War, millions of
refugees have been able to return to their countries of origin.  Many
more have been forced to leave their homes.  In the 1990s, complex
factors precipitated the population displacements in and from such
Since its very
beginnings,
America has been a
refuge for the
persecuted—“a city
on the hill”
beckoning the
victims of political,
religious,
ethnic, and other
forms of repression.
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Chart 1.
Total Displaced Persons: 1996
Sudan
Afghanistan
Angola
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Liberia
Iraq
Sri Lanka
Sierra Leone
Colombia
Azerbaijan
Turkey
Burma
South Africa
Lebanon
Peru
Burundi
Russian Federation
Zaire
Georgia
Cyprus
4,000,000
1,200,000
1,200,000
1,000,000
1,000,000
900,000
900,000
800,000
600,000
550,000
500,000 - 2,000,000
500,000 - 1,000,000
500,000
450,000
420,000
400,000
400,000
400,000
285,000
265,000
COUNTRY NUMBER
Source: U.S. Committee for Refugees, Projected Numbers for World Refugee Survey 1997
Chart 2.
Major IDP Populations: 1996
Source: U.S. Committee for Refugees.  World Refugee Survey 1997.
Source: U.S. Committee for Refugees.  World Refugee Surv  1 97.
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Chart 3.
Populations of Concern to UNHCR: 1995
*Others includes asylum seekers, persons in refugee-like situations
who have not been formally recognized as refugees, UNHCR-
assisted victims of armed conflict in the former Yugoslavia, various
groups of concern in the Commonwealth of Independent States,
and others similarly situated.
Source: UNHCR, Food and Statistical Unit, Division of Programmes
and Operational Support
What is
International
Protection?
Most people can look to
their own government to
guaran-tee and protect
their basic human rights
and physical security.  But
in the case of refugees, the
country of or igin has
proved itself unable or un-
willing to protect those
rights.  UNHCR is man-
dated to ensure that refu-
gees are protected by their
country of asylum, and
assists that government as
far as possible in that task.
. . .  [S]tates may not
refoule, or forcibly return,
refugees to a territory
where they face danger.
They may not dis-criminate
between groups of refu-
gees.  They should ensure
that refugees benefit from
economic and social rights,
at least to the same de-
gree as other foreign resi-
dents of the country of asy-
lum.  Finally, states have
an obligation to cooperate
with UNHCR.  And, for hu-
manitarian reasons, states
should permit the admis-
sion of at least the spouse
and dependent children of
any person to whom tem-
porary refuge or asylum
has been granted.
UNHCR. 1996. Protecting
Refugees: questions & an-
swers.  Geneva.
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Chart 4.
 Major Refugee Source Countries: 1996
Source: U.S. Committee for Refugees. World Refugee Survey, 1997.  [*Number reported from sources varies widely.]
Palestinians 3,718,500*
Afghanistan 2,628,550*
Bosnia/Hercegovina 1,006,450*
Liberia 755,000*
Iraq 608,500*
Somalia 467,100*
Sudan 433,700
Sierra Leone 350,000*
Eritrea 343,100*
Vietnam 288,000
Croatia 300,000*
Burundi 285,000*
Rwanda 257,000
Azerbaijan 238,000*
Angola 220,000*
Tajikistan 215,600*
Armenia 197,000*
Burma 184,300*
China (Tibet) 128,000
Bhutan 121,800*
   n less than 250,000 (7)  n 250,000 - 1 million (10)  n more than 1 million (3)
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varied places as Bosnia, Rwanda, Liberia, Afghanistan, Chechnya,
and Albania.  These complex movements require equally complex
responses both to resolve the existing crises and to avert future
emergencies.  Repatriation, reconstruction, and democracy-building
efforts in Central America, Cambodia, Haiti, Bosnia and elsewhere
point to the significant investment in time, money, and personnel
required to bring stability to these troubled areas and, thereby, avert
future crises.
The vast majority of the refugees and displaced persons from
these and other countries remain within their own region.
Increasingly, they are internally displaced within their own
countries.  The U.S. Committee for Refugees [USCR] esti-
mates that at present there are 14.5 million refugees and
asylum seekers worldwide, with almost 19 million additional
persons who are internally displaced [IDPs].  By contrast, in
the early 1980s, USCR counted fewer than 10 million refu-
gees worldwide and did not even estimate the number of
IDPs.  While most refugees fall under the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR] mandate, only a
small minority of the internally displaced persons receive
international assistance and protection. They become of con-
cern to the UNHCR as a result of a request from the Secre-
tary General or competent organs of the United Nations or
because of their proximity to assisted refugee and returnee
populations.  The UNHCR reports 26 million “persons of
concern”—including more than 13.2 million refugees, 4.6 mil-
lion internally displaced persons, 3.3 million returnees still in
need of assistance and protection, and 4.9 million other per-
sons of concern.
By contrast, even the largest U.S. resettlement program of the past
two decades—that of Southeast Asian refugees—brought no more
than 168,000 refugees to this country in any one year.  During the
same period, the U.S. generally saw fewer than 100,000 asylum seek-
Resident of Gasinci
refugee camp in Bosnia
[Photo: CIR staff]
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Source: U.S. Committee for Refugees. World Refugee Survey, 1997.  [*Number reported from sources varies widely.]
Iran 2,020,000*
Jordan 1,362,500
Pakistan 1,215,700*
Gaza Strip 716,900
Guinea 650,000*
Yugoslavia 550,000*
West Bank 532,400
Russian Federation
484,000*
Zaire 455,000*
Germany 436,400*
Sudan 395,000*
Syria 384,400
Lebanon 355,100
India 352,200*
Tanzania 335,000*
Ethiopia 328,000*
Cote d'Ivoire 320,000
China 294,100*
Saudi Arabia 257,850
Azerbaijan 249,150*
 n less than 400,000 (10)  n 400,000 - 1 million (6) n more than 1 million (3)
Chart 5.
Major Destinations of Refugees
and Asylum Seekers: 1996
1 9 9 7
REFUGEE POLICY
- 7 -
U.S. COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION REFORM
ers per year come directly to our shores.  This is not to say that
these arrivals do not have profound consequences both positive and
negative for the U.S. communities in which they reside.  The Mariel
boatlift in the early 1980s saw more than 125,000 Cubans arrive
within weeks.  Similarly, the more sustained movements of refugees
from southeast Asia and the former Soviet Union continue to pose
challenges and provide opportunities to this country.  Nonetheless,
the comparison between the number of international refugees and
the numbers of those resettled in the U.S. underscores that nearly all
refugees will remain outside of this country—a reality that U.S.
refugee policy must reflect.
A majority of the world's refugees are in Africa and the Middle East.
By USCR’s count, Africa has more than 3.6 million refugees (down
from 5.2 million in 1995 largely because of the recent return of
Rwandans from Zaire [now Congo]) and the Middle East almost six
million.  Major source countries in Africa include Rwanda, Burundi,
Liberia, Somalia, Sierra Leone, Sudan, and Eritrea.  Each of these
countries also has large numbers of internally displaced persons
and returnees.  Afghans, Iraqis, and Palestinians represent the major
refugee groups in the Middle East.  Europe follows with more than
two million refugees, largely from the former Yugoslavia.  South
and Central Asian countries host another one million plus refugees,
primarily from Afghanistan.  Perhaps because of growing support
for democracy, there has been a marked downturn in refugee move-
ments in East Asia, Latin America, and the Caribbean, with excep-
tions such as the flight of Burmese to Thailand.
Despite the small percentage of the world's refugees who can be
resettled in the United States, U.S. resettlement policies nevertheless
can greatly influence the international response to refugees.  U.S.
pledges of resettlement and support for the protection mandate of
UNHCR encourage other nations to provide first asylum to new
arrivals and serve as an example to other resettlement nations.
Who Is a
Refugee?
[A refugee is] any person
who is outside any country
of such person’s national-
ity, or in the case of a per-
son having no nationality,
is outside any country in
which such person last
habitually resided, and who
is unable or unwilling to re-
turn to, and is unable or
unwilling to avail himself or
herself of the protection of,
that country because of
persecution or a well-
founded fear of persecution
on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in
a particular social group, or
political opinion, or . . . any
person who is within the
country of such person’s
nationality . . . and who is
persecuted or who has a
well-founded fear of perse-
cution on account of race,
religion, nationality, mem-
bership in a particular so-
cial group, or political opin-
ion.  The term “refugee”
does not include any per-
son who ordered, incited,
assisted, or otherwise par-
ticipated in the persecution
of any person on account
of race, religion, national-
ity, member-ship in a par-
ticular social group, or po-
litical opinion.
Immigration and National-
ity Act Section 101a(42)
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Conversely, other countries point to U.S. decisions to interdict and
return individuals without screening their claims about persecution
as justification for their own refusal to accept asylum seekers.
U.S. adherence to international norms for the protection of refugees
is essential to a well-functioning international system. The Commis-
sion believes U.S. policies should recognize that persons in life-
threatening situations or subject to serious bodily harm who do not
qualify under the refugee definition may also need protection and
assistance from the United States.
The recommendations in this report support a comprehensive and
coherent U.S. refugee policy that will permit the U.S. to assert inter-
national leadership and implement responsible domestic programs.
The U.S. government must have the capacity to detect the causes of
the movements to better prevent them through political, diplomatic,
and economic initiatives; to assist in caring for and protecting the
refugees overseas who are forced to leave their countries; to resettle
the few for whom U.S. resettlement is the only or best option and
provide sensible transitional assistance to them; to operate an effec-
tive system for protecting bona fide asylum seekers in the U.S. while
deterring those who are not; and to adopt a humane and effective
plan to respond to mass migration emergencies that immediately
impact our own nation.  Because domestic and international policies
affect, and are affected by, each other, this report also emphasizes
the need for White House leadership in coordinating and overseeing
decisionmaking on refugee policy throughout the federal govern-
ment.
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RECOMMENDATIONS
A FOCAL POINT FOR U.S. LEADERSHIP
Demonstrating leadership in a new era requires that the U.S. gov-
ernment develop a coordinated, comprehensive approach to refugee
policy and its implementation.  This leadership will exert maximum
effect if it comes from the White House.
The Commission recommends the designation of an office within the Na-
tional Security Council to serve as the White House focal point for over-
seeing and coordinating all aspects of U.S. policies regarding domestic and
international refugee and related humanitarian issues.    The responsibil-
ity for refugee and related humanitarian issues now is divided among
agencies scattered among several Cabinet-level departments.  For
example, the Department of State has lead responsibility for setting
and implementing policies related to international refugee and hu-
manitarian assistance and protection.  The Department of Justice
sets and implements asylum policy and the Department of Health
and Human Services oversees the domestic assistance program for
resettled refugees.  Each department faces separate issues, but their
overlapping areas of interest necessitate a high level of coordination
to accomplish smooth, effective operations.
When refugee crises emerge, more than coordination is needed.
Generally, only the President can make the final decision to put U.S.
diplomatic, financial, and even military resources behind efforts to
address major crises such as those that have occurred in the Great
Lakes region of Rwanda, Zaire [Congo], and Burundi, and in Bosnia,
Somalia, and northern Iraq.
Designation of a focal point within the National Security Council
[NSC] will help ensure that the President receives the best intelli-
gence needed to make informed decisions during international cri-
The National
Security Council,
 in consultation
with the Domestic
Policy Council,
 is particularly
well-suited
to make sure that
appropriate weight
is given to
national security,
foreign policy,
domestic interests,
and humanitarian
concerns.
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ses and mass migration emergencies involving U.S. borders and
ports.  The NSC, in consultation with the Domestic Policy Council,
is particularly well-suited to make sure that appropriate weight is
given to national security, foreign policy, domestic interests, and
humanitarian concerns. The NSC focal point would have an oppor-
tunity to assess and comment on the implications of various policy
decisions for possible humanitarian crises, as well as alert the Presi-
dent and Cabinet members to looming crises that require early at-
tention.  The NSC has the confidence of the President in policy
judgments and it can bring the key Executive Branch decisionmakers
to the table in critical situations.
The Administration has taken steps in this direction
with the designation of a Special Assistant to the Presi-
dent and Senior Director of the National Security
Council for Democracy, Human Rights, and Humani-
tarian Affairs.  Responsibility for refugee policy should
be institutionalized at the NSC.  And, the office should
be provided the necessary resources and personnel to
coordinate federal programs related to early warning
of refugee and related humanitarian emergencies, pre-
ventive actions that address the causes of such crises,
humanitarian assistance to refugees and internally
displaced persons, U.S. resettlement of refugees, mi-
gration emergency planning, U.S. asylum and tempo-
rary protection policies, and domestic assistance for
refugees and others of humanitarian concern.  The aim
of the NSC office should be to maximize consistency
in policy formulation on domestic and international
issues, enhance coordination among the lead agencies
in developing and implementing policies that cross
lines of authority,1  clarify accountability through a
1 For example, through the formulation of a national strategy paper
addressing all refugee issues.
Bosniac children at
Gasinci refugee camp
[Photo: CIR staff]
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coordinated review of appropriation requests
of agencies implementing refugee programs,
and expedite the appropriate tasking of agen-
cies when an emergency arises.
INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE
POLICY AND PROGRAMS
With the vast majority of the world’s refugees
and displaced persons remaining overseas, the
U.S. must focus first and foremost on interna-
tional refugee policy and programs.  Our lead-
ership can take many forms, including policy
direction and guidance in international fora, financial contributions
to assistance and protection programs, and last but not least, the
example set through our own domestic refugee resettlement and
asylum policies.
The Commission urges the federal government to continue demon-
strating leadership in generating international responses to refugee
and related humanitarian crises.   The vast majority of the world’s
refugees and displaced persons are outside of the United States. The
Commission is charged with taking a broad view of U.S. refugee
policy to include not only domestic but also international policies
and programs.  The leadership the U.S. provides in responding to
international crises is a key component of our refugee policy.  The
number of refugees and displaced persons requiring international
assistance and protection continues to grow.  Thus, the need for a
continued, effective U.S. response remains.  U.S. refugee policy
should:
n Anticipate and take action, when possible, to prevent refu-
gee and related humanitarian emergencies from occurring;
Sudanese children in Kakuma
refugee camp in Kenya
[Photo: CIR staff]
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n Respond in a timely, humanitarian, and effective manner
when their prevention is not possible;
n Facilitate protection of and assistance to refugees regard-
less of their location—that is, in countries of first asylum as
well as at the border and in the interior of the United States;
n Endeavor to ensure, to the extent practicable, humanitar-
ian aid and protection to those who are internally or exter-
nally displaced by other situations that threaten life or lib-
erty; and
n Seek durable solutions (repatriation, local integration, or
third-country resettlement) for those who require interna-
tional protection and assistance so as not to perpetuate long-
term refugee displacements.
The United States should serve these
goals through:
n Preventive diplomacy and other
actions that address the causes of refu-
gee and related humanitarian emer-
gencies and, thereby, reduce the like-
lihood of their occurrence;
n Policy leadership in the interna-
tional refugee system through which
the vast majority of refugees receive
assistance, protection, and durable so-
lutions;
n Timely and appropriate finan-cial contributions designed
to address the causes, conse-quences, and solutions to refu-
gee and related humanitarian emergencies;
Somali women residents of
Kakuma refugee camp in Kenya
[Photo: CIR staff]
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n Support for programs that target assistance and protection
to the most vulnerable populations, with particular regard
for the needs of women and children who comprise the vast
majority of the world’s refugee and displaced populations;
and
n Clear, comprehensive, and consistent domestic refugee
policies that adhere to recognized international norms for
the protection of refugees and others facing life-threatening
situations.
Chart 6.
1997 U.S. Migration
and Refugee Assistance Account
Source: Department of State, Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration
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COUNTRY CONTRIBUTION
$ PER CAPITA
CONTRIBUTION
TOTAL $
$13.25
$12.60
$10.42
$  5.09
$  4.72
$  4.63
$  3.32
$  3.17
$  1.47
$  1.38
$  1.22
$  1.13
$  1.10
$  1.10
$  1.03
$  0.83
$  0.53
$  0.52
$  0.38
$  0.28
$58,297,834
$65,507,230
$91,731,953
$78,875,566
$1,887,174
$32,880,104
$16,930,168
$94,961
$388,792,372
$4,976,523
$12,483,315
$142,633,003
$33,085,740
$54,747,538
$18,797,686
$1,500,000
$10,300,000
$43,454,808
$21,559,888
$10,886,661
Norway
Denmark
Sweden
Netherlands
Luxembourg
Switzerland
Finland
Liechtenstein
United States
Ireland
Belgium
Japan
Canada
United Kingdom
Australia
Kuwait
Saudi Arabia
Germany
Italy
Spain
Source: U.S. Committee for Refugees, World Refugee Survey 1997
* Contributions to UNHCR, IOM, and UNRWA.
The Commission reinforces the need for creative approaches to address
issues that are now impeding effective responses to international refugee
and related humanitarian emergencies.   The most pressing of these are:
n Early Warning of Humanitarian Crises.  Most humanitar-
ian emergencies that generate large-scale movements of refu-
gees and other displaced persons are predictable to some
degree.  Many people know that a potential crisis is brewing
long before the first persons take flight.  The key is to trans-
form such generalized knowledge into the specific informa-
tion needed for action plans to prevent the crisis, if possible,
or to respond more effectively and quickly if not.
 Chart 7.
U.S. Contributions* Relative to Other
Countries: 1996
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n Preventive Actions.  Even more problematic than the ca-
pacity to sound early warnings is the will and capacity among
national and international agencies to respond to them.
Preventive action can involve a wide array of strategies,
ranging from diplomacy, to economic sanctions to, as last
resort, military intervention.  While the United States is not
the only country with the capacity to take such actions, our
unique role as the remaining superpower makes it impera-
tive that we understand how to use these tools
most effectively and when it is in our national
interest to do so.
n Emergency Responses.  Unfortunately, the cir-
cumstances that cause humanitarian emergencies
often cannot be prevented.  Despite decades of
experience, however, emergency responses typi-
cally are “too little, too late.”  Prompt and effec-
tive responses can decrease illness and death re-
sulting from starvation, overcrowding, disease,
and lack of shelter.  Early responses can limit the
security risks to neighboring countries that some-
times result from the large-scale movements of
people during conflict.  And, they can diminish
the later cost of addressing the consequences of
failed assistance and protection policies.
n Internally Displaced Persons.  Few humanitar-
ian issues generate greater controversy and re-
quire more leadership than the situation of inter-
nally displaced persons who seek refuge within
the borders of their own country.  More individu-
als are internally displaced because of repression
and conflict than have sought or obtained refuge in other
countries.  In some cases, they remain in danger in their
own countries because of an unwillingness on the part of
Food distribution at Dadaab
 refugee camp in Kenya
[Photo: CIR staff]
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neighboring countries to permit them to enter and seek asy-
lum.  Above all, there is a need for a clearer picture of the
rights of IDPs to protection and assistance and the respon-
sibilities of states and the international community towards
them.  More effective strategies to reach and provide assis-
tance and protection to IDPs should be developed.  These
strategies should include guidelines and rules of conduct to
help determine when, under what circumstances, and by
whom to provide aid to IDPs and to help ensure that aid
does not become politicized or serve to fuel a conflict.
n Protection of Aid Workers.  In recent years, staff of the
international organizations, government agencies, and non-
governmental organizations providing assistance to refugees
and internally displaced persons have come under deadly
attack.  Agencies such as the International Committee of the
Red Cross [ICRC] that have had long histories of operating
safely on both sides of conflicts are now increasingly the
targets of armed reprisals from
military and paramilitary forces.
Sometimes the attacks have led to
the death of humanitarian aid pro-
viders and forced others to depart,
leaving refugees and IDPs without
outside help.  Violent attacks upon
humanitarian workers are wholly
unacceptable; the protection of aid
workers must be given high prior-
ity if effective assistance and pro-
tection is to occur.
n Durable Solutions for Refu-
gees and Internally Displaced
Persons.  The decade of the 1990s
has seen the end to many refugee
Rwandan refugees return from Tanzania.
[A/P/Wide World Photos]
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and related humanitarian crises.   Yet far too many
inidividuals remain externally or internally displaced be-
cause of continuing conflict or repression in their home coun-
tries.  Expanding repatriation opportunities while promot-
ing local integration and third-country resettlement for those
who cannot return home will help ensure that millions of
refugees are not left without permanent solutions to their
plight.
n Institutional Roles and Relationships.  A number of these
issues fall between the cracks of the U.S. government and
international systems, producing conflicts or leaving gaps in
institutional responsibility.  Sometimes, too many agencies
vie for participation; at other times no one steps forward to
assume responsibility.  Too often, the few agencies willing
and able to assist and protect the victims of humanitarian
crises become overextended.  U.S. leadership in setting out
a more effective humanitarian response system would help
correct these problems.
n International Responsibility.  A broader sharing of respon-
sibility and commitment towards refugees will increase the
effectiveness of responses to refugee and related crises.  No
one country, the United States included, has either the re-
sources or the capacity to undertake all of the tasks neces-
sary to prevent or respond effectively to refugee crises.  The
United States should lead efforts to develop more effective
mechanisms for sharing of responsibility among nations able
to do so.
As a matter of urgency, the Commission calls on the President to establish
a senior-level taskforce, under the leadership of the NSC, to set criteria and
guidelines for the involvement of U.S. military forces in humanitarian
operations related to refugees and IDPs.  In the past, the U.S. military
occasionally has been involved in providing humanitarian assistance
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to victims of conflicts or natural disasters.  Since the end of the Cold
War, however, as crises continue but superpower conflicts no longer
impede international action, the U.S. military has been involved in
numerous complex contingency operations.
These have involved  humanitarian as well
as the more typical political and security
aspects (e.g., Iraq, Somalia, Haiti, former
Yugoslavia, etc.).  The U.S. military also
has continued to provide critical logistical
support to the increasing numbers of hu-
manitarian operations.  Military resources
and facilities have even been used to inter-
dict and, in the case of Guantanamo Naval
Base, to process and protect migrants.
The military is likely to continue to be in-
volved in humanitarian operations, at least
in the near future.  Although the U.S. gov-
ernment has developed criteria for the
participation of military forces in peacemaking and peacekeeping
operations, similar guidelines have not yet been promulgated for
the broader array of humanitarian operations to provide assistance
and protection in situations related to refugees or IDPs.
These situations pose specific challenges that go beyond those en-
countered in providing logistical support.  For instance, a  humani-
tarian response to flood victims may only require airlifting supplies
or feeding people.  Though such efforts can require demanding
logistical planning and difficult operations, they tend to be far less
complex than negotiating access with warlords, preventing the hi-
jacking of supply convoys, or defending the lives of relief workers—
all of which occur in protection situations.  The crisis in Zaire [Congo]
highlights the many complex issues.  Rwandan  refugees have been
threatened not only by the domestic Zairian [Congo] conflict but
also by Rwandan military and militia forces operating in Zaire
U.S. military
loads flour for Sarajevo
[Department of Defense photo]
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[Congo].  The plan for a multinational humanitarian force, including
U.S. military, was put on hold in December 1996 when the majority
of Rwandan refugees repatriated spontaneously, but as of the spring
of 1997, the situation remained fluid with several hundred thousand
refugees remaining in Zaire [Congo], largely out of reach of humani-
tarian refugee assistance.
The proposed taskforce would cover such issues as: recommending
criteria for determining if and when military intervention is in the
U.S. national interest; developing criteria for initial engagement and
later disengagement; formulating a code of conduct during deploy-
ment to include, at a minimum, an absolute right of self-defense;
analyzing the effects of the humanitarian assistance on the situation
on the ground; evaluating the interaction between the humanitarian
operations and political and diplomatic ef-
forts; devising necessary training; delin-
eating agency responsi-bilities and a chain
of command; and clarifying funding is-
sues.  Among others, the taskforce should
include the Secretary of State, the Secre-
tary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, and the Director of Cen-
tral Intelligence, as well as key leaders of
Congress, inter-national and nongovern-
mental organiza-tions and religious insti-
tutions.
MASS MIGRATION
EMERGENCIES
The Commission reiterates its view (expressed in its 1994 report) that a
credible immigration policy requires the ability to respond effectively and
humanely to migration emergencies in which large numbers of people
seek entry into the United States.  Failure to act appropriately and
U.S. soldier in Haiti
gives medical assistance
[Department of Defense photo]
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in a timely manner can have profound humanitarian consequences.
Further, an uncontrolled emergency can overwhelm resources and
create serious problems that far outlast the emergency.  The Com-
mission believes that the recommendations below will facilitate the
ability to respond effectively and humanely.
The Commission recommends establishment of a regional temporary pro-
tection system.  The creation of a regional protection system is by far
the best option to provide temporary protection outside of the U.S.
to individuals fleeing armed conflict and/or upheavals that pose
serious threats to life or liberty.  The U.S. government learned
valuable lessons during the Haitian and Cuban migrations in 1994.
First, we can and should protect those fleeing oppressive regimes
or life-threatening danger.  Second, we can and must do so without
precipitating the migration or admission of large numbers of those
who only seek a better economic life in the U.S.  Third, we can
engage  regional neighbors in providing protection.  The Commis-
sion believes that the U.S. should build on this experience now so
that, in accordance with both our commitment to humanitarian
principles and our role as an international leader on refugee poli-
cies, we can make all feasible efforts to protect, at least on a tem-
porary basis, individuals who fear return to their home countries
because of armed conflict and other serious civil disruptions.
The U.S. should be working hard now—when we are not immedi-
ately affected  by a mass migration crisis—on ways to address the
political, fiscal, and technical problems that may impede efforts to
establish a regional system to deal with likely future crises.  Estab-
lishing such a system will take time, high level political involve-
ment, and the potential commitment and leverage of U.S. financial
and other resources.  A regional protection system would require
the countries of the Americas and the Caribbean to negotiate and
agree upon several key elements:
n Sites.  Various locations would be needed depending on
Failure to act
appropriately
and in a
timely manner
during mass
emergencies
can have
profound
humanitarian
consequences,
overwhelm resources,
and create
serious problems
that far outlast
the emergency.
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the size of the emergency movements, their proximity to the
source country, and geopolitical sensitivities regarding a
particular emergency.  In addition, regional partners are
likely to expect each other to do more than provide funding
or logistical assistance to the system.  Sites in two or three
countries near the source country would likely be the pri-
mary protection locations.  Negotiations on establishing a
regional protection system should address minimum require-
ments for such sites in terms of overall conditions, access to
medical and other services, presence of nongovernmental
organizations, specific policies related to unaccompanied
minors and women-at-risk, and other similar issues.
The U.S. may have to be prepared to provide a location for
use by the regional system.  Until the U.S. develops the
capacity and legal framework that would allow it to pro-
vide truly temporary protec-tion to large numbers within
our territory, Guantanamo Naval Base should continue to
be used in responding to mass migration emergen-cies.  The
base is the only offshore site that the U.S. currently can offer
if called on by our regional neighbors to contribute territory
it controls to a regional
protection system.  Fur-
ther, Guantanamo appears
to be the only U.S.-con-
trolled offshore protection
site in the region available
for situations where the
U.S. acts unilaterally to
handle emergency move-
ments.
Safe havens in the country
of origin also should be
used to provide protection,
Processing at Guantanamo
[Photo: Ramon Garcia]
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but only as a last resort when all else has proven ineffective
in responding to the humanitarian emergency.  The risks to
life for both protected and protectors have so often out-
weighed the potential benefits of such in-country protection
that only in the most extraordinary circumstances should
this option be considered.
n Plans for Processing of Those Who Reach Borders Beyond
the Primary Protection Sites.  Those seeking protection who
reach nations further away from the source country could
be provided refuge either at one of the primary regional
protection sites or within the country that they reach.  Those
nations, including the United States, concerned that too many
individuals might try to reach their country, should be able
to find a principled and humanitarian way to determine
who among those needing protection should receive it at the
primary locations and who within their own borders.
Temporary protection within a regional protection system is
one potential way for the United States to do this.  Under
this framework, the U.S. would not interdict and directly
return asylum seekers in order to prevent their entry in the
U.S.  Instead, those who arrive at U.S. borders requesting
protection would undergo a constitutionally-sound, expe-
dited procedure to determine if they qualify for either asy-
lum or temporary protection.  They would have an oppor-
tunity to make claims before an Asylum Officer and, if not
approved, an Immigration Judge.  Those who fail to prove
eligibility for either asylum or temporary protection would
be returned to their home country.  Those who are deter-
mined ineligible for asylum, but who qualify for temporary
protection, would receive a grant for the latter and be pro-
vided protection at one of the primary sites outside the U.S.
Those whose claims for asylum require adjudication beyond
what can be accomplished within the expedited procedure
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would be admitted into the U.S. for regular asylum process-
ing.  If they ultimately fail in their asylum claim but are
granted temporary protection, they could be allowed to
remain in the U.S. as long as the U.S. determined that such
protection was warranted.
If, however, experience shows that the availability of such
temporary protection in the U.S. creates a magnet effect,
protection could be provided at the primary regional sites.
In this way, the U.S. could share the regional responsibility
of providing temporary protection to some indi-
viduals within its own territory without serious
concerns that such admissions would lead to a
magnet effect.
n Measures to Avert and Resolve Crises.  It is both
humane and pragmatic for the U.S. and its regional
partners to be similarly committed to resolving
the conditions causing flight.  This would require
prompt and intensive assessments of the extent to
which coordinated diplomatic action can serve to
avert mass migration emergencies within the re-
gion.  Coordinated action may also be helpful in
finding solutions to crises that cannot be prevented
so that people can return in safety to their home
countries.
n Durable Solutions.  For most protected popula-
tions, timely repatriation is the best solution.  In
accordance with the humanitarian nature of tem-
porary protection, safe return should be accom-
plished through voluntary means with a combina-
tion of financial and development aid incentives.
Such aid should be targeted to the communities from which
those protected come.  The model UNHCR often uses, Quick
Migrant interdiction
off the Florida coast
[U.S. Coast Guard photo]
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Impact Projects [QIPs], provides resources to communities
where there was substantial displacement resulting from
warfare.  QIPs support rehabilitation of local roads, water
systems, community health centers, schools, housing, and
other infrastructure affected by warfare.  QIPs employ both
the resident population and the returnees, thereby making
the local community more receptive to the return of its resi-
dents while providing needed transitional income to both
residents and returnees.  Compulsory repatriation may be
necessary for some individuals, but should be used only
when an individual has chosen not to return after being
provided with a fair opportunity and appropriate incentives
to do so in a safe and voluntary manner.
In some situations, timely return will prove impossible be-
cause the conditions causing flight persist despite efforts to
resolve the crisis.  Coordinated action to find other durable
solutions will then be needed.  Local integration and third-
country resettlement should be considered for individuals
whose continued presence in protection sites no longer can
be sustained.
n Financing Plan.  The temporary protection system, in addi-
tion to costs incurred by the various government agencies
involved, will entail numerous other costs, including “moth-
ball” maintenance of the protection site and their utilization
and operation if and when a migration emergency occurs.
For example, if the United States were to use Guantanamo,
the military would face costs greater than normal mainte-
nance of the base.  However, certain costs would be in-
curred regardless of the presence of aliens seeking protec-
tion.  Reimbursement formulas need to be developed that
take into account the marginal additional costs incurred.  As
part of their advance planning, the countries involved would
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have to project what the total costs could be and clarify who
would pay which costs and from which budget items.
The Commission recommends that the federal contingency planning for
migration emergencies that has been under development during the past
decade be finalized, with appropriate provisions to review and revise as
needed.  Mass migrations are likely to continue within this hemi-
sphere. The presence of a contingency plan that identifies various
scenarios, policy responses, and appropriate plans for handling them
can help avoid dangerous and costly ad hoc decisionmaking and
planning, as well as the disruption of normal operations.  A great
deal of time and effort already have been put into the contingency
plan, Operation Distant Shore.  Significant improvements in the plan
have been made although further changes are needed to make it
more useful.  These include modifying policy assumptions to reflect
changes in U.S. asylum law and regulations and to incorporate the
lessons of the most recent responses to movements out of Cuba and
Haiti, including the viability of off-shore safe havens and the need
for a formalized structure for making policy decisions.  Contingency
planning also may involve consideration of how to address or
ameliorate the causes of the migration so that
people do not feel they have no choice but to
migrate.  The development of a more realistic
funding plan [as discussed below] is also needed
as part of any contingency plan.
The Commission recommends that the NSC focal
point for refugee issues assume leadership quickly to
ensure a smooth response to an unfolding mass
migration emergency.  The early establishment of
a chain of command is crucial to an effective
emergency response.  Past experiences demon-
strate that the majority of the decisions needed
in responding to an emergency are linked to domestic politics and
end up at the White House.   During the 1994 Cuban and Haitian
Housing at Guantanamo
[Photo: Kenneth Leutbecker]
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migration crises the NSC took an active role in determining and
organizing the U.S. government’s policy response.  To facilitate co-
ordination and to use the emergency powers, authorities, and funds
available to the President, the focal point must have access to the
highest levels of the Executive Branch and have sufficient authority
and government experience to be able to carry out the responsibility
effectively.  Institutionalizing this responsibility within the Execu-
tive Office of the President would help ensure that the designated
individual is involved in the identification of potential crises and
formulation of a coordinated U.S. response.  By exercising leader-
ship in the planning process prior to the emergency, the NSC will
help ensure continuity between planning and implementation after
an emergency has begun.
The Commission urges increased coordination among federal agencies in-
volved in emergency responses as well as with state and local agencies and
regional and international organizations.  Increased coordination within
the federal government would help ensure that the appropriate
participants are identified and involved in the discussions and that
as many decisions and responsibilities as possible are agreed upon
prior to emergency situations.  Such prior agreements between the
federal government and state and local agencies could eliminate
many of the sources of tension and confusion that currently exist
about roles and responsibilities.  This would reduce the reluctance
of state and local government to be involved, increase trust between
the parties, and thus facilitate responses to mass migration emer-
gencies.  Moreover, some state and local governments have knowl-
edge and experience that would enhance the quality of the planning
process.  Fortunately, progress is being made.  The Immigration and
Naturalization Service [INS] and the Federal Emergency Manage-
ment Agency [FEMA] are negotiating a Memorandum of Under-
standing clarifying how FEMA would support INS in an immigra-
tion emergency.  Recent field exercises have increased the active
participation of state and local officials.  Increased coordination with
our regional partners and international agencies prior to a migration
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emergency (as suggested above) would help focus attention on ad-
dressing the causes of such mass migrations, clarifying responsibili-
ties, and creating infrastructures, mechanisms, and guidelines to
deal with any crisis that does occur.  This would facilitate timely
implementation of an appropriate response, lower the costs borne
by the U.S. and its regional partners alike, and prevent the burden
from being placed solely on the U.S.
The Commission recommends development of a realistic financing strategy
and mechanisms to trigger allocation of funds.  Even with planning and
leadership, an effective emergency response can fail if the opera-
tional agencies have insufficient resources and authorities to carry
out their responsibilities.  The Immigration and Nationality Act
established an emergency fund that can be tapped in these situa-
tions.  The development and inclusion of a realistic financing plan
and trigger mechanisms for the disbursement of those funds are
crucial to increasing the viability of any mass immigration response
plan.  Otherwise, the uncertainty regarding funding availability, di-
vision of costs, and reimbursements will continue to impede effec-
tive emergency responses.  Such a process would facilitate agency
participation in an emergency response and in advance planning
and will likely facilitate and enhance the response effort itself.
The Commission also recommends that those particular agencies  man-
dated to take operational responsibility for responding to a mass migration
emergency are granted the necessary statutory authority to allow them to
respond effectively.   For instance, while INS currently has on-the-
ground operational responsibility when migrants enter the U.S. un-
der emergency circumstances, it lacks the authority to assign tasks
to other agencies as needed.  State and local governments are often
confused about their authority to respond during a migration emer-
gency.  During a natural disaster, the Federal Emergency Manage-
ment Agency does have statutory authority to “task” other federal
agencies for additional support in its efforts to respond to the emer-
gency and also has immediate access to funding to reimburse their
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As a matter of
legal obligation,
humanitarian
principles, and
good public policy,
the United States
should not expel or
return refugees to
countries
in which
they have a
well-founded fear of
persecution
on account of
race, religion,
nationality,
membership in a
particular social
group, or
political opinion.
implementing partners.  To further coordination and effectiveness,
officials involved in the migration emergency planning process have
begun to gather additional information from the relevant agencies
about how they would respond to certain situations and what re-
sources and authorities they would need to be able to do so.
ASYLUM
As a matter of legal obligation, humanitarian principles, and good
public policy, the United States should not expel or return refugees
to countries in which they have a well-founded fear of persecution
on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
social group, or political opinion.  The United States fulfills this
commitment through two statutory vehicles: Section 208 of the INA
discretionary grants of asylum to individuals who have been perse-
cuted in the past or who have a well-founded fear of persecution;
and Section 241(b)(3) mandatory withholding of removal of those
demonstrating that their life or freedom would be threatened if
removed to a particular country (or Section 243(h) withholding of
deportation for applications filed before April 1, 1997).  Asylees may
become permanent residents in the United States, but those granted
withholding of removal cannot adjust status and may be deported
to another country.
Although the United States is not legally obliged to admit asylees
for permanent settlement, we should and do provide such refuge on
the basis of humanitarian principles and good public policy.  We are
legally obliged to have in place procedures for determining refugee
status before taking any steps that may result in a person’s return
to a country in which he or she may face a threat to life or liberty.
This obligation extends to refugees within the United States and at
our frontiers.  Asylum and withholding of removal procedures should
ensure protection to bona fide refugees but also deter fraud and
abuse of those procedures from unmeritorious claimants.
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The Commission commends the regulatory changes in the asylum system
that have professionalized and streamlined decisionmaking while reducing
abusive claims to refugee status.  The
Department of Justice promul-
gated regulations in 1990 and 1995
that have greatly improved the
process for adjudicating claims to
asylum in the United States.  The
establishment in 1990 of a trained
corps of asylum officers has raised
the quality of decisions on asylum.
The various administrative
changes adopted in 1995, includ-
ing the delinking of asylum claims
and work authorization and the
more efficient and consistent
decisionmaking at the INS and Immigration Courts through proce-
dural changes accompanied by the addition of more staff, appear to
have reduced significantly the number of frivolous asylum applica-
tions without jeopardizing the integrity of the system.
The Commission recommends enhanced attention to the timely removal of
rejected asylum seekers.  The absence of an effective and coordinated
strategy to ensure the timely removal of rejected asylum seekers
may undermine efforts to demonstrate that the U.S. is serious in its
commitment to a credible asylum system.  The Commission believes
that priority regarding removal of asylum seekers should be given
to those whose applications have been rejected under the new asy-
lum system.  The 1995 reforms sought to deter abuse by concentrat-
ing adjudicatory resources on new cases in order to send a message
that asylum was no longer a route to indefinite stays in the United
States.  Only after INS and the Immigration Courts were able to
make a decision on all new cases within six months did their atten-
tion turn to the large backlog of prereform asylum cases.  This
Asylum interview
[Photo: INS Houston asylum office]
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strategy has, at least initially, reduced new asylum applications by
half.  The same logic holds for setting removal priorities.  The U.S.
should start now to remove the more recent applicants who fail to
qualify for refugee status and who are ineligible for any other form
of relief from removal.  Once we carry out such removals on a
regular basis, attention can then turn to deportation of individuals
now in the asylum backlog who are ineligible for any relief.
The Commission expresses reservations about the asylum-related legisla-
tion enacted in 1996 and urges immediate correction of certain provisions
that can harm bona fide asylum seekers and undermine the efficiency of the
asylum system.  In particular, the Commission is concerned about the
following provisions:
n “Credible Fear” Determinations in Expedited Removal Pro-
ceedings.  The 1996 legislation mandates expedited removal
of individuals who are inadmissible because of certain forms
of fraud, misrepresentation or faulty documentation.2  Un-
der the expedited removal procedures, individuals who re-
quest asylum must demonstrate that they have a credible
fear of persecution in order to continue with their asylum
application.  The law anticipates that the “credible fear”
determination will be made swiftly and requires that the
Immigration Judge review of that determination be com-
pleted in no more than one week.
The “credible fear” provisions were introduced in response
to what appeared to be abuse of the asylum system at air-
ports of entry by individuals who used fraudulent docu-
ments or destroyed the documents they had used to board
flights to the United States.  During 1995 and 1996, how-
ever, significant steps, such as sustained detention of such
2 In its final report, the Commission will examine the application of
expedited procedures to circumstances beyond those related to asylum
or mass migration.
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asylum seekers, were taken to control this abuse of the asy-
lum process.  In FY 1996, about 3,600 individuals requested
asylum at ports of entry.  This number of applications can
be handled through the normal removal proceedings that
provide greater protection to asylum-seekers.  A separate
port of entry process for hearing the preliminary credible
fear applications is not merited for such cases.
The Commission believes that constitutionally-sound expe-
dited procedures may be needed in exceptional circum-
stances.  If the number of asylum applications increases sig-
nificantly within a short period, the Attorney General could
be given standby authority to institute “credible fear” deter-
minations to sort legitimate asylum applications from those
that are manifestly unfounded.  During mass migration emer-
gencies, a “credible fear” process certainly is preferable to
the policy of direct return of all asylum seekers that has
characterized past U.S. actions.
n Detention of Asylum Seekers.  The new legislation speci-
fies that even those applicants who meet the “credible fear”
standard shall be detained until their full asylum hearing
before an Immigration Judge.  Detaining asylum seekers
who have met an initial threshold demonstrating their like-
lihood of obtaining asylum is not a good use of scarce de-
tention resources.  As expressed above, the Commission
does not believe “credible fear” is—except under exceptional
circumstances—an appropriate standard for determining
who will gain access to an asylum hearing.  It is an appro-
priate standard for determining who will be released from
detention.  ”Credible fear” already is used in the Asylum
Pre-Screening Officer [APSO] Program.
Asylum seekers whose claims meet the “credible fear” of
persecution standard are not likely to abscond during their
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removal proceeding as, were they to abscond, they would
forfeit their reasonable chance to win asylum.  Thus, they
are releasable, subject to public safety, reasonable assurance
of reappearance, and reasonable supervision
during the interim.  If the applicant’s claim for
asylum is rejected later at the full hearing on
the merits, the applicant can be detained for
deportation at that time.
By contrast, those do not meet the “credible
fear” standard are subject to confinement pend-
ing their full hearing and cannot be released
unless they obtain asylum.  This immediate
detention may deter future abuse of the asylum
system and will facilitate the deportation of re-
jected asylum seekers.
The Commission recognizes that asylum seekers may create
impacts for certain local communities.  However, we be-
lieve release based on a “credible fear” determination serves
the national interest.  It permits the government to use its
scarce detention resources on only those aliens who are likely
to abscond or be a danger to the community.
n Bars to Asylum and Withholding of Removal on Basis of
Criminal Activity.  Aliens can be barred from applying or
receiving asylum and withholding because they have com-
mitted particularly serious crimes.  Prior to the Immigration
Act of 1990 [IMMACT], determinations of whether a crime
was “particularly serious” were based on a case-by-case
analysis of relevant facts.  Under IMMACT, Congress effec-
tively made aliens convicted of an aggravated felony ineli-
gible for asylum and withholding of removal.  The Antiter-
rorism and Effective Death Penalty Act [AEDPA] created a
Detainees at Krome Detention
Center in Miami
[AP/Wide World Photos]
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waiver of that bar with respect to withholding applications.
IIRAIRA eliminated that waiver and significantly expanded
the crimes that constitute an “aggravated felony.” Thus aliens
are now effectively barred from asylum if they have been
convicted of any aggravated felony and from withholding
of removal if sentenced to five years of imprisonment for
such a conviction.
The Commission is concerned that the current categorical
approach denying eligibility in a prescriptive manner may
result in the return of refugees who are not dangers to the
community and have not committed crimes that most Ameri-
cans would consider to be particularly serious ones.  In
some cases, there would be broad agreement as to the seri-
ousness of a crime that is currently included in the “aggra-
vated felony” category (e.g., rape, murder, armed robbery,
drug trafficking, etc.)  Under IIRAIRA, however, an aggra-
vated felony includes offenses for which a term of impris-
onment of one year or more is imposed, regardless if that
sentence were suspended or the actual time served by the
alien was less.  Such convictions may stem from participa-
tion in a minor brawl, shoplifting, or writing a bad check.
Moreover, for those convicted abroad, the legislation does
not make a distinction between those who truly committed
serious crimes and those jailed by a repressive regime on
trumped-up charges to silence their opposition.  Further,
the law does not take into account the different criminal
standards used in different countries.
The process of determining whether an asylum claimant
convicted of a crime should be denied asylum or returned
should be both individualized and expeditious.  In each
case, and in a timely manner, the severity of the persecution
feared should be balanced against the nature of the particu-
1 9 9 7
REFUGEE POLICY
- 34 -
U.S. COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION REFORM
* Commissioner Ezell believes that asylees should be granted a two-year
conditional LPR status.
lar crime committed and the danger the individual may
pose to the community.  In short, the Commission believes
that, given the consequences to the refugee and the U.S.
community, there should be flexibility in weighing some of
the crimes currently defined as “particularly serious.”
n Numerical Limitations on Asylum Grants.  The new legis-
lation, for the first time, limits the number of grants of asy-
lum that can be made in a given year to a particular cat-
egory of refugees.  Such artificial numerical limits on grants
of asylum to recognized refugees are inadvisable.  It is a
violation of our laws and obligations to return recognized
refugees to conditions that we have defined as persecutory
merely because asylum numbers are unavailable.  The alter-
natives—to place otherwise eligible asylees into the limbo
state of withholding of removal or establish a backlog for
approved cases who are awaiting an asylum number—un-
dermine the credibility and efficiency of our asylum system.
The Commission recommends that asylees be admitted as Legal Permanent
Residents [LPRs] upon the grant of asylum.*  Currently, a grant of
asylum is for an initial period of one year, after which, unless coun-
try conditions have changed or an asylee has availed himself or
herself of the protection of another country, the asylee can adjust
status to that of legal permanent resident.  Part of the criteria for
adjustment under Section 209(b) of the INA is that an applicant for
such adjustment must still be a refugee and, therefore, requires a
personal interview and nominal readjudication of asylum status.
With respect to eligibility for naturalization, an asylee’s record of
admission begins one year before the date of the approval of the
adjustment application.
Artificial
numerical limits on
grants of asylum to
recognized refugees
are inadvisable.
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Elimination of the delay in adjustment would greatly reduce contin-
ued uncertainty and instability in the lives of asylees even after their
initial approval and would enable asylees and their families to in-
tegrate into the U.S. in a timely fashion.   These asylees already have
passed through an extensive process for determining their refugee
bona fides.  It would also reduce the administrative burden placed on
the INS, which already is overwhelmed with too many responsibili-
ties.
The INA, as amended by the Immigration  Act of 1990, also specifies
that no more than 10,000 asylees may adjust to permanent legal
resident status each year.  In FY 1996, 10,000 asylees adjusted to
permanent resident status, up from 7,800 in FY 1995 and 6,000 in FY
1994.  More than 18,000 cases were granted asylum in FY 1996
(combined INS and EOIR figure), each case representing one or
more individuals, in addition to the 6,500 Kurdish refugees resettled
through the asylum process in that fiscal year. The Commission is
seriously concerned that under the current system these develop-
ments will result in an unnecessary backlog of adjustment applica-
tions.  We strongly reiterate our belief, stressed in our 1995 report
on legal immigration, that the federal government should not man-
age immigration policy by backlogs and waiting lists.  Given the
recent reforms in the asylum system and the rigorous standard ap-
plied in granting asylum, numerical ceilings on adjustment are nei-
ther required nor good public policy.
However, we recognize that there are legitimate concerns as to the
total number of refugees admitted, including asylees.  The number
of asylees who are expected to obtain permanent resident status,
barring unforeseen changes in the pattern of asylum applications,
should be considered during the annual consultation on refugee
admissions.  The Refugee Act of 1980 already requires the President
to report on the number of asylees who adjust each year.  This
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Sources:   U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform.  1995.  Legal Immigration: Setting Priorities.
Washington, DC.  Department of State, Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration.
Chart 8.
U.S. Refugee Admissions 1975-1997
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requirement permits the President and Congress to assess the total
commitment the United States is making, via the combination of our
asylum and overseas resettlement program, towards protecting and
assisting refugees.
U.S. REFUGEE ADMISSIONS
FROM OVERSEAS
The United States has long been the principal country of resettle-
ment for refugees from overseas.  In just the past two decades, the
United States has resettled almost two million refugees from such
diverse countries as Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, the former Soviet
Union, Bosnia, Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, Liberia, Ethiopia, Somalia,
and Cuba.  While resettlement is but one element of a comprehen-
sive approach, and only a small proportion of refugees can be con-
sidered for admission to the United States, resettlement remains a
powerful instrument through which the United States exercises lead-
ership to find solutions to refugee crises.  It is also a manifestation
of one of our strongest traditions: to be a refuge to the world’s
persecuted.
The Commission strongly recommends that the U.S. continue its commit-
ment to resettle refugees as one of several elements of humanitarian pro-
tection for the persecuted.  Continuing a refugee admission program of
significant numbers is essential: to sustain our humanitarian com-
mitment to provide refuge to the persecuted; to pursue U.S. foreign
policy interests in promoting human rights; and to encourage inter-
national efforts to resettle persons requiring rescue or durable solu-
tions.  A well-run refugee resettlement program that brings Ameri-
cans into contact with refugees also can build support domestically
for refugee protection and for the international efforts and agencies
engaged in assistance and protection to refugees worldwide.
Resettlement
remains
a powerful
instrument
through which
the United States
exercises leadership
to find solutions
to refugee crises.
It is also a
manifestation
of one of our
strongest traditions:
America
as a refuge
to the world’s
persecuted.
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The Commission recommends that U.S. resettlement policy should rest on
the following principles and frameworks:
n Protection as a Core Priority.  The U.S. should give priority
to those who are in imminent danger within their own coun-
tries or countries of first asylum.
n Obligations to Per- sons Persecuted Be-cause of Close Asso-
ciation with the U.S. Government.  The U.S. has a moral
obligation to accept for resettlement per-sons who are perse-
cuted or who have a well-founded fear of persecution speci-
fically because of their former employment by or significant
assistance to the U.S. government or by agencies acting on
behalf of the U.S. government, unless these individuals pose
a security threat to this country or were themselves guilty of
persecuting others.
n Promotion of Human Rights and Democratization.  Selec-
tive resettlement of political dissidents and other victims of
serious human rights violations can be an important compo-
nent of U.S. foreign policy,
highlighting the human
rights abuses practiced by
other countries and,
thereby, supporting efforts
to encourage other coun-
tries to respect fundamen-
tal human rights and
democratic principles.
n U.S. Leadership in
Promoting Durable Solu-
tions.  Resettlement in the
U.S. should be undertaken
in the context of interna-
Rescue of Vietnamese
Boat People
[UNHCR Photo: P. Deloche]
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tional efforts to find durable solutions for refugees.  Many
of the world’s refugees cannot return to their country of
origin and cannot remain permanently in their country of
asylum.  U.S. pledges of resettlement can help encourage
other nations to do their fair share.
n Consideration of the Effects of Resettlement Decisions on
the Protection and Assistance of Refugees Worldwide.  Ad-
mission to the U.S. should be undertaken in close collabo-
ration with UNHCR and other receiving countries.
n Proportionality of Support for Resettlement.  The U.S.
should review carefully the proportionality of resources ex-
pended on resettlement relative to those required to assist,
protect, and find solutions for refugees worldwide and to
resolve refugee-producing situations.
n Flexibility in Policy and in Program Implementation.  Refu-
gee crises are difficult to predict with any degree of preci-
sion, making it imperative that the U.S. refugee program
maximize its flexibility and minimize its response time.
n Coordination and Consultation with Affected Agencies.
Refugee admission decisions have domestic and foreign
policy ramifications, necessitating consultation and coordi-
nation with a wide range of private agencies, state and local
governments, other nations, and international organizations.
The Commission recommends that the Bureau for Population, Refugees
and Migration, which is charged with determining which refugees are of
special concern to the U.S. for resettlement purposes, establish categories
based firmly on human rights and humanitarian considerations and allo-
cate admissions numbers according to these categories.  Fiscal Year 1997
processing guidelines specify five “priorities” for considering refu-
gees to be of special concern to the United States.  The first priority
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Chart 9.
Proposed Refugee Admissions Categories
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category encompasses refugees who need resettlement for protec-
tion purposes, followed by designated groups of special concern to
the U.S. and by family members of individuals with permanent
legal status in the U.S.  In practice, however, admission numbers are
not now allocated by these so-called priorities.  Instead, numerical
limits are set by geographic region, with suballocations for specific
nationalities within these regions.  The Commission believes a
prioritization and an allocation of numbers based on human rights
and humanitarian considerations would reflect more accurately the
reasons certain refugees are of special concern to the United States.
Such a categorization can be accomplished administratively with no
statutory changes.
The Commission suggests dividing categories for refugee admission
into two broad priorities, each with subgroups, and with numbers
allocated accordingly [Chart 9].
The first priority encompasses refugees whose immediate entry is
justified.  It has two subgroups: refugees who are in urgent need of
rescue and refugees who are the immediate relatives of persons
already living legally in the United States.  The Commission be-
lieves sufficient admission numbers should be allocated each year to
guarantee entry to all such bona fide applicants within this grouping.
The second priority includes refugees whose admission is of special
humanitarian interest to the United States but who are not in immi-
nent danger where they currently reside: refugees who are members
of designated groups who have a well-founded fear of persecution
because of their past association with the U.S. government or whose
admission will support U.S. foreign policy interests in promoting
human rights;  refugees with family ties to permanent residents of
the U.S., but who are not immediate relatives; and refugees in need
of durable solutions who can neither repatriate nor remain indefi-
nitely in their country of asylum.  This second group should be
allocated numbers on a spill-down basis [that is, the annual target
An allocation
and prioritization of
refugee admissions
based on human
rights and
humanitarian
considerations would
reflect
more accurately the
reasons
certain refugees
 are of special
concern to the
United States.
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for refugee admissions minus the numbers needed for Group One],
with the recognition that these refugees may remain in relative safety
where they are until an admission number is available.  Numbers
should be allocated separately to the three categories within the
second grouping, with a mechanism to move unused numbers be-
tween the categories.  More specifically, the categorization would
work as follows:
Priority One:
n Refugees Who Are in Immediate Need of Rescue.  Protec-
tion of refugees is at the heart of the refugee regime.  The
Commission believes the United States should continue to
give highest priority to the admission of refugees who face
individual endangerment, cannot find protection where they
are located or in another country, and for whom third-coun-
try resettlement in the U.S. is both a practical and realistic
solution.  Within this category are refugees who are in need
of legal protection from refoulement (or forced return), certain
refugee women at risk of rape or other violence who cannot
be protected where they are, victims of torture, and selected
refugees who are in urgent need of continuing medical or
other treatment not available in their country of first asy-
lum.  Also included in this category are refugees still within
their country of origin who require immediate rescue from
life- or liberty-threatening circumstances.
n Refugees Who Are Immediate Relatives (spouses, minor
children, and parents).  Imme-diate family members of U.S.
citizens, legal permanent residents, previously admitted refu-
gees, asylees and certain parolees admitted for long-term
residence should have high priority for admission, regard-
less of nationality.  The current system for admission of
refugees with family ties in the U.S. is fraught with incon-
sistencies and discriminatory practices.  Refugees from some
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nationalities (Liberians, Sudanese,
Burundians, Iraqis, and Iranians)
have access to reunification with
spouses, unmarried sons and
daughters, and parents.  Others
(Bosnian Muslims who applied
through March 1997) have access
to reunification with more distant
relatives, such as aunts and
uncles, who are not dependent on
the principal applicant.  Other na-
tionalities have no recourse to
family reunification other than
through regular immigration
channels or in the limited circumstances where a spouse or
minor is  “following-to-join” a previously-admitted refugee
or asylee.  A worldwide standard for admission of immedi-
ate relatives would be more equitable.
Priority Two (each to be assigned a target admission number):
n Refugee Members from Designated Subgroups.  This cat-
egory includes refugees who have a well-founded fear of
persecution because of their past association with the U.S.
government and refugees whose admission will support U.S.
foreign policy interests in promoting human rights.  For
example, the United States has long given priority to the
admission of Vietnamese who spent years in reeducation
camps because they had worked for the U.S. government.
In designating Burmese political dissidents as a group eli-
gible for resettlement, the U.S. reinforces our opposition to
the repression practiced in Burma [Myanmar].  Similarly,
the United States has designated religious minorities expe-
riencing past or present persecution in the former Soviet
Union and Iran for admission.  Designated groups from
A Vietnamese family
reunited in America
[ORR Photo: Mark Halevi]
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Bosnia now include: refugees detained on account of their
ethnicity, political opinion, or religion; victims of torture or
systemic and significant acts of violence against members of
targeted ethnic groups; and persons in mixed marriages.
Should the persons eligible under this category exceed our
targeted admissions level, family or other close ties to the
United States could be considered in giving priority for
admission.
n Refugees with Close Family Ties in the United States.
This category permits the resettlement of a specified num-
ber of refugees who have close family ties in the United
States but do not fit one of the other categories.  The United
States should take responsibility for resettling “our own,”
and we should expect other nations to do likewise.  The
difference in circumstances between refugees and immigrants
justifies a separate category for family-based refugee admis-
sions.  Unlike would-be immigrants, refugees with family
ties in the United States may be in precarious, even if not
life-threatening, situations and be unable to wait where they
are for approval of an immigrant petition.  Further, many
refugees have suffered significant loss of family members
during the very situations that made them refugees; more
extended family members may be the only surviving rela-
tives of refugees already living in the U.S.  These family
members can provide essential practical and psychological
support.  Admission numbers would be allocated on a world-
wide basis using a careful assessment of affidavits of rela-
tionship filed by U.S. family members on behalf of refugees
overseas.
n Refugees in Need of Durable Solutions in Accordance with
Principles of International Responsibility Sharing.  A press-
ing aim of the international refugee system is to find du-
rable solutions to refugee crises.  It is in neither our national
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interest nor that of other countries to see refugees remaining
in camps permanently.  For most refugees, repatriation is
the best and most likely solution, but there are refugees who
are unlikely to be able to repatriate and whose status in the
place of asylum does not present realistic prospects for a
satisfactory long-term solution.  This category encourages
the United States to work with other nations and UNHCR
to provide admission to that minority of refugees for whom
refugee resettlement presents the best likelihood for a du-
rable solution.  A specified number of admission slots would
be allocated to this category each year in accordance with
projections of resettlement needs and negotiations with other
countries about responsibility-sharing for this resettlement.
Should the need for durable solutions exceed our targeted
admissions level, family or other ties to the United States
could be considered in giving priority for admission under
this category.
The Commission recommends that admissions under each category include
family members and close household occupants who are dependent on the
principal applicant for financial or physical security.   Refugee admis-
sions should provide the opportunity for family and other close
household members  who are dependent on the principal applicant
for their financial support and/or physical security to enter with or
quickly follow-to-join the principal applicant.  Examples of indi-
viduals who might not qualify under a narrow interpretation of
family include foster children, grandparents, grandchildren, and un-
married adult sisters and aunts.  If not permitted to resettle with the
rest of the household, the dependent person may be left in a particu-
larly vulnerable situation, alone in what may be a hostile environ-
ment.  It makes no sense for our own resettlement program to create
refugees in urgent need of protection.  However, in implementing
this provision, adequate safeguards must be in place to prevent
fraud or abuse by individuals who are not, in fact, dependent on the
principal applicant.
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The Commission reaffirms its recommendation that the United States set
numerical targets—but not a statutory limit—for future refugee admis-
sions.  The Commission is opposed to establishing a statutory level
of admissions that can be exceeded only by special legislation.  Such
a provision could impede U.S. flexibility to respond to humanitarian
emergencies requiring higher admissions.  The Commission remains
concerned, however, that resettlement could drop to unacceptably
low levels as the need for the two principal re-
settlement efforts of the 1980s and early 1990s—
for refugees from Southeast Asia and the former
Soviet Union—declines.  Hence, we believe that
to preclude a steady erosion of admissions, it is
necessary to establish a minimum target or goal
for post-Cold War refugee admissions.3
The Commission recommends that the consultation
process be strengthened to ensure more effective
Congressional participation in the setting of admis-
sion priorities and levels.   As the Commission
noted in its 1995 report to Congress, the annual
consultations are at present often pro forma and
occur far too late in the planning process to be
effective.  The following reforms would permit
more timely and knowledgeable assessment of
the need for resettlement and the resources required to admit and
assist those admitted.  They also would permit a more meaningful
participation by Congress in the decisionmaking on refugee admis-
sions.
n Annual consultations on refugee admissions should con-
sider not only admission levels and priorities for the com-
ing year but also discuss projected need for resettlement
3 The Commission’s 1995 report, Legal Immigration: Setting Priorities,
contains additional discussion of numerical targets.
Afghan reufugees
[Photo: Nancy Leach]
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and appropriations for the following two years.  The an-
nual consultations should provide the opportunity not only
for substantive discussions on admission targets but also on
the level of appropriation required to pay the costs of the
projected resettlement.  These consultations should involve
both the Judiciary and Appropriations committees.  Consul-
tations that address refugee resettlement projections in the
out-years would foster the development of realistic targets
for future refugee admissions.  Such out-year projections
are already used in developing the President’s budget re-
quest for the Bureau for Population, Refugees and Migra-
tion and the Office of Refugee Resettlement.  The recom-
mended consultation process will permit greater consistency
between admissions numbers and appropriation of resources
by ensuring that admission and funding proposals are thor-
oughly vetted.
n The consultation process should provide an opportunity
for public hearings that involve a wide range of expert
views on refugee admissions.  The Consultation process
has two steps.  The Administration first develops its pro-
posal and Congress then assesses its adequacy.  Both phases
require more consultation with experts on refugee resettle-
ment needs and capacities and with state and local officials.
By law, Cabinet-level representatives must participate in the
formal consultations between the Executive Branch and
Congress, a requirement that often makes it difficult to sched-
ule hearings but does not necessarily invite a thorough ex-
amination of the implications and impact of the resettlement
decisions.  While the Administration often consults with the
private resettlement agencies and state governments assist-
ing refugees, the consultations with Congress seldom in-
volve these other players.  Nor is input solicited by either
the Administration or Congress from the wider range of
human rights and humanitarian organizations that have first-
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hand knowledge of the conditions precipitating the need for
resettlement.  Involving other experts and affected govern-
ment agencies in the assessment of refugee admission pri-
orities and numbers would provide a deeper under-stand-
ing of the domestic and international ramifications of the
President’s proposal.
The Commission recommends that the United States use an active, inclu-
sive process for identifying and making decisions regarding the admissibil-
ity of applicants for resettlement.  At present, resettlement on the basis
of compelling security concerns and durable solutions requires that
refugees be referred by the UNHCR or identified by a U.S. embassy.
The Commission believes the U.S. government should confer with
a broader set of agencies in identifying possible candidates for re-
settlement, including international and local human rights organiza-
tions, relief agencies providing assistance to refugees, and host gov-
ernments.  Department of State Refugee Coordinators now have
broad authority to decide whether to accept a referral from UNHCR
and would continue to exercise this authority in relationship to re-
ferrals from other sources.  The Refugee Coordinators would also
continue to consult with headquarters in Washington where appro-
priate.
The Commission cautions against excessive reliance on in-country process-
ing of refugees for admission to the United States.   In recent years, in-
country processing has become the norm in U.S. refugee admissions
from overseas.  Indeed, about 80 percent of all resettlement to this
country comes through in-country processing programs.  Processing
applications for admission while refugees are still within their own
countries of origin can be a useful tool through which the U.S. can
rescue individuals facing persecution without requiring them to make
what may be a dangerous journey to a country of asylum.  In-
country processing is also an appropriate vehicle for resettling vic-
tims of past persecution whom the U.S. wishes to bring to this
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country rather than leave where once they experienced torture, im-
prisonment, or other human rights violations.
However, in-country processing also presents a number of concerns
that argue for judicious use of such programs. The availability of in-
country processing has been used as a reason to deny asylum seek-
ers access to first asylum protection within the United States.  In-
country programs can place refugee applicants in danger because
processing generally takes place in public locations known to the
persecuting authorities.  When backlogs and waiting lists develop,
even already-approved applicants may remain in danger until they
are granted permission to travel to the United States.  Alternately,
as a recent report from the Department of State Inspector General
points out, in-country processing gives countries that produce refu-
gees (Vietnam, for example) substantial control over the U.S. re-
settlement program because these governments determine whether
specific applicants will be given permission to present themselves
for processing.
The Commission affirms the need for flexible and streamlined determina-
tions of eligibility for the U.S. admissions program.   Current procedures
are too cumbersome to permit a timely response to precisely the
type of refugee emergency that most requires resettlement.  The
most recent example is the 1996 decision to parole U.S.-employed
Kurds into Guam. Had they been accorded refugee status as a group
prior to evacuation, they would have been eligible for resettlement
as refugees.
n Streamlining of administrative processes would allow
quicker adjudication when short notice precludes current
procedures or when there is need to evacuate a refugee who
is in imminent danger.  The Executive Branch should review
the roles and responsibilities of the Department of State
Refugee Coordinators, the Joint Voluntary Agency, the INS,
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and the physicians conducting medical screening to identify
areas where, in urgent cases, the process might properly be
simplified or conducted within the United States after entry.
n Training and career development paths for U.S. officials
involved in the refugee admission program, including De-
partment of State Refugee Coordinators and INS examina-
tions staff, should be reviewed and revised to reflect the
nature of their responsibilities.  Refugee Coordinators often
arrive at their base with only minimal training to prepare
them to respond to the demands of the refugee situations
they monitor.  Serving in this capacity is not seen as a valu-
able career path for these Foreign Service Officers who ro-
tate through the assignment.  The more active nature of the
position contemplated by the Commission requires career
development reforms within the Department of State to at-
tract more experienced candidates.
INS officers making refugee determinations overseas have
not necessarily received the type of extensive training now
available to INS staff making these same determinations for
asylum applicants within the United States.  All INS officers
assigned to interview candidates for admission as refugees
should receive the training provided to asylum officers and,
to the extent possible, be drawn from experienced members
of the asylum corps.
n Narrowly-defined group profiles for adjudicating certain
refugee applications of humani-tarian concern to the U.S.
would facilitate processing when the government has made
a predetermination that it is because of their membership in
the specified group that the refugees have a well-founded
fear of persecution.  Unlike asylum, where the applicant is
self-selected, resettlement applies only to persons that the
U.S. has decided to process.  Using narrowly-designated
groups makes particular sense when the U.S. is offering a
Current
procedures
are too
cumbersome
to permit
a timely response
to just
the type of
refugee emergency
that most
requires
resettlement.
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durable solution to refugees whom we determine are mem-
bers of a group that cannot return to or remain within their
home countries.  An example would be the several thou-
sand Kurds who worked for the U.S. government and U.S.-
supported agencies in northern Iraq. The current interview
that seeks to determine why each principal applicant left
home is unnecessary when a group is defined in such highly
specific terms and objective criteria indicate that members
of that group would have a well-
founded fear of persecution if re-
quired to remain in or return to
their home country.  Instead, the
INS interview should be limited
to determining if the applicant is
indeed a member of the desig-
nated group.
The Commission recommends that refugees
be admitted as Legal Permanent Residents
[LPRs] unless the Attorney General de-
termines that there has been inadequate
opportunity prior to admission for the
INS officer to thoroughly review the
case(s).  Refugees are admitted now as conditional entrants and are
required to appear before INS one year after entry for adjustment
of status to permanent resident.  The provision is an unnecessary
burden on both INS and the refugee when applied to individuals
who undergo a thorough screening prior to entry.  In some in-
stances, however, such as where refugees are hastily evacuated, the
Attorney General could require adjustment of status up to one year
later.  This option protects against fraudulent entries when proper
prescreening is not possible, while eliminating unnecessary bureau-
cratic procedures for the government and the individuals.
Resettlement processing
of Benadir in Kenya
[Photo: CIR staff]
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Chart 10.
Geographic Distribution of Refugees in the U.S.
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TRANSITIONAL REFUGEE
ASSISTANCE AND SERVICES
A cornerstone of refugee policy is the exemption of refugees from
the provisions of immigration law that otherwise bar admission of
individuals who are likely to become public charges.  Failing to
exempt refugees from exclusion on public charge grounds can have
extremely serious consequences—as the U.S. learned when German
Jewish refugees who were refused admission to the U.S. on these
grounds perished in the Holocaust.  As discussed in greater detail
below, the Commission supports a domestic assistance program that
helps refugees, admitted despite the possibility that they may be-
come public charges, to achieve economic self-sufficiency after entry
while providing full federal financial support for refugees who be-
cause of age or disability are unable to support themselves.
The Commission endorses a domestic refugee resettlement program of as-
sistance and services whose aim is the social and civic integration into
local communities of all refugees, as well as economic self-sufficiency of
those refugees who are employable.  Most refugees arrive without the
financial resources, language skills, knowledge of the U.S. work-
place, or occupational skills that would permit a smooth and quick
adjustment to a productive new life.  Moreover, refugees may have
experienced torture, prolonged malnutrition, and other barriers to
their immediate adaptation to life in the United States without some
period of special assistance.  Consequently, the Refugee Act autho-
rized a special refugee assistance program for which funding is
appropriated annually.  This program is administered by the Bureau
for Population, Migration and Refugees [PRM] in the Department of
State and the Office of Refugee Resettlement [ORR] in the Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services.
The following elements are both significant to the historical suc-
cesses of the domestic resettlement program and important to pre-
serve to the maximum extent possible:
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n A flexible national capacity that can respond quickly to
changing needs and circumstances, with structural capacity
to expand and contract in response to the international refu-
gee-producing events that inevitably will create significant
increases and decreases;
n Local flexibility and diversity  in resettlement programs
that can accommodate differences in state and local resources,
local labor market conditions, local agency capacity, and
available complementary community services;
n Specialized services to orient and assist refugees in adjust-
ing to their new country, preparing for employment, finding
jobs, and maintaining employment;
n Public/private-sector partnerships that draw on the strengths
of both;
n A structure that promotes private giving and enlists com-
munity volunteers;
n Participation of the many local, state, and national agencies
that have a history of contributing in the resettlement of
refugees;
n A placement policy that seeks to ameliorate local impact
and facilitate effective resettlement;
n Local accountability for economic, social, and civic integra-
tion outcomes; and
n Federal responsibility for the costs of the domestic resettle-
ment program.
A domestic assistance
program
should help
refugees
achieve
economic
self-sufficiency
after entry
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provide
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ESTIMATED COSTS ($ millions)PROGRAM
Federal Programs
Reception and Placement
Refugee Processing
Overseas Language/Orientation Programs
Transportation
Refugee Processing
Unaccompanied Minors
Targeted Assistance Service Grants
Social Services
Matching Grants
Refugee Cash Assistance
Refugee Medical Assistance
State Admin. Costs
Food Stamps
Federal/State  Programs
Supplemental Security Income
Medicaid
   (12 mos. for AFDC, SSI,  GA
clients)
AFDC
   (12 mos.)
State and Local Programs
General Assistance
(available only in some states)
Total Costs
Per capita (in dollars)
for FY  '95 arrivals (96,924)
Note: aActual costs using ORR and DOS data from North, David.  1997.  Estimates of the Financial Costs of Refugee
Resettlement: The Current System and Five Alternative Models.  CIR: Washington, DC.
bEstimates from Department of State, Proposed Refugee Admissions for FY 1995.
cEstimates by David North.
dDoes not reflect educational costs.
Chart 11.
Estimated Costs of the Current System
(for new refugee arrivals during FY 1995)
Fed. $ 67.8a
Fed. $ 18.6b
Fed. $   6.1b
Fed. $ 71.6b
Fed        $ 14.7b
Fed. $ 23.0a
Fed. $ 44.5a
Fed. $ 80.8a
Fed. $ 23.6a
Private $ 23.6c
Fed. $ 55.9a
Fed. $ 95.7a
Fed. $ 26.3a
Fed. $ 64.2c
Fed. $ 83.5c
State $ 14.7c
Fed. $108.8c
State $ 83.7c
Fed. $ 75.3c
States $ 64.1c
State &
Local $   3.2c
Fed. $860.4
State $165.7
Private $  23.6
Total  $1,049.7
DOS
DOS
DOS
DOS
DOJ
DHHS
DHHS
DHHS
DHHS
DHHS
DHHS
DHHS
USDA
SSA
DHHS
States
DHHS
States
State &
local govts.
AGENCY
 $10,830d
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The Commission supports the current array of assistance and services for
newly arriving refugees and recommends increased attention to services
that prepare refugees for naturalization.  The Commission believes the
following array of assistance and services should characterize the
refugee resettlement program:
n Reception and placement into local communities with a
focus on initial basic maintenance assistance (food, clothing,
shelter), orientation, and referral to services;
n Health screening to identify and follow up on certain com-
municable diseases;
n Transitional cash assistance for needy newly arriving refu-
gees who do not qualify for the Supplemental Security In-
come [SSI] or Temporary Assistance for Needy Families
[TANF] public assistance programs;
n Transitional medical bene-fits for needy newly arriving refu-
gees who do not qualify for Medicaid;
n Refugee-specific social services and educational services
(i.e., services specifically designed to serve refugees), such
as employment, English as a Second Language [ESL], orien-
tation, case manage-ment, and mental health counseling.
n Naturalization preparation, including outreach, civics edu-
cation, and assistance in applying for citizenship.
The Commission supports the continuation of a public/private partnership
to help refugees quickly and effectively achieve economic self-sufficiency,
but recommends a more explicit division of responsibility than currently
exists.  Simultaneously, the Commission urges the federal, state and local
agencies to develop a national plan for streamlining the program.  The
Commission heard extensive discussion of the problems inherent in
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the current partnerships among federal, state, and local public and
private agencies.  Chief among these concerns were the complexity
of the funding process and reporting requirements, the overlap of
programs and responsibilities, the inappropriateness of welfare pro-
grams as the vehicle for providing assistance, and the lack of clear
accountability for the outcomes of the program.
In an ideal world the Commission would urge that all refugees,
except those eligible for SSI, be assisted through a separate, spe-
cially designed refugee cash assistance program linked to a system
of services targeted to their circumstances.  In practice, however, the
obstacles to this are considerable.  Such a program would require
the combined resources of the existing ORR program plus those
spent under TANF for refugees.
However, the TANF budget is a
fixed block grant to states, and hence
its resources could not easily be di-
verted to a separate refugee pro-
gram.  Given the zero-sum federal
budget process, it is unlikely that suf-
ficient new funds would be allocated
to ORR to cover the costs of a pro-
gram for all refugees.
Moreover, the advantages of main-
taining the involvement of both the
private and public sectors in resettle-
ment may outweigh the disadvan-
tages of some fragmentation in pro-
gram delivery.  Where resettlement has been effective, all partners
have contributed positively   and their participation has sustained
broad public support for the admission of refugees. At the same
time, however,  the Commission urges the existing partner agencies
to develop a plan to streamline funding and reporting.
English language instruction
and orientation
[Photo: Mark Halevi]
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The Commission also urges increased planning and coordination in
the local resettlement of refugees and the decisions regarding the
placement of refugees in local communities.  Too often, localities
reported to the Commission that they are given insufficient advance
notice to prepare for the arrival of refugees.  In particular, the Com-
mission was disturbed by reports from local schools of inadequate—
or no—information on anticipated arrivals of refugee children with
special needs.  The Commission recommends that PRM and the
voluntary agencies develop improved procedures of notification to
local schools about the forthcoming arrival of refugee children and
to all relevant state and local agencies about the arrival of families.
This will be particularly important under the Commission’s recom-
mendation of shared public and private sector responsibility.
The Commission further recommends a three-year trial period dur-
ing which roles and responsibilities would be defined and divided
as follows:
n Reception and Placement [R&P] grants from the Depart-
ment of State to the private voluntary agencies would con-
tinue to cover all arriving refugees.  At present, R&P grants
cover a period of up to 120 days of diminishing responsibili-
ties. The Commission proposes that R&P activities be lim-
ited to prearrival and reception and maintenance during the
first thirty days only, to reduce currently overlapping re-
sponsibilities between R&P and the ORR-funded programs.
n Health screening grants, administered by public health
agencies, would continue to cover all arriving refugees.
The health screening could be funded through a per capita
grant to states.
n The private sector subsequently would be funded by ORR
to assume principal responsibility for refugees who are
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not eligible for TANF or SSI.  Under the Commission’s
proposal, the voluntary agencies would provide cash and
medical assistance and services to those refugees who were
ineligible for TANF or SSI.  Cash and medical assistance
would be provided for up to a specified time period [a
maximum of eight months assistance is permitted under
current policy].  Consideration should be given to providing
medical assistance through private health care programs,
rather than through Medicaid. The voluntary agencies would
be charged with implementing an integrated program of
assistance and services and would receive a proportionate
share of appropri-ations for social services, cash and medi-
cal assistance, and administration.
n The public sector would have principal responsibility for
refugees who qualify for TANF, SSI, and Medicaid.  Cash
and medical assistance would be provided to them through
these programs and would be funded by the federal and
state funds that support these programs.  In addition, states
would receive an allocation of funds appropriated for refu-
gee  social services proportional to the number of refugees
enrolled in the TANF and SSI programs.  States also would
receive the funds appropriated for targeted assistance to
provide longer-term and supplemental services to refugees
or to offset state costs.  States would have the option to
subcontract or grant any or all of these functions and funds
to private resettlement agencies.
The Commission believes that the recommended public/private part-
nership should continue for a three-year trial period during which
its effectiveness would be evaluated to assess whether it should be
continued or modified.  This trial period will provide time to deter-
mine if the new TANF welfare program, which is designed to help
its clients rapidly achieve economic self-sufficiency, is responsive to
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the needs of refugees.  It also will test whether the private agencies
have the capacity to administer effectively a comprehensive pro-
gram of services and cash and medical assistance in many different
sites across the country.
The Commission recommends
strengthening the mechanisms
by which the refugee program is
funded.  The current financing
system does not provide suffi-
cient clarity about the resources
available for resettlement.  The
recommended statutory changes
are intended to facilitate man-
agement of appropriations for
the program and responses to
emergency situations.  The Refu-
gee Act should be changed to:
n Specify a minimum time
period of special refugee cash
and medical assistance pro-
vided to refugees not eligible
for TANF or SSI.  Under current law, refugees may receive
cash and medical assistance for up to thirty-six months.  In
practice, the actual period of eligibility—now eight months—
is determined by budget rather than need for such assis-
tance.  A legislated minimum period of eligibility would
preclude such budget-driven program policy.
n Permit the appropriation of “no year” money for the cash
and medical assistance portion of the ORR budget, thus
allowing automatic rollover of funds for these costs and
providing the flexibility in budgeting and administration
needed for such an unpredictable program.
Medical care
[Photo: Betsy K. Frampton]
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n Change the consultation process to ensure greater consis-
tency between admission decisions and appropriation of
funds to support refugee assistance and services.  As dis-
cussed under refugee admissions, the Commission favors
an inclusive consultation on the administration’s proposal
for the upcoming fiscal year, as well as on two additional
out-year projections of admissions.
n Establish a domestic emergency fund to pay for unantici-
pated costs associated with admission of refugees under the
emergency consultation process or, if needed, to cover the
minimum cash or medical assistance costs when they ex-
ceed the amount available for these purposes in a specific
fiscal year.
The Commission recommends that under the leadership of the National
Security Council, existing federal agencies develop an operating plan for
improved national coordination.  Better coordination is needed among
the federal agencies and between the federal agencies and other
public and private agencies to: (1) ensure consistency between ad-
mission decisions and transitional assistance requirements; (2) moni-
tor and assess the adequacy of statutory and regulatory authorities
to resettle refugees and develop a legislative agenda to make needed
corrections; (3) improve local notification and preparation for arriv-
als, and (4) manage responses when emergency consultations are
needed.  The Commission believes that the National Security Coun-
cil is the appropriate venue for this function.
The Commission recommends that Congress make urgently needed correc-
tions in the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation
Act of 1996.    In its 1994 and 1995 reports to Congress, the Commis-
sion recommended against categorical denial of eligibility for public
benefits to lawfully-resident immigrants and refugees.  We continue
to believe that such bars to eligibility are inconsistent with U.S.
national interests and that the safety net provided by needs-tested
1 9 9 7
REFUGEE POLICY
- 62 -
U.S. COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION REFORM
programs should continue to be available to those whom we have
affirmatively accepted as legal permanent residents.  With regard to
refugees, two of the Act’s provisions pose particular problems:
n Inappropriate Time Limits on Eligibility of Elderly and
Disabled Refugees for SSI and Other Federal Needs-based
Programs.  Congress permitted refugees to retain eligibility
for public benefit programs during their first five years in
the country.  Thereafter, refugees cannot obtain public assis-
tance unless they naturalize.  Thus, a refugee eligible for SSI
and food stamps on arrival at age seventy will lose them at
age seventy-five.  Because it can take up to a year to natu-
ralize, such aged and disabled refugees will suffer a disrup-
tive break in coverage.  Also, many elderly and some dis-
abled persons will have great difficulty passing the natural-
ization requirements.  Refugees are not subject to public
charge grounds for exclusion and many do not have family
sponsors to provide support.  Providing continuing cover-
age under SSI, food stamps, and other means-
tested federal benefit programs to elderly and
disabled refugees would strengthen the U.S.
capacity to offer resettlement to some of the
world’s most vulnerable refugees—the aged
and disabled.
n Inappropriate Eligibility Provisions
for TANF-eligible Refugees.  At present,
refugees are eligible for TANF only during
their first five years in the United States and
lose subsequent eligibility unless they natu-
ralize.  We believe that a small modification
that would treat refugees as the law treats
citizens—giving them a lifetime eligibility of
five years—would make more sense.  Pro-
Elderly Bosnian refugee
[UNHCR Photo: A. Hollmann]
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gram experience shows that refugees are most likely to
become self-sufficient if they enter the labor force within
their first year in the United States.  The existing provision
may have the unintended effect of encouraging refugees to
delay entry into the labor force, which would be detrimen-
tal to their likelihood of success.  The proposed change is
equitable and corrects a potential disincentive to employ-
ment.
CONCLUSION
Leadership is the theme of this report.  Through the example of our
own policies as well as leadership in international fora, the United
States should work towards adoption of more effective policies to
avert, respond to, and resolve refugee and related humanitarian
crises.  The Commission hopes these recommendations will serve as
a blue-print for this renewed U.S. leadership.
Residential destruction
in Bosnia/Hercegovina
[Department of Defense photo]
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COVER ART: THE STATUE OF LIBERTY (LIBERTY ENLIGHTENING
THE WORLD), A GIFT FROM FRANCE THAT WAS INTENDED
AS A REPRESENTATION OF REPUBLICAN IDEALS, HAS FOR
MORE THAN A CENTURY BEEN THE PREEMINENT SYMBOL OF
IMMIGRATION TO THE U.S.  THE BLINDFOLDED STATUE OF
JUSTICE, DERIVED FROM THE GREEK GODDESS, THEMIS,
REPRESENTS THE ORDER OF SOCIETY ESTABLISHED BY LAW,
CUSTOM, AND EQUITY.  THESE TWO SYMBOLS HIGHLIGHT
THE COMMISSION'S VIEW THAT A CREDIBLE IMMIGRATION
POLICY MUST UPHOLD BOTH OUR IMMIGRATION TRADITION
AND OUR COMMITMENT TO THE RULE OF LAW.
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The Commissioners and staff
dedicate this final report
of the bipartisan
Commission on Immigration Reform
to the memory of
Barbara Jordan
Chair, U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform
December 14, 1993—January 17, 1996
“We are a nation of immigrants, dedicated to the rule of law.
That is our history—and it is our challenge to ourselves.
. . .It is literally a matter of who we are as a nation
and who we become as a people.  E Pluribus Unum.
Out of many, one.  One people.  The American people.”
(Barbara Jordan, August 1995)
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September 30, 1997
The Honorable Newt Gingrich, Speaker of the House of Representatives
The Honorable Richard Gephardt, Minority Leader of the House of Representatives
The Honorable Trent Lott, Majority Leader of the Senate
The Honorable Tom Daschle, Minority Leader of the Senate
On behalf of the U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform, it is my pleasure to submit our Final
Report, Becoming an American: Immigration and Immigrant Policy.
As mandated by the Immigration Act of 1990 [Public Law 101-649], this bipartisan Commission
has examined and made recommendations regarding the implementation and impact of U.S.
immigration policy.  In fulfilling our mission, the Commission has held more than forty public
hearings, consultations, site visits and expert discussions throughout the United States and in
certain key foreign countries.
This report underscores the need for credible, coherent immigrant and immigration policy.
Admission to this nation is only the first step of a process by which an immigrant becomes an
American.  Through the process of Americanization, immigrants become part of our commu-
nities and our communities learn from and adapt to their presence.  We set out recommenda-
tions for immigrant policies that enhance this process through orientation services for immi-
grants and their new communities, English and civics education, and a credible, efficient natu-
ralization process.
We also recommend immigration reforms.  Since the Commission issued its 1994 report on
illegal migration, significant progress has been made in improving border management, increas-
ing criminal alien removals, reforming the asylum process, responding to mass migration emer-
gencies, and pilot testing new worksite verification procedures.  Illegal migration remains a
problem, however, necessitating continued deterrence and removal efforts.  In addition, we
reiterate our call for legal immigration reform and make new recommendations regarding
limited duration admissions.
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In addition, we urge Congress to reconsider the welfare reform legislation adopted in 1996 that
makes legal immigrants ineligible for basic safety net programs.  Requiring immigrants to be-
come citizens in order to receive the protections afforded by these programs debases citizenship.
Further, making citizenship rather than legal status the determinant of eligibility blurs the dis-
tinction between legal immigrants, whom we welcome, and illegal aliens.
Restoring the credibility of our immigration system cannot happen unless the federal govern-
ment is structured and managed effectively.  While the Executive Branch has taken significant
steps to address many of the weaknesses in current operations, the organization of the immi-
gration system undermines reform efforts.  Hence, in this report, we recommend a fundamental
restructuring and streamlining of responsibilities for immigration.
Our work benefitted greatly from the effective cooperation we received from the Executive
Branch and both Houses of Congress.  We also thank the dozens of researchers who have
contributed the results of their scholarship and the hundreds of community leaders, government
officials, service providers and other experts who participated in our public hearings and con-
sultations.
I particularly thank my fellow Commissioners.  We have struggled with many tough issues, and
we have reached consensus on nearly all of our recommendations.  Without the dedication, hard
work, and good humor of the members of this Commission, we could not have achieved this
agreement. The work of the Commission could not have been accomplished without the support
of an extraordinary staff led by Susan Martin, Executive Director and Andrew Schoenholtz,
Deputy Director, assisted by the members of the Policy Research, the Public Affairs, Editorial,
and  Administrative Staffs.  Each staff member has worked tirelessly to provide the Commission
with volumes of valuable information, policy memoranda, and logistical support.  The Commis-
sion is also indebted to the Executive Branch for lending outstanding career persons to serve on
the Commission’s staff.
Sincerely,
Shirley M. Hufstedler
Chair
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INTRODUCTION
Immigration and immigrant policy is about immigrants, their fami-
lies and the rest of us.  It is about the meaning of American nation-
ality and the foundation of national unity.  It is about uniting per-
sons from all over the world in a common civic culture.
The process of becoming an American is most simply called “Ameri-
canization,” which must always be a two-way street.  All Ameri-
cans, not just immigrants, should understand the importance of our
shared civic culture to our national community.  This final report of
the U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform makes recommenda-
tions to further the goals of Americanization by setting out immi-
grant policies to help orient immigrants and their new communities,
to improve educational programs that help immigrants and their
children learn English and civics, and to reinforce the integrity of
the naturalization process through which immigrants become U.S.
citizens.
This report also makes recommendations regarding immigration
policy.  It reiterates and updates the conclusions we reached in three
interim reports—on unlawful migration, legal immigration, and
refugee and asylum policy—and makes additional recommendations
for reforming immigration policies.  Further, in this report, the
Commission recommends ways to improve the structure and man-
agement of the federal agencies responsible for achieving the goals
of immigration policy.    It is our hope that this final report  Becom-
ing An American: Immigration and Immigrant Policy, along with our
three interim reports, constitutes a full response to the work as-
signed the Commission by Congress: to assess the national interest
in immigration and report how it can best be achieved.
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MANDATE AND METHODS
Public Law 101-649, the Immigration Act of 1990 [IMMACT], estab-
lished this Commission to review and evaluate the impact of immi-
gration policy.  More specifically, the Commission must report on
immigration’s impact on: the need for labor and skills; employment
and other aspects of the economy; social, demographic, and envi-
ronmental conditions; and the foreign policy and national security
interests of the United States.  The Commission engaged in a wide
variety of fact-finding activities to fulfill this mandate.  Site visits
were conducted throughout the United States.  Commission mem-
bers visited immigrant and refugee communities in California, Texas,
Florida, New York, Massachusetts, Illinois, Arizona, Washington,
Kansas, Virginia, Washington, DC, Puerto Rico and the Common-
wealth of the Northern Mariana Islands.  Some Commission and
staff members also visited such major source countries as Mexico,
the Dominican Republic, Cuba, Haiti, and the Philippines.  To in-
crease our understanding of  international refugee policy issues,
members and staff of the Commission visited Bosnia, Croatia, Ger-
many, and Kenya, and consulted with Geneva-based officials from
the U.N. High Commission for Refugees and the International Or-
ganization for Migration.  We held more than forty public hearings,
consultations with government and private sector officials, and ex-
pert roundtable discussions.
TODAYS IMMIGRANTS
The effects of immigration are numerous, complex, and varied. Im-
migrants contribute in many ways to the United States: to its vi-
brant and diverse communities; to its lively and participatory de-
mocracy; to its vital intellectual and cultural life; to its renowned
job-creating entrepreneurship and marketplaces; and to its family
values and hard-work ethic.  However, there are costs as well as
benefits from today’s immigration.  Those workers most at risk in
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Category of Admission 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
TOTAL 810,635 880,014 798,394 716,194 909,959
SUBJECT TO THE NUMERICAL CAP 655,541 719,701 662,029 593,234 771,604
FAMILY-BASED IMMIGRANTS 502,995 539,209 497,682 460,653 595,540
Immediate Relatives of U.S. citizens 235,484 255,059 249,764 220,360 350,192
Spouses and children 170,720 192,631 193,394 171,978 283,592
Parents 64,764 62,428 56,370 48,382 66,600
Children born abroad to alien residents 2,116 2,030 1,883 1,894 1,658
Family-sponsored immigrants 213,123 226,776 211,961 238,122 293,751
Unmarried sons/daughters of U.S. citizens 12,486 12,819 13,181 15,182 20,885
Spouses and children of LPRs 90,486 98,604 88,673 110,960 145,990
Sons and daughters of LPRs 27,761 29,704 26,327 33,575 36,559
Married sons/daughters of U.S. citizens 22,195 23,385 22,191 20,876 25,420
Siblings of U.S. citizens 60,195 62,264 61,589 57,529 64,897
Legalization dependents 52,272 55,344 34,074 277 184
EMPLOYMENT-BASED IMMIGRANTS 116,198 147,012 123,291 85,336 117,346
Priority workers 5,456 21,114 21,053 17,339 27,469
Professionals w/ adv. deg. or of advanced ability 58,401 29,468 14,432 10,475 18,436
Skilled, professionals, other workers, (CSPA) 47,568 87,689 76,956 50,245 62,674
Skilled, professionals, other workers 47,568 60,774 55,659 46,032 62,273
Chinese Student Protection Act (CSPA) X 26,915 21,297 4,213 401
Special immigrants 4,063 8,158 10,406 6,737 7,831
Investors 59 583 444 540 936
Professionals or highly skilled (Old 3rd) 340 X X X X
Needed skilled or unskilled workers (Old 6th) 311 X X X X
DIVERSITY PROGRAMS 36,348 33,480 41,056 47,245 58,718
Diversity permanent X X X 40,301 58,174
Diversity transition 33,911 33,468 41,056 6,994 544
Nationals of adversely affected countries 1,557 10 X X X
Natives of underrepresented countries 880 2 X X X
NOT SUBJECT TO THE NUMERICAL CAP 155,094 160,313 136,365 122,960 138,323
Amerasians 17,253 11,116 2,822 939 954
Cuban/Haitian Entrants 99 62 47 42 29
Parolees, Soviet and Indochinese 13,661 15,772 8,253 3,120 2,283
Refugees and Asylees 117,037 127,343 121,434 114,632 128,367
Refugee adjustments 106,379 115,539 115,451 106,795 118,345
 Asylee adjustments 10,658 11,804 5,983 7,837 10,022
Registered Nurses and their families 3,572 2,178 304 69 16
Registry, entered prior to 1/1/72 1,293 938 667 466 356
Other 2,179 2,904 2,838 3,692 6,318
Note: X = Not Applicable.  Excludes persons granted LPR status under the provisions of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986.
Source: Immigration and Naturalization Service, Statistics Division.
Immigrant Admissions by Major Category:
FYs 1992-1996
U.S. COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION REFORM
1 9 9 7
RECOMMENDATIONS
- 4 -
our restructuring economy—low-skilled workers in production and
service jobs—are those who directly compete with today’s low-skilled
immigrants.  Further, immigration presents special challenges to cer-
tain states and local communities that disproportionately bear the
fiscal and other costs of incorporating newcomers.
Characteristics of Immigrants
In FY 1996 (the last year for which data are available), more than
900,000 immigrants came to the United States from 206 nations, for
a variety of reasons and with a diverse set of personal characteris-
tics.  Not surprisingly, the characteristics of immigrants from differ-
ent sending countries vary, as do their effects on the U.S.  There are
also differences between immigrants admitted under different classes
of admission.  These differences generally reflect the statutory pro-
visions that guide admissions.  [See Appendix for description of
IMMACT’s more specific provisions and its effects.]
Places of Origin.  Asia and North America (i.e., Mexico, Canada,
the Caribbean, and Central America) remain the sending regions
with the largest share of immigrants.  Mexico remains the largest
sending country and its share of total legal immigrants to the U.S.
increased from an average of 12 percent in the 1980s to more than
13 percent in FY 1994 and up to 18 percent in FY 1996.  The effects
of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 [IRCA], which
resulted in the legalization of about two million formerly illegal
Mexican residents, explains this trend.  Even though the special
admission category for the spouses of legalized aliens’ dependents
has been discontinued, Mexico benefits from the IMMACT’s removal
of per- country limits on the numerically limited spouse and chil-
dren class of admission (FB-2A).
IMMACT established a transitional and a permanent “diversity”
category for countries whose admission numbers were adversely
1996
Top Ten
Countries of
Origin of
Legal
Immigrants
Mexico 159,731
Philippines 55,778
India 44,781
Vietnam 42,006
Mainland China 41,662
Dominican Republic 39,516
Cuba 26,415
Ukraine 21,051
Russia 19,646
Jamaica 19,029
Source: INS FY 1996
Public Use Admissions Data.
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affected by the Immigration Act of 1965.    The transitional program
was in effect from FY 1992 to 1994, but unused visas were carried
over through FY 1996.  The permanent program went into effect in
FY 1995.  European countries benefitted the most from the transi-
tional program, which mandated that as many as 40 percent of the
visas could go to nationals of Ireland.  Actual Irish admissions
reached only 35 percent, with Polish immigrants accounting for an
even larger share (38 percent).  Under the permanent diversity pro-
gram, 42 percent of the immigrants came from European countries
and 35 percent came from Africa.  The effect on African admissions
is particularly noteworthy as Africans account for less than 1 per-
cent of immigrants in other admission categories.
Origins of Diversity Immigrants
versus All Other* Immigrants
*Other includes immigrants in family, employment, and humanitarian-based
categories of admission.
Source: INS Public Use Admissions Data.
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Intended U.S. Destinations.  Immigrants in FY 1996 continue to
select just a few states as their destinations.  About two-thirds in-
tend to reside in California, New York, Texas, Florida, and New
Jersey.  One-quarter of admissions are to California alone with an-
other one-seventh to New York.  New York City retains its place as
the pre-eminent immigrant city with 15 percent of immigrants in-
tending to go there.  About 7 percent of immigrants intend to go to
Los Angeles, and Miami and Chicago are in third place with about
4.5 percent each of the total.  There has been little change in these
leading destinations since IMMACT.  However, some new destina-
tions have emerged in recent years.  For example, during the past
decade, such midwestern and southern states as Mississippi, Ne-
braska, Kansas, Georgia and North Carolina saw more than a dou-
bling of the number of immigrants intending to reside there.  Al-
though the numbers are significantly smaller than the more tradi-
tional destinations, absorbing more new immigrants can be a chal-
lenge for these newer destinations that often do not have the immi-
gration-related infrastructure of the traditional receiving communi-
ties.
Age.  Immigrants in FY 1996 remain young, with the largest propor-
tion being in their later teens or twenties.  A little more than one-
fifth are children 15 years of age or younger, and another one-fifth
are 45 years or older.  More than one-half of family-based immi-
grants are younger than 30 years of age, reflecting the predominance
of spouses and children.  Because of beneficiaries, employment-
based immigrants have just as many minor dependents age 15 years
and younger as other groups, but more than two-fifths of these
employment-based immigrants themselves are 30-44 years, the ex-
perienced and highly productive working ages.  Diversity immi-
grants have a similar, yet somewhat younger, age distribution than
other classes of admission.  In contrast, and in large part due to
those admitted as refugees from the former Soviet Union, humani-
tarian admissions tend to be somewhat older than other immigrants.
1996:
Top Ten
Intended States
of Residence
of Legal
Immigrants
California 199,221
New York 153,731
Texas 82,229
Florida 79,067
New Jersey 63,162
Illinois 42,154
Massachusetts 23,017
Virginia 21,329
Maryland 20,683
Washington 18,718
Source: INS FY 1996
Public Use Admissions Data.
Top Ten
Intended
Metro Areas
of Residence
of Legal
Immigrants
New York 133,168
Los Angeles 64,285
Miami 41,527
Chicago 39,989
Washington DC 34,327
Houston 21,387
Boston 18,726
San Diego 18,226
San Francisco 18,171
Newark 17,939
Source:
http:/www.ins.usdoj.gov/
stats/annual/fy96/997.html
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Gender.  Females were 54 percent of admissions in FY 1996.  There
had been an essentially even balance of men and women during the
decade of the 1980s.  The increased share of females in the 1990s
parallels the historical tendency toward more female immigrants
throughout much of the post-World War II period.  It also reflects
the admission of the spouses of legalized aliens who were predomi-
nantly male.  In FY 1996, family-based admissions were predomi-
nantly female (57 percent) and employment-based admissions (in-
cluding beneficiaries) were evenly balanced by gender.   Diversity
(45 percent female) and humanitarian (48 percent female) admis-
sions, in contrast, had more male immigrants.  That a slight majority
of  FY 1996 humanitarian admissions were male is somewhat sur-
prising given that worldwide refugee populations are dispropor-
tionately female.
English ability.  The Immigration and Naturalization Service [INS]
admissions data do not include information on English language
ability (or education, as discussed below).  The following analysis
draws instead on preliminary data from the New Immigrant Survey
[NIS],1 which studied a sample of immigrants admitted in FY 1996.
The NIS is a pilot study designed to test the feasibility of a longi-
Age Groups of 1996 Legal Immigrants
(Principals and Derivative Beneficiaries)
GROUP  ALL  FAMILY EMPLOYMENT DIVERSITY HUMANITARIAN
15 yrs. & younger 22%   23%     20%   22%     20%
16 through 29 yrs. 31%   34%     23%   33%     27%
30 through 44 yrs. 27%   23%     44%   34%     24%
45 through 60 yrs. 15%   14%     12%   10%     21%
65 years & older  5%    5%      0%    1%      8%
Source: INS FY 1996 Public Use Admissions Data.
1 Jasso, G.;  Massey, D.S.;   Rosenzweig, M.R.;  Smith,  J.P.  1997.  The New
Immigrant Survey [NIS] Pilot Study: Preliminary Results.  Paper presented
at the Joint Meeting of the Public Health Conference on Records and
Statistics and the Data Users Conference, Washington, DC. (July.)
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English Language Proficiency among
New Adult Immigrants  (18 years and
older): 1996
Source: Jasso, G.; et al. 1997.  New Immigrant Survey Pilot Study.
tudinal immigrant survey.  Although the data are not yet published,
analysis indicates that it offers promise of providing certain infor-
mation about immigrants that has not previously been available.
The NIS, using the same measure as the U.S. Census, reports on the
English language proficiency of adult legal immigrants who are 18
years and older.  The initial results show that employment-based
immigrants report the greatest English ability—70 percent of em-
ployment-based admissions report speaking at least fairly well and
less than 10 percent speak very little or no English (the remainder
report an “average” speaking ability).  About 37 percent of family-
based admissions report speaking English at least fairly well and an
almost equal proportion report speaking little or no English.  The
diversity immigrants tend to report even less English ability, despite
the requirement that they have at least a high school education.  The
humanitarian admissions trail the furthest behind in reported En-
glish language ability.  Only 16 percent report speaking English at
least fairly well, while more than 50 percent report speaking little or
no English.
PERCENT
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Education.  The years of schooling completed by immigrants is
perhaps one of the most critical measures of skill level.  The NIS
provides our first indicators of years of education of adult legal
immigrants at the time of their admission.  As found in studies of
foreign-born residents, the immigrants surveyed by the NIS tend to
cluster at the higher or lower ends of the educational spectrum and
differ significantly in their educational attainment by class of admis-
sion.  Fully 46 percent of employment-based admissions have com-
pleted four years of college or a graduate degree.  This figure in-
cludes principals and beneficiaries, making it likely that well-edu-
cated employment-based immigrants tend to have well-educated
spouses.  In contrast, just 17 percent of family-based immigrants 25
years and older have completed a college-level education while 42
percent have less than a high school education.
Diversity immigrants are required to have a high school education
or two years of skilled work experience.  The NIS data show that
diversity immigrants tend to be better educated than family-based,
Educational Attainment
of Legal Immigrants
(25 years and older): 1996
Source: Jasso, G.; et al. 1997.  New Immigrant Survey Pilot Study.
0
10
20
30
40
50 College or above
Less than high school
HumanitarianDiversityEmploymentFamily
PERCENT
U.S. COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION REFORM
1 9 9 7
RECOMMENDATIONS
- 10 -
2   The U.S. Current Population Survey [CPS] permits us to compare directly
to the native-born, but the foreign-born data do not distinguish by
admission status.  The CPS data also include illegal aliens who have
extremely low levels of education in the foreign-born category.  See: Fix,
M.;  Passel, J.S.  1994. Immigration and Immigrants: Setting the Record
Straight.  Washington, DC: The Urban Institute.  These figures for the
diversity class of admission correspond to data on education collected
by the U.S. Department of State for diversity immigrants only.
but not as well educated as employment-based immigrants.  About
14 percent have not completed high school.  They may be either
principals who meet the work but not the education requirement or
the spouses of the principals. Twenty-two percent of diversity immi-
grants have completed college or done graduate-level education,
about the same proportion as among U.S. natives.2
The humanitarian classes of admission are less well educated than
the employment-based, but are better educated than family admis-
sions.  The large number of relatively well-educated persons admit-
ted as refugees from the Soviet Union may partly explain this find-
ing.  About 21 percent have less than a high school education, while
about 19 percent have college or higher degrees.
Occupation.  Ultimately, the English and educational skills that im-
migrants have are reflected in their occupations.  The INS admis-
sions data, which we use here, have only crude occupational clas-
sifications.  It imperfectly captures the difference between immi-
grants who adjust into legal permanent resident [LPR] status after
working in a U.S. job for several years and those who report an
occupation upon admission that tells us more about what the immi-
grant did at home than what they will do here.
Sixty-five percent of all immigrants in FY 1996 reported no occupa-
tion or being a “homemaker,” reflecting the fact that children, par-
ents, and spouses are a large share of all admissions and most do
not work at the time of entry.
U.S. COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION REFORM
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Major Occupational Category
by Admission Class: 1996
Source: INS Public Use Admissions Data.
Nevertheless, occupational status faithfully reflects the legal require-
ments of the admission class—the proportion of all immigrants not
reporting an occupation is greater among family and humanitarian
admissions, about 70 percent of all immigrants in each category.  By
way of comparison, only about one-half of all employment and
diversity admissions have no reported occupation.3  The skills which
immigrants bring to the United States are reflected in their type of
occupations.  Family and humanitarian immigrants are primarily
blue-collar workers.  In contrast, employment-based and permanent
diversity immigrants are predominantly white-collar workers.  These
broad differences between the major classes of admission have
changed only slightly over the past three decades.
IMMACT has had an effect on occupational distribution within these
broad categories.  To gauge its effects, a research paper prepared for
3 The initial results from the NIS pilot show that about 40 percent of adult
nonexempt family immigrants are not employed.  Alternatively, more
than 95 percent of employment-based principals are employed.  The INS
admission figures for “no occupation” include children and persons who
are unemployed, retired, or for whom no information is given.
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the Commission calculated simple linear projections for all of the
admission categories now subject to the worldwide ceiling on ad-
missions.  Data from FY 1972-1991 were analyzed and the trends
identified, then projected forward to FY 1996.  This analysis, there-
fore, paints a “what-if” picture of what today’s immigration might
have looked like if past trends had continued unaffected by IMMACT
[see table above].
The actual total number of admissions under the worldwide ceiling
in FY 1996 was 720,314 which—compared to the projected figure of
FY 1996 Regular Admissions by Occupation:
Predicted and Actual
OCCUPATION PREDICTED ACTUAL       EXCESS OF
    (WITHOUT IMMACT)    (WITH IMMACT)        ACTUAL
         OVER
      PREDICTED
WHITE-COLLAR WORKERS
Professional, Technical, and Kindred
Health Professionals   10,244  18.986  85%
Other Professionals    9,231  19,477 111%
Technical & Specialty   22,115  33,117  50%
Executives   20,283  30,702  51%
Sales   12,943  13,002   0%
Administrative Support   19,437  19,807   2%
BLUE-COLLAR WORKERS
Precision Production   21,028  20,116  -4%
Operators, Fabricators, & Laborers   37,702  53,936  43%
FARMING, FORESTRY, AND FISHING              12,251  12,588   3%
SERVICE   48,180  51,797   8%
TOTAL WITH OCCUPATION  165,234            221,731  34%
TOTAL WITHOUT OCCUPATION  261,694 498,583  91%
GRAND TOTAL  426,928 730,314  69%
Note: Predicted numbers in FY 1996 are based on linear projections (from the years
between 1972 and 1991), and are kept within numerical limits on nonexempt
categories.  Humanitarian admissions are not included.
Source: Greenwood, M.;  Ziel, F.A.  1997.  The Impact of the Immigration Act of 1990 on
U.S. Immigration.  Washington, DC: U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform.
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426,929—was 69 percent greater than would have been expected
without IMMACT.  Admissions were greater than the projected fig-
ure because IMMACT increased numerically-limited family, employ-
ment, and diversity admissions.  The numerically-exempt admis-
sions for the immediate relatives of U.S. citizens would have grown
between 1992 and 1996 even without IMMACT.  This analysis does
not include humanitarian admissions.
Of immigrants who reported an occupation, the actual admissions
in FY 1996 were 221,731 which—compared to the projected figure of
165,234—was 34 percent greater than would have been expected if
IMMACT had not gone into effect.  By contrast, nonworking immi-
grants experienced a 91 percent increase of actual over projected.
This finding is not surprising as FY 1996 family admissions were
significantly higher than would have been permissible under previ-
ous law.  In part this was because IMMACT permitted unused FY
1995 employment-based numbers to be transferred to the FY 1996
family categories.  In combination with a growth in immediate rela-
tives (including those who would normally have been admitted in
FY 1995 but were caught in processing delays), the additional visas
meant more spouses and minor children entered.  These immigrants
are the least likely to be employed.
As might be anticipated, IMMACT’s new emphasis on admitting
highly-educated and skilled persons led to growth in professional
occupations among those who reported an occupation.  As stated
above, there was an overall 34 percent increase in persons reporting
an occupation.  This increase was not evenly distributed, however.
The number of health professionals, for example, was projected to
be 10,244, but at 18,985 was 85 percent greater.  The number of
executives also shows a higher than expected increase.  Interest-
ingly, projections not shown here indicate that within the employ-
ment-based category, family members (beneficiaries) of the princi-
pals show the greatest growth in professional occupations.  This
suggests that when principals with more skills are admitted, they
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bring with them spouses who are, likewise, more skilled than in the
past.  Further, projections not shown here indicate that the skill
requirement for permanent diversity immigrants makes for more
highly-skilled admissions from eligible countries.  In short, IMMACT
increased both the numbers of more skilled admissions and their
share of immigrants admitted.
Most nonprofessional white-collar and blue-collar occupations show
very little or no growth over what might have occurred without
IMMACT.  The one notable exception is a greater-than-expected
increase in the number of “Operators, Fabricators, and Laborers.”
There were 53,936 admissions in these occupations compared to the
37,702 that were projected.  As the employment-based access for
persons with these occupations is highly limited, it appears that
much of this increase is attributable to family-based admissions.  It
is unclear from the data, however, why this pattern has emerged.
Earnings.  According to the NIS survey, the median earnings of all
male immigrants admitted in 1996 was $15,600 and for women was
$11,960, lower than the median earnings for natives.  Compared to
the earnings in their last country of residence, male immigrants
experienced a 59 percent increase and women a 45 increase in earn-
ings upon admission to the United States.  Differences in earnings
are, as should be expected, substantial by admission class.  Many
employment-based immigrants earn a median income of $36,400 on
the date of their admission to LPR status, while the sibling or spouse
of an LPR earns $11,750 and the spouse of a citizen earns $18,200.
4 National Research Council.  (Smith, J.P.;  Edmonston, B.  eds.).  1997.
The New Americans: Economic, Demographic, and Fiscal Effects of Immigration.
Washington, DC: National Academy Press.
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Effects on the Economy
An independent evaluation of immigration by a panel of eminent
social scientists at the National Research Council [NRC], sponsored
by the Commission,4 found that immigration has a positive eco-
nomic impact on the national level.  However, the NRC panel’s
findings confirm the by now commonplace conclusion that there are
tangible costs to certain sectors of the labor market and certain
communities.  This reinforces the Commission’s conclusions on the
need for a well-regulated system of immigrant admissions, as well
as the need for attention to means of improving integration and
reducing friction between newcomers and established residents.
The NRC panel estimates that immigrants may add $1-10 billion
directly to the national economy each year, a small but positive
amount in a $7.6 trillion economy.  Many consumers, business
owners, and investors benefit from the immigrant labor force.  Re-
cent newcomers may be willing to work for lower wages than other
U.S. workers, although, with the exception of many immigrants
with less than a high school education, most immigrants tend to
earn as much as natives after a decade.  Many others in the economy
benefit, particularly those who do work that is complementary to
that performed by immigrants.  Immigrants provide the labor that
has kept viable entire segments of certain labor-intensive industries,
such as garment and shoemaking.  Many immigrant entrepreneurs
expand trade with foreign countries from which they come, and the
language and cultural expertise of many immigrant employees are
valuable to U.S. companies doing business abroad.
Immigrants also contribute to the economic revitalization of the com-
munities in which they live.  As middle-class natives have left the
5 Muller, T.  1993.  Immigrants and the American City.  New York: New York
University Press.  Winnick, L.  1990.  New People in Old Neighborhoods:
The Role of New Immigrants in Rejuvenating New York’s Communities.  New
York: Russell Sage Foundation.
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inner cities, immigrant newcomers have settled, established busi-
nesses, bought homes, and otherwise invested in these areas.  Gate-
way cities, such as New York and Los Angeles, have benefitted
particularly from this urban renewal.  At the same time, these cities
face new challenges related to immigration.  Growing immigrant
communities require local school systems (some of which may have
otherwise faced declining enrollments) to provide sufficient class-
room space and teachers.  They must also develop programs to
teach children who are without English skills or prior education.
Overcrowded housing, drug trafficking, gang violence, sweatshops,
and public health problems also may be found in many of these
inner-city communities.5
Immigration particularly affects certain U.S. workers.  The NRC
panel finds that workers with less than twelve years of education
are the most adversely affected by low-skilled immigrant workers.
Immigrants may have reduced substantially the wages of high school
dropouts, who are about one-tenth of the workforce, by 5 percent
nationwide.  This is a sizable impact on a group that was already
poorly paid before the loss in real earnings it experienced over the
past two decades.  Most often it is the foreign-born worker, particu-
larly in labor markets with large numbers of immigrants who expe-
rience the greatest competition.6   While the education and skill level
of most U.S. workers differs significantly from those of most immi-
grants (and therefore they are not competing for the same jobs), the
new arrivals are often direct substitutes for immigrants who arrived
a short time before them.7
6 Greenwood, M.;  Tienda, M.  1997.  U.S. Impacts of Mexican Immigration.
Team Report to Mexico/United States Binational Study on Migration.
Greenwood, J.;  Hunt, G.L.  1995.  Economic Effects of Immigrants on
Native and Foreign-Born Workers: Complementarity, Sustitutability, and
Other Channels of Influence.  Southern Economic Journal.  61:4 1096.
7 Waldinger, R.  1996.  Still the Promised City?  African Americans and New
Immigrants in Postindustrial New York.  Cambridge: Harvard University
Press.  Waldinger, R.;  Bozorgmehr, M.  1996.  Ethnic Los Angeles.  New
York: Russell Sage Foundation.
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The evidence on the impact of immigration on native-born minori-
ties nationwide is less clear.  The NRC concluded that in the aggre-
gate, the economic opportunities of African Americans are not re-
duced by immigration because African Americans and immigrants
tend to be in different labor markets and reside in different cities.
Other research finds small, adverse effects on African Americans.8
These effects are found most strongly when low-skilled minority
workers compete with low-skilled immigrant workers in the same
industries and the same geographic areas.
The fiscal effects of immigration also are complicated.  Generally,
the impacts on the federal government are favorable compared to
those on state and local governments.  Most studies show that at the
federal level, the foreign-born pay more in taxes than they receive
in services.  When spread across all taxpayers, this characteristic
represents a very small, but positive, benefit.  At the local level,
however, immigrants often represent a net fiscal cost, in some cases
a substantial one.  Research on the resident illegal alien population
finds the clearest examples of fiscal costs to states and localities.9  In
general, much of the negative effect is related to school costs that
are considerable because of the larger size of many immigrant fami-
lies.  Although funds spent on education may be considered an
investment, not just a fiscal burden, the payoff is not realized for
many years.
8 Hamermesh, D.S.;  Bean, F.D. (eds.)  1998 forthcoming.  Help or
Hinderance?  Immigration and Its Economic Implications for African Americans.
New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
9 Taylor, E.;  Martin, P.;  Fix, M.  1997.  Poverty Amidst Prosperity: Immigration
and the Changing Face of Rural California.  Washington, DC: The Urban
Institute Press.  U.S. General Accounting Office.  1995.  Illegal Aliens:
National Cost Estimates Vary Widely.  Washington, DC. 6.  Clark, R.;  Passel,
J.S.;  Zimmermann, W.N.;  Fix, M.E.  1994.  Fiscal Impacts of Undocumented
Aliens: Selected Estimates for Seven States.  Washington, DC: The Urban
Institute Press.
U.S. COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION REFORM
1 9 9 7
RECOMMENDATIONS
- 18 -
Education affects fiscal impacts in a second way.  Ultimately, the
economic success and fiscal contributions of immigrants are deter-
mined by their educational level.  The NRC panel found that immi-
grants who complete high school and beyond generally represent a
more favorable balance of fiscal costs and contributions than do
those with little or no education.  Even over their lifetimes, immi-
grants without education are unlikely to contribute sufficient tax
revenues to offset their use of services.  Both groups of immigrants
tend to use public services in a similar fashion, particularly as re-
lated to the schooling of their children, but the more educated im-
migrants tend to earn more and pay higher taxes.
Educational differences also explain why certain states and localities
are more adversely affected by immigration than are others.  Cali-
fornia immigrants represent a sizeable tax burden (estimated at al-
most $1,200 per native-headed family per year) while New Jersey
immigrants represent a more modest tax burden (estimated to be
$232 per native-headed family per year).  The difference can be
explained largely by the differences in the average educational level
of the immigrants residing in these states.10
English language ability also affects the economic success and fiscal
impacts of immigrants.  In the 1990 Census, 47 percent of the for-
eign-born more than 5 years of age reported not speaking English
“very well.”  Individuals with poor English language skills tend to
be confined to the lowest levels of the U.S. job market.  By contrast,
ability in spoken English markedly improves immigrants’ earnings,
especially for Hispanic and Asian adult immigrants.11  English read-
10 See: Espenshade, T.  1997.  Keys to Successful Immigration: Implications of
the New Jersey Experience.  Washington, DC: The Urban Institute Press.
11 Chiswick, B.R. (ed.).  1992.  Immigration, Language, and Ethnicity.
Washington, DC: The AEI Press.  229-96.
12 Rivera-Batiz, F.L.  1992.  English Language Proficiency and the Earnings
of Young Immigrants in the U.S. Labor Market.  Policy Studies Review
11:165-75.
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ing comprehension also has been found to improve the earnings of
young immigrant adults.12
Population Growth and
Natural Resources
In recent years there have been about 800,000 legal admissions and
an additional estimated 200,000 to 300,000 unauthorized entries, but
the net annual increase of the foreign-born population is about 700,000
each year due to return migration and mortality.13  In 1996, the for-
eign-born population was 24.6 million, 9.3 percent of the U.S. popu-
lation.  Recent arrivals make up a large share of the resident foreign-
born population; about 28 percent arrived after 1990, and an addi-
tional 35 percent during the 1980s.
It is estimated that international migration makes up somewhere
between one-quarter and one-third of net annual population increase.
Given current demographic trends and noting that much can hap-
pen to alter long-range forecasts, the U.S. Census Bureau projects
the population to increase by 50 percent between 1995 and 2050.
Immigration is likely to become a larger proportion of the net in-
crease.14
The NRC report also presented estimates of population growth.  It
found that without immigration since 1950, the U.S. population would
have been 14 percent smaller than its 1995 size of 263 million.  The
NRC projected the population to the year 2050 after making certain
assumptions about mortality, fertility, and rates of group inter-mar-
13 National Research Council.  1997.  The New Americans: Economic,
Demographic and Fiscal Effects on Immigration.  Washington, DC:
National Academy Press.
14 U.S. Bureau of the Census.  1996. Current Population Reports.  (Feb.).
Edmonston, B.;  Passel, J.S.  (eds.).  1994.  Immigration and Ethnicity: The
Integration of American’s Newest Arrivals.  Washington, DC: The Urban
Institute Press.
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riage.  According to the projection based on these assumptions, the
U.S. population would increase by 124 million persons to 387 mil-
lion, with immigration responsible for two-thirds (82 million) of the
increase.  Of this 82 million, 45 million are immigrants and an ad-
ditional 37 million increase is due to their higher assumed fertility.
Immigration affects the age structure as well as the overall popula-
tion.  The NRC panel projected that under current immigration
policy, kindergarten through grade eight school enrollment in 2050
would be 17 percent higher than it was in 1995.  High school enroll-
ment would rise from 14.0 million in 1995 to 20.3 million in 2050.
Immigration also has small effects on the proportion of the popula-
tion that is elderly.  No matter which immigration policies are
adopted, according to the NRC, the number of persons aged 65
years and older will double between 1995 and 2050.  However, the
proportion of older people in the total population will be somewhat
smaller with immigration.
The NRC panel’s projection of the ethnic distribution of the U.S.
population in 2050 shows the Hispanic population increasing from
10 to 25 percent and the Asian population from 3 to 8 percent of the
population.  These projections are dependent on today’s rates of
group intermarriage and how persons report their ethnicity.  It may
be that, like children of immigrants who arrived in the last century,
descendents of today’s immigrants will choose to report their
ethnicity as being different from that of their parents, and that today’s
ethnic categories will not accurately describe tomorrow’s popula-
tions.
What broader implications do these growth figures have?  Some
analysts argue that high immigration levels mean an abundant sup-
ply of youthful workers who will be a substantial spur to the
economy.  From this perspective, population growth is an engine for
technological progress and the means to solve environmental prob-
lems, effectively spawning change out of necessity.  Proponents of
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this view argue that human resourcefulness has dealt with popula-
tion growth in the past and the solutions often have left us better
off.  Adding more people may “cause us more problems, but at the
same time there will be more people to solve these problems.”15
Others are concerned about the negative consequences of popula-
tion growth, particularly on the environment, infrastructure, and
services.16 They see population growth as imposing pressures on our
natural resources and quality of life, raising special concerns in the
arid regions of the southwest or sites of industries relocating to the
south central states.17  Those concerned argue that our future well-
being depends upon both conservation, and stabilizing population
growth.18
This debate primarily concerns total U.S. population growth, which
is strongly influenced by immigration.  Still, there is little or no
information about whether immigrants have differential impacts dis-
tinct from the population increase they produce on the U.S. environ-
ment.19
The Commission did find that rapid inflows of immigrants can pose
difficulties for those who must plan for community growth.  Schools
sometimes receive large numbers of new immigrant students that
had not been planned for.  Housing and infrastructure development
15 Simon, J.  1994.  More People, Greater Wealth, More Resources, Healthier
Environment.  Economic Affairs (April) 22-29.
16 Beck, R.  1994.  Re-Charting America’s Future: Responses to Arguments
Against Stabilizing U.S. Population and Limiting Immigration.  Petoskey,
MI: The Social Contract Press.
17 U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform.  1995.  Mesa, Arizona U.S.
Commission on Immigration Reform roundtable.U.S. Commission on
Immigration Reform 1997.  Site visit to Garden City, Kansas.
18 Abernethy, V.  1994.  Population Politics.  New York: Insight Press.
19 Kraly, E.P.  1995.  U.S. Immigration and the Environment: Scientific Research
and Analytic Issues.  Washington, DC: U.S. Commission on Immigration
Reform.
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may not be adequate in affected urban and rural communities.20
New immigrant destinations, sometimes to areas that have not had
new immigrants for a century or more, can put particular stress on
communities that have experienced rapid growth in the past de-
cade.
Foreign Policy and
National Security Interests
Immigration matters frequently are intertwined with foreign policy
and national security.  Today, migration and refugee issues are mat-
ters of high international politics engaging the heads of state in-
volved in defense, internal security, and external relations.21  Inter-
national migration intersects with foreign policy in two principal
ways.  The U.N. Security Council has acknowledged that migration
can pose threats to international peace and security through eco-
nomic or social instability or humanitarian disasters.  Migration can
also build positive relations with other countries and thereby pro-
mote national security.  As a consequence, migration itself requires
bilateral and international attention to help address the causes and
consequences of movements of people.
During the Cold War, a foreign policy priority was the destabilizing
of Communist regimes.  Refugee policy was often a tool to achieve
that strategic goal, for instance, by encouraging the flow of migrants
from Eastern Europe or Cuba.  Elsewhere, political, economic, and
military involvement in Southeast Asia and the Dominican Republic
had significant migration consequences, as large numbers of South-
east Asians and Dominicans ended up as refugees and immigrants
20 Taylor, E.;  Martin, P.;  Fix, M.  1997.  Poverty Amidst Prosperity: Immigration
and the Changing Face of Rural California.  Washington, DC: The Urban
Institute Press.
21 Weiner, M.  1992.  Security, Stability, and International Migration.
International Security 17:3 (Winter) 91-126.
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to the U.S.  These foreign policy priorities generally have had sig-
nificant immigration consequences years later.
Alternatively, immigration concerns sometimes have played a sig-
nificant role in U.S. foreign policy, especially when mass move-
ments to the U.S. are feared.  A stated rationale for U.S. Central-
American policy in the 1980s was to prevent a mass movement that
would occur if anti-American Marxist dictatorships were established
in Central America.  One of the explicit reasons for the military
intervention in Haiti in 1994 was to restrain the flow of migrants
onto U.S. shores.  And, although the U.S. does not officially main-
tain relations with Cuba, migration concerns gained priority over
diplomatic ones leading to negotiations on the Cuban Migration
Agreement and to a reversal of policy regarding the interdiction of
Cuban migrants.
Some observers believe that environmental causes now rival eco-
nomic and political instability as a major source of forced migration
throughout the world.  There are estimates that as many as one-
hundred million people may be displaced, in part, because of deg-
radation of land and natural resources.  “That will increase the
pressure to migrate to places like the United States.”22  The perva-
sive deterioration of Mexico’s rural drylands may contribute to
between 700,000 and 900,000 people a year leaving rural areas.23
Environmental degradation in Mexico, Haiti, and Central America
also are believed to have migration consequences for the U.S.  Often
environmental problems intersect with other causes.  One researcher
argues that migrants from Haiti may be considered “environmental
refugees” because the root causes of their migrations are land deg-
22 Schwartz, M.L.; Notini, J.  1994.  Desertification and Migration: Mexico and
the United States.  Washington, DC: U.S. Commission on Immigration
Reform.
23 National Heritage Institute.  1997.  Environmental Degradation and Migration:
The U.S./Mexico Case Study.  Report prepared for the U.S. Commission
on Immigration Reform.
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radation and the Haitian government’s unwillingness to act in the
interest of the general population.”24
Stabilizing economic growth and democracy may be an effective
means of reducing migration pressures.  The Commission for the
Study of International Migration and Cooperative Economic Devel-
opment25 concluded that, over the long run of a generation or more,
trade and investment are likely to reduce migration pressures.  Sup-
porters of the North American Free Trade Agreement [NAFTA]
argued that NAFTA-related development eventually will reduce
unauthorized Mexican migration.  The U.S. has provided the rein-
stalled democratically-elected government of Haiti with a great deal
of rehabilitation assistance that should aid the stability of that coun-
try.
CONCLUSION
Properly-regulated immigration and immigrant policy serves the
national interest by ensuring the entry of those who will contribute
most to our society and helping lawful newcomers adjust to life in
the United States.   It must give due consideration to shifting eco-
nomic realities.  A well-regulated system sets priorities for admis-
sion; facilitates nuclear family reunification; gives employers access
to a global labor market while protecting U.S. workers; helps to
generate jobs and economic growth; and fulfills our commitment to
resettle refugees as one of several elements of humanitarian protec-
tion of the persecuted.
24 Catanese, A. 1990/91.  Haiti’s Refugees: Political, Economic, Environmental.
(Paper 17).  San Francisco: Natural Heritage Institute; Indianapolis:
Universities Field Staff International.
25 The Commission for the Study of International Migration and Cooperative
Economic Development.  1990.  Unauthorized Migration: An Economic
Development Response.  Washington, DC.
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AMERICANIZATION
AND INTEGRATION
OF IMMIGRANTS
A DECLARATION OF
PRINCIPLES AND VALUES
Immigration to the United States has created one of the world’s
most successful multiethnic nations.  We believe these truths consti-
tute the distinctive characteristics of American nationality:
n American unity depends upon a widely-held belief in the
principles and values embodied in the American Constitu-
tion and their fulfillment in practice: equal protection and
justice under the law; freedom of speech and religion; and
representative government;
n Lawfully-admitted newcomers of any ancestral nationality—
without regard to race, ethnicity, or religion—truly become
Americans when they give allegiance to these principles and
values;
n Ethnic and religious diversity based on personal freedom is
compatible with national unity; and
n The nation is strengthened when those who live in it com-
municate effectively with each other in English, even as many
persons retain or acquire the ability to communicate in other
languages.
As long as we live by these principles and help newcomers to learn
and practice them, we will continue to be a nation that benefits from
substantial but well-regulated immigration.  We must pay attention
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to our core values, as we have tried to do in our recommendations
throughout this report.  Then, we will continue to realize the lofty
goal of E Pluribus Unum.1
AMERICANIZATION
The Commission reiterates its call for the Americanization of new
immigrants, that is the cultivation of a shared commitment to the
American values of liberty, democracy and equal opportunity.  The
U.S. has fought for the principles of individual rights and equal
protection under the law, notions that now apply to all our resi-
dents.  We have long recognized that immigrants are entitled to the
full protection of our Constitution and laws.  The U.S. also has the
sovereign right to impose appropriate obligations on immigrants.
In our 1995 report to Congress, the Commission called for a new
commitment to Americanization.  In a public speech that same year,
Barbara Jordan, our late chair, noted: “That word earned a bad
reputation when it was stolen by racists and xenophobes in the
1920s.  But it is our word, and we are taking it back.”  American-
ization is the process of integration by which immigrants become
part of our communities and by which our communities and the
nation learn from and adapt to their presence.
This process enhances our unity by focusing on what is important,
through acknowledging that the many real differences among us as
individuals do not alter our essential character as a nation.
1 Our national motto, E Pluribus Unum, “from many, one,” was originally
conceived to denote the union of the thirteen states into one nation.
Throughout our history, E Pluribus Unum also has come to mean the
vital unity of our national community founded on individual freedom
and the diversity that flows from it.
The Commission
reiterates
its call
for the
Americanization
of new
immigrants.
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This Americanization process depends on a set of expectations that
the United States, which chooses to invite legal immigrants, legiti-
mately has of newcomers.  It applies equally to the expectations
immigrants legitimately have of their new home.
The Commission proposes that the principles of Americanization be
made more explicit through the covenant between immigrant and
citizens.  These principles are not mere abstractions.  They can form
a covenant between ourselves and immigrant newcomers.  As Presi-
dent Johnson eloquently stated in 1965:
They came here—the exile and the stranger. . . . They made
a covenant with this land.  Conceived in justice, written in
liberty, bound in union, it was meant one day to inspire the
hopes of all mankind; and it binds us still.  If we keep its
terms, we shall flourish.
We have not always abided by its terms, but the ideal of a covenant
between immigrant and nation still captures the essence of Ameri-
canization.  Immigrants become part of us, and we grow and be-
come the stronger for having embraced them.  In this spirit,
the Commission sees the covenant between immigrants and
ourselves as:
Voluntary.  Immigration to the United States—a benefit to
both citizens and immigrants—is not an entitlement and
Americanization cannot be forced.  We as a nation choose to
admit immigrants because we find lawful immigration serves
our interests in many ways.  Likewise, no one requires
immigrants to come here or to become citizens; they choose to
come and, if they naturalize, they choose to become a part of
our polity.
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Mutual and reciprocal.  Immigration presents mutual
obligations.  Immigrants must accept the obligations we
impose—to obey our laws, to pay taxes, to respect other
cultures and ethnic groups.  At the same time, citizens incur
obligations to provide an environment in which newcomers
can become fully participating members of our society.  We
must not exclude them from our community nor bar them
from the polity after admission.  This obligation to immigrants
by no means excuses us from our obligations to our own
disadvantaged populations.  To the extent that immigration
poses undue burdens on our communities, our citizenry, or
immigrants themselves, we have an obligation to recognize
and address them.
Thus the United States assumes an obligation to those it admits,
as immigrants assume an obligation to this country they chose.
Having affirmatively admitted the newcomer, the federal
government necessarily extends civic and societal rights.
Unfortunately recent legislative changes effectively have
excluded immigrants from the public safety net until such
time as they become naturalized citizens.  This Commission
previously recommended against such action.  We believe it is
likely that these changes will lead to greater problems both for
immigrants and for the communities in which they live.
Legislation that leads immigrants to seek citizenship to protect
eligibility for social benefits, rather than out of commitment to
our polity, provides the wrong incentive.  The effect is not to
exalt citizenship, but to diminish it.
Individual, not collective.  The United States is a nation
founded on the proposition that each individual is born with
certain rights and that the purpose of government is to secure
these rights.  The United States admits immigrants as
individuals (or individual members of families).  As long as
the United States continues to emphasize the rights of
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individuals over those of groups, we need not fear that the
diversity brought by immigration will lead to ethnic division
or disunity.  Of course, the right to assemble and join with
others is a fundamental right of all Americans, immigrants
included.  However, unlike other countries, including those
from which many immigrants come, rights in the United States
are not defined by ethnicity, religion, or membership in any
group; nor can immigrants be denied rights because they are
members of a particular ethnic, religious, or political group.
The Commission believes that the federal government should take
the lead and invite states and local governments and the private
sector to join in promoting Americanization.  For example, “I Am an
American Day” was once widely celebrated in public schools and
local communities.  Recent immigration legislation mandates natu-
ralization ceremonies on the 4th of July.  While the federal govern-
ment cannot and should not be the sole instrument of Americaniza-
tion, it can provide important leadership in supporting the imple-
mentation of programs designed to promote full integration of new-
comers.
To help achieve full integration of newcomers, the Commission calls
upon federal, state, and local governments to provide renewed lead-
ership and resources to a program to promote Americanization that
requires:
n Developing capacities to orient both newcomers and receiv-
ing communities;
n Educating newcomers in English language skills and our
core civic values; and
n Revisiting the meaning and conferral of citizenship to en-
sure the integrity of the naturalization process.
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ORIENTATION
The Commission recommends that the federal, state, and local  gov-
ernments take an active role in helping newcomers become self-
reliant: orienting immigrants and receiving communities as to their
mutual rights and responsibilities, providing information they need
for successful integration, and encouraging the development of local
capacities to mediate when divisions occur between groups.  Infor-
mation and orientation must be provided both to immigrants and to
their receiving communities.  The experience of “newcomer schools”
is that providing coordinated information and advice on life in the
United States accelerates the integration of newcomers, which, in
turn, decreases the negative impacts on communities.  Information
on expected impacts and successful programs can help localities
foster immigrant integration and mediate differences to avoid com-
munity conflicts.
More specifically, to integrate into American society, immigrants
need information on their legal rights and obligations, on American
core civic beliefs, on how to access services, and on immigration-
related requirements.  Communities require information on the
numbers and characteristics of immigrants arriving in their midst,
the eligibility of newcomers for various services, the legal responsi-
bilities of state and local government agencies, and similar matters.
The Commission believes the federal government should help im-
migrants and local communities by:
n Giving orientation materials to legal immigrants upon ad-
mission that include, but are not limited to: a welcoming
greeting; a brief discussion of U.S. history, law, and prin-
ciples of U.S. democracy; tools to help the immigrant locate
and use services for which they are eligible; and other im-
migration-related information and documents.  All immi-
grants would receive the same materials.  The packets would
The Commission
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Example of a
Welcoming Statement
Congratulations on your decision to immigrate to the United
States of America.  Best wishes for a successful settlement in
your new home.  This is a proud country of individual freedom,
opportunity, and diversity with a long tradition of immigration.
Finding success and opportunity in the United States can be
difficult.  We realize that immigrants face many challenges as
they become self-reliant, such as learning a new language and
adjusting to new circumstances.  The U.S. has learned from its
tradition of immigration that patience, tolerance, and adaptabil-
ity are required from each and every one of us.
Basic American principles that you are asked to embrace in-
clude: a commitment to serve the best interests of the United
States and the community in which you live; knowledge of and
respect for our laws and democratic institutions; respect for
freedom of speech and religion; and a commitment not to
discriminate against others on the basis of nationality, race,
sex, or religion.  The excerpts from the U.S. history and law
section of your orientation packet should serve to illustrate the
meaning of these important principles.
We the people of the United States welcome you.
be available in English and the main immigrant languages.
It is not the Commission’s intent to prescribe all parts of an
orientation packet but, rather, to suggest the most impor-
tant information and key resources that should be included.
Welcoming statement.  The Welcoming Statement would
congratulate immigrants on their decision to become per-
manent residents of the United States.  It also would sum-
marize the basic principles that all Americans embrace.
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Example of Documents on the Founding Principles
On July 4, 1776, the Continental Congress adopted a Declaration drafted by Thomas Jefferson that
defined the commitment of a new nation to the principles of liberty and justice for all:
We hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created equal, that they are endowed
by their Creator with certain unalienable rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the
Pursuit of Happiness—That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men,
deriving their just Powers from the Consent of the Governed. . . .
The greatest contradiction in the new nation’s founding was the institution of human
slavery, which ended only after a bloody civil war (1860-1864).  After the decisive battle at
Gettysburg, in 1863, Abraham Lincoln dedicated the cemetery, ending with these words:
[W]e here highly resolve that these dead shall not have died in vain—that this nation, under
God, shall have a new birth of freedom—and that government of the people, by the people, for
the people, shall not perish from the earth.
After the Civil War, the effort to live up to the promises of the founding principles
intensified.  In 1872, Susan B. Anthony was arrested for attempting to vote in a Presidential
election.  Her speech on the rights of women was an important step toward gaining women the
vote:
The preamble of the federal Constitution says . . . It was we, the people; not we, the white male
citizens; nor yet we, the male citizens; but we, the whole people, who formed the Union.  And
we formed it, not to give the blessings of liberty, but to secure them; not the half of ourselves
and our posterity; but to the whole people —women as well as men.
Way into the twentieth century, the founding principles continue to challenge Americans.  In 1963,
the Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. led a peaceful March on Washington, and spoke on the
steps of the Lincoln Memorial in the cause of civil rights.
When the architects of our republic wrote the magnificent words of the Constitution and the
Declaration of Independence, they were signing a promissory note to which every American was
to fall heir.  This note was a promise that all men would be guaranteed the unalienable rights
of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness . . .
 I have a dream that one day this nation will rise up and live out the true meaning of its creed:
“We hold these truths to be self-evident; that all men are created equal. . . . I have a dream that
my four little children will one day live in a nation where they will not be judged by the color
of their skin but by the content of their character . . .  And if America is to be a great nation
this must become true.
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U.S. history, law, and principles of democracy.  This would
include a brief history of the United States and of the prin-
ciples listed in the welcoming statement, followed by ex-
cerpts from relevant historical documents.  It would stress
that American civic culture is based on a trust in ordinary
people’s ability to govern themselves through their elected
representatives who are then accountable to the people, on
the right of all members of the polity to participate in public
life as equals, and on the freedom of individual members of
the community to differ from each other in religion and
other private matters.
Tools for settlement.  This section would emphasize the
development of self-reliance.  It would include general in-
formation and checklists to aid immigrants in finding and
using services in their community that may help them in
developing economic independence.
Example of Tools for Settlement
What to expect upon immigration: information to orient newcomers on
federal policies and services, such as a pre-/ post-arrival checklist on
admissions, information for those adjusting status on new rights and
responsibilities as permanent residents, reminder to register for military
service if necessary, the role of government agencies and service
providers; consumer protection and tax policies;
How to secure basic needs: information on housing, employment,
education and language training, health, transportation, police and fire
protection, managing finances, and cultural adjustment;
Finding assistance and advice: telephone numbers for the local
information clearinghouses, government agencies; documents listing
weight and measurement conversions, U.S. holidays, instructions in
using the telephone and postal systems; a U.S. map;
Getting involved in the community:  listings of  community organizations
(e.g., civic, sports, arts) and volunteer opportunities.
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Immigration information and documents. This section
would provide necessary immigration forms, information
on naturalization, and a card for non-English-speaking im-
migrants to indicate their need for an interpreter.
n Encouraging state governments to establish information
clearinghouses in major immigrant receiving communi-
ties. The Commission recommends that the federal govern-
ment provide modest incentive grants to states to encourage
them to establish and maintain local resources that would
provide information to immigrants and local communities.
For example, local information clearinghouses could pro-
vide information to immigrants on rights and responsibili-
ties,  naturalization, education and training, and the world
of work.  They could have materials available on tenant law
and  renter/landlord rights and responsibilities.  They could
spell out how U.S. family law (regarding marriage and pro-
hibiting spouse and child abuse, polygamy, and female geni-
tal mutilation, etc.) may differ from other cultures.  They
could provide information on public life (driving, insurance,
hunting/fishing licences, law enforcement, consumer pro-
tection, etc.).  They could also provide information to local
public and private organizations about immigrants, e.g.,
documentation, culture/background, eligibility status for
programs, work authorization verification.
The resource centers could develop, translate and dissemi-
nate materials; foster partnerships among immigrant inter-
est groups, ethnic churches, and service providers (advisory
boards, taskforces, planning boards, coalitions); and develop
volunteer networks in immigrant communities to help newly-
arriving immigrants.  These efforts could help reduce com-
munity tensions arising from immigration by providing ac-
curate information and helping communities find ways to
mediate these tensions.  The resource centers could also
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provide information on model programs implemented by
businesses, service agencies, and others.
The Office of Refugee Resettlement in the Department of
Health and Human Services, which already provides fund-
ing for refugee services, could administer this grant pro-
gram.  Each state receiving funds would designate the local
structure through which the funding would be administered
as part of its application for funds.  Some states are likely
to designate the state refugee coordinator’s office, but oth-
ers may designate the state education department.  States
had similar flexibility when they received funds under the
State Legalization Impact Assistance Grant [SLIAG] program.
These already-existing structures could easily integrate the
proposed services with only modest financial increments.
Based on its consultations, the Commission believes that an
annual appropriation of $30-35 million would cover devel-
opment of orientation materials and underwrite services in
forty to fifty targeted communities.  The monies should be
administered flexibly, not as a formula to each state.  Tar-
geted areas should include those with historically signifi-
cant numbers of immigrants as well as communities expe-
riencing a sudden growth in immigrant arrivals. (In Garden
City, Kansas, for example, the Commission observed how
the arrival of new meatpacking plants changed the popula-
tion from one with few foreign-born residents a decade ago
to one with a sizeable immigrant component today.)
n Promoting public/private partnerships to orient and assist
immigrants in adapting to life in the United States. The
Commission previously has called for a renewed public/
private partnership in the Americanization of immigrants.
While the federal government makes the decisions about
how many and which immigrants will be admitted to the
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United States, the actual process of integration takes place
in local communities.  Local government, schools, businesses,
religious institutions, ethnic associations, and other groups
play important roles in the Americanization process.
The Commission urges the federal government to assemble
leaders from the public and private sectors at the federal,
state, and local levels to discuss ways to invigorate a public/
private partnership to promote Americanization.  The partici-
pants should include representatives of state and local edu-
cational systems, businesses, labor, local governments, and
community organizations.  The meeting would address ways
to enhance resources for instruction in English language ac-
quisition, civic understanding, and workplace skills.  The
federal grant program described above also could help pro-
mote more coordinated efforts at the local level by establish-
ing advisory structures representing the various public and
private institutions with interest in immigration matters.
EDUCATION
Education is the principal tool of Americanization.  Local educa-
tional institutions have the primary responsibility for educating
immigrants. However, there is a federal role in promoting and fund-
ing English language acquisition and other academic programs for
both immigrant children and adults.
The Commission urges a renewed commitment to the education of
immigrant children.  The number of school-aged children of immi-
grants is growing and expected to increase dramatically.  These
children, mostly young, speak more than 150 different languages;
many have difficulty communicating in English.  They are enrolled
in public schools as well as in secular and religious private schools
through the country.
The Fannie Mae Foun-
dation built a model public/
private initiative with
c o m m u n i t y - b a s e d
organizations, public offi-
cials, and lenders to
facilitate  home ownership
and naturalization for
immigrants.
Project Vida in El Paso
provides medical services
to the Latino border
community.  Funded by the
Presbyterian Church and
public/private grants and
contracts, Vida developed
“one-stop shopping” for
primary health care,
education, housing, and
other social services.  It built
20 affordable rental units;
and helped to generate an
increase in local
elementary school reading
scores.
U.S. COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION REFORM
1 9 9 7
RECOMMENDATIONS
- 37 -
The Commission
urges a renewed
commitment
to the education
of immigrant
children.
In addition to the problems other students have, immigrant children
face particular problems in gaining an education—often because of
language difficulties.  The 1990 Census shows that 87 percent of
immigrant children attended high school as compared to 93 percent
of natives.  More than one-fourth of Mexican immigrant youth be-
tween ages 15 and 17 were not in school in 1990.  While some
dropped out, others never “dropped in” to school in the first place.
Immigrant children often come from countries with customs, tradi-
tions, and social and governmental structures that differ from those
they encounter in the U.S.; some have little or no formal education
and no understanding of the American school system; some arrive
with personal experiences of trauma and war; many older children
come from countries where school ends at a younger age; many ex-
perience lengthy delays in being mainstreamed into regular English-
speaking classes; and some do not receive appropriate-level instruc-
tion in other academic subjects while they are learning English.
Immigrant children also bring strengths to American society.  For
example, their native-language skills contribute to building the fu-
ture multilingual workforce needed in a global economy; sharing of
their cultural heritage will promote the sensitivity of that workforce
as it interacts in a worldwide marketplace.  Many immigrant chil-
dren who enroll in school and then remain to graduate do well
academically.  These immigrant children are more likely than na-
tives to prepare for, attend, and complete college.2  The key, how-
ever, is helping them achieve sufficient English proficiency to be
able to participate.
The Commission emphasizes that rapid acquisition of English should
be the paramount goal of any immigrant language instruction pro-
2 Venez, G.;  Abrahamse, A.  1996.  How Immigrants Fare in U.S. Education.
Santa Monica: RAND.  Rumbaut, R.G.;  Cornelius, W.A.  1995.  California’s
Immigrant Children: Theory, Research, and Implications for Educational Policy.
San Diego: Center for U.S. Mexican Studies.
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gram.  English is the most critical of basic skills for successful inte-
gration.  English can be taught to children in many ways.  Effective
programs share certain common characteristics.  Based on a review
of these programs, the Commission emphasizes the need to:
n Conduct regular evaluations of students’ English compe-
tence and their ability to apply it to academic subjects.
Such evaluations will ensure placement of immigrant chil-
dren into regular English-speaking classes as soon as they
are prepared.  Regular evaluation also will highlight strengths
and weaknesses in educational programs and provide in-
sight on improvements that are needed to ensure timely
English acquisition.
n Collect and analyze data regularly on students, their lin-
guistic and academic performance, and the method of in-
struction.  Presently, federal, state, and local governments
fail to collect and analyze adequate, uniform, data on bilin-
gual and other forms of English instruction.  Such failure
hinders overall evaluation and the responsible allocation of
government funds.  A 1997 National Research Council re-
port3 pointed out the need for new systems to support data
collection and research in this area.  The NRC recommended
establishment of a new Department of Education Advisory
Committee on Research on English-Language Learners, urged
the National Center for Education Statistics to take the lead
in collecting data on students and programs, and recom-
mended that the Office of Bilingual Education and Minority
Language Affairs take the lead in developing and evaluating
programs to enhance teacher development.
3 National Research Council (August, D;  Hakuta, K. eds.).  1997.  Improving
Schooling for Language-Minority Children: A Research Agenda.  Washington,
DC: National Academy Press.
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n Include appropriate grade-level instruction in other aca-
demic disciplines.  Coordination with teachers, curricula,
and instruction outside of English acquisition will promote
students’ mastery of regular subject matter while they learn
English.
n Involve parents of immigrant students in their schooling.
A characteristic of many of the most successful language
acquisition programs is the active involvement of parents in
the education of their children.  Such “family literacy” models
include programs that promote frequent parent-teacher con-
ferences and that also encourage non-English-speaking par-
ents to enroll in English as a Second Language [ESL] pro-
grams.  Some of the adult programs are offered at the local
school in the evenings.
The Commission encourages programs that are responsive to the
needs of immigrant children and an orientation to United States
school systems and the community, such as we have seen in “new-
comer schools.”  Newcomer schools must not isolate immigrant
newcomers.  Instead, they must be transitional and actively pro-
mote the timely integration of students into mainstream schools.
Successful programs recognize the special needs of immigrant chil-
dren, particularly refugees.  They share information among resettle-
ment programs and school administrators and among English ac-
quisition and regular classroom teachers.  Along with English and
other academic subjects, newcomer schools teach basic school sur-
vival and living skills (such as how the local transportation system
works and how to shop for food) and develop intercultural commu-
nications.  Some also provide access to a wide range of support
services, such as health screenings and immunizations.
The Commission recommends the revival and emphasis on instruc-
tion of all kindergarten through grade twelve students in the com-
mon civic culture that is essential to citizenship.  An understanding
Seattle’s Sharples Center
teaches refugee students
with limited or no English
proficiency in grades six
through twelve.  They are
grouped by English
language ability, not age.
Because of high demand,
they usually can stay for
only six months or less.
The program focuses on
preventing subsequent low
academic perfor-mance
and also pre-venting the
high dropout rates that
occur when students with
limited English proficiency
are mainstreamed too
soon.
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of the history of the United States and the principles and practices
of our government are essential for all students, immigrants and
natives alike.  Americanization requires a renewed emphasis on the
common core of civic culture that unites individuals from many
ethnic and racial groups.  Civics instruction teaches students both
the responsibilities and the rights of United States citizenship.  Civ-
ics education also can help immigrant students turning eighteen to
prepare for naturalization.  The Commission recommends that local
school boards institute civics programs that:
n Teach that the U.S. is united by the constitutional principles
of individual rights and equal justice under the law;
n Restore the emphasis on such traditional American leaders
as Washington, Jefferson, and Lincoln, who defined the
American promise of liberty and equality for all, and incor-
porate other heroes and heroines, such as Sojourner Truth,
Susan B. Anthony, Martin Luther King, Jr., Franklin Roosevelt,
and Barbara Jordan, who expanded their promise to all
Americans;
n Stress the importance of civic holidays and of American
symbols and rituals, for example, the flag and the Pledge of
Allegiance.
Civics instruction in public schools should be rooted in the Decla-
ration of Independence, the Constitution—particularly the Preamble,
the Bill of Rights, and the Fourteenth Amendment.  Emphasizing
the ideals in these documents is in no way a distortion of U.S.
history.  Instruction in the history of the United States, as a unique
engine of human liberty notwithstanding its faults, is an indispens-
able foundation for solid civics training for all Americans.
The Commission emphasizes the urgent need to recruit, train, and
provide support to teachers who work with immigrant students.
The Commission
recommends
the revival
and emphasis
on instruction
of all kindergarten
through grade
twelve students
in the common
civic culture
that is essential
to citizenship.
San Francisco’s New-
comer High School was
the nation’s first high
school devoted entirely to
immigrants.  Students with
less than six years of
education and/or poor
English skills may attend
for up to a year of intensive
instruction based on their
English ability rather than
on their age.  Before they
are mainstreamed,
students are taken to see
their new school and meet
their new teachers.
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There is a disturbing shortage of qualified teachers for children with
limited English proficiency, of teacher training programs for pro-
ducing such teachers, and of other support for effective English
acquisition instruction.  More than 50 percent of  teachers in current
bilingual education programs have no formal education in teaching
students with limited English skills.  Teachers are often unprepared
and untrained in understanding how the cultural background and
experiences of immigrant children may affect their ability to learn.
They need to understand that while many students quickly acquire
skill in using and understanding English in social situations, acquir-
ing academic proficiency in English takes longer.
All teachers of immigrant students—those who teach English and
those who teach other academic subjects—need training to develop
the most effective tools for imparting knowledge to students with
limited English proficiency.  Teachers also need help in understand-
ing how best to involve immigrant parents who may themselves be
limited in their command of English.  Schools that have been effec-
tive in involving immigrant parents in their children’s education
tend to be more effective in retaining and educating students. To
promote such involvement, teachers must be sensitive to differences
in language and culture that may impede an immigrant parent’s
ability to participate in school activities.
The Commission supports immigrant education funding that is based
on a more accurate assessment of the impact of immigration on
school systems and that is adequate to alleviate these impacts.
Urban and rural schools often require federal assistance when con-
fronted with large numbers of immigrant students.  Current federal
support comes through several unrelated funding streams: some is
geared to particular instructional models; some is directed to ad-
dress impacts of large numbers of new arrivals; however, most comes
indirectly through monies targeted to schools with economically
disadvantaged children who are performing poorly.
The Commission
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the urgent need
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and provide
support to
teachers who
work with
immigrant
students.
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There are costs and responsibilities for language acquisition and
immigrant education programs that are not now being met.  We
urge the federal government to do its fair share in meeting this
challenge.  The long-run costs of failure in terms of dropouts and
poorly-educated adults will be far larger for the nation and local
communities than the costs of such programs.
More specifically, we urge the federal government to:
n Provide flexibility in federal funding for the teaching of
English to immigrant students to achieve maximum local
choice of instructional model.  The federal government
should not mandate any one mode of instruction (e.g., bilin-
gual education, English as a Second Language programs,
immersion).  Research indicates that no one pedagogical
model for English instruction works more effectively than
any other.  What makes for success are: the commitment
of the local school system to educate its English learners;
well-trained teachers who are adept at English language in-
struction; involvement of parents; frequent evaluation of stu-
dent language acquisition; and a plan for timely placements
in mainstream programs.
n Make funding contingent on performance outcomes—that
is, English language acquisition and mastery of regular
academic subject matter by students served in these pro-
grams.  School systems receiving funds because of large
numbers of children with limited English proficiency and
immigrant children should be held to rigorous performance
standards. Incentives should promote—not impede—expe-
ditious placement in regular, English-speaking, classes.
The Commission urges the federal, state, and local governments and
private institutions to enhance educational opportunities for adult
Washington, DC’s public
Bell Multicultural High
School offers secondary
and adult day/evening
intensive English classes,
vocational programs,
career development,
dropout prevention, tech-
nical preparation, and
comprehensive math and
science. Bell students have
high attendance rates, high
advanced placement exam
scores, and high rates of
continuing on to higher
education. Last year
counselors assisted more
than 30 students to
become citizens.  Many
staff are both immigrant
and multilingual and, thus,
can both empathize with
students’ transitions
and suppor t Bell’s
strong native language-
maintenance program.
The Commission
supports
immigrant
education
funding that is
based on
a more accurate
assessment
of the impact
of immigration
on school systems
and that is
adequate
to alleviate
these impacts.
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immigrants.  Education for basic skills and literacy in English is the
major vehicle that integrates adult immigrants into American soci-
ety and participation in its civic activities.  Literate adults are more
likely to participate in the workforce and twice as likely to partici-
pate in our democracy.  Literate adults foster literacy in their chil-
dren, and parents’ educational levels positively affect their children’s
academic performance.
According to the 1990 Census, a total of 5.8 million adults reported
that they speak English “not well” or “not at all.”  This number
continues to grow because of the entry of non-English-speaking
immigrants.  Researchers estimate that 600,000 adults with only lim-
ited or no English now enter the United States each year.  Immi-
grants who are illiterate even in their native language or who have
only a few years of schooling consequently are confined to employ-
ment in dead-end jobs.
Adult education is severely underfunded.  Available resources are
inadequate to meet the demand for adult immigrant education,
particularly for English proficiency and job skills.  Enrollment in
adult English as a Second Language classes increased 183 percent
from 1980 to 1990; neither classes nor funding have kept pace with
demand.  In Massachusetts, a state widely recognized for its excel-
lent adult education programs, an estimated 11,000 of the 16,000 on
the waiting list for adult basic education are waiting for ESL ser-
vices.
Three principal problems impede the capacity to expand opportuni-
ties for adult education.  First, funding to subsidize courses is lim-
ited.  Many adult immigrants are willing and able to pay some
tuition for courses, expecting a positive return on this investment.
However, given average income levels of uneducated, unskilled
immigrants, they are unlikely to be able to cover the total costs of
adult education courses.
The Commission
urges the federal,
state and local
governments and
private institutions
to enhance
educational
opportunities
for adult
immigrants.
The Carlos Rosario Adult
and Career Center in
Washington DC.  was for 25
years the only DC public
school teaching English to
adult foreigners, gradua-
ting classes as large as 650
students. Closed  due to
funding constraints, it
reopened with private
funding in a church in
Chinatown.  Courses are
offered in computer use,
nursing assistance, and
GED.
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Second, teacher training programs are limited, resulting in short-
ages in the number of qualified teachers.  For example, in Massa-
chusetts, there are only two training programs for teachers of ESL
to adults and no Masters-level program for teachers of adult basic
education.  Many schools utilize volunteers to serve as tutors, but
there is an insufficient number of trained teachers to provide guid-
ance to these volunteer aides.
The third impediment relates to the general quality of adult educa-
tion programs.  The General Accounting Office [GAO] reported in
1995 that adult education and literacy programs funded by the U.S.
Department of Education  have no defined objectives, valid assess-
ment instruments, or accurate program data.
In the early part of the twentieth century, state departments of
education and local school boards played an active role in the
Americanization of immigrants.  They committed resources to adult
education in evening and weekend classes because they recognized
the importance of economic and civic incorporation into their com-
munities.  Similarly, many turn-of-the-century businesses partici-
pated in the Americanization movement, recognizing the benefits to
their operations accruing from a literate, educated workforce.
There has been a shift away from this once widely-held public per-
ception of immigrant adult education as a local responsibility, with
its  local community- and school-based programs.  The source of
funding is federal and state (as compared to  kindergarten through
grade twelve education that is financed primarily through local taxes).
While many local school districts continue to provide classrooms
and other resources, others do not.  In this setting of excess demand
for adult education, volunteers and low-cost options do exist.  Ac-
cess to relatively inexpensive classroom space often is a major im-
pediment to program implementation.  But—even though publicly-
owned classroom space is often available and unused during evening
and weekend hours—such limitations persist.
The Resources Occupa-
tional Training Program in
Brooklyn, New York, a
nonprofit adult vocational
training program, operates
as an affiliate of the
Catholic Migration Office of
the Diocese of Brook-lyn.
Launched in 1994 with
seed money from an Italian
businessman, it trains and
places 98 percent of its
immigrant students in well-
paying jobs without
government assistance.
Responding to requests
from its limited English-
speaking employees, the
United Electric Control
Corporation in Watertown,
Massachusetts in 1992
launched  an educational
and vocational skills training
program.  Em-ployees are
given time off from work to
take courses in a program
that is so successful that it
led to the formation of a
consortium of Boston area
high-technology companies
to provide the same
services.  In this case, the
program was given a jump
start by a federal workplace
literacy program grant.
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In recognition of the benefits they receive from immigration, the
Commission urges leaders from businesses and corporations to
participate in skills training, English instruction, and civics educa-
tion programs for immigrants.  Religious schools and institutions,
charities, foundations, community organizations, public and private
schools, colleges and universities also can contribute resources, fa-
cilities, and expertise. All of these sectors benefit from having skilled,
English-speaking workers and residents.  For example, local school
systems could open schools after hours to community groups pro-
viding English instruction on a volunteer basis, and businesses could
provide employees the opportunity for such classes at the jobsite.
Such public/private partnerships can contribute in many ways to a
greater range of educational opportunities for immigrants.
NATURALIZATION
Naturalization is the most important act that a legal immigrant un-
dertakes in the process of becoming an American.  Taking this step
confers upon the immigrant all the rights and responsibilities of
civic and political participation that the United States has to offer
(except becoming President).  The Commission reiterates its belief
that no action should be taken that detracts from the appeal of
citizenship as an opportunity to become a member of the polity.
The naturalization process must be credible, and it must be ac-
corded the formality and ceremony appropriate to its importance.
The Commission believes that the current legal requirements for
naturalization are appropriate, but improvements are needed in the
means used to measure that an applicant meets these requirements.
To naturalize, legal immigrants must meet certain threshold require-
ments; these have remained remarkably consistent throughout our
history.  At present, to naturalize, a legal permanent residents must
reside in the United States for five years (three years for spouses of
The  Boeing Company and
the International Associa-
tion of Machinists provide
training and skills develop-
ment to current and laid-off
workers that includes En-
glish as a Second Lan-
guage and professional
English development.
Boeing also provided in-
kind production services
for a community-based or-
ganization naturalization
video series in eight lan-
guages.
Maid Bess, a contract ap-
parel business in Salem,
Virginia  provides free on-
site English  instruction to
its refugee employees with
the help of a local refugee
resettlement agency.
Among its more than 400
employees, 17  national and
ethnic groups are repre-
sented.  On its  annual “In-
ternational Day,” all  employ-
ees are encour-aged to
dress in the traditional cos-
tume of their native country
or that of  their ancestors.
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U.S. citizens and legal permanent residents who serve in the mili-
tary); demonstrate the ability to read, write, speak, and understand
English; pass a U.S. history and civics exam; be of good moral
character; and take an oath of allegiance.
With regard to the specific legal requirements, the Commission sup-
ports:
n Maintaining requirements that legal immigrants must re-
side in the United States for five years (three years for
spouses of U.S. citizens and Lawful Permanent Residents
who serve in the military) before naturalizing.  We believe
five years is adequate for immigrants to embrace, under-
stand, and demonstrate their knowledge of the principles of
American democracy.
n Improving the mechanisms used to demonstrate knowl-
edge of U.S. history, civics, and English competence.  The
Commission believes that the tests used in naturalization
should seek to determine if applicants have a meaningful
knowledge of U.S. history and civics and are able to com-
municate in English. The current tests do not adequately
assess such understanding or abilities.  The civics test, for
example, relies on memorization of discrete facts rather than
on substantive understanding of the basic concepts of civic
participation.
INS district offices vary significantly from each other in the
methods by which they administer the test and in the thresh-
old number of correct answers needed for passage.  In some
cases, examiners scale the tests to the perceived educational
abilities of applicants. The lack of uniform standards gov-
erning whether an applicant has satisfactorily fulfilled the
The Commission
believes that
the current legal
requirements
for naturalization
are appropriate
but improvements
are needed
in the means
used to measure
that an applicant
meets these
requirements.
The nonprofit Arlington
Community Foundation in
Virginia funds and
organizes grassroots
programs to assist immi-
grants in their transition to
American society.  It spon-
sors local community
organizations, festivals,
and focus groups to identify
and address sources of
tension be-tween longtime
residents and newcomers.
It    also supports local
initiatives to assist
immigrant entre-preneurs
and parents of school-age
children to understand how
American institutions work.
In 1995, it founded the
Washington Partnership for
New Americans to
encourage naturalization.
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requirements is disturbing.  Such inconsistencies pose un-
due confusion for qualified legal residents and undermine
public confidence in  the naturalization process.
The Commission believes the tests should be standardized
and aim to evaluate a common core of information to be
understood by all new citizens.  The U.S. history and civics
test should assess whether applicants understand the basic
principles of U.S. government: for example, what it means
to have freedom of speech or the freedom to assemble.  The
English test should accurately and fairly measure an
immigrant’s ability to speak, read, and write; the current
practice of dictating English sentences for applicants to write
is not an effective means of testing English proficiency.
INS is now undertaking a full review of its interview and
testing criteria, including the content and format of the
English and civics portions of the test.  The Commission
encourages officials responsible for naturalization to consult
and enlist the assistance of professional educators, peda-
gogical experts, and standardized test providers in the de-
velopment of new history/civics and English standards and
tests.  Consideration should be given to separating the En-
glish reading, writing, and comprehension components from
the personal interview.  Often, applicants are nervous about
making a mistake during the interview and demonstrate
less English proficiency than they may have.  This separa-
tion also would work to the advantage of those responsible
for adjudicating applications as interviews would be reserved
for applicants who had fulfilled the English and civics re-
quirements, sparing scheduling and interviewing of unquali-
fied applicants.
The Arlington County,
Virginia,  Wilson Center
provides education and
training for immigrants
using federal refugee
program funds for
language and employ-
ment services.  It offers
citizenship and English as
a Second Language
classes (focusing on child
rearing and family
violence).  As the school
registration center for
foreign-born children, it can
readily inform immi-grants
of its services.
The American Telephone
and Telegraph Company in
India Hill, Illinois, learned
the lengthy naturalization
process was of major
concern for its employees.
It worked with the Chicago
INS office to distribute
naturalization applications
and study guides to
employees and provided
space for officials to
conduct interviews and
naturalization ceremonies.
A total of 400  employees
and their family members
became citizens.
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These new standards will be meaningful only if applied eq-
uitably and there is a much greater capacity to monitor the
agencies that give the tests.  [See below.]
A more predictable and standardized testing process also
must include consistent and rational exemptions for elderly
legal permanent residents. At present English language ex-
emptions are granted to legal permanent residents aged 50
years or older who have lived in the United States at least
twenty years and to those 55 years of age who have resided
in the U.S. for at least fifteen years.   Special consideration
on the civics component is given to naturalization appli-
cants aged 65 or older who have resided in the U.S. for at
least twenty years.  The Commission supports these exemp-
tions.  However, it makes little sense to confer such exemp-
tions on long-term legal residents, yet not on more recent
elderly legal residents who have had less time to acquire
English proficiency.  The Commission calls for a thorough
review of the current testing exemptions and urges the
Congress to consider additional, narrowly-tailored exemp-
tions to the English requirement for qualified elderly immi-
grants who have resided in the U.S. for fewer years than
required by the current exemptions.
n Expediting swearing-in ceremonies while maintaining their
solemnity and dignity. Approved applicants must take an
oath of allegiance before U.S. citizenship is conferred upon
them.  Generally, the oath is administered in public ceremo-
nies by federal judges.  Most such ceremonies are solemn
and dignified public affirmations of a mutual obligation that
new Americans and their adopted country make to each
other.  However, in districts where the federal court has
exercised sole jurisdiction to conduct the swearing-in cer-
The Voter Education
Registration and Action
Program of the New
England Literacy Re-
source Center in Boston,
Massachusetts  promotes
adult literacy so that its
students can take  in-
formed action on issues
that concern them.  The
Center is supported by
National Institute for
Literacy grants under the
1991 National Literacy Act.
In the November 1996
election, 467 out of 550 of
the program’s adult
learners —85%—
participated.
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emonies, long delays often result from crowded court calen-
dars.
The Commission believes a more expeditious approach to
the swearing-in ceremony should be adopted.  Timely cer-
emonies need not sacrifice the ceremonial and traditional
aspects of the ceremony that the Commission strongly be-
lieves are essential.  The Commission believes the solemnity
and pomp of the current judicial ceremonies should be
maintained and could be enhanced by the inclusion of dis-
tinguished speakers.  However, would-be citizens who have
passed all requirements for naturalization should not be
denied timely citizenship because of processing delays in
scheduling swearing-in ceremonies.
Until 1990, the federal judiciary had sole jurisdiction to confer
citizenship on an approved naturalization applicant. The Im-
migration Act of 1990, however, transferred authority to
confer citizenship to the INS.  Within one year, the Judicial
Naturalization Amendments of 1991 reinstated the judiciary,
albeit in a somewhat modified role.  Consequently, judges
who choose to exercise sole jurisdiction are granted forty-
five days from notification of eligible applicants in which to
perform swearing-in ceremonies.  Despite the changes insti-
tuted by the 1991 Amendments, immigrants typically wait
considerably longer to be sworn in as new citizens.
Such delays can have significant consequences for legal resi-
dents; they are unable to apply for particular jobs, travel
abroad, vote, or receive certain benefits such as Food Stamps
and Supplementary Security Income [SSI].  The Commission
is concerned that as the number of newly-approved citizen-
ship applicants increases, along with an increasing caseload
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for the federal judiciary, the federal courts’ capacity to per-
form timely ceremonies may be further hampered.
The Commission recommends that to reduce this waiting
time Congress restore the Executive Branch’s sole jurisdic-
tion for naturalization.  The Executive Branch should con-
tinue to work with federal judges as well as other qualified
institutions and personnel, such as state courts or Immigra-
tion Judges, to ensure that swearing-in ceremonies are con-
sistently conducted in a timely, efficient, and dignified man-
ner.  Eminent persons who would add dignity to the cer-
emony could be invited to participate as well.   Standards
of conduct should be developed for all such participants to
assure, for example, that all remarks are free of partisan
politics.
n Revising the naturalization oath to make it comprehen-
sible, solemn, and meaningful.  Taking the oath is a critical
legal step in becoming a naturalized citizen.  Its words con-
vey  the core meaning of becoming an American citizen.
Thus, it is imperative that it be understandable by all who
take it.  We recommend that those naturalizing be given a
written copy of the oath that they can read during the swear-
ing-in and that they can keep as a meaningful memento.
The current oath is not easy to comprehend. We believe it is
not widely understood by new citizens.  Its wording in-
cludes dated language, archaic form, and convoluted gram-
mar.  Although the 1952 statute does not prescribe any
particular wording, it does require that the oath contain five
elements: (1) support for the Constitution; (2) renunciation
of prior allegiance; (3) defense of the Constitution against all
U.S. COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION REFORM
1 9 9 7
RECOMMENDATIONS
- 51 -
The Commission
calls for
urgently needed
reforms
to increase
the efficiency
and integrity
of the
naturalization
process.
enemies, foreign and domestic; (4) true faith and allegiance;
and (5) a commitment to bear arms or perform noncomba-
tant service when required.
The Commission  proposes the following revision of the
oath as capturing the essence of naturalization.
Solemnly, freely, and
without any mental reservation,
I, [name] hereby renounce under oath
[or upon affirmation]
all former political allegiances.
My sole political fidelity
and allegiance from this day forward
is to the United States of America.
I pledge to support and respect
its Constitution and laws.
Where and if lawfully required,
I further commit myself to defend them against all
enemies, foreign and domestic, either by military or
civilian service.
This I do solemnly swear [or affirm],
So help me God.4
The Commission calls for urgently needed reforms to increase the
efficiency and integrity of the naturalization process.  The vast
majority of applicants for naturalization are law-abiding immigrants
who contribute to our society.  The value of Americanization is
eroded whenever unnecessary obstacles prevent eligible immigrants
from becoming citizens.  Its value also is undermined when the
4 As is the case under current regulations, when applicants, by reason of
religious training and belief or for other reasons of good conscience,
cannot swear an oath, they may substitute “solemnly affirm” and delete
“so help me God.”
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process permits the abuse of our laws by naturalizing applicants
who are not entitled to citizenship.  For the process of Americaniza-
tion to succeed, it must provide fair and timely service to legal
residents applying for citizenship.  It must also earn the trust and
confidence of the general public.
In August 1995, the INS launched an initiative to address many of
the most serious impediments to naturalization, including a backlog
in excess of 300,000 persons and processing times that in larger
cities approached four years.  Consequently, the Service hired more
than 1,000 new personnel, opened several additional branch offices,
and established direct mail centers.
While these new resources resulted in record numbers of naturaliza-
tions, improprieties in granting citizenship to criminal aliens and
fraud in the testing process undermined the goals of the program.
It is fair to conclude that the new program revealed many of the
structural and managerial weaknesses of the overall naturalization
process.  Subsequent Congressional hearings and independent in-
vestigations demonstrate that many of the most serious problems
preceded the new initiative and were exacerbated by the increasing
number of applications.
The Department of Justice [DOJ] has launched a variety of new
initiatives to reengineer naturalization.  DOJ named a Director for
Naturalization Operations charged with overseeing management and
reform of the naturalization program, including quality assurance
and field operations.  DOJ also contracted with Coopers and Lybrand
to conduct a two-year review of the implementation and adminis-
tration of the INS naturalization program.
Recognizing steps already are underway to reengineer the natural-
ization process, the Commission supports the following approaches:
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n Instituting efficiencies without sacrificing quality controls.
In the Commission’s 1995 report to Congress, we recom-
mended that the Immigration and Naturalization Service
and the Congress take steps to expedite the processing of
naturalization applications while maintaining rigorous stan-
dards.  Two years later, the naturalization process still takes
too long, and previous efforts to expedite processing re-
sulted in serious violation of the integrity of the system.
Because of failures in processing that resulted in the natural-
ization of ineligible applicants, new procedures subsequently
were adopted to reduce inadvertent naturalization of crimi-
nal aliens.  These new procedures, while not foolproof in
barring criminals from naturalizing, have led to processing
delays.  At the same time, adequate staffing remains a prob-
lem.  Congress has authorized reprogramming of funds to
hire additional staff, but the Committees permitted tempo-
rary hires for most of the new positions even though the
number of applications remain large.  An entirely temporary
workforce with short contracts lends instability to a process
that already has problems.  Instituting a system that has
sufficient continuity of personnel and that is both credible
and efficient therefore remains a pressing need.
n Improving the integrity and processing of fingerprints.  Be-
fore applicants for naturalization can receive citizenship, they
must submit fingerprints for FBI review to determine if the
applicants have any disqualifying criminal background.
Problems that delay thousands of applications have been
identified in the operation of private agencies taking the
fingerprints of applicants for citizenship. These problems
include smudged prints and failure of applicants to sign or
properly complete forms.  Further, no mechanism now ex-
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ists to verify accurately that the individual submitting the
prints is the person whose prints are on the application.
To improve this process, the INS placed restrictions on who
may qualify to offer fingerprint services.  INS now  accepts
only fingerprints provided by Designated Fingerprint Ser-
vices [DFS] trained and authorized by INS. These include
local law enforcement agencies, nonprofit agencies, and fin-
gerprint convenience stores.  These restrictions may improve
the quality of the prints, but  do nothing to ensure that
fingerprint services  consistently and competently verify the
identity of individuals whose prints are submitted.  While
law enforcement agencies have a vested interest in preserv-
ing the quality of fingerprints, they have heavy workloads
and do not always give high priority to naturalization re-
quests. Nonprofit, community-based organizations appear
to take clear fingerprints, but there are questions about their
competence to assess the validity of identity documents.
The Commission believes than only service providers under
direct control of the federal government should be autho-
rized to take fingerprints.  If the federal government does
not take fingerprints itself but instead contracts with service
providers, it must screen and monitor such providers rigor-
ously for their capacity, capability, and integrity.  Failure to
meet standards would result in termination of the contract.
n Contracting with a single English and civics testing ser-
vice. The Commission urges a fundamental restructuring of
the policies and procedures with which private agencies test
naturalization applicants for their knowledge of English and
civics.
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A 1991 regulation authorized the INS to recognize the re-
sults of private for-profit and nonprofit testing services.  The
rationale was that private testing of civics and English would
help to adjudicate citizenship applicants more expeditiously.
By 1994, six organizations had been authorized by the INS
to administer the citizenship exam.
Congressional hearings during the fall of 1996 revealed dis-
turbing weaknesses in the use of private testers that under-
mined the integrity of the citizenship test.  In response to
reports that private, for-profit testing services were engag-
ing in price gouging, cheating, and fraud, INS investigated
three sites.  In April and May of 1996, INS made some
changes to improve testing site oversight   Local INS offices
were directed to conduct unannounced inspections of citi-
zenship-testing affiliate locations if the office did not already
have an inspection plan in place.  The congressional hear-
ings revealed that private testers continued to be inadequately
supervised or disciplined by either INS or their parent com-
pany.
The Commission recommends that the federal government
contract with one national and respected testing service to
develop and give the English and civics tests to naturaliza-
tion applicants.  Having one organization under contract
should help the government substantially improve its over-
sight.  Moreover, continuity with a highly-respected and
nationally-recognized testing service will help ensure a high
quality product.
n Increasing professionalism.  While many naturalization staff
are highly professional in carrying out their duties, reports
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from district offices, congressional hearings, and complaints
from naturalization applicants demonstrate continued dis-
satisfaction with the quality of naturalization services.  The
Commission believes that a culture of customer-oriented
service must be developed.
Recent audits point to very high levels of noncompliance
with established practices and excessive error rates even in
such basic tasks as filling in the proper names and identify-
ing numbers on forms.  Mistakes pose two serious problems
for the naturalization process.  First, legitimate applicants
for naturalization face unnecessary delays while clerical and
other mistakes are corrected.  Second, ineligible applicants,
including felons, may be able to obtain citizenship through
administrative error.  While INS must pursue denaturaliza-
tion of such improperly naturalized citizens vigorously within
legal limits, it is difficult to reverse grants of citizenship
once made.  Recruitment and training of longer-term staff
assigned to adjudicating applications and overseeing qual-
ity control would help overcome some of these problems.
n Improving automation.  According to the INS, the number
of naturalization applicants projected for fiscal year 1997
and each of the following few years will exceed 1.8 million.
As more and more immigrants apply for naturalization and
choose to become part of the American polity, there is a
greater need for efficient and accurate recordkeeping.  Cur-
rent systems are inadequate to meet such a demand for
service.  Both the INS and FBI rely on paper rather than
electronic files, which is inefficient and subject to permanent
loss or misplacement of documents.  The inability of INS to
provide accurate data on the number of recently-naturalized
citizens who had undergone full background investigations
is a particularly glaring example of the present system’s
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vulnerabilities.  The costs to applicants and to INS credibil-
ity are significant.  The Commission is encouraged by plans
to develop linkages among data sources related to natural-
ization. The Commission recommends continued funding
for an up-to-date, advanced, electronic automation system
for information entry and recordkeeping.
n Establishing clear fee and other waiver guidelines and
implementing them consistently.  Under current law, the
Attorney General is authorized to grant fee waivers to natu-
ralization applicants.  The Commission has received accounts
of legitimate requests being denied.  The prospective in-
crease in naturalization fees may precipitate more fee waiver
requests or perhaps discourage applicants.  Clear guidelines
and consistent implementation are needed to ensure that
bona fide requests are granted, while guarding against abuse.
The 1994 Immigration and Nationality Technical Corrections
Act provided exceptions to the English proficiency and civ-
ics requirements for naturalization for persons with physi-
cal or developmental disabilities or with mental impairments.
After extensive consideration and opportunities for public
comment, the INS published its final rule in March 1997.
The new rule emphasizes medically determinable standards
that promote integrity and fairness.  Further, the new rule
does not confer a blanket exemption.  Hence, judging whether
an applicant’s disability would bestow a disability waiver is
inherently complex.
The Commission believes that rigorous and equitable inter-
pretation of the new rule will require that adjudicators are
properly trained.  Further, implementation must be strictly
monitored to ensure that exceptions allowed by law are made
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available to otherwise qualified legal residents.  Finally, to
ensure that the qualifications and procedures are understood
and adhered to, the Commission recommends a thorough
public education effort.
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A CREDIBLE FRAMEWORK
FOR IMMIGRATION POLICY
In our previous reports, the Commission defined a credible immi-
gration policy “by a simple yardstick: people who should get in do
get in, people who should not get in are kept out; and people who
are judged deportable are required to leave.”  By these measures,
the U.S. has made substantial, but incomplete, progress. What fol-
lows are the Commission’s recommendations for comprehensive re-
form to achieve more fully a credible framework for immigration
policy.
LEGAL PERMANENT ADMISSIONS
The Commission reiterates its support for a properly-regulated system for
admitting legal permanent residents.1  Research and analyses con-
ducted since the issuance of the Commission’s report on legal im-
migration support our view that a properly regulated system of
legal permanent admissions serves the national interest.  We reiter-
ate that such a system enhances the national benefits while protect-
ing against potential harms.
This position is supported by a recent report we commissioned from
the National Research Council on the impacts of immigration.2  The
panel concluded that “immigration produces net economic gains for
domestic residents” in the form of increased productivity and re-
duced consumer prices.  The benefits go well beyond economic
ones, however.  The panel also identified social and cultural gains
The Commission
reiterates its support
for a properly-
regulated
system for
admitting legal
permanent
residents.
1 For  a full explanation of the Commission’s recommendations see Legal
Immigration: Setting Priorities, 1995.  See Appendix for summary of
Commissioner Leiden’s dissenting statement.
2 National Research Council.  (J.P. Smith, B. Edmonston, eds.).  1997.  The
New Americans: Economic, Demographic, and Fiscal Effects of Immigration.
Washington, DC: National Academy Press.  62.
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resulting from immigration, particularly through the entry of highly-
talented immigrants who choose to live and contribute to the United
States.  The report continues: “Even when the economy as a whole
gains, however, there may be losers as well as gainers among dif-
ferent groups of U.S. residents.”  The principal “gainers” are the
immigrants themselves, owners of capital, higher-skilled workers
who are complements to most immigrants (who are themselves
lower-skilled) and consumers.  The principal “losers” are the low-
skilled workers who compete with immigrants and whose wages
fall as a result.  On a fiscal basis, the panel found national-level net
contributions of tax revenues resulting from immigration, but the
panel also identified significant net fiscal costs to the taxpayers of
states with large number of immigrants.  These high fiscal impacts
are due, particularly, to the presence of sizeable numbers of lesser-
skilled immigrants whose tax payments, even over a lifetime, are
insufficient to cover their use of services.
The Commission urges reforms in our legal immigration system to
enhance  the benefits accruing from the entry of newcomers while
guarding against harms, particularly to the most vulnerable of U.S.
residents—those who are themselves unskilled and living in pov-
erty.  More specifically, the Commission reiterates its support for:
n A significant redefinition of priorities and reallocation of
existing admission numbers to fulfill more effectively the
objectives of our immigration policy.  The Commission’s
more specific recommendations on priorities and procedures
for admission stem not only from the above analysis of the
effects of immigration but also from our review of the work-
ings of the admission system.  We argued in our 1995 report
that the current framework for legal immigration—family,
skills, and humanitarian admissions—makes sense.  How-
ever, the statutory and regulatory priorities and procedures
for admissions do not support the stated intentions of legal
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L E G A L   I M M I G R A T I O N
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Citizens-1st priority
Parents of U.S.
Citizens-2nd priority
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immigration—to reunify families, to provide employers an
opportunity to recruit foreign workers to meet labor needs,
and to respond to humanitarian crises around the world.
During the two years since our report on legal immigration,
the problems in the legal admission system have not been
solved.  Indeed, some of them have worsened as is dis-
cussed below.
We believe current immigration levels should be sustained
for the next several years while the U.S. revamps its legal
immigration system and shifts the priorities for admissions
away from extended family and toward nuclear family and
away from unskilled and toward higher skilled immigrants.
Thereafter, modest reductions in levels of immigration—to
about 550,000 per year, comparable to those of the 1980s—
will result from the changing priority system.
The Commission continues to believe that legal admission
numbers should be authorized by Congress for a specified
time (e.g., three to five years) to ensure regular, periodic
review and, if needed, change by Congress.  This review
should consider the adequacy of admission numbers for
accomplishing priorities.  It also should consider the eco-
nomic and other domestic needs and capacities of the United
States to absorb newcomers.
n Family-based admissions that give priority to nuclear fam-
ily members—spouses and minor children of U.S. citi-
zens, parents of U.S. citizens, and spouses and minor
children of legal permanent residents—and include a back-
log clearance program to permit the most expeditious en-
try of the spouses and minor children of LPRs.
The Commission recommends allocation of 550,000 family-
based admission numbers each year until the large backlog
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of spouses and minor children is cleared.  The backlog, which
numbers more than 1 million persons, consists of the nuclear
family members of legal immigrants who married after the
U.S. spouse became a permanent resident, as well as spouses
and minor children of aliens legalized under IRCA (most of
whom are now eligible to naturalize).  Numbers going to
lower priority categories (e.g., adult children, siblings, and
diversity immigrants), should be transferred to the nuclear
family categories.  Thereafter Congress should set sufficient
admission numbers to permit all spouses and minor chil-
dren of citizens and LPRs to enter expeditiously.
Since the Commission first reported its findings on legal
admissions, the problems associated with family-based ad-
missions have grown.  In 1995, the wait between application
and admission of the spouses and minor children of LPRs
was about three years.  It is now more than four years and
still growing.3
Various statutory changes enacted in 1996 make it all the
more important that Congress take specific action to clear
the backlog quickly to regularize the status of the spouses
and minor children of legal permanent residents in the United
States.  In an effort to deter illegal migration, Congress ex-
panded the bases and number of grounds upon which per-
sons may be denied legal status because of a previous illegal
entry or overstay of a visa.  Most important, a person un-
3 It appears that the priority date (i.e., the cut-off date by which an
approved petition must have been filed) has moved forward as much as
it has only because of delays in processing applications for adjustment
of status within the United States.  When it became clear that INS could
not keep up with the adjustment backlog, the Department of State moved
up the priority date to continue processing visas overseas.  As many of
the adjustment applications are still to be processed, it is likely that there
will be very little movement on the priority date during the next several
months.
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lawfully present for more than six months will be inadmis-
sible for three years, and those unlawfully present for more
than one year will be inadmissible for ten years.4  If Con-
gress decides not to renew the provision [known as Section
245(i)] that permits these individuals to adjust status within
the United States, they will be unable to become legal immi-
grants even if they meet all other admission criteria.
An unknown, but believed to be large, number of spouses
and minor children awaiting legal status are unlawfully
present in the United States.  While the Commission does
not condone their illegal presence, we are cognizant of the
great difficulties posed by the four-or-more-year waiting
period for a family second-preference visa.  U.S. immigra-
tion policy should not force legal immigrants to choose
between family responsibilities and vows and their contin-
ued presence in the United States. The Commission believes
no spouse or minor child should have to wait more than
one year to be reunited with their U.S. petitioner.
The Commission is also concerned with the impact on nuclear
family reunification of the provisions adopted in the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of
1996 [IIRIRA] to address perceived abuses in the use of
parole.  We agree that parole should be used only in excep-
tional circumstances and that Congress should be involved
more directly in decisions to parole large numbers of indi-
viduals for permanent residence.  We further recognize the
validity of efforts to count long-term parolees against world-
wide numerical ceilings.  However, we do not agree with
4 IIRIRA permits the Attorney General to provide a waiver for spouses
and minor children if there is an extreme hardship to the U.S. petitioner.
Although standards have not been set for implementing this provision,
mere separation from family members generally has not counted as an
“extreme hardship” in applying other provisions where extreme hardship
is a ground for relief.
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the IIRIRA provisions that count parolees against family-
based admission numbers.  Moreover, the language of IIRIRA
requires the counting of those admitted with the intention
that they reside permanently and those who are paroled for
short stays but who are not known to have left one year
later.  For the first time in U.S. law, persons illegally in the
U.S. would be counted against legal admission ceilings.  This
creates a conflict between policies.  Moreover, inadequacies
in current entry-exit controls mean that some parolees who
leave the country will be determined to have remained and
will also be counted against the legal admissions ceiling.
Because the parole numbers are deducted from the family
preferences, the new provisions hold the potential for delay-
ing still further the already unacceptable delays in admis-
sion of nuclear family members.
The Commission believes that the national interest in the
entry of nuclear family members outweighs that of more
extended family members.  We recognize that others dis-
agree; they argue that the bonds to adult children and adult
siblings can be as strong as the bond between spouses and
with minor children.  They also point to the valuable assis-
tance provided by many extended families in setting up and
running businesses and providing child care and other sup-
portive services.  Whatever the cultural and economic val-
ues attached to each family relationship, however, the far
stronger responsibilities to one’s spouse and minor children
are well established in the U.S.  We continue to believe that
our family reunification system will remain seriously flawed
until the spouses and minor children of LPRs are treated as
a priority.
An end to extended visa categories is justified even apart
from the large nuclear family backlog.  The Commission
pointed out in its 1995 report that the extraordinarily large
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waiting list for siblings of U.S. citizens, and to a lesser ex-
tent, adult children undermines the integrity of the legal
immigration system.
The backlog for siblings of adult U.S. citizens has stabilized
during the past two years, but at a very large level.  In
January, 1995, there were 1.6 million on the waiting list; as
of January 1997, the waiting list was 1.5 million.  Except for
oversubscribed countries, siblings who applied ten years ago
are now eligible to enter.  Admissions from the Philippines
are of those who applied almost twenty years ago.  These
extended waiting periods mean that most siblings enter well
into their working lives, limiting the time during which they
can make a contribution to the U.S. economy.  More than
one-half of all the siblings and their spouses admitted in FY
1996 were above the age of 45.  In other immigration catego-
ries, most principals are in their twenties or thirties.
The backlog for adult children is growing.  In January 1995,
there were about 70,000 unmarried sons and daughters of
citizens, 500,000 unmarried sons and daughters of LPRs,
and 260,000 married sons and daughters of citizens in the
backlog.  As of January 1997, the unmarried backlog had
grown to more than 90,000 and 575,000, respectively, and
the married children backlog is more than 310,000.
A particular concern is the “aging out” of children who were
minors at the time of application, but who turned 21 years of
age while awaiting their green cards.  The Commission pro-
posed in our 1995 report that the Immigration and National-
ity Act [INA]  be amended so that “a person entitled to status
at the time a petition is approved shall continue to be entitled
to that status regardless of his or her age.”
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n Skill-based admissions policies that enhance opportuni-
ties for the entry of highly-skilled immigrants, particu-
larly those with advanced degrees, and eliminate the cat-
egory for admission of unskilled workers. The Commis-
sion continues to recommend that immigrants be chosen on
the basis of the skills they contribute to the U.S. economy.
Only if there is a compelling national interest—such as
nuclear family reunification or humanitarian admissions—
should immigrants be admitted without regard to the eco-
nomic contributions they can make.  The reunification of
adult children and siblings of adult citizens solely because
of family relationship is not as compelling.
A number of the NRC report’s findings argue for increasing
the proportion of immigrants who are highly-skilled and
educated so as to maximize fiscal contributions, minimize
fiscal impacts, and protect the economic opportunities of
unskilled U.S. workers.  The NRC research shows that edu-
cation plays a major role in determining the impacts of
immigration.  Immigration of unskilled immigrants comes
at a cost to unskilled U.S. workers, particularly established
immigrants for whom new immigrants are economic substi-
tutes.  Further, the difference in estimated fiscal effects of
immigrants by education is striking: using the same meth-
odology to estimate net costs and benefits, immigrants with
a high school education or more are likely to be net con-
tributors while those without a high school degree are likely
to be net costs to taxpayers.
Shifting priorities to higher skilled employment-based im-
migrants will have a beneficial multiplier effect.  The highly-
skilled are, in effect, new seed immigrants who will petition
for admission of their family members.  The educational
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level of the spouses and children of highly-educated per-
sons tends to be in the same range.  Hence, our society
benefits not only from the entry of highly-skilled immigrants
themselves, but also from the entry of their family.
The Commission’s framework for legal skill-based admis-
sions includes two broad categories.  The first category would
cover individuals who are exempt from labor market tests
because their entry will generate economic growth and/or
significantly enhance U.S. intellectual and cultural strength
without undermining the employment prospects and remu-
neration of U.S. workers: aliens with extraordinary ability,
multinational executives and managers, entrepreneurs, and
ministers and religious workers.  The second category cov-
ers individuals subject to labor market tests, including pro-
fessionals with advanced degrees, professionals with bacca-
laureate degrees, and skilled workers with specialized work
experience.
In our 1995 report, the Commission recommended alloca-
tion of 100,000 admission slots to skill-based immigrants.
That number represented an increase of about 10 percent
over actual usage of these visas, but a decline from the
statutory ceiling of 130,000 admission numbers (i.e., 140,000
minus the 10,000 allocated to lesser skilled workers).  We
further recommended that unused skill-based admissions
carry over to the following year’s skill-based admissions.
The trend in admission of skill-based immigrants supports
our 1995 recommendations, but also indicates the great need
to monitor and revise admission numbers as needed.  In FY
1995, 85,000 employment-based immigrants were admitted,
including 7,900 unskilled workers.  This number was artifi-
cially low, however, because of INS delays in adjudicating
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applications for adjustment of status.  In FY 1996, admis-
sions totaled 117,000, including 12,000 unskilled workers.
The 100,000 skilled admission numbers recommended by
the Commission would have been sufficient to cover the
period 1994-1996 (with the carry-over provision).  However,
if the FY 1996 spike turns out to be real (rather than an
artifact of the adjustment of status delays of FY 1995), the
number of employment-based visas may need to be revised.
The Commission also continues to recommend changes in
the procedures used in testing the labor market impact of
employment-based admissions.  Rather than use the lengthy,
costly, and ineffectual labor certification system, the Com-
mission recommends using market forces as a labor market
test.  To ensure a level playing field for U.S. workers, em-
ployers would attest to having used normal company r e -
cruiting procedures that meet industry-wide standards, pay-
ing the prevailing wage, and complying with other labor
standards.  Businesses recruiting foreign workers also would
be required to make significant financial investments in cer-
tified private sector initiatives dedicated to improving the
competitiveness of U.S. workers.    These payments should
be set at a per-worker amount sufficient to ensure there is
no financial incentive to hire a foreign worker over a quali-
fied U.S. worker.   Labor certification continues to be a time-
consuming, unproductive way to protect U.S. workers from
unfair competition from immigrant workers.  The Depart-
ment of Labor has tried to institute reforms that have stream-
lined the process for certain applications.  The result, how-
ever, has been to slow down even further other applications
that do not meet the streamlining requirements.
n Refugee admissions based on human rights and humani-
tarian considerations, as one of several elements of U.S.
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5 For a full explanation of the Commission’s refugee-related
recommendations, see U.S. Refugee Policy: Taking Leadership, 1997.
leadership in assisting and protecting the world’s perse-
cuted.5  Since its very beginnings, the United States has been
a place of refuge.  Today, when millions of refugees are
displaced because of persecution, human rights violations,
or warfare, U.S. leadership in responding to refugee crises
is critical.  The Commission believes continued admission of
refugees sustains our humanitarian commitment to provide
safety to the persecuted, enables the U.S. to pursue foreign
policy interests in promoting human rights, and encourages
international efforts to resettle persons requiring rescue or
durable solutions.  The Commission also urges the federal
government to continue to support international assistance
and protection for the majority of the world’s refugees for
whom resettlement is neither appropriate nor practical.
Admissions to the U.S. should be seen within the context of
broader U.S. interests in protecting and assisting refugees
worldwide.  The Commission believes a comprehensive U.S.
refugee policy should be coordinated by an office within the
National Security Council [NSC] to serve as the White House
focal point for domestic and international refugee and re-
lated humanitarian issues: to care for and protect refugees
overseas; to resettle the few for whom U.S. resettlement is
the only or best option and provide sensible transitional
assistance to them; to operate an effective system for pro-
tecting bona fide asylum seekers in the U.S. while deterring
those who are not; and to adopt a humane and effective
plan to respond to mass migration emergencies.
The admission of refugees should be divided into two broad
priority groups with numbers allocated accordingly.  The
first priority would be for refugees who are in urgent need
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of rescue and refugees who are the immediate relatives of
persons already living legally in the United States.  The
second priority would include refugees whose admission is
of special humanitarian interest to the United States but
who are not in imminent danger where they currently re-
side.  Admission numbers would be sufficient each year to
guarantee entry to all bona fide applicants within the first
priority and an agreed-upon number for the second priority
Family members and close household members who are
dependent on the principal applicant for financial or physi-
cal security should also be included among admissions within
this priority system.
The United States should set annual numerical targets—but
not a statutory limit—for future refugee admissions.  The
Commission recommends an improved consultation process
that will help ensure that admission numbers and alloca-
tions meet U.S. national and international interests.  The
annual consultations should be strengthened by considering
projections of admission levels and priorities for at least two
years beyond the fiscal year under immediate consideration.
Input should be solicited from a wide range of human rights
and humanitarian organizations with knowledge of condi-
tions precipitating the need for resettlement.
The United States also should use an active, inclusive pro-
cess for  identifying and making decisions regarding the
admissibility of applicants for resettlement, conferring with
a broad set of agencies in identifying possible candidates for
resettlement.  The U.S. government should confer with a
broader set of agencies in identifying possible candidates
for resettlement, including international and local human
rights organizations, relief agencies providing assistance to
refugees, and host governments.
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The Commission further believes changes are needed to make
the  administrative processes for admission more flexible
and streamlined in determinations of eligibility in order to
respond quickly to refugee crises.  Also, refugees should be
admitted with LPR status except in cases where there has
been inadequate opportunity prior to admission for the
admitting officer to thoroughly review the case(s).
The Commission supports a continuing program of assis-
tance to refugees after entry.  The current array of assistance
and services that characterize the resettlement program
should be maintained, but with increased attention to ser-
vices that prepare refugees for rapid economic self-suffi-
ciency and civic participation.  In addition, the federal, state,
and local agencies involved in resettlement should develop
a national plan for streamlining the program to address the
complexity of the funding process and reporting require-
ments, the overlap of programs and responsibilities, and the
lack of clear accountability for the outcomes of the program.
The current public/private partnership in the domestic re-
settlement program should be continued, but for a three-
year trial period their division of responsibility should be
more explicit, with (1) the public sector assuming responsi-
bility for refugees eligible for the publicly funded public
assistance programs and (2) the private sector being respon-
sible for a limited duration program for refugees not eligible
for the mainstream public programs.
The mechanisms by which the refugee program is funded
should be strengthened through changes to the Refugee Act:
(1) to specify a minimum time period of special refugee cash
and medical assistance provided to refugees not eligible for
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families [TANF] or Supple-
mental Security Income [SSI]; (2) to permit the appropria-
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tion of “no year” money for the cash and medical assistance
portion of the Office of Refugee Resettlement [ORR] budget;
(3) to broaden the consultation process to ensure greater
consistency between admission decisions and appropriation
of funds to support refugee assistance and services;  and (4)
to establish a domestic emergency fund.
The Commission continues to recommend against denying benefits
to legal immigrants solely because they are noncitizens.  The Com-
mission believes that the denial of safety net programs to immi-
grants solely because they are noncitizens is not in the national
interest.  In previous reports, the Commission argued that Congress
should address the most significant uses of public benefit programs
—particularly, elderly immigrants using Supplementary Security
Income—by requiring sponsors to assume full financial responsibil-
ity for newly-arriving immigrants who otherwise would be excluded
on public charge grounds.  In particular, the Commission argued
that sponsors of parents who would likely become public charges
assume the responsibility for the lifetimes of the immigrants (or
until they became eligible for Social Security on the basis of work
quarters).  We also argued that sponsors of spouses and children
should assume responsibility for the duration of the familial rela-
tionship or a time-specified period.  We continue to believe that this
targeted approach makes greater sense than a blanket denial of eli-
gibility for public services solely on the basis of a person’s alienage.
Basing eligibility for assistance on citizenship debases citizenship.
We encourage immigrants to become citizens in order to participate
fully in the civic life of the country.  We do not want immigrants to
become citizens solely because the alternative is the serious eco-
nomic hardship that may result if benefits are lost or unavailable.  In
some cases, categorical denial of eligibility to legal aliens under-
mines the very purpose of our immigration policy.  For example, the
United States admits refugees, as noted above, to provide protection
against the dangerous situations they encounter in their home coun-
The Commission
continues to
recommend
against denying
benefits to
legal immigrants
solely because
they are
noncitizens.
U.S. COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION REFORM
1 9 9 7
RECOMMENDATIONS
- 74 -
tries and first-asylum countries.  Some of the most vulnerable refu-
gees requiring such protection are the elderly and disabled who will
have the greatest difficulty meeting our naturalization standards.
This is not to deny that elderly and disabled immigrants pose a cost
to U.S. taxpayers.  The NRC report confirms this fact.  By contrast,
however, immigrants who come during their prime working years
generally do not pose a net cost to the taxpayer over their lifetime.
Most of the fiscal impact related to the presence of immigrants
comes in the area of education, which can be seen as both a cost and
an investment as education has long-term benefits to the United
States both in a more skilled workforce and in higher income and
resulting tax payments.
The Congress did not accept the Commission’s recommendations to
preserve the safety net.  Some eligibility for elderly and disabled
immigrants receiving Supplementary Security Income lost as of the
enactment of the welfare reform legislation has been restored as a
result of budget negotiations.  Eligibility for food stamps and other
programs designed for the working poor were not restored, how-
ever.  And, future immigrants will be ineligible for SSI even if they
become disabled after entry and have no other means of support.
The Congress did adopt, but in a modified version, the Commission’s
recommendation for binding affidavits of support.  The 1996 legis-
lation framed the requirement in two ways that differ from the
Commission’s recommendations.  First, the legally-binding affida-
vit, with its more rigorous requirements regarding the income of
sponsors, applies to some persons who are not likely to be public
charges but not to others who are likely to require assistance.  The
affidavits apply to all family-based immigrants, not just to those
who are likely to be public charges.  By contrast, the new affidavit
will not be used for other admission categories (for example, diver-
sity immigrants) even if an immigrant is likely to be a public charge.
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Second, under the new legislation, the same time periods and re-
quirements apply to everyone who signs an affidavit.  The affidavits
are in force until the immigrant works forty quarters or becomes a
U.S. citizen.  The Commission believes the period of responsibility
should be geared instead to the family relationship and likely period
during which the immigrant may require assistance.  For example,
the sponsors of an elderly parent would be required to assume a
longer (even an indefinite) period of support if the parent is of an
age that makes it unlikely that he or she would become self-support-
ing.  The responsibility for a spouse, however, would be for a time-
limited period or for the duration of the marriage, whichever is
longer.  Under the new law, the responsibility of petitioners of
younger immigrants is so open-ended that it does not provide a
realistic or fair set of obligations.  For example, if a U.S. citizen
marries a foreign student with a professional degree and a job offer,
the U.S. citizen must now take on a open-ended obligation to the
foreign student, an obligation that carries on even if the marriage
ends in divorce.  If the immigrant spouse chooses not to work (and
therefore doesn’t meet the forty quarters requirement) and not to
naturalize, the citizen remains responsible for his or her financial
support (at 125 percent of the poverty level) indefinitely.  The law
has no “good cause” exception.
To conclude, the Commission’s recommendations on legal admis-
sions are as relevant today as they were in 1995.  The Commission
urges the Congress to take the measures needed to reform our legal
immigration policies so it best serves the national interest in a well-
regulated immigration system.
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LIMITED DURATION ADMISSIONS
Persons come to the United States for limited duration stays for
several principal purposes: representation of a foreign government
or other foreign entities; work; study; and short-term visits for com-
mercial or personal purposes, such as tourism or family visits.  These
individuals are statutorily referred to as “nonimmigrants.”  In this
report, however, we refer to “limited duration admissions [LDAs]”,
a term that better captures the nature of their admission. When the
original admission expires, the alien must either leave the country
or meet the criteria for a new LDA or permanent residence.  The
term “nonimmigrants” is misleading as some LDAs entering the
United States are really in transition to permanent residence, and
other LDAs enter for temporary stays and become permanent resi-
dents based on marriage or skills.6
The benefits of a well-regulated system of LDAs are palpable.  LDAs
represent a considerable boon to the U.S. economy.  The tourism
and travel industry (domestic and international) is the second larg-
est employer in the United States and generates 6 percent of the
nation’s Gross Domestic Product [GDP].  International tourism pro-
vides a net trade surplus (dollars international visitors spend here
minus dollars U.S. visitors spend outside the U.S.) of $18 billion.
Worldwide, the U.S. earned the most from international visitors—
more than $64 billion.
Foreign students and workers often enrich the cultural, social, and
scientific life of the United States.  Our universities gain access to
many talented students worldwide, thus maintaining the global com-
petitiveness of the U.S. system of higher education.  Foreign stu-
dents give U.S. students the opportunity to learn about foreign
6 Certain LDA categories, such as those for fiancé(e)s, intracompany
transferees, and specialty workers provide explicit bridges to permanent
immigration.
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Limited Duration Admissions
and Visa Issuances
Class of Admission
All classes*
Foreign government officials (& families) (A)
Temporary visitors for business and pleasure (B1, B2)
Transit aliens (C)
Treaty traders and investors (& families) (E)
Students (F1, M1)
Students’ spouses/children (F2, M2)
Representatives (& families) to international organizations (G)
Temporary workers and trainees
Specialty occupations (H-1B)
Performing services unavailable (H2)
Agricultural workers (H-2A)
Unskilled workers (H-2B)
Workers with extraordinary ability (O1, O2)
Internationally recognized athletes or entertainers (P1, P2, P3)
Exchange & religious workers (Q1, R1)
Spouses/children of temporary workers and trainees (H4, O3, P4, R2)
Exchange visitors (J1)
Spouses/children of exchange visitors (J2)
Intracompany transferees (L1)
Spouses/children of transferees (L2)
Sources: Admissions: U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service statistical division.  Visa Issuances: U.S.
Department of State.  1996.  Report of the Visa Office, 1996.  Washington, DC: DOS, Bureau of Consular
Affairs.
*Categories may not equal total because of omitted categories (e.g., fiancé(e)s of U.S. citizens,
overlapping Canadian Free Trade Agreement professionals, unknown, NATO officials and profession-
als, and foreign media).
Admissions
(Entries)
                    1996
24,842,503
118,157
22,880,270
325,538
138,568
426,903
32,485
79,528
227,440
144,458
23,980
9,635
14,345
9,289
33,633
11,048
53,572
215,475
41,250
140,457
73,305
Visa
Issuances
              1996
6,237,870
78,078
4,947,899
186,556
29,909
247,432
21,518
30,258
81,531
58,327
23,204
11,004
12,200
4,359
23,885
5,946
38,496
171,164
33,068
32,098
37,617
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societies and cultures and, on returning home—often to positions of
leadership—share their exposure to our democratic values, constitu-
tional principles, and economic system.  Foreign workers give em-
ployers timely access to a global labor market when they cannot
identify or quickly train U.S. workers with knowledge and expertise
required for a specific job.  These worker programs also help com-
panies conducting business both in the U.S. and internationally to
reassign personnel as needed to maintain their competitiveness.  As
economies become increasingly integrated, companies are attracting
more and more U.S. workers abroad as well.
Yet, LDAs pose problems for U.S. society under two principal cir-
cumstances: when the aliens fail to depart at the end of their legal
stay; and when they present unfair competition to U.S. workers.
The first problem is an enforcement one.  Although overstayers
represent a minute portion of the LDAs admitted each year, they are
a significant part of the illegal immigration problem.  The Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service estimates that as many as 40 percent
of the illegal aliens currently in the country originally entered with
LDAs, many as short-term visitors.  An equally pressing problem is
the current inability to track the continued presence and where-
abouts of many longer-term LDAs, particularly foreign students,
after their arrival in the United States.  This lack of capacity to
monitor their presence exacerbates the problems of overstay and
other violations of their legal status.
The second issue arising in limited duration admissions relates to
the criteria for admission of foreign workers and the procedures
used to determine their impact on U.S. workers.  A proper balance
must be struck in the LDA system between enhancing the produc-
tivity and global competitiveness of the U.S. economy through ac-
cess to foreign workers and protecting U.S. workers against unfair
competition.
The availability of foreign workers may create a dependency on
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them.  It has been well-documented that reliance on foreign workers
in low-wage, low-skill occupations, such as farm work, creates dis-
incentives for employers to improve pay and working conditions for
American workers.  When employers fail to recruit domestically or
to pay wages that meet industry-wide standards, the resulting de-
pendence—even on professionals—may adversely affect both U.S.
workers in that occupation and U.S. companies that adhere to ap-
propriate labor standards.  For many of the foreign workers, even
wages and working conditions that are very poor by U.S. standards
are much better than those available at home.   In a few egregious
cases, businesses have hired temporary foreign workers after laying
off their own domestic workforce.
The Immigration Act of 1990 imposed numerical limits on two em-
ployment categories where such dependence was feared: H-1B (spe-
cialty workers) is capped at 65,000 per year, and H-2B (unskilled
workers) is capped at 66,000 per year.  While the H-2B category is
far from its numerical limits, the statutory cap on annual H-1B ad-
missions was reached for the first time in FY 1997.  INS announced
in August 1997 the formation of a waiting list because approved
workers would be ineligible to enter until the start of the next fiscal
year.  If the trend in applications continues, the cap is likely to be
reached even earlier in FY 1998.  Hence, employers petitioning late
in the year would be required to wait for the admission of approved
workers.
The current business users of the H-1B tend to fall into two distinct
categories.  One group of employers is clearly unlikely to become
dependent on foreign workers but potentially is adversely affected
by the numerical limits.  These employers tend to hire relatively few
foreign workers (for example, measured as a proportion of their
overall workforce).  Generally, they have identified specific foreign
workers whose specialized skills are needed.  Often, the company
has done extensive recruitment in the United States and has been
unable to find qualified workers with the specific skills they seek.
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Because foreign workers represent a relatively small proportion of
their workforce, there is little risk that foreign hires will cause either
job displacement or wage depression for U.S. workers.
A second group of employers includes companies that make exten-
sive use of H-1B professionals (again, as measured by proportion of
their workforce).  Sometimes, they seek approval in the same appli-
cation for a large number of foreign workers who share minimal
professional qualifications.  But even within this more dependent
group, there is variation in the risk posed by the importation of
foreign workers to U.S. workers.  Some employers recruit domesti-
cally or take other steps to employ U.S. workers, but they are unable
to find sufficient professionals to fill their needs.  Other employers
recruit exclusively overseas and make no effort to employ qualified
U.S. workers.  They may utilize the H-1B workers in their own
operations or contract the foreign workers to other employers.
Under current law, the numerical limits, and now required waiting
time, pertain equally to the employer who has few foreign workers
and the employer who has only foreign workers.  Similarly, the
same provisions apply to the employer who has recruited exten-
sively within the United States and been unable to find a worker
with the needed specialized skills and to the employer who does no
domestic
recruitment.
The recommendations presented in this report seek to maximize the
potential benefits for the U.S. economy and society resulting from
the admission of LDAs while minimizing the potential negative
effects.  They build on—and in some cases reinforce—the
Commission’s previous recommendations for reforming the perma-
nent legal immigration system.  The overarching goal is to maintain
the advantages that accrue to American society from entry of LDAs
while protecting the legitimate interests of American workers and
businesses from unfair competition.
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Principles for a Properly-
Regulated System
The Commission believes that LDA policy should rest on the follow-
ing principles:
n Clear goals and priorities.  LDA policy should clearly dif-
ferentiate the goals of each set of visa categories, with pro-
cedures that reflect the requirements of each type of visa
and subsequent admission.  With more than forty different
LDA visas provided for under current law, as discussed
below, it is often difficult to identify how the goals of one
category differ from those of others.
n Systematic and comprehensible organization of LDA cat-
egories.  The statutory definitions, criteria, and procedures
for visas and admission have developed in an ad hoc fash-
ion.  There is now accumulation of more than forty different
LDA visas (subsumed under nineteen alphabetical headings),
including overlapping categories for students, workers, and
other visitors, as well as additional visas added to address
the concerns of specific interest groups.  Simplification of
the system would enable businesses, educators, persons with
LDAs, government officials, and the general public to un-
derstand more clearly the requirements for visa application
and admission and the responsibilities of the persons with
LDAs and their sponsors.  Administration of the LDA sys-
tem could be simplified, with attendant reduction in cost
and confusion.
n Timeliness, efficiency, and flexibility in implementation.
LDA policy should be implemented in a timely and efficient
way with sufficient flexibility in law and regulations to re-
spond to such domestic considerations as changes in the
economy and our educational systems.  Because of the time-
limited nature of the stay, it is imperative that the system
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allow admissions decisions to be made expeditiously while
retaining a capacity to identify unqualified or fraudulent
applications.  Similarly, the provisions to protect U.S. work-
ers must allow for timely and efficient mechanisms to inves-
tigate complaints and impose appropriate sanctions.  While
a good part of the LDA system now functions in a timely
way, the diffusion of responsibility in foreign worker catego-
ries reduces the potential efficiency of that part of the sys-
tem.  The Commission’s structural reform recommendations,
discussed below, will help address certain
inefficiencies.
n Compliance with conditions for entry and exit and effec-
tive mechanisms to monitor and enforce this compliance.
The LDA system should be designed to allow for greater
compliance, monitoring, and enforcement.  Policies should
specify clearly the conditions of entry and the penalties for
noncompliance.  It is the responsibility of the government,
with the cooperation of the private sector where appropri-
ate, to record, track, and report on those entering for limited
duration stays.  Americans expect that aliens will respect
and observe the conditions of their temporary admission,
including departure at the end of their lawful stay, and that
they will be subject to government enforcement if they fail
to comply with the conditions of their admission or if they
overstay.  Their sponsors (generally, businesses and schools)
also bear responsibility for complying with all relevant re-
quirements.  Penalties for noncompliance must be commen-
surate with the offense.  The current system does not yet
have exit controls in place.  In sum, the LDA system should
meet a “truth-in-advertising” test.
n Credible and realistic policies regarding transition from
LDA to permanent immigrant status.  Realistic policies
should continue to differentiate between LDAs who will
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remain only temporarily and those who become permanent.
For example, LDAs should continue to be able to transition
to immigrant status as expeditiously as possible if they enter
bona fide marriages with U.S. citizens or meet the justifiably
high education, skill standards, and prescribed labor market
tests of the permanent skill-based immigration categories.
n Protection of workers from unfair competition and of for-
eign workers from exploitation and abuse.  LDA worker
categories present special challenges in ensuring that U.S.
workers are protected from unfair competition while legiti-
mate foreign workers are protected from exploitation.   Any
system of LDA admissions must include protections for both
U.S. and foreign workers, protections that are commensu-
rate with the risk of unfair competition or abuse that the
specific category presents.  For example, lesser-skilled work-
ers (whether American or foreign) who are newly entering
the workforce and whose skills are easily replaced are gen-
erally more vulnerable—both to displacement and exploita-
tion—than are more highly-skilled, specialized workers.
Businesses that contract out their foreign workers to other
businesses pose a greater risk for labor market violations
because of the greater diffusion of employer responsibility.
Also, employees of firms whose workforces consist prima-
rily of temporary foreign workers, particularly from low-
wage countries, are more vulnerable to exploitation; these
foreign workers may be used to displace American workers
because of their fear that any complaint about wages and
working conditions might lead to deportation.
n Appropriate attention to limited duration admission poli-
cies in trade negotiations.  Important policy decisions on
admission of temporary workers occurred during negotia-
tions on the North American Free Trade Agreement [NAFTA]
and the General Agreement on Trade in Services [GATS].
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Some are concerned that these treaty obligations restrict the
capacity to reform our LDA policies by locking current
immigration law into place or establishing minimum require-
ments to which changes in immigration law must adhere.
In the future, both the Administration, in negotiating trade
agreements, and the Congress, in passing enabling legisla-
tion, should assess more carefully the long-term ramifica-
tions of trade negotiations for immigration policy.  The aim
should be to ensure that options for future immigration
reform are not unknowingly foreclosed.
The following recommendations aim at maximizing the potential
benefits accruing from admission of LDAs while minimizing the
potential harmful effects.
Framework
The Commission recommends a reorganization of the visa catego-
ries for limited duration stays in the United States to make them
more coherent and understandable.  The Commission recommends
that the current proliferation of visa categories be restructured into
five broad groups: official representatives; short-term visitors; for-
eign workers; students; and transitional family members.  Subcat-
7 The current system includes the J visa for cultural exchange, which is
used for a variety of purposes, ranging from short-term visits to study
and work.  The workers include scholars and researchers, camp
counselors, au pairs, and various others. Some work activities under the
J visa demonstrate a clear cultural or education exchange; other work
activities appear only tangentially related to the program’s original
purposes.  Protection of U.S. workers by labor market tests and standards
should apply to the latter group in the same manner as similarly situated
temporary workers in other LDA categories.  The Department of State
should assess how better to fulfill the purpose of the Mutual Educational
and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961 [Fulbright-Hays Act].  Such an analysis
is particularly timely in light of the merger now being implemented
between the Department of State and the United States Information
Agency, which is responsible for administering the J visa.
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egories of these groups may be appropriate in some cases.  This
reorganization reflects such shared characteristics of different visa
categories as entry for like reasons, similarity in testing for eligibil-
ity, and similar duration of stay in the United States.
The definitions and objectives of the five limited duration admission
groups would be:7
n Official representatives are diplomats, representatives of or
to international organizations, representatives of NATO or
NATO forces, and their accompanying family members.  The
objective of this category is to permit the United States to
admit temporarily individuals who represent their govern-
ments or international organizations.  The presence of offi-
cial representatives in the United States is based on reci-
procity; the United States expects similar treatment for its
own persons in similar capacities abroad.  Under current
law, these individuals are admitted under the A and G vi-
sas.  For the most part, members of these groups are admit-
ted to the United States for the duration of their status as
official representatives.
n Short-term visitors come to the United States for commer-
cial or personal purposes.  In 1995 alone, an estimated 43.5
million inbound visitors from other countries spent $76 bil-
lion on travel to and in the United States (on U.S. flag car-
riers, lodging, food, gifts, and entertainment).8 This sup-
ports the U.S. national interest in encouraging tourism and
business exchange.  The majority of short-term visitors enter
the United States under the visa waiver program, which is
available for nationals of countries demonstrating little visa
8 The 43.5 million visitors include the admission entries of individuals
from countries where a visa or visa waiver is required as well as those
from Canada (no visa, visa waiver, or border crossing card required) and
Mexico (border crossing card required).
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abuse.  (For these nationalities, visas are required for all
other purposes).   “Nonwaiver” nationalities must possess a
B visa for tourism or business, or a C visa  for transit.
Some short-term visitors also enter with the J visa if they are
sponsored by the U.S. Information Agency [USIA] or other
U.S. government agency.   Short-term visitors generally have
little or no effect on the U.S. labor market as they are se-
verely limited in what they can do in the United States.
Under current law, waiver visitors are admitted for ninety
days, with no option for extension; visitors admitted with B
visas are normally authorized a six-month stay, with flex-
ibility to apply for another six months.  Those in transit with
C visas are given up to twenty-nine days’ stay.  The majority
of visitors by their own volition stay for very short periods.
This category also includes informants/witnesses (current S
classification) whose temporary entry is in the U.S. national
interest because their knowledge is needed for criminal pros-
ecutions.
n Foreign workers are those who are coming to perform nec-
essary services for prescribed periods of time, at the expira-
tion of which they must either return to their home coun-
tries or, if an employer or family member petitions success-
fully, adjust to permanent residence.  This category would
serve the labor needs demonstrated by U.S. businesses with
appropriate provisions to protect U.S. workers from unfair
competition.  Under current law, numerous types of foreign
workers are admissible under the D visa for crewmembers,
E visa for treaty traders and investors, H visa for “specialty
workers” and other temporary workers, I visa for foreign
journalists, L visa for intracompany transferees, O visa for
aliens of extraordinary ability, P visa for performers and
entertainers, Q visa for participants in cultural exchange
programs, and R visa for religious workers.  In addition,
certain other workers enter under the TN provisions created
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by NAFTA.  There is a second, parallel system under which
other workers enter with J visas because they are sponsored
by an institution approved by the U.S. Information Agency
to engage in cultural exchange.  Some of these J workers are
paid by their own governments or home institutions whereas
others receive compensation from the U.S. institutions and
businesses employing them.  Also included as foreign work-
ers are trainees, that is, individuals receiving on-the-job train-
ing by working in U.S. institutions.  The present multiplicity
of LDA work categories could be rationalized and made to
parallel similar immigrant visa categories.  [See below for
specific recommendations regarding foreign workers.]
n Students are persons who are in the United States for the
purpose of acquiring either academic or practical knowl-
edge of a subject matter.  This category has four major goals:
to  provide foreign nationals with opportunities to obtain
knowledge they can take back to their home countries; to
give U.S. schools access to a global pool of talented stu-
dents;  to permit the sharing of U.S. values and institutions
with individuals from other countries; and to enhance the
education of U.S. students by exposing them to foreign stu-
dents and  cultures.  Students now enter under at least three
visa categories: F visa for academic students; J visa, also for
academic students (but generally including those whose
education is paid by their own government or the U.S. gov-
ernment rather than themselves); and M visas for vocational
students.
n Transitional family members include fiancé(e)s of U.S. citi-
zens.  These individuals differ from other LDAs because
they are processed for immigrant status, although they do
not receive such status until they marry in the U.S. and
adjust.  The Commission believes another category of tran-
sitional family members should be added: spouses of U.S.
U.S. COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION REFORM
1 9 9 7
RECOMMENDATIONS
- 88 -
citizens whose weddings occur overseas but who subse-
quently come to the U.S. to reside.  At present, a U.S. citizen
cannot petition for the admission of a spouse until after the
marriage.  Months often pass before the foreign spouse can
come to the U.S.  Under the Commission’s plan, the newly-
wed should be permitted to enter the U.S. under a transi-
tional family visa and then complete the paperwork for le-
gal permanent resident status.
Short-Term Visitors
The Commission recommends that the current visa waiver pilot program
for short-term business and tourist visits be made permanent upon the
implementation of an entry-exit control system capable of measuring over-
stays.  A permanent visa waiver system requires appropriate provi-
sions to expand the number of participating countries  and clear and
timely means for removing those countries that fail to meet the high
standards reserved for this privilege.  Congress should extend the
pilot three years while the control system is implemented.
Most observers recognize that the waiver has been a positive factor
in increased tourism and trade and in less processing time for many
travelers at ports of entry.  More than one-half of the short-term
visitors from waivered nationalities come to the U.S. under the
waiver, and INS reports little overstay or other immigration viola-
tions from these visitors.  The Department of State [DOS] has been
able to reallocate its relatively high-cost overseas resources to areas
that need greater attention, such as increased antifraud efforts, cop-
ing with the Diversity Visa workload, and staffing new posts in the
former Soviet Union.  A key factor in the success of the waiver
program is the electronic sharing of “watch list” data of persons
ineligible for visas between the Department of State and INS on an
almost immediate basis.  Being able to screen visitors arriving with-
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out visas at ports of entry serves the fundamental purpose of ensur-
ing that statutorily ineligible aliens are not admitted to the United
States.
Foreign Workers
Each year, more foreign workers enter the United States as LDAs
for temporary work than enter as skill-based immigrants.  In FY
1996, the Department of State issued almost 278,000 limited dura-
tion worker visas, including those for spouses and children.  (Other
LDA workers who changed status within the United States are not
reflected in these statistics.  Also not considered are LDA foreign
students working in the United States during their course of study
or as part of their practical training, or researchers entering under
J visa programs.)   By contrast, only 117,000 immigrant visa issu-
ances and domestic adjustments of status in worker categories were
recorded in FY 1996, far less than the legislated limit of 140,000.
The Commission recommends that the limited duration admission classi-
fication for foreign workers include three principal categories: those who,
for significant and specific policy reasons, should be exempt by law from
labor market protection standards; those whose admission is governed by
treaty obligations; and those whose admission must adhere to specified
labor market protection standards.  Under this recommendation, LDA
worker categories would be organized around the same principles
that guide permanent worker categories.  LDA workers would be
subject to rigorous tests of their impact on the labor market unless
they are exempt from these tests because their admission will gen-
erate substantial economic growth and/or significantly enhance U.S.
intellectual and cultural strength and pose little potential for under-
mining the employment prospects and remuneration of U.S. work-
ers.
The Commission
recommends that
the limited duration
admission
classification
for foreign workers
include three
principal categories:
those who,
for significant
and specific
policy reasons,
should be exempt
by law from
labor market
protection
standards;
those whose
admission is
governed by
treaty obligations;
and those whose
admission
must adhere to
specified
labor market
protection standards.
U.S. COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION REFORM
1 9 9 7
RECOMMENDATIONS
- 90 -
Within the labor market protection standards group, criteria for ad-
mission are consistent with the potential adverse effect of given
categories of workers.  The Commission believes adverse impact is
broadly related to educational and skill level of the affected work-
ers.  Although there sometimes is an adverse effect from even the
most highly-skilled and experienced foreign workers, the benefits of
such workers are usually large to American society as a whole.
They are likely to enhance the U.S. national interest through the
generation of economic activity, including the creation of jobs.  In
general, the higher the levels of education and skill required in a
given occupation, the more likely U.S. workers will be able to com-
pete successfully with workers from abroad.  Even at the very high-
est levels of skill and education, however, this generalization fits
some high-skill occupations, but not others.
Entry-level professionals and lesser-skilled workers pose somewhat
greater risk of displacing U.S. workers because their work can more
likely substitute for that of U.S. workers.  If they accept lower wages
and benefits or poorer working conditions, they present unfair com-
petition to U.S. workers and their employers may gain an unfair
advantage over other U.S. employers.  Similarly, unskilled foreign
workers present the greatest potential for adverse impact because
they are competing with some of the most vulnerable of American
workers.  Accordingly, the Commission proposes different sub-cat-
egories with labor market protection standards commensurate with
the risks we believe are posed by the workers.
n Those exempt by law from labor market protection stan-
dards because their admission will generate substantial eco-
nomic growth and/or significantly enhance U.S. intellectual
and cultural strength and pose little potential for undermin-
ing the employment prospects and remuneration of U.S.
workers.  These include:
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Individuals of extraordinary ability in the sciences, arts, educa-
tion, business, or athletics, demonstrated through sustained
national or international acclaim and recognized for extraor-
dinary achievements in their field of expertise.  These indi-
viduals now enter under the O visa.  This category is com-
parable to the first priority in our permanent resident sys-
tem.  The U.S. national interest is well served by entry of
individuals at the very top of their chosen fields who can
contribute during their temporary stay to U.S. economic
growth and intellectual and cultural strength.
Managers and executives of international businesses (current
L visa), also comparable to the first priority in the legal
permanent resident system.  The global competitiveness of
U.S. businesses is enhanced by the capacity of multinational
corporations to move their senior staff around the world as
needed.  Often, there is only temporary need for a transfer,
although permanent relocation may later be required.
Under current law, the person with a LDA visa must have
been employed by the firm, corporation, affiliate or subsid-
iary continuously for one year within the three years pre-
ceding the application for admission.  As discussed below,
the Commission believes greater safeguards must be in place
to ensure that only bona fide international businesses benefit
from this policy.
Professors, researchers and scholars whose salary or other com-
pensation is paid by their home government, home institu-
tion, or the U.S. government in a special program for for-
eign professors, researchers, and scholars.  Each year, pro-
fessors, researchers, and scholars enter the United States on
sabbatical from their own universities or research institutes,
often with a J visa.  Also in this category are foreign mem-
bers of research teams cofunded by the United States and
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other countries.  These individuals present substantial ben-
efits to the United States in the expertise and resources they
bring, and they pose no threat of displacement of U.S. re-
searchers as their salaries are from foreign sources or they
enter under a U.S. government-funded program, such as the
Fulbright Program, whose resources are earmarked through
an appropriation process for foreign researchers and schol-
ars.
Religious workers, including ministers of religion and profes-
sionals and other workers employed by religious nonprofit
organizations in the U.S. to perform religious vocations and
religious occupations. Under current law, religious workers
must have had at least two years’ prior membership in the
religious organization (current R visa).
Members of the foreign media admitted under reciprocal agree-
ments (current I visa).  The U.S. benefits from the presence
of members of the foreign media who help people in their
countries understand events in the United States.  Just as we
would not want our media to be overly regulated by labor
policies of foreign governments, the United States extends
the same courtesy to foreign journalists working in the U.S.
n Foreign workers whose admission is subject to treaty ob-
ligations. This includes treaty traders, treaty investors, and
other workers entering under specific treaties between the
U.S. and the foreign nation of which the alien is a citizen or
national.  Under the provisions of NAFTA, for example,
Canadian professionals are not subject to numerical limits
or labor market testing; Mexican professionals continue to
be subject to labor market tests, but will be exempt from
numerical limits in 2003.
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n Foreign workers subject by law to labor market protection
standards. These are principally:
Professionals and other workers who are sought by employers
because of their highly-specialized skills or knowledge and/
or extensive experience.  Included in this category are employ-
ees of international businesses who have specialized knowl-
edge (now admitted under the L visa) and professionals
(now covered by the H-1B visa).  A diverse range of indi-
viduals may be admitted in this category, including, but not
limited to, university faculty and researchers with advanced
degrees, accountants and lawyers with specialized knowl-
edge of the tax and legal codes of other countries, and elec-
trical engineers and software systems engineers with spe-
cialized knowledge needed for systems design.  This cat-
egory would also cover highly-skilled workers without pro-
fessional degrees if they have substantial experience in their
occupation.  This category includes as well aliens now ad-
mitted under the H-1B visa who have a bachelor’s degree
but little specialized expertise or experience.
Trainees admitted to the United States for practical, on-the-
job training in a variety of occupations.  They now enter
through the H-3 visa, practical training arrangements under
the F visa, and the J visa provisions pertaining to physicians
seeking graduate medical education and to some research-
ers with J visas engaged in post-doctoral studies.  All of
these groups have in common work in U.S. institutions as
part of a training program.  They are paid U.S. wages and,
in many cases, are not readily distinguished from U.S. resi-
dents in the same type of on-the-job training activities.
Institutions petitioning for  foreign workers as trainees would
be required to demonstrate that the principal purpose of the
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program is training by showing a significant educational
component to the work experience.  Trainees would be paid
the actual wages provided to U.S. trainees in similar pro-
grams.  The trainees would be admitted for the specified
duration of the training program.  For example, a foreign
physician admitted for graduate medical education would
be admitted for the period of the specific residency pro-
gram.
Artists, musicians, entertainers, athletes, fashion models, and par-
ticipants in international cultural groups that share the history,
culture, and traditions of their country.  This category in-
cludes aliens now admitted under the P visa and Q visa, as
well as fashion models admitted under H-1B visa, and ath-
letes, musicians and other performers admitted under the
H-2B visa.
Lesser-skilled and unskilled workers coming for seasonal or other
short-term employment.  Such worker programs warrant
strict review, as described below.  This category includes
aliens now admitted with H-2A and H-2B visas.  Requests
for admission of unskilled and lesser-skilled workers should
be met with heightened scrutiny.  Temporary worker pro-
grams for lesser-skilled agricultural workers exert particu-
larly harmful effects on the United States.  The Commission
remains opposed to implementation of a large-scale pro-
gram for temporary admission of lesser-skilled and unskilled
workers along the lines of the bracero program.  Having
examined the issue further during our consultations on LDA
issues, we reaffirm our belief that a new guestworker pro-
gram would be a grievous mistake.
Historically, guestworker programs have depressed the
wages and working conditions of U.S. workers.  Of particu-
lar concern is competition with unskilled American work-
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ers, including recent immigrants who may have originally
entered to perform the needed labor but who can be dis-
placed by newly entering guestworkers.  Foreign
guestworkers often are more exploitable than lawful U.S.
workers, particularly when an employer threatens deporta-
tion if the workers complain about wages or working con-
ditions.  The presence of large numbers of guestworkers in
particular localities—such as rural counties with agricultural
interests—presents substantial costs for housing, health care,
social services, schooling, and basic infrastructure that are
borne by the broader community and even by the federal
government rather than by the employers who benefit from
the inexpensive labor.
Despite the claims of their supporters, guestworker programs
also fail to reduce unauthorized migration.  To the contrary,
research consistently shows that they tend to encourage and
exacerbate illegal movements by setting up labor recruit-
ment and family networks that persist long after the
guestworker programs end.  Moreover, guestworkers them-
selves often remain permanently and illegally in the country
in violation of the conditions of their admission.
If new initiatives to reduce illegal migration were at some
point to create real labor shortages in agriculture or other
low-skill occupations, employers could request foreign work-
ers through the LDA provisions that the Commission pro-
poses for the admission of unskilled workers.
The Commission recommends that the labor market tests used in
admitting temporary workers in this category be commensurate with
the skill level and experience of the worker.
n Employers requesting the admission of temporary work-
ers with highly-specialized skills or extensive experience
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should meet specific requirements.  Admission should be
contingent on an attestation that:
The employer will pay the greater of actual  or prevailing wage
and fringe benefits paid by the employer to other employees
with similar experience and qualifications for the specific
employment in question.  Actual wage rates should be de-
fined in a simple and straightforward manner.  By this rec-
ommendation, we do not intend a complicated, bureaucrati-
cally-defined wage analysis.  Rather, businesses should be
able to use their own compensation systems to determine
appropriate wages and benefits for the individual foreign
worker hired.  The entry of a small number of highly-skilled
foreign workers should have minimal effect on these wage
scales, which will be determined by the majority of U.S.
workers employed by the business.  In the absence of a
company-wide system that ensures equitable compensation
for similarly situated workers, the employer would be re-
quired to attest to paying prevailing wages for that job cat-
egory,  wages that are typical of the enterprise or nonprofit
company.  [See below for recommendations for at-risk em-
ployers with a significant proportion of foreign workers.]
The employer has posted notice of the hire, informed coworkers
at the principal place of business at which the LDA worker
is employed and provided a copy of the attestation to the
LDA worker employed.
The employer has paid a reasonable user fee that will be dedi-
cated to facilitating the processing of applications and the
costs of auditing compliance with all requirements.  Cur-
rently no fees are collected by the Department of Labor
[DOL]  for either processing or monitoring purposes.  In
effect, this requires taxpayers to subsidize these programs.
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To ensure that the employer, and not the foreign worker,
pays the user fee, penalties should be imposed upon viola-
tors.
There is no strike or lockout in the course of a labor dispute
involving the occupational classification at the place of em-
ployment.
The employer has not dismissed, except for cause, or otherwise
displaced workers in the specific job for which the alien is
hired during the previous six months.  Further, the em-
ployer will not displace or lay off, except for cause, U.S.
workers in the specific job during the ninety-day period
following the filing of an application or the ninety-day pe-
riods preceding or following the filing of any visa petition
supported by the application.
The employer will provide working conditions for such tempo-
rary workers that are comparable to those provided to simi-
larly situated U.S. workers.
n Certain at-risk employers of skilled workers [described
below] should be required to attest to having taken signifi-
cant steps—for example, recruitment or training—to em-
ploy U.S. workers in the jobs for which they are recruiting
foreign workers.  The Commission is aware that some com-
panies now petitioning for H-1B workers recruit exclusively
in foreign countries.  The Commission believes that U.S.
recruitment or hiring efforts will help ensure that qualified
U.S. citizens and permanent residents have access to these
jobs.  We do not recommend, however, that current labor
certification processes be used to document significant ef-
forts to recruit.  These procedures are costly, time consum-
ing, and ultimately ineffective in protecting highly-skilled
U.S. workers.
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Under the now expired H-1A visa program for the admis-
sion of LDA registered nurses, several alternative steps were
described as meeting the requirement of timely and signifi-
cant steps to employ U.S. workers.  These alternativesi n -
clude: operating a training program for such workers at the
facility (or providing participation in a training program
elsewhere); providing career development programs and
other methods of facilitating workers to become qualified;
paying qualified workers at a rate higher than currently
paid to other similarly employed workers in the geographic
area; and providing reasonable opportunities for meaning-
ful salary advancement.  Examples of other steps that might
qualify as meeting the timely and significant requirement
include monetary incentives, special perquisites, work sched-
ule options, and other training options.
n Employers requesting the admission of lesser-skilled work-
ers should be required to meet a stricter labor market pro-
tection test.  Such employers should continue to be required
to demonstrate that they have sought, but were unable to
find, sufficient American workers prepared to work under
favorable wages, benefits, and working conditions.  They
also should be required to specify the steps they are taking
to recruit and retain U.S. workers, as well as their plans to
reduce dependence on foreign labor through hiring of U.S.
workers or other means. (For example, sugar cane growers
in southern Florida who had petitioned for foreign workers
had success in reducing their dependence on H-2A workers
through mechanization.)  Employers should continue to be
required to pay the highest of prevailing, minimum, or
adverse wage rates, provide return transportation, and offer
decent housing, health care, and other benefits appropriate
for seasonal employees.
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The Commission recommends that categories of employers who are at special
risk of violating labor market protection standards—regardless of the edu-
cation, skill, or experience level of its employees—be required to obtain
regular independently-conducted audits of their compliance with the attes-
tations made about labor market protection standards, with the results of
such audit being submitted for Department of Labor review.  Certain
businesses, as described below, pose greater risk than others of dis-
placing U.S. workers and/or exploiting foreign workers.  The risk
factors that should be considered in determining whether stricter
protection standards must apply include:
n The employer’s extensive use of temporary foreign work-
ers.  Extensive use can be defined by the percentage of the
employer’s workforce that is comprised of LDA workers.  It
also can be measured by the duration and frequency of the
employer’s use of temporary foreign workers.
n The employer’s history of employing temporary foreign
workers.  Those employers with a history of serious viola-
tions of regular labor market protection standards or spe-
cific labor standards related to the employment of LDA
workers should be considered as at risk for future viola-
tions.
n The employer’s status as a job contracting or employment
agency providing temporary foreign labor to other employ-
ers.  Risk of labor violations increases as responsibility is
divided between a primary and secondary employer.
To ensure adequate protection of labor market standards, such em-
ployers should be required to submit an independent audit of their
compliance with all statements attested in their application.  The
independent audits should be done by recognized accounting firms
that have the demonstrated capacity to determine, for example, that
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wages and fringe benefits were provided as promised in the attes-
tation and conformed to the actual or prevailing wages and fringe
benefits provided to similarly situated U.S. workers.
The Commission recommends enhanced monitoring of and enforcement
against fraudulent applications and postadmission violations of labor market
protection standards.  To function effectively, both the exempt and
nonexempt temporary worker programs must provide expeditious
access to needed labor.  The Commission’s recommendations build
on the current system of employer attestations that receive expedi-
tious preapproval review but are subject to postapproval enforce-
ment actions against violators.  To ensure adequate safeguards for
U.S. workers, the government agencies responsible for processing
applications and enforcing the law must have adequate capacity to
identify and act quickly against fraudulent applicants and to moni-
tor postapproval violations of the terms under which foreign work-
ers enter.  More specifically, the Commission recommends:
n Allocating increased staff and resources to the agencies re-
sponsible for adjudicating applications for admission and
monitoring and taking appropriate enforcement action
against fraudulent applicants and violators of labor market
protection standards.  These agencies require additional re-
sources to investigate potential fraud among applicants for
temporary worker visas as well as violations of the labor
market protection standards.   Enhancing this capability has
significant resource implications, especially if, as the Com-
mission also recommends, such antifraud investigations are
undertaken in a manner that does not delay visa adjudication
and issuance.  Increased costs required for more efficient ad-
judication of applications can be covered by applicant fees.
However, additional costs incurred for more effective inves-
tigations of compliance with labor market standards will re-
quire appropriated funds.
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Sufficient funds should be appropriated to provide the ad-
ditional resources needed for adequate enforcement by the
Department of Labor.  These resources should be targeted at
employers and contractors at special risk of violating labor
market protection standards.  Targeting these employers
makes the most sense both in terms of economical use of
resources and in protection of workers.
The Department of State also must have the capacity to
make a proper investigation of cases in which fraud is sus-
pected.  This capacity is particularly needed in applications
for admission of LDAs in exempt categories to ensure that
use of these categories does not become a means of evading
labor market protection standards. For example, the visa for
intracompany transfers has been abused by persons setting
up sham corporations.  To comply with appropriate require-
ments for timely decisions, the government must have the
resources to investigate suspected fraud.
n Barring the use of LDA workers by any employer who has
been found to have committed willful and serious labor
standards violations with respect to the employment of
LDA workers.  Further, upon the recommendation of any
federal, state, or local tax agency, barring the use of LDA
workers by any employer who has been found to have
committed willful and serious payroll tax violations with
respect to LDA workers.  The law currently provides for
such debarment for failure to meet labor condition attesta-
tion provisions or misrepresentation of material facts on the
application.  Implementation of this recommendation would
enable penalties to be assessed for serious labor standards
violations that are not also violations of the attestations.
This would address an issue that has come to the attention
of the Commission: the knowing misclassification of some
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LDA workers as independent contractors, with subsequent
failure to pay payroll taxes or other legally-required deduc-
tions to the appropriate governmental agency.
n Developing an enforcement strategy to reduce evasion of
the LDA labor market protection standards through use of
contractors.  U.S. businesses’ growth in contracting-out func-
tions has raised questions of employment relationships and
ultimate liability for employment-related violations, includ-
ing those related to temporary foreign workers.  A uniform
policy for dealing with these situations is desirable for the
enforcement agencies involved, as well as for employers,
contractors, and workers.
Conclusion
Limited duration admissions are an important part of immigration
policy because they are linked closely to the  admission of legal
permanent immigrants and to our policies for deterring unlawful
migration.  This report seeks to treat limited duration admission
policy in a comprehensive fashion, building on the recommenda-
tions made by the Commission on other aspects of immigration
policy.  The opportunities presented by the admission of limited
duration admissions are significant.  With the type of regulation
recommended herein, the United States will be able to continue to
benefit from these admissions while mitigating potential harmful
effects, particularly on vulnerable U.S. populations.
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CURBING UNLAWFUL MIGRATION
In its first interim report to Congress this Commission recommended
a comprehensive strategy to curb unlawful migration into the United
States through prevention and removal.9  That report focused on
deterrence—steps that could prevent illegal entry and unauthorized
work.  The Commission found that curbing unlawful immigration
required: (1) better border management; (2) more effective deter-
rence of the employment of unauthorized workers; (3) a more con-
sistent benefits eligibility policy; (4) cooperative efforts with source
countries;  (5) improved data collection and analysis; (6) mecha-
nisms to address migration emergencies; (7) and an improved ca-
pacity to remove deportable aliens.  The Commission presented
detailed recommendations on the first five elements of this strategy
(border, worksite, benefits, source country, and data).  Our report on
refugee policy  detailed more specific recommendations on the sixth,
migration emergencies.10  This final report provides more detailed
recommendations on the seventh, removals.
Since 1994, the immigration system as a whole has undergone al-
most unprecedented change.  As Congress, the public, and the Ad-
ministration focused more keenly on immigration, the financial re-
sources available to INS grew from $1.5 billion in FY 1994 to a
projected $3.6 billion in FY 1998.  During the same period, INS
staffing is expected to rise 65 percent, from 17,000 in FY 1994 to
more than 28,000 in FY 1998.  Once in 1994,11 and  three times in
1996,12 enactment of major legislation made substantive and sub-
stantial changes in laws affecting illegal migration.  Many of these
statutory and administrative actions sought to implement the
Commission’s 1994 recommendations.
9 U.S. Immigration Policy: Restoring Credibility, 1994.
10 U.S. Refugee Policy: Taking Leadership, 1997.
11 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994.
12 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 [AEDPA], Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 [IIRIRA],
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996.
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Deterrence Strategies
The Commission reiterates its 1994 recommendations supporting a com-
prehensive strategy to deter illegal migration.   Despite the additional
resources, new policies, and often innovative strategies adopted
during the past few years, illegal migration continues to be a prob-
lem.  In October 1996, INS released its latest estimates of the illegal
alien population in the United States: some 5 million undocumented
migrants reside in the United States, a number growing by approxi-
mately 275,000 annually; 41 percent of these are nonimmigrant over-
stays; the remaining 59 percent probably entered illegally and with-
out inspection.
The Commission continues to believe that unlawful immigration
can be controlled consistent with our traditions, civil rights, and
civil liberties.  As a nation committed to the rule of law, our immi-
gration policies must conform to the highest standards of integrity
and efficiency in the enforcement of the law.  We must also respect
due process.  The Commission believes that the comprehensive strat-
egy we outlined in 1994 continues to hold the best promise for
reducing levels of illegal migration.  These policies,  combined with
the structural and management recommendations detailed later in
this report, can restore the credibility of our immigration system by
both deterring illegal entry and facilitating legal crossings.  The
Commission emphasizes, however, that no one part of this strategy
will, on its own, solve the problem of unauthorized migration.
More specifically, the Commission continues to support implemen-
tation of the following deterrence strategies:
n An effective border management policy that  accomplishes
the twin goals of preventing illegal entries and facilitating
legal ones.  Increased resources for additional Border Patrol
officers, inspectors, and operational support, combined with
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such new strategies as operations “Hold the Line,”
“Gatekeeper,” and “Safeguard,” have improved significantly
the management of the border where they are deployed.
The very success of these new efforts demonstrates that to
gain full control, the same level of resources and prevention
strategies must be deployed at all points along the border
where significant violations of U.S. immigration law are likely
to occur.
Implementing effective prevention strategies.  In 1994, “Opera-
tion Hold the Line” in El Paso, Texas successfully challenged
outmoded border control concepts.  This effort then served
as the model for efforts to control other parts of the border,
particularly in the San Diego area.  The result, “Operation
Gatekeeper,” utilizing a strategy described as “Prevention
through Deterrence,” began on October 1, 1994, and included
the commitment of significant new resources and the imple-
mentation of innovative new strategies.
Phase I (1994) of the plan had the greatest impact on the
area around Imperial Beach in San Diego County.  For many
years this area accounted for approximately 25 percent of
illegal crossings across the southwest border.  Utilization of
new equipment led to apprehension of greater numbers,
and use of new techniques cracked down on alien smug-
gling rings.  Reinforcement of interior checkpoints helped
capture those who made it illegally across the border.
Phase II (begun in June 1995) consisted mainly of reinforcing
nearby ports of entry seen as the next likely route for aliens
whose illegal entry was disrupted by “Operation
Gatekeeper.”  INS placed additional service inspectors  at
the border, constructed fencing at strategic locations, installed
a fingerprint identification system , and added increased
lighting at ports of entry.
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Phase III (begun in 1996) is designed to extend control over
increasing sections of the southwest border as additional
staff and equipment become available.  The San Diego Bor-
der Patrol Sector now has almost 2,000 agents working along
the border.
Where these new initiatives have been instituted, the num-
ber of people seeking to cross is significantly reduced.  On
Commission site visits, residents of El Paso and Imperial
Beach, the main beneficiaries to date of the new enforce-
ment efforts, cited reduction in vagrancy and petty crime as
evidence of reduced illegal crossings through their commu-
nities.  Preliminary research data reveal that it now takes
longer and costs more to enter the United States illegally.
Illegal migrants now must now cross through tougher ter-
rain and need the assistance of smugglers.  Migrant smug-
gling increasingly is becoming specialized and
professionalized.
The 1997 Binational Study, Migration Between Mexico and the
United States, reports that a systematic survey of border cross-
ers indicates fewer actual crossers but longer periods of stay
in the United States.  Thus, it appears that while new border
initiatives may deter some movements, they do not fully
reduce either levels or impacts of illegal migration.  In other
words, border control is a necessary, but not sufficient, re-
sponse to illegal migration.
Evidence also shows that in response to the new initiatives
migrants have shifted their entry patterns.  For example, as
Imperial Beach and its neighboring communities came un-
der control, the numbers of illegal entries rose in eastern
San Diego county, the Imperial Valley, Arizona, and south
Texas.  As the Commission noted in 1994, the immigration
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system must have the capacity to prevent entry across the
southern border.  Mobile, rapid response teams initially can
help plug holes along the border, but eventually, a preven-
tion capacity must be established in every likely crossing
area.
Protecting human rights.  Effective border management is not
without its human toll, increased violence along the border,
as well as deaths resulting from exposure to extreme weather
in mountain and desert areas.  Both border crossers and
Border Patrol agents have been victims of this heightened
violence.
Since the implementation of the border initiatives, incidents
of violence against the Border Patrol have increased.  Inci-
dents of rock-throwing, a hazard to Border Patrol agents for
years, have risen.  Agents now face random gunfire from
south of the border.  Beginning in May of 1997, six reported
sniper shootings in the San Diego sector were directed at
Border Patrol agents.  Sustained efforts to protect agents
from such violence must be at the top of the policy agenda.
Efforts also must continue to warn potential illegal border
crossers—while they are still in their countries of origin—of
the increased physical dangers and legal consequences of
trying to cross illegally.  In particular aliens must be warned
of  the pitfalls of using smugglers, some of whom abandon
border crossers and otherwise abuse them.
Site visits in Mexico demonstrate that already widespread
knowledge exists about the new difficulties in entering the
United States illegally; misinformation continues to abound
as well.  Residents  in new sending regions such as Oaxaca,
traditional sending regions such as Jalisco, and border cross-
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ing points such as Tijuana, all spoke of the additional costs
and dangers encountered in attempting to cross the border
illegally.
The Commission continues to support efforts to monitor
and reduce human rights violations and potentially violent
confrontations between government personnel and those be-
lieved to be seeking illegal entry into the United States.  The
INS formed a Citizens’ Advisory Panel [CAP] that met pe-
riodically from February 1994 through February 1997, a year
beyond its original expiration date.  During that time, the
CAP discussed ways and means for averting potential hu-
man rights abuses and outright violence by INS employees
against aliens.  As a result, INS adopted a formal complaint
procedure for reporting alleged abuses by government em-
ployees to their supervisors and for INS to respond to those
complaints.  At its February 1997 meeting, the CAP decided
to disband in its present form.  Discussions are now under-
way on how best to retain the CAP input in the INS
decisionmaking processes, in delivering feedback for train-
ing and supervising INS border personnel, and in respond-
ing to complaints made against employees.
Improving ports of entry.  Additional pressure on ports of
entry also accompany enhanced border control.  The vari-
ous initiatives already undertaken provide guidance for other
border sites.  In San Diego, “Operation Gatekeeper II” in-
cluded enhanced resources for inspectors to identify indi-
viduals entering with fraudulent documents or as impos-
tors.  A Port Court was established to place these persons
into formal exclusion proceedings.  Presiding Immigration
Judges made clear to those receiving exclusion orders that
they would face criminal penalties if they were apprehended
attempting to reenter within one year.  To ensure that word
went out that these were not idle threats, the U.S. Attorney
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pledged to prosecute these cases.  A relatively small number
of persons were apprehended attempting reentry after re-
ceiving an exclusion order at the Port Court.
This process has changed somewhat under the new expe-
dited removal procedures mandated by the Illegal Immigra-
tion Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, which
took effect on April 1, 1997.  Under the new procedures, an
alien arriving at a port of entry with fraudulent documents
or without documents is referred to secondary inspection,
where he or she is advised about expedited removal.13  If the
alien does not indicate a fear of persecution or an intent to
apply for asylum, the alien is fingerprinted, photographed
and detained until removal, which in San Diego typically
takes two processing days.  The alien’s identity is recorded
in the INS IDENT database for immediate and future deter-
mination of repeated attempts at unlawful reentry.   An
immigration officer's determination to remove an alien un-
der the expedited procedures is not subject to administra-
tive or judicial review, except under only very narrow cir-
cumstances.
Immigration officials in San Diego report a significant in-
crease in removals as a result of the new expedited removal
provisions.  These gains in the capacity to remove at the
border are no doubt desirable goals for an immigration
enforcement agency.  However, a more reliable determinant
13 IIRIRA permits the Attorney General to apply the expedited removal
provisions to aliens in the U.S. who have not been admitted or paroled
[EWIs] and who have not shown to the satisfaction of the immigration
officer that they have been continuously present in the U.S. for the two-
year period immediately preceding the date of the determination of
inadmissibility.  At present, the Attorney General has elected not to apply
these provisions to EWIs, although she has reserved through regulation,
the option to apply the expedited removal provisions at any time, to any
alien specified in that section.
U.S. COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION REFORM
1 9 9 7
RECOMMENDATIONS
- 110 -
of the extent to which a law actually deters the conduct it
seeks to address is the recidivism rate.   Thus, the effective
communication of the consequences attached to the removal
of an alien as a result of the new provisions is a key ingre-
dient of the efficacy of our immigration laws.  Without such
public education, certain individuals are likely to be unde-
terred by the type of sanction exacted under the new expe-
dited removal procedures.
Although reliable data on reentry is not yet available, the
San Diego district reports an apparent increase in recidi-
vism following implementation of the new law.  It appears
that an order issued by an immigration inspector does not
have the psychological force of an order issued by an Immi-
gration Judge.  What is gained in expediting by the new
statutory process may be lost in increased recidivism.
To counter this trend, the San Diego district has instituted
a three-strike system that corresponds with the changes man-
dated by the new law.  This system was established with the
cooperation of the INS, the Executive Office for Immigra-
tion Review [EOIR], and the U.S. Attorney's Office in re-
sponse to reports of apparent recidivism among aliens turned
away by the expedited removal process.  The first strike
occurs once the INS inspector issues an expedited removal
order to the alien that carries a penalty of inadmissibility for
up to twenty years in some cases and permanently if the
offense involves the use of a fraudulent document.
The second strike—appearance before an Immigration Judge
in Port Court—occurs once the alien is apprehended after
having been removed for a previous immigration or crimi-
nal violation.  This step provides a critical link to deter-
rence: personal communication of the consequences of vio-
lating an immigration law.  At the hearing, the Immigration
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Judge advises the alien of the administrative sanction result-
ing from the attempted illegal reentry after expedited re-
moval (i.e., a bar to admission for some period) and also of
the certainty of felony prosecution if the alien attempts re-
entry during that period.  The presence of an Immigration
Judge is considered a vital component to the credibility of
the San Diego district’s border enforcement.  The clear,
unequivocal notice of the penalty aliens are likely to incur at
the third step, coupled with the prospect of time spent in
prison, is predicted to have more of a deterrent effect than
simply turning aliens away without providing adequate
notice of the consequences of their conduct.
The third strike involves felony prosecution by the U.S.
Attorney's office under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) for illegal reentry
following deportation, exclusion, or removal or under §
1326(b) for illegal reentry by certain criminal aliens who
likewise have been previously removed.  The penalties for
a conviction under these sections of Title 8 range from sen-
tences of not more than two years to not more than twenty
years and/or a fine.
The INS and the Border Patrol are in the process of linking
the IDENT system to all sectors along the southwest U.S.-
Mexican border.  This is especially important in light of the
apparent shift in border movements to the east.  Moreover,
proper coordination of this system with various other law
enforcement agencies to identify criminal aliens and other
immigration violators may enhance the cooperation between
those agencies and heighten enforcement along the border.
For example, within the constraints of privacy limitations,
data on criminal aliens entered into the IDENT system and
furnished to the U.S. Attorney’s Office would allow that
office more readily to identify and prepare the criminal alien
cases it intends to prosecute under the § 1326 provisions.
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San Diego also is a laboratory for initiatives to facilitate
legal entries while guarding against the abuses referenced
above.  The Commission urged in its 1994 report that port
of entry operations be improved to reduce long waiting times
for legal crossings.  We learned in El Paso that some illegal
crossers had legal authority to enter, but because of the long
waits,  chose to use unauthorized avenues to enter.  San
Diego, along with several northern border sites, has been
experimenting with a Dedicated Commuter Lane [DCL] to
speed legitimate border traffic.  This concept combines
upfront screening of the applicant for a commuter pass and
use of technology to ensure that the crosser is indeed the
person who previously was screened.  Another innovation
in San Diego is a new working relationship between INS
inspections and the Customs Service to open all traffic lanes
and to improve the division of responsibility: INS currently
runs the port for pedestrian crossing and Customs for cargo
inspections.  Responsibility for inspections at the vehicle
lanes still is shared by INS and Customs.
Reducing visa overstay and abuse.  Visa overstay and abuse of
visas and Border Crossing Cards [BCCs], particularly through
unauthorized work, continue to challenge effective border
management.  Most of those entering with visas and BCCs
come for legitimate purposes, abide by the terms of their
entry, and leave when required.  Out of the millions of aliens
who are inspected each year, only a very small proportion
(about 150,000 per year) overstay for significant periods.
Any efforts to reduce abuse must also consider the wide-
spread benefits that accrue from most visa and BCC hold-
ers.  A number of policy changes could help ease legal entry
while reducing abuse.  The Commission previously recom-
mended, and Congress and the Administration have taken
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action for, the development of new entry-exit controls for
persons entering with visas, reissuance of Border Crossing
Cards to give them greater integrity, and providing signifi-
cant new resources for inspections.
Monitoring and evaluating new initiatives.  The various in-
tended and unintended consequences of the new resources,
policies, and initiatives in and between ports of entry make
clear the need for careful monitoring.  The Commission
reiterates its 1994 recommendation that a systematic assess-
ment of the effectiveness of new border strategies be under-
taken by internal and external evaluators.  IIRIRA mandates
a General Accounting Office five-year evaluation of border
management.  This study should be underwritten with suf-
ficient resources and expertise to ensure that Congress and
the Executive Branch gain an independent view of the new
policies’ effectiveness.
n Reducing the employment magnet is the linchpin of a
comprehensive strategy to deter unlawful immigration.
Economic opportunity and the prospect of employment re-
main the most important draw for illegal migration to this
country.   Strategies to deter unlawful entries and visa over-
stays require both a reliable process for verifying authoriza-
tion to work and an enforcement capacity to ensure that
employers adhere to all immigration-related labor standards.
The Commission continues to believe the following areas of
worksite regulation and enforcement require improvement:
Employment authorization verification system.  In our 1994 re-
port, the Commission concluded that the single most impor-
tant step that could be taken to reduce unlawful migration
was development of a more effective system for verifying
work authorization.
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A large majority of employers will comply with the law, and
they will not knowingly hire illegal aliens.  However, the
widespread availability of fraudulent documents makes it
easy for illegal aliens to obtain jobs because employers gen-
erally have no way of determining if the workers are autho-
rized or not.  The minority of employers who knowingly
hire illegal aliens, often to exploit their labor, find protection
from sanctions by going through the motions of compliance
while accepting counterfeit documents.  The absence of a
secure verification process also heightens the potential for
discrimination against legally-authorized, foreign-looking or
-sounding workers because employers fear that they may be
inadvertently hiring illegal aliens.
The Commission concluded that the most promising option
for verifying work authorization is a computerized registry
based on the social security number; it unanimously recom-
mended that such a system be tested not only for its effec-
tiveness in deterring the employment of illegal aliens, but
also for its protections against discrimination and infringe-
ments on civil liberties and privacy.14  The Commission urged
the Administration “to initiate and evaluate pilot programs
using the proposed, social security-based computerized veri-
fication system in at least five states with the highest levels
of illegal immigration . . .”  In the interim, we recommended
that INS should continue to implement pilot programs al-
ready underway that permit employers to verify the work
authorization of these newly-hired workers who attest to
being aliens.  The existing pilot, since expanded, was a good
mechanism through which INS could develop the data and
other systems that would be needed in the more extensive
pilots envisioned by the Commission.  They continued to
14 The Concurring Statement of Commissioners Leiden and Merced can be
found in the Commission’s 1994 report.
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have a fatal flaw, however, in that an illegal alien could
attest to being a U.S. citizen and thereby escape verification
by INS.
The Commission’s recommendation for a verification pilot
that involved both citizens and aliens was incorporated in
modified form in IIRIRA.15  Congress mandated that the
Attorney General establish a pilot confirmation system us-
ing a telephone line or other electronic media.  The Com-
missioner of Social Security was mandated to establish a
reliable, secure method to verify the social security number
provided by a new hire as part of the employment confir-
mation process.  Pilot programs testing the new confirma-
tion process were to be implemented in, at a minimum, five
of the seven states with the highest estimated illegal alien
population.  Participation in the pilot programs is to be
voluntary for most employers.  The legislation mandated
participation by federal agencies and the Congress.  Compa-
nies violating employer sanctions provisions can also be
required to participate.  The Attorney General is to report
on the pilot programs after three and four years of opera-
tion.
The first of these pilot projects was to begin not later than
one year from enactment of IIRIRA, or about August 1997.
The first pilot project, starting in Chicago, began in late
August.  Called the “Joint Employment Verification Project”
[JEVP], the pilot involves INS and the Social Security Ad-
ministration.  The verification pilot will test many of the
requirements of the “Basic Pilot Program” mandated in §
403(a) of IIRIRA.
15 IIRIRA, Title IV—Enforcement of Restrictions Against Employment,
Subtitle A: Pilot Programs for Employment Eligibility Confirmation,
sections 401-405.
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The JEVP will have prospective new employees fill out the
current INS Form I-9, submit identification documents listed
in the legislation, and include a photograph.  Employers
will then contact the Social Security Administration [SSA]
through a touch-tone telephone (being developed under a
contract with ATT) that will electronically verify identity
and authorization/nonauthorization to work using the
employee’s social security number.  If either of these is not
confirmed, the prospective employee must be notified. The
employee may then withdraw or contest this tentative
nonconfirmation. In this case, the prospective employee has
ten days in which to provide additional or corrected infor-
mation to the employer.  If this still does not produce con-
firmation of employment authorization, the employee will
be told to contact SSA [for citizens] or INS [for noncitizens]
to correct their record(s) and/or their status.  During this
confirmation process, employees cannot be terminated.  If
still unconfirmed at the end of the process, the employee
then may be terminated.  As mandated by IIRIRA, INS plans
to expand implementation of the JEVP into five additional
states by the end of September 1997.
In addition, IIRIRA mandates two other pilot projects, a
“citizen attestation pilot project” and a “machine readable
document pilot project.”  INS currently is formulating these
additional pilot projects.  The “citizen attestation pilot
project” will be similar to the INS’ current Employment
Verification Program, while the “machine readable docu-
ment pilot project” is a variation of the JEVP and the “Basic
Pilot Project.”
The current pilot programs are a useful step in improving
verification, but they do not fully solve the problems we
have identified.  The Commission reiterates its support for
U.S. COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION REFORM
1 9 9 7
RECOMMENDATIONS
- 117 -
pilot-testing approaches that do not require employers to
use the current I-9 procedure.  The I-9 is flawed in several
ways.  First it is a document system, which is prone to
counterfeiting.  Second, it requires employees to specify if
they are citizens or aliens.  This latter requirement increases
the potential for discrimination based on alienage or pre-
sumed alienage.  Third, it presents an added paperwork
burden for employers who must keep the I-9 file.  The cur-
rent pilot programs help address the first problem by pro-
viding for telephone or computer verification of information
provided in the I-9.  It does not address the second or third
problems, however.
A system based on verification of an employee’s social se-
curity number, with a match to records on work authoriza-
tion for aliens, eliminates any determinations by the em-
ployer and can be implemented electronically, thus eliminat-
ing the need for work authorization documents.  The Com-
mission recognizes that the data systems are not yet in place
for this preferred process to work.  The federal government
does not have the capacity to match social security numbers
with INS work authorization data without some of the in-
formation captured on the I-9.  Congress should provide
sufficient time, resources, and authorities to permit devel-
opment of this capability.
The Commission urges the Administration and Congress to
monitor closely and evaluate the effects of these various
pilot programs.  As discussed in our earlier report, the evalu-
ation should assess their effects in reducing fraud, reducing
the potential for discrimination, reducing emplyers’ time,
resources, and amount of paperwork, and protecting pri-
vacy and civil liberties.  The evaluation should be carried
out by nationally-respected outside evaluators.  It should be
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conceived as a continuing evaluation whose results are used
in modifying and improving the pilots as they are imple-
mented.
Counterfeit documents.  The Commission recommended ac-
tion to reduce the availability of counterfeit documents and
the fraudulent access to so-called “breeder documents,” par-
ticularly birth certificates used to establish identity.  The
Commission is pleased to note progress in the development
of new and more tamper-proof basic documents that could
serve as verification documents until a general, nationwide
verification system is fully in place.   The Commission also
believes that the federal government should develop a pack-
age of incentives and disincentives to encourage states and
other localities to develop standards for issuing birth and
death certificates and drivers’ licenses.  The Commission is
pleased to note that its 1994 recommendation for imposing
additional penalties on those producing and selling counter-
feit documents was adopted in the IIRIRA.
Antidiscrimination strategies.  In its 1994 report, the Commis-
sion expressed its concern regarding the discrimination that
occurs against citizens and noncitizens as a result of the
current employer sanctions system.  To address this issue,
the Commission recommended development of a new veri-
fication process to deter immigration-related discrimination.
We also urged more proactive strategies to identify and com-
bat immigration-related discrimination at the workplace, as
well as a new study to document the nature and extent of
the problem.  Revisiting this issue three years later, the Com-
mission finds that there have been a number of changes that
are relevant to the Commission’s recommendations.
First, the Office of Special Counsel [OSC] for unfair immi-
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gration-related employment practices, formerly housed as
an independent agency within the Department of Justice,
has been incorporated into the DOJ’s Civil Rights Division.
This organizational change seems to have been well received
within the Department as both the Division and OSC focus
on protecting the rights of immigrants and racial and ethnic
minorities.
The number of OSC staff, however, has decreased from thirty-
six to about twenty-five since FY 1994.  This downward
trend harms OSC’s ability to take the proactive role that the
Commission recommended (e.g. increasing independent,
targeted investigations and beginning testing programs).  The
Commission urges attention to this matter, as well as to the
long delay in confirming a Special Counsel to head the of-
fice.
A significant portion of OSC’s efforts have been directed
toward the education of employees and employers, and we
support these efforts.  OSC has awarded 114 grants totaling
$2.09 million since FY 1990 and contracted out for a five-
year national public affairs/communications strategy.  Its
attorneys and staff have made 1,000 presentations in the last
ten years, and its grantees have averaged 1,700 presenta-
tions per year.  OSC also has coordinated its educational
efforts with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion, INS, and DOL and has Memoranda of Understanding
with these and other agencies.
Despite this apparent coordination, however, OSC has not
been involved in designing and monitoring the verification
pilot programs.  Reducing immigration-related employment
discrimination against foreign-looking or -sounding persons
was a key goal of the Commission’s proposed verification
U.S. COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION REFORM
1 9 9 7
RECOMMENDATIONS
- 120 -
system.  OSC should play a role in monitoring the verifica-
tion pilots to see if the discrimination is indeed reduced as
predicted.
The Commission also reiterates its recommendation for a
methodologically-sound study to document the nature and
extent of unfair immigration-related employment practices
that have occurred since the General Accounting Office’s
1990 report. Only through such a study can it be determined
whether employer sanctions-related discrimination has in-
creased or decreased and how the pilot programs compare
with the current situation on this indicator.
In 1996, IIRIRA changed the INA by requiring that an intent
to discriminate must be proven for an employer to be found
guilty of violating IRCA’s antidiscrimination procedures with
respect to document requests.  Some believe that the intent
standard will be a difficult one to prove and that it provides
the employer with a loophole.  The actual effect of this pro-
vision will be known only as OSC implements the statutory
change and should be monitored.
Labor standards enforcement.  Protecting authorized workers
from employment abuses and substandard conditions and
practices remains an essential ingredient of a strategy to
combat illegal migration.  Employers who hire illegal aliens
tend to violate other labor standards and vice versa.  Re-
cently uncovered examples of exploitation of illegal aliens,
including indentured servitude, highlight the necessity of
enhanced labor standards enforcement.  The Commission
recommended in our 1994 report the allocation of increased
staff and resources to the Department of Labor for the en-
forcement of wage and hour and other labor standards.  We
continue to believe that these additional resources are nec-
essary, and the Commission continues to urge Congress to
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authorize and fund additional labor standards investigators
whose work should target industries hiring significant num-
bers of illegal aliens.  As described more fully later in this
report, we believe that the Department of Labor should have
full capacity and authority to sanction employers who fail to
verify work authorization as part of the agency’s duties in
enforcing labor standards.
n Restricting eligibility of illegal aliens for publicly-funded
services or assistance except those made available on an
emergency basis or for similar compelling reasons to pro-
tect public health and safety or to conform to constitu-
tional requirements.  Although public benefit programs do
not appear to be a major magnet for illegal migrants, it is
important that U.S. benefit eligibility policies send the same
message as immigration policy: Illegal aliens should not be
here and, therefore, should not receive public assistance ex-
cept in unusual circumstances.  The Commission recom-
mended drawing a line between illegal aliens and lawfully-
resident immigrants with regard to benefits eligibility, in
part to reinforce this message.  Immigrants are welcome in
the country and, therefore, should be eligible for our basic
safety nets;  illegal aliens are not welcome and should not
receive our assistance.  We continue to believe that this
demarcation between legal and illegal aliens makes sense.
The Commission urges the Congress to reconsider the
changes in welfare policy enacted in 1996 that blur the dis-
tinctions between legal and illegal aliens by treating them
similarly for the purposes of many public benefit programs.
n Strategies for addressing the causes of unlawful migration
in source countries.  An effective strategy to curb unautho-
rized movements includes cooperative efforts with source
countries to address the push factors that cause people to
seek new lives in the United States. The Commission contin-
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ues to urge the United States government to give priority in
its foreign policy and international economic policy to long-
term reduction in the causes of unauthorized migration.  The
United States can take many unilateral steps to improve its
immigration policies, but U.S. policies alone will not stop
unauthorized migration.
Recognizing the complex motivations behind unlawful move-
ments, the Commission advocated the following possible
interventions, many of which have indeed occurred.  They
include: arrangements to facilitate trade and investment in
sending countries; support for human rights and democracy
building; peacekeeping operations; humanitarian assistance
in countries of origin and first asylum; deployment of hu-
man rights monitors; human rights training for government
officials in potential sending countries; humane treatment of
citizens and minorities; and reconstruction programs after
civil wars and civil conflicts.  In its 1997 report on refugee
policy, the Commission recommended that the U.S. govern-
ment continue demonstrating leadership in international re-
sponses to refugee and related humanitarian crises, includ-
ing concerted diplomatic and other efforts to prevent the
emergencies from occurring.
To focus greater attention on the causes of migration, the
Commission recommends development of immigration im-
pact analyses of foreign policy and trade decisions with po-
tential migrant sending countries. The Commission also calls
for adoption of focused strategies for communities produc-
ing large numbers of U.S.-bound migrants and strengthened
intelligence gathering to improve early warning of large
unauthorized movements.  Other efforts to reduce the pres-
sures of migration from the sending countries would be
helpful, such as programs to arrest environmental damage
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throughout the hemisphere, to restore the environment in
such areas as Haiti and Mexico, to improve rural develop-
ment and agricultural productivity, particularly in those areas
where land is becoming marginalized and unlikely to sus-
tain the local population without an intervention strategy,
and to address other environmental problems such as clear-
ing land mines in rural Central America.
Given its proximity to the United States and its number of
migrants, the Commission believes increased coordination
with Mexico is essential to address problems related to
migration. The Commission notes with satisfaction the ef-
forts being conducted jointly by the government of Mexico
and the United States to improve coordination strategies
and actions on their respective sides of the border and en-
courages the continuation of such important dialogues.  In
particular, the Commission recognizes the work of the Bina-
tional Study on Migration Between Mexico and the United
States, the Working Group on Migration and Consular Af-
fairs, the various cross-border liaison groups established
along the border, and efforts between the two countries to
coordinate antismuggling efforts, regulate the movements
of people across land borders, deter third-country nationals
transiting Mexico en route to the U.S., curtail auto theft and
train cargo theft, reduce border violence, and enhance cross-
border law enforcement cooperation.
The Commission also notes that action has taken place at
the regional level; annual discussions have been convened
involving the U.S., Mexico, and Central American countries.
Further, the U.S. has held direct discussions with other coun-
tries in the region, such as Cuba, with whom it signed an
agreement to curb unauthorized migration of its native
population.
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Despite that program, the need remains for forward looking
consultative mechanisms between the U.S. and other coun-
tries.  These should focus on exploring future policies and
their migration implications as well as developing various
policy scenarios and options for addressing unauthorized
migration.  Joint data collection and analysis also would be
useful in resolving some of the disagreements surrounding
migration, for example joint solutions to address the eco-
nomic and social costs of the migration.
n Mechanisms to respond in a timely, effective, and humane
manner to migration emergencies.  A credible immigration
policy requires the ability to respond effectively and hu-
manely to migration emergencies in which large numbers of
people seek entry into the United States.  These emergencies
generally include bona fide refugees, other individuals in need
of protection, and persons seeking a better economic life in
the U.S.  Failure to act appropriately and in a timely manner
to determine who should be admitted and who should be
returned can have profound humanitarian consequences.
Further, an uncontrolled emergency can overwhelm resources
and create serious problems that far outlast the emergency.16
Leadership.  Past experiences demonstrate that leadership and
a chain of command must be established quickly during an
unfolding mass migration emergency to ensure an effective
response.  The proposed National Security Council focal
point for refugee issues should assume these responsibilities
because of the political nature of the decisions, the need for
high Executive Branch access, and the need for credibility
that derives from sufficient authority and government expe-
rience.
16 For a fuller discussion of the Commission’s recommendation on mass
migration emergencies, see U.S. Refugee Policy: Taking Leadership, 1997.
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Regional advance preparation.  Mass migrations are likely to
continue within this hemisphere. To respond effectively and
humanely to future crises, the U.S. and its regional partners
need a plan for a regional temporary protection system.
This plan should identify sites, prepare protection guide-
lines and processing procedures at the primary protection
sites and other locations, and create a funding proposal that
clarifies financial responsibilities and accounts for marginal
additional costs.  It also should include measures to avert
and resolve crises and develop plans for implementing du-
rable solutions.
Domestic advance preparation.  The U.S. must also finalize its
own federal contingency planning for migration emergen-
cies that has been under development during the past de-
cade (with review and revision as needed).  The presence of
a such a contingency plan identifying various scenarios,
policy responses, and appropriate steps for implementing
them can help avoid both dangerous and costly ad hoc
decisionmaking and disruption of normal operations.  An
effective and viable emergency response, however, requires
that the agencies have sufficient resources and authorities to
carry out their responsibilities. Thus, as part of this process,
the U.S. must develop a realistic financing strategy and
mechanisms to trigger allocation of funds.
Increased coordination among federal agencies involved in
emergency responses—as well as with state and local agen-
cies—also is necessary to ensure that the appropriate par-
ticipants are identified and involved in the discussions and
that as many decisions and responsibilities as possible are
agreed upon prior to emergency situations.  This would
facilitate emergency responses by reducing the reluctance of
state and local government to be involved, by clarifying
lines of authority, and by increasing trust between the par-
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ties.  If they had the statutory authority to allow them to
respond rapidly and efficiently, agencies with operational
responsibility for mass migration emergencies could be more
effective. This operational responsibility must include the
authority to assign tasks to other agencies as needed.
Removals
A credible immigration system requires the effective and timely
removal of aliens determined through constitutionally-sound proce-
dures to have no right to remain in the United States.  As the
Commission stated in its 1994 Report, if unlawful aliens believe that
they can remain indefinitely once they are within our national bor-
ders, there will be increased incentives to try to enter or remain
illegally.
Our current removal system does not work.  Hundreds of thou-
sands of aliens with final removal orders remain in the U.S.  The
system’s ineffectiveness results from a fragmented, uncoordinated
approach, rather than flawed legal procedures.  The Executive Branch
does not have the capacity, resources, or strategy to detain aliens
likely to abscond, to monitor the whereabouts of released aliens, or
to remove them.
A large number of aliens—more than 250,000 in the past eight years—
have been issued removal orders but have never been removed.17
[See chart: Comparison of Removal Orders and Actual Removals.]
In studying how the current system produces such a large number
of unexecuted final removal orders, the Commission finds that the
removal process is neither conceived of nor managed as an inte-
grated system.
17 Prior to IIRIRA, such orders were referred to as “deportation” and
“exclusion” orders.
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18 See, e.g., GAO Testimony, “Criminal Aliens: INS’ Efforts to Identify and
Remove Imprisoned Aliens Need to Be Improved,” before the Immigration
and Claims Subcommittee, Committee on the Judiciary, House of
Representatives, July 15, 1997.
The Commission urges immediate reforms to improve management of the
removal system and to ensure that aliens with final orders of deportation,
exclusion, or removal are indeed removed from the United States.
In its 1994 report, the Commission recommended that the top en-
forcement priority should be the removal of criminal aliens from the
U.S. in such a way that their potential return to the U.S. will be
minimized.  The INS has made considerable progress recently in
removing larger numbers of criminal aliens.  This year, INS is on
track to remove 70 percent more criminal aliens than were removed
in FY 1993.  Despite these advances, the actual number of criminal
alien removals still lags behind the total number who should be
deported from this country.18
INS has been able to increase the number of criminal alien removals
by detaining previously incarcerated aliens after they complete serv-
ing their sentences, through conclusion of their proceedings, and
removal can be effected.  More significantly, INS and the Executive
Office for Immigration Review developed the Institutional Hearing
Program [IHP] through which removal hearings are held in the pris-
ons.  When final orders are issued in this setting, criminal aliens can
be deported directly from state or federal prisons, alleviating INS’
need to detain them during deportation proceedings.  The Commis-
sion recommended enhanced use of the IHP in its 1994 report.  As
the recent GAO testimony cited above indicates, improvements are
still needed to ensure that INS identifies and deports all removable
criminal aliens.
Further, while the INS has increased criminal alien removals over
the last several years, noncriminal alien removals remained static
The Commission
urges immediate
reforms to improve
management of the
removal system
and to ensure
that aliens with
final orders of
deportation,
exclusion, or
removal
are indeed
removed from
the United States.
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until 1996, as the chart comparing removal orders and actual orders
indicates.  The recent increase in noncriminal removals may be some-
what related to increased detention space and resources authorized
by Congress.  However, much of the increase appears localized,
suggesting that other forces are at work.  As the chart further shows,
removals from the San Diego District represent much of the increase
and are related directly to the establishment of a Port Court in
1995.19
Even with these increased removals, the system needs significant
improvements before it can be regarded as credible, that is able to
deport most of the aliens with final orders of removal.  To achieve
this goal will require a new approach to correct a fundamental flaw—
the fragmentation in the current conception and management of the
removal system.  Each part of the system—Investigations, Trial
Attorneys, and Detention and Deportation—acts independently,
impeding the total system’s efficiency and leaving no one account-
able for growing numbers of unexecuted final orders of removal.
The system starts with INS investigations of potential immigration
law violations.  When investigators find such violations, they issue
notices placing aliens in removal proceedings.  At that point, the
investigators are finished with their assigned tasks; they are never
connected to the results of their work—whether the alien was ulti-
mately ordered removed and actually deported.  Nor is their perfor-
mance evaluated in connection with actual removals or with the
priority that policymakers place on the removal of particular catego-
19 When “Operation Gatekeeper” changed the patterns of how aliens
attempted to enter the U.S. illegally and resulted in a significant increase
in the number of aliens trying to cross with false documents at the port
of entry, the U.S. Attorney worked with INS and EOIR to establish a
more expeditious removal process for aliens apprehended at ports of
entry.  Previously, such aliens were simply turned back to Mexico; under
the new system, they were placed in exclusion proceedings at the newly
created Port Court.  The aliens were detained for a few days, and the
exclusion proceedings were expeditious because they were uncontested.
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ries of aliens.  Investigators do not, as a matter of practice, distin-
guish among priorities when initiating the formal removal process;
both the worst violators and those who may have good claims for
relief are placed in the same costly and time-consuming proceed-
ings.
Once the proceedings have commenced, the INS Trial Attorney is
responsible for the case.  The volume of cases for each Trial Attor-
ney is very large; yet, again there is no considered prioritization
about which cases to proceed against and which not.  Key
policymakers do not provide guidance to Trial Attorneys about
prioritizing cases, and, even if such guidance were provided, Trial
Attorneys say that they are not given sufficient time to review cases
to determine whether a case is worth pursuing.  Again, there is no
connection to the ultimate aim of the system—removing those who
should be deported.
The system suffers further because many aliens are unrepresented
and thus do not receive advice on whether to go forward because
they have a chance of being granted relief.  As the Commission
learned in studying the results of the Florence Representation Project
[see below], the removal process works much more efficiently when
aliens receive advice of counsel.  Those with weak cases generally
do not pursue relief through proceedings if they understand from
counsel that they will be wasting their time.  As the late Chief
Immigration Judge Robie  pointed out, representation generally makes
the court system work more efficiently.  For example, Immigration
Judges often grant continuances to unrepresented aliens to give them
time to obtain counsel.  In certain types of cases (particularly asy-
lum claims), some judges are hesitant to proceed in the absence of
representation.  When a final order of removal is issued, another
INS office, Detention and Deportation, takes responsibility for the
case.  This office is charged with managing detention space and
effecting removal.  The reality is that there will never be enough
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space to detain everyone who should be removed.  Nonetheless, no
plan has been devised to pursue alternatives.  The only experiment
the INS has launched is the Vera Appearance Assistance Program
that plans to test the utility of supervised release on various limited
populations [as discussed below].  Unfortunately, due to internal
INS problems, that pilot may not gain access to one of the main
groups it should test—asylum seekers who meet the credible fear
standard.  No strategy has been devised for determining when, after
the first hearing on the merits, detention is advisable because the
likelihood of absconding is higher.  Notices ordering removable aliens
to report for deportation, known as “run” letters, continue to be
issued at a 90+ percent no-show rate.  No strategy has been devel-
oped for picking up aliens with final orders even when there is a
recent address.
Establishing a more effective removal system requires changes in
the management of the removal process.  More specifically, the Com-
mission recommends:
n Establishing priorities and numerical targets for the re-
moval of criminal and noncriminal aliens.  The Commis-
sion encourages headquarters, regional, and local immigra-
tion enforcement officials to set these priorities and numeri-
cal goals.  Based on the above analysis of removal orders
and actual removals, it appears that beyond the very high-
est removal priority—convicted criminals—targeted priori-
ties of particular categories generally have not been devel-
oped at the national and local levels.  Nor has INS devel-
oped numerical targets for the removal of specific categories
of noncriminal aliens.  This absence of prioritization and
performance measures generally precludes serious consid-
eration of what strategies, resources, and training will be
needed to effect the desired removals.
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Establishing removal of criminal aliens as a priority and
setting numerical targets helped identify such new strate-
gies as the IHP.   The same process can work with regard to
other categories of aliens, as can be seen in San Diego.  Aliens
who attempted to enter there with fraudulent documents
were singled out as a priority for removal with an exclusion
order.  Formerly, those presenting fraudulent documents were
permitted simply to withdraw their application for admis-
sion with no penalty.  Setting the priority to remove aliens
attempting reentry led to the decision to increase Inspection
staff, establish a Port Court, identify additional detention
space, and gain a commitment from the U.S. Attorney to
prosecute those who attempted reentry after exclusion.
Failed asylum seekers [as the Commission recommended in
our June 1997 Refugee Report], visa overstayers, unautho-
rized workers in targeted industries, and those who use
false documents are categories that require attention if our
removal system is to become credible and deter abuse.
Setting priorities and numerical targets will help the gov-
ernment manage what is potentially a huge caseload of re-
movable aliens.
n Local oversight and accountability for the development
and implementation of plans to coordinate  apprehensions,
detention, hearings, removal, and the prevention of reen-
try.  With guidance on priorities, local managers in charge
of the removal system would be responsible for allocation of
resources to ensure that aliens in the prioritized categories
are placed in the process and ultimately removed.  Local
managers also would be responsible and accountable for
identifying effective deterrents to reduce the likelihood that
removed aliens would attempt to reenter the U.S. Managers
need to redesign the system so that resources are balanced
from beginning to end.  Right now, the system is lopsided
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and disconnected.  The front end (Investigations) drives the
system, and the back end (actual removals) is neglected.
That imbalance can be corrected if the local offices develop
plans to coordinate apprehensions, detention, hearings, and
the removal process in ways that target the particular priori-
ties in different districts.  As discussed above, the San Diego
district has had some success in focusing on aliens trying to
enter with false documents.  After identifying this priority,
the U.S. Attorney coordinated the key federal government
actors to ensure that these aliens were placed into proceed-
ings, either returned to Mexico or detained for several days
awaiting the hearing, promptly removed after the issuance
of a final order, and prosecuted if they reentered.
As discussed above, the local INS Trial Attorneys, who are
part of the General Counsel’s Office, currently do not play
a significant role in driving the removal system.  The Com-
mission believes Trial Attorney offices should function in
the same manner that U.S. and District Attorney Offices do.
Those offices determine which cases they will prosecute;
and these determinations guide detectives as to which cases
they bring to the U.S. or District Attorney for prosecution.
Congress should provide sufficient resources to support such
initiatives.  Based on the policy guidance and plans devel-
oped by headquarters, regional and local offices, the chief
Trial Attorneys [now called District Counsel] should make
it clear to investigators which cases they will pursue in pro-
ceedings and which cases they will not.  Investigators should
then target these priority cases.  Local heads of Immigration
Enforcement Offices should be held accountable for the plan-
ning and implementation of this reconceived removal sys-
tem.  To ensure such accountability, these local officials should
have authority over both the prosecutorial and police func-
tions.
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n Continued attention to improved means for identifying
and removing criminal aliens with a final order of depor-
tation.  The Commission reiterates the importance of re-
moving criminal aliens as a top priority.  Our recommenda-
tion regarding the importance of removing noncriminal aliens
with final orders is not intended to shift the attention of the
removal system away from this priority.  Rather, both crimi-
nal and noncriminal aliens must be removed to protect public
safety (in the case of criminals) and to send a deterrent
message to all who have no permission to be here.
To improve the effectiveness of the criminal removal sys-
tem, criminal aliens must be identified as early in the pro-
cess as possible.  The local jail pilot project mandated by §
329 of IIRIRA should be used to help determine how early
in the criminal process identification should occur.  The De-
partment of Justice and the state and local criminal justice
agencies should develop uniform means of identification,
and the data systems of these agencies should be linked to
identify more effectively criminal aliens who should be re-
moved.
With respect to the Institutional Hearing Program, the GAO
found that the INS (1) failed to identify many removable
criminal aliens and initiate IHP proceedings for them before
they were released from prison, and (2) did not complete
the IHP by the time of prison release for the majority of
criminal aliens it did identify.  GAO recommended improved
data systems to track the IHP status of each foreign-born
inmate and the development of a workload analysis model
to identify the IHP resources needed in any period to achieve
overall program goals.  The Commission believes that the
development of uniform means of such identification and
linked data also will help the program achieve its goals.
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The Commission urges the Department of Justice to attend
carefully to actual removals in two additional ways.  First,
we have heard serious complaints from foreign authorities
that they are not being notified that the U.S. is returning a
criminal alien.  DOJ must develop an improved notification
process so that appropriate authorities in the countries to
which criminal aliens are being returned can plan for such
returns and take these individuals into custody if necessary.
Second, we also have learned that many criminal aliens are
being returned unescorted.  For public safety reasons, crimi-
nal aliens should be returned by escort.
n Legal rights and representation.  The Executive Branch
should be authorized to develop, provide, and fund pro-
grams and services to educate aliens about their legal rights
and immigration proceedings.  Such programs also should
encourage and facilitate legal representation where to do so
would be beneficial to the system and the administration of
justice.  Particular attention should be focused on aliens in
detention where release or removal can be expedited through
such representation.  The alien would not have a right to
appointed counsel, but the government could fund services
to address some of the barriers to representation.
Under the provisions of § 292 of the Immigration and Na-
tionality Act, an alien placed in proceedings is guaranteed
the privilege of being represented by an attorney or other
qualified legal representative, but at no expense to the gov-
ernment.  Under this system, the alien is provided with a
list of local attorneys and accredited organizations practic-
ing immigration law who might be able to provide legal
representation.  Studies have shown that the vast majority
of aliens in proceedings before Immigration Judges are not
represented by counsel.  This is accounted for by several
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factors including the lack of English proficiency on the part
of aliens, a lack of understanding of the legal process and of
their legal rights, the lack of funds to hire an attorney, and
an inability to find someone available and willing to repre-
sent them.  Securing the services of an attorney or otherwise
qualified legal representative presents a particular challenge
for detained aliens whose freedom is constrained, who have
limited phone privileges, and who find themselves situated
in locales not readily served by or accessible to the legal
community.
Experience demonstrates that when aliens are represented
in proceedings, cases move more efficiently, economically,
and expeditiously through the system.  Indeed, represented
aliens with little or no chance of prevailing can be more
readily weeded out of the system.  Aliens who have legal
representation are much more likely to appear at their hear-
ings than  unrepresented aliens.  Fewer continuances are
needed or granted in the case of represented aliens.   Hear-
ings take less time.  Issues presented for decision by the
immigration courts and on appeal are more readily nar-
rowed.   Applications for relief are better prepared and
presented in immigration court.  Appeals are more cogently
presented and are supported by legal briefs.  Simply put,
when aliens in proceedings or on appeal have legal repre-
sentation, the system works better.
The Commission visited the Florence Immigration and Refu-
gee Rights Project in Florence, Arizona, a  project that dem-
onstrates the advantages of programs designed to educate
aliens about their rights and that provides a triage system to
secure representation for those with a likely avenue for
relief.  The Project screens detainees for eligibility for immi-
gration benefits and relief from deportation, exclusion, or
removal, informs aliens about their rights, and directly rep-
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resents as many as it can handle, with the overflow referred
out to pro bono attorneys.  The Project has been recognized
for its success and assistance in moving cases through the
system while affording due process.  An evaluation of the
Project found that aliens with representation had a better
opportunity to become aware of their rights and legal op-
tions.  Many inside and out of government believe that the
Florence Project reduces alien detention time, expedites re-
moval by decreasing necessary immigration court time, and
increases court efficiency.  Representation also decreases anxi-
ety and behavioral problems among detainees.
The Commission believes that programs like the Florence
Project should be facilitated and encouraged.  Moreover, the
Commission believes that the Executive Branch should be
granted the authority to develop, provide, and fund other
programs and services that inform aliens about their rights
and the proceedings in which they are placed and to other-
wise facilitate legal representation where to do so is a ben-
efit to the system.  Under this approach, the alien would not
have a right to appointed counsel, but the government could
fund ancillary services, such as rights presentations, inter-
preters, transportation, attorney/client meeting places, and
training to address some of the barriers to increased legal
representation.
n Prosecutorial discretion to determine whether to proceed
with cases.  Guidelines on the use of prosecutorial discre-
tion should be developed; local Trial Attorneys should be
trained to exercise discretion and support staff should be
provided to ensure that Trial Attorneys have the time needed
to screen cases prior to hearings.  Discretion should be ex-
ercised with the goal of establishing a more efficient and
rational hearing system.
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In addition to targeting priority cases, the District and U.S.
Attorneys decide which of those cases to prosecute based
on an assessment of the strength of each case.  In contrast,
by and large, the INS prosecutes all cases that appear to
involve violations of law.  The Commission is concerned
about the cost of litigating every case, both in terms of the
credibility of the system and expenditure of public funds.
We have recommended setting priorities as a strategy to
establish credibility and to send a deterrent message.  Here
we urge the development of a system based on a sensible
goal: prosecution of those who actually will be removed.
To establish a removal system that operates efficiently by
prosecuting appropriate cases and settling those, for example,
where relief is likely to be established, guidelines should be
developed and issued by the General Counsel.  Trial Attor-
neys should be trained to create and apply these guidelines
nationwide.  Finally, Trial Attorneys need time to screen
cases prior to a removal hearing and to determine whether
the alien has a strong claim for relief.  To free up their time,
support staff should be provided to handle the clerical work
that currently burdens the Trial Attorneys.  By wisely apply-
ing their discretion, the Trial Attorneys could then focus
their attention on immigration court cases that are likely to
result in the removal of the alien upon completion of the
proceedings.  This “out-of-court” approach also would as-
sist the Immigration Judges and the private immigration bar
by reducing the amount of time all parties spend in immi-
gration court.
n Strategic use of detention and release decisions.  Deten-
tion space, always in limited supply, is in greater demand as
the government has focused more on the removal of crimi-
nal aliens and as Congress mandates more categories to be
detained.  IIRIRA requires the Attorney General to detain all
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aliens found inadmissible or deportable on criminal or ter-
rorist grounds.  The criminal grounds include convictions
for certain crimes now categorized as “aggravated felonies”
for which a sentence of one year imprisonment or more may
be imposed.  Congress enacted these changes knowing that
current detention space and personnel were insufficient to
execute such expanded detention requirements and allowed
the Attorney General to waive these requirements for two
one-year periods while developing the capacity to handle
these developments.  The Attorney General notified the
Judiciary Committees of the insufficiencies for the first year.
IIRIRA also requires the detention of asylum seekers during
the credible fear determination process.
Detention needs to be used more strategically if the govern-
ment is going to target and remove designated categories of
aliens determined to be priorities in particular locales.  If it
appears that asylum abuse is getting out of hand in one
locality, for example, detention space would be needed to
ensure that failed asylum seekers are removed.
Alternatives to detention should be developed so that de-
tention space is used efficiently and effectively.  In 1997, INS
initiated a three-year pilot program, created with and imple-
mented by the Vera Institute of Justice, that may help define
effective alternatives to detention for specific populations.
The Vera Assistance Appearance Program aims to develop
and validate with formal research a supervision program
that will increase both appearances at immigration court
proceedings and compliance with the legal process among
those not detained, while ensuring efficient use of detention
space.  The program thus aims to address important re-
moval problems: The Executive Branch can detain only a
fraction of individuals in removal proceedings; those who
are not detained often do not appear in court and rarely
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comply with removal orders.  The pilot will free up valuable
detention space by keeping out of detention aliens who may
eventually be granted relief.  If the Vera pilot demonstrates
the utility of supervised release, an assessment of chances
for relief and community ties or supervision would assist
the Department of Justice in determining more precisely
when detention is needed in each case to ensure that aliens
who ultimately receive no relief do not abscond.  It is hoped
that the pilot will  provide insight into the use of reporting
mechanisms as well as the role of community organizations
who take responsibility for maintaining contact with and
reminding those released of their responsibilities to the
immigration court.
The Commission considers the Vera pilot of great impor-
tance to the development of an effective removal system.
INS officials at headquarters and in the  local offices should
work together to see that this pilot serves as a valid test of
detention alternatives.  In particular, the pilot should be
permitted access to those asylum seekers who meet the “cred-
ible fear” test for two reasons.  First, detaining individuals
who have met an initial threshold demonstrating their like-
lihood of obtaining asylum is not a good use of scarce de-
tention resources.  As the Commission stated in its Refugee
Report, “credible fear” is an appropriate standard for deter-
mining who will be released from detention; it is not appro-
priate for determining who will gain access to an asylum
hearing, except under exceptional circumstances.  Second,
asylum seekers who have met the credible fear test
will enable the pilot to test the utility of supervised release
and make recommendations on the role of community ties
and sponsors.
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Additional alternatives should be developed to address lo-
cal situations.  For example, in border communities, aliens
with pending cases could be permitted to return to Mexico
and come to Port Court for their hearing in lieu of deten-
tion, as occurs in San Diego.  The aliens in such proceedings
are told the consequence of their failure to appear—that
they will be found excludable in absentia and criminally
prosecuted if they attempt to reenter.
n Improved detention conditions and monitoring.  Over the
past two decades, INS has taken on significant responsibili-
ties in detaining aliens.  INS detains a broad range of aliens
of both genders, from criminals to asylum seekers.  While
short detention periods typically are contemplated for those
awaiting removal hearings, the results often are otherwise.
The INS has also become the long-term jailer for a signifi-
cant number of removable aliens from Cuba, Vietnam, and
other nations.   INS currently operates nine Service Process-
ing Centers and, like the U.S. Marshals, contracts bed space
with many state and local jails.  In recent years, Congress
has increased significantly resources for detention space: total
available beds per day totaled 8,600 in 1996; INS is close to
reaching its goal of 12,000 by October 1997.
Serious problems have occurred, the most prominent in 1995
when the ESMOR Contract Facility in Elizabeth, New Jersey,
was shut down following an incident in which detainees
voiced complaints of physical abuse, stealing, and harass-
ment by guards.  INS’ own investigation of the facility un-
covered serious management problems.  More regularly, com-
plaints regarding local jails have included human rights
abuses, overcrowding, poor nourishment, mixing of women
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and juveniles with men and of asylum seekers with crimi-
nals, and lack of access to health care, counsel, family, and
recreation.
Detention cannot be used effectively unless and until the
conditions of detention are humane and detainees are free
from physical abuse and harassment by guards.  We have
no doubt that appropriate criteria for all facilities can be
promulgated, based on sound governmental judgment and
consultation with concerned nongovernmental organizations.
But most importantly, a system to monitor facilities and
publish findings on a regular basis must be developed.  In-
spections must occur more than once annually.
Further, the Commission recommends that the Department
of Justice consider placing administrative responsibility for
operating detention centers with the Bureau of Prisons or
U.S. Marshals Service.  An immigration enforcement agency
should not be shouldered with such a significant responsi-
bility that is not part of its mission or expertise.
n Improved data systems.  The Commission recommends that
data systems link apprehensions and removals.  Current
data systems are unable to link an apprehension to its final
disposition (e.g., removal, adjustment of status).  In addi-
tion, INS statistics relate to events, not individuals.  This
significantly limits the use of apprehension and removal data
for analytical purposes.  The Commission urges develop-
ment of data systems that link apprehensions and removals
and provide statistics on individuals.  This would foster a
better understanding of apprehension as a removal tool and
provide better information on recidivism.
n The redesigned removal system should be managed ini-
tially by a Last-In-First-Out [LIFO] strategy to demonstrate
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The Commission
urges Congress
to clarify that
IIRIRA and
AEDPA do not
apply retroactively
to cases pending
when the new
policies and
procedures went
into effect.
the credibility of the system.   Once a coherent system is
organized and appropriate resources are assigned to  re-
moving deportable aliens—not simply to put  aliens through
proceedings—removals should proceed in a Last-In-First-
Out mode.  In this way, the government can send a credible
deterrent message to failed asylum seekers, visa overstayers,
users of counterfeit documents, and unauthorized workers,
that their presence in the United States will not be tolerated.
The LIFO model has worked successfully in the affirmative
asylum system, allowing the government to demonstrate
control over the current caseload and to quickly establish
priorities for dealing with the backlog for enforcement pur-
poses.  It can provide both the measure of success for the
removal system as well as convey the proper deterrent mes-
sage.
The Commission urges Congress to clarify that the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 and
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 do not
apply retroactively to cases pending when the new policies and
procedures went into effect.  As a matter of policy, the Commission
believes that retroactive application of new immigration laws un-
dermines the effectiveness and credibility of the immigration sys-
tem.  Applying newly-enacted laws or rules in an immigration pro-
ceeding that is pending results in inefficiency in the administration
of the immigration laws.  It also can raise troubling issues of fair-
ness.
There is no uniform effective date for the Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 in its entirety.
Instead, and to the extent it has spoken on the matter, Congress  has
imposed several different effective dates depending on the provi-
sions involved.  Most of the new removal provisions became
effective on April 1, 1997.  The fact that a statutory provision takes
effect upon enactment or upon a future date certain, does not re-
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20 The analytical model for determining statutory retroactivity, set forth by
the Supreme Court of the United States in Langraf v. U.S.I. Film Products,
Inc., 511 U.S. 244 (1994), is aptly encapsulated in the following excerpt
from Immigration Law and Procedure, Gordon and Mailman, Chapter 61,
Special Alert, SPA61-1, 2 (1997):
[T]he first step is to determine whether Congress expressly defined
the statute’s proper reach.  The language of the statute must be
examined to determine whether it manifests an intent to apply to
cases or conduct that arose before the law’s enactment.  For the
statute to apply retroactively, there must be an “unambiguous
directive” or an “express command” from Congress that it intended
such application.  In the absence of such an unambiguous directive,
it must be determined whether the new statute “attaches new legal
consequences to events completed before its enactment” or “would
impair rights a party possessed when he acted, increase a party’s
liability for past conduct or impose new duties with respect to
transactions already completed.”  If the statute has this effect, it
should not apply retroactively.
solve the issue of whether the provision applies to cases already
pending.  When new statutory provisions are applied to such cat-
egories of cases, it is generically considered a “retroactive” applica-
tion of the law.20
Although retroactive application of new statutory requirements by
Congress is legally permissible (subject to certain constitutional con-
straints), it does not constitute sound public policy.  Ours is a sys-
tem governed by the rule of law.   In our view, retroactively chang-
ing the applicable rules once a legal proceeding has commenced not
only is manifestly unfair, but also invites confusion, adds uncer-
tainty, and fosters a lack of trust and confidence in the rule of law.
We are concerned as well that retroactively applying new statutory
provisions results in inefficiency and simply does not make good
sense given the current realities of administering the immigration
laws.  As fully discussed earlier in this report, hundreds of thou-
sands of outstanding administratively final orders of deportation
remained unexecuted long before the enactment of either IIRIRA or
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AEDPA.  Clearly, the system has had little problem in establishing
sufficient grounds for deportation and exclusion under prior law.
Moreover, although relief from deportation and exclusion under prior
law was available, the number of granted applications was propor-
tionally very small compared to the number of aliens in proceed-
ings.   The problem, then, has not been in ordering the deportation
or exclusion of immigration violators, or in granting relief in a rela-
tively small percentage of cases.  The problem has been in actually
removing aliens who have been found to be deportable, excludable,
or removable following the conclusion of their proceedings.
As noted above, the system is not yet removing anything approach-
ing 100 percent of the existing detained or nondetained criminal
alien population for whom an administratively final order of depor-
tation or exclusion already has been entered or who are otherwise
deportable or excludable under prior law based on their criminal
conduct.  Moreover, the system has failed to remove significant
numbers of noncriminal aliens against whom orders of deportation
or exclusion have been outstanding for several years.  Although
retroactive application of the 1996 legislation will both significantly
increase the  numbers of removable aliens and decrease the num-
bers of aliens who might have otherwise qualified for existing relief,
the system does not have the  capacity actually to remove these
added numbers of individuals.  The resulting situation serves only
to further erode the effectiveness and credibility of the immigration
system as a whole.
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ACHIEVING IMMIGRATION
POLICY GOALS
INTRODUCTION
Restoring credibility and setting priorities—themes at the center of
the Commission’s policy recommendations on illegal and legal im-
migration, respectively—will not come to pass unless the govern-
ment is structured to deliver on these policies.  An effective immi-
gration system requires both credible policy and sound manage-
ment.  Good management cannot overcome bad policy.  Poor struc-
tures, lack of professionalism, poor planning, and failure to set pri-
orities will foil even the best policies.
Until relatively recently, the agencies responsible for implementing
immigration policy were underfunded, understaffed, and neglected.
During the past few years, however, massive increases in resources
and personnel, combined with significant political attention to im-
migration issues, have provided new opportunities to address long-
standing problems.  A recent General Accounting Office report docu-
mented improvements—including, for example, a more strategic ap-
proach to the formulation of immigration enforcement programs—
but concluded that management problems remain.  Further change
is required if the overall U.S. immigration system is to function
smoothly and effectively, anticipating and addressing, rather than
reacting to, problems.
STRUCTURAL REFORM
The Commission recommends fundamental restructuring of responsibilities
within the federal government to support more effective management of the
core functions of the immigration system: border and interior enforcement;
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enforcement of immigration-related employment standards; adjudication of
immigration and naturalization applications; and appeals of administra-
tive decisions.  The immigration system is one of the most compli-
cated in the federal government bureaucracy.  In some cases, one
agency has multiple, and sometimes conflicting, operational respon-
sibilities.  In other cases, multiple agencies have responsibility for
elements of the same functions.  Both situations create problems.
Mission overload.  Some of the agencies that implement the immigra-
tion laws have so many responsibilities that they have proved un-
able to manage all of them effectively.  Between congressional man-
dates and administrative determinations, these agencies must give
equal weight to more priorities than any one agency can handle.
Such a system is set up for failure, and, with such failure, further
loss of public confidence in the immigration system.
No one agency is likely to have the capacity to accomplish all of the
goals of immigration policy equally well.  Immigration law enforce-
ment requires staffing, training, resources, and a work culture that
differs from what is required for effective adjudication of benefits or
labor standards regulation of U.S. businesses.  While some argue
that enforcement and benefits are complementary functions, we agree
with the Commission for the Study of International Migration and
Cooperative Economic Development [Asencio Commission, after its
Chair] that placing incompatible service and enforcement functions
within one agency creates problems: competition for resources; lack
of coordination and cooperation; and personnel practices that both
encourage transfer between enforcement and service positions and
create confusion regarding mission and responsibilities.   Combining
responsibility for enforcement and benefits also blurs the distinction
between illegal migration and legal admissions.  As a matter of
public policy, it is important to maintain a bright line between these
two forms of entry.  We believe the Asencio Commission was correct
in contending that separating enforcement and benefits functions
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will lead to cost efficiencies, more effective enforcement, and im-
proved service to the public.
Diffusion of responsibilities among agencies.  Responsibility for many
immigration functions are spread across numerous agencies within
single departments or between departments.  This fragmentation of
responsibility is most clear in relationship to the adjudication of
applications for admission as a legal permanent resident: responsi-
bility for making decisions on skill-based immigrant and LDA ap-
plications is dispersed among the Department of Labor, the Depart-
ment of Justice’s Immigration and Naturalization Service and the
Department of State.  Responsibility for investigating employer com-
pliance with immigration-related labor standards is shared by INS
and DOL.  Additionally, the United States Information Agency has
responsibility for determining who will enter with a J visa, under
which some exchange visitors work in this country.  USIA also must
sign off on requests for waivers of the two-year home residency
required of some J visa holders before they can adjust their status
to other nonimmigrant or immigrant categories.
A second area in which responsibility is diffused and activities are
redundant is worksite enforcement.  Both INS and DOL conduct
investigations to determine if employers have violated the employ-
ment eligibility verification requirement.  Sanctions may be imposed
by INS against employers who knowingly hire unauthorized work-
ers.  The DOJ Office of Special Counsel has related responsibilities
in determining if employers are engaging in immigration-related
unfair employment practices.
Fragmentation of responsibility leads to conflicting messages from
the various agencies, unnecessary delays in adjudication, and, when
more than one agency must adjudicate the same request, redundan-
cies in actual implementation.
U.S. COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION REFORM
1 9 9 7
RECOMMENDATIONS
- 150 -
Current
U.S. Immigration System
DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE
Immigration &
Naturalization
Service
Executive Office for
Immigration Review
DEPARTMENT
OF STATE
Consular Affairs
Bureau for Population,
Refugees & Migration
Board of Appellate
Review*
DEPARTMENT
OF LABOR
Employment Standards
Administration
Employment
Training Administration
Board of Alien Labor
Certification Appeals
IMMIGRATION
33
LABOR
STANDARDS
3 3
APPEALS
3
3
3
3
3
AGENCY
FUNCTION IMMIGRATION
ENFORCEMENT
*For a limited set of nationality- and citizenship-related matters.
3
3
The Commission considered a range of ways to reorganize roles and
responsibilities, including proposals to establish a Cabinet-level
Department of Immigration Affairs or an independent agency along
the lines of the Environmental Protection Agency.  We believe a new
department or independent agency is neither practical nor desir-
able, particularly in the context of current interest in streamlining
government operations, not creating sizeable, new entities.
After examining the full range of options, the Commission con-
BENEFITS
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cludes that a clear division of responsibility among existing federal
agencies, with appropriate consolidation of functions, will improve
management of the federal immigration system. As discussed be-
low, the Commission recommends a restructuring of the immigration’s
four principal operations as follows:1
1. Immigration enforcement at the border and in the interior of
the U.S in a new Bureau for Immigration Enforcement at the
Department of Justice;
2. Adjudication of eligibility for immigration-related
applications (immigrant, limited duration admission,
asylum, refugee, and naturalization) in the Department of
State under the jurisdiction of a new Undersecretary for
Citizenship, Immigration, and Refugee Admissions;
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3. Enforcement of immigration-related employment standards
in the Department of Labor; and
4. Appeals of administrative decisions, including exclusion,
deportation, and removal hearings, in an independent agency,
the Agency for Immigration Review.
The Commission believes this streamlining and reconfiguring of
responsibilities will help ensure: coherence and consistency in immi-
gration-related law enforcement; a supportive environment for ad-
judication of applications for immigration, refugee, and citizenship
services; rigorous enforcement of immigration-related labor stan-
dards to protect U.S. workers; and fair and impartial review of
immigration decisions.
Bureau for Immigration
Enforcement (DOJ)
The Commission recommends placing all responsibility for enforcing United
States immigration laws to deter future illegal entry and remove illegal
aliens in a Bureau for Immigration Enforcement in the Department
of Justice.  The Commission believes that the importance and com-
plexity of the enforcement function within the U.S. immigration
system necessitate the establishment of a higher-level, single-focus
agency within the DOJ.  The Commission further recommends that
the newly configured agency have the prominence and visibility
that the Federal Bureau of Investigation [FBI] currently enjoys within
the DOJ structure. The Director of the Bureau for Immigration En-
forcement would be appointed for a set term (e.g., five years).  The
agency would be responsible for planning, implementing, managing
and evaluating all U.S. immigration enforcement activities both within
the United States and overseas.
1 See Appendix for Commissioner Leiden’s concurring statement.
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The new agency’s responsibilities would include many functions
currently performed by the INS: inspections and admissions at air,
land, and sea ports of entry and at pre-inspection facilities overseas;
border management and control between ports of entry; apprehen-
sion and prosecution and removal of illegal residents and workers;
oversight of pre- and post-trial/hearing release; identification and
prosecution of document fraud; identification, deterrence, and pros-
ecution of alien smuggling gangs; and other domestic and overseas
deterrence activities.
The Commission believes that the current U.S. immigration system
structure diffuses and confuses potential for a more concerted focus
on central functions and activities.  Enforcement objectives some-
times conflict with service goals and vice versa.  Often, both compete
for limited operational resources and for the time and attention of
those responsible for planning, administering, and managing these
programs.
The Commission is particularly concerned that although the current
removal system produces more than 100,000 final removal orders
each year, the system does not have the corresponding capability to
remove the individuals subject to those orders.  The Commission
believes that it is critical to the credibility of the removal sector of
the enforcement system that the agency be held accountable for
setting realistic numerical priorities and producing specific outcomes.
Upper-level management must be responsible for effecting an inte-
grated system such that the agency apprehends, detains, and pro-
ceeds against those aliens it prioritizes for removal, and ultimately
removes all those being issued final orders of removal.
To establish such an integrated system, the Commission recommends
that the new enforcement agency have a more traditional law en-
forcement model structure and that it focus on police activities, pre-
and post-trial probation services, and prosecution.  Agency person-
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nel should be upgraded to receive pay and benefits commensurate
with those provided to other Department of Justice law enforcement
agents.  At present INS personnel performing the same functions as
FBI or Drug Enforcement Agency [DEA]  personnel are often at a
lower-pay grade.
The police function would be carried out by uniformed services, such
as Inspectors and Border Patrol Agents, and investigators who would
conduct investigations and collect intelligence at the border and in
the interior to deter smuggling, facilitate removals, and accomplish
other similar goals. The Commission suggests turning over most
detention responsibility to the U.S. Marshals Service and/or the
Bureau of Prisons.
As in other law enforcement operations, particularly those in which
more people are put into proceedings than can either be accommo-
dated in detention or actually removed, there is a need for pre- and
post-trial/hearing screening and/or supervised release on probation or
bond.  In the immigration context, these could be available, for
example, to asylum-seekers who are deemed by an Asylum Officer
to have demonstrated a credible fear of persecution, to those who
have accepted voluntary departure and posted bond, or to those
unlikely (because of close family members or other strong commu-
nity ties) to abscond pending completion of their hearings or sen-
tences.
To ensure a high expectation of individuals actually being removed
from the U.S. within a certain time, the Commission believes that
Trial Attorneys should have greater discretion to set priorities for
apprehension and prosecution and to determine which cases are
pursued for removal proceedings.
The Commission recommends the following distribution of respon-
sibilities within the Bureau for Immigration Enforcement.
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Uniformed enforcement officers.  The Commission recommends
merger of the INS Inspectors, Border Patrol, and detention officers
into one unit, the Immigration Uniformed Service Branch.  Its offic-
ers would be trained for duties at land, sea, and air ports of entry,
between land ports on the border, and in the interior where uni-
formed officers are needed for enforcement.  The unit would be
accountable for both the facilitation of legal traffic at the ports of
entry and the enforcement against illegal entry.  It also would be
responsible for moving detainees from apprehension sites to deten-
tion facilities and to hearing sites, as well as for escort duty during
removals.  After appropriate training, most of the officers perform-
ing these various functions could be transferred interchangeably,
and opportunity for job mobility would exist across lines not now
possible.  As stated above, grade level and pay should be upgraded
as needed to be commensurate with the law enforcement activities
the officers will perform.
Unlike the current practice in which the Border Patrol reports to
Sector Chiefs and Inspectors report to District Directors, all uni-
formed officers within a particular geographic area would be under
the authority of a single, integrated immigration enforcement man-
ager.
Investigators.  The Commission believes investigations will be a key
part of the new agency’s responsibility.  Investigators are the main
agents responsible for identifying and apprehending people who are
illegally residing or working in the United States, for deterring smug-
gling operations, for building a case against those who are not de-
terred, and for identifying, apprehending, and carrying out the re-
moval of aliens with final orders of removal.
Only some 2,900 employees, out of an INS staff of more than 25,000,
work on these many investigative tasks.  A similar number work in
INS Detention and Deportation.  Most of these Deportation Officers
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could—given additional on-the-job training and supervision con-
duct investigations.  Deportation Officers now deal almost exclu-
sively with docket control and management paperwork that could
be done by lower level support staff, freeing the Deportation Offic-
ers for field work.
INS Investigators primarily work the front end of the removals pro-
cess: identifying and arresting those who are illegally residing or
working in the U.S.  Little attention is given to the removal process
as a whole, for ensuring availability of adequate detention space,
allocating ample Trial Attorney and Immigration Judge time, effect-
ing transfer to airports, and achieving physical removal.  The sys-
tem is bogged down with increasing numbers of aliens who are
apprehended, charged with an immigration violation, put into pro-
ceedings, released due to lack of detention space or other prerequi-
sites for effective timely processing, never appear at their hearings,
or are never deported after a final order of removal is issued.  The
failure of careful planning and integration of the process means
many of those who are apprehended are never removed.  According
to some observers, the INS’ compartmentalized program planning,
budgeting, and implementation procedures blunt attempts to inte-
grate these functions more fully into a seamless and effective pro-
cess.
“Removal Officers” in the new Bureau for Immigration Enforce-
ment, who would integrate the functions of Investigators and De-
portation Officers in apprehensions and removals, would enable the
immigration system to deliver better on its commitment to actually
remove those who are issued final orders.  Managers would then
have the flexibility to shift resources among various investigations
activities as needed to produce a smooth-flowing process that en-
sures timely removal.  As dsicussed above, grade and pay should be
commensurate with the often dangerous law enforcement duties
performed by investigators.
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Intelligence.  The Bureau for Immigration Enforcement will require
an Intelligence Division to provide strategic assessments, training
and expertise on fraud, information about smuggling networks, and
tactical support to uniformed officers or investigators.  It would act
as a liaison with other federal law enforcement agencies and share
information and intelligence.  The Intelligence division would be
one of the smallest in the agency with an anticipated staff of about
100 employees.
Assets Forfeiture Unit.  As with the other DOJ enforcement agen-
cies, the Bureau would have an Assets Forfeiture Unit.  Statutory
authority for Assets Forfeiture activities is a useful addition to the
range of strategies and sanctions available to the U.S. law enforce-
ment community.  Augmented authorities in the 1996 immigration
legislation increased both its usefulness and the potential for misuse
or abuse.  In order to be aggressive in using these new authorities
and equally aggressive and proactive in ensuring against misuse/
abuse, DOJ agencies established assets forfeiture units under the
general guidance of the DOJ Assets Forfeiture Unit.  Each agency,
including FBI, DEA, and INS, has its own unit.  These units, usually
highly-placed within the agency, are the focal points for agency-
wide  asset-related policy implementation, field staff training, and
field operations monitoring.  They assist the agency’s field staff in
case development, monitor use of assets forfeiture funds, and over-
see use of these sanctions to guard against abuse.
Pre- and post-trial “Probation” Officers.  “Probation” functions are
not now performed consistently or effectively in the immigration
system, but the Commission believes these functions are essential to
more strategic use of detention space.  District Directors and Immi-
gration Judges determine the release (either on personal recogni-
zance or on bond) of apprehended aliens from detention.  Often,
release relates more to lack of detention space than to the likelihood
that  aliens will appear at  their proceedings or assessment of aliens’
danger to the community.  Some aliens are given the option to
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depart voluntarily, but there is little tracking of whether they actu-
ally leave the country.  As it is unlikely that all potentially deport-
able aliens could or should be detained awaiting removal, the Com-
mission believes more attention should be given to supervised re-
lease programs and to sophisticated methods for tracking the where-
abouts of those not detained.
Pilot programs, such as the Vera Institute Appearance Assistance
Program discussed above, could be expanded into more areas if
successful.  INS requested this three-year project in the New York
area.  It studies reporting requirements and the effectiveness of com-
munity sponsors in supervising the release of aliens who meet cer-
tain criteria regarding community ties, relief from removal, and public
safety.  The program aims to free up valuable detention space for
aliens without legal remedies who are likely to abscond, while keep-
ing those who might receive relief out of detention.
Trial Attorneys/Prosecutors.  INS has nearly 800 staff involved in
immigration-related legal proceedings, such as offering legalopinions
and advice and representing the government’s interests in proceed-
ings before Immigration Judges and on appeal.
The Commission believes that the Trial Attorneys, who, in effect, are
the Government’s immigration prosecutors, should be vested with,
and should utilize, an important tool possessed by their criminal coun-
terparts: prosecutorial discretion.  Under the current system, the
Trial Attorneys do not as a practice use discretion in determining
which cases to pursue.  The INS does not sufficiently prioritize or
target cases; instead it acts as if it had the means to prosecute each
and every case effectively.  Cases go forward, even when an alien
will, or is likely to, prevail on an application for relief or when there
is no realistic belief that the alien will ever be removed from the
country.  Discretion exercised at the beginning of the process and at
every step would target the use of scarce resources better and con-
tribute to a more effective and credible system.  Central office lead-
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ership would be required to set appropriate priorities and provide
guidance to the Trial Attorneys as to the proper use of discretion.
Greater sharing of information between the Trial Attorneys, aliens,
and their counsels would facilitate smoother and more expeditious
movement through the system and fewer Freedom of Information
Act requests.  Greater use of stipulations and pretrial conferences
(with sanctions resulting when attorneys are not prepared), would
narrow the disputed issues needing court resolution and time.
Field Offices.  The new enforcement agency would implement its
programs through a series of field offices structured to address com-
prehensively the immigration enforcement challenges of the particu-
lar locality  As the location of these offices should be driven by
enforcement priorities, they would likely be located in different places
than current district offices.  Regional Offices could be retained for
administrative and managerial oversight of these dispersed and
diverse field offices.  The field office inspections officers at ports of
entry would both facilitate the admission of legal limited duration
admissions and immigrants and the identification of illegal entrants.
Border Patrol stations along the border and at checkpoints along
major interior transportation corridors would facilitate enforcement
activities.  Appropriate field offices also would investigate and pros-
ecute cases and contribute to detection and destruction of smug-
gling rings.
Current INS Regional Offices could be retained for administrative
and managerial oversight of these dispersed and diverse field of-
fices.  Most existing district offices and suboffices could be incorpo-
rated into the new agency; they also could supervise and administer
the Border Patrol.  [Until the mid-1950s, Border Patrol units worked
out of and reported to INS District Offices.]  The INS overseas
enforcement presence could be retained and expanded by the new
enforcement agency.
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The Commission
recommends that
all citizenship
and immigration
benefits
adjudications
be consolidated
in the Department
of State, and that
an Undersecretary
for Citizenship,
Immigration, and
Refugee Admissions
be created
to manage
these activities.
Citizenship, Immigration, and
Refugee Admissions (DOS)
The Commission recommends that all citizenship and immigration benefits
adjudications be consolidated in the Department of State, and that an
Undersecretary for Citizenship, Immigration, and Refugee Admissions be
created to manage these activities.  At present, three separate agen-
cies—the INS, the Department of State, and the Department of
Labor—play broad roles adjudicating applications for  legal immi-
gration, limited duration admission, refugee admission, asylum, and/
or citizenship.  In addition, the Department of Health and Human
Services plays an ancillary role in setting requirements regarding
health standards for new arrivals, and the United States Information
Agency has a major role in exchange visitor programs.
The Commission believes a more streamlined and accountable ad-
judication process, involving fewer agencies but greater safeguards,
would result in faster and better determinations of these benefits.
Consolidation of responsibility in one department would permit a
reengineering of the adjudication process to make it more efficient
and timely.
In considering which department should be responsible for adjudi-
cating citizenship and immigration benefits, the Commission con-
sidered each agency’s current role and overall mission.  Immigra-
tion has been a stepchild in each of the major departments with
current responsibilities.  The Department of State’s primary role is
the conduct of foreign relations, and immigration issues have been
subsumed within its consular functions of protection and welfare of
American citizens abroad.  The Department of Justice tends to view
immigration as an enforcement matter, and it is not well suited to
oversee an agency that also adjudicates applications for benefits.
The Department of Labor is concerned primarily with the labor
market impact of immigration.  The Department of Health and
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Human Services plays an important role in setting and implement-
ing domestic refugee policy, but it has a very narrow, largely health-
related involvement in overall immigration policy.
Recognizing the drawbacks inherent in choosing any of these loca-
tions, the Commission nevertheless concluded that the Department
of State has the greatest capacity to undertake the additional work
entailed in a consolidated system.
Taking responsibility for immigration and citizenship services out of
the Department of Justice sends the right message, that legal immi-
gration and naturalization are not principally law enforcement prob-
lems; they are opportunities for the nation as long as the services are
properly regulated. Further, the Department of Justice does not have
the capacity internationally to take on the many duties of the De-
partment of State.  The Department of State, however, already has
a domestic presence and an adjudicatory capability.  It issues one-
half million immigrant visas and six million nonimmigrant visas
each year.  DOS also provides a full range of citizenship services
both domestically (issuance of almost six million passports annu-
ally) and abroad (e.g., citizenship determinations and registration of
births of U.S. citizens overseas).  Indeed, DOS has devoted a major
share of its personnel and its capital and operating resources to
these adjudicatory functions at embassies and consulates in more
than two hundred countries and in passport offices in fifteen U.S.
cities.  In addition, the National Visa Center in New Hampshire
processes and forwards to overseas posts three-quarters of a million
immigrant cases.
Consolidating responsibility requires some changes in the way the
Department of State administers its immigration responsibilities,
which we believe would strengthen the adjudication function.  This
increase in domestic responsibilities may raise concern over possible
decrease in attention and focus on the Department of State’s tradi-
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tional mandate in foreign affairs, as well as more practical caution
regarding the well-known difficulties in managing the domestic
aspects of immigration.   Some observers also may be concerned
that DOS might not give sufficient consideration to the domestic
impact of immigration.  To counter this perception (and some un-
derlying reality), the Department of State would need to develop
mechanisms for consultation with domestic groups representing a
broad range of views and interests regarding immigration.
The Department of State also will need to change its historic posi-
tion on review of consular decisions.  At present, decisions made at
INS and the Department of Labor on many immigrant and LDA
applications may be appealed, but no appeal is available on consu-
lar decisions.  The Commission believes that immigrant and certain
limited duration admission visas with a U.S. petitioner should be
subject to independent administrative review [see below].  The De-
partment of State also would have to prepare its own bureaucracy
to take on these new functions.  A need for a renewed emphasis on
training for the management of large and interrelated offices and
processes will be matched by the need for superior personnel man-
agement and leadership.  These highly-regarded management skills
would be an ideal attraction for those Foreign Service officers who
shy away from consular assignments abroad, perceiving them as
unwanted digressions from the classic diplomatic career path.
The new organization would be responsible for naturalization and
determination of citizenship, adjudication of all immigrant and lim-
ited duration admission petitions, work authorizations and other
related permits, and adjustments of status.  It also would have re-
sponsibility for refugee status determinations abroad and asylum
claims at home.  Overseas citizenship services would continue to be
provided by consular officers abroad and in Washington.  Policy
and program development for all immigration activities would be
incorporated into the new organization, which also would have
U.S. COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION REFORM
1 9 9 7
RECOMMENDATIONS
- 164 -
enhanced capacity to detect, deter, and combat fraud and abuse
among those applying for benefits.
With consolidation, the Department of State would have sole re-
sponsibility for processing immigrants—from the filing of the peti-
tion in the United States and subsequent visa issuance abroad, to
the production of the green card and  work authorization in the
U.S., and ultimately, to naturalization.  Issuance of a passport to the
newly-naturalized citizen would complete this almost seamless pro-
cess of immigration benefits adjudications.  Consolidation of these
steps would permit greater operational flexibility (e.g., one-stop ad-
judication of petitions and forwarding to posts abroad, streamlined
processing for work-related visas), greater flexibility in use of per-
sonnel (e.g., the examination function could span visa petitions and
passports), and, as discussed below, greatly enhanced antifraud
capabilities.
The consolidation of these functions in DOS would, of course, be a
major undertaking for a relatively small department already charged
with absorbing the United States Information Agency and the Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency.  The Department of State must
be given the resources to fulfill such new responsibilities.  The ap-
proximately five thousand INS and Department of Labor staff cur-
rently involved in immigration applications adjudications would
likely be transferred to DOS.  Many employees would remain in or
near their present locations and their functions would not apprecia-
bly change.
This recommendation envisions creation of an Undersecretary who
would have direct access to the Secretary of State and who would
be responsible for domestic and overseas immigration, citizenship,
and refugee functions.
Within the Office of the Undersecretary would be a unit responsible
both for formulating and assessing immigration policy as well as
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reviewing and commenting on the immigration-related effects of
foreign policy decisions.  This policy capacity would be new for the
Department of State, but it is in keeping with the important role that
migration now plays in international relations.
The Undersecretary would have three principal operating bureaus:
A Bureau of Immigration Affairs [IA] would focus on the immigra-
tion process, as noted above, as well as on LDA processing.  IA’s
expanded responsibilities would be based on those currently as-
signed to the Visa Office and the National Visa Center.  In addition
to its existing overseas work, the Bureau of Immigration Affairs
would be responsible for domestic adjudication/examination func-
tions, including work authorization, adjustment of status, domestic
interviewing, and the issuance of appropriate documentation (e.g.,
green cards).  The Bureau of Immigration Affairs also would staff
immigration information and adjudication offices in areas with im-
migrant concentrations.  Related INS legal and regulatory staffs in
Washington also would transfer to the IA Bureau, as would DOL
functions regarding employment-based entry.  In short, the IA Bu-
reau would assess—in the U.S. and abroad—applications for all
immigration-related benefits now performed by INS, DOL, DOS,
and USIA.
Importantly, the employment verification system outlined in previ-
ous Commission recommendations also would be under the Depart-
ment of State’s control, although it would likely contract out the
actual operation of that system.  Another important part of its do-
mestic presence would be the staffing of immigration information
offices in areas of major immigrant concentrations.
A Bureau of Refugee Admissions and Asylum Affairs would as-
sure an appropriate level of independence from routine immigration
issues and processes.  It would combine the present Bureau for
Population, Refugees and Migration [PRM] responsibilities for over-
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seas refugee admissions, the refugee and asylum offices of the INS,
and the DOS asylum office in the Bureau of Democracy, Human
Rights and Labor.2 This would integrate the key governmental play-
ers in one of our most important and historic international activities.
In this vein, the direct line of authority to the Secretary of State
through the new Undersecretary underlines the key policy advan-
tage for global refugee issues.
A Bureau of Citizenship and Passport Affairs would be respon-
sible for naturalization, other determinations of citizenship, and is-
suance of passports.  Local offices performing some citizenship func-
tions, such as overseas travel information, passport and naturaliza-
tion applications, testing and interviews, could be located at the
new or expanded immigration offices noted below.
Overseas citizen services would continue to be handled within the
new consolidated organization, utilizing the DOS substantial do-
mestic and overseas staff.  These services include: responding to
inquiries as to the welfare or whereabouts of U.S. citizens; assisting
when U.S. citizens die, are arrested, or experience other emergen-
cies abroad; providing notarial services; and making citizenship
determinations and issuing passports abroad.  In some countries
experiencing instability, an increasingly important activity is orga-
nizing Americans living or working in those areas into networks for
efficient communication of information and warnings.
Quality Assurance Offices would oversee records management,
monitoring procedures, fraud investigations, and internal review.
At present, monitoring of the quality of decisions made on applica-
2 The Commission makes no recommendation regarding the management
or organization of the overseas refugee and humanitarian assistance
programs operated by PRM and the USAID Bureau for Humanitarian
Response.  These functions could remain within the Undersecretary for
Global Affairs or be brought under the new Undersecretary for
Citizenship, Immigration, and Refugee Admissions.
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tions for immigration and citizenship benefits receives insufficient
attention.  INS enforcement officials now have the responsibility to
investigate allegations of fraud in immigration and naturalization
benefits programs, but monitoring the adjudications process is a
low priority in an office that is also responsible for identifying and
removing criminal aliens, breaking up smuggling and counterfeiting
rings, and performing similar police work.  A staff responsible for
and dedicated to ensuring the quality of decisions taken on appli-
cations for immigration and citizenship should address some of the
weaknesses, such as those recently identified in the naturalization
process.
Some adjudication decisions now are reviewed by a separate ad-
ministrative unit within the agency conferring benefits; others are
not.  The Commission believes that quality decisions require some
form of supervisory review for applicants who believe their cases
have been wrongly decided.  This type of review helps an agency
monitor consistency and identify problems in adjudication and of-
fers a means of correcting errors.  At present, DOS has procedures
for some internal supervisory review of consular decisions, but it
has had no need for procedures to review refusals of applications at
earlier stages of adjudication.  With expanded responsibilities, DOS
will need to develop a comprehensive internal review process that
ensures that errors are corrected with minimal disruption to the
applicant and the agency.
Quality assurance requires good records.  The accrued personal
records of each immigrant must be accurate, up-to-date, and retriev-
able at each adjudicative stage: (1) petition/immigrant visa; (2) alien
resident/green card; (3) naturalization; and (4) passport. The cre-
ation and maintenance of the alien filing system (“A” files) should
be reviewed to assure its maximum utility in the adjudicative flow
noted above.  The absolute need for good immigration records can-
not be overstated.
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Standardized and flexible records management and the consolida-
tion of domestic and overseas adjudication functions will greatly
enhance antifraud capabilities.  At present, fraud often is not discov-
ered until after a government agency has given the case one or more
approvals and the alien appears for his or her visa.  The resources
are not now in place for adequate review of questionable petitions,
and communications between overseas posts and domestic agencies
are not adequate.  Even when they receive information from over-
seas posts about likely fraud, the domestic agencies generally do not
follow up with further investigation.  Consolidation within the
Department of State would overcome poor coordination and com-
munication and permit more antifraud efforts at the beginning of
the process, where they are most effective.  A fraudulent entry pre-
vented, a work permit not issued to an unauthorized person, or an
ineligible alien prevented from naturalization—these are far more
preferable to trying to rescind a benefit granted in error.
With respect to the domestic field structure for implementing these
programs, The Regional Service Centers and National Visa Center
would continue to be the location of most adjudication.  The physi-
cal plants are excellent and the locally-hired staffs are trained and
in place.  At this time, information is passed from the RSCs to the
NVC when the applicant for admission is overseas.  Eventually,
however, the functions of the Service Centers and the Visa Center
might be consolidated.  Overseas interviews would continue to take
place at embassies and consulates.
A range of other interviews would take place domestically.  The
Department of State already operates fifteen passport offices through-
out the United States, many in areas of high immigrant settlement.
These offices, however, are not set up for high volume interviewing.
New offices, designed specifically with immigrant services in mind,
would be needed.  Ideally, to avoid long lines and waits for service,
there would be smaller offices in more locations than the current
INS district offices.  The Commission recommends against locating
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these offices with the enforcement offices discussed above.  Asking
individuals requesting benefits or information to go to an enforce-
ment agency sends the wrong message about the U.S. view of legal
immigration.
Immigration-Related
Employment Standards (DOL)
The Commission recommends that all responsibility for enforcement
of immigration-related standards for employers be consolidated in
the Department of Labor.  These activities include enforcing compli-
ance with requirements to verify work authorization and attesta-
tions made regarding conditions for legal hire of temporary and
permanent foreign workers.  The Commission believes that as this
is an issue of labor standards, the Department of Labor is the best
equipped federal agency to regulate and investigate employer compli-
ance with standards intended to protect U.S. workers.  The hiring of
unauthorized workers and the failure of employers to comply with
the commitments they make (e.g., to pay prevailing wages, to have
recruited U.S. workers) in obtaining legal permission to hire tempo-
rary and permanent foreign workers are violations of such labor
standards.  Responsibility for enforcing compliance with these re-
quirements currently lies within both INS and DOL.  Under consoli-
dation, the DOL Employment Standards Administration’s [ESA],
Wage and Hour Division [WH] and Office of Federal Contract  Com-
pliance Programs [OFCCP] would perform these functions in con-
junction with their other worksite labor standards activities.
These increased immigration-related responsibilities would require
increased DOL staff and resources.  In addition to performing all
worksite inspections, DOL would assume new employer sanctions
responsibilities.  Specifically, the Commission makes the following
recommendations regarding the DOL role in regulating the worksite
to ensure the protection of U.S. workers.
The Commission
recommends
that all
responsibility for
enforcement of
immigration-related
standards
for employers
be consolidated
in the Department
of Labor.
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Sanctions against employers who fail to verify work authoriza-
tion.  Among its provisions that address the problem of unautho-
rized immigration, the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986
made it unlawful for an employer knowingly to hire any alien not
authorized to work in the U.S.  IRCA requires all employers to
check the identity and work eligibility documents of all workers
hired.  Upon hiring, employees must sign an I-9 Form certifying
eligibility to work and that the documents they present to the em-
ployer are genuine.  The employer then signs the form, indicates
which documents were presented, and attests that they appear to be
genuine and to relate to the individual who was hired.  IRCA estab-
lished penalties both for employers failing to comply with this pro-
cess and for employers knowingly hiring unauthorized aliens.  Pilot
testing of a more rigorous verification process recommended in the
Commission’s 1994 report and adopted in large part in the immi-
grant legislation passed in 1996 addresses verification problems aris-
ing from the widespread use of fraudulent documents by illegal
aliens.
The Commission believes all worksite investigations to ascertain
employers’ compliance with employment eligibility verification re-
quirements should be conducted by the Department of Labor.  Al-
though DOL already conducts many of these investigations, under
this recommendation, DOL also would assess penalties if employers
fail to verify the employment eligibility of persons being hired.  DOL
would not be required to prove that an employer knowingly hired
an illegal worker, just that the employer hired a worker without
verification of his or her authorization to work. With implementa-
tion of the Commission’s proposal for a more effective verification
process, this function will be critical to deterring the employment of
unauthorized workers.
At present, INS has the principal responsibility for employers sanc-
tions enforcement, including: investigations and prosecution of
“knowing hires” of illegal aliens and paperwork violations; worksite
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raids that apprehend and remove illegal aliens; and development
and maintenance of employee eligibility verification programs de-
signed to help employers determine which individuals are autho-
rized to work in the United States.  DOL also reviews employer
compliance with the employer sanctions verification processes in
the course of its on-site visits to workplaces and as part of regular
labor standards enforcement activities.  DOL Wage and Hour and
OFCCP personnel inspect the I-9 Forms on file and notify INS of the
results of such inspections.  DOL also is authorized to issue warning
notices to employers when deficiencies are found in an employer’s
verification process.  In practice, however, DOL has rarely issued
such  warnings.
Although INS and DOL jointly enforce the employer sanctions pro-
visions, INS has the primary responsibility, including assessing civil
penalties and initiating legal action.  A Memorandum of Under-
standing between DOL and INS retains for INS the responsibility for
promulgating employer sanctions program policy.
Consolidating verification enforcement at DOL gives responsibility
to an agency with extensive experience regulating business compli-
ance with labor standards, an expertise largely lacking at INS.  It
also permits a relatively high level of enforcement activity, as DOL
completes far more employer visits than INS.  The number of em-
ployer sanctions cases completed by INS has decreased sharply from
14,311 in 1990 to 5,211 in FY 1996, of which 90 percent were cases
in which the agency had some reason to believe a violation oc-
curred.3  Over the past several years, the number of Wage and Hour
on-site investigations also has decreased substantially but is still
well above the INS level.  The DOL reduction results largely from
3 The lowered activity, nevertheless, represents more targeted and effective
enforcement.  The number of arrests during this same period increased
more than 50 percent.  In 1,024 cases the employers were fined; warnings
were issued in 669 cases; $4,853,288 was collected in fines; and 13,848
undocumented workers were arrested.
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a greatly expanded use of expedited investigations in the form of
employer self-audits and conciliations in place of on-site investiga-
tions.  For example, Wage and Hour conducted  more than 42,000
on-site investigations and corresponding I-9 inspections in FY 1990,
but less than 23,000 in FY 1996.  OFCCP conducts some 4,000 on-site
inspections each year.  In FY 1996, approximately 70 percent of
Wage and Hour investigations were complaint-driven; the remain-
ing 30 percent were directed or targeted.  Wage and Hour devotes
the equivalent of twenty-one full-time employees to I-9 inspections,
OFCCP the equivalent of eight.
The Commission recognizes DOL concern that from the begining its
assumption of an employer sanctions enforcement role created a
potential conflict with its broader mission of protecting the wages
and working conditions of workers.  Its inspectors worry that work-
ers’ fears that such employer sanction actions might result in INS
apprehension and deportation could have a “chilling effect” on those
workers who might—and should—come forward to report work-
place abuses.  For this reason, DOL has been extremely wary of
crossing the hard-to-distinguish line where sanctions-related activi-
ties might effectively frustrate its ability to protect deserving work-
ers.
The Commission believes that DOL participation in verifying that
only authorized workers are hired should be seen as integral to its
mission of protecting U.S. workers.  DOL has an essential interest in
reducing illegal migration as those employers who hire illegal aliens
are more likely to violate the minimum labor standards that DOL is
charged with enforcing.  A reduction in levels of illegal migration
could well be the most effective tool available to enhance protec-
tions for legally authorized workers.  The primary responsibility of
DOL is protecting American workers, and transfer of employer sanc-
tions enforcement to DOL represents the best option for raising the
level of enforcement to a point that presents a real deterrent to the
employment of undocumented workers.
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Enforcement of skill-based immigrant and limited duration admis-
sions requirements.  In our 1995 report to Congress, the Commis-
sion urged adoption of streamlined procedures for the admission of
skilled foreign workers whom U.S. businesses wish to hire.  We
continue to believe that an expedited process is needed for the
admission of both temporary and permanent foreign workers, as
discussed earlier in this report, as long as adequate safeguards are
in place to protect the wages and working conditions of U.S. work-
ers.  To prevent abuse of an expedited system, an effective
postadmissions enforcement scheme is necessary.
Upon adoption of an expedited process for the admission of both
immigrant and temporary workers, DOL should be given responsi-
bility and resources for enhanced monitoring of employers’ fulfill-
ment of the attestation terms they filed to bring in workers.  As
discussed above, decisions on who will be admitted under the vari-
ous skill-based admission categories would be made by the Depart-
ment of State.
DOL’s other worksite enforcement responsibilities place it in the
best position to monitor employers’ compliance with the attesta-
tions submitted in the admissions process.  DOL investigators are
experienced in examining employment records and interviewing em-
ployees.  Penalties should be established for violations of the condi-
tions to which the employer has attested, including payment of the
appropriate wages and benefits, terms and conditions of employ-
ment, or any misrepresentation or material omissions in the attesta-
tion.  Such penalties should include both the assessment of admin-
istrative fines as well as barring egregious or repeat violators from
petitioning for the admission of permanent or temporary workers.
When DOL has concluded that an employer is an egregious or re-
peat violator, and any subsequent administrative appeal has been
decided, it would notify the DOS Bureau of Immigration Affairs of
such findings, with a recommendation about barring the employer
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from petitioning for the admission of foreign workers for temporary
or permanent employment.  The Bureau of Immigration Affairs would
then determine if such a debarment is to be made and would notify
the employer of its decision.  The employer would have the option
of appealing such a decision.
Agency for Immigration Review
The Commission recommends that administrative review of all immigra-
tion-related decisions be consolidated and be considered by a newly-created
independent agency, the Agency for Immigration Review, within the Ex-
ecutive Branch.
The Commission believes that a system of formal administrative
review of immigration-related decisions—following internal super-
visory review within the initial adjudicating agency—is indispens-
able to the integrity and operation of the immigration system.  Such
review guards against incorrect and arbitrary decisions and pro-
motes fairness, accountability, legal integrity, uniform legal interpre-
tations, and consistency in the application of  the law in individual
cases and across the system as a whole.
Experience teaches that the review function works best when it is
well insulated from the initial adjudicatory function and when it is
conducted by decisionmakers entrusted with the highest degree of
independence.  Not only is independence in decisionmaking the
hallmark of meaningful and effective review, it is also critical to the
reality and the perception of fair and impartial review.
To the extent that administrative review of immigration-related
decisions is authorized under current law, such review is conducted
by several Boards and units located in the Departments of Justice,
Labor, and State.  For example, within the Department of Justice,
the Executive Office for Immigration Review, a separate agency es-
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tablished by regulation in 1983, oversees the system of immigration
courts, as well as the Board of Immigration Appeals [BIA].  The
BIA, a fifteen-member panel appointed by  the Attorney General,
has nationwide jurisdiction over a wide range of cases, including
decisions of Immigration Judges in exclusion, deportation, and re-
moval proceedings, and requests for relief made in those proceed-
ings.  In addition, the BIA adjudicates appeals in several other cat-
egories of cases, such as bond determinations, fines, rescission of
adjustment of status, and certain family-based visa petitions.
Supplementing their normal hearing docket, Immigration Judges
now conduct the final review of the “credible fear” of persecution
determinations made in the admission/inspection process, as well
as determinations that an alien seeking admission is not currently a
lawful permanent resident, refugee, or asylee as he or she claims.
The Office of the Chief Administrative Hearing Officer [OCAHO]
also is housed in EOIR and is responsible for administering the
hearing process issues arising under the employer sanctions, anti-
discrimination, and document fraud provisions of the Immigration
and Nationality Act.
Within the Immigration and Naturalization Service there is an Ad-
ministrative Appeals Office [AAO], whose component parts include
the Administrative Appeals Unit [AAU] and the Legalization Ap-
peals Unit [LAU].  Unlike the BIA, the AAO does not have a
decisionmaking board.  Rather, the Chief of the Unit reviews and
signs off on decisions prepared by individual examiners.  AAO has
appellate jurisdiction over petitions and applications in no fewer
than thirty-nine subject areas, among which are decisions relating to
the breaching of bonds, employment-based visa petitions, adjust-
ment of status for Indochinese refugees, petitions for Amerasian
children,  fiancé(e)s, orphans, temporary workers, permission to
reapply for admission after deportation or exclusion, reentry permit
waivers for certain grounds of excludability, certification of schools
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for acceptance of foreign students, applications for refugee travel
documents, claims to acquisition of citizenship abroad, applications
to preserve residence abroad for naturalization purposes, various
applications for certain certificates of naturalization, and applica-
tions for temporary or permanent resident status under the regular
legalization, Special Agricultural Worker or Replenishment Agricul-
tural Worker programs, and corresponding waivers of inadmissibil-
ity.
Appeals of denials of naturalization applications, however, are not
considered by the AAO.  Instead, review of such decisions occurs at
the INS district office level and is conducted by an officer of equal
or higher grade as the initial adjudicator.  (If the initial decision
denying the naturalization application is sustained, the alien may
challenge the decision in federal district court, the court having
jurisdiction over the ultimate swearing-in of successful naturaliza-
tion applicants.)
In the Office of the Legal Adviser in the Department of State, there
is a Board of Appellate Review [BAR] vested with jurisdiction to
hear, in part, appeals of determinations of loss of nationality or
expatriation, and denials, revocations, restrictions, or invalidations
of passports.
In the Department of Labor, the Board of Alien Labor Certification
Appeals [BALCA], created by regulation in 1987, hears appeals of
denials of applications for labor certification.
When considering the appellate review function in its totality, it
becomes apparent that responsibility for reviewing enforcement-re-
lated decisions rests primarily with the individual components of
EOIR, while responsibility for reviewing benefit adjudication deci-
sions is spread across several offices and agencies including the BIA,
AAO, INS district offices, BALCA, and, for a more limited set of
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nationality- and citizenship-related issues, the BAR at DOS.  Fur-
ther, Immigration Judges and the BIA have the authority to provide
certain forms of relief during deportation, exclusion, and removal
hearings that can result in lawful permanent resident status for aliens.
Inasmuch as the underlying benefits and enforcement functions per-
formed by the immigration system are themselves dispersed among
several Departments, it is not surprising to find that formal admin-
istrative review of decisions made in the context of performing  those
functions is likewise dispersed.  However, in light of our recommen-
dations that responsibility for the enforcement of the immigration
laws be placed with a new Bureau for Immigration Enforcement in
the Department of Justice and that all citizenship and immigration
benefits adjudications be removed from the Department of Justice
and instead be consolidated in the Department of State, we find that
a corresponding change in the placement of responsibility for the
review function is in order.
Even with the assignment of the benefits adjudication function to
DOS and the enforcement function to DOJ, interrelationships will
exist between eligibility for benefits and enforcement actions.  In-
deed, eligibility for an immigration benefit may be an avenue to
relief from deportation, exclusion, or removal while certain immi-
gration violations may present barriers to attaining legal status.  For
example, favorable disposition of a petition or application by the
benefits agency may collaterally resolve a deportation or removal
issue.  Aliens in enforcement proceedings may be eligible for certain
forms of relief involving the same types of legal questions arising in
the context of benefits adjudication outside of proceedings—or aliens
in proceedings may be foreclosed from eligibility for a benefit ap-
plied for outside of proceedings.  Ultimately, however, there is a
need for a uniform administrative interpretation of what the law is
and how it should be applied, regardless of whether the questions
arise when adjudicating an application for a benefit or resolving an
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enforcement action.  These considerations lead us to conclude that
administrative review of all presently reviewable immigration-re-
lated decisions should be consolidated.
In deciding where the review function could best be performed, the
Commission considered a number of options, including separate
reviewing bodies for enforcement actions within DOJ and forbenefit
determinations within DOS, placing responsibility for review en-
tirely with EOIR, and creation of an Article I Immigration Court.
Placing the review function in its entirety with EOIR was an attrac-
tive option, particularly given EOIR’s success in both insulating the
review function and achieving independence of decisionmaking since
its inception in 1983.  At the same time, EOIR remains located in the
Department of Justice, ultimately and predominantly a law enforce-
ment agency.   Further, existing procedures permit the Attorney
General to reverse or modify any decision reached by the BIA.  The
Commission, as well as other commentators, find this practice trou-
bling because, at a minimum, it compromises the appearance of
independent decisionmaking, injects into a quasi-judicial appellate
process the possibility of  intervention by the highest ranking law
enforcement official in the land, and, generally, can undermine the
BIA’s autonomy and stature.  In the end, the Commission decided
the EOIR option was unworkable because of the inherent difficulty
of a reviewing agency in one Department rendering decisions in
cases initially decided by another Department.
Instead, the Commission was persuaded by the arguments that the
review function should be completely independent of the underly-
ing enforcement and benefits adjudication functions and that the
reviewing officials should not be beholden to the head of any De-
partment.  Although the desired independence could be attained by
establishing an Article I Immigration Court, such a court would be
part of the Judicial, rather than the Executive Branch.  The overall
operation of the immigration system requires flexibility and coordi-
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nation of function, including the review function, by the various
agencies in the Executive Branch.  Given this reality, the Commis-
sion concluded that the review function should be conducted by a
newly-created independent reviewing agency in the Executive Branch.
To ensure that the new reviewing agency is independent and will
exist permanently across Administrations, we believe it should be
statutorily created.  It would incorporate the activities now per-
formed by several existing review bodies and offices, including the
DOJ Executive Office for Immigration Review, the INS Administra-
tive Appeals Office and district offices (naturalization), the DOL
Board of Alien Labor Certification Appeals, and the limited set of
nationality and citizenship-related matters presently considered by
the DOS Board of Appellate Review.  The Agency for Immigration
Review also would have additional responsibilities.
Creating any decisional system or tribunal requires attention to sev-
eral guiding principles.  First, no system can work effectively if the
personnel who form the base of the decisional pyramid are insuffi-
cient in number or deficient in skills and integrity to do the job.
Second, the base of any such structure cannot be expanded either in
number of its personnel or in extent of its jurisdiction beyond the
capacity of the next level above to review and decide the outcome.
This must be achieved within a reasonable period and with a rea-
sonable expenditure of resources.  Finally, the apex of any decisional
pyramid should be relatively small.  With these considerations in
mind, the Commission proposes the following organization for the
new independent Agency for Immigration Review.
This new reviewing agency would be headed by a Director, a presi-
dential appointee, who would coordinate the overall work of the
agency, but who would have no say in the substantive decisions
reached on cases considered by any division or component within
the agency.  There would be a trial division headed by a Chief
Immigration Judge, appointed by the Director.  The Chief Judge
would oversee a corps of Immigration Judges sitting in immigration
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courts located around the country.4  The Immigration Judges would
hear every type of case presently falling within the jurisdiction of
the now sitting Immigration Judges.
The new reviewing agency also would consider appeals of decisions
by the benefits adjudication agency, using staff with legal training.
Although the benefits adjudication agency will handle a wide range
of applications—from tourist visas to naturalization and the issu-
ance of passports—not all determinations will be appealable, as is
the case under current law.  We envision that those matters that are
appealable under current law would remain appealable.  The only
difference is that the appeal would be lodged with and considered
by the new independent Agency for Immigration Review rather
than by the various reviewing offices and Boards presently located
among the several Departments.
The administrative appeals division also would consider appeals
from certain visa denials and visa revocations by consular officers.
Under current law, such decisions are not subject to formal admin-
istrative or judicial review.
When a visa is denied, important interests are at stake.  To be sure,
the visa applicant is adversely affected—but more importantly at
stake are the interests of the United States citizens, lawful perma-
nent residents, employers, and businesses who have petitioned the
admission of the applicant or who otherwise have an interest in
having the applicant present in the United States.  Given the lack of
formal administrative and judicial review of consular decisions, these
individuals are left with little or no recourse.
4 Admittedly, currently sitting Immigration Judges perform the classic
review function only to a very limited degree—for the most part they
serve as initial decisionmakers in cases where aliens are placed in
proceedings.  Notwithstanding this circumstance, however, experience
teaches that Immigration Judges should find their home in the same
agency as the appellate reviewing Board, not the enforcement agency
that is initiating the proceedings against the alien.
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The Commission believes that consular decisions denying or revok-
ing visas in specified visa categories, including, all immigrant visas
and those LDA categories where there is a petitioner in the United
States who is seeking the admission of the visa applicant, should be
subject to formal administrative review.  The visa applicant would
have no right to appeal an adverse determination.  Instead, standing
to appeal a visa denial or revocation would lie only with United
States petitioners, whether U.S. citizens, lawful permanent residents,
or employers.
An appellate Board would sit over the trial and administrative
appeals divisions of the new independent Agency for Immigration
Review.  This appellate Board would be the highest administrative
tribunal in the land on questions and interpretations of immigration
law.  It would designate selected decisions as precedents for publi-
cation and distribution to the public at large.  Its decisions would
be binding on all officers of the Executive Branch.  To ensure the
greatest degree of  independence, decisions by the Board would be
subject to reversal or modification only as a result of judicial review
by the federal courts or through congressional action.  Neither the
Director of the reviewing agency nor any other agency or Depart-
ment head could alter, modify, or reverse a decision by the appellate
Board.
The appellate Board would be headed a Chairman.  Both the Chair
and Vice Chair would be appointed by the President for staggered
terms of at least ten years.  The appellate Board would have as
many Members, who would be appointed by the Chair, as needed
to decide appeals in a timely manner.  It would consider appeals
from the categories of cases presently falling within the BIA’s juris-
diction, subject to the above-noted  modifications.  In addition, the
appellate Board could entertain appeals from decisions of the ad-
ministrative appeals division in cases in which a novel or significant
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legal issue were presented, or in any other case in which it was
deemed necessary or appropriate.
The Office of the Chief Administrative Hearing Officer, presently
housed in EOIR, would operate as a separate component in the
Agency for Immigration Review and would perform the same work
as is presently being conducted. Of course, the precise organiza-
tional arrangements and divisional jurisdictions could be subject to
future modification following a comprehensive review by the Agency
for Immigration Review of the types and volume of cases received.
However, to meet the challenges presented by consolidation of all
immigration-related appeals in one place, and to perform its critical
mission of correctly and expeditiously resolving appeals, the new
reviewing agency must be given sufficient resources and staffing.
MANAGEMENT REFORM
The Commission urges the federal government to make needed re-
forms to improve management of the immigration system.  While
the Commission-recommended structural changes will help improve
implementation of U.S. policy, certain management reforms must
also be adopted if the agencies responsible for immigration matters
are to be effective in performing their functions.  Structural reforms
will not by themselves solve some of the management problems that
have persisted across Administrations in the immigration agencies.
More specifically, the Commission recommends:
 n Setting more manageable and fully-funded priorities.  The
Commission urges Congress and the Executive Branch to
establish and then appropriately fund a more manageable
set of immigration-related priorities.  By this we mean es-
tablishing fewer objectives, but also setting more integrated
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priorities, more realistically-achievable short-term and long-
term goals, and greater numerical specificity on expected
annual outcomes to which agencies should be held account-
able.
The processes by which both Congress and the Executive
Branch plan and allocate resources constrain the develop-
ment of a more manageable set of priorities.  Currently,
most immigration priorities result from Legislative/Execu-
tive interaction through a multiyear budget process.  Gov-
ernment budgeting cycles are lengthy and complex. Agen-
cies must work simultaneously with the budgets and report-
ing cycles of four fiscal years.5  Congressional action, mean-
while, consists of the doubly bifurcated processes of autho-
rization, followed by separate appropriations in the House
of Representatives and the Senate, and then by resolution in
conference.
Executive Branch departments seldom identify adequately
how much money they need to accomplish the entirety of a
specified goal.  Nor do they do a good job of scaling back
or increasing objectives depending on the resources appro-
priated.  Within the Legislative Branch, there is little coor-
dination among congressional committees to ensure a con-
gruence of agreed-upon priority expectations and resources
actually allocated to do the job.  Consequently, transparency
and accountability are not built into the system.  For ex-
ample, Congress is not held accountable for adding new
priorities without appropriating resources to accomplish all
of the specified tasks.  Federal agencies are neither directly
nor easily held accountable for their performance in achiev-
ing or not achieving agreed-upon results.
The Commission urges Congress and the Executive Branch
to refrain from overpromising what the federal government
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can accomplish in implementing immigration policy.  For
example, rather than defining the removal of all deportable
and inadmissible aliens as the priority for removal, a goal
that is presently not achievable, the federal government could
define removal priorities in terms of specified numbers  and
categories of aliens (e.g., criminal aliens) and in terms of
certain strategies.   For example, a “last in, first out” strat-
egy would remove everyone who newly enters the removal
system before removing persons whose cases have been
pending in backlogs for some time.  This priority-setting
process worked well in reforming the asylum process and
could be replicated in other areas.
Priority setting must be accompanied by sufficient resources
to undertake the top objectives.  In the case of removals, it
should include resources for Investigations, Trial Attorneys,
Immigration Judges, the BIA Detention and Deportation Of-
ficers, Department of State liaisons with host countries, and
such needs as vehicles, equipment, training, and support.
The priority should identify the problem completely and
clearly and map out which part of that problem will be
solved in which of several years of the priority.  And then
Congress should agree and the Executive Branch should be
held accountable.
n Developing more fully the capacity for policy develop-
ment, planning, monitoring, and evaluation.  In general,
5 For example, for the second quarter [January-March] of FY 1997, federal
agencies were:
n For FY 1996, completing ’96 year-end statistics and reports;
n For FY 1997, continuing work on implementing ’97 goals and priorities;
n For FY 1998, finalizing the President’s February FY 1998 Budget
Submission to the Congress and explaining/defending it at
congressional committee hearings;
n For FY 1999, developing the ’99 budget initiatives, priorities, and
strategies to be submitted to OMB under the “Spring Plan” planning
process.
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the current immigration system suffers from an inability to
develop, sustain, and clearly articulate long-term and short-
term policymaking except in times of crisis.  Often this has
led to bad policymaking, poorly developed programs, inad-
equate policy coordination across departmental lines, and
almost nonexistent program assessment and evaluation of
outcomes.  None of the main Executive Branch departments
has developed a broad-based immigration policymaking
capacity.
The most developed policymaking and coordination unit in
the immigration system exists in the INS Office of Policy
and Planning [OPP].  However,  a majority of its eighty-five
people and its $5 million personnel budget are related to
statistics and other nonpolicymaking activities.  Moreover,
while it is important for the principal agency responsible for
immigration enforcement to have its own policy and plan-
ning capability, OPP is not necessarily well positioned to
advise the Department of Justice about immigration-related
policy issues affecting other DOJ agencies.  Further, under
the Commission’s proposed restructuring, it would make no
sense for the agency responsible for enforcement to have
lead responsibility for formulating policies related to legal
immigration and naturalization or enforcement of immigra-
tion-related labor standards.
Each department with immigration-related responsibilities
needs to perform a wide range of policy functions, includ-
ing, but not limited to, long-range and strategic policy plan-
ning, interagency policy integration, policy review, policy
coordination, priority setting, data collection and analysis,
budget formulation, decisionmaking, and accountability.  The
Domestic Policy Council and the National Security Council,
both situated in the White House can also play an important
role in coordinating policy development across departments.
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Informed policymaking requires systematic review of cur-
rent policies and programs (which themselves should be
informed by reliable and timely statistical information),
development of a range of options, and analysis of the ad-
vantages and disadvantages (including costs and timeframes)
of each.  Further, immigration policy affects, and is affected
by, a wide range of other issues of interest to the depart-
ments.  For example, the DOL overall labor policy is af-
fected by immigration as the foreign-born represent a large
proportion of the growth in the labor force.  As a proportion
of the unskilled workforce, immigrants represent an even
larger proportion and potential impact.  Similarly, interna-
tional migration and the foreign policy and national security
interests of the United States are strongly connected.
The immigration-related policymaking capacities at the de-
partmental level in Justice, State, and Labor tend to be ad
hoc and understaffed.  For example, the Office of the Deputy
Attorney General [DAG] has two and one-half to three at-
torneys working on immigration-related policy and program
coordination.  These staff serve as a clearinghouse through
which immigration-related concerns and policy matters pass
from the responsible agencies (e.g., INS, EOIR, Office of
Special Counsel for Immigration-Related Unfair Employment
Practices, Office of Immigration Litigation) through the DAG
to the Attorney General.  Given the wide range of policy
issues requiring department-level attention, these staff have
an all but unmanageable policy portfolio.  Much of their
time is spent on routine oversight punctuated by crisis man-
agement, with little time left for long-range policy develop-
ment or planning.  The Commission believes more sustained
and timely attention to immigration policy issues within
and across departments will help improve both the formu-
lation and implementation of programs.
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Interagency coordination of immigration policymaking also
is particularly important.  The Domestic Policy Council [DPC]
already plays such a role.  The Commission recommends
strengthening the DPC’s capacity to provide policy guid-
ance, particularly when immigration matters affect or are
affected by other domestic interests.  Designation of a senior
focal point for immigration policy in the DPC would en-
hance its ability to coordinate policy development.  This role
would be complementary to the enhanced role the Commis-
sion recommended for the National Security Council with
regard to refugee issues.  The DPC and the NSC would
coordinate closely when migration issues relate to U.S. for-
eign policy and national security interests.
More specifically, the DPC should be mandated and staffed
to: oversee federal immigration policy development across
departmental and agency lines; monitor the execution and
impact of new legislation, policies and programs; resolve
differences within the Executive Branch, focusing on those
that impede the capacity of the federal government to de-
liver a single, coherent message about immigration policy
and priorities; serve as a forum for discussion of new ideas;
coordinate liaison with and the input of advocates and other
nongovernmental agencies concerned with federal immigra-
tion decisionmaking; and relay the resulting recommenda-
tions to Congress and the President.
n Improving systems of accountability.  The Commission
believes strongly that staff who are responsible for immigra-
tion programs should be held accountable for the results of
their activities.  Systems should be developed to reward or
sanction managers and staff on the basis of their perfor-
mance.  This requires the development of performance
measures that relate to expected outcomes.  For example,
the Commission earlier recommended rewarding Border Pa-
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trol staff for their effectiveness in deterring illegal migration
rather than their prowess at apprehending illegal aliens.
Similarly, managers responsible for adjudication of benefits
should be rewarded if they lessen processing time for the
approval of applications and, simultaneously, improve their
detection of fraudulent cases.  By contrast, managers who
fail to meet recognized operating standards should be held
accountable and be sanctioned for their noncompliance.
Systems to reward innovation or sanction managers and
staff on the basis of their performance also need to be devel-
oped.  Too often, staff who try new approaches not only are
not rewarded for their initiative, they are sanctioned by their
colleagues and supervisors.
n Recruiting and training managers.  The Commission be-
lieves improvements must be made in the recruitment and
training of managers.  As immigration-related agencies grow
and mandated responsibilities increase or evolve, closer at-
tention should be paid to improving the skills and manage-
rial capacity of immigration staff at all levels to ensure more
efficient and effective use of resources allocated.
Since 1993, the immigration system has been undergoing a
tremendous infusion of new resources and, since 1996, sig-
nificantly augmented statutory mandates.  Either change
would seriously burden even the best-run agencies of the
federal government.  Such infusions of new resources to
INS and to several other agencies burden agency adminis-
trative and management systems.  INS has not added a
sufficient number of experienced, proven managers to help
the agency address the many challenges it faces.
Agencies must be able to rapidly recruit, select, train, de-
ploy, and then support new staff—and they must sustain
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this expansionist capacity over several fiscal years.  Most of
the new staff added are entry-level, necessitating on-the-job
training, mentoring, and close supervision before they can
be considered fully functional in their jobs.
As new staff are added, new supervisors are needed—and
they too need supervisory and management training to be
successful.  Supervisors usually are drawn from the ranks of
the operational staff, and with increased operational respon-
sibilities, they often are unable to be freed soon enough or
long enough to attend supervisory training in a timely fash-
ion.
In addition, major changes in the immigration statutes passed
in 1996 necessitate the redrafting and repromulgation of hun-
dreds of sections of law and regulations, hundreds of new
or revised forms, and training and retraining of staff just to
implement these profound changes.  Agencies should con-
sider new ways in which staff are trained to do their work:
e.g., training in management by objectives, in accountability,
in managerial and supervisory skills.  For some agencies,
the skill levels—and agency cultures—are not yet adequate
to be successful in fulfilling present and expected future
increased managerial and supervisory responsibilities. Both
additional supervisors and new skills are urgently needed.
The infusion of new skills and culture can come from two
sources: (1) in-house training and retraining of existing staff;
and (2) the addition—from outside the agencies themselves—
of new middle- and upper-level management staff possess-
ing those skills and the ability to apply them quickly to the
immigration settings.  These two sources need not be mutu-
ally exclusive; some of both may be required.
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One promising recent development is the INS’ new “compe-
tency-based” assessment process for Border Patrol officer
promotions to supervisor.  The Border Patrol is the single
immigration agency receiving the greatest number of new
staff over the coming next several years.  The objective is to
test Border Patrol officers to predict more accurately their
potential for success as future supervisors.  According to
INS, the main focus of the system is assessment of “thinking
skills . . . the way supervisors and managers must think and
react on a daily basis.”6  More than 1,000 Border Patrol
officers have been tested, another 1,000 will be by the end
of summer 1997, and testing of all remaining eligible Border
Patrol Officers will be completed by the end of 1997.
n Strengthening customer service orientation.  The Commis-
sion urges increased attention to instilling a customer-ser-
vice ethic in staff, particularly those responsible for adjudi-
cation of applications for benefits.  Repeatedly, but most
recurringly regarding INS, the public complains of a lack of
service from both their dollar and from the personnel charged
with serving them.  The horror stories are too common.
Most individuals coming into contact with the immigration
system have paid a fee—whether indirectly (such as at air-
ports and the inspections users fees tacked onto their ticket
prices) or directly (such as through the submission of a fee
with their application for a benefit). They expect and should
receive service that is customer-friendly and timely.  Appli-
6 The system is based on four assessments:
1. Decisionmaking Situational Assessment, measures thinking skills such
as reasoning, decisionmaking, and problemsolving;
2. In-basket Job Simulation, measures administrative skills, such as
planning/organizing and managing/organizing information;
3. Managerial Writing Skills Exercise, measures written communication
skills; and
4. Past Achievement Record, measures personal qualities, such as
leadership and flexibility.
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cants should be treated courteously, records should be lo-
cated with ease, and accurate information should be pro-
vided in a professional manner.
The absence of a separate career track for benefits adjudica-
tors hampers efforts to attract and retain the best federal
employees to these tasks.  The structural reforms we recom-
mend should help address this problem.  Currently, many
of those promoted into management positions within INS
moved along the enforcement career track.  Its higher-paid
designations frequently make them eligible for such promo-
tions before those who spend their careers in benefits adju-
dication.  Benefits adjudication personnel should have a
career track that promotes the best performers into posi-
tions of management and leadership and provides all em-
ployees with appropriate incentives as well as models worth
emulating.
The primary currency of service is information—informa-
tion that should be both accurate and timely.  Daily, in many
locations throughout the U.S., people seeking forms, infor-
mation, status checks, and interview appointments, and
reporting a change of address, requesting a copy of a form
in their file, or requesting or extending employment autho-
rization create long lines around local INS offices.
Immigration customers should not have to stand hours in a
line to get information.  Immigration processes should be
reengineered to ensure that information is easily available at
several locations and through several electronic means and,
when given, is accurate.  Several ways to improve access to
forms and information, many electronic, already are in de-
velopment.  Forms increasingly are available on Information
Kiosks located in high volume immigration centers; soon
they will be available over the Internet.  The website devel-
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oped by the Department of State’s Bureau of Consular Af-
fairs makes available pertinent information on conditions
throughout the world.
Customer-service personnel should be both initially well-
trained and periodically tested to ensure they remain cur-
rent with the latest changes and interpretations of policy.  In
addition, there should be a formal quality assurance pro-
gram.  For customer service representatives working on the
lines at district field offices or answering questions on the
telephone, quality assurance of their work should include
the possibility for supervisors to monitor the correctness
and manner of delivery of the service given.
n Using fees for immigration services more effectively.  The
Commission supports the imposition of users fees, but
emphasizes that: (1) the fees should reflect true costs; (2) the
agencies collecting the fees should retain and use them to
cover the costs of those services for which the fees are lev-
ied; (3) those paying fees should expect timely and courte-
ous service; and (4) agencies should have maximum flexibil-
ity  to expand or contract their response expeditiously as
applications increase or decrease.
The current situation has a number of weaknesses.  First,
some programs are now undercharging (or not charging)
fees while others reportedly are overcharging.  INS is now
reviewing its fees to determine where adjustments should
be made.  Second, some fees go into the General Treasury
while others are held by the agencies collecting them and
used for the function for which they were collected.  Third,
agencies do not have effective systems for accurately antici-
pating the volume of applications, forecasting their fee re-
ceipts, and requesting appropriate levels of funding from
fee accounts to meet demand.  Fourth, when there is an
U.S. COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION REFORM
1 9 9 7
RECOMMENDATIONS
- 193 -
The Commission
reiterates its 1994
recommendations
regarding the need
for improvments in
immigration data
collection,
coordination,
analysis, and
dissemination.
unforeseeable increase in the number of applications, there
is a significant lag time before an agency is able to use the
increased fee revenue to expand its service capacity.  For
example, it took several months to develop a reprogram-
ming request and then obtain permission for a reprogram-
ming of funds when naturalization and section 245(i) adjust-
ment applications increased significantly.  This delay resulted
in a growing backlog of persons awaiting service.  Provid-
ing more flexibility would require agreement from the con-
gressional appropriations committees that they need not ap-
prove the reprogramming of fees when the need for addi-
tional resources is related solely to an increase in the vol-
ume of applications.
IMPROVED DATA AND ANALYSIS
The Commission reiterates its 1994 recommendations7 regarding the need
for improvements in immigration data collection, coordination, analysis,
and dissemination.  Although progress has been made, much more
needs to be done.  Reliable and timely data are crucial to the effec-
tive enforcement of immigration law.  They are the basis for the
effective implementation of ongoing and new programs.  And, ulti-
mately, they are the only means of assessing results achieved and
reaching the conclusions necessary for responsible policymaking.
Data problems throughout the immigration system have long been
evident.  The Panel on Immigration Statistics of the National Re-
search Council concluded in 1985 that the “story” about immigrant
data was “one of neglect.”8  Despite increases in congressional fund-
ing and some notable improvements at the INS, the available data
remain incomplete—a problem that exists to some degree in each
agency involved in the immigration system.
7 U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform.  1994.  U.S. Immigration Policy:
Restoring Credibility.  Washington, DC.  179-86.
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The Commission believes there is a pressing need for improvements
in immigration data collection, standardization, intra- and inter-
agency linkages, timely dissemination, rigorous analysis, and use in
policymaking.  The Commission urges the federal government to
support continuing research and evaluation on all aspects of immi-
gration.  Further, the Commission urges the Congress to insist upon
the organizational structures needed to create and maintain high-
quality statistical data.
The statistical function must be given high priority and sufficient
institutional control and authority.  Quality data do not evolve as a
by-product of disjointed administrative data-gathering responsibili-
ties.  Quality data ultimately require a statistical system that can
satisfy policy-relevant and management information needs through
an integrated, centrally-coordinated approach.9
In recent years Congress has addressed the statistical problem by
requiring improvements in specific arenas—primarily through auto-
mation—and by appropriating increased funding.  These steps are
encouraging and the Administration appears to have embarked suc-
cessfully on some programs for automated data collection.  The INS
already has established separate systems for data collection and
retrieval for its core enforcement and benefits functions.10  Under
the Commission’s proposals it is essential that the statistical systems
under DOJ enforcement and DOS benefits retain an automated and
integrated design.  However, statistical systems cannot be improved
simply by automating data collection.
As the Panel on Immigrant Statistics concluded, it would be naive
8 Levine, D. B.;  Hill, K.;  Warren. R.  (eds.).  1985.  Immigration Statistics:
A Story of Neglect. Washington, DC: National Academy Press.
9 Norwood, J. L.  1995.  Organizing to Count: Change in the Federal Statistical
System. Washington, DC: The Urban Institute Press.
10 However, there still remain more than one dozen separate data collection
systems that often suffer from various internal deficiencies and remain
to be integrated into larger core systems.
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to assume that automation will solve the problems that have been
evident for too long a time in statistical operations.11  The Panel
cited an agency-wide lack of understanding and commitment to
high-quality data and the need for the development and acceptance
of appropriate standards as the primary causes of today’s inad-
equate state of affairs.  It is necessary to change priorities from data
collection solely for individual division administrative purposes to
the production of data for integrated enforcement, benefits, quality
control, and analytic uses.
Congress also has been critical of the way in which data has been
disseminated.  In the context of congressional debate, sporadic re-
lease of data has the potential for politicizing statistics.  Regular and
scheduled release of statistics, preferably monthly, can go a long
way toward depoliticizing data and focusing attention on unbiased
analysis.  The Department of Labor’s Bureau of Labor Statistics,
with an autonomous and scheduled release of data, offers one model
for the dissemination of data with no relation to the policy calendar.
The Commission believes each agency with immigration responsi-
bilities should have a statistical office charged with final authority
over data coordination, agency-wide definitions and systems inte-
gration, quality monitoring, research and analysis, and regular dis-
semination.  Data collection and analysis must be a priority and be
reflected in the statistical branch’s organizational placement.  Only
sufficiently high placement and authority can ensure that its mission
is successfully discharged.
Interagency cooperation and coordination of agencies that produce
or use immigration data can enhance the data’s timeliness and value
significantly.  Cooperation also can lead to significant gains in the
11 Levine, D. B.;  Hill, K.;  Warren. R.  (eds.).  1985.  Immigration Statistics:
A Story of Neglect. Washington, DC: National Academy Press.  See also:
Morris, M.D.  1985.  Immigration—The Beleaguered Bureaucracy. Washington,
DC: Brookings Institution.
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use of scarce resources—be they funding, staff, time, or public tol-
erance.  Such coordination must insure monitoring of progress, ad-
herence to standards, common definitions, timeliness in publication,
and full disclosure of methods, methodology, procedures, and prob-
lems.  Only then will significant improvements occur.
Consideration should be given to the creation of a permanent taskforce
on immigration statistics that would coordinate interagency efforts
to improve all aspects of the statistical system.  Various ad hoc and
temporary governmental working groups have tackled a part of, or
the whole of, the data collection system.12  A formally-charged
taskforce would craft the basis for interagency agreements and pos-
sible statutory and regulatory changes.  To be effective, the taskforce
would require appropriate institutional support.  It would marshal
interagency collaboration on data whenever feasible, especially on
definitional issues and on what information is collected.  The taskforce
should conduct an exhaustive review of the data collected in each
agency, identify overlap or potential interagency data linkages, evalu-
ate technical and computer needs, propose standard definitions, and
make recommendations.
Information Needs
Little can be done to make significant advances in our understand-
ing of immigration without improvements in data and targeted re-
search.  Policymaking is particularly hampered by lack of knowl-
edge from detailed surveys and longitudinal studies in three areas:
the experiences and impacts of immigrants; the experiences and
impacts of foreign students and foreign workers admitted for lim-
ited duration stays; and the patterns and impacts of unlawful mi-
12 The INS has convened an Interagency Working Group on Immigration
Statistics that has reviewed various data problems.  It has had a significant
impact on Administration funding for an immigration component in the
Current Population Survey, the preeminent U.S. source of data on national
trends and on the U.S. labor force.  It also made significant contributions
to ultimate Administration support for the New Immigrant Survey.
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gration.  There is a seemingly inexhaustible range of options for
collecting data and, especially, topic areas needing research.13  Ex-
amples of pressing analytic data needs are discussed below.
Legal Permanent Admissions
The gap between questions about legal immigration and the data
needed for answers is greater than in almost any other area of public
policy.  It is not now possible to address fully pressing policy ques-
tions about the changing skill makeup of newly admitted immi-
grants over time, the transitions between temporary and permanent
residence status, the effects of today’s immigration on future de-
mand through family reunification, and the success and impact of
immigrants in the U.S. economy.
To answer such questions, policymakers have a crucial need for
both data on detailed classes of admission and the capacity to track
changes over time.  Recently, the Administration funded the collec-
tion of data on immigrants in the monthly Current Population Sur-
vey.  However, these and other survey data neither collect detailed
information about status nor distinguish between legal and illegal
foreign residents, much less between the various temporary or per-
manent admission statuses.
The INS yearly admissions data are the most immediate source of
information on immigrant entry class.  Yet, the data serve primarily
as a minimalist administrative count of individuals.  Identifying
family units would make it possible to evaluate admissions as they
really are: the immigration not of individuals but of families.  The
quality and type of data gathered on labor force status depends on
definitions that do not conform with modern concepts.  Including
information about immigrant sponsors would go far to increase our
13  Edmonston, B. (ed.).  1996.  Statistics on U.S. Immigration: An Assessment
of Data Needs for Future Research. Washington, DC: National Academy
Press.
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ability to make reliable forecasts about the numbers and skill com-
position of tomorrow's immigrants.
The New Immigrant Survey discussed in the introduction to this
report demonstrates the policy value of expanded data on new
admissions.  For the first time we have an accurate picture of edu-
cation and English ability, as well as the capability for studying
transitions from temporary to permanent status, the characteristics
of sponsors, and the financial well-being of new entrants.  Designed
as a pilot, the NIS should be seriously evaluated for its costs and for
its value as a model for a longitudinal survey.14  Experts agree that
only a longitudinal survey ultimately can answer Congress’ most
pressing questions.15
Finally, it is essential to improve our knowledge of newly natural-
izing citizens.  In the past few years there have been dramatic in-
creases in the numbers of persons naturalizing, but little is known
about the individual circumstances under which residents choose to
naturalize.  Only more detailed knowledge about such things as
eligibility and motivations will yield indicators to forecast the num-
ber of future applications.  Accurate forecasts are needed to meet
demand and to organize processing integrity.
14 A longitudinal survey would, among other things, help address serious
deficiencies due to “lost data sources.”  In the 1950s, the U.S. discontinued
collecting data on persons leaving permanently.  Without accurate
emigration data, demographic estimates of the size and growth of the
foreign population are imprecise exercises.  In the 1980s, the “Alien
Address” database was discontinued.  Knowing the size of the legal
population makes it possible to get significantly more precise estimates
of the size and location of illegal residents.
15 Levine, D. B.;  Hill, K.;  Warren. R.  (eds.).  1985.  Immigration Statistics:
A Story of Neglect. Washington, DC: National Academy Press.  Edmonston,
B. (ed.).  1996.  Statistics on U.S. Immigration: An Assessment of Data Needs
for Future Research. Washington, DC: National Academy Press.   National
Research Council.  (J.P. Smith, B. Edmonston, eds.).  1997.  The New
Americans: Economic, Demographic, and Fiscal Effects of Immigration.
Washington, DC: National Academy Press.
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Limited Duration Admissions
There exists remarkably little comprehensive or policy-relevant
knowledge or research on the administration of the LDA system or
its impact on the U.S. economy.16  Problems in the LDA data system
are even more pervasive than in the legal permanent system.
The Commission believes that improvements in data collection and
analysis of LDAs and the impact of these admissions should be
considered an urgent priority.  The INS has made significant efforts
to improve its data and has directed funds toward new computer
systems.  The Commission urges the Congress to support continued
innovation in data collection and storage retrieval.  As in our last
report, the Commission suggests that building upon existing admin-
istrative recordkeeping will be most cost-effective.
Improved data and new research efforts are especially critical as
there is remarkably little known about the number, characteristics,
and impact of LDA workers and foreign students.  For example,
important basic information is lacking on LDA workers—their geo-
graphic location in the U.S., occupations, or labor-market effects.
Longitudinal data and analysis are needed regarding the transition
of LDA workers to immigrant status—directly or through other tem-
porary categories.  Likewise, little is known about the total popula-
tion and characteristics of foreign students, their geographic distri-
bution,  academic status, duration of stay, employment activities, or
change and adjustment of legal status.
There is a critical need to continue and extend improvements in
departure data—one of the more crucial components of the entire
immigrant information system.  Precise exit information is neces-
sary to track duration of stay, compliance with visa regulations, and
overstays.  Further, the utility of current data could be meaningfully
16 Lowell, B.L. (ed.).  1996.  Temporary Migrants in the United States.
Washington, DC: U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform.
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extended, for example, by collecting accurate information on in-
tended destination.  The Commission endorses continued emphasis
on the improvement and introduction of electronic/paperless mecha-
nisms for the collection of departure data.
Unauthorized Migration
The measurement and study of illegal aliens—a clandestine popula-
tion—always has been fraught with difficulties.  Ironically, a focus
on estimates of this population may well have produced more ac-
curate numbers than official figures on legal residents.  Yet, if our
research knowledge of legal immigrants is circumscribed, and re-
search on LDAs nearly nonexistent, the analysis of the illegal popu-
lation, while extensive, suffers from combinations of problems.
At a rudimentary level, there is a need to know more about the
number of illegal aliens who entered without inspection [EWI] in
contrast to temporary admittees who overstay the time permitted
on their LDA visa.17  In terms of enforcement efforts the distinction
is important, but there is an unknown range of error in current
estimates.  What proportion fall into each type?  Improvements in
existing databases are sorely needed along with research into inno-
vative and reliable means of estimating each population.
Much could be gained from knowing about the varied means by
which EWIs and LDA overstayers come to the United States and the
length of their stay.  If, for example, LDA overstayers had shorter
durations of residence in illegal status, then their proportion of the
total illegal population is, in a sense, more “fluid.”  At a more
critical extreme, subpopulations of highly mobile and circular mi-
17 U.S. General Accounting Office.  1995.  Illegal Immigration: INS Overstay
Estimation Methods Need Improvement.  GAO/PEMD-95-20. Washington,
DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.
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grants may stay for only short periods in the United States.  These
highly mobile individuals would not be fully captured in standard
estimates of the illegal population.18
18 There are few reliable estimates of the highly-mobile, illegal
subpopulation, nevertheless, ad hoc estimates increasingly are heard.  A
correct estimate of this population should adjust for its average, or “person
year,” size.  For example, if 100 illegal workers spent one-half year
working in the United States, they would earn the yearly wages of 50
workers.  See Heer, D.M.  1990.  Undocumented Mexicans in the United
States.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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CONCLUSION
This report concludes the work of the U.S. Commission on Immi-
gration Reform.  Together with our three interim reports, this final
set of recommendations provides a framework for immigration and
immigrant policy to serve our national interests today and in the
years to come.  The report outlines reforms that will enhance the
benefits of legal immigration while mitigating potential harms, curb
unlawful migration to this country, and structure and manage our
immigration system to achieve all these goals.  Most importantly,
this report renews our call for a strong commitment to American-
ization, the process by which immigrants become part of our com-
munity and we learn and adapt to their presence.  Becoming an
American is the theme of this report.  Living up to American values
and ideals is the challenge for us all.
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December 13, 1995. B. Jordan.  House of Representatives, Committee on
the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Immigration and
Claims.
February 6, 1996. S. Martin.  Senate, Committee on the Judiciary,
Subcommittee on Immigration.
February 22, 1966. H. Ezell.  House of Representatives, Committee
on Economic and Educational Opportunities.
May 16, 1996. M.S. Teitelbaum.  House of Representatives,
Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on
Immigration and Claims.
May 16, 1996. L. Fuchs.  House of Representatives, Committee
on the Judiciary, Subcommitte on Immigration
and Claims.
May 16, 1996. S. Martin.  House of Representatives, Commit-
tee on the Judiciary, Subcommitte on Immigra-
tion and Claims.
October 22, 1996. L. Fuchs.  Senate, Committee on the Judiciary,
Subcommittee on Immigration.
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APPENDIX A
IMMACT: PROVISIONS
AND EFFECTS
The Immigration Act of 1990 [IMMACT] attempted to balance a
number of competing interests.  First, it established annual overall
limits on total legal immigration, but allowed those limits to be
“pierced” in response to changing levels of nuclear family applica-
tions and humanitarian admissions.  Second, it created a guaranteed
minimum number of visas for close family members if there are
increases in the number of immediate relatives of U.S. citizens seek-
ing entry.  Third, it increased the number of persons admitted for
employment reasons, with higher priority given to professionals and
highly-skilled persons.  Fourth, it created a  diversity  class of ad-
missions for persons from nations that have not recently sent many
immigrants to the United States.
IMMACT legislated a worldwide level of 675,000 family-based,
employment-based, and diversity immigration admissions per year.1
This ceiling may be pierced if immediate relative applications ex-
ceed expectations and does not include refugee, asylum, or other
humanitarian admissions.  The worldwide pierceable ceiling repre-
sented an increase of about 40 percent in the permitted number of
admissions compared to previously legislated levels.  Prior to
IMMACT, immediate relatives (who entered without regard to nu-
merical limits) averaged about 210,000 per year, and numerically-
limited categories were set at 270,000.  Humanitarian-based admis-
sions were set outside of regular immigration ceilings, as they con-
1 A transition worldwide level of 700,000 admissions was in effect during
FY 1992-1994.  Many admissions during the first two years were from
the pre-IMMACT backlog and do not necessarily reflect the aims of the
new legislation.
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tinue to be under IMMACT.  Most of IMMACT’s legal immigration
provisions went into effect in FY 1992, with the permanent diversity
program beginning in FY 1995.
More specifically, IMMACT contained the following provisions af-
fecting immigration numbers and immigrant characteristics.
Family-based admissions.  IMMACT established a worldwide limit
of 480,000 family-based admissions.  Immediate relatives—includ-
ing spouses, minor children, and parents of U.S. citizens—continue
to enter without regard to numerical limits.  Their actual admission
numbers are subtracted from the worldwide limit to determine how
many other family members (i.e., adult unmarried children of U.S.
citizens, spouses and minor children of legal permanent residents,
married children of U.S. citizens, and siblings of adult U.S. citizens)
will be permitted to enter the following year.   IMMACT set a
minimum floor of 226,000 numerically-limited family immigrants.
In addition, unused employment visas are transferred to the next
year’s family admissions.
The actual number of admission slots available and used each year
varies.  During the past five years, annual family admissions have
been as low as 460,653 in FY 1995 and as high as 595,540 in FY 1996.2
Variation can be seen in both the immediate relative and the nu-
merically-limited categories.
2   Processing problems explain some of the below average numbers for FY
1995 and above average ones for FY 1996.  Higher demand for adjustment
of status within the United States followed enactment of § 245(i) that
permits those not in lawful status to pay a penalty to obtain their legal
immigration status in the U.S.  INS was not prepared for the large
increase in applications, resulting in an adjustment backlog.  Some of
those who normally would have received their green card in FY 1995
had to wait until FY 1996.  In the meantime, the large number of unused
FY 1995 employment-based admissions were transferred to the family
categories for FY 1996.
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One goal of IMMACT was to reduce waiting times, particularly for
the spouses and minor children of legal permanent residents (FB-2A
Preference).  Recognizing that the 2.7 million aliens who were given
LPR status by the Immigration Reform and Control Act would pe-
tition for their immediate families, IMMACT provided three years
of additional visas for spouses and minor children of legalized aliens.
Because per-country limits sometimes create admission backlogs for
affected nationalities, it also required that 75 percent of the FB-2A
numbers would be exempt from per-country limits.
The family categories have attracted far more applicants than there
are admission visas and, hence, large backlogs have developed.  The
total backlog of family applicants stood at 3.5 million at the start of
FY 1997, essentially unchanged from FY 1996.  About one million
individuals are awaiting legal admission under FB-2A.  As projected
by the Commission in its 1995 report, the numbers on the FB-2A
waiting list have declined slightly from the prior year.3  However,
the waiting time until admission has continued to grow since
IMMACT.  From an already long wait of just less than two and one-
half years in FY 1992, the waiting time in the backlog has continued
to increase each year until, at the time of this report, it is almost four
and one-half years.  The priority date for admission advances little
each month, meaning longer and longer waits for new applicants.
Anticipation of such trends led the Commission to recommend in its
1995 report a series of changes to the numerically-limited family
categories, but no congressional action was taken. The Commission
3  Much of the initial rapid increase in the spouse and children of the LPR
backlog was due to IRCA legalization.  Now most of those family
members already have made their applications and, indeed, new applicant
numbers have declined steadily since 1992.  Even so, there were still
82,521 new applicants entering the backlog in 1996.  In most years, about
90,000 admission slots are available for FB-2A, meaning that the waiting
list will experience only modest decreases in the future.
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has projected that waiting times could reach as long as ten years for
applicants at the end of the waiting line.4
Employment-based admissions.  IMMACT extensively revised the
employment-based categories and numbers.  The legislation empha-
sized the admission of high-skilled persons and added a new cat-
egory for investors.  IMMACT allows up to 140,000 employment-
based admissions each year, up from an annual limit of 54,000 un-
der previous statute.  Covered under these numbers are the princi-
pal applicants, as well as their spouses and minor children (both
referred to as beneficiaries).  The numbers are distributed over sev-
eral categories, generally reflecting educational and skill level.
IMMACT also placed a cap of 10,000 admissions on lesser-skilled
admissions.
Employment-based admissions increased significantly under
IMMACT, but they have not approached the annual ceiling of 140,000
(except when the Chinese Student Protection Act of 1992 [CSPA]
permitted Chinese who had entered the U.S. before Tiananmen
Square to become permanent residents under the employment cat-
egory).  Subtracting out the onetime admissions under CSPA, skilled
and unskilled employment-based admissions have gone from about
100,000 in FY 1994 to 81,000 in FY 1995 and back up to 117,000 in
FY 1996.  The increase in FY 1996 appears to reflect a catchup from
4  In principle, the recent surge in the naturalization of potential sponsors
could reduce the backlog and waiting time of spouses and children of
LPRs.  Sponsors who have naturalized can petition for the admission of
their spouses and minor children under the unlimited citizen reunification
category, thus effectively moving them out of the queue.  However, this
process will not decrease the backlog in an expeditious fashion.  Even
assuming rather high rates of naturalization, the Commission projections
also show that it will take at least another decade before today’s backlog
can be reduced to acceptable numbers.  Surprisingly, early indications
are that the large volume of naturalizations since 1995 have not resulted
in increases of relatives of U.S. citizens in the family preference total.
(DOS Bureau of Consular Affairs. 1997. Visa Bulletin 73:7 A7.)
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administrative processing delays in the previous year.  The most
notable increase through this period has been in the first preference,
particularly in the subcategory for executives and managers of mul-
tinational corporations.5  The first preference had fewer than 5,500
admissions in IMMACT’s first year of implementation but now has
more than 25,000 admissions.
In terms of the backlog of employment-based visas, the category of
unskilled workers (EB-3B preference) remains heavily oversubscribed
as of FY 1997, with nearly a seven-year wait for admission for all
nations.  Otherwise, only India is oversubscribed with nearly a two-
year wait for admission for employment professionals with advanced
degrees (EB-2) and skilled workers (EB-3A).  Employment-based
admissions must be closely monitored to know whether or not they
reach their limit in the future and whether per-country limits im-
pede timely entry of the highly-specialized workers who are genu-
inely needed by U.S. business.
Diversity admissions.  The diversity immigrant provisions in
IMMACT seek to increase national diversity in the immigrant popu-
lation by widening access for immigrants from underrepresented
countries whose citizens have neither strong family nor job ties to
the United States.  The permanent program began in October 1994.
It provides 55,000 admission slots per year to nationals of countries
that have sent fewer than 50,000 legal immigrants to this country
over the previous five years.  Each applicant must have a high
school education or its equivalent or two years of work experience
in an occupation requiring at least two years of training or experi-
ence.  Persons eligible to enter are chosen by lottery.  In FY 1996,
some eight million applications were received by the Department of
State.
5 Multinational corporations include U.S.-based companies with overseas
operations and large and small foreign businesses that establish U.S.
offices, subsidiaries, or affiliates.
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About 40,000 diversity immigrants entered in FY 1995 and 58,000 in
FY 1996.  As with other admission categories, the FY 1995 numbers
are misleading because of the delays in processing adjustments of
status.  Unlike other categories, however, the diversity program
does not permit a waiting list of unprocessed applicants who will be
interviewed the following year.
Refugee and other humanitarian admissions.  Various categories
of people may obtain LPR status outside of the worldwide pierceable
ceiling.  The largest groups are refugees admitted from overseas as
part of the refugee resettlement program and asylees granted asy-
lum domestically.  After one year, refugees and asylees become
eligible to adjust to LPR status.  They are counted when the adjust-
ment occurs.  Other humanitarian-based admissions include
Amerasians, parolees permitted to adjust status under special leg-
islation, and individuals granted suspension of deportation.  The
total numbers admitted under these categories vary depending
largely on the annual refugee admission levels determined through
Presidential-Congressional consultation.  All humanitarian admis-
sions reached a high in FY 1994 of 160,000 and dropped modestly
to 123,000 and 138,000 in FYs 1995 and 1996, respectively.
Future trends.  As indicated, the year-to-year admissions under
IMMACT have followed an up-and-down course.  Future trends are
difficult to project.  A number of factors may increase future admis-
sion levels.  Given the pace with which immigrants are naturalizing,
growth in the number of immediate relatives may occur as newly
naturalized citizens petition for their families.  While LPRs may
petition for spouses and minor children, until naturalization, they
may not petition for the admission of a parent.  It is also unlikely
that the numerically-limited family preferences will be
undersubscribed in the foreseeable future.  Continuing backlogs
ensure that available family quotas, as well as any unused employ-
ment numbers transferred to the family categories, will be filled.
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At the same time, new provisions adopted in the recent welfare
reform (The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Recon-
ciliation Act of 1996) and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immi-
grant Responsibility Act of 1996 may dampen future admissions
despite the lengthy waiting lists.  In particular, IIRIRA requires all
family members to be sponsored by a U.S. petitioner whose income
meets at least 125 percent of the poverty level.  Sponsors must sign
legally-binding affidavits under which they pledge to provide any
financial support needed by the new immigrants.  In addition, the
welfare reform legislation bars noncitizens from most income trans-
fer programs.  Some U.S. family members may be unwilling or
unable to take on these new financial responsibilities for new immi-
grants.
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APPENDIX B
STATEMENT OF COMMISSIONER
WARREN R. LEIDEN
While I agree with most of the findings and recommendations of the
Commission majority, there are two subjects of major recommenda-
tions on which I am moved to make separate statements —one in
dissent (Legal Permanent Admissions) and one in concurrence (Struc-
tural Reform).
Legal Permanent Admissions
Legal immigration needs reform of priorities and allocations, but
current levels of legal immigration are in the national interest.
Virtually all the research and analysis received by the Commission
indicated that the current levels of legal immigration continue to
provide a net positive benefit to America in a multitude of ways.
Whatever interest is examined—economic, social, political, scien-
tific, or cultural—the current levels of legal immigration are found
to benefit each of these aspects of American life.  The current levels
of legal immigration that were established by the Immigration Act
of 1990 have served this country well.  And, after the current one-
time increase that is the result of the 1986 legalization program, the
overall number of legal immigrant admissions can be expected to
moderate and decrease.
The current overall levels of legal immigration should be main-
tained until there is another opportunity for review in three to five
years.
The majority recommends a one-quarter reduction in legal immigra-
tion from current levels, but not now, rather in five to eight years.
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This reduction comes at the expense of thousands of American fami-
lies who have been patiently waiting for legal reunification with
their close relatives overseas.  It is accomplished by eliminating
three of four family preference categories and simply shutting the
door on thousands of sons, daughters, and siblings of U.S. citizens.
There is no convincing argument for this drastic reduction in legal
immigration now or years from now.  Current levels of legal immi-
gration clearly serve the national interest and can better do so if
priorities and allocations are reformed.
Prioritize family-based admissions without eliminating family re-
unification.  Spouses and minor children of U.S. citizens and lawful
permanent residents [LPRs] and parents of U.S. citizens should re-
ceive the highest priority for immigration, but this can be accom-
plished without eliminating the immigrant categories for adult sons
and daughters or siblings of U.S. citizens.
The family preference categories should be reordered, placing the
spouses and minor children of LPRs at the top, with a “spilldown”
of unused visas going to the remaining family categories.  This
approach would ensure the quickest reduction in the shameful back-
log of spouses and minor children of LPRs, without sacrificing the
family unification of those sons and daughters who simply turned
21 years old.  The majority, by its determination to reduce legal
immigration, is forced to call for the elimination of sons and daugh-
ters preference categories.  It is wholly unnecessary to impose this
hardship when simple priority setting can accomplish the same end.
The backlog of spouses and children of LPRs has already begun to
decrease, and there are fewer new applicants than there are indi-
viduals being accorded immigrant status under the “second prefer-
ence category.”  This indicates, as predicted, that the current back-
logs can be reduced and that a new stable level of family immigra-
tion can be achieved once the one-time “echo” of the legalization
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program has been processed.  The small increases in the family
preference categories for sons and daughters can be quickly made
up once the top preference category is current.
Preserve employment-based immigration levels and reform labor
market tests without penalizing employers.  I dissent from the
majority's recommendation to reduce employment-based immigra-
tion by almost 30 percent to only 100,000 admissions per year (in-
cluding spouses and children).  This level was already exceeded in
FY 1996, when employment based legal immigration reached 117,000.
Moreover, the continued growth of the international economy prom-
ises to increase employment-based legal immigration up to at least
the current level of 140,000 admissions per year.  The majority’s
recommendation to cut annual employment based admissions down
to 100,000 per year would result in immediate backlogs, which would
recreate precisely the situation that the Immigration Act of 1990 was
enacted to cure.
Proposals that would result in the immediate creation of new back-
logs are clearly wrong.  The employment-based immigration ceiling
should be kept at the current level, with review in three to five
years.
New requirements and procedures need to be developed to replace
the labor certification process to test the bona fides of the petitioning
employer’s need and to avoid adverse effect on similar U.S. work-
ers.  I dissent from the majority’s recommendation that the solution
is that such employers be required to pay a “substantial fee” or tax
for the privilege of sponsoring international personnel.
The “substantial fee” approach simply does not address the real
issues.  It substitutes a penalty on certain employers for an honest
assessment of what is beneficial to the national interest and what is
practical in an environment of heightened international competition.
The majority wants to label the imposition of fees to be a use of
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“market forces,” but it is obvious that government-imposed tariffs
and fees are the complete opposite of market forces.  For the gov-
ernment to charge a substantial, arbitrarily-set fee that will be used
for purposes other than expense of adjudication and processing the
application would be more like a tax, the antithesis of market forces.
The majority would not only impose a penalty fee but would also
require such employers to meet subjective tests of eligibility, such as
whether it took “appropriate steps to recruit U.S. workers.”  It is
hard to imagine that this proposal would not result in a new bu-
reaucracy sitting in judgment on employers’ compliance with new
regulations and requirements.
The majority’s proposal will serve more to penalize U.S. employers
who petition for international personnel than to prevent adverse
effect.  Unfortunately, a proper analysis of these issues and  more
thoughtful recommendations remain to be done.
Structural Reform
Restructure the federal immigration responsibilities to separate
the adjudications function from the enforcement function but keep
them in the Department of Justice along with the appeals func-
tion.  The federal responsibilities to conduct immigration enforce-
ment, both at the border and inside the U.S., and to adjudicate
immigration and naturalization applications and petitions have not
been managed adequately.
Although it has received substantial increases in appropriations for
staff, equipment, and other resources, the enforcement function con-
tinues to suffer from a lack of strategic coordination.  While impor-
tant improvements have been made in enforcement at the border,
coordination with interior enforcement is tactical at best and often
exists in form only.  Interior enforcement is led and managed by
officials who have been charged with too many other responsibilities.
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At most levels of the INS, inadequate attention is given to the glar-
ing imbalances in staff and resource allocations to the sequential
steps of the enforcement process so that the consequences of appre-
hension are neither swift nor certain.  Distracted and overloaded
management also increases the risk of error and misconduct by its
subordinate staff.  Simply put, there is not a single, focused, na-
tional chain of command to pursue an integrated national enforce-
ment strategy, and the immigration function and the nation suffer
as a result.
Similarly on the adjudications side, huge increases in fee account
receipts have not resulted in proportional improvements in accu-
racy or efficiency.  Managers at the local, regional, and national
levels have not been adequately concentrated on their adjudications
responsibilities in immigration and naturalization.  The economies
of scale and additional resources provided by the substantial caseload
(and therefore revenue) increases have not been converted into
improvements, rather there is the appearance that there is just too
much to do.
The lack of success in enforcement and adjudications is not simply
for want of trying.  The immigration agencies are served by many
talented and determined staff and managers.  The current adminis-
tration of the Immigration and Naturalization Service has made
impressive strides forward on a number of fronts and its accom-
plishments are historic.
If, despite huge increases in funding and dedicated staff and lead-
ership, the federal government still has not achieved adequate man-
agement of its immigration responsibilities, it is inescapable that
something else must be done in order to arrive at a successful equa-
tion.  Based on the information, interviews, and analyses the com-
mission has reviewed over the past several years, it becomes an
inescapable conclusion that the primary immigration functions need
to be separated and restructured.
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Separation of the enforcement and adjudications functions is the
only solution to the current overload of responsibilities competing
for attention that is obvious at every level of the INS.  Separation of
the functions would permit the establishment of unified, focused
chains of command and operations at every level.  Separation of
enforcement from adjudications would allow each function to have
a clear mission and to set clear goals on by which performance
could be judged and accountability enforced.  Separate functions
would benefit greatly from the ability to gear hiring, training, pro-
motions, and discipline to a clear mission.
At present, with its combined missions, the INS is often in internal
contradiction, and its personnel, trained primarily in one mission or
the other, are asked to crisscross from positions calling for one type
of expertise and then the other.  The most telling evidence of the
value of separating the enforcement and adjudications functions
comes the recent history of INS itself.  The two most successful
examples of INS adjudications programs, the 1986 Legalization pro-
gram and the creation of an independent corps of asylum officers in
1990, are both instances where adjudications programs were con-
sciously and deliberately kept separate and insulated from the en-
forcement mission of the INS.  These practical, real world examples
conclusively make the case for separation of enforcement from ad-
judications.
Of course, separation and restructuring of the immigration func-
tions is not a panacea in and of itself.  The combined missions are
far from the only problem confronting the agencies, and the sepa-
ration of the functions should be seen only as providing a necessary
foundation from which real, lasting solutions can be hammered out
to the many substantive challenges confronting the government.  The
substantive problems of operations and policy remain the funda-
mental issues of concern; structural changes provide means to better
accomplishing these ends.
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The benefits of restructuring can be gained with far less disruption,
at less cost, and with greater chance of success if it is accomplished
within the Department of Justice. The two main functions of the
INS—enforcement and adjudications—should be separated into two
different agencies within the Department of Justice, with separate
leadership. This would also permit the insertion of a senior level
office in the Department of Justice to coordinate and lead the sepa-
rate functional agencies.
The creation of the Executive Office for Immigration Review [EOIR],
which separated the immigration hearings and appeals function from
the rest of INS in 1983, is a good model for this restructuring.  Like
the EOIR, each agency should have its separate mission, career paths,
training, and management, while still benefiting from policy and
strategic coordination at senior department level.
The Department of Justice is the proper place for the immigration
enforcement function and it is the proper place for the adjudications
function.  The Department of Justice has long experience with and
is the preeminent repository of expertise in both the immigration
enforcement and adjudications functions.  The Department of Jus-
tice epitomizes the values of due process and the rule of law, which
are especially important in achieving effective enforcement and fair,
accurate adjudications for a well-regulated, highly-selective legal
immigration system.  The division of these two immigration func-
tions, within the Department of Justice, would be far less disruptive
to either responsibility at a time when both adjudications workloads
and the need for enforcement activities are at record levels.
In contrast, transferring the adjudications function to the Depart-
ment of State would require it to integrate into its organization large
operations programs with which it has little familiarity.  Any de-
partment other than Justice would have to undertake the absorption
of new missions, expertise, and institutional values with which it
has little experience.
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Keeping both functions within the Department of Justice would be
far less costly than the transfer of all adjudications activities to the
Department of State or another department.  The personnel, train-
ing, facilities, and management are already fully part of and inte-
grated into Department of Justice.  Separation of enforcement and
adjudications within the Department of Justice raises mostly issues
of management and structure, rather the basic re-creation of a sub-
stantial institution in an entirely new setting.
Moreover, keeping adjudications within Justice would not require
the proposed creation of an entirely new independent agency for
immigration review in place of EOIR.  There are substantive argu-
ments on both sides of this issue, and it is one that should be de-
cided on the basis of merit, not mandated simply due to interde-
partmental restructuring.
As in all cases of organizational change, some predictable disrup-
tion and added expense are justifiable if the outcome is most likely
to be an improvement.  However, the consequences of the proposed
transfer of all adjudications functions to the Department of State are
far from certain.  Unlike the Department of Justice, the Department
of State would be undertaking a entirely different mission with which
it has had little experience or interest.  Historically, immigration
and consular matters have received tertiary attention and status at
the Department of State.  It is a gamble to think that these long-
standing attitudes will change for the better.  While some argue that
the Department of State could and should adopt an entirely new
mission in the post-Cold War era, beginning this debate by making
the massive implantation of the entire federal immigration adjudi-
cations function puts the horse before the cart and is a great risk to
take.
The Department of State has not had experience with the large
volume of substantive adjudications that heretofore have been done
by the Department of Justice.  Moreover, elementary concepts of
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legal process, including administrative and judicial review, prece-
dent decisions, and the right to counsel, have been vigorously re-
sisted by the Department of State throughout its history of consular
affairs.  The Department of State has energetically fought all at-
tempts in litigation and in legislation to make individual consular
decisions subject to any review within the Department of State itself
or by the federal courts.  It is difficult for anyone familiar with this
history to conceive that these Department of State traditions would
soon give way to modern legal concepts and the consistency and
accuracy that is their goal.
In contrast, the Department of Justice has the experience and the
expertise.  It needs only the restructuring and separation of enforce-
ment from adjudications, with dedicated leadership and manage-
ment for each, to have the best chance of success, at less cost and
with less disruption of the fundamental immigration responsibili-
ties.
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U.S. COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION REFORM
INTRODUCTION
Immigration and immigrant policy is about immigrants, their fami-
lies and the rest of us.  It is about the meaning of American nation-
ality and the foundation of national unity.  It is about uniting per-
sons from all over the world in a common civic culture.
The process of becoming an American is most simply called “Ameri-
canization,” which must always be a two-way street.  All Ameri-
cans, not just immigrants, should understand the importance of our
shared civic culture to our national community.  This final report of
the U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform makes recommenda-
tions to further the goals of Americanization by setting out immi-
grant policies to help orient immigrants and their new communities,
to improve educational programs that help immigrants and their
children learn English and civics, and to reinforce the integrity of
the naturalization process through which immigrants become U.S.
citizens.
This report also makes recommendations regarding immigration
policy.  It reiterates the conclusions we reached in three interim
reports—on unlawful migration, legal immigration, and refugee and
asylum policy—and makes additional recommendations for reform-
ing immigration policies.  Further, in this report, the Commission
recommends ways to improve the structure and management of the
federal agencies responsible for achieving the goals of immigration
policy.    It is our hope that this final report  Becoming An American:
Immigration and Immigrant Policy, along with our three interim re-
ports, constitutes a full response to the work assigned the Commis-
sion by Congress: to assess the national interest in immigration and
report how it can best be achieved.
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MANDATE AND METHODS
Public Law 101-649, the Immigration Act of 1990, established this
Commission to review and evaluate the impact of immigration policy.
More specifically, the Commission must report on the impact of
immigration on: the need for labor and skills; employment and other
economic conditions; social, demographic, and environmental im-
pact of immigration; and impact of immigrants on the foreign policy
and national security interests of the United States.  The Commis-
sion engaged in a wide variety of fact-finding activities to fulfill this
mandate.  Site visits were conducted throughout the United States.
Commission members visited immigrant and refugee communities
in California, Texas, Florida, New York, Massachusetts, Illinois,
Arizona, Washington, Kansas, Virginia, Washington, DC, Puerto Rico
and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands.  We also
visited such major source countries as Mexico, the Dominican Re-
public, Cuba, Haiti, and the Philippines.  To increase our under-
standing of  international refugee policy issues, we visited Bosnia,
Croatia, Germany, and Kenya, and we consulted with Geneva-based
officials from the U.N. High Commission for Refugees and the In-
ternational Organization for Migration.  We held more than forty
public hearings, consultations with government and private sector
officials, and expert roundtable discussions.
IMMIGRATION TODAY
The effects of immigration are numerous, complex, and varied.1
Immigrants contribute in many ways to the United States: to its
vibrant and diverse communities; to its lively and participatory
democracy; to its vital intellectual and cultural life, to its renowned
1 Please see the full report for a more detailed discussion of the economic,
social, demographic, foreign policy, and national security implications
for U.S. immigration.
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Category of Admission 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
TOTAL 810,635 880,014 798,394 716,194 909,959
SUBJECT TO THE NUMERICAL CAP 655,541 719,701 662,029 593,234 771,604
FAMILY-BASED IMMIGRANTS 502,995 539,209 497,682 460,653 595,540
Immediate Relatives of U.S. citizens 235,484 255,059 249,764 220,360 350,192
Spouses and children 170,720 192,631 193,394 171,978 283,592
Parents 64,764 62,428 56,370 48,382 66,600
Children born abroad to alien residents 2,116 2,030 1,883 1,894 1,658
Family-sponsored immigrants 213,123 226,776 211,961 238,122 293,751
Unmarried sons/daughters of U.S. citizens 12,486 12,819 13,181 15,182 20,885
Spouses and children of LPRs 90,486 98,604 88,673 110,960 145,990
Sons and daughters of LPRs 27,761 29,704 26,327 33,575 36,559
Married sons/daughters of U.S. citizens 22,195 23,385 22,191 20,876 25,420
Siblings of U.S. citizens 60,195 62,264 61,589 57,529 64,897
Legalization dependents 52,272 55,344 34,074 277 184
EMPLOYMENT-BASED IMMIGRANTS 116,198 147,012 123,291 85,336 117,346
Priority workers 5,456 21,114 21,053 17,339 27,469
Professionals w/ adv. deg. or of advanced ability 58,401 29,468 14,432 10,475 18,436
Skilled, professionals, other workers, (CSPA) 47,568 87,689 76,956 50,245 62,674
Skilled, professionals, other workers 47,568 60,774 55,659 46,032 62,273
Chinese Student Protection Act (CSPA) X 26,915 21,297 4,213 401
Special immigrants 4,063 8,158 10,406 6,737 7,831
Investors 59 583 444 540 936
Professionals or highly skilled (Old 3rd) 340 X X X X
Needed skilled or unskilled workers (Old 6th) 311 X X X X
DIVERSITY PROGRAMS 36,348 33,480 41,056 47,245 58,718
Diversity permanent X X X 40,301 58,174
Diversity transition 33,911 33,468 41,056 6,994 544
Nationals of adversely affected countries 1,557 10 X X X
Natives of underrepresented countries 880 2 X X X
NOT SUBJECT TO THE NUMERICAL CAP 155,094 160,313 136,365 122,960 138,323
Amerasians 17,253 11,116 2,822 939 954
Cuban/Haitian Entrants 99 62 47 42 29
Parolees, Soviet and Indochinese 13,661 15,772 8,253 3,120 2,283
Refugees and Asylees 117,037 127,343 121,434 114,632 128,367
Refugee adjustments 106,379 115,539 115,451 106,795 118,345
 Asylee adjustments 10,658 11,804 5,983 7,837 10,022
Registered Nurses and their families 3,572 2,178 304 69 16
Registry, entered prior to 1/1/72 1,293 938 667 466 356
Other 2,179 2,904 2,838 3,692 6,318
Note: X = Not Applicable.  Excludes persons granted LPR status under the provisions of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986.
Source: Immigration and Naturalization Service, Statistics Division.
Immigrant Admissions by Major Category:
FYs 1992-1996
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job-creating entrepreneurship and marketplaces; and to its family
values and hard-work ethic.  However, there are costs as well as
benefits from today’s immigration.  Those workers most at risk in
our restructuring economy—low-skilled workers in production and
service jobs—are those who directly compete with today’s low-skilled
immigrants.  Further, immigration presents special challenges to cer-
tain states and local communities that disproportionately bear the
fiscal and other costs of incorporating newcomers.
Properly-regulated immigration and immigrant policy serves the
national interest by ensuring the entry of those who will contribute
most to our society and helping lawful newcomers adjust to life in
the United States.   It must give due consideration to shifting eco-
nomic realities.  A well-regulated system sets priorities for admis-
sion; facilitates nuclear family reunification; gives U.S. employers
access to a global labor market while ensuring that U.S. workers are
not displaced or otherwise adversely affected; and fulfills our com-
mitment to resettle refugees as one of several elements of humani-
tarian protection of the persecuted.
AMERICANIZATION AND
INTEGRATION OF IMMIGRANTS
A DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND
VALUES
Immigration to the United States has created one of the world’s
most successful multiethnic nations.  We believe these truths consti-
tute the distinctive characteristics of American nationality:
n American unity depends upon a widely-held belief in the
principles and values embodied in the American Constitu-
tion and their fulfillment in practice: equal protection and
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justice under the law; freedom of speech and religion; and
representative government;
n Lawfully admitted newcomers of any ancestral nationality—
without regard to race, ethnicity, or religion—truly become
Americans when they give allegiance to these principles and
values;
n Ethnic and religious diversity based on personal freedom is
compatible with national unity; and
n The nation is strengthened when those who live in it com-
municate effectively with each other in English, even as many
persons retain or acquire the ability to communicate in other
languages.
As long as we live by these principles and help newcomers to learn
and practice them, we will continue to be a nation that benefits from
substantial but well-regulated immigration.  We must pay attention
to our core values, as we have tried to do in our recommendations
throughout this report.  Then, we will continue to realize the lofty
goal of E Pluribus Unum.2
AMERICANIZATION
The Commission reiterates its call for the Americanization of new
immigrants, that is the cultivation of a shared commitment to the
American values of liberty, democracy and equal opportunity.  The
United States has fought for the principles of individual rights and
2 Our national motto, E Pluribus Unum, “from many, one,” was originally
conceived to denote the union of the thirteen states into one nation.
Throughout our history, E Pluribus Unum has also come to mean the
vital unity of our national community founded on individual freedom
and the diversity that flows from it.
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equal protection under the law, notions that now apply to all our
residents.  We have long recognized that immigrants are entitled to
the full protection of our Constitution and laws.  And, the U.S. has
the sovereign right to impose obligations on immigrants.
In our 1995 report to Congress, the Commission called for a new
commitment to Americanization.  In a public speech that same year,
Barbara Jordan, our late chair, noted: “That word earned a bad
reputation when it was stolen by racists and xenophobes in the
1920s.  But it is our word, and we are taking it back.”
Americanization is the process of integration by which immigrants
become part of our communities and by which our communities
and the nation learn from and adapt to their presence.
Americanization means the civic incorporation of immigrants, that
is the cultivation of a shared commitment to the American values of
liberty, democracy, and equal opportunity.
The Commission proposes that the principles of Americanization
be made more explicit through the covenant between immigrant
and nation.  Immigrants become part of us, and we grow and become
all the stronger for having embraced them.  In this spirit, the
Commission sees the covenant as:
Voluntary.  Immigration to the United States—a benefit to
both citizens and immigrants—is not an entitlement and
Americanization cannot be forced.
Mutual and Reciprocal.  Immigration presents mutual
obligations.  Immigrants must accept the obligations we
impose—to obey our laws, to pay taxes, to respect other
cultures and ethnic groups.  At the same time, citizens incur
obligations to provide an environment in which newcomers
can become fully participating members of our society.
Individual, Not Collective.  The United States is a nation
Americanization
is the process of
integration
by which
immigrants
become part of
our communities
and by which
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and the nation
learn from and
adapt to
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founded on the proposition that each individual is born with
certain rights and that the purpose of government is to secure
these rights.  The United States admits immigrants as
individuals (or individual members of families).  As long as
the United States continues to emphasize the rights of
individuals over those of groups, we need not fear that the
diversity brought by immigration will lead to ethnic division
or disunity.
To help achieve full integration of newcomers, the Commission calls
upon federal, state, and local governments to provide renewed
leadership and resources to a program to promote Americanization
that requires:
n Developing capacities to orient both newcomers and receiv-
ing communities;
n Educating newcomers in English language skills and our
core civic values; and
n Revisiting the meaning and conferral of citizenship to en-
sure the integrity of the naturalization process.
ORIENTATION
The Commission recommends that the federal, state, and local
governments take an active role in helping newcomers become self-
reliant: orienting immigrants and receiving communities as to their
mutual rights and responsibilities, providing information they need
for successful integration, and encouraging the development of local
capacities to mediate when divisions occur between groups.
Information and orientation should be provided both to immigrants
and to their receiving communities.
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The Commission believes the federal government should help
immigrants and local communities by:
n Giving orientation materials to legal immigrants upon
admission that include, but are not limited to: a welcoming
greeting; a brief discussion of U.S. history, law, and principles
of U.S. democracy; tools to help the immigrant locate and
use services for which they are eligible; and other
immigration-related information and documents.  All
immigrants would receive the same materials.  The packets
would be available in English and other dominant immigrant
languages.
n Encouraging state governments to establish information
clearinghouses in major immigrant receiving communities.
The Commission recommends that the federal government
provide modest incentive grants to states to encourage them
to establish and maintain local resources that would provide
information to immigrants and local communities.
n Promoting public/private partnerships to orient and assist
immigrants in adapting to life in the United States.   While
the federal government makes the decisions about how many
and which immigrants will be admitted to the United States,
the actual process of integration takes place in local
communities.  Local government, schools, businesses,
charities, foundations, religious institutions, ethnic
associations, and other groups play important roles in the
Americanization process.
EDUCATION
Education is the principal tool of Americanization.  Local educa-
tional institutions have the primary responsibility for educating im-
Information and
orientation
should be provided
both to immigrants
and to their
receiving
communities.
TOP TEN
COUNTRIES OF
ORIGIN OF
LEGAL
IMMIGRANTS
1996
Mexico 159,731
Philippines 55,778
India 44,781
Vietnam 42,006
Mainland China 41,662
Dominican Republic 39,516
Cuba 26,415
Ukraine 21,051
Russia 19,646
Jamaica 19,029
Source: INS FY 1996
Public Use Admissions Data.
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migrants. However, there is a federal role in promoting and funding
English language acquisition and other academic and civic orienta-
tion for both immigrant children and adults.
The Commission urges a renewed commitment to the education of
immigrant children.  The number of school-aged children of
immigrants is growing and expected to increase dramatically.  These
children, mostly young, speak more than 150 different languages;
many have difficulty communicating in English.  They are enrolled
in public schools as well as in secular and religious private schools
throughout the country.  And, in addition to the problems other
students have, they face particular problems in gaining an
education— often because of language difficulties.
The Commission emphasizes that rapid acquisition of English should
be the paramount goal of any immigrant language instruction
program.  English is the most critical of basic skills for successful
integration.  English can be taught to children in many ways.
Effective programs share certain common characteristics.  Based on
a review of these programs, the Commission emphasizes the need
for public and private educational programs to:
n Conduct regular evaluations of students’ English
competence and their ability to apply it to academic
subjects. Such evaluations will ensure placement of
immigrant children into regular English-speaking classes as
soon as they are prepared.  Regular evaluation also will
highlight strengths and weaknesses in educational programs
and provide insight on improvements that are needed to
ensure timely English acquisition.
n Collect and analyze data on immigrant students, including
their linguistic and academic performance and the efficacy
of the instructional methods used in programs for immigrant
children.
English is
the most critical
of basic skills
for successful
integration.
TOP TEN
INTENDED
STATES OF
RESIDENCE OF
LEGAL
IMMIGRANTS:
1996
California 199,221
New York 153,731
Texas 82,229
Florida 79,067
New Jersey 63,162
Illinois 42,154
Massachusetts 23,017
Virginia 21,329
Maryland 20,683
Washington 18,718
Source: INS FY 1996
Public Use Admissions Data.
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n Include appropriate grade-level instruction in other
academic disciplines.  Coordination with teachers, curricula,
and instruction outside of English acquisition will promote
students’ mastery of regular subject matter while they
expeditiously learn English.
n Involve parents of immigrant students in their schooling.
A characteristic of many of the most successful language
acquisition programs is the active involvement of parents in
the education of their children.
The Commission encourages programs that are responsive to the
needs of immigrant children and an orientation to United States
school systems and the community, such as we have seen in
“newcomer schools.”  Newcomer schools must not isolate immigrant
newcomers.  Instead, they must be transitional and actively promote
the timely integration of students into mainstream schools.
The Commission recommends the revival and emphasis on instruction
of all kindergarten through grade twelve students in the common
civic culture that is essential to citizenship.  An understanding of
the history of the United States and the principles and practices of
our government are an essential for all students, immigrants and
natives alike.  Americanization requires a renewed emphasis on the
common core of civic culture that unites individuals from many
ethnic and racial groups.
The Commission emphasizes the urgent need to recruit, train, and
provide support to teachers who work with immigrant students.
There is a disturbing shortage of qualified teachers for children with
limited English proficiency, of teacher training programs for
producing such teachers, and of other support for effective English
acquisition instruction.
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The Commission supports immigrant education funding that is based
on a more accurate assessment of the impact of immigration on
school systems and that is adequate to alleviate these impacts.
There are costs and responsibilities for language acquisition and
immigrant education programs that are not now being met.  We
urge the federal government to do its fair share in meeting this
challenge.  The long-term costs of failure in terms of dropouts and
poorly educated adults will be far larger for the nation and local
communities than the costs of such programs.  More specifically, we
urge the federal government to:
n Provide flexibility in federal funding for the teaching of
English to immigrant students to achieve maximum local
choice of instructional model.  The federal government
should not mandate any one mode of instruction (e.g.,
bilingual education, English as a second language programs,
immersion).
n Make funding contingent on performance outcomes—that
is, English language acquisition and mastery of regular
academic subject matter by students served in these
programs.  School systems receiving funds because of large
numbers of children with limited English proficiency and
immigrant children should be held to rigorous performance
standards. Federal and state funding incentives should
promote—not impede—expeditious placement in regular,
English-speaking classes.
The Commission urges the federal, state, and local governments and
private institutions to enhance educational opportunities for adult
immigrants.  Education for basic skills and literacy in English is the
major vehicle that integrates adult immigrants into American society
and participation in its civic activities.  Literate adults are more
EDUCATIONAL
ATTAINMENT
NATIVE AND
FOREIGN-BORN
RESIDENTS:
1996
Source: U.S. Bureau of the
Census, Current Population
Survey, March 1996.
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
 
 Bachelor degree 
or higher
Not  a high 
school graduate
Native
Foreign born
16%
23.6%
35.6%
23.5%
1 9 9 7
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- XII -
U.S. COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION REFORM
likely to participate in the workforce and twice as likely to participate
in our democracy.  Literate adults foster literacy in their children,
and parents’ educational levels positively affect their children’s
academic performance.
Adult education is severely underfunded.  Available resources are
inadequate to meet the demand for adult immigrant education, par-
ticularly for English proficiency and job skills.  In recognition of the
benefits they receive from immigration, the Commission urges lead-
ers from businesses and corporations to participate in skills training,
English instruction, and civics education programs for immigrants.
Religious schools and institutions, charities, foundations, commu-
nity organizations, public and private schools, colleges and univer-
sities also can contribute resources, facilities, and expertise.
NATURALIZATION
Naturalization is the most important act that a legal immigrant
undertakes in the process of becoming an American.  Taking this
step confers upon the immigrant all the rights and responsibilities
of civic and political participation that the United States has to offer
(except to become President).  The naturalization process must be
credible, and it must be accorded the formality and ceremony
appropriate to its importance.
The Commission believes that the current legal requirements for
naturalization are appropriate, but improvements are needed in the
means used to measure whether an applicant meets these
requirements. With regard to the specific legal requirements, the
Commission supports:
n Maintaining requirements that legal immigrants must
reside in the United States for five years (three years for
spouses of U.S. citizens and Lawful Permanent Residents
The naturalization
process must
be credible, and
it must be accorded
the formality
and ceremony
appropriate to
its importance.
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[LPRs] who serve in the military) before naturalizing.  We
believe five years is adequate for immigrants to embrace,
understand, and demonstrate their knowledge of the
principles of American democracy.
n Improving the mechanisms used to demonstrate
knowledge of U.S. history, civics, and English competence.
The Commission believes that the tests used in naturalization
should seek to determine if applicants have a meaningful
knowledge of U.S. history and civics and are able to
communicate in English.  The tests should be standardized
and aim to evaluate a common core of information to be
understood by all new citizens.
 n Expediting swearing-in ceremonies while maintaining their
solemnity and dignity.  In districts where the federal court
has exercised sole jurisdiction to conduct the swearing-in
ceremonies, long delays often result from crowded court
calendars.  The Commission recommends that Congress
restore the Executive Branch’s sole jurisdiction for
naturalization to reduce this waiting time.  The Executive
Branch should continue to work with federal judges as well
as other qualified institutions, such as state courts and
Immigration Judges, to ensure that swearing-in ceremonies
are consistently conducted in a timely, efficient, and dignified
manner.
n Revising the naturalization oath to make it comprehensible,
solemn, and meaningful.  The current oath is not easy to
comprehend. We believe it is not widely understood by new
citizens.  Its wording includes dated language, archaic form,
and convoluted grammar.  The Commission proposes the
following revision of the oath as capturing the essence of
naturalization.
NATURALIZATION
APPROVALS
1992-1996
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Solemnly, freely, and
without any mental reservation,
I, [name] hereby renounce under oath
[or upon affirmation]
all former political allegiances.
My sole political fidelity
and allegiance from this day forward
is to the United States of America.
I pledge to support and respect
its Constitution and laws.
Where and if lawfully required,
I further commit myself to defend them against all enemies,
foreign and domestic, either by military or civilian service.
This I do solemnly swear [or affirm].
The Commission calls for urgently needed reforms to increase the
efficiency and integrity of the naturalization process.  The vast
majority of applicants for naturalization are law-abiding immigrants
who contribute to our society.  The value of Americanization is
eroded whenever unnecessary obstacles prevent eligible immigrants
from becoming citizens.  Its value also is undermined when the
process permits the abuse of our laws by naturalizing applicants
who are not entitled to citizenship.
Recognizing steps already are underway to reengineer the natural-
ization process, the Commission supports the following approaches:
n Instituting efficiencies without sacrificing quality controls.
In the Commission’s 1995 report to Congress, we
recommended that the Immigration and Naturalization
Service [INS] and the Congress take steps to expedite the
processing of naturalization applications while maintaining
As under current regulations, new citizens will conclude the oath with the
words “so help me God” unless, because of religious beliefs or by other rea-
sons of conscience they choose to affirm their allegiance.
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rigorous standards.  Two years later, the naturalization
process still takes too long, and previous efforts to expedite
processing resulted in serious violations of the integrity of
the system.  Instituting a system that is both credible and
efficient remains a pressing need.
n Improving the integrity and processing of fingerprints.
The Commission believes that only service providers under
direct control of the federal government should be authorized
to take fingerprints.  If the federal government does not take
fingerprints itself but instead contracts with service providers,
it must screen and monitor such providers rigorously for
their capacity, capability, and integrity.  Failure to meet
standards would mean the contract would be terminated.
n Contracting with a single English and civics testing service.
The Commission recommends that the federal government
contract with one national and respected testing service to
develop and administer the English and civics tests to
naturalization applicants.  Having one organization under
contract should help the government substantially improve
its oversight.  Moreover, contracting with a highly-respected
and nationally-recognized testing service will help ensure a
high-quality product.
n Increasing professionalism.  While many naturalization staff
are highly professional in carrying out their duties, reports
from district offices, congressional hearings, and complaints
from naturalization applicants demonstrate continued
dissatisfaction with the quality of naturalization services.
Recruitment and training of longer-term staff assigned to
adjudicating applications and overseeing quality control
would help overcome some of these problems.
n Improving automation.  The Commission is encouraged by
The value of
Americanization
is eroded
whenever
unnecessary
obstacles
prevent eligible
immigrants
from becoming
citizens.
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plans to develop linkages among data sources related to
naturalization. The Commission recommends continued
funding for an up-to-date, advanced, electronic automation
system for information entry and recordkeeping.
n Establishing clear fee-waiver guidelines and implementing
them consistently.  Under current law, the Attorney General
is authorized to grant fee waivers to naturalization applicants.
The Commission has received accounts of legitimate requests
being denied.  Clear guidelines and consistent
implementation are needed to ensure that bona fide requests
are granted, while guarding against abuse.
A CREDIBLE FRAMEWORK FOR
IMMIGRATION POLICY
In our previous reports, the Commission defined a credible immi-
gration policy “by a simple yardstick: people who should get in do
get in, people who should not get in are kept out; and people who
are judged deportable are required to leave.”  By these measures,
we have made substantial, but incomplete, progress.  What follows
are the Commission’s recommendations for comprehensive reform
to achieve more fully a credible framework for immigration policy.
LEGAL PERMANENT ADMISSIONS
The Commission reiterates its support for a properly-regulated
system for admitting lawful permanent residents.3  Research and
analyses conducted since the issuance of the Commission’s report
3 For  a full explanation of the Commission’s recommendations see Legal
Immigration: Setting Priorities, 1995.   See Appendix for summary of
Commissioner Leiden’s dissenting statement.
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on legal immigration support our view that a properly-regulated
system of legal permanent admissions serves the national interest.
The Commission urges reforms in our legal immigration system to
enhance the benefits accruing from the entry of newcomers while
guarding against harms, particularly to the most vulnerable of U.S.
residents—those who are themselves unskilled and living in pov-
erty.  More specifically, the Commission reiterates its support for:
n A significant redefinition of priorities and reallocation of
existing admission numbers to fulfill more effectively the
objectives of our immigration policy.  The current frame-
work for legal immigration—family, skills, and humanitar-
ian admissions—makes sense.  However, the statutory and
regulatory priorities and procedures for admissions do not
adequately support the stated intentions of legal immigra-
tion—to reunify families, to provide employers an opportu-
nity to recruit foreign workers to meet labor needs, and to
respond to humanitarian crises around the world.  During
the two years since our report on legal immigration, the
problems in the legal admission system have not been solved.
Indeed, some of them have worsened.
Current immigration levels should be sustained for the next
several years while the U.S. revamps its legal immigration
system and shifts the priorities for admission away from the
extended family and toward the nuclear family and away
from the unskilled and toward the higher-skilled immigrant.
Thereafter, modest reductions in levels of immigration —to
about 550,000 per year, comparable to those of the 1980s—
will result from the changed priority system.  The Commis-
sion continues to believe that legal admission numbers should
be authorized by Congress for a specified time (e.g., three to
five years) to ensure regular, periodic review and, if needed,
change by Congress.  This review should consider the ad-
A properly-regulated
system of
legal permanent
admissions
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national interest.
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equacy of admission numbers for accomplishing
priorities.
n Family-based admissions that give priority to nuclear fam-
ily members—spouses and minor children of U.S. citi-
zens, parents of U.S. citizens, and spouses and minor
children of lawful permanent residents—and include a
backlog clearance program to permit the most expeditious
entry of the spouses and minor children of LPRs.  The
Commission recommends allocation of 550,000 family-based
admission numbers each year until the large backlog of
spouses and minor children is cleared.  Numbers going to
lower priority categories (e.g., adult children, siblings, and
diversity  immigrants), should be transferred to the nuclear
family categories.  Thereafter Congress should set sufficient
admission numbers to permit all spouses and minor chil-
dren to enter expeditiously.
Since the Commission first reported its findings on legal
admission, the problems associated with family-based
admissions have grown.  In 1995, the wait between applica-
tion and admission of the spouses and minor children of
LPRs was approximately three years.  It is now more than
four and one-half years and still growing.  Moreover, vari-
ous statutory changes made in 1996 make it all the more
important that Congress take specific action to clear the back-
log quickly to regularize the status of the spouses and minor
children of legal permanent residents in the United States.
In an effort to deter illegal migration, Congress expanded
the bases and number of grounds upon which persons may
be denied legal status because of a previous illegal entry or
overstay of a visa.  An unknown, but believed to be large,
number of spouses and minor children of LPRs awaiting
legal status are unlawfully present in the United States.  While
the Commission does not condone their illegal presence, we
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are cognizant of the great difficulties posed by the long
waiting period for a family second preference visa.
n Skill-based admissions policies that enhance opportuni-
ties for the entry of highly-skilled immigrants, particu-
larly those with advanced degrees, and eliminate the cat-
egory for admission of unskilled workers. The Commis-
sion continues to recommend that immigrants be chosen on
the basis of the skills they contribute to the U.S. economy.
Only if there is a compelling national interest—such as
nuclear family reunification or humanitarian admissions—
should immigrants be admitted without regard to the eco-
nomic contributions they can make.
Research shows that education plays a major role in deter-
mining the impacts of immigration.  Immigration of un-
skilled immigrants comes at a cost to unskilled U.S. work-
ers, particularly established immigrants for whom new im-
migrants are economic substitutes.  Further, the difference
in estimated lifetime fiscal effects of immigrants by educa-
tion is striking: using the same methodology to estimate net
costs and benefits, immigrants with a high school education
or more are found to be net contributors while those with-
out a high school degree continue to be net costs to taxpay-
ers throughout their lifetime.4
The Commission also continues to recommend changes in
the procedures used in testing the labor market impact of
employment-based admissions.  Rather than use the lengthy,
costly, and bureaucratic labor certification system, the Com-
mission recommends using market forces as a labor market
test.  To ensure a level playing field for U.S. workers, em-
4 National Research Council.  1997.  The New Americans: Economic,
Demographic, and Fiscal Effects of Immigration.  Washington, DC: National
Academy Press.
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ployers would attest to having taken appropriate steps to
recruit U.S. workers, paying the prevailing wage, and com-
plying with other labor standards.  Businesses recruiting
foreign workers also would be required to make significant
financial investments in certified private sector initiatives
dedicated to improving the competitiveness of U.S. work-
ers.  These payments should be set at a per worker amount
sufficient to ensure there is no financial incentive to hire a
foreign worker over a qualified U.S. worker.
n Refugee admissions based on human rights and humani-
tarian considerations, as one of several elements of U.S.
leadership in assisting and protecting the world’s perse-
cuted.5  Since its very beginnings, the United States has been
a place of refuge.  The Commission believes continued ad-
mission of refugees sustains our humanitarian commitment
to provide safety to the persecuted, enables the U.S. to pur-
sue foreign policy interests in promoting human rights, and
encourages international efforts to resettle persons requiring
rescue or durable solutions.  The Commission also urges the
federal government to continue to support international as-
sistance and protection for the majority of the world’s refu-
gees for whom resettlement is neither appropriate nor prac-
tical.
The Commission continues to recommend against denying benefits
to legal immigrants solely because they are noncitizens.  The Com-
mission believes that the denial of safety net programs to immi-
grants solely because they are noncitizens is not in the national
interest.  In our 1994 and 1995 reports, the Commission argued that
Congress should address the most significant uses of public benefit
programs —particularly, elderly immigrants using Supplementary
5 For a full explanation of the Commission’s refugee-related
recommendations, see U.S. Refugee Policy: Taking Leadership, 1997.
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Security Income— by requiring sponsors to assume full financial
responsibility for newly-arriving immigrants who otherwise would
be excluded on public charge grounds.  In particular, the Commis-
sion argued that sponsors of parents who would likely become public
charges assume the responsibility for the lifetimes of the immigrants
(or until they became eligible for Social Security on the basis of
work quarters).  We also argued that sponsors of spouses and chil-
dren should assume responsibility for the duration of the familial
relationship or a time-specified period.  We continue to believe that
this targeted approach makes greater sense than a blanket denial of
eligibility for public services based solely on a person’s alienage.
LIMITED DURATION ADMISSIONS
Persons come to the United States for limited duration stays for
several principal purposes: representation of a foreign government
or other foreign entities; work; study; and short-term visits for com-
mercial or personal purposes, such as tourism and family visits.
These individuals are statutorily referred to as “nonimmigrants.”  In
this report, however, we refer to “limited duration admissions
[LDAs],” a term that better captures the nature of their admission:
When the original admission expires, the alien must either leave the
country or meet the criteria for a new LDA or permanent residence.
For the most part LDAs help enhance our scientific, cultural, edu-
cational, and economic strength.  However, the admission of LDAs
is not without costs and, as explained below, certain reforms are
needed to make the system even more advantageous for the United
States than it now is.
The Commission believes LDA policy should rest on the following
principles:
n Clear goals and priorities;
Persons admitted
for limited
duration stays
help to enhance
our scientific,
cultural,
educational, and
economic strength.
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Limited Duration Admissions
and Visa Issuances
Class of Admission
All classes*
Foreign government officials (& families) (A)
Temporary visitors for business and pleasure (B1,B2)
Transit aliens (C)
Treaty traders and investors (& families) (E)
Students (F1, M1)
Students’ spouses/children (F2, M2)
Representatives (& families) to international organizations (G)
Temporary workers and trainees
Specialty occupations (H-1B)
Performing services unavailable (H2)
Agricultural workers (H-2A)
Unskilled workers (H-2B)
Workers with extraordinary ability (O1, O2)
Internationally recognized athletes or entertainers (P1, P2, P3)
Exchange & religious workers (Q1, R1)
Spouses/children of temporary workers and trainees (H4, O3, P4, R2)
Exchange visitors (J1)
Spouses/children of exchange visitors (J2)
Intracompany transferees (L1)
Spouses/children of transferees (L2)
Sources: Admissions: U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service statistical division.  Visa Issuances:
U.S. Department of State.  1996.  Report of the Visa Office, 1996.  Washington, DC: DOS, Bureau of Con-
sular Affairs.
*Categories may not equal total because of omitted categories (e.g., fiancé(e)s of U.S. citizens,
overlapping Canadian Free Trade Agreement professionals, unknown, NATO officials and profes-
sionals, and foreign media).
Admissions
(Entries)
                    1996
24,842,503
118,157
22,880,270
325,538
138,568
426,903
32,485
79,528
227,440
144,458
23,980
9,635
14,345
9,289
33,633
11,048
53,572
215,475
41,250
140,457
73,305
Visa
Issuances
              1996
6,237,870
78,078
4,947,899
186,556
29,909
247,432
21,518
30,258
81,531
58,327
23,204
11,004
12,200
4,359
23,885
5,946
38,496
171,164
33,068
32,098
37,617
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n Systematic and comprehensible organization of LDA
categories;
n Timeliness, efficiency, and flexibility in its implementation;
n Compliance with the conditions for entry and exit (and ef-
fective mechanisms to monitor and enforce this compliance);
n Credible and realistic policies governing transition from LDA
to permanent immigration status;
n Protection of U.S. workers from unfair competition and of
foreign workers from exploitation and abuse; and
n Appropriate attention to LDA provisions in trade negotia-
tions to ensure future immigration reforms are not unknow-
ingly foreclosed.
The Commission recommends a reorganization of the visa catego-
ries for limited duration stays in the United States to make them
more coherent and understandable.  The Commission recommends
that the current proliferation of visa categories be restructured into
five broad groups: official representatives; foreign workers; students;
short-term visitors; and transitional family members.  This reorga-
nization reflects such shared characteristics of different visa catego-
ries as entry for like reasons, similarity in testing for eligibility, and
similar duration of stay in the United States.
The definitions and objectives of the five limited duration visa clas-
sifications would be:6
n Official representatives are diplomats, representatives of or
to international organizations, representatives of NATO or
NATO forces, and their accompanying family members.  The
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objective of this category is to permit the United States to
admit temporarily individuals who represent their govern-
ments or international organizations.
n Short-term visitors come to the United States for commer-
cial or personal purposes.  In 1995 alone, millions of in-
bound visitors from other countries spent $76 billion on
travel to and in the United States (on U.S. flag carriers,
lodging, food, gifts, and entertainment).
n Foreign workers are those who are coming to perform nec-
essary services for prescribed periods of time, at the expira-
tion of which they must either return to their home coun-
tries or, if an employer or family member petitions success-
fully, adjust to permanent residence.  This category would
serve the labor needs demonstrated by U.S. businesses, with
appropriate provisions to protect U.S. workers from unfair
competition.
n Students are persons who are in the United States for the
purpose of acquiring either academic or practical knowl-
edge of a subject matter.  This category has four major goals:
to provide foreign nationals with opportunities to obtain
knowledge they can take back to their home countries; to
give U.S. schools access to a global pool of talented stu-
6 The current system includes the J visa for cultural exchange, which is
used for a variety of purposes, ranging from short-term visits to study
and work.  The workers include scholars and researchers, camp
counselors, au pairs, and various others. Some work activities under the
J visa demonstrate a clear cultural or education exchange; other work
activities appear only tangentially related to the program’s original
purposes.  Protection of U.S. workers by labor market tests and standards
should apply to the latter group in the same manner as similarly situated
temporary workers in other LDA categories.  The Department of State
should assess how better to fulfill the purpose of the Mutual Educational
and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961 [Fulbright-Hays Act].  Such an analysis
is particularly timely in light of the merger now being implemented
between the Department of State and the United States Information
Agency, which is responsible for administering the J visa.
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dents; to permit the sharing of U.S. values and institutions
with individuals from other countries; and to enhance the
education of U.S. students by exposing them to foreign stu-
dents and their cultures.
n Transitional family members include fiancé(e)s of U.S. citi-
zens.  These individuals differ from other LDAs because
they are processed for immigrant status, although they do
not receive such status until they marry in the U.S. and
adjust.  The Commission believes another category of tran-
sitional family members should be added: spouses of U.S.
citizens whose weddings occur overseas but who subse-
quently come to the U.S. to reside.
Short-term Visitors
The Commission recommends that the current visa waiver pilot
program for short-term business and tourist visits be made
permanent upon the implementation of an entry-exit control system
capable of measuring overstay rates.  A permanent visa waiver sys-
tem requires appropriate provisions to expand the number of par-
ticipating countries and clear and timely means for removing those
countries that fail to meet the high standards reserved for this privi-
lege.  Congress should extend the pilot three years while the control
system is implemented.
Foreign Workers
Each year, more foreign workers enter the United States as LDAs
for temporary work than enter as skill-based immigrants.  In FY
1996, the Department of State issued almost 278,000 limited dura-
tion  worker visas, including those for spouses and children.  By
contrast, only 118,000 immigrant visa issuances and domestic ad-
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justments of status in worker categories were recorded in FY 1996,
far less than the legislated limit of 140,000.
The Commission recommends that the limited duration admission
classification for foreign workers include three principal categories:
those who, for significant and specific policy reasons, should be
exempt by law from labor market protection standards; those whose
admission is governed by treaty obligations; and those whose ad-
mission must adhere to specified labor market protection standards.
Under this recommendation, LDA worker categories are organized
around the same principles that guide permanent worker catego-
ries.   Accordingly, the Commission proposes different subcategories
with labor market protection standards commensurate with the risks
to U.S. workers we believe are posed by the foreign workers.
n Those exempt by law from labor market protection
standards because their admission will generate substantial
economic growth and/or significantly enhance U.S. intellec-
tual and cultural strength and pose little potential for un-
dermining the employment prospects and remuneration of
U.S. workers.  These include:
Individuals of extraordinary ability in the sciences, arts, educa-
tion, business, or athletics, demonstrated through sustained
national or international acclaim and recognized for extraor-
dinary achievements in their field of expertise.
Managers and executives of international businesses.  The global
competitiveness of U.S. businesses is enhanced by the ca-
pacity of multinational corporations to move their senior
staff around the world as needed.
Professors, researchers and scholars whose salary or other com-
pensation is paid by their home government, home institu-
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tion, or the U.S. government in a special program for for-
eign professors, researchers, and scholars.
Religious workers, including ministers of religion and profes-
sionals and other workers employed by religious nonprofit
organizations in the U.S. to perform religious vocations and
religious occupations.
Members of the foreign media admitted under reciprocal agree-
ments.  The U.S. benefits from the presence of members of
the foreign media who help people in their countries under-
stand events in the United States.  Just as we would not
want our media to be overly regulated by labor policies of
foreign governments, the United States extends the same
courtesy to foreign journalists working in the U.S.
n Foreign workers whose admission is subject to treaty
obligations.  This includes treaty traders, treaty investors,
and other workers entering under specific treaties between
the U.S. and the foreign nation of which the alien is a citizen
or national.  Under the provisions of NAFTA, for example,
Canadian professionals are not subject to numerical limits
or labor market testing; Mexican professionals continue to
be subject to labor market tests, but will be exempt from
numerical limits in 2003.
n Foreign workers subject by law to labor market protection
standards.  These are principally:
Professionals and other workers who are sought by employers
because of their highly-specialized skills or knowledge and/or
extensive experience.  Included in this category are employees
of international businesses who have specialized knowledge
but are not managers or executives.
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Trainees admitted to the United States for practical, on-the-
job training in a variety of occupations.  Trainees work in
U.S. institutions as an integral part of their training pro-
gram.
Artists, musicians, entertainers, athletes, fashion models, and par-
ticipants in international cultural groups that share the history,
culture, and traditions of their country.
Lesser-skilled and unskilled workers coming for seasonal or other
short-term employment.  Such worker programs warrant
strict review, as described below.  The Commission remains
opposed to implementation of a large-scale program for tem-
porary admission of lesser-skilled and unskilled workers.
The Commission recommends that the labor market tests used in
admitting temporary workers in this category be commensurate with
the skill level and experience of the worker.
n Employers requesting the admission of temporary work-
ers with highly-specialized skills or extensive experience
should meet specific requirements.  Admission should be
contingent on an attestation that:
The employer will pay the greater of actual or prevailing wage
and fringe benefits paid to other employees with similar ex-
perience and qualifications for the specific employment in
question.  Actual wage rates should be defined in a simple
and straightforward manner.
The employer has posted notice of the hire, informed
coworkers at the principal place of business at which the
LDA worker is employed, and provided a copy of the attes-
tation to the LDA worker.
1 9 9 7
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- XXX -
U.S. COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION REFORM
The employer has paid a reasonable user fee that will be dedi-
cated to facilitating the processing of applications and the
costs of auditing compliance with all requirements.
There is no strike or lockout in the course of a labor dispute
involving the occupational classification at the place of
employment.
The employer has not dismissed, except for cause, or otherwise
displaced workers in the specific job for which the alien worker
is hired during the previous six months.  Further, the em-
ployer will not displace or lay off, except for cause, U.S.
workers in the specific job during the ninety-day period
following the filing of an application or the ninety-day pe-
riods preceding or following the filing of any visa petition
supported by the application.
The employer will provide working conditions for such tempo-
rary workers that are comparable to those provided to simi-
larly situated U.S. workers.
n Certain at-risk employers of skilled workers (described
below) should be required to attest to having taken signifi-
cant steps—for example, recruitment or training—to employ
U.S. workers in the jobs for which they are recruiting
foreign workers.  We do not recommend, however, that
current labor certification processes be used to document
significant efforts to recruit.  These procedures are costly,
time consuming, and ultimately ineffective in protecting
highly-skilled U.S. workers.
n Employers requesting the admission of lesser-skilled work-
ers should be required to meet a stricter labor market pro-
tection test.  Such employers should continue to be required
to demonstrate that they have sought, but were unable to
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find, sufficient American workers prepared to work under
favorable wages, benefits, and working conditions.  They
also should be required to specify the plans they are taking
to recruit and retain U.S. workers, as well as their plans to
reduce dependence on foreign labor through hiring of U.S.
workers or other means. Employers should continue to be
required to pay the highest of prevailing, minimum, or
adverse wage rates, provide return transportation, and offer
decent housing, health care, and other benefits appropriate
for seasonal employees.
The Commission recommends that categories of employers who are
at special risk of violating labor market protection standards
—regardless of the education, skill, or experience level of its
employees—be required to obtain regular, independently-conducted
audits of their compliance with the attestations made about labor
market protection standards, with the results of such audit being
submitted for Department of Labor review.  Certain businesses, as
described below, pose greater risk than others of displacing U.S.
workers and/or exploiting foreign workers.  The risk factors that
should be considered in determining whether regular audit require-
ments must apply include:
n The employer’s extensive use of temporary foreign work-
ers.  Extensive use can be defined by the percentage of the
employer’s workforce that is comprised of LDA workers.  It
also can be measured by the duration and frequency of the
employer’s use of temporary foreign workers.
n The employer’s history of employing temporary foreign
workers.  Those employers with a history of serious viola-
tions of regular labor market protection standards or of spe-
cific labor standards related to the employment of LDA
workers should be considered as at risk for future viola-
tions.
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n The employer’s status as a job contracting or employment
agency providing temporary foreign labor to other
employers.  Risk of labor violations increases as responsibil-
ity is divided between a primary and secondary employer.
To ensure adequate protection of labor market standards, such
employers should be required to submit an independent audit of
their compliance with all statements attested to in their application.
The independent audits should be done by recognized accounting
firms that have the demonstrated capacity to determine, for ex-
ample, that wages and fringe benefits were provided as promised in
the attestation and conformed to the actual or prevailing wages and
fringe benefits provided to similarly situated U.S. workers.
The Commission recommends enhanced monitoring of and
enforcement against fraudulent applications and postadmission
violations of labor market protection standards.  To function effec-
tively, both the exempt and nonexempt temporary worker programs
must provide expeditious access to needed labor.  The Commission’s
recommendations build on the current system of employer attesta-
tions that receive expeditious preapproval review but are subject to
postapproval enforcement actions against violators.  More specifi-
cally, the Commission recommends:
n Allocating increased staff and resources to the agencies
responsible for adjudicating applications for admission
and monitoring and taking appropriate enforcement ac-
tion against fraudulent applications and violations of la-
bor market protection standards.  Increased costs required
for more efficient adjudication of applications can be cov-
ered by applicant fees.  However, additional costs incurred
for more effective investigations of compliance with labor
market standards will require appropriated funds.
n Barring the use of LDA workers by any employer who has
been found to have committed willful and serious labor
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standards violations with respect to the employment of
LDA workers.  Further, upon the recommendation of any
federal, state, or local tax agency, barring the use of LDA
workers by any employer who has been found to have
committed willful and serious payroll tax violations with
respect to LDA workers.  The law currently provides for
such debarment for failure to meet labor condition attesta-
tion provisions or misrepresentation of material facts on the
application.  Implementation of this recommendation would
enable penalties to be assessed for serious labor  standards
violations that are not also violations of the attestations.
n Developing an enforcement strategy to reduce evasion
of the LDA labor market protection standards through
contractors.  U.S. businesses’ growth in contracting-out
functions has raised questions of employment relationships
and ultimate liability for employment-related violations,
including those related to temporary foreign workers.  A
uniform policy for dealing with these situations is desirable
for the enforcement agencies involved, as well as for em-
ployers, contractors, and workers.
CURBING UNLAWFUL MIGRATION
In its first interim report to Congress , the Commission recommended
a comprehensive strategy to curb unlawful migration into the United
States through prevention and removal.7  Despite the additional
resources, new policies, and often innovative strategies adopted
during the past few years, illegal migration continues to be a prob-
lem.  The Commission continues to believe that unlawful immigra-
tion can be curtailed consistent with our traditions, civil rights, and
civil liberties.  As a nation committed to the rule of law, our immi-
7 For a full explanation of the Commission’s recommendations see: U.S.
Immigration Policy: Restoring Credibility, 1994.
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8 The Concurring Statement of Commissioners Leiden and Merced can be
found in the Commission’s 1994 report.
gration policies must conform to the highest standards of integrity
and efficiency in the enforcement of the law.  We must also respect
due process.
Deterrence Strategies
The Commission reiterates its 1994 recommendations supporting a
comprehensive strategy to deter illegal migration.   More specifi-
cally, the Commission continues to support implementation of the
following deterrence strategies:
n An effective border management policy that  accomplishes
the twin goals of preventing illegal entries and facilitating
legal ones.  New resources for additional Border Patrol of-
ficers, inspectors, and operational support, combined with
such new strategies as operations “Hold the Line,”
“Gatekeeper,” and “Safeguard,” have improved significantly
the management of the border where they are deployed.
The very success of these new efforts demonstrates that to
gain full control, the same level of resources and prevention
strategies must be deployed at all points on the border where
significant violations of U.S. immigration law are likely to
occur.
n Reducing the employment magnet is the linchpin of a
comprehensive strategy to deter unlawful migration.   Eco-
nomic opportunity and the prospect of employment remain
the most important draw for illegal migration to this coun-
try.   Strategies to deter unlawful entries and visa overstays
require both a reliable process for verifying authorization to
work and an enforcement capacity to ensure that employers
TOP TEN
COUNTRIES OF
ORIGIN OF
UNLAWFUL
MIGRANTS*
Mexico 2,700,000
El Salvador 335,000
Guatemala 165,000
Canada 120,000
Haiti 105,000
Philippines 95,000
Honduras 90,000
Poland 70,000
Nicaragua 70,000
Bahamas 70,000
* 1996 estimates; Source:
INS. 1997. 1995 Statistical
Yearbook of Immigration and
Naturalization Service.
Washington, DC: Government
Printing Office.
Unlawful
immigration
can be controlled
consistent with
our traditions,
civil rights, and
civil liberties.
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adhere to all immigration-related labor standards.  The Com-
mission supports implementation of pilot programs to test
what we believe is the most promising option for verifying
work authorization: a computerized registry based on the
social security number.8
n Restricting eligibility of illegal aliens for publicly-funded
services or assistance, except those made available on an
emergency basis or for similar compelling reasons to pro-
tect public health and safety or to conform to constitu-
tional requirements.  Although public benefit programs do
not appear to be a major magnet for illegal migrants, it is
important that U.S. benefit eligibility policies send the same
message as immigration policy: Illegal aliens should not be
here and, therefore, should not receive assistance, except in
unusual circumstances.  The Commission recommended
drawing a line between illegal aliens and lawfully resident
legal immigrants with regard to benefits eligibility, in part to
reinforce this message.  We continue to believe that this
demarcation between legal and illegal aliens makes sense.
The Commission urges the Congress to reconsider the
changes in welfare policy enacted in 1996 that blur the dis-
tinctions between legal and illegal aliens by treating them
similarly for the purposes of many public benefit programs.
n Strategies for addressing the causes of unlawful migration
in source countries.  An effective strategy to curb unautho-
rized movements includes cooperative efforts with source
countries to address the push factors that cause people to
seek new lives in the United States.  The Commission con-
tinues to urge the United States government to give priority
in its foreign policy and international economic policy to
TOP TEN
STATES OF
RESIDENCE OF
UNLAWFUL
MIGRANTS*
California 2,000,000
Texas 700,000
New York 540,000
Florida 350,000
Illinois 290,000
New Jersey 135,000
Arizona 115,000
Massachusetts 85,000
Virginia 55,000
Washington 52,000
* 1996 estimates; Source:
INS. 1997.  1995 Statistical
Yearbook of Immigration and
Naturalization Service.
Washington, DC:
Government Printing Office.
9 For a fuller discussion of the Commission’s recommendation on mass
migration emergencies, see U.S. Refugee Policy: Taking Leadership, 1997.
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long-term reduction in the causes of unauthorized migra-
tion.
n Mechanisms to respond in a timely, effective, and humane
manner to migration emergencies.  A credible immigration
policy requires the ability to respond effectively and hu-
manely to migration emergencies in which large numbers of
people seek entry into the United States.  These emergencies
generally include bona fide refugees, other individuals with
need for protection, and persons seeking a better economic
life in the U.S.  Failure to act appropriately and in a timely
manner to determine who should be admitted and who
should be returned can have profound humanitarian conse-
quences.  Further, an uncontrolled emergency can overwhelm
resources and create serious problems that far outlast the
emergency.9
Removals
A credible immigration system requires the effective and timely
removal of aliens who can be determined through constitutionally-
sound procedures to have no right to remain in the United States.
If unlawful aliens believe that they can remain indefinitely once they
are within our national borders, there will be increased incentives to
try to enter or remain illegally.
Our current removal system does not work.  Hundreds of thou-
sands of aliens with final removal orders remain in the U.S.  The
system’s ineffectiveness results from a fragmented, uncoordinated
approach, rather than flawed legal procedures.  The Executive Branch
does not have the capacity, resources, or strategy to detain aliens
likely to abscond, to monitor the whereabouts of released aliens, or
to remove them.
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The Commission urges immediate reforms to improve management
of the removal system and ensure that aliens with final orders of
deportation, exclusion, or removal are indeed removed from the United
States.  Establishing a more effective removal system requires changes
in the management of the removal process.  More specifically, the
Commission recommends:
n Establishing priorities and numerical targets for the re-
moval of criminal and noncriminal aliens.  The Commis-
sion encourages headquarters, regional, and local immigra-
tion enforcement officials to set these priorities and numeri-
cal goals.
n Local oversight and accountability for the development
and implementation of plans to coordinate apprehensions,
detention, hearings, removal, and the prevention of
reentry.  With guidance on priorities,  local managers in
charge of the removal system would be responsible for al-
location of resources to ensure that aliens in the prioritized
categories are placed in the system and ultimately removed.
Local managers also would be responsible and accountable
for  identifying effective deterrents that reduce the likeli-
hood that removed aliens would attempt to reenter the U.S.
n Continued attention to improved means for identifying
and removing criminal aliens with a final order of depor-
tation.  The Commission reiterates the importance of re-
moving criminal aliens as a top priority.  Our recommenda-
tion regarding the importance of removing noncriminal aliens
with final orders is not intended to shift the attention of the
removal system away from this priority.  Rather, both crimi-
nal and noncriminal aliens must be removed to protect pub-
lic safety (in the case of criminals) and to send a deterrent
message (to all who have no permission to be here).
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n Legal rights and representation.  The Executive Branch
should be authorized to develop, provide, and fund pro-
grams and services that educate aliens about their legal rights
and immigration proceedings.  Such programs also should
encourage and facilitate legal representation where to do so
would be beneficial to the system and the administration of
justice.  Particular attention should be focused on aliens in
detention where release or removal can be expedited through
such representation. Under this approach, the alien would
not have a right to appointed counsel, but the government
could fund services to address some of the barriers to rep-
resentation.
n Prosecutorial discretion to determine whether to proceed
with cases.  Guidelines on the use of prosecutorial discre-
tion should be developed, local Trial Attorneys trained, sup-
port staff  provided, and discretion exercised with the goal
of establishing a more efficient and rational hearing system.
Trial attorneys should focus their efforts on trying cases that
are likely to result in the removal of the alien upon comple-
tion of the proceedings.
n Strategic use of detention and release decisions.  Deten-
tion space, always in limited supply, is in greater demand as
the government has focused more on the removal of crimi-
nal aliens and as Congress mandates more categories to be
detained.  Detention needs to be used more strategically if
removals are to be accomplished.  Alternatives to detention
should be developed so that detention space is used effi-
ciently and effectively.  The Commission fully supports the
three-year pilot program, created with and implemented by
the Vera Institute, to help define effective alternatives to
detention for specific populations.
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n Improved detention conditions and monitoring.  Deten-
tion cannot be used effectively unless the conditions of de-
tention are humane and detainees are free from physical
abuse and harassment by guards.  We have no doubt that
appropriate criteria for all facilities can be promulgated,
based on sound governmental judgment and consultation
with concerned nongovernmental  organizations.  But most
importantly, a system to monitor facilities on a regular basis
must be developed.  Inspections must occur more than once
annually.
Further, the Commission recommends that the Department
of Justice consider placing administrative responsibility for
operating detention centers with the Bureau of Prisons or
U.S. Marshals Service.  An immigration enforcement agency
should not be shouldered with such a significant responsi-
bility that is not part of its fundamental mission or exper-
tise.
n Improved data systems.  Current data systems are unable
to link an apprehension to its final disposition (e.g., removal,
adjustment of status).  This significantly limits the use
of apprehension and removal data for analytical purposes.
The Commission urges development of data systems that
link apprehensions and removals and provide statistics on
individuals.
n The redesigned removal system should be managed ini-
tially by a Last-In-First-Out [LIFO] strategy to demonstrate
the credibility of the system.  Once a coherent system is
organized and appropriate resources are assigned to remov-
ing deportable aliens—not simply to put  aliens through
proceedings—removals should proceed in a Last-In-First-
Out mode.  In this way, the government can send a credible
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deterrent message to failed asylum seekers, visa overstayers,
users of counterfeit documents, and unauthorized workers,
that their presence in the United States will not be tolerated.
Such a well-organized system can establish control over
the current caseload and quickly  prioritize the backlog for
enforcement purposes.  The deterrent effect of LIFO has
been shown in the asylum system where new procedures
were adopted in a LIFO mode.
The Commission urges Congress to clarify that the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
[IIRIRA] and the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996 [AEDPA] do not apply retroactively to cases pending when the
new policies and procedures went into effect.   As a matter of policy,
the Commission believes that retroactive application of new immi-
gration laws undermines the effectiveness and credibility of the
immigration system.  Applying newly-enacted laws or rules in an
immigration proceeding that has already commenced results in in-
efficiency in the administration of the immigration laws.  It also can
raise troubling issues of fairness.  Finally, it invites confusion, adds
uncertainty, and fosters a lack of trust and confidence in the rule
of law.
ACHIEVING IMMIGRATION POLICY
GOALS
INTRODUCTION
Restoring credibility and setting priorities—themes at the center of
the Commission’s policy recommendations on illegal and legal im-
migration, respectively—will not come to pass unless the govern-
ment is structured to deliver on these policies.  An effective immi-
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gration system requires both credible policy and sound manage-
ment.  Good management cannot overcome bad policy.  Poor struc-
tures, lack of professionalism, poor planning, and failure to set pri-
orities will foil even the best policies.
Until relatively recently, the agencies responsible for implementing
immigration policy were underfunded, understaffed, and neglected.
During the past few years, however, massive increases in resources
and personnel, combined with significant political attention to im-
migration issues, have provided new opportunities to address long-
standing problems.  A recent General Accounting Office [GAO] re-
port documented improvements—including, for example, a more
strategic approach to the formulation of immigration enforcement
programs. The Commission has seen progress in many management
areas—for example, more effective border management, increased
numbers of criminal alien removals, and asylum reform that has
deterred abusive claims while protecting bona fide refugees.  Never-
theless, problems remain in the operation of the U.S. immigration
and naturalization system.  Further improvements must be made if
it is to function smoothly and effectively, anticipating and address-
ing, rather than reacting to, problems.
STRUCTURAL REFORM
The Commission recommends fundamental restructuring of respon-
sibilities within the federal government to support more effective
management of the core functions of the immigration system: bor-
der and interior enforcement; enforcement of immigration-related
employment standards; adjudication of immigration and natural-
ization applications; and consolidation of administrative appeals.
The immigration system is one of the most complicated in the fed-
eral government bureaucracy.  In some cases, one agency has mul-
An effective
immigration system
requires both
credible policy and
sound management.
10 See Appendix for Commissioner Leiden’s concurring statement.
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tiple, and sometimes conflicting, operational responsibilities.  In other
cases, multiple agencies have responsibility for elements of the same
functions.  Both situations create problems.
Mission Overload.  Some of the agencies that implement the immi-
gration laws have so many responsibilities that they have proved
unable to manage all of them effectively.  Between Congressional
mandates and administrative determinations, these agencies must
give equal weight to more priorities than any one agency can handle.
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Such a system is set up for failure and, with such failure, further
loss of public confidence in the immigration system.
No one agency is likely to have the capacity to accomplish all of the
goals of immigration policy equally well.  Immigration law enforce-
ment requires staffing, training, resources, and a work culture that
differs from what is required for effective adjudication of benefits or
labor standards regulation of U.S. businesses.
Diffusion of Responsibilities Among Agencies.  Responsibility for many
immigration functions are spread across numerous agencies within
single departments or between departments.  For example, respon-
sibility for making decisions on skill-based immigrant and LDA ap-
plications is dispersed among the Department of Labor [DOL], the
Department of Justice’s [DOJ] Immigration and Naturalization Ser-
vice [INS], and the Department of State [DOS].  Responsibility for
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investigating employer compliance with immigration-related labor
standards is shared by INS and DOL.
The Commission considered a range of ways to reorganize roles and
responsibilities, including proposals to establish a Cabinet-level
Department of Immigration Affairs.  After examining the full range
of options, the Commission concludes that a clear division
of responsibility among existing federal agencies, with appropriate
consolidation of functions, will improve management of the
federal immigration system. As discussed below, the Commission
recommends a restructuring of the immigration system’s four
principal operations as follows:10
1. Immigration enforcement at the border and in the interior of
the United States in a Bureau for Immigration Enforcement
at the Department of Justice;
2. Adjudication of eligibility for immigration-related
applications (immigrant, limited duration admission,
asylum, refugee, and naturalization) in the Department of
State under the jurisdiction of an Undersecretary for
Citizenship, Immigration, and Refugee Admissions;
3. Enforcement of immigration-related employment standards
in the Department of Labor; and
4. Appeals of administrative decisions including hearings
on removal, in an independent body, the Agency for
Immigration Review.
The Commission believes this streamlining and reconfiguring of
responsibilities will help ensure: coherence and consistency in immi-
gration-related law enforcement; a supportive environment for
adjudication of applications for immigration, refugee, and citizen-
ship services; rigorous enforcement of immigration-related labor stan-
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dards to protect U.S. workers; and fair and impartial review of
immigration decisions.
Bureau For Immigration Enforcement
(DOJ)
The Commission recommends placing all responsibility for
enforcing United States immigration laws to deter future illegal
entry and remove illegal aliens in a Bureau for Immigration Enforce-
ment at the Department of Justice.  The Commission believes that
the importance and complexity of the enforcement function within
the U.S. immigration system necessitate the establishment of a higher-
level, single-focus agency within the DOJ.  The Commission further
recommends that the newly configured agency have the prominence
and visibility that the Federal Bureau of Investigation [FBI] cur-
rently enjoys within the DOJ structure. The Director of the Bureau
would be appointed for a set term (e.g., five years).  The agency
would be responsible for planning, implementing, managing, and
evaluating all U.S. immigration enforcement activities both within
the United States and overseas.
The Commission recommends the following distribution of respon-
sibilities within the Bureau for Immigration Enforcement.
Uniformed Enforcement Officers.  The Commission recommends
merger of the INS Inspectors, Border Patrol, and detention officers
into one unit, the Immigration Uniformed Service Branch.  Its offic-
ers would be trained for duties at land, sea, and air ports of entry,
between land ports on the border, and in the interior where uni-
formed officers are needed for enforcement.
Investigators.  The Commission believes investigations will be a key
part of the new agency’s responsibility.  Investigators are the main
agents responsible for identifying and apprehending people who are
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illegally residing or working in the United States, for deterring smug-
gling operations, for building a case against those who are not
deterred, and for identifying, apprehending, and carrying out the
removal of aliens with final enforceable orders of removal.
Intelligence.  The Bureau will require an Intelligence Division to
provide strategic assessments, training and expertise on fraud, in-
formation about smuggling networks, and tactical support to uni-
formed officers or investigators.
Assets Forfeiture Unit.  As with the other DOJ enforcement agen-
cies, the Bureau will have an Assets Forfeiture unit.
Pre- and Post-Trial “Probation” Officers.  “Probation” functions are
not now performed consistently or effectively, but the Commission
believes this function is essential to more strategic use of detention
space.  As it is unlikely that all potentially deportable aliens could
or should be detained awaiting removal, the Commission believes
more attention should be given to supervised release programs and
to sophisticated methods for tracking the whereabouts of those not
detained.
Trial Attorneys/Prosecutors.  The Commission believes that the Trial
Attorneys, who in effect are the Government’s immigration pros-
ecutors, should be vested with, and should utilize, an important tool
possessed by their criminal counterparts: prosecutorial discretion.
Field Offices.  The new agency would implement its programs
through a series of field offices that are structured to address com-
prehensively the immigration enforcement challenges of the particu-
lar locality.  As the location of these offices should be driven by
enforcement priorities, they are likely to be in different places than
current district offices.  Regional Offices could be retained for ad-
ministrative and managerial oversight of these dispersed and di-
verse field offices.
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Citizenship, Immigration, And Refugee
Admissions (DOS)
The Commission recommends that all citizenship and immigration
benefits adjudications be consolidated in the Department of State,
and that an Undersecretary for Citizenship, Immigration, and Refu-
gee Admissions be created to manage these activities.  At present,
three separate agencies—the INS, the Department of State, and the
Department of Labor—play broad roles in adjudicating applications
for legal immigration, limited duration admissions, refugee admis-
sions, asylum, and/or citizenship.  The Commission believes a more
streamlined and accountable adjudication process, involving fewer
agencies but greater safeguards, will result in faster and better de-
terminations of these benefits.  As in the current system, these ser-
vices would be funded through fees paid by applicants and retained
by the benefits offices for delivery of the services.
The Commission considered the advantages and disadvantages of
consolidating responsibility in the Department of Justice and in the
Department of State, the two agencies that already have the most
significant immigration, refugee, and citizenship duties.  Bearing in
mind the dual problems the Commission identified in the current
structures—mission overload and fragmentation of responsibility,
we concluded that consolidation in the Department of State makes
greater sense than creation of a new, separate benefits agency within
the Department of Justice.
Taking responsibility for immigration and citizenship services out of
the Department of Justice sends the right message, that legal immi-
gration and naturalization are not principally law enforcement prob-
lems; they are opportunities for the nation as long as the services are
properly regulated. Further, the Department of Justice does not have
the capacity internationally to take on the many duties of the De-
partment of State.  The Department of State, however, already has
a domestic presence and an adjudication capability.  It issues one-
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half million immigrant visas and six million nonimmigrant visas
each year.  DOS also provides a full range of citizenship services
both domestically (issuance of almost 6 million passports annually)
and abroad (e.g., citizenship determinations and registration of births
of U.S. citizens overseas).  Indeed, DOS has devoted a major share
of its personnel and its capital and operating resources to these
adjudicatory functions at embassies and consulates in more than
two hundred countries and in passport offices in fifteen U.S. cities.
Consolidating responsibility requires some changes in the way the
Department of State administers its immigration responsibilities,
which we believe will strengthen the adjudication function.  Because
immigration has both foreign and domestic policy import, the De-
partment of State will need to develop mechanisms for consultation
with groups representing a broad range of views and interests re-
garding immigration.  Such consultations already occur in the refu-
gee program.  The Department of State also will need to change its
historic position on review of consular decisions.  At present, deci-
sions made at INS and the Department of Labor on many immi-
grant and LDA applications may be appealed, but no appeal is
available on consular decisions.  The Commission believes that
immigrant and certain limited duration admission visas with a U.S.
petitioner should be subject to independent administrative appeal
(see below).
The Undersecretary, who would have direct access to the Secretary
of State, would be responsible for domestic and overseas immigra-
tion, citizenship, and refugee functions.  These include adjudication
of applications for naturalization, determinations of citizenship over-
seas, all immigrant and limited duration admission petitions, work
authorizations and other related permits, and adjustments of status.
It also would have responsibility for refugee status determinations
abroad and asylum claims at home.  Overseas citizenship services
would continue to be provided by consular officers abroad.  The
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agency would have enhanced capacity to detect, deter, and combat
fraud and abuse among those applying for benefits.
Within the Office of the Undersecretary would be a unit responsible
both for formulating and assessing immigration policy as well as
reviewing and commenting on the immigration-related effects of
foreign policy decisions.  This policy capacity would be new for the
Department of State, but it is in keeping with the important role that
migration now plays in international relations.
The Undersecretary would have three principal operating bureaus:
A Bureau of Immigration Affairs would focus on the immigration
process, as noted above, as well as on LDA processing.  In
addition to its existing overseas work, the Immigration Affairs
Bureau would be responsible for domestic adjudication/examina-
tion functions, including work authorization, adjustment of status,
domestic interviewing, and the issuance of appropriate documenta-
tion (e.g., green cards).  The Immigration Affairs Bureau also would
staff immigration information and adjudication offices in areas with
immigrant concentrations.
A Bureau of Refugee Admissions and Asylum Affairs would
assure an appropriate level of independence from routine
immigration issues and processes.  It would combine the present
Bureau for Population, Refugees and Migration [PRM] responsibili-
ties for overseas refugee admissions, the refugee and asylum offices
of the INS, and the DOS asylum office in the  Bureau of Democracy,
Human Rights and Labor.  This would integrate the key govern-
mental offices in one of our most important and historic interna-
tional activities.
A Bureau of Citizenship and Passport Affairs would be respon-
sible for naturalization, other determinations of citizenship, and is-
suance of passports.  Local offices performing some citizenship func-
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tions, such as overseas travel information, passport and naturaliza-
tion applications, testing and interviews, could be located with local
immigration services.
Overseas citizen services would continue to be handled within the
newly consolidated organization.  These services include: respond-
ing to inquiries as to the welfare or whereabouts of U.S. citizens;
assisting when U.S. citizens die, are arrested, or experience other
emergencies abroad; providing notarial services; and making citi-
zenship determinations and issuing passports abroad.
Quality Assurance Offices would oversee records management,
monitoring procedures, fraud investigations, and internal review.
At present, monitoring of the quality of decisions made on applica-
tions for immigration and citizenship benefits receives insufficient
attention.  The Commission believes that quality decisions require
some form of internal supervisory review for applicants who be-
lieve their cases have been wrongly decided.  This type of review
helps an agency monitor consistency and identify problems in adju-
dication and offers a means of correcting errors.  A staff responsible
for and dedicated to ensuring the quality of decisions taken on
applications for immigration and citizenship should address some
of the weaknesses in the current system, such as those recently
identified in the naturalization process.
With respect to the domestic field structure for implementing these
programs, the Regional Service Centers [RSCs] and National Visa
Center [NVC] would continue to be the locus of most adjudication.
The physical plants are excellent and the locally-hired staffs are
trained and in place.  At this time, information is passed from the
11 At present, DOL investigates employer compliance with the requirement
to check documentation and fill out the I-9 form, while INS does this
paperwork review and investigations of knowing hire of illegal aliens.
The latter investigations are hampered, however, by the absence of an
effective verification process and proliferation of fraudulent documents.
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RSCs to the NVC when the applicant for admission is overseas.
Overseas interviews would continue to take place at embassies and
consulates.
A range of other interviews would take place domestically.  Ideally,
to avoid long lines and waits for service, there would be smaller
offices in more locations that the current INS district offices.  The
Commission recommends against locating these offices with the en-
forcement offices discussed above.  Asking individuals requesting
benefits or information to go to an enforcement agency sends the
wrong message about the U.S. view of legal immigration.
Immigration-related Employment
Standards (DOL)
The Commission recommends that all responsibility for enforcement
of immigration-related standards for employers be consolidated in
the Department of Labor.  These activities include enforcing compli-
ance with requirements to verify work authorization and attesta-
tions made regarding conditions for the legal hire of temporary and
permanent foreign workers.  The Commission believes that as this
is an issue of labor standards, the Department of Labor is the best
equipped federal agency to regulate and investigate employer compli-
ance with standards intended to protect U.S. workers.  The hiring of
unauthorized workers and the failure of employers to comply with
the commitments they make (e.g., to pay prevailing wages, to have
recruited U.S. workers) in obtaining legal permission to hire tempo-
rary and permanent foreign workers are violations of such labor
standards.  Enforcement of compliance with these requirements
currently lies within the responsibility of both INS and DOL.  Under
consolidation, the DOL Employment Standards Administration’s
[ESA] Wage and Hour Division [WH] and Office of Federal Con-
tract Compliance Programs [OFCCP] would perform these func-
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tions in conjunction with their other worksite labor standards activi-
ties.
Sanctions Against Employers Who Fail to Verify Work Authoriza-
tion.  The Commission believes all worksite investigations to ascer-
tain employers’ compliance with employment eligibility verification
requirements should be conducted by DOL.  DOL already conducts
many of these investigations.  However, under this recommenda-
tion, DOL also would assess penalties if employers fail to verify the
employment eligibility of persons being hired.  DOL would not be
required to prove that an employer knowingly hired an illegal worker,
just that the employer hired a worker without verification of his or
her authorization to work. With implementation of the Commission’s
proposal for a more effective verification process, this function will
be critical to deterring the employment of unauthorized workers.11
Enforcement of Skill-Based Immigrant and Limited Duration Ad-
missions Requirements.  The Commission believes an expedited
process is needed for the admission of both temporary and perma-
nent foreign workers, as discussed earlier in this report, as long as
adequate safeguards are in place to protect the wages and working
conditions of U.S. workers.  To prevent abuse of an expedited sys-
tem, an effective postadmission enforcement scheme is necessary.
DOL’s other worksite enforcement responsibilities place it in the
best position to monitor employers’ compliance with the attesta-
tions submitted in the admissions process.  DOL investigators are
experienced in examining employment records and interviewing em-
ployees.  Penalties should be established for violations of the condi-
tions to which the employer has attested, including payment of the
appropriate wages and benefits, terms and conditions of employ-
ment, or any misrepresentation or material omissions in the attesta-
tion.  Such penalties should include both the assessment of signifi-
cant administrative fines as well as barring egregious or repeat vio-
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lators from petitioning for the admission of permanent or tempo-
rary workers.
Agency For Immigration Review
The Commission recommends that administrative review of all
immigration-related decisions be consolidated and be considered by
a newly-created independent agency, the Agency for Immigration
Review, within the Executive Branch.  The Commission believes
that a system of formal administrative review of immigration-re-
lated decisions—following  internal supervisory review within the
initial adjudicating body—is indispensable to the integrity and op-
eration of the immigration system.  Such  review guards against
incorrect and arbitrary decisions and promotes fairness, account-
ability, legal integrity, uniform legal interpretations, and consistency
in the application of  the law both in individual cases and across the
system as a whole.
The review function works best when it is well insulated from the
initial adjudicatory function and when it is conducted by
decisionmakers entrusted with the highest degree of independence.
Not only is independence in decisionmaking the hallmark of mean-
ingful and effective review, it is also critical to the reality and the
perception of fair and impartial review.
Hence, the Commission recommends that the review function be
conducted by a newly-created independent reviewing agency in the
Executive Branch.  To ensure that the new reviewing agency is in-
dependent and will exist permanently across Administrations, we
believe it should be statutorily created.  It would incorporate the
activities now performed by several existing review bodies, includ-
ing the DOJ Executive Office for Immigration Review, the INS
Administrative Appeals Office, the DOL Board of Alien Labor Cer-
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tification Appeals, and the DOS Board of Appellate Review.  It also
would have some new responsibilities.
This reviewing agency would be headed by a Director, a presiden-
tial appointee, who would coordinate the overall work of the agency,
but would have no say in the substantive decisions reached on cases
considered by any division or component within the agency.
There would be a trial division headed by a Chief Immigration
Judge, appointed by the Director.  The Chief Judge would oversee
a corps of Immigration Judges sitting in immigration courts located
around the country.   The Immigration Judges would hear every
type of case presently falling within the jurisdiction of the now-
sitting Immigration Judges.
The reviewing agency also would consider appeals of decisions by
the benefits adjudication agency, using staff with legal training.
Although the benefits adjudication agency will handle a wide range
of applications—from tourist visas to naturalization and the issu-
ance of passports—not all determinations will be appealable, as is
the case under current law.  We envision that those matters that are
appealable under current law would remain appealable.  The only
difference is that the appeal would be lodged with and considered
by the new independent Agency for Immigration Review rather
than by the various reviewing offices and Boards presently located
among the several Departments.  The administrative appeals agency
also would consider appeals from certain visa denials and visa re-
vocations by consular officers.  Under current law, such decisions
are not subject to formal administrative or judicial review.  The
Commission believes that consular decisions denying or revoking
visas in specified visa categories—i.e., all immigrant visas and those
LDA categories where there is a petitioner in the United States who
is seeking the admission of the visa applicant—should be subject to
formal administrative review.  The visa applicant would have no
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right to appeal an adverse determination.  Instead, standing to appeal
a visa denial or revocation would lie only with United States peti-
tioners, whether U.S. citizens, lawful permanent residents, or em-
ployers.
An appellate Board would sit over the trial and administrative ap-
peals divisions of the new independent Agency for Immigration
Review.  This appellate Board would be the highest administrative
tribunal in the land on questions and interpretations of immigration
law.  It would designate selected decisions as precedents for publi-
cation and distribution to the public at large.  Its decisions would
be binding on all officers of the Executive Branch.  To ensure the
greatest degree of  independence, decisions by the Board would be
subject to reversal or modification only as a result of judicial review
by the federal courts or through congressional action.  Neither the
Director of the reviewing agency nor any other agency or Depart-
ment head could alter, modify, or reverse a decision by the appellate
Board.
MANAGEMENT REFORM
The Commission urges the federal government to make needed
reforms to improve management of the immigration system.  While
the Commission-recommended structural changes will help improve
implementation of U.S. policy, certain management reforms also must
be adopted if the restructured agencies responsible for immigration
matters are to be effective in performing their functions.  Structural
reforms will not by themselves solve some of the management prob-
lems that have persisted in the immigration agencies.
More specifically, the Commission recommends:
 n Setting More Manageable and Fully-Funded Priorities.  The
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Commission urges Congress and the Executive Branch to
establish and then appropriately fund a more manageable
set of immigration-related priorities.  More manageable
means fewer objectives, but also a set of more integrated
priorities, more realistically-achievable short-term and long-
term goals, and greater numerical specificity on expected
annual     outcomes to which agencies could be held ac-
countable.
n Developing More Fully the Capacity for Policy Develop-
ment, Planning, Monitoring, and Evaluation.  Each depart-
ment with immigration-related responsibilities needs to
perform a wide range of policy functions, including, but not
limited to, long-range and strategic policy planning, inter-
agency policy integration, policy review, policy coordina-
tion, priority setting, data collection and analysis, budget
formulation, decisionmaking, and accountability.  The Do-
mestic Policy Council and the National Security Council in
the White House can also play an important role in coordi-
nating policy development across departments.
n Improving Systems of Accountability.  Staff who are
responsible for immigration programs should be held ac-
countable for the results of their activities.  Systems should
be developed to reward or sanction managers and staff on
the basis of their performance.
n Recruiting and Training Managers.  The Commission
believes enhancements must be made in the recruitment and
training of managers.  As immigration-related agencies grow
and mandated responsibilities increase or evolve, closer
attention should be paid to improving the skills and mana-
gerial capacity of immigration staff at all levels to ensure
more efficient and effective use of allocated resources.
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n Strengthening Customer Service Orientation.  The Com-
mission urges increased attention to instilling a customer-
service ethic in staff, particularly those responsible for
adjudication of applications for benefits.
n Using Fees for Immigration Services More Effectively.  The
Commission supports the imposition of user fees, but
emphasizes: (1) that the fees should reflect true costs; (2)
that the agencies collecting the fees should retain them and
use them to cover the costs of those services for which the
fees are levied; (3) that those paying fees should expect to
be treated to timely and courteous service; and (4) that
maximum flexibility should be given to agencies to expand
or contract their response expeditiously as applications
increase or decrease.
The Commission reiterates its 1994 recommendations concerning the
need for improvements in immigration data collection, coordina-
tion, analysis, and dissemination.  Although some progress has been
made, much more needs to be done to collect data that will inform
responsible immigration policymaking.  The Commission believes
that each agency involved in immigration must establish a system
and develop a strategy for the collection, interagency coordination,
analysis, dissemination, and use of reliable data.
Further, the Commission urges the federal government to support
continuing research and analysis on the implementation and impact
of immigration policy.  In particular, the federal government should
support data collection and analysis in the following areas: longitu-
dinal surveys on the experiences and impact of immigrants; on the
experiences and impact of foreign students and foreign workers
admitted for limited duration stays; and on the patterns and im-
pacts of unlawful migration.
1 9 9 7
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- LIX -
U.S. COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION REFORM
CONCLUSION
This report concludes the work of the U.S. Commission on Immi-
gration Reform.  Together with our three interim reports, this final
set of recommendations provides a framework for immigration and
immigrant policy to serve our national interests today and in the
years to come.  The report outlines reforms that will enhance the
benefits of legal immigration while mitigating potential harms, curb
unlawful migration to this country, and structure and manage our
immigration system to achieve all these goals.  Most importantly,
this report renews our call for a strong commitment to Americaniza-
tion, the process by which immigrants become part of our commu-
nity and we learn and adapt to their presence.  Becoming an Ameri-
can is the theme of this report.  Living up to American values and
ideals is the challenge for us all.
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Legal Immigration: Setting Priorities
THE NATIONAL INTEREST
A properly regulated system of legal immigration is in the national interest of the United States. Such a system enhances
the benefits of immigration while protecting against potential harms.
Immigrants often create new businesses and other employment-generating activities that promote the renewal of city
neighborhoods and commercial districts. Immigrants also can strengthen America's economic and political ties with
other nations and, thus, enhance our ability to compete in a global economy and provide leadership in international and
humanitarian affairs. Properly regulated immigration further strengthens American scientific, literary, artistic and other
cultural resources. It promotes family values and ties, important components of good schools and strong communities.
At a time of troubling ethnic strife in many parts of the world, an effective American immigration policy can
demonstrate to other countries that religious and ethnic diversity are compatible with national civic unity in a
democratic and free society.
Legal immigration, however, has costs, as well as benefits. Immigrants with relatively low education and skills may
compete for jobs and public services with the most vulnerable of Americans, particularly those who are unemployed or
underemployed. Jobs generated by immigrant businesses do not always address this problem. Concentrated and/or rapid
entry of immigrants into a locality may impose immediate net costs, particularly in education funding to meet the
additional and special needs of newcomers. Concentration of new immigrants can exacerbate tensions among ethnic
groups. Certain legal immigrant populations may impose other costs: refugees often need special health and other
services, making per capita resettlement more costly than overseas solutions; elderly new immigrants are more likely to
draw upon public services than elderly native-born Americans or immigrants who came to the United States at a
younger age.
Immigrant Admissions by Major Category: 
FYs 1990-1994
Category of Admission 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
SUBJECT TO THE
NUMERICAL CAP 535,993 537,010 655,541 719,701 662,029
FAMILY-BASED
IMMIGRANTS 448,640 455,415 502,995 539,209 497,682
Immediate Relatives of U.S.
citizens 231,680 237,103 235,484 255,059 249,764
--Spouses and children 171,491 173,527 170,720 192,631 193,394
--Parents 60,189 63,576 64,764 62,428 56,370
Children born abroad to alien
residents 2,410 2,224 2,116 2,030 1,883
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Family-sponsored immigrants 214,550 216,088 213,123 226,776 211,961
--Unmarried sons/daughters of
U.S. citizens 15,861 15,385 12,486 12,819 13,181
--Spouses and children of
LPRs X X 90,486 98,604 88,673
--Sons and daughters of LPRs X X 27,761 29,704 26,327
--Married sons/daughters of
U.S. citizens 26,751 27,115 22,195 23,385 22,191
--Siblings of U.S. citizens 64,252 63,462 60,195 62,264 61,589
Legalization dependents X X 52,272 55,344 34,074
EMPLOYMENT-BASED
IMMIGRANTS 58,192 59,525 116,198 147,012 123,291
Priority workers X X 5,456 21,114 21,053
Professionals w/ adv. deg. or
of advanced ability X X 58,401 29,468 14,432
Skilled, professionals, other
workers, (CSPA) X X 47,568 87,689 76,956
--Skilled, professionals, other
workers X X 47,568 60,774 55,659
--Chinese Student Protection
Act (CSPA) X X X 26,915 21,297
Special immigrants 4,463 4,576 4,063 8,158 10,406
Investors X X 59 583 444
Professionals or highly skilled
(Old 3rd) 26,546 27,748 340 X X
Needed skilled or unskilled
workers (Old 6th) 27,183 27,201 311 X X
DIVERSITY PROGRAMS 29,161 22,070 36,348 33,480 41,056
Diversity transition X X 33,911 33,468 41,056
Nationals of adversely
affected countries 20,371 12,268 1,557 10 X
Natives of underrepresented
countries 8,790 9,802 880 2 X
NOT SUBJECT TO THE
NUMERICAL CAP 120,118 166,995 155,094 160,313 136,365
Amerasians 13,059 16,010 17,253 11,116 2,822
Cuban/Haitian Entrants 710 213 99 62 47
Parolees, Soviet and
Indochineese X 4,998 13,661 15,772 8,253
Refugees and Asylees 97,364 139,079 117,037 127,343 121,434
--Refugee adjustments 92,427 116,415 106,379 115,539 115,451
-- Asylee adjustments 4,937 22,664 10,658 11,804 5,983
Registered Nurses and their
families 2,954 3,069 3,572 2,178 304
Registry, entered prior to 4,633 2,282 1,293 938 667
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Other 1,398 1,344 2,179 2,904 2,838
TOTAL 656,111 704,005 810,635 880,014 798,394
Note: X = Not Applicable. Excludes persons granted LPR status under the provisions of the Immigration Reform
and Control Act of 1986.
Source: Immigration and Naturalization Service, Statistics Division
The recommendations in this report strongly affirm the value of a properly regulated immigration system. They seek to
maximize the many positive opportunities that legal immigration presents to our nation. At the same time, the
recommendations will help mitigate potential negative impacts, particularly on disadvantaged U.S. workers. Finally, the
Commission's recommendations support effective Americanization of new immigrants, that is the cultivation of a shared
commitment to the American values of liberty, democracy, and equal opportunity. These recommendations should help
ensure that our legal immigration system will continue to serve the national interest of the United States.
FRAMEWORK FOR IMMIGRATION REFORM
The Commission supports the basic framework of current policy-family unification, employment-based immigration,
and refugee admissions. We considered alternative frameworks, particularly a point system, but rejected these
approaches. We believe that a system that relies on formulas and bureaucratic procedures for determining which
immigrants meet the ability criteria for admission is not as effective in serving the national interest as one that relies on
the judgment of American families and employers within a framework that protects U.S. workers from unfair
competition. At the same time, the Commission is convinced that our current immigration system must undergo major
reform to ensure that admissions continue to serve our national interests. Hence, the Commission recommends a
significant redefinition of priorities and a reallocation of existing admission numbers to fulfill more effectively the
objectives of our immigration policy.* 
PRINCIPLES FOR A PROPERLY REGULATED IMMIGRATION
POLICY
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The Commission believes that our immigration system should rest upon certain basic principles. 
Clear Goals and Priorities. Sound immigration policy must set out clear goals and give priority to the
admission of those immigrants who best meet those goals.
Enforcement of Immigration Limits. An effectively regulated immigration policy establishes limits on
the number of immigrants that are consistent with the goals of the various categories under which
immigrants enter. Moreover, these limits must be enforceable and enforced. We underscore our
commitment to curtailing illegal immigration as embodied in our 1994 recommendations. We will continue
to monitor progress toward their implementation until the expiration of our mandate in September 1997.
Regular Periodic Review. An effectively regulated system requires some flexibility with regard to
numbers so as to permit adjustment as circumstances in the United States change.
Clarity and Efficiency. Immigration policy should not be overly complex, and the mechanisms used to
implement immigration policy should be efficient and comprehensible. The terms used should be as clear
and self-explanatory as possible. The number of visas allocated to various immigrant categories should be
sufficient to ensure the expeditious entry of those of highest priority. Backlogs in high priority categories
undermine the purposes of immigration policy, while backlogs in lower priority categories give false hope
to individuals whose admissions are of lesser national interest.
Enforcement of Sponsor Responsibility. A properly regulated immigration policy will hold sponsors
accountable for keeping immigrants from becoming burdens on the American taxpayer and enforce that
accountability through legally binding obligations.
Protection of U.S. Workers. A properly regulated system will also provide protection to American
workers against unfair competition arising from immigrant categories that are designed to enhance U.S.
economic strength. A higher level of job protection should be made available to the most vulnerable in our
society.
Coherence. Both temporary and permanent admissions categories must be seen as integral parts of a
coherent legal immigration policy. Temporary student, worker, and humanitarian categories are linked to
permanent immigration. Inefficiencies and inconsistencies in the procedures for determining admissibility
in permanent categories frequently lead employees, employers, and even family members to use temporary
categories to gain entrance when the immigrant's true intention is permanent residence.
Americanization. Immigration policy is not credible without attention to English language training, civic
education, and preparation for naturalization and effective citizen participation. Americanization-by which
we mean cultivation of a shared commitment to the American values of liberty, democracy, and equal
opportunity-is desirable and possible regardless of the nationality, native language, or religious background
of immigrants and their children.
A Transition Period. Fundamental immigration reform, as proposed by the Commission, requires a period
of transition to get from the present system to the new one. We recommend prudent, measured steps to
make that transition possible.
RECOMMENDATIONS
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The following recommendations will contribute to a more accountable and credible application of our immigration
policy:
The Commission supports a tripartite immigration policy that permits the entry of nuclear family members, professional
and skilled workers, and refugees and other humanitarian admissions. In addition, the Commission urges Congress to
take steps to address the continued aftereffects of the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act [IRCA] that provided
legal status to formerly illegal aliens.
The Commission proposes a core immigration admissions level of 550,000 per year, to be divided as follows:
Nuclear family immigration 400,000;
Skill-based immigration 100,000;
Refugee resettlement 50,000.*
The Commission further recommends that Congress authorize 150,000 visas annually for the admission of the spouses
and minor children of legal permanent residents who have been awaiting entry until such time as this backlog is
eliminated. 
The Commission recommends that admission levels be authorized by Congress for a specified time period (e.g., three to
five years) in order to ensure regular periodic review and, if needed, change by Congress. 
These recommendations represent fundamental reform of U.S. immigration policy. 
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Nuclear Family Immigration
Immigration supports the national interest by promoting strong and intact nuclear families-that is, the basic social unit
consisting of parents and their dependent children living in one household. Immigration contributes to this national
interest by permitting the entry of close family members of U.S. citizens and permanent residents who otherwise may be
separated for years. Immigration policy also can contribute to the strength of U.S. families by ensuring that immigrants
receive any needed financial support from their own relatives and, thus, impose no financial burdens upon the taxpaying
public. 
The Commission recommends:
A prioritization of family relationships to determine who will be admitted through family-based immigration, with
admission numbers going to those who are of the highest priority. Only to the extent that visas are available after the
demand in higher priorities is met should visas be made available to lower priority categories. Following this reasoning,
the Commission makes further recommendations. 
Spouses and minor children of U.S. citizens should continue to be admitted as the first priority. Also to be
admitted under this priority are the small number of adult children dependent on U.S. citizen parents because of a
mental or physical disability. This policy permits the expeditious entry of the closest family members while
reinforcing the notion that citizenship confers additional benefits on those who become fully participating
members of our polity.
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Parents of U.S. citizens should be admitted as the second priority. This permits adult children to sponsor their
parents, most of whom are past working age. However, the Commission is mindful of the potential negative
impacts that the entry of parents may pose for the U.S. taxpayer if these individuals utilize Supplemental Security
Income, Medicaid, and similar programs. Therefore, the Commission believes that continued admission of parents
should be contingent on a legally enforceable affidavit of support. The affidavit should ensure that parents who
are unable to work enough quarters to become eligible for Social Security or Medicare do not become a burden to
taxpayers through use of SSI, Medicaid, or equivalent state and local services. Further, the Commission
recommends that affidavit signers (petitioners and, if necessary, coguarantors) should provide: 
Verifiable assurance that they indeed have the capacity to provide what may be a lifetime of financial
support to the parent immigrants; and 
Verifiable assurance of the purchase of what may be lifetime health coverage for the parent
immigrants (obtained either privately or through buying into Medicare, which the government should
make available at an actuarially fair price).
Third priority should be allocated to spouses, minor children, and adult physically or mentally dependent children
of legal permanent residents [LPRs].
The Commission further recommends sufficient additional numbers, on an interim basis, to eliminate the backlog in the
category for admission of spouses and minor children of LPRs. We believe that this backlog, which results primarily
from the Immigration Reform and Control Act, can be cleared without creating another waiting list. By the end of this
fiscal year, 824,000 spouses and minor children of aliens legalized under IRCA will be waiting for visas. The number of
new applications has fallen to only a handful for this group. However, since the filing of applications by the legalization
beneficiaries, a backlog of 279,000 (or about 80,000 per year) spouses and minor children of other LPRs has developed.
Under our current system, it would take more than a decade to clear the backlog, even with substantial naturalization. In
the meantime, when an LPR sponsors a spouse and/or minor child, that individual goes to the end of the waiting list of
1.1 million.
We believe that priority for clearance of the backlog should go first to the spouses and minor children of LPRs who
entered lawfully under the regular immigration preferences. Only afterwards should expedited admission be offered to
the spouses and minor children of LPRs who entered under one of the legalization provisions of the Immigration
Reform and Control Act.
The Commission recommends this separate treatment of the family members of those who became permanent residents
through regular immigration and those who legalized under IRCA because: 
The circumstances are different for the two sets of spouses and minor children. Many of the families of the
immigrants who legalized under IRCA are in the United States and, under the Family Unity provisions of the
Immigration Act of 1990, have a quasi-legal status that permits their continued presence and work authorization.
Many of the families of the other legal immigrants are separated, with their spouses and/or minor child(ren) living
outside the United States. 
The legalized have already received special treatment in obtaining amnesty. To further reward their earlier illegal
entry by giving equal or higher priority to the entry of their relatives sends the wrong message at a time in which
the U.S. must obtain greater control over unauthorized entry. 
As of December 31, 1995, most legalized aliens will be eligible to naturalize. As citizens, they will be able to
expedite the admission of their spouses and minor children without using the additional visas earmarked for
LPRs.
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The Commission believes that the addition of 150,000 visas will permit the elimination of the regular LPR beneficiary
backlog within three years and the legalization beneficiary backlog in five to eight years. Thereafter, the entry of all
spouses and minor children of LPRs should be possible within a year of application under the proposed 400,000
admissions ceiling on family-based immigration.
The Commission recommends elimination of other family-based admission categories, including: 
Adult, unmarried sons and daughters of U.S. citizens;
Adult, married sons and daughters of U.S. citizens;
Adult, unmarried sons and daughters of legal permanent residents; and
Siblings of U.S. citizens.
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The Commission acknowledges that many individuals in these categories have contributed to U.S. society.
Nevertheless, it is necessary at this time to emphasize the reunification of nuclear families. The elimination of these
categories should take place one year after the date that legislation is enacted to accomplish this purpose. In this way,
the plans of U.S. families that are on the verge of reunifying with their foreign siblings and adult children will not be
unfairly disrupted.
The Commission recommends elimination of these categories for several reasons.
The numbers now used to admit these individuals in more extended family relationships could be
used instead to reduce the waiting time for closer family members without raising the overall levels
of immigration. 
Elimination of these preferences will remove extraordinary backlogs that now undermine the
credibility of our policy. Credible immigration policy should not give false hopes to applicants. An
individual now applying under the sibling category, for example, could not expect to enter the U.S.
legally for more than a decade. Applicants from the Philippines face the longest waiting period-as
much as forty years for those applying today. 
Unless there is a compelling national interest to do otherwise, immigrants should be chosen on the
basis of the skills they contribute to the U.S. economy. The Commission believes that admission of
nuclear family members and refugees provide such a compelling national interest. Reunification of
adult children and siblings of adult citizens solely because of their family relationship is not as
compelling.
The Commission recommends amendment of Section 201(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act [INA] to provide
that otherwise unused immigrant visa numbers for a fiscal year be made available to people who have a priority date
that would entitle them to processing in that year but who were not issued visas.
Given the large backlog of spouses and minor children, all efforts should be made to ensure their expeditious entry by
fully utilizing authorized visas. Under current policy visas unused because of administrative delay or personal reasons
are lost. Allowing such unused visas to be made available to otherwise eligible immigrants after the end of that fiscal
year ensures that all the visas allocated for family-sponsored immigrants would be used and charged to the given fiscal
year. The new fiscal year visa numbers would not reflect an increase in visas allocated over the annual worldwide limit
for family-based immigration.
For example, if 400,000 visas were allocated for family-sponsored immigrants in FY 1997, and during that year only
390,000 visas were issued because 10,000 immigrants were delayed beyond the end of the fiscal year, the remaining
10,000 visas could be issued to the delayed or other eligible aliens during the next fiscal year but would count toward
the original year. Under the proposed amendment, the Department of State could charge to FY 1997 all visas allocated
in that year even though the visas themselves might not be issued in FY 1997. As the recommendation affects only
aliens already entitled to a visa, annual number limitations would not be exceeded.
The Commission further recommends that the INA be amended to address better the aging-out problem of certain
aliens. One unfortunate side effect of waiting lists is the aging-out of minor children who become adults while awaiting
their already approved petition. This issue, which arises particularly in the case of the minor children of legal permanent
residents, will become even more of a problem with the elimination of admission opportunities for adult children. For
example, the minor child of a legalized alien may have been granted Family Unity status with the understanding that
eventually a visa would be available. Under current law, a child who has aged-out would rarely be deported but is no
longer eligible for permanent residence as a minor child. A provision stating that "a person entitled to status at the time a
petition is approved shall continue to be entitled to that status regardless of his or her age" would allow such applicants
to retain their eligibility for immigrant visas.
Skill-Based Immigration
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Immigration can support the national interest by bringing to the U.S. individuals whose skills would benefit our society.
It also can help U.S. businesses compete in the global economy. This national interest in the competitiveness of business
must be balanced by an equally compelling national interest in developing a U.S. workforce that has the skills necessary
to compete in the global economy. Immigration policy can contribute to this national interest by: 
Focusing on the admission of highly-skilled individuals;
Giving employers access to a global labor market when they cannot identify U.S. workers with
knowledge and expertise required for a specific job or when they demonstrate a labor shortage that
cannot be filled through short-term training programs;
Helping companies conducting business, both in the United States and internationally, to reassign
personnel as needed to maintain their competitiveness;
Encouraging entrepreneurial activities and other investment in the United States aimed at creation of
jobs;
Providing a means of ensuring that U.S. workers are not displaced or otherwise adversely affected by
the entry of foreign workers; and
Providing incentives or penalties to help ensure that employers in the U.S. engage in serious
recruitment of American workers (for example, national rather than local recruitment where
appropriate) and contribute significantly to the training of the comestic U.S. workforce.
The Commission recommends that the preferences for the admission of skill-based immigrants be
reorganized to establish two categories: those subject to a lobor market test, which we would expect to be
the norm; and those who, for significant and specific policy reasons, should be exempt from such a labor
market test. Labor market testing requires a demonstration that a business has a bona fide need for the skills
of a foreign worker and cannot find a qualified U.S. worker or one who could be readily trained for the
intended job.
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Exempt workers should include those individuals whose entry will generate economic growth and/or
significantly enhance U.S. intellectual and cultural strength without undermining the employment prospects
and remuneration of U.S. workers. The following individuals should be exempt:
Individuals at the very top of their chosen field whose extraordinary ability in the
sciences, arts, education, business, or athletics is demonstrated by sustained national or
international acclaim and whose achievements have been recognized through extensive
documentation, or individuals who have demonstrated the potential for extraordinary
achievement in their chosen field through extensive documentation, including the receipt of
internationally-recognized prizes and the testimony of appropriate experts;
Managers and executives of international businesses whose expertise contributes to U.S.
global competitiveness. Greater safeguards must be put in place to ensure that only bona fide
international businesses benefit from this policy;
Entrepreneurs whose active investment in new commercial enterprises generate a significant
number of jobs for American workers in the United States;
A limited number of individuals ordained by a religious denomination and other religious
workers who have carried on the religious vocation abroad during the two years immediately
preceding the application for admission and who are members of a religious denomination
having a bona fide nonprofit, religious organization in the United States that sponsors them.
Labor market-tested foreign workers permitted to immigrate to the United States under these
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categories should include only those who have attained a baccalaureate or higher academic degree or
those who are needed to fill jobs that require a high level of specific skills above the entry or
journeyman level. Categories that would require a test of the domestic labor market include:
Professionals with advanced degrees, including professors and researchers who do not meet
the definition of "extraordinary;"
Professionals with baccalaureate degrees, and skilled workers with a minimum of five
years of specialized work experience, whose admission should be scrutinized strictly to
ensure that they will have no adverse effect on similarly qualified U.S. workers.
The Commission recommends the elimination of the admission of unskilled workers. Unless there is
another compelling interest, such as in the entry of nuclear families and refugees, it is not in the national
interest to admit unskilled workers. This is especially true when the U.S. economy is showing difficulty in
absorbing disadvantaged workers and when efforts towards welfare reform indicate that many unskilled
Americans will be entering the labor force.
The Commission is not satisfied with current labor certification procedures because they are neither timely
enough to meet the needs of employers with a bona fide interest in hiring a foreign worker nor effective in
protecting the interests of U.S. workers. We seek to replace a failed and expensive regulatory system with
one that is market-driven. (The cost to the federal government was about $70 million in 1992 and is
estimated to be about $60 million in 1995.) The Commission recommends replacing the labor certification
procedure with a more timely and effective labor market test.
To demonstrate the bona fide need for a foreign worker and to increase the competitiveness of U.S.
workers, an employer should be required to pay a substantial fee, that is, make a substantial financial
investment into a certified private sector initiative dedicated to increasing the competitiveness of U.S.
workers, for example through education and training. Employers seeking to hire foreign workers already
incur substantial financial costs and face lengthy processing delays. Under the Commission's proposal, the
fee would go towards developing a well-trained U.S. workforce rather than supporting costly bureaucratic
processes. To ensure that the employer, and not the foreign worker, pays the fee, penalties should be
imposed upon violators.
Employers should demonstrate that they have engaged in appropriate attempts to find a qualified
U.S. worker using normal company recruitment procedures that meet industry-wide standards and offering
wages that are at least 5 percent above the prevailing wage.
The resulting permanent resident status so obtained should be conditional for a two-year period.
Conditional status would be removed at the end of that period if the foreign worker is still employed by the
same employer at the same or higher level and if the employer demonstrates that the attested wage has been
paid. The law should specify conditions under which the foreign worker could obtain a waiver of the two-
year requirement. For example, it could be waived in situations where unanticipated circumstances, such as
layoffs or business failure, occur or where an employer's unfair labor practices would render the foreign
worker subject to abuse. To prevent both fraud and abuse against workers, penalties should be authorized.
To provide greater flexibility and allow for market adjustments, the Commission recommends that skill-
based visas not used in a fiscal year be carried over to the next year's skill-based numbers. 
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Refugee Resettlement
The Commission strongly affirms that the United States should continue its commitment to resettle refugees
as one of several elements of humanitarian protection for the persecuted. Refugee admissions fulfill a
humanitarian commitment to provide protection and assistance to those who otherwise would be persecuted
or endangered. The Commission recommends that, on an interim basis:
The U.S. should allocate 50,000 admission numbers each year to the entry of refugees from
overseas (not including asylum adjustments);
Other than in emergency situations, refugee admissions could exceed the 50,000 admissions
level only with more direct and affirmative participation by Congress than occurs in the current
consultation process;
In the case of an emergency, the President may authorize the admission of additional refugees
upon certification of the emergency circumstances necessitating such action. The Congress
may override the emergency admissions only with a two-house veto of the Presidential action.
Allocating a set number of refugee admissions, with provisions to exceed this number in case of an
emergency or other changed circumstances, ensures a continued U.S. commitment to resettlement,
particularly following the expected closure of the current refugee programs in Southeast Asia and, possibly,
the former Soviet Union. These two programs account for almost 80 percent of current resettlement (about
87,000 out of 112,000 admissions in FY 1994).
Reform of the current consultation process is needed to ensure Congressional oversight of decisions made
to exceed the 50,000 limit. Current consultations are often pro forma and occur very late in the planning
process. As discussed below, the Commission will provide recommendations on mechanisms for
decisionmaking on numbers in a forthcoming report.
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The U.S. should take leadership in generating international responses to refugee crises, with particular focus
on international burdensharing and regional solutions. Future policies also must take into account the
relative weight to be given resettlement versus the other avenues open to the United States to help protect
and assist refugees worldwide, including support for repatriation of refugees to their homelands when
conditions permit.
The Commission recommends a thorough assessment of the criteria used to admit refugees for resettlement
and the procedures for their admission. The contexts for making future policy regarding refugee
resettlement are in flux. The refugee resettlement program must be revamped to meet the needs of a post-
Cold War world. Today extreme nationalism and ethnic conflicts produce massive population
displacements while resolution of other conflicts is permitting large-scale voluntary repatriation.
Resettlement criteria should take into account the protection of refugees who otherwise would be
endangered in a country of origin or asylum and who would have no other alternatives.
The Commission is reviewing a variety of issues related to refugee resettlement, including: the priority
system; in-country refugee processing; country-specific legislation; procedural issues; congressional and
Executive Branch roles, including the consultation process; the role of international organizations; parole
authority; and domestic assistance, including the role of the state and local organizations (e.g.,
nongovernmental organizations and voluntary agencies).
Specific recommendations on refugee resettlement-which may include modification of the above interim
recommendations-will be included in a future Commission report. This report also will include
recommendations related to immigration emergencies.
Nonimmigrant Admissions
The Commission believes that both permanent and temporary (nonimmigrant) admissions must be
considered as part of an integrated immigration system. Although we are deferring specific
recommendations on most nonimmigrant issues until we have completed a comprehensive review, we do
note two areas of particular interest.
Temporary Workers and Foreign Students. The Commission intends to examine in depth
the nonimmigrant temporary worker and foreign student systems and their relationships to
permanent immigration. In particular, we will be looking at ways to simplify and achieve
greater coordination in these systems and to make recommendations as a result of this study. A
high percentage of applicants for permanent skill-based admission are already in this country
on temporary work or student visas. Businesses that intend to petition for permanent visas for
new hires frequently obtain temporary visas first because of long delays in processing. In
addition, a significant number of individuals admitted for temporary study or work seek
permanent jobs during their stay. As noted above, these categories of temporary admission
must be seen as integral parts of a coherent legal immigration policy. The Commission will
address these specific issues in a later report.
Agriculture Guestworker Program. The Commission believes that an agriculture
guestworker program, sometimes referred to as a revisiting of the "bracero agreement," is not
in the national interest and unanimously and strongly agrees that such a program would be a
grievous mistake.
First, the Commission is highly skeptical of the need for an agricultural guestworker program
at this time or in the near future. Proponents of such a program have failed to demonstrate that
a labor shortage is about to occur or that there are no means other than a guestworker program
available to agricultural producers to obtain sufficient employees in their industry.
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Guestworker programs effectively expand rural poverty. Moreover, guestworker programs are
predicated on limitations on the freedom of those who are invited to enter and work.
Experience has shown that such limitations are incompatible with the values of democratic
societies. For that very reason, "temporary" guestworkers tend to become permanent residents,
de facto or even de jure. The inconsistency between the stated intent of guestworker programs
and their actual consequences cannot be ignored by policymakers who seek credibility in a
reformed system.
Americanization
The Commission supports effective Americanization of new immigrants, that is the cultivation of a shared
commitment to the American values of liberty, democracy, and equal opportunity. The United States is one
of the most successful multiethnic nations in history. It has united immigrants and their descendants from
all over the world around a commitment to democratic ideals and constitutional principles. Those ideals and
principles have been embraced by persons from an extraordinary variety of religious and ethnic
backgrounds, partly because they permit and protect religious and cultural diversity within a framework of
national political unity.
Religious and cultural diversity does not pose a threat to the national interest as long as public policies
ensure civic unity. Such policies should help newcomers learn to speak, read, and write English effectively.
They should strengthen civic understanding in the teaching of American history for all Americans. They
should lead to the vigorous enforcement of laws against hate crimes and of laws to deter and to punish
discrimination. Of course, such policies should encourage the naturalization of immigrants as the path to
full civic participation.
At the same time, immigration to the United States should be understood as a privilege, not a right.
Immigration carries with it obligations to embrace the common core of the American civic culture, to
become able to communicate--to the extent possible--in English with other citizens and residents, and to
adapt to fundamental constitutional principles and democratic institutions.
In its further deliberations, the Commission will consider other public policies that are believed by some to
encourage ethnocentrism in the name of multiculturalism or to promote political separatism in the name of
civil rights. For example: Do bilingual education and affirmative action as applied to immigrants and their
children promote or diminish civic unity? Now that immigrants come from more than 160 nations and
many more ethnic groups, it is extremely important that public policies facilitate, not inhibit, the
Americanization of newcomers.
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Naturalization is the most visible manifestation of civic incorporation. At present, there is greater interest in
naturalization than there is a capacity to act upon this interest. Large backlogs must be overcome so that the
nation can benefit from the growing commitment of immigrants to become American citizens.
The Commission strongly recommends that INS adopt and implement as a strategic goal the reduction of
processing time and backlogs for naturalization while maintaining rigorous standards in processing
applications. The Commission also urges Congress to appropriate sufficient resources to support the
implementation of this strategic goal. Applicants for naturalization pay a fee designed to cover the costs of
the application process. The fees go into an account dedicated to use for examinations. The Commission
believes that naturalization applicants have the right to receive the timely service that their fee represents.
Naturalization fees should not subsidize other activities. Nor should an efficient naturalization procedure
require a reallocation of resources from other priority functions. If the current fee is not adequate to cover
the full costs of timely naturalization, it should be increased appropriately. Further, the Commission urges
INS to:
Set a standard reasonable time frame for processing naturalization applications. The time
frame should permit timely review of applications without lowering the standards for civics
and English language knowledge or compromising the required background checks. The INS
also should improve processes and policies, as well as allocation of resources, to establish a
level of efficiency that can withstand fluctuations in volume.
Continue to recruit national and community-based organizations, both public and
private, as well as employers, to assist in facilitating smooth operation of the processing of
naturalization applications. These organizations have proved very helpful in prior
partnerships with INS in: overseeing proper completion of applications; taking security check
fingerprints; serving as testing sites for the required English and civics examinations; briefing
applicants on procedures; providing less intimidating final interview sites; and reviewing files
before interviews to make certain that examiners need spend time only on substantive interview
issues.
Ensure that there are adequate numbers of personnel to complete naturalization
processing efficiently. To reduce waiting periods in districts with backlogs, INS should
reassign personnel and, where appropriate, designate examiners who will do naturalization
interviews exclusively. In instances where an interview can be waived, INS should permit
naturalization applications to be filed, reviewed, and approved at one of its four Regional
Service Centers.
Carefully scrutinize the naturalization applications of all Special Agricultural Workers
[SAW] to assure that their original SAW status was properly granted. Reports of
widespread fraud in this program require such special attention to applications for U.S.
citizenship by SAW legalization beneficiaries.
The Commission urges both the public and private sectors to assist legal immigrants in their preparation for
naturalization.
The Commission urges private industry, churches, community groups and individual
volunteers to redouble their efforts to provide English language instruction and civics
education to immigrants. The current increased interest in naturalization presents an
opportunity to use instruction in English, U.S. history, and civics to help immigrants participate
more fully in the life of the community. Private sector initiatives would fill current gaps in such
services. These programs also would benefit the providers, particularly businesses, who would
gain from a workforce better able to communicate in English.
The Commission supports targeted outreach programs aimed at informing eligible
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immigrants about the requirements for naturalization. Outreach programs are critical to
civic ncorporation. They encourage immigrants to want to become citizens and help ensure
awareness of opportunity and equitable access to information about naturalization.
CONCLUSION
These interim conclusions and recommendations on legal immigration to the United States are a first step in
the Commission's examination of the implementation and impact of our legal immigration system. Together
with our earlier recommendations on illegal immigration, they seek to restore credibility to our immigration
policies.
This report defines the national interest in immigration. It outlines mechanisms that permit the expeditious
entry of those who are of highest priority for admission while mitigating potential harmful effects on U.S.
communities and vulnerable populations.
The Commission continues our longer-term investigation of the impact of legal immigration on the United
States. Based on the results of these studies, the Commission expects to make further recommendations on
legal immigration in our final report to Congress in 1997.
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U.S. Immigration Policy: Restoring Credibility
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Introduction
The U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform was created by Congress to assess U.S. immigration policy and make
recommendations regarding its implementation and effects. Mandated in the Immigration Act of 1990 to submit an
interim report in 1994 and a final report in 1997, the Commission has undertaken public hearings, fact-finding missions,
and expert consultations to identify the major immigration-related issues facing the United States today.
This process has been a complex one. Distinguishing fact from fiction has been difficult, in some cases because of what
has become a highly emotional debate on immigration. We have heard contradictory testimony, shaky statistics, and a
great deal of honest confusion regarding the impacts of immigration. Nevertheless, we have tried throughout to engage
in what we believe is a systematic, non-partisan effort to reach conclusions drawn from analysis of the best data
available.
Underlying Principles
Certain basic principles underlie the Commission's work. The Commission decries hostility and discrimination against
immigrants as antithetical to the traditions and interests of the country. At the same time, we disagree with those who
would label efforts to control immigration as being inherently anti-immigrant. Rather, it is both a right and a
responsibility of a democratic society to manage immigration so that it serves the national interest.
Challenges Ahead
The Commission believes that legal immigration has strengthened and can continue to strengthen this country. While we
will be reporting at a later date on the impacts of our legal immigration system, and while there may even be
disagreements among us as to the total number of immigrants that can be absorbed into the United States or the
categories that should be given priority for admission, the Commission members agree that immigration presents many
opportunities for this nation. Immigrants can contribute to the building of the country. In most cases, they have been
actively sought by family members or businesses in the U.S. The tradition of welcoming newcomers has become an
important element of how we define ourselves as a nation.
The Commission is mindful of the problems that also emanate from immigration. In particular, we believe that unlawful
immigration is unacceptable. Enforcement efforts have not been effective in deterring unlawful immigration. This
failure to develop effective strategies to control unlawful immigration has blurred the public perception of the
distinction between legal and illegal immigrants.
For the Commission, the principal issue at present is how to manage immigration so that it will continue to be in the
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national interest.
* How do we ensure that immigration is based on and supports broad national economic, social, and humanitarian
interests, rather than the interests of those who would abuse our laws?
* How do we gain effective control over our borders while still encouraging international trade, investment, and
tourism?
* How do we maintain a civic culture based on shared values while accommodating the large and diverse population
admitted through immigration policy?
The credibility of immigration policy can be measured by a simple yardstick: people who should get in, do get in;
people who should not get in are kept out; and people who are judged deportable are required to leave.
During the decade from 1980 to 1990, three major pieces of legislation were adopted to govern immigration policy--the
Refugee Act of 1980, the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, and the Immigration Act of 1990. The
Commission supports the broad framework for immigration policy that these laws represent: a legal immigration system
that strives to serve the national interest in helping families to reunify and employers to obtain skills not available in the
U.S. labor force; a refugee system that reflects both our humanitarian beliefs and international refugee law; and an
enforcement system that seeks to deter unlawful immigration through employer sanctions and tighter border control.
The Commission has concluded, however, that more needs to be done to guarantee that the stated goals of our
immigration policy are met. The immediate need is more effective prevention and deterrence of unlawful immigration.
This report to Congress outlines the Commission's recommendations in this area.
In the long term, immigration policies for the 1990s and beyond should anticipate the challenges of the next century.
These challenges will be substantially influenced by factors such as the restructuring of our own economy, the
establishment of such new trade relationships as the North American Free Trade Agreement [NAFTA], and changing
geopolitical relations. No less importantly, immigration policy must carefully take into account social concerns,
demographic trends, and the impact of added population on the country's environment.
Finally, current immigration is the first to occur in what economists call a post-industrial economy, just as it is the first
to occur after the appearance of the modern welfare state. The Commission's report to Congress in 1997 will cover these
issues in assessing the impact of the Immigration Act of 1990. The present report reviews the progress of the beginning
implementation of this legislation.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Serious problems undermine present immigration policies, their implementation, and their credibility: people who
should get in find a cumbersome process that often impedes their entry; people who should not get in find it all too easy
to enter; and people who are here without permission remain with impunity.
The Commission is convinced that unlawful immigration can be controlled consistent with our traditions, civil rights,
and civil liberties. As a nation with a long history of immigration and commitment to the rule of law, this country must
set limits on who can enter and then must credibly enforce our immigration law. Unfortunately, no quick and easy
solutions are available. The United States can do a more effective job, but only with additional financial resources and
the political will to take action. Our recommendations for a comprehensive, effective strategy follow.
Border Management
The Commission believes that significant progress has been made during the past several years in identifying and
remedying some of the weaknesses in U.S. border management. Nevertheless, we believe that far more can and should
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be done to meet the twin goals of border management: preventing illegal entries while facilitating legal ones.
Land Borders
Credibility is a problem at U.S. land borders, given the ease of illegal entry and various obstacles to legal entry. These
problems are particularly prevalent at the U.S.-Mexico border, as the Commission's visit to San Diego and El Paso
demonstrated. The Commission believes that an underlying principle of border management is that prevention is far
more effective and cost-efficient than the apprehension and removal of illegal aliens after entry. At the same time, the
Commission believes that legal entry should be facilitated in order for the country to benefit from cross-border trade and
tourism.
The Commission supports the strategy, now being tested as "Operation Hold the Line" in El Paso, that emphasizes
prevention of illegal entry at the border, rather than apprehension following illegal entry. Prevention holds many
advantages: it is more cost-effective than apprehension and removal; it eliminates the cycle of voluntary return and
reentry that has characterized unlawful border crossings; and it reduces potentially violent confrontations on the border.
The Commission recommends:
* Increased resources for prevention, including additional staff, such improved technology as sensors and infrared
scopes, data systems that permit expeditious identification of repeat offenders, and such additional equipment as
vehicles and radios.
* Increased training for border control officers to execute strategies that emphasize prevention of illegal entry.
* Formation of a mobile, rapid response team to improve Border Patrol anticipation of new smuggling sites and
to augment their capacity at these locations. The Immigration and Naturalization Service [INS] must develop a
capacity to respond quickly to changing patterns of unlawful immigration along the land border. Also, contingency
plans should be developed to address increased boat arrivals that may arise from improved land border enforcement.
* Use of fences to reduce border violence and facilitate enforcement. However, the Commission does not support
the erection of extraordinary physical barriers, such as unscaleable walls, unless needed as a last resort to stop
violence when other means have proved ineffective. Fences have been used effectively in San Diego to reduce border
violence, deter illegal aliens from running across the interstate highway that leads from Mexico, and facilitate
enforcement.
* Systematic evaluation of the effectiveness of any new border strategies by INS. The typical measurements of
Border Patrol effectiveness--apprehension rates--have little meaning in assessing a prevention strategy. INS should
develop new evaluation techniques that measure the effects of border management efforts in terms of the flow of
unauthorized aliens and their impacts on U.S. communities.
The Commission supports efforts to reduce potentially violent confrontations between Border Patrol officers and
those believed to be seeking illegal entry into the U.S. Such confrontations were reduced, for example, during
"Operation Hold the Line," in terms of both reported human rights violations against suspected illegal aliens and attacks
on Border Patrol officers.
The Commission supports efforts already underway to address complaints about human rights violations, including:
* Increased training and professionalism of Border Patrol officers to enable them to respond appropriately to
potentially violent situations;
* Improved procedures for adjudicating complaints of Border Patrol abuses;
* Mechanisms to provide redress or relief to those subjected to improper actions; and
* More effective protection of Border Patrol officers from violence directed at them.
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The Commission believes that port of entry operations can be improved. Legal entry at the border should be facilitated
as the United States benefits from trade, tourism, family visits and consumer spending. More specifically, the
Commission supports:
* Additional resources for inspections at land border ports of entry.
* An expedited adjudication and issuance process for the Border Crossing Card [BCC]. Mexican nationals are
required to have a visa (unlike Canadians). Because of the volume of BCC applications on the Mexican border, the
Commission encourages negotiations between the U.S. and Mexico to amend the bilateral treaty to permit collection of
fees to be used exclusively to expedite the issuance and adjudication of the card.
* Further steps to better ensure that the BCC is not misused by legal crossers who engage in unauthorized
employment after entry. Each BCC should contain the legend indicating it is "not for work authorization," as currently
appears on INS-issued cards.
* Development of a land border user fee to pay for needed improvements in the inspection of border crossers,
with fees to be used exclusively to facilitate land border management.
The Commission supports increased coordination on border issues between the governments of the U.S. and Mexico.
The Commission views favorably the discussions underway between the U.S. and Mexican governments. These
discussions promote greater cooperation between the two governments in solving problems of mutual concern. In
particular, the Commission encourages:
* Continued cooperation in antismuggling efforts to reduce smuggling of people and goods across the U.S.-Mexico
border.
* Bilateral discussions that take into account both U.S. entry and Mexican exit laws in devising a cooperative
approach to regulating the movements of people across the U.S.-Mexican land border. Mexican law requires that
Mexican nationals exit Mexico through official inspection stations. Thus, unauthorized migration into the United States
generally violates not only U.S. law, but Mexican law as well.
* Cross border discussions and cooperative law enforcement efforts among federal, state, and local officials of both
countries to develop cooperative approaches to combat violent crimes and auto and cargo theft along the border.
* Continued U.S. cooperation and support for Mexican efforts to address the problem of third-country nationals
crossing Mexico to come to the United States.
Airports
Each year about 50 million citizens and aliens enter the country through airports.
The Commission supports a combined facilitation and enforcement strategy that would prevent the entry of
unauthorized aliens while facilitating legal admissions at U.S. airports as efficiently as possible, including:
* The use of new technologies to expedite the inspections process and improve law enforcement, including more
efficient processing of travelers with Machine Readable Documents.
* Programs that enhance the capacity of airline carriers to identify and refuse travel to aliens seeking to enter the
U.S. on fraudulent documents, including the Carrier Consultant Program and other coordinated efforts to maintain
complete, accurate, and reliable Advance Passenger Information System [APIS] data and improved lookout data
systems.
* Continued government-airline industry discussions on improving inspections that have led to innovative
proposals.
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* Development of a system for mitigation of penalties or fines for those carriers that cooperate in screening and
other pro-
grams and demonstrate success in reducing the number of unauthorized aliens they carry.
* Making INS, not the carrier, responsible for the actual physical custody of inadmissible air passengers.
Interagency Coordination
The Commission expresses its dissatisfaction with the past lack of coordination between the Customs Service and the
INS at ports of entry. This has hampered effective border management by both agencies.
The Commission recommends implementation of initiatives to
improve coordination between INS and Customs, as recommended by the General Accounting Office [GAO] and the
National Performance Review. The Commission will monitor these efforts to improve coordination of border
management, particularly as they relate to immigration matters.
If these efforts prove ineffective, the Commission will recommend more extensive action, such as creating a new
immigration and customs agency or designating one agency as the lead agency on inspections.
Alien Smuggling
Organized smuggling operations undermine the credibility of U.S. enforcement efforts and pose dangers to the
smuggled aliens.
The Commission recommends an effective prevention strategy that requires enhanced capacities to combat organized
smuggling for commercial gain. Possible enhancements include:
* Expanded enforcement authorities, such as Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act [RICO] provisions,
wiretap authority, and expanded asset forfeiture for smuggling aliens; and
* Enhanced intelligence gathering and diplomatic efforts to deter smuggling.
Worksite Enforcement
The Commission believes that reducing the employment magnet
is the linchpin of a comprehensive strategy to reduce illegal immigration. The ineffectiveness of employer sanctions,
prevalence of fraudulent documents, and continued high numbers of unauthorized workers, combined with confusion
for employers and reported discrimination against employees, have challenged the credibility of current worksite
enforcement efforts.
Verification
A better system for verifying work authorization is central to the effective enforcement of employer sanctions.
The Commission recommends development and implementation of a simpler, more fraud-resistant system for
verifying work authorization. The current system is doubly flawed: it is too susceptible to fraud, particularly through
the counterfeiting of documents; and it can lead to increased discrimination against foreign-looking or foreign-sounding
authorized workers.
In examining the options for improving verification, the Commission believes that the most promising option for
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secure, non-discriminatory verification is a computerized registry using data provided by the Social Security
Administration [SSA] and the INS.
The key to this process is the social security number. For decades, all workers have been required to provide employers
with their social security number. The computer registry would add only one step to this existing requirement: an
employer check that the social security number is valid and has been issued to someone authorized to work in the
United States.
The Commission believes the computerized system is the most promising option because it holds great potential for
accomplishing the following:
* Reduction in the potential for fraud. Using a computerized registry, rather than only an identification card, guards
against counterfeiting of documents. It provides more reliable information about work authorization.
* Reduction in the potential for discrimination based on national origin and citizenship status, as well as
inappropriate demands for specific or additional documents, given that employers will not be required to ascertain
whether a worker is a citizen or an immigrant and will have no reason to reject documents they believe to be counterfeit.
The only relevant question will be: "What is your social security number?"
* Reduction in the time, resources, and paperwork spent by employers in complying with the Immigration Reform
and Control Act of 1986 [IRCA] and corresponding redirection of enforcement activities from paperwork violations to
knowing hire of unauthorized workers.
The Commission recommends that the President immediately initiate and evaluate pilot programs using the proposed
computerized verification system in the five states with the highest levels of illegal immigration as well as several less
affected states. The President has the authority to do so under Section 274A(d)(4) of the Immigration and Nationality
Act. A pilot program will: permit the testing of various approaches to using the proposed verification system; provide
needed information about the advantages, disadvantages, and costs of the various approaches; develop and evaluate
measures to protect civil rights and civil liberties; and ensure that any potential obstacles, such as the quality of the data
used in the registry, are addressed prior to national implementation. Assuming the successful results of the pilot
program, Congress should pass the necessary statutory authorities to support more effective verification. Pilot program
features should include:
* A means by which employers will access the verification system to validate the accuracy of information given
by workers. We have received conflicting testimony about the best way to check the applicant's identity. We have
heard proposals for a more secure social security card, a counterfeit-resistant driver's license, and a telephone
verification system that does not rely on any document. The pilot program presents an opportunity to determine the most
cost-effective, fraud-resistant, and nondiscriminatory method available.
* Measures to ensure the accuracy of and access to the specific data needed to ensure that employers have timely
and reliable information when seeking verification of work authorization. Improvements in the Social Security
Administration and INS databases must be made to ensure that these data are available. Procedures must be developed
to ensure timely and accurate entry, update, extraction, and correction of data. The Commission strongly urges INS and
the Social Security Administration to cooperate in this endeavor, as the proposed registry would be built upon and--once
implemented--would support the primary missions of those agencies.
* Measures to ensure against discrimination and disparate treatment of foreign-looking or -sounding persons.
The Commission believes that the least discriminatory system would have the same requirements for citizens and aliens
alike. To reduce the potential for discrimination and increase the security of the system, the Commission also believes
that employers should not be required to ascertain immigration status in the process of verifying authorization for
employment. Their only requirement should be to check the social security number presented by each employee against
the registry and record an authorization number to prove that they have done so.
* Measures to protect civil liberties. It is essential that explicit protections be devised against use of the database--and
any card or any other means used to gain access to it--for purposes other than those specified in law. The uses to be
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made of the verification system must be clearly specified. We believe the worksite verification system could be used,
without damage to civil liberties, for verifying eligibility to receive public benefits [see p. 22]. However, it should be
stipulated that no one should be required to carry a card, if one is used, or to present it for routine identification
purposes. There also should be penalties for inappropriate use of the verification process.
* Measures to protect the privacy of the information included in the database. The Commission is aware of the
proliferation of databases and the potential for the invasion of privacy by both government and private agencies. There
need to be explicit provisions for protecting privacy; the resultant system should incorporate appropriate safeguards
regarding authorized users' access to individual information. In establishing privacy safeguards, it is important to take
into account that, while access to any one piece of information may not be intrusive, in combination with other
information such access may violate privacy.
* Estimates of the start-up time and financial and other costs of developing, implementing and maintaining a
national system in such a manner that verification is reliable.
* Specification of the rights, responsibilities, and impact on individual workers and employers, for example: what
individuals must do; how long it will take for newly authorized workers to get on the system and to correct inaccurate
data; and what will be required of employers and at what expense. Provisions must also be developed to protect both
workers from denial of employment and employers from penalties in cases where the information provided by the
computer registry may be missing or inaccurate.
* A plan for phasing in of the system. The Commission recognizes that the proposed verification system will result in
financial costs. The system should be phased in to lessen the immediate impact. The pilot programs should test various
phase-in procedures. Given the required levels of accuracy, reliability, and convenience required, the evaluation should
help measure the cost of phasing in the system nationally.
The Commission recommends evaluation of the pilot programs to assess the effectiveness of the verification system.
The evaluation should include objective measures and procedures to determine whether current problems related to
fraud, discrimination, and excessive paperwork requirements for employers are effectively overcome without imposing
undue costs on the government, employers, or employees. The evaluation should pay particular attention to the
effectiveness of the measures used to protect civil liberties and privacy.
The Commission supports INS efforts to improve its Telephone Verification System/SAVE [TVS/SAVE] database-
-but only as an interim measure. The improvements are essential for improving the data needed for the new, more
effective verification process. The Commission is aware of the inadequacies of the current INS data that would be used
in the proposed system. The Commission does not endorse the TVS/SAVE program as a long-term solution to the
verification problem because use of TVS/SAVE requires the inadequate mechanism of self-attestation by workers as to
their citizenship or alienage, thus making it easy for aliens to fraudulently claim U.S. citizenship. It also imposes
requirements on legal immigrants that do not apply to citizens. Nevertheless, improvements in this database, as well as
the Social Security Administration database, are essential to the development of a more secure, less potentially
discriminatory verification system.
The Commission also recommends action that would reduce the fraudulent access to so-called "breeder documents,"
particularly birth certificates, that can be used to establish an identity in this country, including:
* Regulation of requests for birth certificates through standardized application forms;
* A system of interstate and intrastate matching of birth and death records;
* Making certified copies of birth certificates issued by states or state-controlled vital records offices the only
forms accepted by federal agencies;
* Using a standard design and paperstock for all certified copies of birth certificates to reduce counterfeiting; and
* Encouraging states to computerize birth records repositories.
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To address the abuse of fraudulent documents, the Commission recommends imposition of greater penalties on those
producing or selling such documents. Document fraud and counterfeiting has become a lucrative and well-organized
operation that may involve international networks that conspire to produce and sell the resulting fraudulent products.
These documents are used in smuggling and terrorist operations, as well as for work authorization. RICO provisions
designed to facilitate racketeering investigations should cover conspiracy to produce and sell fraudulent documents.
Criminal penalties should also be increased for large-scale counterfeiting activities
Antidiscrimination Strategies
The Commission is concerned about unfair immigration-related employment practices against both citizens and
noncitizens that may occur under the current system of employer sanctions. A more reliable, simpler verification system
holds great potential to reduce any such discrimination because employers will no longer have to make any
determination as to immigration status. Nevertheless, mechanisms must effectively prevent and redress discrimination.
The Commission recommends that the Office of the Special Counsel [OSC] for Immigration-Related Unfair
Employment Practices in the Department of Justice initiate more proactive strategies to identify and combat
immigration-related discrimination at the workplace. OSC should target resources on independent investigations and
on programs to assess the incidence and prevalence of unfair immigration-related employment practices.
The Commission also recommends a methodologically-sound study to document the nature and extent of unfair
immigration-related employment practices that have occurred since GAO's 1990 report. The new study should
measure the effects of immigration policy--as distinct from other factors--on discrimination at the worksite. As noted
above, the pilot programs should be evaluated to determine if they substantially reduce immigration-related
discrimination at the workplace.
Employer Sanctions and Labor Standards Enforcement
The Commission believes that enforcement of employer sanctions, wage/hour, child labor, and other labor standards can
be an effective tool in reducing employment of unauthorized workers. The Commission finds, however, that current
enforcement efforts are inadequate. In addition, the Commission expresses its concern that current coordination efforts
between the Immigration and Naturalization Service and the Department of Labor are insufficient.
The Commission supports vigorous enforcement of labor standards and enforcement against knowing hire of
unauthorized workers as an integral part of the strategy to reduce illegal immigration. Labor standards and employer
sanctions should be seen as mutually reinforcing. Specifically, the Commission recommends:
* Allocation of increased staff and resources to the enforcement of labor standards to complement employer
sanctions enforcement.
* Vigorous enforcement, increased staff and resources, and full use of current penalties against those who
knowingly hire unauthorized workers. If the new verification system proposed by the Commission substantially
reduces inadvertent hiring of unauthorized workers--as we believe will occur--Congress should discontinue paperwork
pen-alties and evaluate the need for in-creased penalties against violators and businesses that knowingly hire or fail to
verify work authorization for all employees.
* Targeting of investigations to industries that have a history of using illegal alien labor.
* Enhanced enforcement efforts targeted at farm labor and other contractors who hire unauthorized workers on
behalf of agricultural growers and other businesses.
* Application of employer sanctions to the federal government. At a minimum, the President should issue an
Executive Order requiring federal agencies to abide by the procedures required of other employers. Alternatively,
legislation should stipulate that federal agencies follow the verification procedures required of other employers and be
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subject to penalties if they fail to verify work authorization.
The Commission urges the Attorney General and the Secretary of Labor to review the current division of
responsibilities between the Departments of Justice and Labor in the enforcement of employer sanctions and labor
standards. INS and the Department of Labor have signed a Memorandum of Understanding [MOU] that spells out each
agency's responsibility for enforcing employer sanctions and labor standards. Preliminary evidence indicates that few
warnings have been issued to employers under the MOU. The implementation of the MOU should be closely monitored
over the next twelve months. Should the monitoring demonstrate that the joint efforts have not resulted in effective
enforcement, it may be necessary to designate a single agency to enforce employer sanctions.
The Commission recommends enhanced coordination mechanisms to promote cooperation among all of the agencies
responsible for worksite enforcement. Strategies to promote coordination at headquarters and in field operations
include:
* Establishment of a taskforce in Washington, D.C., to review and set policy;
* Local taskforces of worksite investigators to coordinate field operations; and
* Continued joint training for worksite investigators from all applicable agencies.
Education
Thousands of new businesses begin operations each year. New workers enter the labor force each year as well.
The Commission recommends coordination and continuance of educational efforts by the Immigration and
Naturalization Service, the Office of Special Counsel, and the Department of Labor regarding employer sanctions,
antidiscrimination provisions, and labor standards. The Commission calls upon these agencies to develop and
communicate a single message to all employers and employees. The Commission also recommends the development of
new strategies, including the enhanced use of technology, to inform employers and workers of their rights and
responsibilities under the law.
Benefits Eligibility and Fiscal Impact
The Commission believes a clear and consistent policy on immigrant eligibility for public benefits is needed. The
Commission also believes that the federal government has a responsibility to mitigate the impacts of unlawful
immigration on states and localities, particularly through renewed efforts to reduce illegal entries.
Eligibility
The U.S. has the sovereign authority to make distinctions as to certain rights and responsibilities of various people
subject to its jurisdiction--illegal aliens, legal immigrants, and U.S. citizens. Policies regarding the eligibility of aliens
for public benefits should be consistent with the objectives of our immigration policy.
The Commission recommends that illegal aliens should not be eligible for any publicly-funded services or assistance
except those made available on an emergency basis or for similar compelling reasons to protect public health and
safety (e.g., immunizations and school lunch and other child nutrition programs) or to conform to constitutional
requirements. Illegal aliens are now eligible for few benefit programs. The Commission firmly believes that benefits
policies should continue to send this message: if aliens enter the U.S. unlawfully, they will not receive aid except in
limited instances. Federal legislation should permit states and localities to limit eligibility of illegal aliens on this same
basis. Should illegal aliens require other forms of assistance, their only recourse should be return to their countries of
origin.
* The pilot programs on work authorization also should test new procedures for verification of benefit eligibility.
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Verification of eligibility for federally-funded benefits is an essential part of the overall strategy for maintaining a
credible benefits enforcement policy. Many of the shortcomings of the eligibility verification process are parallel to
those for employment. The proposed pilot programs will provide an opportunity to test new approaches to benefit
eligibility verification.
* An equitable policy based on immigration status must be adhered to in cases of mixed households (households
in which some members are legal residents and/or citizens and others are illegal aliens). Regardless of a family's
economic situation, only citizen members or those legally authorized to reside and work in the U.S. should receive
routine benefits. Some benefits could be prorated in order to provide them only to eligible recipients in a household.
The Commission recommends against any broad, categorical denial of public benefits to legal immigrants. The
United States admits legal immigrants with the expectation that they will reside permanently in the United States as
productive residents. Therefore, the Commission believes that:
* The safety net provided by needs-tested programs should continue to be available to those whom we have
affirmatively accepted as legal immigrants into our communities. U.S. immigration law bars the entry of those who
are likely to become a public charge [see below]. However, circumstances may arise after entry that create a pressing
need for public help--unexpected illness, injuries from a serious accident, loss of employment, a death in the family.
Under such circumstances, legal immigrants should be eligible for public benefits if they meet other eligibility
requirements.
* Sponsors should be held financially responsible for the immigrants that they bring to this country. In particular,
the Commission believes that the affidavits of support signed by sponsors should be legally enforceable, with
contingencies made if the sponsor's financial circumstances change significantly for reasons that occurred after the
immigrant's entry. Mechanisms should be developed that would ensure that sponsors actually provide the support they
have promised. This would protect recent immigrants and close a loophole in current policy wherein the sponsor's
income is "deemed," or taken into account, in calculating the immigrant's eligibility, regardless of whether such support
is actually available to the immigrant.
* A serious effort to enhance and enforce the public charge provisions in immigration law is needed to ensure that
legal immigrants do not require public assistance within five years of entry for reasons that existed prior to entry. The
Commission recommends modification in the procedures for deporting such individuals. The sustained use of public
benefits for reasons that existed prior to entry should become the basis for deportation. Current practices are
unreasonable: the government is required to show that the benefit program requested repayment of the aid under a
specific statute and that the immigrant has refused repayment.
The Commission recommends that comprehensive categories of aliens in the U.S. be defined in the Immigration and
Nationality Act to simplify determination of eligibility for public benefits. The Commission believes that benefit
eligibility determinations are complicated by the myriad legal statuses now afforded to individuals within this country.
While the rights of lawful permanent residents, refugees and asylees have been spelled out in the Immigration and
Nationality Act and/or benefit laws, it is also true that the Congress, Executive Branch, and the courts have created
various other statuses that may or may not denote benefit eligibility.
The Commission recommends:
* Establishment of statutory categories of aliens according to their eligibility for work and benefits. Such
categories could include those who are authorized to work and eligible for needs-tested benefits, subject to public
charge and sponsorship provisions; authorized to work and eligible only for benefits that accrue from employment; not
authorized to work and not eligible for any but a circumscribed list of benefits.
* Placement of every alien who is permitted to remain in the country on a temporary or permanent basis
(whether by legislation, court order, or administrative order) in one of the designated categories. The categories
should reflect whether an alien has been affirmatively admitted to the United States, is awaiting a final decision on
deportability, or has already been determined deportable and is awaiting removal.
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Impact on States and Localities
Difficulties in enforcing U.S. immigration laws have created fiscal impacts that would not have occurred had
enforcement strategies been more effective. The ineffective enforcement has been due, in some measure, to a lack of
political will on the part of decisionmakers, including officials and representatives of states now heavily affected by
illegal immigration. Nevertheless, the federal government clearly bears a responsibility for alleviating these impacts,
particularly through renewed efforts to reduce unlawful immigration.
The Commission supports in principle a short-term authorization of impact aid to offset at least a portion of the fiscal
burdens of unlawful immigration until such time as better enforcement measures are in place. Any such aid should
be provided contingent on the following conditions:
* Better data and methods to measure the net fiscal impact of illegal immigration. The Commission finds that weak
data make it difficult to determine the extent of these burdens. The authorization of impact aid should follow a
concerted effort to develop better data on such impacts, with impact assistance provided only to the extent that actual
net costs are accurately identified.
* Provision of any impact aid authorized in a manner commensurate with the interim period of regaining control
over unauthorized immigration. Impact aid mechanisms should be temporary and designed to ensure that
governments do not become dependent on impact aid as a continuing source of funding.
* Appropriate cooperation of state and local governments receiving impact aid with federal authorities to enforce
the immigration laws of the United States. The type of cooperation will vary depending on the assistance programs
covered by impact aid and should be consistent with the federal laws and regulations that apply to the program in
question. For example, law enforcement officers may be asked to provide information to identify convicted or arrested
illegal aliens, whereas school officials would not be required to transfer information obtained from their pupils.
The Commission supports an immediate authorization of impact aid aimed specifically at criminal justice costs. The
Commission believes impact assistance for criminal justice and law enforcement is justified where there is a high
incidence of illegal aliens in the criminal justice system. Specific costs attributable to the incarceration of illegal aliens
can be reliably ascertained if state correctional departments cooperate with INS in identifying deportable illegal aliens in
prisons. The federal government should assume responsibility for the costs of incarcerating illegal aliens through
reimbursement, by incarcerating them in federal facilities, and/or by negotiating with foreign governments to accept and
incarcerate their nationals who are criminal illegal aliens.
The Commission recommends further investigation of the costs of education and emergency medical assistance. The
data currently available do not provide reliable estimates of the number of illegal alien children and the proportion of
emergency medical assistance specifically associated with illegal aliens. While the Commission accepts in principle the
need for enhanced federal funding to assist localities with the costs of providing elementary and secondary education to
illegal alien children and of emergency medical care under Medicaid to illegal aliens, the Commission does not
recommend that such a program be instituted until there is a workable method for accurately establishing actual costs.
Detention and Removal of Criminal Aliens
An effective procedure for prompt removal of aliens ordered deported is an essential part of a credible deterrence policy.
If unlawful aliens believe that they can remain indefinitely once they are within our national borders, there will be
increased incentives to try to enter or remain illegally. The Commission is reviewing the full range of issues raised by
U.S. exclusion and deportation procedures and plans to issue a separate report on this subject in FY 1995. For the
present, the Commission limits its specific recommendations to the removal of criminal aliens who represent the most
serious threat to public safety and national security.
The top priority of enforcement strategies should be the removal of criminal aliens from the U.S. in such a way that
the potential for their return to the U.S. will be minimized. To help ensure the prompt and effective removal of
criminal aliens, the Commission recommends:
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* Increased resources for INS investigations to identify and initiate deportation of criminal aliens.
* Enhanced use of the Institutional Hearing Program [IHP] as an effective mechanism to ensure that criminal
aliens are identified and receive final orders of deportation while still serving their sentences. The IHP is cost-
effective in that criminal aliens can be deported directly from state and federal prisons, alleviating INS' need to detain
them during deportation proceedings. The Commission commends the negotiations taking place between INS, the
Executive Office of Immigration Review [EOIR], and state correctional departments to enhance their efficiency.
* In the case of Mexico, repatriation of deported criminal aliens to the area of Mexico from which they came,
rather than simply to the border. Removals should be done in coordination with Mexican authorities who may then
determine if there is a warrant for the arrest of the criminal alien for crimes committed in Mexico.
* Use of bilateral treaties encouraging the transfer of criminal aliens to serve sentences in their own countries.
The Department of State should monitor these cases to be certain that sentences are served.
Immigration Emergencies
Since 1980, emergency circumstances in their home countries have prompted the migration of large numbers of people
to the U.S. Their arrival, in turn, has created emergency circumstances within the United States. The exodus of Haitians
and Cubans are only the most
recent examples. An emergency can overwhelm resources and create
massive problems that far outlast the emergency.
The Commission believes that a credible immigration policy requires the ability to respond effectively and humanely
to immigration emergencies. Specific recommendations regarding emergencies will be the subject of a separate report
in FY 1995 that will include discussion of contingency planning, interdiction, safe havens, refugee processing, asylum
procedures, temporary protected status, aid to communities experiencing emergency arrivals of aliens, and other issues.
Curtailing Unlawful Immigration at the Source
Migrants enter and remain unlawfully in the United States for a variety of reasons. Few migrants take the decision to
leave their countries lightly. Generally, a combination of "push" and "pull" factors contribute to these movements. Many
of the recommendations in this report aim to reduce the pull of both jobs and of ineffective immigration enforcement.
On the push side, lack of employment, low wages and poor working conditions, separation from family members,
political, social and religious repression, civil conflict, and other problems motivate people to leave their homes. Any
effective strategy to prevent unlawful migration must address these causes.
The Commission recommends that the United States give priority in its foreign policy and international economic
policy to long-term reduction in the causes of unauthorized migration to the U.S. More specifically, the Commission
supports:
* The recommendations of the Commission for the Study of International Migration and Cooperative Economic
Development related to trade with, and investment in, immigrant-sending countries.
* Adoption of quick and effective strategies targeted at alleviating migration pressures in communities producing
large numbers of illegal aliens.
* Strengthening intelligence gathering capacities to improve early warning of unauthorized migration patterns.
* Coordinated efforts by the United States and other countries to address pressures for unlawful migration. The
Commission recommends a strengthening of those multilateral coordination efforts that prove effective in averting
unauthorized migration, particularly within the Western Hemisphere.
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Improving Data
Throughout the Commission's own inquiry, we have found it difficult to assess the effects of immigration policy and of
immigration itself because of inadequacies in the data. The Commission commends the work of the InterAgency
Working Group on Immigration Statistics that is seeking to reform data collection efforts within the federal government.
Reliable data is a necessary ingredient for credible policy and its implementation.
The Commission supports improved data collection efforts in four major areas:
* Matching administrative data on immigrants collected by the INS, Social Security Administration, and other
agencies to obtain a more accurate profile of their experiences in this country;
* Developing a methodology for better measuring the size of the illegal alien population and the flow of illegal
aliens entering the United States;
* Developing new methods for estimating emigration from the United States; and
* Improving the estimates of the costs and benefits associated with people of different immigration status.
THE IMMIGRATION ACT 
OF 1990 AND LEGAL IMMIGRATION
The Immigration Act of 1990 [IMMACT], which provided for the most comprehensive change in the legal immigration
system since 1965, aimed to:
* Establish overall limits on legal immigration through adoption of a flexible cap on total numbers;
* Permit continued reunification of close family members (allowing increases above the cap if higher numbers of
immediate relatives of U.S. citizens seek entry);
* Meet labor market needs by
increasing the number of immigrants admitted for employment-based reasons and giving higher priority to the entry of
professionals and others who are highly skilled; and
* Provide greater diversity through new opportunities for migration from countries with relatively small numbers of
immigrants to the United States.
IMMACT Effects on Migration
The principal provisions of IMMACT were not implemented until 1992, and with only two years worth of data, there is
little experience to use in determining its effects. The Diversity Program will not go into effect until FY 1995. The
following analysis, therefore, must be considered preliminary at best.
As Table 1 shows, overall levels of legal immigration increased from an average of 640,000 during the five years
preceding IMMACT implementation to an average 840,000 for the past three years. The immigrants fall into two major
categories: those whose numbers are subject to an annual statutory cap and those whose numerical limits can change
each year.
Statutory Cap
IMMACT established a flexible worldwide level of 700,000 family-based, employment-based, and diversity
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immigration visas for FYs 1992-1994. This limit can be "pierced" if the number of immediate relatives of U.S. citizens,
for whom there are no numerical limits, exceeds 239,000 (FYs 1992-1994) and 254,000 (FY 1995 and after).
* Family-sponsored immigration increased modestly since passage of IMMACT, largely because of an increase in the
number of immediate relatives of U.S. citizens. Waiting lists that number more than one million persons continue in the
categories under which spouses and minor children of permanent residents and siblings of U.S. citizens enter the United
States. Much of the growth in the backlog for spouses and children is attributable to the large number of legalized aliens
who are now seeking to reunify with their families.
* Employment-based immigration represents a sizeable increase over the 58,000 average employment-based
immigration pre-IMMACT. Nevertheless, employment-related admissions under the new legislation have been well
below the statutory ceiling of 140,000. Many of those who entered, particularly in 1992, were in the backlog of
individuals who had applied prior to IMMACT. In addition, Chinese nationals who adjusted status under the provisions
of the Chinese Student Protection Act were counted in this category. The economic recession may have led employers
to petition for fewer immigrant workers than allowable under the IMMACT ceilings.
* Diversity immigration has not yet begun in its permanent form. The diversity transition program averaged 34,000 in
FY 1992-93. As of FY 1995, 55,000 visa numbers will be available for the permanent diversity program.
Immigrants outside the Statutory Cap
The number of immigrants considered in the categories outside the statutory cap varies each year, largely depending on
the number of refugees admitted in prior years who adjust to permanent resident status. Refugees are initially admitted
under conditional status and may adjust to permanent resident status after one year. Because of the increase in refugee
admissions from the former Soviet Union that began in 1988, the 1990s have seen an increase in refugee adjustments.
Characteristics of Legal Immigrants
INS maintains data on the countries of origin, age, gender, occupation, and place of intended residence of new
immigrants.
* Places of origin. IMMACT has not changed the regional origins of immigrants significantly. Asia accounts for more
than 40 percent of new admissions, while North America, including Mexico, accounts for another 30 percent. Mexico
appears to have almost doubled its number of new arrivals since IMMACT passed, largely because of the legalization
dependents program and the elimination of per-country limits for some second preference family visas.
* Age and gender. The median age of immigrants admitted in FYs 1992 and 1993 was 28. About 54 percent of the
immigrants were female and 46 percent were male. By contrast, during the 1980s, men and women were equally
represented. The trend toward more women admitted as legal immigrants began prior to IMMACT. It is likely to be
reinforced by the entry of the family members of aliens legalized under IRCA. Very high proportions of young adult
legalized aliens were men, many of whom have already petitioned for their wives.
* Intended residence. Immigration follows much the same pattern as in the 1980s regarding intended residence.
Approximately 70 percent of the immigrants intend to live in the six states of California, New York, Texas, Florida,
New Jersey, and Illinois. More than 25 percent of immigrants intend to live either in New York City or Los Angeles.
Other metropolitan areas with significant immigrant arrivals are Chicago, Miami, Washington, D.C., and San Francisco.
* Occupation. Among those who reported an occupation, the percentage of immigrants of working age who were
professionals or executives increased slightly from 15 percent in the two years before IMMACT to 17 percent in fiscal
years 1992 and 1993. Every other occupation group declined, except for operators, fabricators, and laborers, which
increased from 9.2 to 9.7 percent.
Looking to the Future
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Much has changed in the U.S. and the world since passage of IMMACT--for example, the end of the Cold War,
cutbacks in many defense industries, and such new trade arrangements as NAFTA and the most recent round of GATT.
Commission recommendations must take into account this changing context, along with the changes brought about by
IMMACT.
Future Commission activities will include:
* Exercising the Commission's mandate to assess the impact which the establishment of a national level of immigration
has upon the availability and priority of family preference visas.
* Developing an understanding of both the long- and short-term interconnections between immigration and the U.S.
economy and labor market with an eye toward formulating sound immigration policy.
* Examining the effects of our immigrant population on social and community relations, as well as the effects of
American life on immigrants. A further area of interest is the civic integration of immigrants, including participation in
local, state, and national political affairs, development of political constituencies, and other manifestations of civic
involvement.
* Looking at data and analyses regarding population pursuant to IMMACT's instruction to determine and report on the
effects of immigration on demographics and natural resources.
* Analyzing and reporting on the relationship between immigration and the environment as mandated by IMMACT.
* Examining the interconnections between U.S. immigration and international trade and foreign policy.
Plans for FY 1995--FY 1997
The Commission will launch a new research program to gauge the effects of IMMACT upon the size and characteristics
of the incoming immigrant population and to evaluate the impacts that legal immigration poses for family reunification,
the U.S. economy, social relations, demographics, the environment, foreign policy, and national security.
The Commission will also develop further recommendations to address two of the issues touched on in this report--
removal of deportable aliens and handling of immigration emergencies.
The Commission plans to continue its schedule of public hearings, roundtable consultations and fact-finding missions.
The Commission's assessments will be discussed and recommendations offered in future reports.
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INTRODUCTION
In recent years the international commu-
nity, as well as individual governments,
have placed growing emphasis on pre-
venting the movement of people across
international borders. This trend is in part
a response to new, post-Cold War oppor-
tunities to address the political, economic,
and environmental problems—often re-
ferred to as “root causes”—that  poten-
tially could result in large-scale move-
ments of people.  The United Nations’
efforts to find a political settlement to the
conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and
Somalia and to provide in-country assis-
tance and protection to victims of those
crises are examples of this new emphasis
on prevention.  In a November 1992
speech before the U.N. General Assem-
bly, Mrs. Sadako Ogata, the U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees, explained
that her agency’s preventive activities
“have taken the form of enhancing legal
norms through extending technical advice,
training, information and institution build-
ing, particularly in countries confronted
by actual or potential refugee problems.”
(Ogata 1992)
Coinciding with these efforts to resolve
the root causes of population displacement
is a trend toward increasingly restrictive
asylum policies in a number of countries.
Political and economic pressures in the
United States and Germany, for example,
have led to proposed legislative and pro-
cedural changes aimed at deterring im-
migration.  This restrictionism is also fu-
eled by a perception that these countries
are becoming overwhelmed by influxes of
asylum seekers. The U.N. General
Assembly’s 47th Session acknowledged
the rise in “persistent problems in coun-
tries or regions seriously jeopardizing the
security or well-being of refugees, includ-
ing incidents of refoulement, expulsion,
physical attack, and detention under un-
acceptable conditions,” and it called upon
member states “to take all measures nec-
essary to ensure respect for the principles
of refugee protection.”
In some cases, efforts to avert mass mi-
gration are motivated by concern that the
influx of migrants to an area could over-
whelm local services.  Even if the migrants
are of humanitarian concern, a govern-
ment may decide that a humanitarian
crisis could ensue if receiving communi-
ties do not have the capacity to provide
migrants with such basic necessities as
food, housing, and medical services.  In
such situations, a favorable—yet often
difficult to achieve—alternative is to dis-
tribute the burden of receiving the mi-
grants among a number of countries.
When migration emergencies are the re-
sult of political repression, a subset of the
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population involved may qualify as refu-
gees and their rights to seek asylum and
not to be returned forcibly to a country
where they face persecution should be pro-
tected.  At the same time, many of those
involved in immigration emergencies are
fleeing from difficult economic conditions
but have no claim to asylum.  Overly
generous immigration policies could leave
industrialized countries open to unman-
ageable influxes of people seeking immi-
gration and economic opportunities.
Therefore, one of the key issues at hand
for the United States in seeking to respond
effectively to migration emergencies is to
strike an appropriate balance between
protecting the rights of refugees and main-
taining reasonable control over its borders.
In June of 1980, when faced with mass
migration from Cuba and Haiti, Victor
Palmieri, the U.S. Coordinator for Refu-
gees at that time, noted the difficulty of
making refugee determinations in the face
of a large-scale immigration emergency:
The Refugee Act of 1980 did not
contemplate the kind of situation
we face now, with a sudden mas-
sive influx, without overseas pro-
cessing and valid documentation.
The procedures for dealing with
asylum seekers in this country
require lengthy examinations on
a case-by-case basis that would
leave many arrivals in limbo sta-
tus for long periods, without eli-
gibility for federally funded assis-
tance.
At the same time, he noted, “we cannot
stand by in silent witness to the unsafe
and uncontrolled exodus” from Cuba
(Palmieri 1980).
Fourteen years later, the United States
continues to struggle with the challenge
of planning for and responding to immi-
gration emergencies in ways that treat
migrants humanely and respect the rights
of refugees without exceeding the
country’s capacity to absorb new immi-
grants.  Over the past two decades, the
United States has had to respond to a
number of immigration emergencies, most
notably from Haiti, Cuba, Central
America, Eastern Europe, and Indochina.
This briefing paper provides background
information on the spectrum of options
the United States has available to avert
immigration emergencies.  These options
range from responding to the early warn-
ings of an emergency before displacement
occurs to redirecting the flow once people
leave.
U.S.  C O M M I S S I O N  O N  I M M I G R A T I O N  R E F O R M
R E S E A R C H
P A P E R
- 7 -
EARLY WARNING
AND PREVENTION
Early warnings of large-scale movements
of people allow advance time to plan an
appropriate response, whether it be alle-
viating the problems causing the displace-
ment or mounting a humanitarian re-
sponse for those who choose to flee. The
response to early warnings should be
determined in a comprehensive frame-
work that takes into consideration condi-
tions in the sending and receiving coun-
tries, as well as the situation of those at
risk of becoming displaced.  In some situ-
ations the need for people to flee across
international borders can be prevented if
the economic and political problems trig-
gering their flight are identified at an early
stage and reported to international or lo-
cal institutions that can resolve them.
Early warning depends upon the system-
atic collection and analysis of field obser-
vations in areas of potential displacement.
Early warnings of impending population
displacements can be detected in such
precipitating factors as political instabil-
ity, human rights violations, or the out-
break of conflict.   The response to early
warning information depends largely
upon the amount of time between the
detection of signals and the potential or
actual displacement.  If detected early
enough, these warnings in some cases can
lead to prevention.  If identified too late
to avoid the displacement, they can allow
for contingency planning and a more ad-
equate and timely response to the out-
flow.
When a crisis breaks out and the threat of
large-scale displacement is imminent, ef-
forts can be made to provide adequate
assistance and protection within the coun-
try to avoid the need for people to cross
an international border.  The growing
emphasis that the U.N. High Commis-
sioner for Refugees has placed on inter-
nally displaced persons in recent years is
aimed at preventing international dis-
placement.  On October 4, 1993, the High
Commissioner stated: “UNHCR is pre-
pared . . . to intervene on behalf of the
internally displaced when our involve-
ment could have a preventive impact on
refugee problems.  For example, we could
provide protection or assistance to dis-
placed people who might otherwise feel
compelled to cross the border to become
refugees.”
One of the most difficult challenges of
assisting and protecting people within
their countries is gaining access to them.
Governments sometimes obstruct relief ef-
forts by outside parties by saying that
these activities infringe upon their sover-
eignty.  This is particularly true in situa-
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tions where the governments do not want
outsiders to interfere with their domestic
policies.  A major turning point in the
international community’s ability to gain
humanitarian access to persons at risk
within their own national borders was
U.N. Security Council Resolution 688
(1991) which allowed the Allied Coalition
to go into northern Iraq to provide assis-
tance and protection to persons displaced
by the civil war in that country.
In addition to the humanitarian interven-
tion in northern Iraq, other innovative
approaches have been taken in recent
years to provide assistance and protec-
tion within countries in the midst of war
so that people do not need to flee.  In Sri
Lanka, for example, the UNHCR has set
up Open Relief Centers [ORCs] where
people affected by the conflict can obtain
essential relief assistance in a safe envi-
ronment until conditions stabilize.
In Somalia, “preventive zones” were
planned to protect displaced victims of
civil conflict.  Assistance in the form of
food, seeds, agricultural equipment, and
livestock are brought across the border
from Kenya into designated zones in So-
malia.  The objectives of this program are
to improve the living conditions of those
remaining in the preventive zones, to
deliver essential supplies to people at risk
of becoming displaced, and to encourage
the return of Somali refugees in Kenya.
The special provisions contained in the
Immigration Act of 1990 [IMMACT] for
residents of Hong Kong are an example
of preventive measures taken far in ad-
vance of a potential immigration emer-
gency.  Anticipating a possible mass exo-
dus when Hong Kong is incorporated into
the People’s Republic of China [PRC] in
1997, IMMACT includes provisions aimed
at regulating the admission of residents
of Hong Kong who may want to immi-
grate legally to the United States over the
next twenty years.
INTER-
NATIONALIZING
IMMIGRATION
EMERGENCIES
When an immigration emergency cannot
be prevented by resolving the problems
causing displacement, strategies must be
found that put the least strain on the coun-
tries trying to respond to the exodus.  The
United States’ experience with large scale
immigration emergencies during the past
two decades testifies to the tremendous
challenge of providing a humane response
that does not exceed the country’s capac-
ity to receive immigrants.  Ideally the
burden of responding to an immigration
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emergency should be distributed among
a number of countries.  Such an arrange-
ment often requires skillful diplomacy and
a commitment on the part of governments
to the principle of burden-sharing.
International
Response to the
Indochinese Migration
Crisis 1979-1989
The 1975 victories of communist forces in
Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos led to a
migration crisis of such urgency and
magnitude that in July 1979, the U.N.
Secretary-General convened an interna-
tional conference attended by sixty-five
governments to formulate an international
emergency response.  Neighboring coun-
tries agreed to allow temporary refuge to
Indochinese asylum seekers, the UNHCR
committed resources for their care and
maintenance, and third countries pledged
to resettle refugees.
While this system was effective in allevi-
ating some of the pressure on neighbor-
ing countries, by 1989 such factors as
continuing arrivals, high birth rates in the
camps, and a decline in admissions to
third countries led to considerable con-
cern in the countries of first asylum.
Therefore, in June 1989, the Secretary-
General convened a second conference, the
International Conference on Indo-chinese
Refugees.  The seventy-four governments
that attended the conference adopted the
Comprehensive Plan of Action [CPA] that
called for: controls on clandestine boat
departures from Vietnam; an expanded
Orderly Departure Program for legal exit
from Vietnam; guarantees of safe arrival
and humane treatment for Vietnamese and
Laotian asylum seekers by neighboring
countries; a region-wide refugee status de-
termination process; continued resettle-
ment abroad; and the eventual return of
nonrefugees to their countries of origin
(Knowles 1989).
As of August 31, 1993, there were approxi-
mately 110,000 Indochinese in UNHCR
camps throughout Southeast Asia; 742,000
Vietnamese, 235,000 Cambodians, and
300,000 Laotians had been resettled.
Through the CPA approximately 46,000
Vietnamese, 23,000 Cambodians and
14,000 Laotians had repatriated.  The CPA
is an example of how the international
community, working with the countries
of a region, can collaborate to distribute
the burden of responding to an migration
emergency.
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Unsuccessful
Attempts to
Internationalize the
Haitian Migration
Crisis, 1991-1994
The immigration emergencies from Cuba
and Haiti in the past two decades have
been viewed by other nations almost ex-
clusively as an United States problem.
Efforts to internationalize the migration
aspect of the crisis in Haiti since the over-
throw of President Aristide demonstrate
the tremendous challenge of brokering an
international program of burden-sharing.
At a meeting  held at the Organization of
American States [OAS] headquarters in
Washington on November 19, 1991, the
UNHCR asked Caribbean states to take
screened-out Haitians.  Venezuela took
100, Suriname 60, and Honduras 250.
Without success, the United States also
searched for alternative sites for tempo-
rary camps in Jamaica, the Bahamas, the
Turks and Caicos Islands, and the Domini-
can Republic. One senior Administration
official stated that other countries would
not share in the burden without an eco-
nomic incentive, “Nobody is going to take
them off our hands without getting some-
thing in return.”
With prospects for a political settlement
to the Haitian stalemate looking increas-
ingly grim in 1993, the UNHCR renewed
its efforts to find an international solution
to the plight of those wanting to flee Haiti.
UNHCR offered to establish one or more
regional processing centers for Haitians
in the Caribbean.  Modelled on the Com-
prehensive Plan of Action, this would
permit UNHCR to screen Haitians for a
fear of persecution in accordance with in-
ternational standards.  Those who were
screened in would be resettled, those who
were screened out would be given tem-
porary safe haven at the center or else-
where in the region.
INTERDICTION
In situations where people are fleeing by
boat, interdiction allows the U.S. to con-
trol the movement of migrants before they
reach U.S. shores.  In the past twelve
years, the United States’ policy of inter-
diction, whereby the Coast Guard inter-
cepts boats on the high seas, has affected
nationals from China, Cuba, the Domini-
can Republic, and Haiti.  Between 1981
and 1993, the U.S. Coast Guard interdicted
3,188 Chinese, 7,142 Cubans, 5,256 Do-
minicans, and 66,122 Haitians.  Upon in-
terdicting migrants, the U.S. can (1) bring
them to the United States, (2) return them
to their country of origin, or (3) bring them
to a third location for temporary protec-
tion. The fate of those interdicted has
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varied depending largely on the country
that they have left.  The clearest example
of this differential treatment is the con-
trast between the reception of interdicted
Haitians and Cubans. Haitians are re-
turned directly to Haiti.  Most Cubans
are brought to the U.S. and given auto-
matic parole.
As the United States’ interdiction policy
was first established in response to the
threat of massive numbers of Haitians
arriving in the United States and contin-
ued to evolve as such, this section focuses
primarily on the interdiction of Haitians.
History of Interdiction
One of the only early recorded incidents
of interdiction was of the St. Louis in 1939.
The St. Louis carried 1,128 German Jews
who went to several points in the West-
ern hemisphere, including the United
States, seeking asylum.  As the ship ap-
proached the United States, a Coast Guard
cutter patrolled the waters off the Florida
coast to prevent any passengers from at-
tempting to come ashore.  The passengers
wired a plea for admission to President
Roosevelt who did not respond.  The State
Department decided that no one without
a visa would be allowed to enter the U.S.
As no one on board had a visa, the St.
Louis returned to Europe where some of
its passengers were killed by Hitler
(Zucker & Zucker 1987).
In part because of the experience in Nazi
Germany during the Holocaust, U.S.
policy regarding refugees shifted in the
years following World War II.  A number
of special laws established programs per-
mitting the entry of displaced persons,
Hungarians, Cubans, and Indochinese.  In
1980, after four decades of ad hoc arrange-
ments, the Refugee Act of 1980, which
adopted the U.N. definition of refugees
and a process for the orderly admission
of refugees from abroad, was passed.  The
law also contained a brief reference to
asylum in the United States, a  provision
tested soon after the law’s passage by the
Mariel boatlift of Cubans.  At the same
time, advocates of asylum for Haitians
urged that their cases be reviewed under
the new legal framework and that Hai-
tians be granted the same special status
given to the Cubans.  Toward the end of
1980, the flow of Cubans had all but
stopped.  Haitians continued to arrive by
boat, however.
On September 23, 1981, through an ex-
change of letters between the U.S. gov-
ernment and the Haitian government of
President Duvalier, the two countries
agreed to the “establishment of a coop-
erative program of interdiction and selec-
tive return to Haiti of certain Haitian
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migrants and vessels involved in illegal
transport of persons coming from Haiti.”1
On September 29, 1981, President Reagan
issued an executive order expressing con-
cern for the “continuing problem of mi-
grants coming to the United States, by sea,
without necessary entry documents . . .”
and stating that the Secretary of State
“shall undertake to enter into, on behalf
of the United States, cooperative arrange-
ments with appropriate foreign govern-
ments for the purpose of preventing ille-
gal migration to the United States by sea”
(Reagan 1981a).
The interdiction agreement stated that the
United States “does not intend to return
to Haiti any Haitian migrants whom
United States authorities determine to
qualify for refugee status.”  Therefore,
during the period from 1981 to 1991, in-
terdicted Haitians were brought on board
Coast Guard cutters and interviewed by
INS officials to determine whether or not
they had “a credible fear” of persecution.
The “credible fear” standard is more le-
nient than the “well-founded fear” stan-
dard that must be met to qualify for po-
litical asylum.  According to one INS of-
ficer, a more generous standard on the
cutters was used as a procedural safe-
guard to compensate for the difficult con-
ditions under which the applicants were
presenting their claims.  Of the 24,600
Haitians screened on the cutters during
that period, only 28 were allowed to en-
ter the United States to seek asylum (US
GAO 1992).  Those who did not meet the
“credible fear” standard were returned to
Haiti.
Following the September 30, 1991 coup
that overthrew President Aristide, the
number of Haitians fleeing by boat ex-
ceeded the capacity of the Coast Guard
cutters to accommodate them during the
screening process.  In November 1991, the
U.S. government established an emergency
camp at the U.S. naval base on
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, where the INS
screened Haitians with the “credible fear”
standard that had been used on the cut-
ters since 1981.  (A fuller discussion of
the reception of Haitians on Guantanamo
is provided below.)
On January 19, 1978, the National Secu-
rity Council issued a Presidential Direc-
tive [P.D. 27] calling for interagency dis-
cussion and decisionmaking when non-
military incidents that could adversely
affect foreign relations occur.  In the case
of interdiction, when a Coast Guard ship
interdicts a vessel carrying undocumented
migrants, the passengers are held until an
interagency decision is made on how to
handle the case.  The Coast Guard ini-
tiates the interagency call, recommending
to the other agencies the action that it
believes to be appropriate.  The discus-
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sion involves the Coast Guard, State De-
partment, Justice Department, and, at
times, the National Security Council.  In
arriving upon an interagency decision, the
various agencies weigh in with their re-
spective operational, legal, and diplomatic
concerns.  P.D. 27 is not invoked in the
case of interdicted Haitians as that policy
is based on the 1981 agreement between
the two countries and the foreign policy
implications, therefore, do not need to be
assessed case-by-case.  As the U.S. does
not have such an agreement with any
other country, the interdiction of nation-
als of any other country is, therefore,
implemented according to P.D. 27.
A major turning point in the U.S. inter-
diction policy was the May 24, 1992 Ex-
ecutive Order issued by President Bush
that revoked the 1981 Executive Order and
replaced it with expanded authority to
“suspend the entry of aliens coming by
sea to the United States without neces-
sary documentation . . .” and “to repatri-
ate aliens interdicted beyond the territo-
rial sea of the United States.”  A contro-
versial aspect of the implementation of
this order is that Haitians no longer were
given the opportunity to present their
claim to asylum as they had been in the
previous eleven years.  Instead, those in-
terdicted were returned directly to Haiti.
Despite campaign promises to end inter-
diction, which he characterized as a “cal-
lous response to a terrible human trag-
edy,” on January 14, 1993 President-elect
Clinton announced that he would continue
the policy on a temporary basis.  Far from
moving away from Bush’s interdiction
policy, the Clinton Administration has
reinforced it with additional ships and
resources. In January 1993, the U.S. in-
creased the presence of U.S. Coast Guard
cutters, Navy ships, and helicopters to
blockade the island and prevent refugee
flight (National Coalition 1993). Under Op-
eration Able Manner, as the blockade is
named, the Coast Guard deployed as
many as twenty-two vessels at one time
to surround Haiti and contain anyone try-
ing to leave.
While interdiction has affected Haitians
more than any other group, it is increas-
ingly being used to control the movement
of other groups of migrants.  On July 6,
1993, the Coast Guard intercepted three
ships in international waters southwest of
San Diego.  The vessels were carrying 658
Chinese emigrants.  This incident came in
the wake of heightened public outcry over
alien smuggling, precipitated by the June
arrival of the Golden Venture, a ship car-
rying 300 Chinese immigrants who had
paid to be smuggled into the United
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States.  When the ships arrived off the
coast of California, the U.S. asked Mexico
to accept the U.S.-bound Chinese for pro-
cessing.  Vice President Gore described
this action as a “no nonsense response to
this wave of criminal smuggling of illegal
immigrants into the US.  They will be
given careful attention under the law, and
those who do not have legitimate requests,
and historically that has been the vast ma-
jority in these cases, will be returned di-
rectly to China.”  Mexico eventually
agreed to accept the Chinese for process-
ing and most of them were returned to
China within a week.
Justification and
Legality of
Interdiction
The U.S. government traditionally has  jus-
tified interdiction by emphasizing that it
is aimed at curbing illegal immigration.
In a proclamation issued on the same day
as his 1981 executive order on interdic-
tion, President Reagan stated that:
. . . the ongoing migration of per-
sons to the United States in viola-
tion of our laws is a serious na-
tional problem detrimental to the
interests of the United States.  A
particularly difficult aspect of the
problem is the continuing illegal
migration by sea of large numbers
of undocumented aliens into the
southeastern United States.  These
arrivals have severely strained the
law enforcement resources of the
Immigration and Naturalization
Service and have threatened the
welfare and safety of communi-
ties in that region (Reagan 1981b).
The U.S. government also has interdicted
Haitians out of concern for the safety of
migrants risking their lives in boats.  In
announcing his decision to continue the
interdiction policy in 1993, President
Clinton stated that “boat departures will
result in further tragic losses of life”
(Clinton 1993).  The Coast Guard also has
noted the danger involved in fleeing Haiti
by boat.  One Coast Guard lieutenant com-
mander explained that the Caribbean
waters are unpredictable and that it is
“common to have beautiful sunny weather
when you leave and a short distance away
localized heavy thunderstorms with forty-
mile-per-hour winds and fifteen-foot
seas.”  He explained that many of the
Haitians fleeing are from rural areas and
have no nautical experience.  “They are
crammed in horrible conditions with in-
adequate food, water, and sanitation.”  In
the late 1980s, another Coast Guard offi-
cial reported that “50 percent of the sail-
U.S.  C O M M I S S I O N  O N  I M M I G R A T I O N  R E F O R M
R E S E A R C H
P A P E R
- 15 -
boats departing from Haiti never land,
capsizing or foundering with total loss of
life” (Refugee Reports 1987).  The U.S.
government’s concern for the safety of
those fleeing Haiti by boat is, therefore,
clearly not unfounded.
An internal UNHCR memorandum of
October 29, 1981 documents the agency’s
early concern about interdiction by not-
ing that “whether or not the measures
[interdiction] can be challenged from a
legal point of view is not certain.  The
newly introduced interdiction measures,
of course, deprive asylum seekers of ac-
cess to counsel and of the appeal possi-
bilities which they would have had they
entered the USA . . . the new interdiction
measures could certainly constitute an
undesirable precedent for other areas of
the world” (Shawcross 19??).
After months of lower court battles over
interdiction and forced return, on June 21,
1993, the policy was upheld by the Su-
preme Court.  The eight-to-one decision
concluded that the policy was legal under
U.S. immigration law and that it did not
renege on the U.S.’s obligations as a sig-
natory to the 1967 U.N. Protocol Relating
to the Status of Refugees.  One of the
central points raised by the plaintiff was
that the interdiction policy violated Ar-
ticle 33 of the 1951 Refugee Convention
and its 1967 Protocol, which states, “No
Contracting State shall expel or return a
refugee in any manner whatsoever to the
frontiers of territories where his life or
freedom would be threatened on account
of his race, religion, nationality, member-
ship of a particular social group, or politi-
cal opinion.”
The majority held that protections against
forced repatriation of refugees apply “only
to aliens who reside in or have arrived at
the border of the United States.”  It, there-
fore, did not apply when the Coast Guard
interdicted vessels outside of U.S. territo-
rial waters. The majority also noted, how-
ever, that while repatriation did not vio-
late the letter of the law, it may violate its
spirit: “the drafters of the Convention . .
. may not have contemplated that any
nation would gather fleeing refugees and
return them to the one country they had
desperately sought to escape.”
The lone dissenter, Justice Harry
Blackmun argued that:
. . . the refugees attempting to
escape from Haiti do not claim a
right of admission to this country.
They do not even argue that the
Government has no right to inter-
cept their boats.  They demand
only that the United States, land
of refugees and guardian of free-
dom, cease forcibly driving them
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back to detention, abuse and
death.  That is a modest plea, vin-
dicated by the Treaty and the stat-
ute.  We should not close our ears
to it.
In response to the decision the UNHCR
stated that “This decision is contrary to
the views of UNHCR’s Executive Com-
mittee that refugees should not be refused
entry to a country where they are seeking
asylum, and that asylum seekers rescued
at sea should always be admitted, at least
on a temporary basis. . . . UNHCR  con-
siders the Court’s decision a setback to
modern international refugee law”
(UNHCR 1993).
IN-COUNTRY
PROCESSING
Like interdiction, in-country processing
aims to avert a potential immigration cri-
sis by directing the flow of migrants be-
fore they reach U.S. shores.  In-country
processing is similar to overseas resettle-
ment processing in that both of these pro-
grams determine whether or not a person
is a refugee before he or she enters the
United States.  This differs from the affir-
mative asylum process that makes such a
determination after a person is already in
the United States.  Admissions through
both in-country and overseas refugee pro-
cessing fall under the refugee ceilings set
annually by Congress in consultation with
the Administration.  The principal differ-
ence between in-country processing and
the resettlement program is that in the
former, applicants are still within the coun-
try where they fear persecution, whereas
in the latter, they have already reached
the safety of a first country of asylum.
The United States has in-country refugee
processing programs in the former Soviet
Union, Cuba, Vietnam, and Haiti.  It also
has participated in in-country processing
programs run by the International Orga-
nization of Migration [IOM] in Chile,
Argentina, Nicaragua, El Salvador, and
Bolivia.
Critics of in-country processing point out
that the people most in fear are the very
ones who likely would be too afraid to
come forward with a persecution claim.
People in fear might mistrust an in-coun-
try processing program’s intentions, fear-
ing that it could be a device for identify-
ing subversives.  After exposing them-
selves, applicants have no guarantee of
escaping from the country.  Proponents of
in-country processing argue that it allows
for the humane and orderly departure of
legitimate refugees.  They also point out
that it avoids the arrival of large numbers
of asylum seekers in the United States
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where, due to backlogged and protracted
asylum procedures, they can remain for
years without ever having established
their claim to asylum.
Orderly Departure
Program for Vietnam
The April 1975 collapse of the Republic of
Vietnam uprooted thousands of people.
By the end of the 1970s, thousands of
Vietnamese boat people were journeying
across the South China Sea to find refuge
in squalid camps throughout Southeast
Asia.  It will never be known how many
perished at sea during their attempts to
escape.  It became clear that an alterna-
tive to the dangerous and uncontrolled
flight of Vietnamese boat people had to
be found.  The United States worked with
the UNHCR—and through the UNHCR with
the Government of Vietnam—to establish a 
ore ordered, legal means of departure. 
The resulting U.S. Orderly Departure Prog-
ram [ODP] began operations in December 198-
0 (Migration and Refugee Services 1986; 
aynes 1992).  Those wishing to partici-
pate in the program first needed to obtain an 
it permit from the Vietnamese Minist
y of Internal Affairs.  Applicants w
uld then be transported to the U.S. em-
bassy in Bangkok where U.S. consular
officers would make the determination as
to whether or not to issue a U.S. entry
visa.
A few months prior to the inception of
the ODP, in May 1980, a U.S. presidential
determination (No. 80-17) was issued al-
lowing Vietnamese “with past or present
ties to the United States” to be considered
“refugees of special humanitarian concern
to the United States even though they are
still within their country of nationality or
habitual residence.”  (The determination
also applied to present and former politi-
cal prisoners and their families in Argen-
tina and Cuba.)  The U.S. established cri-
teria for categories of people eligible for
the program:  Category 1, family mem-
bers of persons in the U.S. not currently
eligible for immigrant visas; Category 2,
former employees of the U.S. government;
and Category 3, other persons closely as-
sociated or identified with the U.S. pres-
ence in Vietnam prior to 1975.
Amerasians and their immediate family
members fell under this third category.
By the end of 1992, more than 300,000
Vietnamese had departed for the United
States via the ODP.  This included 161,400
family reunification cases, 81,500
Amerasians and their relatives, 61,500
former political prisoners and their fami-
lies (US Committee for Refugees 1993).
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In-Country Processing
in Cuba
The U.S.’s in-country processing program
in Cuba is based on a 1984 migration
agreement between the U.S. and Cuban
governments that established procedures
for U.S. processing of nonimmigrant and
immigrant visas, as well as of refugee ap-
plications.  Cuba, to show its opposition
to Radio Marti, unilaterally suspended the
program almost immediately after its in-
ception.  The processing program, there-
fore, did not begin to operate fully until
the Cuban suspension was revoked in No-
vember 1987.  It operates out of the U.S.
Interests Section in Havana.  Those ap-
plying for refugee status must fall into
one of the following seven categories:
former political prisoners; members of per-
secuted religious minorities; human rights
activists; forced labor conscripts; persons
who have lost their professional creden-
tials and are unable to practice their pro-
fession because of their political activity;
dissidents; or other refugees of compel-
ling concern to the United States.
In-Country Processing
in the Former Soviet
Union
Under the Lautenberg Amendment to the
Foreign Assistance Appropriations Act for
FY 1990, selected groups of Indo-chinese
and Eastern Europeans with a “credible
fear of persecution” can qualify for refu-
gee status.  To be eligible for in-country
processing in the former Soviet Union, an
applicant must fall into one of the catego-
ries given special consideration under the
Lautenberg Amendment: Soviet Jews;
evangelical Christians; members of the
Ukrainian Catholics and Ukrainian Ortho-
dox religions.  The in-country processing
program that the U.S. operates in the
former Soviet Union gives priority to those
who fall into one of the Lautenberg cat-
egories with close family members in the
United States.  Since the in-country pro-
cessing program began in 1989, 750,000
preliminary applications have been re-
ceived.  The program has brought approxi-
mately 250,000 people to the United States.
In-Country Processing
in Haiti
In February 1992, in-country processing
began at the consular section of the U.S.
embassy in Haiti.  The program was es-
tablished to facilitate the exit of those most
likely to face persecution, such as high-
ranking officials from the Aristide gov-
ernment, Aristide’s bodyguards, and pro-
Aristide academics.  Since May 1992, when
the U.S. government began its policy of
interdicting Haitian boats and returning
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them directly to Haiti without an oppor-
tunity to make a claim to asylum, the in-
country processing program has served
as the only means by which Haitians can
apply for asylum in the United States
(unless, they are able to slip through the
blockade and arrive on U.S. shores with-
out being interdicted).  The critical differ-
ence between in-country processing in
Haiti and its use in other countries is that,
coupled with interdiction, in-country pro-
cessing in Haiti acts as a deterrent to the
immigration emergency that could ensue
if departure from the island were unre-
stricted during this period of political
instability.  In contrast,  the ODP was
established under emergency circum-
stances similar to those in Haiti when
thousands of people were risking their
lives in boats, but Vietnamese who fled
by boat were not turned back because the
ODP existed (Frelick 1993).
In October 1992, the IOM, under contract
with the State Department, assumed the
responsibility of running the in-country
processing program from an office out-
side of the embassy.  According to the
State Department, one reason for this
transfer was that the high security at the
embassy did not offer the unintimi- dat-
ing atmosphere that would make fearful
people feel safe enough to come forward
with their refugee claims.  An American
Immigration Lawyers Association [AILA]
delegation that went to Haiti in January
1993, reported that the IOM office was
threatening because it is close to the po-
lice headquarters and has very intimidat-
ing security—applicants must pass
through two layers of Haitian guards.  The
State Department counters that those
guards work for the IOM and offer a level
of security that is appropriate to the situ-
ation.
The in-country processing program oper-
ates on a vetting system that
determines the level of priority of each
application.  While the State Department
oversees the vetting of applications, the
INS makes the final determination as to
whether applicants are allowed to go to
the United States as refugees.  Those de-
termined to have valid claims are admit-
ted to the United States within the refu-
gee ceiling set annually by Congress.
Between February 1992 and January 1994,
the program’s vetting system consisted of
three categories.  The “A” category was
for likely targets of persecution, such as
officials in the Aristide government, aca-
demics, and journalists.  The “C” category
was for those who, as one State Depart-
ment official put it, “want to work in
Miami.”  The “B” category was for those
who fell in the middle, such as those who
do not appear to fear individual persecu-
tion but rather fear generalized violence
in their neighborhoods.
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In January 1993, the U.S. government re-
solved to work within Haiti to restore
democracy, protect human life, and im-
prove in-country processing.  A technical
team consisting of representatives from the
INS and the State Department, as well
Members of Congress, travelled to Haiti
to look at ways to improve in-country
processing.  Their recommendations,
which have now been implemented, were:
1. To double the capacity of the in-
country processing from 100 to 200
per week (i.e., that IOM would in-
terview enough applicants for the
INS to adjudicate 200 per week);
2. To streamline the in-country process-
ing for Category A so that the INS
interviews A applicants the very day
that they submit their application
and they can be fully processed and
ready to leave Haiti within seven
days;
3. To open regional processing centers
in rural areas where people find it
difficult to travel to the IOM office
in the capital (two such programs
were set up in the spring of 1993 in
Les Cayes and Cape Haitian and are
being run by nongovernmental or-
ganizations, World Relief and the
U.S. Catholic Conference respec-
tively);
4. To provide additional security to
those afraid to go to the processing
centers, including IOM hiring of a
human rights liaison person to re-
main in contact with the Haitian
human rights community for alerts
on cases of people in particular fear
or danger;
5. To pass out a preliminary question-
naire to returnees on cutters, and
then upon their return, the Refugee
Coordinator and his staff go onto
the cutters and prioritize the ques-
tionnaires, taking those in category
A directly to the INS for processing.
The U.S. Government’s justification for
this program is that it enables legitimate
refugees to leave the country without risk-
ing their lives in boats.  Following a Fed-
eral Appeals Court decision in March 1992
to suspend the forced return of Haitians
(later overturned by the Supreme Court),
one Justice Department official stated,
“The Administration remains convinced
that in-country processing is the most eq-
uitable and humanitarian way to deal with
this situation.  We are extremely concerned
that as a result of today’s actions, Hai-
tians may be lured into embarking on
dangerous journeys on the high seas in
the false hope of reaching the United
States” (Washington Post 1992).
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The three categories of the vetting system
were abolished in January 1994, and they
were replaced by a more narrow set of
criteria.  As of January 31, 1994, to be
eligible for in-country processing, a per-
son must fall into one of the following
groups: former senior or mid-level mem-
bers of the Aristide government; close
Aristide associates; journalists or educa-
tional activists who have experienced sig-
nificant or persistent persecution; highly
visible members of social, political, or
development organizations that have ex-
perienced persecution or significant ha-
rassment by the de facto authorities; or oth-
ers of compelling concern to the U.S. be-
cause they are in immediate danger.
Some who criticize the in-country process-
ing program in Haiti hold that in-country
processing in itself is not necessarily harm-
ful.  It is when it is the only means of
protection that it becomes a dangerous
tool of containment.
TEMPORARY
PROTECTION AT
OFFSHORE
LOCATIONS
One objective of planning for immigra-
tion emergencies is to avoid the economic,
political, and social problems that can
result when an influx of migrants sud-
denly arrives, overwhelming the local
capacity to absorb them.  A middle ground
between sending all migrants involved in
an immigration emergency back to their
country of origin and admitting them all
into the United States, is to provide tem-
porary protection and refugee processing
at an offshore location.  In 1975, the U.S.
temporarily housed fleeing Vietnamese on
Guam, and at the time of the Mariel
boatlift some Cubans were temporarily ac-
commodated in Puerto Rico.  The United
States’ experience of temporarily housing
Haitians at the U.S. Naval Base at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba provides insights
into how this option may be used in the
future.
Within the first few months after the Sep-
tember 1991 coup in Haiti, the Coast
Guard cutters being used for INS screen-
ing became overwhelmed and an alterna-
tive location for conducting the interviews
needed to be found.  In November 1991,
the U.S. government dispatched a mili-
tary task force to erect an emergency camp
at the U.S. Naval Base at Guan-tanamo
Bay.  Once the Guantanamo site was es-
tablished, the Coast Guard brought the
intercepted Haitians to Guantanamo for
screening rather than keeping them on the
cutters.
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During the course of the next seven
months, approximately 12,000 Haitians
were picked up by the Coast Guard and
brought to Guantanamo.  A number of
problems developed during this period
that led the U.S. government to decide to
close the camp in May 1992.  First, the
U.S. government became concerned that
by picking up Haitians at sea and bring-
ing them to Guantanamo, the U.S. was
encouraging increasing numbers to flee.
One State Department official pointed out
that Haitians were beginning to leave Haiti
in boats that were not fit to take them to
Miami but rather were  intended only to
take them a few miles off the coast of
Haiti where they knew they would be
picked up by a Coast Guard ship.
A second problem was that the number
of Haitians needing accommodation on
Guantanamo soon exceeded the capacity
of the facilities that the U.S. had set up to
receive them.  The Administration ex-
plored a number of options to try to alle-
viate the problem of overcrowding, rang-
ing from expanding the facilities on
Guantanamo to accelerating the process
of repatriation.  The Administration also
made diplomatic efforts to persuade other
governments to accept some of the over-
flow.  In June 1992, the Administration
ultimately decided to close the camp.
Between the November 1991 opening of
the camp at Guantanamo and its closing,
the INS prescreened 36,596 cases there.
Approximately 11,000 were screened in
and allowed to pursue asylum claims in
the United States.  With a few exceptions,
who were allowed into the U.S. for medi-
cal reasons, the remaining screened out
Haitians were returned to Haiti.
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The massive refugee resettlement of
Indochinese boat people spurred Congres-
sional action on the Refugee Act of 1980.
The Act, however, was rooted in more
than the immediate challenge of resettle-
ment resulting from the pledges made by
the United States at the Geneva Confer-
ence of 1979.  The original version of the
bill introduced in the Senate by Senator
Edward Kennedy of Massachusetts was
aimed at addressing the longstanding is-
sue of orderly decision making and Con-
gressional-Executive responsibilities in de-
termining levels of refugee admissions.
Federal responsibility for the costs of refu-
gee resettlement in the U.S. were also
taken up in detail in House consideration
of the bill.
The Refugee Act of 1980 was a major step
in codifying the decision-making process
about how many refugees to resettle in
the U.S. annually and from where they
would come.  It also spelled out a new
framework for federal-state-private volun-
tary agency cooperation in the reception
and settlement process.  The implementa-
tion of the settlement process has been
controversial in many aspects, but the Act
provided a working basis to address is-
sues of refugee integration.
The ink was hardly dry on the new law,
signed in March of 1980, when the Mariel
boat lift crisis began.  Mariel was impor-
tant for many reasons but, for the pur-
poses of this analysis, it was particularly
significant as the first experience of the
decade (and a searing one, at that) of what
was to emerge as the most challenging
refugee problem of the 1980s and 1990s
for industrial countries, flows of asylum
applicants.
The Refugee Act of 1980 had set up a
working arrangement to address problems
related to choosing refugees from over-
seas for resettlement in the U.S.  Until
Mariel, U.S. refugee policy virtually meant
how to decide how many and whom,
among those given safe haven in coun-
tries other than their own, to invite to
settle in the United States, as well as
whom to allow to come directly to the
U.S. as refugees from persecution (as in
the case of the former Soviet Union).
The Refugee Act of 1980 solved a past
problem but did not address the emerg-
ing issue of asylum applications.  The Act
took some note of asylum, but almost in
a passing way.  It authorized up to 5,000
persons approved for asylum in a given
year to adjust to permanent resident alien
status.  (The number of asylum applica-
tions—some applications include many
family members—in 1992 was 103,946.)
The number authorized in the legislation
to adjust to immigrant status had no par-
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ticular basis, according to recollection of
Congressional and Executive staff who
worked together on drafting the legisla-
tion.  It seemed more than sufficient for
the trickle of persons who sought asylum,
be they defectors of strategic value, promi-
nent athletes and artists, crew members
who sought refuge, or others.  Others
includes those who sought to stay in the
United States when, due to their prior
political activities, religious beliefs, or
ethnicity, political turmoil left them
stranded and in danger if they returned
to their country.  The law took no note of
the possibility of acute, mass asylum
movements, that is, large numbers com-
ing in a short period with little notice or
preparation.
The United States was not alone in facing
the challenge of asylum.  Other industrial
countries, notably in Europe, encountered
similar increases in asylum applications
in the 1980s.  Many of the stronger econo-
mies of Western Europe had relied on tem-
porary labor (guest workers in the trans-
lation from the German) to help their
economies recover from wartime devas-
tation and grow spectacularly in the late
1950s and 1960s.  Some hesitations were
voiced about the economic wisdom and,
especially, the social costs of temporary
labor programs.  As early as 1968, Swit-
zerland held a referendum about reduc-
ing temporary worker reliance due to
“over-foreignization.”
The oil boycott of 1973 and the subse-
quent economic downturn found Euro-
pean labor importers ending the practice.
Some countries developed programs to
encourage the noncitizen labor to return
home.  Most of these incentive programs,
however, were not successful in spurring
significant returns.  There was reluctance
to develop a wholesale deportation policy,
due probably to a combination of struc-
tural reliance on the “temporary” work-
ers to perform permanent jobs (and so
opposition of employers to a wholesale
deportation policy) and objections from
sectors of the public in these European
liberal democracies on equity grounds.
Although the issuance of new work per-
mits virtually halted, in many cases work-
ers in place were permitted to stay and
allowed to reunite their families in Eu-
rope.  Many social problems developed
related to citizenship, education, minor-
ity group status, employment and train-
ing opportunities, housing, and so on.  The
type and severity of the issues varied by
country and the origin of the worker
population.  Every European country with
the remnants of a guest worker program
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faced some significant social and political
problems related to the sequelae of mi-
grant worker programs.
With the ending of fresh recruitment into
the ranks of temporary labor, Europe faced
an increase in undocumented or illegal
migration.  Attempts to reduce or control
the level of illegal migration had some,
albeit limited, success.  In the 1980s asy-
lum seeking became an alternate to illegal
migration, which itself had developed as
a substitute for temporary labor programs.
Note that the cycle of events in Europe
gives support to the hypothesis that, given
supply of and effective demand for labor,
change in policy to restrict one migration
channel will result in pressure for other
modes of entry.  Ending temporary worker
recruitment after 1973 led to increased
illegal migration. Crackdowns on illegal
migration, including fines for hiring ille-
gal migrants, led to pressure on the asy-
lum system as a means of entry for those
who in large part are labor migrants.  The
logic would lead to the prediction that
the current attempts to restrict access to
asylum procedures by manifestly un-
founded applicants will result in a new
round of increased illegal migration in
Europe.
Most Western European countries are sig-
natories to the Geneva Convention of 1951
on the status of refugees and the 1967 New
York Protocol that removed the temporal
and geographic referents in the refugee
definition of the 1951 Convention.  West-
ern European countries have asylum ad-
judication systems and a strong commit-
ment to asylum, in no small part in reac-
tion to Nazi-era experiences.  The com-
mitment to asylum, like that in the United
States to refugee resettlement, primarily
was expressed in reception from Commu-
nist countries in the East of Europe.  Since
Communist governments’ exit policies
were strict, the flow of asylum seekers
until the 1980s was generally not great
and not perceived to be out of control.
Around 1984, the large movement of Ira-
nian asylum seekers from Turkey, the in-
crease noted in Third World asylum seek-
ers coming through the Warsaw Pact coun-
tries, and the threat of terrorism led to
initial meetings among Western European
states about asylum in Europe.1  As asy-
lum became a route for entry in Europe,
states perceived the flows as increasingly
1 For a review of events in Europe around
multilateral discussions of asylum see:
Russell, S.S.;  Keely, C.B.  Forthcoming.  The
Diplomacy of Multilateral Efforts to
Harmonize Asylum Policy Among
Industrial Countries.  In Towards a New
Refugee Regime (R. Rogers, S.S. Russell, eds.).
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an abuse of the asylum system.  The vast
majority of asylum seekers were found
not to qualify as refugees under the Con-
vention and Protocol.  An asylum system
is to provide protection for politically
persecuted people, not to be an alternate
route to the European labor market.
European governments continue to wrestle
with policy and programs related to indi-
viduals arriving in Europe and applying
for asylum.  More recently, acute flows
(large numbers in a short time) of Euro-
pean asylum seekers due to war and po-
litical turmoil have been added to the
more individualistic asylum flow.  Italy
felt the impact with the boat loads of
Albanians seeking asylum during the over-
throw of the former, extremely repressive
government.  Currently, many people from
former Yugoslavia find haven within its
former components, now new countries
(e.g., Bosnians in Croatia).  Large num-
bers have sought and found a temporary
haven in Germany, Austria, Switzerland,
and Sweden.  In both the Bosnian and
Albanian cases, calls by the recipient coun-
tries for burden sharing in providing a
safe haven, especially by other European
countries, have fallen on deaf ears.  The
potential of additional flows from Central
Europe and the former Soviet Union con-
tinues to worry European capitals.
In short, Europe faces large-scale asylum
flows from both individuals (coming to
the country and asking for asylum on
entry or if detained for migration irregu-
larities) and mass flows in concentrated
periods of people escaping violence.
The United States continues to face both
sorts of asylum seekers.  (The U.S. NAFTA
partners share in these pressures to some
extent already and perhaps increasingly
in the future.)  The Mariel flows repre-
sented a large inflow in a short time, simi-
lar in that respect to the recent Albanian
and former Yugoslav cases of Bosnians
and Croats.  During the 1980s, the U.S.
also received an increasing number of
asylum applications at ports of entry.
Central Americans, especially from El
Salvador and Nicaragua, and more re-
cently from Guatemala, have come in
continuous streams of significant size.
While many applied for asylum, many did
not.  The interpretation of their failure to
apply varies between their fear of being
turned down by an unfair, politically
tainted adjudication system and their dis-
interest because they are economic mi-
grants who know they do not qualify for
asylum.
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In addition to the individual asylum seek-
ers arriving at points of entry or request-
ing asylum at time of arrest for immigra-
tion offenses, and besides the Central
Americans whose entry is related to po-
litical events (even if they do not qualify
under the Convention definition contained
in U.S. law), the U.S. continues to face the
threat of large-scale, time-concentrated
asylum flows from Cuba and Haiti.
The recent arrival of boats of Chinese asy-
lum seekers raises the additional specter
of continuous flows from a distant coun-
try where the U.S. desire for normal rela-
tions, including trade, and the question-
able human rights situation present diffi-
cult problems.  Even if the boat loads of
Chinese are economic migrants caught in
a sophisticated international smuggling
business, the return of such persons raises
human rights issues if their government
punishes them for exercising what the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights
of 1948 declares to be a basic right, to
leave and reenter one’s own country.
Table 1 indicates the level and sources of
asylum applicants to the United States
from 1980-1993.  The data give an idea of
current demands on the asylum adjudica-
tion system.  Asylum seekers’ applications
are decided by an asylum officer corps
specially trained to judge the bona fides of
the cases.  The 1980 Refugee Act man-
dated an asylum officer corps, but it took
a decade to establish the corps and sup-
porting services to provide political, hu-
man rights, and other information neces-
sary to judge the facts presented to adju-
dicators in specific cases.
Asylum adjudication systems like that in
the United States were established in a
number of industrial countries in the
1980s.  The U.S. system was helped in
many ways by the Canadian experience
in establishing an asylum system.  A goal
of these programs is to establish an adju-
dication process that is and is perceived
to be fair, independent of immediate for-
eign policy interests of the sitting govern-
ment, and reasonable in the outcome of
cases.
These objectives fulfill two desiderata.
Democratic governments want to encour-
age human rights values in other societies
as ends in themselves and as a basis for
trade, diplomatic, and other state-to-state
interaction.  Second, public opinion in
democratic countries objected to asylum
systems perceived as virtual captives of
Cold War (especially anti-Communist)
policy, with scant attention to persecution
by rightist governments.  Citizen groups
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Note:  The Refugee Act of 1980 went into effect on April 1, 1980.  The pending beginning of fiscal year 1990 does not match the
pending end of fiscal year 1989 due to changes in the processing of Soviet refugees residing inside the Soviet Union.  The
figures beginning fiscal year 1990 exclude the initial questionnaires submitted by refugee applicants residing in the former
Soviet Union.  The number of applications for refugee status pending at the beginning of fiscal year 1992 has been revised
upward from the 17,555 reported at the end of fiscal year 1991.  The increase of 683 applications is due to revision in the data
from one reporting office.
Source: INS.  1994.  1993 Statistical Yearbook.
YEAR
1980 (Apr-Sept)
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
Applications
pending
beginning of
year
16,642
14,957
18,619
11,668
7,801
12,681
13,707
15,895
20,152
27,441
39,524
20,369
18,238
15,028
Applications
filed
duirng
year
95,241
178,273
76,150
92,522
99,636
80,734
67,310
85,823
105,024
190,597
135,251
123,492
133,786
127,676
Applications
approved
during
year
89,580
155,291
61,527
73,645
77,932
59,436
52,081
61,529
80,282
95,505
99,697
107,962
115,330
106,026
Applications
denied
during
year
6,149
15,322
14,943
20,255
16,220
18,430
9,679
13,911
11,821
33,179
29,805
12,644
14,886
20,280
Applications
otherwise
closed
during year
1,197
3,998
6,631
2,489
604
1,842
3,362
6,126
5,632
4,005
24,904
5,700
6,780
5,107
Applications
pending
end of
year
14,957
18,619
11,668
7,801
12,681
13,707
15,895
20,152
27,441
85,349
20,369
17,555
15,028
11,291
Table 1.
REFUGEE STATUS APPLICATIONS
FISCAL YEARS 1980-1993
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in the U.S. and elsewhere pressed gov-
ernments to develop human rights poli-
cies with a single standard for friends and
enemies alike.
The U.S. asylum adjudication system has
been adjusting to a heavier workload of
individual asylum applications at ports of
entry or after arrest for immigration vio-
lations.  The workload of the asylum
adjudication corps was impacted tremen-
dously by the addition of Central Ameri-
can asylum seekers as a result of the
American Baptist case and by the 1990
Immigration Act’s mandating of rehear-
ing of some cases.
It is important not to minimize the
caseload problem and the resource re-
quirements needed to avoid incessant
“catch-up” (the image of Sisyphus comes
to mind).  While the problem of resources
to dig out from the current backlog and
workload needs attention, there is gen-
eral support for a set of procedures that
are fair, independent, and contribute to
maintaining a global standard of protec-
tion from political persecution.
Two other issues remain.  First, is adher-
ence to the Convention definition ad-
equate to meet the needs of those inno-
cently escaping violence, especially the
violence of war or civil unrest, even if
they are not personally persecuted?
Should an asylum option that does not
automatically assume permanent settle-
ment be developed for such situations by
the U.S. and industrial countries gener-
ally?  This is the familiar issue of the
adequacy of the refugee definition and the
accompanying problem of how to accom-
modate truly temporary asylum with ef-
fective return or removal policies when
political conditions allow for safe return.
The second issue is what to do in the face
of acute, mass asylum flows, like those
during Mariel and feared during recent
years’ events in Haiti?
These two issues are analytically distinct
but are related in concrete cases.  Each
will be addressed in turn, with attention
to their intersection in possible mass
movements to the U.S. in the foreseeable
future.
The Conditions
of Asylum
Despite the adoption of the international
(Convention- and Protocol-based) defini-
tion of a refugee in the Refugee Act of
1980, the U.S. still feels the legacy of anti-
Communism in refugee programs.  Until
the reform of refugee law in 1980, the
R E S E A R C H
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definition of a refugee in U.S. statutes
referred to persons from a Communist-
dominated country and certain areas of
the Middle East.  Even with the change in
definition, inspection of the proposed and
actual admissions of refugees under the
1980 Act reveals a dominance of resettle-
ment of citizens from countries with Com-
munist governments.
Currently, the lion’s share of proposed
admissions to the U.S. are from the former
Soviet Union and Vietnam.  These figures
to a large extent represent redeeming past
promises.  They are based not only on
foreign policy considerations like main-
taining trust in the word of the U.S., but
also on domestic considerations about con-
stituency support for continued admission
of certain groups.  The continued salience
of the Cold War is also evident in legisla-
tion allowing refugee status to people from
Cuba, a remnant of U.S. policy preference
not accorded citizens of other countries.
On the other hand, the U.S. is quite strong
in its policy position that asylum appli-
cants should meet the Convention criteria
and that the United States does not sup-
port an expansion of the international
definition.  The U.S. does supply funds to
the UN High Commissioner for Refugees
[UNHCR] for protection and assistance
activities in countries that accept a broader
definition of refugee, such as those in the
Organization of African Unity Convention
and the Cartegena Declaration as it ap-
plies to Central America.  In both these
instances, persons fleeing war or civil
disturbance are afforded international
protection under UNHCR auspices with
U.S. financial support.  Policy to help fi-
nance international agencies to provide
protection and assistance is a different
matter than policy to accept persons for
permanent residence in the U.S.  In Eu-
rope, Germany, Austria, and Switzerland
receive Bosnian refugees and provide (at
least for now) a purported temporary safe
haven with an expectation of return.  The
decision is based on providing safety from
war and is provided generally without
inquiry into meeting Convention defini-
tions.
During the 1980s, the U.S. policy was to
review asylum applications (which would
result in permanent settlement in the U.S.)
on the basis of meeting the Convention
definition.  Especially in regard to appli-
cations from Central America, this resulted
in very low acceptance rates.  Low accep-
tance rates, in turn, provided the basis for
the claim that asylum seekers were eco-
nomic migrants.  That they were fleeing
devastation of war, massive civil unrest,
or gross human rights violations (with or
without complicity of parts of the U.S.
military, intelligence, or diplomatic agen-
cies) was presented as not relevant to
U.S.  C O M M I S S I O N  O N  I M M I G R A T I O N  R E F O R M
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asylum policy, unless and until the refu-
gee definition of political persecution were
altered to extend beyond the individual
victim of persecution.  The successive ad-
ministrations of both Democratic and
Republican parties opposed extending the
refugee definition to include those fleeing
the general danger of war or unrest.
An honest analysis of the dynamics of the
political differences on Central American
policy concludes that to some extent the
criticism of asylum policy in the 1980s was
a proxy for opposition to U.S. policy in
Central America.  The U.S. government
was accused of double standards on hu-
man rights, complicity in human rights
violations, and lack of responsibility to-
ward victims of a policy of material, mili-
tary, and diplomatic support to the gov-
ernments accused of large-scale human
rights violations.
Conversely, discussion of inadequacies of
asylum and refugee definitions, policy, or
behavior (including an asylum adjudica-
tion system reflecting current foreign
policy that continued for almost a decade
before the development of an independent
asylum officer corps) was dismissed by
supporters of U.S. Central American
policy as nothing but a smoke screen for
political opposition to that policy.  Oppo-
nents of Central American policy carried
the burden of being presumed to be naive
or fellow travellers for Communist expan-
sionist policies.  Discussion of refugee and
asylum policy (and Central American
policy) was poisoned by these sorts of
views.
This state of affairs, in tandem with the
logistical problems of providing for recep-
tion and maintenance of mass movements
like the Mariel experience (to be discussed
below), has resulted, since the early 1980s,
in an unstated policy that the U.S. is not
a country of mass first asylum.  The Con-
vention definition has been rigorously
applied, in deep contrast to prior mass
determinations to accept escapees from
Eastern Europe or the Soviet Union (in-
cluding Hungarians in 1956 and asylum
seekers after the Czech Spring), Cubans,
and Indochinese.  In those cases, to have
been in their own countries was consid-
ered persecution enough.  To escape was
to merit asylum and resettlement.  The
United States as late as 1989, in discus-
sions of the Coordinated Plan of Action
[CPA] for Indochina, insisted that those
denied asylum under processes monitored
by the UNHCR in Hong Kong were not
to be returned to Vietnam.
The contention that implicit U.S. policy
since Mariel has been that the U.S. is not
a country of first asylum is borne out by
rejection rates of Central America
asylum seekers and by the policies of in-
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terdiction and, more recently, return with-
out review of Haitians picked up on the
high seas who wish to claim asylum.  The
reported demarche to Cuba not to inter-
rupt the 1992 U.S. elections lends further
support to this thesis.  Even in the case of
Cuba, the U.S. has not encouraged or
given signs of support for large-scale
emigration, despite domestic support for
accepting escapees as an indication of
continued opposition to Castro.
The debates on Central American policy,
including the role of asylum decisions, and
the desire to avoid being a country of first
asylum have created a highly charged
atmosphere.  No administration since the
Mariel incident in the Carter presidency
has supported expansion of the refugee
(and, by extension, asylee) definition.
Even to suggest such discussion carried
policy baggage.  Reasoned discussion in
this atmosphere has hardly been possible.
Human rights supporters and those con-
cerned about innocent victims of war and
civil unrest welcomed the establishment
of the asylum officer corps as a step in
support of universally applicable stan-
dards of protection from persecution.  All
victims of war’s destruction may not be
eligible for asylum, but at least those suf-
fering or realistically fearing persecution
as defined by the Convention would be
more likely to receive asylum.  Further,
the establishment of Temporary Protective
Status [TPS] in the 1990 Immigration Act
moved another step in the direction of
providing protection temporarily to a
group of people in the United States who
would face danger if required to return to
their country of citizenship.  But the issue
of the adequacy of the refugee definition
remains.
What should be the policy toward per-
sons (inside or outside the country) seek-
ing a safe haven from the general devas-
tation of war or civil unrest but who are
not personally the targets of persecution
as specified in the Convention definition
contained in U.S. legislation?  The defini-
tion should not be broadened to make
such persons eligible for permanent settle-
ment in the U.S. under asylum law and
procedures.  It would be impossible to
implement fairly or fully because the glo-
bal probabilities of civil unrest in the wake
of post-Cold War realignments is so great.
It is logistically not possible for every citi-
zen of any country engaged in civil or
international war to become a permanent
resident alien (immigrant) in the U.S.
through asylum procedures.  It would
hamper progress in burden-sharing agree-
ments and would be politically insupport-
able in the U.S. once the general public
understood the dimensions of such a
policy decision.
Making this recommendation does not end
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the matter.  Practice around the world has
been to offer safe haven to war victims.
It has happened in Africa, Asia, and Latin
America on numerous occasions.  The
generosity, even if sometimes reluctant, of
very poor countries to citizens of neigh-
boring countries has been striking.  In
Europe, a safe haven is accorded to
Bosnians in large numbers by Germany,
Austria, Switzerland, and Sweden.  The
first three of these countries have offered
temporary safe haven and not permanent
settlement under their asylum procedures.
(Sweden, which offered settlement, now
requires a visa for Bosnians, effectively
ending asylum, which means settlement
or temporary safe haven for Bosnians.)
Following these examples of past and cur-
rent practice, the U.S. should be open to
providing temporary safe haven as neces-
sary to the citizens of neighboring coun-
tries.  This requires either new U.S. legis-
lation to create such a status, including a
procedure the President can invoke in
consultation with the Congress, or amend-
ment of TPS in current law.  Safe haven,
especially in the cases of mass movements
in short periods (like the Mariel case)
should provide shelter in camps for up to
one year.  After that, protectees should be
permitted into the general population with
work authorization.  Three years after
admission, protectees should be permit-
ted to petition for adjustment to perma-
nent resident alien.  The three-year pe-
riod is proposed as a reasonable time to
test whether safe return is a plausible pos-
sibility.
For those already in the United States and
in the general population as
nonimmigrants (like students) or even il-
legally, who are judged to be in danger
from war conditions if they return home,
safe haven in the general population with
work authorization could be provided.
(The case of illegal migrants may merit
consideration of safe haven in camps.  The
logistics and incentives inherent in this
suggestion require further thought).  These
cases would be similar to current practice
under TPS.  Under a safe haven policy,
these persons would be given protection
for up to three years from the start of
protection to anyone in their situation.
(Thus, if a student is still in studies and
on a valid student visa, he or she could
be given safe haven after the student visa
expired.  The three-year clock would run
from the date safe haven was given to
people from his or her country who did
not have any visa to be in the U.S.)
The phrase “up to” is emphasized to make
it clear that safe haven is meant to be
temporary and provided only for the time
needed.  The three years of protection is
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not a right, regardless of events in the
homeland.  If events change in six months,
then protectees ought to be required to
return home.  The proposal presumes that
the usual opportunities be extended for
status adjustment in cases of genuine
marriages to U.S. citizens or other immi-
grant-qualifying circumstances.
The current TPS has been interpreted not
to be applicable to persons outside the
United States.  Thus, it was not used for
the Haitians and presumably would not
be used for a massive asylum movement
that was declared a migration emergency
in which migrants would be accepted and
even assisted to enter the U.S. by federal
authorities (as for example was done in
the Mariel case as it unfolded).  The pro-
posed safe haven protection could be used
in cases of people outside or in the United
States.
New legislation may be preferable to
amending TPS because TPS carries mean-
ing and interpretations and amendment
often leads to more unforeseen conse-
quences than necessary.  TPS also is the
U.S. version of European policies creating
categories like Status B refugees, humani-
tarian entrants, persons with extraordinary
leave to stay, and so on.  A major problem
in these cases is that there is usually no
effective removal policy and little pres-
sure on the government to use whatever
good offices or persuasive powers at its
disposal to work to change the conditions
that led to the humanitarian gesture to
offer temporary safe haven.  In the U.S.
case, if safe haven protectees were in a
camp for a year, state authorities would
surely keep the issue before the federal
government.  The need to decide at the
end of a year to release the protectees into
the general population with work autho-
rization would at least require conscious
attention to a “problem,” that is, the con-
ditions that led the government to offer
safe haven.  Again, at the end of two years
(or whatever is deemed a reasonable pe-
riod to test is return is viable), a decision
and process must be undertaken to give
permanent resident alien status.
The safe haven proposed here, therefore,
has three aspects that improve the TPS
policy.  First, the procedure sends a clearer
message that safe haven is meant to be
temporary.  It will save lives but is not
intended or structured to be a route to
residence in the United States.
Second, the procedures keep a safe haven
population in the consciousness of fed-
eral authorities and build in incentives for
federal and local authorities to urge ac-
tion (in so far as is reasonable) to help
change conditions in sending countries.
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The safe haven procedure is not draco-
nian and it echoes attempts of some coun-
tries to move away from immediate work
authorization policies (e.g., Canada and
Australia).  It provides a safe haven, but
in a camp.  It allows for a reasonable test
of whether conditions can change so that
return is feasible.
Even safe haven as proposed may develop
into a program in which settlement after
three years is more the rule than the ex-
ception.  Perhaps additional incentives
need to be built in to encourage the fed-
eral government to focus on conditions
that lead to giving safe haven instead of
seeing safe haven as a convenient way to
put an issue on the back burner.  Like
TPS, safe haven is a step in the direction
of recognizing that providing an escape
route from death and destruction during
war and civil unrest is not the same as
providing a new home.  Unlike TPS, the
safe haven proposal tries to build in cri-
teria about lengths of stay, conditions of
stay (one year in camp), and incentives
for continued federal attention to do what
is possible to change conditions that al-
low for and underscore the expectation of
repatriation.
Third, safe haven is intended either for
persons who find their way to the U.S. or
for assisted entry.
Invoking safe haven preferably will re-
quire consultations on burden sharing
with neighboring countries in anticipation
of such events and close coordination in
the actual event.  A decision to provide a
temporary safe haven is, by its nature, an
ad hoc decision and should not be auto-
matically triggered by criteria in a law.
But offering safe haven should be clearly
separate from asylum leading to perma-
nent residence.
Such a policy would codify what some
other countries’ and international practice
has been in terms of acceptance of vic-
tims of war and unrest, while leaving the
President flexibility to judge when the safe
haven would be offered.  It allows for
mass determinations to escape war con-
ditions.  It recognizes regional responsi-
bilities that are a function of geography.
It is not unreasonable for the bulk of safe
haven granted to Bosnians to take place
in Europe.   Likewise, the North Ameri-
can partners in NAFTA can reasonably be
expected to do the same for victims of
war in a Caribbean or Central American
country.
Unlike the European response to burden
sharing on Bosnia, this proposal includes
prior discussion and agreement of coun-
tries in the region about strategy and roles
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(burden sharing) in the event of emergen-
cies involving mass movements.  It also
has built in incentives to underscore the
expectation of return.  Like disaster pre-
paredness, prior discussions cannot antici-
pate every detail, but they allow coordi-
nated reaction in actual emergencies based
on prior understandings and agreements.
Burden sharing agreements will take time
and an emergency can happen in the
meantime.  That is not a reason to dis-
miss this recommendation.  The recom-
mendation to develop a legislative basis
for temporary safe haven in camps for a
reasonable period for victims of war and
civil strife in this region assumes that
preparedness and burden sharing discus-
sions will be pursued with vigor in order
to make safe haven a reality if necessary
in the region.
Individual asylum procedures also ought
to be changed so that a person granted
asylum must wait for three years before
being permitted to adjust status to per-
manent resident alien.  During this time
she or he should have all the rights and
resources afforded refugees admitted.  The
distinction underlying this proposed
change is that asylum should be, in the
first place, temporary refuge from perse-
cution.  If events warrant return because
the threat of persecution is past, then an
asylee should return or be returned to his
or her homeland.  If, after three years, the
well-founded fear of persecution remains,
then a person should be permitted to fo-
cus on developing a new life in the United
States.
The thrust of these two recommendations
is that asylum for those who fit the Con-
vention definition under current U.S. law
and the proposed safe haven for victims
of war and civil unrest are to provide
temporary refuge.  If events do not change
in a reasonable time (three years), perma-
nent resident status ought to be available.
In the cases of acute, mass movements
(perhaps literally to save life and limb),
no more than a year should be spent in
temporary camps and no more than three
years in the U.S. before immigrant status
is offered.
The hope in all asylum and safe haven
situations is that conditions will permit
people to resume life in their own coun-
try with safety.  The proposals made here
are meant to engender discussion about a
proper balance between safety, incentives
for victims to repatriate, incentives for the
federal government to press as far as rea-
sonable for changes in conditions leading
to exit, and limiting life disruption to a
reasonable level.
Acute Mass
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Asylum Flows
The second issue is what to do about the
possibility of mass asylum flows from
Haiti, Cuba, China, or elsewhere.
The last acute asylum flow to the U.S.
was Mariel.  The U.S. probably did not
learn as much as it could from the expe-
rience.  The following recommendations
are based on review of documents, inter-
views, and an unpublished narrative of
Mariel events by Victor Palmieri, who was
U.S. Coordinator of Refugees at the time.2
At the outset of Mariel, Palmieri was put
in the chair of meetings in the White
House situation room, a position for which
he was unprepared.  No one in the room
mentioned the prior experience of
Camarioca.  The political nature of the
events (in an election year) meant that this
was not just a logistics exercise but car-
ried major political implications.  Expec-
tations and mind sets of actors (military,
State Department, Coast Guard, INS, etc.)
had to be understood generally by the
chair to interpret their input and to gar-
ner their cooperation.  Recall, for example,
that at the time of Mariel the U.S. mili-
tary were dealing with the effects of the
failed desert operation undertaken two
weeks earlier to rescue the hostages in
Iran.
Palmieri needed to know what existing
policies, if any, applied.  In the face of a
mass movement, a preexisting policy
about stopping, containing, working with
the sending government, etc. makes a sig-
nificant difference with respect to efficient
implementation of policy and coordina-
tion of the many agencies involved.
In the Mariel case, policy had to be forged.
Whether to try and stop the boats, with
what assets (military, Coast Guard, INS),
and so on had not been decided or even
discussed beforehand.  Such policies were
made and changed in an ad hoc fashion,
including President Carter’s response to
a reporter’s question after a speech of
welcoming with open hearts and open
arms.
A mass asylum movement is a political
crisis and should be coordinated at the
level of the White House.  Whoever is in
charge of day-to-day operations should be
from the White House staff or assigned to
it and have access to the highest levels of
the Executive Branch.  Given the likeli-
hood of an asylum crisis, someone should
2 See: Keely, C.B.;  Barrett, R.C.  1992.  The
Office of the United States Coordinator of
Refugee Affairs: An Experiment in Legislating
Crisis Management.  Draft report.
Washington, DC: Georgetown University,
Center for Immigration Policy and Refugee
Assistance.
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be designated who actively prepares to
fill the role and take the lead, whenever
needed.  Even if that person hands off to
Chief of Staff or some higher official, the
line that includes political and logistical
considerations ought to be in place.
The first order of priority is to develop
the capacity to decide the reaction to the
flow.  How will the decision be made
about whether a flow will be designated
as an immigration emergency as provided
for in the Immigration Act of 1990?  The
machinery to gather and funnel informa-
tion and prepare options is as necessary
as logistical preparedness.  The Immigra-
tion Act of 1990 in its provisions about
emergencies is properly silent on this is-
sue.  The Executive branch should develop
the decision-making procedures.
Preparedness for accepting a flow is not
the same as assigned roles to attempt to
stop or control a flow.  Preparedness to
stop or contain potential flows also de-
serves attention.  Contingency plans to
stop, deter, deflect, etc., a mass migration
should complement other contingency
plans for various scenarios that assume
asylees will be taken in.
The experience and expertise for being
prepared is available.  The first require-
ment is the machinery to decide how to
respond to a flow.  Then government
agencies must be prepared either to ac-
commodate or to try to prevent, control,
or divert flows.  A review of the
decisionmaking in the Mariel incident
reveals that a basic flaw was the uncoor-
dinated nature of policy development and
decisionmaking during the flow.  The ini-
tial lack of policy on the fundamental
reaction to the flow and the subsequent
shifting policies about issues of interdic-
tion, impounding of boats, fines for cap-
tains, and other matters makes clear that,
even if there was a high level of logistical
preparedness, much of the chaos still
would have taken place.
Recommendations
The foregoing analysis leads to the fol-
lowing recommendations for discussion
and consideration by the Commission.
1.  The resource needs of the asylum ad-
judication system, given current caseloads
and future caseloads if asylum procedures
are legislatively changed, should be pro-
jected.  A balance should be struck be-
tween catching up with current backlogs
and possible reduced applications.
2.  Reduced access to asylum procedures
by screening out manifestly unfounded
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cases, to be successful, requires attention
to illegal migration pressures as this av-
enue to entry is narrowed.
3.  The refugee definition currently used
to decide acceptability of an asylum claim
resulting in admission for permanent resi-
dence (application permitted after one
year presently) ought not to be broadened
to include victims of war and civil unrest.
4.  A safe haven policy for victims of war
and civil unrest ought to be developed.
Safe haven ought to be structured as pro-
posed to encourage attempts by the U.S.
government to influence events so that
those given safe haven can repatriate.  Safe
haven should be given in camps for one
year and then in the general community
with work authorization.  Safe haven is
envisioned as a temporary remedy for
mass migration of persons ineligible for
Convention refugee status who nonethe-
less are fleeing danger due to political
events.  Safe haven ought to replace TPS.
Safe haven ought to be developed and
legislated as a new procedure incorporat-
ing features of TPS that are useful in safe
haven/protection situations.  Congress
should repeal TPS rather than fiddling
with it through amendment.
5.  Asylees admitted under current proce-
dures (meeting the criteria of persecution
in the refugee definition currently used)
and those given safe haven as proposed
here should be permitted to apply for per-
manent resident alien status three years
after entry to the United States.  The pre-
sumption should be that the desired out-
come in both cases is repatriation to a safe
country of origin, free of political perse-
cution.  The three-year period provides a
reasonable test of whether political
changes are likely and whether a person
should be allowed to develop a new life
in the United States.  The three-year pe-
riod is a suggestion that attempts to bal-
ance reasonably and humanely a test of
probable political change with the reali-
ties of people’s tolerance for adjustment
and ambiguity in their lives and their
dependent children’s lives.
6.  Negotiations with countries in the re-
gion on burden sharing in cases when safe
haven is to be provided ought to begin
now to ensure a unified response.
7.  Mass, acute migration incidents are
political crises by definition.  They require
White House coordination from the be-
ginning because of the political nature of
decisions.  Immigration emergencies and
attempts to stop or control large influxes
ought to have political leadership on
policy and operations decisions from the
start.
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8.  The fundamental decision in a mass
flow of migrants is whether it will be
declared an immigration emergency un-
der the IMMACT of 1990.  Contingency
planning ought to focus on how informa-
tion and options will be developed and
the steps in that decision process.
9.  Contingency planning ought to be
developed for what to do in the face of a
large-scale flow that is not to be accepted
as an immigration emergency.
10.  Current planning to accept migrants
in an immigration emergency ought to
continue, even while supplemented with
attention to the decision structure to ar-
rive at the immigration emergency decla-
ration and the roles and procedures for
attempts to stop or divert migrations that
are decided not to be declared immigra-
tion emergencies under the IMMACT 1990
provisions.
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EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
The greatest threat to habitability may be
the degradation of agricultural lands in
developing countries where many people
depend upon farming for their livelihood.
Long periods of over-exploitation due to
population growth and poverty inevita-
bly result in land degradation, sometimes
irreversibly altering the carrying capacity
of the land.  This phenomenon, known as
desertification, currently affects 3.6 billion
hectares, the equivalent of one-quarter of
the world’s total surface.
The Commission on Immigration Reform
[CIR] requested this preliminary study of
environmental degradation related to
unsustainable land and water use as one
of the potential root causes of certain mi-
gration from Mexico to the United States.
Perhaps as with no other country, migra-
tion from Mexico raises critical issues
within the Commission’s mandate.  The
2,000 mile border between Mexico and the
United States historically has been porous.
In the past thirty years the U.S. has de-
ported more than seventeen million ille-
gal Mexican immigrants.  The large wage
differential between the two countries and
extensive migrant networks act as an enor-
mous “pull” in motivating migration.  The
poverty and economic disparity in Mexico
are strong factors which “push” migrants
toward the U.S.   Trade relations and the
exchange of goods and services across the
border heighten the need for stable rela-
tions with Mexico.  Thus, migration from
Mexico will continue to be an important
focus for foreign policy development and,
specifically, of concern to the Commission.
The findings contained in this report sug-
gest that serious impairment of Mexico’s
agricultural lands may give rise to migra-
tion. There is evidence to suggest that a
portion of the 900,000 persons who mi-
grate annually from the arid and semi-
arid regions of Mexico do so because of
the desertification processes which yearly
impair 1,000 square miles of surface area
and cause the abandonment of another
400 square miles of farmlands.
As environmental degradation can often
be addressed through targeted interven-
tion, this report presents recommen-
dations for future action by the
Commission and/or Congress that go be-
yond reform of traditional migration poli-
cies and institutions.  It identifies specific
issues for further study and policy devel-
opment as a first step in addressing Mexi-
can migration related to desertification.
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Findings on
Mexico:
Preliminary Case
Study
Mexico is the third largest and second
most populous country in North America.
Two-thirds of the country’s poor people
are farmers and farm workers.  Three-
quarters of those most impoverished live
in rural areas, many as subsistence farm-
ers.
Desertification in
Mexico
Most of Mexico’s lands are undergoing
some process of land degradation.  As a
result, approximately 2,250 square kilo-
meters of potentially productive farmlands
are taken out of production or  abandoned
each year.  Experts estimate that Mexico’s
desertification problems are caused largely
by the excessive clearing and cultivation
of land unsuitable for agriculture, over-
grazing, the exploitation of forests and
vegetation for fuel, the application of in-
efficient irrigation practices, mining activi-
ties, and urban expansion.  Climate
conditions, particularly periods of pro-
longed drought, exacerbate these prob-
lems.
The environmental and socioeconomic
impacts of desertification have become
more widespread as people abandon de-
graded lands and move onto marginal
lands that are even less suitable for agri-
culture.  This “push” into marginal lands
is attributable to a number of factors, in-
cluding government policy, monopoliza-
tion of higher quality land by large-scale
farmers, and a high population growth
rate.
Historic Migration
from Mexico to the
United States
Mexican migration to the United States
historically has been rooted in economic
trends on both sides of the border.  Most
of this migration has been illegal, despite
such government initiatives as the
“Bracero Program,” that permitted tem-
porary recruitment and employment of
Mexicans in the United States.  Legisla-
tive efforts, including the Immigration
Reform and Control Act of 1986 [IRCA],
have been unsuccessful in substantially
curbing illegal immigration.
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Migration Related to
Desertification
Mexicans have fled rural poverty for de-
cades to seek better opportunities in Mexi-
can cities and the United States.  The
reasons for migration are often complex,
but relationships between certain environ-
mental conditions and population move-
ments can be identified.
The quality of farmlands, availability and
reliability of water supply, and the man-
agement of lands play an important role
in contributing to migration from rural
areas.  Specifically, land degradation and
desertification frequently lead to migra-
tion when people can no longer subsist
on the land.  The Mexican government
has found that approximately 900,000
people now leave arid and semi-arid ar-
eas every year.  Our investigation, includ-
ing analysis of geostatistical information
and migration data, confirmed that the
inability to make a living from the land
due to dry conditions and processes of
soil erosion contribute to the decision of
rural people to migrate.  This is supported
by studies of other regions in Mexico and
Latin America.
No one has attempted to determine how
many of these migrants leave the rural
areas of Mexico because of serious im-
pairment of farmlands or other desertifi-
cation processes.  The time constraints and
scope of our investigation did not permit
us to undertake any real quantification
analysis.  Further investigation and data
development is warranted to provide a
more accurate basis for determining the
scope of the problem.
Conclusions &
Recommendations
for Future Action
The findings contained in this report sup-
port the following preliminary conclu-
sions.
First, there is evidence to suggest that a
portion of the migrating population from
Mexico to the United States consists of
people who are moving because they can-
not farm the lands due to ongoing pro-
cesses of soil desertification.  Second,
preventing this migration will require
addressing the environmental causes of
the problem, largely associated with un-
sustainable land and water use in Mexico.
It is likely that specific policies will be
necessary to assure the viability of farm-
ing and to revitalize degraded lands.
Third, while the development of data on
migration associated with environmental
problems is too premature to recommend
specific foreign policies, our preliminary
R E S E A R C H
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analysis reveals that the Commission and
Congress will need to look beyond tradi-
tional immigration policy to address the
root causes of the problem.  The precise
programs and policies will depend upon
the results of further field and analytical
study described below.
Issues for Further
Investigation of the
Environment and
Migration
Phenomenon
The following recommendations are pre-
sented for the Commission’s future action
to improve understanding of immigration
and foreign policies that could be formu-
lated to address the problem.
Investigate the relationship between the
environment and migration.  Reversing
the trends of land degradation in Mexico
will be critical in stemming the migration
related to unsustainable use of agricultural
lands in certain regions.  Investigating the
links between environment, migration,
and population, as well as the interrela-
tionship of climatological factors, will
provide more definitive analysis of these
trends that can form the basis for appro-
priate policy development.  In this con-
text it would be useful to investigate the
lands currently undergoing desertification
in rural and semi-arid areas of Mexico that
foster significant involuntary migration.
This information should be analyzed in
conjunction with migration and popula-
tion data and other geostatistical infor-
mation.
Investigate the development of immigra-
tion and other policies that may be re-
sponsive to address ecologically-induced
migration.  Traditional measures, such as
tightening border controls and employer
sanctions for hiring illegal immigrants, will
be insufficient to prevent the migration
related to serious environmental deterio-
ration in Mexico.  These traditional policy
responses may be more effective if coupled
with agricultural land remediation, train-
ing, and educational programs.  If the
objective of U.S. immigration policy is to
address root causes of migration, then
such an objective will need to incorporate
broader policies that involve international
cooperation, aid, and technical support
measures.
Issues for Evaluation
in Developing Broader
Policy Responses
The United States could play a catalyzing
role in the development of such policies,
particularly given its expertise in agricul-
tural management.  The Commission and/
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or Congress should investigate opportu-
nities for policy development in this area.
Distinguish between environmentally-
motivated migrants and other economic
migrants to address environmental root
causes of migration. Adverse environ-
mental conditions can lead to increased
poverty when families can no longer sub-
sist on their lands.  They may be forced
to join the growing numbers of other “eco-
nomic” migrants.  However, it appears
useful to distinguish between these “en-
vironmental” migrants and other eco-
nomic migrants for two reasons.  First,
understanding that some segment of the
international migration population is pri-
marily motivated to move because of their
inability to farm could foster the develop-
ment of environmental programs specifi-
cally designed to stem this cause of
migration.  Second, because the motiva-
tion for leaving their homelands is differ-
ent from that of other economic migrants,
those forced to leave because farming is
unsustainable may consider returning
home if remediation programs are offered.
The Commission should explore this dis-
tinction in its further study of migration
and environment issues and in develop-
ing policy recommendations.
Investigate how policy responses could
provide an opportunity for some mi-
grants to return home.  The preliminary
findings of our investigation suggest that
migrants forced to leave because farming
is unsustainable may consider returning
home if they can successfully farm the
land.  Further study is needed to deter-
mine whether these findings represent the
attitudes of a broader base of rural mi-
grants in the United States.  If so, the
Commission and/or Congress should
determine the potential for developing
policies to promote the return of rural mi-
grants to participate in agricultural train-
ing and development programs in Mexico.
Investigate the opportunity for establish-
ing joint U.S.-Mexico programs to ad-
dress the migration related to
environmental problems.  The creation
or modification of certain policies in
Mexico likely will be needed to redress
the growing environmental problems re-
lated to harvesting of forests and vegeta-
tion.  Financial assistance and transfer of
technical expertise could play a key role
in promoting the implementation of these
policies in many parts of Mexico.  The
Commission and/or Congress should ex-
plore the opportunity to develop coop-
erative programs with Mexico to create,
finance, and implement environmental
mitigation and prevention programs.
R E S E A R C H
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Potential Short- and
Long-Term
Opportunities for
Development of
Environmental
Solutions
This report identifies specific measures
that warrant further consideration in the
formulation of environmental programs
and policies.  These are based upon
preliminary investigation of some deser-
tification problems in Mexico and our ex-
perience in developing recommended
programs to address agricultural manage-
ment problems in the western United
States.  We have identified the need to
develop such policy goals as: reducing
crop cultivation on marginalized lands; in-
stituting controlled grazing practices and
promoting alternative sustainable uses of
the lands affected; reducing water-inten-
sive crop cultivation in certain areas; sub-
stituting drought resistant crops, where
appropriate; and implementing efficient
agricultural water management practices.
The primary difficulties in translating
these objectives into actual practices will
be (1) securing the resources and exper-
tise necessary to assist farmers in modify-
ing their behavior and, (2) obtaining the
cooperation of the rural workers who tra-
ditionally have followed particular culti-
vation, grazing, harvesting, and irrigation
practices.
One way to achieve the necessary
participation may be to carry out model
programs or pilot projects to test the rec-
ommended changes in land management.
Rural participants closely involved in the
development and application of solutions
will ensure that programs are more prac-
tical and influential in fostering change
by both the immediate participants and
outside observers.  If there is sufficient
financing to reduce the risks, rural com-
munities or ejidos may participate volun-
tarily in these projects.
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INTRODUCTION
The scope of the mandate of the Commis-
sion on Immigration Reform [CIR], as
created by the Immigration Act of 1990,
includes examination of the impact of
immigration on the foreign policy and
national security interests of the United
States.  Perhaps as with no other country,
immigration from Mexico raises critical
issues within this mandate.  The 2,000-
mile border between Mexico and the
United States historically has been porous.
In the past thirty years, the U.S. has de-
ported more than seventeen million ille-
gal Mexican immigrants.  The large wage
differential between the two countries and
extensive migrant networks act as an enor-
mous “pull” in motivating migration.  The
poverty and economic disparity in Mexico
are strong factors which “push” migrants
toward the U.S.   Trade relations and the
exchange of goods and services across the
border heighten the need for stable rela-
tions with Mexico.  Thus, immigration
from Mexico will continue to be an im-
portant focus for foreign policy develop-
ment.
CIR requested this preliminarily study of
one of the potential root causes or push
factors of migration from Mexico: envi-
ronmental degradation related to unsus-
tainable land and water use in rural areas.
Though this relationship has been little
studied, our investigation revealed that
there may be a strong link between seri-
ous impairment of agricultural lands or
“desertification” and increased migration
to the U.S.  There is evidence to suggest
that a portion of the 900,000 persons who
migrate annually from the arid and semi-
arid regions of Mexico may do so because
of the desertification processes that yearly
impair 1,000 square miles of surface area
and cause the abandonment of another
400 square miles of farmlands.
Perhaps unlike other economic root causes
of migration, environmental degradation
often can be prevented or remediated with
targeted intervention.  We have a solid
understanding of the management tech-
niques required to address many agricul-
tural land and irrigation problems, but
often there is a lack of education, train-
ing, and financial resources to undertake
the necessary reforms.  Such reforms
could yield both short- and long-term
benefits to Mexico and the United States
in addressing the problem.
Our findings suggest that the
Commission’s further investigation of the
environment and migration phenomenon
is warranted to increase understanding of
the official policies that could be formu-
lated in response.  Congress will need to
look beyond traditional immigration poli-
cies to address the environmental root
R E S E A R C H
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causes of migration.  In this paper, we
present the findings of our preliminary
study and recommendations for further
action by the Commission and Congress.
BACKGROUND
There are many areas in the world where
unsustainable land use practices inevita-
bly result in soil deterioration, sometimes
irreversibly altering the carrying capacity
of the land.  This process of desertifica-
tion can have profound social and eco-
nomic impacts, including migration.
The United Nations Conference on Envi-
ronment and Development [UNCED] con-
cluded that desertification affects 3.6
billion hectares of rain-fed croplands,
rangelands, and irrigated lands, the
equivalent of one-quarter of the world’s
total land surface, and 70 percent of all
drylands (UNCED 1992a:47).  Even more
critically, this phenomenon affects one-
sixth of the World’s population (UNCED
1992a:47).  The United Nations Popula-
tion Fund recently concluded that more
than 135 million people may be at risk of
being displaced by severe desertification
(UNPF 1991:32).1
While the causes of environmentally-
induced population movements are nu-
merous, the greatest threat to habitability
may be the degradation of agricultural
lands in countries where most people de-
pend upon farming for their livelihood.
Population growth and poverty place
additional pressure on scarce land re-
sources, exacerbating desertification
(UNPF 1991:32).1 If growth rates are not
reversed, the current, alarming pace of en-
vironmental degradation will accelerate:
each year, eleven million hectares of tropi-
cal rainforests are cut, twenty-six billion
tons of topsoil are eroded, and six million
hectares of arable land are desertified
(UNCED 1992c:para 47, 48, 69, 70, 79, 82,
83, 101).  These factors ultimately force
people to abandon an agricultural subsis-
tence and relocate to nearby already over-
populated urban centers or to migrate to
neighboring states.
We have investigated this issue in vari-
ous countries and regions of the world.
(Maloney 1990/91a, 1990/91b; Sanders
1990/91a, 1990/91b; Tamondong-Helin &
Helin 1990/91; Catanese 1990/91).  De-
velopment in parts of North America and
the Caribbean Basin countries has led to
substantial rural outmigration over the last
1The current trends in population growth exacerbate this threat.  The expected increase in the
world’s population by nearly one billion people will occur in poverty-stricken areas, increasing
pressure on lands that already have been marginalized (UNCED 1991; El Hinnawi 1985).
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three decades, some to the United States
and most to urban centers within the af-
fected countries (Commission for the
Study of International Migration and Co-
operative Economic Development
1990:101).  Little has been documented,
however, on the relationship between en-
vironmental degradation and migration in
this region.2
Mexico is one of many countries affected
by these problems.  Mexico’s climate is
predominantly arid or semi-arid.  Much
of its surface area is affected by desertifi-
cation, caused by a combination of clima-
tological factors and unsustainable
land-use practices. Mexico has also been
the source of large-scale, cross-border
migration for several decades.  The find-
ings contained in this report indicate that
the increasing impairment of Mexico’s
agricultural lands is a potentially signifi-
cant cause of migration to the United
States that warrants further study.  Pre-
liminary evidence of this relationship sug-
gests further avenues of research,
education, and targeted intervention will
be necessary to remediate existing or  pre-
vent future problems.
Our findings and recommendations pre-
sented below are based upon work that
we completed for the United Nations
Secretariat for the Intergovernmental Ne-
gotiating Committee for a Convention to
Combat Desertification and Drought
[INC-D].  Our analysis was expanded to
focus on issues critical to U.S. immigra-
tion policy development.
FINDINGS ON
MEXICO:
PRELIMINARY
CASE STUDY
Introduction and
Methodology
In investigating the desertification and
migration problems in Mexico, we under-
took an extensive literature review, con-
ducted sample interviews with migrants
living in Northern California3 and with
people in several rural towns and villages
in Central Mexico, and discussed the is-
2There is an abundance of literature on deforestation and land degradation, with only incidental
reference to the resultant migration.  While migration experts and academics have undertaken
much research on migration patterns in this region, they have not looked deeply into how
environmental problems may contribute to these population movements.
3California is the primary destination of most undocumented migrants from Mexico.
“Approximately two-thirds of undocumented Mexico State migrants in the United States are
to be found in California . . . ” (Bustamante 1992:10).
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sues with migration and environment
experts.  As we had such a short time to
conduct our investigation, the findings
presented below can be viewed only as
preliminary.
The maps presented in this report were
developed for the Natural Heritage Insti-
tute in connection with this project and as
part of a cooperative program between
COLEF [El Colegio de la Frontera Norte
in Tijuana directed by Dr. Jorge
Bustamante] and ORSTOM [The French
Institute of Scientific Research for Coop-
erative Development], a study financed
in part by CONACYT.  This is part of a
Geographic and Statistical Information
System [SIGEF] concerning the North
Frontier/Border created by D. Delaunay
and J. Santibanez.  The maps use the
Savane and Rapido parameters developed
at the Institute by Marc Souris and Michel
Lepage.  The census information is taken
from CODICE90, CD-ROM edited by
INEGI.  The information provided on
migration was obtained from surveys
conducted by Dr. Bustamante, R. Corona,
and J. Santibanez of COLEF.  The climatic
characterization is derived from the Na-
tional Atlas of Mexico of UNAM, from
the National Atlas of the Physical Envi-
ronment of Mexico and relevant letters
published by ENEGI.  The authors of the
geostatistical information presented are
Daniel Delaunay (Demographer), Alain
Winckell (Geographer) and Michel Lepage
(Data Analyst) of ORSTOM.
Demographic and
Geographic Profile
Mexico is the third largest and second
most populous country in North America.
Its current population of 88 million people
has quadrupled since 1940, (Commission
for the Study of International Migration
and Cooperative Economic Deveopment
1990:11), and is growing by 1.5 million
people annually (Commission for the
Study of Migration and Cooperative Eco-
nomic Deveopment 1990:12).  Mexico City,
the capital of Mexico, is the most popu-
lated city in the world, with an expected
25 million people by the year 2000 (UNPF
1991:60).
Mexico’s territory extends over 1,958,201
square kilometres, bordering the United
States to the north, the Gulf of Mexico
and the Caribbean Sea to the east, Belize
and Guatemala to the southeast, and the
Gulf of California and the Pacific Ocean
to the west.   Most of the country is high-
land or mountainous.  Approximately 20
percent is forested.  Most of the Yucatán
Peninsula and the Isthmus of Tehuan-
tepec in the southeast is lowland.  There
are lowlying strips of land along the Gulf
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of Mexico, the Pacific Ocean, and the Gulf
of California.  The heart of Mexico is the
great Mexican Plateau, which is inter-
rupted by mountain ranges and seg-
mented by deep rifts.
The country is divided into thirty-one
states and a federal district that includes
the capital, Mexico City [Map 1 p.19].  The
government is organized as a federal re-
public, with the powers of chief executive
and head of state vested in a popularly-
elected president.
Approximately 55 percent of Mexico’s
population are Mestizo, 29 percent
Amerindian, and 10 percent European,
with Spanish the primary language and
Roman Catholicism the most-practiced re-
ligion.  Two-thirds of the country’s poor
people are farmers and farm workers.
Three quarters of those most impover-
ished live in rural areas (Martin 1993:99).
Many in agriculture are subsistence farm-
ers who commonly grow corn and beans
for their families and depend on low and
variable rainfall for the success of their
crops (Martin 1993:100).
A unique feature of Mexican agricultural
management is its communal land or
“ejido” system.  Ejidos are communal farms
that were created after the Mexican revo-
lution when the government redistributed
land from large landowners to the land-
less peasants for whom the revolution was
fought.  Ejido members obtain land as a
group from the government, but usually
farm the land individually.  Ejidos control
about 70 percent of Mexico’s croplands
and half of its irrigated lands (Martin
1993:101).  National policy now allows in-
dividual ejido members to sell or rent their
land.
Desertification in
Mexico
There has been much debate about the
meaning of the term “desertification.”  The
best explanation of it as both a physical
state of land degradation and as a pro-
cess of deterioration may be the follow-
ing:
Desertification, revealed by
drought, is caused by human
activities in which the carrying
capacity of the land is exceeded;
it proceeds by exacerbated natural
or man-induced mechanisms, and
is made manifest by intricate steps
of vegetation and soil
deterioration which result, in
human terms, in an irreversible
decrease or destruction of the
biological potential of the land and
its ability to support populations.
(Mainguet 1991:4)
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The term is technically defined by the
recently adopted United Nations Conven-
tion to Combat Desertification as, “land
degradation in arid, semi-arid and dry
sub-humid areas resulting from various
factors, including climatic variations and
human activities.” (UNGA 1993b)
Most of Mexico’s lands are undergoing
some process of land degradation.  The
government of Mexico has concluded that
97 percent of its territory is affected to
some degree, and that 60 percent of its
territory is extremely or severely de-
graded.4  This data is not surprising in
light of findings by experts in 1978 that
approximately 150 million hectares of land
had problems of desertification, represent-
ing 80 percent of Mexico’s territory
(Medellin-Leal 1978:107). These experts es-
timated that desertification would con-
tinue to advance rapidly in Mexico,
degrading between 100,000 and 200,000
hectares of land per year.  The Mexican
government’s current findings suggest that
this prediction was correct.
As a result of this land degradation, it is
now estimated that 1,000 square miles or
2,250 square kilometers of potentially pro-
ductive farmlands are taken out of pro-
duction or abandoned each year (Myers
1993:140; UNPF 1991:99).  These figures
demonstrate the gravity of the desertifi-
cation problem in Mexico and underlie
the need for immediate preventative and
remedial measures.
Aridity in Mexico
Much of Mexico is comprised of arid and
semi-arid zones, making the lands vul-
nerable to the processes of desertification,
as discussed below.  These lands consti-
tute more than 50 percent, and perhaps
as much as 80 percent, of Mexico’s terri-
tory (Myers 1993:139; Ballin-Cortes
1990a:3).  [See Map 2].  The government
of Mexico estimates that they comprise
52.5 percent of Mexico’s total land area
(Comision Nacional de las Zonas Aridas
1993:sum 1.1).
Approximately eight million hectares of
land, constituting approximately 45 per-
cent of all agricultural land, is farmed or
used for grazing in the arid and semi-
4We were unable to obtain a complete copy of the Plan de Accion Para Combatir la Desertification
en Mexico before this paper was submitted to the Commission.  Where possible, we refer
to the portions of the final plan that we obtained (Comision Nacional de las Zonas Aridas
1994).  Where we were missing portion of the final plan, we have in a few instances, relied
on information contained in a prior version of the plan prepared in October 1993 (Comision
Nacional de las Zonas Aridas 1993).
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arid regions of Mexico.  Of this land, only
about 25 percent is irrigated.  Seasonal
agriculture, or rainfed farmland, in these
regions has the highest rate of crop loss
in the country.  Frost and drought are the
principal causes (Comision Nacional de
las Zonas Aridas 1993:sum 1.3).
The desert, arid, semi-arid, dry subhumid,
and humid regions of Mexico are shown
on Map 2 [p.20], “Index of Aridity.”  Of
Mexico’s territory, 23.6 percent is desert,
11.2 percent is arid, 9.9 percent is semi-
arid and 25.7 percent is dry sub-humid
[Map 2].  This indicates that approxi-
mately 70 percent of Mexico’s lands may
be vulnerable to desertification.  Levels of
precipitation and evaporation in Mexico
tend to support this estimate: Maps 3, 4,
and 5 [pp.21-23] identify precipitation and
evaporation levels in various regions in
Mexico and the number of dry months
per year experienced in these regions.  We
determined “aridity” for the purpose of
these charts as the ratio of average an-
nual rainfall and average annual evapo-
ration.  In developing this working
definition of aridity, we incorporated the
definition now contained in the U.N. Con-
vention to Combat Desertification
(UNCCD 1994).5
Processes of
Desertification and
Regions Most
Affected
There are a number of natural mechanisms
or phenomena that contribute to the pro-
cesses of desertification of vulnerable
lands (those lands being utilized beyond
their carrying capacity).  The most signifi-
cant of these in Mexico are wind and
water erosion of soils, affecting between
60 percent and 85 percent of Mexico’s
territory (Comision Nacional de las Zo-
nas Aridas 1993:Ch 2, sect 2.3.2, 2.3.3).
Experts estimate that at least 70 percent
of Mexico’s agricultural lands are affected
by soil erosion of some type (Myers
1993:140; UNPF 1991:98).
Other significant types of land degrada-
tion that form part of the desertification
process include salinization, sodification,
physical degradation, biological degrada-
tion, and chemical degradation.  The Mexi-
5Article 1 of the text defines arid, semi-arid, and dry sub-humid areas as areas “in which the
ratio of average annual precipitation to potential evapotranspiration falls within the range
from 0.05 to 0.65” (UNCCD 1994).  While this definition does not provide clear guidance,
it does suggest the importance of examining temperatures, precipitation and evaporation or
potential evapotranspiration in determining the level of aridity in a particular region.
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can government estimates that these pro-
cesses affect 20 percent, 15 percent, 20
percent, 80 percent and 15 percent of
Mexico’s territory respectively (Comision
Nacional de las Zonas Aridas 1993:Ch 2,
sect 2.3.2-2.3.7).
Salinization and sodification of soils are
of particular interest to some because they
are caused primarily by irrigation that is
otherwise considered to be a beneficial
practice.  The problems generally stem
from poor draining of irrigated lands and
the application of poor quality water.  An
estimated one-fifth of Mexico’s cropland
is irrigated (Liverman & O’Brien 1991:351),
and 10 percent of these lands are now
highly salinized (Myers 1993:140;
Comision Nacional de las Zonas Aridas
1993:Ch 2, sect 2.3.4).  Our investigations
suggest that this problem is particularly
notable in such arid states as Sonora where
irrigation is relied upon for the produc-
tion of crops in the absence of significant
rainfall (Arguelles 1993).6
The government of Mexico has investi-
gated the extent of these processes of land
degradation in the states of Mexico
(Comision Nacional de las Zonas Aridas
1993:Ch 2).  According to this investiga-
tion, the Mexican states with the greatest
rates of land degradation are:
Water erosion. Aguascalientes,
Guanajuato, Coahuila, Michoacan,
Zacatecas, Jalisco, Nuevo Leon, and
San Luis Potosi, with more than 45
percent of the surface severely
affected;
Wind Erosion.  San Luis Potosi,
Morelos, Hidalgo, Nuevo Leon, Baja
California, Queretaro, and Zacatecas,
with more than 80 percent of their
surface affected;
Salinization. Tamaulipas, Sonora,
Baja California, Chihuahua, Coa-huila,
and Colima, with more than 2 percent
of their surface affected;
Sodification. Campeche, Sonora,
Quintana Roo, Morelos, Yucatan,
Tabasco, and Mexico, with 13-40
percent of their surface affected;
Physical Degradation. Hidalgo and
Veracruz, with 40-90 percent of their
surface affected;
Biological Degradation. Colima,
Morelos, Tabasco, Chiapas, Veracruz,
6Mr. Arguelles is an agrarian lawyer with substantial experience and knowledge of conditions
in the Sonora area.
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Jalisco, Michoacan, Nayarit, Yucatan,
and Sinaloa, with more than 90
percent of their surface affected;
Chemical Degradation. Tabasco,
Campeche, Veracruz, Nayarit, and
Oaxaca, with 20-67 percent of their
surface affected;
States that are experiencing nearly all
of these forms of degradation are:
Chihuahua, Coahuila, Colima, Jalisco,
Mexico, Sinaloa, and Sonora
(Comision Nacional de las Zonas
Aridas 1993:Ch 2, sect 2.3.2-2.3.7).
Our investigation indicates that there
may also be considerable land
degradation in Puebla and Guerrero.
Given the extent of arid and semi-arid
areas in Mexico, it is likely that a signifi-
cant portion of the lands in Mexico are
vulnerable to, or are presently undergo-
ing, desertification at some level.  We were
unable to obtain precise information on
the areas in which the soil or vegetative
deterioration has resulted in an irrevers-
ible decrease or destruction of the bio-
logical potential of the land and its ability
to support people.  Further investigation
will be needed.
Experts have found that serious desertifi-
cation usually exists along the borders of
deserts, such as Northern Mexico and in
the areas of transition between semi-arid
and subhumid or tropical zones (Ballin-
Cortes 1990b:158) [See Maps 2 and 6
pp.21,24]. Our observations of the borders
of the Chihuahuense Desert in the San
Luis Potosi area were consistent with this
finding.
Unsustainable Land-
Use Practices
Causing
Desertification
Human activities are generally considered
to be the determining factor in all stages
of desertification (Mainguet 1991:5).  It is
estimated that 87 percent of desertifica-
tion problems are caused by unsustain-
able land use, with the remaining 13
percent attributable to climate conditions
(Ballin-Cortes 1990a:3).  The
overexploitation of lands can make them
vulnerable to the processes of desertifica-
tion.  Lands in arid or semi-arid areas
that have been stripped of their vegeta-
tive cover are perilously susceptible to
erosion from harsh winds or rains.  This
degradation may irreversibly alter the
ability of the soils to sustain crops that
may be replanted or vegetation for graz-
ing.
The types of land use practices that can
lead to desertification include:
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1. Clearing and cultivating lands
unsuitable for agriculture or cul-
tivating crops in a manner that
overburdens the land without tak-
ing adequate precautions against
erosion;
2. Overgrazing lands, including
placing too many animals on
small parcels of land and failing
to rotate the lands grazed;
3. Exploiting forests and other veg-
etation for fuel, consumption, and
sale;
4. Adopting poor water manage-
ment and irrigation practices;
5. Urban expansion, mining, and
public works. (Medellin-Leal
1978:63-71; Comision Nacional de
las Zonas Aridas 1993:Ch 2, Sect
2.2.1-2.2.4; Ballin-Cortes &
Vasquez Rocillo 1993).
Of these activities, the first two may cause
the most widespread degradation in
Mexico (Ballin-Cortes & Vasquez Rocillo
1993).
Our field investigation confirmed that
poor cultivation practices and overgraz-
ing are serious problems.  We toured parts
of San Luis Potosi in the Desert of Chi-
huahua reputed to be typical of arid and
semi-arid areas with desertification prob-
lems.  There we observed, and confirmed
through interviews, that the majority of
the rural population tries to subsist by
growing corn and beans, despite the fact
that the natural soil base is only margin-
ally productive, even when rainfall is
adequate, and is generally exhausted by
these crops in a short time (Ballin-Cortes
& Vasquez Rocillo 1993; Natural Heritage
Institute 1993).  When rainfall is inad-
equate, as is frequently the case, these
people find themselves in a desperate situ-
ation.  We also observed that a substan-
tial portion of the rural population
practices grazing as a supplement or al-
ternative to cultivation.
The results of these practices were visible
in the land conditions we encountered.
Vegetation was extremely sparse in the
areas surrounding each village and many
dusty fields of little apparent productive
value were left exposed to wind and water
erosion.  The poverty of the people living
in these conditions was notable.  At the
time of our visit, hundreds of women and
children from the villages lined the cen-
tral highway begging for candy, money,
or gifts for the upcoming Christmas sea-
son.
The environmental and socioeconomic
impacts of desertification have grown as
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people abandoned the degraded lands and
moved onto more marginal lands, less
suitable for agriculture (Ballin-Cortes &
Vasquez Rocillo 1993).  The push into mar-
ginal lands is attributable to a number of
factors, including official policies.  First,
as land is exhausted due to unsustainable
cultivation and grazing, rural inhabitants
seek official authorization to clear more
land, which they use and manage in the
same way, thereby continuing the pattern
of degradation and abandonment of lands.
Second, the government has commonly
granted permits for this type of clearing
in an attempt to placate poor rural farm-
ers and obtain political support (Ballin-
Cortes & Vasquez Rocillo 1993).  The
government generally has promoted the
expansion of agriculture and grazing into
marginal lands in the wake of the Mexi-
can revolution as part of the effort to pro-
vide peasants with promised land.  The
government has sometimes attempted to
satisfy peasant demands by providing
them marginal land not previously culti-
vated, rather than taking land from large
landholders.
Third, large-scale farmers have consis-
tently purchased the more marginalized
lands of the smaller-scale farmers, caus-
ing them to seek new land in even more
marginal areas (Myers 1993:141).  Many
believe that this trend will intensify in the
wake of new land reform policies which
allow ejido members to sell or rent their
land (Villarejo 1993; Ballin-Cortes &
Vasquez Rocillo 1993).  Fourth, high popu-
lation growth rates increase thedemand
for land in Mexico causing both a push
into marginal lands and an increase in the
level of many activities contributing to
desertification (Liverman 1992:64; Myers
1993:141-42; Comision Nacional de las
Zonas Aridas 1993:Ch 2, sect 2.1).  The
government of Mexico has noted that the
advance of desertification is particularly
rapid in central Mexico where the popu-
lation density is greatest and the pressures
on the land are most severe (Comision
Nacional de las Zonas Aridas 1993:Intro).
Map 6 [p.24] illustrates those areas where
rural density is the greatest in Mexico and
correlates this with data on aridity.  As
the map indicates, the central plateau is a
semi-arid zone with high population den-
sity.  As discussed below, Maps 7 and 8
[pp.25,26] also identify significant migra-
tion from this region.
Finally, for many years, the National Bank
in Mexico has financed the cultivation of
such crops as corn and beans, regardless
of whether those crops were sustainable
by the land under cultivation.  This fiscal
policy apparently has encouraged rural
workers to continue unsus-tainable agri-
cultural practices and created financial dif-
ficulties for the National Bank because the
lack of productivity resulted in reduced
profits and loans were frequently unpaid
(Ballin-Cortes & Vasquez Rocillo 1993).
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Climate, Drought and
Desertification
Periodic droughts and generally dry con-
ditions in the arid, semi-arid, and dry
subhumid areas of Mexico have undoubt-
edly contributed to the advance of deser-
tification.  Only about 12 percent of the
nation’s water is on the central plateau
where 60 percent of the population and
51 percent of the cropland are located
(Liverman 1992:45).  However, some be-
lieve that climatic events have played only
a small role in this process, noting that to
date temperatures have not changed no-
tably  and that the low rainfall experi-
enced in dry years in the arid and
semi-arid regions has usually been within
the expected range of precipitation (Ballin-
Cortes & Vasquez Rocillo 1993).
Where climate change has occurred, some
experts suggest that it has been caused or
exacerbated by human activity.  One study
examining the differences between Ari-
zona and Sonora along the United States/
Mexico border found that variations in
temperature could be explained by differ-
ences in vegetation and soil moisture on
the two sides of the border (Balling
1988:106-07; Bryant, et al. 1990:260-61).  On
the Mexican side of the border, vegeta-
tion and soil moisture were depleted due
to heavy overgrazing, resulting in tem-
peratures that were two to four degrees
centigrade warmer than on the Arizona
side where grazing was practiced in a con-
trolled, sustainable manner (Balling
1988:106-07; Bryant, et al. 1990:260-61).
The authors of the study also believe that
the conditions on the Mexican side of the
border may actually decrease the amount
of rainfall, though this postulation has yet
to be verified (Balling 1993).  Certainly,
the degraded condition of land on the
Mexican side of the border exacerbates
the erosion caused by rainfall.
In addition, the impacts of climate change
on the environment often depend more
on the characteristics of the region and
people affected than on the nature of the
climate change itself (Liverman 1992:44,
57).  Thus, for example, one study found
that the lands vulnerable to drought in
two different regions of Mexico corre-
sponded much more closely with misman-
agement of ejido lands, lack of irrigation,
lack of high yielding seed varieties, and
lack of fertilizer than with physical cli-
mate conditions (Liverman 1992:60).7
7The correlation with ejido land management appeared to be based on the facts that more
marginal land was given to ejidos in land reform efforts and that ejidos are socially more
vulnerable because they have less access to irrigation, credit, improved seeds, and other
resources (Liverman 1992:61).
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Nevertheless, climate clearly plays a role
in the processes of desertification and
there is widespread concern that the de-
cline in sustainability of Mexico’s lands
for agriculture will become even more
alarming if predicted global warming
occurs.  The effects of global warming in
Mexico, under any model, will create
warmer and drier conditions (Liverman
& O’Brien 1991:363).  Such conditions
could increase significantly the severity
and effects of drought, exacerbate the pro-
cesses of desertification, and devastate the
majority of Mexican croplands and farm-
ers relying on low and variable rainfall
(Liverman & O’Brien 1991:364; Liverman
1992:45, 65; Myers 1993:140).
Migration Related
to Desertification
Mexicans have been fleeing rural poverty
for decades to seek better opportunities
in Mexican cities and the United States
(Martin 1993:99).  Work shortages are
worst in the rural areas of Mexico, where
unemployment and underemployment af-
fect two out of three of all potential work-
ers (Myers 1993:142).  Such unemployment
and underemployment generally create
strong currents of migration (Martin
1993:52-53).
It is difficult to determine why migration
occurs in any time period or from any
particular region.  The reasons for migra-
tion are often complex.  Population move-
ments from rural Mexico depend upon a
number of factors, including the extent of
familial or other networks already estab-
lished in the U.S. and potential earnings
(Massey, Goldring & Durand 1993;
Durand & Massey 1992).8  Determining,
with any precision, the central reason for
migration in any particular case or com-
munity requires in-depth study and ex-
tensive survey or interview of migrants
and community members.
8“The changing selectivity of migration results from the growth and elaboration of migrant
networks, which are composed of ties of kinship, friendship, and paisanaje (shared community
origin) between migrants and nonmigrants located in the United States and Mexico. . . . Once
the number of network connections in an origin area reaches a critical threshold, migration
becomes self perpetuating in creating the social structure needed to sustain it.  Every new
migrant reduces the costs of subsequent migration for a set of friends and relatives” (Durand
& Massey 1992:17).
Age, availability of jobs and wages also play a central role (e.g., Ritchey 1976; see also Azipe
1981).
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Notwithstanding the complexity in at-
tempting to determine the primary factor
motivating migration in a particular cir-
cumstance (which may require disaggre-
gating a multiplicity of reasons), we can
identify relationships between certain en-
vironmental phenomenon and population
movements.9 These are discussed below,
after a brief summary of historic migra-
tion from Mexico to the United States, and
should provide context for the discussion
that follows.
Historic Migration
from Mexico to
the United States
The United States, particularly California,
is the primary destination of migrants
leaving Mexico (Bustamante 1992:10).  The
border between Mexico and the United
States extends 2,000 miles.  Unauthorized
migrants cross it daily.  Since 1964, sev-
enteen million illegal Mexican migrants
have been apprehended and deported
(Durand & Massey 1992:6).10
Mexican migration to the United States
historically has been rooted in economic
trends on both sides of the border.  Be-
tween 1849 and 1900, more than 100,000
Mexican immigrants migrated to the
United States (Corwin 1978:31 citing 12th
U.S. census), finding employment
throughout the American Southwest as
ranch hands, agricultural workers, and
track workers for the railroads (Corwin
1978:29).  Between 1910 and 1935, as a
result of the economic turmoil following
the Mexican revolution and the fact that
the average wage for an agricultural
worker in the United States was two to
ten times that of the Mexican agricultural
worker (Corwin 1978:53), approximately
1.5 million Mexican migrants came to the
United States (Commission on Agricul-
tural Workers 1992:42).  During this pe-
riod, large-scale farms, railroads, and
mines in the United States soon became
dependent on the Mexican workers, who
were willing to accept temporary employ-
ment for low wages (Martin 1993:57).  Out
of their desire for a cheap seasonal labor
supply, these commercial interests lobbied
fiercely to obtain exemptions for Mexican
9This has been determined through several other country-specific investigations, some of which
are summarized in this report.
10For decades there has been significant illegal migration form Mexico to the United States.
From 1942-1964, some five million Mexicans were apprehended and deported (Durand &
Massey 1992).  It is widely believed that the U.S. Bracero programs, granting legal status to
thousands of Mexicans and Latin Americans to work the burgeoning U.S. agricultural fields
(particularly during World War II), encouraged illegal migration to the U.S.
U.S.  C O M M I S S I O N  O N  I M M I G R A T I O N  R E F O R M
R E S E A R C H
P A P E R
- 15 -
migrant workers from the then restrictive
immigration laws, and were to a great ex-
tent successful up until the onset of the
Great Depression (Zabin, et al. 1993:19).
After the Crash of 1929, however, as a
result of the huge influx of migrant Ameri-
can workers into the farm labor market in
California, the Department of State began
instituting restrictionist policies that or-
dered more stringent enforcement of ex-
isting immigration laws from which
Mexican laborers had previously been
exempt (Cardenas 1975:74).  From 1929 to
1933, between 300,000 and 450,000 Mexi-
cans were deported or voluntarily de-
parted from the United States (Durand &
Massey 1992:5).  As the Depression sub-
sided and the United States began pre-
paring for World War II, agricultural
employers successfully lobbied for re-
newed importation of Mexican labor (Mar-
tin 1993:60).  As a result, the Bracero
Program was established in 1942 pursu-
ant to a bilateral agreement between the
United States and Mexico (Cardenas
1975:75).
The Bracero Program permitted large-
scale recruitment and temporary employ-
ment of Mexicans, though it did not
provide a mechanism for legal immigra-
tion (Cardenas 1975:75).  The Bracero Pro-
gram, as initially passed, lapsed at the end
of 1947.  During its first five years the
program was small, admitting only 62,000
workers at its peak in 1944 (Martin
1993:61).  The Program continued, how-
ever, under the Ninth Proviso of the Im-
migration act of 1917, which exempted
temporary laborers from alien exclusion
laws (Commission on Agricultural Work-
ers 1992:28).  During this phase of the
Bracero Program, employers directly re-
cruited and contracted with Mexican la-
borers without government supervision
(Cardenas 1975:77).  The most common
method of recruiting Mexican laborers at
this time consisted of finding Mexicans
who were illegally in the United States,
temporarily deporting them to the bor-
der, and then recruiting them as braceros
(Cardenas 1975:78).  After the onset of the
Korean war, Congress enacted the Third
phase of the Bracero Program as Public
Law 78 (Mexican Farm Labor Program)
in 1951.  To protect domestic labor, how-
ever, Public Law 78 required that, before
Mexican laborers could be recruited, the
Secretary of Labor had to determine that:
no domestic laborers were available to do
the work; the employment of Mexican la-
borers would not adversely affect the
wages of similarly situated domestic
workers; and reasonable efforts had been
made to attract domestic workers to the
employment in question (Cardenas
1975:78).  Public Law 78 was extended six
times by Congressional amendments un-
til the end of 1964 (Cardenas 1975:79).
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During the entire span of the program
from 1942 to 1964, approximately 4.6 mil-
lion braceros were admitted into the
United States (Durand & Massey 1992:6).
At its peak between 1956-1959, more than
400,000 braceros were admitted each year
(Martin 1993:63).
Despite the Bracero Program, however,
illegal immigration continued to be im-
portant source of Mexican labor in the
United States (Cardenas 1975:79).  The
number of apprehensions made by the INS
(i.e., 4.87 million) was greater than the
total number of workers admitted pursu-
ant to the Program (Martin 199:63).  Some
authors have argued that the Bracero Pro-
gram actually stimulated illegal immigra-
tion by creating the expectation “that the
fastest way to upward mobility was to go
north,” (Commission on Agricultural
Workers 1992:19) and by establishing per-
manent migratory networks.  In contrast
to the 4.6 million Mexicans admitted un-
der the Bracero Program and the 1.5 to 5
million workers who immigrated illegally,
only 545,000 Mexicans legally immigrated
to the United States between 1942 and
1964 (Martin 1993:63).
Illegal immigration grew rapidly after the
Bracero Program expired.  The number of
illegal aliens apprehended climbed
steadily from 86 thousand in 1964 to more
than 1 million by 1977 (Congressional
Research Service 1980:37).  Estimates of
the total number of illegal aliens in the
United States from the mid-sixties to the
present vary widely, but there appears to
be consensus that there was a steady in-
crease until the enactment of the Immi-
gration Reform and Control Act of 1986
[IRCA] (Commission on Agricultural
Workers 1992:4; Durand & Massey
1992:7).11  IRCA struck a compromise be-
tween agricultural interests, who wanted
a temporary worker program that would
provide an adequate supply of seasonal
laborers, and labor interests, who argued
that importing more labor was unneces-
sary and would depress wages and dis-
place domestic labor (Commission on
Agricultural Workers 1992:6).  IRCA man-
dated employer sanctions as the “princi-
pal tool for reducing illegal immigration
to the United States,” and provided for
legalization of more than 1 million illegal
agricultural workers under the Special Ag-
ricultural Worker Program (Commission
11Durand and Massey suggest that perhaps the most accurate estimate of the number of illegal
immigrants in the United States at the time of IRCA is derived from the number of people
who applied for general amnesty and legalization through the SAW provisions (2.3 million)
plus 25 percent.
U.S.  C O M M I S S I O N  O N  I M M I G R A T I O N  R E F O R M
R E S E A R C H
P A P E R
- 17 -
on Agricultural Workers 1992:5).  Al-
though IRCA was successful in legalizing
2.3 million illegal immigrants, it did not
substantially curb illegal immigration
(Durand & Massey 1992:10), and, there-
fore, failed to stabilize the agricultural
labor market (Commission on Agricultural
Workers 1992:132).  The Commission on
Agricultural Workers, which was man-
dated under IRCA to assess it, concluded
that, as long as employers continued to
hire unauthorized workers and Mexicans
lacked economic opportunities at home,
illegal migration would continue (Com-
mission on Agricultural Workers 1992:132-
33).
Migration from
Mexico to the
United States
Related to
Environmental
Degradation
The results of our preliminary study of
Mexico suggest that the quality of farm-
lands, availability and reliability of water
supply, and the management (or misman-
agement) of lands play an important role
in contributing to migration from rural
areas.  The inability to farm because of
land degradation or desertification can
result in rural unemployment and gen-
eral poverty and can lead to migration.
In 1978, experts examining the desertifi-
cation problem in Mexico concluded that
approximately 600,000 people abandoned
the countryside every year as a direct
result of their inability to subsist on the
land (Medellin-Leal 1978:59, 71).  These
experts attributed the inability to survive
in the countryside in large part to the
process of desertification that continually
reduced the workable surface areas of the
land and impoverished many Mexicans
(Medellin-Leal 1978:59, 65, 71).  They also
noted that arid and semi-arid areas were
the principal sources of these rural mi-
grants (Medellin-Leal 1978:73).
In discussing the historical role that land
quality and distribution has played in
decisions to migrate from rural Mexico,
two experts concluded:
Although the common wisdom is
that adopting cash crops and
capital intensive production
methods led to greater out-
migration via displacement of
rural workers, comparative
studies suggest that the process
was more complex.  Displacement
did occur in communities with
poor quality land and in places
where land was unequally
distributed, but in communities
R E S E A R C H
P A P E R
- 18 -
U.S.  C O M M I S S I O N  O N  I M M I G R A T I O N  R E F O R M
where land was of high quality
and more evenly distributed
among families, the advent of
commercialized farming increased
rural incomes, lowered risks to
farm households, and thereby
reduced pressures for migration
to the United States.  (Durand &
Massey 1992:35)
Based on more recent investigations, the
Mexican government observed that there
is still a strong tendency for people to
migrate from arid and semi-arid areas,
which contain 20 million inhabitants with
scarce possibilities for work (Comision
Nacional de las Zonas Aridas 1993:Ch
2,sect 2.1).  The government found that ap-
proximately 900,000 people now leave these
areas every year (Comision Nacional de las
Zonas Aridas 1993:Ch 2, sect 2.1, 2.5).12
As suggested in earlier studies, a signifi-
cant portion of the migration from arid
and semi-arid rural areas likely is attrib-
utable, at least in part, to the desertifica-
tion that eliminates approximately 1,000
square miles of land and causes the aban-
donment of at least 400 square miles of
farmland every year (Medellin-Leal
1978:59; see also Myers 1993:140; UNPF
1991:98-99).  This explains why some ex-
perts have concluded that recent upsurges
in migration from Mexico’s rural areas are
caused by land degradation that, together
with rising population levels and the push
of small farmers onto marginal lands, has
caused an “agricultural squeeze” (Myers
1993P:141; UNPF 1991:99; Bilsborrow &
DeLargy 1991:128-29).13
Our investigation of the San Luis Potosi
area confirmed a strong relationship be-
tween the inability to make a living from
the land due to dry conditions or land
degradation and the decision to migrate,
at least temporarily (Natural Heritage
Insitute 1993; Ballin-Cortes & Vasquez
Rocillo 1993).  The people we spoke with
stated that when their corn and bean crops
were inadequate and grazing was poor,
as frequently occurred, one or two family
members would be forced to migrate in
search of work to supplement the family
income.  These people generally attributed
the failure of crops and grazing to lack of
rainfall and the absence of irrigation sys-
tems.
Some experts assert that these deficien-
cies more properly are attributed to the
inability of the land to sustain corn and
bean crops, the poor management of graz-
12In the final version of the National Plan, now being issued, the government notes that the
largest part of emigration is from municipalities that are predominantly rural in character.
13 Population growth is greater in rural than urban areas (Mendez y Mercado 1985:14).
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ing, and general land degradation result-
ing from these practices (Ballin-Cortes &
Vasquez Rocillo 1993).  Agricultural
economist David Runsten finds many
problems with existing agricultural prac-
tices in Mexico.  Soilborne diseases are
common and irrigation practices are
poorly applied (Runsten 1994).  While the
government has begun to take steps to
address the problem, in some cases pro-
viding compensation to landowners to
plant trees on their lands, there appar-
ently has been little research, education,
or training in Mexico on alternate or
supplemental agricultural techniques to
remedy this problem (Runsten 1994).
Runsten believes that many of the people
living on marginal lands in Mexico will
continue to migrate as the lands become
unsuitable for farming or grazing.
These observations have been confirmed
by other studies of Mexico and Latin
America (Bilsborrow & DeLargy 1991:128-
9).  For example, Edward Taylor has in-
dicated that, in his investigation of
Michoacan, Mexico, he found a strong link
between environmental degradation and
migration.  He indicated that:
There is a direct negative
relationship between the
productivity of family resources
in village economic activities and
migration.  Because crop
production is an important
activity, declining productivity on
the land increases migration
pressures.  It also encourages a
shift towards less land-quality
dependent activities, including
livestock production, which unless
carefully managed may have a
further detrimental effect on land
quality, especially in fragile
environments.  (Taylor 1994)
Taylor notes that the relationship between
migration and soil degradation is com-
plex and may exacerbate the destruction
of fragile ecosystems in Mexico.  There
also may be an inverse relationship, where
the opportunity to migrate is less costly
to a family than the environmental invest-
ment needed to increase productivity of
the farmland.
The presence of migration
opportunities increases the
opportunity cost of investing in
environmental conservation. In
effect, the environment competes
with migration for scarce family
resources, including time.  The
basic problem is that migration is
an economic activity the returns
to which do not depend on land
quality.  The availability of such
activities tends to discourage land
conservation.  (Taylor 1994)
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Notwithstanding this, Taylor further sug-
gests that remittances sent home from
those who migrate could provide a source
of funds for conservation investment.  This
is particularly important given that most
farmers in Mexico do not have access to
credit.  Remittances have largely taken the
place of the “missing bank” to finance
small farm investments (Taylor 1994).
Integration of
Geostatistical
Data
In completing our investigation, we ana-
lyzed geostatistical information concern-
ing various regions of Mexico affected by
aridity and likely to be most affected by
desertification.  We developed a map iden-
tifying migration from rural areas, with a
cross-comparison to geostatistical data on
aridity in Mexico [see Maps 7, 8 pp.25,26].
The information on migration used in pre-
paring these maps was gathered in a sur-
vey of Mexican migrants living and
working in the United States who were
returning to Mexico in 1993 for an un-
specified period of time.14  The informa-
tion collected in this survey included the
last place of residence in Mexico by rural
locality of the migrants.  This data is sig-
nificant because it tends to indicate the
relative number of people who migrate to
14The survey did not attempt to determine whether the migrants intended to return permanently
or temporarily for such reasons as vacation or family visit.  The survey gathering the data
was conducted by Dr. Jorge Bustamante and his colleagues at El Colegio de la Frontera
Norte as part of an ongoing, large-scale project funded by the World Bank to produce a
direct estimate of the variation of undocumented immigrants from Mexico to be found in
the U.S. during the time monitored.  This estimate is obtained by focusing on patterns of
circulatory migration flows as determined through interviews of randomly selected
individuals at a number of Mexican border cities.  The project, begun in 1993, will be
completed in spring 1994.  Because not all data from the survey has been collected and
analyzed, we developed our estimates by extrapolating six months of the data, providing
an estimate of undocumented immigrants from Mexico in the U.S. in 1993.
   The foundational work for the survey methodology consisted of a pilot study in which Dr.
Bustamante and his colleagues conducted surveys of migrants at various border crossing
points over an approximately six-year period.  The new survey methodology used in these
interviews was developed based on procedures used to sample mobile populations for
biological statistics.  The successfully completed pilot study produced the only time series
database available on the flows of undocumented migration from Mexico other than the
statistics on apprehensions produced by the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service
and provided the information necessary to determine the proper parameters of the survey
and sampling design.
U.S.  C O M M I S S I O N  O N  I M M I G R A T I O N  R E F O R M
R E S E A R C H
P A P E R
- 21 -
the United States from the rural localities
of Mexico.
The use of migration and aridity data in
determining precise correlations between
migration and desertification is limited for
two reasons.  First, much of Mexico’s ter-
ritory is arid or semi-arid and we cannot
assume that all arid or semi-arid areas
are desertified (though, as the government
of Mexico concludes, 60 percent of all
lands are severely degraded).  Second,
though there is migration from the rural
arid and semi-arid areas, we cannot as-
sume, without further investigation, that
all migration identified from these areas
is a result of desertification.  As discussed
above, we do know that the central re-
gion of Mexico, which is arid or semi-
arid and has a high rural density, has
widespread desertification problems and
significant out-migration.  Our discussion
with experts, research, and analysis of the
relevant statistical data (some of which is
presented in Maps 7 and 8) suggests that
further investigation will likely confirm that
desertification, as well as other environmental
factors, contribute to migration from this re-
gion.15
Quantifying
Migration Flows
There has been considerable debate on the
annual flow of migrants from Mexico to
the United States (Durand & Massey
1992:4-5).16 Estimates range from 150,000
persons per year to between 500,000 and
600,000 persons per year (Myers 1993:144;
Durand & Massey 1992:6-9; see also Mar-
tin 1993:4-6).  Approximately 100,000 to
150,000 of these are expected to settle in
the United States (Martin 1993:4).  An ad-
ditional 1.5 to 2 million Mexicans who
enter the U.S. illegally each year are con-
sidered temporary workers or seasonal
migrants expected to return to Mexico.17
The World Bank projects that between
1995 and the year 2000, an additional
750,000 to 900,000 Mexicans will migrate
to the U.S (Martin 1993:5).
15Martin (1993) also suggests that the allocation of water and development of irrigation supplies
can be a powerful force in motivating internal migration; water projects in northern Mexico
have led to substantial internal south to north migration to Sinaloa, Baja, and other areas.
Martin believes that, if Mexico undertakes more such water projects in the north (such as
would be likely to reduce transportation costs of fruit grown in Mexico and exported to the
U.S. market), there may be more “stepping-stone” migration to the United States.
16Myers (1993:144) suggests that 150,000 to 300,000 illegally migrate to the United States each
year to settle.
17“Most Mexicans are expected to continue to arrive illegally; there are estimated to be 1.5 to 2.5
million illegal entries each year, and over 90 percent of those apprehended are Mexicans . .
.” (Martin 1993:4)
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No one has attempted to determine how
many of these migrants leave the rural
areas of Mexico because of serious im-
pairment of farmlands or other desertifi-
cation processes.  The time constraints and
scope of our investigation did not permit
us to undertake any real quantification
analysis.  Further investigation and data
development is warranted to provide a
more accurate basis for determining the
scope of the problem.  However, the lack
of precise data on the number of migrants
should not paralyze the policy develop-
ment process, particularly as quantifica-
tion historically has been an area for
fervent debate in the migration field and
there may be enough qualified data to
warrant policy considerations. Recom-
mended issues for further investigation
are discussed in Conclusions and Recom-
mendations, below.
CONCLUSIONS
AND RECOM-
MENDATIONS FOR
FUTURE ACTION
The relationship between ecological de-
struction and migration is a phenomenon
that has been little studied on a global
level.  Studies of various regions of the
world confirm that migration is increas-
ingly a result of serious environmental
degradation, particularly desertification
processes that impair the viability of soils
and agricultural sustainability.
Mexico has significant desertification prob-
lems because much of its lands are af-
fected by arid or semi-arid climate.
Historically, it has been the source of
large-scale migration to the United States.
We undertook a preliminary study to un-
derstand better the relationship between
severe land degradation in Mexico and
migration to the U.S.  Our preliminary
investigation leads to the following con-
clusions.
First, there is evidence to suggest that a
portion of the migrating population from
Mexico to the United States are people
who are moving, directly or via Mexico’s
urban centers, because they cannot farm
the lands.  The deterioration of the soil
base is due to ongoing processes of deser-
tification affected by both climate and
unsustainable land and water use prac-
tices.  Those most acutely affected are
subsistence farmers who grow corn and
beans for their families to survive.
Second, preventing this migration will
require addressing the root environmen-
tal causes of the problem, largely associ-
ated with inefficient agricultural
management.  National, regional, and lo-
cal policies, institutions, and practices in
U.S.  C O M M I S S I O N  O N  I M M I G R A T I O N  R E F O R M
R E S E A R C H
P A P E R
- 23 -
Mexico likely will need to be reformed.
A significant barrier to implementing re-
forms in Mexico is the lack of education,
training, and financial programs for af-
fected farming communities. Too, U.S.
domestic policies, particularly in the agri-
cultural sector, may be contributing to
these problems and warrant further in-
vestigation.
The U.S. Commission on International
Migration and Cooperative Economic
Development concluded that long-term
economic development is the most effec-
tive means of preventing international
migration in this region (Gregory 1989:31).
However, this may not prevent the mi-
gration associated with severe ecological
damage.  Economic development will be
more effective if coupled with specific en-
vironmental policies, including regulations
and financial incentives designed to pre-
vent and redress land degradation and
drought (e.g., the lack of reliable water
supply).  Redressing the problem will
require programs to assure the viability
of farming and to revitalize salinized soils
or otherwise degraded natural resources
in affected rural communities.18
Third, while the development of data on
migration associated with environmental
problems is too premature to recommend
specific foreign policies, our preliminary
analysis reveals that the Commission and
Congress will need to look beyond tradi-
tional immigration policy to address the
root causes of the problem.  Precise pro-
grams and policies will depend upon the
results of further field and analytical
study, as described below.
Issues for Further
Investigation of
the Environment
and Migration
Phenomenon
The environmental phenomena in Mexico
that can give rise to migration and the
communities most affected should be in-
vestigated more comprehensively to un-
18The San Joaquin Valley, an historically prosperous region that produces much of California's
agricultural revenues of more than $17 billion, may serve as an example.  In spite of its
prosperity, the region only recently has begun to address the salinization and other
desertification problems that have been building for decades because of poor land and water
management practices.  These now threaten the viability of 750,000 acres of prime farmland.
Thousands of acres have been fallowed because of lack of understanding or attention to the
problem by both farmers and regulatory agencies.  These groups are now beginning programs
to arrest the problem.
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derstand better the immigration and for-
eign policies that could be formulated by
United States policymakers to address the
problem.  The Commission may wish to
undertake such investigation or to recom-
mend to Congress that it appropriate re-
sources to conduct the necessary research
and field study.
The following specific recommendations
are proposed to guide the further action
of the Commission and/or Congress:
Further Investigate
the Relationship
Between
Environmental
Problems and
Migration
Reversing the trends of land degradation
in Mexico will be critical in stemming the
migration related to unsustainable use of
agricultural lands in certain regions.
Investigating the links between environ-
ment, migration, and population will pro-
vide more definitive analysis of these
trends and suggest appropriate policy
development.
Given the dearth of available field-based
documentation on which to formulate
policies, further study should seek to
determine how influential a role environ-
mental problems play in decisions to mi-
grate.  Field research should include
interviews of migrants in affected rural
communities as part of broader field stud-
ies.
It will be important to investigate the re-
gions that suffer the most acute environ-
mental problems and that foster significant
involuntary migration because this infor-
mation can provide a basis for the devel-
opment of prevention and remediation
programs that could yield short- and long-
term environmental and migration ben-
efits to both Mexico and the United States.
Specifically, we recommend more precise
identification and investigation of the
lands currently undergoing desertification
in rural, arid, and semi-arid areas of
Mexico.  For example, a detailed inven-
tory of the lands in the Central Plateau
region could enable more accurate corre-
lation of migration from this area and land
degradation patterns, as well as provide
information on the number of people who
may be affected.  This will be critical to
identifying priority areas for policy re-
sponses.
The key will be to build upon and bridge
the existing efforts of researchers, officials,
and nongovernmental organizations to
analyze environmental problems and
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population movements in an integrated
fashion.  For example, new migration data
(that will be available soon) is currently
being produced by the Colegio de la
Frontera Norte and ORSTOM.  This data
can be used to determine more accurately
the migration patterns in Mexico.  Data
on outmigration from an area can be com-
bined with geographical information ser-
vice statistics [GIS] identifying areas of
land impairment.  In turn, this data can
be compared with other regional migra-
tion patterns.  The data can provide a
beginning point for locating the most criti-
cal environment-migration areas and de-
termining the number of migrants
affected.
The relationship between population
growth, environmental problems, and
migration also should be studied.  Popu-
lation growth increases pressure on scarce
natural resources in rural areas.  In agri-
cultural regions, when the carrying capac-
ity of the lands are exceeded, people are
forced to move.  Little is understood about
the dynamic between population growth
in certain agricultural regions in Mexico
and the marginalization of agricultural
lands that promotes migration.  Any fu-
ture investigation into the links between
migration and environment should, there-
fore, include analysis of how population
growth may affect environment and mi-
gration problems.
Finally, understanding climate change in
this region also will be important.  Cer-
tain data already has been developed on
climate change and global warming and
can be evaluated further and integrated
with research on migration and environ-
ment issues.  Some experts are concerned
that declining conditions in rural Mexico,
unemployment, and migration will be-
come worse in the event of global warm-
ing.  If dry regions of Mexico become
warmer and drier as global warming
models suggest, Mexican croplands and
the farmers who rely on low and variable
rainfall could be severely affected.  Many
more rural inhabitants could be forced to
migrate (Liverman 1992).
Investigate the
Development of
Immigration and
Other Policies that
May Be Responsive to
Address Ecologically-
Induced Migration
In carrying out its mandate to consider
ways to increase the effectiveness of U.S.
immigration policy, the Commission may
consider proposals to tighten border con-
trols and employer sanctions for the hir-
ing of illegal immigrants.  Preliminarily,
we analyzed some of these policies to de-
R E S E A R C H
P A P E R
- 26 -
U.S.  C O M M I S S I O N  O N  I M M I G R A T I O N  R E F O R M
termine their potential in addressing mi-
gration related to environmental degra-
dation.
As the Commission is aware, policies to
increase border controls and punitive
sanctions against employers and certain
other measures were adopted under
IRCA.  These were designed to control
the flow of immigration from Mexico to
the U.S.  Some contend that IRCA has
had relatively little impact on stemming
undocumented immigration from Mexico
(e.g., Massey, Durand & Donato 1992:139-
40, 155-56).  The policies have become
somewhat controversial because it is as-
serted that they can lead to violence
against Mexicans and can drive undocu-
mented workers further underground,
leaving no recourse to challenge employer
abuses (Huerta 1992:150-51).  In addition,
certain federal studies have found that
these policies tend to encourage discrimi-
nation against foreign workers, whether
here legally or illegally (Huerta 1992:87-
88, 150-51; Mahoney 1992:150-53).19
These traditional policy responses prob-
ably will not be sufficient to diminish the
pressures on migration related to serious
environmental deterioration in Mexico
because they do not address the root of
the problem.  However, these policies can
be more effective in addressing this type
of migration if coupled with agricultural
land remediation, training, and educa-
tional programs.  If the objective of
U.S. immigration policy is to address root
causes of immigration, then such an ob-
jective will need to incorporate broader
policies that involve international coop-
eration, aid, and technical support mea-
sures.
Issues to Evaluate
in Developing
Broader Policy
Responses
The United States could play a catalyzing
role in encouraging the development of
such environmental policies in Mexico,
particularly as many federal agencies
possess unique expertise in developing
water and land management programs,
largely as a result of the lessons learned
from the salinization and water problems
that have plagued the western United
19The U.S. General Accounting Office concluded in 1990 that federal employer sanctions resulted
in widespread employment discrimination against U.S. citizens and other legal residents,
indicating that 20 percent of employers had engaged in discrimination in California as a result
of this policy (Coalition for Immigrant & Refugee Rights 1990:6).
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States farming regions.20  However, the
application of these programs in Mexico
is best determined in conjunction with
Mexicans most knowledgeable about con-
ditions in their own country.  Thus, the
Commission and/or Congress should in-
vestigate the opportunity for establishing
cooperative programs, as discussed below.
Distinguish Between
Environmentally-
Motivated Migrants
and Other Economic
Migrants to Address
Environmental Root
Causes of Migration
A key concern of the Commission is
whether these migrants are different from
the broader category of “economic” mi-
grants in ways that may warrant consid-
eration of new policies.  Our preliminary
findings suggest that migrants unable to
farm because of desertification or drought can
be distinguished, for purposes of policy devel-
opment, from other urban or economic mi-
grants who may be primarily motivated to
relocate in the United States because of the
wage differential.
Adverse environmental conditions can
lead to increased poverty when families
can no longer subsist on their lands.  They
may be forced to join the growing num-
bers of other “economic” migrants.  How-
ever, it appears useful to distinguish
between these “environmental” migrants
and other economic migrants for two rea-
sons.  First, understanding that some seg-
ment of the international migration
population is primarily motivated to move
because of their inability to farm could
foster the development of programs spe-
cifically designed to stem this cause of
migration.  As discussed below, these
could include environmental prevention
or remedial measures that preserve agri-
cultural land and promote higher agricul-
tural productivity.  Second, because the
motivation for leaving their homelands is
different from that of other economic
migrants, migrants forced to leave because
farming is unsustainable may consider re-
turning home if remediation programs are
offered.  [The findings which support this
are discussed in more detail below].
It may, therefore, be useful to target this
potential group of migrants for policy
responses as a means of addressing or
preventing one root cause of migration to
20The San Joaquin Valley of California is a prime example.  We undertook investigation of these
problems for federal and state agencies, producing a 1990 report identifying solutions to the
legal and institutional barriers that have contributed to agricultural water and drainage
management problems in this region.
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the United States.  However, the environ-
ment-migration phenomena still is too
little understood to support recommen-
dations on specific immigration policy
reforms, such as the expansion of existing
categories of refugees to include persons
acutely affected by ecological damage.
The Commission should study these is-
sues in further detail.
Investigate How
Policy Responses
Might Provide an
Opportunity for Some
Migrants to Return
Home to their
Communities
The Commission should undertake fur-
ther exploration of whether it would be
useful to develop policies or programs that
could encourage immigrants in the U.S.,
to return to their home communities vol-
untarily to engage in sustainable farming
activities.  The Commission could explore
the potential for a joint program with the
Mexican government to undertake land
revitalization programs in certain commu-
nities, with the view toward allowing
migrants who wish to do so to return
home to participate in such programs.
Our preliminary findings suggest that
migrants forced to leave because the soils
are agriculturally unproductive may con-
sider returning home if they can success-
fully farm the lands.  Michael Kearny,
Professor at the University of California,
Riverside, who has studied land problems
and migration in Southern Mexico where
many of the people are indigenous,
Mixteca, has found support for this view
among those in the migrant as- sociations
based in California with which he works
(Center for U.S. Mexican Studies 1986).
These groups desire to improve the situ-
ation in their home communities.  Many
are circular or seasonal migrants who
would prefer to remain at home if they
could make an adequate living and, simi-
larly, would like to return home if cir-
cumstances could be improved in their
communities (Center for U.S. Mexican
Studies 1986; Kearny 1994).  In our inter-
views conducted with Mexican migrants
living in California who migrated from
Mexico’s agricultural regions, many who
identified land degradation or drought as
a factor in the decision to migrate ex-
pressed a desire to return to Mexico if
they could make a living by farming the
lands.21
21We conducted interviews of two groups of Mexican migrants in San Francisco and Oakland,
California in December of 1993.  During the same month, we also conducted interviews of
workers living in villages with problems of desertification in the San Luis Potosi region of
Mexico.
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Further, certain studies of migration have
found that seasonal migrants may own
plots of land in their community of origin
and may either return to farm or employ
others to farm these lands.  This is consis-
tent with our findings in interviews of
rural workers in Mexico who informed
us that families generally wish to remain
on their land and only send one or two
family members to seek employment in a
Mexican city or the United States when
necessary to supplement the family in-
come.
Confirming whether these findings repre-
sent the attitudes of a broader base of rural
migrants in the United States will be im-
portant in thinking through policy re-
sponses.  U.S. immigration policies have
focused on apprehension and deportation
as a means of returning illegal migrants
to Mexico.22  Some studies have found that
these efforts have not deterred immigra-
tion because many of those apprehended
on the border and returned to Mexico sim-
ply repeat their attempts to enter the
United States until they are successful.23
These policies may be more effective in
addressing certain rural migration if
supplemented by policies that promote
incentives or programs for migrants to re-
turn home to participate in community
farming activities.
In some cases, policies adopted in Mexico
to revitalize lands or develop reliable
supplies of water and to foster equitable
distribution among farmers in a commu-
nity may serve to encourage potential
migrants (those who would be forced to
migrate in search of employment if they
could not farm the lands) to remain in
their communities or to encourage mi-
grants in the U.S. to return home.  Incen-
tive programs, organized jointly with
Mexican officials, could include provid-
ing training and education on sustainable
farming methods.  Community farmers
in Mexico and migrants living in the U.S.
could be eligible to participate. (These and
other possible programs are discussed
below).
Further investigation is warranted to de-
termine the potential for developing im-
migration policies that could promote the
return of rural migrants to participate in
agricultural training and development
22Since 1964, approximately 17 million Mexicans have been apprehended and deported (see e.g.,
Durand & Massey 1992).
23Data collected by Donato, Durand and Massey provided “no support for the view that
apprehension deters migration.”  Every migrant who attempted to enter the United States
eventually got in (Massey, Durand & Donato 1992:150).
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programs in Mexico. The potential for
such programs to yield results in reduc-
ing migration pressures will depend upon
more comprehensive data than the find-
ings presented here regarding the desire
of migrants to return to Mexico.  Specifi-
cally, it would be useful to determine,
through migrant interviews and other
means, whether these findings are more
broadly applicable to rural migrants in the
U.S. and how immigration policies can be
formulated to meet this challenge.
Investigate the
Opportunity for
Establishing Joint
U.S.-Mexico Programs
to Address the
Migration Related to
Environmental
Problems
As the Commission appreciates, the cre-
ation or modification of certain national,
regional, and local policies in Mexico
likely will be needed to redress the grow-
ing environmental problems, particularly
to encourage regulations and permitting
practices designed to ensure sustainable
harvesting of forests and vegetation.
Moreover, programs that seek to improve
employment opportunities in Mexico
could focus on the improvement of agri-
cultural lands, such as those involving
expansion of credit to ejido farmers to
improve irrigation efficiency.24 The spe-
cific programs that should be considered
are discussed more fully in the next sec-
tion of this report.
Recognizing that environmental deterio-
ration in Mexico can contribute to migra-
tion to the United States, Mexico and the
United States should cooperate in devel-
oping solutions.  The Commission and
Congress should consider how coopera-
tive programs with Mexico could be de-
veloped to promote, finance, and
implement environmental mitigation and
prevention programs, including the devel-
opment of model techniques and evalua-
tion of successful agricultural methods
developed by indigenous groups in
Mexico that can be replicated in other
24David Runsten, an agricultural economist affiliated with the California Institute for Rural
Studies, believes that there is considerable potential in this type of effort.  He has worked
effectively to promote the production of fruits and vegetables on ejido lands in Mexico.  Small
ejido farmers often do not develop their lands or utilize irrigation because of credit difficulties
or exclusion from economic opportunities, problems that may be addressed through financial
and other policy reforms in Mexico.
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regions of the country.  Moreover, the U.S.
should consider how best to transfer its
considerable expertise and technology to
prevent or remediate many agricultural
problems.
The benefits of such programs to advance
U.S. and Mexican interests go beyond the
potential for reducing migration to the
United States.  The U.S. could benefit eco-
nomically to the extent that private firms
may gain opportunities to participate in
technology transfer and consultation.
Moreover, increasing productivity of ag-
ricultural lands in Mexico will be critical
to the long-term sustainability and mar-
ket competitiveness of Mexican agricul-
ture. The North American Free Trade
Agreement [NAFTA] may increase rural
migration as agricultural exports from the
United States to Mexico displace the ag-
ricultural produce of small, inefficient
farmers (Martin 1993:137).25   If farmers
are not competitive, they may be required
to diversify their incomes or be forced to
migrate to urban areas, including in the
United States, in search of jobs.
One potential framework for cooperation
could be the North American Free Trade
Agreement, which establishes certain co-
operative mechanisms for consideration
and transfer of environmental information.
In addition, there are several joint border
programs that involve the management
of lands associated with the shared natu-
ral resources of Mexico and the U.S.  These
and other mechanisms that could facili-
tate cooperative program development
warrant further investigation.
The Commission also should consider the
following issues for further research in
developing a framework for environmen-
tal cooperation with Mexico and in assist-
ing local communities in Mexico.
Potential Short- and
Long-Term
Opportunities for the
Development of
Environmental
Solutions
Based upon our preliminary investigation
of certain desertification problems in
Mexico and our experience in addressing
these problems in the western United
25Interestingly, NAFTA may increase migration in the short term.  Martin (1993:47) estimates
that approximately 1.4 million workers will be displaced.  This push from rural areas also
will be fostered by Mexico's new agricultural policy to reduce subsidies for corn and beans.
It may be that environmental remediation efforts could help to balance this “hump” in
increased migration by increasing the availability of productive agricultural lands.
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States, we have identified certain environ-
mental measures that warrant further con-
sideration as part of any further
investigation of the migration-environ-
ment phenomenon.  These may provide
both short- and long-term benefits in ad-
dressing the problems.  The importance
of the measures proposed below will de-
pend upon the precise nature of the prob-
lem, the lands affected, the climate, and
the community practices within each af-
fected region.
Academic institutions in Mexico, such as
the Instituto de Investigaciones de Zonas
Deserticas (Universidad Autonoma de San
Luis Potosi) already have begun to for-
mulate ideas on model programs that
could be undertaken in the local commu-
nities most seriously threatened by land
and water quality deterioration.  It may
be useful to consider incorporating such
programs into a larger Mexico-U.S. coop-
erative development assistance program,
such as discussed in the previous section.
• Poor cultivation practices and
overgrazing have been identified
as two of the largest contributors
to desertification.  The economic
and environmental feasibility of
the following measures should be
evaluated as they can produce im-
mediate environmental benefits:
1. Modification of permitting prac-
tices concerning wells to ensure
that poor quality water is not used
for irrigation;
2. Modification of permitting prac-
tices concerning clearing of land
for crop cultivation to reduce
farming on lands unsuitable for
such cultivation;
3. Institution of controlled, sustain-
able grazing in all areas where
grazing is practiced (Ballin-Cortes
& Vasquez Rosillo 1993).
Education, training and economic
incentives should be provided to
growers in affected areas to pro-
mote the following policy goals:
4.  Reduction of crop cultivation in
areas where soil and/or climate
are unsuitable for cultivation and
institution of controlled grazing
practices or other alternative land
uses more suitable to these areas
(Ballin-Cortes & Vasquez Rosillo
1993);
5.  Reduction of water-intensive dry
land crop cultivation and substi-
tution of drought-resistant crops
in areas where the land and cli-
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mate can support some form of
cultivation (Mainguet 1991:32,
213);
6.  Education and financing to sup-
port implementation of rational,
water conserving irrigation sys-
tems (to replace systems that mo-
bilize salts and waste resources
through overapplication of water).
• Other practices contributing to de-
sertification include unsustainable
harvesting of forests and vegeta-
tion, poorly planned urban expan-
sion, and public works projects.
Any investigation should consid-
er the economic and environmen-
tal feasibility of the following
measures as they can produce im-
mediate benefits:
1.  Modification of regulations and
permitting practices to ensure sus-
tainable harvesting of forests and
vegetation.
Measures that can address the
problems on a long-term basis
include:
2.  Education that promotes sustain-
able harvesting practices;
3.  Institution of planning mechanisms
for urban expansion, public
works, and mining projects that
will ensure that environmental
considerations are properly eval-
uated and considered and that
will promote effective public par-
ticipation in their development
and implementation.
• Drought and other processes lead-
ing to desertification often have
more severe impacts where lands
are more marginal and where
farmers lack irrigation, good fer-
tilizer, high yield seeds, and ade-
quate variety in crops.  Further
investigation should consider
ways to reduce these impacts, in-
cluding by:
1.  Providing financing, technology,
and education to expand efficient
irrigation systems;
2.  Providing financing, supplies, and
education to promote use of good
fertilizers, high yield seeds, and
substantial variety in crops
(Liverman 1992b:332).
3.  Developing policies to address the
factors causing the farming of
marginal lands, including govern-
ment regulation, high population
growth, and agricultural financ-
ing.
• Pilot programs with local partici-
pation can achieve significant re-
sults:
1.  The primary difficulties in imple-
menting many of these recom-
mended solutions will be obtain-
ing adequate financing and the co-
operation of the rural workers
who traditionally have followed
particular cultivation, grazing,
harvesting, and irrigation practic-
es.  One way to achieve the nec-
essary participation may be to car-
ry out model programs or pilot
projects to test the recommended
changes in land management
(Ballin-Cortes & Vasquez Rosillo
1993; Ballin-Cortes 1988b:4).  With
sufficient financing to reduce the
risks, rural communities or ejidos
may voluntarily participate in
these projects.
2. Moreover, if rural participants are
closely involved in the develop-
ment and application of the rec-
ommended solutions, the actual
solutions designed not only may
be more practical, but more influ-
ential in fostering change by both
the immediate participants and
outside observers. If successful,
such projects should serve both
to demonstrate the desirability of
the recommended solutions and
to educate the community’s farm-
ers.
3. Once recommended solutions
have been tested and proven suc-
cessful, further implementation
can be encouraged in a number
of ways.  First, education can
serve to spread knowledge and
understanding of the techniques
followed in the pilot projects.  Sec-
ond, government incentives can
reduce the risks and provide the
motivation needed to undertake
changes.  Third, government reg-
ulation and permit policies can
attempt to halt or diminish prac-
tices that are clearly harmful and
ensure consideration of environ-
mental effects.
U.S.  C O M M I S S I O N  O N  I M M I G R A T I O N  R E F O R M
R E S E A R C H
P A P E R
- 35 -
R E S E A R C H
P A P E R
- 36 -
U.S.  C O M M I S S I O N  O N  I M M I G R A T I O N  R E F O R M
U.S.  C O M M I S S I O N  O N  I M M I G R A T I O N  R E F O R M
R E S E A R C H
P A P E R
- 37 -
R E S E A R C H
P A P E R
- 38 -
U.S.  C O M M I S S I O N  O N  I M M I G R A T I O N  R E F O R M
U.S.  C O M M I S S I O N  O N  I M M I G R A T I O N  R E F O R M
R E S E A R C H
P A P E R
- 39 -
R E S E A R C H
P A P E R
- 40 -
U.S.  C O M M I S S I O N  O N  I M M I G R A T I O N  R E F O R M
U.S.  C O M M I S S I O N  O N  I M M I G R A T I O N  R E F O R M
R E S E A R C H
P A P E R
- 41 -
R E S E A R C H
P A P E R
- 42 -
U.S.  C O M M I S S I O N  O N  I M M I G R A T I O N  R E F O R M
U.S.  C O M M I S S I O N  O N  I M M I G R A T I O N  R E F O R M
R E S E A R C H
P A P E R
- 43 -
REFERENCES
Ahlers, T.  1979.  A Microeconomic Analy-
sis of Rural-Urban Migration in Haiti.  Ph.D.
Dissertation, The Fletcher School of Law
and Diplomacy (August).
Alba, F.  1993.  El Tratado de Libre
Comercio Y La Emigracion de Mexicanos
a Estados Unidos. 43 Comercio Exterior 8.
Alvargonzalez, R.  1984.  O Desen-
volvimento do Nordeste Árido. Fortaleza:
Ministério do Interior, DNOCS.
Arguelles, L. 1993.  Personal interview
(December 3).
Arizpe, L. 1981.  The Rural Exodus in
Mexico and Mexican Migration to the
United States.  International Migration Re-
view 15:4 626-49.
Ballin-Cortes, J.R.  1988a.  Desertificacion,
Eminente Peligro para los Ecosistemas de
Mexico.  Universidad Automoma de San
Luis Potosi.
__________  1988b.  Recuperacion de
Agostaderos en la Zona de Villa de Arriaga,
S.L.P.  Universidad Autonoma de San Luis
Potosi.
__________  1990a.  Desertificacion:
Comentarios y Posibilidades de Control.
Universidad Automoma de San Luis
Potosi.
__________  1990b.  Estudio Preliminar de
la Desertificacion en el Limite sur del Desierto
Chihuahuense XII. Universidad Auto-noma
de San Luis Potosi.
Ballin-Cortes, J.R.;  Vasquez Rocillo.  1993.
Personal interview, Instituto de Inves-
tigaciones de Zonas Deserticas,
Universidad Autonomo de San Luis
Potosii (December 6).
Balling, R.  1988.  The Climatic Impact of
a Sonoran Vegetation Discontinuity.  Cli-
matic Change 13:99-109.
__________  1993.  Telephone interview,
Arizona State University.
Bilsborrow, R.E.;  DeLargy, P.E.  1991.
Land Use, Migration, and Natural Re-
source Deterioration: The Experience of
Guatemala and the Sudan.  Population and
Development Review 16:supplement.
Bryant, et al.  1990.   Measuring the Effect
of Overgrazing in the Sonoran Desert.  Cli-
matic Change 17:243-64.
Bustamante, J.  1992.  Migracion Indocu-
mentada desde Zacatecas a Estado
Unidos.  Presented at Insituto Nacional
de Estadistica, Geografia E Infomatica y
R E S E A R C H
P A P E R
- 44 -
U.S.  C O M M I S S I O N  O N  I M M I G R A T I O N  R E F O R M
la Universidad Automona de Zacatecas
symposium (July 6).
Cardenas, G.  1975.  United States Immi-
gration Policy Toward Mexico: An His-
torical Perspective.  Chicano Law Review
2:66 74.
Catanese, A.  1990/91.  Haiti’s Refugees:
Political, Economic, Environmental.  San
Francisco and Indianapolis: Natural Heri-
tage Institute and Universities Field Staff
International (Latin America 17).
Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies.  1986.
Integration of the Mixteca and the Western
U.S.-Mexico Region via Migratory Wage
Labor, Monograph Series 16.  San Diego:
University of California.
Centre for Our Common Future.  1987.
From One Earth to One World: An Overview
by the World Commission on Environment
and Development. Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press.
Coalition for Immigrant and Refugee
Rights and Services.  1990.  Principles for
Discussion of United States Immigration
Policy.  San Francisco.
Comision Nacional de las Zonas Aridas.
1993.  Plan de Accion para Combatir la
Desertificacion en Mexico [draft].  San Luis
Potosi.
Comision Nacional de las Zonas Aridas.
1994.  Plan de Accion para Combatir la
Desertificacion en Mexico [final].  San Luis
Potosi.
Commission for the Study of International
Migration and Cooperative Economic
Development.  1990.  Unauthorized Migra-
tion: An Economic Development Response
(July).  Washington, DC: Government
Printing Office.
Commission on Agricultural Workers.
1992.  Report of the Commission on Agricul-
tural Workers.  Washington: Government
Printing Office.
Congressional Research Service.  1990.
Temporary Worker Programs: Back-
ground and Issues.  Prepared for the Sen-
ate Committee on the Judiciary (February).
Corwin, A. 1978.  Early Mexican Labor
Migration: A Frontier Sketch, 1848-1900.
In Immigrants—and Immigrants: Perspectives
on Mexican Labor Migration to the United
States (A.F. Corwin, ed.).  Westwood, CT:
Greenwood Press.
Corwin, A.;  Cardoso, L.A.  1978.  Vamos
Al Norte: Causes of Mexican Migration
to the United States.  In Immigrants—and
Immigrants: Perspectives on Mexican Labor
Migration to the United States (A.F. Corwin,
ed.).  Westwood, CT: Greenwood Press.
U.S.  C O M M I S S I O N  O N  I M M I G R A T I O N  R E F O R M
R E S E A R C H
P A P E R
- 45 -
Cuthbert, R.;  Stevens, J.  1981.   The Net
Economic Incentive for Illegal Mexican Mi-
gration: A Case Study.  International Mi-
gration Review 15:3 543-50.
Davila, A.  1986.   The Seasonality of Ap-
prehensions of Undocumented Mexican
Workers.  International Migration Review
20:4 986-91.
Declaration of Cartegena.  1984.  Ap-
proved at Colloquium on International
Protection of Refugees in Central America,
Mexico and Panama: Legal and Humani-
tarian Programs, Nov. 19-22, Cartegena,
Colombia.
Desertificacão do Nordeste é Tema de
Debate.  1991.  Jornal do Brasil (April 1).
Desertificacão do Nordeste já Atinge uma
Átinge do 50 mil km2.  1991.  Jornal do
Brasil (May 15)
Durand, J.;  Massey, D.  1992.  Mexican
Migration to the United States: A Critical
Review.  Latin American Research Review
3:42 (Spring).
El-Hinnawi, E.  1985.  Environmental Refu-
gees.  Nairobi: United Nations Environ-
mental Program.
Espiell, H.G.;  Picado, S.;  Lanza, L.V..
1990.  Principles and Criteria for the Pro-
tection of and Assistance to Central
American Refugees, Returnees and Dis-
placed Persons in Latin America.  Int. J.
Ref. Law 2:1.
Fonseca, V.   1979.  A População
Nordestina até 1970.  Desenvolvimento do
Nordeste: Diagnóstico e Sugestôes de Políticas.
Fortaleza: Banco do Nordeste do Brasil.
Gregersen, H.;  Draper, S.;  Elz, D. (eds.).
1989.  People and Trees: The Role of Social
Forestry in Sustainable Development.  Wash-
ington, DC: Economic Development In-
stitute of the World Bank.
Gregory, P.  1989.  The Determinants of
International Migration and Policy Options
for Influencing the Size of Population Flows.
Commission for the Study of International
Migration and Economic Development.
Washington, DC: Government Printing
Office.
Hathaway.  1990.  A Reconsideration of
the Underlying Premise of Refugee Law.
Harvard International Law Journal 39:129.
Huerta, D.  1992.  Statement of Commis-
sioner Dolores Huerta.  In Report of the
Commission on Agricultural Workers.  Wash-
ington, DC: Government Printing Office.
Hutcheson, R.  1991.  Fighting for Survival:
Insecurity, People and the Environment in
R E S E A R C H
P A P E R
- 46 -
U.S.  C O M M I S S I O N  O N  I M M I G R A T I O N  R E F O R M
the Horn of Africa.  Glands, Switzerland:
International Union for the Conservation
of Nature and Natural Resource (Novem-
ber).
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1990.
§101(a)(42)(A) [8 U.S.C.A.
§1101(a)(42)(A)].
International Educational Development
Inc.  1991.  Human Rights and the Envi-
ronment.  Statement submitted to the U.N.
Commission on Human Rights.  Doc. E/
CN.4/Sub.2/1991/NGO/44 (Sept. 2).
International Organization for Migration
and Refugee Policy Group.  1992.  Migra-
tion and the Environment (June).  Geneva
and Washington, DC.
Kearny, M.  1994.  Telephone conference
(March 7).
Kurlansky, M.  1988.  Haiti’s Environment
Teeters on the Edge.  International Wildlife
(March/April) 34-38.
Lewis, L.;  Coffey, W.  1985.  The Con-
tinuing Deforestation of Haiti.  Ambio 14:3.
Limwando, G.  1990.   Report on Malawi’s
State of Environment.  Lilongwe: National
Research Council.
Liverman, D.  1990.  Drought Impacts in
Mexico: Climate, Agriculture, Technology,
and Land Tenure in Sonora and Pueblo.
Annals of the Association of American Geog-
raphers.  80:149-72.
__________  1992a.  The Regional Impact
of Global Warming in Mexico: Uncer-
tainty, Vulnerability and Response.   In
The Regions and Global Warming:  Impacts
and Response Strategies (J. Schmandt, J.
Clarkson eds.).  Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press.
__________  1992b  Global Warming and
Mexican Agriculture:  Some Preliminary
Results.  In Economic Changes in Global
Climate Change (J. Rilley, M. Anderson,
eds.).  Boulder, CO: Westview
Liverman, D.;  O’Brien, K.  1991.  Global
warming and climate change in Mexico.
In Global Environmental Change.  Butter-
worth-Heinemann, Ltd.
Lundahl, M.  1979.  Peasants and Poverty:
A Study of Haiti.  New York: St. Martin’s
Press.
Mainguet, M.  1991.  Desertification: Natu-
ral Background and Human Mismanagement.
New York: Springer-Verlag.
Mahoney, R.  1992.  Statement of Cardi-
nal R. Mahoney.  In Report of the Commis-
U.S.  C O M M I S S I O N  O N  I M M I G R A T I O N  R E F O R M
R E S E A R C H
P A P E R
- 47 -
sion on Agricultural Workers.  Washington,
DC: Government Printing Office.
Maloney, C.  1990/91a.  Environmental and
Project Displacement of Population in South
Asia Part I: Development and Deracination.
San Francisco and Indianaopolis: Natural
Heritage Institute and Universities Field
Staff International (Latin America 18).
__________  1990/91b. Environmental and
Project Displacement of Population in South
Asia Part II: Land and Water.  San Fran-
cisco and Indianaopolis: Natural Heritage
Institute and Universities Field Staff In-
ternational (Latin America 19).
Martin, P.L.  1990.  The Outlook for Ag-
ricultural Labor in the 1990s.  U.C. Davis
Law Review 23:499.
__________  1993.  Trade and Migration:
NAFTA and Agriculture.  Washington, DC:
Institute for International Economics (Oc-
tober).
Massey, D.F.;  et al.  1987.  Return to Aztlan:
The Social Process of International Migration
from Western Mexico.  Berkeley: Univer-
sity of California Press.
Massey, D.F.;  Durand, J.;  Donato. K.M.
1992.  Stemming the Tide? Assessing the
Deterrent Effects of the Immigraton Re-
form and Control Act.  Demography 29:2
(May) 139-40, 155-56.
Massey, D.F.;  Goldring, L.;  Durand, J.
1993.  Continuities in Transnational Migra-
tion: An Analysis of 19 Mexican Communi-
ties.  Univeristy of Chicago: Population
Research Center (July). (Forthcoming in
American Journal of Sociology).
Medellin-Leal, F. (ed.).  1978.  La
Desertificacion en Mexico. Universidad
Autonoma de San Luis Potosi: Instituto
de Investigacion de Zonas Deserticas.
Mendez y Mercado, L.  1985.   Migracion:
Decision Involuntaria.  Instituto Nacional
Indigenista.
Mines, R.  1991.  A Case Study of the Evo-
lution of Mexican Migration to the United
States: Las Animas, Zacatecas.  University
of California: Division of Agricultural
Sciences (September).
Myers,  N.  1993.  Mexico, Ultimate Secu-
rity: The Environmental Basis of Political
Stability.  New York: W.W. Norton.
Nafziger.  1984.  A Commentary on
American Legal Scholarship Concerning
the Admission of Migrants  J. Law Reform
17:2 (Winter).
Natural Heritage Institute.  1993.  Inter-
views with people living and working in
San Luis Potosi rural areas (December 5).
R E S E A R C H
P A P E R
- 48 -
U.S.  C O M M I S S I O N  O N  I M M I G R A T I O N  R E F O R M
Organization of African Unity.   1969 Con-
vention Governing the Specific Aspects of
Refugee Problems in Africa, entered into
force June 20, 1974. (Reprinted in 691
UNTS 14.)
Raju, K.V.;  Maloney, C.  1992.   Environ-
mental Refugees in India.  Prepared for
Meeting of Experts on Migration and the
Environment, Nyon, Switzerland (Janu-
ary).
Refugee Policy Group.   1991.  Human
Rights Protection for Internally Displaced Per-
sons Conference Report.  (June 24-25).
Washington, DC.
__________  1992.  Report on Migration and
the Environment.  (Conclusions from ex-
perts meeting in Nyon, Switzerland [Janu-
ary]).  Washington, DC.
Ribeiro, A.;  Blecher, B.  1991.  Erosão
Ataca Várias Regiões do Brasil.  Folha de
São Paulo, Agrofolha (April 9).
Ritchey, P.N.  1976.  Explanations of Mi-
gration.  Annual Review of Sociology 2: 363-
404.
Runsten, D.  1994.  Telephone conference.
Sanders, T.  1990/91a..  Northeast Brazil-
ian Environmental Refugees: Part I: Why They
Leave.  San Francisco and Indianapolis:
Natural Heritage Institute and Universi-
ties Field Staff International (Latin America
20).
__________  1990/91b.  Northeast Brazilian
Environmental Refugees: Part II: Where They
Go.  San Francisco and Indianapolis: Natu-
ral Heritage Institute and Universities
Field Staff International (Latin America 21).
Schwartz, M.  1993.  International Legal
Protection for Victims of Environmental
Abuse.  Yale Journal of International Law
18:1 (Winter).
Secas no Nordeste 1979-1983.  1983.  Recife:
SUDENE.
Sohn. L.;  Buergenthal, T.  (eds).  1992.
The Movement of Persons Across Borders.
The American Society of International Law,
Studies in Transnational Legal Policy 23
(October).
Tamondong-Helin, S.;  Helin, W.  1990/
91.  Migration and the Environment: Interre-
lationships in Sub-Saharan Africa.  San Fran-
cisco and Indianapolis: Natural Heritage
Institute and Universities Field Staff In-
ternational (Latin America 22).
Tata, R.  1982.  Haiti: Land of Poverty.  New
York: University Press of America.
U.S.  C O M M I S S I O N  O N  I M M I G R A T I O N  R E F O R M
R E S E A R C H
P A P E R
- 49 -
Taylor, E.  1994.  Correspondence from
Professor Edward Taylor, University of
California, Davis.
Thomas, G.  1993.  Centralized Versus De-
centralized Approaches to Groundwater
Management and Allocation in the Con-
text of Overdevelopment.  Prepared for
Water Management: India’s Groundwa-
ter Challenge Workshop (December 14-
16).
Timberlake, L.  1986.  Africa in Crisis: The
Causes, the Cures of Environmental Bank-
ruptcy.  Philadelphia: Earthscan, New
Society Publishers.
United Nations Conference on Environ-
ment and Development [UNCED]. 1991.
Land Resources: Desertification and Drought,
Chairman’s Summary and Proposal for Ac-
tion.  Doc. A/CONF.151/PC/WG.1/L.29,
(August 29).
__________  [UNCED]  1992a. Managing
Fragile Ecosystems: Combating Desertification
and Drought.  Agenda 21, Chapter 12, Doc.
A/CONF.151/26, Vol. II (August 13).
__________ [UNCED]  1992b.  Combating
Poverty, Changing Consumption Patterns,
and Demographic Dynamics and
Sustainability. Report of the Secretary-Gen-
eral of the Conference.  Doc. A/
CONF.151/PC/100/Add.2, (January 14).
__________  [UNCED]  1992c.   Secretary
General’s Report to Fourth Preparatory Com-
mittee of UNCED.  Doc. A/CONF.151/PC/
100/Add.2.
United Nations Convention to Combat
Desertification [UNCCD].  1994.  Elabora-
tion of an International Convention to Com-
bat Desertification in Countries Experiencing
Serious Drought and/or Desertification, Par-
ticularly in Africa.  Doc. A/AC.241/15/
rev.7 (June 30).
United Nations Population Fund [UNPF].
1987.  Population Images.  New York.
__________ [UNPF].  1991.  Population, Re-
sources and the Environment: The Critical
Challenges.
U.S. Committee for Refugees [UNCR].
1991. World Refugee Survey 1991.  Wash-
ington, DC: American Council for Nation-
alities Service.
Villarego, D.  1993.  Telephone interview,
California Institute for Rural Studies (Nov.
18).
Warren, G.  1992.  A Study of Selected Refu-
gee and Migration Issues.  Report to the
Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House
of Representatives (June).
Working Group on Solutions and Protec-
tion.  1991.  Report of the Working Group on
R E S E A R C H
P A P E R
- 50 -
U.S.  C O M M I S S I O N  O N  I M M I G R A T I O N  R E F O R M
Solutions and Protection, Executive Commit-
tee of the High Commissioner’s Pro-gramme,
Sub. Commission of the Whole on Interna-
tional Protection.  42nd Session, U.N. Doc.
EC/SCP/64.
The World Bank.  1985.  Haiti Agricultural
Sector Study (Report No. 5375-HA, I-III,
June).
Zabin. C.;  et al.  1993.  A New Cycle of
Poverty, Mixtec Migrants In California Ag-
riculture.  Davis, CA: California Institute
For Rural Studies.
THE COMMISSION'S RESEARCH PAPERS, WHICH PRESENT THE RESULTS OF
COMMISSION-SPONSORED RESEARCH, ARE INTENDED TO ELICIT COMMENT AND PROVOKE
DISCUSSION.    THE VIEWS PRESENTED IN THESE PAPERS ARE THOSE OF THE AUTHORS
AND DO NOT NECESSARILY REFLECT THOSE OF THE COMMISSION.
U.S. COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION REFORM
2430 E STREET NW, SOUTH BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC 20037
202-776-8400
RESEARCH
P A P E R
U.S.  C O M M I S S I O N  O N  I M M I G R A T I O N  R E F O R M
U.S. COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION REFORM
R E S E A R C H
P A P E R
Employer Sanctions in France:
From the Campaign Against Illegal Alien
Employment to the Campaign
Against Illegal Work
Mark J. Miller
THE U.S. COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION REFORM IS A BIPARTISAN COMMISSION AUTHORIZED BY THE
IMMIGRATION ACT OF 1990 AND CHARGED WITH EXAMINING IMMIGRATION POLICY AND ITS IMPACT ON
SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, AND COMMUNITY RELATIONS, ON POPULATION SIZE AND CHARACTERISTICS, AND ON
THE ENVIRONMENT.
RICHARD ESTRADA
ASSOCIATE EDITOR, EDITORIAL PAGE, DALLAS MORNING NEWS
APPOINTED BY SENATE REPUBLICAN LEADERSHIP
HAROLD EZELL
PRESIDENT, THE EZELL GROUP, INC.
APPOINTED BY HOUSE REPUBLICAN LEADERSHIP
LAWRENCE H. FUCHS, VICE CHAIR
JAFFEE PROFESSOR OF AMERICAN CIVILIZATION AND POLITICS
BRANDEIS UNIVERSITY
APPOINTED BY SENATE DEMOCRATIC LEADERSHIP
ELECTED BY COMMISSIONERS TO BE VICE CHAIR
ROBERT CHARLES HILL
PARTNER, VENABLE BAETJER HOWARD & CIVILLETTI
APPOINTED BY HOUSE REPUBLICAN LEADERSHIP
SHIRLEY MOUNT HUFSTEDLER
FORMER JUDGE, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, NINTH CIRCUIT
FORMER SECRETARY OF DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
APPOINTED BY PRESIDENT CLINTON AS COMMISSION CHAIR
WARREN R. LEIDEN
BERRY, APPLEMAN & LEIDEN LLP
APPOINTED BY HOUSE DEMOCRATIC LEADERSHIP
NELSON MERCED
SENIOR ASSOCIATE
COMMUNITY TRAINING & ASSISTANCE CENTER
APPOINTED BY SENATE DEMOCRATIC LEADERSHIP
BRUCE A. MORRISON
CHAIRMAN, FEDERAL HOUSING FINANCE BOARD
APPOINTED BY HOUSE DEMOCRATIC LEADERSHIP
MICHAEL S. TEITELBAUM
ALFRED P. SLOAN FOUNDATION
APPOINTED BY SENATE REPUBLICAN LEADERSHIP
ELECTED BY COMMISSIONERS TO BE VICE CHAIR
SUSAN MARTIN, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
U.S.  C O M M I S S I O N  O N  I M M I G R A T I O N  R E F O R M
R E S E A R C H
P A P E R
Employer Sanctions in France:
From the Campaign Against Illegal Alien
Employment to the Campaign
Against Illegal Work
MARK J. MILLER
UNIVERSITY OF DELAWARE
1995

U.S.  C O M M I S S I O N  O N  I M M I G R A T I O N  R E F O R M
R E S E A R C H
P A P E R
CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY    1
INTRODUCTION    2
SCHOLARLY DISAGREEMENTS OVER EMPLOYER SANCTIONS IN
WESTERN EUROPE     4
PROBLEMS AND ISSUES IN ENFORCEMENT    14
EVOLUTION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE FINE (SPECIAL CONTRIBUTION) FOR ILLEGAL
EMPLOYMENT OF ALIENS IN FRANCE 1977-1992    14
OTHER LEGAL BARRIERS    16
INSUFFICIENT ENFORCEMENT PERSONNEL AND RESOURCES?    17
PROBLEMS OF PROPORTIONALITY, EMPLOYER ADAPTATION, AND COORDINATION    19
IMPLICATIONS FOR ENFORCEMENT OF IRCA AND OTHER U.S. LABOR
LAWS     21
APPENDIX    38
PRINCIPAL STEPS IN THE EVOLUTION OF FRENCH POLICY TO CURB ILLEGAL ALIEN
EMPLOYMENT AND THE UNDERGROUND ECONOMY    38
REFERENCES    42

U.S.  C O M M I S S I O N  O N  I M M I G R A T I O N  R E F O R M
R E S E A R C H
P A P E R
- 1 -
EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
French enforcement of laws penalizing
illegal alien employment is of particular
interest to U.S. policymakers.  In France,
where enforcement of employer sanctions
has been less controversial than in the U.S.,
the major complaint has been that there is
too little enforcement.  While some French
and American scholars have dismissed
French enforcement as a serious deterrent
to illegal alien employment, the French
government steadily has refined and im-
proved its capacity to punish illegal em-
ployment of aliens over the last quarter
century.  It possesses a substantially more
credible ability to detect and punish ille-
gal alien employment now than it did in
1968 when such employment was tacitly
condoned.  However, concommitantly,
internal and external developments have
rendered France increasingly vulnerable
to illegal alien employment.  Restruc-
turing of the French economy, for instance,
has expanded the role of small employ-
ers—more likely to employ aliens ille-
gally—at the expense of large firms.
The French strategy has evolved through
time.  The effort to curb illegal alien em-
ployment has been subsumed under a
broader campaign against illegal employ-
ment and the underground economy in
general.  An interagency taskforce charged
by the French government with monitor-
ing and facilitating enforcement of laws
against illegal migration proposed wid-
ening of its mandate.  Its studies revealed
illegal alien employment to be character-
istic of certain industries and of employ-
ers typically involved in other forms of
illegality in addition to their illegal em-
ployment of aliens.  The broader focus
has served to demystify illegal employ-
ment (what the French commonly call
clandestine employment) as more French
nationals than aliens break laws against
illegal employment.   However, a
disproportionally high number of alien
employers employ other aliens illegally
and these employers receive more severe
punishment than comparable French na-
tional offenders.
French enforcement of laws against ille-
gal alien employment has encountered
numerous obstacles, ranging from insuffi-
cient interagency cooperation in enforce-
ment to legal system unrespon-siveness,
to cases brought against employers who
hired aliens illegally.  In many areas, bar-
riers have been overcome incrementally;
in others, they persist.  Illegal alien em-
ployment continues but would be much
greater in the absence of employer sanc-
tions enforcement and related measures.
More rigorous enforcement would entail
greater commitment of budgetary and
enforcement personnel resources, a com-
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mitment that has grown incre-mentally
over the years.
The French approach to curbing illegal
employment could be emulated in the U.S.
The first step would be to create an inter-
agency taskforce charged with monitor-
ing and facilitating enforcement of laws
against illegal employment, most promi-
nently illegal alien employment.  Such a
step would appear consistent with the
commitment made by the U.S. when it
signed the agreement creating the World
Trade Organization.  The entity should be
small but endowed with a research staff
and budget.  It should prepare an annual
report on enforcement of laws against il-
legal employment.   Its mission should
include training and education of various
enforcement services and a mandate to
sensitize courts and prosecutors to the
harm caused by illegal employment.
Subsequent steps might include: 1) cre-
ation of regional, state, and local advisory
committees designed to facilitate enforce-
ment of laws against illegal employment;
2) enactment of voluntary agreements
amongst employ-ers in heavily-affected
sectors designed to promote employment
transparency and a level playing field for
competition; and 3) implementation of a
more secure employee eligibility verifica-
tion system.
Recent progress in France includes a sys-
tem in which employers notify authori-
ties of a new employee’s identity prior to
the onset of employment.  The system has
secured a high degree of voluntary com-
pliance from employers and promises to
make legal punishment of illegal employ-
ment more certain.  The most recent
French enforcement statistics suggest that
the effort begun more than one-quarter
century ago is bearing fruit.
INTRODUCTION
Continuing controversy in the United
States over the wisdom of laws penaliz-
ing illegal employment of aliens is unique
among Western democracies.  Most West-
ern democracies, as seen in Table 1 [pp.30-
33], have adopted and refined employer
sanctions over the last twenty years.  The
issue of enforcement of employer sanc-
tions has been much more controversial.
There is less confidence now than there
was twenty years ago concerning the ef-
ficacy and deterrent potential of employer
sanctions.  To the extent that they are
controversial outside the U.S., the com-
plaint usually is that enforcement is inad-
equate in light of mounting illegal migra-
tion.
Of the universe of Western democratic
experiences with employer sanctions en-
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forcement, the French case is in many
respects the most pertinent to the United
States.  France has a long immigration
tradition with substantial citizen and resi-
dent alien minority populations.  In 1930,
aliens constituted roughly the same per-
centage of the total population of France,
about 7 percent, as they do today.  After
1945, France actively pursued demo-
graphic goals through immigration policy,
but it also massively recruited foreign
labor.  Technically, illegal immi-gration
was commonplace but tolerated.  By 1970,
the alien population stood at more than
four million.  One out of every three con-
struction workers and one out of every
four auto workers were foreigners.  How-
ever, mounting eco-nomic and
sociopolitical difficulties contributed to a
1974 decision to stop most further foreign
worker recruitment.
Since 1975, the French government has
allowed family reunification for resident
aliens and admission of refugees.  But,
despite recurrent legalization policy, it has
taken an increasingly tough stand against
illegal immigration.  The laws and regu-
lations summarized in the Appendix
[p.42] testify to the incremental develop-
ment of a con-siderable govern-mental
capacity to punish illegal alien employ-
ment and illegal employment practices in
general.
In 1992, France admitted 135,000 aliens to
residence (Lebron 1993:3-4).  This repre-
sented a 10 percent increase over the 1991
total, but a tiny fraction of France’s total
population of almost 57 million.  Of the
135,000 legal admissions, some 56,000
were family members of legally resident
aliens or French citizen and 11,000 were
refugees.  While these numbers seem small
in relation to the U.S. admissions, the
magnitude of legal immigration to France
and the United States is roughly the same,
about 0.4 percent of the total population.
(This is Jonas Widgren’s calculation.)
From 1975 to 1990, the characteristics of
the legal resident alien population of
France evolved markedly.  These changes
have been analyzed at length by Claude-
Valentin Marie and are summarized here
(Marie undated.a.).  While the total resi-
dent alien population stabilized at about
3.6 million, in part due to liberal natural-
ization and nationality laws (95,000 aliens
became French citizens in 1992), alien
employment declined by 14 percent over
the period while total French employment
increased 8 percent.  Foreign workers
disproportionally were affected adversely
by recession and economic restructuring.
Nearly 500,000 foreign workers lost em-
ployment in industry over the period, with
aliens accounting for nearly one-half of
all jobs lost in the auto industry.  Unem-
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ployment of resident aliens in France to-
day is roughly double that of the French
national rate (10.3 percent).  Some resi-
dent alien groups, such as Algerians, have
unemployment rates greater than 25 per-
cent.  Many of the unemployed foreigners
are older, for example, laid-off auto work-
ers hired in the 1960s, but there is also
extremely high youth unemployment.
North Africans, in particular, face enor-
mous barriers including educational prob-
lems and discrimination.
Resident aliens, like French citizens, in-
creasingly find employment in services.
Indeed, in 1975, two-thirds of alien em-
ployees worked in the manufacturing and
building sectors, whereas only one-quar-
ter were employed in services.  Today,
those proportions are reversed.  A 1991
Ministry of Labor survey estimated that
38.9 percent of alien employees was em-
ployed in services and that this consti-
tuted the premier employment sector for
aliens.
These broad trends have affected illegal
immigration and illegal alien employ-ment
in France.  For instance, aliens in the 1990s
are much more likely to be hired by small
firms with fewer than ten employees than
was the case two decades ago.  There was,
and is, little illegal alien employment in
highly-unionized auto plants.  However,
most aliens now are hired by small firms
that historically have been more prone to
hire aliens illegally.  The shift from indus-
trial to service employment and trends
toward greater labor market flexibility,
declining unionization, and growing pre-
carious-ness of employment all have con-
tributed to a flourishing underground
economy.
In the quarter century since the May/June
events of 1968, which marked a turning
point in French policies toward interna-
tional migration, the government gradu-
ally subsumed its campaign against ille-
gal alien employment under a broader
campaign against illegal work.  This shift
reflected a learning process, as well as the
influence of public strategies adopted else-
where in the European Union, particularly
in Germany.
SCHOLARLY
DISAGREEMENTS
OVER EMPLOYER
SANCTIONS IN
WESTERN
EUROPE
In recent years, a number of American
and European students of migration have
expressed viewpoints on employer sanc-
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tions enforcement, but largely in passing.
James F. Hollifield (1992) is skeptical of
the capacity of Western governments to
regulate international migration in general,
principally due to the extension of rights
to migrants and to the complexity and
extensiveness of economic interdepen-
dence. He is dismissive of employer sanc-
tions.  In an important chapter on illegal
migration in Western Europe, Catherine
Wihtol de Wenden (1990) found them to
be weakly enforced.  George Tapinos, Jean-
Pierre Garson and Yann Moulier-Boutang
similarly have scoffed at the seriousness
of employer sanctions enforcement in
France.
One of the most detailed and widely avail-
able examinations of French efforts to curb
illegal alien employment and residency is
made by Patrick Weil (1991:223-27).  He
holds that “. . . the application of repres-
sive laws has revealed itself to be particu-
larly difficult.“ He regards enforcement
of the panoply of French laws designed
to curb illegal migration a “failure.” At
one point, echoing a charge made by the
French specialist on foreign seasonal agri-
cultural workers Jean-Pierre Berlan, Weil
suggests that there is an understanding
between enforcement agents, various min-
istries, and employers not to apply em-
ployer sanctions.  Such charges also have
been levelled, off the record, by some
usually highly knowledgeable officials of
international organizations and even by
some French government officials.  How-
ever, the charge also is denied heatedly
by many others.
Other experts on immigration to France
have been more upbeat in their assess-
ments.  Jacqueline Costa-Lascoux  (1990)
has taken exception to the viewpoint that
such laws are merely symbolic by point-
ing out that laws are supposed to have an
educational, symbolic function and that it
is a rare law that overnight eradicates the
ill that motivated its promulgation.
Claude-Valentin Marie, who has been fol-
lowing enforcement of laws against ille-
gal employment, including illegal alien
employment, for the French government
also has been more generous in his as-
sessment (Marie 1993b, 1994).  He points
to significant progress in enforcement
since 1987 and especially since 1990.  In
this respect, he echoes earlier optimistic
assessments made by experts at the
interministerial mission charged with
monitoring and facilitating application of
laws against illegal employment.
[These viewpoints were reflected in ear-
lier reports and congressional testimony
by the author on the subject of employer
sanctions enforcement in Western Europe,
which is summarized and updated below.]
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IMPLEMENTATION AND
MAJOR REVISIONS
IN FRANCE
By 1976, the Interministry Liaison Mis-
sion to Combat Manpower Traffick-ing
was formally created, and a law passed
in July of that year reinforced penalties
against individuals who aided illegal mi-
gration and created an administrative
penalty for employers of aliens not en-
titled to work.  Employers who hired
aliens illegally were required to pay the
National Immigration Office a sum
equivalent to 500 times the minimum
hourly wage for each worker illegally
employed.  In 1980, the fine was approxi-
mately $1,000 per worker.  In principle,
imposition of the fine was automatic and
offending employers also could be impris-
oned for one to two months—or longer in
the case of recurrent offenders.
A major difference between French and
German administration enforcement of
employer sanctions was the German in-
clusion of enforcement of employer sanc-
tions against illegal employment of aliens
within the German Ministry for Labor and
Social Affairs broad mandate to combat
the underground economy in general.  The
French Interministry Liaison Committee
to Combat Manpower Trafficking mandate
was far narrower and limited to suppres-
sion of illegal alien entry, residency, and
employment.  This administrative contrast
ended in 1989 when the French
Interministry Liaison Committee to Com-
bat Manpower Traf-ficking was renamed
the Interministry Liaison Ministry to Com-
bat Illegal Work, Undeclared Employment
and Manpower Trafficking (Arrete
Interministeriel 1989).  The scope of its
responsibilities was extended, as in the
German case, to the entire underground
economy.  This expanded mandate long
had been advocated by officials of the
former Interministry Liaison Mission to
Combat Manpower Trafficking.
One of the major functions of the
Interministry Liaison Mission was to keep
track of enforcement of the panoply of
laws aimed against illegal immigration
and employment.  Employer sanctions are
only part of an impressive legal arsenal
that has built up.  Graph A [p. 40] pre-
sents an overview of overall legal enforce-
ment between 1976 and 1984 as measured
by communicated legal complaints (procès-
verbaux) made by various enforcement
agencies (the top line representing the
combined total).  The graph reveals a 1976
upsurge in enforcement followed by a
decline, precipitous in 1977, 1978, and
1981, prior to a resurgence in 1982 and
1983.  The graph traces the number of
legal complaints communicated by each
of the four agencies involved with enforce-
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ment of French laws against illegal immi-
gration and employment.
Graph B [p. 41] portrays the number of
infractions by employers against section
L 341-6 of the Work Code that specifically
penalizes employers for hiring irregular-
status aliens.  Strictly speaking, the level
of enforcement of employer sanctions
corresponded to the up and downs in
overall enforcement of laws aimed against
illegal immigration and employment and
centrally affected those variations.
The annual report on the year 1979 by the
Interministry Liaison Mission summarized
the first four years of enforcement of the
1976 law reinforcing employer sanctions
(Mission de Liaison 1980:2):
After four years of functioning, it
is necessary to recognize that the
objective was not totally attained
and that irregular-status alien
employment remains an
important problem both with
regard to the employment
situation and on the social and
human level of those workers
themselves.  On the other hand, it
is difficult to evaluate the number
of clandestine foreign workers
thus to know whether it is more
important in 1980 than it was in
1976.
Implementation of employer sanctions
over the period was complicated by a
number of factors.  Among those was the
continuation of legalization despite the
intent announced during the Fontanet-
Marcellin Gorse decrees period of the early
1970s to terminate the practice.  A num-
ber of “exceptional” collective legalizations
occurred during this period, particularly
in the spring of 1980 when some 4,000
Parisian garment industry workers, pri-
marily Turks, were granted legal status.
The legalizations diverted manpower re-
sources, as a good number of labor in-
spectors—always in short supply—were
involved with the legalization efforts.
There was also a notable surge in depor-
tations during this period.  A 1975 law
made illegal alien employment a deport-
able offense for aliens.  A 1980 law appre-
ciably increased the government’s depor-
tation powers.  By 1980, depor-tation
seems to have become a major sanction to
illegal employment.  According to Garson
and Moulier-Boutang (Unpublished:21-23),
“With the law of January 10, 1980, depor-
tation had become simultaneously a pri-
ority means of combatting clandestine
immigration, but also a means to render-
ing precarious (the legality) of alien so-
journs in France.”
The French law of October 17, 1981, made
employment of irregular-status aliens a
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criminal offense subject to fines of 2,000
to 20,000 francs and imprisonment from
two months to a year.  For repeat offend-
ers, the prison term could reach two years
and the fine 40,000 francs.  The fine could
be imposed as many times as there were
individual aliens involved.  However, a
legalization program was simultaneously
announced and employer sanctions were
not to be enforced until after the termina-
tion of the legalization period.  Contrary
to expectations, the legalization period
was prolonged as additional categories of
aliens, such as seasonal workers, were
permitted to apply for legalization.  Hence,
the marked drop in enforcement of em-
ployer sanctions in 1981, as indicated in
Graph B, was linked directly to French
legalization policy.
Enforcement of employer sanctions did
not begin again until well into 1982.  On
August 31, 1983, the French government
adopted a series of measures proposed
by the Interministry Liaison Mission that
simultaneously aimed at reinforcing the
effort to curb illegal alien residency and
employment while promoting the “inser-
tion” of legally resident alien communi-
ties in France.  This linkage was made
explicit in the 1983 annual report of the
Interministry Liaison Mission (Mission de
Liaison 1984:21):
Stopping clandestine immigra-
tion, combatting employers of
irregular-status aliens and
controlling migratory fluxes
effectively constitute a priority
objective (for the French
government).  Failure in this case
would put in doubt the insertion
of legally resident alien
communities in France.
The August 31, 1983 measures increased
the administrative fine for employers of
irregular-status aliens from 500 to 2,000
times the minimum hourly wage for each
alien illegally employed.  As of January 1,
1985, the administrative fine was 26,340
francs, roughly $3,000.  The Interministry
Liaison Mission staff was increased, al-
lowing the Mission to open up a regional
office in Marseille.  An increase to fifty-
five in the number of specialized labor
inspectors was authorized.  In September,
the Minister of Justice addressed a memo-
randum to all public prosecutors which
reiterated the government’s viewpoint
regarding the grave consequences of ille-
gal alien employment and called upon
prosecutors to step up enforcement of laws
prohibiting illegal alien employment.
Prosecutors also were asked to “rigorously
apply” the text of the laws concerning
penalties.
In June of 1984, the first of twenty-three
priority departmental coordinating com-
mittees, authorized by a govern-mental
memorandum (circulaire) of November 21,
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1983, came into being.  The objective of
the coordinating committees was to facili-
tate the exchange of information to detect
and more effectively impose sanctions for
violations stemming from illegal alien
employment.  The Paris-area coordinat-
ing committee included representatives
from the police, fiscal authorities, the
Department of Labor and Employment,
the Department of Sanitary and Social
Affairs, the National Employment Agency,
the National Immigration Office, the en-
forcement arm for social security and fam-
ily allowance taxes [URSSAF], and the
departmental authority for state finances
and economic affairs.  Representatives
from other public organizations and the
prosecutor’s office also were invited.  The
Paris-area coordinating committee has
served since as the model for coordinat-
ing committees established in other prior-
ity areas.
The termination of legalization, com-bined
with the measures taken in 1983 and 1984,
resulted in an increase, as measured by
legal complaints com-municated to the
Interministry Liaison Committee, in en-
forcement of laws against illegal immigra-
tion and employment.  The total of 2,245
procès-verbaux communicated to the Mis-
sion in 1983 was the highest ever.  The
number of procès-verbaux for infraction of
article L 341-6, which prohibits employ-
ment of irregular-status aliens, rose from
549 in 1982 to 947 in 1983.  The increase
in legal complaints was matched by in-
creased court action, enforcement of the
administrative fine, and penalties against
employers of irregular-status aliens.
About 1,300 court decisions ordering
employers to pay fines of at least 2,000
francs were made during 1983.  In Paris,
the first six months of 1984 witnessed a
50 percent increase, relative to the 1983
period, in the number of persons found
guilty of employing illegal aliens.  The
Director of the Interministry Liaison Mis-
sion summed up the judiciary’s handling
of employer sanctions over the first six
months of 1984 (Le Quotidien de Paris 1985):
The sampling of judgements
rendered during the first half of
1984 by various courts appears to
us as very indicative of the current
tendency toward harden-ing of
legal counteraction vis-a-vis
employers of irregular-status
aliens.  The great majority of fines
are to be found from now on
above the minimum provided by
the law, which denotes a clear cut
understanding by the courts of
matters connected to man-power
trafficking.
There was clearly an official perception
that enforcement of employer sanctions
was beginning to bear fruit by 1985.  The
1981-1983 period was seen as a stage in
which the policy instruments decided
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upon in 1981 were “broken in” and in
which the policy outlined in 1981 on pa-
per took concrete form.  In March of 1985,
Georgina Dufoix, Minister of Social Af-
fairs and National Solidarity and the
spokesperson for the French government,
declared that the results of enforcement
of laws against illegal immigration and
employment had a “. . . very encouraging
balance sheet” (Agence France Press 1985).
The Interministry Liaison Mission report
on the 1986-1987 enforcement period in-
cluded a revised summary of enforce-ment
as measured by legal complaints.  This
statistical series, presented in Tables 2 and
3 [pp. 34, 35], excludes citations for illegal
housing of aliens.  Tables 2 and 3 reveal
a dip in infractions communicated, par-
ticularly for employment of aliens with-
out permits and illegal (underground)
labor in 1985 and 1986.  French officials
and labor inspectors interviewed in 1987
and 1988 spoke of a “demobilization” over
this period linked to the uncertainty cre-
ated by a decision not to prosecute a large
case because of the ambiguity of the law
under which the citations had been made
(the provision of the Labor Code prohib-
iting illegal or underground labor, travail
clandestine) and to the changes in French
government.
In an October 1987 address of unusual
candor, the new director of the
Interministry Liaison Mission maintained
(Hue 1987:4) that the level of legal com-
plaints “. . . is of little impact and
unrevealing of a mass of legal conten-tions
which is a priori surprising since illegal
employment is a widespread mass phe-
nomenon.”  She particularly criticized the
disjuncture between statistics on condem-
nations of aliens for illegal entry and/or
residency and the number of infractions
for manpower trafficking.
Condemnations for
Illegal Entry & Residency Infractions
1984 15,120 4,131
1985 10,404 3,608
1986 16,506 3,655
Director Hue also was critical of the geo-
graphical imbalance in enforcement, not-
ing that more than 84 percent of the legal
complaints originated in three regions.
Moreover, two-thirds of the legal com-
plaints for illegal alien employ-ment were
dismissed by provincial courts as opposed
to less than 10 percent in the Paris region.
Parisian area courts assessed fines of more
than 10,000 francs on 53 percent of the
individuals punished and condemned 56
percent of them to a prison term as op-
posed to only two out of every seven such
individuals in the provinces (Hue 1987:4).
The speech concluded with questions on
the efficacy of the effort being made to
curb illegal employment, of which illegal
alien employment was a significant com-
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ponent: Were the means utilized appro-
priate and sufficient?  Was an essentially
social and repressive approach to the prob-
lem a wise choice?  Was the oft-affirmed
political will to curb illegal employment
truly there?  Did enforcement services
possess sufficient understanding and
know-how to implement policy?  Overall,
Hue’s (1987) assessment was that the ac-
tion under-taken to that date was unsat-
isfactory as legal complaints were insuffi-
cient and negatively perceived by enforce-
ment services.  The results were not
propor-tional to the effort being made.
The demobilization of the 1986-1987 pe-
riod seems to have marked a nadir.  In
1987, a revised legal text was adopted
redefining illegal employment and the
period of cohabitation in French govern-
ment ended.  This led to a
“remobilization” reflected in an upsurge
in citations communicated in 1987, par-
ticularly for employment of aliens with-
out permits.  A dramatic increase in en-
forcement, as measured by legal com-
plaints for illegal employment of aliens,
continued in 1988 and 1989 (Hue 1990a).
Employers convicted under the panoply
of laws aimed at curbing illegal alien
employment and residency in France ex-
pressly were excluded from the pardons
traditionally extended at the onset of a
new presidential term.  This exclusion was
intended by the government to underscore
the gravity of the social harm caused by
illegal employment of aliens and the seri-
ousness of the government’s intent to
combat illegal alien employment and resi-
dency.  Illegal employment of aliens in
France had always been viewed as a di-
mension of a broader problem of illegal
employ-ment practices.  However, by the
late 1980s, what had begun as a campaign
against illegal alien employment had been
largely subsumed under a cam-paign
against illegal employment in general.  The
focus was less on alienage and immigra-
tion policy and more on violation of labor
laws.  This shift was reflected in the re-
porting on enforcement of laws as statis-
tics were changed and refined.  The data
reported here discretely in various tables
and graphs cannot be collapsed into one
series.
The most recent French governmental sta-
tistics are concerned with enforcement of
laws against illegal employment practices
in general.  Punishment of illegal alien
employment is one dimen-sion of the
broader enforcement effort.
Table 4 [p.35] reveals that the building
sector experiences the highest level of
delinquency whatever the specific viola-
tion.  When overall employment in this
sector expands, violations of labor laws
expand as well in a proportional manner.
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Hence, Table 5 [p.36] is unsurprising.
Roughly one-third of all legal complaints
and infractions cited concern the building
sector alone.  Indeed, violations of pro-
scriptions against illegal employment are
very concentrated in a few industries.  The
building industry, agriculture, commerce,
hotels, cafes, and restaurants account for
seven out of ten cases overall.
Table 6 [p.36] suggests that the intense
legislative and regulatory activity
chronicled in the Appendix was paralleled
by non-negligible net results in quantita-
tive terms in enforcement.  However, in-
terpretation of the statistics must be
guarded.  For instance, is the increase in
legal complaints against illegal employ-
ment of aliens from 1989 to 1990 an indi-
cation of improved enforcement or a re-
flection of growing illegal alien employ-
ment?  Is the decrease registered from 1990
to 1991 a hopeful, or adverse, indication?
One can only report that the best-informed
officials felt that progress was being made.
There was deterrence.  There would be
greater deterrence with greater resources.
The principal novelty of the most recent
French reporting on enforcement of laws
against illegal employment was a finding
that three-quarters of all employers sanc-
tioned were French citizens (69 percent of
the total) or citizens of the European
Union.  This fact was widely publicized
to correct the commonplace equation of
clandestine or illegal employ-ment with
immigration.  Illegal alien employment,
the reporting emphasized, was but one
dimension of a much broader socioeco-
nomic problem.
Table 7 [p.37] is based on a Ministry of
Justice analysis of legal proceedings for
violation of laws against illegal employ-
ment in 1988 and 1989.  Over those two
years, more than 6,131 persons were con-
victed for a total of 7,244 punished infrac-
tions.  Convictions for illegal alien em-
ployment constituted only one-quarter of
total convictions.  While three-quarters of
the convictions involved French and Eu-
ropean Union citizens, non-European
Union aliens constituted 21.5 percent of
all those convicted—a much higher pro-
portion than the 6.6 percent share of aliens
in the total population of France.  North
African-origin employers predominate
among aliens convicted for illegal employ-
ment practices that disproportionately
involve illegal alien employment.  Three-
quarters of convic-tions for illegal work
involved French citizens, who may or may
not be of immigrant origin, while 15 per-
cent of such convictions involved aliens.
However, only 52 percent of convictions
for illegal alien employment involved
French citizens, while 37 percent involved
non-European Union aliens (Marie
undated.a).
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Overall, one-quarter of the convictions for
illegal work resulted in incarcerations.  The
study concluded that the severity of pun-
ishment for illegal work was greater than
for other comparable offenses.  Moreover,
illegal alien employment was more se-
verely punished than other illegal work
transgressions.  This can be seen best by
comparing average fines for illegal work
and for illegal alien employment in Table
8 [p.38], which similarly is derived from
the Ministry of Justice analysis.  Accord-
ing to Claude-Valentin Marie
(undated.a:28):
Three major traits characterize the
punishment of unauthorized alien
employment as compared to that
meted out for clandestine work:
it is more severe; it is the object of
more extreme views by judges;
and fines for it are heavier.
Incarcerations are slightly more
prevalent in cases of unauthorized
alien employ-ment and sentences
rarely are partially suspended as
judges opt for either incarceration
or total suspension of sentence.
The level of fines levied for
unautho-rized alien employment
is superior to that levied in cases
of recourse to clandestine
workers.  Regardless of the type
of infraction, aliens from non-
European Union countries are
punished more severely than are
French citizens.
The most recent French reporting on en-
forcement of laws against illegal work
suggests, thus, that progress is being made
in making the court system more respon-
sive to violations of laws prohibiting ille-
gal alien employment.  Enforcement of
employer sanctions in France has a deter-
rent effect but, in many respects, is insuf-
ficient.  Nonetheless, considerable progress
has been made over the last two decades.
Now, the French government has a cred-
ible, if limited, capacity to prevent illegal
alien employment; one-quarter century
ago, it had none.  Indeed, back then, ille-
gal alien employment was tolerated and
accepted.  It is much less so today, al-
though the present global migratory situ-
ation contributing to illegal alien employ-
ment in France is more alarming than
several decades ago.  Moreover, deregu-
lation, liberalization, and other changes
in the French economy since 1968 have
made prevention of illegal alien employ-
ment more difficult.
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PROBLEMS AND
ISSUES IN
ENFORCEMENT
Evolution of the
Administrative Fine
(Special Contribution)
for Illegal
Employment of Aliens
in France 1977-1992
Since 1977, the Office of International
Migrations [OMI], formerly the National
Immigration Office, which holds a legal
monopoly over recruitment and admis-
sion of foreign workers in France, has been
empowered to recover an administrative
fine, called the Special Contribution, from
employers who illegally hire aliens.  The
legal rationale is to heighten punishment
of an offending employer because he or
she violated the OMI monopoly.  Hence,
the administrative fine is separate from
judicial punishment for illegal employ-
ment of an alien.  It is also, in principle,
separate from complementary fines for
nonpayment of social security taxes, etc.
The Special Contribution is an automatic
fine, subject to admini-strative appeal, that
punishes an employer irrespective of the
outcome of legal proceedings.
Administratively, a special contribution
should result from every infraction for
illegal alien employment.  However, OMI
must be notified by the director of a de-
partmental labor and employment office
of an infraction in order for OMI to levy
the Special Contribution.  Most citations
for illegal alien employment are made by
labor inspectors, but police, gendarmes,
agricultural inspectors, and other corps
also can write up violations.  The enforce-
ment powers of the various services vary.
Labor inspectors, for instance, can inspect
any site without prior notification; they
cannot verify identities; they call upon the
judicial police to do that.  The judicial
police must have a justifiable motive for
entering a business; they cannot conduct
random verifications of identities.  En-
forcement, thus, usually involves inter-
agency cooperation.  When a labor inspec-
tor writes up a citation for illegal employ-
ment of an alien, it has the force of law
unless overturned or forgiven during ap-
peal.
According to Bernard Vachette (1990) of
OMI and to other sources interviewed
over the years, many citations for infrac-
tions of the law barring illegal employ-
ment of aliens, which arrive in the form
of dossiers at OMI, were not transmitted
by departmental directors in the late 1970s
and early 1980s.  Progress in transmission
of dossiers was reported in the 1983-1984
period.
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By 1990, a debate had developed over the
Special Contribution.  Many enforce-ment
personnel and administrators felt the
32,000 franc fine was too high and was
disproportionate relative to punishment
for other comparable offenses.  Several
labor inspectors reported that they hesi-
tated to write up illegal alien employment
infractions because of the severity of the
admini-strative fine that increasingly was
accompanied by other punishments.
Writing up an infraction could put small
and marginal firms out of business.  Some-
times only one violation would be writ-
ten up when additional aliens were ille-
gally employed and/or additional cita-
tions could be made.  French labor in-
spectors are entitled to use their discre-
tion in the public interest.  Several inspec-
tors cited aggravation of unemployment,
already a major preoccupation in France
by 1990, as a reason for not writing up
infractions.
This debate contributed to the falloff in
Special Contribution notifications in 1990
seen in Table 9 [p.39].  The decree of
November 8, 1990 modified the Special
Contri-bution.  Three levels of Special
Contri-butions, tailored or modulated to
the nature of the illegal alien employment
offense, were instituted.  The normal fine
henceforth would be 1,000 times the mini-
mum hourly wage (16,870 francs as of July
1, 1992).  An augmented fine would be
due from employers who already had
been subject to the Special Contribution
in the five years prior to the infraction.
The augmented fine was 2,000 times the
minimum hourly wage (or 33,740 francs
as of July 1, 1992).  A reduced fine was
inaugurated for illegal employment of an
alien that was not accompanied by other
infractions.  Such a reduction was at the
discretion of OMI consequent to a recom-
mendation from a department-level direc-
tor of labor and employment.  This same
decree instituted a 10 percent surcharge
on the Special Contribution if it were not
paid within two months of notification of
the employer.  An interagency directive
made application of the November 8, 1990
decree retroactive to cover all dossiers in
which there had not been notification of
the fine or that were under appeal.  This
procedure lasted until the end of 1992.
During this period, a new computer-as-
sisted procedure for administration of the
Special Contri-bution was put into place
and became operational as of December,
1991.
Citations for illegal alien employment in-
creased in 1991, but they dipped again in
1992.  The primary reason for the decrease
was the change in legal status of Portu-
guese and Spanish nationals in that year.
They became European Com-munity
workers.
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In 1992, 2,498 Special Contributions were
assessed—the highest level ever.  Between
1977 and 1992, a total of 25,942 infrac-
tions for illegal employment of aliens had
been transmitted to OMI.  The annual
average of Special Contribution fines lev-
ied between 1977 and 1989 was 1,370.
Hence, French officials inter-viewed in
1993 and 1994 spoke of significant
progress in enforcement of employer sanc-
tions.
The severity of the Special Contribution
fine, in addition to judicial punishments
for illegal alien employment and punish-
ments for related offenses like nonpay-
ment of social security taxes, figured in
the sharp drop in recovery of Special
Contribution fines between 1985 and 1989.
OMI received only 11.41 percent of the
Special Contributions levied in 1985, 7.79
percent in 1986, 4.28 percent in 1987, and
3.24 percent in 1989.  Data for 1990 and
1991 were not comparable.  However, by
1992, the recovery rate had increased to
18.64 percent.
OMI reported that “the reform made in
1990 and the amelioration of manage-ment
procedures regarding recovery and issues
surrounding it have therefore allowed a
clear redressing of the situation and even
contributed to heightened efficacy of this
administrative sanction” (L’Office des
Migrations Internationales 1992:77-78).
Nevertheless, numerous obstacles to re-
covery remain.  A dispro-portionally high
number of illegal alien employment cases
involve employers who themselves are
aliens.  They frequently repatriate and do
not pay the fine.  Other employers de-
clare insolvency or are imprisoned and
cannot pay.
Other Legal Barriers
As already noted,the French government
responded incrementally, and ultimately
constructively, to the reluctance of public
prosecutors to pursue charges against
employers by revising legal texts.  In one
noteworthy case that adversely affected
overall enforcement of sanctions in France
in 1986, a public prosecutor found the
provisions in the Labor Code prohibiting
illegal employment (under which charges
had been brought against an employer
employing some 350 aliens) ambiguous.
Therefore, all 350 charges were dropped
with a resultant demor-alizing effect upon
those charged with enforcement.  The
dismissal led to redrafting of the legal
provision in question and subsequent
adoption of the redraft as law.  The result
was the remo-bilization suggested by the
upsurge in citations made by labor inspec-
tors beginning in 1987.
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Whatever the shortcomings in the respon-
siveness of French courts to employer
sanctions, it must be recalled that a great
deal of enforcement is not recorded in
statistics kept on court cases.  Adminis-
trative and other sanctions, such as fines
collected for nonpayment of mandatory
health insurance premiums, are not re-
corded.  And many enforcement activi-
ties have a deterrent effect even if they do
not result in the writing up of complaints
and successful prosecution of employers
in the courts.
Laws that prohibit illegal employment of
aliens seem to be adhered to by many, if
not most, employers, a non-negligible
deterrent to greater illegal migration.  A
minority of employers either ignore or
consciously violate the prohibition.  And
there is reason to believe that this minor-
ity is growing despite enforcement efforts.
Prosecution of violations of social legisla-
tion is always difficult.  Agricultural law
inspectors, in particular, tell of presum-
ably illegally employed workers running
into the fields as they approach.  Labor
and agricultural inspectors need the co-
operation of the police to apprehend the
employees in such situations.  Prosecu-
tion of employers under criminal law, of
course, must comply to standard rules of
evidence and procedure.  Complaints
generally are not written up unless, in the
opinion of an inspector or other enforce-
ment agent, all the elements of a success-
ful case are there.  A number of enforce-
ment agents pointed out that investiga-
tions and visits that did not result in the
writing up of complaints and prosecution
undoubtedly had a deterrent effect upon
employers.
Insufficient Enforcement
Personnel and Resources?
An upsurge in criminality over the last
several decades has fed anti-immigrant
sentiment and profoundly affected poli-
tics in a number of Western European
states.  Court systems and law enforce-
ment agents have been sorely tried by the
resultant mass of litigation.  Enforcement
agents have far broader responsibilities
above and beyond enforcement of laws
prohibiting illegal employment of aliens.
For many labor inspectors and police of-
ficers, enforcement of employer sanctions
is a low priority.  Labor inspectors, in
particular, often do not write up com-
plaints for infractions that they detect
because there are other enforcement pri-
orities in their eyes.  This is why the
Interministry Liaison Mission in France
devotes most of its effort, in addition to
studying illegal migration and illegal alien
employment, to informing enforce-ment
agents about the various laws penalizing
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illegal alien employment and the priority
attached to their enforcement by the gov-
ernment.  Members of the Marseille
branch office of the Inter-ministry Liaison
Mission have noted an upsurge in cita-
tions, particularly by the Gendarmerie or
national rural police, in the wake of their
visits.
Labor inspection historically has been
based on inspections of factories.  Most
illegal alien employment is not to be found
in large factories, which often have a sub-
stantial union presence.  Illegal alien em-
ployment is concentrated in small busi-
nesses, in an environment that is different
from the classic focus of labor inspector
training and service.  This disjuncture
between the focus of labor inspection and
the focus of illegal alien employment ad-
versely affects enforce-ment of laws pro-
hibiting illegal alien employment.  By
training, labor inspectors look for unsafe
working conditions more than for illegal
alien employment.  Enforcement of laws
prohibiting illegal alien employment is
largely incidental to routine enforcement
of social legislation by enforcement agents.
Enforcement agents must have a reason
to suspect illegal alien employ-ment, for
example, a letter of denun-ciation or a
telephone tip, before launching a
nonroutine investigation.
Inadequacy of enforcement personnel and
resources is the factor most cited by au-
thorities in charge of enforcement of em-
ployer sanctions in Western Europe in
discussing problems of enforcement.  In
the key agricultural department of the
Vaucluse in May 1990, for example, there
were five enforcement personnel with a
budget of some 38,000 francs.  The agri-
cultural inspector explained that budget-
ary constraints greatly limited the num-
ber of inspections that could be made.
While enforcement of employer sanctions
was thought to have a deterrent effect, it
was clear that budgetary and personnel
limitations restricted enforce-ment.  The
Vaucluse example is illus-trative of a limi-
tation in employer sanctions enforcement
across western Europe.
Is there a disjuncture or a gap between
laws and governmental policies that call
for steadily harsher punishment of illegal
alien employment and the reality of lim-
ited personnel and other resources allo-
cated to employer sanctions enforcement?
To western European critics of the level
of employer sanctions enforcement, the
answer is clearly, ”Yes.“  But this view-
point tends to ignore a perceptible, if in-
cremental, increase in personnel and other
enforcement resources allocated to en-
forcement of employer sanctions over the
past fifteen years.  Director Hue of the
Interministry Liaison Mission explained
that the mission regularly requested
greater resources.  Usually most of their
requests were denied, as the government
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had other priorities, but always there was
an incremental increase in the capacity of
the French government to punish illegal
employment of aliens.  For example, it
was difficult for the Mission to obtain
additional labor inspectors specialized in
enforcement of laws pertaining to aliens
in a political atmosphere dominated by
calls to reduce the presence of state regu-
lation in French business activity.  Enforce-
ment of laws prohibiting illegal alien
employment clearly is a function of the
personnel and other resources allocated
to it.  It seemed obvious that the level of
enforcement could be increased if there
were the political will to expand the com-
mitment of enforce-ment personnel and
other resources.
Still, the commitment of enforcement per-
sonnel in France by 1994 was consider-
able. According to information supplied
by C-V. Marie in March of 1995, the French
corps of labor inspectors includes 2,910
agents authorized to make inspections; 32
agents specialize in illegal employment
enforcement. All together, the labor inspec-
torate made 284,921 site inspections in
1992 and witnessed 921,856 violations.   Of
the 23,345 of these that were written up,
2,270 concerned illegal employment.
Within the Ministry of the Interior, a new
agency, known by the acronym DICILEC,
was created in late 1994, mainly out of
the Air and Frontier Police.  It is a spe-
cialized agency for control of immigra-
tion and illegal employment, although its
mission was not entirely clear as late as
November of 1994.  It has 950 operational
agents, of whom about 100 have adminis-
trative jobs.  Additionally, Officers of the
Judicial Police play an important role.
Overall, there are about 4,000 police po-
tentially competent to enforce laws against
illegal employment.
The number of fiscal agents available to
write up citations for infractions related
to illegal employment, nonpayment of
employment taxes for example, is esti-
mated at 1,100.  Agents from the
Gendarmerie, customs, maritime affairs,
and social security also participate in en-
forcement, but estimates of their numbers
in enforcement of laws against illegal
employment are unavailable.
Problems of
Proportionality,
Employer Adaptation,
and Coordination
An additional problem of enforcement is
linked to the proportionality concern.
Some enforcement agents are reluctant to
write up complaints against employers
because they feel that the illegal workers
are more severely punished than their
employers.
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Historically, employer sanctions were ad-
vocated by trade unions and progressive
political parties because they made em-
ployers responsible for illegal employment
that previously was punished by depor-
tation and other penalties levied against
the illegally employed alien alone.  Par-
ticularly in the Paris area, a number of
labor inspectors interviewed in the 1985-
1987 period indicated that often they did
not write up complaints for fear of put-
ting marginal firms out of business.  Or,
they might locate four illegal alien em-
ployees but only charge the employer with
hiring one.  French labor inspectors enjoy
a great deal of discretion.  They need not
write up citations if it is not in the public
interest, which they are free to interpret.
In the South of France, particularly in the
department of the Var, a movement de-
veloped in the ranks of labor inspectors
against enforcement of employer sanc-
tions.  A group calling itself the antiracist
collective distributed tracts and essentially
argued that enforcement punished alien
workers with deportation while their
employers escaped punishment.  This
movement appeared localized.  One of the
com-plaints frequently heard in the Midi
is that deportation of illegal alien workers
prevents them from collecting the pay and
employment-related benefits due to them
under French law.  This, coupled with the
perception that employers will not be
punished, appeared to prompt the pro-
test.  The proportionality concern, there-
fore, paradoxically appeared to affect en-
forcement in two ways: too heavy a fine
against employers was seen by some
French labor inspectors as a reason not to
write up complaints; other inspectors
claimed just the opposite as a reason for
not writing up complaints.
A further problem affecting punishment
of offending employers arises from their
ability to adapt to enforcement strategies.
Some employers have thwarted enforce-
ment by going, as it were, deeper under-
ground.  This has been the case, for ex-
ample, in the Paris area garment indus-
try; some employers of aliens ineligible to
work have relocated out of the garment
industry center to more difficult to detect
underground factories in the suburbs.
Another employer strategy has been to
utilize subcontractors who hire illegal
aliens.  French authorities have revised
their laws punishing illegal employment
of aliens to facilitate punishment of the
subcontractors and of firms that know-
ingly dissimulate illegal alien employment
through subcontracting.  The problem of
subcontractors employ-ing aliens ineligible
to work is particularly significant in the
construc-tion industry.  A number of re-
cent studies of the construction industry
in France have found widespread employ-
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ment of illegal aliens through the subcon-
tracting mechanism.  The phenomenal
growth of subcontracting in construction
and service industries like cleaning and
maintenance mitigates against successful
enforcement of laws prohibiting illegal
employment of aliens.
As underscored in the 1986-1987 report
of the Interministry Liaison Mission to
Combat Manpower Trafficking, the trend
towards deregulation and greater flexibil-
ity in labor markets, as exem-plified by
the growth of temporary worker agencies
and eased regulations concerning employ-
ment of nonper-manent workers, tends to
undercut governmental policies aimed at
curbing illegal alien entry and employ-
ment.  Employer sanctions are only one
component of broader public policies af-
fecting illegal migration.  Labor market
trends and developments in the 1980s
generally mitigated against successful
enforcement of laws prohibiting illegal
alien employment.
IMPLICATIONS FOR
ENFORCEMENT OF
IRCA AND OTHER
U.S. LABOR LAWS
The as-yet-unpublished French enforce-
ment statistics for 1992 include 5,133 cases
of illegal employment transmitted to pros-
ecutors, with a total of 11,232 infractions;
1,457 or 13 percent of these cases involved
illegal employment of aliens.  In all, 8,130
persons were indicted, including 5,700
business managers.  In 1991, 4,742 per-
sons were convicted for illegal work; 27
percent of the convictions involved illegal
alien employment; 25 percent of those
convicted in 1991 were aliens from non-
European Union countries.  In 1993, 100
or so investigations by fiscal agents were
conducted on the basis of cases written
up in 1992.  These investigations recov-
ered 223,942,000 francs (roughly $45 mil-
lion).
French officials also were upbeat about
the implementation of the December
31,1992 law obligating employers to de-
clare their intention to hire an employee
prior to the onset of employment.  By
January 1995, more than 176,000 firms had
made 1.2 million prior declarations to
social security authorities before actual
employment began.  From September 1993
to December 1994, there were more than
18 million such prior declarations.  These
figures suggest that the experiment begun
in 1992 conclusively had succeeded and
that firms were complying voluntarily.
This should further help prosecution of
offending employers in court.  Already,
between 1988 and 1991, convictions for
illegal employment progressed 90 percent.
Bearing in mind that the appropriateness
of governmental regulation of labor mar-
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kets and the economy is generally viewed
as less problematic in France than in the
United States, there would appear to be
much to learn from the French experience.
Perhaps the most important lesson is that
it takes years, even decades, to refine
employer sanctions and related laws in
order to make them more effective and
credible.  While there have been ups and
downs and setbacks and advances in
French enforcement, the French govern-
ment clearly is doing more to prevent il-
legal immigration and illegal alien employ-
ment than it was one-quarter century ago.
Employer sanctions have not stopped il-
legal immigration to France and are un-
likely to do so in the future.  But presum-
ably they do deter some illegal alien em-
ployment.  They help confine it to certain
industries and types of jobs.  Many labor
market developments in recent years ad-
versely affected enforcement of employer
sanctions, but the French government
continues to adapt its strategy to chang-
ing circumstances.
The United States would do well to adopt
the French and German approach of view-
ing illegal alien employment as but one
aspect of a broader problem of illegal
employment.  This would tend to defuse
the intense political opposition to em-
ployer sanctions enforcement in the United
States that is unique among Western de-
mocracies.  French enforce-ment history
demonstrates that employer sanctions
enforcement is not a threat to civil liber-
ties or something that aggra-vates employ-
ment discrimination against minorities.  To
the contrary, legally resident and citizen
minorities in particular have a great stake
in effective enforcement of laws punish-
ing illegal employment of aliens, as well
as of other related labor laws.
France does not have a mandatory na-
tional identification document.  But most
French citizens, probably more than 95
percent, carry a national identity card.  All
aliens are required to carry appropriate
identification.  While there is concern over
falsification of identify documents and
safeguards have been instituted to pre-
vent abuse of identity documents by au-
thorities and others, the availability of
more reliable identification in France is
critical to French enforcement efforts.
Particularly noteworthy is the growing
ability of labor inspectors and social secu-
rity agents to exchange information and
coordinate their enforce-ment efforts with
the assistance of computer-based research.
The challenge of preventing illegal immi-
gration is long-term.  Viewed from the
perspective of the Western democracies,
there are few hopeful signs on the hori-
zon.  Initiatives like NAFTA will produce
desired results only over the long term.
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Over the short to medium term, there is
no alternative to enforce-ment of laws like
IRCA.  Indeed, it is likely that there will
be mounting pressure from electorates for
govern-ments to take more effective steps
to prevent illegal migration.  As Gary
Freeman (1994) has suggested, a primary
paradox in Western democracies in the
late twentieth century is the lag and dis-
crepancy between the average citizen’s
desire for immigration control and the
reality of high levels of immigration, both
legal and illegal.
Progress in regulation of international
migration will come only incremently and
piecemeal.  Employer sanctions were
never viewed as a panacea for illegal
immigration by French authorities but
rather as a useful, indeed key and indis-
pensable, measure in a broader strategy
to control immigration.
For all the criticism of the Immigration
Reform and Control Act of 1986 [IRCA]
and enforcement of its employer sanctions
provisions, IRCA made it illegal to hire
unauthorized aliens.  That was a major
accomplishment, albeit one achieved at a
high price given the subsequent adminis-
tration of the Special Agricultural Worker
[SAW] program.  Now the imperative is
to make employer sanctions work, to make
them into a credible deterrent.
Ultimately, the battle for immigration con-
trol will be won or lost at the local level,
in particular in industries and places of
employment.  The French model of de-
partment-level commissions bringing to-
gether concerned enforcement services,
elected officials, and repre-sentatives of
employers and employees is one that the
United States could emulate.  One of the
initial effects of such statewide,
countywide, or municipal commissions
might be to put an end to blatant defiance
and disrespect for the law by a number of
municipal county and state authorities.
Such commissions would tend to make
local representatives more politically ac-
countable for their immigration stands and
this would serve American democracy
well.  Elected repre-sentatives would be
less able to undermine and impede immi-
gration control and then turn around and
bill the federal government for failing to
prevent illegal immigration.
More importantly, the creation of such
commissions could be part of a repackag-
ing of the immigration control issue as
part of a broader problem—the growth of
the underground economy and illegal
employment practices in general.  Oppo-
nents of immigration reform in the 1980s
tended to portray enforcement of labor
laws and the then hypothetical employer
sanctions as a zero-sum game.  The real-
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ity, of course, is otherwise.  Enforcement
of employer sanctions complements en-
forcement of labor laws.  Employers who
violate immigration laws—whether in
France or the United States—also are more
prone to violate related labor law.
This reality makes improved interservice
enforcement cooperation and coordi-na-
tion a high priority.  The recent agree-
ment between the U.S. Department of
Labor and The Immigration and Natural-
ization Service to allow labor inspectors
to check I-9 compliance was a step to-
wards the French approach.  Much more
can, and should, be done in this respect
at all levels of government.  The French
began with local and regional experiments,
initially in the Paris area, and then ex-
tended the departmental commission idea
around the country.
The French government also has experi-
mented with industrywide voluntary
agreements.  The idea is to get employers
and employees in industries heavily af-
fected by illegal alien employment to co-
operate voluntarily in levelling the play-
ing field as it were.  Uncooperative firms
and entrepreneurs might be barred from
bidding for public contracts while coop-
erative firms would be favored.  Espe-
cially in light of the Clinton
administration’s request that the newly-
created World Trade Organization concern
itself with labor conditions and standards,
both France and the United States will
need to take steps to ensure compliance
with labor laws in order to make credible
demands of others.
Democratic societies like the United States
and France cannot balk before the com-
plexities and cost of regulation of interna-
tional migration.  A great deal is at stake.
Increasingly, the idiom of international
migration—terms like ”boat people,“ ”asy-
lum-seekers,” ”non-refoulement,“ and
”guestworkers“ once not in our vocabu-
lary—has become the idiom of diplomacy
and international relations.  It no longer
seems absurd to suggest that regulation
of international migration looms as a prin-
cipal foreign and domestic policy chal-
lenge for the twenty-first century.
The time actually is long overdue for
scarce resources to be apportioned in a
fashion commensurate with perceptions of
threats.  In the post-Cold War rethinking
of foreign and national defense policies,
regulation of international migration is
assuming greater saliency.  This bodes well
for France and the United States as inter-
national migration policies for too long
were not regarded as priorities.  Enforce-
ment of laws regulating inter-national
migration is contingent upon political will.
The capacity is there in France and, thanks
to IRCA, increasingly in the United States.
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Doubts persist, however, as to the politi-
cal will to prevent illegal immigration in
both countries.  The task at hand is to
erase those doubts through effective, cred-
ible action.
The progress made in France over the last
two decades stems in no small part from
the charge given to an interagency
taskforce to monitor and report on en-
forcement, to propose reforms to make it
more effective, and to facilitate inter-
agency—including local and regional—
cooperation.  The United States should
emulate the French interagency taskforce
and mandate it to coordinate enforcement
of all laws pertaining to illegal employ-
ment, not just illegal alien employment.
Perhaps the Commission on Immigration
Reform might fulfill this function.  More-
over, the charge to this interagency entity
should include research on the under-
ground economy in general in order bet-
ter to curb illegal alien employment in
particular.
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FINE
YES
1,000 TO 2,000
BEL. FR. PER
WORKER.
MAX OF
150,000 BEL.
FR.
UP TO $5,000
IMPRISON-
MENT
POSSIBLE 8
DAYS
TO 1 MO.
UP TO 2 YRS.
CANCELLA-
TION OF
RECRUITMENT
POSSIBLE
POSSIBLE
POSSIBLE
PAYMENT OF
DEPORTA-
TION
TRANSP.
COSTS
YES
(INCLUDING
FAMILY OF
WORKER)
YES
CLOSURE OF
BUSINESS
YES
PENALTIES
FOR VIOLA-
TION OF
SOCIAL LAWS
(HEALTH,
ACCIDENT,
PENSION,
INS.)
YES
YES
YES
Y
PENALTIES
FOR ILLEGAL
ALIEN
EMPLOYMENT
IN LEASING
 & TEMP.
WORK
Table 1.
Employer Sanctions in
Western Democracies
ES
OTHER
  PROVISION
OF FALSE
INFO. TO
AUTHORITIES
PUNISHABLE
BY FINE &
IMPRISON-
MENT UP TO
6 MOS.
LEGAL
BASIS
ALIENS
POLICE LAW
SOCIAL
INSURANCE
ACT
ILLEGAL
ALIEN
EMPLOYMENT
OFTEN
VIOLATES
COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING
AGREEMENTS-
AWARDS
LAW OF JULY
22, 1976
SECT. 96 OF
IMMIGRANT
ACT
 COUNTRY
AUSTRIA
AUSTRALIA
BELGIUM
CANADA
DENMARK
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COUNTRY
FRANCE
GERMANY
GREECE
LEGAL
BASIS
LABOR CODE
LAW OF
10/17/81
EMPLOYMENT
PROMOTION
ACT,
TEMPORARY
EMPLOY. ACT,
ACT TO
COMBAT
ILLEGAL
EMPLOYMENT
OF 1981
BASIC LAW
1346183
FINE
2,000-20,000
WORKER
COURT FINE
40,000 FR.
FOR REPEAT
16,870 FR.
ADMIN. FINE
PER
WORKER ,
CAN BE
DOUBLED
OR
REDUCED
100,000
MARKS/
WORKER
FINE MAY BE
INCREASED
TO DETER
EMPLOYERS
MIN. 30,000
DRACHMAS
PER
WORKER
IMPRISON-
MENT
2 MOS.-1 YR.,
3 YRS. FOR
REPEAT
FOR
EMPLOYMENT
IN CONDI-
TIONS WORSE
THAN
GERMAN,
3-5 YRS.
(+FINE)
MIN. 3 MOS.
CANCELLA-
TION OF
RECRUITMENT
POSSIBLE
YES
YES
PAYMENT OF
DEPORTA-
TION
TRANSP.
COSTS
CLOSURE OF
BUSINESS
MATERIALS &
GOODS MAY
BE SEIZED.
CONVICTED
ALIEN
EMPLOYERS
MAY BE
BARRED
FROM
RESIDENCY
UP TO 5 YRS.
PENALITIES
FOR VIOLA-
TION OF
SOCIAL LAWS
(HEALTH,
ACCIDENT,
PENSION,
INS.)
YES
YES
PENALTIES
FOR ILLEGAL
ALIEN
EMPLOYMENT
IN LEASING
 & TEMP.
WORK
FINES OF
4,000 TO
20,000 FR.
8,000 TO
40,000 FOR
REPEAT
OFFENDERS
AND/OR
2-6 MOS.
IMPRISON-
MENT FOR
HIRING
ILLEGAL
ALIEN TEMP.
WORKER
OR FOR
LEASING
UP TO 3 YRS.
& 100,000
FINE,
UP TO 5 YRS.
IN SERIOUS
CASES FOR
LEASING
ILLEGAL
ALIENS.
MAX. FINE
MAY BE
INCREASED
OTHER
2 MOS.-1YR.
IMPRISON-
MENT & 2,000-
20,000 FR. FINE
FOR VIOLATION
OF OMI
RECRUITMENT
MONOPOLY,
UP TO 3 YRS.
IN PRISON
40,000 FOR
REPEAT
OFFENSE.
4,000-20,000 FR.
FINE FOR
REIMBURSE-
MENT OF
RECRUITMENT
COSTS,
8,000-40,000 FR.
& UP TO 6 MOS.
FOR REPEAT
Table 1. cont.
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COUNTRY
ITALY
JAPAN
LIECHTEN-
STEIN
LUXEMBURG
NETHERLANDS
NORWAY
SPAIN
SWEDEN
LEGAL
BASIS
LAW 243
OF 1986
AND 39
OF 1990
1989 REVISION
OF
IMMIGRATON
ACT (ART. 73,
SECT. 2)
REGULATION
OF 5/12/72
FOREIGN
WORKERS
EMPLOYMENT
ACT OF 1984
& THE
ECONOMIC
OFFENSES
ACT
SEC. 47 OF
IMMIGRATION
LAW
ALIENS
ACT
FINE
732 TO
3,000 US$
UP TO 19,500
US$
UP TO 10,000
SW. FR.
2,501 TO
50,00 FL.
UP TO
2,000 FL.
PER  ALIEN
UP TO
500 US$
7,000-18,000
US$
UP TO
20,000 SEK
MPRISON-
MENT
3 MOS.-1 YR.
3 YRS. MAX.
UP TO 6 MOS.
8 DAYS
TO 1 MO.
UP TO 6 MOS.
UP TO
2 YRS.
YES
CANCELLA-
TION OF
RECRUITMENT
YES
CLOSURE OF
BUSINESS
YES
YES
PENALTIES
FOR ILLEGAL
ALIEN
EMPLOYMENT
IN LEASING
 & TEMP.
WORK
ILLEGAL
SUBCON-
TRACTING
OF ALIEN
SUBJECT TO
FINE OF 3,000-
15,000 US$
AND UP TO
5 YRS.
OTHER
VIOLATION OF
EMPLOYMENT
OFFICE
MONOPOLY
FINE 100,000
TO 1,000,000
LIRA AND
IMPRISON-
MENT FOR 15
DAYS TO 1 YR.
Table 1. cont.
YES
PAYMENT OF
DEPORTA-
TION
TRANSP.
COSTS
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Table 1. cont.
COUNTRY
SWITZERLAND
UNITED
KINGDOM
LEGAL
BASIS
LAW ON THE
SOJURN &
ESTABLISH-
MENT OF
ALIENS OF
1988
FINE
UP TO 5,000
SW. FR. FOR
INTENTIONAL
VIOLATION, UP
TO 3,000 SW.
FR. FOR
NEGLIGENT
HIRING,
UP TO 10,000
SW. FR. FOR
HOUSING
ILLEGAL
EMPLOYEE
NO
MPRISON-
MENT
UP TO 6 MOS.
FOR HOUSING
ILLEGAL
EMPLOYEE
OR FOR
RECIVIDISM
WITHIN
5 YRS.
NO
CANCELLA-
TION OF
RECRUITMENT
POSSIBLE
PAYMENT OF
DEPORTA-
TION
TRANSP.
COSTS
CLOSURE OF
BUSINESS
PENALITIES
FOR VIOLA-
TION OF
SOCIAL LAWS
(HEALTH,
ACCIDENT,
PENSION,
INS.)
YES
PENALTIES
FOR ILLEGAL
ALIEN
EMPLOYMENT
IN LEASING
 & TEMP.
WORK
YES
OTHER
EMPLOYER
MIGHT BE
PROSECUTED
FOR
HARBORING
ALIENS
  Sources: Council of Europe; OECD; U.S. Department of State Unclassified Cables.
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Table 2.
InfractIons Communicated to
Interministry Liaison Mission to
Combat Manpower Trafficking
AGAINST
REIMBURSE-
MENT OF
VIOLATION
BAN
20
NA
4
24
4
1
5
VIOLATION
OF ONO
RECRUITMENT
MONOPOLY
25
NA
9
94
36
67
103
EMPLOY-
MENT OF
ALIENS
WITHOUT
PERMITS
1,366
513
1,255
1,538
963
1,397
1,716
UNDER-
GROUND
LABOR
NA
NA
135
214
533
141
328
TRAVEL
COST
FRAUD TO
OBTAIN
WORK
PERMIT
19
69
14
274
16
11
37
NON-
MAINTENANCE
OF
EMPLOYER
REGISTER
205
259
207
358
185
232
290*
LACK OF
COLLECTIVE
HOUSING
DECLARA-
TION
31
14
9
128
19
100
9
ABETTING
ILLEGAL
IMMIGRA-
TION
469
253
604
686
700
529
727
TOTAL
2,135
1,108
2,237
2,953
2,456
2,478
3,215
*Incomplete
Source: Mission de Liaison Interministerielle pour la Lutte contre les Trafics de Main-d’oeuvre 1988:21.
DATE
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987 *
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Table 3.
Citations for Infractions Against Panoply of
French Laws Against Illegal Alien Employment and
Residency 1982-1987 by Enforcement Service
POLICE
199
398
447
434
409
432
GENDARMERIE
NATIONAL
POLICE
217
370
321
166
246
231
LABOR
109
395
649
462
499
572
   TRANSPORTATION
1
2
2
1
1
2
TOTAL
586
1,266
1,468
1,115
1,213
1,301
*Incomplete
Source: Mission de Liaison Interministerrelle pour la Lutte contre les Trafics de Main-d’oeuvre 1988:20.
Table 4.
Total Infractions by Sector and by
Principal Offenses, 1989-1991
(Percentage)
AG
62
104
49
52
55
64
TOTAL
11.16
36.2
7.9
9.5
9.1
3.0
UNAUTHORIZED
ALIEN EMPLOYMENT
11.9
42.8
10.8
4.0
10.6
0.7
AGRICULTURE
BUILDING
GARMET
COMMERCE
HOTELS, CAFES,
RESTAURANTS
AUTOMOBILE
CLANDESTINE WORK
10.9
29.1
7.2
15.3
10.1
5.4
ILLICIT LENDING OF
WORKERS ON LABOR
TRAFFICKING
1.4
78.5
5.4
1.7
0.1
__
Source: Marie 1993a.
YEAR
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
      1987*
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SECTOR
AGRICULTURE
BUILDING
COMMERCE
HOTELS, CAFES, RESTAURANTS
AUTOMOBILE
1989
9.0
31.8
11.2
11.2
4.8
1990
9.0
34.5
13.3
11.9
4.4
1991
9.5
31.7
14.4
11.7
4.9
LEGAL COMPAINTS
1989
10.7
31.6
8.6
9.1
3.2
1990
11.5
39.8
10.2
9.2
2.8
1991
12.5
38.5
10.3
9.7
3.0
Source: Marie  1993a.
Table 5.
Evolution of Legal Complaints and Infractions
for Illegal Work by Economic Sector, 1989-1991
(Percentage of Annual Total)
TYPE OF INFRACTION
CLANDESTINE WORK
UNAUTHORIZED ALIEN EMPLOYLMENT
LABOR  TRAFFICKING  AND
ILLICIT LENDING OF WORKERS
OTHER INFRACTIONS
TOTAL
1989
4,426
3,107
292
1,412
9,237
1990
4,983
3,858
763
2,083
11,687
1991
5,283
3,808
768
2,699
12,558
1989-1991
14,692
10,773
1,823
6,194
33,482
Source: Marie  1993a.
Table 6.
Legal Complaints by Type of Infraction, 1989-1991
INFRACTIONS
U.S.  C O M M I S S I O N  O N  I M M I G R A T I O N  R E F O R M
R E S E A R C H
P A P E R
- 33 -
Table 7.
Totality of Single and Multiple Infractions Sanctioned
by Tribunals, by Type of Infraction, 1988-1989
(Absolute Number and Percentage)
Source: Brizard & Marie 1993.
PERCENTAGE
57.0
25.0
6.5
0.7
0.1
89.3
4.0
3.2
3.4
--
10.6
100.0
ILLEGAL WORK
CLANDESTINE WORK
EMPLOYMENT OF ALIENS'
(OF WHICH UNAUTHROIZED ALIEN EMPLOYMENT)
LABOR TRAFFICKING AND ILLICIT WORKER LENDING
ABSENCE OF REQUIRED PROFESSIONAL PAPERS FOR ALIENS
INFRACTION OF EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS
SUBTOTAL
ASSOCIATED INFRACTIONS
ALIENS POLICE RELATED TO IMMIGRATION
OTHER ENDANGERMENT OF SOCIOECONOMIC ORDER
FALSE DOCUMENTS
FRAUD
OTHER INFRACTIONS
SUBTOTAL
TOTAL
NUMBER OF INFRACTIONS
4,131
1,814
471
52
10
6,478
293
230
55
58
130
766
7,244
(1,754)
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Table 8.
Convictions and Punishments for Illegal
Work in France 1988-1989
IMPRISONMENT FINES
Source: Infostate Justice 1992.
NATURE OF CONVICTION
(NATIONALITY OF CONVICTED)
DOING ILLEGAL WORK
TOTAL
(FRENCH)
(EC)
(NON-EC)
(N. AFRICAN)
(TURK)
RECOURSE TO ILLEGAL WORK
TOTAL
(FRENCH)
(EC)
(NON-EC)
(N. AFRICAN)
(TURK)
REGULATIONS CONCERNING
ALIEN EMPLOYEES
TOTAL
(FRENCH)
(EC)
(NON-EC)
(N. AFRICAN)
(TURK)
TOTAL
2,3456
1,769
131
363
199
32
993
819
41
90
58
15
1,329
713
99
462
220
78
CONFIRMED
122
71
8
41
19
20
15
1
3
2
74
20
1
51
20
17
TOTAL
544
369
31
133
63
153
121
6
21
12
346
117
9
207
77
47
TOTAL
1,710
1,221
94
216
127
24
808
669
35
66
44
10
954
572
89
252
143
30
AVG. TERM
(MOS.)
4.0
3.5
--
4.9
4.6
3.2
3.0
--
--
--
4.3
4.6
--
4.3
3.1
5.7
CONF IRMED
1,417
1,086
82,
189
113
20
708
584
33
55
37
6
886
526
83
241
137
30
AVG. LEVY
(FR. FR.
3,900
3,913
3,961
3,867
4,180
3,675
4,000
4,030
3,557
4,213
4,054
5,333
5,000
4,878
5,031
5,333
5,025
4,493
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Table 9.
Evolutionof Citations for Illegal Employment
of Aliens Communicated to OMI and
Notifications of the Special Contribution Fine
Year Citations Notifications
1977/1978  1,899    1,899
1979  2,151    2,151
1980  1,313    1,313
1981  1,844    1,844
1982     684       684
1983  1,143    1,143
1984  1,268    1,268
1985  1,316    1,316
1986  1,188    1,188
1987  1,547    1,547
1988  1,702    1,702
1989  1,773    1,773
1990  2,508       607
1991  3,250    1,220
1992  2,356    2,498
Source: L’Office des Migrations Internationales  1992:70.
Note: Between 1977 and 1989 OMI statistics kept only for notifications.
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Graph A.
  Source:Mission de Liaison Interministerielle pour la Lutte contre Trafics de Main-d’oeuvre. Internal
              document.
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Graph B.
  Source:Mission de Liaison Interministerielle pour la Lutte contre Trafics de Main-d’oeuvre.  Annual
              Reports.
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APPENDIX
Principal Steps in the Evolution of French Policy to Curb
Illegal Alien Employment and the Underground Economy
DATE MEASURE
July 11, 1972 Made illegal employment an indictable offense.
1972 Promulgated initial ordonnances concerning temporary work,
trafficking of labor, and manpower leasing.
July, 1974 Suspended nonseasonal alien worker recruitment.
December 31, 1975 Adopted civil law regulating subcontracting in public and pri-
vate markets.
1974-1976 Adopted laws that provide for the hiring of labor inspectors
specializing in control of foreign labor in twenty-three “prior-
ity” departments.
July 10, 1976 Instituted a “special contribution” civil fine payable to the
National Immigration Office for illegal employment of alien
workers.
August 10, 1976 Created Interministry Mission to Combat Manpower Traffick-
ing.
1980-1983 Completed  four governmental studies of illegal work and the
underground economy.
October 17/29, 1981 Passed new laws making illegal employment of aliens a more
serious offense—a  misdemeanor subject to police courts—and
increased fines.
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February 2, 1982 Institutued new ordonnances that reinforce regulation of man-
power leasing.
August 31, 1983 Cabinet acted to reinforce policy against illegal alien migration
and employment by:
• Creation of fifty-five new positions for labor inspectors
specializing in control of foreign labor;
• Creation of department-level interagency committees to
combat illegal alien migration and employment in twenty-
three “priority” departments;
• Creation of a branch office of the Interministry Liaison
Mission to Combat Manpower Trafficking in Marseille;
• Augmentation of the “special contribution” civil fine from
500 to 2,000 times the minimum hourly wage (30,200 francs
as of January 1, 1990);
July 25, 1985 Made illegal work a misdemeanor.
January 16, 1986 Extended laws pertaining to illegal alien migration and em-
ployment to overseas departments.
March 14, 1986 Replaced by decree department-level interagency committees
created August 31, 1983 with similar committees with a broader
mandate to combat illegal work (the underground economy) in
addition to illegal alien migration and employment
.
January 27, 1987 Legally redefined illegal employment infraction.  Simplified the
definition of illegal work  and broadened applicability.
July 21, 1988 Passed amnesty law that expressly excluded those punished
for illegal work, illegal alien employment, and manpower traf-
ficking and leasing.
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January 13, 1989 Legally redefined an illegal employment infraction.
January 16, 1989 Extended by Interministerial decree the competency of the
Interministry Liaison Mission to the underground economy.
July 10, 1989 Adopted new labor law that:
• Newly incriminated illegal alien employment through
intermediaries;
• Redefined and more severely punished violation of the
prohibition against reimbursement of fees paid to the Inter-
national Migrations Office for foreign worker recruitment.
January 2, 1990 Amended Labor law that enabled officers of the Judiciary po-
lice, after court authorization, to enter workplaces on the pre-
sumption of illegal employment or illegal alien employment.
July 12, 1990 Modified labor code articles pertaining to subcontracting and
leasing of labor: doubled fines for infractions to 8,000 to 40,000
francs; authorized unions to act on behalf of the workers in-
volved.
July 25, 1990 Redefined by decre the role of department-level commissions.
November 8, 1990 Modulated by decree special contribution administrative fine
for illegal alien employment: set the routine fine at 16,870 francs;
doubled fine for employers who have been fined previously
within the last five years; reduced fine for illegal alien employ-
ment without complementary violations if recommended by
departmental authorities.
January 3, 1991 Legally extended authority to bring charges for illegal work
infractions to social security and other enforcement agents.
April 18/22, 1991 Government granted employment authorization to Poles con-
tingent on no adverse labor market effect.
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September 26, 1991 Removed automatic work authorization for asylum seekers (as
of October 1, 1991).
October 1, 1991 Facilitated by decree abrogation of short-term visas for aliens
who work without authorization.
October 3/4, 1991 Government acted to facilitate recovery of social security pay-
ments due in illegal work cases.
October 30, 1991 Reinforced by decree the role of judicial authorities within
departmental commissions and more fully associated
socioprofessional representatives in department-level campaigns
against illegal work.
December 31, 1991 Passed major new law overhauling and bringing together leg-
islation concerning illegal employment.
January 24, 1992 Prime minister authorized departmental prefects (the chief
governmental authority) to sign partnership agreements with
unions and employer organizations to reduce illegal employ-
ment.
December 31, 1992 Instituted experimental requirement obligating all employers
to declare their employment intentions prior to actual employ-
ment of an employee.
March 29, 1993 Authorized by decree social security organisms to use a na-
tional identification system to verify whether employers have
complied with the obligation to declare all employees prior to
the start of employment.
Sources: Hue 1990b:4-7; Marie Undated.b.
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INTRODUCTION
Refugee resettlement is a diminishing, but
continuing, part of the U.S. immigration
pattern.  In the last decade, the number of
arriving refugees often exceeded 100,000
a year; only 75,000 are expected in FY ’97.
The organizational pattern of refugee re-
settlement, often cobbled together under
such emergency situations as the fall of
Saigon in 1975, remains an administrative
oddity.  It is a combination of several fed-
eral entities, most, but not all, of the states,
and a mix of quite different private, vol-
untary agencies.1   Sometimes this amal-
gam works smoothly; sometimes it does
not.  Partially as a result of the design of
the refugee resettlement program, and
partially because of differing state stan-
dards regarding assistance to low- or no-
income people, the de facto benefit pack-
ages for arriving refugees—and the finan-
cial costs to the states, counties, and the
cities where they settle—range consider-
ably.
There has been a remarkable change in
the legislative mood about how, and how
much, assistance should be made avail-
able to the poor.  Both the recent Welfare
Reform and Immigration Reform bills
changed the rules drastically—but consid-
erably less so for refugees than other
groups of the foreign-born.  Major efforts
have been made to reduce the costs of
assistance programs, particularly of “wel-
fare” benefits for aliens.
Thus, options in resettlement exist within
a triple context—lower refugee flows, a
complex service delivery system, and leg-
islative desires to reduce welfare expen-
ditures.  This paper explores current costs
and it estimates costs under other models
that might be considered in this context.
The paper first briefly describes how refu-
gee resettlement is currently organized in
the U.S. and how and why it might be
changed.  Second, it estimates: (1) the
apparent financial costs of the current sys-
tem, including federal costs now clearly
recognized as being refugee-related; (2)
federal costs that are not separately iden-
tified; and (3) major state and local gov-
ernment costs.  Third it discusses differ-
ent resettlement models—current and pro-
1 Three types of nongovernment agencies are involved in refugee resettlement: (1) Department
of State recognized voluntary agencies [volags] and their local affiliates that provide initial
and continuing services to newly-arrived refugees; (2) mutual assistance associations [MAAs],
self-help organizations usually organized around ethnic lines; and (3) other local service
providers not associated with either the volags or MAAs.
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posed—and their fiscal costs (primarily
in the refugee’s first year in the U.S.).
These models use different constellations
of agencies to deliver services.  Some of
these models, while probably costing so-
ciety less in the middle- or long-term, have
more visible costs, particularly in the short-
term.
In any proposed reorganization of the refu-
gee resettlement system, cost to the tax-
payers is only one major factor.  The real
financial costs of the current system, or
any alternatives, are murky.  The estimates
of financial costs—visible and invisible—
to the federal and to state and local gov-
ernments of the current refugee resettle-
ment system and of five proposed alter-
native systems are primarily for the first
twelve months—sometimes just the first
eight months—of costs of refugees’ first
year in the U.S. even though long-term
cost differences are, or at least could be,
more striking.
Among resettlement system changes (not
mutually exclusive) being discussed are
giving more up-front financial responsi-
bility to the federal government and re-
structuring the way resettlement and
health services are delivered.  Within this
latter category, one suggestion is that pri-
vate agencies do all resettlement work,
another is that state and private refugee
functions be reorganized, a third is replac-
ing Refugee Medical Assistance [RMA] (a
program of the Department of Health and
Human Services [DHHS]) with Medicaid,
another and larger DHHS program.
Some of these changes, it is argued, would
result in lower first-year costs to the states,
better (and more culturally-sensitive) ser-
vices to refugees, less refugee welfare uti-
lization, and smaller total governmental
expenditures.  Others suggest that pro-
posed changes might remove state gov-
ernments further from refugee work
(eliminating or weakening the current
network of state managers of refugee pro-
grams, called state refugee coordinators)
and give an uneven assemblage of volun-
tary agencies [volags] the responsibility
for distributing hundreds of millions in
cash benefits—not the volags’ forte in the
past.
This paper does not evaluate these argu-
ments and does not take a position on the
social utility of the different resettlement
models.  It aims to provide useful back-
ground information on the cost structures
of the various proposals  and to provide
cost estimates for six models:
Model A, the current resettlement
system (many of whose costs are
not identified as such in federal
reporting systems);
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Model B, a Wilson-Fish
Amendment-type program, based
on the State of New York proposal
that would take the resettlement
program out of the welfare system
(where it is currently lodged) but
continue to use both RMA and
Medicaid to deliver health
services;
Model B-1, identical to Model B,
but using only Medicaid to fund
health services for refugees;
Model C, based on an extended
experiment in San Diego County
that would put all resettlement
services in the hands of private,
voluntary agencies, but would use
both RMA and Medicaid;
Model C-1, identical to C, except
that only Medicaid would be used
to fund health services;
Model C-2, identical to C, except
that most refugees would receive
health services through the system
now used for federal employees,
except for SSI clients who would
stay in Medicaid.
As Chart 1, a Summary Exhibit, indicates,
the alternative scenarios would increase
the visibility of refugee funding; some
would increase substantially the federal
share of the costs during the refugees’ first
year; all would reduce overall taxpayer
costs; state costs would vary from model
to model.
Estimates are that the costs of refugee re-
settlement, as defined, totalled $938.7 mil-
lion in FY ’95, while the costs for the vari-
ous alternative models (for the same year)
would have ranged from a high of  $910.6
million to a low of $782.9 million.  FY ’95
was used for these models because some
actual cost information is available and
the numbers of arriving refugees, their
demographic characteristics, and their
distribution within the U.S. also are
known.
A key variable, the extent to which alter-
native programs would reduce refugee
assistance utilization, is an estimate based
on work done and plans made in the two
states where the costs of the refugee re-
settlement program are the highest: New
York and California.  Costs are high in
these two states both because a large per-
centage of arriving refugees are resettled
there and because their cash assistance
benefits are relatively generous.
The alternative cost estimates in the pa-
per were made in two steps.  The first
R E S E A R C H
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Chart 1. Summary Exhibit
Six Models of Refugee Resettlement Costs in
Refugees First Year in the U.S.
(Estimates in $ millions are based on FY and CY 1995 data/assumptions outlined in text)
Cost Categories/
Program Models
Model A
Current
System
Model B
NY-style:
RMA + Medicaid
(as in current
system)
Model B-1
NY-style:
only Medicaid
used for
health
services
Model C
San Diego-style:
RMA + Medicaid
(as in current
system)
Model C-1
San Diego-style:
only Medicaid
used for
health
services
Model C-2
San Diego-style:
Fed. Employee
System
used for health
care
Visible Costs*
   Federal
   State
   Private
Total
Invisible Costs*
   Federal
   State & Local
Total
All Costs
   Federal
   State
   Private
Total
$417.6
0
$  23.6
$441.2
$331.8
$165.7
$497.5
$749.4
$165.7
$  23.6
$938.7
$722.8
0
$  22.4
$745.2
$147.7
$  17.7
$165.4
$870.5
$  17.7
$  22.4
$910.6
$449.0
0
$  22.4
$471.4
$288.3
$132.8
$421.1
$737.3
$132.8
$  22.4
$892.5
$713.9
0
               0
$713.9
$147.7
$  17.7
$165.4
$861.6
$  17.7
       0
$879.3
$440.1
0
       0
$440.1
$288.3
$132.8
$421.1
$728.4
$132.8
       0
$861.2
$554.2
0
       0
$554.2
$182.5
$  46.2
$228.7
$736.7
$  46.2
       0
$782.9
* Visible costs are those clearly identified as related to refugees; invisible costs are not so identified; see text.
Estimates are for first-year costs only, based on the arrival of 96,924 refugees that year; different arrival
totals would, of course, affect program costs.
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was to estimate, [see Model A] the actual
costs of the current system.2  The second
step was to estimate costs after factoring
in the advocates’ arguments that restruc-
turing would lower some costs [see Mod-
els B, B-1, C, C-1 and C-2].  A series of
detailed estimates include calculations for
thirteen resettlement, health, and welfare
programs.  (Several other expenses, such
as INS staffing, refugee travel loans, and
the costs of education, were excluded from
these calculations because the proposed
shift in resettlement responsibilities would
have no impact on these costs.)
Were any of these modifications to be
implemented, there would be an addi-
tional complication, introduced by Wel-
fare Reform.  In the past, decreased utili-
zation of cash assistance by low-income
people generally—which was a very vis-
ible trend in the last couple of years—was
evident for national budgetmaking.  If
changes in refugee resettlement cause a
lower rate of refugee welfare utilization
in the future, however, only some of the
decrease would appear in federal calcula-
tions; the rest would simply ease the pres-
sure on the block grants made to the states
for the new Temporary Assistance to
Needy Families [TANF] program that has
replaced the previous federal welfare pro-
gram of Aid to Families with Dependent
children [AFDC].
HOW THE U.S.
RESETTLES
REFUGEES
Because public policy views refugees as
victims of overseas oppression, as people
who did not have the opportunity of plan-
ning and saving for international migra-
tion, and as people often scarred by their
experiences, they are treated differently
from other low-income aliens.  Refugees
are selected in a different manner and then
given more services and much broader
benefit packages than other aliens.  Many
agencies, public and private, are involved.
A macro decision—the Presidential
Determination—is made about how many
refugees will be resettled in the U.S. from
various parts of the world, based largely
on overseas considerations by the Depart-
ment of State [DOS] in consultation with
Congress.  Within this context, overseas
officers of the Immigration and Natural-
ization Service [INS] determine which in-
2 As many refugee expenditures are not recorded as such, for example in most Aid to Families
with Dependent Children [AFDC] and Medicaid programs, many of the numbers in this
paper are (and must be) estimates.
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dividuals qualify for admission as refu-
gees.
Those so selected are given DOS travel
loans, if needed, to pay for the air travel.
Meanwhile, the names and profiles of the
selected refugees are sent to New York
City, where representatives of the volags
decide where the refugees will be sent
within the U.S.  Refugees’ desires regard-
ing the resettlement location are given
more weight than anything else in this
process.
Each refugee is then assigned not only to
a location, but also to one of the volags.
The local affiliate of the volag meets the
incoming refugee at the airport and makes
immediate housing, social service, and
medical screening arrangements for the
refugee.  These activities are funded by
Reception and Placement [R&P] grants
($700 each in FY ’95).
Those refugees who do not find work im-
mediately—the majority—then are linked
to services to help them meet their basic
needs in the U.S.  Some of these services
(such as English as a Second Language
[ESL] and job placement) sometimes are
provided by the settling volag and some-
times by other agencies, including MAAs.
In some instances, such as in the Match-
ing Grant Program and in three Wilson-
Fish programs [described below] efforts
are made to keep the refugees away from
mainstream assistance programs; in oth-
ers, the refugees are signed up fairly
quickly for cash and medical assistance
and for Food Stamps, programs run by
state and county welfare agencies.
Older and disabled people often file for
Supplemental Security Income [SSI], a
specialized cash assistance program run
by the Social Security Administration
[SSA].  Younger and nondisabled refugees
are divided into two major groups for as-
sistance purposes; those in families with
children eighteen and under usually are
eligible for what until recently was AFDC.
Refugees not qualified for either SSI or
AFDC (single adults and childless couples)
are eligible for Refugee Cash Assistance
[RCA] assuming, of course, that their in-
comes are low enough.
RCA, however, is available for only eight
months.  Refugee eligibility for AFDC and
SSI, unlimited in time at the start of 1996,
is now limited by the new welfare and
immigration legislation; however, the abil-
ity to draw benefits is defined in both pro-
grams in terms of years, not months, and
is affected by citizenship.
Historically, in states where benefits are
at the generous end of the spectrum,
AFDC offered some refugees an attrac-
tive alternative to immediate employment;
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perhaps they could secure a better com-
mand of the English language or more
education before venturing into the job
market.  Available data shows that most
refugees are not fully supporting them-
selves two years after their arrival [see
Chart 13, page 41 below].
It is the extensive utilization of welfare—
partially supported by state funds—that
helped stimulate some observers to de-
sign alternative resettlement models.
One set of models would retain both a
state and private agency role, but take re-
settlement out of the welfare program that
currently distributes assistance checks and
provides some services.  Another set of
models would place all responsibilities on
the volags.
The argument for the latter is that the fre-
quent assignment of refugees to main-
stream agencies that may not have either
the linguistic or the cultural capacity to
work with them leads to inadequate ser-
vices or neglect.  The  volags, which have
been with the refugees since the plane
touched down, have more ability to help
the refugees and often carry the “get a
job” message more firmly—and in the
refugee’s own language—than  state and
county welfare system personnel.
This study focuses on the largest of the
domestic government programs that work
with refugees and on the costs of the first
year of resettlement.  It excludes the INS
and DOS overseas costs of selecting refu-
gees for resettlement in the U.S., costs in-
curred by local U.S. educational systems,
such smaller segments of resettlement as
the costs of the DOS and DHHS staff who
run these programs, and the Department
of Justice funding of the resettlement of
Cuban-Haitian Entrants3 (a relatively small
program) because none of these costs
would be seriously impacted by any of
the proposed alternative systems.
The programs covered in this study are
the twelve national or federal programs
most directly involved with the resettle-
ment and the health and welfare of the
refugees [see Chart 2].  Also included—
though the first-year costs are relatively
minor—are the General Assistance (Home
Relief in New York) programs that states
and localities provide to indigent persons
not eligible for AFDC, SSI or (in the case
of refugees) RCA.  Some refugees, when
RCA expires, are supported by these pro-
grams, for which there are no federal
funds.
3 For years this program was lodged in the Community Relations Service; recently it was
moved to INS.
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Chart 2.
Refugee Resettlement: The Current System
            PROGRAM AGENCY FUNCTION
FEDERAL
Reception and Placement DOS Initial resettlement
Unaccompanied Minors DHHS Taking care of orphans
Targeted Assistance Grants [TAG] DHHS Social & employment services
  in impacted areas
Social Services DHHS Social & employment services
Matching Grant [MG] DHHS A resettlement program with
  some private funds
Refugee Cash Assistance [RCA] DHHS Cash assistance to refugees not
  eligible for SSI or AFDC
Refugee Medical Assistance [RMA] DHHS Medical services to non-AFDC,
   non-SSI refugees
State Administrative Costs DHHS State administrative costs for
  all DHHS ORR-funded programs
Food Stamps USDA Food Stamps
FEDERAL/STATE
Supplemental Security Income [SSI] SSA Cash assistance for the disabled
  and aging
Medicaid States Medical services for low-income
  refugees not in RMA
AFDC [now TANF] States Cash assistance for low-income
  refugees not in RCA, MG, or SSI
STATE/LOCAL
General Assistance State/Local Cash assistance for those
(available only in some states) Governments   ineligible for national and
  federal assistance programs
.   listed above
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CALCULATING
THE COSTS OF
THE CURRENT
RESETTLEMENT
SYSTEM
Statistical systems usually reflect the in-
terests of their masters.  Forms are writ-
ten and data banks are designed to pro-
duce information managers regard as vi-
tal or at least useful;  dates of birth and
dollars spent are usually recorded; left-
handedness, outside of baseball, is not.
For such reasons, some government sys-
tems record refugee status and some do
not; those that note the presence of refu-
gees in their systems sometimes do not
make much use of the data.  Thus it is
hard to track the costs of resettling refu-
gees in this country.  Ironically, sometimes
the largest of the costs (e.g., those within
the massive Medicaid and AFDC systems)
are the hardest to measure.
The task is made more difficult by the
just-described, decentralized, complex
structures for helping refugees. Definitions
of status and reporting periods vary; data
on movements within the U.S. (second-
ary migration) are fragmentary; some refu-
gees operate in the underground economy;
many of the people who help refugees are
more warm-hearted than computer-liter-
ate.
But before any rational discussion can be
held on the best ways to improve the cur-
rent system—to better serve refugees and
to reduce or at least to contain costs—it is
helpful to identify the current costs; hence
the exercise, which includes equal part
hard data and educated guesses,  that fol-
lows.  The techniques used to measure or
estimate the more significant cost elements
in refugee resettlement are described in
detail below so that others can critique
and, one hopes, improve on them.
The first-year cost estimates for the pro-
grams identified in Chart 2, are shown in
Model A [Chart 3].  First-year estimates
are used for several reasons: first, these
are somewhat easier to quantify than the
longer-term costs (which often get mixed
in with programs for other Americans);
second, much of the investment in refu-
gees takes place during their first year in
the U.S.; third, the overall direction of
refugees’ lives—towards self-sufficiency or
long-term dependency—is largely deter-
mined in the first months in America.
For the sake of simplicity, calculations
assume that all the refugees arrive on the
first day of the fiscal year and that all the
refugees have been here a full year at the
end of that period.  Similarly, I also as-
sume that no refugees die in their first
year in the U.S., that none return to their
homelands, and that only 5 percent or so
R E S E A R C H
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have enough resources or enough good
luck not to need help beyond the R&P
period.
In each instance the sequence of the ex-
planations below follows the order of the
programs in these exhibits. Throughout
“e” means the dollar figure is an estimate
and “a” means an actual expenditure for
FY ’95.
Detailed Information
on Model A Estimates
Reception and Placement.  These are
the initial expenses incurred by the
volags as they help refugees on their
arrival; DOS makes per capita grants
to the limited number of volags
involved in this work.  The number
shown is the number of arrivals that
year, 96,924, multiplied by the R&P
per capita grant of that year, $700.
Would that the rest of the numbers in
this paper were this straight-forward!
Unaccompanied Minors.  There are
always a relatively small number of
unaccompanied minors (orphans in an
earlier terminology) in any refugee
situation.  They are handled
separately, with funding from ORR to
the state child welfare agencies that
oversee this work.  The number shown
is the annual expenditure for this
population; it includes some funds for
this year’s arrivals and rather more
for the young people who arrived in
earlier years.  We call these recurring
costs.  The number shown was
secured by assuming that the ORR
budget estimates for these costs for
FY ’96 ($22,861,000) and for FY ’97
($22,495,000) indicated a $23,000,000
actual for FY ’95.
Targeted Assistance Grants.  These
are ORR funds used to support
employment and other assistance
programs in areas with concentrations
of refugees.  Some of the funds are
distributed on a formula basis and
some in a discretionary manner.  The
number shown is a FY ’95 actual.
Social Services Funds.   These are
also ORR moneys used for
employment and related services and
are distributed mostly on a formula
basis through the states, but up to 15
percent is awarded as discretionary
grants.  The total is also a FY ’95
actual.
Matching Grant Program.  This is an
ongoing ORR program.  During FY
’95 it provided volags with $1,000
grants per refugee when the volags
produced, on average, an equal or
larger amount of money (and/or
goods and services) to help the
U.S.  C O M M I S S I O N  O N  I M M I G R A T I O N  R E F O R M
R E S E A R C H
P A P E R
- 11 -
refugee resettle.  These combined
funds were then used, among other
things, to support the refugees for four
months without recourse to the
mainstream welfare program.
ORR provided $1,000 grants to
resettle 23,567 refugees in CY ’95,
hence the $23.6 million federal figure,
used here for the fiscal year.  While
some agencies, notably those affiliated
with the Hebrew Immigrant Aid
Society [HIAS], overmatched the
$1,000 figure, others did not.  In these
calculations I have used the amount
of the mandatory match ($23.6
million), rather than estimating the
actual total of these matches.  This, as
well as not noting the substantial
contributions that many of the volags
make to the R&P process, understates
the role played by private
contributions, but this analysis
assumes that these contributions
would not be impacted by a
reorganization of the resettlement
process.
Refugee Cash Assistance.  This is an
actual FY ’95 expenditure.
Refugee Medical Assistance.  This is
also a FY ’95 actual.
State Administrative Costs.  These are
the state’s costs for operating RCA,
RMA, the state refugee coordinators’
offices, and other refugee programs.
In some cases, where public assistance
is administered through counties, this
line item also covers the counties’
costs in managing these programs.
Again, this is a FY ’95 actual.
Food Stamps.  While some volags
seek to avoid placing refugees on cash
assistance, none to my knowledge
discourage the use of the Food Stamp
program that helps low-income people
whether they are on assistance or are
among the working poor.  This
estimate is constructed from: (1) the
number of arrivals in FY ’95 (96,924);
(2) an educated guess about an
average midyear utilization factor of
80 percent (higher at the start of the
period, lower at the end); and (3) the
average individual’s Food Stamp
benefit of $828.00 per year for 1994.4
SSI.  The Social Security
Administration ran a special
tabulation for the Commission5
showing the number of new SSI
awards made to refugees in CY ’95,
22,780 in all.  From this total, and
using a series of other data and
4 Calculated from Statistical Abstract of the U.S. 1995, Table 613.
5 For which I am grateful to Charles Scott and Elsa Ponce of the Office of Research, Statistics
and Evaluation of the Social Security Administration.
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Chart 4.
Annual Additional Cost of SSI Payments to
Refugees/Asylees; Payments to New Enrollees,
CY 95
CATEGORIES  APPLICATIONS AWARDS           ESTIMATED TOTAL
        BENEFITS FOR THE YEAR
(column 1) (column 2)       (column 3)
Aged  8,400               7,530              $ 43,301,000
Blind and Disabled 20,570             15,250               $ 87,694,000
Total 28,970   22,780 $130,995,000
Processing delay
factor [see below]
x .75 $ 98,246,000
Average monthly payment
 (Federal and State)                                        $  479.20
Source: Columns 1 and 2: unpublished data from SSA, Office of Research, Evaluation, and Statistics ob-
tained from SSI 10-percent files of 1995; Column 3, benefit totals calculations by the author based
on $479.20 figure at the bottom of column, which comes from: Ponce, Elsa. 1996. “Lawfully  Resident
Aliens Who Receive SSI Payments, December 1995.”  Office of Program Benefit Payments, SSA
(February 1996) Table 11.  Assuming a three-month average processing time for SSI, the first year’s
benefit total has been reduced by 25 percent.
The monthly benefit figure shown is the average for the SSA category of “Color of Law Aliens,” most
of whom are refugees; a few asylees and others are included as well.  The other SSA alien category,
“Lawfully Admitted Aliens,” covers those arriving in the nation as immigrants; the average monthly
benefit for that group is $400.83.  All data are for federally administered payments; a few state-
managed state supplementation checks are outside this system.
Note: The $130,995,000 estimated here is a recurring cost that will persist for years, dwindling over time
as the enrollees die.  Many other costs in this study (e.g. RCA) are short-term costs only.
SSA does not record the year of arrival of aliens; one year’s cohort of new awardees thus includes
some persons arriving in the year of the award and some in earlier years; alternatively,  some aliens
arriving in CY 1995 will apply for benefits in future years; at a time of steady arrivals, these factors
balance.  The 1995 arrivals, 96,924, were about equal to the average of the arrivals in the ten prior
years, 99,490.  If refugee arrivals decline in the future, the number of refugees applying for SSI would
decline, too, but more slowly than the decline in arrivals.
U.S.  C O M M I S S I O N  O N  I M M I G R A T I O N  R E F O R M
R E S E A R C H
P A P E R
- 13 -
assumptions spelled out in Chart 4, I
calculated that the new SSI awards
made to arriving refugees that year
would come to $130,995,000 a year on
an annual basis.  This would be a
recurring cost for as long as the SSI
beneficiaries survived (about one third
were aged, the others were disabled
or blind.)
As, however, there is a multimonth
application process (during which
newly-arrived refugees often use RCA
or their family’s AFDC grants) and as
the Commission is interested in first-
year costs, I factored in a three-month
waiting period and reduced the total
amount of costs in this program (for
this first year) by 25 percent.
SSI is largely, but not exclusively, a
national program.  Some of the states
that have higher AFDC payments also
supplement the national SSI payment;
California is particularly notworthy in
doing this.
The Social Security Administration,
however, apparently to avoid
attracting the attention of migratory
benefit shoppers, publishes no data on
this state-by-state variable.  Informally
I was told that a 15 percent state
supplement would be a safe guess,
particularly with a population that
included many Californians and New
Yorkers, and so I used a 85 percent
federal/15 percent state ratio in the
various models.
Medicaid.  Refugees who are eligible
for AFDC or SSI on arrival are also
eligible for Medicaid.  Refugees who
are eligible for RCA are covered by
RMA.  RCA Refugees covered by the
Matching Grant program also are
routinely covered by RMA.
Thus, to estimate the Medicaid cost,
it was necessary to calculate what
percentage of the incoming population
was eligible for AFDC and SSI and
then multiply that combined
population by a plausible unit cost.
Thanks to DOS and its contractor, the
Refugee Data Center, I was able to
obtain a printout on all refugees
arriving in June, 1996; various
knowledgeable people assured me
that the 6,054 refugees arriving that
month represented a good sample of
refugee cohorts in the last few years.
I then examined the demographic
characteristics of each arriving refugee
(largely date of birth and family
membership) and assigned all arrivals
to three eligibility categories: RCA;
AFDC; and SSI (as spelled out at the
R E S E A R C H
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bottom of Chart 5).  Clearly not all
those eligible for these programs used
them, but the exercise gave a sense of
the sizes of these three populations:
59 percent AFDC; 33 percent RCA;
and 8 percent SSI.  (This system
probably slightly overstates the AFDC
percentage and slightly understates
the RCA percentage as a few states
(such as Colorado) classify intact
refugee families into the RCA program
rather than into AFDC.)5
The SSI and AFDC eligibles thus came
to 67 percent of the arrivals; this was
multiplied by a 90 percent Medicaid
usage estimate to secure an estimated
FY ’95 refugee Medicaid utilization
population of 55,445.
For a Medicaid unit cost in FY ’95, I
used $3,294 a year; this is the 1993
average cost of Medicaid6 increased
by 6 percent for inflation.  This
Medicaid estimate, for twelve months,
of $3,294 compares with the FY ’96
ORR budget estimate of $3,592 for
eight months of RMA, and thus my
estimate may be on the conservative
side.7
These two unit costs may, on the other
hand, simply indicate that RMA is a
more costly way to provide health
services than Medicaid.
The math for this is one of the more
heroic estimates: 1995 arrivals of
96,924 x 67 percent (AFDC + SSI
eligibles) x 90 percent utilization =
55,445 x $3,294 = $192.5 million
(rounded).
To divide the costs between the federal
and the state governments, I used the
Health Care Financing Administration
[HCFA] rule-of-thumb for national
calculations of 55 percent federal, 45
percent state.  There is a sliding scale
formula tilted in favor of the low-
income states, but the 55/45 ratio
works on national estimates. In this
case it is $108.8 million federal, $83.7
million state.
5 For an explanation of why Colorado, and a few other states, handle this situation in this
manner, see Appendix C.
6 Calculated from Statistical Abstract of the United States 1995, Table 163.
7 There is a nuance in the funding of medical care for refugees in their first months in the U.S.
that supports the notion that the costs of the eight-month period of RMA may exceed the
twelve-month costs of Medicaid for similar populations.  Many states use RMA funds to
finance, or help finance, the initial, domestic health screening of newly-arrived refugees, and
thus RMA funds are used for both RMA- and Medicaid-eligible refugees.  This pattern was
discussed at the conference on refugee health held by ORR in Washington in September, 1996.
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AFDC.  This estimate is based on an
adjustment to the ORR actuals for
RCA expenditures during FY ’95, of
$55,947,645; as there were (in the June
1996 sample population) 178 AFDC
eligibles for every 100 RCA eligibles,
I multiplied the RCA expenditures by
1.78, and then multiplied the product
by 1.4.  The use of 1.4 was needed
because, while RCA benefits can be
paid for no more than eight months,
AFDC payments can be paid for the
full year.  However, later in the period,
cash assistance begins to decline, so
instead of using a factor of 1.5 (the
relation between 12 and 8) I used 1.4.
This works out as follows: $55,947,645
(RCA actual) x 1.78 (AFDC/RCA
eligible ratio) x 1.4 (time factor) =
$139.4 million (rounded).8
To divide the costs between federal
and state governments, I used a 54
percent-46 percent ratio calculated
from an Office of Family Assistance
Report.9  Thus it is $75.3 federal
million and $64.1 million state.
General Assistance [GA].  This is a
state-and-local-government-only
program that provides limited cash
assistance to nonelderly, non-disabled,
nonparents, i.e., to those who do not
qualify for either AFDC or SSI.  A
refugee leaving RCA and not able to
find a job would qualify in the state
such as California and New York
(where it is known as Home Relief)
that offer this program).
For those states that have GA
programs, the state’s exposure to these
costs, as far as refugees are concerned,
does not begin until the end of the
eighth month, so state exposure in the
first year is limited, but may grow
rapidly in later years if GA clients do
not secure jobs.
The $3.2 million estimate is based on
the assumptions that half the arrivals
will come to states without General
Assistance programs (e.g., Texas), that
33 percent of that half will be RCA
eligible, and that after the eight
months half of them will apply for
General Assistance, which will be paid
to them at the rate of $100 a month.
Again, some heroic assumptions, but
(in the first year) the costs are
8 An effort was made to collect state data on refugee utilization of AFDC and Medicaid; most
states, however, do not keep data on this variable as the DHHS does not require the states
to identify refugees in these programs.  Some information was secured, however; this is
discussed in Appendix C.
9 Overview of the AFDC Program, Fiscal Year 1994, page 20.
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Chart 5.
Characteristics of the Arriving Refugees,
June, 1996, by State
(By Potential Eligibility for Cash Assistance)
State
AL
AK
AZ
AR
CA
CO
CT
DE
DC
FL
GA
HI
ID
IL
IN
IA
KS
KY
LA
ME
MD
MA
MI
MN
MS
MO
MT
NB
NV
NH
NJ
NM
NY
Total
13
3
131
0
902
67
47
0
134
313
285
4
17
282
18
78
35
88
17
7
84
263
157
165
0
178
3
27
11
19
66
18
1,059
AFDC #
7
0
84
0
463
35
25
0
108
153
190
4
13
147
9
54
17
58
8
5
52
160
96
111
0
120
0
18
7
16
26
7
540
AFDC %
54
-
64
-
51
52
53
-
81
49
67
100
76
52
50
69
49
66
47
71
62
61
61
67
-
67
-
67
64
84
39
39
51
RCA #
5
1
39
0
327
25
17
0
24
133
82
0
3
107
8
21
13
25
9
1
30
83
54
42
0
52
3
9
4
3
27
8
390
RCA %
38
33
30
-
36
37
36
-
18
42
29
-
18
38
44
27
37
28
53
14
36
32
34
25
-
29
100
33
36
16
41
44
37
SSI #
1
2
7
0
93
7
5
0
2
27
8
0
1
24
1
3
2
5
0
1
2
17
7
8
0
6
0
0
0
0
13
3
125
SSI %
8
67
5
-
10
10
11
-
1
9
3
-
6
9
6
4
6
6
-
14
2
6
4
5
-
3
-
-
-
-
20
17
12
4.0
1.5
3.4
-
3.0
3.9
2.6
-
5.2
3.3
4.1
4.0
5.7
2.9
2.3
3.0
3.5
3.5
4.3
3.5
4.0
4.0
3.5
4.0
-
3.8
3.0
4.5
2.2
3.8
2.9
2.6
2.9
Average
case
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Source: Refugee Arrivals by City/State for June, 1996; prepared by the Refugee Data Center (New
York, NY) for the Bureau for Population, Refugees, and Migration, Department of State.
Note: Chart shows potential eligibility of the arriving refugee population for the three principal
sources of cash assistance available to them: AFDC; RCA; SSI; not shown is the utilization of these
programs.
The birth years of the arriving refugees and apparent family composition were used as a
rough measure of program eligibility. Those born in or before 1931 were placed in the SSI column,
children born in or after 1979 and those appearing to be their parent(s) in the AFDC column; all
others in the RCA column.  RCA eligibles included many in the Matching Grant program.  No effort
was made to estimate the number of disabled SSI claimants, who presumably use AFDC or RCA
while in the process of seeking those SSI benefits.  Included in the state and national totals, but
not in the three columns of welfare eligibility, are 54 unaccompanied minors.
The average case size was derived by dividing the total number of arriving refugees by the
number of cases reported.
Chart 5.  continued
NC
ND
OH
OK
OR
PA
RI
SC
SD
TN
TX
UT
VT
VA
WA
WV
WI
WY
PR
TOTALS
125
57
75
5
104
205
6
11
17
68
315
72
4
157
304
0
33
0
5
6,054
94
46
32
0
87
111
3
8
12
55
221
36
0
101
207
0
16
0
0
3,562
75
81
43
-
84
54
50
73
71
81
70
50
-
64
68
-
48
-
-
59
28
9
29
4
11
69
2
3
4
12
83
33
4
49
64
0
16
0
5
1,969
22
16
39
80
11
34
33
27
24
18
26
42
00
31
21
-
48
-
100
33
3
2
14
1
5
24
1
0
1
1
4
3
0
6
33
0
1
0
0
469
2
4
19
29
5
12
17
-
6
1
1
8
-
4
11
-
3
-
-
8
4.3
4.8
2.6
1.3
4.5
3.8
3.0
3.7
3.4
4.5
3.8
3.4
2.0
4.4
3.7
-
3.3
-
2.5
3.36
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minimal; they might triple, however,
in subsequent years. The math is as
follows: 96,924 arrivals x .5 (presence/
absence of GA) = 48,462 x .33 (RCA
eligible) = 16,152 x .5 (GA usage rate)
= 8,076 (users) x 4 months x $100 per
month = $3.2 million (rounded).
As a result of all of these calculations, the
estimate of the total federal, state, local
and private costs of resettling the 96,924
new refugees is $938.7 million for FY ’95.
This covers, as stated earlier, the costs of
the stipulated programs.
What would these costs have looked like
—again, for these programs—had alter-
native scenarios been in place during FY
’95?  That is the next subject.
CALCULATING
THE RELATIVE
COSTS OF THE
ALTERNATIVE
SCENARIOS
Some of the first-year costs of refugee re-
settlement potentially are susceptible to
change under the discussed alternative
systems; some are not.  What these sys-
tems arguably could do would be to de-
crease cash assistance utilization over
time.  This also would have effects, but
lesser ones, on both health care and ad-
ministrative costs.  The effects on Medic-
aid would be lesser because medical as-
sistance programs include among their
beneficiaries some members of the work-
ing poor even after they have left cash
assistance.
None of the alternative scenarios, how-
ever, would do anything to the size of
R&P grants, for example.  For a program-
by-program checklist of what the alterna-
tive scenarios could and could not do, see
Chart 6.  [These are the judgements of the
author; others might come to different
conclusions.]
Five alternative scenarios are outlined
below.
1. Model B
Model B [Chart 7] is based roughly on a
New York State proposal under the Wil-
son-Fish Amendment.  While I have not
seen a text of that proposal, its central
feature is that the new program would
decrease taxpayer costs by 5 percent over
the first two years that refugees are in the
country.   The proposal currently is the
subject of negotiations between the City
and the State of New York, both of which
must sign off on it prior to implementa-
tion.
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                PROGRAM
FEDERAL
Reception and Placement
Unaccompanied Minors
Targeted Assistance Grants [TAG]
Social Services
Matching Grant [MG]
Refugee Cash Assistance  [RCA]
State Administrative Costs
Food Stamps
FEDERAL/STATE
Supplemental Security Income [SSI]
Medicaid
AFDC [Now TANF]
STATE/LOCAL
General Assistance
(available only in some states)
AGENCY
DOS
DHHS
DHHS
DHHS
DHHS
DHHS
DHHS
USDA
SSA
States
States
State/Local
G o v e r n -
ments
LIKELIHOOD OF CHANGE
None
None
Unlikely, employemnt services will
    still be needed
See line above
Limited
Some reduction is likely, but current 8-month
    cut-off limits the extent of reduction
Use of Medicaid instread of RMA would
    proably reduce cotsts, perhaps
    substantially
Minimal, as program helps the working poor
    as well as those on cash assistance
None, employment highly unlikely for SSI
    recipeints
Some reduction the first year, more in later
    years
Some reduction the first year, more in later
    years
Minimal reductions in first year, substantial
    ones later
Note: These are the author’s judgements and relate, generally, to the alternative models described
       in the text.
Chart 6.
Refugee Resettlement: Likelihood of the Described
Alternative Scenarios Reducing Governmental Costs
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Chart 7. Model B
Estimated Costs of a New York-Style Modification
of a U.S.-funded Program Using Both RMA and
Medicaid as Is the Current Practice
(for new refugee arrivals during FY 1995)
               PROGRAM       AGENCY ESTIMATED COSTS
($ MILLIONS)
FEDERAL
Reception and Placement DOS Federal $ 67.8a
Unaccompanied Minors DHHS Federal $ 23.0e
Targeted Assistance Grants [TAG] DHHS Federal $ 44.5a
Social Services DHHS Federal $ 80.8a
Matching Grant [MG] DHHS Federal $ 22.4e
Private $ 22.4e,c
Refugee Cash Assistance  [RCA] DHHS Federal $185.5e
   (8 mos.) + AFDC (12 mos.)
Refugee Medical Assistance [RMA] DHHS Federal $273.8e
   (8 mos.) + Medicaid (12 mos.)
Admin. Costs DHHS Federal $ 25.0e
Food Stamps USDA Federal $ 64.2e
FEDERAL/STATE
Supplemental Security Income [SSI] SSA Federal $ 83.5e
State $ 14.7e
Medicaid (12 mos., for AFDC, SSI & GA clients) States [covered in RMA line]
AFDC (now TANF) (12 mos.) States [covered in RCA line]
STATE/LOCAL
General Assistance (available only in some states)    State/Local State/Local $ 3.0e
                           Governments        Governments
Total Costs Federal $870.5e
State $ 17.7e
Private $ 22.4e
Total $910.6e
Per capita, for FY ’95 arrivals (96,924) $9,395e
Notes: Most cost estimates are based on the N.Y. Wilson-Fish proposal, calling for a five percent reduction
in specified programs for refugees [see text].  See model A for key to symbols a, e, c.
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In a version of this basic model used in
this paper the reductions are calculated
as creating 5 percent savings in the first
year for the following programs: RCA,
RMA, AFDC, Medicaid, GA, Matching
Grant and administrative costs.10  Most of
these specified costs currently are paid by
the federal government, but others (in-
cluding AFDC, Medicaid and GA) include
state and local costs.  The proposed pro-
gram is not expected to reduce expendi-
tures in some other areas, such as R&P
and SSI.
Further, in Model B, the federal govern-
ment would fund all cash assistance costs
for RCA and RMA clients during the first
eight months and all costs of AFDC and
Medicaid for the first twelve months.
The estimate for Model B is that all na-
tionwide costs of the specified resettlement
programs would have been $910.6 mil-
lion, were this program in effect nation-
ally in FY ’95.  This would have been a
savings of about $28 million compared to
this paper’s estimates of the real costs of
the specified resettlement programs in that
year [Chart 6, Model A].
Model B would reduce states’ first-year
costs dramatically, from $165.7 million (in
Model A) to $17.7 million, and increase
federal costs by about $120 million.
It should be stressed that these are the
author’s calculations based on the formula
described above, and are not estimates
generated by the State of New York or the
volags working  there.  Nor are these es-
timates (as opposed to those for Models
C, C-1, and C-2) based—in part—on ac-
tual experience.
The projected cost savings are based on
the assumption that a cooperative state-
private program mounted outside the
welfare system would bring about more
rapid employment among the refugees
and would reduce fraud caused by simul-
taneous receipt of cash benefits and un-
derground wages.  The notion is that a
refugee-specific program, with major in-
puts from the voluntary agencies, would
be based on closer case management and
more finely-tuned employment counsel-
ing than found in the current system.
It appears that these benefits—and some
administrative savings—easily could lead
to the promised reduction of at least 5
percent.
2. Model B-1
Model B-1 [Chart 8] is identical to Model
B except that health services would be
handled differently.   Model B would con-
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Chart 8.  Model B-1
Estimated Costs of a New York-Style Modification
of a U.S.-funded Program Using Medicaid Only
for Health Services Instead of Medicaid + RMA
(for new refugee arrivals during FY 1995)
             PROGRAM AGENCY ESTIMATED COSTS
($ MILLIONS)
FEDERAL
Reception and Placement DOS Federal $ 67.8a
Unaccompanied Minors DHHS Federal $ 23.0e
Targeted Assistance Grants [TAG] DHHS Federal $ 44.5a
Social Services DHHS Federal $ 80.8a
Matching Grant [MG] DHHS Federal $ 22.4e
Private $ 22.4e,c
Refugee Cash Assistance  [RCA] DHHS Federal $185.5e
   (8 mos.) + AFDC (12 mos.)
RMA [covered in Medicaid line]
Admin. Costs DHHS Federal $ 25.0e
Food Stamps USDA Federal $ 64.2e
FEDERAL/STATE
Supplemental Security Income [SSI] SSA Federal $ 83.5e
State $ 14.7e
Medicaid (12 mos., for AFDC, SSI & GA States Federal $140.6e
clients;  8 mos. for RCA clients) State $115.1e
AFDC [now TANF] (12 mos.) States [covered in RCA line]
STATE/LOCAL
General Assistance State/Local State/Local $ 3.0e
(available only in some states) Governments       Governments
Total Costs Federal $737.3e
State $132.8e
Private $ 22.4e
Total $892.5e
Per capita, for FY ’95 arrivals (96,924) $9,208e
Note: Estimated costs are the same as in Model B, except that Medicaid unit costs have been
substituted for RMA actual expenditures.  See note for Model A for a key to the symbols
a, e, c
.
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tinue to use the current system, RMA for
some and Medicaid for other refugees,
with the Federal government covering all
health costs in the first year.  Model B-l
would place all health services in the
Medicaid system, with funding from both
Federal and state sources.
As noted earlier, Medicaid costs less—for
reasons that are not totally clear—per per-
son than RMA.  Medicaid is a much larger
program, and there may be economies of
scale at work.  As noted earlier, initial
health screenings for Medicaid-covered
refugees appear as RMA costs.
The estimate in Model B-1 is that the total
costs of medical assistance, nationwide,
during the first year would be $255.7 mil-
lion.  If the usual HCFA formula applies
(55 percent U.S./45 percent states), this
would work out to $140.6 million in fed-
eral costs and $115.1 million in state costs.
The $255.7 estimate is worked out in the
following manner: first, there is the esti-
mate (from Model A) that Medicaid costs
in FY ’95 were $192.5 million for first-year
refugees being served by this program.
To this is added $63.2 million as the esti-
mate of what it would have cost in FY ’95
to provide health services via Medicaid
rather than RMA ($192.5 + $63.2 = $255.7).
The $63.2 million, in turn, is based on: the
previously-cited unit cost for Medicaid for
a year ($3,294) times two-thirds (for eight
months out of twelve) times an assump-
tion that 33 percent of the arriving cohort
of 96,924 (or 31,985) is RMA- (and RCA-
) eligible, and that all but 10 percent of
them will use medical services.  Stated in
another way:  $3,294 x .667 x 31,985 x .90
= $63,246,761.
This is then rounded to $63.2 million.  In
contrast, RMA actual costs in FY ’95 were
$95.7 million.
The total costs of Model B-1 come to
$892.5, lower than the costs for either
Model A ($938.7 million) or Model B
($910.6).  Both federal and state costs
would be below those of Model A; most
of the savings between Models A and B-
1 would fall to the states, about $33 mil-
lion, as opposed to federal savings, esti-
mated at about $12 million.
The San Diego
Experience
Before describing the estimates for Mod-
els C, C-1, and C-2, it would be useful to
review the experience of alternative refu-
gee resettlement programs, ones that are
not run through the welfare system.  What
does research show on this subject?  As
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usual, not as much as one might want,
but there are some useful informational
building blocks.
First, there is strong statistical evidence
gathered over the years within the welfare
system that cash assistance utilization is
lower in jurisdictions that have lower ben-
efit checks than in those with higher ones;
this is the case for both refugee and
nonrefugee populations.  This  suggests
that factors—in fact, government-
determined factors—external to the refu-
gees, and to their traditions and cultures,
can play a role in the dependence-inde-
pendence equation.11
A somewhat similar precedent regarding
a neglected relationship between govern-
mental policy and use of welfare can be
seen in the comparison between the Food
Stamp utilization rates of refugees and
asylees noted in Appendix D.
Asylee utilization rates are considerably
below those of refugees, although both
have equal legal access to benefit pro-
grams; asylees are not greeted on their
arrival with the supportive programs that
exist for refugees; they typically have re-
course to only one source of income—
unauthorized employment.  (Asylum ap-
plicants cannot work legally until the pas-
sage of six months—or earlier if asylum
is granted.)
Appendix D also notes that there are some
demographic as well as programmatic
differences between these populations, i.e.,
a higher proportion of working-age males
among asylees than among refugees.
Second, there is some evidence outside the
welfare system that the Matching Grant
[MG] program, which keeps refugees out
of the welfare system for their first four
months in the country, does well by most
of its clients.  ORR data show that during
CY ’95 40.9 percent of MG clients were
self-sufficient at the end of the four
months.
In contrast, earlier ORR data, dealing with
all refugees in the nation for five years or
less, found that only 30.5 percent were
self-sufficient [see Chart 13, page 41].  The
MG program, working with a much more
recently-arrived population, had more
self-sufficiency at the end of four months
than the broader population, even though,
11 The last ORR report offering information on this variable, Report to the Congress: Refugee
Resettlement Program, Dec. 31, 1989, pp. 41-42, showed dependency rates, after two years, of
10-11 percent in North Carolina and Louisiana, for example, compared to 69 percent in
Wisconsin and Minnesota.
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on average, the latter group had been in
the nation for two and one-half years.
Matching Grant is a major program, with
25,767 individuals completing their four-
month programs during CY ’95.12  Thus
systems like Matching Grant apparently
can make a difference.
Third, and most on target, there is evi-
dence both inside and outside the welfare sys-
tem that the Wilson-Fish program oper-
ated by U.S. Catholic Charities [USCC]
has made a major difference in welfare
utilization in a difficult environment—
California—which has had one of the most
generous state welfare systems.
Briefly, USCC, through its affiliate, Catho-
lic Charities, has been running for six years
an experimental program resettling RCA
refugees in San Diego County.  Robert
Moser, a social scientist, is the program
director and he has data not only on its
own clientele (the study group), but on a
comparable control group as well; the
former are the RCA refugees served by
USCC, and the latter are RCA refugees
served along traditional lines, by the San
Diego County Department of Social Ser-
vices.
The study group is subject to concerted
case management, with project staffers
providing reception and placement ser-
vices, social and employment services, di-
rect cash assistance (the same formula as
for other refugees but without contact with
the welfare system), and, if need be, sanc-
tions.  Everything is done within a single
organization, and refugees are encouraged
at every turn to get a job; there is no
opportunity for clients to play off one or-
ganization against another, nor to be in-
fluenced (to put it bluntly) by the habits
of some of the longtime welfare users.13
The San Diego program is a major project,
which dealt with 918 refugees (as opposed
to 1,209 refugees in the control group)
between September 1990 and March 1994.
A major neutral data source has been
12 Unpublished data on the Matching Grant Program, received from ORR in October, 1996.
13 Congressmen David Obey (WI) and Gary Condit (CA) both testified in favor of a resettlement
program that would have many of the characteristics of the San Diego program and a House
of Representatives Immigration Subcommittee hearing on August 1, 1996.  Obey’s proposal,
not yet shaped into bill form, would turn over all resettlement activities to the voluntary
agencies and would provide for full federal funding during refugees’ first twelve months in
the U.S.  Models C and C-1 are close to the Obey proposal, but each provides federal cash
and medical assistance to non-AFDC refugees for eight month, not the twelve suggested by
Obey.
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14 “Final Program Progress Report, Sept. 1, 1990 - August 31, 1994” U.S. Catholic Conference/
Migration & Refugee Services, San Diego Wilson-Fish Demonstration Project, ORR Grant No.
902WF-DC001/90RD0005/01.  An ORR-funded evaluation of the multiyear project is expected
early in 1997.
15 Personal fax from Dr. Moser, Nov. 15, 1996.
tapped; this consists of the forms filed
with INS by refugees at the end of their
first year in this country.  These are the I-
643s; their principal purpose is to docu-
ment the applicant’s transition from refu-
gee to permanent resident alien status; Dr.
Moser has used the one line on the form
that asks if the refugee has a job to mea-
sure the employment status of the control
and experimental groups.  The percent
currently employed at the time of the fil-
ing of the form for the two populations
were: USCC experimental group 55 per-
cent;  San Diego control group 42 per-
cent.14
Dr. Moser reports that in more recent
months the percentage of USCC clients
with jobs has increased to 60 percent.
Using the earlier data, the rate of employ-
ment (and presumably self-sufficiency) is
24 percent higher for the experimental
group than for the control group, i.e., 42
is 76 percent of 55.
Another measure of welfare utilization
reduction, pulled from the same set of I-
643 data, relates to the number of months
of RCA utilization.  Assuming  no signifi-
cant difference can occur in the first
month, Dr. Moser notes that in the fol-
lowing seven months the experimental
group used 4.67 months of RCA while the
control group used 7 months of it, a 33
percent reduction for the experimental
group.15
While it would be very helpful if there
were other careful comparison studies of
privatization programs vis-a-vis the main-
stream refugee resettlement programs, this
one is encouraging enough, large enough,
and structured enough for careful consid-
eration.  [For a note on the other two
USCC Wilson-Fish programs, those in
Nevada and Kentucky, see Appendix B.]
For the purposes of this analysis, the 24
percent higher incidence of employment
and the 33 percent reduction in RCA uti-
lization will be averaged as a 28 percent
reduction in cash assistance in California-
type situations.
This is not to suggest, however, that the
introduction of a San Diego-style scenario,
even if it proved to be equally successful
nationwide, would have the same cost-
cutting effect in say, Texas, as it does in
California.  The alternative scenario pre-
U.S.  C O M M I S S I O N  O N  I M M I G R A T I O N  R E F O R M
R E S E A R C H
P A P E R
- 27 -
sumably would make little difference in
the really low-benefit states, where the
modest size of the checks drives all able-
bodied people immediately into the job
market.16
The next question then is: How do we
weigh the national significance of the
USCC’s apparent success in California?  Is
California such an outlier in terms of ben-
efit amounts, that the San Diego experi-
ment can have no replicability outside that
state?
To obtain an answer, without having ac-
cess to actual state-by-state RCA expendi-
tures, I used two other data sets: average
monthly AFDC benefits for a family in FY
’93, and the size of the arriving refugee
populations in June 1996.  Chart 9 shows
the construction of a proxy measure for
actual RCA expenditures; three classes of
states were created on the basis of the
dimensions of the typical AFDC benefit,
and a median benefit amount for each
class was multiplied by the number of
June arrivals in those groups of states.
This suggests that about 64 percent of the
RCA and AFDC funds  for refugees was
spent in the nine most generous states; 21
percent in the next band of (16) states,
and 15 percent in the twelve states in the
lowest band.  (The other thirteen states
had too few arrivals—less than ten each
that month—to be considered usefully in
the exercise.)
As something like 64 percent of the refu-
gee cash assistance dollars was going to
states like California and 36 percent was
going elsewhere, I deflated the San Diego
percentage (28 percent) by a factor of 25
percent before applying it nationally, i.e.,
if the privatization program could reduce
cash utilization by 28 percent in Califor-
nia, it would be able to reduce it by about
21 percent nationwide.
While this may be a heroic estimate, it is
also a modest one.  Given dependence
rates that have sometimes reached 90 per-
cent or more among certain refugee com-
munities, a 21 percent reduction of the
use of cash assistance during the first year
is not unreasonable.
3. Model C
Model C [Chart 10], then, is similar to
Model B except that it uses the San Diego
experience with RCA—a reduction in the
first year of 21 percent—instead of the 5
16 One policy option that I have not seen discussed would be to privatize the refugee program
in the high-benefit states and leave it alone in the low-benefit states on the grounds that
benefit levels alone were forcing people into employment.
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Chart 9:
Distribution of Arriving Refugees
vis-a-vis AFDC Benefit Rates
(June ’96 arrivals, ’93 AFDC Monthly Benefits, Selected States)
HIGH BENEFIT STATES ($401+ monthly per family)
CA, CT, MA, MI, MN, NH, NY, WA, WI
Arrivals  2,949
Median Benefit            x $581
Product (proxy for refugee costs)   $1,477,449
MEDIUM BENEFIT STATES ($301 - $400)
AZ, CO, DC, IA, ID, IL, KS, MD, NB, ND, NJ, NM, OH, PA, OR, UT,
Arrivals  1,452
Median Benefit x $335
Product (proxy for refugee costs)     $486,420
LOW BENEFIT STATES ($300 and less)
FL, GA, KY, IN, LA, MO, NC, NV, SC, SD, TN, TX
Arrivals   1,478
Median Benefit x $235
Product (proxy for refugee costs)     $347,330
TOTALS BY CATEGORY
Proxies for High-Benefit States         1,447,449  64%
Proxies for Medium-Benefit States           486,420  21%
Proxies for Low-Benefit States           347,330  15%
Total        $2,281,207 100%
Note: In the absence of RCA state-by-state actuals, this calculation shows the relative financial
significance of changes in welfare utilization in high-benefit states; more money is saved if
utilization is reduced where the benefits are the highest.
Sources: Arrival data is from Chart 5 (for June 1996) and benefit rates are from Statistical Abstract of
the United States 1995, Table 612.  To eliminate statistical distractions, the two states with the
lowest AFDC benefit rates (MS and AL) and the two with the highest (AK, HI) were eliminated;
none of these four states settles a significant number of refugees.  Similarly, other states with
fewer than ten arrivals in June 1996 also were dropped.
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Chart 10.  Model C
Estimated Costs of a San Diego-Style
Modification of a U.S.-funded Program Using Both
RMA and  Medicaid as Is the Current Practice
(for new refugee arrivals during FY 1995)
             PROGRAM AGENCY ESTIMATED COSTS
($ MILLIONS)
FEDERAL
Reception and Placement    DOS Federal $ 67.8a
Unaccompanied Minors    DHHS Federal $ 23.0e
Targeted Assistance Grants [TAG]    DHHS Federal $ 44.5a
Social Services    DHHS Federal $ 80.8a
MG Program    DHHS [no separate program]
Refugee Cash Assistance  [RCA]    DHHS Federal $199.0e
(8 mos.) + AFDC (12 mos.)
Refugee Medical Assistance [RMA]    DHHS Federal $273.8e
(8 mos.) + Medicaid (12 mos.)
Admin. Costs    DHHS Federal $ 25.0e
Food Stamps    USDA Federal $ 64.2e
FEDERAL/STATE
Supplemental Security Income [SSI]    SSA Federal $ 83.5e
State $ 14.7e
Medicaid (12 mos., for AFDC, SSI & GA clients)   States       [covered in RMA line]
AFDC [now TANF] (12 mos.)   States [covered in RCA line]
STATE/LOCAL
General Assistance (available only in some states)   State/Local State/Local $  3.0e
  Governments       Governments
Total Costs Federal $861.6e
State $ 17.7e
Total $879.3e
Per capita, for FY ’95 arrivals (96,924) $9,072e
Note: Most cost estimates are the same as in Model B, but there is no Matching Grant program and the
San Diego experience with reducing the use of RCA is used in this model.  Also, a actual
expenditures and e estimates.
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percent used in Model B; further, C like B
has federal funds for health care the first
year.
Additionally, Model C, as it would oper-
ate totally within the private resettlement
operation, eliminates the Matching Grant
program as a separate entity; the $22.4
million in federal funds used in this pro-
gram (largely for RCA-like grants) have
been added into the combined RCA-AFDC
line in Models C, C-1, and C-2.  (Private
funds are dropped from the formula, but
it is likely that some of these resources
would continue to be available for refu-
gees.)
While USCC has had some limited, and
encouraging, experience with AFDC cli-
ents in San Diego County, the calculations
for reductions in AFDC spending in Mod-
els C, C-1, and C-2 are the same as they
are for Models B and B-1 (i.e. down 5
percent).  Similarly, the reductions in
medical assistance and administrative
costs are also shown as 5 percent in all
five models.
Given the larger size of monthly benefit
checks when there are children, it is more
difficult to encourage refugees to take
entry-level jobs when they are on AFDC
than when they are on RCA, hence the
use of the 5 percent reduction figure rather
than a higher one.
Model C produces a national cost esti-
mate of $879.3 million, compared to the
Model A estimate of $938.7 million.
4. Model C-1
Model C-1 [Chart 11] is like Model C ex-
cept that it uses the Medicaid-only, as op-
posed to RMA-plus-Medicaid, for health
services.  The health cost estimates are
those used for Model B-1.  Again, as in
the B series, in Model C the federal gov-
ernment would cover all health costs the
first year, but in Models C-1 and C-2 they
would be split with the states.  Model C-
1 is estimated at $861.2 million.
5. Model C-2
Model C-2 [Chart 12] is similar to Models
C and C-1, except that it takes a yet an-
other approach to the delivery of health
services.  Instead of using the system in
place for newly-arrived refugees (RMA),
or the one in place for low-income Ameri-
cans generally (Medicaid) it would largely
utilize the various systems now used for
federal employees.  It would call for total
federal funding of health services, through
these channels, for eight months for RCA
clients and for twelve months for AFDC
clients.  SSI clients would continue to be
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Chart 11. Model C-1
Estimated Costs of a San Diego-Style Modification
of a U.S.-funded Program Using Medicaid Only for
Health Services Instead of Medicaid + RMA
(for new refugee arrivals during FY 1995)
                  PROGRAM                        AGENCY ESTIMATED COSTS
($ MILLIONS)
FEDERAL
Reception and Placement DOS Federal $ 67.8a
Unaccompanied Minors DHHS Federal $ 23.0e
Targeted Assistance Grants [TAG] DHHS Federal $ 44.5a
Social Services DHHS Federal $ 80.8a
MG Program DHHS [no separate program]
Refugee Cash Assistance  [RCA] DHHS Federal $199.0e
 (8 mos.) + AFDC (12 mos.)
RMA DHHS [covered in Medicaid line]
Admin. Costs DHHS Federal $ 25.0e
Food Stamps USDA Federal $ 64.2e
FEDERAL/STATE
Supplemental Security Income [SSI]  SSA Federal $  83.5e
State $  14.7e
Medicaid States Federal $140.6e
(12 mos. for AFDC, SSI & GA clients; State $115.1e
8 mos. for RCA clients)
AFDC [now TANF] (12 mos.) States [covered in RCA line]
STATE/LOCAL
General Assistance State/Local State/Local  $ 3.0e
(available only in some states) Governments             Governments
Total Costs Federal $728.4e
State $132.8e
Total $861.2e
Per capita, for FY ’95 arrivals (96,924) $8,885e
Note: Estimated costs are the same as in Model C, except that Medicaid unit costs have been substi-
tuted for RMA actual expenditures.  Also, a actual expenditures and
e estimates.
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Chart 12.  Model C-2.
Estimated Costs of a San Diego-Style
Modification of a U.S.-funded Program
Using Federal Employee Health Insurance
Instead of Medicaid + RMA
(for new refugee arrivals during FY 1995)
       PROGRAM                           AGENCY ESTIMATED COSTS
($ MILLIONS)
FEDERAL
Reception and Placement DOS Federal $ 67.8a
Unaccompanied Minors DHHS Federal $ 23.0e
Targeted Assistance Grants [TAG] DHHS Federal $ 44.5a
Social Services DHHS Federal $ 80.8a
MG Program DHHS [no separate program]
Refugee Cash Assistance  [RCA] DHHS Federal $199.0e
 (8 mos.) + AFDC (12 mos.)
Health coverage                               no agency  selected Federal $114.1e
(12 mos. for AFDC; 8 mos. for RCA)
Admin. Costs DHHS Federal $ 25.0e
Food Stamps USDA Federal $ 64.2e
FEDERAL/STATE
Supplemental Security Income [SSI]     SSA.                  Federal $ 83.5e
      State $ 14.7e
Medicaid (for SSI clients only) 12 mos. States       Federal $ 34.8e
State $ 28.5e
AFDC [now TANF] (12 mos.) States [covered in RCA line]
STATE/LOCAL
General Assistance                                 State/Local State/Local $ 3.0e
   (available only in some states)                 Governments              Governments
Total Costs Federal $736.7e
State  $ 46.2e
Total $782.9e
Per capita, for FY’95 arrivals (96,924) $8,077e
Note: Estimated costs are the same as in Models C and C-1 except that median federal employee
health insurance cost rates have been substituted for those of the RMA and Medicaid systems
for RCA and AFDC clients.  Also, a actual expenditures and e estimates.
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covered by Medicaid. [The methods for
estimating FY ’96 median costs of provid-
ing health services to federal employees
and their families, and thus to refugees is
described in Appendix E.]
A glance at the bottom line of Model C-
2 suggests one of its prime attractions; it
would appear to reduce the costs of pro-
viding health services to newly-arrived
refugees substantially, by more than
$75,000,000 in comparison to Model C-1
and by even more vis-a-vis Model C
(which shows the current practice in this
field).  These reductions are on the order
of 30-40 percent.
As far as the states are concerned, such a
program would substantially reduce
health costs for first-year refugees.   There
would, however, presumably be some
drawbacks.
First, there would be the inevitable fric-
tion as a new system was introduced to
refugee-serving agencies, and, perhaps
even more so, to the hundreds of health
care providers now serving federal
employees—organizations for the most
part not accustomed to refugee clients.
Second, the cost structure of these health
systems (although they vary remarkably
from one another17) all are based on work-
ing with a largely native-born population,
one that has had a lifetime of service from
the American health system.  In contrast,
refugees prior to arrival typically have
been minimally served by health systems
and often arrive with an accumulation of
unmet health needs.
In short, it will cost more to provide ser-
vices to newly-arrived refugees than to
government workers and their families.
Were the refugees to be regarded as a
single population (for health costing pur-
poses) the estimates shown in Model C-2
would perhaps double or triple after a
year or so of cost-experience.
Were the refugees, on the other hand, to
be simply mixed in with the federal em-
ployees (for costing purposes) it would
mean a tiny, and generally imperceptible,
increase for all involved.  There were an
estimated 89,000 non-SSI refugee arrivals
in FY ’95; in contrast, there were 3,043,000
federal employees in 199318 and, if each
employee was a member of a family of
four, that would work out to more than
12,000,000 persons.  Thus the arriving refu-
17 In the sample of programs studied, for example, the monthly total cost for coverage of a
single worker ranged from a low of $111 a month to a high of $249.
18 Statistical Abstract of the United States 1995, table 542.
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gees would account for less than 1 per-
cent of the people served in the federal
employee health systems in any given year
(assuming that many arrivals); further, the
refugees would all be out of the federal
employee health system twelve months
later.
Another Model
There are, of course, many other possible
combinations and permutations of resettle-
ment programs, but at least one of them
should be mentioned.  In this scenario,
while the voluntary agencies would
handle case management, counseling,
training, and employment, the actual cut-
ting of checks for RCA and AFDC would
be handled by the states.  This is clearly
an area in which the states have more ex-
perience than the volags.
Further, as Frank Bien, the Maryland State
Coordinator, has pointed out, many of the
states are moving into the use of more
and more high technology in the assis-
tance programs.  One such example is the
distribution of Food Stamp benefits not
with coupons, but with debit cards that
can be used only in grocery stores (thus
preventing many types of Food Stamp
fraud).  The use of such a model might
bring with it a mild increase in up-front
administrative expenses, while reducing
losses through fraud.
Savings in Later
Years
These descriptions of projected savings all
have dealt with the first twelve months of
refugee resettlement.
Although the initial costs of resettlement
are considerable, the possibility of saving
substantial funds by encouraging lesser
utilization of assistance by refugees would
pay major dividends in the later years, as
Chart 13 indicates.
It is, of course, much more difficult to
make cost estimates deeper into the fu-
ture, than for a single year, but with (at
the moment) at least a five-year window
for the receipt of AFDC [now TANF] by
refugees, the utility of moving them into
jobs early in the process is self-evident.
For example, securing a job for a refugee
(that she keeps) nine months into the first
year reduces first-year cash assistance
costs by 25 percent but the same place-
ment, when looked at in a five-year con-
text, reduces those costs by 85 percent
(three months of nonuse of cash assistance
is 25 percent of twelve, while fifty-one
months of nonuse is 85 percent of sixty.)
These estimated real savings would be
largely invisible ones, making the institu-
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Chart 13.
Pattern of Decline in Cash Assistance
Usage by Refugees over Time
(Based Roughly on ORR Survey Data)
UTILIZATION OF MONTHS SINCE ARRIVAL IN U.S.
CASH ASSISTANCE 0 4 8 12 16 20 24 28 32 36 40 44 48 52 56 60
(Percentages)
95%
90%
85%
80%                             Earned income only
75%
70%
65%
60%        .                                             .
55%
50%
45%
40%
35%            Some receipt of or full dependence on
30%                     public or private cash assistance
35%
30%
25%
20%
15%
10%
 5%
 0%
Note: This schema assumes that almost all arriving refugees use cash assistance, if only R&P funds,
hence the location of A; the placement of B reflects the portion of refugees in the U.S. for five years
or less who get along without cash assistance; as ORR survey data show the average for the five-
year experience is at about B, then at the end of the five years the utilization rate is probably lower,
such as at C.  The shape of the line A-B-C is illustrative only.
`
The location of B, at 69 percent, is derived from the ORR Report to Congress FY ’94, page 61,
which reports 30.5 percent of the five-years-or-less refugee population as dependent on earnings
only, hence 69.5 percent of the five-year refugee population depends, to some extent or fully, on
assistance payments from various sources.
Notice what a large percentage of the savings, as represented by the area above line A-B-C,
occurs after the first year in the country (shown by the dotted vertical line).
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tion of such a reform—should it be re-
garded as good public policy—that much
more difficult politically than it would be
were the cost savings more visible.
APPENDICES
A: A Note About
Educational Costs
Educational costs have not been calculated
in this paper, but not because they are not
significant.  The cost of the full course of
K-12 education for a single child dwarfs
the costs of resettling a single refugee.  As
we have shown, the first- year costs of
resettling a refugee run in the $8,000-10,000
range and then decline in later years,
sharply for those who secure employment.
In contrast, the U.S. was spending $5,528
a year per elementary and high school
student ($71,864 for thirteen years) in
1993.19
The reasons for not calculating refugee
education costs are dual: first, these costs
would not be changed a bit were refugees
to be resettled in a different manner; sec-
ond, the history of refugee resettlement
has been replete with the federal support
of specific health and welfare costs of the
refugees, but rarely has it done much
about refugee education costs, per se.
Some federal dollars help fund the edu-
cation of refugee children, but only be-
cause they belong to a larger class, such
as low-income children, or those involved
in a bilingual instruction program.
B: A Note About
Kentucky, Nevada,
and Health Care
Costs
There is a superficial resemblance between
the San Diego USCC project and the USCC
work in Kentucky and Nevada.  In all
three instances, USCC affiliates are oper-
ating under the wing of the ORR Wilson-
Fish program, (a statutory arrangement
for alternative resettlement systems) and
in all three the affiliates are furnishing a
one-stop refugee resettlement operation,
providing R&P, cash assistance, and so-
cial and employment services to RCA
refugees.
The San Diego program, however, was
designed as an experiment to test an al-
ternative resettlement model.  (It does not,
incidentally, deal with health care.)  In the
two other sites, the state government es-
sentially withdrew from the refugee pro-
19 Calculated from Statistical Abstract of the United States 1995, Table 287.
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gram, and USCC stepped in to fill the
gap.
While both the Kentucky and Nevada pro-
grams have been successful in finding
work for refugees, neither, apparently has
created a control group to evaluate its
activities.  (The San Diego program, in
contrast, hired an outside evaluator whose
report was not available as of this writ-
ing.)
Both of these statewide programs pro-
vided me with information, and both are
among the smaller states in terms of  FY
’95 refugee arrivals (Kentucky 1,097 and
Nevada, 609)  but their experiences have
been so different from one another that at
first glance, one can not see them as fit-
ting into any particular pattern.
For example, their reports on the three
basic elements of resettlement costs (RCA,
RMA, and administrative) are quite dif-
ferent.  The AFDC unit costs (a proxy for
RCA unit costs) are about 35 percent
higher in Nevada than in Kentucky so the
higher Nevada RCA costs [see below]
should be expected.  Nevada is spending
considerably more on administration than
Kentucky and much less on health care,
with the principal variation in the latter
instance being the medical insurance costs
in the two states.  The data follow.
COST NEVADA KENTUCKY
CATEGORY (ACTUALS (BUDGET
 FY ’95)  96-97)
RCA $354,824 $  231,661
RMA $410,924 $1,909,937
Administrative $289,388** $  100,403*
*Does not include its share of USCC’s nation-
al Wilson-Fish administrative costs, which, for
Kentucky came to about $70,000.
**May or may not include such costs.
On a second glance, however, two con-
cepts emerge from these puzzling
numbers:
1. There is a lot of room for state-by-
state variations in refugee resettlement
patterns and cost structures; and,
more importantly,
2. Purchasing health care may become
the key factor in managing the costs of
refugee resettlement.
Recall that RMA costs about twice as
much as RCA [see Model A, Chart 3] and
that Medicaid (for the U.S. generally) costs
five times as much as AFDC; Medicaid is
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the wider program, but even on a per capita
basis, Medicaid cost about twice as much
in 1993 as AFDC ($3,042 v. $1,591).20
Reorganizing resettlement to reduce cash
assistance costs may be an excellent idea,
but perhaps the way to really contain costs
in the refugee program is to figure out a
way to purchase appropriate health ser-
vices for refugees in a cost-effective man-
ner.  However, it may also be that the
skills needed to cause refugees to seek
work, rather than cash assistance, are quite
different than the skills needed to make
effective health care purchasing decisions.
The resettlement dialogue has been fo-
cused on the first subject, not the second.
C: State-Supplied
Data on Cash
Assistance
Early in this study there was a hope that
enough refugee cash and medical assis-
tance data could be secured from the states
to provide substantial insights; unfortu-
nately, few states collect data or even make
estimates on the use of AFDC and Med-
icaid by refugees, collecting only the data
they need to meet the ORR requirements
on RCA and RMA.
Several people, however, did have data,
and it is appropriate to record what was
learned from these refugee coordinators.21
Louisiana is a low-benefit state, with an
average AFDC monthly family check of
$164 in 1993;22 one would thus expect that
there would be more newly arrived RCA
beneficiaries than continuing AFDC
claims.  This is the case.  While the state
does not collect data on refugees on
AFDC, the state coordinator polled the
local resettlement agencies and estimated
that there were 65 people on AFDC in
late 1996, as compared to a count of 312
RCA recipients.
Illinois and Colorado (both with an aver-
age $324 per month family benefits) are
among the mid-level benefit states, and
both maintain highly useful cash assistance
tracking systems well beyond the ORR
requirements, Illinois for two years, and
Colorado, seemingly, forever (or at least
since 1975).
20 Total costs, in 1993, were $101,709,000,000 for Medicaid and $22,688,000,000 for AFDC.
See: Statistical Abstract of the United States 1995, Tables 163 and 612.
21 Steve Thibodeaux in Louisiana, Ed Silverman in Illinois, and Laurie Bagan in Colorado
were very helpful.  State Coordinator offices in Maine, Massachusetts, and Nebraska also
provided information they had on the subject.
22 Statistical Abstract of the United States 1995, Table 612.
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The most useful Illinois data, for assis-
tance utilization in FY ’95, showed the fol-
lowing:
ILLINOIS REFUGEE DATA: FY ’95
ARRIVALS AVERAGE PERCENT
MONTHLY ARRIVALS
PERSONS
FY ’95 RCA 957 10.9
(4,464) RMA/MG 736 17.0
GA 264  6.0
AFDC 940 21.7
                         2,897 66.8
FY ’94 GA 615 13.8
(4,335) AFDC 941 21.1
          1,556 34.9
While the data above deal with two co-
horts of refugees, those arriving in FYs ’94
and ’95, the numbers work out as one
might expect were this a longitudinal data
set: RCA and MG leave the scene after the
first year, cash assistance drops sharply,
GA is much more of a factor the second
year, and, at least in this instance, AFDC
remains stable.  The two-year average for
cash assistance utilization of 50.6 percent
in Illinois (over the two years) is consistent
with the national ORR survey data shown
in Chart 13, but there is less welfare utili-
zation in Illinois than nationally.
While the Louisiana and Illinois data tend
to confirm national patterns, Colorado’s
does not because of a significant differ-
ence in the way AFDC is handled in that
state.  Most refugee families contain two
parents, and are thus in welfare jargon
“intact.”  In most states intact refugee
families are eligible for AFDC (or more
precisely AFDC-U); in Colorado, however,
one must have documented work experi-
ence to qualify for AFDC-U.  (In most
states this documentation requirement is
waived, and a declaration that one has
worked sufficient quarters in the past will
be accepted.)  Refugees typically cannot
produce such documentation, and, thus,
CASH ASSISTANCE UTILIZATION / INDIVIDUALS / FY ’95 / COLORADO
Year of RCA AFDC Other Total Percent
Arrival of Arrivals
1995  318   8   2 328       41.8
1994    0  51  47  98    8.1
1993    0  83  39 122   10.5
1992    0  87  67 154   13.4
Most of the “others” above are SSI cases.
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intact families are supported only by RCA
in Colorado.
Because of this element in the system, the
Colorado experience with long-term cash
assistance utilization is much like that of
the USCC operation in San Diego; refu-
gees either get jobs or they leave the state.
Some workers in intact families get jobs
in Colorado, however, and lose them later,
and consequently qualify for AFDC-U.
This explains why there is a mild rise in
AFDC utilization (from a tiny base) as time
passes.
D: Social Service
Usage by Asylees and
Refugees23
In a nonlegal sense, one might lump refu-
gees, asylees, and asylum seekers into a
single category: people fleeing from per-
secution in their homeland (or arguing that
they are doing so).  Thus, a casual ob-
server might think that refugees, asylees,
and asylum seekers all have the same
rights to social service benefits and the
have same patterns of utilization.  But this
is not so.
In general terms, asylees and U.S.
government-recognized refugees have the
same legal rights to social service benefits,
which can be extensive.  Asylum seekers,
however, have legal access to very few
government-funded programs.  Further,
although the evidence is sketchy, it ap-
pears that asylees are much less likely to
be extensive users of social service pro-
grams than refugees.  There appears to be
nothing within the asylee experience that
is comparable to the widespread use of
AFDC by large Hmong families in Cali-
fornia and Wisconsin, for  example, or the
widespread use of SSI by age sixty-five or
older former Soviets in Brooklyn; these
are refugee, not asylee, populations.
Additionally, eligibility to work legally in
the U.S., as symbolized by the Employ-
ment Authorization Document [EAD] and
eligibility for federally-funded social ser-
vices are handled quite separately for the
asylum applicant and the asylee popula-
tions—even as they are neatly linked for
the refugee population.
n Refugees, as they arrive in the U.S.,
immediately are granted the right
to work and to an array of social
service programs, the latter slight-
ly wider than that enjoyed by cit-
izens.  (In their first eight months
in the nation, low-income refugees
can secure both Refugee Cash As-
sistance [RCA] and Refugee Med-
ical Assistance [RMA] even if they
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are single adults, i.e., without the
dependent children needed for
AFDC eligibility.)
n Asylum applicants are eligible for
virtually no social services beyond
the bare minimum, i.e., those ser-
vices provided to illegal immi-
grants (emergency medical servic-
es and K-12 public education.)24
Asylee applicants in the past had
access to EADs after 90 days, and
currently after 180 days, provid-
ed that they have not encountered
a final rejection of their claims.
n Asylees, on the other hand, are
eligible for the full collection of
refugee benefits described above.
So much for the rules.  In practice it ap-
pears that asylees are much less likely than
refugees to make use of their eligibility
for cash assistance.  While no formal work
has been done on this matter, we do have
two strong sets of indicators.  The first
one is statistical.  There is a much lower
use of Food Stamps and Supplemental
Security Income [SSI] among the asylees
than among the refugees [see Chart 14].
The second indicator is a structural one.
Yes, asylees are eligible for the same set
of benefits as refugees; but, while refugee
benefits start upon admission to the U.S.,
asylee benefits occur only after asylee sta-
tus has been granted.  Until reform, asy-
lum applicants rarely received asylee sta-
tus during the fleeting eight months of
Refugee Cash Assistance, so asylees do
not experience the temptation of instant
welfare benefits (as refugees do); instead
they have to work for a living (legally or
illegally) and this sets them on a path to
employment, rather than welfare.
Further, and probably of at least equal
importance, the prospect of asylum in the
U.S. attracts a somewhat different popu-
lation than the prospect of refugee life in
the U.S.  While the refugee process brings
whole families to the U.S, including people
who are old and/or disabled (and thus
eligible for SSI), the chancier asylum pro-
cess is more likely to attract younger, more
able-bodied people.
Finally, there is the variable of financing
the trip to the U.S.  Refugees receive travel
loans and pay nothing up-front for the
airplane trip to the U.S.; asylum appli-
cants (or their families) pay for the plane
ride, indicating that they have at least a
little more money, on average, than refu-
gees.
The delay in securing asylee status, at least
in the past, has been such that the eligibil-
ity of asylees for Refugee Cash Assistance
[RCA] has been little utilized, if ever, ac-
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Chart 14.
Food Stamp and SSI Usage
among Refugees and Asylees
Note: Both asylees and refugees are aliens who have, by definition, convinced the U.S. govern-
ment that they are fleeing from persecution; asylees and refugees, once recognized as such,
have exactly the same sets of rights to government benefits and services.  Refugees,
however, travel to the U.S. by plane on U.S. travel loans, and upon arrival they have instant
access to cash assistance and government-funded volag services.  Asylees must pay for
their own travel to the U.S., have no rights to benefits and services on arrival, and typically
work illegally until securing asylee status. It is argued that this initial differential treatment
has an impact on the subsequent patterns of social service utilization by these aliens.
Sources: Admissions and approvals data are from the 1994 Statistical Yearbook of INS, Tables 25 and
29; unpublished SSI utilization data from the 1 percent sample of SSI recipients, by tele-
phone, from SSA/Baltimore; unpublished Food Stamps utilization data from the Food and
Nutrition Service/Alexandria, by telephone.
POPULATIONS
REFUGEE
ADMISSIONS
(1987-1994)
ASYLEE
APPROVALS
(1987-1994)
PROXY FOR
THE SIZE OF
THE TWO DIF-
FERENT POP-
ULATIONS
 (COLUMN 1)
809,316
48,336
SSI
USERS
DEC. 1995
(COLUMN 2)
149,100
4,100
COLUMN 2
AS % OF
COLUMN 1
(COLUMN 3)
17.9
8.4
FOOD
STAMP
USERS
FY 1994
(COLUMN 4)
363,000
12,000
COLUMN 4
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COLUMN 1
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44.9
24.8
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cording to those at the ORR dealing with
such matters.  Asylees can, however,
should they meet the family and income
requirements of AFDC, be eligible for that
program were they to apply.  I did not
find any asylee-specific data on AFD uti-
lization, but would suspect that AFDC,
like Food Stamps, would be utilized less
by asylees than by refugees.
E: Estimating the
Median Cost of
Federal Employee
Health Services
Model C-2 includes an estimate of what it
would cost the federal government were
it to provide most health services to refu-
gees through the systems used for federal
employees and their families.  Those esti-
mates are, in turn, based on the prevail-
ing (1996) monthly premiums; these pre-
miums are the total cost of the programs
and include both federal and worker pay-
ments.
There are more than 1,000 such programs,
sometimes organized for a particular
group of employees (e.g., foreign service
officers), but more often relating to a spe-
cific health service catchment area.  Some
are managed fee-for-service programs,
some are “plans with a point-of-service
product” but most are Health Maintenance
Organizations [HMOs].  The monthly costs
vary widely.
Virtually all of the premiums in this sys-
tem are either for “High Self” coverage,
i.e., for the worker only or “High Fam-
ily,” for the worker and his/her depen-
dents.  The handful of “standard” rates
were not included.
Estimation of  a median cost for these pro-
grams involved the following steps:
1. I obtained from the government
personnel office serving the Ad-
ministration on Children, Youth,
and Families a seventy-one-page
publication, Non-Postal Premium
Rates for the Federal Employees
Health Benefits Program (whose
source, while clearly within the
federal government, was not
shown);
2. I used a sampling strategy, writ-
ing down the first “High Self”
monthly premium on each page
of the listing, rounding to the
nearest dollar (for the RCA and
SSI clients in the refugee program,
most of whom are single individ-
uals or childless couples), and
then used the merge/sort function
in WordPerfect to find the medi-
an among these seventy-one en-
tries;
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3. I repeated the same operation for
“High Family” benefit amounts
(which was used vis-a-vis the
AFDC population);
4. In this manner I found monthly
medians of $163 for individuals
and $422 for families.
5. I then calculated annual cost fig-
ures, per covered refugee unit, as
follows: AFDC 12 mos. x $422 =
$5,064; RCA 8 mos. x $163 =
$1,304.
The SSI population in this scenar-
io is to remain in Medicaid (where
it is now); 1993 data on the aver-
age annual cost of 65+ Medicaid
recipients is $8,168.25
6. Then using the proportion of
AFDC-RCA-SSI cases seen in
Chart 5 above, I secured the fol-
lowing population estimates (for
those individuals arriving in FY
’95): AFDC 57,185, SSI  7,754, RCA
31,985, for a total  96,924 individ-
uals.
7. I selected an admittedly arbitrary
estimate of 4.0 members for each
refugee family in the AFDC cate-
gory,
8. I divided 57,185 by 4.0 and found
a family total of 14,296.
9. Next I multiplied the populations
shown above (in steps 6, 7, and 8)
by the first year cost figures (in
step 4) as follows: AFDC 14,296
(families) x $5,064 = $72,394,944;
RCA 31,985 (individuals) x $1,304
= $41,708,440.
This produced a rounded total of
$114.1 million for this group.  The
calculation for the SSI clients in
Medicaid was: SSI  7,754 (individ-
uals) x $8,168 = $63,334,672.
Applying the usual 55-45 percent
formula for the division of Med-
icaid costs between the federal
and the state levels produces these
rounded numbers: $34.8 million
federal and $28.5 million state, as
is shown in Model C-2.
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eration.  Without knowing its consequences, it would
be difficult to tell if the Operation has been working
in the ways it was intended, not to mention hard to
render an overall judgment about the balance of
positive and negative consequences that it might be
generating.
The study’s ultimate objective, which is to discern
the larger significance of the Operation for issues
pertaining to U.S. immigration and immigrant policy,
has several implications.  First, it means conse-
quences must be assessed for both El Paso and
Juárez.  If apparently positive effects in one commu-
nity are accompanied by seemingly negative effects
in the other, then focusing on only one side of the
border could give misleading impressions about the
overall effects on two cities tied by a symbiotic (if at
times uneasy) relationship.  Obviously each city’s
home country retains sovereignty over its side of
the border.  But equally clearly, if one city gains at
the expense of the other, hardship and disequilib-
rium may result, with attendant implications both
for the kinds and numbers of Mexicans wanting to
migrate to the United States and for the kind of
reception migrants encounter when they arrive.
Second, different persons cross the border between
Juárez and El Paso for different reasons, which means
that there are several different types of border cross-
ers.  Generalizations about one type of flow may not
apply to another type.  Thus, Operation Hold the
Line may have affected (and may be affecting) these
different kinds of crossers in varying ways.  It is
critical to examine initiatives like Operation Hold
the Line within a framework that from the very be-
ginning takes into account this possibility.  This
conceptualization of multiple kinds of border cross-
ers provides not only a multidimensional framework
for examining the workings and effects of Operation
Hold the Line, but one that also holds the promise
of leading to new ways to assess the effectiveness of
border control policies and strategies.
Third, and relatedly, an adequate interpretation of
the effects of Operation Hold the Line must con-
sider a multiplicity of outcomes.  For example, an
interpretation that seemingly explains changes since
the inception of the Operation in apprehension sta-
I. Introduction
On September 19, 1993, Silvestre Reyes, the Chief of
the El Paso Sector of the Border Patrol of the U.S.
Immigration and Naturalization Service [INS],
launched Operation Blockade along a twenty-mile
stretch of the U.S./Mexico border between El Paso
and Juárez.  Renamed Operation Hold the Line three
weeks later (to avoid the negative connotations as-
sociated with the word “blockade”), the initiative
represented an effort to cut off illegal migration from
Mexico into El Paso (and through El Paso into the
United States).  As such, it involved a major shift in
strategy on the part of the El Paso sector Border
Patrol.  Previously the Border Patrol had allowed
relatively unhindered movements across the river,
concentrating on the subsequent interception of cross-
ers who had already entered the city, including those
who were trying to move inland at major transpor-
tation arteries (roads, railroad lines, and airports).
While the old strategy took advantage of the rug-
ged, arid terrain around El Paso that makes it dif-
ficult for long distance migrants to move to other
destinations once they have entered, it allowed easy
access to El Paso for substantial numbers of undocu-
mented Mexicans who were not intent on migrating
on to other destinations.  The new strategy, how-
ever, by saturating the border between El Paso and
Juárez with agents, was intended to curtail both local
and long-distance illegal migration.
This research examines the workings and effects of
Operation Hold the Line, starting with its inception
in late September 1993 and running through April
1994, the latest release date for relevant data as of
the writing of this report.  The main goal of the
Operation was to slow illegal flows.  In the words
of the Border Patrol, “Operation Hold the Line’s
main mission is to prevent . . . undocumented aliens
from crossing illegally” (Reyes 1994).  Hence, the
first objective of this study is to assess the extent to
which a slowdown in such flows has been achieved.
The second major goal of the study is to determine
the social and economic effects of the Operation on
El Paso/Juárez.  This is not only crucial for deter-
mining the extent to which the Operation is achiev-
ing its primary mission, but it is also fundamental
for developing rough overall assessments of the Op-
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tistics but not in hospital admissions and births, for
example, is less useful than one that explains both.
The strategy used examines a wide range of conse-
quences that might be thought to be associated with
the Operation.  This offers the advantages of both
greater comprehensiveness of coverage and an in-
creased likelihood of discerning the Operation’s ef-
fects.  Whereas individual pieces of evidence may
not provide enough basis for reaching firm conclu-
sions, many different pieces of evidence taken to-
gether carry greater weight and provide a stronger
basis for research conclusions, especially if these gen-
erally point in the same direction.
Certain theoretical and methodological consider-
ations have implications for the strategies followed
in this research.  Theoretical notions about the U.S./
Mexico border consist of implicit and explicit ideas
people hold and articulate about the structure and
functioning of economic and social relationships in
the relevant regions of both countries.  Different
theories influence thinking about the kinds of immi-
gration (and other) policies that various observers
believe are most needed in a post-NAFTA environ-
ment.  Views that give overriding emphasis to the
border as a mostly geographic boundary between
sovereign states tend to highlight divergences in state
interests and the need for policies that protect these,
just as views that give predominant weight to the
border as an area in which northern Mexico and the
southwestern United States are inextricably tied to-
gether tend to highlight convergences in state inter-
ests and the need for policies that foster further
integration (Bean, Vernez & Kelly 1989; Weintraub
1990).
The theoretical view used here combines elements
of both of these.  It is akin to perspectives that see
the border as a complex mixture of both integrating
and differentiating processes that are often in ten-
sion with one another (Lowenthal & Burgess 1993).
Policies that would either only increase legal cross-
ings or only restrict illegal crossings risk oversimpli-
fying the complexities involved in border dynamics.
As shown below in the case of the U.S./Mexico
border in general, and in the case of Operation Hold
the Line in particular, legal and illegal migration are
not only connected by virtue of U.S. immigration
policy and border control strategies, they also often
appear to substitute for one another.  This examina-
tion of Operation Hold the Line thus seeks to assess
its effects on both illegal and legal crossings, as well
as to discern the implications of these for various
policy options concerning both legal and illegal im-
migration and nonimmigrant crossings at the U.S./
Mexico border.
Methodologically, this research relies on both quan-
titative and qualitative evidence to develop an as-
sessment of the Operation.  The former includes
official statistics that provide a basis for ascertaining
the representativeness, scope, and magnitude of the
Operation’s effects.  Border crossing and apprehen-
sions data, police and crime data, birth and hospital
data, education and school attendance statistics, and
sales tax and general sales data were examined.  The
qualitative evidence is obtained from ethnographic
fieldwork and in-depth interviews that provide in-
formation about motivations and processes not al-
ways revealed in official statistics; over four months
the research team conducted interviews with nearly
two hundred persons, including both local and fed-
eral government officials in both El Paso and Juárez,
as well as numerous other persons at border cross-
ing sites and other locales in both cities.  The objec-
tive of the study is thus to combine the lessons from
both qualitative and quantitative data into an inter-
pretation of what has been happening in El Paso/
Juárez as a result of the onset and continuation of
Operation Hold the Line.
The monograph is organized into nine chapters.
After the introduction, the second is a description of
Operation Hold the Line, together with a discussion
of the geographical and metropolitan context within
which the Operation has taken place.  The third
examines evidence about the curtailment of flows as
indicated by border crossing and apprehensions data.
The fourth examines effects on business and eco-
nomic activity, and the fifth analyzes effects on edu-
cation, births and social services.  The sixth presents
an examination of the effects of the Operation on
crime rates and other indicators of illegal or disrup-
tive behaviors.  The seventh details effects on com-
munity and public opinion.  The eighth chapter fo-
cuses on the Operation’s consequences for Juárez
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and the people living there, paying special attention
to the experience of obtaining and using Border
Crossing Cards.  The ninth provides an overall as-
sessment of the Operation’s effects, together with
discussion of the implications of the study’s find-
ings for immigration and border crossing issues.
II. The
Operation and
Its Context
This chapter presents a brief description of the Op-
eration, followed by a discussion of the wider met-
ropolitan and border crossing context within which
the Operation began and continues to the present
day.  Two aspects of context are particularly impor-
tant: the geographic and urban structural features of
the larger El Paso/Juárez metropolitan area that both
constrain and compel certain kinds of migration
patterns; and the policies governing legal nonimmi-
grant border crossings between Juárez and El Paso,
together with their implementation, that structure
the interrelationship between legal and illegal mi-
gration in the region.  Thus, understanding the ef-
fects of the Operation necessitates both an aware-
ness of the circumstances under which legal cross-
ings take place and a recognition that these can of-
ten influence illegal crossings.
Operation Hold the Line
Operation Blockade was launched on Sunday, Sep-
tember 19, 1993.  Conceived by Silvestre Reyes, Chief
Patrol Agent for the El Paso Sector of the United
States Border Patrol, the Operation represented a
major change in strategy for controlling the border
in the El Paso sector.  The previous emphasis had
been on apprehending suspected illegal aliens once
they had crossed the border.  The new concept was
to enhance linewatch operations by maintaining a
high profile along a stretch of approximately twenty
miles of border in the metropolitan El Paso area.
The goal was to discourage the unregulated flow of
illegal migration of individuals from Mexico into El
Paso and the United States by stopping people be-
fore they crossed the border (Martin 1993).
Shortly after his appointment in July, 1993, Chief
Reyes submitted plans for Operation Blockade to
Headquarters, U.S. Immigration and Naturalization
Service [INS], suggesting that the border could be
controlled with an aggressive, high-profile intercep-
tion strategy.  INS approved the expenditure of $300
thousand for the operation, primarily to fund over-
time payments.  The Operation was launched shortly
after midnight on September 19, when 130 agents
and 3 maintenance crews were deployed to saturate
the line along the river and to begin repairing holes
in the border fence.  More than 400 of the El Paso
Sector’s 650 Border Patrol agents were deployed 24-
hours-per-day, 7-days-per-week along the border.
Agents were withdrawn from such other duties as
employer sanctions, traffic checks, and support po-
sitions, to double the number of agents stationed
along the border.  Prior to the initiation of Opera-
tion Blockade, the Border Patrol had concentrated
less on illegal migrants crossing the border and more
on tracking them down and arresting them after
they crossed and as they moved on to other desti-
nations.  The new Operation was designed mainly
to curtail illegal crossing.  Other major goals of the
Operation, according to Chief Reyes, were to reduce
crime, panhandling, and street vending in down-
town El Paso and to remove agents from situations
that sometimes not only led to the accidental ha-
rassment of Mexican Americans in El Paso, but also
placed agents at risk of personal injury.
The blockade took a three-pronged approach.  First,
a line of Border Patrol agents was established in full
view of the border.  Parked in their distinctive, sig-
nature-green Chevrolet Suburbans on the levee roads
along the Rio Grande from border monument num-
ber one in the west to the Ysleta headgates in the
east, the agents, through the sheer force of numbers,
were intended to deter potential illegal border cross-
ers.  Agents were stationed close enough together to
have visual contact with other agents on either side
of them.  Some were as close as fifty yards and
others as far apart as one-quarter mile, depending
on the terrain.  Agents were instructed to appre-
hend and detain illegal border crossers and to call
for assistance and reinforcements as required.  Con-
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centrations of agents were particularly heavy at the
most common border penetration locations, such as
railroad bridges and shallow points in the river.
Second, four helicopter patrols were established and
operated during the three-week blockade.  Airborne
agents maintained radio contact with agents on the
ground to coordinate deterrent efforts.
Third, the 9-mile stretch of the border fence in the
downtown El Paso area along the Rio Grande River,
which had numerous holes and was breachable in
some 125 locations, was repaired. The holes in the
fence were closed at the start of Operation Block-
ade; the agency effected rapid repairs as new holes
were created by migrants trying to cross the border.
A week prior to initiating the Operation, Chief Reyes
informed Mr. Alfred Giugni, El Paso INS District
Director of the impending operation.  The INS Dis-
trict Office is responsible for controlling border cross-
ings at ports of entry.  To strengthen bridge traffic-
screening capabilities in El Paso, Mr. Giugni re-
quested additional manpower from the INS regional
office in Dallas.  A team of one coordinator, nine
immigration inspectors, and one K-9 drug-sniffing
dog and handler was dispatched for the initial three
weeks of the Operation.  INS agents at border-cross-
ing points of entry were instructed to inspect docu-
ments of individuals passing through inspection sta-
tions more thoroughly than previously.  As a result
of the closer inspections, some 443 Mexican Border
Crossing Cards [BCCs] (INS forms I-186/I-586) were
seized in the first thirty days.  Some were confis-
cated because they were counterfeit, while others
were carried by unauthorized holders or by people
who were thought to be crossing the border to work
illegally.
The initiation of Operation Blockade produced a di-
versity of reactions.  The Operation was widely cov-
ered by both the U.S. and Mexican media, and in
general the response in El Paso was favorable.  Ra-
dio call-in polls in El Paso reported overwhelmingly
positive reactions with levels of support running
higher than 90 percent.  The national news media
ran numerous stories praising the Operation.  A Time
Magazine article quoted Mayor Larry Francis: “The
rampant criminal problems in our downtown are
gone,” and Fred Morales, from the Chihuahuita
barrio, said “The stabbings and shootings are down
to zero” (Woodbury 1993).  On the MacNeil/Lehrer
News Hour on November 23, Doris Meissner, the
newly appointed Commissioner of the Immigration
and Naturalization Service, said of the Operation:
“It’s been a very successful program from an en-
forcement standpoint. . . . because it has prevented
illegal immigration from occurring.”  In California,
officials called for a similar program along their
state’s southern border (Pinkerton 1993).  Many other
similarly positive reactions were reported.
In Juárez, however, reactions were more negative.
For example, an interview with the presidente mu-
nicipal (mayor) of Juárez, Francisco Villarreal,
Abelardo Escobar, the secretario del ayuntamiento, and
Jose Albert Silva, the director del gobierno revealed
that the mayor had first learned of Operation Block-
ade in the press.  He felt that the U.S. authorities
should have notified their counterparts and local
government officials on the Mexican side before
launching the Operation in September 1993.  Al-
though he opposed the Operation from the start as
an “unfortunate, discriminatory, and unjust mea-
sure,” Villarreal  felt that fewer problems would have
resulted had consultation with the Mexican side been
pursued:
A lot of it has to do with the way it was
done.  The way they chose was terribly un-
fortunate.  We have a good relationship with
Mr. Reyes [the Border Patrol chief].  He has
been here several times, but this was some-
thing different. . . . If you go about things
the right way it is very easy to find a com-
mon objective.  Actions that converge upon
the same thing.  But they didn’t give us that
opportunity, but rather presented the block-
ade as adversaries.1
He also added that as mayor of Juárez, he had no
objection to the Border Patrol’s enforcement of U.S.
laws, but only to what he saw as the disrespectful
and inconsiderate way in which the new enforce-
1 All direct quotes in this section are translated from
Spanish.
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ment strategy was implemented.
Like other Juárez citizens and business leaders in-
terviewed, Mayor Villarreal was particularly con-
cerned by statements—made by Chief Reyes and
later repeated in the press—that associated undocu-
mented Mexicans with crime in El Paso.  He noted
the lack of U.S. efforts to cooperate with the appro-
priate authorities in Juárez before acting unilater-
ally.  He also said the implication that Mexican
nationals are responsible for downtown El Paso’s
crime problems is especially rankling to Juárenses
given the numerous disturbances caused by drunken
El Paso revelers on the streets of downtown Juárez:
You can’t associate crime with Mexican
crossers.  Whether it’s true or not.  But if
even if it is true, you don’t bring it up pub-
licly!  Nobody can say that Mexican delin-
quents go to El Paso.  Why don’t we talk
about the American delinquents who come
over here to get drunk before going home?
Because I have no reason to say it.  I have
to see what can be done about it first.  At
three o’clock in the morning, the people
coming out of the bars are pure Americans—
children and adolescents that come over here
just to raise hell.  Why should I broadcast
that?  I need to call across the border to my
counterpart to see what we can do about it.
Mr. Escobar added that if all the ilegales that had
been prevented from crossing into El Paso were in
fact delincuentes, then Juárez would have experienced
a sharp rise in petty crime.  It did not.  Instead, he
noted, it experienced a boom in street vending by
persons who before the Operation sold their wares
in El Paso.
Like many Juárez citizens who spoke with us, the
city officials were critical how INS officials treated
legal Mexican border crossers at the ports of entry.
Mr. Escobar discussed the fear and intimidation that
the INS inspector confiscation of Border Crossing
Cards [BCCs] provoked among Juárez residents:
One important thing about the checking of
the Border Crossing Cards.  A lot of our
people in Juárez work here and cross over
to El Paso to shop, or for other activities.  It
takes a lot of effort for them to get their
crossing card.  When officials on the bridges
put pressure on them, people get nervous.
They’re afraid that they’re going to have their
card taken away.  This provoked a kind of
psychosis in the community.  Especially
among the most humble people, the ones
who can least defend themselves.  If one of
these officials is hostile towards me, and
demands to know where I’m going, and
what I’m going to do in El Paso, this is going
to upset me, even if I’m not going to do
anything bad.  And many people don’t know
exactly what their rights are or how the of-
ficial is supposed to act, and these people
don’t know how to stand up for themselves
in such a situation.  So when they started
inspecting crossers so aggressively, a lot of
people just stopped going to El Paso because
they were afraid.
At the same time, the mayor and the other officials
emphasized that the tolerance of illegal crossing for
so many years by the Border Patrol led many Juárez
residents not to bother to apply for the Border Cross-
ing Card.  They also thought it undermined the le-
gitimacy of the U.S. authorities in the minds of many
Mexican border residents.  Mr. Escobar described
the situation on the international bridges before Op-
eration Hold the Line:
Before the Operation, for many years, the
people of Juárez went to El Paso, oftentimes
illegally.  Some through the river, others even
over the bridge!  On the Bridge of the Ameri-
cas you could be waiting in line to be in-
spected, and on the left hand side of the
bridge, that other side, you could see people
walking north right through [illegally] into
the United States, just fifty meters away from
the official inspection point.  And there we’d
be, right on the bridge, and we’d watch—I
don’t know how the Border Patrol let this
happen—we’d watch people walk through,
with strollers, with children, with bags.  And
here you are in line to enter, asking yourself,
“How is this possible?”  Here they’re asking
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you, “Where are you going?  What do you
intend to do in the United States?”  A series
of aggressive questions.  And I’m here in
line, my passport in hand, and I’m not bring-
ing in any contraband.  And watching the
people walk right on through on the other
side, freely.  Then all of a sudden the Border
Patrol shuts off this “unofficial” entry into
El Paso, you know?  That was tolerated for
years.  It wasn’t that it was hidden, it was
tolerated.
The concern felt by Juárez residents after the block-
ade began came in large measure, these officials
agreed, from the overnight shift from evident toler-
ance of illegal crossing by Mexicans on the part of
the Border Patrol, to zero tolerance.  Moreover, the
Border Patrol’s historical tolerance of illegal border
crossing had resulted in many families in Juárez
becoming dependent upon goods and incomes
brought back by family members who crossed ille-
gally into El Paso.
On October 2, after more than 800 hours of over-
time costing more than $250 thousand, Operation
Blockade ended.  By the time the money to fund
payments of overtime compensation had been ex-
pended, Chief Reyes had decided to continue the
operation indefinitely because of its apparent suc-
cess in curtailing illegal flows into El Paso.  He re-
assigned agents from the interior of the El Paso
Sector2 to work the extreme ends of the line and
continue the operation.  The strategy continued to
be implemented, now renamed Operation Hold the
Line because the military-sounding term “blockade”
had offended community leaders in both El Paso
and Juárez.  Chief Reyes was further able to aug-
ment his core cadre of agents by requesting through
Border Patrol headquarters the temporary reassign-
ment of northern border sector personnel.  Thus far,
agents from sectors in Maine and Washington have
been detailed to augment the El Paso sector on thirty-
day assignments.  In a long-term action, Attorney
General Janet Reno announced on February 9, 1994,
that fifty additional agents would be hired and as-
signed to the El Paso Sector to further support imple-
mentation of the strategy.
On October 10, 1993, in an extension of the strategy,
the Border Patrol also proposed building a wall
dividing Sunland Park, New Mexico from Rancho
Anapra, Chihuahua, a poor squatter settlement on
the outskirts of Juárez and a favorite illegal crossing
point for Mexicans that is so easy to traverse that
Border Patrol agents refer to it as the “Anapra port
of entry.”  The squatter settlement at Anapra is not
served by the Juárez water or sewage system; resi-
dents of Sunland Park have for years given water to
their neighbors across the line by running garden
hoses across the border.  Many residents of Anapra
have shopped, worked, and even gone to church in
Sunland Park.  It is virtually impossible, especially
at night, to prevent illegal crossings, and the Border
Patrol believed that building a wall would be neces-
sary to control illegal crossing there.  Hence, Silvestre
Reyes announced his intention to construct a 2.8
kilometer steel wall on the slopes of Mount Cristo
Rey in the Sunland Park area.
This action was immediately dubbed “the border’s
own Berlin Wall” in the Mexican press.  The pro-
posal to build a wall also drew an immediate re-
sponse from the governor of the state of Chihuahua,
of the Partido de Acción Nacional [PAN], who de-
nounced the idea as “part of the environment of
hostility that has arisen on the border,” adding that
the wall “will not stem the flow of undocumented
migrants.”  Further, he called on Mexicans to “ab-
stain from shopping in El Paso, Texas, during this
Christmas season.”  The governor’s call for a boy-
cott was backed immediately by such business orga-
nizations such Cámera Nacional de la Industria de la
Transformación [CANACINTRA] and Cámera Nacional
del Comercio [CANACO], whose spokespersons talked
of possibly reviving “Operation Dignity,” a public
“buy Mexican” campaign of the past to convince
Juárez residents to refrain from shopping in El Paso.
The call for a boycott, however, was not supported
by the city government, also controlled by the PAN.
The consul general of Mexico in El Paso, Texas,
Armando Ortiz Rocha, called the proposed wall,
2 The El Paso Sector includes two counties in West Texas
and all of New Mexico, an area of 125 thousand square
miles and 289 miles of border.
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“unfriendly, inopportune and imprudent” and “an
unjustifiable aggression.”  Other organizations ex-
pressing opposition to the wall included both the
Hispanic and Greater El Paso Chambers of Com-
merce, some human rights and Latino civil rights
organizations, as well as Mayor Larry Francis of El
Paso.  Bruce King, the governor of New Mexico also
weighed in, saying that the wall would send an
“unfriendly message” at exactly the wrong time,
during the ongoing negotiations on the North Ameri-
can Free Trade Agreement [NAFTA].  Also, on Fri-
day, October 10, the mayors of both El Paso and
Juárez had confirmed their participation in a series
of cultural and artistic events that were planned
under the rubric of “Day of Unity: We are all
Fronterizos.”  The culmination of “Day of Unity” was
to have been the signing by city officials and civic
leaders from both cities of a “good neighbors con-
vention” at the international line on the “Free Bridge”
connecting the United States and Mexico.  The sign-
ing ceremony was canceled at the last minute to
protest the wall proposal.  The Juárez mayor de-
clared his opposition in an official statement, as did
Mayor Francis of El Paso, who said the wall “would
send the wrong message,” a view shared by Con-
gressman Ron Coleman.
The Metropolitan Context
The nature of the El Paso/Juárez metropolitan area
must be understood to appreciate fully the con-
straints facing the Operation.  El Paso’s unique geo-
graphical location has played a vital role in its so-
cial, economic, and political development.  The city
lies in extreme west Texas, at an elevation of 3,762
feet.  To the east lies the west Texas desert, while to
the west lie the Rocky Mountains.  El Paso is con-
nected to the rest of the United States by air (an
international airport), rail (three major railroads), and
highways, but the city remains nonetheless some-
what isolated because of the long distances that must
be traveled to reach other population centers.  Al-
though El Paso lies along U.S. Interstate 10, a main
cross-country highway that connects the Atlantic
Coast at Jacksonville, Florida, to the Pacific Coast at
Los Angeles, vast distances must be covered to reach
other major cities: to the west, Phoenix is 400 miles,
San Diego 725 and Los Angeles 790; to the east lies
San Antonio (560 miles), Dallas (625 miles), Hous-
ton (750 miles), and New Orleans (1100 miles).  El
Paso also straddles the Pan American Highway,
which connects Nome, Alaska to Tierra del Fuego at
the southern tip of South America.  Albuquerque,
New Mexico, lies 275 miles to the north, along U.S.
Interstate 25.  Ciudad Chihuahua lies 240 miles to
the south of Juárez on Mexican National Highway
45.
El Paso, with a population in 1990 of about 600 thou-
sand persons, is the largest U.S. city on the Mexican
border and the twenty-sixth largest city in the United
States.  Juárez, with a 1990 population of about 800
thousand persons, is the fourth largest city in Mexico.
The juxtaposition of the two cities has led to dense
economic and social ties between the residents of El
Paso and Juárez.  During the Prohibition Era, two
prominent Kentucky distilleries relocated plants to
Juárez and several El Paso bar owners moved south.
Tourism flourished as numerous associations decided
to hold conventions in the city.  During World War
II, the establishment of training facilities led to a
military build-up that, in turn, resulted in extensive
border crossings.  The disparities between U.S. and
Mexican divorce laws led to continued growth in El
Paso’s tourist industry during the 1940s through the
1960s as many U.S. citizens lodged and dined in El
Paso while arranging their divorces in Juárez.  Fi-
nally, the maquiladora [assembly plant] industry has
grown and been significantly influenced by the
economy and laws of both countries (Hirsch 1987;
Martinez 1994).
The legacy of El Paso’s past is a multicultural, bilin-
gual, international city of more than one-half mil-
lion people.  Nearly 69 percent of the population
claim Mexican origin.  Both English and Spanish are
spoken regularly.  According to the 1990 U.S. Cen-
sus, English is spoken by 85 percent of the people,
while 64 percent of the people speak Spanish (U.S.
Bureau of the Census 1993).  Many families can trace
their ancestry to settlers who came to the Paso del
Norte region hundreds of years ago.  This history
has resulted in a feeling of community that often
transcends the international boundary.  The popula-
tion includes Caucasians, African-Americans, Native
Americans, Asians, and Pacific Islanders, and the
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international flavor of the city has been enhanced by
resettlement of Vietnamese refugees and the pres-
ence of foreign military personnel.  However, the
city’s predominant tenor derives from its heritage
as an Old West town on the Mexican border.
The large populations relative to other border towns,
the geographic isolation from other parts of the
United States and Mexico, and the cross-border fa-
milial relationships between people in both cities
have resulted in a special relationship between El
Paso and Juárez.  Relatives visit back and forth, resi-
dents regularly cross the border to shop for items
either not found in their home city or to take advan-
tage of lower prices in the other city.  On Hallow-
een, Mexican children routinely cross into El Paso to
“trick or treat” (except in 1993, when INS port of
entry inspectors denied entry to those without Bor-
der Crossing Cards) (Conely & Parra 1993).
That relationship notwithstanding, tensions have
arisen in the past.  The problems of air quality and
pollution sources are prime examples of strains that
have developed between the cities.  Past incidents
also include the arrest of an El Paso policeman and
the seizure of his police car when he entered Mexico
after pursuing an auto theft suspect (Ivey 1992a,
1992b) and the shooting of a nineteen-year old El
Pasoan, allegedly by a Juárez police officer (Olvera
1992b).  The implementation of Operation Hold the
Line certainly raised concerns in Juárez, spawning
anti-American protests and a proposed boycott on
shopping in El Paso.  Nevertheless, as tensions have
arisen between the cities over the years, efforts to
respond with a sense of cooperation and joint ven-
ture have been common.  Air quality is a major
concern in El Paso, and it is adversely affected by
pollutants from Juárez .  An El Paso/Juárez Interna-
tional Air Quality Management District has been pro-
posed for the purpose of resolving many of those
problems (Negron 1993).  Various official and unof-
ficial agencies and groups meet periodically to im-
prove relations and work on joint projects.  The two
city councils have met in joint session (Jauregui 1992);
the chambers of commerce work together on tour-
ism and economic development issues (Hamann
1993; Townsend 1992), and local officials coordinate
with federal officials to facilitate international coop-
eration (Townsend 1991).
Economically, El Paso is a relatively poor city, with
more than 25 percent of its population living below
the official poverty line (U.S. Bureau of the Census
1993).  Per capita income falls 30 to 35 percent be-
low the state of Texas average (Institute for Manu-
facturing and Materials Management 1991).  The
federal government is the major employer in the
region.  Three major military installations—Fort Bliss,
White Sands Missile Range, and Holloman Air Force
Base—lie within 100 miles of El Paso and supply the
city and region with a large number of jobs and
significant economic activity.  The military base popu-
lations, which include military personnel, their de-
pendents, civilian employees, civil servants and
defense contractors, number about 95 thousand.  Ad-
ditionally, more than 15 thousand retired military
live in the region.  The economic impact of this
military presence was nearly $1.3 trillion in 1990
(Institute for Manufacturing and Materials Manage-
ment 1991).  Other federal agencies, such as the Im-
migration and Naturalization Service, Border Patrol,
Customs Service, also have an economic impact on
the region (Institute for Manufacturing and Materi-
als Management 1991).
Tourism is the second largest source of revenue for
the city.  The maquiladora industry provides jobs and
money to El Paso as well.  At one time there were
as many assembly plants in El Paso as there were in
Juárez (Institute for Manufacturing and Materials
Management 1991).  However, as productivity and
skill levels increased in Mexican plants, the perceived
need for plants on the U.S. side declined.  Currently
about five thousand El Pasoans either support
maquiladoras in El Paso or work in Juárez plants.
Maquiladoras are the second largest generator of for-
eign exchange (behind petroleum) in Mexico.  A great
deal of commercial development on both sides of
the border is financed by Texas banks and holding
companies.  El Paso banks are said to hold hun-
dreds of millions of dollars from Mexican deposi-
tors (Hirsch 1987; Martinez 1994).
El Pasoans shop in Juárez, and Juárenses shop in El
Paso (Resendiz 1993).  The Greater El Paso Chamber
of Commerce estimates Mexican shoppers account
for more than $1 billion dollars a year in El Paso
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crossers not intending to move on to other loca-
tions.  The new strategy, by contrast, seeks to dis-
courage all illegal crossers whether their destina-
tions are local or some distance from El Paso.  But
what kinds of crossers are most affected by the new
strategy?  This requires understanding who is not
affected, that is, understanding who can cross le-
gally and under what circumstances.  Federal immi-
gration law, as given in Title 8 of the Code of Federal
Regulations, has established many different catego-
ries of nonimmigrant visas for foreign citizens who
wish to visit the United States on a nonpermanent
basis.  Nearly all of these categories require the visi-
tor to be the bearer of a valid passport from his/her
country and to apply for the visa at a U.S. consulate
in that country.  Such persons can, of course, enter
the country legally.
There are also other categories of persons who can
enter legally.  One category of nonimmigrant visa is
the Mexican Border Crossing Card [BCC]3 held by
thousands of Mexican citizens residing in Ciudad
Juárez and other Mexican border cities.  Bearers of
the BCC, which has no expiration date, are entitled
to admission to the United States “as a border crosser
or nonimmigrant visitor for a period not to exceed
72 hours to visit within 25 miles of the border” (CFR,
Title 8, § 235.1).  The BCC may be issued to Mexican
residents by officers of the INS at official U.S. ports
of entry located on the southern border.  A recipient
of the BCC need not bear a valid Mexican passport
but may instead present proof of his/her Mexican
residency by presenting a valid Mexican Form 13,
also known as the pasaporte provisional (CFR, Title 8,
§212.6).  As is the case with any other nonimmigrant
visa, applicants for the BCC must demonstrate that
they do not intend to abandon their Mexican resi-
dence in favor of residence in the United States and
that they do not intend to seek employment in the
United States (CFR, Title 8, §1184 (b)).  As is the case
with any visa, whether immigrant or nonimmigrant,
3 The Border crossing card is known by several names to
Juárez residents:  pasaporte local, mica, and permiso de
cruce.  The BCC is not to be confused with the tarjeta
verde [green card] held by legal permanent residents of
the United States, or with the pasaporte provisional (or
Mexican Form 13), which is one of the documents
applicants must present in order to be issued a BCC.
retail sales.  After the 1982 peso devaluation, retail
sales fell 42 percent in El Paso (Institute for Manu-
facturing and Materials Management 1991).  One
Juárez businessman is establishing a company to help
finance loans to facilitate Mexican purchases of au-
tomobiles in El Paso.  Currently, according to some
El Paso car dealers, Mexicans account for up to 10
percent of their sales, but most pay cash because of
the difficulties of arranging loans internationally
(Olvera 1992a).   Mexican capital also plays an in-
creasingly important role in the El Paso economy.
The Westin Hotel in downtown El Paso was recently
purchased by the Mexican El Camino Real chain,
for example, and the Cielo Vista Mall is owned by
investors from Chihuahua City.
Geographical and climatic conditions combine to
funnel migrants into, rather than around, El Paso.
The rugged terrain and desert conditions provide
little respite for weary foot travelers.  The climate of
the region can be harsh.  Summers are hot and dry.
Temperatures regularly climb above 100 degrees
during the summer, and annual rainfall is less than
10 inches.  Winters can be equally harsh, with cold
temperatures exacerbated by high winds.  Water is
a scarce commodity.  Another factor that funnels
migrants into El Paso is that only in the city can one
find ground and air transportation.  Consequently,
immigration officials conduct random vehicle checks
and patrol the airport, bus terminals, and train de-
pots for illegal migrants.  Railroad tracks run within
fifty feet of the border west of El Paso outside
Sunland Park, New Mexico.  Anapra, the Mexican
squatter settlement immediately across the border
from Sunland Park, is situated within 100 yards of
the tracks and is a staging area for migrants and
others to hop west-bound freight trains.
Legal Nonimmigrant
Border Crossings
The harsh terrain around El Paso, the generally long
distances to other cities, and the lack of sufficient
numbers of agents, help to account for the prior
Border Patrol strategy of emphasizing interception
of undocumented migrants after entry rather than
deterrence before entry.  This strategy allowed rela-
tively easy entry into the city on the part of illegal
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applicants for the BCC must demonstrate that they
are “not otherwise inadmissible” to the United States
(CFR, Title 8, §212.6), i.e., that they are not members
of a class of “excludable aliens” under CFR, Title 8,
§1182 and have not broken any other U.S. immigra-
tion laws.4
The existence of the BCC both reflects and facilitates
the historical economic and social integration of
border “twin” cities like Ciudad Juárez and El Paso.
Juárez residents who possess the BCC use it to pass
freely back and forth between El Paso and their city
to conduct all sorts of personal affairs—to shop, pay
social visits, change currency, deposit money in U.S.
banks, attend cultural and sporting events, receive
medical services (including to give birth), go out to
eat.  Many also use the BCC to conduct business—
to meet with business or trading partners, purchase
supplies, deliver orders of goods produced or as-
sembled in Mexico, use communications, financial,
or repair services, and, in some cases (illegally), to
go to work.  The city of El Paso is economically
dependent upon Mexican nationals for dollars spent
on personal consumption as well as other kinds of
business transactions in El Paso, both of which serve
to integrate the economies of the United States and
Mexico.  Without the free, legal, and routine cross-
border movement of thousands of Mexican nation-
als facilitated on a daily basis by the BCC, the El
Paso economy clearly would be adversely affected.
While no current figures on the number of Juárez
residents who hold the BCC are available,5 it seems
safe to say that most of  the millions of legal border
crossings made by Mexican nationals between Juárez
and El Paso each year are made by BCC holders.6
Both the BCC and the Mexican Form 13 are issued
free of charge to the applicant.  There is no legal
limit on the number of BCCs that may be issued.
Given the apparent ease of meeting the requirements,
the lack of a prohibitive charge for processing docu-
ments, the fact that as many people may be issued
the BCC as apply for it, and its obvious utility to the
bearer, why would anyone choose to cross the bor-
der illegally when it appears to be easy to cross
legally?  One reason is that, while the BCC can be
used to cross the border legally, it does not confer
the right to obtain employment in the United States.
Illegal workers often do not wish to expose them-
selves to possible detection by U.S. immigration
authorities who inspect entrants at official ports of
entry to the United States.  Moreover, many long-
and short-term residents of Juárez have little hope
of obtaining a BCC and must resort to illegal border
crossing if they wish to avail themselves of oppor-
tunities for consumption and employment on the
U.S. side of the border.
A second, and probably more significant, reason is
that obtaining a BCC can be a time-consuming and
complicated process.  Many border residents are
unable to obtain the BCC because of the way the
INS interprets its legal mandate to determine which
applicants for admission to the United States are
eligible for nonimmigrant visas (CFR, Title 8, §1184
(b)) and which applicants belong to classes of ex-
cludable aliens (CFR, Title 8, §1182).  The law grants
a great deal of discretion to the INS at every level of
its hierarchy, from the Commissioner, to District Di-
rectors, to port of entry Inspectors in making these
determinations.  For most practical purposes the
answers to these questions hinge on whether the
applicant, in the estimation of the INS, is financially
4 An additional requirement, although it does not seem
to be specified in the Code of Federal Regulations, is that
the applicant be a resident of a Mexican border city.
Mexican nationals residing in cities in the Mexican
interior may be awarded multiple entry, nonimmigrant
visas with similar privileges and limitations as the BCC,
but these visas must be issued by a U.S. consulate and
be stamped on a valid Mexican passport.  As a practical
matter, this is sensible: the BCC is a wallet-sized card
designed to be carried at all times by persons who
cross the border routinely; residents of Mexican interior
cities would seem to have less need for such a special
document.
5 Because the BCC is issued without a fixed date of
expiration, it is difficult to know how many valid BCCs
are currently in circulation.
6 In 1993, 5,891,625 northbound pedestrian and 15,466,202
northbound vehicle crossings were made across the
border into El Paso.  Figures are not kept regarding the
nationality or place of residence of crossers, however.
Nonetheless, it seems safe to say from qualitative
observation that the majority of crossers, both vehicular
and pedestrian, are Mexican residents.
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solvent.  Applicants who are financially solvent,
based on their employment or their assets, are
thought to be less likely to be immigrants posing as
temporary visitors to the United States.  Their sol-
vency helps to demonstrate their claim of eligibility
for a nonimmigrant visa such as the BCC.  It also
helps demonstrate they do not belong to the three
classes of excludable aliens: (1) paupers, professional
beggars, or vagrants; (2) persons seeking to enter
the United States to perform skilled or unskilled
labor; and (3) persons who are likely to become
“public charges” (CFR, Title 8, §1182 (a)).7  INS of-
ficers, according to the relevant statutes, may re-
quire entrants to answer questions regarding their
solvency or present written documentation thereof
(CFR, Title 8, §1225 (a)).  Failure on the part of
applicants to provide such answers/evidence at the
time of application constitutes sufficient grounds for
denying issuance of the BCC.  Failure to provide
such requested information to an INS officer when
using the BCC for entry can result in its confiscation
and revocation.
There is a high degree of consistency among the
Brownsville, Laredo, and El Paso district ports of
entry in the documents that applicants for the BCC
must present to demonstrate their Mexican residency
and financial solvency, although BCC application and
issuance administrative procedures vary from dis-
trict to district.  In El Paso, the INS distributes mim-
eographed fliers in Spanish at the ports of entry at
Ysleta, the Bridge of the Americans, and the Paso
del Norte Bridge that list the documents BCC appli-
cants are required to present.  An English transla-
tion of this flier is presented in Table 1.  All appli-
cants for the BCC must present either a valid Mexi-
can passport or a provisional passport known as the
Form 13.  In practice, most BCC applicants obtain
the Form 13 from the delagación of the Mexican fed-
eral government next to the Paso del Norte Bridge
in downtown Juárez.  The Form 13 is issued free of
charge to all applicants who present two photographs
and the required documents, which include a valid
birth certificate and two proofs of residency issued
at least six months prior to the time of application,
from among the following:
• Receipts from gas, electricity, and telephone bills,
or title to land;
• Proof of Mexican Social Security registration;
• Voter registration card;
• Driver’s license;
• Rent receipts.
In addition to the Form 13, the INS, in its flier, asks
applicants to bring with them utility receipts in their
name to demonstrate further  their Mexican border
residency.
To demonstrate financial solvency, the INS asks BCC
applicants who are employees to present original
pay stubs demonstrating their employment over the
last twelve months, a letter from their employer veri-
fying their employment, as well as proof of Mexican
Social Security registration and bank account state-
ments.  Business people, professionals, farmers, and
ranchers must similarly document stable sources of
income or assets.  Children and the elderly must
demonstrate solvency based on the income/assets
of the persons who support them.  Upon obtaining
their Form 13 and getting together the documenta-
tion requested for proving Juárez residency and fi-
nancial solvency, BCC applicants line up at 4:00 A.M.
on Wednesday mornings on the Mexican side of one
of the bridges spanning the Rio Grande to cross to
the INS port of entry office and request an applica-
tion appointment with an INS officer the following
week.  If the INS officer approves their application
at the time of that appointment, applicants are is-
sued a temporary BCC which they may begin to use
immediately to enter the United States.  They may
then pick up their permanent BCC in approximately
six months at the Bridge of the Americas port of
entry.
In sum, a number of obstacles must be overcome to
obtain legal border crossing cards.  Many Juárez
residents think they are not able to satisfy the INS
desire for documentation of their employment and
income and self-select themselves out of the appli-
cation process. [The reasons for this are discussed in
more detail in Chapter VIII.]  Long waits in line on
7 Other classes of excludable aliens are not terribly
common in the general population: the mentally
retarded; the insane; drug addicts; convicted or
confessed criminals; polygamists; prostitutes; etc.
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Table 1.
REQUIREMENTS FOR PROCESSING APPLICATION FOR CROSSING CARD
(PASAPORTE LOCAL)
A. Form 13, or a valid provisional or international passport.
B. Two individual, color photographs, 3/4 profile, untouched, with the right ear uncovered, against a white
background, for each applicant (regardless of age).
C. If the person applying for the permit does not work, the person supporting him/her must come to this office
and personally present documents demonstrating his/her employment (economic solvency).
D. All applications for permits are processed individually, regardless of the age of the applicant.  Dependent
children of any age must present their birth certificates, 2 photos, and must also appear in this office; they
must also present the documents listed above with letter “A,” and bring with them the person who supports
them economically.
E. Women may no longer bring children with them to be added to their MICA.  Children must appear with the
requirements mentioned above in letter “D”.
PROOF OF RESIDENCY: Receipts in your name for electricity, water, telephone, gas, etc.!!!
REQUIREMENTS TO PROVE ECONOMIC SOLVENCY
1. EMPLOYEE/WORKER—You must present paycheck stubs, or receipts for salary or payroll (photocopies are
not acceptable) for an entire year.  A letter from your employer on official stationery that indicates how long
you have been working, if the position is permanent, and the salary you receive.  Social Security Card, bank
account, or savings account.  Any other evidence that you judge to be important for demonstrating your
economic solvency.
2. BUSINESSPERSON—You must present your City License, annual receipts for taxes collected by the federal
government, receipts for business purchases, taxpayer ID number, bank account, Social Security registra-
tion, and a copy of the list of employees officially on your payroll.
3. FARMER/RANCHER—You must present the title(s) to your land, tax receipts, taxpayer ID number, cédula
cuarta, official registration of your crops from the Agency of the Secretariat of Agriculture and Ranching with
official seals, plus the registration of your cattle brand, if you are a rancher.
4. PROFESSIONAL—City license, tax receipts, bank account, credit cards.  Professional ID card.
5. STUDENT—You must present your student ID and a letter from your school showing that you study there
year-round.  In addition, the person who supports you economically must come to this office with the
documents mentioned above with regard to his/her employment (economic solvency).
6. OTHER APPLICANTS—Those persons not mentioned above, for example pensioners and older persons
may present the person who supports them economically or whatever else they consider pertinent to their
economic solvency.
PLEASE NOTE:  Whether or not your application is approved by the inspector who interviews you depends in
large measure upon the presentation of all the documents mentioned above.
U.S.  C O M M I S S I O N  O N  I M M I G R A T I O N  R E F O R M
RESEARCH
P A P E R
- 17 -
workdays to be issued the Form 13, a night-time
and early-morning wait on the bridge to be given an
application form and appointment date, and a third
wait on the appointed day in the INS port of entry
office all help to deter applicants who have doubts
about their likelihood to be approved for permis-
sion to cross the border.
Moreover, the INS only processes a fixed maximum
number of applications per year, although in prin-
ciple there is no limit on the number of BCCs that
may be issued.  According to the chief inspector at
the Paso del Norte port of entry, before the Opera-
tion began, his staff processed a maximum of 250
individual BCC applications per week.8  From the
start of the Operation through the month of October
1993, the number of applications processed was in-
creased to 750 per week to handle an expected rise
in demand for new or replacement BCCs as a result
of the new border control strategy.  In November,
the status quo ante was resumed.  The reason for this
limit, according to INS officials, is that they lack
sufficient resources to process more BCC applica-
tions without increasing the backlog of applications
they receive for legal permanent residence.  This
accounts for the long and, in the past, often unruly
queues formed on the Mexican side of the interna-
tional bridges on the nights before the INS gives out
BCC interview appointments.  The cap also makes
it impossible to gauge the true demand for the BCC
on the part of Juárez residents.
The phenomenon of illegal border crossings in El
Paso thus cannot be divorced from the issue of how
Juárez residents become legal border crossers.  The
inconvenience of obtaining the necessary documents,
BCC eligibility criteria that deter many people who
in principle might qualify, the need for processing
more BCC applications per year, and the previous
allowance of relatively easy entry into El Paso of
illegal crossers all combined prior to the Operation
to encourage illegal crossings.  Other factors dis-
cussed below also encourage illegal crossings.  Thus,
given that many persons have reasons to want to
cross the border, given the deterrents that exist to
obtaining BCCs in order to cross legally, and given
that the Border Patrol’s first line of defense was eas-
ily penetrated, many Juárez residents chose to make
routine illegal crossings (while many more simply
abstained from the opportunity).  Such crossings
helped to create the appearance that the Border Pa-
trol had lost control of the border in the El Paso
district and provided much of the impetus for
launching Operation Hold the Line.
III. Effects on
Illegal Flows
The major reason for conceiving and implementing
Operation Hold the Line was to curtail illegal entry
into El Paso (and through El Paso into the United
States).  This chapter seeks to ascertain the degree to
which that objective has been achieved.  Given the
interconnection between legal and illegal border
crossings in El Paso, it also seeks to gauge the
Operation’s effects on legal crossings.  As noted
above, understanding the effects of the Operation
on border crossings requires a recognition that there
are many different reasons for crossing and that
either legal or illegal means may be used to achieve
various crossing objectives.  This means that it is
useful to consider a taxonomy of different kinds of
crossers.  Just as it has been useful to consider dif-
ferent kinds and national origins of illegal entrants
to the United States in estimating the magnitude of
stocks and flows of illegal migrants (Bean,
Edmonston & Passel 1990), so, too, is it useful to
consider different kinds of crossers to assess the
effects of Operation Hold the Line on El Paso/Juárez.
Two major distinctions among kinds of crossers are
important at the outset: between legal and illegal
crossers; and between long-distance and local mi-
grants (or crossers).  When combined with certain
other characteristics of crossers, these distinctions
yield eight possible kinds of crossers (see Table 2).
One (illegal long-distance labor migrants) consists
of persons who cross illegally with the intention of
moving on to other destinations in the United States
to find work.  A second (illegal crossers/illegal work-
8 Many applications are to replace lost or damaged cards
or to issue cards with photos that better reflect a
person’s current appearance.  Further, the number of
individual applications processed is somewhat less than
the number of application interviews conducted, as INS
inspectors typically interview entire families together.
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Table 2.
A TYPOLOGY OF MEXICAN BORDER CROSSERS IN EL PASO/JUÁREZ
    Crosses_____      Works in El Paso_____ Other Legal Activities in El Paso Criminal
Activities
Type Legally Illegally Legally Illegally Doesn't Shopping Social Services in El Paso
work Visits
Illegal
Long-
Distance   +   +
Labor
Migrants
Illegal
Crossers/   +   +   +   +   +
Illegal
Workers
Local
Juvenile   +   +   +   +
Crossers
Legal
Crossers/   +   +   +   +   +
Illegal
Workers
Illegal,
Nonlabor   +   +   +   +   +
Crossers
Legal
Temporary   +   +   +   +   +
Crossers
Legal
Crossers/   +   +   +   +   +
Legal
Workers
Lives in
El Paso   +   +   +   +   +
Illegally
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change in border control strategy that accompanied
Operation Hold the Line) affects some outcome vari-
able, it is useful to examine data that permit com-
parisons of the key variables designed to be affected
by the change in time periods before and after the
change.  Such comparisons provide approximations
of natural experiments, but because one can never
be sure that factors other than the one of interest are
not accounting for postevent changes in the variable
of interest, they have been termed “quasi-experi-
ments” (Campbell & Stanley 1966).  Such quasi-ex-
perimental designs have been usefully employed to
study the effects of the 1986 Immigration and Re-
form Act [IRCA] on changes in illegal flows (Bean,
Edmonston & Passel 1990; Donato, Durand & Massey
1992).
To assess whether illegal flows into El Paso were
curtailed by Operation Hold the Line, U.S. Immi-
gration and Naturalization Service apprehensions
data, which are counts of the number of times per-
sons entering the country illegally are apprehended
by the Border Patrol or other INS enforcement per-
sonnel within a given period, were examined.  The
primary research strategy was to develop and esti-
mate the parameters of a statistical model that in-
corporates post-Operation dummy variables, as well
as time trend, seasonal, and enforcement effort vari-
ables, that might be thought to influence variation
in apprehensions across months.  Estimates of coef-
ficients for post-Operation dummy variables were
used to infer whether the variation in illegal flows
had been affected by the Operation.
Some observers suggest that such data are not par-
ticularly useful because some persons are appre-
hended more than once; others imply that such data,
when multiplied by a factor to take into account the
number of crossers going unapprehended, indicate
the number of illegal aliens residing in the country
who entered at the border.  One view totally rejects
apprehensions data; the other accepts them at face
value.  While apprehensions data have well-known
limitations, they provide a reflection—although only
a partial one—of the volume of illegal crossings and
are particularly useful for indicating periodic changes
in the number of such crossings, especially to the
extent that it can be assumed over time that there is
ers) consists of persons who cross illegally to seek
work or to set up street vending operations.  A third
(local juvenile crossers) consists of persons (mostly
teenage males) who cross illegally to hang out, have
a good time, or just have the experience of crossing.
Much of the petty vandalism often attributed to mi-
grants may be committed by this type of crosser.  A
fourth (“legal crossers/illegal workers”) consists of
persons who cross legally using mica cards (the local
resident commuting card) but who work illegally as
maids, gardeners, or other kinds of workers in El
Paso.  A fifth (illegal nonlabor crossers) consists of
persons who cross illegally to engage in some
nonwork-related activity, including shopping, visit-
ing friends and relatives, and seeking medical ser-
vices.  A sixth (legal temporary crossers) consists of
persons who cross legally (using the mica card) to
pursue a similar variety of legal activities.  A sev-
enth (legal crossers/legal workers) consists of U.S.
citizens living in Juárez, or legal long-distance labor
migrants, for example.  An eighth (illegal residents)
consists of persons who live illegally in El Paso and
cross into the United States illegally upon returning
from visits with friends and family in Mexico.
Operation Hold the Line can affect different types of
crossers differently.  Long distance labor migrants,
who for example, may be strongly motivated to find
a way to enter despite any increased efforts at deter-
rence, may have been inconvenienced but not sub-
stantially deterred by Operation Hold the Line.  To
determine if such crossers seek simply to go around
the end of the line outside of El Paso or cross into
the United States at other points along the border
where surveillance is less intense, month and sector-
specific apprehensions data were analyzed.  To see
if persons crossing illegally to work in El Paso may
have changed their crossing patterns and the dura-
tion of their stays as a result of the Operation, daily
and weekly data on northbound and southbound
bridge crossings were looked at.  In both cases, the
different effects on different kinds of crossers were
considered.
Apprehensions Data
To assess whether the occurrence of some event or
the change in some policy or strategy (such as the
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a fairly constant relationship between crossers and
apprehensions (Espenshade 1990).
The total number of INS apprehensions occurring in
a given year results from activities undertaken by
both the Border Patrol, the main enforcement arm
of the INS, and the Investigations Unit, the entity
responsible for interior operations.  Most of the ille-
gal aliens apprehended in the United States are ar-
rested by the Border Patrol; most are caught near
the U.S/-Mexico border; and most entered the United
States without inspection by the INS.  Data for FY
1992 are instructive (U.S. Immigration and Natural-
ization Service 1993).  First, of the 1.26 million ap-
prehensions made in that year, 1.22 million were
credited to the Border Patrol; the remaining 46 thou-
sand to the investigations unit.  Second, the INS is
divided for administrative purposes into four re-
gions and thirty-three districts.  Five of these dis-
tricts touch the 1,900-mile southern border with
Mexico (El Paso, Harlingen, and San Antonio in the
state of Texas; Phoenix in Arizona; and San Diego in
California).  Together, these five districts accounted
in 1992 for nearly 98 percent of all aliens deported
or required to depart.  Third, 97 percent of all ap-
prehensions in 1992 involved aliens who entered the
country without inspection (a majority of illegal
aliens, however, are visa-overstayers rather than
persons entering without inspection (Bean,
Edmonston & Passel 1990).  The small remaining
fraction of apprehensions consisted of persons who
entered with fraudulent documentation, or who en-
tered legally but subsequently violated the terms of
their visa by, for example, accepting unauthorized
employment or overstaying the length of their visa
(Levine, Hill & Warren 1985).
There are two types of INS Border Patrol apprehen-
sions at the U.S./Mexico border—linewatch and
nonlinewatch.  The former result from time spent
guarding the border against smuggling and illegal
entry of aliens.  They include apprehensions by Bor-
der Patrol agents engaged in surveillance, tower
watch, foot, horseback or vehicle patrol, as well as
other operations designed to prevent illegal entry.
As implied by the nature of the activity, nearly ev-
ery linewatch apprehension (roughly 97 percent) is
of a person apprehended trying to enter the United
States without appropriate entry documents.
Nonlinewatch operations involve several kinds of
activities, including farm and ranch checks, traffic
checks, transportation checks, city patrols, and other
activities.
In examining linewatch and nonlinewatch apprehen-
sions, the former may provide a somewhat better
basis than the latter for assessing changes in the
flow of illegal migrants over a given period of time
for two reasons.  First, linewatch apprehensions occur
very close to the border and do not involve the dif-
ferent kinds of enforcement activities that are in-
volved in nonlinewatch apprehensions and are thus
less likely to fluctuate over time as a consequence of
changing Border Patrol enforcement strategies (North
1988; Bean, Vernez & Keely 1989).
Second, only about one out of every seven
nonlinewatch apprehensions occur at entry, unlike
almost 98 percent of linewatch apprehensions.  One-
fourth of nonlinewatch apprehensions are of per-
sons who have been in the country four days or
longer, with the numbers varying considerably de-
pending upon the method of apprehension.  This
fraction tends to be even higher in the case of all
categories of nonlinewatch activity except traffic and
transportation checks.  The change over time in
nonlinewatch apprehensions may reflect changes in
the stock of illegal immigrants, in enforcement strat-
egies, and in the flow of undocumented migrants.
Variations may also occur because of changes in the
number of linewatch apprehensions (i.e., the more
successful the Border Patrol is in catching persons
upon entry, the fewer numbers will be at risk of
being apprehended as a result of nonline-watch ac-
tivities).
Information on changes in the number of Border
Patrol linewatch and nonlinewatch apprehensions
thus provides a partial basis for assessing whether
the monthly number of illegal southern border cross-
ings into the United States (or the magnitude of the
flow of undocumented migrants) has changed since
Operation Hold the Line began.  This change was
assessed using time-series analyses of linewatch and
nonlinewatch apprehensions data from FY 1989
through April of FY 1994.  To be most useful for
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of nonlinewatch apprehensions.  Prior research has
shown that both linewatch and nonlinewatch appre-
hensions vary directly with enforcement hours (Bean,
Edmonston & Passel 1990; North 1988), a relation-
ship that derives from the enforcement strategy fol-
lowed by the Border Patrol of trying to intercept
aliens after entry.  Thus, the results shown in Table
3 indicate that, except in the El Paso sector, appre-
hensions generally go up when enforcement hours
rise and generally decline when hours drop.  The
Operation Hold the Line change in strategy, how-
ever, turned this relationship upside-down.  By sta-
tioning agents at the border to prevent illegal en-
tries before they occur, fewer apprehensions are made
because fewer illegal crossings occur.  Thus, while
linewatch enforcement hours more than doubled
during the Operation in comparison to the same
months of the previous year (from 32 thousand per
month to almost 67 thousand per month), appre-
hensions in the El Paso sector dropped to less than
one-fourth of their previous level.
It is also the case that the increase in linewatch hours
at the border was achieved in part by reassigning
agents, resulting in the 42.8 percent decline in
nonlinewatch enforcement hours in the El Paso sec-
tor (from about 41,000 per month in FY 1993 to about
23,400 per month during FY 1994, when Operation
Hold the Line was in force).  Given that fewer ille-
gal aliens were getting through the initial line to
begin with, nonlinewatch apprehensions declined
disproportionately (by 70.6 percent).  However, some
of the decline in nonlinewatch apprehensions is un-
doubtedly due to the shift from nonlinewatch to
linewatch activities.
That Operation Hold the Line reduced apprehen-
sions is also revealed in an examination of changes
in the number of apprehensions per hour (Table 4).
From the same months in FY 1993 to the Operation
months in FY 1994, the number of apprehensions
per hour in the El Paso sector declined by 87 per-
cent (from 0.45 per hour to 0.06 per hour).  A smaller
decline (about 50 percent) occurred in the case of
nonlinewatch apprehensions.  In all other groupings
of sectors except California, and in the case of both
linewatch and nonlinewatch apprehensions, the av-
erage number per hour increased slightly.  This sug-
assessing the degree to which Operation Hold the
Line has affected the nature and degree of illegal
border crossings into the United States, apprehen-
sions data must be “freed” of other factors that in-
fluence their magnitude, including those that have
nothing to do with the Operation; it is necessary to
control for the influence of time trend, seasonal fac-
tors, enforcement effort, and serial correlation.
Moving from West to East, the U.S./Mexico border
is divided into nine Border Patrol sectors—San Di-
ego, El Centro, Tucson, Yuma, El Paso, Marfa, Del
Rio, Laredo, and McAllen.  As of the date of this
writing, data were obtainable on only apprehensions
and enforcement hours through April for FY 1994.
Table 3 shows the average monthly values for both
linewatch and nonlinewatch apprehensions and en-
forcement hours for the first seven months of FYs
1993 (October 1992-April 1993) and 1994 (October
1993-April 1994).  The latter period encompasses
almost the entire time of Operation Hold the Line,
which began in late September 1993.  At this point
only data for the first seven months of FYs 1993 and
1994 were examined to ensure that comparison of
the same months across the two years, a strategy
necessitated by the strong seasonal pattern of illegal
flows (and thus apprehensions) into the United States
(Bean, et al. 1990).
The average gross number of apprehensions along
the entire U.S./Mexico border declined by nearly
12,000 per month from FY 1993 to FY 1994 (from
about 66,300 to about 54,500 per month).  Most of
this decline occurred because of the sharp drop in
the El Paso sector (see second line, Table 3), where
apprehensions dropped by more than 10,000 per
month.  The dramatic effects of Operation Hold the
Line can also be seen in the steep drop evident for
the post-Operation months in Figure 1.  Thus, as
measured in these terms, Operation Hold the Line
clearly has reduced the number of linewatch appre-
hensions in the El Paso sector substantially and, by
implication, the flow of illegal crossers into the
United States.
The patterns for enforcement hours and non-
linewatch apprehensions also indicate, however, that
this may have occurred to some extent at the price
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Table 4.
LINEWATCH AND NONLINEWATCH APPREHENSIONS
PER HOUR BY SECTOR GROUPING,
FISCAL YEARS 1993-1994 (FIRST SEVEN MONTHS)
Linewatch Nonlinewatch
FY 93 FY 94 FY 93 FY 94
Entire U.S./Mexico Border .309 .209 .162 .164
El Paso Only .447 .058 .166 .085
All but El Paso .284 .261 .161 .179
Arizona .142 .183 .202 .262
California .485 .399 .218 .220
Texas (-El Paso) .137 .151 .123 .136
Source: Immigration and Naturalization Service, Statistics Division
Table 3.
AVERAGE MONTHLY LINEWATCH AND NONLINEWATCH APPREHENSIONS
AND ENFORCEMENT HOURS BY SECTOR GROUPING,
FISCAL YEARS 1993-1994 (FIRST SEVEN MONTHS)
A.  Linewatch
Hours Apprehensions
FY 93 FY 94 FY 93 FY 94
(000s) (000s) (000s) (000s)
Entire U.S./Mexico Border 214.9 261.1 66.3 54.5
El Paso Only  32.0  66.9 14.3  3.9
All but El Paso 182.9 194.2 52.0 50.6
Arizona  34.4  37.1  4.9  6.8
California  76.9  80.9 37.3 32.3
Texas (-El Paso)  71.6  76.3  9.8 11.5
B.  Nonlinewatch
Hours Apprehensions
FY 93 FY 94 FY 93 FY 94
(000s) (000s) (000s) (000s)
Entire U.S./Mexico Border    170.0     145.8 27.6 23.9
El Paso Only  40.9  23.4  6.8  2.0
All but El Paso            129.1     122.4 20.8 21.9
Arizona  16.8  18.3  3.4  4.8
California             38.1  35.0  8.3  7.7
Texas (-El Paso)  74.2  69.1  9.1  9.4
Source: Immigration and Naturalization Service, Statistics Division
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gests that illegal flows might be increasing in sectors
outside the El Paso corridor although, as noted be-
low, analyses that control for additional variables
are required before this hypothesis can be assessed
more fully.  The numbers for California, however,
behave somewhat differently than those for other
sectors, perhaps because of the slump in the Califor-
nia economy over the past three years and because
of the January 1994 Los Angeles earthquake that
undoubtedly affected the flow of illegal migrants, at
least in the short term.
As suggestive as these results are, they are limited
because they are gross figures that do not control
fully for time trends in apprehensions, seasonal fac-
tors, enforcement hours, and serial correlation.  Even
though the above comparisons of apprehension sta-
tistics before and after the Operation seek to adjust
for seasonal variations by comparing the same
months of FYs 1993 and 1994, they are based on
only one year’s pre-Operation experience.  (The
strong seasonal pattern of apprehensions is evident
in Figure 1.)  Moreover, they do not remove the
effects of long-term trends.  To control better for
time-trend and seasonality, time-series analyses were
undertaken of monthly linewatch and nonlinewatch
apprehensions data beginning with FY 1989 and run-
ning through April 1994, a total of sixty-seven
months.  Because ordinary least squares estimates
with time-series data typically exhibit serial correla-
tion in the residuals, we estimate the effects of the
independent variables with a procedure that adjusts
for serial auto-correlation (SPSS 1993).  Tests for first
and higher-order terms indicated that a first-order
auto regressive term was sufficient to capture the
serial correlation (Pyndyck & Rubinfeld 1991).  The
models are estimated for various border sector
groupings (all sectors, all but El Paso, El Paso alone,
the Arizona sectors, the California sectors, and the
Texas sectors excluding El Paso).  Independent vari-
ables are included for long-term trend (measured as
the month in the series), seasonality (measured as
dummy variables for months in the year, with De-
cember deleted from the model), enforcement hours
(measured as monthly linewatch or nonlinewatch
hours respectively), and dummy variables for two
post-Operation periods, the first four months after
the Operation (October-January) and the following
three months (February-April).  The post-Operation
dummy variables thus measure the average monthly
increase or decrease in linewatch (or nonlinewatch)
apprehensions for the early or late Operation period
compared to the average in the five preceding fiscal
years, net of the effects of seasonality, time trend,
serial correlation, and enforcement hours.
The results of such models can help answer several
questions.  First, the findings for the El Paso sector
are relevant to the assessment of the extent to which
Operation Hold the Line reduced illegal flows into
the El Paso sector beyond any changes associated
with the influence of other factors.  The time-series
results thus provide a stronger basis for making this
assessment than the single-year comparisons dis-
cussed above.  Second, the findings for sectors other
than El Paso are relevant to assessing the extent to
which rumors might have spread throughout Mexico
that the crackdown was being extended to other
sectors, thus exerting a deterrent effect on illegal
migration flows into other sectors besides El Paso.
If this had occurred, one would expect to observe
declines in apprehensions (especially linewatch ap-
prehensions) immediately after the Operation, with
these declines dissipating as such a shakedown pe-
riod moved to its termination.  Third, the findings
are relevant to the assessment of the extent to which
net illegal flows into sectors other than El Paso have
been increasing over time, perhaps as a result of the
diversion of long-distance labor migration from El
Paso to other sectors.
The results of the time-series regressions are shown
in Table 5.  Coefficients are shown here only for
enforcement hours and for the early and late post-
Operation periods.  Coefficients for the other vari-
ables (the time trend variable and the seasonal dum-
mies) are omitted to improve clarity of presentation.
The first column shows the results for the entire
U.S./Mexico border.  It indicates that in the first
four months of the Operation, linewatch apprehen-
sions —net of time trend, seasonality, enforcement
hours, and serial correlation—were down by a small
amount for the entire border.  In the next three
months net apprehensions increased considerably—
by more than 2,700 per month.  Comparison of col-
umns two and three indicates the extent to which El
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Table 5.
TIME SERIES REGRESSION RESULTS FOR MONTHLY LINEWATCH
AND NONLINEWATCH APPREHENSIONS ON ENFORCEMENT HOURS
AND POST-OPERATION DUMMIES BY STATE SECTOR GROUPINGS
(FISCAL YEARS 1989-1994)
A.  Linewatch
Independent Entire El Paso All But Texas
Variables Border Only El Paso Arizona California (-El Paso)
Enforcement Hours    .189    .068    .189     .064    .281   .139
Early Operation  -233.6 -7803.3  2164.8     84.0 1870.6  296.9
Late Operation  2753.7 -7032.7  3314.7  1473.7 1898.4  574.1
Intercept  1169.6   714.5  -196.2      4.5  -199.1 -359.7
R2    .419    .602    .395     .337    .352   .498
N      67      67      67       67      67     67
B.  Nonlinewatch
Independent Entire El Paso All But Texas
Variables Border Only El Paso Arizona California (-El Paso)
Enforcement Hours    .201    .174    .205     .202    .226   .138
Early Operation   -41.2 -1456.4   781.6   -464.4   752.6  510.8
Late Operation -2027.3 -2375.6 -1430.1   -248.6  -645.8 -454.6
Intercept -1017.2  -104.5 -1021.2   -264.8  -343.2 -218.6
R2    .548    .670    .520     .430    .435   .405
N      67      67      67       67      67     67
percent.  At the same time, however, increases oc-
curred in the Arizona, California, and Texas sectors.
Proportionally, these were especially large in Ari-
zona.  By the late period (February-April), nearly
one-half of the El Paso decline was offset by in-
creases elsewhere that were occurring net of time
trend, seasonal factors, and differences in enforce-
ment hours.  Net apprehensions increased in the
post-Operation period, even though gross apprehen-
sions decreased somewhat, indicating that the gross
decreases observed in California would have been
even greater had the California figures not been
pushed upward (net of time-trend, seasonality, en-
forcement hours, and serial correlation) in the post-
Operation period.
Paso and the rest of the border sectors contributed
to this overall pattern.  While net monthly appre-
hensions were steeply reduced in El Paso, net ap-
prehensions increased across all other sectors.  In
short, some of the decrease in apprehensions that
occurred in El Paso appears to have been offset by
increases in other sectors.
A comparison of the early and the late post-Opera-
tion effects indicates that the deterrent effect of the
Operation on apprehensions appears to lessen as
more time elapsed.  Comparing the late to the early
period effects in El Paso indicates that the decrease
in net apprehensions lessens (although it remains
substantial), falling from a decrease of about 7,800
to a decrease of about 7,030, a decline of almost 10
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Thus, net apprehensions were up throughout the
post-Operation period in California, and they were
up substantially more in Arizona late in the period.
These patterns are consistent with the belief that
part of the illegal flow from throughout Mexico to
the United States (probably long-distance labor mi-
gration) tends to get routed through two major ports
of entry, El Paso and Chula Vista.  If one of these
ports is closed off, some of this flow may be di-
verted to the other port.  Thus, while net linewatch
apprehensions were down substantially in El Paso,
they were up in California.  Another part of the
illegal flow is probably more regionalized, perhaps
with respect to both the origins and destinations of
migrants.  With the El Paso port of entry closed
down, some of this flow gets diverted to the most
geographically proximate sectors (Arizona), and a
lesser portion to the next most proximate sectors
(Texas).  These sectors showed an increasing num-
ber of apprehensions moving from early to late in
the Operation.  Thus, overall, the Operation appeared
to continue to depress flows into El Paso as time
elapsed (although at a decreasing rate), but nearly
one-half of this decrease was offset by increases in
flows over time to other sectors (at an increasing
rate in the Arizona and Texas sectors).
In nonlinewatch apprehensions (Table 3), the most
notable pattern is a decline during the late post-
Operation period in the cases of all sector group-
ings.  There are two plausible explanations: first, it
is possible that the below average levels of appre-
hensions in the months right after the blockade
means that there were fewer illegal migrants around
in subsequent months to be apprehended in
nonlinewatch locations; second, as nonlinewatch
enforcement hours fell in the later months, there
were probably disproportionately fewer apprehen-
sions may have taken place because so few agents
were pursuing illegals.  Thus, the numbers of appre-
hensions may have dropped to a greater degree than
did the number of hours.  More research will be
required to ascertain whether, and to what degree,
these explanations are correct, or whether there is
some other explanation.
Bridge Crossing Data
Mexican commuter workers are one of the major
groups of  border crossers who have been affected
by Operation Hold the Line.  Commuter workers
live in Juárez but regularly cross the border to work
in El Paso or in other nearby communities in Texas
and New Mexico.  They may cross daily, weekly, or
less frequently depending upon the terms of their
employment in the United States and whether they
maintain residences on both sides or only on one
side of the border.  The legal status of these Mexican
commuters in the United States varies.  For analyti-
cal purposes, it is useful to classify commuters into
four legal-status categories:
U.S. citizens: Mexican residents who were either
born in the United States or who became natu-
ralized citizens at an earlier point in their lives.
These persons may choose to live in Mexico for
a variety of reasons, including family ties, cul-
tural preferences, and a lower cost of living in
Juárez.  As U.S. citizens, they have the legal
right to both enter the United States and find
employment here.
Work-permit holders: Mexican residents who have
a visa that permits them to seek employment in
the United States.  This group includes legal
permanent residents of the United States who
maintain a residence in Mexico.  Like U.S. citi-
zens, members of this group legally enter the
United States.  These commuters are sometimes
referred to as green carders.9
Border Crossing Card holders: Mexican residents
who have been issued a special nonimmigrant
visa  by the U.S. Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service that allows them to enter the twelve-
mile strip of the United States along the Mexi-
can border for periods of up to seventy-two
hours for purposes of tourism, shopping, and
conducting other kinds of personal business.
Holders of the Border Crossing Card [BCC]
9 See Martinez’ Border Boom Town for an historical
discussion of Juárez “green card” workers (Martinez
1975).  Also, see North’s (1970) Department of Labor
report on Mexican commuter workers.
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sometimes cross the border into the United States
legally in order to work illegally.10  The Border
Crossing Card is known by several names in
Juárez, including pasaporte local, mica, and permiso
de cruce.
Undocumented commuters: Mexican residents who
lack any kind of  passport or visa that grants
them the right either to enter or work in the
United States.  These commuters cross the bor-
der illegally, either away from legal ports of entry
or with false documents, and may work ille-
gally as well.
Table 6 summarizes these categories of commuter
workers and classifies them by legal status with re-
gard to entry and employment.  No institution in
the United States or Mexico regularly collects data
on Mexican commuter workers.  It is therefore im-
possible to make precise estimates of the number of
persons in each commuter category.  We attempt a
rough estimate of the size of each category by tak-
ing the results of three separate data collection ef-
forts conducted on the Mexican side of the border
between 1987 and 1990 and imputing these findings
to the 1993 Juárez population.
To estimate the size of each commuter category re-
quires an estimate of the size of the economically
active population of Juárez in 1993.  According to
the 1990 Mexican Census of Population and Hous-
ing, the total population of the municipio11 of Juárez
was 798,499 persons.  According to census reports,
the economically active population12 of Juárez in 1990
was 286,683.  Between 1970 and 1990, the total popu-
lation of Juárez grew at an annual rate of 3.2 per-
cent.  If that rate of growth remained constant, and
if we assume, for practical purposes, that the growth
rates for the total population and the economically
active population were approximately equal, by the
end of 1993 we would expect the total population of
Juárez to be 877,900 persons, and the economically
active population to be 315,351.
LEGAL STATUS CATEGORIES OF MEXICAN COMMUTER WORKERS
Commuter Enters United States Works in United States
Legally Illegally Legally Illegally
U.S. Citizen    +    +
Work Permit    +    +
BCC Only    +    +
Undocumented    +    +
Table 6.
10 Under situations of easy illegal border-crossing (as
seems to have been the case prior to Operation
Blockade), some BCC holders may in fact enter the
United States illegally, away from legal ports of entry,
for several reasons:  a) to avoid paying bridge tolls; b)
to minimize detection as illegal workers and
confiscation of their BCC; or c) to avoid long bus rides
from outlying areas of Juárez to official ports of entry
to the United States, as in the case of residents of Rancho
Anapra who regularly walked across the 100 yards of
desert separating them from Sunland Park, New
Mexico.
11 The term municipio in Mexico corresponds roughly to
county in the United States.  It is the closest equivalent
to the U.S. census designation metropolitan statistical
area that is reported by the Mexican statistical agency
INEGI.
12 Those persons fifteen years of age or older who were
employed or seeking employment at the time the census
was taken.
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ESAF with regard to commuters were reported in
an article published by Tito Alegría (Alegría 1990)
in the journal Frontera Norte.  Alegría’s first finding
of interest was that 6 percent of Juárez workers
were either U.S. citizens or legal permanent resi-
dents of the United States; 48 percent had a border
crossing card or other type of visa that allowed
them to enter the United States legally, but not to
work in the United States; and 46 percent had no
type of permit to enter the United States legally.  If
we apply these percentages to our estimate of the
economically active population residing in Juárez
in 1993, we obtain the results displayed in Table 7.
Alegría also reported that of the persons identified
by the ESAF as cross-border commuter workers,
• 38 percent were U.S. citizens;
• 24 percent had visas that allowed them to work
in the United States;
• 33 percent crossed the border legally with a
BCC to work in the United States; and
• 5 percent were undocumented both for entry
and work in the United States.
Because Alegría reports neither the raw frequency
counts of these categories of commuters nor the
standard errors of  his estimates, we are unable
directly to ascertain the confidence interval (plus/
minus x percentage points) surrounding each esti-
mate.  We assume, however, that the confidence
intervals are rather large, since the raw frequency
The Mexican statistical agency, INEGI, conducts a
quarterly urban labor market survey similar to the
United States Current Population Survey.  Questions
included in the survey, the Encuesta Nacional de Empleo
Urbano [ENEU], ask respondents where they worked
during the preceding week.  In the fourth quarter of
1989 (the latest data available), ENEU results indi-
cated that 4.8 percent of the economically active
population had worked in the United States in the
week preceding the survey.  In other words, 4.8 per-
cent of the working people in Juárez at the end of
1989 commuted from their residences in Juárez to
jobs in the United States at least once a week.  If we
assume that the proportion of working people in
Juárez with jobs in the United States remained con-
stant through 1993, we arrive at an estimate of  15,137
cross-border commuter workers residing in Juárez at
the time of Operation Hold the Line.
Lamentably, the ENEU survey does not include a
classification of commuter workers by their legal
status in the United States.  To our knowledge, only
one survey has ever been conducted in Juárez that
collected this information.  In 1987, the Colegio de la
Frontera Norte, a research institute based in Tijuana,
Baja California, conducted the Encuesta Socioeconómica
Anual de la Frontera [ESAF],13 which collected a wide
range of data on 605 households in Juárez, including
the legal status of commuter workers.  Results of the
Table 7.
 CATEGORIES AND ESTIMATED NUMBERS OF COMMUTERS
Category of Commuter % Est #
U.S. Citizen 38 5,752
Work Permit 24 3,633
Border Crossing Card Only 33 4,995
Undocumented  5   757
Total          100          15,137
Derived from: Alegría (1990); Mexican Census of Population and Housing (1990).
13 The ESAF was optimistically named; rather than being
conducted annually, it was conducted only once.
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count for each category of commuter must be small,
given the number of households in the sample and
what we know from the ENEU about Juárez worker
participation in the U.S. labor market.
To calculate the confidence intervals indirectly, as-
sume that, on average, each household in the sample
contained 5 persons, giving an n of 3,025 (the aver-
age household size for Juárez in the 1990 census).
Assume further that 35.9 percent of these 3,025 per-
sons, or 1,087, were economically active (the percent
of the total 1990 Juárez population that was eco-
nomically active).  Finally, assume that 4.8 percent
of these 1,087, or 52 persons, worked in the United
States at least once during the week prior to the
survey (the percent of the total economically active
population working in the United States given by
the ENEU, 4th quarter, 1989).  Choosing a confi-
dence level of 0.05, we can then say that:
• Between 25 and 51 percent of cross-border com-
muters were U.S. citizens;
• Between 12 and 36 percent held work permits;
• Between 20 and 46 percent had only the BCC;
and
• 11 percent or less were undocumented.
Applying these intervals to our earlier estimate of  a
total of 15,137 cross-border commuter workers re-
siding in Juárez at the time of the Operation, we
obtain the estimates of numbers of different kinds of
commuters displayed in Table 8.  While these esti-
mates are admittedly rough, based as they are on
several assumptions, they nonetheless provide a
number of insights for understanding the nature of
cross-border work commuting by Juárez residents
and the size of potential impacts of the Border
Patrol’s new deployment strategy upon different
kinds of commuters.
Qualitative field work on both sides of the border in
El Paso-Ciudad Juárez led to formulation of several
related hypotheses regarding the overall effects of
Operation Hold the Line on illegal border crossing
and illegal employment of Juárez residents in El Paso.
Hypothesis One.  Illegal crossings by Juárez resi-
dents have been reduced, but not eliminated.
Hypothesis Two.  The number of illegal cross-
ers residing in Juárez has been reduced less than
the number of illegal crossings.
Corollary Two.  Illegal crossers who live in
Juárez and work in El Paso have extended
their stays in El Paso to minimize their risk
of apprehension while attempting illegal
northbound crossings.
Hypothesis Three.  Legal crossers who live in
Juárez and work illegally in El Paso have con-
tinued to do so, but some have begun to cross
less frequently in order to minimize the risk of
losing their Border Crossing Cards.
Table 8.
ESTIMATED NUMBERS OF MEXICAN COMMUTER WORKERS RESIDING IN CIUDAD JUÁREZ
Commuter % of Commuters # of Commuters
Upper Limit Lower Limit Upper Limit Lower Limit
U.S citizen 51 25 7,720 3,784
Work Permit 36 12 5,449 1,816
BCC Only 46 20 6,963 3,027
Undocumented 11 - 1,665 -
Derived from: Alegría (1990); ESAF (1987); Mexican Census of Population and Housing (1990).
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southbound.  In principle, average monthly north-
bound and southbound pedestrian crossings should
roughly equal one another, although in practice there
are usually more northbound than southbound pe-
destrian crossings in any given month, a pattern that
Operation Hold the Line does not seem to have
changed much.15
What kinds of changes in pedestrian crossing pat-
terns might result from Operation Hold the Line?
Before the Operation began, it was common for un-
documented crossers who lived in Juárez to cross
the Rio Grande northbound illegally—by boat or
wading, or by walking across one of the bridges in
one of the southbound lanes—but then return to
Mexico by walking across one of the bridges legally
since they had nothing to fear by doing so.16  One
change, then, is that if Operation Hold the Line
substantially reduced illegal crossings, the gap be-
tween northbound and southbound crossings would
widen somewhat following the Operation’s initia-
tion.  Table 9 presents time-trend data on north-
bound versus southbound crossings by month, from
Hypothesis Four.  The Operation has initially
discouraged both legal and illegal crossings from
Juárez, but after the first few months legal cross-
ers have begun to return to El Paso in numbers
comparable to before the Operation began.  Ille-
gal crossings have also crept back towards ear-
lier levels after the first month of the Operation.
This section examines these hypotheses by analyz-
ing changes in the patterns of  pedestrian border
crossings on the Paso del Norte and Stanton Street
International Bridges.14  These two bridges carry the
bulk of pedestrian border crossings in the El Paso
area.  Pedestrians may cross the border both north-
bound and southbound on the Paso del Norte Bridge,
and southbound only on the Stanton Street Bridge.
Every day, thousands of Juárez residents walk north-
bound on the Paso del Norte Bridge into downtown
El Paso’s “Golden Horseshoe,” the commercial dis-
trict in the city that most strongly caters to Mexican
customers.  This section is known as the Golden
Horseshoe because of the path that the multitudes
of  Mexican shoppers tend to follow: north up Santa
Fe or Oregon Streets, right on one of their several
cross streets, and then south on Stanton Street to
cross back into Juárez over the Stanton Street Bridge.
Pedestrian crossers pay a toll of 50 cents to the Mexi-
can government to cross north on the Paso del Norte
Bridge, and 25 cents to the city of El Paso to cross
south on either one of the bridges.  It was on these
bridges that disturbances occurred in the first days
of Operation Blockade as Mexican commuters and
several political organizations blocked traffic in pro-
test of the INS confiscation of some commuters’
BCCs.
Pedestrian crossing are recorded northbound by the
U.S. Customs Service, and tallies are available by
day, month, and year.  Similar southbound figures
are generated by the turnstiles counting toll-payers
for the city of El Paso.  Pedestrian crossing counts
are the best measure of the legal movement of per-
sons back and forth across the border; while counts
of passenger vehicles are also available, no actual
passenger counts are made either northbound or
14 The Paso del Norte Bridge is also known as the Santa
Fe Bridge.  The Stanton Street Bridge is also known as
the Lerdo Bridge, after Avenida Lerdo that it connects
with El Paso’s Stanton Street.
15 Many factors may account for the frequent “deficits”
in southbound crossings.  Commuter buses running
between Juárez and El Paso (the “Red Bus” service that
was halted indefinitely as of February 8, 1994) were
obliged to discharge passengers on the Paso del Norte
Bridge to walk through the U.S. Customs and
Immigration checkpoint, and these commuters were
thus counted as pedestrian crossers.  Going southbound
across the Stanton Street Bridge, these bus passengers
were not counted as pedestrians, since they did not
pass through the City of El Paso’s pedestrian toll booth.
Also, for some time before the Operation began, it was
a common practice for package-laden shoppers to wait
at the vehicle toll booths on the Stanton Street Bridge
in hopes of hopping in the back of the next willing
pickup in order to simultaneously avoid paying the 25
cent toll and carrying their loads across the border by
hand.  Some northbound pedestrian crossers may get
rides back across the border in the vehicles of friends,
relatives, and employers who live in El Paso.  Mexican
immigrants may enter the United States at the Paso del
Norte port of entry and then stay permanently in the
United States.  Many other explanations are plausible;
all are untested.
16 Mexican authorities would obviously have no quarrel
with their return.  U.S. authorities would only be
thankful that their job—to return illegal crossers to
Mexican soil—was being done for them.
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Table 9.
TRENDS IN NORTHBOUND AND SOUTHBOUND PEDESTRIAN CROSSINGS ON THE PASO DEL NORTE
AND STANTON STREET INTERNATIONAL BRIDGES (BY MONTH)
Month & Northbound Southbound North North/
Year minus South South
Apr 92 460,967 439,794  21,173 1.05
May 92 497,347 449,162  48,185 1.11
Jun 92 423,481 404,504  18,977 1.05
Jul 92 354,716 415,192 (60,476) 0.85
Aug 92 524,700 429,434  95,266 1.22
Sep 92 349,313 404,077 (54,764) 0.86
Oct 92 399,702 437,198 (37,496) 0.91
Nov 92 576,198 395,545 180,653 1.46
Dec 92 649,898 480,318 169,580 1.35
Jan 93 417,110 380,537  36,573 1.10
Feb 93 420,966 365,531  55,435 1.15
Mar 93 390,277 404,283 (14,006) 0.97
Apr 93 410,073 407,452    2,621 1.01
May 93 448,310 413,630  34,680 1.08
Jun 93 382,864 384,193  (1,329) 1.00
Jul 93 482,963 424,288  58,675 1.14
Aug 93 450,269 411,060  39,209 1.10
Sep 93 367,563 367,638     (75) 1.00
Oct 93 438,910 323,691 115,219 1.36
Nov 93 385,829 343,317  42,512 1.12
Dec 93 514,472 452,689  61,783 1.14
Jan 94 407,386 361,622  45,764 1.13
Feb 94 446,663 373,472  73,191 1.20
Mar 94 559,403   n/a   n/a  n/a
Source: El Paso Department of Traffic and Transportation, US Customs Office, El Paso District
April 1992 through March 1994.  The north minus
south difference went from 39,209 in August 1993,
the last full month before the Operation began, to
115,219 in October 1993, the first full month after
the blockade.  In contrast, in the same months of
1992, the difference declined.  Whereas in August
1992 there were 95,266 more northbound than south-
bound crossings, in October 1992 there were 37,496
fewer northbound than southbound crossings.  This
change in pattern tends to confirm a finding sup-
ported by several kinds of evidence: Operation Hold
the Line is effective in stopping a substantial num-
ber of illegal northbound crossings in the immediate
term.17
Table 10 summarizes changes in the monthly rela-
tionships between northbound and southbound pe-
destrian crossings that resulted from Operation Hold
the Line.  On average, before the blockade there
were 8 percent more northbound than southbound
crossings; in the months after the blockade there
were, on average, 19 percent more.  Calculated on
an average daily basis, the difference between north-
bound and southbound crossings grew from 1,163
to 2,256, an increase of 1,093, due almost entirely to
a reduction in southbound crossings.  The
postblockade averages presented in Table 10 mask
important differences between months, however,
overstating the lasting impacts of the blockade.  As
Table 9 indicates, the postblockade average differ-
ence is pulled up by the dramatic spike in the north-
south difference and ratio in October 1993.  By
17Wider fluctuations than this have occurred in the recent
past, for example, the change between October and No-
vember 1992.
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November, however, the difference and ratio between
northbound and southbound crossings dropped to
about August 1993 levels.  From November 1993,
through February 1994, northbound crossings were,
on average, only 15 percent higher than southbound
crossings, essentially the same level as July 1993,
before the blockade.  During the same four-month
period the previous year, northbound crossings were,
on average, 27 percent higher than southbound cross-
ings.
These findings regarding the differences and ratios
between north and southbound pedestrian crossings
pre- and post-Operation tend to support two of our
hypotheses above: hypothesis one, that illegal cross-
ings by Juárez residents have been reduced, but not
eliminated; and hypothesis two, that the deterrent
effect of the Operation decreases over time.  Imme-
diately after the blockade, we see the expected re-
duction in southbound crossings relative to north-
bound, but this effect seems to diminish significantly
over time.  Such a result conforms to what illegal
crossers told us about the Operation: in the first
month following the blockade, crossing was diffi-
cult to impossible, but border crossing became easier
in subsequent months.
Another effect of the Operation one might expect
based on public reaction on both sides of the border,
Table 10.
POSTBLOCKADE CHANGES IN DIFFERENCE AND RATIO BETWEEN NORTHBOUND AND SOUTHBOUND
PEDESTRIAN CROSSINGS, PASO DEL NORTE AND STANTON STREET INTERNATIONAL BRIDGES
Measure Preblockade Average* Postblockade Average* Change in Average
Ratio of northbound to
southbound monthly crossings   1.08    1.19 +0.11
North minus south
monthly difference 34,880 67,694 +32,814
North minus south daily difference  1,163   2,256 +1,093
*Excludes crossings during month of September 1993.  Operation Blockade began on September 19 and resulted in
disruptions in bridge traffic that make September data incomparable with other months.
Source: El Paso Department of Traffic and Transportation, US Customs Office, El Paso District
is a reduction in both northbound and southbound
pedestrian crossings compared to the same months
of the year prior to the Operation.  Northbound
crossings were down 4 percent and southbound
crossings were down 10 percent after the blockade,
as compared with the same period in the previous
year.  On the other hand, northbound crossings in
the period April-August, 1993, before the blockade,
were also down 4 percent compared with the same
period in 1992.   Table 11 gives a clearer picture of
how the blockade affected northbound crossings in
both the short- and somewhat longer-term.  Octo-
ber, 1993 northbound crossings were up 10 percent
over 1992, but this may reflect the return of an
unusually large number of shoppers and commut-
ers deterred from crossing in the first days and
weeks of the Operation in September to take care of
affairs in El Paso that had been left unattended.
Northbound crossings were down 33 percent and
21 percent in November and December, respectively,
from the year before, lending considerable credence
to the claims of downtown merchants in El Paso
that traffic into their stores during the Christmas
shopping season was down considerably.  By Janu-
ary 1994, however, northbound pedestrian crossings
were back up to their level of the previous year, and
in February and March they surpassed the levels of
the previous year.  As Table 11 also indicates, south-
bound crossings exhibit a similar pattern of sharp
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Table 11.
NORTHBOUND AND SOUTHBOUND PEDESTRIAN CROSSINGS
(April 1992-March 1994)
A.  Paso Del Norte International Bridge
(Northbound)
Month 1992-1993 1993-1994 1993 minus 1992 1993/1994 or
1994/1993
Apr 460,967 410,073  (50,894) 0.89
May 497,347 448,310  (49,037) 0.90
Jun 423,481 382,864  (40,617) 0.90
Jul 354,716 482,963  128,247 1.36
Aug 524,700 450,269  (74,431) 0.86
Sep 349,313 367,563   18,250 1.05
Oct 399,702 438,910   39,208 1.10
Nov 576,198 385,829 (190,369) 0.67
Dec 649,898 514,472 (135,426) 0.79
Jan 417,110 407,386   (9,724) 0.98
Feb 420,966 446,663   25,697 1.06
Mar 390,277 559,403  169,126 1.43
B.  Paso Del Norte And Stanton Street International Bridges
(Southbound)
Month 1992-1993 1993-1994 1993 minus 1992 1993/1992 or
1994/1993
Apr 439,794 407,452  (32,342) 0.93
May 449,162 413,630  (35,532) 0.92
Jun 404,504 384,193  (20,311) 0.95
Jul 415,192 424,288    9,096 1.02
Aug 429,434 411,060  (18,374) 0.96
Sep 404,077 367,638  (36,439) 0.91
Oct 437,198 323,691 (113,507) 0.74
Nov 395,545 343,317  (52,228) 0.87
Dec 480,318 452,689  (27,629) 0.94
Jan 380,537 361,622  (18,915) 0.95
Feb 365,531 373,472    7,941 1.02
Mar 403,974 404,283      309 1.00
Source: El Paso Department of Traffic and Transportation, US Customs Office, El Paso District
decline soon after the Operation begins, after which
they creep back up to comparable preblockade lev-
els by January 1994.
These results tend to support hypothesis four, that
the Operation initially discouraged legal border
crossings, but that some of this effect diminished
over time.  It does appear, however, that declines in
pedestrian border crossing were most pronounced
during the Christmas shopping season, presumably
hurting businesses in downtown El Paso that de-
pend upon purchases made by Mexican cross-
border shoppers.
According to reports in the El Paso Times and re-
peated to us by INS inspectors on the Paso del Norte
Bridge, following the blockade in September 1993,
there was a strong surge in legal pedestrian border
crossings on the bridges, as well as an increase in
the presentation of false or otherwise invalid border
crossing documents.  The reasons for this were
thought to be that many persons who formerly
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crossed the border illegally, were suddenly attempt-
ing to cross legally, either by using valid documents
they had hitherto chosen not to use or by presenting
fraudulent or invalid documents.  While it is true
that many more persons walked north into El Paso
on the Paso del Norte Bridge in October 1993, than
did in September 1993, the number in October was
lower than it had been in August 1993, before the
blockade began.  In addition, northbound pedes-
trian crossings in October 1993, were up only 10
percent over the previous October, an increase far
exceeded by the 36 percent jump seen between July
1992 and July 1993, also before the Operation.  Thus,
the apparent post-Operation surge in northbound
crossings may derive from routine crossings that
were interrupted in the early days of the Operation,
creating a pent-up demand to cross once some sem-
blance of normality returned on the bridges.  As
already noted above, northbound pedestrian cross-
ings in November and December were sharply down
from the year before, not supporting the notion that
many persons who hitherto had crossed illegally
began to cross legally after the Operation began.
In addition to changes in the difference and ratio
between northbound and southbound crossings, and
an immediate overall decline in pedestrian border
crossing, we expected some changes in crossing by
day of week following the Operation. There are sev-
eral reasons for this.  First, the Operation led to a
decrease in pedestrian traffic into Juárez, particu-
larly at night.18  U.S. citizens feared harassment by
Mexicans angered by the Operation and stayed away
in the initial months.  U.S. military forces stationed
at Fort Bliss were prohibited by their commanders
from going to Juárez from the time the Operation
began until mid-February 1994.  Thus, one would
expect Friday (evening) southbound crossings and
Saturday (early AM) crossings to be down some-
what, as well as Saturday (evening) and Sunday
(early AM) crossings to be reduced.
Second, if closer scrutiny of the validity of crossing
documents by INS officers on the Paso del Norte
Bridge discouraged pedestrian visits to the United
States (as seems to have been the case, at least ini-
tially), one would expect crossings to be dispropor-
tionately reduced on Saturdays, since Saturdays are
heavy shopping days in downtown El Paso and
shopping is a less necessary trip than going for em-
ployment or business.
Third, both legal and illegal crossers who work in El
Paso report that their principal strategy for coping
with increased surveillance at the border is to re-
duce the number of times they cross and increase
the number of nights they spend in El Paso.  Those
working illegally, but crossing with their BCC, re-
duce crossings to reduce the chances of having their
crossing documents confiscated.  Those crossing il-
legally do so less frequently to minimize their risk
of being detained by the Border Patrol, a risk that
greatly increased since the Operation began.  One
would thus expect to see increased southbound pe-
destrian bridge crossings on Saturdays, as persons
who have stayed over to work in El Paso during the
week return to Juárez.  Similarly, one might also
expect some increase in northbound bridge cross-
ings on Sundays, as persons working in El Paso at-
tempt to cross the bridge at an hour when they are
less likely to be suspected of going to work than,
say, if they were crossing early Monday morning.
The next two tables summarize the results of a kind
of “shift-share” analysis conducted of pedestrian
bridge crossing patterns.  We compared southbound
crossings on different days of the week, postblockade,
by month in 1993-1994 with crossings during the
same period in 1992-1993.  The same was also done
for northbound crossings.  The ratios that appear in
Tables 12 and 13 were calculated as follows.  Total
crossings in a given month were apportioned to dif-
ferent days of the week as if they were evenly dis-
tributed by day, so that as many crossings occur on
a Friday, say, as do on a Sunday.  The number of
crossings generated for a given day of the week is
the expected number of crossings for that day in
that month.  We then divided the actual number of
crossings that occurred by the expected number to
produce the ratios in the tables.  If crossings were
evenly distributed by day, the value of each ratio
would be 1.00.  We interpret the ratio obtained for
18 CONACO, the official Mexican Chamber of Commerce,
has produced a report decrying the negative impact
that the Operation has had on restaurants, bars, and
nightclubs in Juárez (See Chapter IV for more detail).
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What changes in patterns of crossing by day of week
were observed following the Operation?  In the first
two months, southbound (October and November
of 1993 versus the same two months of 1992) , and
in the first three months northbound (October
through December), Saturday pedestrian crossings
decline sharply relative to other days of the week
(See Table 12 for southbound and Table 13 for north-
bound figures).  Saturday’s share of southbound
crossings was down 42 percentage points in No-
vember from the year before, and northbound its
share declined by 73 percentage points.  Meanwhile,
the share of pedestrian crossings in both directions
southbound pedestrian crossings on Fridays in Oc-
tober 1992 as meaning that “17 percent more south-
bound crossings were made on Fridays than one
would expect simply on the basis of the number of
Fridays in the month.”  Of interest in our analysis
are the changes in these ratios for the same month
of the year prior to the Operation and during the
Operation.  Table 12 indicates, for example, that
Fridays in October 1993, lost a slight share of total
southbound crossings for the month as compared to
1992.  Instead of there being 17 percent more Friday
southbound crossings than expected, there were only
15 percent, a decline in share of two percentage
points.
Table 12.
RATIO OF OBSERVED TO EXPECTED SOUTHBOUND PEDESTRIAN CROSSINGS,
 PASO DEL NORTE AND STANTON STREET INTERNATIONAL BRIDGES
(BY DAY OF WEEK)
Month & Year Friday Saturday Sunday/Holiday Weekday
Oct 92 1.17 1.54 0.65 0.87
Oct 93 1.15 1.40 0.67 0.93
Nov 92 1.42 1.86 0.50 0.95
Nov 93 1.23 1.44 0.69 0.97
Dec 92 1.10 1.33 0.57 1.03
Dec 93 1.10 1.53 0.57 1.00
Jan 93 1.23 1.45 0.58 0.96
Jan 94 1.18 1.51 0.64 0.96
Feb 93 1.28 1.49 0.66 0.94
Feb 94 1.20 1.60 0.69 0.93
Change in Ratios
Month Friday Saturday Sunday/Holiday Weekday
Oct -0.02 -0.14 0.02  0.06
Nov -0.20 -0.42 0.19  0.03
Dec  0.01  0.20 0.00 -0.03
Jan -0.05  0.06 0.06  0.01
Feb -0.08  0.10 0.02 -0.01
Source: El Paso Department of Traffic and Transportation
RESEARCH
P A P E R
- 36 -
U.S.  C O M M I S S I O N  O N  I M M I G R A T I O N  R E F O R M
Table 13.
RATIO OF OBSERVED TO EXPECTED NUMBER OF NORTHBOUND
PEDESTRIAN CROSSINGS, PASO DEL NORTE INTERNATIONAL BRIDGE
(BY DAY OF WEEK)
Month & Year Friday Saturday Sunday/Holiday Weekday
Oct 92 1.18 1.54 0.78 0.84
Oct 93 0.99 1.16 0.62 1.07
Nov 92 0.88 1.88 0.71 0.97
Nov 93 1.30 1.14 0.67 1.02
Dec 92 0.94 1.38 0.63 1.03
Dec 93 0.77 1.23 0.70 1.11
Jan 93 1.19 1.31 0.68 0.98
Jan 94 1.11 1.61 0.81 0.90
Feb 93 0.85 1.49 0.53 1.05
Feb 94 0.95 1.19 0.84 1.01
Change in Ratios
Month Friday Saturday Sunday/Holiday Weekday
Oct -0.19 -0.39 -0.16  0.23
Nov  0.42 -0.73 -0.04  0.05
Dec -0.17 -0.15  0.07  0.08
Jan -0.08  0.30  0.13 -0.08
Feb  0.10 -0.30  0.31 -0.04
Source: US Customs Office, El Paso District
captured by the Monday-Thursday weekday period19
rose in the first two months following the Opera-
tion, when compared with the previous year.  This
decline in both directions on a prime downtown
shopping day and increase in both directions on days
in the work week are consistent with the hypothesis
that, immediately following the Operation, unneces-
sary pedestrian crossings (to shop, pay social visits,
etc.) were discouraged relative to more necessary
crossings (to work, for example).  This finding ac-
cords with the other finding above that overall pe-
destrian bridge crossings declined substantially dur-
ing the peak Christmas shopping season after the
blockade.
After the first two months of the Operation,
Saturday’s share of southbound pedestrian cross-
ings rose relative to the previous year (Table 12).
This change in pattern suggests that over time, both
legal and illegal crossers who worked illegally in El
Paso responded to the Operation by reducing their
number of crossings and extending their number of
nights spent in El Paso during the work week, thus
supporting corollary two of hypothesis two and
hypothesis three above.  It also tends to support
hypothesis two itself, that the number of illegal cross-
19 Fridays are unlike other weekdays for several reasons.
Some persons working during the week in El Paso
may return to Juárez on that day.  Youth, military
personnel, and other groups also tend to cross the
border southbound on Friday to go out for the evening.
Large numbers of other persons may walk back and
forth across the bridges on Friday as they would on
any other work day.  Friday is therefore an ambiguous
case, similar to Monday-Thursday in some ways, and
to Saturday in others.  Postblockade changes in Friday’s
share of crossings in both directions, not surprisingly,
show no clear pattern.
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Conclusions
Several major conclusions about the effects of the
Operation on illegal flows and legal/illegal border
crossings are suggested by the findings that emerge
from the analyses of INS apprehensions and bridge
crossings data presented in this chapter.  First, the
Operation seems to have sharply reduced illegal
flows into El Paso.  Second, this decline appears to
be diminishing the longer the Operation lasts.  Third,
a substantial amount of long-distance labor immi-
gration appears to have been diverted to other ports-
of-entry on the U.S./Mexico border.  Fourth, legal
crossers/illegal workers and illegal crossers/illegal
workers appear to have extended the duration of
their stays in El Paso and changed the daily pattern
of their crossings to minimize the risk of detection/
document confiscation.  The Border Patrol in El Paso
has said that, prior to the Operation, about 60 per-
cent of persons apprehended were Juárez residents
whose destination was El Paso and 40 percent were
persons headed for other U.S. destinations.  The re-
sults presented in this chapter suggest that the
Operation’s greatest effect has been to deter or make
more difficult illegal crossings by short-term migrants
residing in Juárez.  Also, the late post-Operation in-
creases in apprehensions outside the El Paso sector
are about 45 percent of the decline in apprehensions
in the El Paso sector, which suggests that long-dis-
tant labor migration has moved elsewhere.  We re-
turn to these conclusions below after analyses of
other data and examination of other situations
thought to have been influenced by the Operation.
These additional analyses help determine the de-
gree to which these initial conclusions can be em-
braced with greater confidence or must be viewed
as hypotheses contradicted by other evidence.
IV. Effects on
Business and
Economic
Activities
Within days of its implementation, many members
of the El Paso business community stated their op-
position to Operation Hold the Line.  Hostility to
ings has been reduced more than the number of
illegal crossers.  Additional support for hypothesis
three can be found in that, after the first two months
of the Operation, Sunday’s share of northbound
crossings increases strongly relative to the previous
year, suggesting that legal crossers who work ille-
gally in El Paso may be crossing north in greater
numbers on Sundays to have the purpose of their
visit less subject to scrutiny and challenge by INS
inspectors at the port of entry.
A final cautionary note: a shift-share analysis serves
primarily to improve observation of changes in a
patterned social phenomenon; it does not indicate
the causes of the changes observed.  Thus, the inter-
pretations offered here are tentative.  Their likely
validity, however, is enhanced by the fact that they
accord with other pieces of qualitative and quanti-
tative evidence.  Also, the changes observed were
not dramatically large, which should come as no
surprise, however, since our best estimates indicate
that the number of Juárez residents working ille-
gally in El Paso is small relative to the combined
working populations of the two cities.  A change in
the behavior of less than two thousand illegal cross-
ers/illegal workers and less than seven thousand
legal crossers/illegal workers, not all of whom will
respond similarly to the Operation and not all of
whom use the Paso del Norte and Stanton Street
pedestrian bridges to return to Mexico, is unlikely
to produce radical changes in pedestrian crossings
that number in the hundreds of thousands per
month.  By the same token, the changes observed,
while perhaps not dramatic, are not subject to sta-
tistical probability error, since they are counts of all
legal pedestrian crossings on these bridges.  They
are not estimates based on a sample of crossers.
Consequently, we have no doubt that crossing pat-
terns have indeed changed in the ways observed
here.20  When combined with qualitative reports
obtained from government officials and residents on
both sides of the border, these data provide a more
complete picture of the effects of Operation Hold
the Line on people’s behavior related to the interna-
tional boundary dividing El Paso and Juárez.
20 Unless, of course, the counts supplied to us by either
the Customs Service or the City of El Paso were
themselves erroneous.
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the Operation rose as it appeared that sales were
being lost to a combination of the interruption of
traffic into the city from Juárez and the “Buy Mexi-
can” campaign proposed by the governor of the State
of Chihuahua, and such Mexican business organiza-
tions as Cámera Nacional de la Industria de la
Transformación [CANACINTRA] and Cámera Nacional
del Comercio [CANACO].  Business leaders declared
in open meetings, at city hall and in the media that
the Operation was having a significantly negative
impact on the economic activity of the city by pre-
venting or discouraging Mexican patrons from cross-
ing the border to shop.  As it has been estimated
that as much as 40 percent of all purchases in the
retail sales industry in the city are made by consum-
ers from Mexico (Institute for Manufacturing and
Materials Management 1991), anything that inter-
fered with consumer access to El Paso stores could
reasonably have a major impact on the city’s eco-
nomic stability.  In order to assess the real impact of
the Operation on local business activity, the research
team interviewed leaders of the El Paso and Juárez
business communities, analyzed data from the Texas
State Comptroller’s Office on sales tax receipts and
sales by zip code area, and examined data on the
local labor market, hotel occupancy, bus ridership,
and auto accidents in El Paso.
Business Leader Response
The top officials of the Greater El Paso Chamber of
Commerce [GEPCC], the El Paso Hispanic Chamber
of Commerce [EPHCC], and the El Paso Downtown
Development Association [DDA] were interviewed
separately regarding the effects of the Operation both
on their members specifically and on the El Paso
business environment in general.  The leaders of the
three organizations expressed similar positions re-
garding the Border Patrol’s new strategy for polic-
ing the border.  None of the leaders expressed any
objection in principle to the redeployment of Border
Patrol agents to the frontline border.  Rather, they
complained about the implementation of the Opera-
tion by the federal authorities, which they believed
was done without regard for its effects on the local
community.
First, they objected that the Operation was launched
without warning.  They felt that they should have
been consulted prior to the redeployment of agents
so that they could have minimized any negative
impacts on business in El Paso and avoided alienat-
ing Mexican customers of El Paso businesses.  Hav-
ing spent many years developing close working re-
lationships with the Juárez and Chihuahua City
business communities, they were hard pressed to
convince their counterparts across the Rio Grande
that they did not receive advance notice of the
Operation.  Representatives of the GEPCC, EPHCC,
and DDA requested meetings with officials from the
INS/Border Patrol and Customs Service subsequent
to the Operation to promote better communications
and understanding between the federal authorities
and the local communities.  These meetings con-
tinue to take place, but leaders of each organization
expressed doubts as to whether the meetings would
lead to greater INS/Border Patrol sensitivity to their
concerns in the future.
Second, they objected to the conceptualization and
naming of the INS operation as a “blockade,” and
its implementation as a “crackdown” attempting to
“seal” the border.  Leaders of each of the business
organizations maintained that “perception is real-
ity,” especially when most people get their informa-
tion from the news media and not from direct expe-
rience with events.  They complained that the over-
night presence of dozens of armed Border Patrol
agents at the river and on the international bridges
gave the appearance of a military blockade of the
border.  This image, once transmitted by the news
media to people in Mexico, provoked widespread
fear and resentment, even on the part of many people
who had legal authorization to cross the border.  A
blockade, these leaders argued, is what the United
States did to Cuba and Iraq and implies both a ban
on movement of persons and a prohibition against
trade and commerce.  A blockade on Mexico, a
friendly and close neighbor and ally of the United
States, could be taken as an affront to Mexicans.
This came at a particularly sensitive time, just six
weeks before the Congressional vote on NAFTA and
in the middle of the El Paso business community’s
promotion of the El Camino Real Corridor, an eco-
nomic alliance among Mexican and American cities
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or that any of these employees had been prevented
from getting to work in a timely fashion.  With re-
gard to the impact of the Operation on sales, there
was consensus that the businesses most affected were
those retail stores in what is known as the “Golden
Horseshoe” in downtown El Paso (South of I-10),
which serve many Mexican pedestrian bridge-cross-
ers, and that businesses that could only be reached
by car or bus from the border (i.e., those not within
walking distance from the river) were less affected.
The leader of the DDA reported that although Christ-
mas season sales in 1993 appeared to have been better
for the El Paso downtown merchants than they were
in 1992, they might have been better still were it not
for a “buy Mexican” campaign launched by Juárez
retailers to exploit nationalist resentment against the
blockade on the part of Mexican consumers.  In any
event, the DDA leader maintained, the bounce-back
in sales in November and December of 1993 did not
make up for the losses incurred downtown in Sep-
tember and October, a claim that corresponds fairly
well to observations based on zip-code retail sales
and to pedestrian bridge-crossing data.
Sales
Gross retail sales are reported to the State
Comptroller’s Office quarterly.  The Research Divi-
sion provided quarterly reported gross sales data
for the retail trade industry for each zip code (Fig-
ure 2) in El Paso through the end of the fourth
quarter of calendar year 1993.  Table 14 shows the
percent change in reported gross sales for each zip
code area in 1993, comparing each quarter with the
same quarter in 1992.  El Paso experienced a 5.5
percent increase in reported gross sales in the retail
trade industry for the year.  The fourth quarter ex-
perienced a 3.8 percent increase, the lowest change
of any quarter.  Only six of the eighteen zip code
areas in El Paso showed a decline in the fourth
quarter (the quarter in which the Operation oc-
curred), although eight showed an overall annual
decline.  The overall increases for both quarter and
year are heavily influenced by the increases for the
quarter and year that occurred in one zip code
(79925).  That area, containing the international air-
port and a large shopping mall, accounted for 29.4
percent of the annual gross reported sales in the
stretching from Chihuahua City to Santa Fe, New
Mexico.  The president of the GEPCC complained
that having pictures of “armed guards and steel
walls” associated with El Paso in the national media
has made it harder to convince companies to locate
in El Paso.  All three organizations expressed reser-
vations about the construction of any new walls along
the border and the use of such military forces as the
National Guard to aid the Border Patrol in Opera-
tion Hold the Line.
Third, leaders of all three organizations expressed
concerns about the treatment of Mexican holders of
border crossing cards by INS personnel on the inter-
national bridges both during the initial stages of the
Operation and subsequent to its conversion to Op-
eration Hold the Line.  They received reports from
their members that Mexican customers had been
subjected to “undue and aggressive” interrogation
by INS agents on the bridge, had been turned back
at the gate when they were deemed to have insuf-
ficient funds to shop, and had their valid border
crossing cards confiscated when they failed to an-
swer questions to INS inspectors’ satisfaction.  The
president of the GEPCC and the chairman of the
board of the EPHCC each recounted the experiences
of Mexican business people they knew, one of whom
had owned a business in El Paso for many years,
who had been turned back at one of the interna-
tional bridges after presenting documents they had
used for years to cross legally.  Making it more dif-
ficult to enter the United States for Mexican nation-
als who have a legal right to do so inevitably hurts
business in El Paso, these leaders argued.  In each
interview, the same observation was made: the fed-
eral government had managed to produce additional
funds to mount the blockade, but had made no funds
available to facilitate legal border crossings by Mexi-
cans.  One way this could be done, the business
leaders felt, would be to streamline what they see as
the current lengthy and expensive bureaucratic pro-
cess for obtaining Border Crossing Cards.
In terms of the effects of the Operation on the busi-
nesses of their members, the leaders of all three
organizations reported that they had heard no com-
plaints from members that they had lost any Mexi-
can employees who regularly commuted from Juárez
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Figure 2.
El Paso Postal Zip Codes
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retail trade in El Paso and 31.7 percent during the
fourth quarter.
Initial complaints about loss of business due to Op-
eration Hold the Line came from business people in
the downtown districts.  The available data appear
to support their contention.  Of the six zip code
areas that showed a decline in the fourth quarter of
1993 versus the fourth quarter of 1992, four are close
to the city’s center.  Zip code 79901 comprises the
downtown district of El Paso south of Interstate 10
and includes the area at the foot of the Paso del
Norte Bridge.  The area includes the city’s civic cen-
ter and contains the shopping district that serves
those Juarenses who walk across the bridge.  This
area accounted for 10.4 percent of total reported gross
retail sales in the city during 1993.  Reported gross
sales declined by 3.6 percent in that area during the
fourth quarter of 1993 versus the fourth quarter of
1992.  Other downtown areas include zip code area
79902 (north of Interstate 10), zip code area 79903
(north of Interstate 10 and east of zip code area
79902), and zip code area 79905 (which includes the
district at the foot of the Bridge of the Americas).
For those four zip code areas combined, fourth quar-
ter gross reported sales in the retail trade industry
declined by a total of 8.2 percent.  Because of their
central location and proximity to the border, com-
plaints that the Border Patrol’s operation hurt busi-
ness in the area appear justified.  However, each of
those four areas also reported declines in gross sales
in 1993 from the comparable period in 1992.  Of the
twenty-two reported periods of declining sales dur-
ing 1993, ten were reported by those four zip code
areas.  Other zip code areas (79907, 79915, and 79922)
also are bordered on the south by the Rio Grande
but are not downtown.  All showed increases in the
fourth quarter of 1993 versus the fourth quarter 1992.
Table 14.
PERCENT CHANGES IN REPORTED GROSS SALES IN THE RETAIL TRADE INDUSTRY
ZIP CODES IN EL PASO (1993)
Zip Code Qtr 1 Qtr 2 Qtr 3 Qtr 4 Total
79901  0.5  1.2 4.6  3.6  0.4
79902 12.9 13.7 2.1 11.9  3.6
79903  6.5 12.8 2.7  0.7  2.6
79904  3.4  6.4 5.1  5.2  0.8
79905 20.5  2.0 4.8 21.1  2.1
79906 25.2 17.3 4.3  2.4 13.7
79907  8.8  5.7 2.7  0.1  4.1
79908 25.7 38.3 2.2 13.8  2.4
79912 13.0 12.2 9.5 15.7 12.8
79915 10.6 16.4 5.5 14.1 14.2
79922 15.8 11.0 4.9 18.6  6.8
79924  2.0  4.3 1.8  0.8  2.2
79925  8.4  5.4 4.7 10.2  7.4
79930  2.1  1.7 3.4  1.6  0.4
79932 18.3  3.7 4.9 11.6  9.7
79934 47.6 12.1 5.7  3.6 14.2
79935 14.8  5.5 5.4 14.2  1.1
79936 22.0 18.4 6.9  3.2 13.8
Total  8.4  4.5 5.8  3.8  5.4
Source: Texas State Comptroller’s Office, Research Division
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vember are generally significantly higher than for
the remaining months.  They do not indicate peri-
odic surges in economic activity, and adjustments
must be made for their presence.  Table 15 shows
the percent change in sales tax allocations for se-
lected cities in Texas for the past three years.  The
last row shows the percent change in sales tax allo-
cations to all the cities in the state.  From 1992 to
1993, sales taxes allocated to El Paso increased by
8.4 percent as compared to an 11.1 percent increase
for all cities in the state.  However, allocations to El
Paso have been below the state average in five of
the past six years.
Table 16 compares the percent change in sales tax
allocations for selected cities in Texas for October
through April during the past three years.  During
the period since Operation Hold the Line began, i.e.,
October 1993 through April 1994, sales taxes allo-
cated to El Paso increased by 8.7 percent over the
same period in the previous year.  This compares to
a 12.3 percent increase in sales tax allocations for all
cities in Texas during the same observation period.
Over the past four such observation periods, El
Paso’s allocations have lagged behind the state, on
average, three out of four times.  Thus, while the
Operation appears to have exerted a negative effect
on downtown business activity, it does not appear
to have influenced overall business sales negatively
in the larger metropolitan area.
City Sales and Use
Tax Collections
Analyzing collections of city sales taxes is another
useful way of evaluating the effects of Operation
Hold the Line on El Paso’s economy.  In Texas, the
State Treasurer collects sales tax revenues for all tax-
ing entities in the state—state, city, county, and
metropolitan transit authorities.  Business people
forward tax receipts from customers depending on
a formula that includes the taxpayer’s average
monthly revenue.  Quarterly sales tax payments are
due in the months of February, May, August, and
November.  The State Treasurer remits to each tax-
ing entity its portion of the tax receipts in a monthly
allocation.  This amount, remitted by the State Trea-
surer to each city, roughly represents the amount of
city sales tax collected during a given time frame.
Taxpayers do not always forward their tax receipts
on time and the resulting penalties and interest pay-
ments are also included in the monthly allocation
figures.  While these may alter the data somewhat,
they should have little effect on the overall assess-
ment of economic activity.
City sales tax remittances allocated to each city each
month are directly related to taxes, penalties, and
interest payments received by the State Treasurer.
Thus, allocations for February, May, August, and No-
Table 15.
PERCENT CHANGES IN SALES TAX ALLOCATIONS
(ANNUAL CHANGES)
1990-1991 1991-1992 1992-1993
Austin  9.8  7.7 14.1
Brownsville  5.4  5.6 21.0
Corpus Christi  5.9  6.1  7.8
Dallas  1.3  4.7  7.9
El Paso  6.5  5.9  8.4
Fort Worth  0.8  3.8  8.0
Houston  5.6  0.1  5.6
Laredo 16.2 12.7  8.7
McAllen 15.2 19.0  8.1
San Antonio  6.5  6.7 11.3
State of Texas  9.2  7.1 11.1
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Table 16.
PERCENT CHANGES IN SALES TAX ALLOCATIONS
(OCTOBER THROUGH APRIL CHANGES)
1990-1991 1991-1992 1992-1993 1993-1994
Austin 89.3  5.8 14.5 11.9
Brownsville  6.3  7.5 12.7 15.7
Corpus Christi 97.1  1.8  9.0 10.9
Dallas 82.6  2.8  8.4  9.2
El Paso  7.4  6.6  5.7  8.7
Fort Worth 79.2  2.7  5.8 12.5
Houston 92.7  0.6  2.8  6.3
Laredo 13.6 13.8 12.4  8.1
McAllen 60.5 31.2 12.1  6.9
San Antonio  8.2  3.6 10.2 11.2
State of Texas 10.9  5.6  9.5 12.3
Source: Texas Comptroller’s Office, Tax Allocation Division
Labor Market
Many people suggest that undocumented migrants
entering El Paso to obtain work take jobs away from
El Paso residents.  If this is true, and if the Opera-
tion has been successful in stopping undocumented
migrants from entering El Paso, one would expect
to see an increase in the number of new job postings
after the implementation of Operation Hold the Line.
This would particularly be true in the kinds of jobs
thought to be filled by illegal migrants: primarily
positions in the services, machine trades, benchwork,
and structural work occupation groups.
One measure of economic activity in the community
is the number of new job order postings recorded
each week through the Texas Employment Commis-
sion [TEC].  Part of the TEC mission is to assist
unemployed persons in their job searches.  Many
organizations, in both the private and public sec-
tors, notify the local Texas Employment Commis-
sion office when jobs become available.  Employers
seeking persons to fill specific job openings submit
job orders to TEC, which, in turn, matches legal
U.S. residents who are seeking employment to those
job openings.  A significant rise in job orders placed
by employers with the Employee Services unit of
the TEC’s office in El Paso is another way in which
an increased demand for legal employees in El Paso
could be reflected.
To assess the effect of the Operation, the Texas Em-
ployment Commission’s El Paso Office collected data
on new job postings for fifty-nine weeks from Janu-
ary 7, 1993, through May 18, 1994.  Table 17 pre-
sents the number of job orders received from em-
ployers during the reporting weeks for jobs in the
services, machine trades, benchwork, and structural
work occupation groups.  It also shows total job
orders for all nine occupation groups.  These data
do not cover every week during the period nor do
they cover a sufficient period to allow for time-se-
ries analysis, but they do provide a rough estimate.
As can be seen, the TEC received no obvious surge
in placement of job orders following implementa-
tion of the Operation, as might have been expected
had large numbers of illegal workers suddenly been
removed from the El Paso work force.  For the week
of September 23, 1993, the first week of the Opera-
tion, new job order postings increased 1 to 5 percent
in the four occupation groups shown; however, new
postings dropped in all four groups the following
week.
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Table 17.
JOB ORDERS TAKEN BY TEXAS EMPLOYMENT COMMISSION, EL PASO COUNTY (BY WEEK)
Date Services Machine Trades Benchwork Structural Work Total
01/07/93  60 27 28 25 280
01/14/93  70 22 30 28 287
01/21/93  71 23 33 33 319
01/28/93  67 23 42 38 316
02/05/93  68 29 46 33 320
02/12/93  69 34 66 35 356
02/18/93  83 29 55 32 364
02/24/93  97 40 59 46 433
03/04/93  94 40 57 39 420
03/11/93 105 46 57 33 433
03/17/93 113 41 52 42 467
03/24/93 102 47 65 48 486
04/08/93 136 51 65 59 574
04/15/93 121 49 63 63 528
04/22/93 134 46 59 49 532
04/29/93 136 48 61 53 576
05/06/93 130 58 67 62 593
05/14/93 148 55 59 62 580
05/21/93 156 52 60 52 559
05/27/93 154 50 78 65 591
06/11/93 147 53 89 58 615
06/18/93 149 52 91 58 603
08/12/93 147 71 68 96 636
08/20/93 129 71 75 94 630
08/26/93 131 69 69 90 627
09/02/93 122 73 58 83 595
09/10/93 106 68 57 91 576
09/16/93  98 64 58 77 552
09/23/93 101 66 61 78 557
09/30/93  98 65 51 53 541
10/08/93  98 52 49 87 535
10/15/93  82 57 37 87 505
10/22/93  78 60 50 77 507
10/29/93  78 50 33 74 462
11/04/93  74 37 35 53 405
11/12/93  82 41 34 47 404
11/19/93  75 49 31 47 423
11/24/93  92 45 26 46 402
12/03/93  88 42 39 43 398
12/10/93  83 38 31 45 380
12/23/93  85 38 34 46 392
12/30/93  90 32 30 41 364
01/06/94  96 33 39 38 382
01/14/94 108 33 43 53 419
01/21/94 108 32 44 51 431
01/28/94 109 38 29 51 396
02/11/94  88 38 32 43 425
02/18/94  82 48 34 39 421
02/24/94  72 46 34 35 373
03/11/94  84 61 44 54 460
03/18/94  94 58 40 46 463
04/01/94 100 58 42 56 496
04/08/94  98 58 48 58 483
04/14/94 100 61 54 42 481
04/21/94 128 54 46 52 280
04/28/94 105 58 46 57 266
05/05/94 113 49 40 57 259
05/12/94  97 50 42 56 245
05/18/94 110 43 34 60 247
Source: Texas Employment Commission, El Paso Office
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One way in which increased demand for U.S. resi-
dent labor could manifest itself would be in a de-
cline in the local unemployment rate in the months
following the blockade.  Table 19 gives monthly un-
employment figures for El Paso County from 1989
through the end of 1993.  As can be seen, no sub-
stantial, unseasonable rise or fall in the unemploy-
ment rate took place after the Operation started in
late September 1993.  The post-Operation average
unemployment rate of 10.6 percent is identical with
both the average rate for the months January-Au-
gust from 1989 through 1993 and for the months
October-December from 1989 through 1992.21
Our field work and review of the relevant quantita-
tive data available in El Paso/Juárez indicate that
the proportion of Juárez residents working illegally
in El Paso before the blockade was probably rela-
tively small and that most of them worked in do-
mestic service, as street vendors, or for construction
contractors at rates of pay not attractive to most
legal U.S. residents.  As noted above, while the
Operation has reduced illegal crossings, it has not
entirely eliminated them.  Moreover, part of the
reduction in illegal crossings may be due to people
extending their stays on the El Paso side so as to
continue working while commuting back and forth
less frequently.  Finally, most of the Juárez residents
working illegally in El Paso cross the border legally
with a Border Crossing Card and thus have not been
Table 18 shows the mean number of new job order
postings for the four occupation groups and the to-
tal prior to and after the implementation of Opera-
tion Hold the Line, as well as the means for the
entire data set.  As can readily be seen, the mean
number of new job order postings after implemen-
tation of the Operation declined in three of the four
occupation groups after the Operation was imple-
mented.  Only in the machine trade occupation group
did the mean number of new job order postings
rise, and then only by 1.3 percent.  The incomplete-
ness of the available data limits analysis; however,
it would appear that the operation has had little, if
any, impact on the formal labor market in El Paso.
It is more likely that the fluctuations observed in the
data are due to changes in economic conditions or
effects of the business cycle.  It may be that many
Juárez residents who work illegally in El Paso do so
not for formal companies, but rather for private in-
dividuals and informal enterprises in various kinds
of domestic service—lawn maintenance, gardening,
housecleaning, daycare, and construction.  Employ-
ers of illegal workers, to the extent that they are not
formal companies, may not tend to use the TEC job
order service.
If the number of Juárez residents working illegally
in El Paso were very large, if such persons were
performing jobs vital to the local economy that were
seen as desirable by legal U.S. residents, and if
Operation Hold the Line made it impossible for a
substantial number of those working illegally before
the Operation to continue to do so afterwards, one
would expect the demand for labor from U.S. resi-
dents to rise measurably after the Operation began.
Table 18.
MEAN NEW JOB ORDER LISTINGS FOR EL PASO TEXAS EMPLOYMENT COMMISSION
SELECTED WEEKS
Means Services    Machine Trades   Benchwork     Structural Work Total
Preimplementation 112.3      47.5     59.5            55.1 494.6
Postimplementation  93.4      48.1     39.7            53.9 448.7
Combined means 102.4      47.8     49.1            54.5 470.5
Source: Texas Employment Commission, El Paso Office
21 We exclude the month of September from these
comparisons of the average unemployment rate because
of the temporary disruptions that occurred in cross
border traffic in the first days of Operation Blockade.
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Paso, that concern appears to have rapidly waned.
Tourism is the second largest industry in El Paso,
and one would have expected a decline in hotel
occupancy rates if tourism were appreciably affected.
Table 20 shows monthly hotel occupancy rates from
January 1990 through May 1994.  The rates dropped
from September 1993 through February 1994 com-
pared to the same months in the previous year.
However, occupancy rates have been declining over
the past three years.  The major exceptions, in July
and August 1993, were due to state and regional
meetings held in El Paso during those months.
Conversations with El Paso Tourist Bureau employ-
ees suggest that factors other than Operation Hold
the Line were at work and, in their judgment, were
more likely to have influenced tourism and hotel
occupancy than the Operation.  A major factor ap-
pears to be the declining budget of El Paso Tourist
Bureau.  Advertising is a prime factor in inducing
people to visit the city.  Another factor may have
been the nationwide trend in recent years for shorter
vacations, which means that tourists tend to stay
closer to their home areas.  El Paso draws on the
northern plains states and the Midwest for much of
its tourism trade.  Because of its distance from those
areas, El Paso may be experiencing the effects of the
general trend and the unwillingness of tourists to
spend extra time on the road.
Bus Ridership
We also received ridership data from representa-
tives of both Sunland Metro (the local bus company)
and Greyhound Corporation in El Paso.  Neither
prevented from working by the Operation, which
seeks mainly to curb illegal crossings, not illegal
employment.  Thus, the lack of any sign of a sub-
stantial impact of the Operation on the El Paso labor
market is perhaps not surprising.
The legalization provisions of the Immigration Re-
form and Control Act of 1986 are also likely to have
had an impact on the employment and wages of
undocumented Mexican workers in the El Paso area
(Sorensen & Bean 1994).  In the late 1980s, many
Mexicans living and working illegally in El Paso
legalized their status through the INS amnesty pro-
gram.  Thus hundreds of maids, gardeners, farm
workers, nannies, mechanics, and others who for-
merly worked illegally continued on in their jobs as
legal workers.  According to the leader of the Union
de Trabajadores Agricolas, an El Paso farm worker
organization, most farm workers in the area now
are legal residents.  According to this source, most
growers and ranchers have no incentive and thus
refuse to hire undocumented workers.  In El Paso’s
Plaza San Jacinto, interviews at bus stops with a
number of immigrant women working as house-
cleaners uncovered that they were not Juárez com-
muter workers, but legalized El Paso residents.  It is
likely, then, that the legalization of many of  the El
Paso area’s undocumented workers may have damp-
ened any labor market effects that Operation Hold
the Line otherwise might have had.
Tourism
Although there was some initial concern over the
potential impact of the Operation on tourism in El
Table 19.
UNEMPLOYMENT RATE IN EL PASO COUNTY
(BY MONTH AND YEAR)
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
1989 11.0 10.8  9.7 10.1  8.9 10.8 10.8 10.6  9.6 11.1  9.5 10.2
1990  9.7 12.1  9.6 10.2 10.7 10.8 10.7 10.3 11.0  9.7 12.2 11.3
1991 12.0 10.6 10.9 11.4 10.5 10.0 10.9 10.1 10.1 11.3 10.5 10.1
1992 12.3 11.4 10.7 10.6 10.5 11.9 10.5  9.4 10.6  9.7 10.8 10.8
1993 11.7 11.3  9.3  9.6  9.3 10.9 10.3  9.3  9.5 10.6 10.3 11.0
Source: Texas Employment Commission, El Paso office
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Table 20.
HOTEL OCCUPANCY RATES IN EL PASO
(January 1990-May 1994)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
January 71.0 70.3 68.1 67.7 65.2
February 74.2 76.0 71.8 74.4 72.2
March 76.6 78.4 78.0 71.3 74.4
April 75.0 74.6 76.4 71.9 76.7
May 76.4 76.0 75.0 70.9 74.7
June 81.0 80.1 77.2 74.7
July 79.5 77.5 75.9 79.1
August 79.3 74.6 73.1 85.4
September 67.9 72.2 74.0 70.0
October 70.6 73.7 71.5 68.8
November67.5 67.9 66.9 65.3
December 70.7 69.7 66.0 65.7
Source:  El Paso Tourist Bureau
Accidents
One alleged side effect of Operation Hold the Line
was improved safety along Loop 375, the “Border
Highway” that extends from the Paso del Norte
Bridge in downtown El Paso to the Zaragoza Bridge.
This stretch of highway parallels the Rio Grande
and is an obstacle to illegal border crossers.  Having
crossed the river, migrants are faced with crossing
this high-speed, limited-access, four-lane divided
highway, a main traffic artery bringing El Pasoans
from the east into the downtown area.  Prior to the
Operation, migrants were known to run across the
road, dodging oncoming traffic.  Border Patrol agents
were stationed along the levee between the river
and the highway as part of the Operation Hold the
Line strategy.  This placement of agents virtually
eliminated border crossings in that area.  Several
interviewees cited the reduction in highway conges-
tion caused by border crossers and the consequent
reduction in highway accidents and fatalities.
A Texas Department of Public Safety search of its
official record of automobile-pedestrian traffic acci-
dents January 1, 1989 through May 1993, along the
border highway from Santa Fe Street at the foot of
the Paso del Norte Bridge and Zaragoza Avenue,
which extends from the Zaragoza Bridge, found
thirty-four reports involving thirty-six pedestrian in-
juries.
company noted any appreciable change in ridership
following the launching of Operation Hold the Line.
Greyhound notes that it makes little sense for un-
documented Mexicans to attempt to leave El Paso
on its buses because Border Patrol personnel rou-
tinely board buses at highway checkpoints on the
way out of town to check riders’ documents.  About
one or two undocumented persons a month are re-
moved from Greyhound buses as a result.
That Sunland Metro ridership was not affected by
eliminating the crossing of undocumented Mexicans
seems to indicate that few undocumented residents
of Juárez were using the Sunland Metro system to
get to work in El Paso.  Conversely, it also suggests
that the majority of the Mexican domestic workers
employed in El Paso are (1) either U.S. citizens or
legal permanent residents who choose to reside in
Juárez while working in El Paso, or (2) holders of
Border Crossing Cards who enter the United States
legally in order to work illegally.  At the downtown
San Jacinto Plaza we ascertained that many Mexican
women queued up every morning to board Sunland
Metro buses headed for outlying parts of El Paso.
Thus, the Operation does not appear to have halted
the employment of domestic workers from Juárez.
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ness leader expressed resentment of the portrayal in
the press of Mexican illegal crossers as a criminal
element and of the INS officials’ treatment of legal
Mexican crossers as criminal suspects.  Each knew
of business people or their employees who had ex-
perienced harassment and other difficulties at the
hands of INS officials on the bridges in the first
days after the Operation began, though they acknowl-
edged that treatment of Mexican entrants subse-
quently improved.  They emphasized that Mexicans
who crossed into El Paso illegally were “productive
people who go there to work, not to steal,” in the
words of Mr. Ochoa.  While the leaders did not
question the Border Patrol’s right to enforce the laws
of the United States, they did object to the way in
which the Operation was undertaken: as a surprise,
action that fomented animosity between Mexicans
and U.S. citizens.
Second, all three business leaders concurred that the
negative publicity surrounding Operation Hold the
Line led to steep drops in business among restau-
rants, bars, nightclubs, and shops in downtown
Juárez that catered to U.S. tourists.  A press release
issued by CONACO shortly after the Operation’s
implementation described its impact:
On September 19, 1993, the Immigration and
Naturalization Service of the United States
of America, acting through the Border Pa-
trol, El Paso District, under the command of
Silvestre Reyes, implemented what was
named “Operation Blockade,” with the goal
of reducing the flow of undocumented per-
sons across the international boundary sepa-
rating Juárez and El Paso.  Parallel to this, a
negative publicity campaign towards Ciudad
Juárez was undertaken by the U.S. press
which warned U.S. citizens of the risks they
faced upon visiting this border city and ex-
posing themselves to a situation of lack of
public order and police abuse.  The effects
of this were felt immediately in the form of
a drop in visitors from El Paso, who were
even less disposed to come upon seeing the
long lines going back into El Paso occasioned
by the scrupulous inspections being realized
by immigration and customs agents.
Table 21 provides information about each of those
reported accidents.  Two involved El Paso residents,
one with a non-Hispanic surname.  Twenty-one of
the pedestrians were residents of Juárez, eight were
from the interior of Mexico, and the residences of
five were undetermined.  Ten of the accidents re-
sulted in fatalities.  In one accident, two pedestrians
were killed.  In anther accident a mother carrying
her one month old baby was injured and the child
was killed.
While there have been no automobile-pedestrian
accidents reported on Loop 375 since May 1993, there
is insufficient data to determine what effect, if any,
Operation Hold the Line has had.  In spite of the
suggestion that automobile-pedestrian accidents were
frequent occurrences, there have been no more than
8 in any one year, and the average is fewer than 6.5
per year.
JuÆrez Business Activities
We interviewed several leaders of the three major
business organizations in Juárez: the Cámera Nacional
de Comercio [CONACO], the Cámera Nacional de la
Industria de la Transformación [CANACINTRA], and
Desarrollo Económica de Juárez.  Of the three, only
Desarrollo Económica is not officially sponsored by
the national government.  We asked for their views
on Operation Hold the Line in general and its ef-
fects on the economy of Juárez in particular.  There
was general consensus in both their views on the
Operation and its effects on the Juárez economy.
First, all three viewed the Operation as an unneces-
sary affront to Mexicans and the antithesis of the
good neighbor policy that they and their counter-
parts in El Paso had been trying to develop over the
years with such joint projects such as the creation of
the El Camino Real trade corridor.  Manuel Ochoa,
the leader of CONACO, placed particular emphasis
on the interdependence of the two cities, comment-
ing that “the two are not just twin cities, but Siamese
twin cities, sharing the same digestive system.”  The
other leaders concurred that what was damaging to
Juárez was also damaging to El Paso and that fed-
eral authorities in Mexico City and Washington of-
ten failed to appreciate this local reality.  Each busi-
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Table 21.
AUTOMOBILE-PEDESTRIAN ACCIDENTS
EL PASO BORDER HIGHWAY (L375)
(JANUARY 1989-May 1993)
Date Day Time Gender Age From Fatality
1989 Jan 5 Thur  7:15 PM female 21 Durango X
female 25 Durango X
Apr 7 Fri 12:45 PM male 16 Juárez
May 20 Sat 11:38 PM male 33 El Paso
Jun 14 Wed  6:20 PM male 17 Juárez
Jul 14 Fri  2:30 PM male 25 Chiapas
Aug 13 Sun 11:30 PM male 25 Juárez
Oct 29 Sun 12:30 PM female unk Juárez
Dec 15 Fri  5:50 PM male 27 Juárez
1990 Jan 23 Tues  7:45 AM male 22 Juárez
Apr 13 Fri  7:05 PM male 29 Juárez
May 13 Sun  2:05 PM male 23 Juárez
May 19 Sat  7:35 PM male 22 Juárez
Jul 12 Thur  2:00 PM male 25 Juárez
Aug 17 Fri  5:53 PM female 21 Durango
Sep 8 Sat  2:05 PM male 20 Juárez
Dec 21 Fri  3:30 PM male 31 Juárez
1991 Mar 11 Mon 10:42 AM female 21 Juárez22
male 1 mo. Juárez X
Apr 27 Sat 10:05 AM male 31 El Paso X
May 29 Wed  8:53 AM male 30 Juárez
Jul 1 Mon 12:15 PM male unk unk X
Nov 27 Wed  6:30 AM male 47 Juárez X
Dec 20 Fri  5:50 PM male unk unk X
1992 Jan 14 Tues  3:50 PM male 33 Durango
May 16 Sat 10:50 PM male 33 Juárez X
Jul 21 Tues  9:00 PM female 30 Juárez X
Aug 14 Fri  7:55 PM male unk unk
Aug 17 Mon  3:23 PM female 50 Torreon
Sep 23 Wed  7:40 PM male 22 Luvianos
Dec 2 Wed  6:25 PM male 26 Juárez X23
Dec 4 Fri 12:10 PM male 25 Juárez
1993 Jan 21 Thur  1:15 PM female 37 Durango X
Mar 16 Tues  5:15 PM male 37 Juárez
May 2 Sun  6:05 PM male unk unk
May 3 Mon  4:00 PM male unk unk
Source: Texas Department  of Public Safety
22Woman was carrying the baby. Two witnesses with the woman accompanied her to the hospital.
 The woman, baby, and witnesses were all illegal aliens.
23Blood-Alcohol Content was 0.23.
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Conclusions
The implementation of Operation Hold the Line may
have affected the economic activity in central areas
of the city negatively; however, its impact appar-
ently was not felt much in other parts of the city.
Comparing the reported gross sales in the retail trade
industry in El Paso during the fourth quarter 1992
to the fourth quarter 1993, the city showed a 3.8
percent increase overall.  As this is the lowest per-
cent increase of any quarter during the year, it is not
unreasonable to believe that Operation Hold the Line
had some negative influence.  The decline in the
downtown area was almost certainly due in part to
a combination of factors related to the Operation,
including a reduced flow of undocumented border
crossers, delays of documented border crossers at
the ports of entry (because of either more stringent
inspections or protests on the Mexican side), anti-
American sentiment and the “Buy Mexican” cam-
paign, and general concern by Mexican residents
about crossing into El Paso to shop.  However, other
factors, including the condition of the Mexican
economy, may have played a role.  It is difficult,
therefore, to determine to what extent Operation
Hold the Line affected retail sales in El Paso during
its first three months of operation.
Comparison of city sales and use tax data do not
suggest that Operation Hold the Line had any sig-
nificant impact on the overall economy of the city.
El Paso has about 3.5 percent of the state’s popula-
tion.  Receipts from city sales and use taxes in El
Paso constitute about 2.5 percent of the state’s total
revenue from those sources, reflecting the area’s
economic conditions.  Over the past six years these
percentages were relatively constant.  El Paso’s trail-
ing behind the state’s average growth is more likely
due to national and global factors than to Operation
Hold the Line.  Comparisons of labor market data,
hotel occupancy rates, and bus ridership informa-
tion also provide little evidence to indicate that the
Operation had much overall effect, although down-
town businesses may have been affected. Business
leaders’ complaints, except in the case of downtown
businesses, thus appear to have been exaggerated
and largely unfounded.
CONACO’s Department of Economic Studies con-
ducted a survey of thirty restaurants, eight disco-
theques, eighteen bars, and twenty-two hotels lo-
cated on streets in the city’s tourist area, and asked
each to estimate how much their business was up or
down in number of customers entering their estab-
lishments since the Operation and reported:
• Discotheques experienced a 38 percent reduc-
tion in clientele, on average;
• Bars experienced a 74 percent reduction; and
• Restaurants and hotels each experienced a 45
percent reduction in customers immediately fol-
lowing the blockade.
At the same time, CONACO acknowledged the limi-
tations of its survey:
We are conscious of the fact that it is diffi-
cult to make a precise quantitative evalua-
tion of the repercussions of the Operation.
Furthermore, several other situations come
into play such as: old problems of public
security, traffic, taxi drivers, street vendors
and beggars, and police, as well as the
gradual loss of the tourist sector’s ability to
attract visitors contraction of economic ac-
tivity in the country as a whole, as a conse-
quence of measures taken by the Mexican
government in 1992 to decelerate the
economy and reduce inflation to one digit;
and the economic difficulties faced by the
United States and that impact us directly.
In other words, the Juárez tourist business was al-
ready hurting before the Operation began, and the
other problems plaguing it make it difficult to gauge
the Operation’s effects after its first few weeks.  None
of the three business leaders we interviewed felt
that other sectors of the Juárez economy had been
materially harmed, and none, save for those appear-
ing in the CONACO report quoted above, had re-
ceived complaints from their members reporting
specific business problems generated for them by
the Operation.
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V. Effects on
education, Births
and Social Services
This chapter examines the effects of Operation Hold
the Line on school enrollments, registered births in
El Paso County, births in Thomason Hospital (the
only hospital in El Paso County providing indigent
health care), and welfare programs in El Paso.  Ex-
amination of these factors is important because of
the widespread perception that illegal migrants are
attracted to U.S. border communities because they
can receive free social and health services there.  If
these types of flows were large to begin with, and if
the Operation has slowed the flow of these persons
crossing the border, we should see some evidence of
this in the form of fewer persons receiving social
and health services after than before the Operation.
This chapter also reports what was learned about
the effects of the Operation on the delivery of social
services in Juárez, although the information we were
able to obtain was quite limited.
Education
There has been considerable discussion about the
impact of illegal immigration upon the United States’
educational system.  Studies of the costs of educat-
ing the children of illegal immigrants find that this
expense is one of the highest, if not the highest,
associated with illegal immigration (Clark & Passel
1993; Huddle 1993).  For some observers, this ex-
penditure is viewed as a sound investment in the
nation’s future.  However, for others such children
are seen as “free riders” because their parents often
do not shoulder a proportionate share of state and
local taxes used to finance education, even though
they pay a substantial amount of federal taxes.  In
communities along the U.S.-Mexico border, an im-
portant issue is the extent to which Mexican chil-
dren cross the border to attend schools free, espe-
cially middle and high schools, as free public edu-
cation in Mexico extends only through sixth grade.
Thus, it has been argued that if the Border Patrol
were able successfully to stem the flow of illegal
migrants into the United States and of children cross-
ing the border from Mexico to attend school, the
burden on local taxpayers would be greatly dimin-
ished.  An important part of assessing the impact of
the Operation thus involves determining how the
Operation affected the El Paso schools.
At the outset, the distinction between Mexican resi-
dents and illegal immigrants must be clarified.  These
two groups are often lumped together during the
debate over school financing, as well as debates over
such issues as medical care, but they are two very
distinct groups, each of which has a different impact
on U.S. immigration and immigrant policy.  One
group consists of Mexican residents who send their
children to El Paso for free public schooling, thus
violating laws dealing with both public education
and immigration policy.  The other group consists of
immigrants who enter the country illegally and settle.
This group is violating immigration, but not educa-
tion, laws.  While we are not condoning the viola-
tion of any law, for the present discussion it is im-
portant to understand the differing nature of the
violations committed by each group.
El Paso is a multicultural city with a large Hispanic
population.  Approximately 70 percent of the city-
county population is Hispanic.  There are nine inde-
pendent school districts [ISDs] in El Paso County,
two of which are in the city itself.  In the Fall 1993-
1994 school term, 64,141 students were enrolled in
the El Paso ISD, and 49,398 were in Ysleta ISD.  His-
panics constituted 74.3 percent of the enrollment in
El Paso ISD and 83.2 percent in Ysleta ISD.  The
remaining seven ISDs enrolled 33,758 students, of
whom 90.2 percent were Hispanic.
While the public argument rages over the free rider
issue, a combination of legal restrictions and fund-
ing limitations have prevented school districts from
eliminating illegal immigrant and border crossing
students from their enrollment rosters.  The free-
rider perception notwithstanding, the U.S. Supreme
Court [Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 102 S.Ct. 2382
(1982)] declared that the age and residence of the
student or the residency of the student’s parent(s)
are the sole criteria for admission to public schools.
Further, under federal guidelines, residency require-
ments have been declared inapplicable when a child
is declared homeless.  Therefore, school administra-
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tively easy to obtain, there is rarely a reason to chal-
lenge an application in which the appropriate docu-
mentation is properly presented.  Some apparent
irregularities, such as a student’s having a different
surname from that on the documentation, are often
easily explained.  Because of concern over fraudu-
lent enrollments, each district has a system for en-
suring the residency status of its enrolled students.
Each campus administration identifies students it
believes are not district residents.  Identification may
be based on attendance records, tips received from
other students or parents, or some other means.
District officials investigate, and if it is determined
that a student is not a resident, the school’s princi-
pal takes action to disenroll the student.  The ad-
ministrative and investigative staffs, however, are
small for the size of the enrolled school population.
Therefore, it is difficult to ensure that no nonresi-
dent students are enrolled in a district.  During the
1992-1993 school year, less than 1 percent of the stu-
dents in the El Paso ISD were determined to be
fraudulently enrolled in the district.  Students and
their parents have the legal right to appeal an unfa-
vorable ruling through the school system to the presi-
dent of the school board and through the court sys-
tem; however, according to school officials, appeals
are rare because decisions to disenroll a student are
usually based on fairly substantial and irrefutable
evidence.
There is no legal way to determine accurately the
number of residents of Mexico who are enrolled as
students in the El Paso and Ysleta school districts.
Essentially, there are three options available to Mexi-
can residents who wish to enroll their child in a
school in the El Paso area.  Option one is to have the
child live in Mexico and commute daily.  Option
two is to send the child to live with friends or rela-
tives in El Paso during the school year, returning
home to Mexico at varying intervals.  Option three
is to obtain the necessary documentation and pay
tuition to enroll the child in either a private school
or in an El Paso ISD school.24
tors are prohibited from asking applicants their na-
tionality or immigrant status.  To conform with that
ruling, the 72nd Texas Legislature amended Section
21.031 of the Texas Education Code relating to the
admission of children to the public school system so
that under current law, the only requirement to at-
tend a public school in Texas is residency within
that school’s district.  Consequently, the distinction
discussed above between Mexican residents and il-
legal immigrants plays a key role in education policy
because it is not a more serious violation of state
and federal law for a student who resides in Mexico
to fraudulently enroll in an El Paso area school than
it is for a student who is a resident of another school
district within the county.
Since residency is the key requirement for school
enrollment, the issue for school district administra-
tors has become one of determining the actual resi-
dency of the prospective student.  To prove resi-
dency, an applicant must submit some form of docu-
mentation that reasonably assures the school district’s
administrators that the student does reside within
the district.  Acceptable documentation includes
utility bills, rent receipts, and notarized statements
by landlords confirming a person’s residency.  The
various forms of acceptable documentation are evi-
dently easy to obtain.  Anecdotal evidence suggests
that documents can be obtained through the black
market if not from friends or relatives, so the task of
confirming a student’s residency declaration with
absolute certainty is nearly impossible.  As in most
jurisdictions around the country, families frequently
move into and out of neighborhoods, which makes
keeping track of who lives within the district bound-
aries a daunting task.  Changing residency from one
school district to another is prohibited by Texas law
only in cases where the primary purpose for mov-
ing is either to participate in extracurricular activi-
ties or to evade court-ordered desegregation plans.
School districts have standard procedures for review-
ing and accepting applications for enrollment.  When
an individual applies to a district for admission of
a student, the district’s administrative staff reviews
the application.  Applications which appear irregu-
lar are investigated prior to admission.  However,
although the required documents appear to be rela-
24 Unlike other area school districts, nonresident students
may legally enroll in El Paso ISD schools by paying
tuition.
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The school administrators and teachers interviewed
for this study considered option one less common
than option two because of the inconvenience, ex-
pense, and hazards inherent in crossing the border.
One might speculate that daily student-crossers are
more likely to be older, higher grade-level students.
Some option two student-crossers might choose to
return to Mexico every weekend, while others might
only return to Mexico during extended school holi-
days such as Christmas.  This foster homelike ar-
rangement is not an uncommon practice in Mexican
culture and is facilitated in El Paso/Juárez because
many Mexican families have members living on
opposite sides of the border.  Option three is clearly
a choice only for more affluent Mexicans.
These three options result in five possible groups of
student-crossers.  The first group consists of stu-
dents who enter the United States surreptitiously,
lacking appropriate legal-entry documentation.
Group two consists of daily student-crossers who
enter through a port of entry using a legal entry
document, such as the Border Crossing Card.  Al-
though the BCC is not intended to be used for this
purpose, it is possible for a child to enter the coun-
try through a port of entry every day without being
stopped.  Groups three and four consist, respectively,
of undocumented and documented student-crossers
who live in the foster homelike circumstances.  The
possession or nonpossession of legal-entry docu-
ments may or may not determine the frequency of
crossings during the school year.  Group five con-
sists of those student crossers with legal border cross-
ing documents who attend school legally in the
United States (e.g., University of Texas-El Paso stu-
dents with student visas or tuition-paying parochial
school students).
Closing the border under Operation Hold the Line
might have affected each group differently.  We
hypothesized that those without documents would
be most affected, as the new strategy was designed
to prevent people from crossing the border at loca-
tions other than the legal points of entry.  It appears
that long lines, delays, and fear of having one’s docu-
ments confiscated may have prevented some Mexi-
can residents with legal border crossing documents
from crossing during the first weeks of the Opera-
tion for such legitimate purposes as shopping and
visiting relatives.  Nevertheless, while those with
documents who used them to cross after the Opera-
tion began may have been inconvenienced by long
lines, they should have been minimally affected.
Clearly, students without documentation should have
faced more significant challenges from Operation
Hold the Line.  Those who were crossing the border
daily without benefit of papers (group one) should
have been most affected.  Since the Operation began
on Sunday morning, some of those in group three
may have been in Mexico for the weekend and would
have been affected along with the daily crossers.
Both groups would have experienced delays in cross-
ing and may have been stopped altogether.  How-
ever, we heard reports that crossers can evade the
Border Patrol, although to do so sometimes means
circumnavigating the line.  On the other hand, those
in possession of legal-entry documentation (groups
two, four and five) and those in group three who
were on the U.S. side of the border on September
19th, should have been unaffected.
If the Operation was successful in preventing un-
documented students from crossing, then daily at-
tendance would have dropped in proportion to the
number of student crossers.  While a few
interviewees recalled some attendance irregularities
during the first few weeks of the Operation, records
from the El Paso ISD and Ysleta ISD schools do not
indicate a significant change in enrollment subse-
quent to implementation of Operation Blockade.  In
El Paso ISD, enrollment dropped by 193 students
from one week prior to implementation to one week
after implementation, three tenths of one percent
(.003) of the school district’s population and com-
pares to a 112-student drop over the analogous pe-
riod for 1992.25   Table 22 shows changes in enroll-
ment for selected schools (near the border) during
the two periods of observation.
25 Comparison was made of 1993 enrollment at the end
of the fourth week of classes (Sept. 9) versus enrollment
at the end of the sixth week of classes (Sept. 24) and
was contrasted with 1992 enrollment at the same time
of the school year (Sept. 17-Oct. 2).
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In contrast to Bowie High School and Guillen Middle
School, elementary schools along the border experi-
enced smaller changes in enrollments.  Hart Elemen-
tary School, virtually next door to Guillen Middle
School, showed a 1 student gain during the two-
week period around the Operation versus a 5 stu-
dent gain during the comparable period in the pre-
vious year.  Aoy and Roosevelt Elementary Schools,
each within three blocks of the foot of the Good
Neighbor Bridge in downtown El Paso, showed en-
rollment increases in the 1993 study period that ex-
ceeded increases during the comparable 1992 pe-
riod.  Total enrollment for all El Paso ISD elemen-
tary schools increased by 24 students during the
1992 observation period versus an increase of 158
students during the 1993 period.  The difference in
gain between the two periods (158 - 24 = 134), when
combined with the high school and middle school
figures, resulted in a total (negative) change of 81
students between the two periods for the entire
Two schools virtually adjacent to the border showed
larger changes.  Enrollment at Bowie High School
declined by 204 students during that two-week pe-
riod in 1993 versus a decline of 18 students during
the same period in 1992.  The net difference is a
decline of 186 students.  By comparison, the remain-
ing 9 high schools in the El Paso ISD went from a
decline in enrollment of 130 students in the observed
period of 1992 to a decline of 124 students in the
1993 observation period.  That indicates that 6 fewer
students left El Paso ISD high schools in the ob-
served period of 1993 than occurred during the same
period in 1992.  Enrollment at Guillen Middle School
changed from an increase of 66 students in 1992 to
a decrease of 6 students during the critical period in
1993, a net negative change of 72.  The 10 remaining
middle schools in the district saw the 1992 decline
of 54 students reduced in 1993 to 17 students, a net
positive change of 37.
Table 22.
CHANGES IN ENROLLMENT, SELECTED SCHOOLS
EL PASO INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT
    Chng Chng Chng
9/17/92 10/2/92 1992 9/9/93 9/24/93 1993   92-3
Bowie HS  2,055  2,037  -18  2,074  1,870 -204   -186
Other 9 HS 14,777 14,647 -130 15,431 15,307 -124 6
Total HS 16,832 16,684 -148 17,505 17,177 -328   -180
Guillen MS  1,023  1,089   66  1,020  1,014    -6    -72
Other 10 MS 10,362 10,308  -54 11,453 11,436   -17     37
Total MS 11,385 11,397   12 12,473 12,450   -23    -35
Alamo EM    406    398   -8    407    411     4     12
Aoy EM    740    741    1    735    739     4      3
Burleson EM    709    719   10    656    659     3     -7
Clardy EM    946    953    7    960    966     6     -1
Hart EM    806    811    5    821    822     1     -4
Roosevelt EM    368    358  -10    385    386     1     11
Other 51 EM 30,837 30,856   19 31,217 31,356  139   120
Total EM 34,812 34,836   24 35,181 35,339  158   134
Grand Totals 63,029 62,917 -112 65,159 64,966 -193    -81
Source: El Paso Independent School District, Research & Evaluation Division
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school district.  Data from Table 22 also suggest
that those students who cross the border daily, or at
least on a regular basis, to attend classes illegally
may be older, higher grade-level students.  The large
changes occurred at the high school and middle
school level; there was little change in the elemen-
tary schools.
The changes that occurred have induced El Paso
ISD administrators to declare that the district lost
approximately five hundred students districtwide
as a result of the Border Patrol’s operation, possibly
as many as one thousand, based on annual projec-
tions of the growth in enrollment.  While losses based
on projections are hypothetical, actual changes in
enrollment are known to have occurred.  Table 23
shows school enrollments in each of the nine ISDs in
El Paso County for the 1992-1993 and 1993-1994
school years, based on figures provided at the end
of October each year.  While each of the other school
districts recorded an increase in enrollment, El Paso
ISD is the only district where enrollment declined
(by 110 students).  While that is only 0.2 percent of
the school district population, the percent change is
not what is significant.  What is critical is that El
Paso ISD is the only district where enrollment de-
clined and that Clint and San Elizario, the two dis-
tricts immediately to the east of the end of the
Operation line also showed gains.  Those figures
indicate that the Operation caused a small shift in
school enrollments.
In Ysleta ISD, enrollment remained virtually un-
changed around the time the Operation was imple-
mented.  During the week prior to the establish-
ment of Operation Blockade (Sept. 13-17), the atten-
dance rate in Ysleta ISD schools was 95.4 percent.
During the first week the strategy was in place (Sept.
20-24), the attendance rate was 95.7 percent.  School
administrators in Ysleta ISD, mindful of the border
situation, observed a decline in attendance immedi-
ately following the Christmas vacation.  However,
average daily attendance returned to normal within
a week.  Some administrators attributed the tempo-
rary decline in the attendance rate to parents taking
their children for extended Christmas vacations.
Numerous El Pasoans visit relatives in Mexico dur-
ing Christmas vacation and the timing differences
between the two jurisdiction’s vacation periods of-
ten causes attendance fluctuations at the beginning
of the new year.
Although school districts are partially funded by
local taxes, state and federal governments subsidize
local school systems from other tax revenues as well.
It is widely believed that local property taxes consti-
tute the main source of revenue for school districts.
However, state sales taxes and federal income taxes
Table 23.
SCHOOL ENROLLMENTS IN NINE EL PASO COUNTY ISDs
1992-93 1993-94 Change % Change
Anthony    752    753     1    0.1
Canutillo  3,897  4,151  254    6.5
Clint  4,819  5,323  504   10.5
El Paso 64,251 64,141 -110   -0.2
Fabens  2,537  2,572   35    1.4
San Elizario  2,538  2,876  338   13.3
Socorro 16,757 17,614  857    5.1
Tornillo    448    469   21    4.7
Ysleta 49,273 49,398  125    0.3
Totals 145,272 147,297  2,025    1.4
Source: Texas Education Agency
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has a relatively high percentage of economically dis-
advantaged students in its population.  Table 24
lists 1992-1993 school year enrollments for each of
the nine independent school districts in El Paso
County and shows the percentage of economically
disadvantaged students within each district.  Nearly
63 percent of the county’s students are classified as
economically disadvantaged, as compared to 43.6
percent for all students within the state.  The smaller
districts have even higher high percentages of eco-
nomically disadvantaged students, particularly San
Elizario (96.2 percent) and Tornillo (97.3 percent).
These higher percentages justify the provision of such
special services as free lunch programs that mean
higher costs for the school district and, subsequently,
a greater requirement for funding assistance from
the state and federal governments.
Table 25, which shows each school district’s total
funding for school year 1992-1993 and displays the
budgeted revenue distribution for each of El Paso
County’s nine independent school districts, shows
each public school district in El Paso County re-
ceived at least two-thirds of its annual funding from
a combination of the state and federal governments
for the 1992-1993 school year.  By comparison, the
mean statewide distribution of state and federal
also support school systems.  Each school district
receives funding assistance from the state and fed-
eral governments based on the average daily atten-
dance figures submitted by the school districts.  In
Texas, as in many states, each independent school
district imposes an ad valorem tax on real property
to support its operations, and since the 1986-1987
school year, the average level of local tax rates has
risen by 81 percent statewide.  As many observers
note, both legal and illegal immigrants pay taxes.
Illegality of one’s residency status does not absolve
one of paying taxes.  Being in the United States
illegally does not prevent one from buying or rent-
ing a house, apartment, or other place to live.  Home
owners and renters (through their landlords) pay
property taxes regardless of their immigration sta-
tus, and residents, both legal and illegal, pay sales
taxes on purchases of goods and services.
In an attempt to ensure equality of education
throughout the state, funding from state and federal
sources is distributed asymmetrically, the intent be-
ing that economically disadvantaged districts should
receive higher percentages of funding assistance.
Each El Paso County school district receives a per-
centage of state and federal funding in excess of the
statewide average for assistance because the county
Table 24.
SCHOOL ENROLLMENT AND PERCENTAGE OF STUDENTS CLASSIFIED AS ECONOMICALLY DISADVANTAGED
(1992-1993 SCHOOL YEAR)
% of Students
District # of Students Econ Disadv Total
Anthony    752 77.3    581
Canutillo  3,897 69.8  2,720
Clint  4,819 72.8  3,508
El Paso 64,251 60.8 39,065
Fabens  2,537 83.0  2,106
San Elizario  2,538 96.2  2,442
Socorro 16,757 65.2 10,926
Tornillo    448 97.3    436
Ysleta 49,273 59.6 29,367
County Total 145,272 62.7 91,150
Source: Texas Education Agency
U.S.  C O M M I S S I O N  O N  I M M I G R A T I O N  R E F O R M
RESEARCH
P A P E R
- 57 -
funding for school districts was 48 percent (41 per-
cent state and 7 percent federal).  There is no intent
to suggest that school districts knowingly and will-
fully allow nonresidents to enroll fraudulently.
School districts appear to be conscientious in their
efforts to identify individuals attempting to fraudu-
lently enroll their children and to disenroll those
students found to be fraudulently enrolled.  Never-
theless, the method of funding schools and the ben-
efits to the community of universal education pro-
vide no incentive for schools to be aggressive in
seeking out and eliminating nonresident students.
In summary, the Operation may have exerted a small
depressing effect on school enrollments.  Whatever
the number of Mexican students who were enrolled,
however, few students seem to have been crossing
the border illegally on a routine and frequent basis
to attend school.  Thus, any problems of free-rider-
ship that exist in the El Paso school system have
more to do with the schools’ inability to make accu-
rate determinations of students’ permanent residency
status than of their border crossing status.  More
research on the longer-term effects of the Operation
that examines the data for the calendar year 1994,
which was unavailable, is needed.
Births
Regardless of the status of entry into the United
States, Mexican residents use health care services in
El Paso, including some who do so in order to es-
tablish U.S. citizenship for their newborn.  The mayor
estimates that $30 million is spent by El Paso’s tax-
payers to service the education and health needs of
nonresident migrants and for law enforcement ser-
vices because of crimes committed by nonresident
migrants.  Health officials believe the health prob-
lems of the area go beyond the cost of providing
services for nonresidents.  The county is one of the
poorest in the nation and has an extremely high
proportion of Women, Infants, and Children Pro-
gram [WIC] clients largely because of the conditions
in extralegal settlements called colonias.  The county
has an estimated 350 colonias with about 68 thou-
sand residents.  Many exist without proper housing,
sewage, water, or electricity due to a combination of
poverty levels among the colonia residents and the
state’s restrictions on county regulation.  Officials
believe the conditions in the colonias constitute a
serious health risk to the entire population of the
county.
Table 25.
DISTRIBUTION OF FUNDING, 1992-1993
Funding % from State % from Local % from Fed
District ($000) Gov’t Gov’t Gov’t
Anthony   3,874 64 26 10
Canutillo  19,821 69 19 12
Clint  20,832 80 15  5
El Paso 284,601 55 33 12
Fabens  11,698 76 10 14
San Elizario  11,064 85  7  8
Socorro  84,045 75 19  6
Tornillo   2,998 74 17  9
Ysleta 236,403 67 23 10
Source: Texas Education Agency
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ers to assist her in filling out forms when she pre-
tended not to speak English, and other expectant
mothers in waiting rooms able to provide her with
information as to how to apply for welfare benefits
(Jauregui 1993a, 1993b).
El Paso County had 17,553 registered births in 1993,
a rate that implies that more than 6 percent of all
women from the age of 1 to 105 would have had to
give birth in any given year if they were all resi-
dents of the county (or about 12 percent of all women
15-44 years of age).  Such a fertility rate would be
extremely high.  Some of the deliveries may be for
people in surrounding counties, but many are pre-
sumed to be for Mexican residents wanting to estab-
lish U.S. citizenship for their children.  For many
years, pregnant Mexican nationals have entered the
United States to give birth.  Some commentators
contend that these women are taking advantage of
available health care, while others argue that the
reason is to ensure that their children will be born
American citizens.  Jauregui (1993a) compiled a list
of reasons given by Juárez women for having their
children born in the United States:
• Better educational and job opportunities are
available for a child who is born a U.S. citizen;
• Medicaid, for those who qualify, can pay the
full cost of the delivery and postnatal care;
• The Women, Infants and Children program pro-
vides free milk, juices and other food for chil-
dren through age five;
• As a citizen, the child will not be deported from
the United States and, many women believe, the
mother will generally be ignored by U.S. Border
Patrol agents;
• With American children, a family with legal
residency has better access to public housing and
other social programs.
One method of evaluating the effectiveness of Op-
eration Hold the Line is to analyze birth data to
determine if there has been a change in the number
of Hispanics born in El Paso County since the
Operation’s inception.  If the Operation has been
successful in preventing women from crossing the
border illegally to give birth, the numbers of His-
panic births should have declined.  Before any de-
Conditions are potentially worsened by circum-
stances in Juárez, which has no sewage treatment
system and where access to adequate housing, po-
table water, and electricity is limited in most of the
city.  The effects of industrial air pollution and toxic
waste disposal on water quality are increasingly
making health hazards worse over time.  El Paso
Health officials, who occasionally see such diseases
as typhoid, tuberculosis, and dysentery that are rare
or nonexistent in most other parts of the United
States, believe a major health catastrophe in the El
Paso-Juárez area is possible, particularly given the
amount of commuter traffic between the two cities.
Like schools, hospitals and clinics are prohibited by
law from asking questions about citizenship or im-
migration status.  While they may request informa-
tion about the residential addresses of those seeking
services, they do not have the resources to verify
the accuracy of the information given.  They cannot
refuse anyone seeking emergency treatment regard-
less of their place of residence.  While they may
charge for such services, their ability to actually
collect from both nonpaying nonresidents and resi-
dents is negligible.
With regard to the issue of Mexican women giving
birth in El Paso, the city demographer, who has con-
structed a database of all residential addresses in
the county and matched those with information
provided on birth registration forms, reports that 70
percent of addresses given on birth registration forms
do not match any real address in El Paso,26 a dis-
crepancy believed to result from the relative ease
with which Mexican residents can obtain services
from such facilities as Thomason General Hospital.
For a series of articles for the El Paso Times, Emily
Jauregui posed during the latter stages of her preg-
nancy in June 1993 as a Mexican citizen attempting
to have a baby in El Paso.  She found coyotes to
smuggle her across the Rio Grande and take her to
the hospital or clinic of her choice, health care work-
26 Some of the discrepancies are due to minor errors in
recording. A sample of records to determine the number
that are actually false addresses as opposed to minor
discrepancies in spelling, zip code, etc., could be useful
in  determining a count of those that actually indicate
nonresident status.
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cline in Hispanic births during the final four months
of 1993 can be confirmed as resulting from Opera-
tion Hold the Line, seasonal patterns in Hispanic
births that suggest that the fall months typically show
decreases compared to summer months must be
taken into account.
Birth data for El Paso County, provided by the Texas
Department of Health, Bureau of Vital Statistics, are
available through December of 1993, although the
1993 database is considered only 90-95 percent com-
plete as of this writing.  Table 26 shows the number
of Hispanic births per month during the years 1991-
1993.  Figure 3 and Figure 4 graphically represent
the data for each ethnic group registered.27  While
the seasonal pattern with respect to Hispanic births
is clear, no such pattern appears to exist among the
non-Hispanic groups.  For Hispanic births (Figure
3), the number of births tends to rise from January
in each of the three years analyzed.  The number of
births then declines through November, rises in
December, and declines in January; the cycle then
repeats itself.  Figure 4 represents the data for non-
Hispanic births.  There is no discernible seasonal
trend.  As is apparent from Table 26 and Figure 3,
there is a systematic trend upward in the annual
number of Hispanic births within the county.  This
is expected based on the trend in population growth.
Figure 5 compares Hispanic births over the three-
year observation period.  The pattern of declining
numbers of births from August through November
holds for each year; however, there is a sharper
decline in births from September to October 1993,
than in the previous two years.  Also, comparing
the same months from 1991 to 1992 to 1993, almost
all showed increases except the post-Operation
months.  This combination of monthly increases fol-
lowed by virtually no monthly change or decline
suggests that Operation Hold the Line may have
deterred pregnant Mexican nationals from crossing
into El Paso for the period of time covered by these
data.  The decline in December 1993 may also be the
result of incomplete data.  Unfortunately for this
Table 26.
HISPANIC BIRTHS IN EL PASO COUNTY
(1991-1993)
1991 1992 1993
January 1,101 1,103 1,129
February 1,024 1,134 1,120
March 1,043 1,134 1,215
April 1,062 1,109 1,191
May 1,186 1,134 1,267
June 1,145 1,242 1,268
July 1,221 1,318 1,385
August 1,291 1,381 1,396
September 1,246 1,305 1,382
October 1,232 1,328 1,261
November1,133 1,231 1,258
December 1,214 1,282 1,074
Total 13,898 14,701 14,946
Source: Texas Department of Health, Bureau of Vital Statistics
27 Because the number of Hispanic births is such a large
percentage of the total birth count, two graphs are
presented.  Graphing all data together would have
resulted in a scale of such magnitude that the patterns
of non-Hispanic birth data would not have been
discernible.
through August, the peak month for Hispanic births
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lower than expected), which is less than, but consis-
tent with the above estimate based on linear trend
for deliveries (an estimated decline of 3.9 per day
on average).  Thus, irrespective of how the estimate
is calculated, births come out lower than one would
have thought at Thomason General Hospital after
the Operation.  Interestingly, the shortfall increases
the further one goes into the post-Operation period.
In summary, examination of data on both registered
births from El Paso county and on deliveries from
Thomason Hospital point to the same conclusion:
births appear to have declined since the Operation
began.  Further, these declines occur in the cases
one would most expect if the Operation were pre-
venting some women from crossing the border ille-
gally to give birth, namely in the case of women of
Mexican origin (whose births are labeled Hispanic
births by the Health Department) and in the case of
deliveries at Thomason General Hospital.  However,
the declines are not very large and are based on
only a few months of data.  More research on this
issue as more time passes is clearly needed.
Welfare Utilization
During the initial week of Operation Blockade it
was thought that the workload might have dropped
at some of the El Paso offices of the Texas Depart-
ment of Human Services [TDHS] because a large
number of recipients caught in Mexico and unable
to cross the border could not reach TDHS offices to
obtain services.  To explore this possibility the El
Paso Regional Director of TDHS requested an analy-
sis of the workload at each of the offices in El Paso
County for the week of September 20 through Sep-
tember 24, 1993.
The evaluation proceeded in two steps.  First, each
program manager submitted data on the numbers
of TDHS clients failing to keep their appointments
[FKAs] for certification or recertification for food
stamps, Aid to Families with Dependent Children
[AFDC], or Medicaid during that week.  This initial
investigation indicated no marked difference in
workload compared to the same period in other
months.  Second, three offices (Mills, Stanton, and
Clint) were selected for further study due to their
analysis, complete Health Department data for this
month is not expected to be ready until July-August
1994.  Because of the 90-95 percent completion rate
of the data, one would still not expect the final count
of Hispanic births to rise to the level of previous
Decembers, but one cannot be certain.
What do data on deliveries in Thomason General
Hospital reveal?  Table 27 shows the average daily
use of Thomason Hospital for a twenty-nine month
period, including the post-Operation months of
October 1993 through May 1994., indicating an up-
ward trend in the pre-Operation period for the hos-
pital population followed by a downward trend after
the Operation began in the twenty-first month in the
series.  The pattern was similar for all five of the
measures in the table including deliveries.  The de-
cline in the number of deliveries can be estimated
by computing the linear trend in deliveries during
the pre-Operation period and projecting those esti-
mates for the post-Operation period.  Using this
technique, the daily average of 18 deliveries for the
post-Operation period is 3.8 deliveries per day lower
than expected, which is a decline of 17.6 percent
below expectations.  We also followed an alternative
three-step procedure, the first step of which was to
estimate the regression of deliveries on the other
measures using the pre-Operation data.  The corre-
lation between admissions and deliveries is 0.972,
and that is all that is required to estimate the regres-
sion equation: Deliveries = -7.66 + .442* Admissions
for the period September 1992 through September
1993.  The equation provides a good predictor for
the post-Operation period as the mean residual is
only .03 for the eight-month period.
The second step involved estimating the linear trend
on admissions prior to the Operation and using the
trend to predict admissions in the post-Operation
period had the trend continued.  These projections
are included in the last column of the attached table.
The projected daily admission levels are then en-
tered into the above regression equation in the third
step to obtain the estimated deliveries for the post-
Operation period.  These estimates and the differ-
ence between estimates and observed deliveries are
also given in the table.  This approach yields a short-
fall of 2.7 deliveries per day on average (13 percent
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Year Population % Occupancy Admissions Emerg Visits Deliveries
January 1992 241.5 67.3 57.9 125.2
February 1992 237.5 66.1 56.7 135.3
March 1992 243.4 67.8 58.0 142.8
April 1992 236.8 66.0 59.5 145.3
May 1992 218.2 60.8 54.2 142.4
June 1992 241.6 67.2 62.3 144.6
July 1992 254.2 70.8 62.8 136.8
August 1992 233.1 64.9 59.5 143.4
September 1992 239.4 66.7 60.5 151.2 19.1
October 1992 250.6 69.8 61.0 147.7 18.8
November1992 256.0 71.3 62.2 131.9 19.3
December 1992 255.1 71.1 58.4 136.0 18.7
January 1993 236.9 66.0 56.5 151.3 17.0
February 1993 247.7 69.0 59.1 158.2 18.3
March 1993 247.5 69.0 55.4 162.6 16.4
April 1993 256.2 71.4 60.1 163.8 19.1
May 1993 254.1 70.8 61.1 155.3 19.3
June 1993 258.7 72.1 59.7 153.1 19.2
July 1993 264.6 73.7 67.9 156.1 21.9
August 1993 271.2 75.6 65.9 151.0 21.5
Sept 1-18 1993 258.7 72.1 61.8 160.2 20.6
Sept 19-30 1993 259.2 72.2 69.4 161.7 22.7
October 1993 251.6 70.1 63.5 146.5 20.1
November1993 255.8 71.3 60.4 142.5 18.9
December 1993 251.6 70.1 60.9 144.0 18.7
January 1994 251.7 70.1 60.5 158.8 16.9
February 1994 238.9 66.6 55.6 148.6 17.3
March 1994 238.7 66.5 55.8 146.2 18.2
April 1994 217.2 60.5 52.5 154.5 16.9
May 1-22 1994 223.3 62.2 55.7 149.6 16.9
Source: Thomason General Hospital
Table 27.
THOMASON HOSPITAL STATISTICS
(JANUARY 1, 1994 - MAY 22, 1994)
relatively large numbers of FKAs.  All cases in which
clients failed to keep their appointments from Sep-
tember 17-September 24, 1993 [no explanation is
given for the change in the time period] were the
subject of home visits by TDHS employees to deter-
mine the reason for their absence.  Out of 2,325 ap-
pointments scheduled, 405 persons failed to keep
appointments in the three offices.  Of these, 304 ei-
ther had scheduled new appointments or otherwise
resolved their missed appointments before home
visits began.  This left 101 cases to be investigated.
U.S. residency of the applicant was confirmed in all
but four cases.  In these, the head of household was
unable to return from Juárez, Mexico, because of the
Operation, although the exact reasons for this are
not evident from the report.
Effects in JuÆrez
According to our interviews with Juárenses, the city
of Juárez generally does not appear to have felt any
serious increased demand for social services since
the Operation began.  Reasons for this include:
• The number of illegal crossers now prevented
from working in El Paso is small relative to the
total Juárez population;
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for the passage of school children.  Since the Opera-
tion began, these types of problems have been al-
most entirely eliminated, resulting in a more secure
and less dangerous environment.
With regard to health care, there appears to have
been a small effect as well.  The change in the popu-
lation, admissions, deliveries, and emergency visits
at the county’s hospital (Thomason General) since
Operation Hold the Line began suggests a discern-
ible impact.  Data on registered births suggest a
small depressing effect of the Operation.  Data from
the TDHS analysis of workload study, however, in-
dicate the Operation had a virtually no impact on
the workload of TDHS offices in El Paso County
during September 17-24.
VI. Effects on
Crime and
Related
Indicators in
El Paso
Local Perceptions
and Expectations
The first stage of the analysis of the potential impact
of Operation Hold the Line on crime in the El Paso
area consisted of interviews with law enforcement
and city officials in February 1994.  The intention
was to take advantage of local knowledge and ex-
pertise to suggest guiding questions if not hypoth-
eses to explore in the empirical analyses.  Not all the
views we encountered were universally shared and
not all received support in the data examined.  A
composite of those first impressions would include
the following:
The crime rate in El Paso was thought to be
high, especially for property crime in general,
and for motor vehicle theft in particular, but
less so for violent crime.  The high crime rate
was seen as due to:
• The region’s relatively poor economic condi-
tions;
• Illegal crossers live in many different neighbor-
hoods throughout the city;
• Many families have several members in the work
force, and it is not typical for all of these to
work in the United States.
• Public welfare assistance in Juárez is only mini-
mally available to begin with and people in need
don’t expect government assistance and, there-
fore, haven’t sought it since the blockade began.
Conclusions
Operation Hold the Line has had a small effect on
the delivery of social services in El Paso.  With re-
gard to enrollment of children of Mexican residents
in the El Paso city school system, it is quite likely
that most either have legal border-crossing docu-
ments or live with relatives or friends during the
school year in the district in which they attend school.
These children would not have been significantly
affected by the Operation as it primarily discour-
ages people, meaning those without documentation,
from crossing the border at other than the official
ports of entry.  Second, since illegal immigrants who
now permanently live in El Paso are residents of
their school districts, their children would have been
unaffected by the Operation as well.
The Operation had positive side effects on the edu-
cation system, however.  One, cited by virtually ev-
ery administrator and teacher interviewed, was the
increased sense of safety in the school environment,
particularly in schools directly adjacent to the bor-
der.  Prior to implementation of Operation Hold the
Line, border-crossers frequently used school grounds,
such as at Bowie High School, Guillen Middle School,
and Aoy, Roosevelt, and Hart Elementary Schools,
to evade Border Patrol agents.  School administra-
tors often observed border-crossers loitering around
school buildings and playgrounds, changing clothes
on school property, and leaving bags of wet clothing
behind.  Educators, for reasons of safety, often re-
stricted the children from using school grounds.  Bor-
der Patrol agent chases of illegal border-crossers
through the streets of the neighborhoods in which
the schools are located often made the streets unsafe
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•  The city’s proximity to a larger and substan-
tially poorer population on the Mexican side
of the border where there is a market for
stolen property exploited by criminal entre-
preneurs on both sides of the border; and
• The relatively low ratio of law enforcement
officers to population for a city the size of El
Paso.
None of our respondents seemed to overstate
the problems that the border presents to law
enforcement agencies.  The border is a problem
but it is not the only, or necessarily the most
critical, problem for crime control.
The crime rate was seen as escalating dramati-
cally in recent years and as such, perceived as
“getting out of hand” in spite of the best efforts
of local law enforcement agencies.  Increases in
crime were viewed as due to:
• El Paso’s own urban growth, much of which
has been spawned by migration from Mexico
at a pace that makes it difficult for the com-
munity to respond adequately to its needs,
with   community   resources   all   the more
stressed because of the additional pressures
of  dealing  with  a  large  illegal  and/or
nonresident population;
• Increased  population  pressures  in  Juárez,
which remains a relatively poor community
compared to El Paso and in which both the
access to community services (health, educa-
tion, and welfare, for example) and the op-
portunities for predatory criminal activity
are greater;28 and
• As is the case in other large, poor, urban
communities, conditions in Juárez that cre-
ate a large population at risk for criminal
activity,  many of whom seek opportunities
in El Paso, particularly young males and
professional  criminals  (a  broad  class  that
seems  to  include  car  thieves,  drug  deal-
ers, prostitutes and others who provide il-
licit services in the informal economy of the
two communities).
Some members of the high-risk population were
seen as undoubtedly entering the United States
illegally on occasion, thus adding to the prob-
lems of El Paso.  However, illegals were not
seen as the only problem for law enforcement.
Most of our respondents took care to point out
that they did not believe that all illegals were
criminals, or that all criminals entered the United
States illegally, or that the Mexican population
across the border was culturally more prone to
crime than the El Paso population.  The pre-
ferred interpretation was based on economic
conditions.
To the extent any of our respondents were will-
ing to make an estimate of its likely effect, most
thought the primary impact of the Operation
was on young male offenders and other inexpe-
rienced or unprofessional offenders.  Those in
Juárez who are in crime as a business were
thought to be much more adaptable over the
long term in dealing with obstacles to crossing
the border and more likely to use legal methods
to gain entry for illegal purposes.  There is a
prevailing view that the professional criminal
often has official connections that facilitate his
criminal activity—connections on both sides of
the border.29
28 No other countries that share a common border have
a larger disparity in economic conditions than is the
case for Mexico and the United States.  Juárez and the
Mexican state of Chihuahua are relatively better off
than other places in Mexico, but the are extraordinarily
poor by U.S. standards.
29 Some misunderstandings about how Mexican law
operates may also contribute to a critical view of
Mexican authorities from an American perspective.
Stolen goods that have entered the country are seized
as contraband, for example, and available for state and
personal use in Mexico until ownership is settled in
court.  See Miller (1987) for a commentary on motor
vehicle theft in this regard.  In spite of a Mexican-U.S.
agreement on stolen vehicles that is supposed to
prohibit the practice, the custom of using such vehicles
for official and personal use remains, and the sight of
a Mexican official driving around in a vehicle known
to have been stolen in the United States raises more
than a few eyebrows among U.S. authorities.
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that the border is a seamless boundary running
through a single city, but the cities of Juárez and El
Paso appear to be a long way from operating in that
manner at the administrative level, perhaps no less
the case with respect to law enforcement issues than
with health, education, and other shared problems
in the two communities.  Although none of the of-
ficials interviewed reported negative views about
the Border Patrol Operation, no one believed that
the Operation would improve relations with their
counterparts on the Mexican side or that it would
facilitate cross-border law enforcement activity.
We do not have data that pertain to all of the issues
derived from the interviews.  Some of the issues
raised require time series data that would extend
into the future and others require primary data gath-
ering beyond the project’s resources.  The points
listed above give a fair representation of the initial
reaction of a segment of the law enforcement com-
munity in the El Paso area concerning the impact of
the Border Patrol’s Operation on local crime.  The
expertise reflected in those comments makes them
worth considering as they stand.  However, we have
reformulated those perceptions into six guiding
hypotheses to shape our research strategy:30
1. The crime rate in El Paso is high due to its
proximity to a large and relatively poor Mexi-
can city, particularly with respect to property
crime.
2. The crime rate has been increasing in recent
years, in part because of the increasing popu-
lation pressures El Paso shares with Juárez and
in part because of the predatory behavior of
some illegal entrants to the United States.  To
the extent the flow of illegals has been uncon-
trolled, the opportunities for a small, preda-
tory subclass to engage in criminal activity in
El Paso have increased.
Thus, the Operation might be hypothesized to have
a direct, immediate, and, if it can be sustained, long-
term effect on:
• Young, male offender residents of Juárez;
• Minor or petty, rather than serious, crime;
• Opportunistic and less-organized, rather than
planned or organized, criminal activity;
• Property, rather than violent, crime; and
• Crime in the central downtown parts of El Paso
(Police Districts 31-36 and nearby Districts 51-
56) that are closely located to the more acces-
sible legal and illegal routes for crossing the
border,  the area of the greatest cross-border
traffic and where the informal economy has been
most visible in the past.
The Operation might also have an indirect impact
on more serious crime to the extent that law en-
forcement resources can be redirected from the
downtown area to impact teams, gang taskforces,
and the like.  Eventually this may have an effect on
the patterns of serious property crime and on vio-
lent crime among young, male offenders regardless
of the offender’s origins.  The more mature and ex-
perienced offender is expected to be a constant prob-
lem.  Indeed, most respondents seemed to believe
that both the Operation and any changes in law
enforcement strategies they might initiate in response
may have only short-term effects.  None of the in-
terviewed law enforcement officers doubted the ca-
pacity of the serious offender to adapt to changing
conditions, particularly as law enforcement resources
are stretched thin even in the best of times.  More-
over, none believed that chronic offenders are so
specialized that an effective crackdown in one area
would put them out of business forever.  For ex-
ample, an effective blitz on burglary or motor ve-
hicle theft would be expected to result in a burgeon-
ing larceny-theft rate.
A number of incidents have strained relations among
law enforcement personnel on the two sides of the
border in recent years.  Some observers may believe
30 All of the agencies contacted were extremely cooperative
in facilitating our access to information.  We are
particularly grateful to the Data Processing personnel
of the El Paso Police Department, the El Paso City
Demographer, and the El Paso County Sheriff’s Office.
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3. Young, male, poor residents of Juárez consti-
tute a high risk population for some types of
criminal activity, mostly in regard to gang ac-
tivity, minor offenses, and property crime.
4. To the extent that it curtails the illegal entry of
the population at risk, the Border Patrol’s strat-
egy should have an immediate impact on prop-
erty offenses and minor crime that should con-
tinue over the long term.
5. The largest immediate effect of the Border
Patrol’s effort will be felt in the downtown ar-
eas of El Paso (police districts 30-36 and 50-56).
6. The Operation’s initial effects on serious crime
may be short-lived as chronic offenders adapt
to the new conditions.  The Operation may
have a long-term effect on violent and more
serious crime if it is sustained and if law en-
forcement agencies are able to redirect re-
sources into those areas as a result of sustained
curtailment of the more numerous petty of-
fenses that plague the community.
Trends and the
Magnitude of Crime
in El Paso
The ratio of law enforcement officers to population
in El Paso is low relative to other cities of compa-
rable size in the United States (1.55 per 1,000 popu-
lation in 1992 compared to 2.76 per 1,000 for 63
cities of 250,000+ population).31  In 1980, the figure
was 1.56 per 1,000 in El Paso and 2.73 per 1,000 in
56 cities of 250,000 or more population.  The differ-
ence between El Paso and other cities seems to re-
main constant over time.  However, the choice of
these particular times as bases for determining dif-
ferences masks increases and decreases in between,
a extremely important point in assessing crime trends
in general and for assessing speculations about El
Paso trends as reported in the press during the
months before this study.
If the ratio for El Paso remained constant from 1980-
1992, any increase in crime rates could not be attrib-
uted directly to a deterioration in law enforcement
manpower, the only easily accessible measure of law
enforcement.  If it were constant, the low ratio of
law enforcement personnel to population in El Paso
might be a factor in accounting for a high rate of
crime but not for variations in rates over time.32  We
might conclude then that, in spite of rapid, urban
growth and migration, legal or otherwise, the num-
ber of law enforcement officers has kept pace with
population growth, and changes in crime rates must
be due to such other factors as increases in the size
of the population at risk for criminal behavior be-
cause of lax border control.
The data present a different picture.  As our inter-
view respondents indicated, law enforcement num-
bers, and presumably law enforcement effectiveness,
declined during the 1980s to a low of 1.31 per 1,000
population for the City of El Paso in 1988.  Only in
recent years has the ratio climbed back to the 1980
level.33  For nine of the thirteen years in the period,
the El Paso ratio of police manpower to population
hovered around 50 percent of the national average.
At the same time, of 120,432 foreign born residents
in El Paso in 1990, 35 percent entered the country
during the 1981-1990 decade, more than half of
whom entered after 1985.34  INS apprehension data
suggest that illegal entry into the United States also
increased substantially at the turn of the decade.
Differentiating between the effects on crime rates of
variations in law enforcement manpower and quali-
tative changes in the population is beyond the capa-
bilities of the data at hand, although it is clear that
increases in the serious crime rate outpaced both
population growth and enforcement manpower in
the past decade.
31 Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reports,
1992.
32 Clearly a larger city may be qualitatively more difficult
to police than a smaller city and that may also account
for deteriorating conditions in spite of constant police
manpower.  However, an independent measure of the
qualitative difference would have to be introduced into
the analysis.
33 The 1990 ratio may be partly an artifact of the census
undercount for El Paso for that year (18 thousand
according to the U.S. Census Post Enumeration Survey).
34 U.S. Census of Population, 1990; data provided by El
Paso City Demographer.
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Myths and Nonmyths about High Crime Rates.
Irrespective of the presumed increase in crimino-
genic conditions, perceptions of the city’s high crime
rate are more myth than reality.  The city’s rates for
serious, especially violent, crime35 are relatively low
compared to cities of comparable size.  El Paso’s
total crime rate ranks thirtieth among the forty U.S.
cities of comparable size in 1992 (Table 28).  El Paso
ranks thirty-first among the forty cities in motor
vehicle theft, and is above the mean for the forty
cities only on larceny-theft (ranking thirteenth but
within 10 percent of the mean for all cities).  The
murder rate is little more than one-third of that for
all the cities and 12 percent lower than the national
average.  We were told that only one police officer
has been feloniously slain in the line of duty in El
Paso since 1957.  Few other cities of comparable size
would average less than one officer killed per de-
cade during that period.
Some law enforcement officials attribute the low rate
of violent crime in El Paso, in part, to a relatively
low propensity for crime in the Hispanic popula-
tion, particularly for violent crime.  Apparently the
murder rate in Juárez is comparable to that of El
Paso and a fraction of the rate in large metropolitan
areas of the United States.  Hispanic offenders are
perceived to be less likely to be armed than Anglo
or African-American offenders, although that may
be less the case in recent years, particularly as weap-
ons become more accessible economically among
young offenders involved in gang activities through-
out the city.36  Other officials attribute the low crime
rates to an effective crime control strategy using
impact teams that concentrate on repeat offenders
and on crime in specific areas of the city.  For ex-
ample, the rate of reported burglaries declined by
55 percent from 1988 to 1993 after a repeat offender
program was introduced by the El Paso Police De-
partment specifically to deal with that offense.
The local myth that El Paso is a high crime city is
sustained in part by comparisons of El Paso with
national Metropolitan Statistical Area [MSA] data or
such data for other Texas MSAs, but such compari-
sons are misleading.  MSAs are heterogeneous units.
U.S. southern border cities tend to be more urban-
ized than other U.S. cities (87 percent of the popu-
lation in the El Paso MSA lived in the city in 1992,
two times the 43 percent national average for all
MSAs).37  Urban areas have both more opportunities
for criminal activity than rural areas and larger popu-
lations at risk due to the social and economic con-
35 Murder and non-negligent manslaughter, forcible rape,
robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny-theft, and
motor vehicle theft are the seven categories of serious
crime used by the Federal Bureau of Investigation as
the major indicators of criminal activity and trends.
The seven categories are assumed to be the crimes most
likely to be reported to the police, although, with the
exception of murder and possibly motor vehicle theft,
they tend to be underestimates of the actual number of
offenses as reported in victimization surveys for
example.  See O’Brien (1985) and Biderman and Lynch
(1991) for a description of the history, procedures,
strength and weaknesses of the Uniform Crime
Reporting system, crime victimization surveys, and
alternative measures.
36 American impressions of high rates of violent behavior
in Mexico seem largely based on reports about Mexico
City, which has an exceedingly high rate of violent
crime according to Interpol statistics.
37 The El Paso MSA is one of the most urbanized in the
nation. Only four other MSAs have more urbanized
populations, and three of those are in Texas including
the border city of Laredo which has the highest rate in
the nation (92 percent).  Personal and ethnographic
accounts of crime in the border region often illustrate
differences in the nature and style of criminal activity
compared to other metropolitan centers in the United
States.  Those differences, some of which are quite
striking to those who are unaccustomed to life in the
informal economy, may also lead to false impressions
about the magnitude of crime.  Visibility and difference
say nothing about magnitude, and that, in part, may
account for the apparent fear of crime in the El Paso
area.  Street vendors and panhandlers may be a nuisance
to some, but they do not present the same danger to
public safety as burglars or bank robbers.
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Table 28.
NUMBER OF OFFENSES REPORTED TO THE POLICE  PER 100,000 POPULATION FOR 40 U.S. CITIES
SIMILAR IN POPULATION SIZE TO EL PASO RANKED BY TOTAL CRIME INDEX (1992)
Total Crime Violent Property  Motor
Crime Index Crime Crime Forcible  Aggravated Larceny- Vehicle
Population Index Rank Index Index Murder Rape  Robbery Assault Burglary Theft Theft
Miami, FL 401529 17488   1 3731 13757 34.2   73 1890 1734 3232 8195 2330
Atlanta, GA 410876 17347   2 3859 13488 48.2 153 1417 2241 3180 8251 2057
St Louis, MO 483975 14800   3 3291 11509 57.4   87 1226 1920 3056 6359 2094
Fort Worth, TX 755517 14135   4 2019 12116 32.9 113   750 1123 3074 6905 2136
Charlotte, NC 572822 12591   5 2312 10278 24.2   88   748 1452 3072 6606   600
Kansas City, MO 408951 12475   6 2855   9620 34.0 128 1019 1674 2845 4952 1823
Oakland, CA 369707 12455   7 2626   9828 42.7 108 1194 1281 2297 5519 2011
Fresno, CA 513487 12112   8 1460 10653 22.0   55   842   540 2562 4549 3542
Seattle, WA 643028 12001   9 1345 10657 11.0   65   473   796 1697 7547 1413
Baltimore, MD 492672 11927 10 2885   9042 44.3   99 1623 1119 2157 5389 1496
Washington, DC 535655 11398 11 2832   8566 75.2   37 1266 1454 1820 5198 1548
Portland, OR 465262 11266 12 1831   9435 10.0 107   586 1128 1912 5798 1725
Oklahoma City, OK 367376 11177 13 1400   9777 13.4 104   404   878 2476 5991 1310
Minneapolis, MN 493928 11103 14 1643  9461 15.9 159   815   653 2466 5624 1370
Austin, TX 663899 10944 15   589 10355   7.6   61   300   221 2109 7301   944
Jacksonville, FL 441162 10510 16 1739  8771 18.5 107   544 1069 2456 4991 1324
Tucson, AZ 678385 10413 17 1021  9392   9.9   91   229   691 1608 6755 1029
San Francisco, CA 445405 10195 18 1821  8373 15.6   53 1102   651 1576 5111 1687
Sacramento, CA 628865 10017 19 1220  8797 11.7   62   606   540 1907 4755 2135
New Orleans, LA 301200   9988 20 1982  8007 55.2   57 1058   812 2172 4028 1807
Memphis, TN 373791   9849 21 1553  8296 28.0 109   849   566 2589 3605 2101
Boston, MA 643017   9846 22 2038  7808 12.7   94   832 1099 1522 4294 1992
Nashville, TN 377345   9687 23 1628  8058 17.5   97   518   996 1989 5071   998
Albuquerque, NM 514771   9467 24 1536  7931 10.5   73   364 1089 2168 5040   723
Wichita, KS 505008   9123 25   889  8234   9.7   82   432   365 2102 5217   916
Columbus, OH 386086   9054 26 1093  7961 17.6 106   558   412 2336 4543 1083
El Paso, TX 454255   9044 27 1088  7956   8.2   51   301   728 1429 5513 1014
Cincinnati, OH 373842   8840 28 1567  7273 13.3 131   620   802 1912 4786   573
Toledo, OH 458132   8714 29   934  7780 12.7 109   448   364 1809 4750 1221
Milwaukee, WI 383102   8669 30   983  7686 22.7   80   674   207 1360 4111 2215
Cleveland, OH 750885   8284 31 1662  6622 30.6 166   861   603 1753 2773 2096
Pittsburgh, PA 811342   8210 32 1202  7008 11.8   59   800   332 1391 3444 2173
Tulsa, OK 544940   8208 33 1335  6872   8.8   98   358   870 2147 3449 1277
Denver, CO 402573   8155 34 1076  7078 19.3   89   366   602 1806 3632 1641
Long Beach, CA 338126   7934 35 1555  6379 23.3   49   804   678 1696 3264 1418
Las Vegas, NV 423836   7353 36   888  6464 14.6   58   532   284 1524 3850 1091
Indianapolis, IN 375053   7260 37 1380  5880 17.8 110   437   816 1640 3185 1055
Mesa, AZ 405116    7026 38   682  6344   3.0   40     98   542 1481 4030   833
Virginia Beach, VA 589000   5216 39   285  4931   5.7   38   151     91   916 3729   286
San Jose, CA 309955   4906 40   669  4237   5.3   55   152   457   835 2934   467
Mean 487347 10230 1663  8567 21.9   87   706   847 2052 5026 1489
State of Texas          17623000   7058   806  6252 12.7   53   253   488 1523 3907   822
United States          255082000   5660   758  4903   9.3   43   264   442 1168 3103   632
Note: Murder includes nonnegligent manslaughter in all tables throughout this chapter.  The violent crime index is sum of murder, forcible rape, robbery, and
aggravated assault.  The property crime index is the sum for burglary, larceny-theft, and motor vehicle theft. The total crime index is the sum for all seven
categories of serious crime.
Source:  Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reports, 1992
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ditions that nurture crime.  To illustrate using the
MSAs for which data is available for 1992:
El Paso   Border     Texas    U.S.
            MSA   MSAs38     MSAs   MSAs
Density
(population
per square
mile)   584     369      251       334
Population
under 18 years
of age (%)    33       31       27        26
Per capita
income ($)         10,008        13,281   15,342    15,342
Unemployment
rate (% of labor
force)   10.2      5.5       6.4        5.5
% of population
in central cities     87       62       59       43
Number of MSAs       1       14       17         261
Any comparison of differences in crime rates among
MSAs would have to consider differentials in such
risk factors.  Even a comparison between El Paso
and other Texas cities is misleading because, among
the eight Texas cities of 250 thousand population or
more, only Houston and Arlington have lower crime
rates than El Paso, and even those differences are
slight (Federal Bureau of Investigation 1992).39
The perception that young males disproportionately
contribute to serious crimes rates is well grounded
according to Uniform Crime Report data on arrests.40
Given the concerns expressed to us about increasing
gang activity and youth crime in El Paso and the
proximity to a large and substantially poorer com-
munity across the river, we expected to find that the
city would be above the national average on such
figures. That seems not to be the case.  Contrasting
El Paso’s 1993-1994 arrest rate for juveniles (as a
percent of all arrests) with national figures for 1989,
we find:
Percent of all arrests of persons under 18 years of age.
El Paso United States41
(1993-1994)  (1989)
Murder  5.6 12.3
Forcible rape  8.4 15.4
Robbery 13.1 23.0
Aggravated
   assault 10.2 13.3
Burglary 19.7 31.9
Larceny-theft 20.4 28.7
Motor vehicle
   theft  6.4 40.9
Total 13.6 27.3
Unless there has been a dramatic downturn in juve-
nile arrests nationwide over the past few years, it
would appear that El Paso’s juvenile problem is pro-
portionately less than the situation in most other
metropolitan areas in the United States.  If youth
from Mexico are adding to the crime problem in El
Paso, it is not apparent in the data for serious of-
fenders.
Although El Paso crime rates are relatively low com-
pared to other cities, the total crime rate for serious
offenses increased 41 percent in El Paso from 1982
to 1992 (Table 29).  The population increased 17
percent but the total number of serious crimes in-
creased 65 percent, with most of the increase due to
larceny-theft and motor vehicle theft.  The total crime
rate for El Paso grew faster than any of the other
forty-eight cities of comparable size identified in
Table 29.  Of the forty-eight cites listed, only Vir-
ginia Beach, Virginia, had a total crime rate lower
than El Paso’s in 1982.  It is this rapid increase that
38 These include all MSAs within approximately 100 miles
of the U.S.-Mexican border in Arizona, California, New
Mexico, and Texas.
39 We have yet to locate the figures, but we are told that
the number of people deported for criminal violations
per year is less than 1,000, most for drug offenses.
Given the millions of serious crimes committed per
year, that is not a large number, although it tells us
nothing about the institutionalized population.
40 See Sutherland, Cressey & Luckenbill (1992, Chapter 8)
for age specific arrest rates in the United States.
41 Sutherland, Cressey & Luckenbill (1992:155, derived
from Federal Bureau of Investigation, Crime in the United
States, 1989:188).
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Table 29.
AVERAGE ANNUAL PERCENT CHANGES IN CRIME RATES PER 100,000 POPULATION
FOR 49 U.S. CITIES (1982 TO 1992) RANKED BY PERCENT CHANGE
IN TOTAL CRIME RATE
Mean Total Total Mean Crime Crime Viol.  Viol. Mean Prop. Prop. Mean
Annual Crime Crime Annual Index Index  Crime Crime Annual Crime Crime Annual
Population Percent Rate Rate Percent Rank Rank Rate Rate  Percent Rate Rate Percent
1982 1992 Change 1982 1992 Change 1982 1992 1982 1992 Change 1982 1992 Change
El Paso TX 458429 535655  1.68   6419   9044  4.09 48 31   856 1088    2.71    5564 7956  4.30
Jacksonville FL 590957 663899  1.23   7641 10510  3.75 40 19   955 1739    8.22    6686 8771  3.12
Newark NJ 334414 277544 -1.70 10817 14624  3.52 12   5 3201 3500    0.94    7616        11124  4.61
Atlanta GA 441103 410876 -0.69 12914 17347  3.43   6   2 2377 3859    6.23  10537        13488  2.80
Baltimore MD 798175 755517 -0.53   9134 11927  3.06 23 12 2090 2885    3.80    7044 9042  2.84
Arlington TX 173821 272037  5.65   6573   8489  2.92 47 35   349   756  11.64    6224 7733  2.43
Austin TX 370331 483975  3.07   8590 10944  2.74 31 18   414   589    4.23    8176        10355  2.66
Nashville TN 462507 514771  1.13   7612   9687  2.73 41 27   702 1628  13.19    6910 8058  1.66
OklahomaCity OK 425093 454255  0.69   8985 11177  2.44 25 16 1008 1400    3.88    7977 9777  2.26
FortWorth TX 412661 465262  1.27 11421 14135  2.38   8   6 1188 2019    7.00  10233        12116  1.84
KansasCity MO 451397 441162 -0.23 10080 12475  2.37 18   8 1491 2855    9.15    8590 9620  1.20
Charlotte NC 320119 408951  2.77 10305 12591  2.22 16   7 1281 2312    8.05    9024        10278  1.39
Milwaukee WI 645231 643017 -0.03   7106  8669  2.20 44 34   557   983    7.66    6549 7686  1.74
Miami FL 365506 373791  0.23 14473 17488  2.08   1   1 2726 3731    3.69  11748        13757  1.71
Tampa FL 292551 291920 -0.02 13171 15803  2.00   3   3 1961 3379    7.23  11210        12424  1.08
New Orleans LA 579338 505008 -1.28   8541   9988  1.69 32 24 1485 1982    3.34    7056 8007  1.35
Pittsburgh PA 425814 373842 -1.22   7025   8210  1.69 45 38 1266 1202   -0.50    5759 7008  2.17
Memphis TN 659913 628865 -0.47   8476   9849  1.62 34 25 1153 1553    3.47    7322 8296  1.33
Seattle WA 507643 544940  0.73 10519 12001  1.41 14 11 1009 1345    3.33    9511        10657  1.20
Corpus Christi TX 248791 267601  0.76   9130 10317  1.30 24 21   793   957    2.06    8337 9360  1.23
Minneapolis MN 376704 377345  0.02   9891 11103  1.23 20 17 1127 1643    4.57    8763 9461  0.80
St Louis MO 455362 402573 -1.16 13206 14800  1.21   2   4 2211 3291    4.88  10995        11509  0.47
Alburquerque NM 344962 401529  1.64   8469   9467  1.18 35 28   771 1536    9.93    7698 7931  0.30
Birmingham AL 288037 277407 -0.37 10650 11735  1.02 13 13 1001 2215  12.12    9648 9520 -0.13
Washington DC 631000 589000 -0.67 10411 11398  0.95 15 14 2123 2832    3.34    8288 8566  0.34
Fresno CA 226300 367376  6.23 11102 12112  0.91 10 10   964 1460    5.14  10138         10653  0.51
Norfolk VA 271076 269347 -0.06   7723   8407  0.89 39 36   876 1005    1.47    6846 7402  0.81
SanFrancisco CA 708278 750885  0.60   9685 10195  0.53 21 22 1640 1821    1.11    8045 8373  0.41
Columbus OH 563680 643028  1.41   8744   9054  0.36 29 30   769 1093    4.21    7974 7961 -0.02
Mesa AZ 157634 301200  9.11   6813   7026  0.31 46 45   447   682    5.25    6365 6344 -0.03
Wichita KS 285665 309955  0.85   8876   9123  0.28 27 29   593   889    4.98    8283 8234 -0.06
Toledo OH 355355 338126 -0.48   8509   8714  0.24 33 33   674   934    3.85    7835 7780 -0.07
Oakland CA 355868 386086  0.85 12180 12455  0.23   7   9 1857 2626    4.14  10322 9828 -0.48
Tucson AZ 349165 423836  2.14 10289 10413  0.12 17 20   838 1021    2.19    9451 9392 -0.06
Cincinnati OH 383975 369707 -0.37   8772   8840  0.08 28 32   980 1567    5.98    7792 7273 -0.67
Indianapolis IN 462657 493928  0.68   7508   7260 -0.33 43 44   938 1380    4.70    6570 5880 -1.05
Virginia Beach VA 268887 405116  5.07   5406   5216 -0.35 49 48   240   285    1.87    5166 4931 -0.45
Long Beach CA 374974 445405  1.88   8361   7934 -0.51 37 41 1200 1555    2.96    7162 6379 -1.09
Tulsa OK 376599 375053 -0.04   8722   8208 -0.59 30 39   718 1335    8.60    8004 6872 -1.41
Sacramento CA 288446 383102  3.28 10817 10017 -0.74 11 23 1036 1220    1.78    9781 8797 -1.01
Louisville KY 300404 274312 -0.87   7568   6796 -1.02 42 47   853 1082    2.69    6715 5714 -1.49
Portland OR 369796 458132  2.39 13005 11266 -1.34   5 15 1753 1831    0.44  11252 9435 -1.61
Cleveland OH 573994 513487 -1.05   9569   8284 -1.34 22 37 1635 1662    0.16    7934 6622 -1.65
StPaul MN 273187 278762  0.20   8936   7676 -1.41 26 42   749   940    2.54    8187 6737 -1.77
Colorado SpringsCO 218958 296124  3.52   8428   6819 -1.91 36 46   612   521   -1.49    7816 6299 -1.94
Boston MA 567785 572822  0.09 13040   9846 -2.45   4 26 1932 2038    0.55  11108 7808 -2.97
LasVegas NV 424252 678385  5.99   9927   7353 -2.59 19 43 1054   888   -1.57    8873 6464 -2.71
Denver CO 517638 492672 -0.48 11393   8155 -2.84   9 40   953 1076    1.29  10439 7078 -3.22
SanJose CA 659903 811342  2.29   7847   4906 -3.75 38 49   548   669    2.21    7299 4237 -4.20
Mean 416211 448958  1.14   9485 10201  0.77 1183 1650    4.27    8302 8551  0.38
Source:  Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reports, 1982, 1992.
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must give rise to the local concern about rising crime.
The increase has been dramatic relative to the pre-
viously low base, but El Paso still remains in the
lower end of the spectrum for cities of comparable
size.  The reasons for the increase in crime rates in
the El Paso area during the 1980s remain unclear.  It
should be possible to develop a data set that allows
an assessment of changes in the urban context that
led to such rapid increases in crime rates.  Clearly,
in-migration flows and the source of such flows
should be included in such an analysis.
Myths about the Criminogenic Border Condition.
Disregarding its relative position, why is the crime
rate in El Paso as high as it is?  One argument might
focus on the criminogenic conditions El Paso shares
in common with other U.S. cities.  It is quite another
thing to argue that the proximity to the border ex-
acerbates those conditions.  Table 30 presents the
results of regression analyses on violent crime and
property crime for 244 MSAs. The first eight vari-
ables in the list (percent of the MSA population that
lives in the urban area to percent of the labor force
unemployed) provide crude indicators of urban
conditions that are known to have high correlations
with crime rates and have relatively straightforward
interpretations.  Percent black, percent Hispanic, and
the ethnic/racial homogeneity index provide indica-
tors of variations in the racial/ethnic mix of MSAs.
The last three variables assess the variation in crime
rates due to an MSA being located within 100 miles
of the U.S.-Mexican border or in Texas (if not on the
border) or in another border state (Arizona, Califor-
nia, or New Mexico).  A negative value for the co-
efficients indicates that a variable is associated with
a decrease in the crime rate, a positive value indi-
cates that a variable is associated with an increase in
the crime rate.
In general the results indicate that, when urban con-
ditions are held constant, the percent Hispanic has
a negative relationship with violent crime but nearly
as high an impact as percent black on the property
crime index.  More importantly, the border effects,
statistically speaking, are all negative for violent
crime and largely so for property crime.  If the data
suggest anything about the border’s impact on crime,
it is that crime is lower on average in border areas
than in other U.S. cities when the characteristics of
the urban population are held constant.  As indi-
cated above, we do not have the resources required
to look at the potential border effects on variations
in crime rates over time when changes in urban con-
ditions are held constant.  The result of the
synchronic analysis is quite clear however.  If there
is anything particularly criminogenic about the bor-
der, it is not reflected in the data, and that tells us
a great deal about the difficulty of basing under-
standing purely on local perceptions, myths, and
impressions, which necessarily have a limited basis
for comparison spatially, if not temporally.
Serious Crime
The Reality of Recent Trends in El Paso.  The trend
for property crime in El Paso in recent years has
been downward.  The trend is quite evident in the
annual percent change in rates presented in panel
(B) of Table 31.  The property crime index has been
declining since 1990, burglary since 1988, and lar-
ceny-theft since 1989.  Motor vehicle theft went down
in the early part of the 1990s, and robbery may have
started to decline just prior to the onset of the Bor-
der Patrol’s Operation.  The experience in El Paso
mirrors a national trend in declining crime rates,
particularly with respect to property crime.  See panel
(C) Table 31 for a comparison of the most recent
national data available.  Clearly, an attempt to as-
sess the magnitude of the effect of the Operation on
crime in El Paso would have to take recent trends
into consideration.
The last row of  panel (B) Table 31 gives crime pro-
jections for 1994 based on the October 1993 to Feb-
ruary 1994 post-Operation period, disregarding sea-
sonal variations and assuming that low values for
that period will be sustained throughout the year.
This provides the most hopeful scenario of an Op-
eration effect based on current data.  The negative
swings are substantial, in double digits in most cases.
However, each of the indicators has at least one
double digit swing in an earlier time period.  Nev-
ertheless, the pattern appears impressive.  Three out
of the four violent crime indicators are down, but
that also occurred in 1982-1983, 1984-1985, and 1986-
1987.  Similarly, three of the four property crime
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Table 30.
REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF VIOLENT AND PROPERTY CRIME INDEXES:
U.S. METROPOLITAN STATISTICAL AREAS (1992)
    Criterion Variable
Violent Property
Crime Crime
Predictor Variable Index Index
X1 Percent urban -0.32            12.42
X2 Population size 44.35           197.63
X3 Population density  0.09  0.25
X4 Police officers per 1,000 population  0.01            -0.13
X5 Percent 18+ years of age 22.58            -3.31
X6 Percent of school age enrolled -0.10            -1.14
X7 Per capita income  0.01  0.18
X8 Percent unemployed            60.57          139.47
X9 Percent black  5.11            20.41
X10 Percent Hispanic -2.46            16.54
X11 Homogeneity index           -10.72           -30.44
X12 Border MSA           -73.09           -39.47
X13 Texas MSA          133.72  1.24
X14 Border State          -264.24         -1379.47
Constant         -743.88         3297.37
RSQ  0.51  0.43
n          244           237
Mean          660.22         5199.71
Standard deviation          347.21         1499.96
Notes: The Homogeneity Index (X11) is a measure of racial/ethnic homogeneity varying from
0 to 100; the higher the value, the more homogeneous the population.  It is the observed
standard deviation for percent white, black, other race, and Hispanic divided by the theoretical
maximum standard deviation for a percentage distribution with four categories.  X12-X14 are
dummy variables with a value of one if a city is in a category and zero otherwise.  The
categories are mutually exclusive with border MSA, Texas MSA, and other border state MSA
being classified in that order.  Cell entries for predictor variables are unstandardized regres-
sion coefficients.
Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reports, 1992; U.S. Census of Popu-
lation, 1990.
was also another prior period in which six of the
seven indicators declined from one year to the next:
1982-1983.  It seems premature to claim, then, that
the 1993-1994 shifts are unprecedented in the recent
history of the community.  The fact that current pat-
terns are not unique raises doubts about the impact
of Operation Hold the Line on crime in El Paso
unless the observed differences are substantially
larger than prior swings.
Observations on the Post-Operation Period.  The
indicators show substantial declines, but that, too,
occurred in 1981-1982, 1982-1983, and all three were
down in recent years, 1990-1991 and 1991-1992.  In
1990-1991, the number of offenses known to the po-
lice declined by 7,233.  Our best estimates for the
likely 1993-1994 decline range between 5,873 and
7,750.  The most optimistic figure is not likely to be
much larger than the drop experienced four years
ago.  Thus the current patterns in the Operation
period (October 1993-February 1994) are not with-
out precedent in the pre-Operation period.  There
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Table 31.
    MAJOR CRIME TRENDS IN EL PASO
            (1980 to 1993)
A.  Annualized Crime Rates (Offenses Reported To The Police Per 100,000 Population)
Crime Violent Property Motor
Popula- Index Crime Crime Forcible  Aggravated Larceny- Vehicle
tion Total Index Index Murder Rape  Robbery Assault Burglary Theft Theft
1980 425122  6366  661  5705 12.7 51 195 402 1474 3675   556
1981 442677  6613  793  5820  7.9 46 197 542 1613 3743   465
1982 458429  6419  856  5564  8.9 48 203 596 1570 3507   486
1983 471749  6190  906  5284  7.0 38 183 678 1563 3260   460
1984 465748  6455  801  5654  5.2 38 225 533 1547 3525   582
1985 474870  7096  771  6325  4.6 38 209 519 1686 4045   594
1986 483925  7806  978  6827  9.5 41 215 713 1899 4394   534
1987 494954  8501  875  7626  5.1 44 196 630 2113 4969   544
1988 501544 10165  898  9266  6.2 48 217 627 2425 5856   986
1989 515607 10623  916  9707  8.0 47 221 640 2214 6447 1046
1990 515342 11239  992 10248  6.6 50 268 668 1856 7298 1094
1991 526339  9630 1067  8563  9.3 50 282 725 1726 5787 1050
1992 535655  9044 1088  7956  8.2 51 301 728 1429 5513 1014
1993 a 544236  8794 1252  7567  8.6 55 297 891 1091 5377 1099
1993-94 b  8042   881            7161  8.8 43 255 575   873 5508   780
B.  Annual Percent Change in Crime Rates, 1980-94
1980-81  4.1  3.9 19.9  2.0 -37.8  -9.7   1.0  34.7   9.4     1.8         -16.4
1981-82  3.6 -2.9  7.9 -4.4  13.1   3.2   3.3    9.9  -2.6    -6.3   4.5
1982-83  2.9 -3.6  5.9 -5.0 -21.8         -21.5  -9.8  13.9  -0.4    -7.0  -5.2
1983-84 -1.3  4.3           -11.6  7.0 -26.3   0.1 23.0 -21.5  -1.0     8.1 26.4
1984-85  2.0  9.9 -3.7           11.9 -10.1   1.4  -7.2   -2.5    9.0   14.7   2.0
1985-86  1.9            10.0            26.9  7.9             105.2   7.3   2.7  37.3  12.6     8.6         -10.1
1986-87  2.3  8.9           -10.5           11.7 -46.9   8.1  -8.8 -11.6  11.3   13.1   1.9
1987-88  1.3            19.6  2.6           21.5  22.4   9.1 10.8   -0.5  14.8   17.8 81.2
1988-89  2.8  4.5  2.0  4.8  28.7  -3.1   1.8    2.1   -8.7   10.1   6.1
1989-90 -0.1  5.8  8.3  5.6 -17.0   6.3 21.3    4.3 -16.2   13.2   4.6
1990-91  2.1           -14.3  7.6           -16.4             41.1   1.4   5.2    8.7   -7.0  -20.7  -4.0
1991-92  1.8 -6.1             1.9 -7.1            -11.8   0.9   6.6    0.4 -17.2    -4.7  -3.4
1992-93 a  1.6 -2.8           15.1 -4.9   4.7   7.5 -1.1  22.4 -23.6    -2.5   8.4
1993-94 b -8.6          -29.6 -5.4   2.3           -22.0          -14.3            -35.5 -20.0     2.4         -29.0
C.  Annual Percent Change in Crime Rates, 1991-92
El Paso -6.1  1.9 -7.1 -11.8 0.9 6.6 0.4 -17.2 -4.7  -3.4
U.S. Cities of
Comparable Size -3.5  1.0 -4.1  -3.4 -2 2.3 0.2   -7 -4.2   2.5
United States -4.0 -0.1 -4.6  -5.1 1.2            -3.3 2                  -6.7 -3.9  -4.2
a = Based on Pre-Operation Months (September 1991 - September 1993)
b = Based on Projections from Post-Operation Months (October 1993 - February 1994)
Sources:  Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reports, 1980-92; El Paso Police Department, 1991-94
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Table 32.
CRIMES REPORTED TO THE EL PASO POLICE DEPARTMENT BY MONTH
(SEPTEMBER 1991 - FEBRUARY 1994)
A.  Number of Crimes in Post-Operation Period
Crime Violent Property  Motor
Index Crime Crime Forcible Aggravated  Larceny- Vehicle Simple
Total Index Index Murder Rape Robbery Assault  Burglary Theft Theft Assault
Oct-93 3650 424 3226 2 12 132 278 435 2493 298 1063
Nov-93 3711 439 3272 6 26 118 289 356 2512 404   975
Dec-93 3581 336 3245 4 20  97 215 397 2489 359   959
Jan-94 3468 351 3117 3 17  81 250 368 2355 394   877
Feb-94 3030 388 2642 2 22  99 265 314 1975 353   806
B.  Monthly Averages for Specified Periods
Pre-Operation Period
Oct 91-Feb 92 3957 393 3564 4.0 21 121 247 706 2445 412   821
Mar 92-Sep 92 4065 502 3563 4.0 24 131 343 671 2434 458   982
Oct 92-Feb 93 4007 474 3532 3.0 21 133 317 530 2512 490   942
Mar 93-Sep 93 4010 571 3439 4.1 25 138 404 505 2444 490 1102
Post-Operation Period
Oct 93-Feb 94 3488 388 3100 3.4 19 105 259 374 2365 362   936
Entire Period 3940 476 3464 4 22 127 322 573 2444 447   965
C.  Average Monthly Percent Change in Number for Specified Periods
Pre-Operation Period
Oct 91-Feb 92 -3.2 -1.6 -3.3   4.7 0.6 1.9 -2.6 -6.9 -1.7 -3.9 -0.7
Mar 92-Sep 92  2.3  3.8  2.1  60.4 5.3 0.0  6.4  0.7  2.1  6.1  2.7
Oct 92-Feb 93 -3.2 -3.1 -3.1 -45.0 1.0 1.9 -4.0 -7.8 -2.7  2.6 -2.0
Mar 93-Sep 93  1.4  4.4  1.0  57.6 6.6 0.4  7.0  4.8  1.4 -3.2  4.2
Post-Operation Period
Oct 93-Feb 94 -5.1 -6.1 -4.7   8.3 11.6 -2.9 -6.6 -10.1 -3.9 -0.6 -6.4
Entire Period -1.1  0.1 -1.2 25.4   5.1   0.3   1.0  -2.9 -0.6   0.4   0.1
Source:  El Paso Police Department
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El Paso Police Department provided us with a two
and one-half year period of monthly returns that
they submit to the Texas Department Public Safety
as part of the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reporting Pro-
cedure.42  Summaries of these data for the seven
index crimes are presented in Table 32.  Panels (A)
and (B) give means and average percent changes in
the number of offenses known for specified periods.
In particular, the October 1993 to February 1994
period provides the five-month averages for each of
the crime index counts for the post-Operation pe-
riod to contrast with earlier periods.  The patterns
are consistently down for the post-Operation period.
But are the differences so unusual that a claim can
be made for an Operation effect?  Some simple arith-
metic provides a partial answer.
Overall, there are 519 fewer offenses reported on
average for each month during the post-Operation
period (October 1993 to February 1994) than for the
same period one year earlier (3499 - 4007 = 519, or
a 13 percent decline from the October 1992-Febru-
ary 1993 period).  Multiplying that figure by 12 gives
the expected reduction in the total number of of-
fenses for an entire year (6228).  However, note that
the decline in the total crime rate was from 11,239 in
1990 to 9,630 in 1991 (see Table 31), a 14 percent
decline over 1 year.  Since both figures are based on
number of offenses per 100,000 population, multi-
plying each by the respective population estimate
for that year and dividing by 100,000 gives the num-
ber of offenses, 59,919 for 1990 and 50,686 for 1991,
a difference of 7,233 for the year or an average of
603 per month, a 14 percent larger reduction per
month than the 519 reduction during the post-Op-
eration months.43  This analysis is not elegant, but it
is instructive.  Larger downturns in the crime rate
have been observed in El Paso in recent years than
were observed during the first five months of the
Border Patrol’s Operation.  It is not clear that the
earlier downturns in the crime rates were noticed or
that local law enforcement agencies received any
kudos for those prior shifts.
A Technically Rigorous Approach with Equally
Ambiguous Results.  Just as it is too early to credit
Operation Hold the Line as an essential element in
any border city’s crime control strategy, it is also too
early to be dismissive.  Multivariate statistical pro-
cedures are available to analyze trends over time.
Estimates of effects can depend on the length of the
available time series and the trend line that is used
to make forecasts, but the process is technically and
theoretically sounder than best guesses based on
contrasts for only two points in time.  Table 33
contrasts the results for four different models that
take into consideration trends over time as well as
seasonal variations in the seven major crime rates.
The analysis is based on monthly reports of offenses
reported to the El Paso Police Department, and the
models differ only in terms of the time periods used
to estimate the trends and seasonal effects.  The
estimated effects during the post-Operation period
are fairly consistent throughout the analyses.44
Based on the pre-Operation data only, each model
estimates a linear trend and the last two models
include estimates of seasonal trends.  These esti-
mates are then used to forecast the number of of-
fenses for the post-Operation months.  Differences
between the predicted and observed number of of-
fenses for the post-Operation period would indicate
the extent to which the post-Operation data could
not be estimated by prior trends (or by trends and
seasonal effects in Models III and IV).  These differ-
ences are provided for each category of crime in
42 At the time of this writing, data should be available for
the months of March-June 1994.  Analysis of the
additional four months plus monthly data going back
at least as far as January 1990 would eliminate much
of the random noise in the time series and allow greater
confidence in the outcome of the analysis than is
possible with the current data set.
43 A simpler strategy, of course, is to go to the Uniform
Crime Reports for those years and read the figures
presented in the tables.
44 Interrupted time series procedures were used with
estimates based on the pre-Operation periods for
Models I - III.  Common modeling procedures were
considered in terms of ARIMA analysis as was the
case for the apprehensions data considered elsewhere
in the report.  A first order autoregressive structure
was controlled for in four of the seven categories of
crime in the Model I data.  The result of all that effort
is that, no matter which approach is used to model the
effects of trends and seasonal variations in the offenses
reported to the police, the findings are similar, with
declines in most of the offense categories during the
post-Operation period that are independent of trends
and seasonal variations.
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Table 33.
ESTIMATES OF POST-OPERATION EFFECT ON MAJOR CRIME
FOR FOUR MODELS OF TREND AND SEASONALITY
Model III Model IV
Model I Model II Short Short
Long Medium Term Trend Term Trend
Term Trend Term Trend + Seasonal + Seasonal
Effect Effect Effect Effect
Estimates Based on
Period from: 1980-1993 1988-1993 Sep 91-Sep 93 Sep. 91-Feb 94
A.  RSQ for Trend and Seasonal Effects
Murder 0.04 0.01 0.56 0.54
Forcible Rape 0.29 0.07 0.36 0.38
Robbery 0.70 0.39 0.37 0.53
Aggravated Assault 0.48 0.32 0.84 0.74
Burglary 0.02 0.77 0.88 0.84
Larceny-Theft 0.73 0.11 0.56 0.55
Motor Vehicle Theft 0.81 0.15 0.48 0.47
B.  Regression Coefficients for Trend
Murder 0.01 0.02 -0.03 -0.03
Forcible Rape 0.06* 0.09 -0.06 -0.11
Robbery 0.52* 0.91* -0.36 -1.24
Aggravated Assault 1.23* 3.00*  2.15* -1.06
Burglary           -0.46         -10.39* -4.28* -3.73*
Larceny-Theft 9.10*           -4.80*  6.72  2.60
Motor Vehicle Theft 2.45*            1.60*  1.81                 -2.37
C.  Differences Between Observed and Predicted Offenses for the Post-Operation Period
Murder   -0.5   -0.7    0.2   0.1
Forcible Rape   -4.4*   -5.1   -1.8  -0.6
Robbery  -32.5*  -39.9*  -31.6 -10.5
Aggravated Assault  -95.8* -126.6*           -115.6* -38.5
Burglary -257.6  -77.4*  20.1*   6.7*
Larceny-Theft -278.9*  -40.9*           -148.3 -49.4
Motor Vehicle Theft -141.8* -130.7*          -150.5** -50.2
Violent Crime -133.2 -172.3          -148.8 -49.5
Property Crime -678.3 -249.0          -278.7 -92.9
Total Crime -811.5 -421.3          -427.5          -142.4
*  Probability < .10
** Probability < .15
Note: Negative differences in panel C indicate a decline in crime rate beyond that predicted by trends or seasonal variations prior
to the Operation.
Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reports, 1980-92; El Paso Police Department for 1991-94 monthly crime
report data.
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(Model IV) minimizes the post-Operation effect and
provides a lower bound.  Although the differences
may not be statistically significant, the overall pat-
tern in Model IV is consistently down for most vio-
lent and property offenses.  Thus, the minimum case
still exhibits a downturn for the post-Operation
period.  With the exception of burglary, the esti-
mates for the other two models are extremely con-
sistent.  The bottom line is that the when short-term
trend and seasonal factors are controlled, overall
crimes rates are down by more than 420 per month
on average, and both aggravated assault and motor
vehicle theft in particular are down more than could
be explained by previous trends.
Below are the results for total crime index for the
five post-Operation months using a model that re-
lies on the period from 1990 to estimate recent trends
and seasonal patterns.  The observed number of of-
fenses for each month is decomposed into the num-
ber of offenses predicted by the trend, the expected
number of offenses to be added or subtracted from
the trend component given seasonal variations ob-
served in the series, and a remaining component
that cannot be explained by either trend or seasonal
variation.  Thus, there were 3,650 offenses in Octo-
ber 1993; 3,758 were expected given the declining
trend since 1990.  The month of October is typically
up 66 offenses over the trend.  Trend plus seasonal
component give a predicted number of offenses for
the month: 3,824.  The observed value (3,650) minus
the predicted value (3,824) gives the remainder.  The
observed value was 174 offenses lower than would
have been predicted by trend and seasonal varia-
tions alone.  It is the magnitude of that remainder
that should tell whether there is something unusual
happening.  The total for the five-month period, 407
fewer offenses committed or 81 fewer per month on
average, is smaller but consistent with the other
medium to short-term models considered.
The total number of offenses were a bit higher two
years earlier, but the declines that were not pre-
dicted by trend or seasonal effects (the remainder)
in the five month period in 1991-1992 (down 162
offenses per month) were twice those observed in
the first five months of the post-Operation period
(down 81 offenses per month). Given the consis-
tency of these results, it is difficult to say that some-
panel (C) of Table 33 for each model.45  As was the
case in the inelegant analyses presented earlier, if
the differences are negative, they indicate the mag-
nitude of the decline in offenses that cannot be at-
tributed to trend and/or seasonal variations.  If the
differences are positive, they indicate the magnitude
of the increase over what would have been expected
given trends that started before the Border Patrol
Operation began.
• Model I estimates the trend for each category of
crime over the long term starting with the 1980
data and running through September 1993. As
rates had been increasing over the majority of
the period considered and declining only in re-
cent years, this model probably exaggerates the
apparent effects of the Operation.
• Model II estimates trend focusing on the me-
dium term, from 1988, the year that seemed to
initiate a sequence of downturns in the property
crime rate, through September 1993.
• Model III estimates trend in the short term, from
September 1991 through September 1993,
and uses the monthly data to estimate seasonal
effects.
• Model IV uses the entire short term series of
thirty months from September 1991 through
February 1994, again with seasonal estimates.
Model IV would minimize the observed effect
during the post-Operation period.
Using a long-term trend (Model I) does seem to
exaggerate the post-Operation statistical effect on
property crime rates.  This is not surprising since
we had observed a recent downturn in both bur-
glary and larceny-theft.46   Using the entire series
45 Panel (A) gives the squared multiple correlation
coefficient and indicates how well the trend line and
seasonal variables predict the number of offenses for
each month throughout the time period.  The  regression
coefficients for trend in panel (B) indicate whether the
trend is rising or declining during the specified period.
46 A cubic model provides a better fit for that curve, but
that degree of elegance is probably not justified by the
data or by any theoretical reasoning underlying such a
model for this data.
RESEARCH
P A P E R
- 80 -
U.S.  C O M M I S S I O N  O N  I M M I G R A T I O N  R E F O R M
Summary of trend analysis results for the post-Operation period:
Observed Number Seasonal Predicted (Observed-
number of predicted component Number Predicted)
Month offenses by trend Remainder
Oct  3,650  3,758   66  3,824 -174
Nov  3,711  3,735 -146  3,589  122
Dec  3,581  3,711 -127  3,584    -3
Jan  3,468  3,689 -128  3,561   -93
Feb  3,030  3,666 -377  3,289 -259
Total 17,440 18,559 -712 17,847 -407
Average  3,488  3,712 -142  3,569   -81
Observed Number Seasonal Predicted (Observed-
number of predicted component Number Predicted)
Month offenses by trend Remainder
Oct  4,173  4,307   66  4,373 -200
Nov  4,071  4,284 -  146  4,139  -68
Dec  3,916  4,261 -127  4,134 -218
Jan  3,872  4,238 -128  4,110 -238
Feb  3,752  4,215 -376  3,839  -87
Total 19,784 21,305 -710 20,595 -811
Average 3,957  4,261 -142  4,119 -162
Summary of trend analysis results for a five-month periuod two years earlier (1991-1992 using the same estimates for trend and seasonal
components as for the post-Operation period:
47 We attempted a preliminary analysis of the relationship
between INS apprehensions and offenses known to the
police after the effects of trend and seasonality had
been removed from both.  There is a small statistical
relationship between aggravated assault and total INS
apprehensions: for every 200 increase (or decrease) in
apprehensions, the number of assaults increases
(decreases) .5 in the detrended series.  The series we
have on arrests is too short to remove seasonal effects,
but, again, there is a modest statistical relationship
between aggravated assault and the detrended INS
apprehension totals: an increase of 1.4 arrests for every
100 INS apprehensions.  A longer time frame is needed
to tease out the possibility of a relationship worth
pursuing, particularly given the prospect of lagged
effects between apprehensions and offenses.
thing extraordinary is happening with respect to
serious crime due to the Operation.
These results are suggestive, not definitive.  The time
series is too short, particularly for the post-Opera-
tion period.  Nevertheless, the results are indicative.
At least to this point in time, it appears that the
Border Patrol’s strategy may directly or indirectly
have some impact on serious crime in the El Paso
region.  Several criteria would have to be met to
provide a persuasive case that those who gain ille-
gal entry into the United States or who are nonresi-
dent in the United States contribute disproportion-
ately to the rate of serious crime in border cities and
that the Operation is having a direct effect on seri-
ous crime in El Paso:
• The declines in the crime rates would have to be
unprecedented, which is not the case at present;
• If not unprecedented, the declines would have
to larger than those previously experienced,
which is not the case at present;
• The declines would have to be sustained signifi-
cantly below levels that could be expected by
recent trends and seasonal patterns, as yet not
the case;
• Variations in the rates of crimes along the bor-
der should vary in proportion to the illegal flow
along the border (we have insufficient informa-
tion to speak to that issue);47
• Direct information on citizenship, residence sta-
tus, and entry status on apprehended offenders
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includes the main bridge crossing points in the down-
town area.49  In the first nine months of 1993, 41
percent of all felony arrests in the city occurred in
that district.  When the arrest data are linked with
census information on municipal regions, the cen-
tral area has the highest arrest rates as expected.
Some contributing factors are easy to identify.  Both
per-capita income and median family income in the
central region are about two-thirds of those for the
entire city.  The central area has a younger popula-
tion and a higher proportion of residents twenty-
five years or older with less than a ninth grade edu-
cation.  By these measures, the economic and social
status of the population is worse than for the city as
a whole.  The central area also has a high proportion
of Hispanic residents, although some parts of the
area have an even a higher proportion with similar
economic status, older perhaps, but more poorly edu-
cated, and substantially lower arrest rates on all
measures except prohibited weapons offenses.
Distribution of Complaints.  In addition to serious
crime, we were told that a great deal of highly vis-
ible petty criminal activity (e.g., vandalism, shoplift-
ing and other petty theft, prostitution, minor drug
offenses, aggressive panhandling and begging, and
illegal street vending) also has been concentrated in
the central downtown district.  The Border Patrol’s
operation may have had only a small effect on major
crime, but many observers apparently think the com-
munity is safer now than before.
The public view may be shaped by the reduction in
petty offenses in the downtown area, much of which
apparently involves youthful offenders.  That view
is supported by the reduction in incoming complaint
calls monitored by the El Paso Police Department
over an eight-week period when the Operation first
should demonstrate a declining contribution after
the Operation’s inception to the arrest rates of
individuals who are noncitizen, nonresident, and
without legitimate entry into the country (we
have no information that addresses this issue.
Geographic Distribution of
Crime
Distribution of Arrests.  Public perception in El Paso
is dominated by a view that the crime problem has
been getting worse, and the evidence presented
above supports that view over the long-term, al-
though some property crime rates appear to have
declined in recent years.  Some of the past increase
may have been due to changes in the age and sex
distribution of the resident population and in chang-
ing economic and social conditions in the area.
During the 1980s much of the city’s growth has been
affected by migration patterns due to its proximity
to a large Mexican population across the border, and
many people believe that undocumented aliens are
the source of the increase in serious crime in El Paso
and that the increasing number of undocumented
aliens is due to the U.S. government’s inability to
control the border.  This impression probably is
bolstered in part by the unusually low recovery rate
for motor vehicle theft in the city48 and by the num-
ber and dollar value of motor vehicles stolen in the
United States that have been recovered south of the
border by the FBI in cooperation with Mexican law
enforcement agencies.
The serious criminal activity in the city is dispropor-
tionately located in City Representative District 8,
which follows the U.S.-Mexico border throughout
the south and west side of the city of El Paso and
49 Police districts 31-36, 42, 44, 51, and 54.  There are six
other police districts on the border scattered through
four city representative districts.
50 A sharp reduction in 911 calls and accidents in week
eight suggest that a seasonal variation may account for
the reduction observed in some of the categories in
that week as neither would be expected to go down so
precipitously.  The number of alarms, silent and audible
combined, provide an automatic measure of variation
in property crime that tended to decline during the
eight-week period independent of law enforcement
activity.
48 El Paso’s recovery rate was about 43 percent in the 12
months before Operation Hold the Line began
compared to about 60 percent for Texas cities (see Miller
1987 for a comparison between Texas cities and motor
vehicle theft in border cities in the mid-1980s).  The
recovery rate in El Paso increased to 64 percent in the
five months after the Operation started.  Although the
annual motor vehicle theft rate remained fairly constant
at about 500 per 100,000 population, the recovery rate
for El Paso declined from about 81 percent in 1976 to
about 40 percent from 1986. Since that time, the rate of
thefts has doubled with no appreciable increase in
recoveries.
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began.50  Most of the reduction in incoming calls
came from the downtown police districts and oc-
curred in all categories with the surprising excep-
tions of shoplifting, prowlers, and sex offenses, as
some of our respondents led us to believe these
offenses were among the first to decline.  The de-
cline in the proportion of all petty offenses and
nuisance complaints coming from the downtown
area substantiates the impression that some of the
population at risk, most probably youthful offend-
ers, have been turned back at the border.  The data
may reflect some seasonal variation during the pe-
riod of the study undertaken by the El Paso Police
Department as well, but the initial impact appears
to confirm most expectations.
The early impact on minor crime is substantiated by
the activity reports of the Anthony Police Depart-
ment to the west, the Horizon City Police Depart-
ment to the east, and the University of Texas at El
Paso Police Department (near the Mexican border in
the southwest corner of the city).  Apparently Mayor
Francis was sufficiently impressed by the reduction
in minor crime observed in the early stages of the
Operation to shift sixty-five police officers from the
downtown area into a newly established gang task-
force.  He appears confident enough about the
Operation’s long-term prospects that he has invested
community resources in a cleanup campaign for the
downtown area to revitalize economic activity in
that part of the city.
On other fronts, federal authorities indicate that
criminal alien cases appear to have declined since
the Operation began; bridge apprehensions (mainly
drug trafficking) have increased; river apprehensions
are down; and criminal activities have increased on
the perimeters of the Border Patrol’s Operation (near
Fabens, Texas to the east and New Mexico to the
west).  They have no illusions that major drug traf-
fickers will not be able to adapt successfully to the
new situation.
Juvenile Offenders and the
Racial/Ethnic Distribution
of Arrests
We examined the arrest rates of juvenile offenders
for serious crime, contrasting the differences in
monthly average number of arrests for the post-
Operation period with the same five-month period
one year earlier.  Again, this type of contrast ignores
any trends that may have been present prior to the
onset of the Operation and can only identify con-
trasts that may be consistent (or inconsistent) with
expectations about the Operation’s potential effect
on crime.  The underlying causes of the differences
remain uncertain.  In particular we have no direct
information on the citizenship or resident status of
offenders.
Although the number of juveniles processed for all
offenses, including serious crime, increased by 23.5
percent compared to the same period one year ear-
lier and the number referred to court increased by
40.3 percent, the number of arrests for serious of-
fenses were down for both violent crime and prop-
erty crime (the numbers in individual categories of
offense are too small to be meaningful with the ex-
ception of aggravated assault and larceny-theft, both
of which are down on the previous year’s figures).
The results suggest a significant decline in juvenile
involvement in serious crime.  The difference can-
not be explained by less vigilance on the part of the
police department given the substantial increase in
the number of juveniles being turned over.  But,
there is a perplexing caveat.  Juvenile arrests for
serious offenses did not decline disproportionately
as might be expected.  The proportion, 4.2 percent
of all arrests for serious crime involving juveniles,
was up marginally compared to the same period
one year earlier.  The number of arrests of adult
offenders, most probably young adults, must have
declined in tandem.
From our respondents’ comments, we would expect
juvenile arrests to be down for minor offenses, dis-
proportionately so for Hispanics to the extent their
entry to El Paso has been restricted by the Opera-
tion.  Table 34 identifies the contribution to changes
in average arrest rates of seven categories of crime
by race, ethnicity, and age group.  Reading from
right to left in the top row, there were sixteen fewer
arrests for major violent crimes on average October
1993 to February 1994 compared with the same five-
month period one year earlier (October 1992 to Feb-
ruary 1993).  Juvenile arrests declined by nearly nine
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Table 34.
DIFFERENCES IN AVERAGE ARREST RATES FROM EL PASO
BY RACE/ETHNICITY AND AGE CATEGORY
(OCTOBER 1993 TO FEBRUARY 1994 MONTHLY AVERAGE -
OCTOBER 1992 TO FEBRUARY 1993 MONTHLY AVERAGE)
White White White Black Black Black Hispanic  Hispanic Hispanic Total Total All
Type Of Crime < 18 Yrs 18+ Yrs Total < 18 Yrs 18+ Yrs Total < 18 Yrs 18+ Yrs Total < 18 Yrs 18+ Yrs Categ
Major Violent -1.4 -1.2   -2.6 -0.4    -2.0  -2.4   -6.8   -4.2 -11.0   -8.6   -7.4  -16
Major Property -9.4 -2.2 -11.6  0.8    -1.2  -0.4 -24.0 -38.8 -62.8 -32.6 -42.2  -74.8
Minor Violence  4.8  4.8    9.6  1.0     2.0   3.0    2.0    8.2  10.2    7.8   15   22.8
Minor Property  1.6    .4    2.0 -0.2     0.2   0.0   -2.2    4.4    2.2   -0.8     5     4.2
Vandalism  9.2  4.4  13.6  1.0     1.6   2.6  35.4    2.6  38.0  45.6     8.6   54.2
Prohibited Weapons  0.2 -1.4   -1.2  0.6    -1.0  -0.4    3.6    1.8    5.4    4.4    -0.6     3.8
Sex Offenses  7.5 -2.4    5.1  0.0    -1.4  -1.4   -1.1 -17.5 -18.6    6.4  -21.3  -14.9
Drug Offenses  1.8 -4.8   -3.0  0.9    -2.8  -1.9    9.7 -34.6 -24.9  12.4  -42.2  -29.8
Public Order
   Offenses  7.2 -21.2 -14.0 -0.1    -4.8  -4.9    8.2       -150.8      -142.6 15.3 -177        -161.5
Total 21.5 -23.6    -2.1  3.6    -9.4  -5.8  24.8       -228.9       -204.1 49.9        -261.9       -212.0
Juvenile Status Offenses
Curfew Violations 9.6  2.4  48.6 60.6
Runaways 3.8  2.2  10.2 16.2
Total                13.4  4.6  58.8 76.8
Source:  El Paso Police Department
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apprehension rates improved for some violent and
property offenses.  This may suggest that the redi-
rection of police resources from minor and petty
offenses to more major crimes was fruitful, or it
may be a trend that started some time ago; we do
not have sufficient data to resolve the issue, and it
would be useful to know whether there was a simi-
lar pattern during the 1990-1991 downturn.
The cost of crime to the community involves more
than property losses, but property losses, a visible
measure of changing conditions, were down during
the post-Operation period in all major categories:
robbery, burglary, larceny-theft, and motor vehicle
theft (Table 35, panel B).  Equally important, both
the value and the percent of property recovered in-
creased.  The patterns are too consistent to ignore
and are consistent with the hypothesis that crime
control, as measured by property losses, improved
during the post-Operation period.  Again, in the
absence of a longer time series,51  it is not clear
whether the recent declines can be attributed to in-
direct or direct effects of the Border Patrol’s activi-
ties or to trends in law enforcement effectiveness
begun before the Border Patrol shifted its strategy.
Most of the property lost to criminal activity in the
region comes from motor vehicle theft (70 percent
of the total value of stolen property in the October
1993 to February 1994 period).  That, and the rise in
motor vehicle theft of 138 percent from a low of 460
motor vehicle thefts per 100 thousand population in
1983 to a high of 1094 per 100 thousand by 1990,
probably accounts for the community perception that
motor vehicle theft is high.  It is no solace to those
whose cars go missing to learn that the motor ve-
hicle theft rate is low relative to communities of
comparable size in the United States.  In 1992 El
Paso ranked thirty-first in motor vehicle theft among
the forty cities of comparable size (Table 28).52
per month and adult arrests by seven per month.
Arrests of Hispanics for major violent crimes were
down eleven per month, which is more than the
decline for blacks and white non-Hispanics com-
bined.  The number declined more for young His-
panics (by about seven per month) compared to
adults (about four per month).
Such a result is consistent with expectations about
the Operation’s effect on young Hispanics.  That is
not the case for any other category.  Arrests tend to
be down generally more for older than younger of-
fenders in all race/ethnic categories and for older
Hispanics more than any other group.  Arrests for
minor property offenses and minor violence in-
creased, and arrests for vandalism increased consid-
erably for young Hispanics.  Arrests for sex, drugs,
and public order offenses are down for adults in all
race/ethnic categories and especially for adult His-
panics.  There is a juvenile effect, particularly for
Hispanics, but more for serious than minor crime.
There is an Hispanic effect relating to minor crime,
but more for adults than juveniles.
The evidence supports the thesis that juvenile of-
fenders are being restrained with respect to serious
crimes, Hispanics more than blacks or white non-
Hispanics, but possibly as an outcome of the addi-
tional resources available for the gang taskforce.
There is little support in the arrest data for the sort
of effects predicted by our respondents in terms of
the role age group plays.  There is considerable sup-
port for the notion that public nuisance activities
may be down with the possible exception of vandal-
ism, but juvenile offenders appear less responsible
for the downturn than was anticipated although the
effect of young adults is obscured in this analysis.
Cost of Crime
We also examined data relevant to assessing changes
in the cost of crime.  With the exception of forcible
rape, burglary, and larceny-theft, the police clear-
ance rates increased in the October 1993 to February
1994 period compared to the same period one year
earlier (Table 35, panel A).  Clearance rates for motor
vehicle theft more than doubled.  Thus, not only are
most offenses down compared to a year earlier, the
51 In particular the series should include the period around
the time of the previous large downturn in 1990-1991.
52 See Miller (1987) for a comparison of trends in motor
vehicle theft among border cities in Texas and for a
description of how border theft rings operate and the
responses of law enforcement agencies on both sides
of the border.
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Table 35.
VARIOUS MEASURES OF COST OF CRIME
A.  Monthly Average Clearance Rates (Percent)
         Motor
Total Violent Property Forcible Aggravated Larceny- Vehicle Simple
Period Crime Crime Crime Murder Rape Robbery  Assault Burglary Theft Theft Assault
Oct 92 - Feb 93 16.7 37.1 14.0 68.0 53.5 24.4 41.3 11.8 15.1 11.3 47.1
Mar 93 - Sep 93 15.9 35.6 12.6 99.5 47.2 27.3 37.5 11.0 13.8 8.4 49.5
Oct 93 - Feb 94 18.4 42.4 15.4 95.0 44.7 33.0 45.1 11.8 14.3 26.0 49.5
Percent Change a  9.8 14.2 10.1 39.7           -16.5 35.5  9.3   0.3  -5.3             130.9  5.1
B.  Value of Stolen Property
Motor Value of Percent
Larceny- Vehicle Property Property Percent
Robbery Burglary Theft Theft Stolen Recovered of Value
($ ‘000) ($ ‘000) ($ ‘000) ($ ‘000) ($ ‘000) ($ ‘000)  Recovered
(A) Monthly Average
Oct 92 - Feb 93 80.00 619.60 631.20 3070.8 4402.20  1421.40 32.29
Mar 93 - Sep 93 258.86 467.71 531.57 2870.1 4129.29  1314.86 32.17
Oct 93 - Feb 94 54.40 420.00 610.40 2591.2 3676.00  1539.00 42.07
Percent Change a
Oct 92 - Feb 93 to
Oct 93 - Feb 94 -32.00 -32.21 -3.30 -15.6 -16.50 8.27  30.29
(B) Average Value Per Incident ($)
Oct 92 - Feb 93  602 1169 251 6264 1201
Mar 93 - Sep 93 1876  926 218 5859 1154
Oct 93 - Feb 94  518 1123 258 7166 1147
Percent Change a
Oct 92 - Feb 93 to
Oct 93 - Feb 94 -13.9 -3.9 2.7 14.4 -4.5
C.  Cost of Motor Vehicle Theft
Vehicles_________ Vehicle  Recovery_____________________________ Average Average Percent  Percent Percent
Stolen Value Value Recovered  Recovered Total Value  Value Vehicles Value Vehicles
(Number) ($ ‘000) ($ ‘000) Locally   Elsewhere Recovered Stolen  Recovered Recovered Recovered Recovered
($) ($) Elsewhere
Monthly Average
Oct 92-Feb 93 490.2 3070.8 1344.6 167.6 50.2 217.8  6264.4 6173.6 44.7 44.1 23.1
Mar 93-Sep 93 489.9 2870.1 1233.7 150.4 56.0 206.4  5859.1 5976.5 42.0 43.2 26.3
Oct 93-Feb 94 361.6 2591.2 1370.8 134.2 95.8 230.0  7165.9 5960.0 63.8 53.5 41.9
Percent Change a
Oct 92-Feb93
Oct93-Feb 94 -26.2 -15.6 1.9 -19.9 90.8 5.6 14.4 -3.5 42.6 21.4 81.4
D.  Minor Property Offenses
Number of Incidents__________________ Value of Property Stolen ($’000)_________ Average Value   per Incident ($)_________
Larceny- Pickpocket/ Larceny- Pickpocket/ Larceny-  Pickpocket/
Residential Theft Purse Shop- Residential Theft Purse Shop-  Residential Theft Purse Shop-
Burglaries < $50 Snatching Lifting Burglaries < $50 Snatching Lifting  Burglaries < $50 Snatching Lifting
Monthly Average
Oct 92 - Feb 93 372.0 1661.4 33.6 630.8 456.0 109.7 5.8 38.5 1198.1 72.3 170.1 61.1
Mar 93 - Sep 93 356.9 1674.1 21.3 554.7 337.3 29.2 4.4 33.5 936.5 17.4 215.3 63.7
Oct 93 - Feb 94 277.4 1673.2 14.2 647.4 307.6 29.0 1.6 34.9 1112.2 17.2 116.3 53.4
Percent Change a
Oct 92 - Feb 93 to
Oct 93 - Feb 94 -25.4 0.7 -57.7 2.6 -32.5 -73.6 -71.9 -9.4 -7.2 -76.2 -31.6 -12.7
a = Percent calculated from Oct 92 - Feb 93 to Oct 93 - Feb 94.
Source:  El Paso Police Department
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It should come as no surprise that our data bear out
local perceptions of the decline of motor vehicle theft
in the early part of the post-Blockade period.  Both
the number of vehicles stolen and the total value of
the community’s loss are down compared to the
same period one year earlier (Table 35, panel C).
About 43 percent of vehicles were recovered in the
year prior to the Operation compared to 60 percent
in the five-month period after the Operation began.
About 43 percent of the total value stolen53 was re-
covered in the prior year compared to 53 percent
during the post-Operation period.  From 1983, the
recovery rate for stolen vehicles in El Paso was low
compared to other cities (the recovery rate is about
60 percent for Texas cities, see Miller 1987), the dif-
ficulty of tracking culprits across the border being
the perceived explanation for this low recovery rate.
The FBI does recover some vehicles through its liai-
son with authorities in Mexico, but we are told that
the recovered vehicles are often stripped and sub-
stantially reduced in value. The data indicate that
both the recovery rate and the value of recovered
vehicles increased during the post-Operation period,
but, paradoxically, the average value of recovered
vehicles has been declining steadily in recent years.
That the number of vehicles recovered from outside
the community has nearly doubled in a short period
may be testimony to statewide and regional efforts
to become more effective in dealing with motor ve-
hicle theft.
As indicated above, some law enforcement officials
hypothesize that the Border Patrol’s new strategy
reduces minor and unreported crime, the nuisance
activities of at risk juveniles and young adults, by
making it more difficult for young males to enter
the United States from Juárez.  They may be less
likely to have the required documentation to get
through the regulated entry points.  To the extent
that this type of flow has been reduced, the results
should be reflected in minor criminal offenses.
Although residential burglaries are not minor crimes
by any standard, we have added them to a list of
such petty crimes as minor theft, purse snatching,
and shoplifting presumed to be committed by
younger offenders (Table 35, panel D).  We assume
greater expertise would be required to burglarize a
commercial establishment, where the returns may
be greater but so are the risks of detection from
security systems.
The incidence of residential burglaries and purse-
snatching/pick pocketing complaints is dramatically
lower in the post-Operation period compared to the
same months one year earlier, as is the total value of
losses and the average property loss per incident
(Table 35, panel D).  Both minor larceny-theft, where
the stolen property is valued less than $50, and shop-
lifting incidents did not vary much in terms of total
number during the two five-month periods con-
trasted in Table 35, although the total value and the
average value per incident both declined.54
The number of commercial burglaries were down
even more than residential burglaries during the two
periods (38.9 percent).  Although commercial bur-
glaries showed a similar drop in total value of prop-
erty lost as in residential burglaries, the average loss
per incident increased by 12 percent, to $1,164 per
incident on average, surprisingly similar to the resi-
dential burglary average ($1,112).  Major larcenies
(property losses over $50) decreased by 19 percent
but the value per incident increased 37 percent (the
total value increased by 12 percent).
In the absence of any information on earlier trends,
the data are consistent with the hypothesis that both
major and minor property crime declined somewhat
during the post-Operation period relative to the situ-
ation one year earlier.  Whether the decline is due to
the Border Patrol ’s success in curtailing the entry of
the at risk population or to the efforts of law en-
forcement agencies is speculative from this data
alone.  The total decline in such incidents is exclu-
sively due to the change in the number of burglaries
and motor vehicle thefts, both of which have re-
ceived particular attention from local law enforce-
ment agencies in recent years, and with some effect
in recent years prior to the Operation.
53 $35.4 million, up from $10.6 million in 1986 according
to Miller (1987).
54 We are mystified why the average value per incident is
greater than $50 ($66) from October 1992-February 1993
for incidents that are supposed to be valued at $50 or
less and suspect either an accounting or a classification
error may be at fault.
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Operation Hold the Line was implemented.55  Table
36 displays the number of illegal migrant adults ap-
prehended systemwide by the Santa Fe Railroad from
January 1, 1992, through May 26, 1994.  The table
shows that apprehensions increased for comparable
months from 1992 to 1993.  Since the operation’s
implementation, apprehensions of illegal migrant
adults by Santa Fe Railroad police are down dra-
matically.  Systemwide, between January 1 and May
27, 1994, Santa Fe Railroad police officers appre-
hended 1,407 illegal migrant adults, compared to
3,047 during the same period in 1993, a 53.8 percent
decrease.  Apprehensions of illegal migrant juve-
niles and arrests of illegal migrants by Santa Fe Rail-
road police declined by 38.2 percent (from
89 to 55) and 49.9 percent (from 2,612 to 1,309),
respectively.
The available data do not provide the numbers of
illegal migrants apprehended/arrested in El Paso
Other Measurements
Railroads.  In addition to being served by major
airlines and highways, El Paso is connected to other
parts of the country by three major rail systems, the
Santa Fe Railroad, the Southern Pacific Railroad, and
the Union Pacific Railroad.  While providing trans-
portation for the shipment of goods both into and
through the city, they unintentionally also provide
transportation for migrants.  If Operation Hold the
Line successfully reduced the numbers of illegal
migrants entering the country near El Paso, then it
should have reduce the numbers of illegal migrants
trespassing on railroad property.  Data provided by
the Santa Fe Railroad suggest such a reduction; the
numbers of illegal migrants caught by the railroad’s
police department significantly declined since the
Operation was implemented.
Apprehensions and arrests of illegal migrants across
the entire Santa Fe Railroad system declined since
Table 36.
TOTAL APPREHENSIONS OF ILLEGAL MIGRANT ADULTS BY SANTA FE RAILROAD POLICE OFFICERS
1992 1993 1994
January 359  400  205
February 504  598  212
March 469  615  301
April 468  613  375
May 617  821  314
June 517  797
July 720  588
August 791 1095
September 545  509
October 473  120
November331  110
December 268  130
Total           6062 6396 1407
Source: Santa Fe Railroad Police Department
55 An apprehended illegal migrant may or may not be
arrested.  The Santa Fe Railroad police record an arrest
when the apprehending officer turns the alien(s) over
to either the Border Patrol or local authorities.  In areas
where there is no Border Patrol or where local
authorities refuse to take trespassers into custody
(because of jail overcrowding due to more serious
crimes), railroad police officers warn the illegal migrants
and release them.
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by month.  Therefore, to compare the number of
illegal migrants apprehended/arrested in El Paso
during the post-Operation implementation period
to analogous months in the pre-Operation period,
one must extrapolate.  In 1993, 47.9 percent (3,047 of
6,396) of the illegal migrant adults apprehended by
the Santa Fe Railroad police were caught between
January and May 1993.  (For ease of discussion, the
proportion of apprehensions/arrests in January-May
to those for the full year is henceforth referred to as
the JM ratio.)  Assuming the JM ratio for 1993 holds
true for 1994, one can project that approximately
1,191 illegal migrant adults will be apprehended in
El Paso in 1994, a 76.0 percent decrease from 1993.56
Thirty-four illegal migrant juveniles were appre-
hended during the January-May 1994 time.  Assum-
ing the 1993 JM ratio for illegal migrant juvenile
apprehensions of 53.0 percent holds for 1994, one
can project a total of 64 illegal migrant juvenile ap-
prehensions in El Paso during 1994, a 57.8 percent
decrease from the previous year.  A similar projec-
tion based on the 1993 JM ratio for illegal migrant
arrests in El Paso by Santa Fe Railroad police re-
veals a predicted 73.1 percent decrease in arrests in
1994 versus 1993.
These projections, however, are based on the assump-
tion that the JM ratios for each group observed, i.e.,
illegal migrant adults, illegal migrant juveniles, and
arrests, will remain constant for 1994.  This assump-
tion is questionable because of the dramatic decline
in illegal migrant apprehensions/arrests during the
final three months of 1993 as shown in Table 36.  It
is, therefore, not unreasonable to believe that Op-
eration Hold the Line may have unduly influenced
the JM ratios for 1993.  However, using the JM ra-
tios for 1992 and developing a mean JM ratio by
averaging 1992 and 1993 data provides similar re-
sults.  The JM ratio for illegal migrant adults for
1992 is 39.9 percent.  Using that figure, one would
predict that 1,422 illegal migrant adults would be
apprehended by Santa Fe Railroad police officers in
El Paso in 1994.  That means a 71.4 percent reduc-
tion in apprehensions of illegal migrant adults dur-
ing the first five months of 1994 versus the same
time period in 1993.  The mean 1992-1993 JM ratio
is 43.8 percent, resulting in a predicted 1,293 appre-
hensions of illegal migrant adults, a 73.9 percent
decline in apprehensions from 1993 to 1994.  Similar
conclusions result from applying the same approach
to apprehensions of illegal migrant juveniles and ar-
rests of illegal migrants by the Santa Fe Railroad
police.
Clearly, the numbers of apprehensions and/or ar-
rests of illegal migrants, both adults and juveniles
have declined since the implementation of Opera-
tion Hold the Line.  While it is unlikely that the
decrease in apprehensions and arrests can be solely
attributed to the Operation Hold the Line, it is not
unreasonable to believe that the Operation is respon-
sible for a substantial part of the decrease.  Similar
information was provided by the Southern Pacific
Railroad police department.  Although unwilling to
provide specific crime statistics, they reported a 75
percent reduction in apprehensions of undocumented
migrants.  In October and November 1993, they ex-
perienced a total of five burglaries, compared to
about five per day previously.  The department at-
tributes about 90 percent of the crimes on Southern
Pacific property to undocumented migrants and
attributes the majority of the reduction in criminal
activity to Operation Hold the Line.
Drugs and Contraband.  The U.S. Customs Service
in El Paso is responsible for inspecting incoming
people and vehicles to collect duties imposed on
incoming goods and to prevent the importation of
goods declared illegal by the U.S government.
Among those items often smuggled across the bor-
der are illegal drugs.  As Operation Hold the Line
interrupted the flow of people across the border at
other than legal ports of entry, one would have ex-
pected an increase in attempts to smuggle drugs
and other items through the ports of entry.  The
Customs Service maintains records of people appre-
hended for attempting to import goods illegally,
paying particular attention to drug smuggling.  Table
37 shows the numbers of people apprehended while
attempting to smuggle drugs and other items
through the El Paso ports of entry during the period
September 1992 -March 1994.  The mean number of
56 567 illegal migrant adults apprehended from January-
May 1994 in El Paso divided by the 47.6% JM ratio
results in a projection of 1,191 expected to be
apprehended in El Paso during the entire 1994 year.
1,191 projected apprehensions for 1994 is a 76.0 percent
decrease from the 4,964 actual apprehensions in El Paso
in 1993.
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Table 37.
APPREHENSIONS OF PEOPLE ATTEMPTING TO IMPORT DRUGS
(SEPTEMBER 1992-MARCH 1994)
  Marijuana   Cocaine  Heroine     Other     Total
Month 92-93 93-94 92-93 93-94 92-93 93-94 92-93 93-94 92-93 93-94
September 26 32 4 3 0 0 79 66 109 101
October 20 40 2 4 1 4 44 58  66 106
November39 29 1 4 1 1 64 56 105  90
December 23 29 4 3 0 2 86 72 113 106
January 28 28 2 2 0 0 64 55  94  85
February 30 41 1 6 1 3 58 50  90 100
March 39 28 6 4 0 2 55 65 100  99
April 28 4 0 71 103
May 27 4 1 70 102
June 26 3 1 46  76
July 25 4 1           101 131
August 28 6 4 55  93
Total           339       227       41        26         10        12 793      422 1182 687
Mean 28.3 32.4 3.4 3.7 0.8 1.7 66.1 60.3 98.5  98.1
% Change 14.8 8.7         105.7  8.8   0.4
Source: U.S. Customs Service, El Paso Office
monthly apprehensions decreased slightly after the
operation was implemented, but apprehensions for
smuggling of marijuana, cocaine, and heroine in-
creased by 14.8 percent, 8.7 percent, and 105.7 per-
cent, respectively.  Table 38 shows the amounts by
weight of marijuana, cocaine and heroine seized
during those apprehensions.  Marijuana seizures
increased by 69.4 percent and heroine seizures in-
creased by 61.9 percent, while cocaine seizures de-
creased by 28.3 percent.  During the same time, total
vehicle inspections increased by 3.9 percent.  Be-
cause the rate of apprehensions for drug smuggling
increased at a rate significantly higher than the rate
of vehicle inspections, it is not unreasonable to sug-
gest that Operation Hold the Line had an impact on
drug smugglers.  Deterred from crossing the border
where the line of Border Patrol are stationed, it
appears that smugglers increased attempts to cross
at the ports of entries, resulting in increased appre-
hensions and seizures.
Agriculture.  It also appears that Operation Hold
the Line had a significant impact on the illegal im-
portation of various agricultural goods through the
El Paso area.  Since the operation began, there was
a substantial decrease in the number of persons ap-
prehended by agents of the El Paso district of the
U.S. Department of Agriculture in possession of con-
traband agricultural goods while attempting to cross
the border illegally.  The department maintains data
on the quantities seized of various fruits (specifi-
cally limes, avocados, guavas, and mangos), plants,
exotic birds, and other items.  Table 39 shows the
number of persons apprehended carrying contraband
agricultural products into the El Paso area by USDA
agents during fiscal years 1984 through 1993.  It also
lists the quantities of fruits and the numbers of ex-
otic birds seized during that period.
The dramatic changes in apprehensions and confis-
cations appear to be directly related to the number
of agents patrolling the border area.  The USDA
assigns agents to the district primarily to inspect
people and vehicles entering the country through
legal ports of entry.  Prior to 1986, USDA agents had
patrolled illegal border crossing points sporadically,
on a volunteer basis.  In 1986, the district increased
the number of agents patrolling the border away
from legal ports of entry.  Then in 1989, the district
teamed its agents with Border Patrol agents, effec-
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Table 38.
AMOUNTS OF SEIZURES OF DRUGS AT BRIDGES BY U.S. CUSTOMS SERVICE
(SEP 92 - MAR 94)
Marijuana (lbs.) Cocaine (lbs.) Heroine (grams)
Month 92-93 93-94 92-93 93-94 92-93 93-94
Sep             606.0      696.0   8.5   *   0.1  none
Oct  486.0 2755.0  76.5  90.0   0.6  906.9
Nov            1047.0 1131.0   2.0 234.0   0.6 1587.0
Dec  423.0 1655.0   1.5   * none  680.2
Jan            1571.0 1523.0    *   * none  none
Feb            1335.0 2849.0    *    * 680.1 4081.0
Mar            1734.0 2148.0  28.7  * none 1133.6
Apr  875.0 2414.0    * 961.0 none 1133.6
May            1144.0   5.8 997.6
Jun  859.0   1.1           1315.0
Jul  978.0 446.0 453.4
Aug            1854.0 205.0           5441.3
Total          12912.0     15171.0 775.1     1285.1           8888.7 9522.2
Mean           1076.0   2167.3  64.6  183.6 740.7 1360.3
%Change 101.4 184.2  83.6
* less than 0.1 lbs.
Source: U.S. Customs Service, El Paso Office
Table 39.
SEIZURES OF ILLEGAL AGRICULTURAL GOODS AND CARGO
Fiscal Year Persons Fruits (lbs) Birds
1984     6       33    7
1985    19    3,722    7
1986    94   18,789   91
1987   430   23,764  122
1988 1,113   78,203   96
1989 3,461  170,670  111
1990 3,280  285,040   82
1991 2,785  256,680  101
1992   717   66,482   44
1993 1,051   84,862   36
Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture, El Paso Office
U.S.  C O M M I S S I O N  O N  I M M I G R A T I O N  R E F O R M
RESEARCH
P A P E R
- 91 -
Since the implementation of Operation Hold the Line,
Miguel continued to work as a pasamojados, but his
clients and his means for crossing them changed.
Where before he ferried up to three hundred per-
sons a day, mainly Juarenses who worked in El Paso,
he now guides around thirty persons per week,
mainly individuals migrating long distances from
the interior of Mexico to interior points in the United
States.  Instead of ferrying them across the river in
downtown Juárez by boat in daylight, he takes them
by cover of night over or around Monte Cristo Rey
near the western terminus of the Border Patrol’s
line of agents where the Juárez colonia of Anapra
abuts Sunland Park, New Mexico.  At this point, the
border is just a line on a map, not a river to cross.
The rate he charges now depends upon the extent of
the service offered:
• U.S. $50 to be taken to Sunland Park, NM (cli-
ents either make their own arrangements to be
picked up on the U.S. side or can take a Sun
Metro bus into El Paso);
• U.S. $100 to be crossed at Sunland Park and
taken by car or truck to downtown El Paso;
• U.S. $300 to make flight arrangements to an
interior U.S. city and be taken to the El Paso
airport.
Frequent destinations for current customers are Den-
ver, Los Angeles, Dallas, and Chicago.  Miguel claims
that other pasamojados charge lower rates but don’t
provide as reliable a service.  He claims an 85 per-
cent success rate in getting people across via Sunland
Park.
Interviews with other pasamojados indicate that even
if a wall were built at Sunland Park-Anapra, other
areas exist where crossers could get around the
walled-off area (currently, for example, in the area
around Zaragoza).  Where before these pasamojados
took daily commuters across the river to shop and
work, their clients now are persons who intend to
remain in the United States.  The pasamojados report
that they continue to earn $200-$300 a day working
three or four hours at a time; some days they make
as much as $500 or even $700.  Where before they
tively doubling the number of patrols searching for
illegal border crossers importing undeclared agri-
cultural products.  In 1992, the USDA reduced the
number of its agents patrolling the border as in-
creasing activity at legal ports of entry restricted the
availability of agents for patrol duties.  The num-
bers of persons apprehended and contraband goods
confiscated shown in Table 39 correspondingly re-
flect the increase and subsequent decrease in USDA
agents patrolling the border.  However, the number
of apprehensions and contraband goods seizures
plummeted in fiscal year 1994, when Operation Hold
the Line was implemented.  The number of persons
carrying contraband agricultural products appre-
hended in the El Paso area by USDA agents during
the fiscal year 1993 was higher than the first six
months of fiscal year 1994, suggesting that the Bor-
der Patrol’s operation had a significant impact on
illegal importation of contraband agricultural prod-
ucts in the El Paso area.
Effects on Pasamojados in Juárez.  We interviewed
one smuggler of undocumented international mi-
grants—we refer to him as Miguel—next to the Rio
Grande on a busy street in downtown Juárez on the
afternoon of February 9, 1994.  Prior to the initiation
of the Operation in September 1993, this pasamojados
(“crosser of wetbacks”) had worked as a lanchero,
ferrying Mexican nationals in his launch across the
river to the shore in El Paso daily.  The Border
Patrol’s new enforcement strategy had forced him
to discontinue his boat service and adopt new strat-
egies for crossing people illegally into the United
States.  Miguel told us that as a lanchero, he used to
ferry three hundred persons daily across the Rio
Grande in his boat, principally between 6 and 11
A.M.  He charged his customers between U.S. $1-5,
depending on his perception of their ability to pay—
better dressed people who appeared to be better off
economically generally paid more.  Miguel said that
he used to ferry “all kinds of different people” who
were heading north for “all kinds of different rea-
sons,” but the bulk of his clientele consisted of Juárez
residents who worked in El Paso.  He also explained
that, generally speaking, he did not ferry people from
El Paso back to Juárez: those who waded or boated
north across the river illegally typically walked or
hitched a ride back across one of the bridges head-
ing south.
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charged between $1 and $3 per client, now they
charge up to $100 to deliver an undocumented cli-
ent to downtown El Paso.
Conclusions
What can we conclude from the above analyses?
Our expectations on crime data were shaped by the
information we received from interviews with law
enforcement and city officials in February 1994.  From
six hypotheses based on that information, our con-
clusions follow the restatement of each hypothesis:
1. The El Paso crime rate, particularly with respect
to property crime, is high due to its proximity
to a large and relatively poor Mexican city.
No crime rate is acceptably low, but the evi-
dence is clear that El Paso does not have a high
crime rate relative to other U.S. cities of compa-
rable size.  There is no statistical evidence that
demonstrates that the crime rate in El Paso, or
other border cities for that matter, is high be-
cause of proximity to the Mexican border.  There
is evidence that suggests the Hispanic popula-
tion is a relatively low-risk population for com-
mitting violent crimes when other factors are
held constant, but relatively high-risk for com-
mitting property crimes.
2. The crime rate has been increasing in recent
years, in part because of the increasing popula-
tion pressures that El Paso shares with Juárez
and in part because of the predatory behavior of
some illegal entrants to the United States.  To
the extent the flow of illegals has been uncon-
trolled, the opportunities for a small, predatory
subclass to engage in criminal activity in El Paso
has increased.
There is no doubt that the crime rate increased
sharply for most serious offenses during the
1980s, particularly for motor vehicle theft, and
that the total rate for El Paso grew faster than
other cities of comparable size from 1982 to 1992.
But the rates for property crime, especially bur-
glary and larceny-theft, have been declining in
recent years.  It is possible that undocumented
aliens contributed disproportionately to the rapid
increase in crime in El Paso in the 1980s, but law
enforcement manpower in the city was about
one-half the national average during that time,
and this must have been a contributing factor to
the deteriorating situation as well.  We have no
direct evidence on the contribution of the illegal
flow to crime rates in El Paso.
3. Young, male, poor residents of Juárez constitute
a high-risk population for some types of crimi-
nal activity, mostly in regard to gang activity,
minor offenses, and property crime.
The evidence here is mixed.  We have no infor-
mation on gang activity, but according to data
on arrests, the reduction in minor offenses in
the post-Operation period appeared more due
to the role played by adult (possibly young adult)
Hispanics rather than juveniles.  Juveniles, par-
ticularly Hispanics, contributed disproportion-
ately more to the reduction in serious crime than
did adult offenders, and they certainly were more
evident in arrests for vandalism.  The expected
decrease in petty crime does seem to be sup-
ported by the evidence, but the mechanisms that
account for the decline are not as clear as our
informants had predicted.
4. To the extent it curtails the illegal entry of the
population at risk, the Border Patrol’s strategy
should have an immediate impact on property
offenses and minor crime that should continue
over the long term.
We do not have a long term to inspect as yet,
but the immediate effects, if they are real, seem
to include violent offenses, especially aggravated
assault, and motor vehicle theft.  It is clear that
the cost of crime for the criminal has gone up as
reflected in the clearance rates, and the returns
have gone down for all levels of property crime.
5. The largest immediate effect of the Border
Patrol’s effort will be felt in the downtown areas
of El Paso (police districts 31-36 and 51-56).
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This seems unequivocally supported by the avail-
able data and by local police impressions of the
changing character of the downtown area.  We
do not have access to post-Operation arrests
linked to surrounding geographical areas that
would provide a definitive commentary on the
changing distribution of crime in the region.
6. The Operation’s initial effects on serious crime
may be short-lived as chronic offenders adapt
to the new conditions.  The Operation may have
a long-term effect on violent and more serious
crime if it is sustained and if law enforcement
agencies are able to redirect resources into those
areas as a result of sustained curtailment of the
more numerous petty offenses that plague the
community.
Serious crime does appear to have declined since
the Operation began.  However, not enough time
has elapsed to be able to tell if the reductions in
serious crime are due mostly to the Operation
curtailing illegals who commit crimes or to the
redeployment of El Paso police so that serious
crimes among noncrossers are being deterred.
Downward trends predate the onset of the Op-
eration, and earlier years have experienced simi-
larly comprehensive and sharp downturns in
crime rates (1990-1991 in particular).  The trends
may have as much to do with local law enforce-
ment and other factors in the community that
may have gone unnoticed until the Border
Patrol’s Operation drew attention to such issues.
Nevertheless, the patterns are consistent with
the possibility that Operation Hold the Line has
directly reduced crime, but it is yet unclear that
the effects are large enough to be significant.
There is no doubt that minor offenders of all
ages and some petty nuisance crimes commit-
ted by juveniles in the downtown have waned
and quite probably as a direct result of the cur-
rent strategy to police the border.  There is also
no doubt that law enforcement resources have
been redirected to other kinds of crime in the
community.  This may account for some of the
drop in serious crime.
In regard to conclusions based on our examina-
tion of data from the railroads, the U.S. Cus-
toms service, the U.S. Department of Agricul-
ture, and our interviews with pasamojados, we
found that railyard arrests and drug and contra-
band seizures declined since the Operation be-
gan.  Mexican smugglers ferrying persons across
the river continue to operate, but at a reduced
rate of activity, and they are now charging higher
prices than before the Operation began.
VII. Community &
Organizational
Effects in El Paso
This chapter examines the effects of the Operation
on community and organization-related variables.
We assess three aspects of the Operation’s impact
on the community—its effects on public opinion, its
perception by Mexican-American community lead-
ers, and its effects on human rights.  We also inter-
viewed Border Patrol agents to determine their per-
ceptions of the Operation’s impact on the organiza-
tion and  on their own job situations.
Public Opinion
The general impression one gets from talking to
people in El Paso is that there is overwhelming popu-
lar support for Operation Hold the Line and for
continuing it indefinitely.  Media reports indicate
that while some may have had reservations about
the manner in which the Operation was imple-
mented, the overall reception to it has been positive
and the vast majority of El Pasoans are pleased with
the Border Patrol’s initiative.  In the Chihuahuita
neighborhood, residents even painted a mural thank-
ing the Border Patrol for their action and praising
Silvestre Reyes.  El Paso’s Channel 4 television news
program regularly conducts call-in polls on topics
of public interest; during the first week of the Op-
eration received about 2,500 calls, nearly double the
normal response.  About 95 percent of the respon-
dents indicated support for the Operation.  An exit
poll at a primary election site and one other political
poll indicated support ranging from 84 to 95 percent
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as well, and a survey conducted by the Border Rights
Coalition in conjunction with the Mexican-Ameri-
can Legal Defense and Education Fund found a
nearly 70 percent favorable response in the
Chihuahuita neighborhood.  Results from research
team interviews confirm these findings and indicate
a significant amount of popular support for the
Operation.
While the figures appear to suggest overwhelming
support within the community, there has been no
scientific survey based on an unbiased representa-
tive sampling of the population.  Telephone call-in
polls  do not ensure a random sample.  The political
polls asked only two questions in a larger survey of
a broad array of topics.  One poll was conducted for
a Republican and one for a Democrat.  The former
involved 125 respondents selected at random from
a list of people who had voted in the four previous
Republican party primary elections and were, there-
fore, considered likely to vote in the primary elec-
tion for which the poll was taken.  The second poll
was an exit survey of 115 people who had voted on
the day of the survey during the early voting period
for the Democratic primary.  Both of these surveys,
as with the Chihuahuita survey, sought information
from a selected group of individuals and, conse-
quently, cannot be taken as representative of the
entire El Paso population.
The research budget was insufficient to conduct a
scientific public opinion poll among El Paso and
Juárez residents.  In El Paso, survey costs are el-
evated by the large size of the Mexican-ancestry com-
munity, which would necessitate additional sample
stratification.  The Mexican-ancestry population of
El Paso is quite diverse in terms of citizenship and
residency status, Spanish-English language ability
and practices, and degree of cultural, social, and
kin-based linkedness to Mexico (Martinez 1994; Vila
1994).  To get a comprehensive picture of public
attitudes towards the Operation, it would be neces-
sary to take special account of this diversity not
only in terms of sample stratification, but also in
terms of the language used in the questionnaires,
the language fluency of interviewers in both Span-
ish and English, and the ethnicity of interviewers as
well (Marin & Marin 1991).
Although it was not possible to conduct an unbi-
ased, scientific survey in El Paso or Juárez, we were
able to uncover many themes present in the public
discourse on the Operation through in-depth inter-
views of key informants in both cities.  In particular,
we present below the results of meetings with lead-
ers of El Paso’s Mexican-American community.
Mexican-American subsections of the community
may support the Operation in different ways and
for different reasons.  Undoubtedly, there are those
who support the Operation because they no long
identify strongly with Mexico.  Still others might
favor the Operation because they strongly identify
with the United States, believe that by doing so they
will be accepted as Americans, or feel that doing so
will prevent their being denounced as un-American.
Whatever the case, a scientific survey of an appro-
priately sized, random sample of the entire popula-
tion of El Paso and Juárez would generate results
that would show which sectors of the population
support the Operation and which do not.
Mexican-American
Community57
This section describes the attitudes of Mexican-
American elites in El Paso regarding Operation Hold
the Line based on information gathered in ten per-
sonal interviews and in a group discussion involv-
ing fourteen participants conducted about seven
months after the Operation began.  The respondents
included the county  judge, two city councilmen,
senior level public employees, directors of commu-
nity-based organizations and social service agencies,
and representatives of a wide range of civic and
business associations.
The interviews focused on the positive and negative
aspects of Operation Hold the Line.  The following
themes developed in the course of that conversa-
tion:
• The objectives of the policy;
• The legality of the policy;
57 By Mexican American community, we refer to those
persons of Mexican ancestry residing in El Paso who
were born and/or raised in the United States.
U.S.  C O M M I S S I O N  O N  I M M I G R A T I O N  R E F O R M
RESEARCH
P A P E R
- 95 -
sizable number of El Paso’s Mexican American lead-
ers that recognize and value the many strong ties
that link the two cities and that do not want to
contradict official Mexican policy.  Once Mexico
made its position public, these Mexican-Americans,
who included elected officials and directors of com-
munity-based organizations, did not feel constrained
to hide their support for the Operation.
Moreover, because it explicitly targeted Mexicans as
they illegally entered the United States rather than
pursuing them once they mixed with Mexican-
Americans within the U.S., Operation Hold the Line
reduced harassment of Mexican-Americans and vio-
lations of the civil rights of Mexican-Americans or
legal Mexican immigrants.  Operation Hold the Line,
thus, gave rise to no legal protests on account of
such actions.  The absence of legal challenges pro-
foundly affected  Mexican-American responses to
Operation Hold the Line.  It eliminated organized
protests.  More significantly, it made it possible for
Mexican American leaders to participate in serious
conversations regarding the El Paso/Juárez relation-
ship.
Why the Policy was Initiated.  The respondents
unanimously agreed that prior to the initiation of
Operation Hold the Line nothing unusual was hap-
pening in El Paso to prompt the new policy.  What-
ever their reactions to Operation Hold the Line, once
it was implemented, El Paso residents in general,
and Mexican-Americans in particular, were not ask-
ing that such a policy be developed.  To the con-
trary, border control and immigration reform were
not significant issues for most of El Paso’s Mexican-
Americans.  In this, El Paso’s Mexican-Americans
reflect a well-established pattern.  When asked to
identify the issues that most concern them, Mexi-
can-American leaders seldom mention immigration
or immigration-related issues (de la Garza 1982;
Pachon & DeSipio 1990).  Similarly, the Latino Na-
tional Political survey found that virtually no Mexi-
can-American identified immigration as the most im-
portant problem facing their community or the na-
tion (de la Garza 1992).
Given that Operation Hold the Line was not spurred
by any new developments in El Paso, the respon-
dents were troubled that El Paso was chosen as the
• Who wanted the policy;
• The effects of the policy;
• Support and opposition among Mexican-
Americans; and
• Ethnicity as a factor affecting Mexican-Ameri-
can responses.
The Objectives of the Policy.  As is described more
fully below, no precipitating events in El Paso were
seen as having caused Operation Hold the Line.  Re-
spondents were, therefore, uncertain about the
policy’s objectives. The predominant view was that
the policy was aimed primarily at  reducing crime
and social service abuse by undocumented immi-
grants.  This was the justification offered by Mr.
Silvestre Reyes of the Border Patrol, according to
numerous respondents.  A second view shared by a
smaller, but substantial, number of respondents was
that the policy was a means for the Border Patrol to
defend its institutional interests.  None of the re-
spondents identified control of illegal immigration
per se as an objective of Operation Hold the Line.
The Legality of the Policy.  The respondents noted
and emphasized that the United States has the right
to police its border and control entry into the na-
tional territory.  That Mexican-American leaders did
not challenge Operation Hold the Line’s legitimacy
might seem somewhat surprising to some observ-
ers.  One reason mentioned for this response was
that the Mexican government publicly declared that
the U. S. government had the right to implement
Operation Hold the Line.  This official Mexican
position had four significant consequences.  First, it
helped defuse public anger in Juárez.  As protests
there were fueling similar sentiments in El Paso,
dampening the public’s ire in Juárez helped quiet
voices across the river.  Second, just as Mexican-
Americans were mobilizing to demonstrate against
Operation Hold the Line, the Mexican government
publicly declared that it was not going to protest in
behalf of its citizens, thus making it problematic for
Mexican-Americans to do so.  Third, Mexico’s offi-
cial position made it politically easier for those
Mexican-Americans who supported the policy to
make their views public.  There has long been a
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site for implementing this new policy with no ap-
parent regard for how it would affect El Paso/Juárez.
Moreover, there was widespread agreement that a
major factor motivating Operation Hold the Line
was the need for the Border Patrol to improve its
image in the wake of national concern regarding
undocumented immigration.  Several respondents
referred to proposals to militarize the border as in-
dications that the Border Patrol was under siege and
needed to act to protect its turf.
At no time did any respondent refer to illegal immi-
gration as a national problem.  Respondents acknowl-
edged the debate regarding undocumented immi-
gration, but seemed oblivious to claims that illegal
immigrants were a drain on the nation.
Evaluation of Operation Hold the Line’s Effects.
Virtually all respondents agreed that Operation Hold
the Line has:
• Reduced petty crime;
• Greatly diminished Border Patrol and police ha-
rassment of Mexican-Americans and legal Mexi-
can resident aliens;
• Negatively affected businesses along the border;
• Increased tensions between El Paso and Juárez;
• Had, with one exception, no-long term effect on
the prior patterns of interactions between El
Paso/Juárez, including illegal crossings for the
purpose of employment (it was reported that
crossers in this category have changed their rou-
tine, i.e., maids and gardeners now stay in El
Paso for longer periods rather than cross on a
daily basis); and
• The one pre-Operation pattern that was dis-
rupted is daily illegal crossings that appear to
have been responsible for petty crime and made
up the “street people” in El Paso’s downtown
area.
Support and Opposition among Mexican-Ameri-
can leaders.  Respondents were divided in their
reaction to Operation Hold the Line.  Overall, their
response is best characterized as a combination of
general opposition, acquiescence, and targeted sup-
port.  A clear majority expressed reservations about
Operation Hold the Line, and between one-quarter
and one-third supported it.  This split reverses the
pattern that appears to characterize how Mexican-
Americans in general view Operation Hold the Line.
However, as noted above, Mexican-American lead-
ers opposed to Operation Hold the Line said they
have had little political space within which to voice
their opposition.  That silence combined with public
expressions of support may give an exaggerated
impression of the extent to which Mexican-Ameri-
can leaders support Operation Hold the Line.
Respondents with reservations about Operation Hold
the Line dismissed its achievements on several
grounds.  First, they argued that the amount and
type of crime and nuisance caused by illegal cross-
ers did not warrant such a heavy-handed response.
Moreover, they claimed that street people continue
to populate downtown El Paso, but that now, how-
ever, they are Anglo panhandlers.  Several respon-
dents asked why the latter are tolerated when their
Mexican counterparts, who tended to be street ven-
dors or windshield washers rather than panhandlers,
are not?  Second, they argued that because the Bor-
der Patrol and police have no right to harass Mexi-
can-Americans, it makes no sense to defend Opera-
tion Hold the Line because it reduces such abuse.
Third, they questioned how the cost of Operation
Hold the Line could be justified if all it does is re-
duce petty crime?  Fourth, they thought Operation
Hold the Line contradicts the spirit of NAFTA and
that its achievements do not compensate for the re-
sentment it causes among Mexicans in Juárez and
the disruptions it effected in the historical relation-
ship of the El Paso/Juárez communities.
Operation Hold the Line opponents were made up
primarily of leaders of community-based organiza-
tions and advocacy groups.  Most of them were
reluctant to acknowledge the extent to which Mexi-
can-Americans in general support Operation Hold
the Line.  This is best exemplified by the author of
the survey that found over 70 percent support in
Chihuahuita, a poor neighborhood along the border
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clear that crime had gone down since the Operation
began.
Business leaders explained their support on legalis-
tic grounds.  Like everyone else, they were surprised
when Operation Hold the Line was initiated.  As it
became clear that there was no legal basis for chal-
lenging the policy, that the policy would respect
human rights, and that it would target illegal cross-
ings and reduce the presence of the Border Patrol in
Mexican-American neighborhoods, they came out in
favor of it.  Additionally, political and business lead-
ers said that supporting the policy helped the Mexi-
can-American image.  First, it proved that Mexican-
Americans are patriotic and support the nation’s
laws.  Second, to the extent that crime and other
problems in El Paso continued, it would show that
Mexicans were not the cause of those difficulties.
Operation Hold the Line supporters and opponents
voiced few general concerns about illegal immigra-
tion.  Indeed, they favored liberalizing cross-border
movements.  Several proposed redefining the bor-
der so that movement between El Paso/Juárez would
be unrestricted and would be controlled only at some
distance beyond the border.  Again, this is a view
common to Mexican-American leaders (de la Garza
1982).  Others advocated making it easier for Juárez
residents to get the necessary documents for cross-
ing the border.  Most also noted that their only
concern was with the 1 percent of the undocumented
migrants who participated in illegal activities.  Other
illegal crossers came to shop or work and thus con-
tributed to El Paso.  “Why,” asked the respondents,
“should we prevent those activities?”
Respondents made no reference to the abuse of so-
cial services by undocumented crossers.  To the con-
trary, one leader claimed that data showed that there
was no decline in births following Operation Hold
the Line, as presumably there would have been if
large numbers of illegal crossers were using these
services [see Chapter V for a statistical analysis of
birth data that show a decline].  Several other re-
spondents noted that legal crossers make use of these
services but no one seems to know or protest that.
that includes many small privately owned residences,
who argued that those he interviewed were not op-
posed to immigrants and did not really understand
the broader implications of Operation Hold the Line.
He and others who denied widespread Mexican-
American support of Operation Hold the Line were
chastised by the head of a neighborhood clinic (who
adamantly opposes Operation Hold the Line) for
being out of touch with and projecting their views
onto poor Mexican-American residents who live
along the border.  The head of a community-based
religious organization also pointed out that many in
his organization supported Operation Hold the Line.
Operation Hold the Line supporters consisted pri-
marily of  elected officials and representatives of
business organizations.  The former insisted that the
great majority of Mexican-Americans support Op-
eration Hold the Line because it has reduced petty
crime and removed street vendors and others from
parks and the downtown area.  One city council-
man noted that his constituents were calling him
and stopping him on the street to tell him how
pleased they were that they were once again able to
leave their homes, walk the streets and go shop-
ping.  Another reported that his constituents strongly
supported Operation Hold the Line because “no one
jumped through my yard last night,” and “my wa-
ter hose has been in my yard for a week.”  A third
elected official noted that residents in neighborhoods
along the border often complained about burglaries
perpetrated by illegal crossers.  Thus, they were
hanging out banners supporting Operation Hold the
Line.
Several respondents suggested that the extent to
which Mexican-Americans were concerned about the
crime issue had been affected by how the press had
covered the issue.  For example, one respondent
noted that her grandmother commented on how she
felt relieved now that illegal crossers were no longer
present in her neighborhood.  The respondent re-
minded her grandmother that she had for years hired
illegal crossers to do yard work and had never be-
fore expressed concern about theft or other prob-
lems.  The grandmother agreed, but then explained
her reaction by noting that the press had made it
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The division between supporters and opponents re-
flects a pattern common to Mexican-American views
of immigration.  As has been noted, immigration
issues are not salient to Mexican-American leaders.
Moreover, Mexican-American opposition to immi-
gration is inversely correlated with education and
income (de la Garza 1993).  This pattern holds in El
Paso.  The respondents who oppose Operation Hold
the Line live or work outside the areas most af-
fected by petty crime.  They are well-educated pro-
fessionals.  Those who support Operation Hold the
Line do so in behalf of the victimized who are poorer
and live in the affected areas.
Ethnicity as a Factor Affecting Mexican-American
Responses.  Ethnicity sometimes affected the re-
sponses of the Mexican-American leaders  to Opera-
tion Hold the Line.
• Whether they supported or opposed Operation
Hold the Line, several respondents thought the
Mexican-American reaction might have been
more negative but for the fact that the person
who initiated it, Silvestre Reyes, was also a
member of the Mexican-American leadership
community and a source of pride for Mexican-
Americans.  Thus, when he announced the policy,
some of the Mexican-American leaders argued
that it was thus hard for them to protest.
Some of them even argued that had an Anglo
initiated Operation Hold the Line, there might
have been more protest of the policy.  This is
because, as one Operation Hold the Line sup-
porter said, “We have been attacked so many
times that we are always defensive.  The Opera-
tion would have disappeared in two or three
days [if a Mexican-American had not directed
it].  We would have been up in arms.”  Reyes’
presence, in other words, was thought to have
had two effects. First, it was argued that it de-
terred Mexican-Americans from mobilizing
against Operation Hold the Line on the grounds
that it was racist.  Second, and as a result, the
leaders argued that Reyes and Operation Hold
the Line supporters had enough time to influ-
ence how the policy would be evaluated.  They
also said this initial period was further extended
by Mexico’s announced lack of protest of the
legality of the policy.  With that, the leaders said
there was nothing left around which to mobilize
protests, and the policy thus had a real chance
to make itself felt.
• According to the respondents, Operation Hold
the Line initially created a hostile anti-Mexican
mood in El Paso.  Spurred by Anglo support
and press coverage, the leaders said some Mexi-
can-American opponents of Operation Hold the
Line were criticized as un-American by Anglos
and Mexican-Americans alike.  They said this
served to prevent other potential Mexican-
American critics from mobilizing or speaking
out.
In conclusion, it would appear that Mexican-Ameri-
can leaders in El Paso are ambivalent regarding Op-
eration Hold the Line.  One reason they said they
did not publicly oppose it was because there was
little political space within which they could do so.
They also said they were deterred from attacking
the policy because a Mexican-American designed and
was implementing it.  Moreover, they also indicated
they did not protest because Mexican officials rec-
ognized the right of the United States to enact it,
and because it did not result in abuses of Mexican-
American civil rights.
A sizable minority supported it because of its legal-
ity.  Since it was legal, it would be unpatriotic to
oppose it.  Mexican-American elected officials sup-
ported it because their constituents benefited from
it.  That is, illegal crossers were disrupting neigh-
borhoods and their presence was provoking Border
Patrol and police harassment in El Paso’s poor bar-
rios.  To the extent that the objectives of Operation
Hold the Line are limited to reducing petty crime,
the respondents we interviewed supported it.  Be-
yond that, however, they did not.  Virtually all re-
spondents favored a much more open border policy.
Finally, the responses to Operation Hold the Line
suggest the extent to which Mexican-American reac-
tions to immigration policy reflect their concern about
how such policy directly affects them.  Initially
Mexican-Americans reacted defensively to Opera-
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Bowie High School in El Paso [Murillo v. Musegades
(EP-92-319-B), W.D. Tex. December 4, 1992].  The
school is situated adjacent to the border and, ac-
cording to the Border Patrol, illegal Mexican cross-
ers frequently fled onto the school grounds in order
to disappear into the crowds and avoid apprehen-
sion.  U.S. District Judge Lucius D. Bunton enjoined
the Border Patrol from detaining individuals simply
because they “look Hispanic.”  The judge singled
out the El Paso Border Patrol Chief, Dale Musegades
for “doing nothing” to end abuses that were brought
to his attention.  Musegades admitted in court that
he had not even read a previous court order forbid-
ding dragnet sweeps in which agents illegally tar-
geted Latino bar patrons.  The judge concluded that
the Border Patrol had used “excessive force” in en-
gaging in illegal and abusive conduct against Latinos
in the city.  He said that “no justification existed for
the force used against numerous plaintiffs and wit-
nesses,” and that “victims fear retaliation by the INS
and by the El Paso Border Patrol in the form of
deportation, criminal charges, or loss of legal immi-
gration status for themselves or family members.”
In 1991, the U.S. District Court ruled that two agents
were negligent when, in the course of pursuing five
Mexicans attempting an illegal crossing by boat into
El Paso, they caused the boat to capsize.  One man
drowned in the incident, and the court awarded
$210 thousand in civil damages.
In May 1991 an El Paso agent shot and killed a
lanchero (a Rio Grande boatman who ferries illegal
crossers across the river) and was cleared as acting
in self-defense.  Witnesses and the Mexican govern-
ment protested that the agent was in no danger when
he fired.
The Mexican Consuls in border cities have frequently
protested agent actions, and the Mexican govern-
ment, through its embassy in Washington, has filed
numerous diplomatic notes accusing agents of crimi-
nal violations of the rights of Mexican nationals.  In
August, 1992, the American Friends Service Com-
mittee, the League of United Latin American Citi-
zens, and various organizations and individuals from
the U.S. and Mexico filed a petition against the U.S.
government with the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights of the Organization of American
tion Hold the Line.  Once they realized that they
could not protest it on racist grounds and that Op-
eration Hold the Line would neither target them nor
round them up inadvertently, they were free to ei-
ther support it or acquiesce to its implementation.
Human Rights
There is a long-standing and ongoing controversy
regarding the violation of human and civil rights of
both legally admitted and undocumented migrants
and Mexican-American citizens along the U.S./
Mexico border by Border Patrol agents and other
INS personnel.  Complaints about Border Patrol
behavior appear to have escalated after passage of
the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act as
the number of agents increased and enforcement
activities intensified.  Questions about Border Patrol
behavior have been raised in reports by human rights
watchdog groups and journalists, lawsuits, protests
from Mexican Consulates, and hearings conducted
by Congress and the U.S. Civil Rights Commission.
Important allegations of human rights abuses were
cited by various organizations, including Americas
Watch (a branch of Human Rights Watch), the Im-
migration Law Enforcement Monitoring Project
[ILEMP] of the American Friends Service Commit-
tee, the National Human Rights Commission of
Mexico, and the U.S. Civil Rights Commission.  A
hard-hitting series in the Los Angeles Times
(McDonnell & Rotella 1993) also documented seri-
ous abuses.
In addition to these reports, there have been indi-
vidual complaints and lawsuits against agents and
the Border Patrol as an institution, including accu-
sations of verbal, psychological, physical, and sexual
abuse, as well as of racial discrimination and failure
to follow proper legal procedures.  The Border Pa-
trol and the INS more generally have been accused
of having inadequate complaint and oversight pro-
cedures, of failing to discipline abusive officers, and
of covering up instances of abuse.  These have fre-
quently resulted in substantial monetary awards to
plaintiffs.  One extraordinary case involved a class
action suite brought against the El Paso Border Pa-
trol by seven American citizens who claimed they
were harassed by agents on or near the grounds of
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States.  The petition alleged that the government
had “engaged in gross violations of human rights of
individuals along the U.S. border with Mexico
through the unjustified deadly use of force and vio-
lence.”
Hearings looking into abuses on the border have
been conducted by the House Committee on Gov-
ernment Operations, Subcommittee on Government
Information, Justice, and Agriculture in July, 1992
and by the Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee on
International Law, Immigration, and Refugees in
August, 1992.  In addition, the U.S. Civil Rights
Commission held hearings on border incidents in
San Diego in March 1993.  In response to these and
other developments, legislation is pending to estab-
lish an Immigration Enforcement Review Commis-
sion (H.R. 2119, commonly known as the Becerra
bill after its principal sponsor, Xavier Becerra, D-
California).  The bill would set up the first civilian
review panel ever created to oversee a federal gov-
ernment enforcement agency.
In summary, the INS and the Border Patrol have
been targets of charges of excessive and abusive
behavior in their enforcement of the nation’s immi-
gration laws on the southwestern frontier.  The El
Paso sector has been the scene of a significant num-
ber of complaints.  The former El Paso Border Pa-
trol chief was the target of a class action suit which
the government lost.
Chief Patrol Agent Reyes took over from Mr.
Musegades upon the latter’s retirement.  According
to his own testimony, Chief Reyes was deeply con-
cerned about the number of complaints of miscon-
duct being lodged against his agents and the effect
this was having on the Border Patrol’s morale and
its image in the community.  In an interview, Chief
Reyes said that when he first arrived on the job the
community generally thought that the Patrol was
part of the illegal immigration problem, not its so-
lution.  He noted the numerous individual allega-
tions against agents, the lawsuits, the Bowie High
School verdict, and a restraining order against the
agency.
According to Chief Reyes most of these complaints
were unjustified and stemmed from a systematic
flaw in Border Patrol strategy that he said guaran-
teed failure.  The strategy in place when he arrived
on the scene was basically to permit Mexicans to
cross the border illegally into the United States more
or less at will and then to concentrate on appre-
hending those who either tried to continue into the
interior or came to the attention of the Border Patrol
once inside El Paso proper.  Apprehensions of illegal
migrants already in the United States were the bench-
mark by which the agency and individual officers
rated their success.  Operations took on the aspect
of a cat and mouse game in which agents patrolled
the sector on the lookout for suspicious persons,
stopped them for questioning, and often engaged in
pursuits if they fled.  Those being pursued frequently
resisted and/or claimed that agents used unneces-
sary force, failed to follow proper procedure, or
engaged in harassment of a physical, psychological,
or sexual nature.  Both agents and suspected illegals
often sustained injuries.  More than occasionally shots
were fired.  Moreover, persons questioned or pur-
sued sometimes turned out to be permanent resi-
dents, U.S. citizens, or Mexican nationals legally in
the United States.
It seems evident that Chief Reyes hoped to reduce
complaints leveled against his agents by changing
enforcement strategy.  The Patrol’s own Seventy-
Five Day Evaluation of Hold the Line states, “The
complaints by the local community of over aggres-
siveness by the agents, the lawsuits and the com-
plaints heard by the Chief Patrol Agent called for an
immediate solution” (Reyes 1994).  Operations Block-
ade and Hold the Line would arguably have the
effect of reducing the number of encounters between
agents and suspected illegal aliens by shifting from
an effort to discover, catch, and return those who
managed to get into El Paso to preventing them
from entering in the first place.
What have been the consequences of this change of
strategy for the rate and seriousness of complaints
against agents?  Interviews with Border Patrol offi-
cials, human rights activists, and other interested
observers, and the analysis of those data that are
available suggest that complaints of abuses have
fallen markedly since September 19, 1993.  It seems
reasonable to attribute this change to Operation Hold
the Line insofar as (1) the Border Patrol is no longer
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Operation, compared to 114 during the previous 11
1/2 months, a reduction of 21 percent.  The ratio of
serious to less serious complaints in the period be-
tween the onset of the operation and February 1,
1994, is about 2 to 1; in the previous year it was
about 4 to 1.
Another source of information on the level of com-
plaints of abuses was collected and provided  by
Suzan Kern, Coordinator of the Border Rights Coa-
lition, an El Paso-based group that works in the area
of the human rights of Mexican migrants and mi-
nority groups.  The Coalition was established by the
Immigration Law Enforcement Monitoring program
[ILEMP] of the American Friends Service Commit-
tee, based in Houston.  One of its principal pur-
poses is to encourage individuals to report abuses
of the Border Patrol.  ILEMP has established a com-
mon complaint form and organized groups to col-
lect complaints in each of the five sectors along the
U.S.-Mexican border.  These data are then fed into
a central collection point in Houston.  None of the
complaints collected by Ms. Kern in El Paso in 1993-
1994 have been inputted; instead she provided a
summary of all the reports she had collected from
1988 through January 1994.
These data can be somewhat difficult to interpret
quantitatively.  A form is completed for each “inci-
dent.” Incidents may involve one or more persons.
The person(s) may relate a number of different sorts
of abuses occurring during the same incident.  Some-
times the incident reported is not a single event but
several or many that have involved the individual.
The result is that the number of abusive behaviors
reported is many times larger than the numbers of
abusive incidents reported.
A coding mechanism has been developed by ILEMP
to categorize types of abuse, the broad categories
being (1) psychological or verbal, (2) physical, (3)
denial of due process, (4) illegal or inappropriate
seizure of persons, (5) illegal or inappropriate
searches, (6) seizure or destruction of property, and
(7) local law enforcement/Border Patrol cooperation.
Both the date of the incident and the date the report
is filed are recorded, although sometimes informa-
tion is incomplete.  The individuals involved may
or may not report the incident to the authorities.
deploying many agents within the city to look for
and pursue illegal migrants, and (2) encounters be-
tween agents and suspected migrants have subse-
quently declined.  Fewer encounters mean fewer
opportunities for abuse and claims of abuse.  Quali-
tative evidence collected in interviews with law en-
forcement officials, Border Patrol employees, and
community groups indicates that the numbers of
incidents involving abuses or charges of abuses have
dropped substantially since the launching of the
Operation.
Official evidence of complaints is collected by sev-
eral government agencies, including the FBI, the lo-
cal police, and the Border Patrol itself.  The FBI is
responsible for investigating complaints that come
to its attention and the INS forwards those deemed
of sufficient weight to the Office of Inspector Gen-
eral in the Justice Department in Washington.  Inter-
views with the El Paso office of the FBI indicate that
no complaints have come to their attention since the
Operation began.  Figures from the Office of Inspec-
tor General in Washington have not been made
available as of this writing.
The El Paso Border district of the Patrol has pro-
vided data on complaints lodged with it and for-
warded to the local branch of the Office of Inspector
General, called the Office of Internal Audit.  Serious
complaints that involve violation of civil rights or
criminal activity on the part of the agents are pro-
cessed by the Office of Internal Audit; the rest are
returned to the Border Patrol for review.  Their data,
while difficult to interpret, show a substantial drop
in the overall number of complaints and cases con-
sidered serious enough to merit processing by the
Office of Internal Audit.  From October 1, 1992,
through September 19, 1993, that is, in the eleven
and a half months before the launching of the Op-
eration, there were 114 complaints, 91 of which were
found to merit review by the Office of Internal Au-
dit.  From September 19, 1993, until February 8, 1994,
approximately the first five months of the opera-
tion, there were 38 complaints, 25 of which were
handled by the Office of Internal Audit.  This means
that between September 19, 1993, and February 8,
1994, complaints were made at the rate of approxi-
mately 7.6 per month.  If that rate continued, there
would be 91 complaints over the first year of the
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The Border Rights Coalition makes no attempt to
externally validate the statements given by their
informants.
In sum, the data result from an humanitarian
organization’s attempts to encourage and system-
atize the filing of complaints against the Border Pa-
trol.  Collection of data is erratic and episodic.  No
claim could be made that the figures represent the
actual level of abuse or citizen perception of abuse.
Nevertheless, they may be analyzed to see if there is
a discernible difference before and after the imple-
mentation of Operation Hold the Line.  The Border
Rights Coalition’s data indicate that there has been
a sharp decline in the number of complaints filed
and in the number of abuses reported by complain-
ants in the months after September 19 (Tables 40
and 41).
If one of the chief objectives of Operation Hold the
Line was to relieve the Border Patrol of the pressure
and embarrassment of frequent, highly visible con-
troversies over agents’ alleged abusive behavior, it
seems undeniably to have been successful.  How-
ever, this objective has been achieved through a
change in tactics and does not, on present evidence,
appear to reflect any more fundamental change in
the culture, training, or behavior of Border Patrol
agents.
Table 40.
HUMAN RIGHTS-RELATED INCIDENTS REPORTED, EL PASO SECTOR
Incidents Incidents/Month
January 1 - September 18, 1993 18 2.1
September 19 - May 30, 1994  5 0.58
A single incident may involve a variety of abuses.
Source: Suzan Kern, Coordinator, Border Rights Coalition, El Paso.
Table 41.
TYPES OF ABUSE
1/01-9/18/94 1/19-5/31/94
Psychological or verbal 25 1
Physical  8 2
Due process 11 3
Illegal/Inappropriate seizure of persons 17 2
Illegal/Inappropriate searches — 1
Seizure or destruction of property  7 1
Local law enforcement/
  Border Patrol cooperation  1 —
Total 69           10
Abuses/Month              8.1 1.2
Abuses are more numerous than  incidents because a single incident may involve a variety of abuses.
Source: Suzan Kern, Coordinator, Border Rights Coalition, El Paso.
U.S.  C O M M I S S I O N  O N  I M M I G R A T I O N  R E F O R M
RESEARCH
P A P E R
- 103 -
new border control strategy and a belief that the
Operation is costly in terms of boredom, the erosion
of job skills, low morale, and the resultant physical
and psychological effects of stress.  First among these
is boredom.  Instead of pursuing illegal migrants (a
task they said required skill), agents are sitting alone
on station for long hours watching for crossers with
no action.  One agent indicated that the six hours
spent during the interview had been the high point
of his job since the Operation started.  He felt that
the Operation had been harmful to his professional
and personal life and stated that he was “dying of
boredom.”
A second problem, erosion of skills, is an important
concern of the agents.  Under the previous strategy,
agents thought they encountered opportunities to
improve their powers of observation and enhance
their investigative and interrogative abilities through
the diversity of activities they faced every day.  In
addition to pursuing and apprehending Mexicans
observed crossing the border, they also investigated
locations and businesses where undocumented aliens
were suspected of being illegally employed, culti-
vated informants and followed up on informant’s
tips, and gathered information by talking to people
in the streets.  Under the current strategy, the major-
ity of agents are assigned to the line for most of
their duty time.  The following is a typical reaction:
You’re sitting there and you are holding the
line . . . that’s all we’re doing.  We’re not
doing paperwork, we’re not speaking Span-
ish, we’re not cultivating our interviewing
and investigative skills.  Everything is dy-
ing.
[What we need is] the opportunity to de-
velop our skills, to get better at them gives
us self-satisfaction.  We want to excel in our
job.  We do not want to stay put, we do not
want to sit and do nothing.  We need the
challenge of our investigative skills. We need
the challenge of our physical skills.
The third problem is a loss of self-esteem and feel-
ings of self-worth and the concomitant concern that
those higher in the chain of command will be un-
able to identify and reward high achievers.  Since
Job Satisfaction among
Border Patrol Agents
One potentially significant and pivotal effect of
Operation Hold the Line is its impact on Border
Patrol agents.  The research team observed agents
on duty over extended periods and conducted in-
depth interviews.  This section summarizes the find-
ings of these observations and interviews, most of
which were conducted between March 17 and May
3.  Twelve agents at various levels of authority and
experience were interviewed at length over the
course of several weeks.  Additionally, four man-
agement-level personnel were interviewed.  The
agents were asked to comment not only on their
own situations, but also on the concerns of their
fellow agents as they perceived those concerns.  We
had an opportunity to ride with agents, observe the
line at different points, witness tracking and appre-
hension of undocumented migrants, spend time at
Paso del Norte detention center [PDN], talk with
undocumented migrants, and interview agents.  The
interviews result from an effort to locate individuals
who could somehow represent a variety of perspec-
tives (among those interviewed were three female
agents).  However, the sample size (12 of approxi-
mately 450 agents) and the nature of the topic means
that the views expressed might not be representa-
tive.
Agents readily discussed their views and situations,
which may itself signify the important effects of Op-
eration Hold the Line on the lives of the agents.
Several interviews lasted as long six hours.  Agents
were asked to act both as respondents, commenting
on how the Operation had influenced their personal
lives, and as observers, reporting what effects other
agents had discussed with them.  Some agents were
interviewed more than once, particularly in their
role as observers.  Our observations and interviews
generated more than two hundred pages of notes.
What follows is a first assessment of the most sa-
lient issues that surfaced about the internal effects
of Operation Hold the Line on the Border Patrol
and its agents.
There appear to be several problems facing the
agents.  A number expressed frustration with the
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agents spend much of their time sitting and watch-
ing, they perceive little opportunity to excel; conse-
quently, it would appear that their chances for pro-
motion or beneficial transfers are substantially di-
minished.  One agent who was adamant about this
stated: “I feel that my career has ended.”  Others
were equally adamant:
Because we’re just sitting on the line and
we’re not being productive, no paperwork,
no cases, our appraisals have no chance of
getting an outstanding rating.  Everybody is
going to get a satisfactory, in which you don’t
get an extra point.
If we’re just sitting on the levee doing noth-
ing but crossword puzzles or reading, no
cases, how can we justify that we should be
upgraded to a GS11?  We’re afraid that they
will come out here and audit us and say,
“GS9, making $45,000 a year, are you kid-
ding.  You guys should be GS3s.”  Any GS3
person could be doing this.  We’re not do-
ing anything.  So that’s what we’re afraid
will happen.  I don’t think they’ll ever take
our grade away, but it’s a scary thought.
It used to be that the Border Patrol allowed
you to be involved in several different ar-
eas—freight trains, airports, a unit with plain
clothes for picking up smugglers, foot pa-
trol downtown with the PD officers, task
force.  The thing about it was that El Paso
agents gained more experience/intelligence
than a lot of other stations.  It used to be
that if you worked El Paso and you put in
for something somewhere else, you prob-
ably got picked because they knew you had
handled it all.  But now, El Paso agents, now
it’s been seven months.  At the end of one
year, you get an appraisal. Now the super-
visor will write one little sentence on there.
“Satisfactory, sat on the levee.”
Another important issue is job satisfaction, and a
critical factor in job satisfaction was the freedom of
action each agent was afforded.  When asked what
they most liked about their jobs, a frequent answer
was the freedom that they had to operate:
You were able to do your job the way you
thought it should be done, not according to
someone else’s standards.  If you were good
at catching people coming across, if you had
a way that worked best for you, that’s how
you worked it.  No one told you how you
had to catch the people, no one told you
how to break someone if they said they were
a U.S. citizen and you knew they weren’t.
You did it your way.  You were challenging
yourself everyday.  It gave everybody a lot
of freedom.  In most jobs there is a quota,
but we didn’t have that.  I can catch as many
as I want; I can sit and wait for drugs to
come across if I want; I can catch criminal
acts if I want.  That’s a big freedom.
However, this kind job flexibility has also been a
source of difficulty for the Border Patrol as an insti-
tution.  Complaints and law suits were filed as a
result of what others perceive as an arbitrary use of
force.  One of the most significant positive results of
Operation Hold the Line is the dramatic reduction
of abuse complaints against the Border Patrol.  Some
of the agents noted this:
I think the number one benefit is the fact
that we’re not out there in the public and
every other person turns around and files a
civil rights or some sort of law suit on us.
We’re no longer out there for everybody to
turn around and call the chief and say “he
mistreated me.” It’s keeping us out of
trouble.
Other agents expounded on their feelings of having
been robbed of one of their primary sources of job
satisfaction, the camaraderie:
You miss working with the people because
in the past you were one of the important
components.  When you were tracking, you
worked closely with the people, working in
a team, and [now] you don’t get to do that.
Especially in Anapra area, you have to work
teamwork.  If they took a little study [of]
the agents who work for two weeks straight
compared to those who work the line, you’ll
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ment outside the federal government are limited.
Nevertheless, there are those who have decided to
make the best of what they consider to be a difficult
situation. They are taking college classes, listening
to language course tapes, or bringing hobby projects
to the job with them.  Only a minority of the agents
interviewed acknowledged taking this approach,
however.
Another finding is that agents do not detain every
illegal migrant.  Each of the agents seemed to have
his or her own method for distinguishing between
whom they considered to be the good guys and the
bad guys:
You weren’t just worried about this one per-
son standing there, especially if you knew
that he’s okay, just wanting to come in and
pick up cans.  We used to let people . . . pick
up aluminum cans around UTEP or some-
where.  That was the money they lived on.
We knew that once they filled up their bag
of aluminum cans, they’d go right back.
That’s not a problem. Rescue Mission people,
same thing.  They’d get their meals, they’d
feed their kids, they’d go back.  It’s easy to
turn your back on that so to speak, when
you know you can go around the corner
and pick up hundreds of illegals that are
going to be standing on corners trying to
wash your windows, or steal things, or sell
cigarettes illegally.
Finally, it appears that a number of agents do not
believe that Operation Hold the Line is successfully
reducing the entry of undocumented aliens.  One
frustrated agent stated “they are coming around us,
above us, below us, and between us,” referring to
the ends of the line, the railroad tracks which run
above the ASARCO area, the tunnels by the down-
town area, and the space between agents.  During
observation periods we witnessed several attempts
to cross, some successful.  Since agents are discour-
aged from leaving their designated spots, it is diffi-
cult to apprehend illegal migrants once they have
crossed.  One agent noted that management trum-
pets the success of the Operation based on reduced
apprehensions data.  He claimed that the reduction
see a whole different personality.  They’re
much happier.  They joke around.  They’re
ready for work. They want to go to work.
All of the factors mentioned above—boredom, ero-
sion of skills, low morale and self-esteem, loss of job
satisfaction—can lead to stress which, in turn, can
generate further problems in a vicious cycle:
I know that the guys I’ve talked to have
said that their wives have told them that
they’re not the same person.  [The wives say
their husbands] never talk, never want to
do anything anymore, have gained weight,
or are constantly negative and in bad moods.
Sitting in one place for nine hours a day
with no one to talk to will do it to you.  So
as far as health effect, morale, spiritually,
mentally, it’s really, really taken it’s toll.
They’ve [management] obviously never
thought about [the negative costs].  What
can you do to alleviate back problems, head-
aches, migraines, stress?  Some of these guys
are just about ready to go off the deep end.
The frustration sensed during several interviews in-
dicated classic signs of alienation—powerlessness,
lack of sense of purpose, isolation, and detachment
from work (Seeman 1959).  Several agents were put-
ting in for other jobs—about 40 percent according to
one source.  They said they were trying to leave the
Border Patrol because they didn’t feel they were ac-
complishing anything with their lives.  One source
said that in the past no one looked at the job vacan-
cies book; now they all were looking at it just prior
to heading out to the line.
The desire to quit is usually among the first responses
towards an unfulfilling work environment (Mobly
1977; Steers & Mowday 1981).  However, in the case
of the Border Patrol, quitting is not an entirely vi-
able alternative.  Agents feel that they cannot quit
because they earn a good salary.  With overtime
many can make between $35 thousand and $45 thou-
sand after five to ten years on the job.  Since many
have no more than two years of college education,
some believe that their opportunities for employ-
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in apprehensions was not because illegal crossings
were being prevented, but rather because there were
no agents available to apprehend illegal crossers once
they had gotten beyond the line of agents at the
border.  He also asserted that the Border Patrol’s
employer sanctions unit was not apprehending sus-
pects because it was not being allowed to open new
cases.
Some agents noted that Operation Hold the Line
does not prevent the entry of undocumented mi-
grants; rather, it simply generates new crossing tac-
tics.  The most popular and successful technique is
to use a decoy.  According to one agent:
They have one alien try to come across as a
decoy.  All the agents focus attention on him.
But meanwhile, five will cross on the other
area where they’re not looking.  So they
know how to get in.  There’s an area way
up here where there’s no river, no fence.  At
nighttime, they just walk across.
The willingness to engage in this tactic can be ex-
plained in part by the low cost to the decoy who
gets apprehended.  Most of the time when an illegal
migrant is apprehended, he/she is detained at PDN
until twelve to fifteen individuals are being held.
At that time Mexican authorities are notified.  The
Mexican authorities return the detainees to Mexico
and release those who are Mexican citizens.  Only
those detainees who appear to be criminals are held
at PDN for further investigation.  Thus, the only
real consequence to the average decoy who is caught
is that he/she is detained and returned to Mexico
for another attempt.
During one observation period researchers were able
to see the decoy tactic in action. Agents were faced
with a dilemma.  If they ignored the decoy, that
individual would succeed, knowing that once away
from the line the chances of apprehension are seri-
ously reduced.  The tactic calls for decoys to be sent
one at a time until the agents give chase. Then the
rest cross unmolested.  One agent expressed her frus-
tration over the perception that once undocumented
migrants have crossed they are essentially home free:
They’re not worried about walking outside
their door or driving down the street, or
working downtown, because they know
there are no agents there.  So most of these
people have no worries about being in El
Paso, once they’re away from the border.  I
live on the west side, and I see maids over
there, illegal maids, ten to twenty everyday
in this one area.  People ask, “How do you
know they’re illegal?” Because some of them
I recognize from when I caught them.
Another popular tactic is to cross at night.  Accord-
ing to one agent:
[Night is] the easiest time.  There are times
at night where there is an area maybe every
three or four hundred yards where we have
a vehicle.  But there are other areas that you
have one vehicle and then for half a mile to
a mile further, there is none. It’s very easy
for them to get into those areas, and they
know which areas they can cross more eas-
ily.  Nighttime, when it’s dark, agents can’t
see everything.  And he’s not allowed to
walk too far away from his vehicle, because
we’ve had incidents where they’ve broken
into the vehicle and stolen things, so he can’t
go too far away from the vehicle, so this
allows the aliens to come through.  Mid-
night shift is very easy. You’ve got agents
now who have done this for seven months,
and there are times when you just can’t stay
awake.
Although these statements and perceptions repre-
sent a small sampling of El Paso sector agents, a
high percentage of the persons talked to expressed
similar morale problems and similar concerns over
the well-being of their fellow sector personnel.
Without a more comprehensive survey, it is difficult
to judge the full extent of the problem.  However,
these problems will require resolution if the enforce-
ment strategy embodied in the Operation is to be
replicated elsewhere along the border.
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Before Operation Blockade
Many people we interviewed in Juárez and El Paso
agreed that before the initiation of the blockade, il-
legal crossing of the border was fairly easy.  While
one reason given for this was that the border was
not heavily patrolled, we also received reports that
Border Patrol agents often informally allowed work-
ers and other cross-border commuters who they be-
lieved were not engaged in criminal activities to cross
freely without formal inspection at official ports of
entry.  This practice appears to have been particu-
larly common at the point where Colonia Anapra,
on the Mexican side, faces Sunland Park, New
Mexico.  Here the border is nothing more than a line
in the sand separating two communities only sev-
eral hundred yards apart from one another.  Anapra
is an outlying colonia in Juárez, and is a long bus
ride over rough roads from downtown Juárez and
the nearest international bridges.  The Border Patrol
kept this area under surveillance but, given the in-
convenience of crossing at the official ports of entry,
routinely allowed residents of both Anapra and
Sunland Park to cross here.  According to Border
Patrol agents we interviewed, within the Patrol the
Sunland Park, New Mexico zone was referred to as
the “Anapra Port of Entry.”  One resident of Anapra,
whose testimony matches that of other residents we
interviewed, described the situation prevailing be-
fore the Operation:
All kinds of people used this crossing, even
if they had a Border Crossing Card.  This is
because we know that a Border Crossing
Card is not valid for working.  And if they
have to be at work before nine in the morn-
ing, they can’t cross on the bridge and still
get to work on time.  And the people having
to work in the fields in New Mexico, well
they have to be at work at four or five in the
morning!  So even with their border cross-
ing cards it paid for them to cross here. . .
. The immigration officials themselves made
it easy if they knew that the people were
crossing to work or if they recognized the
person crossing.  There were agents whose
post seemed to be permanent, and they just
about knew everyone who crossed here.  I
Conclusions
In summary, the Operation appears to have received
widespread popular support, although no scientific
representative poll has been taken to document the
overall degree of this support or those population
segments in which it is highest.  Some ambivalence
is evident among Mexican-American community
leaders.  While most support the Operation, several
leaders of community organizations expressed op-
position.  A major positive effect of the Operation
on the community is its substantial reduction of
charges of human rights violations and abuses
brought against the Border Patrol.  Finally, the Op-
eration may be creating morale problems among the
Border Patrol rank-and-file, who report a high de-
gree of boredom with the new duties involved in
the Operation and express anxiety about what crite-
ria will be used to assess their performance and
determine promotion.
VIII. Effects on Illegal
Border Crossers in El
Paso and JuÆrez
Chapter III presented quantitative findings on the
effects that the Operation had on illegal crossings
from Mexico into the United States.  In this chapter,
we present our findings on the effects that Opera-
tion Hold the Line had on illegal crossers and their
border-crossing behavior.  These findings are based
on dozens of qualitative, field interviews conducted
in Juárez and El Paso in February, March, and April
1994.  The first section describes the border-crossing
situation prevailing in the months and years preced-
ing the launching of Operation Blockade.  The sec-
ond section presents findings on some of the rea-
sons why many Juárez residents have not been able
to obtain INS permission to cross the border legally
with a Border Crossing Card [BCC].  The last sec-
tion  describes illegal crossers’ reports on how they
have been affected by the Operation.
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myself spent four years crossing here on foot.
A lot of times we would go shopping in El
Paso [Sunland Park is served by the El Paso
bus system] or we would go to the San
Martin de Porres church in Sunland Park,
very close to here.  The mounted migra
would stop us over there to take some in-
formation from us, and when we would
explain that we lived here, many times they
would say, “Go ahead.  Be careful and make
sure you go back to where you live after-
wards.”  Other times they would say, “Well,
you can’t cross here now.  Go on back.”
Practically speaking, they never detained us.
. . . And the street vendors knew the times
of day when the agents would let them
across, by pretending not to see them, after
four o’clock in the afternoon and between
six and eight in the morning.
Persons we interviewed in other parts of Juárez and
El Paso confirmed these practices on the part of
Border Patrol agents before the Operation began.
And we were told of lancheros who ferried people
across the river downtown in plain view of INS
officials on the international bridges, who also ap-
parently ignored illegal northbound crossings by
people walking across on the wrong side of the
bridge.  (See, for example, the comments of Juárez
city officials in Chapter II.)
The apparent tolerance of illegal crossing on the part
of the Border Patrol led at times to anomalous re-
sults.  The Rescue Mission, a church-run homeless
shelter and soup kitchen located along the river near
Old Fort Bliss, regularly received persons from Juárez
seeking food and shelter.  The Rio Grande at that
point is shallow and easily forded, and many poor
residents of Juárez would cross there to get a meal
at the Mission.  On occasion, the Border Patrol would
enter the grounds of the Mission and arrest Mexi-
cans who were on U.S. soil illegally.  On Thanksgiv-
ing Day 1992, the Border Patrol staged a raid on the
Rescue Mission and deported several undocumented
Mexicans, mostly women and children.
The director of the Rescue Mission, a retired El Paso
police officer, described his reaction to this incident.
He said he could not understand why the Border
Patrol would allow people to cross the river unim-
peded and then arrest them when they sat down in
his mission to say grace before their meal.  Follow-
ing the Thanksgiving incident, the Rescue Mission
arranged a truce with the Border Patrol whereby the
Mission agreed to check entrants’ identification be-
fore serving them and the Border Patrol agreed to
stage no further raids there.  This agreement gener-
ated its own set of potential problems insofar as a
homeless persons who appeared to be Mexican and
could not prove U.S. residence could be turned away
by the shelter—even though they could be U.S. citi-
zens who, as homeless people, had lost their ID.
Not all illegal border crossers live in Juárez.  Many
undocumented Mexican residents live illegally in El
Paso.  Before the Operation, they were able to take
advantage of the Border Patrol’s tolerance of illegal
crossing to visit friends and family on the Mexican
side.  In some cases, these illegal crossers living in
El Paso were married to legal residents or citizens
or had children who were U.S. citizens.  We inter-
viewed one Mexican man in El Paso whose case is
illustrative.  The man and his wife moved, illegally,
from Delicias, Chihuahua to El Paso in 1979.  They
have resided in El Paso ever since, and have two
children who are U.S. citizens attending the El Paso
Public Schools.  Both the man and his wife applied
for amnesty in 1988.  The man was granted am-
nesty, but his wife, because some of her papers were
not properly filed by their immigration lawyer, was
not.  They have since applied for her to become a
legal permanent resident, but her application is still
pending.  Traditionally, when this family wants to
take the children to visit their grandparents in
Delicias, they have driven together into Mexico in
their station wagon.  Upon returning to the border
from Delicias, the man would drop his wife off near
downtown Juárez to take a launch across the Rio
Grande.  He would drive across the international
bridge with the children and pick her up on the
north bank of the river.  Since the Operation began,
they have had to abandon this practice.  This man
says he knows that it is still possible to cross ille-
gally, but that it is too risky for her to try anymore.
“We’re talking about the mother of my children, you
know!”
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vice to eliminate illegal northbound crossings of the
U.S.-Mexican border in El Paso.  Less concern seems
to have been demonstrated with regard to prevent-
ing the illegal employment or settlement of Mexican
nationals in El Paso once they have crossed the bor-
der.  Most illegal northbound crossings in the El
Paso district are made not by Mexican long-distance
migrants whose destinations lie far into the U.S. in-
terior, but rather by residents of Juárez  who make
social visits, shop, sell goods, and work in El Paso.
These activities are often no different than those car-
ried out by Juárez residents who cross the border
legally with a Border Crossing Card.  Moreover,
many legal and illegal crossers are not meaningfully
distinguishable in terms of their likelihood of be-
coming immigrants to the United States and  of their
potential membership in classes of excludable aliens
under §1182 of the CFR (see above).  Our best esti-
mates indicate that there are many more Juárez resi-
dents who abuse their privileges as BCC holders by
working in El Paso than there are Juárez-El Paso
commuters who cross the border illegally.  (See Chap-
ter III for estimates of the relative sizes of these
groups.)  Table 42 summarizes the differences and
similarities among illegal border crossers,
noncrossers, and BCC holders.
From a U.S. perspective, it would seem that almost
any employed person in the workforce would quickly
be able to meet the common sense requirements of
the BCC application process regarding proof of one’s
residency and economic solvency.59   The Mexican
reality in general, and the Juárez reality in particu-
lar, however, do not correspond very well to a U.S.
perspective on routine documentation of an
individual’s socioeconomic status.  First, thousands
of employed residents of Juárez, including the mul-
titudes employed by U.S.-owned maquiladora plants,
live in self-constructed housing in vast squatter settle-
ments called colonias.  Residents of these colonias
often own no official title to their lots, pay no rent,
and receive no public utilities.  Water and propane
gas are trucked in, and electricity is frequently pi-
rated by attaching illicit feeder lines to main power
lines.  While colonia residents are poor by U.S. stan-
dards, they are typically quite attached to living in
In extensive interviews with both legal and illegal
crossers from Juárez, we were told on several occa-
sions that prior to Operation Hold the Line some
persons who lived in Juárez and worked illegally in
El Paso would cross the border illegally, away from
official ports of entry, even though they possessed a
valid BCC.  The reason we were given for this ap-
parently anomalous behavior was that these illegal
workers feared having their BCCs confiscated by
INS port of entry officers who might suspect them
of working illegally.58  The loss of the BCC could
entail considerable hardship for its bearer, both in
terms of loss of the privileges it confers and in terms
of future prejudice should the person wish to apply
for any other visa to the United States.  Detention
by the Border Patrol for illegal crossing, however,
implied rather less drastic consequences for the
detainee.  Because the detainee need not present
documents to the Border Patrol in order to be “vol-
untarily departed” back across the border, he/she
could simply give a false name and be walked back
across the bridge to Juárez after a few hours in
detention, avoiding both loss of the BCC and future
prejudice before the INS.  Given that confiscation of
the BCC seems to have been an unlikely event, we
may surmise that BCC holders who routinely crossed
the border illegally before Operation Hold the Line
did so owing rather more to the fact that crossing
illegally was fairly easy than to any substantial re-
duction in risk by pursuing such a strategy.  Further,
nearly all of the current or former illegal crossers
we interviewed in Juárez and El Paso did not pos-
sess a BCC and had never applied for one.  Below
we discuss the reasons why illegal crossers did not
avail themselves of the BCC in order to cross the
border legally.
The Border Crossing Card
Operation Hold the Line was initiated by the Border
Patrol of the Immigration and Naturalization Ser-
58 As we discuss in more detail below, INS officers have
the right to confiscate BCCs they suspect are being
used to work illegally in the U.S.  A person crossing
daily in the early morning hours would run a
considerably higher risk of detection over time than
someone crossing less frequently or at hours that
corresponded better to other kinds of nonprohibited
activities.
59 See Table 1 (Chapter II) for a listing of official INS
requirement for BCC applicants.
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Table  42.
COMPARISON OF CHARACTERISTICS OF ILLEGAL BORDER CROSSERS, NONCROSSERS,
AND CROSSERS WHO POSSESS THE BORDER CROSSING CARD
Illegal Crosser Noncrosser, No BCC BCC Holder
Length of Juárez Likely to be a Likely to be a Likely to be
residence recent arrival. recent arrival. long-term resident.
Informal vs. Formal Likely to be unemployed May be either formally Likely to have been
employment or informally employed or informally employed, formally employed in Juárez
in Juárez; or unemployed in Juárez at the time of issuance
informally employed of the  BCC;
in El Paso. may be formally or informally
employed, or unemployed
in  Juárez at present;
informally employed in El Paso.
Stable and sufficient May or may not have a May or may not have a Has stable and sufficient
source of income tostable and sufficientstable and sufficient source of income at the
support self and source of income. source of income. time the BCC is issued;
dependents may or may not subsequently.
Benefits derived from Access to goods & Access to goods Access to goods &
proximity to U.S.A. services; lower prices imported by smugglers services; lower prices
for goods; may gain and middlemen. for goods; may gain
access to employment access to employment
at higher wages. at higher wages.
Frequency of border May cross frequently Does not cross. May cross frequently
crossing or infrequently, or infrequently
depending on motives depending on motives
for crossing and degree for crossing; if
to which the border is employed in El Paso,
effectively patrolled. frequency of crossing
depends on work schedule
and intensity of inspection
of entrants by INS officers
at U.S. ports of entry.
Family in El Paso May have family members Seldom has family members May have family members
living in El Paso. living in El Paso. living in El Paso.
Crossing status of May or may not have May or may not have May or may not have
other family members BCC. BCC. BCC.
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Juárez, often having invested considerable portions
of income and savings in the construction and main-
tenance of their homes.60   Many residents own cars
and have such modern appliances as stereos, VCRs,
refrigerators, gas ranges, and televisions.  The exist-
ence of such squatter settlements is less an indica-
tion of widespread absolute poverty in Juárez (as
measured by personal incomes), and more an indi-
cation of the city’s lack of an adequate infrastruc-
ture to meet the needs of a population growing rap-
idly due to migration from the Mexican interior.
Many colonia residents might have a difficult time in
documenting their Juárez residence in the ways re-
quested of BCC applicants by the INS.
Second, a large proportion of the population all over
Mexico, but especially in a Northern border city like
Juárez, is employed in the so-called informal sector.
By informal sector, we refer here not only to the
petty commerce of street vendors and market stall
operators, but also to a wide range of economic
activities undertaken by small-scale establishments
and the self-employed that take place largely be-
yond the reach of government regulation.  Informal
sector workers typically are not registered with
Mexican Social Security, do not appear on any offi-
cial payroll, have no taxes deducted from their
wages, and are not protected by state health and
safety regulations.  Various research studies in re-
cent years point out that, especially in Mexico’s
northern border cities, informal employment is de-
cidedly not synonymous with poverty; for older
males especially, informal self-employment typically
offers higher income potential than employment in
a formal enterprise such as a maquiladora (Roberts
1991; 1993).  Our interviews in Juárez confirmed
this.  A number of working men reported that they
could earn two and one-half to three times more as
informal laborers in construction than they could in
the maquiladoras as machine operators (a formal
occupation).
Informal employment, when defined in these terms,
reflects not so much the massive pursuit of subsis-
tence alternatives to unemployment by the urban
poor, but instead the inability of the Mexican state
to regulate effectively the multitude of small-scale
commercial activities undertaken by its citizens.
Using results from the Encuesta Nacional de Empleo
Urbano, Zenteno (1993) estimates that at the end of
1989, 29.3 percent of workers in Juárez were not
covered by Mexican Social Security and that up to
47 percent of workers were employed by enterprises
that could be considered informal by one definition
or another.  We also know from the ENEU that 17.4
percent of Juárez’s economically active population
consisted of self-employed workers, most of whom
were informal (Browning & Zenteno 1993).  Many
workers employed informally are in fact poor and
working under highly precarious conditions.  Many
others, however, are quite gainfully employed by
prevailing local standards, and may in fact them-
selves be employers.  Because the employment of all
informal workers (by definition) is incompletely regu-
lated/documented by the Mexican government,
many gainfully employed people in the informal
sector might find it difficult to document their fi-
nancial solvency in the ways requested of BCC ap-
plicants by the INS.  Many of the interviews we
conducted with Juárez residents confirmed this point:
• A housewife living in Rancho Anapra, a colonia
opposite Sunland Park, New Mexico described
her neighbors’ situations:
Well, the requirements for the pasaporte local
aren’t many, but most of the men living
around here can’t fulfill them because they
work in construction, you know.  They don’t
have any kind of receipts, or pay stubs and
they know that’s one of the indispensable
requirements you have to present—a whole
year’s worth, you know, of pay stubs.  And
that’s why they can’t do it.  Most of the
women around here work as domestics, and
they don’t get pay receipts, either.  The
people who work in the maquiladoras, well
they have a little easier time of it, and I
60 Interestingly, a number of illegal border crossers we
interviewed in such colonias remarked that, although
they worked in El Paso, they had no intention of
abandoning their Juárez residences to live in El Paso.
They had too much invested in their homes, which
were not readily salable, and could see no affordable
housing alternatives for themselves and their families
on the U.S. side of the border.
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• A businessman eating lunch at a restaurant in
the Cuauhtémoc market had no problems get-
ting his BCC because he had all his business
papers in order.  He believed, however, that
employees would have a harder time document-
ing their status:
In my opinion, the requirements the Ameri-
cans demand [for the BCC] are too tough.
Because a lot of people are working, that
have been working for some time, and due
to negligence on somebody’s part, because
of the way Mexicans operate—we don’t file
our checks, and we don’t keep our payroll
and other books completely in order.  For
that reason, a lot of people have problems
trying to get together all the paperwork that
the United States asks for. . . . The problem
is all the paperwork they ask for.  A lot of
people meet the requirements [of financial
solvency], but getting the paperwork is im-
possible because we don’t keep our books
the way they want us to.
• Jose Alberto Silva, Juárez’s director del gobierno
was well aware of the difficulties encountered
by the informally employed in obtaining the
BCC:
Unlike in the United States, in Mexico not
everybody is registered with the government.
In the United States everybody is registered
through the Social Security system.  But here
in Mexico it’s not possible.  We don’t have
that mechanism, that kind of registry.  In
Mexico, for example, I know some people
who are carpenters, or who run other small
businesses for themselves.  And they don’t
take care of their taxes properly since they
work alone.  In order to get a permit to
enter the United States, they ask these people
for many documents.  The truth is that these
people do have jobs.  But they can’t prove it
because they aren’t registered in any way
like the United States has with Social Secu-
rity. . . . In our country this is a very large
think that there you’ll find people who have
their pasaporte local.61
• The proprietor of a small grocery store, also in
Rancho Anapra, was recently able to get BCCs
for himself and his wife by presenting his tax
receipts, bank statement, and business registra-
tion papers to the INS.  Getting the BCC for the
two of them was “no problem.”  His grown son,
however, was unable to demonstrate his finan-
cial solvency to get the BCC because although
he worked full-time for his father, he was not on
the official books of the business.
• Another man residing in Rancho Anapra paints
cars for a living and lives with his family on a
plot of land to which they have no title.  They
built their home, a small cement block cubicle,
themselves, and do not receive any public utili-
ties (they have to pirate their electricity).  He
would like to get his Form 13 and BCC but has
virtually none of the documents required to
prove his residency and financial solvency.
• A man in his twenties selling fruit from a stall
at the Cuauhtémoc market would like to get his
BCC, but “doesn’t get paid by check” and thus
is unable to present pay stubs documenting his
employment.  He has lived in Juárez all his life.
• A twenty-six-year-old man, and lifelong resident
of Juárez, was waiting in line on the Paso del
Norte Bridge to apply for the BCC for the first
time.  Until a year ago, he had always worked
as a journeyman mason in the construction in-
dustry, and had never appeared on anyone’s
official nómina, or payroll.  Since last year, he
has been working as an electrician at a
maquiladora and just now has completed a full
year’s set of pay stubs.
61 All interviews of Juárez residents were conducted in
Spanish.  Direct quotes appearing in this section of the
report are translations.
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group, these kinds of people.  They could be
maids or mechanics.  In these types of ac-
tivities people work and have money, but
they have no way of documenting it.  And
they have a hard time obtaining permission
to enter the United States.
We also interviewed and observed INS officers in-
volved in the BCC application and issuance process.
As noted above, the law grants INS officers almost
total discretion in determining a BCC applicant’s
eligibility for entry into the United States.  We found
these officers to be aware that for many working
Juárez residents it is not possible to obtain all of the
documentation of solvency that the INS flier indi-
cates are required for issuance of the BCC.  Many of
these officers are Mexican-Americans who have lived
in El Paso for many years, and some still have rela-
tives living in Mexico.  As a result, they are aware
that the BCC requirements do not always correspond
well to Mexican reality, and they are willing to be
“flexible” in whether absolutely all the documents
listed on the flier must be presented.
A self-employed carpenter, for example, who could
not produce pay stubs because he worked for cash
for many different clients, could be issued a BCC—
according to one of these INS officials—if he could
present bank statements showing frequent deposits
of sufficiently large amounts so as to reasonably sup-
port himself and any dependents he might declare.
According to these officials, there is no set amount
of money that one must have in the bank in order
to be considered solvent—it appears to be left to the
judgment of the officer reviewing the application.
We received one indication of how subjective such
determinations of status can be when one agent told
us that he had approved an older, self-employed
man’s application mainly because he saw that the
man had “hard-working hands.”
Another agent described his attitude towards the
application process:
Poor people have rights, too.  My grandpar-
ents were Mexican and they were poor, poor
but honorable.  People of scarce means that
can prove to me that they work for a living
and only want to come over here to shop,
since some things are cheaper to buy here,
can get a mica.  Above all it’s necessary to
be humane.  If you have any doubt about
some case, before rejecting it, you have to
ask the opinions of the other officers. . . . It’s
all about giving the best service possible and
issue micas to everyone who qualifies, and
even more so if it’s poor people.
In spite of the statements of individual agents re-
garding their own flexibility in considering docu-
ments presented by BCC applicants, the INS chief of
the Paso del Norte port of entry insisted that all his
inspectors apply a common set of criteria regarding
applicants’ proof of solvency.  The most important
of these, and one to which he said no exceptions are
made, is that applicants present documentation of
at least one year of continuous employment up to
the time of presenting the application.  Further, by
making clear to potential applicants before they ap-
ply that they will be required to present documen-
tation of their solvency, the INS makes sure that
people who are unlikely to have their applications
approved do not even bother to apply.  The fliers
distributed by the INS at the ports of entry to El
Paso are one indication of this.  Another strong piece
of evidence is that officials of the Mexican federal
delegacion in Juárez inform applicants for the Form
13 that the INS will require them to produce docu-
mentation of their economic solvency, in the form of
pay stub, tax receipts, bank statements, and the like,
before it will issue them the BCC.  Information about
the BCC application process is also disseminated
via Spanish-language radio programs that have been
broadcast in El Paso and Juárez since June 1993 and
that allow listeners to call in questions about the
BCC to on-the-air INS officers.  While exceptions to
documentation requirements may be made on a case-
by-case basis by individual agents, the INS public
position is clearly that documentation of one’s stable
employment and income is expected.
After interviewing dozens of Juárez residents about
the BCC in a number of different situations around
the city—in working class colonias, at the
Cuauhtémoc market, with families waiting in line to
be given their application interview appointment at
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the Paso del Norte Bridge, and at maquiladora gates
at shift’s end—we reached an additional set of con-
clusions regarding people’s knowledge and experi-
ence of the BCC:62
1.  Most Juárez residents are aware of the existence
of the BCC and the documents required to obtain
it.  Everyone we interviewed, whether they had ever
applied for one or not, knew what the pasaporte local
was.  They also knew that one must demonstrate
financial solvency to qualify for the BCC, and that
this meant, in most cases, being able to present the
INS with a full year’s worth of pay stubs from a
full-time job in Juárez.  Consequently, virtually all of
the persons we interviewed knew whether they
themselves could meet the INS official documenta-
tion requirements.
2.  Getting the BCC is not a problem for those who
can produce the required documents.  Those people
we interviewed who had obtained their BCC did
not report having had any particular difficulties in
negotiating the process.  The documents they needed
were not costly to obtain (legally)63 and nobody
complained of having been badly treated by any
Mexican or INS officials during the application pro-
cess.  Some people did complain of the inconve-
nience of having to wait all day in line at the Mexi-
can delagación for their Form 13, and then having to
wait all night again on the Paso del Norte Bridge to
get their application appointment, but this inconve-
nience was clearly outweighed by the benefits of
obtaining the BCC.
3.  Long-term residents of Juárez are more likely
than more recent arrivals to qualify for and obtain
the BCC than more recent arrivals from other parts
of Mexico.  Because over the course of a lifetime,
individuals and their family members may work in
a variety of occupations, longer-term residents of
Juárez are more likely to have worked at some point
in time in a formal-sector job that provided them
with the documentation needed to demonstrate fi-
nancial solvency.  Many long-term Juárez residents
first obtained their BCC as dependents of their par-
ents, and as the BCC has no expiration date, they
still are able to use it.  Long-term residents are more
likely to live in established neighborhoods fully
served by public utilities.  They are also more likely
to view the BCC as a document that is both obtain-
able and worth having, having known about it for
most of their lives.  Although long-term residents of
Juárez are more likely to qualify than newer arriv-
als, some of them miss the opportunity to get their
BCC.  This is because individuals may meet the BCC
requirements at one point in their lives, but not at a
later point.  If they fail to see the need for a BCC at
the time they have access to the required documen-
tation of their eligibility, they may lose the opportu-
nity for the rest of their lives
4.  It is not uncommon for Juárez residents with-
out a BCC to have immediate family members who
do have one, and vice versa.  We interviewed many
people whose immediate family members—sisters,
brothers, parents, and children—do not share their
own status as a holder or nonholder of a BCC, even
though all family members have lived in Juárez for
the same amount of time.  This situation seems to be
more common when immediate family members do
not live with one another, particularly in the case of
siblings, and presumably do not participate in a com-
mon household budget.64
5.  Many Juárez residents, both long-term and
shorter-term, have no interest or need to go to El
Paso regularly, and thus do not apply for the BCC
(nor do they enter the United States illegally).  A
substantial portion of the people we interviewed in
62 We gleaned little information in our interviews about
individuals who use the BCC to work illegally in the
United States.  Such persons were presumably not in
Juárez during weekday working hours when most of
our interviews were conducted.  While we also
interviewed many individuals in El Paso, it was
exceedingly difficult to find people who were willing
to admit to working illegally there and to let us
interview them about their experiences.   We do know
from other sources, however, that many BCC holders
do work in El Paso.  See Chapter III of this report for
estimates of the magnitude of this phenomenon.
63 It can be difficult, however, for persons who have
migrated to Juárez from elsewhere in Mexico to obtain
official copies of their birth certificates if they have lost
the original.  This is especially the case for older
individuals or persons from rural areas.
64 Many people we interviewed also had immediate family
members living in the United States, some legally, some
not.
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Juárez, from among a variety of working class occu-
pations and neighborhoods, said that they had no
reason to apply for the BCC as they had no need to
or interest in going to El Paso or the United States.65
Part of the reason for this may have to do with the
self-perpetuating nature of residential and occupa-
tional segregation as it exists in any large metro-
politan area: people tend to restrict their routine
geographical movements to areas around where they
live and work.  Just as many residents of the Bronx
may have never been to Staten Island and see no
need to ever go, many working people in Juárez
have virtually no knowledge of or relationship with
El Paso or people living there.  The fact that El Paso
is, of course, in another country, and one that is
perceived as not particularly welcoming of work-
ing-class Mexicans, only makes this phenomenon
stronger.  Here, as above, it is worth quoting a few
of our informants directly:
I don’t need a pasaporte local because it’s just
the same over there as it is here.  (Man,
mid-twenties, working as a vendor in
Cuauhtémoc market)
I wasn’t thinking about getting my pasaporte
local when I started working here.  I wasn’t
interested in going [to the United States].  It
looks like they treat Mexicans very badly
over there. . . . For us, Mexico is better.
We’ve seen on television how badly they
treat Mexicans in the United States.  (Seven-
teen-year-old woman, lifelong Juárez resi-
dent, maquiladora employee)
No, I didn’t go into the maquiladoras to get
my pasaporte [local].  Because going over to
the other side doesn’t interest me.  The
United States doesn’t interest me.  Not even
to shop!  Because I say that what there is
over there, we’ve got here, too.  I’m not going
to go over there just because a few things
are cheaper!  Sometimes it’s better for a
person to just to stay around here in Juárez,
in their own Mexico, and not over there
where they’re going to be against you, look
down on you.  (Twenty-four-year-old
woman, native of Durango who has been
living in Juárez for three years and working
in a maquiladora)
I don’t visit the United States.  I don’t con-
sider it necessary.  Anything you’d want is
here.  We don’t need to go over there.
(Thirty-one-year-old man, native of San Luis
Potosi, living in Juárez for seven years work-
ing in a maquiladora)
It doesn’t pay for the person who has his/
her job or studies or something like that to
come here.  My brother is one of those
people.  He’ll never get his crossing card!
And now that a lot of American products
are imported into Juárez he and his family
buy things there.  Sometimes they ask me or
my mother to bring them things.  It’s no
problem for us.  We go to see them in Juárez,
too.  They’re so close!  The ones who have
problems are the ones who live far away
and can’t cross the border.  (Woman, former
resident of Juárez, now living legally in El
Paso)
6.  Obtaining the BCC is seen as a fringe benefit
of working in a maquiladora.  We interviewed a
number of maquiladora workers, both women and
men, most of whom had obtained or were in the
process of obtaining their BCC.  While no one we
interviewed stated that they themselves had taken a
job in a maquiladora principally in order to get the
BCC, many acknowledged that one of the fringe
benefits of their employment was the ability to
qualify for it after a year of work.  Nobody indi-
cated definitively that once they had obtained the
BCC they would leave maquiladora employment to
attempt to work in the United States, although some
65 Interestingly, even a number of the people we
interviewed waiting in line for their BCC on the Paso
del Norte Bridge stated that they had qualified for the
BCC for some years, but only then had gotten around
to applying for it.  The main reason given for not having
applied sooner was that they had no need for it up
until now.  The pressing need now, typically, was to
shop for better prices and merchandise in El Paso.  Some
people reported that their economic circumstances had
recently changed, making the potential savings gained
or particular product obtained more urgent for them.
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clearly considered that to be one option open to
them.  Young adults working in the maquiladoras are
able to get BCCs for other family members living
with them, including their parents, based on their
maquiladora employment.  People we interviewed
who did not work in the maquiladoras generally re-
garded maquiladora employment as low-paying and
otherwise unattractive, except for the fact that such
employment facilitated obtaining the BCC.
7.  Some persons in possession of the BCC for-
merly entered and worked in the United States
illegally.  Several people we interviewed who had
obtained their BCC based on their current employ-
ment in Juárez had, at some earlier point in their
lives, worked illegally in El Paso or elsewhere in the
United States.  These people preferred to live and
work in Juárez under less precarious circumstances
than they had experienced in the United States
working illegally.  At the same time, the BCC of-
fered them the possibility of access to certain of the
economic benefits, in the area of personal consump-
tion, that they had formerly accessed by entering or
residing in the United States illegally.
8.  Mexican residents who do not possess valid
border crossing documents themselves often still
attempt to cross into the United States at official
ports of entry.  To avoid bottlenecks in the flow of
pedestrian and vehicular traffic on the international
bridges between El Paso and Juárez, INS inspectors
do not ask every crosser to produce documents, nor
do they inspect all requested documents very closely.
Often, inspectors will only ask entrants for a verbal
declaration of their U.S. citizenship before letting
them pass.  Before Operation Hold the Line, this
meant it was possible, albeit risky, for crossers to
enter the United States with improper documents or
no documents at all.  After Operation Hold the Line
began, INS inspectors began checking entrants’ docu-
ments much more closely, and uncovered many cases
of Mexican nationals using invalid, fraudulent, or
other improper documents to attempt to enter the
United States.  Table 43 presents a summary of
documents confiscated at the Bridge of Americas
Port of Entry from September 1993 through January
1994.  Interestingly, the most common type of mis-
representation detected was the use of fraudulent
U.S. naturalization papers.  While almost no one
appears to attempt to cross with an altered or fraudu-
lent BCC, a fair number of people seem to attempt
to cross with someone else’s card, presumably bet-
ting on lax inspection of the photograph it bears on
the part of INS personnel at the port of entry.  Other
Table 43.
TYPES OF FALSE DOCUMENTATION ATTEMPTED BY MEXICAN CROSSERS, BRIDGE OF THE AMERICAS
(SEPTEMBER 1993-JANUARY 1994)
Type of Improper Documentation   %   #
Impostor using BCC  30  78
Altered BCC   0   0
Fraudulent  naturalization papers (USC-911)  38  98
Impostor using legal permanent resident document  12  31
Counterfeit legal alien permanent resident document  17  44
Altered legal permanent resident document   1   3
Impostor, I-94   0   1
Amnesty fraud   0   1
Amnesty impostor   1   2
Fraudulent or altered U.S. passport   0   0
TOTAL 100 258
Source: U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Office, El Paso Office
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common misrepresentations include using a coun-
terfeit Legal Alien Permanent Resident Card [LAPR]
or using someone else’s “green card.”
One kind of misrepresentation that cannot be picked
up at the port of entry is the use of falsified docu-
ments to obtain a valid Border Crossing Card.  Sev-
eral informants we interviewed in both El Paso and
in Juárez averred that the purchase of fake pay stubs,
birth certificates, employment letters, utility receipts
and the like was not uncommon among persons who
desired a BCC but could not otherwise obtain the
necessary documents to present with their applica-
tion for it.  The most ingenious account we heard
was that of a woman whose sister had obtained a
BCC by purchasing false documentation of her
employment from a man working in the personnel
office of a maquiladora in Juárez.  The INS does rou-
tinely make calls to employers to verify the employ-
ment of BCC applicants; in a case such as this veri-
fication was useless as the company official was a
participant in the scam.  As with the frequency of
the incidence of misrepresenting oneself with im-
proper documents at the port of entry, it is impos-
sible to estimate the frequency of this sort of fraudu-
lent acquisition of the BCC.  Documents seized are
only those discovered, and the number discovered
depends not only on the number in circulation but
also on the amount of effort made to detect them.
Effects and Responses
Based on our field interviews in both El Paso and
Juárez, we reached the following conclusions about
the effects of Operation Hold the Line on illegal
crossing and illegal crossers.
1.  Illegal crossing is now much more difficult than
it was before the Operation began.  Absolutely ev-
eryone we interviewed who has attempted illegal
border crossings in the El Paso area acknowledges
that doing so is much more difficult than before
September 1993.  Those who attempt to cross are
more likely to be detained than before and are
obliged to make their attempts at night and/or by
going around the Operation to cross at deserted lo-
cations near Sunland Park, New Mexico or Fabens,
Texas.  These attempts are time-consuming and ar-
duous.  Several of our informants on both sides of
the border have commented that the intensity of the
blockade of the border has diminished since its first
month.  While crossing now is easier than it was in
that first month, it is still more difficult than before
the Operation began.
2.  Some illegal crossers have given up crossing;
many people who have other income alternatives
in Juárez have given up working in El Paso.  Un-
employment in Juárez is low relative to the rest of
Mexico; jobs are available in the maquiladoras, in con-
struction, and in domestic service.  The pay for these
jobs, however, is quite low relative to the cost of
living.  Older illegal crossers, particularly older
women, have largely given up illegal crossing, re-
gardless of the loss of income.  They simply do not
see the benefit as being worth the increased risk and
difficulty of making arduous, nighttime crossings.
Many street vendors gave up crossing after the Op-
eration began because of their inability to get through
the Border Patrol linewatch quickly and surrepti-
tiously while loaded down with fruit and other wares
to sell.66  Some of these vendors took up selling in
downtown Juárez instead, including to drivers wait-
ing in line to enter the United States on the Paso del
Norte International Bridge.  All former illegal cross-
ers who earned incomes in El Paso before the Op-
eration began have experienced a loss of income; for
some this loss has been catastrophic, for others, who
have other family members working in Juárez, it
has been less so, particularly if they themselves have
been able to find other work in Juárez.  Some recent
migrants to Juárez who earned their living in El
Paso’s underground economy were forced to return
to the Mexican interior following the Operation as
their remaining personal and/or family resources
were insufficient to maintain themselves in Juárez.
3.  Illegal crossing is still possible and many people
continue to cross illegally, though fewer than the
before Operation Blockade/Hold the Line.  The line
of agents posted along the border by the Border
Patrol is penetrable, particularly away from the
66 Former El Paso street vendors we interviewed reported
that they could make $120 or $130 per week selling
fruit in El Paso.  In Juárez they would be lucky to
make one-third that amount as vendors and one-half
that amount in other occupations.
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can maid who lives and works in El Paso
relating the tale of a gardener she sees work-
ing at one of the houses she cleans)
Like out away from town, the day before
yesterday, the Border Patrol wasn’t around
at all.  And I was getting my nerve up to
cross right then, but I didn’t cross because
of my kids there in Juárez.  What am I going
to do with them over there and me over
here?  So, I’m going to take my kids back
down to Durango and then come back across
again at Anapra, because it’s safer there.
(Mexican woman who formerly sold fruit
on the street in Juárez, interviewed in El
Paso)
4.  Juárez residents who use their border crossing
card to work illegally in El Paso have responded
to more rigorous inspection and interrogation of
bridge crossers by crossing at times when it is more
believable that the purpose of their visit is other
than to go to work.  When Operation Hold the Line
began, INS inspectors on the international bridges
confiscated the border crossing documents of some
Mexican entrants who made apparently false claims
about the purposes of their visits to the United States.
Reports abounded of persons being turned back at
the border for claiming to make shopping trips at
7:00 AM with only a few dollars on their person.67
Illegal workers and people who live or work with
them who we interviewed concurred that many
crossing card abusers have taken to crossing the
bridges at hours when it is easier to convince INS
inspectors that they are make a shopping trip or a
social visit.  A Mexican maid we interviewed in El
Paso had this to say:
A lot of maids have their crossing card and
come across to work.  But they don’t cross
early in the morning anymore.  They cross
later in the day.  They’re afraid that if they
cross early in the morning they’ll be caught.
They’ll be asked, “Where are you going?  All
downtown areas where several physical barriers,
such as fences and aqueducts, make a speedy cross-
ing impossible.  This was corroborated in our inter-
views with illegal crossers on both sides of the bor-
der, by their legal coworkers in El Paso, social ser-
vice providers in El Paso who still serve nonresi-
dents, and Border Patrol agents.  Since the begin-
ning of the Operation, the number of agents on duty
at any given time has been reduced and, as a result,
Border Patrol vehicles are stationed as much as one-
half mile apart in some areas.  Fewer agents are
available to make actual apprehensions of illegal
crossers who have breached the first line of defense.
Moreover, boredom, disillusionment, and fatigue
have resulted in some Border Patrol agents not prov-
ing to be very good sentinels, sometimes allowing
illegal crossings while sleeping or reading in their
vehicles, and other times simply not intervening in
time to halt an illegal crossing in progress.
They slip through [the line of the operation].
You can cross at night.  At dawn or at night.
You know, the migra stands sometimes half
a mile apart, and you can slip through the
line.  It’s a lot harder.  [The ones who get
through] are fast runners, they’re young.  I
know one woman that crossed that we’d had
in the shelter for a long period of time, has
an American kid.  The American kids had
to stay over there [in Juárez] with the mother,
but she crossed to work as a domestic.  Many
of these people, they send money back, be-
cause here they eat, there they don’t.  (Ray
Tullius, Director, El Paso Homeless Coali-
tion)
I asked him how he’d done it.  I thought
with the blockade, he wouldn’t be able to
come any more.  So when I saw him again
at work, I asked him, “How did you do it?”
He told me at two in the morning, through
the desert.  He said that several of them
cross at once.  They get together.  If the see
the Border Patrol agents, and the agents run
to try to catch them, they all run in opposite
directions, but towards the other side.  Who-
ever gets away, well, he gets away!  (Mexi-
67 Here it seems that a few isolated incidents were greatly
magnified by the power of rumor and sensationalist
media coverage.
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the stores are closed now.  What will you be
doing?”  And they also have to carry some
money on them, enough to be able to justify
that they’re going shopping.  Because some-
times they’ll run into an immigration agent
who wants to examine the contents of their
purse.  I’ve seen them do this.
5.  Those who continue to cross illegally do so less
frequently, but stay over longer periods of time in
El Paso.  Illegal crossers, as well as people who
associate with illegal crossers, say that they cross
the border less frequently than before the Operation
because crossing is more difficult and the likelihood
of apprehension is greater.  For people who do not
spend the night in El Paso, this means a substantial
loss in income compared with before the Operation,
because they work fewer days in El Paso.  They are
typically men who work irregularly in El Paso cut-
ting grass, trimming hedges, or as construction day
laborers.  Crossing at less frequent intervals for them
does not imply the loss of a job, for they did not
have a regular work schedule in El Paso before the
Operation began.  For others, such as nannies, house-
keepers, and skilled trades people, whose employ-
ers expect them to keep a consistent schedule, the
response has been to cross less frequently, but sleep
over in El Paso several nights in a row, or even for
up to a week or two.  Some maids and nannies
moved in with their employers.  Other illegal cross-
ers stayed with relatives, or rented a room from a
Mexican friend or acquaintance in El Paso.  Some
outdoor construction and yard workers took to sleep-
ing under the desert stars on the mountainsides
surrounding El Paso.
I used to work as a housekeeper in El Paso,
but now I'm an operator in a maquiladora
here in Juárez.  I quit crossing [illegally] with
the blockade.  Lots of people were detained.
A lot of us women used to cross, and then
we just couldn’t any more. . . . The people
who still manage to cross, well, we don’t
see them again for a long time, or we only
hear from them by phone. . . . Most of them
are staying with the people they work for,
or with some friends or family, if they have
them in El Paso.
In our interviews, we also received secondhand re-
ports of illegal crossers who have abandoned their
Juárez residence altogether since the Operation and
moved to El Paso to live as well as work.  Given the
disincentives for revealing their identity as illegal
residents, we were unable, however, to interview
any of these persons directly.
6.  Some undocumented Mexicans residing and
working in El Paso are now cut off from friends
and family in Mexico by the Operation.  Not all
illegal border crossers, either before or after the
Operation began, lived in Mexico.  Undocumented
Mexican residents of El Paso are also obliged to cross
the border illegally if they wish to visit friends and
relatives or to conduct business in Mexico.  These
people may be members of households that include
members who are legal residents of the United States,
including Anglo and Mexican-Americans, Mexicans
who are legal permanent residents of the United
Sates, Mexicans who legalized their residence under
the Immigration Reform and Control Act, and U.S.-
born children of Mexican immigrants.
One of the things that this blockade has
done—many of our families in El Paso are
“mixed,” which means . . . I married a
woman from Juárez!  Many of us have inter-
married across this river.  Now it takes some
time for the Mexican woman to become le-
galized, and it cost me $800 to legalize my
wife and her son.  Now many of these people
don’t have that: $800, that’s their life.  So
many of these women that are tied there
throughout El Paso are living with Ameri-
can kids, an American husband, sometime
who runs off, with extended family in Juárez.
Now she’s illegal—she’s technically illegal.
She cannot cross. She’s stuck on this side
with her American kid with her family across
the river.  That’s prevalent, all throughout
this place!  Right now, she can’t go back.
And Immigration could technically pick her
up and tell her “Go back.”  And here you’ve
got five American kids, who go back over
there and they’re not supported in Juárez
because they’re American kids.  They don’t
participate in any of the social services [in
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Blockade/Hold the Line, illegal crossers who worked
illegally in El Paso feared apprehension at all times
while in the United States, now their risk of capture
is restricted to the moment of crossing.  Moreover,
the risk of apprehension while crossing illegally has
risen considerably.  Hence it is a good strategy to
try to maximize the work days in El Paso gained
per illegal crossing.  The same logic applies to per-
sons who abuse their Border Crossing Card by us-
ing it to work illegally in El Paso.
Many of these conclusions are embodied in the case
of one Mexican man working in El Paso whom we
interviewed in April 1994.  His story follows.
Reynaldo Rodriguez [a pseudonym] is a skilled ma-
son who works as an independent contractor to
homeowners in El Paso.   Now in his mid-forties, he
moved to Juárez from his hometown of San Fran-
cisco, Chihuahua in 1972.  Before he began working
in El Paso five years ago, he worked for many years
in the construction industry in Juárez.  He has al-
ways earned his living as a mason.  He lives in
Juárez with his family in Colonia Felipe Angel.  He
has eleven children, ranging in age from fifteen
months to twenty-five years old.  Four of his chil-
dren work in maquiladoras; his wife does not work
outside the home.
Mr. Rodriguez does not have a Border Crossing Card
because he has always worked informally in the
construction industry; moreover, he is not in posses-
sion of his birth certificate, which he lost many years
ago.  Nobody else in his family holds a BCC, al-
though one of his daughters plans to apply when
she completes the required year of employment at
her maquiladora job.
As a mason in El Paso, Mr. Rodriguez can earn up
to $150 a week; doing the same work in Juárez, he
would be lucky to clear $100.  The additional money
he is able to earn in El Paso is essential to him,
given the size of his family.  By the same token,
having such a large family obliges him to live with
them in Juárez, where the cost of living, especially
for housing, is considerably lower than in El Paso.
He prefers working independently for private
homeowners because on a construction site in El
Juárez] because they’re foreign kids. (Ray
Tullius, El Paso Homeless Coalition)
Before Operation Blockade/Hold the Line, illegal
border crossing was relatively easy, and Mexican
nationals residing illegally in El Paso more readily
could maintain relationships with friends and kin
still residing in Mexico.  Many times these cross-
border relationships among families consisted of a
parent or an adult child living and working in El
Paso and returning regularly to the rest of the fam-
ily on the Mexican side with money and goods.
Operation Blockade/Hold the Line, by making the
maintenance of these kinds of relationships more
difficult, also generates some incentives for family
residential reunification: the family member living
in El Paso may return to live in Mexico, or other
family members may seek to move to El Paso.
7.  Once across the border, undocumented Mexi-
cans are less likely to be picked up by the Border
Patrol than they were before the Operation.  Illegal
border crossers we interviewed in Juárez and El Paso,
as well as residents of Mexican immigrant neighbor-
hoods in El Paso, concurred that since the Opera-
tion began, Border Patrol surveillance of El Paso
neighborhoods and workplaces had abated notice-
ably.  As a result, undocumented Mexicans, once
they had crossed the border, faced a decreased
chance of being detected and deported by the Bor-
der Patrol.  For example, a Mexican resident of an
El Paso apartment building located in El Paso near
Chamizal Park on the border, reported:
Down where I live you used to see the Bor-
der Patrol passing by the entrance of my
complex fairly frequently.  Now you never
see them.  They used to make sweeps
through the neighborhood, and people used
to hide or we used to hid them! [Laughs.]  A
lot of them would dive under parked cars
to hide when they would see the Patrol.
They would hide however they could!
This decrease in Border Patrol surveillance of areas
in El Paso located away from the border has made
illegal worker’ strategy of extending stays in El Paso
all the more sensible.  Whereas before Operation
U.S.  C O M M I S S I O N  O N  I M M I G R A T I O N  R E F O R M
RESEARCH
P A P E R
- 121 -
is coming to work.  You’re not coming to,
you’re not one of those that they say is com-
ing from over there to steal.  They’re look-
ing the other way then, once they begin to
recognize you, it comes to people coming
across to work.  They know full well that
you’re coming to work.  Sure, they see us
cross.  And they don’t do anything. . . .
When I cross [the Border Patrol vehicle] is
about sixty yards away.  Sometimes they
see us.  Or, as I say, they’re asleep. . . .
When they detain me, it’s because they see
me, and I stop, and that’s it!  Why would I
try to run?  It just makes it a bigger crime.
He has been apprehended by the Border Patrol two
or three time since the Operation began.  Being de-
tained by the Border Patrol is “no big deal” accord-
ing to him.  They just ask him for his personal data
and return him to the Mexican side.  He then goes
home to bed to get some sleep before attempting to
cross again the next night.
In spite of the added difficulty in crossing illegally,
Mr. Rodriguez still feels obliged to do so.  He needs
the extra money he can make in El Paso to support
his family.  He believes that the Mexicans who have
stopped crossing since the Operation began weren’t
really coming over to work.  He claims to know
many people who continue to cross illegally in spite
of increased surveillance of the border:
Yes, I know quite a few people who still
cross.  Out in the colonia where I live, well,
there in the same street where I live, there
are some ten people who cross, aside from
those we meet on the way [across the river].
If the border were someday effectively sealed, he
supposed that he would go back to working in the
construction industry in Juárez, as he did before he
stared working in El Paso five years ago.
Because of the increased difficulty in crossing ille-
gally, Mr. Rodriguez has tried to minimize the num-
ber of crossing he has to make.  Whereas before the
Operation began he crossed daily, he now limits his
crossings to two or three per week.  He rents space
Paso he would have payroll and social security taxes
deducted from his check.  He gets work from
homeowners based on recommendations from people
he has worked for in the past.  He believes he is
paid fairly for his work and has generally been
treated well by his various employers.
We interviewed Mr. Rodriguez one afternoon when
he was at work laying a brick stairway on the
grounds of a home in an affluent section of El Paso
high on the slopes of a mountain northeast of down-
town.  He spoke unreservedly about his experiences
crossing the border illegally, both before and after
Operation Hold the Line.
Mr. Rodriguez told us, as have many other with
whom we spoke, that crossing the border illegally,
even downtown during the day, was fairly easy be-
fore the implementation of Operation Blockade/Hold
the Line.  He used to cross back and forth to work
almost every day.  When the Operation began, he
was taken by surprise and was unable to get across
the border for the first month or two.  After that, he
found he was able to make the crossing, although it
was difficult, and he had to do it at night.
When they began the blockade, yes, we did
go a month or two without being able to
cross.  I mean, the surveillance was more
intense.  And now it seems that things are
getting back to normal so that one can cross.
Mr. Rodriguez usually makes his crossing now at a
point on the Rio Grande known as Las Piedras next
to the big ASARCO smelter in El Paso.  He crosses
the river by himself at night, but sees many other
people crossing in the same place.  He describes his
method of crossing:
Well, we just wait until they aren’t in the
spot where we want to cross, you know.
Because they’re not there, you know.  In
other words, they’re not planted right there
in the spot where we want to cross.  And, if
they are there, why sometimes they’re asleep!
And we cross!  We cross, and it’s no prob-
lem.  It hasn’t been very difficult.  I guess
that now they recognize you as someone who
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in an apartment with some kin who live in El Paso.
Other men he knows have taken to sleeping out
under the stars in the desert near where they are
working.
A lot of people, at times they go out into
these little gullies there, where they sleep.
And they come out of there to work.  They
go downtown to eat dinner.  Because up
here the bosses give them their midday meal,
you know.  So they go downtown to eat
dinner, they come back up here, and wher-
ever it gets dark on them, that’s where they
stay.  Nobody complains about them sleep-
ing up here.  No problems.68
Mr. Rodriguez says that even before Operation Hold
the Line began, he had never been apprehended by
the Border patrol once he had made it past the agents
right at the border itself.  He says now that he doesn't
worry at all about being picked up in El Paso.
We also had the opportunity to interview Mr.
Rodriguez’ employer of the moment.  The owner of
the house where he worked was a real estate agent
in her early fifties, the product of a mixed Mexican-
Anglo marriage.  She spoke Spanish fluently.  She
remarked that while immediately after Operation
Hold the Line began some of her friends in the neigh-
borhood complained of losing their help or having
them not show up for a period of time afterwards,
Mexican laborers had generally continued to be avail-
able for domestic service since the blockade without
any major interruption.  This woman described her
own attitude regarding employing undocumented
Mexican laborers:
I had a yard guy that worked for me for
seventeen years and he told me that he was
under the amnesty.  I don’t ask!  If you asked
me about him, I don't ask about him [Mr.
Rodriguez].  I don’t ride him in my car and
I don’t ask him.  He works for the guy be-
low [her neighbor down the hill], that’s
where I got him from, and I don’t ask.  I
don’t think I have an obligation to ask, if
I’ve got a yard guy, you know.  I might, but
I just don’t ask.  What I don’t know doesn’t
hurt me, and I really don’t want to know.
That’s the way I do it.!
Her ambivalent views regarding the ethics of em-
ploying undocumented Mexicans were also telling,
reflecting the peculiar contradictions of living on the
Mexican border.
But the people who are coming and who are
staying here, it’s draining on the taxpayers,
you know, hospitals and all the rest of it.
On the other hand, these people are hungry,
and they climb the mountain, you feel sorry
for them.  You know, they start across that
mountain at two o’clock in the morning hop-
ing to come get a job.  And they talk about,
I’m sure there are a lot of thieves and a lot
of criminals, but there’s a lot of honest
people, and they should really come and give
them some kind of thing for maid and yard
work, because people here aren’t going to
do it.  They’re just not going to do it, you
know.  You can’t get anybody to do maid
service that lives here—they’d rather go
collect welfare.
The views of interviewed Juárez officials were rather
less ambivalent.  They argued forcefully that the
INS should create some mechanism to ratify legally
a long-standing practice in El Paso-Juárez that they
regard as beneficial to residents of both sides of the
border: the employment in El Paso of noncitizen,
nonresident Mexican workers, such as Mr.
Rodriguez.  Abelardo Escobar, Juárez’ secretario del
ayuntamiento, summarized these officials’ views:
We have made some comments at the meet-
ings we have had with U.S. customs and
immigrations officials.  There are many
people who live in Juárez and cross to work
in El Paso who have done so for years.  They
work in homes as domestic help, they are
employed in workshops.  They work.  A
68 Mr. Rodriguez’ account in this regard was corroborated
by his employer, who mentioned that she regularly
saw Mexican men sleeping under the stars on the
mountainside near her house since Operation Blockade/
Hold the Line went into effect.
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good, efficient, and honest work force.  Thou-
sands of people!  Why can’t there be some
mechanism invented to legalize their situa-
tion?  These are people who live here in
Juárez who are not going to invade the in-
terior of the United States because these
people by tradition live here.  This would
greatly reduce a lot of the pressure in this
area.  Because it would benefit the commu-
nity of El Paso as well.  There are families
and there are businesses that require these
people.  They have needed them and they
have utilized them, and it has worked and
has been of mutual benefit, as much for the
businesses as for the American families as
for the Mexican people.  And they’re not
riffraff, they’re honest people that go over
there to work.
These local Mexican officials recognize the incen-
tives low wages on their side of the border create
for illegal border crossing.  They claim that as long
as the large wage discrepancy between Juárez and
El Paso continues to exist, strong pressures to cross
illegally into the United States will persist.
IX. SUMMARY
This chapter summarizes the major research find-
ings from the analyses presented in the preceding
chapters concerning the effect to date of Operation
Hold the Line on illegal crossings and on other
variables thought to be associated with such cross-
ings.  Examining the study’s findings taken together,
instead of individually in separate chapters, facili-
tates the formulation of an overall assessment of the
extent to which the Operation has been achieving its
objectives.  It also provides a better perspective from
which to consider any unintended negative side
effects to be factored into the evaluation.  Because
the objective of this study is to provide an assess-
ment of the Operation, not to formulate policy rec-
ommendations, we do not present recommendations
concerning changes in immigration policy.  Recom-
mending policy is the task of the U.S.. Commission
on Immigration Reform, which was established as
part of the 1990 Immigration Act and charged with
the responsibility of studying all aspects of U.S. im-
migration trends and policies and formulating rec-
ommendations for policy changes in its reports to
Congress, the first of which is to be submitted by
October 1, 1994.  The findings of this research are,
nonetheless, particularly relevant to certain immi-
gration and border policy issues.  Thus, the last
section of this chapter outlines these issues and dis-
cusses the implications of the study’s findings for
each of them.
Findings
The major findings to emerge from the analyses pre-
sented above are:
1. Illegal crossings into El Paso have been sub-
stantially deterred by Operation Hold the Line;
2. The deterrent effect appears to have dimin-
ished the longer the operation has lasted;
3. Long-distant labor migrants have been less de-
terred from crossing by the Operation than
other kinds of crossers because they seem to
have shifted their crossing points to other lo-
cations along the border;
4. Legal crossers/illegal workers and illegal cross-
ers/illegal workers appear to have changed the
daily pattern of their crossings and to have
extended the duration of their stays in El Paso;
5. Illegal crossers/illegal workers who engage
in street vending and small-scale, low-level
criminal activities have been substantially de-
terred from crossing;
6. Business activity in both El Paso and Juárez in
general does not appear to have been substan-
tially harmed by the Operation, although sales
in downtown El Paso close to the bridges have
declined somewhat and certain representatives
on both sides of the border continue to claim
that negative business effects exist;
7. The Operation may have led to a small reduc-
tion in school enrollment in the El Paso area;
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8. The Operation appears to have led to a small
decline in the number of births in El Paso as
indicated by data both on registered births and
on deliveries in Thomason Hospital;
9. The Operation seems to have caused a reduc-
tion in petty crime (small-scale, low-levelnui-
sance and property crimes), especially in down-
town El Paso;
10. The Operation appears to have led to a small
reduction in other property and violent crime
rates beyond what would be expected given
the long-term downward trend in these rates
in El Paso (and most other cities of similar
size).  However, this decline may have come
about because these kinds of crime were tar-
geted for additional police activity in the
months right after the Operation began.
11. The Operation has increased the rate at which
illegal drugs and other contraband and illegal
agricultural products have been seized;
12. The Operation appears to have received over-
whelmingly positive public support in El Paso,
although no representative scientific poll has
been carried out that confirms this or that docu-
ments in which groups support is strongest
and in which it is weakest;
13. Support in the Mexican-American community
appears to be high, although most leaders of
community organizations that we interviewed
expressed opposition.  Also, several Mexican-
American leaders argued that this support was
partly because Chief Reyes was Mexican-
American, partly because the Mexican govern-
ment had publicly acknowledged the right of
the United States to control its own borders
and to carry out the Operation, and partly be-
cause the new strategy reduced discriminatory
Border Patrol actions against Mexican-Ameri-
cans (e.g., agents stopping Mexican-Americans
to questions whether they were illegal clients
or not);
14. The Operation’s change in border control strat-
egy has resulted in substantial declines in
charges of human rights violations and other
abuses against the Border Patrol and, accord-
ing to school administrators, to much safer
environments around schools close to the bor-
der because agents are no longer chasing sus-
pected illegal crossers through school yards and
playgrounds or questioning Mexican-American
students;
15. The redeployment of Border Patrol agents to
shift-length, guard-duty responsibilities at the
border may be causing substantial morale prob-
lems arising out of boredom and concerns
about how performance will be evaluated un-
der the Operation’s new work conditions;
16. Some illegal Mexican immigrants residing and
working in El Paso find it more difficult as a
result of the Operation to visit friends and rela-
tives in Mexico and then return to El Paso;
17. Once across the border, illegal crossers appear
less likely to be apprehended by the Border
Patrol than they were before the Operation;
and
18. Some of the pressure to cross the border ille-
gally in the past from Juárez to El Paso has
derived from inconveniences in obtaining Bor-
der Crossing Cards; some of the current pres-
sure results from persons who desire to cross
temporarily and who meet the requirement
necessary to obtain a BCC except that their
employment in the informal sector means they
do no possess the kinds of papers necessary to
verify employment.
Assessment
Based on an examination of a wide variety of evi-
dence, there is little doubt that Operation Hold-the
Line has curtailed crossings into El Paso.  According
to the Border Patrol, the number of illegal crossings
prior to the Operation was in the neighborhood of
eight thousand per day (as based on photographs
taken at selected points at selected times along the
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border).  Since the Operation, apprehensions have
declined from about seven hundred a day in the
comparable preblockade months of fiscal year 1993
to about two hundred a day in the months after the
blockade.
It is difficult to know how such figures on appre-
hensions correspond to reductions in the number of
border crossers (in part because the same individual
can be apprehended more than once and because
some crossers may be staying longer periods in El
Paso).  This is especially true in the post-Operation
months when the usual relationships between the
amount of enforcement effort and apprehensions
seem to have reversed their previous pattern.  How-
ever, the number of crossers probably also has been
cut substantially.  This curtailment of illegal crossers
into El Paso includes both workers and nonworkers.
Our ethnographic data indicate that the former have
been less affected than the latter.  But the Operation
has also changed the crossing patterns of those who
cross intending to work.
The Operation has resulted in other intended and
unintended effects as well.  One intended effect was
to reduce street vending by Mexican nationals in El
Paso’s downtown commercial district and in certain
residential neighborhoods close to the border.  The
Operation seems to have been successful in reduc-
ing the participation of illegal crossers in this activ-
ity.  One study, conducted by the University of Texas
at El Paso, interviewed forty-six of the several hun-
dred downtown street vendors before the blockade
and found that 41 percent of these referred to them-
selves as “illegals” who lacked papers to work in
the United States (Staudt 1994).  One of the unin-
tended effects of the Operation, as suggested by
interviews with residents of Juárez as noted above
was to encourage some Juárez commuter workers,
particularly women domestic workers, to find places
to live in El Paso in order to keep their jobs.  This
does not necessarily imply a complete abandonment
of Juárez as their principal residence, but rather an
effort to reduce the number of times they must make
an illegal crossing per week or per month.  The data
examined in Chapter III on bridge crossings showed
patterns consistent with this outcome.
Overall, based on the anecdotal and other evidence,
we conclude that the Operation has been more suc-
cessful in curtailing illegal migration among local
crossers than among long-distant migrants.  The lat-
ter can go around the line, either with the help of
pasamojados or by choosing another entry point along
the 1,900-mile border.  Moreover, Operation Hold
the Line makes the apprehension of long-distance
migrants passing though El Paso even less likely,
insofar as Border Patrol agents formerly deployed
inland are now deployed right on the border.  And
among local crossers, differences in the extent to
which the Operation has been successful exist by
type of crosser.  It seems to have been successful
among certain illegal crossers/illegal workers (par-
ticularly street vendors and others like older female
domestic workers for whom crossing has become
especially difficult), and (especially) juvenile cross-
ers.  These types of crossers tend to be the poorest
of the Juárez crossers.69  Long distance labor migrants
and legal crossers/illegal workers typically have
greater financial resources as their disposal; other-
wise they could not finance their long-distance mi-
gration or qualify for a Border Crossing Card.  Le-
gal crossers/illegal workers, as long as they have
valid crossing documents and believable reasons for
entering the United States, are perhaps even more
free to work illegally, given the decreased presence
of the Border Patrol throughout the city of El Paso.
And by all accounts, those illegal crossers, including
nonlabor crossers, who are well-integrated into the
social fabric on both sides of the border, can still
find ways to cross, including obtaining false docu-
ments and staying for longer periods with friends
and relatives (who may also be illegal) in El Paso.
Those nonworking crossers who have been entering
the United Sates to give birth may have been de-
terred somewhat as evidenced by the small decline
observed in births.  But what has gone down the
most, apparently, is the participation of illegal cross-
ers in petty crime and street vending in south El
Paso, activities most associated with juvenile cross-
ers and other youths and adults from Juárez who
sought to extend their information economic subsis-
tence activities to the U.S. side.
69 See Chapter VIII for information about socioeconomic
heterogeneity within these categories.
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Policy Implications
The principal stated objective of Operation Hold the
Line was to eliminate illegal border crossings by
persons from Mexico into the United States in the El
Paso sector.  Several broad lines of strategy might
be drawn to achieve this policy objective, not all of
which are mutually exclusive:
1. Illegal crossings might be physically deterred
through increased policing or placement of bar-
riers along the border (such as fences, trenches,
walls, etc.);
2. The benefits of both legal and illegal border
crossing could be absolutely reduced by elimi-
nating sources of employment and consump-
tion in the Untied States to illegal or insuffi-
ciently documented Mexican residents (by re-
quiring fraudulent-proof identification, for ex-
ample, and by requiring employers to check
prospective employees’ IDs);
3. The benefits of both legal and illegal border
crossing could be relatively reduced by lower-
ing disparities between the two sides of the
border with regard to wages, prices, and the
availability of goods, services, and jobs;
4. The ease of illegal crossing could be reduced
relative to legal crossing by making legal cross-
ing documents easier and less expensive to ob-
tain;
5. The cost of legal crossing could be lowered
relative to illegal crossing by increasing the
number of legal ports of entry to the United
States and reducing border-crossing fees; and
6. Illegal border crossing could be legalized.
Of these five broad lines of strategy, numbers 2, 3,
5, and 6 fall outside the purview of the local dis-
tricts and sectors of the INS/Border Patrol.  Num-
bers 2 and 5 would require action by the U.S. Con-
gress, and number 3 would require concerted inter-
national cooperation between the U.S. and Mexican
governments, as well as among industries in both
countries.  Number 5 would depend upon actions
by other department/agencies of the Executive
Branch of the U.S. government as well as the Mexi-
can federal government (which collects northbound
tolls).  Strategy number 1 is the one emphasized in
Operation Hold-the Line.  Number 4, because it falls
within the purview of the INS Border patrol in the
El Paso district, could receive greater consideration
given the relationship between legal and illegal cross-
ings.
The research results hold several other implications,
four of which in particular warrant discussion.  One
is that strategies number 1 and 4 often need to be
considered together because of the relationship be-
tween legal and illegal crossings.  As noted in Chap-
ters I and II, the formulation of immigration policy
needs to take into account that legal and illegal mi-
gration to the United States are often interrelated,
particularly in the case of Mexican migration.  Poli-
cies that restrict one can increase pressure for the
other, and vice versa.  In the case of El Paso/Juárez
before Operation Hold the Line, the difficulty and
inconvenience of obtaining BCCs led to increased
numbers of persons crossing illegally.  Many other
crossed illegally, and continue to do so, because they
meet the requirements for obtaining a BCC but are
not able to provide the papers verifying that they
do.  Thus, border control strategies that make illegal
crossings more difficult (as is the case with Opera-
tion Hold the Line) may increase the propensity to
cross legally among those holding valid BCCs, and
thus increase the traffic at, and pressure on, bridge
check points.  They also increase the desirability of
obtaining BCCs to cross legally.  Stated differently,
closing what many have called the “safety valve” of
illegal Mexican migration often serves to increase
demand for legal migration, whether in the form of
those seeking to settle as permanent immigrants or
those seeking local border crossings into El Paso.
The failure to take steps to meet the demand for
local commuter border crossings is likely, in turn, to
increase pressure for illegal migration.
The members of the research team frequently heard
that a need existed before and continues after Op-
eration Hold the Line to place more INS and U.S.
customs personnel at the bridges to speed the pace
of legal crossings.  Increased personnel also are
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needed to process BCC applications. Many observ-
ers in El Paso who support the goals and strategies
of Operation Hold the Line remarked that it was
unfortunate that effort had been devoted to curtail-
ing illegal crossings but not to facilitating legal cross-
ings.  To the extent that the Operation is successful
in curtailing illegal crossings, and especially certain
kinds of illegal crossings, perhaps it will also serve
to focus increased attention on the need to facilitate
legal crossings.  And, as the flow of certain kinds if
illegal crossers diminishes, it may focus attention on
a major remaining group whose members possess
strong motivations to cross illegally—those who want
to shop and visit friends and relatives in El Paso
and who now meet the residency and employment
criteria for a BCC but do not have papers to verify
this because they work in the informal economy.
Developing ways for such persons to cross legally,
however, would involve the risk that crossers might
abuse such a privilege for permanent illegal migra-
tion purposes and to obtain access to jobs and social
services, rather than for temporary shopping or visi-
tation.
Current holders of the BCC could retain and use
their documents through their current expiration date
or as long as they remain valid, without having to
pay a fee.  Not changing the status of current BCC
holders could avoid creating disincentives for Juárez
residents to shop and conduct business in El Paso.
By legalizing the crossing of additional Juárez resi-
dents of financial means, El Paso businesses might
also increase their sales to Mexican consumers.  The
border crossing licensing fee, if set at the proper
level, need not discourage potential cross-border
shoppers, either.  The large business done with
Mexican shoppers by such discount houses as Sam’s
Warehouse and Price Club, which have a member-
ship fee, demonstrates that collecting a fee and mak-
ing sales are not mutually exclusive propositions.
The second (and related) implication of the findings
is that border control strategies and reward system
design and implementation must acknowledge the
multiplicity of different kinds of border crossers.  As
the United States and Mexico increase trade with
one another as a result of NAFTA, it becomes more
important that the border not become a bottleneck
to the legal flow of goods and people necessary for
the further growth of trade.  Our field interviews
indicated that individual Border Patrol agents infor-
mally engage in practices that involve related kinds
of distinctions when they overlook the illegal cross-
ings of persons they know are going to El Paso to
work rather than to “cause trouble.”  If the logic
implied by such practices were extended to the level
of more formal border control strategies, it might
lead to efforts to find new ways both to facilitate
legal crossings and to develop border control strat-
egies that penalize neither Mexicans who want to
cross legally for legitimate reasons nor Mexican-
Americans whose appearance makes Border Patrol
agents think they might be illegal migrants.
It is also our conclusion that Operation Hold the
Line has been more successful in curtailing some
kinds of El Paso crossers than it has in slowing long-
distance labor migration.  The Commissioner of the
INS, Doris Meissner, has announced that strategies
similar to Operation Hold the Line will soon be
implemented in all sectors west of El Paso.  If the
main objective of extending the Operation is to stop
illegal labor migration to the United States, the ques-
tion might be raised about the degree to which this
will be effective without similar strategies being put
into place along the entire United States border with
Mexico.  If the main objective, however, is to deter
temporary crossers whose destinations are U.S. com-
munities along the border, then operations similar
to the one that has been in force in El Paso over the
past eight months would seem to hold greater prom-
ise of success.
The third major implication flowing from the find-
ings of this research is that, whatever the degree of
effectiveness of Operation Hold the Line, its contin-
ued effectiveness will increasingly depend on find-
ing ways to deploy and motivate Border Patrol
personnel and that take into account that the new
border control strategy appears to involve agents in
long periods of inactivity as a result of their holding
fixed positions from which they watch for crossers.
This inactivity not only appears to be causing bore-
dom, it seems to be raising anxiety that the new
strategy does not entail the kinds of activities for
which agents have traditionally been evaluated and
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considered for promotion.  As Operation Hold the
Line is extended to other sectors, some sort of modi-
fied deployment strategy might be necessary to maxi-
mize long-term effectiveness.
The strategy implemented by Chief Reyes in El Paso
of stationing agents right on the border, rather than
having them search for illegals who have already
entered the city, has received considerable national
publicity.  Some observers have expressed puzzle-
ment that this new strategy has not been tried sooner
and elsewhere.  This reaction reflects a misunder-
standing about the number of agents required to
implement a border saturation strategy like Opera-
tion Hold the Line.  Initiating such a strategy in El
Paso seemingly required all the resources the sector
could muster and then some.  Supplementary funds
were approved for overtime pay and agents were
pulled off other assignments (such as employer sanc-
tions investigations and desk jobs) and redeployed
on the border.  Operation Hold the Line is a very
labor-intensive strategy and it seems evident that it
has stretched to the limit the ability of the El Paso
sector to carry out the functions it was performing
before the Operation began.  And as reported in
Chapter VII, the long shifts served by agents appear
to be harming morale and perhaps reducing their
effectiveness.
In truth, the Border Patrol has probably never had
a sufficient number of agents to implement border
saturation strategies on a widespread scale.  In FY
1994, Border Patrol agents numbered an estimated
4,343, the largest number in the history of the ser-
vice.  In FY 1984, by contrast, the number of agents
was 2,333, a number probably insufficient to imple-
ment a strategy like Hold the Line.  After the pas-
sage of the Immigration and Control Act of 1986,
however, the number grew to 4,074 by FY 1988, an
increase of 34.7 percent over FY 1985.  Since then
the number has declined, dropping to 3,684 by FY
1991, after which it jumped by 10.2 percent to 4,061
agents in FY 1992.  Thus, if the present level of re-
sources in the Border Patrol is stretched consider-
ably by Operation Hold the Line in El Paso, this is
also likely to be the case as the strategy is extended
to other sectors.
Resources are all the more likely to be strained if
efforts are made to redeploy agents so as to cut
back the number of consecutive hours spent on what
amounts to guard duty at the border.  In the mili-
tary, to achieve maximum vigilance at guard posts,
troops are rarely assigned to more than two hours
of guard duty at a time .  While Operation Hold the
Line may not require the intensity of vigilance nec-
essary in the military, there is a real possibility that
eight hours is too long for maximum effectiveness.
Implementing shorter shifts would undoubtedly
require more personnel, especially to the degree that
the Border Patrol will continue to fulfill all the other
responsibilities it has been allocated in recent years.
At a minimum, it would seem worthwhile to con-
duct field experiments and evaluations to ascertain
the most effective ways to deploy agents in field
situations like Operation Hold the Line.
The fourth issue for which the results of this study
hold implications concerns the question of how to
evaluate evidence about the effectiveness of a change
in policy or strategy such as that involved in Opera-
tion Hold the Line.  As noted in Chapter III, observ-
ing changes over time in outcomes that are expected
as a result of policy changes amounts to conducting
quasi-experiments in which before-after comparisons
are drawn.  The difficulty of such comparisons for
the observer, of course, is in making as sure as pos-
sible that observed postevent changes can be attrib-
uted to shifts in policy rather than to changes in
other factors with which postevent changes might
be associated.  The results of this research demon-
strate the need for care and caution in making judg-
ments about such changes, particularly when the
outcome that is being observed is itself changing
over time because of factors having nothing to do
with the change in policy.
Two examples from the El Paso situation are in-
structive.  One of these was seized upon by sup-
porters of Hold the Line as evidence the Operation
was successful and the other was embraced by op-
ponents as indication it was not.  These examples
involve crime statistics and birth data.  It is easy to
misread the meaning of these because each has been
changing over time, but in different directions.
Crime rates in El Paso, as elsewhere, have generally
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been declining in recent years.  This means compari-
sons of rates for post-Operation months with rates
for the previous pre-Operation year will necessarily
show a decline and thus appear to indicate a reduc-
tion in crime as a result of the Operation.  Numbers
of births, on the other hand, have been increasing,
especially births in the Mexican-origin population.
This means comparisons of the number of post-
Operation births with the number from the previous
year will show an increase if the Operation has had
no effect on births, or they will show no change in
births if the Operation has reduced the number of
Mexican-origin births by an amount roughly equal
to the annual secular increase.
The first of these relatively unsophisticated compari-
sons appears to show the Operation was working as
intended; the second seems to indicate it was not.
However, when crime and birth data are analyzed
using procedures that take into account the longer-
term trends in each of the variables, the results are
different.  The crime data generally show smaller
effects of the Operation on major crime than the
crude comparisons, whereas the birth data show that
births seem to have declined by about 5 to 10 per-
cent.  This demonstrates that both supporters and
opponents of policy changes should be cautious in
claiming evidence that upholds a certain point of
view.  All sides to an issue are entitled to an assess-
ment that strives to be as objective as possible and
that seeks to use the best possible research methods
in its work.  Even such objective efforts are inevita-
bly incomplete, however, especially when they in-
volve assessments of ongoing processes as is the
case here.  Thus, continued monitoring of Operation
Hold the Line and its effects is both necessary and
important.
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Introduction
This review summarizes the conclusions
reached by recent studies of immigration
to the United States.  The central ques-
tions that motivate this literature are: How
has the character of immigrants changed
over time?  How have these immigrants
been assimilated and performed economi-
cally in the United States?  What demands
have immigrants placed on public services
and income transfer programs? What con-
sequences have immigrants had for na-
tive-born workers?  These questions span
a large field of study, and references and
discussion of major issues of interpreta-
tion and uncertainty are of necessity se-
lective.
Our knowledge of the answers to these
questions is limited.  One source of un-
certainty stems from gaps in nationally
representative data on refugees, on legal
and illegal immigrants, and on emigrants
leaving the United States by their origin,
immigration status, and duration of resi-
dence in the United States.  If resolution
of these uncertainties would affect impor-
tant choices before the United States, the
cost of collecting more adequate data on
immigration and emigration should be
weighed carefully by Congress.  Uncer-
tainty in our answers also can arise from
the limitations in the methods used by
researchers studying these questions.  In
such cases it is not always possible to dem-
onstrate how methodological improve-
ments in an original study would affect
its conclusions without time-consuming
replication and extension of the basic re-
search.  It is generally not possible, there-
fore, to judge which methodological short-
coming in the existing literature will af-
fect a particular conclusion.  At several
points, an indication is given as to the
direction the bias might take.
The first section discusses how character-
istics of cohorts of immigrants that enter
the United States at different times can be
compared, both with earlier or later im-
migrants and with native-born Americans.
The appropriate reference groups are not
clear, in part because immigrant sub-
groups cannot be distinguished and the
native counterpart is not always obvious.
The second section describes the conclu-
sions from studies that attempt to quan-
tify the assimilation process, where the
standard practice is to compare the eco-
nomic productivity or earnings of immi-
grant and native workers, although con-
sideration of how well the children of the
immigrants are assimilated might bring
us closer to the long-run effects of immi-
gration.  Section three discusses the social
consequences of legal and illegal immi-
gration and the unresolved problems we
have in assessing these consequences from
local labor market studies.  Finally, the
R E S E A R C H
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characteristics and assimilation of immi-
grants can be affected by immigration
policies that can emphasize family reuni-
fication or skill-based selection of immi-
grants or humanitarian assistance to refu-
gees.  Policies that reduce the flow of le-
gal immigration also can influence the
flow of illegal immigration and those seek-
ing refugee status.  A final section reca-
pitulates the findings.
The Quality of an
Immigrant Cohort
The simplest and perhaps most adequate
measure of quality of a cohort of immi-
grants entering the United States in a
specific time period is the distribution of
education in this population.  Starting with
the 1940 Decennial Census of the Popula-
tion, representative data are available on
both the years of educational attainment
and the earnings of the U.S. resident popu-
lation, often by immigrant status.  Educa-
tion has become the primary predictor of
the wage rate, and education is linked to
the productivity of people in both home
and labor market activities.  Education
obtained by immigrants in their country
of origin may be less relevant to the pro-
ductive opportunities in the United States
than that which native-born Americans
receive.  The quality or relevance of that
education may differ, for example, by
origin country (e.g., by GNP per capita)
and, most notably, if the language of in-
struction is English (Jasso & Rosenzweig
1986, 1990a).  Despite the incomparability
of education between and among immi-
grants born abroad and natives born here,
years of schooling is the most powerful
single explanatory variable known to ac-
count for productivity in the U.S. labor
market and elsewhere in the world.  Edu-
cation of parents also is critical for pre-
dicting the health and schooling attain-
ment that the children of immigrants and
natives obtain (Schultz 1984).  Thus, in
both the short run and over the
immigrant’s life cycle, education forecasts
his or her own productivity; in the long
run it forecasts the assimilation of the
immigrant’s children into the productive
mainstream of the U.S. economy and so-
ciety.  The alternative to education as an
indicator of quality is occupation.  Occu-
pations are, however, more elusive be-
cause individuals often change their oc-
cupation over their lifetime and because
the economic meaning of occupation as a
basis for social stratification and produc-
tivity changes over time.
The average years of education of immi-
grants entering the United States has de-
creased relative to native-born Americans
of the same age and sex (Borjas 1992).  In
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1940, immigrant men had .8 more years
of schooling than native-born men, and
by 1980 they had .7 fewer years of school-
ing.  Although the education of these
immigrants increased from 9.5 years of
schooling in 1940 to 12 years of schooling
in 1980, that of the native population in-
creased more rapidly.  This deterioration
in the schooling of immigrants relative to
natives is associated with the changing
composition of immigrants by region of
origin, with the decline in the share com-
ing from Europe (from 60 percent in the
1940s to 10 percent in 1981-1986) being
replaced by a rising share from Asia,
Mexico, and, more recently, other coun-
tries in Latin America (Abowd & Free-
man 1991; Funkhouser & Trejo 1993).  It
also undoubtedly is related to the in-
creased share of immigrants who are ille-
gal (Fix & Passel 1994).
These estimates of education probably are
are not seriously biased because virtually
all individuals report their education in
the Census.  The margin of undercount of
immigrants, and perhaps especially ille-
gal immigrants, probably is greater than
for natives, but this is not likely to be a
serious source of bias in estimating the
level or trend in education of the two
populations.  However, it should be noted
that the distribution of education of im-
migrants is far from uniform.  Recent
changes suggest an increased concentra-
tion of immigrants with more education
than native Americans (more than sixteen
years completed) and far more with edu-
cation levels below the average of natives
(eight or fewer years).  Consequently, the
average education of immigrant cohorts
masks a substantial degree of heterogene-
ity, and recent problems of assimilation of
immigrants in the lower tail of the educa-
tion distribution deserve emphasis (Fix &
Passel 1994; Chiswick & Sullivan 1995;
Simon & Akbari 1995).  A large share of
these recent less-educated immigrants are
undoubtedly in the United States illegally,
but data are not available to characterize
this group.
Productivity of
Immigrants
The comparison of the earnings of immi-
grants and natives is much more difficult
than the comparison of education.  First,
everyone does not work in the labor force.
There are a variety of reasons to think
that the rules governing self-selection into
the labor force may be different for the
immigrant and native, and perhaps dif-
ferent for legal and illegal immigrants.
Moreover, comparisons of earnings are
generally restricted to exclude the self-
employed, and one often observes that a
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larger proportion of immigrants are self-
employed than are natives.  There also is
a tendency for individuals to shift from
being a wage earner to self-employed as
they accumulate business capital and la-
bor market experience, which is naturally
correlated with their age.  Thus, immi-
grant workers may be observed less often
to be wage earners than natives, and they
may shift out of wage-earning jobs and
into self-employment as they are assimi-
lated into the United States at a faster rate
over their life cycle than do natives.  It is
not possible to know for certain whether
these individuals, both natives and immi-
grants, who decide to work for wages are
more or less productive than those who
do not work for wages.  It might seem
reasonable to expect that the more suc-
cessful are able to accumulate capital and
have the motivation to become self- em-
ployed.  Such a tendency would under-
state the productivity of immigrants rela-
tive to natives, and this understatement
of immigrant assimilation could grow with
duration in the United States.  This source
of bias downward in measured quality
and the rate of assimilation of recent im-
migrant cohorts appears to be particularly
noticeable among whites and Asians
(Yuengert 1989).  In general, most com-
parisons of native and immigrant earn-
ings in the literature ignore the sample
selection bias due to excluding self-em-
ployed and nonworkers.  Adjustment for
this source of sample selection bias is
expected to improve the relative earnings
of immigrants and increase immigrant
earnings for those who have had more
time in the U.S. to assimilate.  How this
self-employment bias might have changed
from 1940 to 1990 is not well documented,
but warrants more research.
A final source of bias in following the
assimilation of an immigrant cohort over
time after it has arrived in the United
States is return migration or emigration.
Those returning may be either the more
successful immigrants with relatively high
earnings or the less successful immigrants
with relatively low earnings.  Conse-
quently, the uncertainty surrounding as-
similation estimates increases with dura-
tion of U.S. residence and growth in re-
turn migration.  As the size of an entering
cohort of immigrants is observed to de-
cline from one Census to the next, and
this decline is faster than can be explained
by mortality, this cohort attrition can be
attributed either to return migration or to
a tendency for persons to increase their
underreporting of immigrant status with
duration of residence.  A statistical expla-
nation is needed for how this form of
cohort attrition varies across Censuses, by
country of origin, by education, and by
sex.  Until we have better data on emigra-
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tion from the United States by birth ori-
gin and date of entry into the United
States, the existing data will have diffi-
culty clarifying these various life-cycle
processes that could substantially affect
immigrant/native comparisons of earn-
ings or what is reported as the rate of
assimilation of immigrant cohorts.  This
is a second source of bias in assimilation
estimates that requires more study.
Immigrant hourly earnings of men who
had arrived in the five years before the
1940 Census are 1 percent more than the
earnings of natives age twenty-five to
forty-four in the 1940 Census.  The analo-
gous immigrants in 1980 reported wages
26 percent below this native-born Ameri-
can comparison group in the 1980 Census
(Borjas 1992).  As with the education
trends, much of this pattern can be re-
lated to the shift in composition of immi-
grants by origin country, from Europe to
Asia and Latin America.  Since 1980, the
wage structure in the United States has
shifted markedly against the least edu-
cated workers, increasing the wage pre-
mium paid for workers with a college
education.  The proportion of immigrant
cohorts in 1970 and 1980 with twelve or
fewer years of schooling is greater than
for the native population, and it comes as
no surprise that these immigrants are dis-
proportionately from Latin America.
Wages declined for these less educated
immigrants during the 1980s as they did
for equally educated native-born Ameri-
cans (LaLonde & Topel 1992).
After the 1980 Census, it is possible to
trace changes in the education and earn-
ings of immigrants relative to natives in
the immigrant supplements to the monthly
Current Population Surveys [CPS] in 1979,
1983, 1986, and 1989.  These data are
analyzed by Funkhouser and Trejo (1993).
From the early 1980s to 1987-1989, the
average educational attainment and
hourly earnings of immigrants improved
relative to native males age eighteen to
sixty-one, reversing the downward trend
of earlier decades.  Funkhouser and Trejo
also note an increase in the share of im-
migrants coming from Europe and from
some areas of Asia during the 1980s.  The
proportion of less-educated immigrants
continued to increase in the 1980s, but
these increases were only among those
coming from Hispanic areas other than
Mexico.  It may be argued that because of
its more detailed income questions and
better-trained enumerators, the CPS elic-
its more accurate information on hourly
earnings than does the Decennial Census.
If the CPS is a more precise source of data
on earnings than the Census, future com-
parisons of the earnings of immigrants and
natives should rely more extensively on
R E S E A R C H
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analyses of the CPS files.  One hypothesis
offered by Funkhouser and Trejo for the
upsurge in better-educated European and
Asian immigrants in the 1980s is the pre-
viously noted increase in the relative wage
premia offered to highly educated work-
ers in the U.S. labor market (Murphy &
Welch 1992).  They conclude that the
Immigration Reform and Control Act of
1986 is not the primary cause for this im-
provement in the quality of immigrant
cohorts during the 1980s because the
change in composition begins before this
act was passed and is evident in regions
that are not the primary concern of the
legislation.
The basic regularity first noted by
Chiswick (1978), and then replicated in
many settings around the world, is that
immigrants increase their earnings more
rapidly than natives after their arrival in
a destination.  Chiswick noted that after a
decade, the earnings of immigrants to the
United States had roughly caught up to
those of natives, and thereafter immigrants
tend on average to outperform natives.
Different groups, however, experienced
very different earnings profiles relative to
natives depending on their self-selection,
their match of skills relevant to the U.S.
labor market, and their likelihood of be-
coming a return migrant (Jasso &
Rosenzweig 1986).  Borjas (1985) found
that later cohorts of immigrants caught
up to the earnings of natives more slowly
than Chiswick estimated and attributed
this to a lower “quality” of subsequent
immigrant cohorts.  This slower assimila-
tion of later cohorts of immigrants can
also be associated with the shifting com-
position of immigrant origins.  Borjas’
(1987) analysis was designed to deal with
the self-selection of emigration, but ex-
cluded many origin countries from which
two-thirds of the foreign born who en-
tered the United States from 1975 and 1980
came and did not include literacy, which
is widely associated with migration
(Schultz 1982) among the conditioning
variables.  Jasso and Rosenzweig (1990a)
show, based on a much larger sample of
immigrants and countries of origin, that
when these omissions are corrected, a
pattern of positive self-selection of the
emigrants emerges more strongly than in
Borjas’ (1987) study.  If the estimates of
Jasso and Rosenzweig are accepted, then
part of the lower level of “assimilation”
of later cohorts of immigrants to the
United States might be due to the in-
creased rate of positively selected emigra-
tion.
By the very nature of the distinction be-
tween legal and illegal immigrants, repre-
sentative data that describe these two
groups are scarce.  In practice, most stud-
ies of the education and earnings of im-
migrants and natives simply combine le-
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gal and illegal immigrants along with refu-
gees.  Only a few investigations actually
use records of legal immigrant cohorts
from the INS in combination with other
representative surveys and censuses to
trace the assimilation of legal immigrants
(e.g., Jasso & Rosenzweig 1986).
The Social Costs
of Legal and
Illegal
Immigration
Despite the convincing evidence that im-
migrants are productive after arriving in
the United States and that their earnings
converge with duration of residence here
toward the earnings level of natives with
the same education,  do the migrants nev-
ertheless impose social costs on native
Americans?  These social costs could be
of two types.  Do they consume more
services from the public sector than they
pay for in taxes?  And, do they reduce the
employment and wage opportunities and
amenities for some native-born Ameri-
cans?  First it should be clear that illegal
immigrants are not eligible for federal
welfare and income transfer programs in
the United States as they are in some
European countries.  Even legal immi-
grants cannot apply for welfare for their
first five years in the United States or they
risk deportation.  Only refugees are eli-
gible for welfare programs and, indeed,
have been the beneficiaries of other spe-
cial programs designed to assist them in
their resettlement.
Given the previously documented decline
in the education and earnings of immi-
grants relative to natives from 1940 to
1980, it is not unexpected that immigrants
in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s were less
likely than natives to draw upon the
welfare system (Tienda & Jensen 1986;
Simon 1989), but that this pattern appears
to have reversed by the 1990s (Borjas
1994).  In the earlier Censuses, the wel-
fare participation rate of immigrants rises
with the duration of residence in the
United States, either due to the satisfac-
tion of eligibility requirements or because
immigrants were converging toward the
behavior of other Americans in their will-
ingness to depend on welfare.  There is
much greater welfare participation among
refugees than among nonrefugee immi-
grants, as we might expect from the in-
tent of legislation.  Even after twenty years
in the United States, 14 percent of refu-
gees arriving in 1965-1969 are still on
welfare, according to the 1990 Census,
compared with 7.4 percent of all native
households (Borjas 1994, Tables 1 and 3).
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The accounting exercises that are offered
in the literature to represent the taxes paid
and benefits received by immigrants are
difficult to evaluate and reflect widely
varying assumptions (Fix & Passel 1994).
Figures suggest that the balance is less
favorable for the native taxpayer in 1990
than it was in 1950, when immigrants
came predominantly from Europe and had
a higher educational attainment than na-
tive-born Americans.  There are also fac-
tors working in the opposite direction.  If
many immigrants return to their origin
country after a period of residence in the
United States, it is likely that they do not
recoup their contributions to the social
security trust fund.
For young immigrants other than refugees,
the taxes they pay probably roughly equal
the discounted value of the benefits they
receive.  Moreover, many of these ben-
efits are designed to improve the health
and future productivity of the children of
immigrants.  This is a social investment
the United States may want to make.  Such
generational accounts are less rewarding
in the case of immigrants who enter the
United States toward the end of their
productive careers, many of whom enter
under an immigration visa provision jus-
tified for family reunification.  For this
older group, five years of residence in the
United States may qualify them to apply
for a retirement pension under Supple-
mental Disability Insurance, which is
funded from Social Security, and then
secure Medicare coverage.  In such cases,
taxpayers are subsidizing family reunifi-
cation of elderly immigrants to a substan-
tial extent, and the transfer of public funds
is not justifiable as an investment in the
future productivity of Americans.
In addition to any net drain on (or contri-
bution to) public resources that immi-
grants may impose on (make to) native-
born Americans, the immigrant worker
may depress the wage rate available to
natives who seek work in similar activi-
ties.  Alternatively, immigrant labor may
raise the returns on physical capital and
complement the returns to certain other
groups of native workers who occupy
different types of jobs than do immigrants.
Many studies have sought to estimate how
the concentration of immigrants in a local
labor market affects the wage in that
market for native workers.  Most studies
that are able to find such an immigrant
cross-wage effect on native workers find
the effect to be negligibly small (OECD
1993; Fix & Passel 1994; Zimmermann
1994).  However, migrants do substitute
for themselves in the sense that they lower
the wages that other migrants receive on
average in a regional labor market.  But
few studies find much evidence that im-
migrants substitute for any distinguish-
able group of native workers, except per-
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haps among unskilled workers during
periods of recession (Card 1990; LaLonde
& Topel 1992; Altonji & Card 1991; Fix &
Passel 1994).  It has long been hypoth-
esized that unskilled labor could be a
complement for more skilled or educated
labor.  Evidence of this pattern is found
with regard to unskilled immigrant labor
by Gang and Rivera-Batiz (1993), who es-
timate that a 1 percent increase in un-
skilled labor due to immigration raises the
returns to education by three-fourths of a
percentage point.  If the wages of domes-
tic labor are inflexible, immigration might
be expected to lead to higher unemploy-
ment rates or lower labor force participa-
tion rates among native workers.  But
neither has been found.  A concentration
of immigrants in the labor force is associ-
ated with an increase in the proportion of
the population in the labor force (Altonji
& Card 1991).  One effect of a concentra-
tion of immigrant workers in a region of
the United States is an increase in the
outmigration from that region of native
workers to other parts of the U.S. labor
market.  Thus, the mobility of native
workers may dilute the wage-depressing
effect one might expect to find among less-
skilled native workers in regions such as
Texas, California, or Florida with a large
proportion of immigrant workers.
To complete the range of possible effects
of immigration, the timing of immigra-
tion and the choice of destination (even
by refugees) are likely to be responsive to
economic conditions in the host country
and the alternative labor markets within
that country.  This is more obvious in the
European context where an individual on
leaving one country then has a choice of
destinations among others countries, and
the net flow of immigrants is sensitive to
where the best opportunities are to be
found (Zimmermann 1994).  The compo-
sition of migration may also change ac-
cording to changes in the structure of
wages in different destinations
(Funkhouser & Trejo 1993).  If immigrants
decide to locate in relatively high local
labor markets in the United States, it is
not surprising that the local concentration
of immigrants is not strongly (inversely)
correlated with wage outcomes for natives
or for immigrants.
The unresolved problem with virtually all
empirical studies of the labor market con-
sequences of immigration is that they
examine the correlation between the num-
ber or share of immigrants in local labor
markets and other employment or wage
outcomes in those markets.  This approach
is valid only if the allocation of immigrants
across local labor markets is random and
no other compensating adjustments occur.
These adjustments might take the form of
outmigration of natives, as noted earlier,
or changes in local prices, such as increases
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in housing costs or in congestion costs of
using public services (e.g., schooling),
(Sala-i-Martin 1994) or in decreases in the
prices of services, such as child care, that
immigrants are likely to provide.  In the
longer run, any changes in local wages
and prices would be expected to give rise
to movements in capital as well as further
migration of labor.
To analyze correctly the consequences of
immigration requires the economist to
devise a way to identify the distinguish-
able effects of shifts in the derived de-
mand for labor from the effects of exog-
enous shifts in the supply and regional
allocation of immigrant labor.  I have not
found any satisfactory analysis of the con-
sequences of immigration that provides a
basis for empirically identifying these
general equilibrium effects.  For example,
Card’s (1990) study of the Mariel Boatlift
exploits this exogenous event to trigger a
supply shift of immigrant labor and thus
focuses attention on a natural experiment.
But immigrants (and natives) nonetheless
choose where to settle, and these simulta-
neous decisions are unavoidably contami-
nated by their responsiveness to regional
demand factors.  Research in this area has
concluded that immigration has no major
effects on local labor market outcomes.
This finding, however, is fragile because
the analytical methods used in these stud-
ies do not provide convincing empirical
evidence on the difficult central question.
Policy Choices
First, how should the United States deter-
mine the aggregate flow of immigrants?
Second, how should this flow be allo-
cated?  Third, what resources should be
expended to curb illegal immigration?
Political pressures restrict migration, es-
pecially during recessions when domestic
levels of unemployment are relatively high
and real wages are not likely to be rising.
For this reason it might be reasonable to
have the quota of immigration legislated
to vary pro-cyclically with the business
cycle, and thereby dampen cyclical move-
ments in unemployment and wages.  The
share of the immigration quota provided
for the purposes of family reunification in
the United States appears to be high
compared with other industrially ad-
vanced countries (OECD 1993).  However,
countries that have relied more heavily
on skill-based admissions of immigrants,
such as Canada, do not appear to have
obtained a very different mix of immi-
grants than the United States.  If immi-
gration visas are awarded to applicants
with skills that are designated to be scarce,
annual calculations based on the wage
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premia for each skill group in the Current
Population Survey could be used to de-
termine such “scarce skills.”  This mecha-
nism should moderate the increasing
spread of wages between education and
skill groups that has occurred in the
United States since 1980 (Murphy & Welch
1992).  This fine-tuning of the composi-
tion of immigration would remove this
issue from perennial political debates and
might mitigate somewhat the growing
income inequality that faces the U.S. soci-
ety.
There will continue to be excess demand
for immigration to the United States, even
if Latin American growth in the 1990s
returns to the respectable pace of the 1960s
or 1970s.  Resources should be appropri-
ated to interdict illegal immigrants only
to the extent that these resources can be
shown to be effective.  There is always an
alternative approach, one that fosters fur-
ther liberalization in the world trading
economy.  Strengthening the institutions
that promote freer international trade in
commodities and enhance long-term capi-
tal mobility may help to absorb the excess
demand for immigrating to the United
States, while also increasing world out-
put.
Summary
The educational attainment of cohorts of
immigrants to the United States has in-
creased over time from 1940 to 1980.  But
that increase has not been as rapid as that
among native-born Americans.  Conse-
quently, the difference in average years of
education between natives and immi-
grants increased.  This trend appears to
have reversed in the mid 1980s according
to the CPS data analyzed by Funkhouser
and Trejo (1993), with a resurgence in
immigration from Europe.  It will be im-
portant to document if this improving
trend in educational attainment of immi-
grants relative to natives continued up to
the 1990 Census and into the 1990s.
Some part of the decline from 1950 to 1980
in immigrant-native relative education is
probably due to the growth in the share
of illegal immigration in total immigra-
tion.  But without better data on who is a
legal and illegal immigrant, this conclu-
sion about the consequences of illegal
immigration must remain tentative.  The
decrease in average education of the im-
migrant population entering the Uni-ted
States compared with the native popula-
tion is probably less important than the
growing heterogeneity of immigrants, with
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a substantial inflow of immigrants who
are both relatively well-educated (beyond
college) and poorly-educated (less than
high school).  The former group presents
few special problems for assimilation,
whereas the latter may present a special
challenge.
Comparisons of the earnings of immi-
grants and natives are subject to several
additional sources of uncertainty and
probable bias that cloud the adequacies
of cohort assimilation comparisons.  Be-
cause earnings are only observed for a
possibly unrepresentative sample of wage
earners, the comparisons reported in the
literature that show earnings of recent
immigrants falling relative to those of
natives may be biased.  It is my opinion
that the omission of self-employed prob-
ably understates the earnings capacity of
immigrants relative to natives, and this
understatement might increase with du-
ration of residence in the United States,
underestimating the rate of assimilation
of immigrant cohorts in recent decades.
A second source of bias is caused by re-
turn migrants.  Lacking direct data on
emigrants from the United States accord-
ing to when they first immigrated to the
United States and from where they came,
it is difficult to adjust the comparisons of
immigrant cohorts and natives for these
self-selected return migrants who have left
the cohort between one census and the
next census enumeration.  If the return
migrants are positively selected, as some
studies suggest, then the immigrant
cohort’s earnings comparisons over time
are biased downward, and the true rate
of assimilation of immigrants is more
rapid than our estimates have indicated.
The evidence of the effects of immigrants
on natives is not compelling.  Estimates
of what immigrants consume in the way
of public services appear roughly to bal-
ance their tax payments.  Many of these
public services involve investments in the
health and schooling of the children of
immigrants that the society should encour-
age.  However, the taxes immigrants pay
flow primarily to the federal government
while the benefits are often funded at the
local and state government levels, creat-
ing hardships that the federal system
should explicitly address.
Many studies have not been able to find
evidence that a concentration of immi-
grants in a local labor market depresses
employment or wage opportunities for
local groups of native-born Americans.
But these studies do not confront ad-
equately the problem of separating the
consequences of the immigrant supply
from the local labor market demand con-
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ditions that probably contributed to where
the immigrants settled.  Among the out-
comes that need to be evaluated are, in
addition to wages and employment, the
resulting changes in various prices and
capital movements.  This is a major chal-
lenge to imbed the immigration issue
within a general equilibrium model of
regional growth that can be estimated
directly from data on multiple regional
economies within the United States over
time.
Unskilled Americans, who have seen their
job prospects erode since 1980 and their
real wages fall, have an understandable
concern that the government should pro-
tect their livelihoods.  But immigration
does not appear to be a large part of this
broad national problem of a growing
imbalance between our educational sys-
tem and the skills it provides to our
workforce and the demands of the
economy for more highly skilled, better
educated workers.  Dealing with this more
fundamental problem requires more in-
novative educational and social programs.
Building barriers to immigration would
not seem to be justified by current re-
search, although raising the skill compo-
sition of immigrants could make a minor
contribution to reducing wage inequality
and improving job prospects for the least
skilled and educated native-born Ameri-
can workers who have recently lost much
ground.
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INTRODUCTION
The development of American immigra-
tion and refugee policies and procedures
in the twentieth century has been charac-
terized by ad hoc administrative measures
and incremental legislative steps.  Thus,
when faced with the new and unexpected
situation of a direct influx of large num-
bers of Cubans, Haitians, and Central
Americans during the 1980s, legislation,
administrative procedures, and contin-
gency planning based on the previous
crisis were overcome by events.  Based
on lessons from the U.S. experience in this
period, this paper sheds light on policy
development, legal statuses available for
immigration emergencies, resettlement
management, and return programs.  The
experiences in 1980 regarding Cuban and
Haitian entrants and in 1988-89 regarding
Central Americans are used to illustrate
these points.
A selected list of legal, logistical, institu-
tional, and financial systems or remedies
that may play a role during an immigra-
tion emergency should help structure a
discussion of policy options.  This paper
attempts to review various aspects of
preparedness, institutional responses,
long-term adjustments, and special cases
that must be considered in addressing
immigration emergencies.  In discussing
these components of the Cuban-Haitian
crisis and the Central American influx, the
paper focuses on:
• Expectations on the eve of the Cuban-
Haitian crisis in 1980 and in relation
to the expansion of direct migration
from Central America to the U.S. in
the ensuing years;
• Results and impact of such expecta-
tions on existing procedures;
• Legislative and administrative
changes instituted during that period;
• Lessons that can be distilled from the
U.S. experience with immigration
emergencies in the 1980s.
Defining an
Immigration
Emergency
At the outset, it may be useful to look at
different definitions of an immigration
emergency for which extraordinary poli-
cies and procedures must be developed.
The Federal Emergency Management
Agency [FEMA], which was called into
action to manage the Marel crisis in 1980,
is normally expected to follow specific
procedures to define the kinds of emer-
gencies in which it takes responsibility:
R E S E A R C H
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State disaster officials request Preliminary
Damage Assessments [PDAs]; state gov-
ernors ask the President to declare a major
disaster when supplemental federal assis-
tance is required; FEMA evaluates PDAs
and advises the President, not on the basis
of the numbers affected, nor on the basis
of cost estimates (which are considered
unreliable), but rather on the basis of
uninsured needs not met by state, local,
and voluntary recovery efforts.
This formulation of criteria and proce-
dures was intended for a recovery effort
following a discrete event, like a hurri-
cane or earthquake, not for the manage-
ment of influxes of large numbers of
people, where the crises might be ongo-
ing, nor for a crisis with legal and inter-
national repercussions.  However, the
FEMA focus on local needs, its immedi-
ate access to funding, and its “mission
assignment” capability to call upon sev-
enteen other agencies and departments of
the federal government to detail person-
nel to assist in an emergency, made it a
very useful—and perhaps the essential in-
stitution at the time—to spearhead efforts
to manage the Mariel crisis.
A report of the Cuban-Haitian Task Force
[CHTF], looking back at its experience in
1980, suggested a simpler definition of an
immigration emergency: “a future possible
influx of persons . . . who will require
large-scale social services.”  Another defi-
nition from the time was an influx of
unpredictable numbers and of unpredict-
able duration.
In legislating procedures for use of the
newly created Department of Justice Im-
migration Emergency Fund in 1990, the
Congress left it to the Attorney General to
prescribe scenarios that constituted an
immigration emergency.  The INS Pro-
posed Rule on the Immigration Emergency
Fund (Nov. 5, 1993) established procedures
governing requests for a Presidential dec-
laration of an immigration emergency, but
again did not provide a clear definition.
In addition, the Attorney General was
given authority to provide for local assis-
tance up to $20 million of the $35 million
fund even in the absence of an emergency
where (a) more than 1000 asylum appli-
cants arrived in one quarter of a year and
(b) there was danger to lives, property,
safety, or welfare of residents.
The definition of a refugee or migration
emergency meant to trigger funding from
the Emergency Refugee and Migration
Assistance fund [ERMA] of the Depart-
ment of State is a Presidential designation
of an “unexpected, unforeseen refugee or
migration emergency” which is deemed
to be in the national interest.  “Unfore-
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seen” is defined as “not predictable
enough to seek an appropriation from
Congress in advance.”  The criteria that
trigger the use of ERMA are, thus, lack of
funds in the budget and no
reprogrammable funds.  The Department
of State has reserved use of the fund since
1980 for overseas emergencies, not domes-
tic border crises.
These definitions of an emergency signifi-
cantly are largely objectively quantifiable
and expected to trigger certain responses.
Different agencies and departments of
government use different definitions de-
pending on the response that they are ca-
pable of making and the policy and tradi-
tion they bring to it.  INS, for example,
operates from a definition focused almost
entirely on the difficulties of processing
and control, the hardship an influx of
migrants might bring to American resi-
dents, and the question of legal status—
in other words, a border enforcement
point of view.
FEMA looks at local crisis management
issues: recovery needs requiring resources
beyond the capacity of the local commu-
nity.  The CHTF, in the period that it was
becoming more attached to the Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services
[HHS] Office of Refugee Resettlement
[ORR], was more concerned with the well-
being of the migrants themselves and of
their social service needs.  The Depart-
ment of State, under the authority of the
President, looks at unanticipated costs and
“the national interest,” objective and sub-
jective criteria that are motivated by for-
eign policy rather than by domestic con-
cerns and that focus on emergencies in
other countries.
In this paper, preparedness for the immi-
gration emergencies of the 1980s is evalu-
ated by the extent to which expectations
were closely related to the realities of his-
tory and current conditions, the accuracy
and timeliness of information reaching an
appropriate level to trigger action, and the
degree to which contingency planning was
in line with national laws and values and
coordinated in a manner to ensure uni-
form compliance and cooperation among
the relevant federal and state agencies and
departments and local voluntary groups.
R E S E A R C H
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THE 1980
CUBAN-
HAITIAN
IMMIGRATION
EMERGENCY
Federal Expectations,
Information, and
Preparedness
Despite some obvious indicators that
things were changing, the nation on the
eve of the Mariel crisis did not consider
itself a country of first asylum for refu-
gees.  President Carter said, on May 14,
1980, in the middle of the crisis, “Our laws
never contemplated and do not ad-
equately provide for people coming to our
shores directly for asylum . . .”  It was
anticipated that traditional U.S. generos-
ity to those fleeing political persecution
could be exercised in a deliberate, orderly,
and planned migration and resettlement
program.
The model of an orderly and internation-
alized resettlement program so recently
in the national consciousness was the U.S.
response to the Vietnamese boat people
landing in Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia,
and the Philippines.  Except for the initial
exodus from Vietnam in 1975, when refu-
gees stayed briefly at reception centers on
the West Coast of the United States and
four military camps around the U.S. while
awaiting transfer to sponsors or relatives,
refugees were selected and processed in
holding camps abroad and brought to the
U.S. only when they could be delivered
directly to sponsoring families or volun-
tary organizations.  Boat people did not
land on U.S. beaches; that kind of chaos
and tragedy was not expected here.  The
U.S. had the luxury of time and planning
in the selection and resettlement program.
Further, following the Geneva Conference
on the boat people situation in Southeast
Asia in the summer of 1979, the U.S. was
one of a number of countries that pledged
resettlement numbers, and although the
U.S. pledged the most numbers of any
single country (14,000 a month), there was
a sense of joint responsibility in the inter-
nationalized program.
The U.S. had experienced its most mas-
sive and long-lasting refugee resettlement
program in the Cuban Refugee Program,
which had lasted for nearly fifteen years
from 1959 to 1973.  This program, estab-
lished by the Attorney General’s parole
authority and then through special legis-
lation and outside the usual immigrant
visa quotas, brought 800,000 Cubans to
the U.S.  In the earliest period, Cuban
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exiles arrived by air, through various visa
arrangements, or on their own cognizance
without special assistance.  After suspen-
sion of commercial air travel from 1962 to
1965, when U.S.-Cuban relations were at
their lowest point, Fidel Castro suddenly
opened the port of Camarioca for one
month in 1965.  Just as they were to do
fifteen years later, Cuban-Americans plied
the straits in small boats to rescue some
5,000 family members until President
Johnson formalized an “air bridge” or-
derly migration program (the “Freedom
Flights”) that was to bring 50,000 Cubans
a year to the U.S. for the next eight years.
While arrivals had essentially stopped in
1973 when Castro brought that program
to an end, a plan for phasing out the last
Cuban refugee resettlement services over
a period of six years was entering its third
year when the Mariel crisis occurred.
The Refugee Act
of 1980
Congress and the federal government had
been working together in the years pre-
ceding 1980 to establish for the first time
permanent statutory authority for the ac-
ceptance and resettlement of refugees in
such orderly migration programs.  The
Refugee Act of 1980, signed into law
March 17, 1980, which amended the Im-
migration and Nationality Act of 1965 to
bring it in line with current practices and
international norms of refugee assistance,
was intended to put into place a contin-
gency plan and procedures that would be
sufficiently flexible to be responsive to
unforeseen emergency refugee situations.
During the previous thirty years, refugees
had been resettled in the U.S. on the basis
of group designations in each overseas
emergency under the parole authority of
the Attorney General, with a presumption
in favor of those fleeing communist coun-
tries.  Resettlement assistance and adjust-
ment of status to permanent resident had
been made available through country-spe-
cific legislation on a case-by-case basis.
Due to Congressional dissatisfaction with
the ad hoc legislative and administrative
practices, the 1980 law for the first time
incorporated into U.S. law the interna-
tional legal definition of a “refugee” ac-
cording to the Geneva Convention of 1951,
without the ideological baggage of the
Cold War.  [See Appendix for full defini-
tion.]  With the intention of using the
services of the U.N. High Commissioner
for Refugees [UNHCR] in the country of
first asylum abroad for protection and
designation of those refugees requiring
resettlement, the act provided procedures
for selection and processing on an indi-
R E S E A R C H
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vidual basis of those refugees whose ad-
mission to the U.S. is “justified by hu-
manitarian concerns . . . or is otherwise in
the national interest.”  For the first three
years that the legislation was in force, a
“normal flow” of refugees up to 50,000
could be admitted to the U.S. annually.
The President was to consult with Con-
gress annually concerning planned admis-
sions in excess of that number and imme-
diately in case of an unforeseen emergency
refugee situation.  Proposed Admissions
for FY 1980 started at a high of 217,000
because of current concerns for
Indochinese “boat people” and Soviet
Jews.
Provision was made for the coordination
of this complex program through the
newly-created office of the U.S. Coordi-
nator for Refugees, an Ambassador-at-
large under the authority of the Secretary
of State.  At the same time, legal status
determinations for resettlement of refu-
gees were to be carried out under the
authority of the Attorney General, as del-
egated to the Immigration and Natural-
ization Service [INS].
The 1980 legislation also created the Of-
fice of Refugee Resettlement in the De-
partment of Health and Human Services
under the general policy guidance of the
U.S. Coordinator to fund and carry out
programs for domestic resettlement of,
and assistance to, refugees.  Such pro-
grams were to include employment train-
ing and placement, English language train-
ing, cash assistance as well as supplemen-
tal security income benefits [SSI], and re-
sponse to such special needs as health,
social services, and care for unaccompa-
nied refugee children.  Services were to
be subcontracted largely to voluntary re-
settlement assistance agencies or to be 100
percent reimbursable by the federal gov-
ernment to the states.
With the passage of a systematic program
for all refugees, the Indochina Migration
and Refugee Assistance Act of 1975, one
of the pieces of special legislation still on
the books from the earlier era, was re-
pealed.  However, while the assistance
program for earlier Cuban refugees was
being phased out, the new legislation did
not repeal the special legislation for Cu-
bans, but merely amended the Cuban Ad-
justment Act of 1966 to conform with the
one-year adjustment provisions of the new
refugee act.  The 1966 act and its poten-
tial for future use in adjusting the status
of Cuban entrants to permanent residency
was not a matter of discussion in the Con-
ference Committee concluding negotia-
tions on the new legislation.
The criterion for acceptance as a refugee—
a well-founded fear of persecution in the
home country for various reasons—was
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established as the basis for adjudicating
asylum applications for individuals after
their entry into the U.S. as well.  The
Refugee Act of 1980 went further than the
U.N. in allowing for the designation as
refugees of certain persons still in their
own country in certain circumstances, thus
allowing for in-country processing and
orderly movements of would-be refugees
when the exit of politically sensitive
people and family members could be ne-
gotiated in preference to imprisonment
and persecution.  This important provi-
sion was useful in the following years in
setting up the Overseas Departure Pro-
gram from Vietnam, Moscow processing
of Soviet Jews, and the processing and
movement of selected refugees directly
from such Western Hemisphere countries
as Cuba, El Salvador, Haiti, and Nicara-
gua.
The new Act did not, however, anticipate
in any manner a direct influx of large
numbers of people in little boats arriving
on U.S. beaches and applying for asylum.
In designating the number of asylees who
could adjust their status to permanent
resident under the new legislative author-
ity, the Congress anticipated the possibil-
ity of only 5,000 bona fide asylees being
accepted for adjusted status in FY 1980
from among aliens already in this coun-
try.
Camarioca: The
Cuban Precedent, the
Cuban Presentiment?
The incident at the port of Camarioca
clearly had been forgotten by Congress
and the Administration in Washington.
However, when Castro brought the air
bridge program to an end in 1973, some
135,000 approved refugees had been left
behind.   The flow of migrants from Cuba
to the U.S. was at its lowest point during
the period from 1973 to 1978.  Only 18,000
people successfully made the trip through
third countries or by entering the U.S.
illegally.
With the beginnings of a thaw in U.S.-
Cuban relations in 1978, “Interest Sections”
were opened in each nation’s capital to
conduct diplomatic business, and between
October 1978 and March 1980, a total of
22,168 former political prisoners and their
families were allowed to migrate from
Cuba to the U.S.  Negotiations aimed at
easing relations with Cuba in the fall of
1979 included discussions about expan-
sion of this program to a possible larger
orderly migration program.  Economic
conditions in Cuba had declined, the de-
sire to emigrate had been whetted by vis-
its now permitted from exile relatives, and
Castro was eager to export those most
likely to foment dissent in Cuba.
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Later in 1980, the House Permanent Se-
lect Committee on Intelligence was to
accuse the Carter Administration of an
intelligence failure due, in part, to Castro’s
March 8, 1980 speech intimating that a
repeat of Camarioca could occur if nego-
tiations broke down.  The Department of
State, however, believed “that the reopen-
ing of Camarioca did not seem imminent,”
and instructed the Interests Section to brief
Cuban officials on the Refugee Act of 1980,
which, they believed, would provide for
the more rapid processing that the Cuban
Government was seeking.  [See Copeland,
R.  1981.  The 1980 Cuban Crisis: Some
Observations.  Journal of Refugee Resettle-
ment (August).]
Whether this was an intelligence failure
or failure to act on intelligence received is
not clear, but it is clear that no one in
authority recognized that a crisis was
imminent.  Significantly, however, at that
time the President was deeply distracted
by the Iran hostage crisis and the deterio-
rating U.S. economy.  No early warning
system can be effective if those in charge
are not in a position to pay attention and
act on the warning.
Growing Numbers of
Haitian Arrivals
If the arrival in south Florida from 1973
on of Haitians in small boats was noted
outside the local community, it was in the
courts where Haitian rights activists were
fighting for fair hearings for Haitian asy-
lum applicants.  The small group of Hai-
tians was being managed not through the
generous refugee and asylum procedures
offered to those fleeing communist coun-
tries but, rather, through the border en-
forcement procedures of the INS applied
in an inconsistent, ad hoc manner.  Until
1977, a year when only 274 Haitians had
been apprehended entering the U.S., the
INS had detained Haitians until deporta-
tion hearings.
In 1977, appeals from Haitian rights ad-
vocates bore fruit; the INS reversed course
and released imprisoned Haitians with-
out bond, giving them work authoriza-
tion while they were awaiting asylum and
deportation hearings.  The new policy and
procedures, along with a tightening up in
official policy in the Bahamas (where
Haitians had also sought asylum), caused
an increase in the flow of Haitian boat
people to the U.S. from 274 in 1977 to
1,815 in 1978, a growing backlog of cases
at INS offices, and strain on local social
and health care services.  There was a
backlog of some 20,000 asylum applicants
from all sources by fall 1979.
In response, the INS again reversed course
in 1978, reinstituting detention, cancelling
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work authorization, and setting up an
expedited deportation hearing process
with little representation available for the
Haitian asylum applicant.  U.S. Federal
District Judge James King imposed a tem-
porary injunction against the INS to sus-
pend this practice in July of 1979 and ruled
in July 1980 that, “The decision was made
among high INS officials [note: only INS
officials are mentioned] to expel Haitians,
despite whatever claims to asylum indi-
vidual Haitians might have. . . . This pro-
gram, in its planning and executing, is of-
fensive to every notion of constitutional
due process and equal protection.”
At the time of the onset of the Mariel crisis
in April, 1980, the INS was still in limbo
as to how it would be permitted to re-
spond to the growing Haitian influx,
which had increased by 2,522 additional
arrivals in 1979 and already surpassed that
number in the first three and one-half
months of 1980.
Occupation of the
Peruvian Embassy: An
International Crisis
A number of fast moving situations there-
after were beyond American control.
When on March 28 a busload of Cubans
seeking political asylum crashed through
the gates into the Peruvian embassy com-
pound in Havana killing a Cuban guard
in the shooting that followed, Castro, in
an effort to embarrass the Peruvians, an-
nounced that those seeking to leave Cuba
would be allowed to do so.  The antago-
nism toward Peru and a number of other
Latin American governments had come
about because they had been offering
Cubans political asylum if they came to
the embassies, but had not been willing
to move ahead with an orderly migration
program with the Castro government
(contrary to the procedures preferred by
the U.S.).
As the number of Cubans massed at the
Peruvian Embassy in Havana  in increas-
ingly inhumane and untenable living con-
ditions grew to more than 10,000, the gov-
ernment of Peru, supported by Venezu-
ela, Costa Rica, and the United States, re-
quested assistance of the Intergovernmen-
tal Committee for European Migration
[ICEM]1 for an internationalized resettle-
ment effort.  Responding to the appeal
from ICEM for resettlement numbers from
1 ICEM underwent two name changes in the
1980s, first dropping “European” from its
name to become the Intergovernmental
Committee for Migration [ICM] reflecting
its growing international responsibilities,
and later being renamed the International
Organization for Migration [IOM].  This
paper uses the name or initials in effect at
the time of the events discussed.
R E S E A R C H
P A P E R
- 14 -
U.S.  C O M M I S S I O N  O N  I M M I G R A T I O N  R E F O R M
governments around the world, the U.S.
offered to resettle 3,500 Cuban refugees,
the largest number offered by any of the
participating countries.  The other quotas
established by April 30 were Argentina
300, Australia 200, Austria 50, Canada 300,
Costa Rica 300, Ecuador 200, Federal Re-
public of Germany 278, Peru 1,000, Spain
500, and Venezuela 500.  In addition, fi-
nancial contributions of some $768,000 for
the resettlement program, plus unspeci-
fied additional transportation costs, were
pledged by the U.S. and by the countries
where quotas were established.
Costa Rica, with ICEM assistance, agreed
to provide a staging area for prescreening
and transit for the Cubans.  With the ac-
quiescence of the Cuban government,
ICEM initiated an airlift from Cuba to
Costa Rica and onward to the other coun-
tries on April 16, 1980.  On April 18, with
only 677 Cubans transported, Castro pre-
cipitously cut off the flights to Costa Rica
and within three days opened the Port of
Mariel to all those wishing to leave.
(There was one more flight on April 24,
bringing the total airlifted to San Jose to
773.  Another 484 persons were able to go
to Spain on direct commercial flights from
Havana, and ICEM arranged transit flights
from San Jose for 387 for resettlement in
Peru by May 15.)2
Castro was reacting to an international
public relations disaster and an internal
economic crisis.  The question arises
whether at this point the U.S. could have
done anything within its humanitarian
tradition without threatening either other
foreign policy initiatives to forestall the
measures Castro took to take the heat off
his government or the overwhelming re-
sponse of Cuban-Americans in Florida
who went out in their boats to bring their
relatives and friends over.  Castro’s goal
was to embarrass the U.S. and other coun-
tries that were gaining political mileage
at Castro’s expense through the interna-
tional resettlement program.  By mixing
undesirable criminals or individuals re-
leased from mental hospitals with the
dissidents and family reunification cases,
and by overwhelming the State of Florida,
Castro succeeded.  For months to come,
despite two international conferences in
San Jose, Costa Rica, Castro would be re-
2 Different sources quote different numbers
of Cubans moved from Havana in the
airlift.  This paper relies on the statistics
issued by ICEM at the time of the airlift.
Discrepancies—for example, much higher
figures in the Report of the Cuban-Haitian
Task Force, November 1980—may be due
to the inclusion of numbers of released
Cuban political prisoners who had left
Havana earlier in 1980 and were not
actually occupants of the Peruvian
Embassy compound or part of the ICEM
airlift.
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sponsive neither to further calls for an
orderly migration program nor calls for
adherence to the norms of international
law and customary international courte-
sies.
Under such circumstances, the contin-
gency plans laid out in the Refugee Act of
1980, starting with the internationalization
of the resettlement effort, had question-
able efficacy.  The Act did not anticipate
the use of refugees as a weapon by one
country against another, much less the
mockery of a generous refugee policy
through imposition of “undesirables”—
criminals and the mentally ill—on the
recipient country.
The Post-Mariel
Limits of
Internationalization
Just as the Refugee Act of 1980 did not
anticipate large numbers of refugees or
asylum-seekers landing directly on the
U.S. shores, so it did not anticipate that
the prevailing international attitude in
such a circumstance would be that this
was now an American problem and no
major international effort was required.
UNHCR and a number of European gov-
ernments were extremely reluctant to
make an all-out effort toward internation-
alizing the resettlement program once the
Cubans were in a country that, more than
any other country in the world, seemed
fully capable of providing adequate first
asylum and resettlement and was obvi-
ously the destination of choice.
The UNHCR also had not been able to
respond positively to requests from Latin
American countries to assist with the asy-
lum seekers in the Peruvian Embassy com-
pound in Havana, at least in part because
by the narrow Geneva Convention defini-
tion of refugee (as opposed to the ex-
panded designation allowed by U.S. law)
these people had not yet left their country
of origin.  At that time and in this par-
ticular crisis, the U.S. Department of State
was involved in an effort to urge the
UNHCR toward a broader commitment
and interpretation of its mandate, but
without immediate success.3  On the basis
of appeals from major donors, the
UNHCR did agree to provide limited
funds for care and maintenance of the
Cubans in transit in Costa Rica.  Ques-
tioned on the eligibility of Cubans for
refugee status and resettlement assistance
under the UNHCR mandate, a spokesman
3 The UNHCR has since that time interpreted
its mission more broadly to include peoples
displaced or threatened within their own
countries who require protection and/or
resettlement, e.g., the Kurds in Iraq
following the Gulf war and the Bosnians in
war-torn former Yugoslavia.
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replied as late as April 25, 1980, that
UNHCR would pay its share in the cost
of a humanitarian operation in Costa Rica
and Peru and that the question of eligibil-
ity would eventually be studied by
UNHCR later when migrants had arrived
in countries of resettlement.  No funding
for Cubans resettled in the U.S. was ever
made available by the UNHCR.
ICEM had the more flexible mandate to
assist refugees and migrants without defi-
nition at the request of its member gov-
ernments through fully reimbursable pro-
grams rather than through annual grants
to a general fund.  Thus, ICEM was able
to provide processing and transportation
assistance from Havana to Costa Rica and
later was to take responsibility for
outprocessing and transportation to U.S.
sponsors from each of the U.S. holding
camps on contract with the U.S.  “In these
circumstances,” the U.S. Coordinator for
Refugees, Ambassador Victor Palmieri,
stated, “an organization like ICEM is . . .
indispensable.  It is an organization that
we have found in Indochina, in our op-
erations with the Soviet Jews and Eastern
Europeans in Vienna and Rome, and now
with our Cubans to be flexible, respon-
sive and cost effective.  Indeed, it is an
organization which, if it did not exist, we
would have to have invented . . .”
While the U.S. leaned heavily on ICEM
for specific logistical services, the agency
of choice for internationally accepted refu-
gee protection and advocacy was the
UNHCR, and the U.S. expected some
benefits at the time of its national crisis in
return for its large financial commitments
to the UNHCR.  After further negotiations
the UNHCR did eventually take over from
ICEM the limited screening and interview-
ing of Cubans for third- country resettle-
ment from U.S. holding camps, but once
the Cubans were in the U.S. only a few
hundred were ever successfully resettled
elsewhere, despite the pledged resettle-
ment numbers.  Those who had been taken
initially to Peru did not become perma-
nently resettled for some time, some even-
tually making their way to the U.S. after
a considerable period of discontent.
Failed Expectations
The image on television of chaos and of
criminals and mental patients being im-
posed on the “freedom flotilla” led to a
turning point in American attitudes, even
though the actual number of excludable
undesirables may have been only a few
thousand out of more than 124,000 Cu-
bans who came.  The prevailing attitude
of generosity to refugees among the pub-
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lic and in the Carter Administration was
overtaken by a feeling of insecurity and
lack of control at the borders as well as
weakness at being the fall guy for Castro’s
dirty tricks.  The imperfect coordination
of refugee and asylum procedures and the
inconsistency of U.S. Administration poli-
cies from one bureaucracy to another
within the federal government also were
revealed when the boat arrivals of Cu-
bans and of Haitians were inevitably
linked.  In the aftermath, the mood of the
country toward refugees turned from sym-
pathy to anxiety, and Members of Con-
gress and professionals in the field of
assistance to migrants and refugees spoke
of “compassion fatigue.”
In summary, in April 1980, when the
Cubans began to arrive, neither refugee
resettlement policy and procedures admin-
istrated by the office of the U.S. Coordi-
nator for Refugees and the Department of
State’s new Refugee Programs Bureau, nor
immigration policies and procedures and
border enforcement administrated by INS
provided any guidance for immediate
action at the federal level.  Controversy
occurred as well over the mandates and
responsibilities of international organiza-
tions.  Expectations were not in line with
historic reality and current conditions, and
available information or “early warnings”
were ignored.
A number of critics have pointed to a
double standard at work in the operation
of U.S. immigration, refugee, and asylum
programs—racial discrimination and po-
litically motivated determinations of sta-
tus.  At the same time as officials of the
newly created Refugee Programs Bureau
at the Department of State and as Mem-
bers of Congress who had worked many
years on the issue were congratulating
themselves on the institution of a nonpo-
litical definition of refugee, an official of
the Haitian desk at the Department of
State opined that the U.S. could not ac-
cept Haitians as refugees because it was
on friendly terms with the Duvalier gov-
ernment.  It is not necessary to imply
negative motivations to the policy incon-
sistencies of 1980.  This particular situa-
tion points to a lapse in communication
among the various agencies and depart-
ments and the independence and irregu-
larity of accountability of the separate
bureaucracies.  Deeply ingrained bureau-
cratic attitudes, like pieces of heavy earth-
moving equipment, are especially difficult
to turn in new directions without a firm
coordinating hand and advanced plan-
ning.
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Response and Impact
in Florida
At the outset, South Florida’s response to
the “freedom flotilla” was swifter and
more generous than the federal response.
It had been only five years since the Cu-
ban “freedom flights” had been cut off.
The HHS Cuban Refugee Center in Mi-
ami was still in operation at 75 percent of
its former capacity despite the reduced
number of arrivals in the years preceding
the new crisis.  The Center, the state of
Florida, and the local governments, with
the assistance of Cuban-American volun-
teers, established a registration procedure
in Key West as boats landed and a pro-
cessing center in Tamiami to centralize and
coordinate the effort to place the new
arrivals with their families or with other
Cubans in the U.S.  Voluntary agencies
with prior experience in sponsoring and
resettling refugees from Cuba came to the
assistance of the local groups.  The Cu-
ban-American community raised more
than $1 million nationwide and donated
food and clothing.
More than 54 percent of the Cubans who
arrived between April and June 1980 were
resettled with family in this manner with-
out major delay or detention, but the cri-
sis overwhelmed the local effort.  FEMA
was called in on April 27, and holding
centers in military facilities outside the
South Florida area were opened during a
five-week period in May and June with
the cooperation of the Department of
Defense: Eglin Air Force Base, Florida;
Fort Chaffee, Arkansas;  Fort Indiantown
Gap, Pennsylvania; and Fort McCoy, Wis-
consin.
Although FEMA was already present, on
May 5, Governor Robert Graham of
Florida formally requested that the Presi-
dent declare a state-of-emergency in
Florida.  President Carter issued the emer-
gency declaration the next day and also
authorized use of the ERMA fund from
the Department of State to help cover re-
settlement costs.
The positive expectations among the Cu-
ban-American community in South
Florida were soon strained by Castro’s
actions.  It had been a group of promi-
nent Cuban exiles, the Committee of 75,
who had spearheaded efforts toward both
better and more open relations and com-
munication between Cuba and America
in 1978-1979 and expanded migration.
When the Peruvian Embassy was occu-
pied, the exiles in South Florida advocated
the admission of all 10,000 asylum-seek-
ers.  As numerous first-person reports
testify, Cuban-Americans were also the
first to feel the shock and disappointment
when they viewed their efforts to provide
transit to dissidents and relatives manipu-
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lated by a cynical leader who included
political prisoners and mentally ill among
the migrants.
Despite the eagerness of Cuban-Americans
to accept their relatives and compatriots
at the outset of the crisis, Florida state
and local officials questioned how they
were going to be able to resettle large
numbers of people without massive fed-
eral assistance, as had been provided in
the earlier Cuban Refugee Program.
Florida had been uniquely receptive in
absorbing Cuban refugees during the past
twenty years, but conditions had also been
changing.  The growth of the city of Mi-
ami from a pleasant tourist mecca to the
so-called capital of Latin American trade
and banking in that same period of time
had been accompanied by growing crime,
drug trafficking and money laundering.
Further, the new arrivals had lived twenty
years under communism.  They were less
educated, more dependent, and less pre-
pared to adjust to a modern capitalist
society.
By mid-May 1980, the problem popula-
tion that Castro had imposed on the boat
owners of the freedom flotilla was begin-
ning to be obvious on the streets of Mi-
ami and in the holding camps.  Hardened
criminals and mental patients released
from Cuban hospitals were the most ob-
vious group, but there were also large
numbers of unaccompanied minors and
the Dade County school system estimated
more than 15,000 school-age children
would require special facilities.  At the
height of the crisis when upwards of
10,000 Cubans were arriving in one week,
mistakes were made, and many Cubans
who had been released without sponsors
or whose sponsors had deserted them
were becoming street people.
Managing the Crisis
At a hearing in May 1980, members of the
Senate Judiciary Committee of both par-
ties, led by Senator Edward Kennedy and
responding to appeals from relief organi-
zations, most notably the U.S. Catholic
Conference, operating in Florida,  advo-
cated application of the new Refugee Act
to the Cuban and Haitian arrivals, calling
on the administration to let the UNHCR
help in screening and designating the refu-
gees within U.S. camps in the same man-
ner as is done abroad.  They also called
upon the administration to use the Refu-
gee Act to trigger administrative proce-
dures and 100 percent reimbursement of
states for job and language training, health
care and social services in the process of
resettlement equivalent to those currently
available to Indochinese refugees.  Such
an approach would have put into opera-
tion immediately the services of ORR/
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HHS as well as the Reception and Place-
ment services of the Bureau of Refugee
Programs in the Department of State.
Because of a traditional assertion of U.S.
sovereignty once aliens were on U.S. ter-
ritory, the Administration would not ac-
cede to the request for the involvement of
the UNHCR even in advisory opinions on
asylum status for the new arrivals in the
U.S., and the UNHCR was less than ea-
ger as noted to assist even in third-coun-
try resettlement.
A desire to deter potential new arrivals
and reassert border controls played a
major role in policymaking in an effort to
retake the initiative lost through Castro’s
treachery.  The administration was unwill-
ing to admit either Cuban or Haitian boat
people as refugees for fear of setting a
precedent for other groups.  In addition,
the chaotic situation in South Florida and
the lack of an adequate number of trained
INS officials to adjudicate individual cases,
not to mention officials in the Department
of State’s Bureau of Human Rights and
Humanitarian Affairs who were required
by INS regulations to provide advisory
opinions, mitigated against applying the
new Refugee Act.  The question of fund-
ing also hung heavy over the Administra-
tion.  Focussing on reducing tensions in
the Miami community, the Administration
wished to avoid any appearance of re-
warding the illegal migrants.
Refugees by Any
Other Name . . .
For these reasons, as well as in response
to critics of apparent unequal treatment
of Cuban and Haitian boat people, and in
anticipation of Judge King’s final ruling,
Ambassador Palmieri announced on June
20, 1980, the ad hoc designation for both
groups of “Cuban-Haitian Entrants (sta-
tus pending),” under six-month renewable
parole authority of the Attorney General.
All Cubans who had arrived from April
21 to June 19 and were in INS proceed-
ings were covered by the new designa-
tion as well as all Haitians who were in
INS proceedings as of June 19.  (The sta-
tus was later extended to include Cuban
and Haitian arrivals from June 20 to Oc-
tober 10.)
The Attorney General’s parole authority
allowed a more flexible, not to mention
cost- and time-efficient, procedure of
granting temporary status on a group
basis, which the Refugee Act with its in-
dividual determinations had been in-
tended largely to replace.  The Refugee
Act specifically proscribed use of parole
authority for anyone who could be de-
fined as a “refugee.”  The “entrant” sta-
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tus thus allowed the Administration to
sidestep the refugee resettlement benefits
requirements of the Act and create an ad
hoc administration for the resettlement
program.
A supplemental appropriation was passed
on July 2, and the Cuban-Haitian Entrant
Act of 1980 was submitted to the Con-
gress by the Administration on July 31,
authorizing 75 percent reimbursement of
expenses to the states, as opposed to the
100 percent provided for in the Refugee
Act.  Senator Kennedy countered on Au-
gust 5 with his own Entrant Act declaring
Cubans and Haitians to be refugees eli-
gible for benefits through the Refugee Act
and providing for 100 percent federal re-
imbursement to the states as specified by
the Act.  Disagreement between the Ad-
ministration and Congress was resolved
on October 10, 1980, when the Adminis-
tration belatedly supported special autho-
rizing legislation that was embodied in
the so-called Fascell-Stone Amendment to
the Refugee Education Assistance Act of
1980.
This oddly-placed piece of legislation pro-
vided the first statutory legal definition
of Cuban-Haitian entrants, extending cov-
erage back to arrivals since November
1979.  More importantly, it stipulated that
they would all be treated as refugees,
without regard for any future status des-
ignation, for the purposes of providing
them domestic assistance under the terms
of the Refugee Act of 1980 and reimburs-
ing states and localities at 100 percent.
Funding authorized by this act was in-
cluded in the Supplemental Appropria-
tions, Continuing Resolution for FY 1980
and in FY 1981 budget requests.
Thus, a period of uncertainty as to status,
benefits, and federal reimbursement of
costs came to an end for the most part.
The Cuban and Haitian Entrants of 1980
were basically treated like refugees, de-
spite the difference in label and in legisla-
tive authority.  There never was any in-
tention or sufficient political will to de-
port any of the new arrivals except those
clearly excludable for reasons of criminal
activity.
Even were there not forceful lobbies for
the states most affected by the resettle-
ment process—and especially Florida— as
well as a Cuban-American lobby for their
compatriots, the Department of State knew
very well that Thailand and other South-
east Asian countries of first asylum were
watching closely how America was going
to treat its boat people.  The U.S. could
not afford to do anything to cause re-
newed mistreatment and push-offs of
desperate Vietnamese refugees landing in
those countries and upset the equilibrium
so carefully negotiated the previous year.
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The question of regularizing the status of
Cuban-Haitian Entrants was left open for
a future date and was not resolved until
the resurrection in 1984 of the Cuban
Adjustment Act of 1966, which, as
amended in 1976, allows for Cubans who
have been in the U.S. for at least one year
to apply for adjustment of status to per-
manent resident at the discretion of the
Attorney General.  This special country
legislation is unique in that it does not
have a cut-off date.  It remains in force,
although such ad hoc country-specific pro-
cedures are not favored by Congress.  The
limitations on the Attorney General’s pa-
role authority written into the Refugee Act
of 1980 were intended to reduce the ne-
cessity for relying on special legislation,
but despite repeated efforts the Cuban Ad-
justment Act of 1966 has never been re-
pealed.
The Cuban-Haitian
Task Force
Administratively, there were some awk-
ward results.  The CHTF, which was for-
mally brought into being on July 15, 1980,
was an entirely new bureaucratic institu-
tion, comprised of officials detailed from
more than ten different federal agencies,
including FEMA for overall funding and
mission assignment authority, ORR/HHS
for refugee resettlement services, the De-
partment of State for international policy
and overall coordination, the Department
of Justice and INS for legal status pro-
cessing, the Department of Defense for
holding camps in four different locations,
the Department of Education, the Depart-
ment of Transportation, among others.
Initially, in contrast to the INS response
to the trickle of Haitian boat people in the
1970s, the CHTF was under the authority
of the Secretary of State and the U.S.
Coordinator for Refugees, who was seated
in the Department of State.  This set-up
also contrasted significantly with the ear-
lier Cuban program, which was essentially
coordinated from the Department of
Health, Education and Welfare [HEW,
which preceded HHS].  The crisis had
started in Cuba as an international refu-
gee situation, and it continued to have
important foreign policy implications.
Both the Administration and Congress
wanted to use the new structure of the
U.S. Coordinator’s office to the extent
possible, despite its lack of experience or
expertise in working with the large num-
ber of federal, state, local, and private
entities involved.  In a confusion of au-
thority, however, which actually helped
to strengthen his position with other agen-
cies and departments, the Task Force Di-
rector also reported directly to the Presi-
dential Assistant for Intergovernmental
Affairs in the White House.
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The CHTF continued to rely in large part
for funding of camps, staff, and services
through the authority of FEMA, which
was given the lead role at the outset of
the emergency for the practical reasons
mentioned above.  At the other end of the
spectrum, the CHTF reimbursed states
and localities for services rendered and
subcontracted services to a variety of
voluntary refugee resettlement agencies
and local community service organiza-
tions, which were vital partners in the
resettlement process.
Without the authority of the plan of assis-
tance authorized by the Refugee Act,
CHTF found one aspect of the resettle-
ment program particularly irksome—the
question of unaccompanied minors for
whom no guardianship authority was
available.  The Refugee Act specifically
designates to ORR/HHS the role of guard-
ianship for unaccompanied refugee chil-
dren.  Without legislative authority, ORR/
HHS would not take on the responsibility
for several months.  The history of the
CHTF reveals that the Task Force repeat-
edly had to create ad hoc assistance to the
minors and to sign special contracts with
the states for their care.
Among other unanticipated problems that
the CHTF faced were the criminal element
of the Cuban influx and disruptive actions
leading to riots in camps, broken spon-
sorships leading to a “tent city” in Miami,
the need for special legislation to obtain
authorization and funding, as well as to
settle status questions and care and place-
ment of the mentally ill.
Without a refugee designation for the
Cuban and Haitian influx, the Office of
the U.S. Coordinator for Refugees in the
Department of State began a slow and
inevitable withdrawal from resettlement
and relief operations as arrivals wound
down over the summer after the institu-
tion in May of Coast Guard interception
and fining of vessels travelling to and from
Cuba.  The effort to continue internation-
alizing the crisis also languished.  In the
long run, one year later, by July 1981, the
CHTF was merged with ORR at HHS, its
logical home once the emergency period
was past and resettlement services and
aid to problem cases were the main ongo-
ing requirements.
A full discussion of CHTF management
and responsibility is beyond the scope of
this overview, but it may be worthwhile
for those involved in contingency plan-
ning to review the Report of the Cuban-
Haitian Task Force, November 1, 1980.
Decision and Structure: U.S. Refugee Policy
in the Mariel Crisis by Mario Antonio
Rivera also gives a complex and theoreti-
cal, but at the same time sympathetic and
enlightening, discussion of bureaucratic
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politics during the Cuban-Haitian crisis.
The CHTF leadership did not have an easy
time of it, having to depend on diplomacy
and negotiating skills, rather than statute
and full authority, to gain assistance from
other agencies and departments in solv-
ing the myriad problems thrust upon
them.
The End of the
Emergency
By the time Castro closed Mariel Harbor
on September 26, 1980, a total of 124,779
Cubans and 7,785 Haitians had entered
the country.  On October 9, the United
States Interests Section in Havana officially
resumed Immigrant Visa Operations for
orderly, legal migration.  While there was
great disappointment in some circles that
the new Refugee Act had failed its first
test, others in the federal bureaucracies
involved, notably those working with the
CHTF, congratulated themselves on the
flexibility and creativity of their response
operations.  Questions of how to establish
more effective early warning systems and
contingency planning as well as entry sta-
tus determinations for immigration emer-
gencies, were raised that to this day have
not been answered.
With the end of the Cuban crisis, the
Haitian migration did not end, but rather
moved into a new phase.  The largest
monthly number of Haitians arriving on
boats in 1980 was 2,280 in October, when
only 10 more Cubans arrived.  While
monthly Haitians arrivals diminished
somewhat after that time, they continued
larger than prior to 1980 until the policy
of Coast Guard interdiction of boats at
sea and temporary detention of arrivals
was instituted in the second half of 1981.
By 1982, the numbers were smaller than
in 1988-1989.
The Coast Guard interdiction was part of
a new “program proposal” or contingency
plan announced by then Acting Commis-
sioner of INS Doris Meissner to the Sen-
ate Judiciary Sub-Committee on Immigra-
tion and Refugee Policy on July 31, 1981.
The plan combined strong prevention
measures to preclude a recurrence of the
Mariel crisis with the first legislative pro-
posal to regularize the status of the Cu-
ban-Haitian Entrants.  It also signalled that
the lead role in any future crisis of direct
arrivals in the U.S. under the Reagan Ad-
ministration would move from the De-
partment of State and the U.S. Coordina-
tor for Refugees to the Immigration and
Naturalization Service of the Department
of Justice.  The story of arrivals from Cen-
tral America in South Texas in 1988-1989
is a case in point.
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THE CENTRAL
AMERICAN
INFLUX ON THE
SOUTHERN
BORDER
Anticipation,
Information, and
Policy Options
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the fear
and anticipation of a major invasion of
illegal economic migrants and asylum
seekers from Central America animated
federal immigration and refugee policy
initiatives and border enforcement.4  By
1984, according to the UNHCR, more than
300,000 refugees were displaced and liv-
ing in camps both inside and outside their
home countries in Central America and
Mexico.  Just as President Carter’s remark
in May 1980 that the U.S. would greet the
Mariel Cubans “with open arms” became
a focal point for political responses posi-
tive and negative to the Cuban crisis, so
President Reagan helped set the national
agenda when he said that the civil wars
to the south would “create a tidal wave
of refugees—and this time they’ll be ‘feet
people’ and not boat people—swarming
our country seeking safe haven . . .”  These
remarks fed anxieties arising from the Cu-
ban and Haitian influxes and set up a po-
larization of attitudes—sympathetic or an-
tagonistic— toward the growing numbers
fleeing the Central American civil wars
and their resulting economic distress.
In 1982, the INS moved ahead with its
“Mass Migration Emergency Plan” prima-
rily for South Florida in 1982, which in-
volved mostly the same preventive mea-
sures announced by Acting Commissioner
Meissner the previous year: (1) interdic-
tion of boats bringing migrants by sea; (2)
detention of those who elude interdiction
until their status was adjudicated; and (3)
deportation of all who were not eligible
for resettlement.  A plan for a major revi-
sion of immigration legislation entitled the
Immigration Reform and Control Act
[IRCA] preoccupied the Administration
and Congress for several years before its
passage in 1986, leaving a plan for mass
immigration control on the U.S.-Mexican
border in draft during that period.
Proposals for the new legislation came
about because of the growing perception
that illegal migration to the U.S. from all
4 The question of “undocumented migrants
and migrants in an irregular situation” was
also high on the international agenda, with
a major intergovernmental conference
hosted by ICM in Geneva in April 1983.  A
comparative look at the policies of European
countries in this connection is in order but
outside the scope of this paper.
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around the world, but mostly from south
of the border, was out of control.  The
numbers of illegal residents in the U.S.
was variously estimated from three to ten
million persons.  The omnibus reform bill
was also the second stage of the immigra-
tion and refugee reform effort that started
with the Refugee Act of 1980 and the stud-
ies prepared by the Select Commission on
Immigration and Refugee Reform from
1979 to 1981.  The IRCA legislation ap-
proached border control on two fronts:
on the one hand, stronger regulation and
enforcement, including sanctions against
employers of illegal aliens; on the other
hand, provision of, among other measures,
a time-limited amnesty program for the
many illegal aliens already in the U.S.  The
concept was that once the U.S. could get
a handle on the undocumented alien
population already in long-term residence
and provide them with a humane option
to legalize their status, then the U.S. could
intensify its enforcement efforts to prevent
future illegal arrivals.
The intensifying civil strife in Central
America during the 1980s and the result-
ing refugee crisis served to confound these
immigration enforcement expectations.
The Department of State responded to the
refugee crisis in Central America by con-
tinuing to assert that the tradition of re-
gional hospitality and asylum was a vi-
able solution in Central America, although
contingent on the availability of interna-
tional funding.  Very few refugees pro-
cessed in the region were accepted for
resettlement in the U.S. under the Depart-
ment of State's refugee program.  Despite
U.S. and international funding in the re-
gion, a General Accounting Office [GAO]
report from July 1984 suggested that re-
sources in Central America were insuffi-
cient to care for all those in need in the
region.
Expanding Legal
Categories for
Migration
Emergencies: A
Trend for the
Eighties
As early as 1981, a movement began to
extend some form of temporary legal sta-
tus to those fleeing violence who arrived
in the U.S. and were not eligible for asy-
lum status.  At the extreme was the sanc-
tuary movement, in which churches as-
serted a right to provide temporary pro-
tection to such asylum-seekers without
color of law.  In Washington, bipartisan
political forces were lining up in support
of either an administrative status of “ex-
tended voluntary departure” [EVD] for
Salvadorans and Nicaraguans or for a
broader, legislated status offering “safe
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haven” to those fleeing civil strife in their
home countries and needing temporary
protection.
EVD is a discretionary measure provid-
ing temporary relief from deportation for
individuals or groups already in the U.S.
Granting temporary work authorization
as well, it is applied administratively by
the Department of Justice when the De-
partment of State determines that condi-
tions in the countries of origin are “un-
stable” or “unsettled” or show a pattern
of “denial of rights” that would put re-
turnees in danger even if they did not
have a “well-founded fear” of individual
persecution according to the definition of
a refugee.  Since 1960, EVD status had
been given for shorter or longer periods
of time to citizens of fourteen countries:
Cuba; Czechoslovakia; Cambodia; Viet-
nam; Laos; Lebanon; Ethiopia; Hungary;
Romania; Iran; Nicaragua; Uganda; Af-
ghanistan; and Poland.
For both political and practical reasons,
however, there was strong resistance in
the Reagan Administration to the appli-
cation of EVD to Salvadorans and other
Central Americans in the 1980s.  First,
there was the potential size of the prob-
lem, the vision of hundreds of thousands
of feet people arriving at the southern
border and their immigration impact.  The
problem, which was not resolved in pro-
posing such a temporary status, was how
to get the migrant to return to his home
country when conditions improved.  With
the granting of work authorization, EVD
became an obvious option for those seek-
ing to circumvent the employment limita-
tions of IRCA.  It hardly seemed feasible
that INS successfully could lift work au-
thorization and institute deportation pro-
ceedings for several hundred thousand
Central Americans once conditions im-
proved in their home countries.
Second, there were political and percep-
tual differences as to the conditions in El
Salvador and Nicaragua.  The Adminis-
tration, and those who felt the Adminis-
tration was on the right track in support-
ing the Salvadoran government and op-
posing the Nicaraguan government, por-
trayed conditions as improving in El Sal-
vador while human rights abuses in Nica-
ragua had become institutionalized.  Those
who opposed Administration policies
harkened back to the black days of the
Salvadoran death squads in 1979-1983 and
continued to feel the situation in El Salva-
dor was unstable and dangerous.  They
protested the fact that much larger per-
centages of Nicaraguans received favor-
able decisions on their asylum applications
than Salvadorans and accused the Admin-
istration of playing politics with human
lives.  The return of Salvadorans to El
Salvador under present conditions, they
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protested, was tantamount to
“refoulement” (forced return) and a vio-
lation of U.S. international obligations
under the U.N. Protocol on Refugees.
To answer critics of the U.S. policy of de-
portation or voluntary return of illegal
Salvadoran migrants who did not present
an adequate case for asylum, the Depart-
ment of State contracted with ICM, as an
independent international organization,
for a program of reception assistance and
follow-up for the returnees in order to
monitor whether they faced security prob-
lems upon their return.  Should security
problems arise, ICM was to offer them
assistance in migrating to other countries.
ICM was at that time prescreening and
assisting Salvadorans who might be ac-
cepted for special “safe haven” status in
Canada and Australia, among other coun-
tries.
In May 1987, another GAO report con-
cluded that the extent of problems expe-
rienced by returned Salvadorans was not
determinable on the basis of the data
which ICM, the U.S. Embassy in San Sal-
vador, and various human rights and
church organizations were able to collect.
While the Department of State was quot-
ing ICM data as if it showed that return-
ees had run into little or no personal dan-
ger upon return, ICM was wary of mak-
ing broad assumptions from its limited
data and asserted logistical limitations to
its methods, which were based on meet-
ing short-term material assistance needs,
not legal protection or human rights cri-
teria.  The other organizations had col-
lected data at different, and thus incom-
parable, times in the fluid and changing
situation and on incomparable popula-
tions.  While there was disagreement on
the extent of individually targeted violence
in El Salvador, there was more general
agreement on all sides of the political
spectrum that returnees to El Salvador
would face the same range of violence that
others in El Salvador faced during the civil
war.
In the second half of the decade, as illegal
arrivals continued to trickle in along the
long and porous southern border, critics
of the Administration began to propose
legislation to put carefully delineated pro-
cedures and criteria for a “safe haven”
status into law, rather than leaving the
only protection against deportation in
times of conflict, barring refugee or asy-
lum status, to the discretionary authority
of any particular administration.  Coun-
try-specific legislation for Salvadorans and
Nicaraguans (the Moakley-Deconcini bill)
was passed four times by the House of
Representatives but, under threat of fili-
buster, never reached the Senate floor for
a vote.  A new general status, Temporary
Protected Status [TPS], was finally enacted
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into law in the Immigration Act of 1990
[IMMACT] and applied first to Salvador-
ans.
Other remedies utilized were extensive
court challenges of INS asylum adjudica-
tion procedures.  On April 29, 1988, a U.S.
District Court judge ordered the INS to
stop “employing threats, misrepresenta-
tion, subterfuge, and other forms of coer-
cion to induce Salvadorans to accept ‘vol-
untary departure’ to El Salvador.”  The
judge held that the 1980 Refugee Act
should be interpreted to mandate that
those in deportation proceedings had a
right to be informed of the possible rem-
edy of applying for asylum to obtain re-
lief from deportation.
Misguided Policies in
South Texas 1988-
1989
All this controversy aside, it was not until
1988 that mass numbers of asylum-seek-
ers sought again to enter the U.S. in an
uncontrolled manner as in Florida in 1980.
Even then, the “crisis” atmosphere that
pervaded South Texas briefly in 1988-1989
could be said to have been caused by an
ill-advised, but largely misinterpreted ad
hoc statement of Attorney General Edwin
Meese and by localized policy changes by
the INS District Office in South Texas.  All
the Attorney General had said was that
Nicaraguan applicants for asylum who
had fled their country on the basis of a
well-founded fear of persecution would
be considered positively.  But, this restate-
ment of basic asylum policy was taken
both by Nicaraguans and by some INS
officials in its context without mention of
Salvadorans as a political indication that
Nicaraguans would receive preferential
treatment for their asylum applications.
As a result, apprehension of illegal Nica-
raguans along the South Texas border
jumped exponentially, reaching nearly 50
percent of all border apprehensions, or
14,243 persons, in the Harlingen District
by the last six months of 1988.  Probably
due to greater availability of information
on the asylum process and work authori-
zation following the District Court deci-
sion, asylum requests from all groups from
Central America—Salvadorans, Guatema-
lans and Hondurans, as well as the Nica-
raguans—grew to exceed 50,000 for FY
1988, according to a Congressional staff
report, which also predicted that if arriv-
als and applications for asylum contin-
ued to increase at the same rate, there
would be 100,000 in FY 1989, a figure that
was beginning to look more like the Cu-
ban crisis numbers.
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At first, most of the asylum seekers arriv-
ing in the Rio Grande Valley of South
Texas received work authorization and
were allowed to travel to their intended
destinations to stay with family or friends
and to apply for asylum with the local
INS office.  But, as numbers increased,
facilities in such locations as Miami and
Los Angeles, where there were anchor
communities of Central Americans acting
as magnets, became overburdened, and
local communities as well as the INS be-
gan to fear no end in sight to the influx.
In response, the INS District Director in
South Texas instituted a series of control
and deterrence mechanisms on December
16, 1988, requiring that all asylum appli-
cants file their applications immediately
at the INS Harlingen facility and have their
initial interview there before travelling to
any other location.  A roadblock on the
highway out of the Valley effectively kept
aliens from travelling north without
proper papers.
Unforeseen
Consequences:
Bringing the Long-
Expected Crisis
Applications for asylum quickly rose to
some 6,000 a month at the Harlingen INS
office, which was not equipped to handle
the numbers, and backlogs of asylum
applicants were quoted as high as 20,000.
These numbers may seem relatively mi-
nor compared to the 100,000 Cuban en-
trants in April and May 1980, but the
homeless migrants were very obvious in
the small cities of Harlingen and Browns-
ville.  With national media watching, they
were wandering the streets, sleeping out
in front of the INS facility, illegally squat-
ting in an abandoned motel, and camping
out in vacant lots by the end of Decem-
ber, despite a sudden spate of cold
weather.
The border communities, which were al-
ready suffering from economic depression,
with 18 percent unemployment, were out-
raged and sought relief from the unfair
burden put on them by INS procedures.
The travel restrictions imposed by the INS
forced the asylum-seekers to stay in the
Valley rather than allowing for the natu-
ral distribution of the social burden to
other parts of the country where family
and friends could assist the new arrivals.
Some in the border communities reacted
with hostility to the newcomers and the
situation was getting explosive.  Thus, an
ad hoc plan to relieve burdens on other
communities and INS offices, while at-
tempting to deter new arrivals, had actu-
ally become in large part the cause of a
localized immigration emergency in South
Texas.
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National media and humanitarian and
human rights groups emphasized the suf-
fering of the asylum-seekers and the al-
leged violations of their due process rights
that the new INS system appeared to
cause.  INS was accused of failing to fol-
low its own rulemaking by not giving ad-
equate notice of proposed procedural
changes that would have allowed the com-
munity to testify to the social conse-
quences of the new policy and would have
provided time for raising any legal chal-
lenges to the procedures.
Because of the paucity of legal services in
the Valley, the travel restrictions deprived
asylum applicants adequate information
and legal counsel concerning their rights
under American law.  In 1989, there were
only three lawyers in the Rio Grande
Valley able to offer pro bono legal services
to the asylum-seekers and only three in
private practice who would assist for a
fee.  Four voluntary groups providing
legal assistance also utilized three or four
volunteer paralegals among them at any
one time.  Taxi drivers and other unscru-
pulous individuals were profiteering from
the asylum applicants, filling out obvi-
ously fraudulent applications for them at
a price, which applicants were willing to
pay in hopes just to get out of the Valley
and join relatives elsewhere.
At least two of the voluntary groups were
politically motivated in opposition to U.S.
policies and actions in Central American
and refused to serve Nicaraguans, whom,
they were convinced, were Contras or
Contra deserters, and whom, they felt, had
the protection of the Attorney General in
any case.  An outside observer indepen-
dently interviewing some of the asylum
seekers noted that this political assump-
tion was false.  Many of the Nicaraguans
were indeed deserters, but from forced
conscription and re-enlistment into the
Sandinista army.  Basically nonpolitical,
they fled their country in disillusionment
and despair at the continuing civil war
and impossible living conditions for their
families.  A Congressional staff study
group concurred with the view that there
was no single reason for the sudden esca-
lation in Central American arrivals, not-
ing that it appeared that many were now
simply “giving up” on their homelands.
Crisis Resolution
Class action litigation undertaken jointly
by both community and out-of-state at-
torneys resulted in a temporary restrain-
ing order from the U.S. District Court in
January 1989 requiring the INS to revert
to its previous policy of allowing asylum-
seekers to be transferred to other districts.
The overload of asylum seekers in the
Valley dispersed around the country early
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in 1989, “scattered to the four winds,” as
Attorney General Thornburgh described
it.  INS reported that of 2,541 applicants
in Harlingen who had requested that their
files be transferred for adjudication to
Miami, only 371 appeared for their inter-
views in Miami 14 days later.
While the restraining order was in effect,
INS and the Department of Justice had
time to develop a plan for addressing the
rising number of “frivolous” asylum ap-
plications from Central Americans.  On
February 20, 1989, when the restraining
order was lifted, INS announced and in-
stituted a program with the necessary
staffing which, in brief, provided for ac-
celerated adjudication of affirmative asy-
lum claims, immediate detention and ini-
tiation of deportation proceedings for
applicants whose claims appeared frivo-
lous or without apparent merit, and hold-
ing camps for those detained for deporta-
tion or awaiting appeals.
The Community Relations Service of the
Department of Justice was mandated to
insure that families were kept together,
which was possible in facilities managed
by the American Red Cross, and that
adequate juvenile facilities were available
for unaccompanied minors.  Three such
centers were funded in rural areas or small
towns not far from Harlingen, and the
unaccompanied minors, mostly single
male teenagers, were cared for in relatively
pleasant surroundings for a few weeks
until they could be processed out to rela-
tives or foster families willing to act as
guardians while asylum applications were
processed.  The INS alien detention facil-
ity for single adults was located at
Bayview, Texas, in a prison-like setting.
The care with which the new program was
developed and instituted made it immune
to further successful class action legal
challenges, and the program, which at-
tained its goals from the INS point of view,
resulted in significant deterrence to po-
tentially frivolous asylum applications
from Central Americans, while expedit-
ing affirmative applications with merit.
After the 9,502 pending asylum applica-
tions from January and February 1989
were dispersed, there were only 975 cu-
mulative applications in the Rio Grande
district through October 23, 1989.  These
figures compare to 28,541 affirmative asy-
lum applicants in 1988.
Apprehensions thus dropped precipitously
after the deterrent effect of the new pro-
cedures kicked in.  Guatemalan and Hon-
duran monthly apprehensions leveled off
at or below monthly levels at the end of
1987.  Figures for Salvadoran apprehen-
sions in September, October, and Novem-
ber 1989 were significantly lower than
comparable months two years earlier in
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1987, while Nicaraguan numbers re-
mained about double the 1987 monthly
levels but ceased accelerating.
The bipartisan Senate subcommittee staff
report declared the new INS policy to-
ward South Texas “appropriate” and “ef-
fective in deterring frivolous asylum ap-
plications,” although “certain adjust-
ments” were recommended to assure
greater opportunities for nonfrivolous
applicants.  The report also noted that the
local community had been remarkably
tolerant of the Central Americans, while
at the same time local leaders were un-
derstandably impatient with the sluggish
federal response.  In Harlingen itself, as
crowds of Central American asylum ap-
plicants gathered around the INS office
and were eating, sleeping, and carrying
out personal functions in public while
saving their places in line for processing
of their applications, the town mayor even
went so far as to padlock the INS office
for code violations.
What is distinctive about the South Texas
situation, as in the case of the initial Hai-
tian arrivals ten years earlier, is the ad hoc
nature of the federal response.  Then INS
Commissioner Alan Nelson was known
to give considerable leeway in authority
to INS District Directors.  The emergency
contingency plans proposed in the early
1980s were not finalized until the 1990s.
In the meantime, INS District Directors
appeared to be in a tug-of-war with Fed-
eral District Courts, formulating enforce-
ment and deterrent policies without much
attention to the niceties of rulemaking
procedures and then having to pull back
from them in the middle of a crisis.
Unlike the Cuban crisis, there was never
any intention to consider the asylum seek-
ers in South Texas for paroled entry as a
group.  However, the long and tedious
process of individual asylum adjudication
and appeal, not to mention deportation
hearings for those denied asylum, meant
that most of those seeking asylum would
remain in the U.S. for some time, even
under the accelerated procedures.   Delay
was, indeed, a strategy of choice used by
attorneys handling asylum cases.  A study
by the GAO in January 1987 concluded
that, even when asylum applications were
denied, few denied applicants were actu-
ally being deported.
A class action suit originally brought in
1985, American Baptist Churches v.
Thornburgh, was finally settled in Decem-
ber 1990, with the agreement by the U.S.
government to readjudicate the asylum
claims of all Salvadorans and Guatema-
lans who had been denied since 1980
because of discriminatory treatment in
government determinations of asylum,
deportation, and EVD.  The settlement of
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the so-called “ABC” case, combined with
the TPS, has meant that only a very small
percentage of Central Americans who ar-
rived in the 1980s have ever been de-
ported.  Nearly 200,000 originally regis-
tered for “ABC” or TPS (the registration
requirements were combined to save on
costs); four years later, with repeated ex-
tension of the status or delay of deporta-
tion they still are in the country even
though the civil war and economic crisis
which precipitated their migration is
largely over.5
THE 1980s
EXPERIENCE
Lessons Learned
For a coordinated federal response and
Presidential declaration of a national im-
migration emergency, no consistent defi-
nition without color of separate bureau-
cracies appears to have emerged from the
experiences of the 1980s.  The President,
rather is left with a palette from which he
can pick or choose depending upon which
agencies he wishes to activate.  All of the
following might be part of the definition:
• Imminent danger either to the lives of
those arriving or to residents in the
community of arrival, or both;
• Capacity of local officials and local of-
fices of federal agencies to manage a
benchmark number of direct arrivals
within a limited period of time;
• Security and social services required
and their availability locally;  legal
status or potential legal status of the
immigrants;  manner of arrival and
physical condition of those arriving;
economic and/or social impact on the
community;
• Duration or potential duration of the
crisis; and
• International and domestic political re-
percussions.
The lack of more specific triggering de-
vices and the bureaucratic politics of the
federal response appears to contribute
significantly to what some have called the
federal molasses and to the frustration of
local communities in the face of an influx.
In the Cuban crisis, it took weeks before
a strong federal presence took over recep-
tion, processing, housing, and security in
Florida, and it was months before the
question of federal reimbursement of ser-
vices to states and localities was resolved
through legislation introduced by a Florida
congressman.
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Some of the delay is probably inherent in
the nature of the crisis, both in the objec-
tive, but unpredictable, numerical aspects
of an influx of people and in the more
subjective legal and foreign policy aspects
that must be considered.  Flexible
policymaking has characterized the U.S.
approach to immigration and refugee
admissions and is unlikely to be elimi-
nated entirely through contingency plan-
ning, if experience is any guide, because
of this mixture of humanitarian, legal, and
foreign policy considerations, and because
of the participation in the decisionmaking
of a variety of institutions with different
agendas.  While response may be delayed,
there are some times when such delays
are useful.  The delegation of authority
for quick response to federal district offi-
cials, as in the South Texas situation, re-
sulted in inappropriate and inhumane
actions and a social and legal crisis that
might have been avoided.
Another question is raised by the South
Texas situation in which the immigrants
were allowed to disperse to other regions
of the country: Was there ever a real
emergency?  Except for the pressures on
INS District Offices of processing large
numbers of asylum applications, it is not
clear that the country or even the South
Texas region was ever overwhelmed by
the influx until movement was restricted
to a limited region.  Attorney General
Thornburgh’s remarks that the asylum-
seekers were mostly scattered to the four
winds never to be seen again imply that
the country could absorb the illegal im-
migrants without major distress or fed-
eral assistance.
In contrast, the large numbers of Cubans
arriving and desiring to settle in South
Florida presented a major social and eco-
nomic problem, even when the commu-
nity was enthusiastic about resettling
them.
Aspects of
Contingency Planning
Once an immigration emergency is recog-
nized, prompt action is paramount to
avoid human tragedy and/or political
disaster.  Both the Cuban-Haitian and the
Central American influxes demonstrated
a confusion in priorities and authorities
just at a time when clear thinking and
action would have been helpful.  Evidence
from these two crises points to the fol-
lowing areas where advance decisions for
contingency planning in the case of an
immigration emergency are needed.
1. Clear articulation of the national
interest.   Criteria shold be devel-
oped to use in determining whether
legal, humanitarian, or foreign policy
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concerns should take precedence.
Such criteria may include in the for-
eign policy area: a balancing of U.S.
domestic impact against the condi-
tions in the country of origin of the
migrant; the circumstances of depar-
ture and personal condition of the
illegal entrant; and international
standards and treaty obligations, as
well as bilateral relations.  From a
humanitarian, domestic point of
view, consideration should be given
to: the size of the group and the pre-
dictability of the flow; other imme-
diate international options; and re-
lationship with existing ethnic com-
munities in the U.S. that could re-
lieve federal, state, or local authori-
ties of immediate responsibility for
a short or long stay.
Legal consideration may have to be
delayed in order to meet these value-
oriented criteria and to serve the
overall national interest.  Court cases
in the 1980s pushed INS toward
more humane and equitable proce-
dures, and the public debate over
status issues that resulted in TPS
legislation in 1990 made it clear that
humanitarian concerns are a major
component of the national interest.
Whatever the legal status of the
Cuban influx, humanitarian and po-
litical circumstance dictated a policy
of acceptance, and relationships with
the Cuban-American community
made possible the immediate re-
settlement of the majority of those
arriving.  Had a decision been made
at the outset to follow this path of
least resistance, then refugee services
through existing procedures might
have been made available immedi-
ately.  Indecision and inconsistency
in policies, combined with negative
media portrayals, contributed to the
national anxiety.
2. Recognition of the nature of ser-
vices needed.  If resettlement or tem-
porary protection of the arriving
group seems the most likely solu-
tion, determination should be made
as to whether they are to be treated
and provided services like refugees
or like immigrants, whatever their
eventual legal status.
Refugees have particular character-
istics of vulnerability caused by sud-
den flight: no material preparation
in advance (“leaving with just the
clothes on their backs”); an involun-
tary or unplanned migration based
on fear, not anticipation of a chosen
new life; and estrangement from
family members and culture.  Both
the procedures laid out in the Refu-
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gee Act of 1980 to ease resettlement
and an experienced cadre of federal
officials, state, local, and voluntary
agencies consider these factors in
planning for reception and place-
ment, health services, housing, ori-
entation, and income-producing ac-
tivity for the refugee.  If the arriving
group has refugee-like characteris-
tics, as the Cuban group did, then it
would appear more practical to ac-
tivate immediately the existing refu-
gee services rather than penalize the
group, jeopardize successful resettle-
ment through delays or diminution
of services, and place unwarranted
burdens on impacted communities.
Immigrants arriving voluntarily on
a legal or illegal basis, on the other
hand, may have existing contacts
and planned resources for integrat-
ing themselves into the economy and
finding their place in the culture.
The cost of individual refugee resettle-
ment can be discussed in concrete
terms; the cost of immigrant resettle-
ment cannot be discussed except in
the most general terms because the
immigrant is largely free-living.  In
the long run, the smaller group of
illegal arrivals in South Texas and
other asylum-seekers who trickled in
during the 1980s followed the im-
migrant pattern of resettlement, dis-
persing themselves around the coun-
try and using their own contacts to
resettle and find work, whether or
not they ever regularized their legal
status.
Community concentration and im-
pact, as well as aggregate numbers
and conditions of the migrants, also
must be considered in determining
whether to activate federal services.
State and local governments view
refugees and indigent migrants as a
segment of the dependent popula-
tion that may require cash assistance,
medical services, job training, and
schools.  Gradual increases or
changes in such populations can be
accommodated, but a sudden influx,
as in South Florida and South Texas,
is seen as an imposition of a federal
problem on the local community,
demanding consultation between
federal and local officials on policy
and on federal impact assistance.
3.  Adequacy of legal criteria.  Only
once these primarily humanitarian
and domestic considerations are re-
solved for mass arrivals, can ques-
tions of legal status and procedures
adequately be approached.  As was
seen in the South Texas situation,
legal status issues and procedural
changes took precedence over hu-
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manitarian concerns and community
impact, resulting in a crisis that
could have been avoided.  In the
Cuban situation, the attempt to em-
phasize international responsibility
faltered and was finally buried by
the burdens of the domestic situa-
tion.
While a clear articulation of the na-
tional interest in case of an immi-
gration emergency was not forth-
coming in the 1980s, legal categories
open for discussion included: immi-
grant, refugee, asylee, and parole
status; the special Cuban-Hait ian
entrant (status pending); the possi-
bility of EVD; “safe haven;” and TPS.
This proliferation of categories may
be seen as a reflection of the diffi-
culties in reaching a “merciful” de-
termination using legal statutes and
procedures.  It may be that the
Geneva Convention definition of a
refugee is not adequate for U.S. situ-
ations, or at least not when applied
on an individual basis.
New INS procedures, promulgated
in the 1990s with careful regard for
the instructions of the courts, are
considerably less biased in asylum
determinations, but the applicant
still  faces long waits for adjudica-
tion and, as in the case of the Salva-
dorans, still is unlikely to be de-
ported quickly if turned down.
Americans may have to listen to
their own voices on the question of
status.  Is the U.S. really willing to
take punitive steps against large
numbers of people coming to this
country in an immigration emer-
gency?
4.  Alternatives to domestic resettle-
ment.  While it is beyond the scope
of this paper to discuss alternatives
to domestic resettlement in detail, a
few remarks are in order.  Contin-
gency planning requires advance
thought as to the potential for third-
country resettlement or internation-
alization, deterrence, detention, in-
terdiction at sea and deportation.  In
addition, although the issues have
yet to be effectively approached,
various forms of return assistance to
those whose status has come to an
end because of improvements in
their home country should be con-
sidered.  There are international
models that combine return assis-
tance to the individual migrant and
his family with economic develop-
ment assistance to the country of
return.
5. Handling of special cases.  Every
mass movement of peoples has a
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different demographic composition.
On the basis of experience in other
refugee or mass immigration emer-
gencies, models of assistance to
women, children, single men, inva-
lids, the mentally ill, and criminal
elements may be available and
should be considered in contingency
planning.  The Refugee Act of 1980
made specific provision for unac-
companied refugee children in rec-
ognition of the frequency with which
this special group appears in refu-
gee movements and of the special
services they require.  Because the
Refugee Act was not used at the
outset for setting up a services for
the Cuban entrants, the needs of un-
accompanied minors initially were
not met adequately, even though
they could have been anticipated.
Marielito Cubans, who had come
from prisons or mental hospitals, ex-
hibited extreme characteristics not
necessarily normal among mass im-
migration populations.
6. Preparation and coordination.  In
1993, the Department of State pro-
posed the abolition of the position
of U.S. Coordinator for Refugees that
had been created by the Refugee Act
of 1980.  There has not been a politi-
cal whimper to greet its demise.  In
the years since 1980, the Coordina-
tor, usually a political appointee with
little experience with the extensive
federal bureaucracy, could not carry
out fully his/her role.  Even at the
time of the Cuban-Haitian crisis, the
Director of the CHTF reported both
to the Coordinator’s office and to
the White House.
The problem with this separate per-
manent office for a coordinator is
that the working staffs are in other
offices, departments, or agencies,
and under other supervision, rules,
and traditions.  At the Department
of State, the Coordinator relied for
substance and operations on the
Refugee Bureau, which was headed
by a Director with Assistant Secre-
tary status.  The Coordinator’s posi-
tion was even weaker in relation to
every other department and agency.
In 1981, the Select Commission had
recommended that the Coordinator’s
office be in the White House.  Who-
ever is appointed by the President
to coordinate an immigration emer-
gency must have the authority and
experience in the government to
carry out the responsibility effec-
tively.
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Final Remarks
An immigration emergency is by its very
nature an unanticipated situation.  Con-
tingency planning may anticipate differ-
ent kinds of emergencies, project special
situations concerning individual countries,
and make plans for deterrents or man-
agement.  Both the Department of State
and the Department of Justice have estab-
lished committees to do so.  If successful,
contingency planning—both administra-
tive and legislative—will avert an emer-
gency.  There is no such thing as budget-
ing for contingencies, nor can the Presi-
dent be certain in advance which agency
or department should lead in any specific
emergency.  What is certain is that clear
values and goals, a national interest, must
be articulated that all will adhere to when
carrying out what, of necessity, may be ad
hoc procedures if, and when, an emergency
occurs.
APPENDIX
Refugee Act of
1980 Definition
of Refugee
The term ‘refugee’ means (A) any person
who is outside any country of such
person’s nationality or in the case of a
person having no nationality, is outside
any country in which such person last ha-
bitually resided, and is unable to avail
himself or herself of the protection of, that
country because of persecution or a well-
founded fear of persecution on account of
race, religion, nationality, membership in
a particular social group, or political opin-
ion, or (B) in such special circumstances
as the President after appropriate consul-
tation . . . may specify, any person who is
within the country of such person’s na-
tionality or, in the case of a person having
no nationality, within the country in which
such person is habitually residing, and
who is persecuted or who has a well-
founded fear of persecution on account of
race, religion, nationality, membership in
a particular social group, or political opin-
ion.  The term ‘refugee’ does not include
any person who ordered, incited, assisted,
or otherwise participated in the persecu-
tion of any person on account of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a par-
ticular social group, or political opinion.
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INTRODUCTION
This paper examines the relationship be-
tween U.S. immigration, foreign policy,
and national security.  It assumes that the
primary interest of the United States is its
national security and that the ultimate goal
of U.S. foreign policy is to promote U.S.
national security.  The paper outlines the
ways in which immigration has been af-
fected by the national security interests
and foreign policies of the United States
as well as the way in which immigration
has affected national security concerns and
resulting foreign policy.
NATIONAL
SECURITY
The initial difficulty in determining
whether immigration to the United States
constitutes a national security threat is
determining what constitutes national se-
curity.  Terms such as “national interest”
and “national security” do not have a
universally agreed-upon meaning.  The
term “security” covers a range of goals so
wide that highly divergent policies can be
interpreted as politics of security (Wolfers
1982:118).
Traditional notions of national security are
represented by theorists such as Hans J.
Morgenthau for whom the national inter-
est contained “. . . two elements, one that
is logically required and in that sense
necessary, and one that is variable and
determined by circumstances”
(Morgenthau 1982:972).  The survival of
the state is the necessary element of na-
tional interest and the minimum require-
ments of the national interest are the
integrity of the nation’s territory, its po-
litical institutions, and its culture
(Morgenthau 1982:973).  It was this theory
of national security that held sway—
largely uncontested—throughout the Cold
War period.
Since the 1980s—and accelerating with the
end of the Cold War—the content of
national security concerns has expanded
from the traditional focus on military
threats to borders and governments to
include nonmilitary sources of insecurity
(Rogers & Copeland 1993:12).  An example
of this more expansive notion is advanced
by Richard Ullman who considers as a
threat to a state’s security any actions or
events that “threaten significantly to nar-
row the range of policy choices available
to the government of a state or to private,
non-governmental entities (persons,
groups, corporations) within the state”
(Ullman 1983:133).
In a similar vein, the January 31, 1992
Summit Declaration of the United Nations
Security Council acknowledged that
threats to international peace and secu-
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rity can come from nonmilitary sources
of instability in the economic, social, hu-
manitarian, and ecological fields and that
such conflicts fall within the Security
Council’s sphere of action.  The Declara-
tion also called for election monitoring,
human rights verification, and repatria-
tion of refugees as integral parts of the
Security Council’s efforts to maintain in-
ternational peace and security (Rogers &
Copeland 1993:12).
However, these recent broadened ideas of
national security  stretch  the concept to a
point where its application would lead to
illogical results.  Under the recent defini-
tions, a military attack against the United
States is equivalent to a totalitarian re-
gime refusing to allow a United States-
based human rights organization to
operate in its country.  Clearly the former
represents a threat to national security and
warrants a military response.  Just as
clearly, the latter does not.  Therefore, this
paper treats national security as it has been
defined in the traditional sense.  As will
be demonstrated, immigration can be a
threat to traditional ideas of national se-
curity even if one concludes it has not yet
posed such a threat to the United States.
The recently expanded definitions of na-
tional security, therefore, elevate interests
that Morgenthau would have considered
as variable or secondary to necessary and
make it easier to classify immigrants and
refugees as national security threats.
Morgenthau wrote that a state can never
compromise or trade a primary interest.
Yet the history of United States immigra-
tion and refugee policy is a series of com-
promises and trade-offs.  Thus, it is fair
to conclude that for the United States
immigration is a variable interest, one
which at any particular time it chooses to
regard as a national interest (Morgenthau
1958:66).
Some argue that current immigration
poses a threat to U.S. national security.
They see immigration as a threat to the
language and culture, destroying the sense
of nationhood.  Others believe immigrants
an economic threat, taking jobs from U.S.
citizens and imposing prohibitive costs by
their use of social services.  Still others
draw a relationship between immigration
and terrorism or increased crime.
Alternatively, some argue that immigra-
tion bolsters our national security.  Ac-
cess to talent in a properly-regulated
immigration system strengthens American
resources in science and the humanities.
Examples abound of American-immigrant
Nobel laureates, renowned inventors,
business leaders, and scientists who have
made immeasurable contributions to our
prosperity (U.S. Commission on Immigra-
tion Reform 1995:23).  For example, the
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admission of scientists fleeing from Ger-
many and Italy before World War II was
instrumental in the United States being
the first to produce atomic weapons and
gave the U.S. a distinct advantage in
nuclear research.  Highly-skilled immi-
grants supply talented workers for
America’s world-class medical establish-
ment, engineering sector, and higher edu-
cation (U.S. Commission on Immigration
Reform 1995:22).  These immigrants en-
hance the research and development ca-
pacity of U.S. firms and bring foreign
language skills, contacts, knowledge, and
experience that appear to offer a unique
advantage in a global business commu-
nity.
Strong immigrant support for family val-
ues strengthen and reinvigorate American
values.   Immigrants often play important
and visible roles at the highest levels of
the U.S. military and federal and local
government.  Renowned immigrant art-
ists, performers, and athletes strengthen
and diversify cultural institutions (U.S.
Commission on Immigration Reform
1995:23).  The United States has been the
world’s largest multiethnic and
multicultural society, successfully integrat-
ing new immigrants from diverse heri-
tages.
MIGRANT
EFFECTS
Myron Weiner identified five broad cat-
egories in which refugees or migrants may
be perceived as either a threat or a benefit
to the sending country, to the receiving
country, or to relations between the two
(Weiner 1992/93:105-06).
Opposition to Home
Country Government
When refugees and migrants are opposed
to the regime of their home country, they
can threaten relations between sending
and receiving countries in several ways.
A host country’s decision to grant asylum
based on a finding that a fear of persecu-
tion exists may be treated by the home
country as interference in its affairs.  The
People’s Republic of China responded in
this manner to the 1990 U.S. congressional
debate over whether Chinese students
should be permitted to remain in the
United States because of persecution in
China.  When a host country actively
supports a refugee group’s effort to over-
throw the homeland government, such as
in the Bay of Pigs or United States sup-
port for the contras against the Nicaraguan
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government, tensions are certain to be ex-
acerbated.  However, whether the national
security of the host state is threatened
depends on the abilities of the home coun-
try to respond against the host.  For ex-
ample, although the Cuban government
may object to the opposition activities of
Cuban-Americans, Cuba lacks the ability
to pose a credible threat to U.S. national
security.  Nevertheless, the activities of
migrants still can create foreign policy
problems for host countries, even if those
problems do not pose a threat to national
security.
Immigration from hostile nations also can
advance U.S. national security.  Immi-
grants from these countries can be a valu-
able source of intelligence, they can use
their freedoms here to publicize repres-
sive or discriminatory practices at home,
they can fundraise and supply opposition
political movements supported by the
United States and in the extreme case,
such as the Bay of Pigs, provide the per-
sonnel for military action or covert opera-
tions against U.S. enemies.
Immigrants also can strengthen America’s
political and economic ties with other
nations.  The knowledge they bring with
them and their ties to their home country
enhance the ability of the United States to
understand other countries and cultures.
Immigrants also can disseminate informa-
tion about the U.S. that may improve other
countries’ understanding of us.  Immigra-
tion from friendly countries can serve as
a safety valve that increases the political
stability of these states.
Political/Security
Threat
The second category identified by Weiner
is perception of migrants or refugees as a
political threat or security threat to the
regime of the host country.  This was
exemplified in the bombing of the World
Trade Center by a group of Middle East-
ern immigrants and asylum seekers and
the murder of several CIA employees, both
in the fall of 1992.  Although incidents of
this nature have been relatively isolated,
the perception of a link between immi-
gration and terrorism leads to legislative
action such as the Violent Crime Control
and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 and
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996 that responded to
perceptions of problems, including asy-
lum abuse by potential terrorists, the in-
ability to remove criminal aliens from the
United States, and porous borders that
make illegal entry far too easy.
Legislators from diverse ends of the po-
litical spectrum, such as Lamar Smith (R-
TX), Chairman of the House
Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims
and Edward M. Kennedy (D-MA) can
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sound remarkably similar on these sub-
jects:  Smith said “our immigration laws
and procedures are being overwhelmed
by applicants for asylum, many of whom
are making fraudulent claims and some
of whom are terrorists (U.S. House of Rep-
resentatives 1996:1); Kennedy said “a clear
sign of the crisis in illegal immigration is
that we have lost control over the process
for removing illegal, and especially, crimi-
nal aliens from the United States” (U.S.
Senate 1993:1).  The 1997 arrest of Ghazi
Abu Maizar in Brooklyn  for plotting to
bomb the New York City subway system,
after being caught three times trying to
sneak into the United States and then
being released pending an asylum appli-
cation that acknowledged that Israel con-
sidered him to be a terrorist, demonstrates
the degree of difficulty in addressing this
problem (Barry 1997:1).  The ease with
which radical Islamic preacher Sheik
Omar Abdel Rahman entered and exited
the United States, despite being on the
Department of State’s watch list of poten-
tial security threats, and the use of the
asylum process to remain in the U.S. by
those involved in the World Trade Center
bombing and murder of the two CIA
employees clearly spurred legislative ac-
tion.
The United States, like any host country,
will remain vulnerable to reprisals (such
as terrorist attacks) from sending coun-
tries who believe that the United States is
too supportive of opposition political
groups.  Terrorist attacks also may be a
response to U.S. foreign policy actions,
such as support for a particular country,
economic embargo, or military action.
Although the relative paucity of such at-
tacks by immigrants to date is strong evi-
dence that U.S. national security is not
currently threatened by immigration, more
intensive measures to prevent the entry
of potential terrorist threats is warranted.
Immigrant groups also may pose a secu-
rity threat to host countries by smuggling
arms or people, forming alliances with
domestic opposition groups, or participat-
ing in drug trafficking.  Palestinians be-
came an important political force in Jordan
and Lebanon and, ultimately, engaged in
armed conflict in those countries.  When
a host country arms refugees for their
struggle against the home country, they
create risks that the refugees may seek to
dictate the host country’s policies toward
the sending country or invite armed in-
tervention from the sending country.
Hutu refugees who launched attacks
against Rwanda from Zaire undoubtedly
were instrumental in provoking Rwandan
support for Zairian rebels who recently
overthrew the regime of  Mobutu Sese
Seko.
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Another threat is the smuggling of aliens
into a country.  Smuggling into the U.S.
from China is estimated to be as high as
several hundred thousand people per year
(Zimmerman 1995:101).  Not only is the
smuggling illegal, those smuggled in of-
ten are forced to endure abusive living
and working conditions while they, and
or their friends and relatives, attempt to
pay  smugglers’ fees that can be as high
as $35,000 per person (Burdman 1993:A1).
The recent case of deaf Mexicans in New
York City, the drowning of smuggled
Chinese immigrants after the grounding
of the smuggling ship Golden Venture, the
smuggling and virtual enslaving of illegal
aliens by employees of the Georgia Peach
Harvester Lane Packing Company all at-
test to the breadth of this problem.  In
1993, in response to such incidents, Presi-
dent Clinton declared the problem to be a
national security threat and charged the
National Security Council with responsi-
bility for dealing with it (Russell 1995:83-
4).
Smuggling of immigrants into the United
States is believed to be a $3 billion per-
year business (Burdman 1993:A1).  Groups
engaged in smuggling also are linked to
narcotics trafficking.  The immense prof-
its to be made in smuggling immigrants
has attracted established crime rings that
now control the smuggling trade.  Efforts
to control the smuggling trade have led
to gang warfare in the United States, as in
the murder of four members of the Fuk
Ching gang in New Jersey in 1993 (Hanley
1993:B1).  In response to the criminal
nature of these activities, the Violent Crime
Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994
increased the penalties for most alien
smuggling offenses.
Cultural Threat or
Contribution
A violation of the norms of the host coun-
try may be regarded as a threat to basic
values and a threat to national security.
How a host community defines itself and
how they decide who can be admitted into
the community will determine the rights
and privileges of those permitted to enter
and whether the host culture regards a
migrant community as potential citizens.
These host country norms often are re-
flected in a state’s citizenship laws, those
based on jus sanguinis, citizenship based
on that of the parents, regardless of place
of birth and jus soli, citizenship based on
place of birth.  The United States recog-
nizes both the jus soli and jus sanguinis
doctrines (Goldstein & Piazza 1996:519).
Thus, United States citizenship may be
acquired by either birth or naturalization.
Persons born here automatically are citi-
zens; in most situations a child born
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abroad to U.S. citizens also is considered
a U.S. citizen.  U.S. naturalization law re-
quires applicants to demonstrate knowl-
edge of the U.S. Constitution and form of
government and swear an oath of alle-
giance, thus political knowledge and loy-
alty are sufficient norms for citizenship.
This is a valuable method of assimilating
new immigrants as it requires a conscious
choice and effort for immigrants to obtain
U.S. citizenship.
Regardless of the manner in which citi-
zenship is obtained, most societies react
with alarm when they perceive that there
are too many immigrants who do not
share the culture and national identity of
the host population.  The United States
has suffered from this perception periodi-
cally throughout its history.   Racist theo-
ries held that certain nationalities were
culturally inassimilable and racially infe-
rior (Fuchs 1983:300).  The 1882 Chinese
Exclusion Act, the 1907 “Gentlemen’s
Agreement” with Japan, and the U.S. Im-
migration Act of 1924 all resulted from
pseudoscientific assaults on immigration
that claimed that the most recent immi-
grants came from inferior racial stock and
were handicapped in ways that would
make them unfit for American civiliza-
tion (Morris 1985:18).
While more refined, much of the criticism
of current U.S. immigration is based on
the perception of a cultural threat (Massey
1995:631; Brimelow 1995:249, 18; Nelson
1994:94).  Perception of a cultural threat
to national security has led to proposed
constitutional amendments that would
deny citizenship to those born in the
United States to noncitizens   It also has
led to the passage of English only or “of-
ficial English” laws in several states and
a 1996 attempt in the U.S. House of Rep-
resentatives to make English the official
language of the United States.
These arguments ignore the ability of
United States culture and society to as-
similate large numbers of people from
diverse countries of origin.  Despite past
fears concerning the effects of immigra-
tion on the social fabric of the United
States, few socioeconomic differences now
separate the descendants of immigrants
from Europe (National Research Council
1997:S-10).  With the convergence of so-
cioeconomic status across generations,
most immigrants disperse from the ethnic
neighborhoods where they first tend to
settle and integrate with the overall popu-
lation.  Residential movements have par-
allels in intermarriage among immigrant
groups.  Today, the descendants of immi-
grants from various European countries
and of various religions, once so distinct
they were referred to as races, have inter-
married to such an extent as to virtually
erase differences in education, income, and
occupation (National Research Council
1997:S-10).
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Much the same is true concerning English
language ability.  Proponents of the cul-
tural threat to national security believe that
the sense of nationhood is lost when
people do not speak a common language.
For them, linguistic diversity is tanta-
mount to national disunity.  Language
becomes a symbol and serves as a means
of communication and also “a means of
communion” (King 1997:64).  According
to the 1990 census, 94 percent of U.S. resi-
dents speak English reasonably well.
Three-fifths of the immigrants who arrived
in the 1980s spoke English well or very
well.  Not many immigrants see their first
language survive into the second genera-
tion.  The common lament of first genera-
tion immigrants is that their children are
not learning their language and are losing
the culture of the parents (King 1997:64).
A majority of third-generation Mexican-
Americans living in the United States
speak only English.  Further,
No religious, ethno-religious, or
purely ethnic group of any size
has ever attacked basic American
political values.  Nor has any tried
to form an ethnic party.  Nor has
any group ever tried to prevent
its children and grandchildren
from learning English, except for
some unsuccessful efforts among
rural Germans and Scandinavians
(Fuchs 1983:293).
Moreover, the extraordinary number of
immigrants now naturalizing probably
will serve to accelerate the assimilation
process.   Adoption of the U.S. Commis-
sion on Immigration Reform’s recommen-
dations for the Americanization of new
immigrants also would serve to reduce
the perceived cultural threats from immi-
grants (U.S. Commission on Immigration
Reform 1995:175).  That report found that:
The benefits of naturalization are
even more compelling for
American society as a whole than
for the new citizen. . . .
Naturalization, then, goes far
beyond providing new citizens
with benefits.  It is about ensuring
the vitality of this nation through
the inclusion of new members and
through cohesion of our nation’s
peoples, ensuring continuity of
our past, present, and future (U.S.
Commission on Immigration
Reform 1995:178-179).
The contributions of immigrants to vari-
ous aspects of American culture are too
numerous to mention.  In painting, sculp-
ture, music, dance, scholarship, fashion,
popular entertainment, and sports, immi-
grants have brought elements of their own
culture and have embraced, reinterpreted,
and reinvigorated American culture to
produce a product, which although
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uniquely American in its formation, has
near universal appeal.  American music,
film, and fashion have become increas-
ingly popular throughout the world as
they exalt American values in a context
readily understandable to people all over
the planet.  Alternatively, aspects of cul-
ture brought by immigrant groups sur-
vive intact.  Residents of the United States
can listen to music such as salsa and
reggae and enjoy scores of different cui-
sines.  The presence of the culture of im-
migrants expands the recreational and
leisure activities available to United States
citizens and enhances our knowledge and
appreciation of other cultures and peoples.
Ultimately, this enhances the ability of
Americans to communicate, travel, and
conduct business abroad, enriching us
socially and economically.
Most immigrants come to the United
States with a commitment to the Ameri-
can values of liberty, democracy, and equal
opportunity.  The United States has united
immigrants and their descendants into the
most successful multiethnic nation in his-
tory.  In turn, core American values are
strengthened by the inclusion into society
of people who, in many cases, made great
sacrifices in pursuit of these ideals.
Social or Economic
Burden or
Contribution
Migrants may be perceived as a social or
economic burden because of the fiscal
costs they impose or because of their pur-
ported social behavior, such as criminal-
ity or welfare dependency.  Societies may
fear that the number of people entering
are so numerous that they will create a
substantial economic burden by straining
housing, education, and transportation
facilities.  In advanced industrial societ-
ies, services provided by the welfare state
to newcomers may generate resentment.
The willingness to bear these costs is likely
to be low if the host government believes
that the government of the sending coun-
try is “dumping” its unwanted popula-
tion on the receiving country, although
historically this has not been a significant
element in the flow of migrants from the
Third World to advanced industrial coun-
tries (Weiner 1992/93:114-15).
The perception that immigrants receive
social welfare benefits for which they are
ineligible or manipulate the asylum pro-
cess to delay their removal from the
United States results in laws designed to
stop these perceived abuses.  The Personal
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Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act of 1996, the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Re-
sponsibility Act of 1996, and Proposition
187 in California in 1994 are all responses
to the perception that immigrants abuse
public benefits.  The Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 sought
to address the problem of asylum abuse.
Much of today’s debate concerning immi-
gration in the United States centers on the
perception of migrants as social or eco-
nomic burdens.  However, it is far from
clear that they are either.  There have been
numerous attempts to estimate the costs
and benefits of immigration.  Invariably,
the results prove highly controversial and
are challenged on conceptual, method-
ological, or philosophical grounds.  For
example, three recent studies by Donald
Huddle, Jeffrey J. Passel, and the Center
for Immigration Studies [CIS] estimated
the net fiscal costs of providing public
services to immigrants.  According to
Huddle and CIS, immigrants receive more
in government benefits than they pay in
taxes; Passel found the opposite (Vernez
& McCarthy 1996:54).  The recent  Na-
tional Research Council study found that
under most scenarios, the long-run fiscal
impact of immigration is strongly posi-
tive at the federal level, but substantially
negative at the state and local levels.  The
federal impact is shared evenly across the
country, but negative state and local im-
pacts are concentrated in those states that
receive most of the new immigrants, thus
incurring net fiscal burdens for native
residents of these states while residents
of most states reap net fiscal benefits
(National Research Council 1997).
The National Research Council study also
found that immigration produces net eco-
nomic gains for domestic residents.  Im-
migrants increase the supply of labor and
help produce new goods and services.
However, as they are paid less than the
total value of these new goods and ser-
vices, domestic workers as a group gain
(National Research Council 1997:S-3).
However, there may be losers as well as
gainers among different groups of U.S.
residents.  Along with immigrants, the
gainers are owners of productive factors
that are complementary with the labor of
immigrants whose incomes will rise.
Consumers who buy goods and services
produced by immigrant labor also ben-
efit.  The losers may be less-skilled do-
mestic workers who compete with
immigrants and whose wages will fall
(National Research Council 1997:S-4).
The evidence points to the
conclusion that immigration has
had a relatively small adverse
impact on the wage and
employment opportunities of
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competing native groups. This
effect does not appear to be
concentrated in the local areas
where immigrants live, but
instead is dispersed across the
United States. This dispersal
comes about in part because
competing native workers migrate
out of the areas to which
immigrants move (National
Research Council 1997:S-5).
Overall, in the massive and complex U.S.
economy, immigration is unlikely to have
a very large effect on relative earnings or
gross domestic product per capita.  The
impacts of immigration on the economy
are relatively modest.  The domestic gain
may be on the order of $1 billion to $10
billion per year.  Although this gain may
be modest relative to the size of the U.S.
economy, it remains a significant positive
gain in absolute terms (National Research
Council 1997:S-5).
Attempts to draw empirical conclusions
about the relation between immigration
and crime rates founder on problems of
measurement.  Crime rates measured from
the 1960s show no obvious link with
trends in immigration.  Studies at the lo-
cal level have found no association of im-
migration concentrations with crime rates
except high rates of nonviolent crime near
the borders (National Research Council
1997:S-10).
Hostage
The fifth category identified by Weiner is
the holding of migrants as hostages, cre-
ating risks for the sending country, as
when Iraq used Westerners living in Iraq
as shields against armed attack during the
Gulf War.  This situation has not applied
to the United States as a receiving county
of immigrants and, therefore, is beyond
the scope of this paper.
RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN
IMMIGRATION,
FOREIGN POLICY
AND NATIONAL
SECURITY
Immigration, foreign policy, and U.S. na-
tional security are closely intertwined.
Immigration policy could be changed ac-
cording to circumstances, but always with
the larger goal of advancing U.S. national
security.  Foreign policy often has used
immigration as a tool to advance U.S.
national security.  Emigration from com-
munist enemies was promoted with the
goal of destabilizing those countries; it was
discouraged from repressive Cold War
allies to avoid U.S. association with a
country’s policies that forced its own
people to flee.  The activities of immi-
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grants also can change perceptions of
national security and thus impact foreign
policy.  U.S. foreign policy also can unin-
tentionally cause migratory movements;
alternatively, migratory movements can
affect foreign policy by creating humani-
tarian crises that require a response or
national security threats resulting from
large numbers of migrants arriving in a
short period of time.
Resulting Migratory
Movements
The most prominent examples of U.S.
foreign policy-induced migratory move-
ments occurred during the Cold War era.
To advance the national security goal of
preventing the spread of communism, U.S.
intelligence services engaged in a cam-
paign to encourage defections from be-
hind the Iron Curtain as a means of
destabilizing communist regimes.  In the
1950s, the Voice of America’s extensive
coverage of stories of escape and consis-
tent contrasting of the horrors of life be-
hind the Iron Curtain to the attractions of
the West was at least partially responsible
for the continuing movement of escapees
into the West (Loescher & Scanlan
1986:34,36).
Similarly, the United States encouraged
emigration from Cuba as an essential part
of a much broader set of U.S. policies that
sought first to roll back and then to pre-
vent the spread of the Cuban Revolution
(Zolberg, Suhrke & Aguayo 1989:188).  At
the signing of the Immigration Act of 1965
in front of the Statue of Liberty, President
Johnson said, “I declare this afternoon to
the people of Cuba that those who seek
refuge here in America will find it”
(Dominguez 1992:41).  In response to the
exodus of Cubans from Mariel in 1980,
President Carter declared, “We’ll continue
to provide an open heart and open arms
to refugees seeking freedom from com-
munist domination and from economic
deprivation brought about primarily by
Fidel Castro and his government”
(Dominguez 1992:45).
United States policies toward immigration
from Cuba demonstrate that immigration
policy depends on the perception of its
effect upon U.S. national security.  Dur-
ing the Cold War, when preventing the
spread of communism from Cuba into the
Western Hemisphere was a primary for-
eign policy goal, Cuban emigration was
encouraged.  Cubans arriving in the
United States were automatically treated
as refugees and enthusiastically welcomed.
With the end of the Cold War, the col-
lapse of the Cuban economy, and the in-
ability of Cuba to export revolution to
countries adopting free market economic
policies and democratic political reforms,
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Cuban immigration is not viewed as a
national security concern.  Without the
overriding Cold War national security
concerns that previously encouraged and
welcomed Cuban migrants, the domestic
political concerns advanced by Florida’s
political leadership gained primacy and
brought about a drastic change in U.S.
policy.  The exodus of Cubans in 1994
resulted in an agreement between the
United States and Cuba wherein the
United States agreed to increase the quota
for Cuban immigrants to 20,000 per year
and Cuba agreed to prevent undocu-
mented emigrants from leaving.
However, not all migratory movements
caused or contributed to by U.S. foreign
policy actions are by design.  Generally,
migrant flows occasioned by U.S. foreign
policy were accidental, reflecting a historic
lack of attention to migration from the
makers of foreign policy.
The massive resettlement of Indochinese
in the United States from 1975 on—a by-
product of the Vietnam War—provides a
dramatic example of the unanticipated
immigration consequences of foreign
policy (Zolberg 1995:129).
Because of U.S. political, economic, and
military involvement from the mid-1950s
through 1975 in South Vietnam, our re-
cruitment and training of agents in Laos,
and our intensive bombing campaign in
Cambodia, the United States felt a pro-
found sense of obligation to the hundreds
of thousands of Indochinese who feared
for their safety once Communist govern-
ments came to power in these countries.
The U.S. rescue operation that began with
the 1975 fall of South Vietnam became a
long-term international commitment that
by 1986 had resulted in the resettlement
of some 1.5 million Indochinese, more than
750,000 of whom came to the United States
(Loescher & Scanlan 1986:121).
United States Central America foreign
policies also are cited as a cause for emi-
gration.  As the dominant foreign actor in
Central America for more than one hun-
dred years, the United States intervened
militarily on numerous occasions and
supported repressive governments.
United States-owned businesses have been
dominant in the region, and U.S. trade,
aid, and development policies have been
instrumental in the area’s economic de-
velopment.  Whether one takes the posi-
tion that the outpouring of people from
El Salvador and Guatemala in the 1980s
was a refugee movement from brutal
militaries supported by the United States,
economic migration of people seeking
employment opportunities, or a combina-
tion thereof, there can be little disagree-
ment that U.S. policies toward the region
added considerably to the incentives for
migration.
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In the 1980s a stated rationale for U.S.
policy towards Central America was to
prevent the movement of migrants to the
United States.  President Reagan stated in
June 1983 that if the United States were to
acquiesce in the establishment of a “string
of anti-American Marxist dictatorships”
in Central America “the result could be a
tidal wave of refugees—and this time
they’d be feet people, not boat people—
swarming into our country seeking a safe
haven from communist repression to the
south” (Loescher and Scanlan 1986:192).
The use of U.S. foreign policy in an at-
tempt to prevent emigration from Central
America in the 1980s was not unique.  In
response to Haitian migration to the
United States, the United States and Haiti
reached an agreement in 1981 permitting
the interception of boats leaving Haiti by
United States vessels as a condition for
Haiti receiving U.S. aid (Zolberg 1995:145).
In the wake of the 1991 military coup that
overthrew the government of President
Aristide, thousands attempted to flee
Haiti.  President Bush invoked the 1981
agreement and over the next sixteen
months 30,000 Haitians were interdicted
at sea and diverted to either Guantanamo
Bay or Haiti.
The bracero program between the United
States and Mexico is an example of for-
eign policy unintentionally stimulating a
nonrefugee migration to the United States.
Bilateral agreements during both World
Wars provided that Mexicans could come
to the United States for temporary work
to meet manpower shortages.  The World
War II agreement developed into the
bracero program that continued until 1964.
“The bracero program is generally agreed
to have stimulated permanent legal im-
migration by temporary workers and their
families who acquired permanent legal
status, as well as illegal immigration by
those who chose to migrate unlawfully
along pathways and networks established
by legal temporary workers” (Teitelbaum
1985:31).
U.S. foreign policy—political, military, and
economic—was instrumental in the migra-
tion of Dominicans to the United States.
From 1961 to 1966 the United States
sought to limit political tensions in the
Dominican Republic where government
instability was seen as an opportunity for
radical revolution.  The United States
supported efforts to remove dictator
Rafael Leonidas Trujillo.  In 1965, the
United States intervened militarily and
occupied the country for seventeen
months, in many respects governing the
Dominican Republic during this period
(Mitchell 1992:101).  After Trujillo was
deposed, Dominican emigration to the
United States increased markedly as the
United States believed a liberal immigra-
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tion policy would reduce urban unem-
ployment and political pressures.  The
reestablishment of U.S. sugar quotas in
1982  subsequently wreaked havoc with
the Dominican economy; total export ton-
nage to the United States dropped from
an average of 815,335 tons for the period
1975 to 1981 to about one-fourth that level
at the end of the 1980s (Zolberg 1995:153).
The economic hardship resulting from U.S.
sugar quotas led to a doubling in the
demand for visas and expanding Domini-
can migration to the United States.
Another important foreign policy tool
impacting upon immigration is the United
State’s symbolic position as the world’s
preeminent immigration country.  The sig-
nificance of this factor for foreign policy
was probably most apparent in compari-
son with the former Soviet Union’s tradi-
tion of emigration.  Our immigration
tradition has a privileged place in Ameri-
can myth and national self image that is
reflected in the positive image the United
States projects abroad of national gener-
osity, attractiveness, and toleration.  This
image is one of the most potent but least
appreciated foreign policy assets of the
United States (Miller & Papademetriou
1983:166).  Not surprisingly, a consequence
of this image projected abroad is its mag-
net effect upon potential migrants
throughout the world that certainly has
contributed to increased immigration
(Miller & Papademetriou 1983:166).
Foreign Policy
Responses
The effect of immigration on the foreign
policy of a receiving country is determined
by a number of considerations: if the
numbers of immigrants are small or they
are otherwise easily assimilated into soci-
ety, the impacts on the foreign policy of
the host country are likely to be small; if
immigrants gain entry through the appro-
priate legal processes, the effect on for-
eign policy also may be negligible.
However, if the receiving country per-
ceives that either the level of immigration
is too high or that substantial numbers of
immigrants are entering the country out-
side its legal framework, then an entire
range of foreign policies may be imple-
mented to reduce immigration.  The
United States has availed itself of many
of these foreign policy options.
Unauthorized migration is generally the
result of a combination of “push” and
“pull” factors.  The pull factors include
the prospects of employment and better
wages, freedom, physical security, the
opportunity for easy remittal of earnings
to home countries, and ineffective immi-
gration enforcement.  Push factors include
lack of employment, poor wages and
working conditions, separation from fam-
ily members, civil conflict, and political,
social, and religious repression (U.S. Com-
mission on Immigration Reform 1994:174).
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Policymakers have begun to consider the
impact of trade, foreign aid, and invest-
ment strategies  on push factors of emi-
gration.  However, much remains to be
done in this area.
Economic Policy
Responses
The United States also has used trade
policy to influence emigration.  The
Jackson-Vanik amendment to the Trade
Reform Act of 1974  originated in response
to the Soviet Union imposing an “educa-
tion tax” that required Soviet Jewish emi-
grants to pay compensation to the state
for the costs of higher education.  Jack-
son-Vanik, passed in December 1974 tied
trade benefits for Communist countries,
including “most favorable nation” tariff
treatment, credit, credit guarantees, and
investment guarantees, to the removal of
obstacles to emigration (Loescher &
Scanlan 1986:93).  However, Jewish emi-
gration from the Soviet Union fluctuated
as a function of the general state of rela-
tions between the superpowers (Zolberg
1995:137).
The North American Free Trade Agree-
ment [NAFTA] included provisions for the
temporary movement of personnel be-
tween the signatory countries.  NAFTA
had the effect of establishing an additional
nonimmigrant category of professionals
permitted to enter the United States  tem-
porarily.  Similarly, the Uruguay round of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade [GATT] for the first time included
a General Agreement on Trade Services
that provided for easier entry for inves-
tors, managers, executives, and other pro-
fessionals.  Perhaps more importantly, the
effect NAFTA would have on immigra-
tion became a major part of the debate.
Opponents claimed the dislocations
caused by NAFTA, particularly in rural
areas of Mexico, would lead to an increase
in illegal immigration.  Proponents argued
that NAFTA would stimulate Mexico’s
economy, increase jobs and wages, and
thereby reduce critical push factors of
emigration.  The effect of trade policy on
immigration thus was expressly acknowl-
edged.
The recommendations of the Commission
for the Study of International Migration
and Cooperative Economic Development
[the Asencio Commission] makes clear the
importance of trade and investment poli-
cies to emigration to the United States.
Mandated by the Immigration Reform and
Control Act of 1986 to examine the condi-
tions in countries that contribute to unau-
thorized migration to the United States
and to explore mutually beneficial, recip-
rocal trade and investment programs to
alleviate such conditions, the Asencio
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Commission stated the problem directly,
“the issue for many countries is stark: they
either export goods and services to create
jobs at home, or they export people”
(Commission For The Study of Interna-
tional Migration and Cooperative Eco-
nomic Development 1990:xvi).
The Commission was equally clear in its
recommendations to solve the problem of
unauthorized immigration.  It found that
a program of trade and investment di-
rected toward the long-term alleviation of
push factors in migrant-sending countries
in the Western Hemisphere would increase
political stability in the region and increase
the markets for U.S. exports by reducing
unauthorized immigration.  Among its
principal recommendations was NAFTA.
Also recommended were accelerating the
Caribbean Basin Institute [CBI] by easing
limitations on beneficiary products, revi-
talizing the Central American Common
Market, encouraging exports of manufac-
tured goods with quota allocations for
textiles, apparel, and steel to be shifted in
favor of Mexico and CBI beneficiary coun-
tries, improving access to U.S. markets for
sending country’s agricultural products
(including partial restoration of Caribbean
Basin sugar quotas pending a  return to a
free market situation), coproduction strat-
egies, increased investment, and support
for technology transfers and job creation
through Section 936 of the Internal Rev-
enue Code for CBI countries.  Although
movement has been slow on many of the
Asencio Commission’s recommendations,
it is readily apparent that immigration to
the United States is now an important
consideration in the making of U.S. for-
eign economic policy.  Immigration con-
siderations also entered the debate on the
CBI, financial assistance to Mexico after
the 1994 peso devaluation, and the Bor-
der Industrialization Program with Mexico
(Diaz-Briquets 1995:175).
In conjunction with trade and investment
policies, foreign assistance can be used to
achieve immigration-reducing objectives.
The Asencio Commission recommended
involving local organizations in project
preparation of foreign assistance pro-
grams, assessment of the potential immi-
gration impact of development projects,
evaluation of their actual impact after
implementation, and channeling of more
funds through private voluntary organi-
zations.
However, trade, investment, and foreign
assistance policies that seek to reduce
emigration pressures must confront the
dilemma that over the short term these
policies are likely to increase emigration
(Diaz-Briquets 1995:174).  Conditioning
trade and investment policy and foreign
assistance on short-term reductions in
immigration will undercut their potential
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long-term success.  Only over time will
economic development reduce demo-
graphic pressures, improve labor condi-
tions, and result in rising wages and living
standards so that people do not feel com-
pelled to emigrate.  Spain, Japan, Italy,
and Malaysia are all examples where eco-
nomic development transformed migrant-
sending countries into countries that
attract immigrants from other nations
(Diaz-Briquets 1995:175).  However these
countries also are proof that the success
or failure of development efforts is prin-
cipally determined by the domestic policy
choices a country makes.
Military Responses
Immigration concerns also have affected
the use of the U.S. armed forces.  In re-
sponse to perceived immigration crises,
United States forces began interdicting
Haitians at sea in 1981.  By 1993, more
than 60,000 Haitians were interdicted and
returned to Haiti or taken to camps at the
U.S. military base in Guantanamo.  In
1994, the U.S. government, in a major
policy reversal, began interdicting Cuban
rafters attempting to reach South Florida
by sea.  In fear of another Mariel type
exodus, more than 35,000 people were
picked up by the U.S. Coast Guard in the
summer of 1994 (Newland 1995:197).
Immigration fears were used to justify
military support to Nicaraguan contras and
the government of El Salvador through-
out the Central American crises of the
1980s.
Concerns over unauthorized immigration
have contributed to the militarization of
the border between the United States and
Mexico, although this was motivated pri-
marily by concerns with drug smuggling.
Military rhetoric, tactics, strategy, technol-
ogy, equipment, and personnel are now
part of the effort to staunch the flow of
unauthorized immigration.  Helicopters,
intrusion detection and surveillance hard-
ware, advanced communications systems,
and increases in border patrol agents and
facilities have been used in the effort to
decrease unauthorized immigration (Dunn
1996:44-5).  The United States also pro-
vided funding to Mexico for a land inter-
diction program to prevent Central
Americans from reaching the United
States.  As a result, Mexican apprehen-
sions and deportations of undocumented
immigrants jumped from 14,000 in 1988
to an estimated 160,000 in 1990 (Dunn
1996:95).
The most prominent use of U.S. military
force in response to a perceived immigra-
tion crisis was the intervention in Haiti in
September 1994.  On May 19, 1994, Presi-
dent Clinton included among U.S. inter-
ests that would justify an intervention in
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Haiti the likelihood of a “massive outflow”
of refugees to U.S. shores.  Four days
before the intervention the President said:
Three hundred thousand more
Haitians, 5 percent of their entire
population, are in hiding in their
own country.  If we don’t act, they
could be the next wave of refugees
at our door.  We will continue to
face the threat of a mass exodus
of refugees and its constant threat
to stability in our region, and
control of our borders  (Newland
1995:202).
A number of arguments have been ad-
vanced to justify military intervention in
refugee-producing situations.  For ex-
ample, human rights violations by a gov-
ernment against its citizens violates the
sovereignty of the people and the offend-
ing government cannot thereafter claim
that intervention violates its sovereignty
because the real violation of sovereignty
was the government’s mistreatment of its
own citizens (Keely 1996:1060 quoting
Reisman).  Human rights violations car-
ried out or tolerated by a government or
carried out when a government is inca-
pable of stopping it almost invariably lead
to internal displacement and eventual
refugee flows across borders (Keely
1996:1060).  The threat of refugees to the
stability of receiving countries provides
an argument justifying self-defensive ac-
tions under the U.N. charter.  “Provoking
refugee flows can rise to the equivalent of
aggression” (Keely 1996:1060 quoting
McCalmon).  “A country may defend it-
self by forceful intervention in another
state to end human rights violations and
prevent imminent refugee flows that
threaten its security (Keely 1996:1060).
Such theories have been used to support
interventions authorized by the United
Nations Security Council pursuant to
Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter.  In 1991
and 1994, the Security Council invoked
transborder refugee flows to justify inter-
national action in Iraq and Haiti respec-
tively.  The Security Council authorization
of U.S. intervention in Somalia in 1992
took note of the large numbers of refu-
gees displaced by the conflict and called
for repatriation of refugees as part of the
U.N. operation (Dowty & Loescher
1996:63).  U.N.-authorized interventions
in Rwanda in 1994 and in Kurdish areas
of northern Iraq in 1991 both explicitly
took note of the large numbers of refu-
gees and displaced persons created by
those crises (Dowty & Loescher 1996:65).
Established foreign policy agencies of the
United States could be used in prepara-
tion for such immigration emergencies as
those of the Vietnamese boat people and
the large numbers fleeing periodically
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from Cuba, Haiti, and Central America.
Most humanitarian emergencies that gen-
erate large-scale movements of refugees
and other displaced persons are predict-
able to some degree.  United States intel-
ligence services and the Department of
State are well placed to analyze events in
potential migrant-sending countries and
make recommendations to prevent mas-
sive emigrations.  Preventive actions after
identification of a potential large-scale
emigration of people can involve a wide
array of strategies ranging from diplo-
macy, to economic sanctions, to military
intervention (U.S. Commission on Immi-
gration Reform 1997:13).  Emergency re-
sponses often involve the use of military
forces for rescue operations and military
bases for housing displaced persons.
Multilateral
Approaches
Controlling immigration to the United
States calls for a multilateral approach.
Although a fundamental aspect of sover-
eignty is the control of borders and the
unilateral right to determine who may
enter the state, transportation and com-
munication advances, long-established
migration patterns, and increasingly in-
terdependent political and economic rela-
tions mean that only a multilateral
approach can address current immigra-
tion concerns effectively.
Because there are numerous problems
related to immigration that can only be
addressed effectively through multilateral
solutions, we should expect, and hope, to
see increased approaches of this nature.
Problems that will require multilateral
approaches for effective resolution include
the smuggling of peoples across the bor-
der, the deportation of criminal aliens in
a manner to insure that they do not re-
turn, harmonization of exit and entry
rules, the prediction, prevention, and re-
sponse to immigration emergencies, sup-
port for human rights and democracy
building in potential migrant-sending
countries, peacekeeping operations, pro-
grams aimed at reconstruction of sending
countries following civil wars and civil
conflict, resettlement of refugees, and co-
ordination of efforts between sending and
receiving countries to address pressures
for unauthorized migration and environ-
mental degradation.
Although United States responses to im-
migration have been largely unilateral,
there are significant historical examples
of bilateral/multilateral approaches to
immigration problems: the “Gentlemen’s
Agreement” with Japan in 1907; agree-
ments with Mexico during both World
Wars and the bracero agreement; migra-
tion agreements in 1965, 1984, and 1995
with a Cuban government with which the
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United States did not have diplomatic
relations; the 1981 agreement with Haiti;
and the Comprehensive Plan of Action in
1989 to address the pushback of
Indochinese refugees.  Most of these agree-
ments were reached ad hoc in response to
an immediate crisis.  Unfortunately, they
did not result in a coherent policy that
could be applied in future situations.
Today the United States engages in a
number of multilateral regimes concerned
with refugees and migration.  The work-
ing group of the U.S. Mexico Binational
Commission promotes bilateral dialogue
on migration through recurring commu-
nication and exchange of information and
addresses mutual migration problems
through cooperative mechanisms.
Mexico’s consultation with the Asencio
Commission and lobbying by Mexican
authorities in the United States on politi-
cal and economic matters, which did not
occur prior to the NAFTA negotiating
process, shows an increasing acceptance
of bilateral approaches to issues that af-
fect both countries.  NAFTA created a
number of institutional arrangements that
have breathed new life into established
consultation groups. Both sides of the joint
Border Liaison Mechanism have taken
steps to reduce smuggling of immigrants.
The bilateral engagement with Mexico on
migration issues that began before NAFTA
has increased since its passage.
Within the Western Hemisphere there is
now an established regional mechanism
for discussion of migration issues.  In 1996,
a multilateral approach to Western Hemi-
sphere migration  issues, known as the
Puebla Process, was begun with the Re-
gional Conference on Migration held in
Puebla, Mexico.  Canada and the Central
American states joined the United States
and Mexico.  In recognition that a com-
prehensive and objective approach to the
origins, manifestation, and effects of re-
gional migration would contribute to a
better understanding of this phenomenon,
the participating governments entered into
a series of agreements on a wide range of
issues affecting migration.   These include
promoting economic and social develop-
ment, encouraging states with common
borders to establish mechanisms for dia-
logue at various levels of government, and
preventing the trafficking in migrants.
At the group’s Second Regional Confer-
ence on Migration in March 1997 in
Panama, the parties agreed to establish
the Regional Consultation Group on Mi-
gration and adopted the Plan of Action
designed to insure the timely achievement
of agreements reached at the 1996 meet-
ing.  Also participating in the Panama
meeting were such multinational organi-
zations as the International Organization
for Migration [IOM], the Economic Com-
mission for Latin America and the Carib-
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bean, the Inter-American Development
Bank, and the Office of the United Na-
tions High Commissioner for Refugees
[UNHCR].
The Puebla Process is an important devel-
opment in addressing Western Hemi-
sphere migration concerns because the
established organizations dealing with
migration issues were not well equipped
for the task.  UNHCR has as its primary
mandate the protection of and assistance
to refugees.  The International Organiza-
tion for Migration has a mandate to assist
all types of migrants but focuses on the
provision of transport to individuals who
are being resettled or who are returning
to their home countries.  The complex cir-
cumstances that characterize many mass
movements do not fit well with either
organization’s current mandate or capaci-
ties (U.S. Commission on Immigration
Reform 1994:179).
Environmental degradation, droughts,
floods, and famines compel people to flee
across international borders.  Rapid popu-
lation growth in migrant-sending coun-
tries and measures leading to economic
development have led to considerable
environmental degradation and erosion of
natural resource bases.  There already have
been mass migrations within and between
countries as a result of desertification,
floods, and threats of inundation from
rising sea levels (Weiner 1992:92-93).  Find-
ing effective solutions to these problems
may require multilateral approaches.
A study of Mexico has found that the
inability to farm because of land degrada-
tion or desertification can result in rural
unemployment and general poverty that
in turn can lead to migration (Schwartz &
Notini 1994:18).  The Mexican government
also has observed that there is a strong
tendency for people to migrate from the
arid and semi-arid areas of the country
that contain twenty million inhabitants
with scarce possibilities for work
(Schwartz & Notini 1994:18).  There has
been insufficient research, education, and
training in Mexico to remedy problems
caused by existing agricultural practices.
The relationship between migration and
soil degradation is complex and may ex-
acerbate the destruction of fragile ecosys-
tems in Mexico.  The costs of migration to
a family may also be less than the envi-
ronmental investment needed to increase
the productivity of farmland (Schwartz &
Notini 1994:28).
Deforestation in Haiti has led to soil ero-
sion that has contributed to the massive
emigration from that country (Mathews
1989:168).  Traced through its effects on
agriculture, energy supply, and water re-
sources, tropical deforestation impover-
ishes about one billion people.  This
U.S.  C O M M I S S I O N  O N  I M M I G R A T I O N  R E F O R M
R E S E A R C H
P A P E R
- 23 -
pattern is endemic throughout Central and
South America (Mathews 1989:165).  U.S.
policies to limit immigration will have to
take into effect such environmental im-
pacts.  Policies designed specifically to
prevent environmental degradation in
potential migrant-sending countries may
be necessary to control migration.
IMMIGRANT/
ETHNIC GROUP
INFLUENCE
The role of immigrants and ethnic groups
in the foreign policymaking process of the
United States has engendered much de-
bate.  The idea that the ethnic composi-
tion of the United States is critical in the
making of its foreign policy was expressed
by Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan
(1975:23):
Without too much exaggeration it
could be stated that the
immigration process is the single
most important determinant of
American foreign policy.  This
process regulates the ethnic
composition of the American
electorate.  Foreign policy
responds to that ethnic
composition.  It responds to other
things as well, but probably first
of all to the primal factor of
ethnicity.
This argument subsequently was de-
scribed as “plausible” by a member of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee
(Mathias 1981:979).  It also has been said
that “domestic ethnic pressures on foreign
policy formulation loom large in the
United States, affecting foreign policies
toward settings as diverse as Northern
Ireland, the Turkish-Greek conflict, the
Middle East, Cuba, Mexico, Haiti, and
Poland, to name only a few of the obvi-
ous cases” (Teitelbaum 1984:441).  Charles
B. Keely identified three reasons why the
activities of ethnic lobbies are suspect:
those influential in foreign policymaking
see ethnic lobbies as an obstacle; ethnic
groups are perceived as single-issue lob-
bies; and nativists (defined as an those in
intense opposition to an internal minority
on the ground of its foreign connections)
consider lobbying activities on part of a
foreign government as un-American
(Keely 1995:231-32).
Equally persuasive arguments are made
that immigrants and ethnic groups have
only a limited impact on the making of
U.S. foreign policy (Gerson 1977:55):
Ethnic pressures on foreign
policies, with accompanying
claims of success or failure, have
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led to false beliefs at home and
abroad that the policies were
based on domestic ethnic
considerations.   Seldom, if ever,
have major U.S. foreign  policy
decisions been affected by purely
ethnic considerations.
Similarly, an examination of the effect that
immigrant groups had upon U.S. foreign
policy between the two World Wars found
that “. . .the impact of the one upon the
other has been greatly exaggerated” (Jonas
1990:67).
Despite being criticized, they are
not indisputably a detriment to or
subversive of the national
interests.  They are not all
powerful or a force out of control.
They can be an effective check,
and provide viewpoints that may
be otherwise overlooked (Keely
1995:241).
An examination of particular cases reveals
that while ethnic lobbies may influence
U.S. foreign policy, several factors constrict
such influence.  An ethnic lobby may have
success in the foreign policymaking pro-
cess when the policy in question affects
the homeland of the particular ethnic
group, where the issue involved does not
threaten U.S. national security, where there
is no equally effective lobbying effort
against the proposed policy, or where the
proposed policy is within the mainstream
of overall U.S. foreign policy.
Much has been written of the influence of
the Greek-American lobby in contribut-
ing to the U.S. arms embargo imposed on
Turkey after it invaded Cyprus in 1974.
“[T]he Greeks, with a powerful ethnic
lobby mobilized for their cause, held the
upper hand in Washington” (Mathias
1981:987-88).  One newspaper columnist,
in a not untypical opinion, deplored the
“ethnic foreign policy making” that cul-
minated in the arms embargo as a “rising
menace” tantamount to communism in its
potential destabilization of U.S. foreign
policy (Hicks & Couloumbis 1977:86).
However, these responses overlooked
critical factors that led to the imposition
of the arms embargo.  Turkey had vio-
lated the Foreign Military Sales Act by
using U.S.-supplied arms in their invasion
of Cyprus.  Greece, like Turkey, was also
a member of NATO.  The Greek lobby
also had merit on its side, the invasion of
a sovereign country violates international
law.  Congressman John Brademas, a lead-
ing congressional proponent of the em-
bargo, said:
If we members had not been able
to put together a compelling case,
in terms of law, policy and
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morality, we would not have been
effective.  But on the other hand,
without the kind of support we
got from the Greek community,
our case might not have been
sufficient to win the day (Hicks &
Couloumbis 1977:86).
Those who claimed that the Greek lobby
was the determining factor in the congres-
sional decision to cut off military aid to
Turkey are incorrect (Hicks & Couloumbis
1977:110).  While the Greek lobby clearly
had an impact on the decision to impose
the arms embargo, it would not have
prevailed had its position not been con-
sistent with U.S. law and foreign policy
principles.  In any event, the embargo was
gradually relaxed in the two years imme-
diately following its imposition and was
repealed entirely in 1978.
Another major ethnic entity credited with
notable success in influencing U.S. foreign
policy is the Cuban lobby, which has fo-
cused primarily on toppling Castro and
reversing the revolution (Keely 1995:237).
“For many years a key consideration
among Washington policy makers ad-
dressing U.S.-Cuban relations has been the
strong opposition of the Florida congres-
sional delegation—pressed by the large
and influential Cuban constituency in the
state—to any moves toward normaliza-
tion unless they are balanced by major
changes in Cuban foreign and domestic
policies” (Teitelbaum 1985:47).  No other
immigrant group to the United States has
been able to use its opposition to its home
government to influence U.S. foreign
policy as effectively  (Newland 1995:204).
A Bush administration official said of the
role of the Cuban-American National
Foundation, the voice of hard-line Cuban-
Americans, “[t]he foundation has had a
chilling effect on the debate.  Anytime
anyone starts to think creatively about
Cuba we’re told: What do you want to
do, lose South Florida for us?” (Newland
1995:205).
However, even a well-financed and well-
organized lobby like the Cuban-Americans
is successful because their goals are con-
sistent with larger U.S. foreign policy in-
terests.  Their anticommunism was well
matched to the U.S. policies of the Cold
War era.  A communist regime in Cuba
was seen as a major threat to U.S. na-
tional security and overthrowing the
Castro government was a major U.S. for-
eign policy goal throughout the 1960s.
Even after the collapse of the Soviet Union,
the United States still treats Cuba as an
implacable enemy and continues the eco-
nomic embargo.
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With the resulting changed post-Cold War
political environment, immigration from
Cuba no longer is seen as advancing U.S.
national security.  This diminishes the
effectiveness of the Cuban lobby.  The 1994
interdiction of fleeing Cubans at sea by
the U.S. Coast Guard, and the subsequent
agreement in 1995 between the United
States and Cuba to prevent people from
leaving Cuba would have been unthink-
able ten years earlier.  Passage of the
Helms-Burton law, which tightens the
economic embargo against Cuba, was
aided by the outrage provoked by the
shooting down by the Cuban Air Force of
two planes operated by the Miami exile
group Brothers To The Rescue.  As long
as the Castro regime denies its citizens
basic human rights and refuses to democ-
ratize, there will remain a substantial con-
gruence of interests between U.S. foreign
policy and the goals of hard-line Cuban-
Americans that will insure a degree of
success in their lobbying effectiveness.
However, without the national security
threat presented by Cuba during the Cold
War, the lobby’s effectiveness will be di-
minished and counterbalanced by other
competing interests.
The Jewish-American community’s influ-
ence on United States policy toward Is-
rael represents another effective ethnic
lobbying effort.  “The American Israel
Public Affairs Committee [AIPAC], the
Jewish-American community’s most pow-
erful voice is often used as an example to
emulate among other ethnic lobbies in the
United States.  Although there are many
policy differences between the United
States and Israel, the United States gov-
ernment has been extraordinarily support-
ive of Israeli government policies.  AIPAC
is held responsible for most of this sup-
port” (Keely 1995:236).
However, the influence of the Jewish-
American lobby does not alone explain
the strong U.S. support for Israel.  Israel
remains the United States’ most loyal and
only democratic ally in a volatile region
of the world of great strategic importance
to the United States.  Most analysts be-
lieve that support for Israel is in the inter-
est of the United States.  Mathias
(1981:993) described the relationship be-
tween the lobbying activities of Jewish-
Americans and support for Israel as being
in the U.S. national interest:
This is not to suggest that
Congress supports Israel for no
better reason than fear of the Israel
lobby; on the contrary, I know of
few members of either house of
Congress who do not believe
deeply and strongly that support
of Israel is both a moral duty and
a national interest of the United
States.
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Perhaps the most controversial example
of the influence of the Jewish-American
community was the passage of the
Jackson-Vanik amendment to the Trade
Reform Act of 1974.  Because it believed
human rights concerns would interfere
with its policy of détente, the Nixon ad-
ministration consistently eschewed human
rights intercession with the Soviets unless
domestic political pressure forced it to act
(Loescher & Scanlan 1986:91-92).  How-
ever, many members of the Jewish com-
munity in the United States and key
members of Congress feared that détente
was being pursued without adequate at-
tention to human rights concerns.
The effects of Jackson-Vanik on at least
the short-term national security interest
of U.S-Soviet relations is widely seen as
negative.  Jackson-Vanik’s linkage of non-
discriminatory trade with free emigration
so angered the Soviets that they canceled
the 1972 Soviet-American trade agree-
ment, stopped payment on World War II
lend-lease debts, and reduced the num-
ber of Jews permitted to emigrate (Mathias
1981:995).  Jackson-Vanik strained overall
U.S.-Soviet relations and left the impres-
sion that a gamble was taken for the sake
of human rights and emigration goals
without regard for other, and possibly
larger, issues of geopolitical stability (Keely
1995:237).
Ethnic groups’ influence on U.S. policy
generally is limited to the narrow objec-
tive of securing access to the United States
for members of the nationality or ethnic
group abroad (Miller & Papademetriou
1983:180).  According to Teitelbaum and
Weiner (1995:26):
American ethnic groups can claim
considerable success, since the
1960s at least, in the framing and
resolution of public debate about
the criteria for immigrant and
refugee admission, the elements
of law underlying control of
immigration, and the feasibility
and seriousness with which
immigration enforcement efforts
have been granted.
Examples of this influence include the
Jackson-Vanik Amendment, the Morrison-
Lautenberg Amendment that lowered the
definitional barriers for “refugees” only
for Soviet Jews and Evangelical Christians,
the Refugee Act of 1980, the Cuban Ad-
justment Act of 1966, and “diversity” vi-
sas pursuant to the 1990 Immigration Act.
Despite the fact that ethnic groups in the
United States traditionally have pursued
policies consistent with U.S. national in-
terests, there appears to be much conster-
nation about the role that post-1965
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Immigration Act immigrants, largely Latin
American and Asian, will play in the for-
eign policymaking process.  Mexican-
Americans, for example, have not
indicated greater interest than other eth-
nic groups in issues related to their home-
land or Latin America generally, and those
who have long been in the United States
exhibit the same reduction in ethnic group
identity as any other group.  Mexico does
not appeal to U.S. citizens of Mexican
origin to support Mexico’s interests in this
country.  Mexican-American attitudes to-
wards immigration do not appear to be
determined by concern for Mexico.  Nor
do Mexican-Americans view the problems
facing the United States substantially dif-
ferent than the general public (Glazer
1985:212-14).  There is no evidence that
the retention of Mexican cultural practices
has prevented Mexican-Americans from
identifying with the U.S. political system
(de la Garza 1985b:238).  U.S. culture and
politics continue to be powerful assimila-
tive forces.
Mexican-American participation in the
U.S. political process is remarkably simi-
lar to that of other ethnic and immigrant
groups.  It is affected by the same forces:
education, income level, and the desgree
of participation in professions from which
political leaders are drawn.  These factors
have served to limit the political influ-
ence of Mexican-Americans, as was true
of other immigrant and ethnic groups in
the past (Glazer 1985:224).  As Mexican-
American naturalization rates increase and
Mexican-Americans increase their role in
the policymaking process, their activities
will come under increased scrutiny.  How-
ever, there is nothing to indicate that the
role of Mexican-Americans in the
policymaking process will be different in
any material respect from other immigrant
groups and their descendants.
Immigrants from Latin America or Asia
are unlikely to coalesce into monolithic
groups.  The political differences between
Cuban-Americans and Mexican- Ameri-
cans, for example, means that a broad-
based Latin American ethnic lobby is
unlikely to form.  Serious tensions exist
between Mexican-Americans and Mexican
émigrés (de la Garza 1985a:97).  Similarly,
historical differences between Koreans,
Japanese, Chinese, and Vietnamese makes
a broad Asian-American political lobby
unlikely.  Successful integration into U.S.
society is a prerequisite to successful in-
fluence on public policy; however full in-
tegration may diminish the interest of
ethnic groups in their culture or countries
of origin (Teitelbaum & Weiner 1995:26).
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COUNTRY
INFLUENCE
The mere presence of an immigrant group
in the United States might cause that
group’s home country to insert itself into
the foreign policymaking process of the
United States when issues affecting its
nationals are involved.  Although Mexi-
can government policy until the mid-to-
late 1980s was “to have no policy” on the
issue of illegal immigration to the United
States, Mexico still negotiated the World
War I, World War II, and bracero employ-
ment agreements with the United States.
In 1982, in response to Senate passage of
the Simpson-Mazzoli immigration bill by
a vote of 80 to 19, the Mexican Senate
adopted a strongly worded resolution on
“this grave matter that negatively affects
our good neighbor relations,” expressing
its alarm and concern for the repercus-
sions that would impact both countries if
the Simpson-Mazzoli legislation were
passed.  Undocumented Mexican migra-
tion was called a “transcendent matter that
should not be considered from a unilat-
eral perspective, but rather should be
treated from a bilateral and even multi-
lateral perspective” (Teitelbaum 1984:449).
In 1984, then Mexican President Miguel
de la Madrid wrote:
The situation of Mexican migrant
workers in the United States has
been, and continues to be, of
special interest [to Mexico].  We
have reiterated our support for the
rights and interests of Mexican
nationals abroad.  We have no
intention of meddling in the
legislative processes of the United
States.  But we express our
concern over measures such as the
Simpson-Mazzoli bill which could
affect the social, labor, and human
rights of numerous Mexicans,
whose daily work and efforts
represent considerable benefit to
the U.S. economy (Teitelbaum
1985:32-3).
As Mexico began to liberalize its economy
and play a more active role in world eco-
nomic affairs, it also increased its engage-
ment with the United States on migration
issues.  Today the Mexican government
pursues three major objectives in regard
to migration: protection of the rights of
emigrants; avoidance of abrupt changes
in United States immigration policy; and
recognition for Mexican migrant contri-
butions to the United States.  As emigra-
tion issues increasingly require a
multilateral approach it is to be expected
that sending countries will seek participa-
tion in the U.S. foreign policymaking pro-
cess as it affects these matters.
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One example of migrant-sending countries
seeking participation in the U.S.
policymaking process was the lobbying of
President Clinton on immigration issues
by foreign heads of state during his 1997
trip to Latin America and the Caribbean.
A joint statement concerning immigration
was issued with President Zedillo in
Mexico.  In a speech in Mexico City, Presi-
dent Clinton felt compelled to defend
recent U.S. laws affecting immigration.  In
Cost Rica, the President of El Salvador,
Armando Calderon Sol, proposed an
amnesty for some immigrants from Cen-
tral America.  Central American leaders
expressed concerns that the 1996 Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Re-
sponsibility Act would compel the return
of hundreds of thousands of immigrants
from the United States, causing damage
to local economies by creating strains on
the job market and the loss of remittances
from the United States.  In both Mexico
and Costa Rica, President Clinton pledged
to seek a change in the Illegal Immigra-
tion Reform and Immigrant Responsibil-
ity Act of 1996 that would force illegal
immigrants to return home while they
waited for legal status (Bennet 1997:A6).
In Barbados, Caribbean leaders offered
pointed criticism of U.S. immigration
policies.
The increased number of deportations of
legal and illegal immigrants from the
United States because of criminal convic-
tions has resulted in increasing crime and
pressures on the criminal justice systems
in their home countries.  Throughout
Central America and the Caribbean gov-
ernment officials have expressed anger
and frustration at a crisis they regard as
caused by the United States and beyond
their ability to control (Rohter 1997:A1).
Several regional leaders raised this issue
with President Clinton during his May trip
to the region.
Some ambassadors of Asian governments
to Washington have acted as bridges to
their own immigrant communities and
have sought to encourage their former
nationals in the United States to lobby on
their behalf on issues that affect the send-
ing country.  Some Asian embassies and
their intelligence organizations have moni-
tored the activities of their citizens or
former citizens in the United States
(Weiner 1990:194).  The 1984 murder of
Henry Liu in San Francisco, a Chinese-
American who had written a book critical
of Taiwanese President Chiang Ching-Kuo,
resulted in the arrest and conviction of
the former head of Taiwan’s intelligence
service for plotting the murder.
Both the People’s Republic of China and
the Republic of China have attempted to
use the presence of Chinese-Americans to
advance their state’s interests.  Both gov-
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ernments take the view that overseas
Chinese are migrants who retain ties to
China and eventually will return home.
This bond legitimizes efforts by the two
Chinese governments to seek assistance
from the overseas Chinese (Weiner
1990:197).
The presence of forty thousand Chinese
students in the United States led the
People’s Republic of China to inject itself
into the debate over the proposed Chi-
nese Student Protection Act after the
Tiananmen Square killings in June 1989.
In vetoing the bill, President Bush ex-
pressed his hope that China would object
less to his administrative action to protect
the students than the vetoed legislation
(Pear 1989:A24).  In 1996, U.S. law en-
forcement agencies received evidence that
the People’s Republic of China planned
to try to influence U.S. elections by con-
tributing money to political campaigns.  It
is unclear whether such donations were
made and whether any such money was
laundered by Asian-Americans; congres-
sional hearings into these allegations con-
tinue (Rosenbaum 1997:B9).
The Indian government has encouraged
the Indian community in the United States
to support Indian foreign policy objectives
in Washington actively, seeking, for ex-
ample, to persuade Congress not to pro-
vide military assistance to Pakistan
(Weiner 1990:203-04).
Despite such efforts, migrants are not
automatically instruments of their home
countries’ foreign policies.  Substantial
numbers of the immigrant groups in the
United States from such countries as Viet-
nam, China, the Philippines, Korea, and
Cuba fled their countries of origin as a
result of persecution.  Not only are they
unwilling to advance the interests of their
home countries, on many occasions they
make up opposition political groups that
pressure the United States to insist on free
elections, respect for human rights, and
democratic reforms in their home coun-
tries.
Foreign politicians seek political support
and monetary contributions from their
countrymen residing in the United States.
Dominican presidential candidates cam-
paigned in New York City during their
1996 elections.  The winner Leonel
Fernandez Reyna grew up in New York
City.  In 1978, Ecuadoran presidential
candidate Jaime Roldos campaigned in
New York City and in 1980, Italian parlia-
mentary candidates vied for absentee
votes in the United States.  Israel may
have as many as 500,000 citizens living in
the United States, which would probably
be the most significant case within the
United States of an expatriate
community’s political influence (Miller &
Papademetriou 1983:169-70).  It is not
apparent that the campaign activities of
foreign politicians on U.S. soil have had
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any effects on the foreign policymaking
process in the United States.
Increasing nationalization rates raise the
issue of dual citizenship.  There is no inter-
nationally agreed-upon principle govern-
ing dual citizenship.  Therefore, the effect
of an individual’s acquisition of another
citizenship on his or her existing citizen-
ship varies widely (Goldstein & Piazza
1996:517).  For some countries, citizenship
may carry with it an obligation to per-
form military service or pay taxes.  Citi-
zenship may be a prerequisite to property
ownership, employment, social welfare
benefits, or university attendance.  Dual
citizenship is more tolerated than explic-
itly accepted by both the U.S. and many
other governments.  The U.S. State De-
partment notes:
. . . while recognizing the existence
of dual nationality and permitting
Americans to have other
nationalities, the U.S. Government
does not endorse dual nationality
as a matter of policy because of
the problems it may cause.
Claims of other countries upon
dual national U.S. citizens often
place them in situations where
their obligations to one country
are in conflict with the laws of
the other (Goldstein & Piazza
1996:518).
The concern over dual citizenship is that
it may weaken the allegiance or commit-
ment of an individual to the country
where he or she is naturalized.  For the
United States, the assimilative process
advanced by naturalization may be dimin-
ished.  However, should dual citizenship
prove to be a problem, it could be ad-
dressed by treaty as some countries have
already done (Goldstein & Piazza
1996:519).
While dual citizenship currently does not
pose a problem for U.S. foreign
policymaking, it is an issue that bears
watching.  Ireland recently changed its
nationality laws to allow for dual citizen-
ship.  Colombia, Ecuador, Turkey, and
Italy have done the same.  In December
1996, constitutional amendments were
passed that, when implemented, will al-
low Mexicans to naturalize in another
country without automatically losing
Mexican citizenship.
Immigrants and ethnic groups do influ-
ence U.S. foreign policy, but in a circum-
scribed manner.  The success of ethnic
lobbies in influencing U.S. foreign policy
is limited to those circumstances where
the policy in question affects the home-
land of the ethnic group, where the issue
involved does not threaten U.S. national
security, where there is no equally effec-
tive lobbying effort against the proposed
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policy, and where the proposed policy is
within the mainstream of overall U.S. for-
eign policy.  If any of these circumstances
is absent, the proposed policy will likely
fail.
Ethnic lobbies are part of the U.S. politi-
cal scene.  They are historically main-
stream in their objectives.  Ethnic lobbies
serve as a useful voice and can even be a
corrective to conventional wisdom.  They
have the same right to present views con-
cerning the national interest as other
Americans (Keely 1995:242).  There is no
reason to believe that as the post-1965
immigrant groups become more active in
the policymaking process their behavior
will differ from that of earlier ethnic
groups.
CONCLUSION
Whether one subscribes to traditional or
modern ideas of national security, it is fair
to conclude that under certain circum-
stances immigration can pose a threat to
national security.  Immigration is closely
intertwined with foreign policy and na-
tional security, with each acting upon and
being influenced by the other.  To advance
national security, U.S. foreign policy has
been used to stimulate or inhibit migra-
tory movements.  The historical lack of
attention by foreign policy decisionmakers
to immigration has resulted in unintended
migration to the United States.  Virtually
every type of foreign policy tool—eco-
nomic, military, trade, or propaganda—
has been used at one time or another to
respond to concerns arising from immi-
gration.
The perception of and response to immi-
gration by U.S. policymakers is seen in
the context of U.S. national security.
During the Cold War era when commu-
nism posed a clear and imminent threat,
immigration policy was used to stimulate
defections from communist countries and
inhibit it from repressive allies.  In the
post-Cold War era, where no such obvi-
ous and imminent threat exists, immigra-
tion policy has become more restrictive in
response to domestic political perceptions.
Immigrants and their descendants attempt
to influence U.S. foreign policy in the same
manner as other interest groups.  How-
ever, historically their successes have been
limited almost entirely to those situations
where their goals were consistent with
prevailing U.S. national security needs.
The presence of immigrants in the United
States creates situations where foreign
governments become involved in attempt-
ing to influence U.S. foreign policy and
immigration policy either to protect their
countrymen in the U.S. or their national
interests that may be advanced by the
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presence of their nationals in the United
States.
As advances in travel and communica-
tion make migrations increasingly easy, the
ramifications of foreign policy decisions
upon immigration will need more than
ever to become an established part of the
foreign policy decisionmaking process.
The connections and implications between
these issues  need  more focused atten-
tion.  Addressing migration concerns ef-
fectively requires multilateral approaches
and cooperation with international agen-
cies.
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employment-based restricted immigrants, and certain special immigrants are studied.  In every
case, principals are distinguished from derivatives, and where necessary to address a specific
issue, other distinctions are made in the data, such as age, occupation, country or region of birth,
adjustments by nonimmigrant entry class, new immigrants versus adjustments of status, and
specific immigrant entry class
Aspects of the Immigration Act of 1990
Effective October 1, 1991, U.S. immigration law changed considerably.  These changes
were the result of the Immigration Act of 1990 which, while retaining the basic principles of the
earlier legislation, provided the most comprehensive change in legal immigration since 1965.
Data on which we base our forecasts relate to the old law.  The new law has many similarities to
the earlier law.  For example, the new law, like the old, provides for the unrestricted immigration
of certain immediate relatives of U.S. citizens.  The new law places more emphasis on
employment considerations, but the old occupation preferences (third and sixth) also place
emphasis on the same types of considerations.  Under the old law legal resident aliens were able
to reunite with immediate members of their family under the second preference, and a similar
preference (though expanded in terms of available visas) also is available under the new law.
2Moreover, the new law provides for “diversity” immigrants and explicitly excludes from this class
any natives of countries that are oversubscribed.
Several changes made by the 1990 Act are of particular relevance.  Under the previous
law, the annual allocation of numerically restricted visas was 270,000.  The 1990 Act established
a “flexible” worldwide cap on family-based, employment-based, and diversity immigrant visas.
Beginning in fiscal year 1995, after a “transition” period during which the annual quota was set at
700,000 the worldwide limit is 675,000.  Separate ceilings are set for each of the immigrant
categories: for family-sponsored visas, 480,000; for employment-based visas, 140,000; and for
diversity visas, 55,000.  While immediate relatives of U.S. citizens remain exempt from numerical
limitation, the number of spouses, minor children and parents of U.S. citizens are subtracted from
the overall numbers available for family sponsorship.  However, under no circumstances can the
number of numerically restricted family-sponsored visas be less than 226,000.  Therefore, if the
number of immediate relatives of U.S. citizens exceeds 254,000 (i.e., 480,000 - 226,000), the
flexible worldwide cap of 675,000 may be pierced.
In addition to setting a higher overall limit on admissions, the 1990 Act altered the per-
country limitations used to determine how many immigrants may enter the United States each
year.  Previously, the per-country quota was set at 20,000 visas per year.  The 1990 Act provides
that family-based and employment-based visas made available to citizens of a single independent
foreign state may not exceed 7 percent of the total available.  Given the minimum of 226,000
family-sponsored and 140 employment-based allocations, the per-country ceiling for an
independent country is raised to 25,620.  Additional flexibility is provided for potential migrants
by the fact that the 7 percent per-country limit is not subdivided between family-sponsored and
employment-based allocations.
3In many respects the new law concerning family-based immigrants is similar to the
previous law.  Immediate relatives of U.S. citizens remain exempt from numerical limitation.
Moreover, the annual floor of 226,000 numerically restricted family-sponsored visas represents
only a relatively small increase over the 216,000 available within the previous law’s family-related
preference categories.  However, the new law makes certain provisions that should alter the mix
of immigrants within  the family-sponsored categories.  The major change in the family-sponsored
categories involves spouses, minor children and unmarried adult children of permanent resident
aliens (i.e., second preference).  For these immigrants, the new law increased the allotment from
70,200 to at least 114,200.  Moreover, at least 77 percent of these visas are designated for
spouses and minor children of permanent resident aliens and three-quarters of these are not
subject to per-country limits.  The other family-based categories (i.e., first, fourth, and fifth
preference), either had their allocation remain essentially unchanged (i.e., fifth) or reduced by the
new law.
While maintaining the strong orientation toward family reunification that characterized the
1965 Amendments, the new law accommodates more skill-based immigrants, and it provides for
more source-country diversity.  Prior to the 1990 Act, 54,000 visas were available for occupation-
based immigrants.  The new law allows up to 140,000 employment-based visas and also places
more emphasis on skilled migrants within this category.  The so called “diversity” immigration
allocation was made available for the first time by the 1990 Act (although a relatively small
number of diversity visas were allocated by means of a lottery before the new law took effect).
The diversity immigrant allocations are designed to facilitate the entry of potential migrants from
countries adversely affected by the 1965 law.  Effective in 1995, the diversity quota is 55,000.
These 55,000 visas are to be allocated to natives of a country that has sent fewer than 50,000
4immigrants to the United States over the previous five years.  No single country may receive more
than 7 percent (3,850) of the number available worldwide.  To be eligible for a diversity visa, a
prospective immigrant must have at least a high school education or its equivalent and at least two
years of work experience in an occupation that requires at least two years of training or
experience.  Diversity immigrants are therefore a kind of occupational immigrant.
Table 1 bridges immigration under the old law and immigration under the Immigration Act
of 1990.  Data in this table are averages for 1990 and 1991 (the last years of the old law), 1992-
1994 (the three transition years of the new law), and 1995 and 1996 (the first two years during
which the more or less permanent cap and quota numbers were in effect).  Between 1990-1991
and 1995-1996, immigration subject to the numerical cap increased by 27.0 percent from 535,993
to 681,209.  Family-based immigration increased by 16.9 percent to 528,551, whereas
employment-based immigration increased by 72.3 percent to 101,418.  Immigration not subject to
the numerical cap fell by 7.7 percent, and in 1995-1996 accounted for 16.3 percent of total
immigration compared to 21.1 percent during 1990-1991.
Whereas total immigration subject to the numerical cap increased somewhat due to the
new law, many of the percentages noted above did not change markedly with the exception of the
percentage increase in employment-based immigrants.  Thus the Immigration Act of 1990 appears
clearly to have had the effect of boosting employment-related immigration, which was one of the
major objectives of the new law.  This conclusion is further substantiated in the analysis provided
below.  However, professionals with an advanced degree (employment 2nd preference principals)
have declined steadily since the first year that the new law was in effect: 58,401 in 1992, 29,468 in
1993, 14,432 in 1994, 10,475 in 1995 and 8,870 in 1996.  This pattern suggests a pent-up
demand for entry by such individuals that was relieved the Immigration Act of 1990.
5Data and Methodology
As noted above, the goal of this study is to determine the extent to which the Immigration
Act of 1990 changed the number and composition of various types of legal U.S. immigrants
relative to what they would have been if the former law remained in effect.  The “old law” was
operational from FY 1968 through FY 1991 and thus allows the development of a considerable
history of legal entrants.  Because data are available on each legal resident alien accepted by the
United States for FY 1972 through FY 1991, we are able to generate 20 annual observations for
any cross classification that is possible given the information reported in the Immigration and
Naturalization Service’s Public Use Tapes.  However, due to the different treatment of the
Eastern and Western Hemispheres until 1976, the study’s historical background consists of data
beginning with 1977.
Simple linear extrapolation is the methodology used in this study to predict what
immigration of various types under the old immigration law would have been had it continued
through 1995 and 1996.  The form of forecasting equation is
IMMit = 0 + 1T + eit,  ,
where IMMit is immigration of type i in year t, T is a simple time trend (1, 2, . . .,15), and eit is
random errors.  Each forecast refers to 1995 and 1996, which values are forecasted by carrying
the time trend to 19 and 20 respectively.  With the estimated constant term (or intercept) and the
estimated coefficient on T, which indicates the direction and strength of the trend, each estimated
relationship yields a “predicted value” that represents immigration under the old law if the 15-year
trend continued for four (1995) and five (1996) more years.  These values then are compared to a
corresponding comparable value that occurred  under the Immigration Act of 1990 (for 1995 and
1996).  Comparable classes of immigrants, or the mapping from the old law to the new law, are
6reported in Appendix A.  The ratio of “actual” to “predicted” yields an estimate of the percentage
difference that exists for the new law compared to the old law.
For those immigrant classes subject to a ceiling under the old law, various shares were
forecasted (e.g., principals versus derivatives).  The ceilings were assumed to have been met, so
that the issue became not how many but rather who was admitted under the ceiling.  Even when
predictions are developed for aggregate numbers, the ceilings are recognized in the components
that make up the aggregate prediction.
All forecasting regressions and all corresponding forecasts distinguish “principals” and
“derivatives.”  Principals enter the United States by dint of their relationship with a U.S. citizen or
resident alien, or by dint of their skills, whereas derivatives enter as the spouses and/or minor
children of the principals.
Estimating linear trends is not without shortcomings.  First, in certain instances nonlinear
relationships may provide better fits than linear relationships.  Second, in other cases step
functions may fit the historical data better, and by imposing a linear trend on the data such a
pattern could impose a strong trend to a relationship that would better be carried forward at a
constant level.  Third, certain categories of immigration occurred under a ceiling.  Nevertheless,
trends may be apparent under the ceiling as levels approached the maximum.  In such cases ceiling
levels are preferable to extrapolating the trend.  Finally, some behavioral model may underlie the
historical data.  The problem with using more complex forecasting models is that forecast values
of the independent variables of the model must be used to generate out-of-sample forecasts and
these may be unavailable.
7The advantage of using a similar linear trend is its simplicity.  The trend line is easily
extrapolated out of sample and the technique can be applied to numerous 15-year series required
for this report.  However, the assumptions that underlie the approach should be kept in mind.
Appendix A contains considerable detail on the methodology used here, as well as the
mapping of immigrant classes from the old law to the new law.  In what follows, we begin each
section with a specific question regarding immigration under the new law relative to the old law.
What is the difference between actual and predicted total immigration for 1995 and
1996?  The Immigration Act of 1990 appears to have slightly increased total immigration for
1995 (by 4.4%) and to have greatly increased that for 1996 (by 35.2%).  The respective ratios of
actual to predicted are 1.044 and 1.352.  In Table 2 and in subsequent tables, a ratio of 1.0
indicates that actual equals predicted, whereas values less than 1.0 indicate that the new law
yielded immigration of type i that was less than predicted under the old law.  Values greater than
1.0 indicate that the new law increased immigration compared to the numbers expected under the
old law.  Table 2 also indicates that whereas the actual numbers are greater than those predicted
for both principals (1.4% and 33.1% for 1995 and 1996, respectively) and derivatives (14.2% and
42.3%, respectively), the derivatives rose relatively more than the principals with the consequence
that the share of total immigration accounted for by derivatives increased compared to that
predicted under the old law (by 9.4% in 1995 and 5.2% in 1996).  (Appendix A provides further
detail on the methodology used to generate predicted values.)
In Table 3, the above question is addressed by occupation.  This table shows that
professional, technical, and kindred (or PTK) immigration was increased considerably by the
Immigration Act of 1990.  For both principals and derivatives each component of the PTK group
(i.e., other professional, health professional, and technical specialty) increased relative to
8predicted values.  The same conclusion holds for the managerial and executive group.  For
principals, other occupational groups are generally down (except operators, fabricators, and
labors – up 41.8% in 1996; farming, forestry, and fishing – up 5.2% in 1996; and services – up
2.9% in 1996).  All occupational categories of derivatives increased relative to predicated values
(except farming, forestry, and fishing, which is down each year).
Table 3 has two components.  Table 3A provides shares of all immigrants who report an
occupation.  Thus, for each year values in the columns for predicted and actual shares sum to
100% for principals and derivatives taken as a whole.  Shares in Table 3B sum to 100% for
principals and to 100% for derivatives.  In each table the shares refer only to those immigrants
who report an occupation.  For principals, each table indicates a strong increase in the shares for
the PTK groups, as well as for managers and executives.  Thus, the Immigration Act of 1990 not
only increased the numbers of highly educated and skilled individuals relative to what they would
have been under the old law, but also it tilted the overall composition of U.S. immigration toward
the more highly skilled groups.  Moreover, for derivatives, relatively large increases occurred in
both the numbers of highly skilled immigrants and the percentages of such individuals compared
to what was expected under the old immigration law.
Table 4 is similar to Table 3, except that Table 4 breaks out two age groups that
correspond to working ages (20-34, 35-64).  Principals among the PTK immigrants tend to be
concentrated in the younger ages, whereas principals among managers and executives tend to in
the older ages.  Among derivatives, the most highly educated and skilled individuals tend to be
concentrated in the older age categories.
9The next series of questions relates to employment-based immigration.  Under the old law
the employment preferences (often called “occupational preferences”) were the third (P3) and
sixth (P6) preferences.  These are the preference categories used for forecasting purposes.
To what extent have EB1 versus EB2 versus EB3 visa issuances increased the skill
composition of U.S. immigration?  These categories refer to aliens with extraordinary ability,
outstanding professors or researchers, and multinational executives and managers (EB1 or E1);
professionals holding advanced degrees (EB2 or E2); and skilled workers and professionals as
well as needed unskilled workers (EB3 or E3). Table 5 reports four groupings (or mappings) of
the data relating to the old and new laws: (1) E1/P3; (2) E3/P6;  (3) (E1 + E2)/P3; and (4) (E1 +
E2 + E3)/(P3 + P6).  These groupings allow comparisons between the highest skills (E1 and P3)
and skills in short supply (E3 and P6), as well as other comparisons that are more general, but
remain within the employment preferences.  The preference categories that require the very
highest skills and/or education (E1and P3) suggest that for both 1995 and 1996 both principals
and derivatives (who came with principals admitted under the employment preferences) were
down considerably relative to the predictions.  The shortfall of principals in 1995 was 0.546 of the
predicted number and in 1996 was 0.892 in employment-based preference EB1 compared to what
would have been expected under old preference category P3.  (The respective shortfall in
derivatives was 0.724 in 1995, but in 1996 an increase occurred of 12.7%).
For skills in short supply (E3 and P6), the numbers are up considerably.  For principals
EB3 admittances in 1995 were 130.5% higher than anticipated and in 1996 were 189.4% higher.
When the mappings are expanded to include all employment preferences (E1 + E2 + E3 relative
to P3 + P6), principals also were up sharply for both 1995 and 1996 (55.0% and 117.2%,
respectively).  Derivatives too were up, but by correspondingly smaller percentages (37.3% for
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1995 and 90.5% for 1996).  In Table 5, the figures for derivatives indicate nothing about the skills
of derivatives because this group of immigrants does not need to satisfy any skill requirement (and
indeed most of them report this occupation as our category 9, which is “homemakers, unknown,
retired, etc.”).
Table 5 also reports EB4 admissions, which under the old law were numerically exempt
special immigrants.  Under the new law they are also special immigrants, including ministers and
others.  These immigrants were for casted by means of a simple time trend (unconstrained), which
yields predicted 1995 and 1996 values for them.  Under the Immigration Act of 1990 these
immigrants are up in numbers for both principals (63.8% in 1995 and 90.7% in 1996) and
derivatives (3.2% in 1995 and 13.5% in 1996).
Are the derivatives of the new employment-based categories more skilled than those
of the old occupational preferences?  This question is addressed by examining occupation-
specific forecasts based on the sum of P3 and P6 with occupation-specific ac uals based on the
sum of E1, E2, and E3.  Table 6 corresponds to Table 5, except that in Table 6 occupations are
distinguished and EB1, EB2, and EB3 taken as a whole relative to the forecast for P3 and P6 is
shown.  For principals, as expected, the professional, technical, and kindred (PTK) as well as the
managerial and executive groups show major increases.  Health professionals stand out as the
group with the largest increases for both 1995 and 1996.  The answer to this question appears to
be a clear “yes.”  Among derivatives, in 1996 health professionals (numbering 916) were 535.6%
over the predicted number.  Other professionals (1,375 in 1996) were 305.9% greater than
predicted, and technical specialty workers (1,711 in 1996) were 145.1% greater than predicted.
Most derivatives fall in the “homemaker, unknown, retired, etc.” class, but among those who
report an occupation the PTK groups, especially health professionals, are up considerably.
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However, the numbers in these groups are understandably small compared to their counterparts
among the principals.
Has “dual intent” on adjustments from nonimmigrant entry classes (in particular
from H1, H1B, and L) increased skill composition?  Table 7 addresses this questions.  Table
7A reports principals and Table 7B shows derivatives of these principals.  Principals are further
divided into new entrants and those who adjust their status, with those who adjust distinguished
as H1B, L1, and other adjuster.  Among nonimmigrant entry classes, H1B refers to specialty
occupations (and under the old law referred to admissions of “distinguished merit or ability”), and
L1 refers to intracompany transferees.  In addition to H1B, the H1 category includes registered
nurses (H1A).   Regarding H1B adjusters, the answer to the question is that professional groups,
as well as managers and executives, definitely are up compared to what is predicted under the old
law.  For L1s, managers and executives are up, but PTK workers are not heavily represented in
this group.  Other adjusters are in the various high-skill occupations, but they are up in most other
occupations as well.  With the exception of the “other professional” category, new immigrants are
lower than expected or are only slightly higher (in 1996 only).  Although their numbers are not
great, derivative adjusters increased skilled immigration, but less-skilled immigration also.
Derivatives of new immigrants clearly increased skills.
How did the composition of source countries change due to the fact that the
Immigration Act of 1990 did not subject three quarters of FB2As to per country limits?
Under the Immigration Act of 1990, the former second preference became the second family
based preference class (FB2). This preference class is for spouses and children of legal permanent
residents.  The Act further distinguishes between FB2A (spouses and children under 21 years of
age) and FB2B (unmarried children 21 years of age and older).  Table 8 reports information
12
relating to this questions.  Mexico received the major benefit from the three-quarter exclusion
from country limits.  In 1995, Mexico alone had 51,502 FB2A admissions (relative to a predicted
number of 3,740).  In 1996, actual FB2A admissions from Mexico were 86,390 compared to a
predicted number of 3,424.  The Philippines also b nefitted from FB2As, but benefitted more
from FB2Bs.  In short, source-country composition was strongly tilted toward Mexico and to a
lesser extent toward the Philippines due to the exclusions from country limits.
Did the Immigration Act of 1990 increase the overall numbers of family-based
immigration?  Table 9 distinguishes principals and derivatives both for family-based numerically
restricted immigration and for numerically exempt immediate relatives of U.S. citizens.  The
family-based restricted under the old law (Preference Classes P1, P2, P4, P5) entered under a
numerical limitation that was in the late 1980s and early 1990s about 216,000 per year.  Thus, for
this group we predicted shares of principals (derivatives) under an annual limit of 216,000.
However, immediate relatives of U.S. citizens were (and are) exempt from quota limits. Thus,
immediate relatives were predicted by means of an unconstrained linear regression.
Family-based restricted principals increased considerably relative to predicted numbers
(29.1% in 1995 and 68.6% in 1996).  Immediate relatives of U.S. citizens were below the
predicted number in 1995 (0.775), but slightly above in 1996 (1.024).  In terms of shares, during
1995 and 1996 numerically restricted principals increased by 40.2% and 44.0%, respectively,
relative to predicted shares.  Family-based restricted derivatives fell relative to predicted numbers
(0.875 in 1995 and 0.965 in 1996).  Do the above numbers differ by restricted/exempt?  From
the above discussion, we can see that the answer is “yes” for numerically restricted immigrants
(and strongly so), but is “no” for numerically exempt immigrants.  Overall, the Immigration Act of
1990 increased immigrant numbers.
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The final block of questions relates to diversity issues.
Did the Immigration Act of 1990 result in more diversity by country of birth?
Tables 10, 11 and 12 relate to this question.  Table 10 shows principals (9A) and derivatives (9B)
by class of immigrant and country or region of birth.  Country/region predictions are based on
forecasts of shares (constrained to sum to 1.0) for those groups that enter under a restriction.
The number of restricted employment-based principals in 1995 and 1996 exceeds predictions for
most countries/regions, but especially for China, which for each year had over 10 times the
predicted number.  The Philippines, Canada, India, Africa, and Europe all had 1995 and 1996
numbers well in excess of their predicted numbers.
Family-based restricted principals exceeds predictions especially for Mexico, but for the
Philippines as well, which were due primarily to the FB2A visas discussed above.  For principals,
exempt immediate relatives in 1995 were below the predicted numbers, but in 1996 were above
for many countries/regions.
The most notable increase in employment-based derivatives was for China, but Canada
and India also had relatively large increases.  The largest relative increase (compared to predicted
numbers) in restricted family-based numbers was for Africa , but the total numbers for Africa are
small in comparison to other regions/countries.
The answer to the question immediately above depends upon perspective. The major
source of U.S. immigrants is Mexico, and Mexico had by far the largest increases in 1995 and
1996 relative to predicted numbers.  These increases were due in part to FB2A category of
admissions discussed above.  For example, restricted family-based principals from Mexico
accounted in 1995 for 10.0% of admissions listed in Table 10 and in 1996 for 11.9%.  However,
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more immigrants are originating in most other parts of the world and in this sense immigration is
becoming more diverse.
What is the skill composition of the new permanent diversity program? Table 11
sheds more light on the diversity questions by breaking out countries that were not qualified for
“diversity visas” from those that were.  (The set of diversity-qualified countries may change over
time, but we took Mexico, Philippines, and India as not diversity qualified.)  Table 11 reports
simple cross tabs for diversity immigrants versus non-diversity immigrants from diversity-qualified
countries and for immigrants from  non-diversity qualified countries.  In each case principals are
distinguished from derivatives and occupational detail is provided.  For diversity-qualified
countries, diversity immigrants accounted for higher shares of the PTK groups and for smaller
shares of the less skilled occupational groups.  This statement holds for principals and derivatives.
Thus, the qualifications for the diversity program appear to have increased skills.  The non-
diversity qualified countries tend to have greater shares of immigrants in less-skilled occupations
than diversity-qualified countries, but health professionals is an exception.
Table 12 provides overall predictions for the various occupational groups for diversity-
qualified and non diversity-qualified countries and for principals versus derivatives.  For principals
from diversity-qualified countries, the diversity programs appear to have increased skills.  The
high-skilled occupational groups all tend to have actual values in excess of predicted values for
diversity-qualified countries.  So do the derivatives from these countries, but for them all
occupational groups tend to have risen relative to predicted numbers (although the increases are
relatively largest for those with the highest skills).  The permanent diversity programs thus appear
to have increased skilled immigration compared to what it would have been under the old
immigration law.
Table 1. Average Immigrant Admissions by Major Category:  FYs 1990-1996
Category of Admission 1990-91 1992-94 1995-96
TOTAL 680,058 813,730
SUBJECT TO THE NUMERICAL CAP 536,502 681,209
143,557 150,591
Refugees and Asylees 118,222 121,615
Other 28,653 10,907
FAMILY-BASED IMMIGRANTS 513,295 528,551
Immediate Relatives of U.S. citizens (NX) 234,392 246,769 260,395
     Spouses and children 172,509 185,582 202,855
     Parents 61,883 61,187 57,541
Children born abroad to alien residents (NX) 2,317 2,010 1,777
Family-sponsored preference immigrants (NR) 215,319 217,287 266,148
     Unmarried sons/daughters of U.S. citizens 15,623 12,829 18,046
     Spouses and children of LPRs X 120,473 163,685
     Married sons/daughters of U.S. citizens 26,933 22,590 23,164
     Siblings of U.S. citizens 63,857 61,349 61,254
Legalization dependents (NR) X 47,230 231
58,859 128,834
Priority workers X 22,420
Professionals w/ adv. deg. or of advanced ability 34,100 14,469
X 70,738
Special immigrants 4,520 7,291
Investors 362 738
27,147 113
Needed skilled or unskilled workers (Old 6th) 27,192 X
25,616 53,018
X 36,145
Nationals of adversely affected countries (NR) 16,320 X
Natives of underrepresented countries (NR) 294 X
provisions of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986
Source:  For 1990-94--U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform (1995), Chart 1: for 1995-1996--U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (1997), Table 4 and 5.
Table 2.  Principals and Derivatives: Actual and Predicted Immigration, 1995 and 1996
Fiscal Year 1995 Fiscal Year 1996
Numbers Shares Numbers Shares
Predicted Actual
Actual/ 
Predicted Predicted Actual
Actual/ 
Predicted Predicted Actual
Actual/ 
Predicted Predicted Actual
Actual/ 
Predicted
Principals 431,873 438,072 1.014 76.9% 74.7% 0.972 439,490 584,795 1.331 76.9% 75.7% 0.984
Derivatives 129,711 148,097 1.142 23.1% 25.3% 1.094 131,660 187,316 1.423 23.1% 24.3% 1.052
Total 561,584 586,169 1.044 100.0% 100.0% 1.000 571,151 772,111 1.352 100.0% 100.0% 1.000
Note: This comparison excludes refugees and immigrants from certain other admission classes.
Table 3A.  Principals and Derivatives by Occupation: Actual and Predicted Immigration, 1995 and 1996
Fiscal Year 1995 Fiscal Year 1996
Numbers Shares Numbers Shares
Predicted Actual
Actual/ 
Predicted Predicted Actual
Actual/ 
Predicted Predicted Actual
Actual/ 
Predicted Predicted Actual
Actual/ 
Predicted
Principals
1. professional, technical, and kindred
a. health professional 9,182 14,103 1.536 4.4% 7.0% 1.599 9,353 16,551 1.770 4.4% 6.1% 1.380
b. other professional 8,858 11,549 1.304 4.2% 5.7% 1.357 8,618 16,353 1.898 4.0% 6.0% 1.480
c. technical specialty 19,186 21,206 1.105 9.1% 10.5% 1.151 19,500 27,758 1.423 9.1% 10.1% 1.110
2. managerial and executive 17,936 20,113 1.121 8.5% 9.9% 1.168 18,029 26,443 1.467 8.5% 9.7% 1.144
3. sales 11,262 8,424 0.748 5.3% 4.2% 0.779 11,673 10,934 0.937 5.5% 4.0% 0.731
4. administrative support 17,475 13,453 0.770 8.3% 6.6% 0.802 17,555 16,367 0.932 8.2% 6.0% 0.727
5. precision production 18,972 13,042 0.687 9.0% 6.4% 0.716 19,126 17,274 0.903 9.0% 6.3% 0.704
6. operators, fabricators, and laborers 34,010 31,127 0.915 16.1% 15.4% 0.953 34,165 48,445 1.418 16.0% 17.7% 1.106
7. farming, forestry, and fishing 10,089 9,341 0.926 4.8% 4.6% 0.964 10,217 10,747 1.052 4.8% 3.9% 0.820
8. service 43,141 33,233 0.770 20.5% 16.4% 0.802 44,422 45,715 1.029 20.8% 16.7% 0.803
9. homemakers, unknown, retired, etc. 244,790 262,481 1.072 250,106 348,208 1.392
Derivatives
1. professional, technical, and kindred
a. health professional 910 1,844 2.026 0.4% 0.9% 2.110 891 2,435 2.733 0.4% 0.9% 2.131
b. other professional 678 2,096 3.094 0.3% 1.0% 3.221 613 3,124 5.100 0.3% 1.1% 3.977
c. technical specialty 2,597 3,928 1.513 1.2% 1.9% 1.575 2,615 5,359 2.049 1.2% 2.0% 1.598
2. managerial and executive 2,286 3,311 1.448 1.1% 1.6% 1.508 2,254 4,259 1.889 1.1% 1.6% 1.474
3. sales 1,236 1,523 1.232 0.6% 0.8% 1.283 1,270 2,068 1.628 0.6% 0.8% 1.270
4. administrative support 1,928 2,591 1.344 0.9% 1.3% 1.399 1,882 3,440 1.828 0.9% 1.3% 1.426
5. precision production 1,927 2,225 1.155 0.9% 1.1% 1.202 1,902 2,842 1.494 0.9% 1.0% 1.166
6. operators, fabricators, and laborers 3,513 3,913 1.114 1.7% 1.9% 1.160 3,517 5,491 1.561 1.6% 2.0% 1.218
7. farming, forestry, and fishing 1,945 1,434 0.737 0.9% 0.7% 0.768 1,980 1,841 0.930 0.9% 0.7% 0.725
8. service 3,653 3,999 1.095 1.7% 2.0% 1.140 3,758 6,082 1.618 1.8% 2.2% 1.262
9. homemakers, unknown, retired, etc. 109,965 121,233 1.102 111,588 150,375 1.348
Note: Shares refer to shares of those who report an occupation (occupation categories 1-8)
Note: This comparison excludes refugees and immigrants from certain other admission classes.
Table 3B.  Principals and Derivatives by Occupation: Actual and Predicted Immigration with Intra-Category Shares, 1995 and 1996
Fiscal Year 1995 Fiscal Year 1996
Numbers Shares Numbers Shares
Predicted Actual
Actual/ 
Predicted Predicted Actual
Actual/ 
Predicted Predicted Actual
Actual/ 
Predicted Predicted Actual
Actual/ 
Predicted
Principals
1. professional, technical, and kindred
a. health professional 9,182 14,103 1.536 5.1% 8.7% 1.721 9,353 16,551 1.770 5.1% 7.5% 1.474
b. other professional 8,858 11,549 1.304 4.9% 7.2% 1.461 8,618 16,353 1.898 4.7% 7.4% 1.581
c. technical specialty 19,186 21,206 1.105 10.6% 13.1% 1.238 19,500 27,758 1.423 10.6% 12.6% 1.186
2. managerial and executive 17,936 20,113 1.121 9.9% 12.5% 1.256 18,029 26,443 1.467 9.8% 12.0% 1.222
3. sales 11,262 8,424 0.748 6.2% 5.2% 0.838 11,673 10,934 0.937 6.4% 5.0% 0.780
4. administrative support 17,475 13,453 0.770 9.7% 8.3% 0.863 17,555 16,367 0.932 9.6% 7.4% 0.777
5. precision production 18,972 13,042 0.687 10.5% 8.1% 0.770 19,126 17,274 0.903 10.4% 7.9% 0.752
6. operators, fabricators, and laborers 34,010 31,127 0.915 18.8% 19.3% 1.025 34,165 48,445 1.418 18.6% 22.0% 1.181
7. farming, forestry, and fishing 10,089 9,341 0.926 5.6% 5.8% 1.037 10,217 10,747 1.052 5.6% 4.9% 0.876
8. service 43,141 33,233 0.770 23.8% 20.6% 0.863 44,422 45,715 1.029 24.2% 20.8% 0.857
9. homemakers, unknown, retired, etc. 244,790 262,481 1.072 250,106 348,208 1.392
Derivatives
1. professional, technical, and kindred
a. health professional 910 1,844 2.026 4.6% 7.4% 1.600 891 2,435 2.733 4.5% 7.1% 1.567
b. other professional 678 2,096 3.094 3.4% 8.4% 2.444 613 3,124 5.100 3.1% 9.1% 2.925
c. technical specialty 2,597 3,928 1.513 13.1% 15.7% 1.195 2,615 5,359 2.049 13.2% 15.5% 1.175
2. managerial and executive 2,286 3,311 1.448 11.6% 13.2% 1.144 2,254 4,259 1.889 11.4% 12.3% 1.084
3. sales 1,236 1,523 1.232 6.3% 6.1% 0.973 1,270 2,068 1.628 6.4% 6.0% 0.934
4. administrative support 1,928 2,591 1.344 9.8% 10.4% 1.062 1,882 3,440 1.828 9.5% 10.0% 1.048
5. precision production 1,927 2,225 1.155 9.7% 8.9% 0.912 1,902 2,842 1.494 9.6% 8.2% 0.857
6. operators, fabricators, and laborers 3,513 3,913 1.114 17.8% 15.6% 0.880 3,517 5,491 1.561 17.8% 15.9% 0.896
7. farming, forestry, and fishing 1,945 1,434 0.737 9.8% 5.7% 0.582 1,980 1,841 0.930 10.0% 5.3% 0.533
8. service 3,653 3,999 1.095 18.5% 16.0% 0.865 3,758 6,082 1.618 19.0% 17.6% 0.928
9. homemakers, unknown, retired, etc. 109,965 121,233 1.102 111,588 150,375 1.348
Note: Shares refer to shares of those immigrants within the category (e.g. Derivatives) who report an occupation (occupation categories 1-8)
Note: This comparison excludes refugees and immigrants from certain other admission classes.
Table 4A.  Principals and Derivatives by Age and Occupation: Actual and Predicted Immigration, 1995 and 1996
Fiscal Year 1995 Fiscal Year 1996
Numbers Shares Numbers Shares
Predicted Actual
Actual/ 
Predicted Predicted Actual
Actual/ 
Predicted Predicted Actual
Actual/ 
Predicted Predicted Actual
Actual/ 
Predicted
Principals, Age 20-34
1. professional, technical, and kindred
a. health professional 5,882 8,426 1.432 2.8% 4.2% 1.484 5,955 9,654 1.621 2.8% 3.5% 1.259
b. other professional 5,292 6,864 1.297 2.5% 3.4% 1.343 5,090 9,432 1.853 2.4% 3.4% 1.439
c. technical specialty 10,036 10,667 1.063 4.8% 5.3% 1.101 10,113 13,518 1.337 4.8% 4.9% 1.038
2. managerial and executive 7,979 8,165 1.023 3.8% 4.0% 1.060 8,047 10,350 1.286 3.8% 3.8% 0.999
3. sales 6,825 4,627 0.678 3.3% 2.3% 0.702 7,056 5,834 0.827 3.3% 2.1% 0.642
4. administrative support 11,642 8,093 0.695 5.6% 4.0% 0.720 11,629 9,639 0.829 5.5% 3.5% 0.644
5. precision production 10,820 6,613 0.611 5.2% 3.3% 0.633 10,850 9,080 0.837 5.1% 3.3% 0.650
6. operators, fabricators, and laborers 22,232 16,373 0.736 10.6% 8.1% 0.763 22,318 26,686 1.196 10.5% 9.8% 0.928
7. farming, forestry, and fishing 4,291 3,105 0.724 2.0% 1.5% 0.750 4,299 3,530 0.821 2.0% 1.3% 0.638
8. service 26,072 17,362 0.666 12.4% 8.6% 0.690 26,891 23,523 0.875 12.7% 8.6% 0.679
9. homemakers, unknown, retired, etc. 97,076 86,155 0.888 99,289 115,767 1.166
Principals, Age 35-64
1. professional, technical, and kindred
a. health professional 3,433 5,515 1.606 1.6% 2.7% 1.664 3,484 6,627 1.902 1.6% 2.4% 1.477
b. other professional 3,261 4,561 1.399 1.6% 2.3% 1.449 3,245 6,754 2.081 1.5% 2.5% 1.616
c. technical specialty 8,684 10,090 1.162 4.1% 5.0% 1.203 8,896 13,699 1.540 4.2% 5.0% 1.196
2. managerial and executive 9,224 11,443 1.241 4.4% 5.7% 1.285 9,317 15,395 1.652 4.4% 5.6% 1.283
3. sales 3,854 3,358 0.871 1.8% 1.7% 0.902 4,013 4,564 1.137 1.9% 1.7% 0.883
4. administrative support 5,505 5,064 0.920 2.6% 2.5% 0.953 5,628 6,391 1.136 2.6% 2.3% 0.882
5. precision production 7,372 5,914 0.802 3.5% 2.9% 0.831 7,500 7,571 1.010 3.5% 2.8% 0.784
6. operators, fabricators, and laborers 10,154 11,845 1.166 4.8% 5.9% 1.208 10,245 17,810 1.738 4.8% 6.5% 1.350
7. farming, forestry, and fishing 4,330 4,484 1.036 2.1% 2.2% 1.073 4,420 5,382 1.218 2.1% 2.0% 0.945
8. service 15,118 14,259 0.943 7.2% 7.0% 0.977 15,573 19,644 1.261 7.3% 7.2% 0.979
9. homemakers, unknown, retired, etc. 58,754 56,969 0.970 60,611 76,673 1.265
Derivatives, Age 20-34
1. professional, technical, and kindred
a. health professional 197 712 3.607 0.1% 0.4% 3.736 188 932 4.965 0.1% 0.3% 3.854
b. other professional 160 831 5.186 0.1% 0.4% 5.371 152 1,265 8.340 0.1% 0.5% 6.475
c. technical specialty 462 1,304 2.822 0.2% 0.6% 2.922 426 1,855 4.353 0.2% 0.7% 3.380
2. managerial and executive 380 750 1.976 0.2% 0.4% 2.046 353 981 2.776 0.2% 0.4% 2.155
3. sales 341 519 1.524 0.2% 0.3% 1.578 346 730 2.112 0.2% 0.3% 1.640
4. administrative support 439 903 2.056 0.2% 0.4% 2.130 385 1,259 3.270 0.2% 0.5% 2.538
5. precision production 564 722 1.280 0.3% 0.4% 1.325 555 1,003 1.808 0.3% 0.4% 1.404
6. operators, fabricators, and laborers 1,011 1,266 1.253 0.5% 0.6% 1.297 998 2,017 2.021 0.5% 0.7% 1.569
7. farming, forestry, and fishing 308 267 0.866 0.1% 0.1% 0.897 304 348 1.144 0.1% 0.1% 0.888
8. service 1,198 1,474 1.230 0.6% 0.7% 1.274 1,229 2,454 1.997 0.6% 0.9% 1.550
9. homemakers, unknown, retired, etc. 10,324 16,691 1.617 10,274 23,682 2.305
Derivatives, Age 35-64
1. professional, technical, and kindred
a. health professional 735 1,109 1.508 0.4% 0.5% 1.562 749 1,460 1.951 0.4% 0.5% 1.514
b. other professional 628 1,245 1.983 0.3% 0.6% 2.054 621 1,827 2.942 0.3% 0.7% 2.284
c. technical specialty 2,034 2,540 1.249 1.0% 1.3% 1.293 2,094 3,399 1.623 1.0% 1.2% 1.260
2. managerial and executive 1,869 2,507 1.341 0.9% 1.2% 1.389 1,875 3,225 1.720 0.9% 1.2% 1.335
3. sales 776 920 1.186 0.4% 0.5% 1.229 802 1,243 1.549 0.4% 0.5% 1.203
4. administrative support 1,347 1,566 1.162 0.6% 0.8% 1.204 1,370 2,057 1.502 0.6% 0.8% 1.166
5. precision production 1,233 1,307 1.060 0.6% 0.6% 1.098 1,237 1,617 1.307 0.6% 0.6% 1.015
6. operators, fabricators, and laborers 2,086 2,260 1.084 1.0% 1.1% 1.122 2,115 3,044 1.439 1.0% 1.1% 1.117
7. farming, forestry, and fishing 1,252 983 0.785 0.6% 0.5% 0.813 1,287 1,246 0.968 0.6% 0.5% 0.752
8. service 2,097 2,222 1.060 1.0% 1.1% 1.098 2,178 3,276 1.504 1.0% 1.2% 1.168
9. homemakers, unknown, retired, etc. 11,099 15,274 1.376 11,284 20,224 1.792
Note: Shares refer to shares of those immigrants who report an occupation (occupation categories 1-8)
Note: This comparison excludes refugees and immigrants from certain other admission classes.
Table 4B.  Principals and Derivatives by Age and Occupation: Actual and Predicted Immigration with Intra-Category Shares, 1995 and 1996
Fiscal Year 1995 Fiscal Year 1996
Numbers Shares Numbers Shares
Predicted Actual
Actual/ 
Predicted Predicted Actual
Actual/ 
Predicted Predicted Actual
Actual/ 
Predicted Predicted Actual
Actual/ 
Predicted
Principals, Age 20-34
1. professional, technical, and Kindred
a. health professional 5,882 8,426 1.432 5.6% 10.3% 1.841 5,955 9,654 1.621 5.6% 8.7% 1.544
b. other professional 5,292 6,864 1.297 5.0% 8.4% 1.666 5,090 9,432 1.853 4.8% 8.5% 1.765
c. technical specialty 10,036 10,667 1.063 9.5% 13.0% 1.366 10,113 13,518 1.337 9.5% 12.1% 1.273
2. managerial and executive 7,979 8,165 1.023 7.6% 10.0% 1.315 8,047 10,350 1.286 7.6% 9.3% 1.225
3. sales 6,825 4,627 0.678 6.5% 5.7% 0.871 7,056 5,834 0.827 6.6% 5.2% 0.788
4. administrative support 11,642 8,093 0.695 11.1% 9.9% 0.893 11,629 9,639 0.829 10.9% 8.6% 0.789
5. precision production 10,820 6,613 0.611 10.3% 8.1% 0.785 10,850 9,080 0.837 10.2% 8.1% 0.797
6. operators, fabricators, and laborers 22,232 16,373 0.736 21.1% 20.0% 0.946 22,318 26,686 1.196 21.0% 23.9% 1.139
7. farming, forestry, and fishing 4,291 3,105 0.724 4.1% 3.8% 0.930 4,299 3,530 0.821 4.0% 3.2% 0.782
8. service 26,072 17,362 0.666 24.8% 21.2% 0.856 26,891 23,523 0.875 25.3% 21.1% 0.833
9. homemakers, unknown, retired, etc. 97,076 86,155 0.888 99,289 115,767 1.166
Principals, Age 35-64
1. professional, technical, and Kindred
a. health professional 3,433 5,515 1.606 5.1% 7.8% 1.527 3,484 6,627 1.902 5.1% 6.8% 1.347
b. other professional 3,261 4,561 1.399 4.8% 6.4% 1.330 3,245 6,754 2.081 4.7% 6.9% 1.474
c. technical specialty 8,684 10,090 1.162 12.9% 14.2% 1.104 8,896 13,699 1.540 12.9% 14.1% 1.090
2. managerial and executive 9,224 11,443 1.241 13.7% 16.1% 1.179 9,317 15,395 1.652 13.5% 15.8% 1.170
3. sales 3,854 3,358 0.871 5.7% 4.7% 0.828 4,013 4,564 1.137 5.8% 4.7% 0.805
4. administrative support 5,505 5,064 0.920 8.2% 7.1% 0.874 5,628 6,391 1.136 8.2% 6.6% 0.804
5. precision production 7,372 5,914 0.802 10.9% 8.3% 0.763 7,500 7,571 1.010 10.9% 7.8% 0.715
6. operators, fabricators, and laborers 10,154 11,845 1.166 15.0% 16.7% 1.109 10,245 17,810 1.738 14.9% 18.3% 1.231
7. farming, forestry, and fishing 4,330 4,484 1.036 6.4% 6.3% 0.984 4,420 5,382 1.218 6.4% 5.5% 0.862
8. service 15,118 14,259 0.943 22.4% 20.1% 0.896 15,573 19,644 1.261 22.6% 20.2% 0.893
9. homemakers, unknown, retired, etc. 58,754 56,969 0.970 60,611 76,673 1.265
Derivatives, Age 20-34
1. professional, technical, and kindred
a. health professional 197 712 3.607 4.1% 8.9% 2.183 188 932 4.965 4.0% 7.8% 1.979
b. other professional 160 831 5.186 3.3% 10.3% 3.138 152 1,265 8.340 3.2% 10.6% 3.324
c. technical specialty 462 1,304 2.822 9.5% 16.2% 1.707 426 1,855 4.353 9.0% 15.6% 1.735
2. managerial and executive 380 750 1.976 7.8% 9.3% 1.196 353 981 2.776 7.4% 8.2% 1.107
3. sales 341 519 1.524 7.0% 6.5% 0.922 346 730 2.112 7.3% 6.1% 0.842
4. administrative support 439 903 2.056 9.0% 11.2% 1.244 385 1,259 3.270 8.1% 10.6% 1.303
5. precision production 564 722 1.280 11.6% 9.0% 0.774 555 1,003 1.808 11.7% 8.4% 0.721
6. operators, fabricators, and laborers 1,011 1,266 1.253 20.8% 15.8% 0.758 998 2,017 2.021 21.0% 16.9% 0.806
7. farming, forestry, and fishing 308 267 0.866 6.3% 3.3% 0.524 304 348 1.144 6.4% 2.9% 0.456
8. service 1,198 1,474 1.230 24.6% 18.3% 0.745 1,229 2,454 1.997 25.9% 20.6% 0.796
9. homemakers, unknown, retired, etc. 10,324 16,691 1.617 10,274 23,682 2.305
Derivatives, Age 35-64
1. professional, technical, and kindred
a. health professional 735 1,109 1.508 5.5% 7.1% 1.292 749 1,460 1.951 5.5% 7.0% 1.265
b. other professional 628 1,245 1.983 4.7% 8.0% 1.699 621 1,827 2.942 4.6% 8.7% 1.908
c. technical specialty 2,034 2,540 1.249 15.3% 16.3% 1.070 2,094 3,399 1.623 15.4% 16.2% 1.053
2. managerial and executive 1,869 2,507 1.341 14.0% 16.1% 1.149 1,875 3,225 1.720 13.8% 15.4% 1.116
3. sales 776 920 1.186 5.8% 5.9% 1.016 802 1,243 1.549 5.9% 5.9% 1.005
4. administrative support 1,347 1,566 1.162 10.1% 10.1% 0.996 1,370 2,057 1.502 10.1% 9.8% 0.974
5. precision production 1,233 1,307 1.060 9.3% 8.4% 0.908 1,237 1,617 1.307 9.1% 7.7% 0.848
6. operators, fabricators, and laborers 2,086 2,260 1.084 15.7% 14.5% 0.928 2,115 3,044 1.439 15.6% 14.5% 0.933
7. farming, forestry, and fishing 1,252 983 0.785 9.4% 6.3% 0.672 1,287 1,246 0.968 9.5% 6.0% 0.628
8. service 2,097 2,222 1.060 15.7% 14.3% 0.908 2,178 3,276 1.504 16.0% 15.6% 0.976
9. homemakers, unknown, retired, etc. 11,099 15,274 1.376 11,284 20,224 1.792
Note: Shares refer to shares of those immigrants within the category (e.g. Derivatives, Age 35-65) who report an occupation (occupation categories 1-8)
Note: This comparison excludes refugees and immigrants from certain other admission classes.
Table 5.  Principals and Derivatives for Employment Based Preferences: Actual and Predicted Immigration, 1995 and 1996
Fiscal Year 1995 Fiscal Year 1996
Numbers Shares Numbers Shares
Predicted Actual
Actual/ 
Predicted Predicted Actual
Actual/ 
Predicted Predicted Actual
Actual/ 
Predicted Predicted Actual
Actual/ 
Predicted
Principals
EB1 vs. P3 12,341 6,733 0.546 8.8% 3.7% 0.425 12,379 11,047 0.892 8.8% 4.4% 0.492
EB3 vs. P6 9,840 22,684 2.305 7.0% 12.5% 1.794 9,639 27,897 2.894 6.9% 11.0% 1.595
EB1+EB2 vs. P3 12,341 11,685 0.947 8.8% 6.5% 0.737 12,379 19,917 1.609 8.8% 7.8% 0.887
EB1+EB2+EB3 vs. P3+P6 22,181 34,369 1.550 15.8% 19.0% 1.206 22,018 47,814 2.172 15.7% 18.8% 1.197
EB4 1,788 2,929 1.638 1.3% 1.6% 1.273 1,832 3,494 1.907 1.3% 1.4% 1.057
EB5 174 0.1% 395 0.2%
Derivatives
EB1 vs. P3 14,659 10,613 0.724 10.4% 5.9% 0.563 14,621 16,472 1.127 10.4% 6.5% 0.621
EB3 vs. P6 17,160 27,561 1.606 12.2% 15.2% 1.250 17,361 34,859 2.008 12.3% 13.7% 1.106
EB1+EB2 vs. P3 14,659 16,136 1.101 10.4% 8.9% 0.857 14,621 26,064 1.783 10.4% 10.3% 0.982
EB1+EB2+EB3 vs. P3+P6 31,819 43,697 1.373 22.7% 24.2% 1.069 31,982 60,923 1.905 22.7% 24.0% 1.050
EB4 3,689 3,808 1.032 2.6% 2.1% 0.802 3,834 4,350 1.135 2.7% 1.7% 0.629
EB5 366 0.2% 641 0.3%
Note: Shares refer to shares of employment based immigrants
Note: Estimates for EB4 are based on the formerly exempt special categories now part of it
Table 6A.  Principals and Derivatives for Employment Preference by Occupation: Actual and Predicted Immigration, 1995 and 1996
Fiscal Year 1995 Fiscal Year 1996
Numbers Shares Numbers Shares
Predicted Actual
Actual/ 
Predicted Predicted Actual
Actual/ 
Predicted Predicted Actual
Actual/ 
Predicted Predicted Actual
Actual/ 
Predicted
Principals
1. professional, technical, and kindred
a. health professional 725 6,794 9.366 2.7% 20.7% 7.570 719 7,658 10.647 2.7% 15.4% 5.727
b. other professional 4,805 5,201 1.082 18.1% 15.9% 0.875 4,831 8,714 1.804 18.1% 17.6% 0.970
c. technical specialty 2,338 4,013 1.716 8.8% 12.2% 1.387 2,329 6,386 2.742 8.7% 12.9% 1.475
2. managerial and executive 4,229 7,158 1.693 16.0% 21.8% 1.368 4,267 10,917 2.559 16.0% 22.0% 1.376
3. sales 232 322 1.387 0.9% 1.0% 1.121 228 367 1.611 0.9% 0.7% 0.866
4. administrative support 773 697 0.902 2.9% 2.1% 0.729 781 972 1.245 2.9% 2.0% 0.670
5. precision production 1,367 1,471 1.076 5.2% 4.5% 0.869 1,337 2,841 2.125 5.0% 5.7% 1.143
6. operators, fabricators, and laborers 980 1,317 1.344 3.7% 4.0% 1.086 980 1,576 1.609 3.7% 3.2% 0.865
7. farming, forestry, and fishing 10 133 13.182 0.0% 0.4% 10.655 9 220 24.735 0.0% 0.4% 13.305
8. service 6,332 6,064 0.958 23.9% 18.5% 0.774 6,468 7,959 1.231 24.2% 16.0% 0.662
9. homemakers, unknown, retired, etc. 1,325 1,199 0.905 1,299 204 0.157
Derivatives
1. professional, technical, and kindred
a. health professional 171 765 4.482 0.6% 2.3% 3.623 144 916 6.356 0.5% 1.8% 3.419
b. other professional 356 883 2.481 1.3% 2.7% 2.005 339 1,375 4.059 1.3% 2.8% 2.184
c. technical specialty 712 1,234 1.732 2.7% 3.8% 1.400 698 1,711 2.451 2.6% 3.5% 1.319
2. managerial and executive 807 957 1.186 3.0% 2.9% 0.959 814 1,278 1.569 3.1% 2.6% 0.844
3. sales 323 384 1.189 1.2% 1.2% 0.961 330 508 1.539 1.2% 1.0% 0.828
4. administrative support 389 660 1.696 1.5% 2.0% 1.371 355 809 2.277 1.3% 1.6% 1.225
5. precision production 565 302 0.535 2.1% 0.9% 0.432 574 572 0.997 2.2% 1.2% 0.536
6. operators, fabricators, and laborers 910 805 0.885 3.4% 2.5% 0.715 939 1,258 1.339 3.5% 2.5% 0.720
7. farming, forestry, and fishing 85 101 1.184 0.3% 0.3% 0.957 85 147 1.728 0.3% 0.3% 0.929
8. service 1,275 1,071 0.840 4.8% 3.3% 0.679 1,313 1,983 1.510 4.9% 4.0% 0.812
9. homemakers, unknown, retired, etc. 25,290 36,535 1.445 25,161 50,366 2.002
Note: The new fourth and fifth employment based preference classes are not included in this table
Note: Shares refer to shares of employment based immigrants (excluding the new EB4 and EB5 categories) who report an occupation
Table 6B.  Principals and Derivatives for Employment Preference by Occupation: Actual and Predicted Immigration with Intra-Category Shares, 1995 and 1996
Fiscal Year 1995 Fiscal Year 1996
Numbers Shares Numbers Shares
Predicted Actual
Actual/ 
Predicted Predicted Actual
Actual/ 
Predicted Predicted Actual
Actual/ 
Predicted Predicted Actual
Actual/ 
Predicted
Principals
1. professional, technical, and kindred
a. health professional 725 6,794 9.366 3.4% 25.8% 7.481 719 7,658 10.647 3.4% 19.2% 5.657
b. other professional 4,805 5,201 1.082 22.8% 19.7% 0.865 4,831 8,714 1.804 22.8% 21.8% 0.958
c. technical specialty 2,338 4,013 1.716 11.1% 15.2% 1.371 2,329 6,386 2.742 11.0% 16.0% 1.457
2. managerial and executive 4,229 7,158 1.693 20.1% 27.1% 1.352 4,267 10,917 2.559 20.1% 27.3% 1.360
3. sales 232 322 1.387 1.1% 1.2% 1.108 228 367 1.611 1.1% 0.9% 0.856
4. administrative support 773 697 0.902 3.7% 2.6% 0.720 781 972 1.245 3.7% 2.4% 0.661
5. precision production 1,367 1,471 1.076 6.5% 5.6% 0.859 1,337 2,841 2.125 6.3% 7.1% 1.129
6. operators, fabricators, and laborers 980 1,317 1.344 4.7% 5.0% 1.073 980 1,576 1.609 4.6% 3.9% 0.855
7. farming, forestry, and fishing 10 133 13.182 0.0% 0.5% 10.528 9 220 24.735 0.0% 0.6% 13.143
8. service 6,332 6,064 0.958 30.1% 23.0% 0.765 6,468 7,959 1.231 30.5% 19.9% 0.654
9. homemakers, unknown, retired, etc. 1,325 1,199 0.905 1,299 204 0.157
Derivatives
1. professional, technical, and kindred
a. health professional 171 765 4.482 3.1% 12.0% 3.799 144 916 6.356 2.6% 9.5% 3.592
b. other professional 356 883 2.481 6.6% 13.8% 2.103 339 1,375 4.059 6.2% 14.3% 2.294
c. technical specialty 712 1,234 1.732 13.1% 19.3% 1.468 698 1,711 2.451 12.8% 17.7% 1.385
2. managerial and executive 807 957 1.186 14.9% 15.0% 1.005 814 1,278 1.569 14.9% 13.3% 0.887
3. sales 323 384 1.189 6.0% 6.0% 1.008 330 508 1.539 6.1% 5.3% 0.870
4. administrative support 389 660 1.696 7.2% 10.3% 1.438 355 809 2.277 6.5% 8.4% 1.286
5. precision production 565 302 0.535 10.4% 4.7% 0.453 574 572 0.997 10.5% 5.9% 0.563
6. operators, fabricators, and laborers 910 805 0.885 16.8% 12.6% 0.750 939 1,258 1.339 17.2% 13.0% 0.757
7. farming, forestry, and fishing 85 101 1.184 1.6% 1.6% 1.004 85 147 1.728 1.6% 1.5% 0.976
8. service 1,275 1,071 0.840 23.5% 16.7% 0.712 1,313 1,983 1.510 24.1% 20.6% 0.853
9. homemakers, unknown, retired, etc. 25,290 36,535 1.445 25,161 50,366 2.002
Note: The new fourth and fifth employment based preference classes are not included in this table
Note: Shares refer to shares of employment based immigrants (excluding the new EB4 and EB5 categories) within the category (principal or derivative) who report an occupation
Table 7A.  Principals by Adjustment Status and Occupation: Actual and Predicted Immigration, 1995 and 1996
Fiscal Year 1995 Fiscal Year 1996
Numbers Shares Numbers Shares
Predicted Actual
Actual/ 
Predicted Predicted Actual
Actual/ 
Predicted Predicted Actual
Actual/ 
Predicted Predicted Actual
Actual/ 
Predicted
Principals, New
1. professional, technical, and kindred
a. health professional 6,099 5,978 0.980 1.1% 1.1% 0.980 6,160 6,479 1.052 1.1% 1.2% 1.052
b. other professional 3,914 4,836 1.236 0.7% 0.9% 1.236 3,698 5,587 1.511 0.7% 1.0% 1.511
c. technical specialty 13,357 12,191 0.913 2.4% 2.2% 0.913 13,533 14,598 1.079 2.4% 2.6% 1.079
2. managerial and executive 11,696 10,319 0.882 2.1% 1.8% 0.882 11,691 11,857 1.014 2.1% 2.1% 1.014
3. sales 8,427 5,468 0.649 1.5% 1.0% 0.649 8,710 6,742 0.774 1.6% 1.2% 0.774
4. administrative support 13,327 9,773 0.733 2.4% 1.7% 0.733 13,346 11,194 0.839 2.4% 2.0% 0.839
5. precision production 17,122 9,383 0.548 3.0% 1.7% 0.548 17,260 10,112 0.586 3.1% 1.8% 0.586
6. operators, fabricators, and laborers 30,392 20,048 0.660 5.4% 3.6% 0.660 30,556 23,100 0.756 5.4% 4.1% 0.756
7. farming, forestry, and fishing 9,763 8,742 0.895 1.7% 1.6% 0.895 9,864 9,404 0.953 1.8% 1.7% 0.953
8. service 32,063 17,429 0.544 5.7% 3.1% 0.544 32,780 19,303 0.589 5.8% 3.4% 0.589
9. homemakers, unknown, retired, etc. 165,297 162,163 0.981 167,794 176,604 1.053
Principals, H1B
1. professional, technical, and kindred
a. health professional 1,020 4,935 4.839 0.2% 0.9% 4.839 1,040 5,181 4.981 0.2% 0.9% 4.981
b. other professional 2,646 4,110 1.553 0.5% 0.7% 1.553 2,757 6,592 2.391 0.5% 1.2% 2.391
c. technical specialty 1,694 2,439 1.440 0.3% 0.4% 1.440 1,767 3,519 1.991 0.3% 0.6% 1.991
2. managerial and executive 1,053 1,910 1.814 0.2% 0.3% 1.814 1,102 2,585 2.346 0.2% 0.5% 2.346
3. sales 47 82 1.730 0.0% 0.0% 1.730 50 124 2.496 0.0% 0.0% 2.496
4. administrative support 209 213 1.019 0.0% 0.0% 1.019 220 314 1.428 0.0% 0.1% 1.428
5. precision production 73 78 1.064 0.0% 0.0% 1.064 77 165 2.148 0.0% 0.0% 2.148
6. operators, fabricators, and laborers 53 63 1.183 0.0% 0.0% 1.183 55 83 1.519 0.0% 0.0% 1.519
7. farming, forestry, and fishing 12 17 1.442 0.0% 0.0% 1.442 12 16 1.315 0.0% 0.0% 1.315
8. service 200 136 0.680 0.0% 0.0% 0.680 208 205 0.986 0.0% 0.0% 0.986
9. homemakers, unknown, retired, etc. 845 424 0.502 886 440 0.497
Principals, L1
1. professional, technical, and kindred
a. health professional 4 0 0.000 0.0% 0.0% 0.000 4 2 0.482 0.0% 0.0% 0.482
b. other professional 237 121 0.510 0.0% 0.0% 0.510 234 178 0.760 0.0% 0.0% 0.760
c. technical specialty 38 57 1.515 0.0% 0.0% 1.515 39 76 1.966 0.0% 0.0% 1.966
2. managerial and executive 1,181 2,467 2.089 0.2% 0.4% 2.089 1,194 4,217 3.532 0.2% 0.8% 3.532
3. sales 54 26 0.479 0.0% 0.0% 0.479 55 36 0.652 0.0% 0.0% 0.652
4. administrative support 73 20 0.275 0.0% 0.0% 0.275 75 34 0.453 0.0% 0.0% 0.453
5. precision production 23 11 0.474 0.0% 0.0% 0.474 24 16 0.667 0.0% 0.0% 0.667
6. operators, fabricators, and laborers 11 9 0.796 0.0% 0.0% 0.796 11 17 1.489 0.0% 0.0% 1.489
7. farming, forestry, and fishing 2 0 0.000 0.0% 0.0% 0.000 2 3 1.400 0.0% 0.0% 1.400
8. service 68 18 0.265 0.0% 0.0% 0.265 70 21 0.298 0.0% 0.0% 0.298
9. homemakers, unknown, retired, etc. 226 76 0.336 235 67 0.285
Principals, Other Adjusters
1. professional, technical, and kindred
a. health professional 2,638 3,190 1.209 0.5% 0.6% 1.209 2,770 4,889 1.765 0.5% 0.9% 1.765
b. other professional 2,130 2,482 1.165 0.4% 0.4% 1.165 2,060 3,996 1.940 0.4% 0.7% 1.940
c. technical specialty 4,578 6,519 1.424 0.8% 1.2% 1.424 4,650 9,565 2.057 0.8% 1.7% 2.057
2. managerial and executive 4,178 5,417 1.297 0.7% 1.0% 1.297 4,292 7,784 1.814 0.8% 1.4% 1.814
3. sales 2,693 2,848 1.057 0.5% 0.5% 1.057 2,802 4,032 1.439 0.5% 0.7% 1.439
4. administrative support 4,166 3,447 0.827 0.7% 0.6% 0.827 4,267 4,825 1.131 0.8% 0.9% 1.131
5. precision production 1,878 3,570 1.901 0.3% 0.6% 1.901 1,891 6,981 3.692 0.3% 1.2% 3.692
6. operators, fabricators, and laborers 3,821 11,007 2.881 0.7% 2.0% 2.881 3,835 25,245 6.583 0.7% 4.5% 6.583
7. farming, forestry, and fishing 259 582 2.251 0.0% 0.1% 2.251 252 1,324 5.261 0.0% 0.2% 5.261
8. service 10,362 15,650 1.510 1.8% 2.8% 1.510 10,786 26,186 2.428 1.9% 4.7% 2.428
9. homemakers, unknown, retired, etc. 77,744 99,818 1.284 81,008 171,097 2.112
Note: Shares refer to shares of those immigrants who report an occupation (occupation categories 1-8)
Note: This comparison excludes refugees and immigrants from certain other admission classes.
Table 7B.  Derivatives by Adjustment Status and Occupation: Actual and Predicted Immigration, 1995 and 1996
Fiscal Year 1995 Fiscal Year 1996
Numbers Shares Numbers Shares
Predicted Actual
Actual/ 
Predicted Predicted Actual
Actual/ 
Predicted Predicted Actual
Actual/ 
Predicted Predicted Actual
Actual/ 
Predicted
Derivatives, New
1. professional, technical, and kindred
a. health professional 889 1,221 1.374 0.2% 0.2% 1.374 882 1,541 1.747 0.2% 0.3% 1.747
b. other professional 518 1,250 2.415 0.1% 0.2% 2.415 467 1,759 3.770 0.1% 0.3% 3.770
c. technical specialty 2,243 2,806 1.251 0.4% 0.5% 1.251 2,257 3,631 1.609 0.4% 0.6% 1.609
2. managerial and executive 2,019 2,427 1.202 0.4% 0.4% 1.202 1,981 2,948 1.488 0.4% 0.5% 1.488
3. sales 1,155 1,153 0.998 0.2% 0.2% 0.998 1,179 1,445 1.225 0.2% 0.3% 1.225
4. administrative support 1,856 2,022 1.089 0.3% 0.4% 1.089 1,822 2,587 1.420 0.3% 0.5% 1.420
5. precision production 1,858 1,879 1.011 0.3% 0.3% 1.011 1,822 2,049 1.124 0.3% 0.4% 1.124
6. operators, fabricators, and laborers 3,415 2,804 0.821 0.6% 0.5% 0.821 3,395 3,244 0.956 0.6% 0.6% 0.956
7. farming, forestry, and fishing 1,875 1,408 0.751 0.3% 0.3% 0.751 1,894 1,803 0.952 0.3% 0.3% 0.952
8. service 3,368 2,596 0.771 0.6% 0.5% 0.771 3,436 3,113 0.906 0.6% 0.6% 0.906
9. homemakers, unknown, retired, etc. 94,771 86,283 0.910 95,821 100,403 1.048
Derivatives, Adjusters
1. professional, technical, and kindred
a. health professional 82 623 7.619 0.0% 0.1% 7.619 85 894 10.559 0.0% 0.2% 10.559
b. other professional 225 846 3.759 0.0% 0.2% 3.759 225 1,365 6.056 0.0% 0.2% 6.056
c. technical specialty 354 1,122 3.173 0.1% 0.2% 3.173 357 1,728 4.837 0.1% 0.3% 4.837
2. managerial and executive 182 884 4.846 0.0% 0.2% 4.846 184 1,311 7.130 0.0% 0.2% 7.130
3. sales 28 370 13.264 0.0% 0.1% 13.264 28 623 22.635 0.0% 0.1% 22.635
4. administrative support 106 569 5.371 0.0% 0.1% 5.371 100 853 8.509 0.0% 0.2% 8.509
5. precision production 11 346 31.309 0.0% 0.1% 31.309 10 793 83.082 0.0% 0.1% 83.082
6. operators, fabricators, and laborers 5 1,109 205.441 0.0% 0.2% 205.441 5 2,247 424.146 0.0% 0.4% 424.146
7. farming, forestry, and fishing 1 26 17.990 0.0% 0.0% 17.990 1 38 27.454 0.0% 0.0% 27.454
8. service 121 1,403 11.581 0.0% 0.2% 11.581 123 2,969 24.073 0.0% 0.5% 24.073
9. homemakers, unknown, retired, etc. 10,827 34,950 3.228 10,955 49,972 4.562
Note: Shares refer to shares of those immigrants who report an occupation (occupation categories 1-8)
Note: This comparison excludes refugees and immigrants from certain other admission classes.
Table 8.  Principals and Derivatives for the FB2 Admission Class by Country/Region of Birth: Actual and Predicted Immigration, 1995 and 1996
Fiscal Year 1995 Fiscal Year 1996
Numbers Shares Numbers Shares
Predicted Actual
Actual/ 
Predicted Predicted Actual
Actual/ 
Predicted Predicted Actual
Actual/ 
Predicted Predicted Actual
Actual/ 
Predicted
Principals, Admission Class FB2A
Canada 18 195 10.823 0.0% 0.2% 5.141 0 256 0.0% 0.2%
Mexico 3,740 51,502 13.771 7.9% 51.4% 6.541 3,424 86,390 25.232 7.3% 63.0% 8.577
China 2,004 2,311 1.153 4.2% 2.3% 0.548 1,907 1,951 1.023 4.1% 1.4% 0.348
India 2,909 4,813 1.655 6.1% 4.8% 0.786 2,787 3,721 1.335 6.0% 2.7% 0.454
Philippines 0 2,004 0.0% 2.0% 0 2,547 0.0% 1.9%
Remainder of Asia and Oceania 8,572 8,877 1.036 18.0% 8.9% 0.492 8,168 8,696 1.065 17.5% 6.3% 0.362
Africa 1,156 1,647 1.424 2.4% 1.6% 0.677 1,109 1,714 1.545 2.4% 1.3% 0.525
Caribbean and Central America 22,891 20,903 0.913 48.0% 20.8% 0.434 22,856 23,422 1.025 49.1% 17.1% 0.348
Europe 0 2,483 0.0% 2.5% 0 2,644 0.0% 1.9%
South America 6,351 5,561 0.876 13.3% 5.5% 0.416 6,338 5,716 0.902 13.6% 4.2% 0.307
Principals, Restricted Family Based
Canada 137 31 0.226 0.3% 0.1% 0.412 129 39 0.302 0.3% 0.1% 0.486
Mexico 1,466 866 0.591 3.3% 3.6% 1.075 1,455 2,303 1.583 3.3% 8.3% 2.553
China 3,519 1,608 0.457 8.0% 6.7% 0.831 3,577 1,421 0.397 8.0% 5.1% 0.641
India 3,848 1,119 0.291 8.7% 4.6% 0.529 3,986 1,259 0.316 8.9% 4.6% 0.509
Philippines 1,001 6,147 6.141 2.3% 25.4% 11.172 648 4,022 6.204 1.5% 14.6% 10.003
Remainder of Asia and Oceania 13,685 3,488 0.255 31.1% 14.4% 0.464 14,090 4,724 0.335 31.6% 17.1% 0.541
Africa 981 376 0.383 2.2% 1.6% 0.697 1,005 546 0.543 2.3% 2.0% 0.876
Caribbean and Central America 13,137 7,862 0.598 29.9% 32.5% 1.089 13,341 9,449 0.708 29.9% 34.2% 1.142
Europe 908 429 0.473 2.1% 1.8% 0.860 873 587 0.673 2.0% 2.1% 1.085
South America 5,300 2,248 0.424 12.1% 9.3% 0.772 5,451 3,283 0.602 12.2% 11.9% 0.971
Principals, Exempt Immediate Relatives
Canada 96 53 0.549 0.3% 0.2% 0.695 94 53 0.562 0.3% 0.3% 0.819
Mexico 650 168 0.258 2.3% 0.8% 0.327 665 330 0.496 2.3% 1.7% 0.723
China 556 190 0.342 2.0% 0.9% 0.432 555 248 0.447 1.9% 1.3% 0.651
India 351 2,337 6.665 1.3% 10.6% 8.436 353 1,865 5.279 1.2% 9.4% 7.692
Philippines 1,092 1,778 1.628 3.9% 8.1% 2.060 1,129 1,632 1.446 3.9% 8.2% 2.106
Remainder of Asia and Oceania 2,754 2,123 0.771 9.9% 9.7% 0.976 2,828 1,813 0.641 9.8% 9.2% 0.934
Africa 285 353 1.239 1.0% 1.6% 1.568 295 288 0.977 1.0% 1.5% 1.423
Caribbean and Central America 17,832 12,170 0.682 64.2% 55.4% 0.864 18,611 10,490 0.564 64.5% 53.0% 0.821
Europe 390 242 0.620 1.4% 1.1% 0.784 388 269 0.694 1.3% 1.4% 1.011
South America 3,785 2,545 0.672 13.6% 11.6% 0.851 3,936 2,815 0.715 13.6% 14.2% 1.042
Note: Shares refer to shares of thos immigrants within the enclosing category (e.g. Principals, Admission Class FB2A)
Fiscal Year 1995 Fiscal Year 1996
Numbers Shares Numbers Shares
Predicted Actual
Actual/ 
Predicted Predicted Actual
Actual/ 
Predicted Predicted Actual
Actual/ 
Predicted Predicted Actual
Actual/ 
Predicted
Principals
Family Based Restricted 122,805 158,520 1.291 24.6% 34.4% 1.402 121,199 204,353 1.686 23.8% 34.3% 1.440
Immediate Relatives 283,642 219,868 0.775 56.7% 47.7% 0.842 292,879 299,791 1.024 57.5% 50.3% 0.874
Derivatives
Family Based Restricted 93,195 81,554 0.875 18.6% 17.7% 0.951 94,801 91,530 0.965 18.6% 15.3% 0.825
Immediate Relatives 523 519 0.992 0.1% 0.1% 1.078 524 660 1.260 0.1% 0.1% 1.077
Note: Shares refer to shares of overall exempt immediate relatives of U.S. Citizens and restricted family based immigrants.
Table 10A.  Principals by Broad Admission Class and Country/Region of Birth: Actual and Predicted Immigration, 1995 and 1996
Fiscal Year 1995 Fiscal Year 1996
Numbers Shares Numbers Shares
Predicted Actual
Actual/ 
Predicted Predicted Actual
Actual/ 
Predicted Predicted Actual
Actual/ 
Predicted Predicted Actual
Actual/ 
Predicted
Principals, Diversity Immigrants
Canada 9 0.0% 12 0.0%
Mexico 4 0.0% 1 0.0%
China 11 0.0% 12 0.0%
India 30 0.0% 28 0.0%
Philippines 2 0.0% 5 0.0%
Remainder of Asia and Oceania 3,531 0.6% 5,158 0.7%
Africa 8,488 1.5% 11,307 1.5%
Caribbean and Central America 440 0.1% 445 0.1%
Europe 8,950 1.6% 11,387 1.5%
South America 727 0.1% 687 0.1%
Principals, Restricted Employment Based
Canada 778 2,097 2.697 0.1% 0.4% 2.697 772 2,995 3.882 0.1% 0.4% 3.882
Mexico 1,115 830 0.744 0.2% 0.1% 0.744 1,144 1,666 1.457 0.1% 0.2% 1.457
China 568 5,767 10.155 0.1% 1.0% 10.155 490 5,158 10.536 0.1% 0.7% 10.536
India 1,394 3,515 2.522 0.2% 0.6% 2.522 1,338 4,886 3.652 0.2% 0.6% 3.652
Philippines 1,652 4,830 2.924 0.3% 0.9% 2.924 1,684 4,480 2.661 0.2% 0.6% 2.661
Remainder of Asia and Oceania 7,518 7,455 0.992 1.3% 1.3% 0.992 7,527 11,253 1.495 1.0% 1.5% 1.495
Africa 946 1,597 1.689 0.2% 0.3% 1.689 930 2,266 2.436 0.1% 0.3% 2.436
Caribbean and Central America 4,524 2,795 0.618 0.8% 0.5% 0.618 4,610 4,735 1.027 0.6% 0.6% 1.027
Europe 3,215 6,188 1.925 0.6% 1.1% 1.925 3,238 9,972 3.080 0.4% 1.3% 3.080
South America 2,473 2,398 0.970 0.4% 0.4% 0.970 2,532 4,191 1.655 0.3% 0.5% 1.655
Principals, Restricted Family Based
Canada 408 525 1.287 0.1% 0.1% 1.287 332 605 1.821 0.0% 0.1% 1.821
Mexico 11,452 55,847 4.877 2.0% 10.0% 4.877 11,244 92,062 8.187 1.5% 11.9% 8.187
China 8,950 6,263 0.700 1.6% 1.1% 0.700 8,864 6,049 0.682 1.1% 0.8% 0.682
India 8,764 8,944 1.020 1.6% 1.6% 1.020 8,621 9,924 1.151 1.1% 1.3% 1.151
Philippines 4,132 11,223 2.716 0.7% 2.0% 2.716 3,447 9,919 2.878 0.4% 1.3% 2.878
Remainder of Asia and Oceania 28,114 20,894 0.743 5.0% 3.7% 0.743 27,660 23,100 0.835 3.6% 3.0% 0.835
Africa 2,363 3,019 1.277 0.4% 0.5% 1.277 2,262 3,555 1.572 0.3% 0.5% 1.572
Caribbean and Central America 44,362 36,230 0.817 7.9% 6.5% 0.817 44,491 40,967 0.921 5.8% 5.3% 0.921
Europe 0 5,265 0.0% 0.9% 0 6,081 0.0% 0.8%
South America 14,589 10,310 0.707 2.6% 1.8% 0.707 14,700 12,091 0.823 1.9% 1.6% 0.823
Principals, Exempt Immediate Relatives
Canada 6,184 5,274 0.853 1.1% 0.9% 0.853 6,273 5,354 0.854 0.8% 0.7% 0.854
Mexico 46,319 21,988 0.475 8.3% 3.9% 0.475 47,583 55,430 1.165 6.2% 7.2% 1.165
China 11,569 10,816 0.935 2.1% 1.9% 0.935 12,001 14,103 1.175 1.6% 1.8% 1.175
India 12,367 9,265 0.749 2.2% 1.7% 0.749 12,991 11,802 0.908 1.7% 1.5% 0.908
Philippines 34,889 22,578 0.647 6.2% 4.0% 0.647 35,827 28,059 0.783 4.6% 3.6% 0.783
Remainder of Asia and Oceania 58,309 41,633 0.714 10.4% 7.4% 0.714 60,241 47,796 0.793 7.8% 6.2% 0.793
Africa 12,500 12,457 0.997 2.2% 2.2% 0.997 13,020 16,106 1.237 1.7% 2.1% 1.237
Caribbean and Central America 43,516 44,345 1.019 7.8% 7.9% 1.019 45,250 56,890 1.257 5.9% 7.4% 1.257
Europe 33,819 31,178 0.922 6.0% 5.6% 0.922 34,588 35,031 1.013 4.5% 4.5% 1.013
South America 24,162 20,334 0.842 4.3% 3.6% 0.842 25,101 29,219 1.164 3.3% 3.8% 1.164
Note: Shares refer to shares of overall immigrants within the four listed broad admission classes
Table 10B.  Derivatives by Broad Admission Class and Country/Region of Birth: Actual and Predicted Immigration, 1995 and 1996
Fiscal Year 1995 Fiscal Year 1996
Numbers Shares Numbers Shares
Predicted Actual
Actual/ 
Predicted Predicted Actual
Actual/ 
Predicted Predicted Actual
Actual/ 
Predicted Predicted Actual
Actual/ 
Predicted
Derivatives, Diversity Immigrants
Canada 136 0.0% 173 0.0%
Mexico 17 0.0% 14 0.0%
China 25 0.0% 28 0.0%
India 92 0.0% 77 0.0%
Philippines 6 0.0% 12 0.0%
Remainder of Asia and Oceania 3,166 0.6% 5,101 0.7%
Africa 5,212 0.9% 9,499 1.2%
Caribbean and Central America 429 0.1% 554 0.1%
Europe 8,235 1.5% 12,940 1.7%
South America 786 0.1% 804 0.1%
Derivatives, Restricted Employment Based
Canada 1,147 3,652 3.184 0.2% 0.7% 3.184 1,109 5,399 4.867 0.1% 0.7% 4.867
Mexico 1,892 878 0.464 0.3% 0.2% 0.464 1,942 1,839 0.947 0.3% 0.2% 0.947
China 847 7,990 9.429 0.2% 1.4% 9.429 809 11,196 13.832 0.1% 1.5% 13.832
India 950 3,650 3.842 0.2% 0.7% 3.842 838 5,024 5.995 0.1% 0.7% 5.995
Philippines 3,104 5,343 1.721 0.6% 1.0% 1.721 3,082 4,479 1.453 0.4% 0.6% 1.453
Remainder of Asia and Oceania 10,857 10,336 0.952 1.9% 1.8% 0.952 10,958 14,265 1.302 1.4% 1.8% 1.302
Africa 1,210 2,232 1.844 0.2% 0.4% 1.844 1,190 2,680 2.251 0.2% 0.3% 2.251
Caribbean and Central America 7,167 3,104 0.433 1.3% 0.6% 0.433 7,407 4,588 0.619 1.0% 0.6% 0.619
Europe 4,370 7,417 1.697 0.8% 1.3% 1.697 4,211 11,192 2.658 0.5% 1.4% 2.658
South America 3,792 3,269 0.862 0.7% 0.6% 0.862 3,910 5,252 1.343 0.5% 0.7% 1.343
Derivatives, Restricted Family Based
Canada 462 769 1.663 0.1% 0.1% 1.663 393 939 2.391 0.1% 0.1% 2.391
Mexico 8,636 6,403 0.741 1.5% 1.1% 0.741 8,873 7,416 0.836 1.1% 1.0% 0.836
China 8,761 3,762 0.429 1.6% 0.7% 0.429 8,923 4,308 0.483 1.2% 0.6% 0.483
India 7,434 8,835 1.188 1.3% 1.6% 1.188 7,515 12,565 1.672 1.0% 1.6% 1.672
Philippines 8,960 6,506 0.726 1.6% 1.2% 0.726 9,205 8,461 0.919 1.2% 1.1% 0.919
Remainder of Asia and Oceania 17,729 19,444 1.097 3.2% 3.5% 1.097 17,429 20,684 1.187 2.3% 2.7% 1.187
Africa 591 1,569 2.654 0.1% 0.3% 2.654 504 1,628 3.227 0.1% 0.2% 3.227
Caribbean and Central America 31,053 22,570 0.727 5.5% 4.0% 0.727 32,131 21,166 0.659 4.2% 2.7% 0.659
Europe 0 4,853 0.0% 0.9% 0 6,313 0.0% 0.8%
South America 9,240 6,843 0.741 1.7% 1.2% 0.741 9,406 8,050 0.856 1.2% 1.0% 0.856
Derivatives, Exempt Immediate Relatives
Canada 32 27 0.847 0.0% 0.0% 0.847 32 41 1.290 0.0% 0.0% 1.290
Mexico 82 40 0.487 0.0% 0.0% 0.487 82 60 0.733 0.0% 0.0% 0.733
China 8 7 0.901 0.0% 0.0% 0.901 8 8 0.986 0.0% 0.0% 0.986
India 1 5 3.440 0.0% 0.0% 3.440 1 6 4.330 0.0% 0.0% 4.330
Philippines 271 123 0.454 0.0% 0.0% 0.454 280 117 0.417 0.0% 0.0% 0.417
Remainder of Asia and Oceania 16 50 3.048 0.0% 0.0% 3.048 11 71 6.583 0.0% 0.0% 6.583
Africa 11 21 1.940 0.0% 0.0% 1.940 11 23 2.084 0.0% 0.0% 2.084
Caribbean and Central America 30 58 1.913 0.0% 0.0% 1.913 31 76 2.479 0.0% 0.0% 2.479
Europe 36 153 4.194 0.0% 0.0% 4.194 32 207 6.510 0.0% 0.0% 6.510
South America 35 35 1.002 0.0% 0.0% 1.002 36 51 1.424 0.0% 0.0% 1.424
Note: Shares refer to shares of overall immigrants within the four listed broad admission classes
Table 11.  Principals and Derivatives for Diversity Qualified and Non-Diversity Qualified Countries by Occupation, 1995 and 1996
Fiscal Year 1995 Fiscal Year 1996
Principals Derivatives Principals Derivatives
Actual Share
Category 
Share Actual Share
Category 
Share Actual Share
Category 
Share Actual Share
Category 
Share
Diversity immigrants from diversity qualified Countries of Birth
1. professional, technical, and kindred
a. health professional 954 0.5% 6.5% 421 0.2% 8.0% 1,345 0.5% 6.6% 671 0.2% 8.2%
b. other professional 1,538 0.8% 10.4% 657 0.3% 12.4% 2,121 0.8% 10.5% 1,037 0.4% 12.6%
c. technical specialty 2,798 1.4% 19.0% 992 0.5% 18.8% 4,116 1.5% 20.3% 1,618 0.6% 19.7%
2. managerial and executive 1,718 0.8% 11.7% 621 0.3% 11.8% 1,761 0.6% 8.7% 714 0.3% 8.7%
3. sales 766 0.4% 5.2% 300 0.1% 5.7% 1,192 0.4% 5.9% 522 0.2% 6.3%
4. administrative support 1,435 0.7% 9.7% 491 0.2% 9.3% 2,238 0.8% 11.1% 876 0.3% 10.6%
5. precision production 1,480 0.7% 10.1% 466 0.2% 8.8% 1,956 0.7% 9.7% 667 0.2% 8.1%
6. operators, fabricators, and laborers 1,244 0.6% 8.5% 463 0.2% 8.8% 1,604 0.6% 7.9% 679 0.2% 8.2%
7. farming, forestry, and fishing 129 0.1% 0.9% 50 0.0% 0.9% 231 0.1% 1.1% 103 0.0% 1.3%
8. service 2,658 1.3% 18.1% 823 0.4% 15.6% 3,683 1.3% 18.2% 1,344 0.5% 16.3%
9. homemakers, unknown, retired, etc. 7,436 12,705 8,761 20,868
Non-diversity immigrants from diversity qualified Countries of Birth
1. professional, technical, and kindred
a. health professional 7,375 3.6% 6.4% 947 0.5% 5.9% 9,673 3.5% 6.5% 1,170 0.4% 5.5%
b. other professional 7,112 3.5% 6.2% 1,053 0.5% 6.5% 10,331 3.8% 6.9% 1,515 0.6% 7.2%
c. technical specialty 15,234 7.5% 13.3% 2,354 1.2% 14.6% 19,418 7.1% 13.0% 2,934 1.1% 13.9%
2. managerial and executive 14,685 7.3% 12.8% 1,977 1.0% 12.2% 19,839 7.3% 13.3% 2,606 1.0% 12.3%
3. sales 6,111 3.0% 5.3% 977 0.5% 6.0% 7,655 2.8% 5.1% 1,199 0.4% 5.7%
4. administrative support 9,759 4.8% 8.5% 1,704 0.8% 10.5% 11,200 4.1% 7.5% 2,033 0.7% 9.6%
5. precision production 9,355 4.6% 8.2% 1,525 0.8% 9.4% 12,156 4.4% 8.2% 1,862 0.7% 8.8%
6. operators, fabricators, and laborers 16,781 8.3% 14.6% 2,181 1.1% 13.5% 24,324 8.9% 16.3% 3,275 1.2% 15.5%
7. farming, forestry, and fishing 5,213 2.6% 4.5% 1,055 0.5% 6.5% 5,629 2.1% 3.8% 1,166 0.4% 5.5%
8. service 23,040 11.4% 20.1% 2,386 1.2% 14.8% 28,896 10.6% 19.4% 3,412 1.2% 16.1%
9. homemakers, unknown, retired, etc. 162,175 82,003 188,399 96,969
Immigrants from non-diversity qualified Countries of Birth
1. professional, technical, and kindred
a. health professional 5,774 2.9% 12.5% 476 0.2% 8.8% 5,533 2.0% 8.2% 594 0.2% 7.9%
b. other professional 2,899 1.4% 6.3% 386 0.2% 7.1% 3,901 1.4% 5.8% 572 0.2% 7.6%
c. technical specialty 3,174 1.6% 6.9% 582 0.3% 10.7% 4,224 1.5% 6.3% 807 0.3% 10.7%
2. managerial and executive 3,710 1.8% 8.0% 713 0.4% 13.2% 4,843 1.8% 7.2% 939 0.3% 12.5%
3. sales 1,547 0.8% 3.3% 246 0.1% 4.5% 2,087 0.8% 3.1% 347 0.1% 4.6%
4. administrative support 2,259 1.1% 4.9% 396 0.2% 7.3% 2,929 1.1% 4.4% 531 0.2% 7.0%
5. precision production 2,207 1.1% 4.8% 234 0.1% 4.3% 3,162 1.2% 4.7% 313 0.1% 4.2%
6. operators, fabricators, and laborers 13,102 6.5% 28.4% 1,269 0.6% 23.4% 22,517 8.2% 33.5% 1,537 0.6% 20.4%
7. farming, forestry, and fishing 3,999 2.0% 8.7% 329 0.2% 6.1% 4,887 1.8% 7.3% 572 0.2% 7.6%
8. service 7,535 3.7% 16.3% 790 0.4% 14.6% 13,136 4.8% 19.5% 1,326 0.5% 17.6%
9. homemakers, unknown, retired, etc. 92,870 26,525 151,048 32,538
Note: Shares refer to shares of those immigrants who report an occupation (occupation categories 1-8)
Note: This comparison excludes refugees and immigrants from certain other admission classes.
Note: The Category share refers to shares of those in indicated category (e.g. Principals/Diversity Immigrants from diversity qualified Countries of Birth) who report an occupation (occupation categories 1-8)
Table 12.  Principals and Derivatives for Diversity Qualified and Non-Diversity Qualified Countries by Occupation: Actual and Predicted Immigration, 1995 and 1996
Fiscal Year 1995 Fiscal Year 1996
Numbers Shares Numbers Shares
PredictedActual
Actual/ 
PredictedPredictedActual
Actual/ 
PredictedPredictedActual
Actual/ 
PredictedPredictedActual
Actual/ 
Predicted
Principals from diversity qualified Countries of Birth
1. professional, technical, and kindred
a. health professional 4,400 8,329 1.893 0.8% 1.5% 1.893 4,470 11,018 2.465 0.8% 2.0% 2.465
b. other professional 7,150 8,650 1.210 1.3% 1.5% 1.210 7,035 12,452 1.770 1.3% 2.2% 1.770
c. technical specialty 15,598 18,032 1.156 2.8% 3.2% 1.156 15,866 23,534 1.483 2.8% 4.2% 1.483
2. managerial and executive 13,295 16,403 1.234 2.4% 2.9% 1.234 13,310 21,600 1.623 2.4% 3.8% 1.623
3. sales 8,860 6,877 0.776 1.6% 1.2% 0.776 9,183 8,847 0.963 1.6% 1.6% 0.963
4. administrative support 13,756 11,194 0.814 2.4% 2.0% 0.814 13,814 13,438 0.973 2.5% 2.4% 0.973
5. precision production 13,757 10,835 0.788 2.4% 1.9% 0.788 13,832 14,112 1.020 2.5% 2.5% 1.020
6. operators, fabricators, and laborers 18,371 18,025 0.981 3.3% 3.2% 0.981 18,333 25,928 1.414 3.3% 4.6% 1.414
7. farming, forestry, and fishing 6,099 5,342 0.876 1.1% 1.0% 0.876 6,225 5,860 0.941 1.1% 1.0% 0.941
8. service 33,675 25,698 0.763 6.0% 4.6% 0.763 34,755 32,579 0.937 6.2% 5.8% 0.937
9. homemakers, unknown, retired, etc. 173,647 169,611 0.977 177,558 197,160 1.110
Principals from non-diversity qualified Countries of Birth
1. professional, technical, and kindred
a. health professional 4,830 5,774 1.195 0.9% 1.0% 1.195 4,953 5,533 1.117 0.9% 1.0% 1.117
b. other professional 1,511 2,899 1.918 0.3% 0.5% 1.918 1,389 3,901 2.809 0.2% 0.7% 2.809
c. technical specialty 3,443 3,174 0.922 0.6% 0.6% 0.922 3,466 4,224 1.219 0.6% 0.8% 1.219
2. managerial and executive 4,426 3,710 0.838 0.8% 0.7% 0.838 4,504 4,843 1.075 0.8% 0.9% 1.075
3. sales 2,338 1,547 0.662 0.4% 0.3% 0.662 2,424 2,087 0.861 0.4% 0.4% 0.861
4. administrative support 3,606 2,259 0.626 0.6% 0.4% 0.626 3,630 2,929 0.807 0.6% 0.5% 0.807
5. precision production 5,085 2,207 0.434 0.9% 0.4% 0.434 5,166 3,162 0.612 0.9% 0.6% 0.612
6. operators, fabricators, and laborers 15,462 13,102 0.847 2.8% 2.3% 0.847 15,659 22,517 1.438 2.8% 4.0% 1.438
7. farming, forestry, and fishing 3,959 3,999 1.010 0.7% 0.7% 1.010 3,960 4,887 1.234 0.7% 0.9% 1.234
8. service 9,168 7,535 0.822 1.6% 1.3% 0.822 9,366 13,136 1.403 1.7% 2.3% 1.403
9. homemakers, unknown, retired, etc. 70,411 92,870 1.319 71,838 151,048 2.103
Derivatives from diversity qualified Countries of Birth
1. professional, technical, and kindred
a. health professional 575 1,368 2.381 0.1% 0.2% 2.381 561 1,841 3.280 0.1% 0.3% 3.280
b. other professional 497 1,710 3.444 0.1% 0.3% 3.444 456 2,552 5.601 0.1% 0.5% 5.601
c. technical specialty 1,988 3,346 1.683 0.4% 0.6% 1.683 1,999 4,552 2.278 0.4% 0.8% 2.278
2. managerial and executive 1,443 2,598 1.800 0.3% 0.5% 1.800 1,392 3,320 2.385 0.2% 0.6% 2.385
3. sales 953 1,277 1.340 0.2% 0.2% 1.340 977 1,721 1.761 0.2% 0.3% 1.761
4. administrative support 1,483 2,195 1.480 0.3% 0.4% 1.480 1,440 2,909 2.021 0.3% 0.5% 2.021
5. precision production 1,479 1,991 1.346 0.3% 0.4% 1.346 1,448 2,529 1.747 0.3% 0.5% 1.747
6. operators, fabricators, and laborers 2,109 2,644 1.254 0.4% 0.5% 1.254 2,069 3,954 1.911 0.4% 0.7% 1.911
7. farming, forestry, and fishing 1,571 1,105 0.704 0.3% 0.2% 0.704 1,605 1,269 0.791 0.3% 0.2% 0.791
8. service 2,712 3,209 1.183 0.5% 0.6% 1.183 2,784 4,756 1.708 0.5% 0.8% 1.708
9. homemakers, unknown, retired, etc. 81,777 94,708 1.158 82,737 117,837 1.424
Derivatives from non-diversity qualified Countries of Birth
1. professional, technical, and kindred
a. health professional 370 476 1.286 0.1% 0.1% 1.286 380 594 1.564 0.1% 0.1% 1.564
b. other professional 165 386 2.339 0.0% 0.1% 2.339 148 572 3.858 0.0% 0.1% 3.858
c. technical specialty 564 582 1.031 0.1% 0.1% 1.031 572 807 1.411 0.1% 0.1% 1.411
2. managerial and executive 803 713 0.888 0.1% 0.1% 0.888 824 939 1.140 0.1% 0.2% 1.140
3. sales 265 246 0.929 0.0% 0.0% 0.929 274 347 1.265 0.0% 0.1% 1.265
4. administrative support 460 396 0.860 0.1% 0.1% 0.860 473 531 1.123 0.1% 0.1% 1.123
5. precision production 435 234 0.538 0.1% 0.0% 0.538 447 313 0.701 0.1% 0.1% 0.701
6. operators, fabricators, and laborers 1,356 1,269 0.936 0.2% 0.2% 0.936 1,401 1,537 1.097 0.2% 0.3% 1.097
7. farming, forestry, and fishing 355 329 0.928 0.1% 0.1% 0.928 357 572 1.600 0.1% 0.1% 1.600
8. service 885 790 0.893 0.2% 0.1% 0.893 918 1,326 1.445 0.2% 0.2% 1.445
9. homemakers, unknown, retired, etc. 26,493 26,525 1.001 27,156 32,538 1.198
Note: Shares refer to shares of those immigrants who report an occupation (occupation categories 1-8)
Note: This comparison excludes refugees and immigrants from certain other admission classes.
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Appendix A - Data Processing Notes
The INS Public Use data tapes for the years 1977-1996 served as the source of the
underlying data for this study.  (Data for the years 1972-1976 were not employed because the
Western Hemisphere was treated differently than the Eastern Hemisphere in these years.)  These
raw data were aggregated into a processed data set whose data dictionary is presented below.
The aggregated data and, in some cases, further aggregations thereof were used to produce the
number used in the regressions and cross-tabs presented in this study.  This appendix describes
this process including details such as how the structured missing data present in the data for
FY80-FY83 were processed.  (The INS Public Use tapes contain flaws for the years 1980-1983
that require attention.)
The data were aggregated as described in the following outline.  The outermost level of
the outline describes the variables appearing in the processed data set (with difference between the
“old” and “new” data indicated.)  The deepest level of the outline indicates the actual values the
specific variable may take in the processed data set. Where necessary, additional aggregation was
performed to recover the inner levels.
I. Class of Admission [10,12]
A. Employment Based [2,4]
1. Pre-92 categories [2]
a) third preference (P3 )
b) sixth preference (P6 )
2. Post-91 categories [4]
a) EB1 (E1 )
b) EB2 (E2 )
c) EB3 [2]
(1) skilled (E3A)
(2) unskilled (E3B)
d) EB4 [2]
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(1) A portion of EB4 which corresponds to certain formerly
exempt special classes.  Therefore this category is defined
both Pre-92 and Post-91 (E4A).
(2) The remainder of the new EB4 category (E4B).
e) EB5 (E5 )
B. Family Based [6]
1. Unmarried Sons and Daughters of Citizens (F1 ) P1/FB1
2. Spouses and unmarried sons and daughters of Permanent Residents. Note:
Children were not distinguished from Unmarried Sons and Daughters 21
years and older prior to 1992.  In these years the F2A/F2B split will be
accomplished for principals based on their age and derivative immigrants
are assumed to be in F2B.
a) Spouses and Children (F2A) P2A/FB2A.
b) Unmarried Sons and Daughters 21 years or older (F2B) P2B/FB2B
3. Married Sons/Daughters of citizens (F3 ) P4/FB3
4. Brothers/Sisters of Citizens 21 years of age or older (F4 ) P5/FB4
C. Exempt Immediate Relatives (IR )
D. Diversity (DIV)
II. Diversity - Is country of birth a 1996 qualified for diversity country? [2]
A. Yes (Y)
B. No (N)
III. Country of Birth [10]
A. North America (2)
1. Mexico (MEX)
2. Canada (CAN)
B. Asia and Oceania  (4)
1. Philippines (PHL)
2. India (IND)
3. China (CHN)
4. Remainder (ASO)
C. Europe (EUR)
D. Africa (AFR)
E. South America (SAM)
F. Caribbean and Central America (CCA)
IV. Occupation [12]
A. Professional Technical and Kindred [3]
1. Health Professionals (H)- contains DOC, HLD,  HLT, and NUR.
2. Other Professionals (P)- contains ARC, ENG, MCS, NSC, and SSC.
3. Technical Specialty (T) - contains ART, COU, LAW, LIB, SWK, TCO,
TCU, TNH, and TNO.
B. Managerial, Executive (2) - contains EXC.
C. Sales (3) -contains SLS
D. Administrative support (4) - contains ASP.
E. Precision Production (5) - contains PCR.
F. Operators, fabricators, and laborers (6) - contains LAB.
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G. Farming, forestry, and fishing (7) - contains FFF.
H. Service (8) - contains SER.
I. Homemakers, unknown, retired, etc. (9) - contains HOU, NOT, UNR, and STC.
J. Structured Missing (U)
V. Age [4]
A. (A1) - contains 0-19
B. (A2) - contains 20-34
C. (A3) - contains 35-64
D. (A4) - contains 65+
VI. Adjuster Detail [5]
A. New (NEW)
B. Adjuster [4]
1. H1 [2]
a) H1A- registered nurse as indicated by admission class RN6 or RN7
(H1A).
b) H1B- other H1 category (H1B).
2. L1 (L1 )
3. Others (OTH)
C. Structured Missing (UUU)
VII. Principal/Derivative [2]
A. Principal (P)
B. Derivative (D)
VIII. Gender [2]
A. Male (M)
B. Female (F)
C. Missing (X)
D. Structured Missing (U)
IX. Fiscal Year
To produce the processed data set, we processed the files into an intermediate format that
adds two pieces of information to the above: a registered nurse (RN6/RN7) admission class and
an age indicator.  These fields are used to produce the H1A/H1B and, in pre-92 data, the
F2A/F2B distinctions as described above.  The additional fields are then removed.  Some
important notes regarding the H1A/H1B and F2A/F2B split appear later in this appendix.
Distribution of the Structured Missing Data
This section describes the technique used to distribute the structured missing data in the
occupation, sex, and adjuster detail variables caused by structured missing data for fiscal years
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1980 through 1983. Because of concerns about data strength at the fine level of detail provided
by this module, a straightforward technique of distributing the structured missing data has been
chosen. To ensure that the data set remains consistent when examined in less aggregated views,
we have applied the proportions determined at an aggregate level to the highest level of detail
provided.
Consider a module which contains two variables affected by the structured missing data:
sex and intended state of residence.  Sex and intended state of residence are not relevant in the
current study, but they serve to illustrate how the data were treated.  The distribution procedure is
described graphically in Figure 1.  The structured missing data are indicated by the number in the
intersection of the structured missing values for sex (‘U’) and state of intended residence (‘UU’).
These data are to be distributed into the desired categories for the sex and state. The structured
missing data are distributed into the shaded region of Figure 1, which includes all sex/state pairs.
On a fiscal-year basis the proportion of missing data that should be allocated to each sex/state pair
is determined by dividing the total number of records for that tuple prior o distribution by the
total number for all destination pairs to distribution.  The data are then distributed at the finest
FY80 U X F M
Sex Total 132541 2 205436 192660
UU 132541
XX 4234 3866
AK 267 173
AL 445 384
AR 517 421
AZ 2128 1961
CA 1 52550 49407
.
.
Figure 1:  The distribution procedure.
We want to
distribute these
data...
into the shaded
categories
preserving the
relative
proportions of
those categories.
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level of detail provided for the module as follows.  For each combination of the variables
unaffected by the missing information, a table analogous to the one in Figure 1 is formed. Within
that table, the structured missing is distributed to the destination pairs in the shaded area
according to the proportions determined at the fiscal year level in Figure 1.
Performing the procedure in this manner ensures that the data for each fiscal year are
consistent with the overall proportions in the data unaffected by the structured missing data while
providing data at the level of detail required by this study.  As a side effect, the data after
distribution for the years FY80-FY83 include numbers that have a fractional part.  This is
necessary to ensure that totals after distribution agree with those prior to distribution.
As a check on this procedure, one should observe no change in the category totals for
variables other than those affected by this problem.  The relative proportions of each category
(disregarding the structured missing category) should be the same before and after distribution.
For the processed data sets, the sex, occupation, and adjuster detail variables are those
affected by the structured missing data problem.
The H1A/H1B split
The nonimmigrant class of entry field in the INS Public Use data records the most recent
entry class for immigrants adjusting their status.  The entry class H1 indicates a “Temporary
worker of distinguished merit and ability.”  Beginning in 1992, the documentation indicates that
the class H1 is divided into H1A for registered nurses and H1B for “temporary worker with
‘specialty occupation’.”
The manner in which the post-92 split is recorded in the Public Use data sets is not clear.
For 1992 and 1993, the indicated codes are H1A and H1B.  Since the field is has only two
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characters, there is no distinction.  In 1994 and later, the documentation indicates that H1A is
coded as S8 while H1B is coded as H1.  In these years where the distinction is clearly made in the
documentation, the number of immigrants coded as H1A is negligible.
The admission class codes corresponding to H1A are RN6 and RN7 which appear in years
1990 and later.  To use this information, the admission codes RN6/RN7 are mapped to a separate
value of the admission class variable (namely RNE).  The adjuster detail is recorded as H1 rather
than making the H1A/H1B distinction.  In a post processing step, the immigrants whose adjuster
detail is H1 are assigned to H1A if their admission class is RNE and H1B otherwise.
The FB2A/FB2B split
Under IMMACT90 the former second preference class became the second family based
preference class: FB2.  This preference class is for spouses and children of legal permanent
residents.  IMMACT90 further distinguishes between FB2A containing spouses and children
under the age of 21 and FB2B containing unmarried children 21 years of age and older.
The admission class code appearing in the Public Use Data for the second preference class
does not distinguish between children under 21 and those 21 and over.  To facilitate comparison
between the pre-92 and post-92 data, the following procedure was used.  For immigrants whose
admission class was that of a child of a legal permanent resident, the age field was examined.
Those under 21 were assigned to FB2A while those 21 or older were assigned the FB2B.  For
immigrants whose admission class was that of a derivative of a child of a legal permanent resident,
there was no way of selecting FB2A or FB2B.  All such derivatives were assigned to FB2B.  In
effect, the FB2A/FB2B split was not made for derivatives and this fact is reflected in the analysis.
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The estimation procedure
The estimates are based on regressions from fiscal years 1977 through 1991.  Simple
numerical regressions are appropriate for the exempt categories, but would result in estimates for
1995 and 1996 which exceed certain caps in the old law such as the 27,000 limit for the third (P3)
and sixth (P6) preference classes and the 80% limit on restricted family based (FB) immigration.
In an effort to reflect the anticipated effects of these caps, the estimates were produced from four
separate regressions: P3, P6, FB, and exempt.
The division of a group’s immigrants into the P3, P6, FB and exempt categories is based
on admission class.  P3 and P6 each correspond directly to a value of the admission class variable.
FB is the aggregation of the F1, F2A, F2B, F3, and F4 values of the admission class variable.  The
exempt category is the aggregation of IR, E4A, and RNE (recall that E4A was numerically
exempt under the old law.)  The remaining categories either do not appear in the historical portion
of the data (the DIV and remaining “E” classes), or are excluded from the analysis (the REF and
“X” classes.)
For the P3, P6, and FB categories regressions are performed on the share of P3, P6, and
FB immigration associated with the group being estimated.  For the exempt category a numerical
regression is calculated.  The raw estimated shares of P3, P6, and FB and the number of exempt
immigrants are then estimated for 1995 and 1996.  Any negative raw shares or numbers are set to
zero.  Then the shares are scaled to sum to 1.  The estimate for a given group is then the sum of
the its exempt estimate, 27,000 times its estimated P3 share, 27,000 times its estimate P6 share,
and 216,000 times its estimated FB share.
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The Mapping Used for Aggregation
This section describes the mapping used to aggregate the INS Public Use data into the
process data sets.  The utility used to perform the aggregation uses configuration files which
describe how the data appearing in the Public Use Data are to be mapped into the desired
variables.  The appropriate portions of these configuration files are reproduced below.
Admission Class
DIV=DV1,DV2,DV3,DV6,DV7,DV8
E1 =E10,E11,E12,E13,E14,E15,E16,E17,E18,E19,XE3
E2 =E21,E22,E23,E26,E27,E28,ES1,ES6
E3A=E30,E31,E32,E34,E35,E36,E37,E39,EC6,EC7,EC7,EC8
E3B=EW0,EW3,EW4,EW5,EW8,EW9
E4A=SD1,SD2,SD3,SD6,SD7,SD8,SE1,SE2,SE3,SE6,SE7,SE8,SEH,SEK,SF1,SF2,SF6\
  SF7,SG1,SG2,SG6,SG7,SH1,SH2,SH6,SH7,SJ2,SJ6,SJ7,SK1,SK2,SK3,SK4,SK6,SK7\
  SK8,SK9,SL1,SL6,SR1,SR2,SR3,SR6,SR7,SR8
E4B=SM0,SM1,SM2,SM3,SM4,SM5,SM6,SM7,SM8,SM9
E5 =C51,C52,C53,C56,C57,C58,E51,E52,E53,E56,E57,E58,I51,I52,I53,I56,I57\
  I58,R51,R52,R53,R56,R57,R58,T51,T52,T53,T56,T57,T58
F1 =A11,A12,A16,A17,B11,B12,B16,B17,F11,F12,F16,F17,K23,K24,KR4,KS4,P11\
  P12,P16,P17,XF3
F2A=B20,B21,B22,B23,B26,B27,B28,BX1,BX2,BX3,BX7,BX8,C20,C21,C26,CX1,CX2\
  CX3,CX6,CX7,CX8,F21,F22,F23,F26,F27,F28,FX1,FX2,FX3,FX6,FX7,FX8,K21,KN4\
  NA3,P21,P26
F2B=B24,B25,B29,C24,C25,C29,F20,F24,F25,F29
F2X=C22,C23,C27,C28,P22,P23,P27,P28
F3 =A31,A32,A33,A36,A37,A38,B31,B32,B33,B36,B37,B38,BX6,C31,C32,C33,C36\
  C37,C38,C41,C42,C43,C46,C47,C48,F31,F32,F33,F36,F37,F38,K25,K26,KT4,KU4\
  P41,P42,P43,P46,P47,P48
F4 =A41,A42,A43,A46,A47,A48,F41,F42,F43,F46,F47,F48,P51,P52,P53,P56,P57\
  P58
IR =AR1,AR6,CF1,CF2,CR1,CR2,CR6,CR7,IB1,IB2,IB3,IB6,IB7,IB8,IF1,IF2,IR0\
  IR1,IR2,IR3,IR4,IR5,IR6,IR7,IR8,IR9,IW1,IW2,IW6,IW7,MR0,MR6,MR7,XR3
P3 =K22,KP4,P31,P32,P33,P36,P37,P38
P6 =P61,P62,P63,P66,P67,P68
REF=AS6,AS7,AS8,C7P,CH6,CNP,CU0,CU6,CU7,CU8,CU9,CUP,IC6,IC7,LA6,M83,M93\
  NP2,NP7,P71,P72,P76,R86,RE6,RE7,RE8,RE9,Y64
RNE=RN6,RN7
X66=Z66
XAM=AM1,AM2,AM3,AM6,AM7,AM8
XCH=CB1,CB2,CB6,CB7,LB1,LB2,LB6,LB7
XDV=AA1,AA2,AA3,AA6,AA7,AA8
XIN=NP8,NP9
XLG=W16,W26,W36
XNP=NP0,NP1,NP5,NP6,OP1,OP6
XOT=DT1,DT2,DT3,DT6,DT7,DT8,HK1,HK2,HK3,HK6,HK7,HK8,VI0,VI5,VI6,VI7
XSA=SA1,SA2,SA3,SA6,SA7,SA8
XSW=S16,S26
XXE=DS1,S13,SC1,SC2,SC6,SC7,XA3,Z03,Z13,Z33,Z43,Z56,Z83
XXX=XB3,XN3,Z11,Z41,Z57,Z91
Note: The admission class variables assigns all possible admission class codes to some category.
In addition to the categories described in the data dictionary and the RNE class used for
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H1A/H1B, there is a refugee class REF and several special classes indicated by the first letter X.
The REF and “X” classes are not included in any of the tables.  The F2X class lists admission
categories which are F2B after FY91 but are ambiguous prior to FY92.  The previous section
describes how this category is used.
Country of Birth Diversity Qualified
N=582-582,260-260,247-247
Y=100-245,248-259,261-581,583-999
Country/Region of Birth
MEX=582-582
CAN=574-574
PHL=260-260
IND=247-247
CHN=245-245,299-299
ASO=201-244,248-259,261-298,403-474
EUR=100-199,501-501
AFR=301-399
SAM=601-696
CCA=502-502,504-533,575-581,583-586
XXX=900-999,700-700
Occupation
Prior to FY83:
P=001-023,034-055,091-096,150-162
H=061-076
T=024-033,056-056,080-090,100-145,163-196
2=200-255
3=260-296
4=301-396
5=401-446,452-582
6=601-751,753-760,762-796
7=450,752,761,801-846
8=901-986
9=995-995,X10-X60
U=
FY83 and later:
P=ARC,ENG,MCS,NSC,SSC
H=DOC,HLD,NUR,HLT
T=TCU,TCO,COU,LIB,SWK,LAW,ART,TNH,TNO
2=EXC
3=SLS
4=ASP
5=PCR
6=LAB
7=FFF
8=SER
9=HOU,UNR,STC,NOT
U=
Age Group
A1= 0-19
20=20-20
A-10
A2=21-34
A3=35-64
A4=65-98
XX=UU-UU,99-99
Note: The special case of 20 is used as part of the FB2A/B split described in the previous section.
The 20 age group is joined with the A2 age group in the post-processing step.
Adjuster Detail
Prior to FY92:
NEW=  |
H1 =H1
L1 =L1
OTH=A1,A2,A3,B1,B2,C1,C2,C3,C4,D1,D2,E1,E2,F1,F2,G1,G2,G3,G4,G5\
  H2,H3,H4,I1,J1,J2,K1,K2,L2,M1,M2,N1,PR,RE,S9,TC,WB,WI,WT,UU,99,CT
FY92 and later:
NEW=  |
H1B=H1
H1A=S8
L1 =L1
OTH=A1,A2,A3,B1,B2,C1,C2,C3,C4,D1,D2,E1,E2,F1,F2,G1,G2,G3,G4,G5\
  H2,H3,H4,I1,J1,J2,K1,K2,L2,M1,M2,N1,PR,RE,S9,TC,WB,WI,WT\
  CC,CH,CP,DA,DE,DT,GB,N8,N9,O1,O2,O3,P1,P2,P3,P4,OP,Q1,R1,R2\
  S1,S2,TB,TD,TN,W1,W2,UU
Note: In both cases, new immigrants are indicated by spaces in the field.  The vertical bar
character informs the processing software that the spaces are significant rather than just white
space.
Sex
M=1,M
F=2,F
X=9,U
Principal/Derivative
D=A12,A17,A32,A33,A37,A38,A42,A43,A47,A48,AA2,AA3,AA7,AA8,AM2,AM3,AM7,AM8\
  AS7,AS8,B12,B17,B20,B23,B25,B28,B32,B33,B37,B38,BX3,BX8,C20,C23,C25,C28\
  C32,C33,C37,C38,C42,C43,C47,C48,C52,C53,C57,C58,CF2,CU7,CX3,CX8,DT2,DT3\
  DT7,DT8,DV2,DV3,DV7,DV8,E10,E14,E15,E19,E22,E23,E27,E28,E30,E34,E35,E39\
  E52,E53,E57,E58,EC7,EC8,EW0,EW4,EW5,EW9,F12,F16,F17,F20,F23,F25,F28,F32\
  F33,F37,F38,F42,F43,F47,F48,FX3,FX8,HK2,HK3,HK7,HK8,I52,I53,I57,I58,IB3\
  IB8,IC7,IF2,K21,K22,K23,K24,K25,K26,KN4,KP4,KR4,KS4,KT4,KU4,LB1,LB2,LB6\
  LB7,NP2,NP7,NP9,P12,P17,P23,P28,P32,P33,P37,P38,P42,P43,P47,P48,P52,P53\
  P57,P58,P62,P63,P67,P68,R52,R53,R57,R58,RE7,RE8,RE9,RN7,SA2,SA3,SA7,SA8\
  SD2,SD3,SD7,SD8,SE2,SE3,SE7,SE8,SF2,SF7,SG2,SG7,SH2,SH7,SJ2,SJ7,SK2,SK3\
  SK4,SK7,SK8,SK9,SM0,SM2,SM3,SM5,SM7,SM8,SR2,SR3,SR7,SR8,T52,T53,T57,T58\
  VI7,XA3,XE3,XF3,XN3,XR3
P=A11,A16,A31,A36,A41,A46,AA1,AA6,AM1,AM6,AR1,AR6,AS6,B11,B16,B21,B22,B24\
  B26,B27,B29,B31,B36,BX1,BX2,BX6,BX7,C21,C22,C24,C26,C27,C29,C31,C36,C41\
  C46,C51,C56,C7P,CB1,CB2,CB6,CB7,CF1,CH6,CNP,CR1,CR2,CR6,CR7,CU0,CU6,CU8\
  CU9,CUP,CX1,CX2,CX6,CX7,DS1,DT1,DT6,DV1,DV6,E11,E12,E13,E16,E17,E18,E21\
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  E26,E31,E32,E36,E37,E51,E56,EC6,EC7,ES1,ES6,EW3,EW8,F11,F21,F22,F24,F26\
  F27,F29,F31,F36,F41,F46,FX1,FX2,FX6,FX7,HK1,HK6,I51,I56,IB1,IB2,IB6,IB7\
  IC6,IF1,IR0,IR1,IR2,IR3,IR4,IR5,IR6,IR7,IR8,IR9,IW1,IW2,IW6,IW7,LA6,M83\
  M93,MR0,MR6,MR7,NA3,NP0,NP1,NP5,NP6,NP8,OP1,OP6,P11,P16,P21,P22,P26,P27\
  P31,P36,P41,P46,P51,P56,P61,P66,P71,P72,P76,R51,R56,R86,RE6,RN6,S13,S16\
  S26,SA1,SA6,SC1,SC2,SC6,SC7,SD1,SD6,SE1,SE6,SEH,SEK,SF1,SF6,SG1,SG6,SH1\
  SH6,SJ6,SK1,SK6,SL1,SL6,SM1,SM4,SM6,SM9,SR1,SR6,T51,T56,VI0,VI5,VI6,W16\
  W26,W36,XB3,Y64,Z03,Z11,Z13,Z33,Z41,Z43,Z56,Z57,Z66,Z83,Z91
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I. OVERVIEW
This report was prepared by The Lewin Group for the U.S. Commission on Immigration
Reform.  This report is based on findings from a survey of key informants in five states
(California, Florida, Illinois, New York and Texas) conducted to determine the effects of
federal changes to welfare policy as a result of the enactment of the Personal Responsibility
and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (Public Law 104 –193, PRWORA). The
survey, funded by the John D. and Catherine MacArthur Foundation, focused on the impact of
changes to the following federal programs:  food stamps, Supplemental Security Income
(SSI), Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF), and the Medicaid program (with the
exception of emergency medical services), as well as on changes to state and local programs.
Interviews were conducted from April through June 1997. Survey findings were updated
through July 24, 1997.  An executive summary and five detailed state reports accompany this
overview.
This overview summarizes findings from the five state survey in the following areas:
Provisions of PRWORA that apply to immigrants
Political environment and state decisionmaking regarding PRWORA
State and local implementation of PRWORA
Impact of welfare reform on state and local governments, local economies, health and
social service providers, and immigrants
 Provisions of PRWORA
 In August 1996, the 104th Congress of the United States passed historic welfare reform
legislation that has had enormous consequences for states.  Among the changes contained in
the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 are specific
restrictions on welfare programs and federal public benefits for immigrants. Title IV of
PRWORA sets forth new requirements on the states to discontinue benefits and deny
eligibility for federal, state and local welfare programs to specific classes of immigrants,
including qualified immigrants, non-qualified immigrants, and illegal immigrants.
 Title IV of PRWORA intersects with federal immigration law (i.e. Illegal Immigration Reform
and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996), particularly as it relates to the designation or
determination of immigration status.  States are now required to understand the intricacies of
immigration law in order to process applications by immigrants for welfare benefits.
 Political Environment and State Decisionmaking Regarding PRWORA
 In order to respond to the Welfare Act, states are required by their constitutions and by
administrative practice to make a host of legislative and policy decisions with respect to the
various federal, state and public benefits that immigrants receive. This is a challenging task
because the criteria established in PRWORA for denying and limiting benefits to immigrants
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are not uniform across programs.
 Furthermore, despite the enactment of  PRWORA, there is still a high level of uncertainty at
the federal level surrounding immigrant eligibility for SSI and Medicaid. States are faced with
the task of responding to the immigrant-related provisions of PRWORA in the absence of final
decisions around major issues (e.g. whether SSI benefits will be restored for all or a fraction
of legal immigrants) at the federal level.
 As part of their response to PRWORA, many states and localities have legally challenged the
denial of benefits for immigrants and are strongly advocating that the federal government
reassumes its responsibility in this area. States argue that since they are not responsible for
“immigration policy”, they should not be faced with the responsibility of having an “immigrant
policy”, i.e. determining whether immigrants may receive benefits and paying for those
benefits.
 There is consensus that the objective of reducing federal responsibility for immigrants under
these provisions will result in an unprecedented cost transfer to the states.  In turn, some
states will transfer liability for the costs to localities.
 States are currently making complex and unprecedented decisions regarding federal  programs
in three areas: (i) immigrant eligibility decisions, i.e. whether immigrants should be covered
and which types of immigrants should be covered; (ii) the level of benefits to be offered to
immigrants; (iii) administrative decisions, i.e. whether to create new state programs or reform
current programs to serve immigrants.
 State and Local Implementation of PRWORA
 The criteria for denying and limiting benefits to immigrants in PRWORA are not uniform
across federal programs.  The lack of uniformity and the complexity of program designs create
a significant administrative burden on states to fashion program-specific eligibility changes,
including management of information and the development of new tracking and monitoring
systems for all affected programs.
 Among the five states we surveyed, there is considerable variation in the extent to which
decisions have been made. The legislative sessions in Florida, Illinois and Texas have ended.
On the other hand, in California and New York, the legislatures are in session and there are
still many uncertainties. In this section, we present an overview of the legislative and policy
decisions that these five states have made through this point in time. States continue to debate
about how to respond to the immigrant provisions of PRWORA. When the federal budget is
approved, states may have to both reconsider their positions and evaluate issues they have not
addressed yet. Additionally, once PRWORA is fully implemented, states will have to confront
its impacts on immigrants.
 Among the five states in this study, there is a wide range of responses to the immigrant
provisions of the Welfare Act. Texas appears to be at one end of the spectrum. This state
seems to be “in denial” of the devastating effects that PRWORA will have on the immigrant
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population. On the other hand, Illinois falls on the other end of the spectrum, having already
made several important decisions regarding immigrants. California, Florida and New York fall
between Texas and Illinois with regard to reaching consensus around immigrant eligibility and
program changes necessary to replace benefits for immigrants.
 States are making decisions about eligibility for three major types of immigrants: qualified
immigrants (as defined by the Welfare Act) who entered the country before the enactment of
PRWORA (i.e. August 22, 1996), non-qualified immigrants, and legal immigrants who
entered the country after the enactment of the Act (hereinafter referred to as new immigrants).
State decisions concerning the four main federal programs are summarized below.
 SSI: Only Illinois has decided to replace SSI for a fraction of qualified immigrants (i.e. those
who were receiving benefits prior to August 22, 1996). Similarly, only Illinois will replace SSI
for a fraction non-qualified immigrants--it will cover those individuals who were  receiving
benefits prior to the enactment of the Act. No state has decided to replace SSI for new
immigrants.
 Food Stamps: No state has decided to replace food stamps for qualified immigrants who
entered the United States before the enactment of PWRORA, non qualified immigrants or
new immigrants.
 TANF: All states in the survey have decided to cover under TANF qualified immigrants who
entered the country prior to August 22, 1996. No states have decided to cover non-qualified
immigrants or new immigrants (during the five-year federal ban) for TANF at state cost.
 Medicaid: All states in the survey will cover pre August 22, 1996 qualified immigrants under
their Medicaid programs. However, no state will cover post August 22, 1996 qualified
immigrants or new immigrants at state cost.
 In addition to making decisions about immigrant eligibility, replacement of programs for
immigrants and the respective level of benefits, states need to develop systems that track
information on immigrants.  Currently, states rely on the Systematic Alien Verification for
Entitlements (SAVE) Program, a single federally-developed information system that can
provide information on immigrant status. This is an inter-governmental information-sharing
service for agencies and institutions that was developed pursuant to Section 121 of the
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA). However, states now need information
systems that can track immigrant categories and exemption criteria as defined in the Welfare
Act. States are currently waiting for the U.S. Attorney General to develop verification criteria
and procedures, and then they will have a year to make their systems conform to the new
guidelines.
 Impact of welfare reform on state and local governments, local economies, health and social
service providers, and immigrants
 The effects of the immigrant related provisions of the Welfare Act will be far reaching. State
and local governments will face new responsibilities, an unprecedented cost transfer from the
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federal government, and complicated administrative decisions. State projections of the number
of immigrants who will become ineligible by type of public program apply only to current
caseloads.  Neither the states nor the federal government has the capacity at present to project
the number of qualified, non-qualified and new immigrants who may need assistance but will
not be eligible for public benefit programs in future.
 The number of current recipients who will lose benefits as well as the cost to the states of
losing those federal funds is significant. In California, 345,000 immigrants will lose food
stamps; and 243,720 will lose SSI. In Florida, 97,658 immigrants will lose food stamps;
54,000 will lose SSI; 503 will lose TANF; and 3,062 will lose Medicaid. In Illinois 39,000
immigrants will lose food stamps; 22,000 will lose SSI; 1,698 will lose TANF; and 2,379 will
lose Medicaid. In New York, 130,000 immigrants will lose food stamps; and 80,000 will lose
SSI. In Texas, 140,937 immigrants will lose food stamps; 34,892 will lose SSI; about 37,061
will lose the state optional Medicaid benefits and 33,725 will lose SSI-linked Medicaid
benefits. For those states that provided estimates, the loss of federal funds due to the
immigrant provisions of PRWORA will be considerable. Under the Welfare Act, the most
significant financial loss to the states will be the loss of SSI and food stamp funds. For food
stamps and SSI, Florida will lose nearly $311 million per year, while Illinois and Texas will
lose about $150 million each.
 Local economies will be seriously affected by the direct loss of benefits as well as the indirect
economic impact associated with diminished household incomes, purchasing power and
workforce productivity.
 Community-based social service and health care providers are likely to face an increased
demand for their services as immigrants are denied public benefits. Whether the financial and
structural capacity of these providers will be sufficient to offer a safety net to immigrants
remains to be seen. Providers are also concerned that immigrants, qualified and nonqualified,
may not seek necessary medical care due to the fear of being reported to the INS or fear of
jeopardizing one’s chances of obtaining citizenship. These fears could pose a serious health
problem to the states and localities if immigrants do not receive care for infectious or
communicable diseases like tuberculosis.
 
 Immigrant families will be the most negatively impacted by PWRORA. The effects on
immigrants include fear and confusion, diminished household incomes, increased food and
housing insecurity, reduced access to health care and other social services, and changing
incentives regarding naturalization, assimilation and family reunification strategies. The
weakening of immigrants’ socio-economic status and well-being will have a detrimental effect
not only on immigrants themselves but on those U.S. citizens who are members of immigrant
families and households as well as on communities where immigrants constitute a substantial
fraction of the population, work force and social fabric.
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 II. INTRODUCTION
 In April 1997, The Lewin Group received a grant from The John D. and Catherine T.
MacArthur Foundation to conduct a survey of key informants in five states to determine the
effects of federal changes to welfare policy as a consequence of Congressional enactment in
1996 of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (Public
Law 104 - 193).  Lewin also received funding from the U.S. Commission on Immigration
Reform to prepare a report summarizing the findings from the five state survey.
 The states included in the survey are California, Florida, Illinois, New York, and Texas.  The
number of immigrants residing in these five states collectively represents approximately 75%
of the total number of immigrants currently living in the U.S.
 This report summarizes the findings from the five state survey.  Accompanying this Executive
Summary are separate state reports which provide detailed findings from each of the states
studied.  Also attached in separate volumes are appendices for each of the states that include
official documents, research papers, and other supporting materials that describe legislative,
judicial, administrative, and other findings or activities outlined in each of the state reports.
 This Executive Summary is organized into the following sections:
Project Purposes and Methods
State Policy Options
State Decisions and Actions
Actual and Expected Impacts on Immigrants
State Efforts to Monitor Impacts
Conclusion
Appendices
III. PROJECT PURPOS ES AND METHODS
In August 1996, the 104th Congress of the United States passed historic welfare reform
legislation that has had enormous consequences for states.  Among the changes contained in
the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, (hereinafter
referred to as PRWORA or the Welfare Act), are specific restrictions on welfare programs
and federal public benefits for aliens (hereinafter also referred to as immigrants).  Title IV of
PRWORA (See Appendix I) sets forth new requirements on the states to discontinue benefits
and deny eligibility for federal welfare programs to specific classes of immigrants, including
qualified immigrants, non-qualified immigrants, and illegal immigrants. (Appendix I)
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Title IV sets forth the basis of national policy concerning welfare benefits for immigrants
including specific restrictions and exceptions regarding eligibility for federal benefits; eligibility
for state and local benefits; attribution of income and affidavits of support for immigrants
establishing eligibility; general provisions regarding verification and communication between
states, local and federal authorities regarding immigrants and law enforcement; conforming
amendments related to assisted housing; and earned income credit denied to unauthorized
employees.  A brief summary of the discontinuation of benefits by federal and state program
for specific classes of immigrants is provided in Appendix  II.
In its entirety, Title IV intersects with federal immigration law (i.e. Illegal Immigration Reform
and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996), particularly as it relates to the designation or
determination of immigration status.  States are now required to understand the intricacies of
immigration law in order to process applications by immigrants for welfare benefits.
Currently, even the description of who is a “legal, qualified alien” creates confusion among
many state workers unfamiliar with conditions surrounding entry to the U.S. by non-citizens
and the role of the Immigration and Naturalization Service in the determination of immigration
status.  For qualified aliens, the distinctions drawn among asylees, parolees, refugees, persons
with deportation withheld, and determination of minor children suffering abuse or cruelty and
in need of welfare benefits altogether create ample opportunity for dismay and confusion at
the local level of welfare program administration.
In addition, provisions of PRWORA regarding new eligibility requirements for immigrants
requires substantial documentation by the applicant to establish all of the requirements,
including residency and income provisions.  One particular section of the law requires the
attribution of sponsor income and resources for aliens with sponsorship.  These requirements
require significant understanding of immigration law and procedures and also impose new
requirements to review the income and resources not only of the alien but of his/her sponsor
which states have rarely performed.
Practically, states report that the enforcement of Title IV of PRWORA creates new types of
work to determine an applicant’s immigration status for which they are unprepared and
untrained.  State respondents also report that the type of work required to process
applications for benefits now borders on the exercise of federal powers regarding a
determination of an individual’s immigration status.  This intersection with federal
responsibilities concerns the states and will continue to be an issue for states and localities.
Nearly one year since the passage of PRWORA, governors, legislators, agencies, interest
groups, and citizens in each of the states are struggling to come to grips with the complexity
of the federal law, the interaction of provisions in PRWORA with changes in federal
immigration law, the range of policy and program alternatives available to the states to
respond to PRWORA, and the expected impact of policy and program changes on
immigrants.
Study Questions
Impact of Federal Welfare Reform on Immigrant
The Lewin Group 7
The Lewin Group was commissioned to conduct a phone survey of key informants in five
states with the highest proportion of resident immigrants to determine the impact of federal
welfare policy on immigrants, including attention to impacts at the local level.  The main study
questions were as follows:
1. What changes are states planning in response to federal policy changes that
discontinue immigrants from specific federal programs and federal/state programs?
2. How are counties and service providers responding to the federal and state welfare
reforms?
3. How will the state and county welfare reforms affect the costs to states, counties and
providers, particularly with respect to substitution of funds for withdrawn federal
payments, and also with respect to other social (i.e. human) costs?
4. What are the problems that states, counties and providers report they will face in
responding to welfare reform that were previously unforeseen by government officials?
5. What distinctions, if any, are states making to determine eligibility for welfare
programs under their reforms with regard to an individual’s immigration status, age,
disability level, or employment status?
6. What are the direct effects of the policy changes, including health care delivery (access
to care, payment for care, cost of care, and quality of care) for immigrants at the
community level?
7. Are there state and local plans to monitor and assess the impact of policy changes?
Key Sources and Interviewees
Lewin developed a list of key informants in each of the states, drawing from several areas of
the public and private sectors:  government officials at the state and local levels charged with
implementing state welfare reforms, service providers, research organizations, and advocacy
groups.  The officials contacted included key staff to Governors, Special Assistants on
Welfare Reform, sponsors of key state legislation, state budget officers, agency heads in
health care and welfare, legislators and legislative staff, state Attorneys General, County
Commissioners, Boards of Supervisors, and other local officials charged with planning and
executing local-level reforms.
Lewin initially contacted between 35 and 125 individuals in each of the states, depending on
the size of the state, number of localities with significant immigrant populations, and the
degree of local involvement in shaping state responses to the federal welfare changes.  From
the over 350 initial contacts, we developed about 200 key sources and conducted about 100
full interviews to produce the state reports.  Key sources and interviewees are listed in
Appendix III.
Impact of Federal Welfare Reform on Immigrant
The Lewin Group 8
Lewin developed a structured interview protocol to guide each of the interviews.  The
protocol was sent in advance to each interviewee or group of interviewees, where we had
multiple informants participating in a single interview (Appendix IV).  Because of the
complexity of the issues, the evolving nature of state decisionmaking and action in the
implementation of welfare reform, and the uncertainty posed by ongoing federal budget
negotiations concerning retention of certain key provisions of PRWORA affecting immigrants,
informants had a need to speak well beyond the allotted time.  In most cases, the interviews
exceeded 60 minutes, some requiring follow-up interviews to complete the interview protocol
and to secure additional referral sources.
Respondents welcomed the project effort and were extremely generous with their time,
referrals, insight, and advice.  A number of individuals contacted expressed interest in the
study but declined to participate.  Most of these non-respondents stated that since the status
of decisionmaking was still in flux in their respective states, they did not want to engage in
speculation or conjecture as to what the ultimate legislative decisions would be.  Responses
from each of the interviews were synthesized and are contained in separate state reports.  The
outline for each of the state reports is provided in Appendix V.
The following sections summarize findings from the state interviews.  This report attempts to
capture the high-level commonalties among the states and report on the significant differences
with regard to decision processes, policy frameworks, program options, implementation of
state and local decisions regarding welfare reforms affecting immigrants, and impacts on
individuals and communities.  Detailed state reports are attached to this Executive Summary.
The state reports include findings from the many interviews conducted for each state and also
include official records and proceedings describing the legislation and administrative
procedures states have adopted or intend to adopt to implement welfare reform at the state
and local level of government.
IV. STATE POLICY OP TIONS
In order to respond to the Welfare Act states are required by state constitutions and
administrative practice to make a host of legislative and policy decisions with respect to the
various federal, state and public benefits that immigrants receive. Various reasons why these
changes pose challenging and protracted deliberations are discussed below.
The criteria established in PRWORA for denying and limiting benefits to immigrants are not
uniform across programs.  For example, food stamps and the Supplemental Security Income
(SSI) program, which are entirely funded by the federal government, have been discontinued
for legal immigrants, including qualified immigrants, with the exception of five categories of
immigrants.  For Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program -- now a block
grant according to PRWORA -- and Medicaid -- still an entitlement program funded by both
the federal and the state governments -- states have the option of continuing to cover qualified
immigrants who entered the United States before August 22, 1996.
Despite the enactment of  PRWORA, there is still a high level of uncertainty at the federal
level surrounding immigrant eligibility for SSI and Medicaid. The federal budget agreement
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(April 1997) would restore SSI to those immigrants who become disabled after entering the
United States; eliminate restrictions on SSI and Medicaid for qualified immigrant children;
delay the ban on food stamps for current recipients from April 1, 1997 to September 30, 1997;
and extend the exception for refugees and asylees from five to seven years.  However,
members of Congress continue to debate the extent of the restoration of benefits for
immigrants. Most of the discussions have focused on the SSI program. Two particular
amendments were passed to the Senate version of the Balanced Budget Act. The first
amendment would exempt qualified immigrants who come in the future and are too disabled
to naturalize from the SSI restrictions. The second amendment would allow Amerasians to
receive SSI and all other benefits during their first seven years in the United States. While the
Senate version passed a few amendments revising provisions impacting immigrants, the House
version of the Balanced Budget Act did not include any such provisions. The conference
committee is currently meeting to iron out the differences between the House and the Senate
bills. According to the National Law and Immigration Center, the House and Senate
Republican conferees decided to support the provisions least favorable to immigrants in cases
where the House and Senate versions of the bill diverge. As of July 23, 1997, the bill would
provide SSI to qualified immigrants who were receiving SSI on August 22, 1996; all other
classes of immigrants are not qualified and therefore face the termination of their benefits.
These decisions are not final, however, until the White House and the Congress complete their
negotiations over the balanced budget bill.
Several governors and congressional members feel strongly that the federal government
should reassume its responsibility and restore SSI and food stamps benefits for legal
immigrants. States are afraid of taking action to replace those benefits with state funds while
there is still no resolution at the federal level. It is felt that by assuming this responsibility,
states would be weakening their position vis-à-vis the federal government. On the other hand,
states face internal pressures to protect immigrants by replacing benefits. Pro-immigrant
legislators, social service providers and advocacy groups argue that, although the federal
government should ultimately be responsible, with the enactment of PRWORA, “the ball is
now on the states’ court.” There are indications that large sectors of the population view as
unacceptable the human, public health and economic costs of denying assistance to poor legal
immigrants. For example, in California, a recent survey of registered voters showed that 92
percent support public benefits for legal immigrants1.
There is consensus that the immigrant provisions of the Welfare Act represent an
unprecedented cost transfer from the federal government to the states. Besides the direct costs
of providing benefits, there would be significant administrative costs if states were to establish
their own programs to serve immigrants. For example, if a state wanted to replace food
stamps it would need to create a  new program for immigrants, while citizens will continue to
be served by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) food stamps program. Another
possibility would be for the states to contract out the provision of benefits for immigrants with
the federal government. Currently, a federal bill (HR1469), which has not been passed yet,
                                                 
1  The survey, conducted by the Service Employee International Union, polled a sample of registered voters who
have voted in recent elections about various topics--the questions on public benefits for legal immigrants
constituted a small section of the questionnaire. The results of this survey will be available soon.
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contains language permitting states to contract with USDA to continue providing food stamps
to legal immigrants.
In addition to the cost-shifting issue, states question whether the federal government has the
right to force states to make decisions about public benefits for immigrants. States argue that
“immigration policy”, i.e. determining and enforcing the conditions under which non-citizens
can enter and reside in the country legally, is a federal responsibility. Therefore, states should
not be faced with the responsibility of having an “immigrant policy”, i.e. determining whether
immigrants, whom they did not admit, may receive benefits. Nor should states be asked “to
act as agents of the INS”. An individual interviewed for this study illustrated this paradox by
suggesting that if the federal government wants to decentralize immigrant policy, it should
also be willing to decentralize immigration policy.
Policy options regarding federal programs
The decisions that states need to make regarding federal programs can be classified in three
types:
1) Immigrant eligibility decisions, i.e. whether immigrants should be covered and which
types of immigrants should be covered.
2) Economic decisions, i.e. determining the level of benefits to be offered to immigrants.
3) Administrative decisions, i.e. whether to create new state programs or reform current
programs to serve immigrants.
 SSI
According to the welfare act, with the exception of five immigrant categories, all non-citizens
will lose eligibility for SSI. However, as discussed above, there is still great uncertainty
around the continuation of the SSI program for immigrants. States will have to decide
whether to establish a state-funded program to replace benefits for those immigrants who will
eventually lose SSI. The range of decisions that states need to make are summarized in Table
4.1.
Table 4.1: Range of State Decisions Regarding Replacement of SSI for Immigrants
Immigrant eligibility decisions
Whether to wait until the federal budget is passed and it is clear which types of immigrants
will lose SSI.
Whether to create a state program to replace SSI. If this program is created before the
federal budget is passed, the state will have to estimate which types of immigrants are less
likely to be covered by the federal government.
Whether to cover only qualified aliens as defined in the Welfare Act or all legal aliens
(qualified and non-qualified).
Whether to cover only qualified (legal) immigrants who entered the country before the
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enactment of PRWORA (current immigrants) or cover all qualified (legal) immigrants
regardless of their date of entry.
Whether to subject state-funded coverage for qualified (legal) immigrants who entered the
country after the enactment of PRWORA (new immigrants) to deeming.
 Economic decisions
Level of benefits.
 Administrative decisions
Structure of state program to replace SSI.
If there are state programs linked to SSI (e.g. in-home support services, Medicaid), state
may want to de-link eligibility to allow immigrants losing SSI to continue receiving
benefits/services under those programs.
 Food stamps
 According to the Welfare Act, with the exception of five immigrant categories, all non-citizens
will lose eligibility for food stamps. States will have to decide whether to establish a state-
funded program to replace food stamps. The range of decisions that states need to make are
summarized in Table 4.2.
 Table 4.2: Range of State Decisions Regarding Replacement of Food Stamps for
Immigrants
 Immigrant eligibility decisions
Whether to discontinue food stamps for immigrants by April 1, 1997 or promote
recertification of immigrants to receive food stamps to delay discontinuation.
Whether to create a state program to replace food stamps.
Whether to cover only qualified aliens as defined in the Welfare Act or all legal aliens
(qualified and non-qualified).
Whether to cover only qualified (legal) immigrants who entered the country before the
enactment of PRWORA (current immigrants) or cover all qualified (legal) immigrants
regardless of their date of entry.
Whether to subject state-funded coverage for qualified (legal) immigrants who entered the
country after the enactment of PRWORA to deeming.
 Economic decisions
Level of benefits.
 Administrative decisions
Whether to extend recertification periods as far as possible, but in any event not later than
August 22, 1997.  This option is from the waiver the USDA Food and Consumer Service
issued subsequent to the enactment of PRWORA.  The waiver allows States to extend
certification periods for aliens currently receiving Food Stamps for up to 12 months, or up
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to 24 months in the case of elderly and disabled aliens, but not past August 22, 1997.
Whether to seek a waiver from USDA to exempt able-bodied, childless adults between the
ages of 18 and 50 from the Federal welfare provisions if those individuals live in a county
with an unemployment rate greater than 10 percent. Also, counties could qualify for a
different waiver because of their designation as “labor surplus areas.”
If HR1469 is passed, whether to contract with USDA to continue providing food stamps
to immigrants who lose assistance or create state program to replace food stamps.
Structure of state program to replace food stamps.
 TANF
 According to the Welfare Act states are authorized to determine the eligibility of qualified
aliens for TANF. Federal funds may be used for covering qualified immigrants. States may use
their own funds to cover non-qualified and new immigrants. The range of decisions that states
need to make are summarized in Table 4.3.
 Table 4.3: Range of State Decisions Regarding Continuation & Replacement of TANF
for Immigrants
 Immigrant eligibility decisions
Whether to continue covering qualified immigrants. Federal funds may be used for
covering qualified immigrants. If the state decides to cover qualified immigrants, the block
grant amount received from the federal government, in combination with the
corresponding state funds, should be sufficient to cover those immigrants. The state may
decide to cover only certain types of qualified immigrants.
Whether to use state funds to cover all legal immigrants (i.e. qualified and non-qualified
immigrants). Federal funds may not be used to cover non-qualified immigrants.
Whether to cover only qualified (legal) immigrants who entered the country before the
enactment of PRWORA (current immigrants) or cover all qualified (legal) immigrants
regardless of their date of entry. During the five year ban, federal funds may not be used
to cover new qualified immigrants. After the five-year ban, federal funds may be used to
cover qualified immigrants but states must deem the income and resources of the alien’s
sponsor.
Whether to subject state-funded coverage for qualified (legal) immigrants who entered the
country after the enactment of PRWORA to deeming.
Whether to cover citizen children of non-qualified immigrants.
 Economic decisions
Level of benefits.
 Administrative decisions
TANF implementation decisions around immigrants including:
Whether the state will implement any immigrant-specific programs in regard to work
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requirements, e.g. job training programs in appropriate languages
Whether the state plans to include any immigrant categories (e.g. refugees) in the
fraction of recipients to be exempted from the TANF work requirements
If the state decides to cover new qualified or non-qualified immigrants, whether the
state will have this spending count towards the “maintenance of effort” requirement
for TANF under PRWORA
TANF implementation decisions around households composed of non-citizen and citizen
members including:
Whether new qualified, non-qualified and illegal immigrant parents of citizen children
will be eligible for limited assistance
Whether new qualified and non-qualified immigrant parents will have to meet work
requirements
Whether undocumented immigrant parents will be required to meet work requirements
through community service, since they are not legally permitted to work in the United
States
 Whether single undocumented immigrant parents will be eligible for child care.
Medicaid
According to the Welfare Act states are authorized to determine the eligibility of qualified
aliens for Medicaid. Federal funds may be used for covering qualified immigrants. States may
use their own funds to cover non-qualified and new immigrants. Emergency Medicaid must be
available to all types of immigrants--including illegal immigrants. The range of decisions that
states need to make are summarized in Table 4.4.
Table 4.4: Range of State Decisions Regarding Continuation & Replacement of
Medicaid for Immigrants
Immigrant eligibility decisions
Whether to continue covering qualified immigrants. Federal funds may be used for
covering qualified immigrants. The state may decide to cover only certain types of
qualified immigrants.
Whether to use state funds to cover all legal immigrants (i.e. qualified and non-qualified
immigrants). Federal funds may not be used to cover non-qualified immigrants.
Whether to cover only qualified (legal) immigrants who entered the country before the
enactment of PRWORA (current immigrants) or cover all qualified (legal) immigrants
regardless of their date of entry. During the five year ban, federal funds may not be used
to cover new qualified immigrants.
Whether to cover citizen children of nonqualified immigrants and whether to distinguish
between children in a family with citizen and nonqualified immigrants children.
Whether to subject coverage for qualified (legal) immigrants who entered the country
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after the enactment of PRWORA to deeming.
 Economic decisions
Level of benefits
 Administrative decisions
Whether to establish eligibility criteria (i.e. medically needy) to allow immigrants who lose
SSI to continue receiving Medicaid--such criteria may already exist.
Policy options regarding state and county programs
Besides restricting immigrant eligibility for federal programs, the Welfare Act limited
immigrant eligibility for state and county programs. States are authorized to determine the
eligibility of qualified immigrants who entered the United States before August 22, 1996, for
state and county programs. States are also authorized to determine the eligibility of non-
immigrants under the Immigration and Nationality Act and aliens paroled into the United
States for less than a year. If  a state wants state and county programs to cover non-qualified
and illegal immigrants, it has to enact a state law after the enactment of PRWORA that
affirmatively provides for such eligibility.
State legislative and policy decisions regarding immigrant-related provisions of Welfare Act
As described above, states are faced with making multiple decisions regarding the immigrant-
related provisions of the Welfare Act. Among the five states we surveyed, there is
considerable variation in the extent to which decisions have been made. The legislative
sessions in Florida, Illinois and Texas have ended. On the other hand, in California and New
York, the legislatures are in session and there are still many uncertainties. In this section, we
present an overview of the legislative and policy decisions that these five states have made
through this point in time. This, of course, does not mean that the states in question will not
continue debating how to respond to the immigrant provisions of PRWORA. When the
federal budget is approved, states may have to both reconsider their positions and evaluate
issues they have not addressed yet. Additionally, once PRWORA is fully implemented, states
will have to confront its impacts on immigrants.
Among the five states in this study, there is a wide range of responses to the immigrant
provisions of the Welfare Act. Texas appears to be at one end of the spectrum. Several
interviewees stressed that the state seems to be “in denial” of the devastating effects that
PRWORA will have on the immigrant population. On the other hand, Illinois has already made
two important decisions, i.e. replacing SSI for a fraction of those immigrants who may lose
benefits and continuing prenatal care for all types of immigrants. Furthermore, Illinois appears
to be the only state where practically all the range of policy options discussed in Section 2,
have been considered. California, Florida and New York are between Texas and Illinois with
regard to reaching consensus on a policy framework to determine program changes at the
state and local levels of government. A complete discussion of each state is included in the
case studies in this report.
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Some of the issues that states have not fully addressed yet are whether to use state funds to
cover non-qualified legal immigrants, i.e. persons residing in the United States under color of
law (PRUCOL immigrants); whether to use state funds to cover immigrants who entered the
United States after August 22, 1996 (new immigrants); and whether to subject coverage of
new immigrants with state funds to the new deeming provisions.
State legislative and policy decisions regarding federal programs
Below we discuss the decisions that states have made regarding food stamps, SSI, TANF and
Medicaid.  Tables referenced follow on pages 19 through 22.
SSI
Except for Illinois, none of the states has decided to allocate state funds to replace SSI for
those immigrants who will lose benefits. The Illinois legislature has appropriated $10 million
to cover  4,192 elderly legal immigrants who applied for SSI before August 22, 1996. At the
federal level, the governors and/or congressional members of California, Florida, Illinois and
New York have advocated that the federal government restore SSI. To our knowledge, Texas
is the only state that has not been openly active at the federal level.
Food stamps
None of the states has made a decision to create a program to replace the food stamp program
for immigrants. In California and New York, the creation of such program is being
considered. For the time being, Illinois and Florida have decided against this option. Finally,
the issue of replacing food stamps with a state-funded program has not been raised in Texas.
In general, although the consequences of not restoring or replacing food stamps will be as
devastating as the consequences of not restoring or replacing SSI, at the state level there is
considerably less political support for food stamps than for SSI. At the federal level, the
governor and/or congressional members of California, Florida, Illinois and New York have
advocated that the federal government restore food stamps. However, discussions at the
federal level have focused on SSI, and advocacy for food stamps has been less vocal. Again,
to our knowledge, Texas is the only state that has not been strongly lobbying at the federal
level.
Although the replacement of food stamps for legal immigrant has not received as much
attention as the replacement of SSI benefits, numerous advocacy groups are deeply concerned
about the consequences of denying food stamps to non-citizens.
As illustrated later in this report (see Tables 6.1 and 6.2), in terms of the number of individuals
losing benefits, the denial of food stamps will be even more serious than the denial of SSI. In
terms of lost federal funds, the loss of SSI would be roughly 150 percent larger than the loss
of food stamps for Florida, 130 percent larger for Illinois, and 7 percent larger for Texas --
data for California and New York were not available. However, the amount of federal funds
lost for both programs is significant. Additionally, the figures in Tables 6.1 and 6.2 do not
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reflect that Congress is likely to restore SSI benefits for at least a fraction of immigrants,
while restoring food stamps is not being considered2.
Besides the direct impact on state finances, food stamp cuts will have a severe effect on legal
immigrants’ income. For instance, according to California Food Policy Advocates, in the state
of California the average immigrant household cut from the program will lose about $70 per
person monthly. For immigrant families in Los Angeles and San Francisco, this will represent
a reduction in their monthly income of one-fourth and one-third respectively.
Food stamp cuts will result in increased malnutrition. In California, several advocacy groups
have stressed that the denial of food stamp benefits to legal immigrants will cause the largest
increase in food insecurity since the Great Depression. Food stamp cuts will have serious
consequences for both immigrant and citizen children. For instance, in California children
represent about one-third of those legal immigrants who are likely to lose food stamps.
Furthermore, citizen children whose non-citizen parents and/or siblings will lose food stamps
will be negatively impacted by a reduction in their family’s ability to purchase food. In turn,
increased malnutrition and hunger will give rise to health problems (e.g. anemia, low-birth
weight and growth stunting) as well as educational problems.
Finally, the discontinuation of food stamp benefits will have a large negative impact on local
economies. In addition to the direct loss of purchasing power, studies have shown that there is
a three-fold multiplier effect associated with food stamps3. Some local economic interests
realize the negative effect that the food stamp cuts may have on them and a few have taken
some action to address this issue, e.g. in Houston some grocery stores have begun
disseminating information on naturalization because of concerns about potential losses in food
stamp revenue. However, none of the individuals interviewed for this study mentioned any
efforts on the part of local chambers of commerce or other economic interests to lobby state
governments and/or legislatures to replace food stamps. An additional economic impact of the
loss of food stamps will be the removal of an implicit subsidy from the federal government to
employers. By providing food stamps, the federal government has helped improve the
economic well-being, nutritional status, and productivity of important sectors of the
workforce. For instance, off-season, food stamps help immigrant farm workers support
themselves and their families. Without food stamps, employers are likely to face a less
productive workforce. However, interviewees did not note any employer efforts to advocate
for the replacement of food stamps.
As mentioned above, in general, at both the state and federal levels, there appears to be more
political support for protecting the elderly and disabled population, while both Congress and
the public have been less sympathetic towards families and children who will lose food stamps.
However, in the months to come, as the effects of the food stamp cuts are fully understood
and realized, it is likely that state governments, legislators and local economic interests will
advocate more aggressively for the restoration of these benefits and/or take action to replace
                                                 
2 President Clinton did not provide for the restoration of food stamps for legal immigrants in his budget proposal.
3 The size of the multiplier effect comes from the California Food Policy Advocates, the Texas’s, Comptroller and
the El Paso Chamber of Commerce. The three sources agree that the food stamp multiplier (i.e. the indirect impact
on local economies of losing direct food stamp funds) is about 3.0.
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them. The announcement by Governor Pataki on July 23, 1997 that New York is likely to
replace food stamps at least for children, the elderly or disabled who have legal immigrant
status points in this direction4.
TANF
All states have decided to preserve TANF eligibility for qualified immigrants who entered the
country before the enactment of PRWORA. Florida and Illinois already have decided against
covering new qualified immigrants, while California and New York are still considering this
option. With respect to non-qualified immigrants, Florida, Illinois and New York have decided
against it, while California is still evaluating this alternative. In the last legislative session, the
Texas legislature did not contemplate coverage for either new qualified or non-qualified
immigrants.
States are now considering how to treat families comprised of immigrant parents (qualified
and nonqualified) and citizen children. As the above table highlights, in Florida and Illinois,
citizen children of nonqualified immigrants will receive benefits and their cases will be referred
to as child only cases. These two states are not going to require the nonqualified immigrants
to meet any work or community service requirements. The State of Illinois is planning on
exempting these children from the five-year time-limit ban; it is not clear whether Florida will
also exempt these children from the time limit. Similar to Florida and Illinois, the state of
California will provide benefits to citizen children of nonqualified and qualified immigrants.
However, in contrast to Florida and Illinois, California will not exempt these nonqualified
immigrant parents from the work requirement; rather, these immigrants will be required to
participate in community service activities. At this point in time, it is unclear how Texas and
New York will treat the citizen children. No additional documentation or information was
available.
Table 4.5 Overview of the Immigrant Provisions of the State TANF Plans
California Florida Illinois
New
York Texas
TANF effective date 10/9/96 10/1
/96
5/1/
97
12/2/9
6
10/1/96
Time limit 60 mos. 48 mos. 60 mos. 60 mos. 12
continuous
mos., 60 mos.
lifetime
Provide TANF to qualified immigrants Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Provide TANF to nonqualified immigrants:
Who entered the U.S. prior to 8/22/96
Who entered the U.S. after 8/22/96
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
Provide TANF to citizen children of
nonqualified immigrant parents Yes Yes Yes
Info
N/A Info N/A
Establish work requirements for
nonqualified parents whose citizen
children are receiving benefits
Yes,
community
service No No
Info
N/A Info N/A
                                                 
4 “Albany Chiefs Near Pact on Food Aid for Immigrants”, The New York Times, July 24, 1997.
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Exempting certain qualified immigrants
from work requirements
To be
decided No
To be
decided
Info
N/A Info N/A
Subjecting new immigrant eligibility and
coverage to deeming Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Source: State TANF Plans
Under the TANF, states have the option of exempting a segment of the population from the
work requirements. At this point in time, it appears that only one state (California) is
considering whether to exempt refugees, asylees, or parolees. The remaining states will
require qualified immigrants to meet the work requirements. In addition, the states have also
stated that they plan on subjecting immigrant eligibility and coverage to deeming as stated in
PRWORA.
Medicaid
All states have decided to preserve Medicaid eligibility for all qualified immigrants who
entered the country before the enactment of PRWORA. Illinois and Florida have decided
against covering new qualified immigrants, while California and New York are still
considering this option. With respect to non-qualified immigrants, Florida, Illinois and New
York have decided against it, while California is still evaluating this possibility. Texas did not
contemplate coverage for either new qualified or non-qualified immigrants.
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V. STATE DECISIONS AND ACTIONS
Table 5.1: State Policy Decisions Regarding Replacement of SSI Benefits for Immigrants
State State will replace SSI for
pre 8/22/96 qualified
immigrants
State will replace SSI for
post 8/22/96 qualified
immigrants
State will replace SSI for
non-qualified immigrants
Governor has
openly advocated
the federal
government restore
SSI
Congressional
members have
sponsored bills to
store SSI
Yes No TBD NC Yes No TBD NC Yes No TBD NC Yes No Yes No
California X X X X X
Florida X X X X X
Illinois X1 X X1 X X
New York X X X X X
 Texas X X X X2 X
Note: Yes  indicates that a bill or budget appropriation to replace SSI has been passed; No indicate  that a bill or budget appropriation to restore SSI did not
pass; TBD (to be decided) indicates that a decision about a bill or budget appropriation to restore SSI has not been made yet; NC (not considere ) indicates that
a bill or budget appropriation to restore SSI has not been considered.
1  Covers 4,192 legal (both qualified and non-qualified) immigrants who are not disabled and applied for SSI before August 22, 1996.
2  Interviews with the Governor’s Office have not been completed. A statement from the Governor’s office is forthcoming
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Table 5.2: State Policy Decisions Regarding Replacement of Food Stamps Benefits for Immigrants
State State will replace food
stamps for pre 8/22/96
qualified immigrants
State will replace food
stamps for post 8/22/96
qualified immigrants
State will replace food
stamps for non-qualified
immigrants
Governor has
openly advocated
the federal
government restore
food stamps
Congressional
members have
sponsored bills to
store food stamps
Yes No TBD NC Yes No TBD NC Yes No TBD NC Yes No Yes No
California X X X X X
Florida X X X X X
Illinois X X X X X
New York X X X X X
Texas X X X X5 X
Note: Yes indicates that a bill or budget appropriation to replace food stamps has been passed; No indicates that a bill or budget appropriation to restore food
stamps did not pass; TBD (to be decided) indicates that a decision about a bill or budget appropriation to restore food stamps has not been made yet; NC (not
considered) indicates that a bill or budget appropriation to restore food stamps has not been considered.
                                                 
5 Interviews with the Governor’s Office have not been completed; a statement from the Governor’s Office is forthcoming.
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Table 5.3: State Policy Decisions Regarding TANF Benefits for Immigrants
State State will cover pre 8/22/96 qualified
immigrants (as stated in TANF plan)
State will cover post 8/22/96 qualified
immigrants at state’s cost
State will cover non-qualified
immigrants at state’s cost
Yes No Yes No TBD NC Yes No TBD NC
California X X X
Florida X X X
Illinois X X X
New York X X X
Texas X X X
Note: For qualified immigrants, Yes indicates this is the state’s intent under TANF plan; No indicates that this is not state’s intent under TANF plan. For new
and non-qualified immigrants, Yes indicates that a bill or budget appropriation to replace TANF has been passed; No indicates that a bill or budget
appropriation to restore TANF did not pass; TBD (to be decided) indicates that a decision about a bill or budget appropriation to restore TANF has not been
made yet; NC (not considered) indicates that a bill or budget appropriation to restore TANF has not been considered.
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Table 5.4: State Policy Decisions Regarding Medicaid Benefits for Immigrants
State State will cover pre 8/22/96 qualified
immigrants
State will cover post 8/22/96 qualified
immigrants at state’s cost
State will cover non-qualified
immigrants at state’s cost
Yes No Yes No TBD NC Yes No TBD NC
California X X X
Florida X X X
Illinois X X X
New York X X X
Texas X X X
Note: For qualified immigrants, Yes indicates that state intends to cover these immigrants; No indicates that state does not intend to cover these immigrants.
For new and non-qualified immigrants, Yes indicates that a bill or budget appropriation to replace Medicaid has been passed; No indicates that a bill or budget
appropriation to restore Medicaid did not pass; TBD (to be decided) indicates that a decision about a bill or budget appropriation to restore Medicaid has not
been made yet; NC (not considered) indicates that a bill or budget appropriation to restore Medicaid has not been considered.
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VI. ACTUAL & EXPECT ED IMPACTS OF THE WELFARE ACT ON IMMIGRANTS
Estimates of the number of immigrants losing benefits by federal program
Table 6.1 shows estimates of the number of immigrants who are likely to lose benefits. The
number of immigrants who will lose SSI will be subject to the final outcome of the federal budget
negotiations. For TANF and Medicaid, the five states have opted to cover qualified immigrant
who entered the United States before the enactment of PRWORA. Illinois and Florida were able
to provide estimates of the number of  PRUCOL individuals who will lose TANF and Medicaid
because they are no longer eligible under the welfare act. However, the other states did not
provide these data.
It is important to note that the estimates provided by the states reflect only the number of current
recipients who are likely to lose benefits. Furthermore, under PRWORA, except for the exempted
categories, legal immigrants who entered the country before August 22, 1996 will not be able to
apply for food stamps and SSI. New legal immigrants will not be able to apply for food stamps,
SSI, TANF and Medicaid. Therefore, the estimates in Table 6.1 are a conservative estimate of the
impact of the Welfare Act on immigrants. Ideally, estimates of the number of immigrants who
would apply for benefits if they were still eligible should be added to the number of current
recipients losing benefits.
The data in Table 6.1 show that in terms of the number of current recipients losing benefits, the
largest impact would be felt by food stamp and SSI recipients. About 750,000 immigrants will
lose food stamps in the five states, while about 430,000 immigrants will lose SSI.
Table 6.1: Number of Current Recipients by States to Become Ineligible by Program
Food Stamps SSI TANF Medicaid
California 345,000 243,720 N/A N/A
Florida 97,658 54,000 503a 3,062 a b
Illinois 39,000 22,000 1,698a 2,379a
New York 130,000 80,000 N/A N/A
Texas 140,937 34,892 N/A 37,061 (State option); 33,725 (SSI-linked)
California: Data provided by the California Department of Social Services. SSI data do not take into account the provisions of
the federal budget agreement.
Florida: AFDC, Food Stamp, and Medicaid data as of January 1997; SSI data as of December 1996. Data provided by the State
Department of Children and Families Economic Self-Sufficiency Services Program,
Illinois: Data provided by the Illinois Department of Public Aid. SSI data do not take into account the provisions of the federal
budget agreement.
New York: Food stamps data come from USDA; SSI data provided by the State Department of Social Services,
Texas: Data from the Texas Health and Human Services Commission, Report of the Interagency Workgroup on Welfare
Reform, November 1, 1996.  The 37,061 Medicaid estimate is based on July 1996 caseloads and indicates the minimum
number of legal aliens who will be subject to the State’s option to continue coverage.  The 33,725 Medicaid estimate is based
on updated SSI caseloads from January 1997.  The figure indicates the number of aged and disabled qualified aliens receiving
SSI who were not receiving institutional care and would be likely to lose Medicaid even if the state opted to continue coverage,
because their only access to Medicaid was through SSI.
a:/Permanently Residing Under Color Of Law
b:/Not including SSI recipients
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Estimates of the costs to the states by federal program
As illustrated in Table 6.2 for those states that provided estimates, the loss of federal funds due to
the immigrant provisions of PRWORA will be considerable. For food stamps and SSI, Florida will
lose nearly $311 million per year, while Illinois and Texas will lose about $150 million each. As
explained above, these figures may change once the federal budget is approved. Under the
Welfare Act, the most significant financial loss to the states will be the loss of SSI funds.
 Table 6.2: Estimated Costs of Federal Welfare Reform to the States
Food Stamps SSI TANF Medicaid
California N/A N/A N/A $16,000 a
Florida $89,064 $221,616 $561 $3,123
Illinois $46,000 $105,000 N/A $12,300 b
New York N/A N/A N/A N/A
Texas $122,200 $130,300 $9,000 $90,000 (State option); $94,600 (SSI-linked)
Notes: Numbers in thousands of dollars. Unless otherwise indicated, figures reflect amount of lost federal funds for current
recipients (per year).
California: Data provided by the Legislative Analyst’s Office. a:\ Yearly cost to the state of covering new immigrants.
Florida: AFDC, Food Stamp, and Medicaid data as of January 1997; SSI data as of December 1996. Data provided by the State
Department of Children and Families Economic Self-Sufficiency Services Program.
Illinois: Data provided by the Illinois Department of Public Aid (IDPA). SSI data do not take into account the provisions of the
federal budget agreement. b:\ Yearly cost to the state of covering PRUCOL recipients (estimated by IDPA).
Texas:  TANF estimates from Legislative Budget Board, December 1996.  SSI, Food Stamps, and Medicaid estimates from the
Texas Health and Human Services Commission, Report of the Interagency Workgroup on Welfare Reform, November 1, 1996.
The $90 million loss for SSI indicates the dollar value of coverage for legal aliens subject to the State’s option to continue
coverage.  The $94.6 million indicates the dollar value of coverage for aged and disabled qualified aliens receiving SSI who
were not receiving institutional care and would be likely to lose Medicaid even if the state opted to continue coverage, because
their only access to Medicaid was through SSI.
Impacts on immigrants
Although PRWORA has not been fully implemented, state and county officials, social service
providers and pro-immigrant advocacy groups in the five states in this study provided both data
and compelling anecdotal evidence suggesting that the Act will have a significant negative impact
on the well-being and health of large sectors of the immigrant population. The effects of
PRWORA are discussed below.
Fear and confusion among the immigrant population
The Welfare Act has created widespread fear and confusion among immigrants. As discussed
earlier, the final form that the immigrant provisions of PRWORA will take has yet to be
determined. Even state and county officials, and advocates specialized in welfare and immigration
issues find it difficult to fully understand the language and implications of the Act, and to keep
track of its evolution. For low-income immigrants, many of whom are elderly, disabled, or not
fully proficient in English, the technicalities of PRWORA may be incomprehensible. However,
they are aware of the “bottom line”, i.e. they will lose their benefits because they are immigrants.
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Effects on the socio-economic status of immigrants
By limiting eligibility to various public assistance programs, the Welfare Act will significantly
reduce the income of those immigrant families who are currently receiving benefits. The SSI cuts
will affect elderly and disabled legal immigrants, while the food stamp cuts will affect young
adults and children. As discussed earlier, among legal immigrants, a substantial fraction of current
food stamp recipients are children--e.g. in California roughly one-third of immigrants on the food
stamp program are children. Furthermore, the Act will make new legal immigrants ineligible for
TANF for five years after they enter the country.
PRWORA will not only have a negative effect on non-citizens but it will increase income, housing
and food insecurity among U.S. citizens. In mixed households, i.e households composed of both
non-citizens and citizens, a reduction in household income due to the immigrant-related
provisions of the Act will impact all the members of the household not only the non-citizen ones.
Effects on the Health Status of Immigrants
By reducing the income of immigrant families by limiting SSI, food stamp and TANF eligibility,
PWRORA will put immigrants at risk of malnutrition and inferior housing conditions including
overcrowding. In turn, these risk factors will increase the likelihood of health problems among
immigrants.
The Welfare Act has also reduced immigrants’ access to social and health services. First,
according to the Act, non-qualified, new qualified and undocumented immigrants will only be
eligible for a narrow range of health services. Furthermore, the difficulty in understanding the
scope of PRWORA may result in reduced access to services for which immigrants are still
eligible. For instance, in several states nursing homes are already turning away immigrants. Illinois
and New York have issued clarification letters to long-term care providers to prevent them from
denying admission to immigrants. Additionally, the overlap between the Welfare Act and the
Immigration Act has the potential of creating disincentives to access health care and other
services. For example, service providers reported that immigrants fear that by using health
services they may be at risk of deportation and/or jeopardizing their chances of becoming U.S.
citizens.
For illegal aliens, one of the main impacts of  PRWORA may be the lack of access to prenatal
care. Several interviewees noted that the lack of prenatal care will result in higher health care
costs, since high-risk pregnancies among undocumented women will go undetected until the
women present themselves at emergency rooms to deliver their babies--according to PRWORA,
all types of immigrants are still eligible for emergency health care. Furthermore, children born to
these women are U.S. citizens and are eligible for Medicaid. The medical costs incurred in serving
children whose mothers did not receive prenatal care have been shown to be higher than for those
children whose mothers did receive care. Advocates and public health officials in the five states
covered in this report noted that national data have demonstrated that for every dollar spent on
prenatal care, three dollars are saved in future health care costs.
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Despite overwhelming evidence that both from a public health and a financial perspective, prenatal
care is highly effective, California and New York plan to discontinue these services for
undocumented immigrants. Although the measure has not been implemented yet, providers
already report a decline in prenatal care utilization by illegal immigrants.  In California, a legal suit
against the state government has delayed the implementation of this measure --originally
scheduled for July 1st 1997-- at least until September 1st, 1997. In contrast to California and New
York, Illinois has decided to preserve prenatal care for illegal immigrants.
Furthermore, PRWORA may give rise to serious public health problems. For instance, according
to the Act, both legal and illegal immigrants can receive treatment if they have symptoms of a
contagious disease. However, immigrants, especially illegal ones, are afraid of seeking health care.
In Texas, some providers noted that language of PRWORA has the potential of increasing the
spread of infectious diseases. For instance, individuals with active tuberculosis whose symptoms
are mild may be denied treatment. This is a major concern along the Mexico-Texas border where
TB prevalence is very high.
Finally, the Welfare Act is already having a severe negative impact on the mental health status of
immigrants. Among individuals receiving SSI, the threat of being left without any means to
support themselves has resulted in an increased incidence of mental health problems and suicides.
Individuals interviewed for this report cited suicide cases as a dramatic illustration of the
“unfairness” of the Welfare Act.
Effects on naturalization and assimilation
As explained in the introduction, there is an intersection between PRWORA and the Immigration
Act. Immigrants are responding to both pieces of legislation and may find it hard to distinguish
between the welfare and the immigration provisions. Both the threat of not being able to access
public benefits and the threat of being deported are inducing a large number of immigrants to
apply for citizenship. States, counties and community-based organizations are providing assistance
to immigrants who want to seek naturalization. The Welfare Act has changed the incentives to
become U.S. citizens facing immigrants.  It remains to be seen whether these new incentives and
the corresponding expected increase in naturalization rates will result in a faster assimilation
process.
Furthermore, the deeming provisions of the Welfare Act--including the enforcement of affidavits
of support--may change family reunification strategies among immigrants, e.g. by discouraging
bringing into the United States elderly family members and/or small children who are more likely
to need economic support.
Increased awareness about and mobilization around immigrant issues
Finally, despite all its negative impacts on immigrants, PRWORA may have at least one
unintended positive outcome, that pro-immigrant service providers, community-based
organizations and advocacy groups are becoming increasingly organized. For example, in
California a bipartisan Committee in the legislature charged with summarizing the state options to
respond to PRWORA has incorporated in its report the key initiatives of pro-immigrant groups
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and legislators. In Illinois, advocacy groups have defined the terms of the debate. In Texas
community-based organizations have been instrumental in explaining the implications of the
Welfare Act to the state administration and legislature. Given that states are likely to become
increasingly responsible for providing benefits and services to immigrants, pro-immigrant groups
will have to strengthen their ability to shape the state political and policy responses towards
immigrants.
VII.STATE EFFORTS T O MONITOR IMPACTS
At the present time, none of the states interviewed has an official, comprehensive plan to monitor
the impacts of welfare reform change on immigrants.  In fact, no state has a comprehensive plan
to monitor the effects of welfare reform on other segments of the populations affected by this
monumental legislation.  The few monitoring studies that do exist focusing on the effects of
welfare reform are being conducted by private research institutes funded by private philanthropies.
Private organizations in New York and Texas have funded a monitoring project with particular
focus on the disabled populations. Two states, New York and Florida, are planning to fund
monitoring activities, but neither state has had the staff or other resources at their disposal to
develop a monitoring approach.
Florida has a number of locally funded efforts to educate immigrant communities about changes in
welfare programs.  However, these programs do not link to any state efforts to monitor changes
in program management or benefit use.  In Texas, a number of charities and local governments are
tracking changes in food sales as proxy measure of changes in food stamp circulation.  There is no
state-initiated effort to study the impact of changes in the food stamp program on the local
economy or the nutritional status of populations at-risk.
The most immediate, albeit crude, tool available in each state to monitor changes in welfare
programs is the monthly or quarterly caseload.  These caseload figures are collected by each of
the programs.  In California and Texas, information on joint state/county-funded and county-only-
funded welfare programs have been maintained primarily at the county level.  In New York, the
responsibility for maintaining information systems for welfare administration is devolving to the
counties.  Florida and Illinois have maintained centralized information systems for the state-
funded welfare programs.  However, in Florida county-only welfare programs are maintained by
the counties and municipalities.
Clearly, states and counties are faced with several decisions regarding developing the capacity to
track welfare program beneficiaries and resource use across localities.  With changes in the
lifetime limits imposed by the federal legislation and changes in eligibility requirements for
immigrants, even the limited information systems currently maintained by states and counties will
be inadequate to assure compliance with federal law.  At present, of the states included in this
study, none has indicated a current effort to integrate county and state information systems to
track welfare caseload and benefit use across welfare programs and for specific classes of
recipients, including immigrants.
States will have to rely increasingly on systems that track information on immigrants.  The single
federally-developed information system currently available to states that can provide information
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on immigrant status is known as the Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements (SAVE)
Program.  This is an intergovernmental information-sharing service for agencies and institutions
that was developed pursuant to Section 121 of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986
(IRCA).
Program components include a database of selected immigration status information on
approximately 50 million individual non-citizens.  The database is updated daily by the INS.
States are using this information system to determine primary immigration status.  However,
states must still develop information systems that track immigrant categories and exemption
criteria as defined in the Welfare Act. States are currently waiting for the U.S. Attorney General
to develop verification criteria and procedures, and then they will have a year to make their
systems conform to the new guidelines.
California, New York, Florida, and Texas are not developing centralized administrative
information systems that link immigrants receiving state or local welfare benefits to immigration
verification systems.  Each county and municipality will be responsible for developing that
capability.  None of these states has plans to develop the capacity to electronically summarize the
information linking immigrants to welfare programs or other tracking systems.  Illinois has a
centralized system, but immigrant categories are not uniform across programs. The prospects for
developing centralized capabilities to monitor changes of welfare reform on immigrants are not
bright.  State and local resource constraints, competing demands for investments in information
systems, and continuing devolution of responsibilities for program administration and financing to
local government work against the likelihood that states will put a high priority on building a
centralized capability to track the impact of welfare reform for immigrants and other populations
affected by this historic change in welfare programs in the United States.
There remain public health interests in monitoring the impact of welfare reform at the state and
local levels despite the apparent disinterest or disinclination of governments to fund these
activities.  The need to track communicable disease and contacts of individuals with
communicable disease transcends local and state boundaries.  Public health officials and providers
may lose the ability to effectively intervene in the management of infectious diseases, many of
which show a higher incidence among the poor and among immigrants from selected countries.
Despite the limitations of current state and local tracking systems, it is possible to develop
simulation techniques to estimate the incidence of disease and the patterns of infection for small
areas and large regions to assist in the control of communicable disease among the population at-
large.  There is an immediate national interest in mitigating the worst effects that restrictions on
access to public benefits and medical care may have on at-risk populations among immigrants.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS   
The five states in this study are only starting to respond to the immigrant provisions of the
Welfare Act. However, the current status of decisionmaking should not be viewed as inaction by
the states. With the exception of Texas, all states are assessing various policy options ranging
from covering all immigrants to minimizing state responsibility in this area. States are faced with
both a significant cost shift from the federal government and the need to make complex decisions
about immigrant eligibility. This transfer of immigrant-related costs and policy decisions is
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unprecedented and states are challenging the constitutionality of many of the provisions in the
Welfare Act, if not the Act in its entirety. Additionally, since states are unlikely to have the ability
to completely replace federal benefits, immigrants will have access to lower levels of assistance.
In addition to the transfer of “immigrant policy” to the states, PRWORA raises another important
question, i.e. whether it is legitimate to use welfare benefits as an immigration policy tool. First,
the Welfare Act assumes that the availability of public benefits constitutes an incentive for
immigration to the United States6. However, it is questionable whether immigrants factor public
benefits into their decision to migrate7. Second, PRWORA seeks to reduce public assistance in
order to generate incentives for individuals to work. However, for immigrants PRWORA also
creates an incentive to naturalize in order to remain eligible for benefits.
Furthermore, a recent report by the National Academy of Sciences has shown that, overall,
immigrants make a positive contribution to the U.S. economy. Furthermore, although at the state
and local level immigrants have a negative fiscal impact, at the federal level they have a larger
positive impact, resulting in an overall positive impact. Therefore, from a fiscal standpoint it
should be questioned whether it is acceptable to use immigration status as an eligibility criteria for
public benefits.
The effects of the immigrant related provisions of the Welfare Act will be far reaching. State and
local governments will face new responsibilities, increased fiscal pressures and complicated
administrative decisions. Local economies will be seriously affected by the direct loss of benefits
as well as the indirect economic impact associated with diminished household incomes, purchasing
power and workforce productivity. Community-based social service and health care providers are
likely to face an increased demand for their services as immigrants are denied public benefits.
Whether the financial and structural capacity of these providers will be sufficient to offer a safety
net to immigrants remains to be seen8. Immigrant families will be the most negatively impacted by
PWRORA. The effects on immigrants include fear and confusion, diminished household incomes,
increased food and housing insecurity, reduced access to health care and other social services, and
changing incentives regarding naturalization, assimilation and family reunification strategies. The
weakening of immigrants’ socio-economic status and well-being will have a detrimental effect not
only on immigrants themselves but on those U.S. citizens who are members of immigrant families
and households as well as on communities where immigrants constitute a substantial fraction of
the population, work force and social fabric.
                                                 
6 See PRWORA, Section 400:  “Statements of National Policy Concerning Welfare and Immigration”.
7 In the literature, migration flows have been explained as a function of wage and unemployment rate differentials
between the origin and the destination country, and as a function of immigrant networks. See Madeline Zavoday.
“Welfare and the Locational Choices of Immigrants,” Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas Economic Review.. S cond
Quarter, 1997.
8 A recent study of the impact of welfare reform in Los Angeles has shown that the capacity of the non-profit sector
will be insufficient to fill the subsistence and human service gaps created by welfare reform  (Wolch and Sommer,
1997,  Los Angeles in an Era of Welfare Reform).
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Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act  (PRWORA) of 1996
Limitations on immigrants’ eligibility for federal, state and local public benefit programs
Federal programs Current immigrants (i.e. aliens entering the country
before the enactment of the Act)
New immigrants (i.e. aliens entering the country after the
enactment of the Act)
“Specified Federal
programs”-  SSI
Legal-qualified: Not eligible
Exceptions: refugees; asylees; aliens whose deportation
has been withheld; permanent residents (i.e.,. green card
holders) who have  worked for 40 qualifying quarters
and did not receive any means-tested federal public
benefits; veterans; aliens on active duty
Legal-non qualified: (Not Eligible)
Illegal: (Not Eligible)
Legal-qualified: (Not Eligible)
Legal-non qualified: (Not Eligible)
Illegal: (Not Eligible)
“Specified Federal
programs” - Food stamps
Legal-qualified (i.e. permanent residents, asylees,
refugees, aliens paroled into the U.S. for at least one
year, aliens whose deportation is being withheld):
Not Eligible
Exceptions: refugees; asylees; aliens whose deportation
has been withheld; permanent residents (i.e., green card
holders) who have  worked for 40 qualifying quarters
and did not receive any means-tested federal public
benefits; veterans; aliens on active duty
Legal-non qualified: (Not Eligible)
Illegal: (Not Eligible)
Legal-qualified: (Not Eligible)
Legal-non qualified: (Not Eligible)
Illegal: (Not Eligible)
“Designated federal
programs” –
Legal-qualified: State is authorized to determine the
eligibility of qualified aliens
Legal-qualified: Not Eligible for 5 years beginning on the
date of entry into the U.S.
TANF(formerly AFDC),
Part A of Title IV of the
Social Security Act
Exceptions: Until five years after date of entry/grant of
asylum/withholding for refugees, asylees and aliens
whose deportation has been withheld, permanent
residents who have worked 40 qualifying quarters,
veterans, aliens on active duty (i.e. the eligibility of
these aliens is not at the state’s discretion)
Legal-non qualified: Not Eligible
Illegal: Not Eligible
After 5-year ban, in determining eligibility states must deem
the income and resources of the alien’s sponsor
Exceptions: refugees; asylees; aliens whose deportation has
been withheld; veterans; aliens on active duty; Cuban and
Haitian refugees
Legal-non qualified: Not Eligible
Illegal: Not Eligible
“Designated federal
programs” - Medicaid, a
state plan under Title XIX
of the Social Security Act
Legal-qualified: State is authorized to determine the
eligibility of qualified aliens
Exceptions: Until five years after date of entry/grant of
asylum/withholding for refugees, asylees and aliens
whose deportation has been withheld, permanent
residents who have worked 40 qualifying quarters,
veterans, aliens on active duty (i.e. the eligibility of
these aliens is not at state’s discretion)
Legal-non qualified: Not Eligible
Illegal: Not Eligible
Legal-qualified: Not Eligible for 5 years beginning on the
date of entry into the U.S.
After 5-year ban, in determining eligibility states must deem
the income and resources of the alien’s sponsor
Exceptions: refugees; asylees; aliens whose deportation has
been withheld; veterans; aliens on active duty; Cuban and
Haitian refugees
Legal-non qualified: Not Eligible
Illegal: Not Eligible
“Designated federal
programs” - Social services
block grant, Title XX of
the Social Security Act
Legal-non qualified: State is authorized to determine
the eligibility of qualified aliens
Exceptions: Until five years after date of entry/grant of
asylum/withholding for refugees, asylees and aliens
whose deportation has been withheld, permanent
residents who have worked 40 qualifying quarters,
veterans, aliens on active duty (i.e. the eligibility of
these aliens is not at state’s discretion)
Legal-non qualified: Not Eligible
Illegal: Not Eligible
Legal-qualified: Not Eligible for 5 years beginning on the
date of entry into the U.S.
After 5-year ban, in determining eligibility states must deem
the income and resources of the alien’s sponsor
Exceptions: refugees; asylees; aliens whose deportation has
been withheld; veterans; aliens on active duty; Cuban and
Haitian refugees
Legal-non qualified: Not Eligible
Illegal: Not Eligible
“Federal public benefits”Legal-qualified: eligible
Legal-non qualified: Not Eligible
Exceptions:
1. Emergency medical care (Title XIX of the Social
Security Act)
2. Short-term, in-kind disaster-relief
3. Public health assistance (not including
Title XIX) for immunizations and treatment of
symptoms of communicable diseases
4. Programs specified by the Attorney General that
provide in-kind assistance at the community level; do
not condition the provision of assistance on the
recipient’s income; are necessary for the protection of
life and safety
5. Housing assistance  to the extent that the alien was
receiving assistance when the Act was enacted
Illegal: Not Eligible
Exceptions: same as above
Legal-qualified: Not Eligible for any federal means-tested
public benefit or 5 years beginning on the date of entry into
the U.S.
After 5-year ban, in determining eligibility states must deem
the income and resources of the alien’s sponsor
Exceptions: refugees; asylees; aliens whose deportation has
been withheld; veterans; aliens on active duty; Cuban and
Haitian refugees
Exceptions:
1. Emergency medical care (Title XIX, Social Security Act)
2. Short-term, in-kind disaster-relief
3. Assistance under the National School Lunch act
4. Assistance under the Child Nutrition Act of 1966
5. Public health assistance (not including
Title XIX) for immunizations and treatment of symptoms of
communicable diseases
6. Payments for foster care or adoption assistance (several
conditions apply)
“Federal Public Benefits”
7. Programs specified by the Attorney General that provide
in-kind assistance at the community level; do not condition
the provision of assistance on the recipient’s income; are
necessary for the protection of life and safety
8. Several programs of student assistance under the Higher
Education Act of 1965
9. Means-tested programs under the Elementary and
Secondary Education Act of 1965
10. Benefits under the Head Start Act
11. Benefits under the Job Training Partnership Act
Legal-non qualified: (Not Eligible)
Exceptions: Same as above
Illegal: (Not Eligible)
Exceptions: None
State public benefit
programs
Legal-qualified, aliens who are not non-immigrants
under the Immigration and Nationality Act, aliens
paroled into the U.S. for less than one year: State
authorized to determine eligibility
Exceptions: Until five years after date of entry/grant of
asylum/withholding for refugees, asylees and aliens
whose deportation has been withheld, permanent
residents who have worked 40 qualifying quarters and
did not receive any federal means-tested public benefit,
veterans, aliens on active duty (i.e. the eligibility of
these aliens is not at state’s discretion)
State has the authority to provide for attribution of
sponsors income and resources to the alien with respect
to state programs (“deeming”)
Legal-qualified: State authorized to determine eligibility
Exceptions: Same as for current qualified immigrants
Legal-non qualified: (Not Eligible)
Illegal: (Not Eligible)
State Public Benefit
Programs
Legal-non qualified, non-immigrants: [S ate may
determine that non-qualified aliens are eligible for state
and local public benefits only through the enactment of
a state law after the enactment of the Act that
affirmatively provides for such eligibility]
Exceptions:
1. Emergency medical care
2. Short-term, in-kind disaster-relief
3. Public health assistance (not including
Title XIX) for immunizations and treatment of
symptoms of communicable diseases
4. Programs specified by the Attorney General that
provide in-kind assistance at the community level; do
not condition the provision of assistance on the
recipient’s income; are necessary for the protection of
life and safety
Illegal: State may determine that illegal aliens are
eligible for state and local public benefits only through
the enactment of a state law after the enactment of the
Act that affirmatively provides for such eligibility
County programs Legal-qualified, aliens who are not non-immigrants
under the Immigration and Nationality Act, aliens
paroled into the U.S. for less than one year: State
authorized to determine eligibility
Exceptions: Until five years after date of entry/grant of
asylum/withholding for refugees, asylees and aliens
whose deportation has been withheld, permanent
residents who have worked 40 qualifying quarters and
did not receive any federal means-tested public benefit,
veterans, aliens on active duty (i.e. the eligibility of
these aliens is not at state’s discretion)
Legal-qualified: State and county authorized to determine
eligibility
Legal-non qualified: (Not Eligible)
Illegal:  (Not Eligible)
County Programs
Legal-non qualified, non-immigrants: [S ate may
determine that non-qualified aliens are eligible for state
and local public benefits only through the enactment of
a state law after the enactment of the Act that
affirmatively provides for such eligibility]
Exceptions:
1. Emergency medical care
2. Short-term, in-kind disaster-relief
3. Public health assistance (not including
Title XIX) for immunizations and treatment of
symptoms of communicable diseases
4. Programs specified by the Attorney General that
provide in-kind assistance at the community level; do
not condition the provision of assistance on the
recipient’s income; are necessary for the protection of
life and safety
Illegal: State may determine that illegal aliens are
eligible for state and local public benefits only through
the enactment of a state law after the enactment of the
Act that affirmatively provides for such eligibility
Notes: Information in parenthesis “( )” indicates that although the respective restriction/exemption is not explicitly stated in PRWORA, that appears
to be the implication of the Act.
Appendix III. List of Key Informants:  Sources and Interviewees
INTERVIEWEES
California
Lisa Kalustian
Deputy Press Secretary
Governor Wilson’s Office
Lynn Delap
California State Association of Counties
Becky Lavally
State Senate Office of Research
Phil Ansell
Welfare Reform Special Assistant
County of Los Angeles Department of
Public Social Services
Dan Rabovsky
Legislative Analysis Office
Susan Drake
National Immigration Law Center
Tonya Broder
National Immigration Law Center
Barbara Earley
Program Assistant
Human Services Agency
San Joaquin  County
Elena López-Eldridge
Mexican-American Legal Defense and
Education Fund
Joan Zinser
Deputy Director
Health and Human Services Agency
San Diego County
Bob Barton
Chief
Refugee Programs Bureau at the state
Lucy Quachanella
Western Center on Law & Poverty
Larisa Casillas
Interfaith Coalition for Immigrant Rights
(San Francisco)
Hellan Roth Dowden
Office of the Senate Majority Whip
Sacramento
Susan Alba
Commission for Humane Immigrant
Rights LA (CHIRLA)
Los Angeles
Florida
Gary Crawford
Refugee Program Administrator
State Department of Health Rehabilitative Services
State of Florida
Mark Schlakman, J.D.
Executive Office of the Governor
State of Florida
Patty Grogan
Executive Office of the Governor
Assistant to Special Counsel
State of Florida
Don Winstead
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2I. State’s (county’s) response to changes in federal, state and county
public benefits for immigrants
1. What changes are states planning in response to federal policy changes that
discontinue immigrants from specific federal programs and federal/state
programs?
Federal programs
Nutrition programs
How many immigrants will lose food stamps?
Does the state have plans to assist those immigrants who will lose food stamps? If yes, please
describe those plans.
What has been the state policy regarding recertification of immigrants to receive food stamps?
Will the state make other federal nutrition programs such as WIC available to non-qualified
immigrants?
 SSI
How many immigrants will lose SSI? What is the composition of these immigrants (elderly
versus disabled)?
Will SSI-linked programs for immigrants (e.g., personal care services) be preserved? How?
 TANF/AFDC
How many immigrants were receiving AFDC? What proportion of legal aliens who were
receiving AFDC are qualified aliens (as defined by the Act) and therefore may continue
receiving benefits? Does the state plan to allow qualified (eligible) immigrant families to
receive TANF? What types of qualified immigrants? How many immigrants will lose TANF
(AFDC)?
Please provide us with a copy of the TANF plan for the state or with the waiver if there is one
in place.
Will TANF be preserved for future legal-qualified immigrants after the 5-year ban?
What will the state do to cover non-qualified (non-eligible) immigrant families who were
previously covered under AFDC? Does the state plan to advocate with federal agencies that
this spending count toward the state “maintenance of effort” requirement?
3 Medicaid
How many immigrants were receiving Medicaid? What proportion of legal aliens who were
receiving Medicaid are qualified aliens (as defined by the Act) and therefore may continue
receiving benefits? Does the state plan to allow qualified immigrants to be eligible for
Medicaid? What types of qualified immigrants? How many immigrants will lose Medicaid?
Will Medicaid be preserved for future qualified immigrants after the 5-year ban?
Will the state try to preserve Medicaid eligibility for those immigrants who will lose
categorical eligibility (to Medicaid) because they will lose SSI?
Will the state try to preserve Medicaid eligibility for those immigrants who will lose
categorical eligibility (to Medicaid) because they will lose TANF?
 Title XX
How many immigrants were receiving social services under Title XX of the Social Security
Act? What proportion of legal aliens who were receiving Title XX services are qualified aliens
(as defined by the Act) and therefore may continue receiving benefits? Does the state plan to
allow qualified immigrants to be eligible for Title XX services? What types of qualified
immigrants? How many immigrants will lose Title XX services?
Will Title XX services be preserved for future qualified immigrants after the 5-year ban?
 Other
How is the state interpreting the provision that non-qualified and illegal immigrants do not
have the right to receive “federal public benefits”? How is the state applying the exceptions
specified in the Act (e.g., emergency medical care, immunizations, treatment of symptoms of
communicable diseases)?
How is the state interpreting the provision that future qualified immigrants cannot receive any
federal means-tested public benefits for five years beginning on the date of entry into the
United States? How is the state applying the exceptions specified in the Act (e.g., emergency
medical care, immunizations, treatment of symptoms of communicable diseases)?
 State programs
Will the state limit the eligibility of qualified aliens to state public benefits? What types of
qualified legal aliens? What benefits? Please provide a list of those state public benefit
programs that are (were) available to qualified immigrants and note those that will no longer
be available.
According to the Act, non-qualified aliens are not eligible to receive state public benefits. How
is the state interpreting this provision? Does the state plan to challenge it? What kind of state
public benefits were non-qualified immigrants receiving? What will happen to these benefits?
4Please provide a list of state public benefit programs that are (were) available to non-qualified
immigrants and note those that will no longer be available.
According to the Act, illegal aliens are not eligible to receive state public benefits unless a
state law is enacted after the enactment of the Act that affirmatively provides for such
eligibility. How is the state interpreting this provision? Does the state plan to challenge it?
Does state plan to enact a law to provide benefits to illegal immigrants? What kind of state
public benefits are (were) illegal aliens receiving? What will happen to these benefits? Please
provide a list of state public benefit programs that illegal immigrants are (were) receiving and
note those that will no longer be available.
 2. How are counties and service providers responding to federal and state
welfare reforms?
Will the state limit eligibility of qualified aliens to county public benefit programs? What types
of qualified legal aliens? What benefits? Please provide a list of those county public benefit
programs that are (were) available to qualified immigrants and note those that will no longer
be available.
According to the Act, non-qualified aliens are not eligible to receive local public benefits.
How is the state interpreting this provision? Are there counties challenging it? Please provide
a list of county public benefit programs that non-qualified immigrants are (were) receiving and
note those that will no longer be available.
According to the Act, illegal aliens are not eligible to receive local public benefits. How is the
state interpreting this provision? Are there counties challenging it? Please provide a list of
county public benefit programs that illegal immigrants are (were) receiving and note those that
will no longer be available.
 3. How will welfare reform affect the costs to states, counties and providers,
particularly with respect to substitution of funds for withdrawn federal
payments, and also with respect to other social (i.e. human) costs?
 Federal programs
 Nutrition programs
How much federal funding will the state lose in food stamps? Will the state / county substitute
for food stamps? To what extent? From what sources? At what cost to other programs? What
will be the costs for the local economy?
 SSI
How much federal funding will the state lose in SSI payments? Will state general assistance
payments be used to support immigrants who lose SSI? To what extent? What will be the
costs for the local economy?
5 TANF (AFDC)
Will state funds be used to provide TANF to future qualified immigrants? What funds? How
much will this cost?
 Medicaid
Will state funds be used to provide Medicaid to future qualified immigrants? What funds?
How much will this cost?
If the state plans to preserve Medicaid eligibility or use a state medically needy program for
those immigrants who will lose categorical eligibility because they will lose SSI or TANF,
what will the costs of these options be?
 State and county programs
If the state will be discontinuing state benefits for immigrants, how much will it save by doing
so? Will counties have to bear the cost of these discontinued state benefits? What will be the
social costs of denying these state benefits? Are there estimates?
If the state/county will be discontinuing county benefits for immigrants, how much will it save
by doing so? Who will bear the cost of these discontinued county benefits (e.g.,
municipalities)? What will be the social costs of denying these county benefits? Are there
estimates?
 4. What distinctions, if any, are states making to determine eligibility for
welfare programs under their reforms with regard to an individual’s
immigration status, age, disability level or employment status?
In those cases in which the state has the option of determining the eligibility of qualified
immigrants (e.g., TANF, Medicaid, state and county benefits), what criteria is the state using
to distinguish among different types of qualified aliens?
Prior to the enactment of the Act, did the state or counties distinguish between legal and
illegal immigrants? What kind of verification system was in place?
How far along is the state in developing verification rules (i.e., procedures for verifying that
an individual is a qualified alien) under the Act?
How is the state (county) training state (county) employees to determine eligibility based on
immigration status?
Please describe any problems facing the state/counties in the implementation of verification
rules. Have there been any legal challenges?
6 5. Are there state and local plans to monitor and assess the impact of policy
changes?
How does the state/county plan to monitor the effects of the Act? What kind of monitoring
activities are taking place for federal programs? For state programs? For county programs?
What kind of baseline information exists for federal, state and county programs?
What kind of information will the state/county collect for federal, state and county programs?
What agencies will be responsible for collecting data and tracking the effects of the law? How
will the information be used?
Are state/county MIS systems adequate for tracking the effects of the law?
 II. Impact of the welfare reform on immigrants, state and county
governments, and the community
 1. What are the direct effects of the policy changes, including health care
delivery (access to care, payment for care, cost of care, and quality of care) for
immigrants at the community level?
What state/county agencies have started to turn away immigrants?
What are immigrants doing to replace the benefits they have lost? Where are they turning to
(e.g., other governmental levels, non-profit agencies)?
Are there any observable effects of the welfare reform on immigrants, e.g., increased use of
emergency rooms, homeless shelters? Please give examples.
Are there groups of legal immigrants getting organized to protest against or legally challenge
the welfare Act? Please describe/give examples.
 2. What are the problems that states, counties and providers report they will
face in responding to welfare reform that were previously unforeseen by
federal government officials?
Is the cost of providing services to immigrants being transferred from state to county
governments? To other governments?
Is the cost of providing services to immigrants being transferred from state and county
governments to the community, e.g., to charity organizations?
Are there any estimates of the “hidden costs” of denying services to immigrants, e.g., babies
being born to immigrant mothers who do not have access to prenatal care will represent
higher health care costs?
7Are there any organizations/groups that have legally challenged the constitutionality of the
welfare reform? Please explain.
 3. Is the state providing assistance to immigrants to become naturalized or
prove qualified status?
Is state/county/other groups providing advice/assistance to immigrants who wish to
naturalize?
Is state/county/other groups providing advice/assistance to immigrants who need to prove
qualifying quarters?
Are there already state/county agencies exchanging information with the INS on the status of
aliens?
Appendix V. Outline for State Reports
IMPACT OF THE FEDERAL WELFARE POLICY REFORM
ON IMMIGRANTS IN THE UNITED STATES
STATE REPORT OUTLINE
DRAFT
2I. BACKGROUND
1. Size of state foreign born population (both in absolute numbers and with respect to. total state
population) (If possible, break down foreign born by citizen vs. non-citizen, and legal vs.
illegal)
2. Characteristics of state foreign born population, e.g. countries of origin, date of entry,  income,
educational level, occupation (If possible, break down foreign born by citizen vs. non-citizen,
and legal  vs. illegal)
3. Geographic distribution of state foreign born population, i.e. cities/counties with highest
immigrant concentrations, both in absolute numbers and percentages (If possible, break down
foreign born by citizen vs. non-citizen, and legal  vs. illegal)
II. POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT AROUND WELFARE REFORM AND
IMMIGRATION
1. Welfare reform and immigration issues that have already been resolved (e.g. preserve TANF
for qualified immigrants)
2. Welfare reform and immigration issues that have not been resolved (e.g. benefits for new
immigrants and illegal immigrants)
3. The governor’s position
4. The federal senators and representatives’ position
5. The state legislature’s position
6. Budget proposals, bill proposals and other initiatives that address welfare reform and
immigration issues
a. Groups sponsoring these proposals
b. Issues addressed by these proposals
c. Issues not addressed by these proposals
7. Tensions between state and counties.
8. Legal challenges
9.  Likely outcome of the political process (i.e. most likely decisions regarding issues that have
not been resolved)
3III. DISCONTINUATION OF FEDERAL PROGRAMS FOR IMMIGRANTS
1. Estimates of the number of legal immigrants losing food stamps, SSI, TANF, Medicaid (discuss
differences between different sets of estimates)
2. Cost to the state
a. Estimates of the cost to the state of replacing federal benefits  (discuss
         differences between different sets of estimates)
b. Proposals to lessen cost-shifting to state
3. Cost to the counties
a. Discuss which counties are the most impacted
b. Estimates of the cost to the counties of replacing federal benefits (focus
         on most affected counties; be specific, i.e. distinguish between various
   federal programs: Food stamps, SSI, TANF, Medicaid, other)
c. Proposals to lessen cost-shifting to counties
4. State’s position regarding new immigrants and deeming
IV. DISCONTINUATION OF STATE AND COUNTY PROGRAMS FOR
IMMIGRANTS
1.  Plans to discontinue state and county benefits for qualified, non-qualified and illegal
immigrants (be specific, i.e. provide a list of state and county programs that may be
discontinued)
2. Plans to restructure state and county benefits as a result of the welfare reform
V. STATE AND COUNTY SYSTEMS FOR IMPLEMENTING IMMIGRANT
PROVISIONS OF WELFARE REFORM
1. State and county immigrant status verification systems
a. Current systems (e.g. verification concentrated at one state agency, verification done by
counties; differences in coding across various programs and agencies)
b.  Limitations of these systems for implementing welfare reform
c. Plans to change current systems (discuss financing)
42.  State and county naturalization assistance
a. State outreach efforts (target population, types of outreach, response from immigrants,
expected outcomes, INS backlog)
b. County outreach efforts (target population, types of outreach, response from immigrants,
expected outcomes, INS backlog)
c. Advocacy groups and community-based organizations’ outreach efforts (target population,
types of outreach, response from immigrants, expected outcomes, INS backlog)
d. Plans to “institutionalize” and increase funding for naturalization assistance
3.  Data to monitor the impact of the welfare act on immigrants
VI. IMPACT OF THE WELFARE REFORM ON IMMIGRANTS
1. State and local government’s perspectives and estimates
2. Advocacy groups’ perspectives and estimates
3. Service providers’ perspectives and estimates
VII. CONCLUSIONS
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EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
A particular consideration of the Commis-
sion for Immigration Reform is the de-
mand to immigrate to the United States
by immediate relatives of aliens lawfully
admitted for permanent residence and citi-
zens of the United States.  In devising the
Immigration Act of 1990, policymakers
considered current queues for relative
categories and sought a balance among
high demand, maintaining the family re-
unification principle, and establishment of
a national level or “cap” on immigration.
Given that the large backlogs of the 1980s
and 1990s had not been anticipated be-
fore the 1965 Amendments to the Immi-
gration and Nationality Act, an ongoing
review of legally resident immigrants’
requirements for family reunification is
worthwhile.  This review is timely because
recent legislative reforms created sizable
new immigrant subgroups (formerly un-
documented residents who have been here
for more than a decade, formerly undocu-
mented workers in seasonal agricultural
services, and diversity immigrants from
countries adversely affected by the 1965
Amendments) and expanded admissions
under employment-based preference cat-
egories.
This research focuses on demand to im-
migrate legally by relatives of those aliens
who, having resided in an unlawful sta-
tus since before 1982, legalized under the
Immigration Reform and Control Act of
1986 [IRCA].  A special survey of these
legalized immigrants affords analysis of
household composition (including mem-
bers’ legal residence status and relation-
ship to the IRCA-legalized immigrant),
distribution of nonresident relatives in-
tending to immigrate to the United States,
and intentions to naturalize among IRCA-
legalized immigrants.  The questions ad-
dressed are:  What will be the probable
numbers and timing of visa petitions
under second preference?1  Assuming that
immigrants intending to naturalize do so,
what will be the probable numbers and
timing of visa petitions under first, third,
and fourth preferences, and under exempt
immediate relatives categories?  Unfortu-
nately, the survey did not include aliens
legalized under Special Agricultural
Worker [SAW] provisions and the magni-
1 Family preference categories under the Immigration Act of 1990 are:
1st: Unmarried sons and daughters of U.S. citizens and their children;
2nd: Spouses, children, and unmarried sons and daughters of permanent resident aliens;
3rd: Married sons and daughters of U.S. citizens and their spouses and children;
4th: Siblings of U.S. citizens (at least twenty-one years of age) and their spouses and children.
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tude of requirements to be joined by their
immediate family members cannot be ad-
dressed.  IRCA-legalized aliens, both from
general and agricultural provisions, are
already accountable for substantial num-
bers of visa petitions for spouses and
children and, as shown here, these cohorts
could eventually sponsor considerable im-
migration of their immediate relatives.
This work contributes insights to the
broader question of family reunification
requirements for immigrant cohorts un-
der the Immigration Act of 1990.  Several
recommendations are included for im-
proving social science and policy analy-
ses of progression to naturalization,
impacts for legal immigration of family
migration, and possible interconnections
of family migration with undocumented
immigration to the United States.
INTRODUCTION
For a long time, combined immigration
under family preference categories and
immigration of immediate relatives of U.S.
citizens without numerical limitation has
exceeded immigration under occupational
preference and other categories.  In devis-
ing the Immigration Act of 1990,
policymakers considered the opinions of
immigration experts (U.S. General Ac-
counting Office 1989) that setting an ab-
solute limit on family-based immigration
was not feasible.  If such a limit had been
imposed, the trend of increasing numbers
of immediate relative immigration, only
partly resulting from the amnesty pro-
grams, would have reduced the numbers
of family preference visas.
Therefore, the current three-track
immigration system has a “piercable cap,”
a limit of 675,000 that theoretically con-
sists of 480,000 family-sponsored immigrant
visas, 140,000 employment-based visas, and
55,000 diversity visas.  Refugees and cer-
tain other aliens are outside this cap.  The
“piercability” stems from the artificiality
of the 480,000 limit on family immigra-
tion.  Immigration of immediate relatives,
including spouses of citizens, children
(under twenty-one years of age) of citi-
zens, parents of citizens twenty-one years
of age or older, and orphans adopted by
citizens who are at least twenty-one years
of age, continues to be exempt from nu-
merical limitation.  With a set minimum
of 226,000 for family preference visas, the
combination of immediate relatives and
family preference immigration could ex-
ceed the so-called cap.  Although the ini-
tial piercing had been expected for fiscal
1993 (Interpreter Releases 1990), fiscal 1994
marked the initial application of the mini-
mum for family preference visas (U.S.
Department of State 1993b).
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An important task for the Commission on
Immigration Reform is consideration of
“the requirements of citizens of the United
States and of aliens lawfully admitted for
permanent residence to be joined in the
United States by immediate family mem-
bers and the impact which the establish-
ment of a national level of immigration
has upon the availability and priority of
family preference visas” (Immigration Act
of 1990 Section 141, (c), (1), (A)).
In devising the Immigration Act of 1990,
policymakers considered current queues
for relative categories and sought a bal-
ance among: high demand for visas for
family members of citizens and aliens;
maintaining the family reunification prin-
ciple; and establishment of a national level
or “cap” on immigration.  Given that the
large backlogs of those waiting for visas
in the 1980s and 1990s had not been an-
ticipated before the 1965 Amendments to
the Immigration and Nationality Act, an
ongoing review of the needs for family
reunification is worthwhile.  Recent legis-
lative reforms created special needs for
this assessment by creating sizable new
immigrant subgroups (formerly undocu-
mented residents who have been here for
more than a decade, formerly undocu-
mented workers in seasonal agricultural
services, and diversity immigrants from
countries adversely affected by the 1965
Amendments) and expanding admissions
under employment-based preference cat-
egories.
Significant contributions to the issue of
chain migration have drawn broadly from
census data sources in ex post facto fash-
ion, but relied on naturalization for a
single immigrant entry cohort (Jasso &
Rosenzweig 1986, 1989, 1990), focused on
naturalization and sponsorship for a small
sample with linked records (U.S. General
Accounting Office 1988; Heinberg, Harris
& York 1989), or studied selected origin
groups longitudinally subsequent to im-
migration  (Arnold, et al. 1989).  (Also see
Goering 1989; Arnold 1989; Teitelbaum
1989; and Passel & Woodrow 1987.)
Immigrants to the United States are a
highly heterogeneous group by demo-
graphic characteristics, origin country,
immigration circumstances, and reasons
for emigration, so that large-scale data are
really needed to capture this heterogene-
ity.  Immigrant statistics and censuses and
surveys have cross-sectional analytic value
for delineating events and foreign-born
populations (Woodrow 1992), but these
sources are inadequate for causal or de-
scriptive multistate modelling of initial mi-
gration, duration of residence,
naturalization, and sponsorship of imme-
diate relatives over time.  Change in the
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composition of the kinship network by
residence may occur at each stage, and
demographic factors of marriage, fertility,
and mortality continue to operate.  In
general, analytic development of models
of household and kinship organization is
incomplete as there is a complex mosaic
of constraints (De Vos & Palloni 1989).
Compounding family network change is
the additional constraint of legality of im-
migration to the United States to join the
household or kinship organization.  Inter-
national migration dynamics are most ap-
propriately studied with attention to the
“families, households, or other culturally
defined units of production and consump-
tion” in the new economics of migration
(Massey, et al. 1993).
The foreign-born population in the United
States was estimated to have at least 17
million parents, children, and siblings liv-
ing abroad in 1989, with siblings as the
most prevalent type (Woodrow-Lafield
1994a; Woodrow & Peregoy 1991).  Al-
though this estimate could understate the
true number, it is also an overstatement
of the potential level of future immigra-
tion of immediate family members.  First,
as the foreign-born universe included at
least two million undocumented residents,
some of these residents would be ineli-
gible to sponsor any immediate relatives
(Woodrow 1992).  Second, the actual num-
ber of family members seeking to immi-
grate to the United States is unknown.
Third, some foreign-born persons resid-
ing here in 1989 would eventually emi-
grate, making immigration of their family
members less likely or possible.
The demand of immediate family mem-
bers to immigrate legally to the United
States is partially reflected in petitioner
backlogs for immigrant visas.  These
counts are available only on an annual
basis rather than more frequently as might
be possible if petitions were maintained
on automated systems.  By this indicator,
demand increased markedly between
January 1, 1990 and January 1, 1994, from
2.5 million to 3.6 million (40 percent) (U.S.
Department of State 1994).2  Actual de-
mand could be higher as not all persons
wishing to come to the United States
would have filed petitions, given the
waiting time and concern that a nonim-
migrant visa might be denied if intention
to overstay and reside in the United States
were suspected.  Most of the increase in
the backlog is located in the second pref-
erence category.
2 Petitions are removed from consular listings on receipt of immigrant visa or on failure to
respond to visa notification within one year.
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The 1990 Act has significantly
added to the number of visas for
the 2A class (issuances during FY
1994 will be close to 50% more
than would have been possible
under the former provisions of
law), and has now virtually equal-
ized the visa waiting period for
applicants from all countries.
(Previously, there had been sub-
stantially earlier cut-off dates for
Mexico, Philippines and Domini-
can Republic applicants.)  It is
apparent, however, that even with
the greater visa availability, the
large and rapidly growing wait-
ing list assures continued oversub-
scription in the foreseeable future,
and the prospect of a lengthening
delay between the filing of a pe-
tition and the applicant’s turn for
visa issuance being reached. . . .
As is clear from the section be-
low, the major factor contributing
to the greatly increased Family 2A
visa demand is the filing of peti-
tions for immediate family mem-
bers by persons legalized under
the terms of the Immigration Re-
form and Control Act of 1986,
who began to be admitted to per-
manent residence in large num-
bers during 1989. . . .
Over the next few years, as the
petitioners in 2A cases become
eligible to apply for naturalization,
some may become citizens and
thus pending 2A petitions for their
spouses and children would be
converted automatically into the
immediate relative visa category,
which is not subject to numerical
limit and for which, therefore,
there is no waiting period.  There
is potential for a possible, indeed
probable, major increase in imme-
diate relative visas in coming
years, therefore, with a corre-
sponding drop in the Family 2A
waiting list.  It is not possible at
present to quantify this prospect,
however.  (U.S. Department of
State 1994:A6)
For general and SAW-legalized immi-
grants under the Immigration Reform and
Control Act of 1986 [IRCA], there were
853,382 petitions as of January 1994 for
admission of spouses and children under
second preference, of whom 675,626 were
Mexico-born petitioners.  Other countries
with significant numbers were El Salva-
dor (34,293), Haiti (26,277), Guatemala
(15,689), India (13,052), and the Domini-
can Republic (10,645).  Mexico, El Salva-
dor, Guatemala, and the Dominican
Republic were important source countries
R E S E A R C H
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Table 1.
VISA PETITIONS FILED WITH THE U.S.  DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BY PREFERENCE CATEGORY:
JANUARY 1992, 1993, AND 1994
January 1992  January 1993 January 1994
Total Of Legalization Total Of Legalization Total Of Legalization
Category Beneficiaries Beneficiaries Beneficiaries
Total 2,923,765 268,818                      3,393,193 739,774 3,612,121 853,382
Family
Preferences 2,751,152 268,818 3,235,270 739,774 3,462,147  853,382
First      42,646   NE      54,779   NE      63,499   NE
Second    894,620 268,818 1,350,655 739,774 1,498,075 853,382
      Spouses &
      children    589,997 268,818    958,839 739,774 1,047,496 853,382
      Adult sons &
      daughters    304,623   NE    391,816   NE    450,579   NE
Third    199,460   NE    218,121   NE    257,110   NE
Fourth 1,614,426   NE 1,611,715   NE 1,643,463   NE
Employment
Preferences    172,613    157,923    149,974
First           535   NE        6,882   NE        8,315   NE
Second      32,452   NE      18,682   NE      11,159   NE
Third    137,809   NE    128,175   NE    125,083   NE
Skilled      50,003   NE      32,813   NE      30,735   NE
Other      87,806   NE      95,362   NE      94,348   NE
Fourth        1,817   NE        4,045   NE        5,241   NE
Fifth              0   NE           139   NE            176        NE
Note: ‘NE’ designates ineligibility
Sources: U.S. Department of State (1993a, 1993b, 1994)
U.S.  C O M M I S S I O N  O N  I M M I G R A T I O N  R E F O R M
R E S E A R C H
P A P E R
- 7 -
for generally legalized immigrants.
Mexico, Haiti, and India were important
source countries for SAW applicants.
During 1992 and 1993, visas were granted
respectively to 52,272 and 55,344 depen-
dents of legalization.  In 1994, as only
32,776 visas were anticipated for such
dependents, only about 140,000 spouses
and children of legalized individuals
would have been admitted under this
special allocation, despite demand by
nearly one million spouses and children.
This research focuses on demand to im-
migrate legally by immediate family mem-
bers of those who, having resided in an
unlawful status since before January 1,
1982, legalized under IRCA.  The research
questions addressed are:  What will be
the probable numbers and timing of visa
petitions under second preference and,
subsequent to naturalization, under first,
third, and fourth preferences, and of im-
migrants under exempt immediate rela-
tives categories?
This research begins to address the issue
of future family immigration empirically
with special survey data, for a specific
cohort, for immediate relatives residing
abroad, intending to come to the United
States, and already living in the United
States, whether lawfully resident or in
undocumented status.
Ideally, the composition of immediate fam-
ily networks would be studied with data
compiled from individuals’ applications
for lawful permanent residence, but these
items are not transferred for data files.  In
lieu of such a resource and given the short-
comings of visa petitions data, special
surveys alone can yield answers.
DATA AND
METHODS
Pursuant to legislative requirements to
study the characteristics of aliens legal-
ized after long-term undocumented resi-
dence, the Legalized Population Survey
[LPS1], under primary sponsorship of the
INS, surveyed about 6,000 respondents in
1988 on their background and socioeco-
nomic characteristics (U.S. Immigration
and Naturalization Service 1992; Borjas &
Tienda 1993).3  The Legalized Population
Follow-up Survey [LPS2], primarily spon-
sored by the U.S. Department of Labor,
recontacted about 4,000 respondents and
3 The sampling frame did not include all applicants for legalization, such as late filers or those
whose right to apply was unclear.
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is a unique longitudinal data source with
detailed questions affording analyses of
post-legalization experiences.  Woodrow-
Lafield (1995a, 1995b) outlined changes in
household composition (including legal
residence status and relationship to the
IRCA-legalized immigrant) and described
the distribution of nonresident
consanguineal relatives intending to im-
migrate to the United States.  For this
research, IRCA-legalized relatives’ inten-
tions to naturalize are used to set param-
eters on the extent to which that intending
population may immigrate.
Individual-level characteristics may be
analyzed as with any survey, utilizing the
base weights to achieve population-level
results.  Because some households in-
cluded more than one legalized applicant,
alternative weights were necessary for
accurately representing household or rela-
tives network characteristics, e.g., the
household population and the populations
nonresident in the household.  Family- or
household-level characteristics, including
relationships that are consanguineal (by
blood) and affineal (by marriage), may be
analyzed by utilizing the family weights,
which are the base weights modified for
respondents’ reporting of the presence of
one or more other legalized individuals
within the household.  Each legalized in-
dividual in a household would be eligible
to report every other member of the
household in the survey but would not
necessarily be eligible to report the same
individual family members as the respon-
dent.  These weights are used here for
analyses of household composition with
the caveat that all relationships are de-
fined with respect to the primary appli-
cant or respondent for the household.4
For analyzing data on nonresident rela-
tives, consanguineal relatives may be spe-
cifically analyzed by accounting for the
probability of selection into the sample
and the chances that any legalized indi-
vidual is eligible to report the family rela-
tive.  A series of questions pertained to
the legalized respondent’s consanguineal
relatives (parents, siblings, and children)
who were not residing in the household
and were outside the United States.  Un-
fortunately, we do not know whether there
were any legalized individuals outside the
household who would also be eligible to
4 As LPS1 did not acquire legalization applicant status for household members, a computer
matching algorithm was used with household listings and administrative records of applicants,
producing a set of variables for household legal status characteristics, i.e., numbers of legalized
applicants, rejected applicants, citizens or lawful permanent residents, and “other,” presumably
undocumented status (U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service 1992).
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report these non-U.S. resident relatives.
For parents and siblings, the family weight
is assumed to account for that multiplic-
ity.  For children, a weight is used based
on whether a legalized spouse is residing
with the legalized respondent and, pre-
sumably, could report the same children.
It also accounts for whether a legalized
co-resident grandchild might be able to
report those individuals as parents, and a
legalized co-resident child could report the
legalized respondent’s other children as
siblings.  For siblings, these estimates may
be overstated as other legalized individu-
als outside the household might be eli-
gible to report the legalized respondent’s
siblings, e.g., as children.   Legalized grand-
parents, and, possibly, some of the ‘other
relatives,’ also could report the legalized
respon-dent’s parents.  By examining the
network of legalized individuals within
and outside the household who also are
eligible to report immediate relatives of
the respondent with the same
consanguineal counting rule, the base
weight could be appropriately modified
to account for multiplicity of reporting and
derive more accurate estimates for the
respondent’s relatives abroad.5
To summarize this discussion of weight-
ing and estimation of various relatives,
first, estimates for household members
should be very accurate.  However, com-
plete information is lacking for the most
accurate weighting of nonresident relatives
of the reporting respondent.  For example,
if an individual reported a nonresident
parent living abroad, we would need to
know how many other consanguineal rela-
tives living in the United States and legal-
ized under IRCA could also have reported
that parent, with other children as the
most likely.  If an individual reported a
nonresident sibling abroad, we would
ideally know how many other siblings,
parents, or children of that nonresident
were here as legalized aliens.  As a surro-
gate, the number of legalized respondents
in the household is used as the multiplic-
ity in developing these estimates of non-
residents.
Estimating the demand of immediate fam-
ily members to immigrate legally involves
both nonresident immediate family mem-
bers, reported as intending to come to the
United States, and resident ones without
permission to reside permanently, each
with specificity for respondent’s intentions
to naturalize.  These results are presented
in direct relationship to family preference
categories and eligibility under exempt
immediate relatives provisions and with
5See Woodrow-Lafield (1995c) for more rigorous questions and multiplicity weighting scheme in
estimating the emigrant population.
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specificity for the legalized respondent’s
country.6  The approach is static rather
than dynamically incorporating the range
of possible demographic changes between
the survey and occurrence of immigra-
tion.
Behavioral intentions data are admittedly
subject to response error; respondents may
have not considered fully their future
behavior or a present decision may be
changed in the course of future events.
For example, fertility expectations may not
accurately depict eventual fertility levels
(O’Connell 1991).  These levels of intended
immigration and intended naturalization
merit serious consideration for five sin-
gular reasons.
First, this cohort has demonstrated major
commitment in their most extra-ordinary
experience of living here in undocumented
status for an extended period.  This may
portend truly high rates of naturalization
and certainly implies higher rates than
past measurements that confounded emi-
gration and naturalization.  There has
already been extensive information ex-
change with relatives in the home coun-
try about the United States.  Second, the
survey occurred only one to two years
before legalized individuals began to reach
their dates of eligibility for applying for
citizenship so that there may be high cor-
respondence of intentions and behavior.
Third, many legalized persons fulfilled
their English and civics requirements at
application for lawful permanent resi-
dence in 1988-1989, perhaps corroborat-
ing their intention to naturalize and
portending expeditious processing of their
applications.  Fourth, legalized persons
were highly concentrated geographically
by state and metropolitan area, and, fifth,
their familial ties to their origin countries
are substantial.
Regarding the role of geographic concen-
tration, Yang (1994) found that living in
sizeable immigrant ethnic communities
facilitates naturalization.  His analysis also
led him to support the hypothesis that
unfavorable country-of-origin conditions
might provide impetus for citizenship
acquisition to help other relatives to im-
migrate to the United States.  The legal-
ized population is strongly representative
of such countries as Mexico, El Salvador,
and Guatemala, among others, that are
unfavorable relative to the United States,
i.e., with less developed economic infra-
structures for adequate labor force incor-
poration of their working age populations.
6 As country of birth was categorized in the LPS2 survey only as “born in Mexico” or “born in
a country other than Mexico,” country of citizenship is used for analyzing the experiences of
legalized persons from countries other than Mexico.
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PRESENCE AND
FUTURE
IMMIGRATION OF
SPOUSES AND
CHILDREN
The demographic profile of undocu-
mented residents of the United States in
1980 diverged from that of the border-
apprehended population as primarily
young, male, and Mexican.  Rather, the
undocumented population included large
numbers of women, children, and non-
Mexicans (Passel & Woodrow 1984), re-
flecting family migration and settlement
rather than merely circular migration pat-
terns.  Analysis of the initial survey of the
legalized population by Woodrow-Lafield
(1995a, 1995b) described the scope of fam-
ily migration for the legalized population
at amnesty application.  These long-term
residents not only had 1.8 million rela-
tives living with them, but they also had
4.0 million relatives living elsewhere in
the United States.  Also remarkable is that
there were an estimated 9.6 million rela-
tives living outside the United States
(Woodrow-Lafield 1995a, 1995b).  Inter-
preting these numbers in terms of poten-
tial demand to immigrate is difficult,
because, as noted earlier, these two ques-
tions were broadly stated to include all
family members, that is, “spouse or part-
ner, parents, children, brothers, sisters,
grandparents, grand-children, father-in-
law, mother-in-law, brothers-in-law, sis-
ters-in-law.”  That is, these figures pertain
to consanguineal and affineal relatives rather
than specifically consanguineal relatives.
Nevertheless, these statistics discount
notions of transience about the popula-
tion.
In 1992, four to five years after amnesty
application, legalized households included
more spouses and children and fewer
other relatives and nonrelatives than at
application (Woodrow-Lafield 1995a,
1995b).  The reference group of legalized
residents included 1,577,000 based on the
survey.  Composition by residence status
is mixed, but members are predominantly
entitled to reside permanently in the
United States.  Among the 2,519,000 per-
sons living in households of legalized
persons in 1992,7 a very high number,
1,432,000 were described as citizens of the
United States.  Another 248,000 are law-
ful permanent residents.  Another 78,000
were described as having Special Agricul-
tural Worker status and, consequently, en-
7 These figures are based on family weights that use information on number of legalized persons
in the household.
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titled to lawful permanent residence8 and
eligible for citizenship beginning in 1994.
Many (129,000) are described as under
“family fairness,”9 principally spouses
(41,000) and children (66,000).  About
95,000 are described as having temporary
visas and 385,000 fall within the “other”
category.  In the earlier survey, there were
an estimated 686,000 individuals in this
“other” category, presumably including
undocumented status.
Although nearly 1.9 million resident fam-
ily members have, or will have, perma-
nent residence status, many household
members may not be so entitled and might
have filed visa petitions.  Specifically,
136,000 spouses, 223,000 children, 30,000
parents, 130,000 siblings, and 102,000 other
relatives (including grandparents and
grandchildren) are estimated with status
of family fairness, temporary visa, other,
or missing.
With questions on nonresident children,
parents, and siblings, specific for
consanguineal, and weighting to compen-
sate for multiple reporting of the same
persons, a set of estimates is derived for
these nonresident relatives.  In 1992, the
legalized population is linked to approxi-
mately 60,000 nonresident spouses,
424,000 nonresident children, 901,000 non-
resident parents, and 2,843,000 nonresi-
dent siblings, totalling 4,229,000.  High
proportions of spouses (59.4 percent) and
children (64.4 percent) are stated as in-
tending to immigrate to the United States,
but the total number is only about 309,000.
Legalized respondents indicated that
lower proportions of parents (25.7 percent)
and siblings (25.1 percent) were intending
to come to the United States, but the
numbers are larger—232,000 parents and
714,000 siblings.  The total number of in-
dividuals estimated as intending to im-
migrate is 1,254,000.
With Mexico so strongly represented in
the legalization population, that country
is likely to be dominant in every country-
specific analysis.  With these survey data,
sampling variability and small numbers
preclude a complete country-by-country
examination of patterns.  In Table 3, show-
ing estimates for Mexican-born and other
origin legalized respondents, the numbers
of consan-guineal family members living
outside the United States and intending
to come dwarf those figures for relatives
of legalized persons from other countries.
8Technically, these individuals misreported SAW status as nondenied SAW applicants were
automatically converted to lawful permanent residence as of December 1, 1990.
9For a discussion of “family fairness,” see Baker (1990) and for international guidelines on
“family unity,” see, Sohn and Buergenthal (1992).
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Table 3.
CONSANGUINEAL FAMILY MEMBERS BY RELATIONSHIP TO RESPONDENT
AND INTENTIONS TO COME TO THE UNTIED STATES:
SELECTED COUNTRIES OF CITIZENSHIP, LEGALIZED POPULATION FOLLOW-UP SURVEY, 1992
    Total
484,000
309,000
377,000
228,000
285,000
164,000
45,000
31,000
19,000
14,000
8,000
5,000
10,000
8,000
10,000
6,000
107,000
81,000
 Spouses/
 Partners
60,000
36,000
48,000
27,000
37,000
21,000
3,000
1,000
2,000
1,000
1,000
1,000
1,000
1,000
2,000
2,000
13,000
9,000
Children
424,000
273,000
329,000
200,000
247,000
143,000
42,000
29,000
16,000
13,000
7,000
4,000
9,000
8,000
8,000
4,000
95,000
72,000
  Total
3,745,000
1,041,000
3,068,000
779,000
2,528,000
617,000
290,000
95,000
121,000
31,000
70,000
18,000
43,000
17,000
17,000
2,000
677,000
262,000
 Parents
901,000
232,000
745,000
200,000
612,000
163,000
76,000
21,000
30,000
9,000
14,000
4,000
8,000
3,000
5,000
0
157,000
32,000
   Siblings
2,843,000
809,000
2,323,000
579,000
1,916,000
454,000
214,000
74,000
90,000
22,000
56,000
14,000
35,000
13,000
12,000
2,000
520,000
230,000
Country and Category
All Countries (N=1,294,562;  H=905,386)
Living Outside U.S.
Intends to Come
Selected Countries (N=1,097,932;  H=744,861)
Living Outside U.S.
Intends to Come
Mexico (N=893,449;  H=596,131)
Living Outside U.S.
Intends to Come
El Salvador (N=113,386;  H=78,268)
Living Outside U.S.
Intends to Come
Guatemala (N=44,077;  H=30,695)
Living Outside U.S.
Intends to Come
Colombia (N=19,851;  H=16,741)
Living Outside U.S.
Intends to Come
Philippines (N=14,627;  H=12,217)
Living Outside U.S.
Intends to Come
Poland (N=12,542;  H=10,809)
Living Outside U.S.
Intends to Come
Unspecified Countries (N=196,630;  H=160,525)
Living Outside U.S.
Intends to Come
Immediate Family Other Relatives
  Members
4,229,000
1,350,000
3,445,000
1,007,000
2,813,000
781,000
335,000
126,000
139,000
45,000
78,000
22,000
53,000
25,000
27,000
8,000
784,000
343,000
  Family
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Six countries (Mexico, El Salvador, Gua-
temala, Colombia, Philippines, and Po-
land) account for 81.5 percent of spouses,
children, parents, and siblings living
abroad and 74.6 percent of those whom
respondents state as intending to come to
the United States.  Relatives of Mexicans
living outside the United States number
2,813,000, and 781,000 (about 28 percent)
intend to come here to live.  Siblings rep-
resent the majority of each of these cat-
egories, with an astounding estimate of
1,916,000 nonresident siblings and 454,000
siblings intending to immigrate.  El Sal-
vadorean legalized persons have about
335,000 spouses and consan-guineal fam-
ily members abroad, of whom 126,000
would like to immigrate.  Guatemalan
legalized persons have about 139,000 fam-
ily members abroad, of whom 45,000 are
expected to immigrate to the United
States.
Lesser levels of demand for family immi-
gration are evident for legalized persons
of Colombian, Polish, and Filipino citizen-
ship, as commensurate with their lesser
representation in the amnestied popula-
tion.  Altogether, remaining countries of
citizenship account for 784,000 nonresident
family members with 343,000 stated as
intending to immigrate.
This perspective on numbers intending to
immigrate relative to the numbers of non-
resident immediate family members
brings realism to temper any debate about
explosive chain migration for legalized
immigrants.  By any measure, the num-
bers of family members expected or de-
sired by their legalized relative to
immigrate to the United States have de-
mographic and policy significance.  Nev-
ertheless, the magnitude of this intended
immigration is much less than the magni-
tude if all immediate family members liv-
ing abroad desired to join their relatives
in the United States.  With the “illusory”
character of sibling immigration (Arnold,
et al. 1989), the absolute numbers of im-
mediate family members that may immi-
grate to the United States within the next
few years would be significantly lower.
INTENTION TO
NATURALIZE AND
FUTURE
IMMIGRATION
Already into their second decade of U.S.
residence, these persons appear as a sol-
idly settled population with many having
married and begun childrearing in their
first five years of legal residence.  Transi-
tion to naturalized citizenship is the next
legal option in the route to full American
status.  Eligibility for greater sponsorship
of family members for immigrant visas is
R E S E A R C H
P A P E R
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generally considered to be a major benefit
of acquisition of citizenship.  Citizens are
able to sponsor unmarried sons and
daughters (first preference), married sons
and daughters with spouses and children
(third preference), siblings with spouses
and children (fourth preference), as well
as parents, spouses, and children under
twenty-one years (immediate relatives
provisions).
Very few legalized individuals indicated
that they would “probably not” (28,000)
or “definitely not” (22,000) apply for U.S.
citizenship.  The overwhelming majority
indicated that they would apply for citi-
zenship, with most responding “yes, defi-
nitely” (621,000) or “yes, probably”
(355,000).  A substantial number (225,000)
indicated some uncertainty about whether
they would apply for citizenship.  If these
intentions or expectations become fulfilled,
they presage a remarkable shift toward
naturalization.
Presumably, those indicating they “defi-
nitely” will apply for citizenship will do
so early upon eligibility and may be
among those having partially fulfilled
naturalization requirements.  The extent
of revision of intentions to apply for citi-
zenship among those stating “probably,”
“uncertain,” “definitely not,” or “don’t
know” may depend on success levels of
early applicants for naturalization, prima-
rily the “definitely” category.  The roles
of individuals as “social actors” in nego-
tiating INS procedures have been high-
lighted by Hagan and Baker’s (1993)
evaluation of the legalization program at
eight sites nationally.  During the legal-
ization application period for both am-
nesty programs, response levels were
moderate initially.  As the legalization
program proceeded without negative con-
sequences for applicants and as knowl-
edge about the application process, the
immediate benefit of work authorization,
and advocacy groups’ role diffused
through social networks in communities,
applications increased dramatically
(Hagan & Baker 1993).  April and May of
1988 were the peak months of applica-
tions under general legislation and SAW
legislation.  After the close of the general
legislation application period, SAW appli-
cations flowed in during June-November
1988 at gradually increasing levels until
dramatically increasing in the final month
(Baker 1990).
At the close of 1993, a year with a resur-
gence of anti-immigration debate (Perotti
1994), the U.S. Immigration and Natural-
ization Service inaugurated a new policy
of actively encouraging legal immigrants
to become United States citizens.  In the
past, the naturalization process has been
complex, unfriendly, and lengthy (North
1987; Alvarez 1987), perhaps deterring any
immigrants already feeling ambivalent
U.S.  C O M M I S S I O N  O N  I M M I G R A T I O N  R E F O R M
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about severing the home country tie.  INS
Commissioner Doris Meissner’s new
policy is to involve “work with private
groups to publicize the advantages of citi-
zenship and to expedite the handling of
applications. . . . without lowering stan-
dards for citizenship . . . she intends to
simplify naturalization procedures . . .”
(Pear 1993).
Assuming that intentions to naturalize will
be realized and that intentions for rela-
tives to immigrate to the United States
will reflect visa petitions, an assessment
of future immigration of family members
of the legalized population is possible.
Shown in Tables 5, 6, and 7  are
crosstabulations of nonresident and im-
migration-intending relatives by intention
to naturalize for all legalized respondents,
Mexican legalized respondents, and El
Salvadorean legalized respondents.  There
are approximately 1,965,000 nonresident
spouses, children, parents, and siblings for
INTENTIONS TO NATURALIZE:
LEGALIZED POPULATION FOLLOW-UP SURVEY, 1992
             PERCENT
100.0
48.0
27.4
17.4
2.2
1.7
0.1
3.1
0.2
       NUMBER
1, 295,000
621,000
355,000
225,000
28,000
22,000
1,000
40,000
2,000
INTENTION
TOTAL
Yes, Definitely
Yes, Probably
Uncertain, Not Sure
Probably Not
Definitely Not
Refused
Don't Know
Not Ascertained
Table 4.
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legalized persons “definitely” intending to
naturalize and another 1,189,000 nonresi-
dent relatives for those “probably” intend-
ing to naturalize.  Of these figures, 685,000
are relatives of “definitely” naturalizing
persons intending to come to the United
States.  Another 333,000 relatives of “prob-
ably” naturalizing persons are reportedly
intending to come.
Of family members of Mexico-born
legalized persons living outside the United
States in 1992, more than one million
(1,115,000) were related to a respondent
“definitely” intending to naturalize and
another 893,000 were related to someone
“probably” intending to naturalize.
Slightly more than one-half million
(582,000) were related to a respondent
GROUP AND RESPONDENT'S
INTENTION TO NATURALIZE
Living Outside U.S.
Yes, Definitely
Yes, Probably
Uncertain, Not Sure
Probably Not
Definitely Not
Refused
Don't Know
Not Ascertained
Intends to Come
Yes, Definitely
Yes, Probably
Uncertain, Not Sure
Probably Not
Definitely Not
Refused
Don't Know
Not Ascertained
IMMEDIATE FAMILY OTHER RELATIVES
SPOUSES/
PARTNERS
60,000
25,000
17,000
12,000
1,000
2,000
0
4,000
0
36,000
17,000
9,000
7,000
1,000
0
0
2,000
0
   TOTAL
484,000
233,000
119,000
78,000
13,000
20,000
0
20,000
2,000
309,000
164,000
74,000
44,000
11,000
5,000
0
9,000
2,000
CHILDREN
424,000
207,000
102,000
66,000
11,000
19,000
0
16,000
2,000
273,000
147,000
65,000
37,000
10,000
4,000
0
8,000
2,000
         TOTAL
3,745,000
1,733,000
1,071,000
679,000
85,000
56,000
1,000
118,000
4,000
945,000
521,000
259,000
128,000
13,000
6,000
0
19,000
0
  PARENTS
901,000
416,000
261,000
164,000
20,000
13,000
0
28,000
1,000
232,000
126,000
66,000
33,000
2,000
1,000
0
5,000
0
SIBLINGS
2,843,000
1,317,000
809,000
516,000
65,000
43,000
0
90,000
3,000
714,000
395,000
193,000
95,000
11,000
6,000
0
14,000
0
Table 5.
FAMILY MEMBERS LIVING OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES AND INTENDING TO COME TO THE UNITED STATES
 BY RESPONDENT'S INTENTION TO NATURALIZE:
LEGALIZED POPULATION FOLLOW-UP SURVEY, 1992
         TOTAL
4,229,000
1,965,000
1,189,000
757,000
97,000
76,000
1,000
138,000
6,000
1,254,000
685,000
333,000
172,000
24,000
11,000
0
28,000
2,000
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uncertain about applying for citizenship.
Of those family members of Mexican le-
galized persons reportedly intending to
immigrate, more than one-half million
were related to someone either “definitely”
(373,000) or “probably” (235,000) apply-
ing for citizenship.
Among legalized individuals of El Salva-
dorean citizenship, the estimated numbers
of nonresident relatives of those “defi-
nitely” and “probably” applying for U.S.
citizenship were 162,000 and 95,000, re-
spectively, and the implied numbers in-
tending to come to the United States were
67,000 and 37,000.
Estimated numbers of children living
outside the United States and intending
to come to the United States by respon-
Table 6.
FAMILY MEMBERS LIVING OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES AND INTENDING TO COME TO THE UNITED STATES
BY RESPONDENT'S INTENTION TO NATURALIZE:
MEXICO-BORN, LEGALIZED POPULATION FOLLOW-UP SURVEY, 1992
IMMEDIATE FAMILY OTHER RELATIVES
GROUP AND RESPONDENT'S
INTENTION TO NATURALIZE
Living Outside U.S.
Yes, Definitely
Yes, Probably
Uncertain, Not Sure
Probably Not
Definitely Not
Refused
Don't Know
Not Ascertained
Intends to Come
Yes, Definitely
Yes, Probably
Uncertain, Not Sure
Probably Not
Definitely Not
Refused
Don't Know
Not Ascertained
TOTAL
2,813,000
1,115,000
893,000
582,000
65,000
53,000
0
105,000
1,000
782,000
373,000
235,000
127,000
15,000
9,000
0
23,000
0
TOTAL
2,528,000
1,005,000
811,000
526,000
56,000
37,000
0
91,000
1,000
617,000
302,000
188,000
98,000
8,000
6,000
0
16,000
0
 PARENTS
612,000
245,000
198,000
125,000
13,000
8,000
0
23,000
0
163,000
79,000
52,000
26,000
1,000
1,000
0
5,000
0
SIBLINGS
1.916,000
760,000
613,000
402,000
43,000
29,000
0
68,000
1,000
454,000
223,000
136,000
72,000
7,000
5,000
0
12,000
0
TOTAL
285,000
110,000
82,000
55,000
9,000
15,000
0
14,000
0
165,000
72,000
47,000
30,000
8,000
3,000
0
6,000
0
SPOUSES/
PARTNERS
37,000
12,000
12,000
9,000
1,000
1,000
0
3,000
0
22,000
8,000
6,000
5,000
1,000
0
0
2,000
0
CHILDREN
247,000
98,000
70,000
46,000
8,000
14,000
0
11,000
0
143,000
64,000
41,000
25,000
7,000
2,000
0
4,000
0
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dent parent’s intentions to naturalize are
shown in Table 7 with detail on marital
status and age group (under twenty-one
years or twenty-one years or older).  The
largest number of children living outside
the United States are unmarried and
younger than twenty-one years despite the
legalized respondent’s U.S. residence for
at least ten years—238,000 (56.1 percent).
Of the 177,000 adult children living
abroad, a slightly higher number were
married (92,000) than unmarried (85,000).
A large proportion (65.9 percent) of chil-
dren intending to come here to live are
unmarried and under age twenty-one.
Results for children of Mexico-born and
El Salvadorean-citizen legalization respon-
dents have similar patterns to those over-
all results.  Not all of those children living
Table 7.
IMMEDIATE FAMILY OTHER RELATIVES
FAMILY MEMBERS LIVING OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES AND INTENDING TO COME TO THE UNITED STATES
BY RESPONDENT'S INTENTION TO NATURALIZE:
EL SALVADOR-ORIGIN, LEGALIZED POPULATION FOLLOW-UP SURVEY, 1992
GROUP AND RESPONDENT'S
INTENTION TO NATURALIZE
Living Outside U.S.
Yes, Definitely
Yes, Probably
Uncertain, Not Sure
Probably Not
Definitely Not
Refused
Don't Know
Not Ascertained
Intends to Come
Yes, Definitely
Yes, Probably
Uncertain, Not Sure
Probably Not
Definitely Not
Refused
Don't Know
Not Ascertained
TOTAL
335,000
162,000
95,000
53,000
9,000
9,000
0
7,000
0
125,000
67,000
37,000
13,000
3,000
1,000
0
3,000
0
TOTAL
46,000
22,000
9,000
8,000
2,000
4,000
0
1,000
0
31,000
16,000
7,000
5,000
1,000
1,000
0
1,000
0
SPOUSES/
PARTNERS
4,000
2,000
1,000
1,000
0
0
0
0
0
2,000
1,000
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
CHILDREN
42,000
20,000
8,000
7,000
2,000
3,000
0
1,000
0
29,000
15,000
7,000
4,000
1,000
1,000
0
1,000
0
TOTAL
290,000
140,000
87,000
44,000
7,000
6,000
0
6,000
0
95,000
51,000
30,000
9,000
2,000
0
0
2,000
0
 PARENTS
76,000
37,000
22,000
12,000
2,000
1,000
0
1,000
0
21,000
13,000
6,000
2,000
0
0
0
1,000
0
SIBLINGS
214,000
103,000
65,000
32,000
5,000
4,000
0
5,000
0
73,000
38,000
24,000
7,000
1,000
0
0
1,000
0
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outside the United States are stated as
intending to come to live here.  This is the
case even for the largest single category,
unmarried younger children, that might
be expected to be most dependent.
PROJECTING VISA
PETITIONS
To project visa petitions for immediate
family members, the essential components
are projected numbers of family members
(and spouses and children) requiring or
desiring to immigrate and aspects of resi-
dent relative’s eligibility as sponsor, i.e.,
whether resident alien or naturalized citi-
zen.  Known is that a substantial number
of legalized immigrants have already filed
visa petitions for substantial numbers of
spouses and children, many of whom are
already living in the United States under
“family fairness” protection or with other
temporary status.  Further, the cohort has
Table 8.
CHILDREN LIVING OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES AND INTENDING TO COME TO THE UNITED STATES
BY AGE, MARITAL STATUS, AND RESPONDENT'S INTENTION TO NATURALIZE:
LEGALIZED POPULATION FOLLOW-UP SURVEY, 1992
21 OR OLDERUNDER 21
GROUP AND RESPONDENT'S
INTENTION TO NATURALIZE
Living Outside U.S.
Yes, Definitely
Yes, Probably
Uncertain, Not Sure
Probably Not
Definitely Not
Refused
Don't Know
Not Ascertained
Intends to Come
Yes, Definitely
Yes, Probably
Uncertain, Not Sure
Probably Not
Definitely Not
Refused
Don't Know
Not Ascertained
TOTAL
424,000
207,000
102,000
66,000
11,000
19,000
0
16,000
2,000
273,000
147,000
65,000
37,000
10,000
4,000
0
8,000
2,000
TOTAL
247,000
114,000
64,000
39,000
8,000
11,000
0
11,000
1,000
185,000
92,000
49,000
28,000
7,000
3,000
0
6,000
1,000
MARRIED
9,000
4,000
2,000
2,000
1.000
0
0
0
0
5,000
3,000
2,000
0
0
0
0
0
0
UNMARRIED
238,000
110,000
61,000
37,000
7,000
11,000
0
11,000
1,000
180,000
89,000
47,000
28,000
7,000
3,000
0
6,000
1,000
TOTAL
177,000
93,000
39,000
26,000
4,000
8,000
0
5,000
1,000
88,000
55,000
17,000
9,000
3,000
1,000
0
2,000
1,000
MARRIED
92,000
44,000
24,000
15,000
2,000
4,000
0
4,000
0
34,000
22,000
7,000
4,000
1,000
0
0
1,000
0
UNMARRIED
85,000
49,000
15,000
11,000
2,000
4,000
0
2,000
1,000
54,000
33,000
10,000
6,000
2,000
1,000
0
1,000
1,000
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exhibited strong levels of desire to natu-
ralize in stated intentions and partial
completion of requirements.  These are
the more certain contributions of the
present research.  To move beyond this
level and project visa petitions to be filed
for immediate family members, various
assumptions are necessary concerning:
1. The relationship between the legal-
ized immigrant’s stated commitment
to apply for citizenship and the time
lag between naturalization and visa
petition;
2. Unmarried sons’ and daughters’
transition to married status prior to
immigration;
3. Transition from child to adult;
4. Spouses and children per married
son or daughter;
Table 9.
CHILDREN LIVING OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES AND INTENDING TO COME TO THE UNITED STATES
BY AGE, MARITAL STATUS, RESPONDENT'S INTENTION TO NATURALIZE:
MEXICO-BORN, LEGALIZED POPULATION FOLLOW-UP SURVEY, 1992
GROUP AND RESPONDENT'S
INTENTION TO NATURALIZE
Living Outside U.S.
Yes, Definitely
Yes, Probably
Uncertain, Not Sure
Probably Not
Definitely Not
Refused
Don't Know
Not Ascertained
Intends to Come
Yes, Definitely
Yes, Probably
Uncertain, Not Sure
Probably Not
Definitely Not
Refused
Don't Know
Not Ascertained
TOTAL
247,000
98,000
70,000
46,000
8,000
14,000
0
11,000
0
143,000
64,000
41,000
25,000
7,000
2,000
0
4,000
0
TOTAL
143,000
50,000
43,000
28,000
5,000
8,000
0
9,000
0
99,000
38,000
31,000
19,000
5,000
2,000
0
4,000
0
UNDER 21 21 OR OLDER
MARRIED
7,000
2,000
2,000
2,000
0
0
0
0
0
4,000
2,000
2,000
0
0
0
0
0
0
UNMARRIED
136,000
48,000
41,000
26,000
5,000
8,000
0
9,000
0
95,000
36,000
29,000
19,000
5,000
2,000
0
4,000
0
TOTAL
104,000
48,000
27,000
18,000
3,000
6,000
0
3,000
0
44,000
26,000
10,000
5,000
2,000
0
0
0
0
MARRIED
69,000
30,000
19,000
12,000
2,000
4,000
0
3,000
0
26,000
16,000
6,000
3,000
1,000
0
0
0
0
UNMARRIED
35,000
18,000
8,000
6,000
1,000
2,000
0
0
0
18,000
10,000
4,000
2,000
1,000
0
0
0
0
U.S.  C O M M I S S I O N  O N  I M M I G R A T I O N  R E F O R M
R E S E A R C H
P A P E R
- 23 -
5. Proportion married of siblings and
average number of children per sib-
ling.
Each of these assumptions will be dis-
cussed before compiling a schedule of
possible visa petitions by family prefer-
ence category to be filed during fiscal
years 1994 through 1998.
The assumption is made that those indi-
cating they will “definitely” apply for citi-
zenship will complete naturalization and
will do so relatively quickly, perhaps
within three years.  Accordingly, this tim-
ing is assumed such that one-quarter will
become naturalized in 1994, one-half in
1995, and one-quarter in 1996.  Anecdotal
accounts suggest that the pace of natural-
izations already has accelerated in such
places as Miami and southern California
where there were large numbers of legal-
izations (Cleveland 1994; McDonnell &
Simon 1994).  Of those indicating that they
Table 10.
CHILDREN LIVING OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES AND INTENDING TO COME TO THE UNITED STATES
BY AGE, MARITAL STATUS, RESPONDENT'S INTENTION TO NATURALIZE:
EL SALVADOR-BORN, LEGALIZED POPULATION FOLLOW-UP SURVEY, 1992
UNDER 21 21 OR OLDER
GROUP AND RESPONDENT'S
INTENTION TO NATURALIZE
Living Outside U.S.
Yes, Definitely
Yes, Probably
Uncertain, Not Sure
Probably Not
Definitely Not
Refused
Don't Know
Not Ascertained
Intends to Come
Yes, Definitely
Yes, Probably
Uncertain, Not Sure
Probably Not
Definitely Not
Refused
Don't Know
Not Ascertained
TOTAL
28,000
13,000
5,000
5,000
2,000
2,000
0
1,000
0
22,000
11,000
5,000
3,000
1,000
1,000
0
1,000
0
MARRIED
1,000
1,000
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1,000
1,000
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
TOTAL
14,000
7,000
3,000
3,000
0
1,000
0
0
0
7,000
3,000
2,000
1,000
0
0
0
0
0
MARRIED
6,000
3,000
1,000
1,000
0
0
0
0
0
2,000
1,000
1,000
0
0
0
0
0
0
UNMARRIED
8,000
4,000
2,000
1,000
0
1,000
0
0
0
5,000
3,000
2,000
1,000
0
0
0
0
0
TOTAL
42,000
20,000
8,000
7,000
2,000
3,000
0
1,000
0
29,000
15,000
7,000
4,000
1,000
1,000
0
1,000
0
UNMARRIED
27,000
12,000
5,000
5,000
2,000
2,000
0
1,000
0
22,000
11,000
5,000
3,000
1,000
1,000
0
1,000
0
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will “probably” apply for citizenship, an
overall completion rate of .75 is assumed
with completion of naturalization equally
in 1995 and 1996.  Among those who were
“uncertain,” the assumption is that one-
half will decide to so, split equally be-
tween 1996 and 1997.  Finally, the
assumption is made that one-quarter of
those saying they would “probably not”
apply for citizenship would do so and
become naturalized by 1997.  These as-
sumptions are obviously tentative and un-
supported, but helpful in devising
illustrative projections.
The timing of entry into marriage varies
across cultures and marriage timing for
sons and daughters living in origin coun-
tries and separated from parents already
immigrated to the United States might be
highly unpredictable.  For the purposes
here, the assumption is that sons’ and
daughters’ marital statuses at petition will
not differ from marital status based on
the 1992 response.  Also, for children al-
ready living in legalized households for
whom a petition may be filed, it is not
possible to differentiate married from
unmarried or even sons and daughters
from sons-in-law and daughters-in-law, so
all are assumed as unmarried.  For pur-
poses of estimation of second preference
and immediate relatives’ petitions, the as-
sumption is made that children do not
age into adulthood prior to immigration.
For married sons and daughters, the as-
sumptions are that a visa petition also will
be filed for one spouse and that 50 per-
cent of these couples will have one child
for whom a petition is filed.  For siblings,
the assumptions are that 60 percent will
be married at time of filing petition and
that 50 percent of these will have one child.
Even if the survey had acquired informa-
tion on children of unmarried and mar-
ried sons and daughters, that number
might have changed by the prospective
date of immigration as couples had more
children or children aged to adulthood.
Finally, the assumption is made that visa
petitions already have been filed under
second preference for spouses and chil-
dren estimated as residing in legalized
households in 1992.  As discussed above,
figures for co-resident children are too
high, including sons-in-law and daugh-
ters-in-law.  Although these petitions were
competing with those from dependents of
SAW legalization, the assumption is made
here that these individuals already re-
ceived a visa during 1992-1994 or that
their status will be less likely to be af-
fected by naturalization of their immigrant
sponsor.  The point is moot as a new
petition need not be filed because the
petition is automatically shifted upon
naturalization.
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Despite the necessity of these various as-
sumptions, at this point, serious doubts
may have arisen about the value of the
ensuing illustrations.  In discussing visa
petitions possibly to be filed under family
preference and immediate relatives catego-
ries under sponsorship of immigrants le-
galized under general provisions, general
patterns are noteworthy and minor dif-
ferences may not be.  The foundation for
these projections may appear to be sim-
plistic relative to the complex operations
of the immigration system, but these have
a major advantage over any others in that
there are empirical estimates for immedi-
ate family members intending to immi-
grate and there is an empirical gauge for
naturalization.
With an accounting for possible numbers
of spouses and children of siblings and
married sons and daughters, the overall
implied number of nonresident immedi-
ate family members would be increased
to 1,894,000.  Siblings, with their spouses
and children, could account for 1,356,000
of these.  Most of the petitions ensuing
from citizenship attainment are shown to
be filed in fiscal years 1996 and 1997 ac-
cording to assumed timing.
Petitions under exempt immediate rela-
tives categories would increase under this
scenario, especially during fiscal years
1996 and 1997.  Subject to the accuracy of
assumptions about coresident spouses’
and children’s achievement of immigrant
visas, there might only be moderate in-
creases for spousal petitions.  For children
and parents, annually petitions easily
could be twice as high as the numbers of
immigrant visas granted during fiscal year
1992.
By stipulation, there would be no further
impacts for petitioner backlogs under sec-
ond preference.  These illustrative flows
for first preference would not create any
major delays, as this category is fairly up-
to-date.  These types of petition flows
would probably mean that there would
be increases to backlogs under third and,
especially, fourth, preferences.
For fourth preference, this is particularly
a concern as the most recent cut-off date
among countries of chargeability is March 22,
1985 (U.S. Department of State 1995)!
Even if all of the 65,000 visas annually
were dedicated only to siblings of these
legalization beneficiaries, it would take
approximately seventeen years to allocate
visas to this many siblings with spouses
and children as estimated.  During that
waiting period, some might decide not to
migrate, but that source of attrition might
be offset by others changing to decide to
immigrate or by higher numbers of chil-
dren.
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Category for Petitioning Possible Petitions in Fiscal YearRelevant Demand Level
Total
1994-1998
1994-1995 1995-1996 1996-1997 1997-1998
578,000
551,000
(A)
330,000
125,000
205,000
(A)
(---)
(A)
(A)
(A)
222,000
117,000
70,000
35,000
---
27,000
(C)
(C)
1,894,000
1,716,000
54,000
221,000
36,000
185,000
(A)
85,000
34,000
34,000
17,000
1,356,000
714,000
428,000
214,000
---
232,000
(C)
(C)
1,965,000
1,207,000
13,000
---
(B)
(B)
(A)
73,000
29,000
29,000
15,000
1,121,000
590,000
354,000
177,000
417,000
192,000
144,000
81,000
282,000
210,000
8,000
---
(B)
(B)
(A)
14,000
6,000
6,000
3,000
188,000
99,000
59,000
30,000
72,000
31,000
23,000
18,000
849,000
501,000
2,000
---
(B)
(B)
(A)
32,000
13,000
13,000
6,000
467,000
246,000
147,000
74,000
175,000
79,000
58,000
38,000
742,000
442,000
1,000
---
(B)
(B)
(A)
25,000
10,000
10,000
5,000
416,000
219,000
131,000
66,000
151,000
72,000
54,000
24,000
92,000
54,000
1,000
---
(B)
(B)
(A)
3,000
1,000
1,000
1,000
50,000
27,000
16,000
8,000
19,000
9,000
9,000
2,000
Note: These estimates are illustrative. See text for explanation.
(A) Given high demand under second preference, assumption is that all unmarried sons and daughters will be transferred to
petition under first preference for which demand is much lower.
(B) The assumptions are that visa petitions have already been filed under second preference, will have been largely satisfied in
1992-1994, and that legalized immigrants may be slower to naturalize and sponsor co-residing relatives.
(C) These groups are included above.
Table 11.
VISA PETITIONS POSSIBLY TO BE FILED UNDER FAMILY PREFERENCE AND IMMEDIATE RELATIVES CATEGORIES
UNDER SPONSORSHIP OF GENERALLY LEGALIZED IMMIGRANTS
Combined  In U.S. Intending
Total Family Members
Family Preferences
First
Unmarried adult sons and
daughters of citizens
(and children)
Second
Spouses
children,
unmarried sons and daughters
of permanent resident aliens
Third
Married sons and daughters
of citizens (and spouses
and children)
Fourth
Siblings of citizens
(and their spouses
and children)
Immediate Relatives
Parents
Children
Spouses
2,472,000
2,267,000
54,000
551,000
161,000
389,000
(A)
85,000
34,000
34,000
17,000
1,577,000
830,000
498,000
249,000
---
259,000
(C)
(C)
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The Mexico case shows similar patterns
with an implied estimate of 1,210,000
immediate family members nonresident
and intending to immigrate to the United
States, of whom the majority (862,000) are
siblings with spouses and children.  This
high level of demand would mean that
waiting times under this category, now
nearly twelve years, never would be likely
to improve.
These projections are of lesser magnitude
for El Salvadorean legalized immigrants,
with about 189,000 immediate relatives,
mostly siblings with their spouses and
children, implied as intending to immi-
grate.
Demographic population projections
grounded in measurement of recent pat-
terns of fertility, mortality, and net immi-
gration seldom achieve high accuracy due
to the likelihood of measurement error,
erroneous assumptions, or even demo-
graphic behavioral shifts by time periods.
These projections are unlikely to be error-
free for levels and timing of family mem-
ber visa petitions from legalization
beneficiaries under general provisions.
Similar projections have rarely been de-
vised.  [See Roney (1988) and Harper
(1988) for projections of future immigra-
tion prepared for background discussion
of an earlier version of the Immigration
Act of 1990.]  With very little empirical
information, Warren (1988) estimated that
there would be about 300,000 dependents
of legalization beneficiaries, relying on an
assumption that prior low rates of natu-
ralization for Mexican immigrants would
pertain to this special cohort.  Teitelbaum
(1989) rightly cautioned against assuming
that past patterns of naturalization and
petitioning would hold.  The recent work
of Yang (1994) indicates the pitfalls of
merely using demographic characteristics
to explain naturalization with its influence
for social and economic outcomes.  Entry
cohorts of the past three decades also may
differ from historical cohorts in that they
may be lifetime migrants.  Although the
foreign-born population has nearly
doubled in 1970-1990, emigration research
has not detected any increases (Woodrow-
Lafield 1995c).
Now that the appropriate caveats have
been cited, the major findings can be freely
noted.  With these empirical portraits of
immediate relatives networks, intentions
to immigrate, and naturalization inten-
tions, naturalization may be broadly
sought and facilitate family migration
from Mexico as well as other countries.
These projections have great value for il-
lustrating that there will be extremely heavy
demand for visas under fourth preference from
the legalization cohort.  The actual level
of demand may be lower if these legal-
ized individuals had one or more siblings
R E S E A R C H
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VISA PETITIONS POSSIBLY TO BE FILED UNDER FAMILY PREFERENCE AND IMMEDIATE RELATIVES CATEGORIES
UNDER SPONSORSHIP OF GENERALLY LEGALIZED IMMIGRANTS:
MEXICO-BORN
Relevant Demand Level Possible Petitions in Fiscal Year
Table 12.
Combined
1,629,000
1,466,000
18,000
349,000
105,000
244,000
(A)
64,000
26,000
26,000
13,000
1,035,000
545,000
327,000
163,000
---
181,000
(C)
(C)
In U.S.
419,000
401,000
(A)
228,000
84,000
144,000
(A)
(---)
(A)
(A)
(A)
173,000
91,000
55,000
27,000
---
18,000
(C)
(C)
Intending
1,210,000
1,065,000
18,000
120,000
21,000
99,000
(A)
64,000
26,000
26,000
13,000
862,000
454,000
272,000
136,000
---
163,000
(C)
(C)
       Total
1994-1998
1,391,000
1,174,000
4,000
---
(B)
(B)
(A)
54,000
22,000
22,000
11,000
1,115,000
587,000
352,000
176,000
219,000
131,000
72,000
15,000
1994-1995
149,000
118,000
2,000
---
(B)
(B)
(A)
10,000
4,000
4,000
2,000
106,000
56,000
33,000
17,000
31,000
20,000
10,000
1,000
1995-1996
526,000
442,000
1,000
---
(B)
(B)
(A)
23,000
9,000
9,000
5,000
418,000
220,000
132,000
66,000
85,000
53,000
27,000
5,000
1996-1997
661,000
573,000
1,000
---
(B)
(B)
(A)
19,000
8,000
8,000
4,000
554,000
291,000
175,000
87,000
89,000
52,000
30,000
6,000
1997-1998
54,000
40,000
0
---
(B)
(B)
(A)
2,000
1,000
1,000
0
37,000
20,000
12,000
6,000
14,000
7,000
6,000
1,000
Category for Petitioning
Total Family Members
Family Preferences
First
Unmarried adult sons and
daughters of citizens
(and children)
Second
Spouses
children,
unmarried sons and daughters
of permanent resident aliens
Third
Married sons and daughters
of citizens (and spouses
and children)
Fourth
Siblings of citizens
(and their spouses
and children)
Immediate Relatives
Parents
Children
Spouses
Note: These estimates are illustrative. See text for explanation.
(A) Given high demand under second preference, assumption is that all unmarried sons and daughters will be transferred to
petition under first preference for which demand is much lower.
(B) The assumptions are that visa petitions have already been filed under second preference, will have been largely satisfied in
1992-1994, and that legalized immigrants may be slower to naturalize and sponsor co-residing relatives.
(C) These groups are included above.
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Table 13.
VISA PETITIONS POSSIBLY TO BE FILED UNDER FAMILY PREFERENCE AND IMMEDIATE RELATIVES CATEGORIES
UNDER SPONSORSHIP OF GENERALLY LEGALIZED IMMIGRANTS:
EL SALVADOREAN ORIGIN
Category for Petitioning
Total Family Members
Family Preferences
First
Unmarried adult sons and
daughters of citizens
(and children)
Second
Spouses
children,
unmarried sons and daughters
of permanent resident aliens
Third
Married sons and daughters
of citizens (and spouses
and children)
Fourth
Siblings of citizens
(and their spouses
and children)
Immediate Relatives
Parents
Children
Spouses
Possible Petitions in Fiscal YearRelevant Demand Level
Note: These estimates are illustrative. See text for explanation.
(A) Given high demand under second preference, assumption is that all unmarried sons and daughters will be transferred to
petition under first preference for which demand is much lower.
(B) The assumptions are that visa petitions have already been filed under second preference, will have been largely satisfied in
1992-1994, and that legalized immigrants may be slower to naturalize and sponsor co-residing relatives.
(C) These groups are included above.
Intending
189,000
173,000
5,000
24,000
1,000
22,000
(A)
4,000
2,000
2,000
1,000
140,000
74,000
44,000
22,000
---
21,000
(C)
(C)
      Total
1994-1998
135,000
107,000
1,000
---
(B)
(B)
(A)
3,000
1,000
1,000
1,000
102,000
54,000
32,000
16,000
35,000
17,000
17,000
1,000
1994-1995
18,000
18,000
1,000
---
(B)
(B)
(A)
1,000
0
0
0
16,000
9,000
5,000
3,000
6,000
3,000
3,000
0
1996-1997
53,000
41,000
0
---
(B)
(B)
(A)
1,000
1,000
1,000
0
40,000
21,000
12,000
6,000
12,000
6,000
6,000
0
1997-1998
6,000
4,000
0
---
(B)
(B)
(A)
0
0
0
0
4,000
2,000
1,000
1,000
2,000
0
1,000
0
Combined
254,000
235,000
5,000
62,000
15,000
46,000
(A)
4,000
2,000
2,000
1,000
164,000
86,000
52,000
26,000
---
25,000
(C)
(C)
In U.S.
65,000
61,000
(A)
38,000
14,000
24,000
(A)
(---)
(A)
(A)
(A)
24,000
12,000
7,000
4,000
---
4,000
(C)
(C)
1995-1996
59,000
45,000
0
---
(B)
(B)
(A)
1,000
1,000
1,000
0
43,000
23,000
14,000
7,000
15,000
7,000
7,000
0
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living outside their household who, hav-
ing resided here since before 1982, also
received legalization.
Beyond this immediate scenario, introduc-
tion of parents as immediate relatives
could lead to appearance of petitions
shown here under fourth preference, un-
der second preference, and, eventually,
under first or third preferences.  A path-
way for sibling immigration may involve
bringing in the parent, who later may
sponsor remaining children (Arnold, et al.
1989).  This effort is conservative about
making explicit projections of that wave
of petitioning as it is contingent on so
many assumptions about the occurrence
and timing of legalized immigrants’ and
parents’ naturalization, among others.  The
accuracy of any projection diminishes as
effects of erroneous assumptions com-
pound over time.  A few tentative state-
ments are possible.  Depending on family
characteristics of siblings, there could be
tremendous increases under second pref-
erence, possibly even before the year 2000,
with many of these petitions spooling into
third preference.  Petitions filed under the
third preference category could increase
several-fold in the early part of 2000-2009.
SUMMARY
The ideal source for depicting socioeco-
nomic changes, acculturation, fertility, and
family reunification, would be longitudi-
nal data for a full array of immigrant entry
cohorts (White 1992) with linkages to
original immigrants.  However, the pro-
cesses of sponsorship, naturalization, and
family reunification are lengthy.  Such a
survey or administrative tracking system
would be quite costly, would need to be
in place for two to four decades, and
would always be subject to the bias of
incomplete observation of more recent
entry cohorts’ experiences.
This research draws on an existing dataset
with detailed information about numbers,
residence, and intended residence for
parents, siblings, and children of an im-
migrant cohort.  Although the study popu-
lation is unique in its long-term residence
in undocumented status and the effect that
transition to legal status may have on the
timing of bringing other family members
to the United States, these data offer ex-
traordinary insights to family migration
for immigration during the 1990s.  It ap-
pears that the family preference visa back-
log could increase by as much as 100
percent merely as a result of the legaliza-
tion of 1.7 million aliens under IRCA.
Of what value will this study be in the
contemporary discussions about immigra-
tion and immigrants?  May we assume
enough accuracy about these predictions
for policy purposes?  Keyfitz (1987:237)
has stated “Yet standing against this as-
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sertion of the absolute impossibility of
knowing the future is the absolute neces-
sity of a picture of the future if behavior
is to have any sense.”  For this population
subgroup previously destined for an
underclass life-style, the picture features
massive embracing of American citizen-
ship.  Among the benefits of citizenship
are greater range of eligibility for spon-
sorship of family members as immigrants,
but political participation will be a more
universally received benefit.  Patterns of
geographic concentration of immigrants
in certain states and cities are long-stand-
ing and empowerment of these immi-
grants from undocumented origins in the
1970s may bode well for future urban
health.
Several recommendations for federal agen-
cies and policymakers are warranted.  The
recommendation with the most imme-
diacy is that the U.S. Immigration and
Naturalization Service should make an
organized field effort to guarantee prompt
and complete statistical records for natu-
ralizations for 1994 and subsequent years.
If the sea change suggested herein takes
place, these data will be extremely rel-
evant for social science studies of assimi-
lation and political behavior.  Concurrently
with these administrative efforts, initia-
tion of evaluation research, including natu-
ralistic
research, on advocacy groups’ role in pro-
moting naturalization and political edu-
cation is merited (e.g., Hagan & Baker
1993).  To sharpen the precision of these
projections and the relationship between
needs for family reunification and deci-
sion to naturalize, the Legalized Popula-
tion Follow-up Survey and the Legalized
Applicants Public-Use File should be up-
dated regularly during 1995-2000 to in-
clude administrative data from linked
naturalization records.
A recommendation for a third wave sur-
vey of the legalized population is an ob-
vious necessity at this critical juncture in
the cohort’s experience, not merely for
traditional assimilation analysis, but also
for informing immigration policy more
fully.  Only with longitudinal data on
socioeconomic assimilation would the
push-pull aspects of the relationship
between settlement success and family re-
unification be discernible.   Only by re-
contacting these individuals will there be
measures of the degree to which
parents, children, or siblings may
have chosen to settle here as undocu-
mented residents while awaiting an
immigrant visa.
One of IRCA’s main purposes, curbing
undocumented immigration, apparently
has not been fulfilled, based on analyses
of apprehensions statistics (Bean, et al.
1990), surveys of Mexican sending com-
munities (Donato, Durand & Massey
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1992), and assessment of net undocu-
mented immigration in the 1980s
(Woodrow-Lafield 1994b; Woodrow 1992).
A portion of this failure is due to continu-
ing migration of undocumented farm
workers (Martin 1994).  Unrealized by
policymakers and researchers may be the
full extent to which undocumented mi-
gration is an integral part of legal immi-
gration to the United States as individuals
enter illegally or overstay for the funda-
mental reason of living with their fami-
lies.  With the exception of sending
communities surveys, research on undocu-
mented migration ignores its family char-
acter.
Yet family ties may be the critical link in
analyzing undocumented migration pat-
terns for the 1990s and into the twenty-
first century.  Failure of the legal
immigration system to afford legal oppor-
tunity for family migration may lead to
substantial undocumented immigration of
family members of this cohort of legal-
ized immigrants who have been settled
for a decade.  Another survey with simi-
lar and expanded questions on residence
of family members would be valuable for
studying the linkages of legal and undocu-
mented immigration and informing
policymakers concerned with enforcement
of employer sanctions provisions and
border control.
Finally, a similar survey of Special Agri-
cultural Workers is long overdue.  The
controversy aroused by the unexpected
numbers of SAW applicants probably
would be relatively diminutive if the scope
of undocumented and legal immigration
stemming from SAWs were measurable.
This population is truly elusive from the
demographer’s measurement view as
SAWs are fully entitled to reside perma-
nently in the United States and yet the
extent to which they are resident is un-
known.
Characterized as primarily Mexican and
young, this population has tremendous
potential for introducing wives and chil-
dren into the United States initially as
undocumented migrants, eventually as
legal immigrants.  In the present, these
families may contribute to rural poverty
problems (Martin 1994).  These families
and, to a lesser extent, families of gener-
ally IRCA-legalized immigrants, are mixed
by legal status with complex implications
for access to public benefits programs.
Both another follow-up survey of the gen-
erally IRCA-legalized immigrants and a
SAW survey are most relevant for Cali-
fornia and the Los Angeles area with their
concentrations of these individuals.
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PREFACE
Temporary migrants to the United States, known legally as nonimmigrants, have grown
in number and importance over the 1980s and 1990s.  The Immigration Act of 1990 in
particular instituted a number of changes that the U.S. Commission on Immigration
Reform is evaluating for its final report to Congress in 1997.  This volume represents
a significant contribution to the fact-finding efforts undertaken by the Commission to
understand the implementation and impact of these policies.
Scholars and policymakers working in the immigration arena have long appreciated
the complexity of the different categories of permanent admissions, but only now are
they turning their attention to the oftentimes linked temporary system with its rather
different complexities.  In this volume, leading scholars examine the nonimmigrant
system’s major visa categories for temporary workers and foreign students.  The Com-
mission solicited these authors’ contributions to help the Commission identify major
policy issues and their solutions.  The  introductory chapter by B. Lindsay Lowell of
the Commission’s staff summarizes the authors’ observations and recommendations on
a range of topics, from the overall system of nonimmigrant admissions to the effects
of specific visa categories on U.S. businesses and workers, as well as our universities
and students.  The chapters here, comprising one of the first collections of scholarly
studies on the topic, offer considerable scope and a solid point of departure for
policymakers evaluating the nonimmigrant system.
Susan Martin
Executive Director
U.S.  C O M M I S S I O N  O N  I M M I G R A T I O N  R E F O R M
R E S E A R C H
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There always have been those who come
to the United States for short stays—to
work and conduct business, to study, or
to visit and sightsee.  No single definition
best describes this type of international
migrant; they have come to be known for
what they are not.  With a few notable
exceptions (e.g., holders of H-1B and L
visas), they are not intending, or not per-
mitted under the terms of their visas, to
reside permanently in the United States
with the full range of rights granted to
“immigrants.”  Legally they are, therefore,
not immigrants, they are “nonimmigrants”
whose legal rights and responsibilities are
limited to certain activities and whose stay
is of limited duration.
The numbers of those on nonimmigrant
visas [NIVs] coming to the United States
are substantial and, unlike permanent
admissions that only now are reaching
peak historical levels, they have been
growing throughout the century.  During
the first decade after the turn of the cen-
tury (1901-1910), 770,000 nonimmigrants
were admitted to the United States and
that figure grew to 7 million in the de-
cade following World War II.
   Year   Total         Tourists
1951-1960 1 7,113,023        4,005,028
1961-1970       24,107,224       15,473,400
1971-1980       64,314,041      45,369,373
1981-1990     123,140,403      91,469,272
1991-1994        83,159,275        65,232,217
TEMPORARY VISAS FOR WORK,
STUDY, AND CULTURAL EXCHANGE:
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
B. LINDSAY LOWELL
U.S. COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION REFORM
1 These data are from special tabulations from the Statistics Office of the U.S. Immigration and
Naturalization Service.
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Two things are immediately apparent from
these data: the rate of growth has been
phenomenal with more than a doubling
across each of the last three decades and
it looks safe to forecast more than a dou-
bling for the 1990s.  The greatest share of
the NIVs are issued to tourists, counted
as temporary visitors for pleasure, who
over the past decade have made up nearly
three-quarters of all admissions by the
Immigration and Naturalization Service
[INS]—17 out of a total 22 million in fis-
cal year 1994 alone.2  As of fiscal year
1994, the remaining approximately 5 mil-
lion admissions comprise just more than
3 million temporary visitors for business
and less than 2 million assorted other cat-
egories of admission, of which 764,000
include those addressed by the authors in
this volume.
The U.S. Commission on Immigration
Reform has been studying nonimmigrant
visas under its mandate to review and
evaluate the Immigration Act of 1990.
That law created new admission catego-
ries and set in place regulations to control
the entry and stay of nonimmigrants.
Twelve authors describe here a core of
temporary visas that authorize specific ac-
tivities, namely the right to attend U.S.
institutions of education, to work or con-
duct business, or to undertake study or
work that comports with exchange agree-
ments with foreign countries.  These visa
categories are among those with the great-
est degree of rights and, with the excep-
tion of temporary visitors for business or
pleasure, they are the most numerous.
They also have not been subject to research
by academics and have not received much
systematic evaluation by policymakers.
The articles in this volume address the
lack of systematic study and set forth the
policy implications of the available re-
search.
2 Tourists represent a considerable boon to the U.S. economy.  In 1995, an estimated 43.5 million
in-bound visitors, a figure that includes tourists for pleasure plus cross-border visitors from
Mexico and Canada, spent $76 billion on travel to and in the United States.  International
tourism provides a net trade surplus of $18 billion (dollars international visitors spend here
less dollars U.S. visitors spend outside of the United States) (communication with the
Department of Commerce, U.S. Travel and Tourism Administration).
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COUNTING
TEMPORARY
MIGRANTS
Two broad types of visa classes—(1) work-
ers and (2) students and exchange visi-
tors—are most central to today’s concerns
and are predominantly discussed in this
volume (U.S. INS 1996a).
n Workers.  The sole purpose of these
categories of admission is to grant
legal authorization to work in the
United States.  H-1B workers are
professionals and highly-skilled in-
dividuals in specialty occupations.
They are sponsored by employers
who must attest that they will ful-
fill a number of wage and working
conditions designed to protect U.S.
workers.  The visa for agricultural
workers (H-2A), although numbers
are small, is a constant source of
debate.  It requires a sponsoring
employer and the job must be “cer-
tified” beforehand by the U.S. De-
partment of Labor [DOL] as meet-
ing a number of wage and working
conditions designed to protect U.S.
workers.  H-2B  visas for tempo-
rary nonagricultural workers (lim-
ited to 66,000 annually—although
only 16,00 were issued in FY 1994)
also require labor certification.  D
visas for foreign crewman require
employer attestation unlike E visas
for treaty traders and investors that
require no labor market test.  L vi-
sas are for intracompany transfer-
ees, workers who are employed by
international organizations based in
the United States.
The Immigration Act of 1990 creat-
ed a number of new work visa cat-
egories: O visas for aliens with ex-
traordinary ability in sciences, arts,
education, business, or athletics, and
those assisting in their athletic or
artistic performances; P visas for in-
ternationally recognized entertainers
and athletes, artists or entertainers
on an exchange program or under a
culturally-unique program; Q visas
for participants in international cul-
tural exchange programs; and R
visas for religious workers.  Addi-
tional workers, such as researchers,
scholars, au pairs, and camp coun-
selors, enter under the J visa [see
below].
R E S E A R C H
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n Students and Exchange Visitors).
Both the foreign student (F) and
cultural exchange visitor (J) visas are
intended primarily to promote both
formal education and learning by
experience, and both permit limit-
ed work authorization.  In the case
of the foreign student (F), work is
generally restricted to campus with
one year of off-campus practical
training allowed.  These visas are
issued only to students who are at-
tending INS-accepted institutions.
In the case, of exchange visitors (J),
whose visa may partly be governed
by international agreements, some
may only study, while others engage
in significant work activity during
their stay.  The M visa is used for
vocational students, who are pro-
hibited from any employment ex-
cept for postcompletion of studies
and practical training.
The Number of
Temporary
Immigrants
The accompanying table shows three ways
of counting nonimmigrants in the fiscal
year 1994.  The differing methods of
measuring these populations demon-
strate both notable administrative differ-
ences between the collecting agencies, as
well as the lack of a single comprehensive
measure or set of measures that count
nonimmigrants and their implied year-
round population in the United States.
INS admission numbers.  The first col-
umn shows the most commonly cited INS
figures on admissions, which are not
counts of individuals but, rather, counts
of the total number of entries.   Thus, an
individual with a business visa will be
counted separately each time he or she
enters the U.S.  The number of admis-
sions counted is consistent with the INS
role in screening persons at entry into the
United States and tallying each individu-
al (entry) inspected.  Clearly, admission
numbers overstate the number of individ-
uals actually involved.  The count of NIV
admissions or entries is, instead, the re-
sult of an administrative process.
State issuance numbers.  The Department
of State [DOS] counts its issuances of vi-
sas to individuals abroad, consistent with
its role as the foreign representative of the
U.S.  Individuals apply for their visa
through U.S. embassies and, when the
U.S.  C O M M I S S I O N  O N  I M M I G R A T I O N  R E F O R M
R E S E A R C H
P A P E R
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Counting Nonimmigrants: FY 1994
Class of Admission
All classes*
Foreign government officials (& families) (A)
Temporary visitors
For business (B1)
For pleasure (B2)
Transit aliens (C)
Treaty traders and investors (& families) (E)
Students (F1, M1)
Students’ spouses/children (F2, M2)
Representatives (& families) to international organizations (G)
Temporary workers and trainees
Specialty occupations (H-1B)
Performing services unavailable (H2)
Agricultural workers (H-2A)
Unskilled workers (H-2B)
Workers with extraordinary ability (O1, O2)
Internationally recognized athletes or entertainers (P1, P2, P3)
Exchange & religious workers (Q1, R1)
Spouses/children of temporary workers and trainees (H4, O3, P4, R2)
Exchange visitors (J1)
Spouses/children of exchange visitors (J2)
Intracompany transferees (L1)
Spouses/children of transferees (L2)
Sources:  Admissions (U.S. INS 1996b); Visa Issuances (U.S. DOS 1996); Person-Year Populations (U.S. INS 1996a).
*Categories may not equal total because of omitted categories (e.g., fiancees of U.S. citizens, overlapping Canadian
Free Trade Agreement professionals, unknown, NATO officials and professionals, and foreign media).
Admissions
(Entries)
22,118,706
105,299
20,318,933
3,164,099
17,154,834
330,936
141,030
390,001
33,720
74,722
185,988
105,899
28,872
13,185
15,687
6,484
28,055
7,497
43,207
216,610
42,561
89,189
56,048
Visa
Issuances
5,610,953
67,190
4,428,011
216,825
4,211,186
177,815
30,931
219,941
20,955
26,525
104,143
42,843
25,842
7,721
10,400
3,625
19,938
4,372
30,584
166,639
32,151
22,666
26,450
Person-Year
(Average)
Populations
1,444,319
30,997
107,027
86,235
810,067
4,520
54,657
245,319
27,876
22,773
48,815
31,092
8,562
3,328
5,234
2,131
1,822
2,516
16,943
89,651
29,035
20,765
24,207
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application is approved by the appropri-
ate agency, DOS issues the visa for ad-
mission into the United States.  But if INS
admission data clearly overcount the true
number of individuals who travel with a
nonimmigrant visa, DOS issuance figures
do not include persons from countries
with whom treaties permit that the visa is
“waived.”  Nor do all persons issued a
visa necessarily use it to enter the U.S. in
the year it was issued.  Nor do the issu-
ance figures reflect individuals who
change from one visa to another within
the United States (more on this below).
Person year population.  The person-year
or “average” population reflects just the
portion of a year that all NIV individuals
spend in the U.S.  It reflects more accu-
rately, for example, the full-time contri-
bution of certain NIV categories to U.S.
businesses: if there are 100 workers with
an average stay of one-half year, they con-
tribute only 50 person-years’ worth of la-
bor in that year.  Because of the available
means of measuring the person-year pop-
ulation, the figures will be somewhat low
as they do not reflect some NIV individ-
uals who stay more than an entire year.3
The table shows that INS “admissions”
are significantly greater than visa “issu-
ances,” 22 million versus 5 million in FY
1994.  And because the average length of
stay of nonimmigrants is short, as should
be expected, the person-year population
is only 1.4 million.  No one figure is “bet-
ter” in the sense that it is more correct,
3 The INS calculations for the person-year population is based upon comparing departure data
with earlier entry records.  Because not all individuals depart in a given year, especially those
with longer durations of stay such as students or family members, the average stay figure will
be too low.  Hence, the “true person-year” population is some unknown amount greater than
the one shown.
4 Which “number” of temporary NIVs would one compare to the number of legal permanent
immigrants admitted to the U.S. in a given year?  INS data on legal permanent residents
counts individuals and, hence, cannot be directly compared to NIV admissions data.  DOS
visa issuance data more nearly counts individuals like the permanent admissions’ data
published by the INS, but issuances overstate the year-round involvement of temporary NIVs
in the U.S. economy.  Also, the INS (1996b:178) estimates that as of 1992, about half of the
3.4 million illegal population were persons illegally overstaying the period of their
nonimmigrant visas.
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instead each is useful to describe the INS
or DOS administrative burden or, in the
person-year figure, one gets a sense of the
average “year-round” equivalent.4  Unfor-
tunately, counting the non-immigrant pop-
ulation has even further complexity.
CHANGE OF
STATUS ACROSS
NONIMMIGRANT
AND PERMANENT
VISAS
Nonimmigrants do not always remain in
the visa category under which they first
entered the country.  For example, a for-
eign student (F) may become a specialty
worker (H-1B) and later adjust to perma-
nent status.
Unfortunately, there is no reliable data
readily available on the numbers of non-
immigrant changes across NIV statuses,
such as the F to H-1B example above.  In
lieu of such figures we can only crudely
estimate about how many Fs end up as
H-1Bs and, ultimately, in a permanent sta-
tus.  One possible source of information
is INS records on change of status made
within the U.S. that suggests that perhaps
as much as two-fifths of those changing
status to H-1B in FY 1994 previously held
a nonimmigrant visa.5 In any given labor
market that portion may be much greater
depending upon the job possibilities (see
Michael Smith in this volume).
Data on adjustments to legal residency
allow us to gauge the portion of NIV
holders who transition onward to perma-
nent status.  In this volume, David North
estimates that cultural exchange visitors
(J) and foreign students (F) have low rates
of direct adjustment, with an estimated
one-sixth of Fs adjusting to permanent res-
ident status.6  Both the intracompany
transferees (L) and skilled workers (H-1B)
5 In FY 1995, there were more than 26,000 changes of status to H-1B, out of a possible 65,000
H-1B approvals.  Most were from the foreign student NIV (F) (Special tabulations of INS
district offices made available to the Commission).
6 A crude, lower-bound estimate places about one-fifth of foreign students moving both from
F directly and indirectly through H-1B to any permanent status (calculated from North’s F
and H adjustments to LPR status; and 1995 INS Service Center data [F to H] over DOS  of
F issuances five years previously [F to H status change]).
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have substantially higher adjustment
rates—a little more than one-fifth of trans-
ferees and possibly as many as four-tenths
of H-1B workers adjust to permanent res-
ident status.  These relative rates are what
might be expected.  Students may have
low adjustment rates because, once their
training is finished, their purpose for stay-
ing is finished as well.  And, as the num-
ber of students is substantially greater than
that of specialty workers, it is not possi-
ble for a high proportion of students to
adjust into the numerically-limited em-
ployment categories.
By contrast, specialty workers (H-1B) and
intracompany transferees (L) are exempt
from provisions precluding issuance of
NIVs to those who intend to reside per-
manently in the U.S.  Some of these work-
ers enter with temporary work visas to
bridge the period needed to obtain per-
manent immigrant visas.  In other cases,
employers choose to retain temporary
workers, to capitalize on skills learned in
the U.S.
It is also interesting to note the perma-
nent categories into which nonimmi-grants
adjust.7  Although nonimmigrants adjust
into all permanent resident statuses, as of
FY 1994 foreign students (F) were most
likely to adjust into the following perma-
nent visa categories: exempt spouse (47
percent) and skilled employment-based
preference (EB-3) (44 percent).  In con-
trast, about one-half of both specialty
workers (H-1B) and exchange visitors (J)
adjust through the skilled employment-
based preference, while intracompany
transferees (L) adjust into the U.S. prima-
rily as priority employment-based work-
ers (EB1) (81 percent).  Perhaps it is no
surprise that one-third of the H-1B ad-
justers report science or  engineering  oc-
cupations, while 90 percent of intracom-
pany transferees (L) report executive or
administrative occupations at adjustment.
On the other hand, neither foreign stu-
dents (F) nor exchange visitors (J) fall
clearly into any occupational grouping.
Several articles in this volume assess this
process of moving from one status into
another.
7 Special tabulations by the Commission of only principal visa holders from the INS FY 1994
permanent admissions public use data.
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Changing Status Not a Problem.  Charles
Keely makes the case that the process of
changing status and adjusting to perma-
nent residency is a natural consequence
of the U.S. admissions’ system and the
global economy.  He believes the process
is not detrimental and is, in fact, a favor-
able phenomenon.  Papade-metriou and
North recommend that the adjustment
process be recognized and, as they regard
adjusters as presumable successes who
have gained valuable experience in the
United States, they, too, view the process
in a favorable light.
These authors recommend some type of
dual-track temporary visa that acknowl-
edges the process of adjustment to per-
manent residency status.  The details of
how such a visa would be granted and its
terms are not spelled out, however.  If a
special visa were not created, the deci-
sion to grant permanent residency to an
individual might somehow take into ac-
count their experience as a nonimmigrant.8
And if there remains a concern about the
ease of shifting status, North recommends
that a sizable fee be assessed against the
employer who petitions for a permanent
visa.
Length of Stay.   Despite the overall pos-
itive aspects of this process of change,
several authors recognize potential abus-
es by individuals whose initial intent in
obtaining a NIV is to remain permanent-
ly.  They imply that reducing the length
of stay permitted on a NIV would reduce
such abuse.  Such shortening of the time
frame for action would be consonant with
the purpose of a temporary stay, would
acknowledge that some NIV stays with
renewal options, etc., are too lengthy, and
would lessen the possibility of individu-
als acclimating to the U.S. and drifting
from one status to another.  Both
Papademetriou and Gregory DeFreitas
recommend that the stay permitted on
working visas (H-1B) be reduced, to three
and two years, respectively, with no pos-
sibility of renewal without return to the
home country.   Barry Chiswick and North
recommend that to keep individuals from
endlessly pursuing education (often as a
8 North implies that, if a point system was created to screen applicants (see text below), additional
points could be granted for relevant experience.
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screen for unauthorized employment),
student visas (F) be closely monitored with
regular evaluations of academic progress.
Return Requirements.  Another way in
which to deal with the changing status
phenomenon might be to require that, at
the end of their temporary stay, NIV hold-
ers return to their country of origin for
some period of time.  Only after that re-
turn requirement was finished could the
individual reapply for a U.S. visa.  This is
a requirement for some cultural exchange
visitors (J) and could be applied to other
NIVs as well.  North, for example, recom-
mends an option that would impose a
two-year return on foreign students.
Keely, while not advocating a return re-
quirement for foreign students, makes a
clear distinction between foreign students
who pursue higher education with inde-
pendent financing and those who receive
funding from their home government, in-
ternational organizations, or scholarship
programs intent on aiding international
development by education.  If return re-
quirements are put into place, he argues
compellingly that return should be re-
quired only of students whose education
is intended to benefit their nation of ori-
gin.  DeFreitas would require working H-
1B visa holders to leave the U.S. for one
year after their temporary stay ended.
TEMPORARY
WORKERS IN A
POSTINDUSTRIAL
ECONOMY
Both Demetrios Papademetriou and
Charles Keely present the big picture of
the role of temporary foreign workers in
a postindustrial economy.  Global firms
and fast-evolving, knowledge-based prod-
ucts demand a very different perspective
than yesterday’s.  Today’s knowledge in-
dustries must be fast moving and their
product, unlike yesterday’s industries,
does not become more expensive to pro-
duce as raw materials are used up—a pro-
cess that takes time.  By extension, to-
day’s knowledge industries cannot treat
all workers as essentially interchangeable;
training takes time and may never fully
compensate for a foreigner’s specialized
experience in a desired foreign market.
Contemporary knowledge industries face
steep, up-front development costs that are
recouped by volume (and ever cheaper)
U.S.  C O M M I S S I O N  O N  I M M I G R A T I O N  R E F O R M
R E S E A R C H
P A P E R
- 11 -
sales, and the race for market share goes
to those who get their product out first.
Getting the right worker with specific
qualifications for short-term needs can be
very important in these competitive mar-
ketplaces.  Examples abound in pharma-
ceuticals, electronics, or computer soft-
ware development, but the pace of the
marketplace often is replicated in tradi-
tional industries like automobile manu-
facturing that market state-of-the-art au-
tos on short cycles and produce just-in-
time.
Positive Role of Foreign Workers.
Against this backdrop, some believe re-
strictions on high-skilled temporary work-
ers could well have adverse effects on the
U.S. economy and its resident workforce.
Keely argues that the genesis of those
advocating severe restrictions is rooted,
not only in a profound misunderstanding
of the reality of post-industrial economies,
but in the evolution of nonimmigrant
policy and procedures.  He traces NIV
history from a passive admissions policy:
employment-based immigrants entered
unless the Secretary of Labor took steps
to prevent entry based on a complaint or
large level of petitioning by a single em-
ployer.  However, after the Immigration
Act of 1965, a more active process was
introduced that Keely says:
. . . institutionalized anxiety about
the impact of immigration on the
labor force. Dimensions of the
economy were pitted against one
another in an adversarial way, as
if labor force development is a
zero sum game.
The legal profession and adversarial pro-
cedures have become integral parts of the
admissions’ system for both permanent
applicants and nonimmigrants and Keely
believes “it is virtually naive to suggest
that it could be otherwise;” however, the
heritage of this adversarial mentality of-
ten is based on the assumption that the
labor force is static like a fixed pie.  Keely
argues the restrictive and bureaucratic
procedures that result from this heritage
can run against the needs of a modern
economy for flexibility, timeliness, and
access to a global labor force.  Most of the
authors would concur that an emphasis
on facilitating employers’ genuine needs is
in the national interest and can make the
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U.S. more globally competitive to the
benefit of U.S. workers.
Areas of Concern.  Nevertheless, these
chapters raise areas of concern, especially
with the number of H-1B workers in-
volved and the special features of their
employment that may contribute to some
adverse impacts.  As David North argues:
. . . when there are concentrations
of alien workers in a given labor
market . . . there are likely to be
problems of labor market distor-
tion lower than normal wages,
higher than normal unemploy-
ment. These problems are likely
to be aggravated when the work-
ers involved have few rights or
few perceived rights (such as the
H-2A farm workers and the new-
ly-arrived Indian programmers).
Where North argues that the long-term
impact of the student and cultural ex-
change categories are “bland or scattered,”
he classifies the skilled worker as having
an impact “of some concern.”  His con-
cern is bolstered by “plenty of noise” in
certain occupational sectors; North pays
particular attention to the fields of sci-
ence and engineering that are believed to
already have an oversupply of workers
(North 1995;  see also Anderson, 1996).
Gregory DeFreitas also articulates con-
cerns about the number of foreign work-
ers now in high-skilled U.S. occupations
and argues that all—permanent and tem-
porary—skill-based admissions be closely
regulated.  Although many economists
argue that immigrants should be selected
on the basis of their skills, they seem im-
plicitly to assume either that highly-skilled
workers are not adversely impacted by
increases in immigration or that any im-
pacts are small and quickly responded to
by U.S. professionals without broader
ramifications. There are, however, a few
studies that do find the possibility for
direct competition between foreign and
U.S. professionals, especially among per-
manent residents, and DeFreitas notes
that:
. . . in an era of widespread cor-
porate downsizing, claims of
skilled labor shortages have raised
growing suspicions.  Unlike the
early 1980s, the majority of per-
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manent layoffs now are occurring
among college-educated employ-
ees.  The share of job losses ac-
counted for by those earning at
least $50,000 has doubled since the
eighties.
If wage depression does occur among
skilled workers it might be associated with
lowered demand and less opportunity for
upward mobility of low-skilled U.S. work-
ers.  And there may be further complica-
tions in relying on skilled foreign labor
that are raised by use of H-1B workers.
DeFreitas argues that the current Labor
Condition Application [LCA] does not ad-
equately protect the U.S. worker from
being replaced by an H-1B; nor does the
LCA hold the ultimate employer respon-
sible for the attested wage rates and work-
ing conditions of the H-1B worker.  This
can encourage the growth of job shops
with the attendant potential for misuse of
the H-1B program.   Further, DeFreitas
believes the program itself can sew the
seeds for increasing outsourced jobs
abroad because the H-1B worker, once
trained in the U.S. and familiarized with
corporate needs, becomes an ideal jobber
when he or she returns home.  He argues
that “what is needed now is more, not
less, limitation on and monitoring of skill-
based temporary immigration programs.”
These themes surface not only from
DeFreitas’ close observation of the labor
market and the limited number of official
documents and media coverage that deal
with foreign workers, but also in two field
studies reported on in this volume: both
were conducted on the H-1B labor force
in 1994-1995, two years after the imple-
mentation of the Immigration Act of 1990
and in globally competitive industries
undergoing downsizing and restructuring.
Houston Field Study.  Jacqueline Hagan
and Susana McCollom undertook a study
of H-1Bs employed in about thirty com-
puter programming and research organi-
zations in the Houston metropolitan area.
Their research found circumstances con-
sistent with the nature of spot shortages
that occur in fast-changing, globally-re-
sponsive businesses, at least in the case of
the highly-specialized skills required in
Houston’s research sector:
Given what looks like a robust
labor market in Houston for com-
R E S E A R C H
P A P E R
- 14 -
U.S.  C O M M I S S I O N  O N  I M M I G R A T I O N  R E F O R M
puter analysts and programmers,
and for high level researchers in
faculty positions, we were initial-
ly at a loss to explain what we
encountered in the field: unem-
ployed and underemployed com-
puter programmers and analysts
and an increasingly tight labor
market for faculty positions.
Yet, employers reported a need for H-1B
workers because they were unable to find
U.S. workers.  A spot shortage appeared
to be indicated in the case of positions at
university or private research settings
which have gone “unfilled for months or
years” because a very specific set of skills,
say in robotics development, is sought.
In such instances the H-1B workers, some
of whom were research assistants in such
settings, provided a valuable resource for
the U.S. with seemingly little adverse
impact on U.S. workers.
On the other hand, the computer program-
ming field has developed an outsourcing
strategy that involves job shops that take
on the production work of larger software
development firms, pointing to potential-
ly adverse outcomes in the H-1B program.
These shops permit the larger firms to get
production work done as needed without
employing year-round employees.  Unfor-
tunately, the authors suggest, the incen-
tives for job shops to be competitive in
lower-end programming work can lead to
adverse outcomes for the H-1B worker
and for similarly-skilled U.S. workers.  In
the case Hagan and McCollom elaborate
on,
H-1B workers were recruited abroad and,
once in the U.S., were paid less and placed
in poorer working conditions than similar
U.S. workers in the same organization.
And the skills they needed were not nec-
essarily those for which the employer
advertised.  This research suggests sys-
tematic violation of the employers’ H-1B
attestation that could place H-1Bs in un-
fair competition with U.S. workers with
the requisite education, of whom there are
many in the Houston area.
San Francisco Field Study.  In field work
on high-tech workers, Michael Smith asks,
“Who is the employer?” and “What is the
problem?”   His study gathered qualita-
tive data through open-ended interviews
with “all parties involved in the recruit-
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ment, employment, and regulation of for-
eign nonimmigrant skilled workers” (i.e.,
employers, workers, and various repre-
sentative groups).  Most of the H-1Bs had
master’s degrees and most of these for-
eign workers had received that degree in
the U.S. while on an F-1 student visa (one
estimate is as many as 70 percent).  Em-
ployers reported that because technolo-
gies change so rapidly, they must hire
applicants who already possess the spe-
cialized skills the employers require.
Several computer consulting firms stud-
ied had changed their use of visas in re-
sponse to the tightening of wage compli-
ance and stricter B-1 enforcement.  The
consultants reported that the longer du-
ration of stay permitted by the H-1B visas
is reducing the number of workers who
return to their home country and increas-
ing those who stay permanently.  Oddly,
these consultant were critical of the client
firms that hired them for not investing in
the training of an available labor pool of
U.S. workers displaced by the corporate
downsizing of recent years.  For their part,
U.S. workers believed that the Immigra-
tion Act of 1990 encouraged the expan-
sion of foreign-run consulting firms that
now underbid U.S. consulting firms.  All
parties agreed that H-1Bs received lower
wages in consulting firms than their U.S.
counterparts.  While industrial restructur-
ing and, more particularly, corporate
downsizing are the major forces behind
poorer working conditions for laid-off
workers, both appear here to be reinforced
by the related growth of subcontracted
work.  When job shops are used as mid-
dlemen to provide low-cost production
programmers to client firms—private or
public—the potential for abuse and dis-
placement may well increase.
At the same time, U.S. workers in Smith’s
study argued that the just-in-time skills
employers claim they require is not, in
fact, consonant with the prevailing prac-
tice to train and the time taken to famil-
iarize oneself with a new client firm.  For
their part, professional and union associ-
ations reported three problem areas in the
H-1B visa: the ultimate employer is
masked; the workers have little security
and thus tend not to complain about de-
pressed wages; and the prevailing wage
calculation produces low average wages.
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In contrast, the study found that H-1B
workers in biotechnology firms pre-sented
a different picture.  Here Ph.D.s recruited
internationally (in a search process that
might take as long as six months) were
hired as project managers and
postdoctoral researchers.  Findings here
do not indicate wage depression or job
displacement.  In the university teaching
and research settings, H-1Bs tended to be
hired as faculty or postdoctoral research-
ers.  But, while faculty hires required a
substantial investment in hiring the very
best, postdoctoral student positions were
more plentiful and appeared more likely
to misuse the H-1B visa.  As some argue,
such findings suggest that foreign
postdoctoral students dominate these po-
sitions while many U.S. graduates, de-
terred by the low wages, look for work in
the private sector.
Comments on the
Current System
Having identified both strengths and
weaknesses of the current system for ad-
mitting foreign workers, the authors
present a range of recommendations to
address problems in the current system.
For the most part their recommendations
focus on the H-1B.
DeFreitas recommends greater control and
more protections, measures that go even
further than those advocated by DOL
(Reich 1995).  He would restrict working
visa applications to DOL-determined
shortage occupations, require an applica-
tion fee, reduce the permitted stay to two
years, with a minimum one-year proba-
tion from applying for permanent residen-
cy following the stay,9 apply additional
employer attestations that protect U.S.
workers (provisions against layoffs, lock-
outs, strike, and demonstration of “sub-
stantial and continuous efforts to fill the
jobs for which they currently desire for-
eign workers”), and apply H-1B regula-
tions to all work sites where H-1Bs are
working.  His recommendations would
apply to all working visas.
9 This recommendation is intended to reduce the waiting period for permanent residency
applications and to reduce employer dependency.
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All the authors concur in the spirit of the
latter recommendation aimed at keeping
the ultimate employer, not the middleman,
responsible.  As Smith says:
Regulatory and enforcement
mechanisms should focus on the
“real employer,” i.e., the clients
of contract workers, including
holding them accountable for
paying prevailing wages to non-
immigrant workers.
Both Smith and Hagan call for increased
DOL workplace monitoring efforts, target-
ed especially on so-called job shops, and
particularly on prevailing wages.  Other-
wise, perhaps because their field work
found the most blatant visa violations only
in the out-contracting sector, they do not
advocate reforms as extensive as those
DeFreitas proposes.
Smith and Hagan also found substantial
frustration among college and university
employers with the H-1B visa conditions
and with the unrealistic prevailing wage
determination in their sector.  Because of
the importance of this sector, Hagan rec-
ommends the “creation of a special H cat-
egory for research universities and insti-
tutes.”  While Smith concurs that an “H-
1C” visa should be created, he also found
some evidence that foreign postdoctoral
students sometimes compete with natives,
creating a “potential for general wage de-
pression [and] abusive working condi-
tions.”  Therefore, he recommends that
the university visa be restricted to “full-
time, tenure-track, teaching and research
occupations.”  The resources freed up
from close monitoring of these truly se-
lect workers he would allocate toward the
postdoctoral researchers.
North recommends two possible roads to
reform: making a moderate number of
changes in the existing system; or  sub-
stantially reworking the entire adminis-
trative and visa system.  At the least, he
argues for a mandatory return ticket for
all temporary visa holders, elimination of
employer petitions for groups of H work-
ers, the elimination of the H-2 visa, and
the introduction of labor standards into
the exchange (J) visa (or better yet, mov-
ing J-workers into the H worker visa).
Reconfiguration of the NIV System.
North’s more substantial reform propos-
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als involve reconfiguration of the visa cat-
egories, revised screening methods that
would facilitate the process with due at-
tention to protections, and reform of the
governmental administrative apparatus to
manage the entire system more efficiently
and effectively.  North believes several
basic principles should underlie a substan-
tially reformed temporary visa system: the
number of visa categories, as well as the
number of government agencies involved,
should be limited.  Instead of eight stu-
dent and working visas, he recommends
four visa types: for students; for tempo-
rary workers; for intercompany transfer-
ees; and for H-type workers on a track
for permanent residency, a transitional
visa.  Like Papade-metriou, he believes
enforcement efforts should be at least
partly funded by user fees, should be more
efficient, and should target certain coun-
tries or employers with far more scrutiny.
To ensure that individuals leave, he calls
for a required, lifetime, round-trip ticket
for all temporary visas.
Although Papademetriou finds that the
current visa categories satisfy “one or
more of [the basic] requirements” for a
temporary worker system, he also recom-
mends a substantial reconfiguration of the
selection and management systems.  The
restructuring he considers would move
most administrative functions into the INS
and couple a rigorous, though simple,
points test of foreign workers with a more
stringent employer attestation and enforce-
ment regime.  The points test he outlines
would be applied to potential workers,
including H-1Bs, to select those least like-
ly to compete with low-skilled Americans
and those whose skills and productivity
are most likely to promote U.S. economic
interests: employer selection would be
constrained to this pool and they would
be required to file an attestation.  Bypass-
ing the cumbersome and time-consuming
aspects of a certification system (in the
case of H-2A and H-2Bs) could well facil-
itate employers’ access to workers (who
meet the minimum points test).  An attes-
tation requirement likewise could facili-
tate the process and serve as an enforce-
ment tool for what should be (for his rec-
ommended system to work best) a re-
newed emphasis on the enforcement of
the conditions agreed upon for the work
authorization.
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Temporary Workers
in Agriculture: Are
More Needed?
Predictably, in agriculture, the role of mid-
dlemen and its potential for adverse con-
sequences surfaces again with the H-2A
visa.  Philip Martin covers the economics
of labor in the agricultural industry, de-
scribing its historical reliance on cheap,
foreign labor.  It is a story, however, that
differs from the others in this volume.
There have been calls for an expanded
and simplified H-2A program in agricul-
ture, partly by some who want to ratio-
nalize the exchange of labor be-tween
Mexico and the United States.  However,
those most interested in the expanded/
simplified version of a new guestworker
visa are the growers of crops that are
harvested by hand.  Much of the foreign
labor upon which growers of fruits and
vegetables rely is unauthorized. There are
extremely few legal nonimmigrant (H-2A)
visas in use by growers who dislike the
paperwork, the number of labor protec-
tions and requirements, and the federal
control of that program.
There is, of course, a long and complex
history of the demand for seasonal agri-
cultural labor and the employment of au-
thorized and unauthorized workers
throughout the southwest.  California ag-
riculture, in particular, has played a spe-
cial role in most of the twentieth century
debates involving Mexican immigration.
The controversial bracero program brought
more than 4.5 million Mexican workers to
U.S. farms—more than one-half to Cali-
fornia alone—between 1942 and 1964.
California farmers were among those
employers who most strongly argued that
the price of their support for the employ-
er sanctions provisions of the Immigra-
tion Reform and Control Act of 1986
[IRCA] was an assurance of continued
access to legal Mexican workers.  Con-
gress established the Replenishment Ag-
ricultural Worker [RAW] program that
would authorize the entry of workers in
the event that they were needed.  If IRCA
proved to be successful, it could conceiv-
ably cut off the ready supply of unautho-
rized workers and the Departments of
Labor and Agriculture were charged with
determining if a shortage of seasonal
workers developed.  North reports that
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no shortage was found during the life of
the program and no RAW work authori-
zations were given.
When Operation Gatekeeper along the
Mexican border was launched in 1994, and
again, when Congress moved toward
tightening restrictions against illegal im-
migrants in 1995, California farmers
sought to secure legal guestworkers.
Martin notes that the debate frequently is
framed by contrasting extremes—farmers
assert that there are likely to be labor
shortages, farmworker advocates argue
that 10 to 30 percent of farm-workers are
unemployed even during peak seasonal
demand and there is no need to bring in
more workers.  Congress has considered,
and may well consider again, establishing
an agricultural guestworker program that
is either an altogether new visa or a sim-
plification of the existing H-2A program.
Has stepped-up border and interior en-
forcement actually reduced the availabil-
ity of legal seasonal laborers?  Californian
growers Martin surveyed in the fall of
1995 virtually all report an ample supply
of farm workers.  He argues there should
be visible labor market responses, such as
rising wages or increased applications for
H-2A workers, before such programs
should be considered seriously.  Yet, more
than 90 percent of the responding farm
employers reported no trouble finding suf-
ficient seasonal farm workers in 1995; the
handful of employers who reported short-
ages generally did nothing concrete to
obtain additional workers, such as raise
wages, ask the state employment service
for workers, or apply for certification to
bring foreign workers into the U.S. under
the existing H-2A program.  Martin finds
that the evidence and the survey data
support the U.S. Commission on Immi-
gration Reform’s unanimous position (U.S.
CIR 1995) that no new guest worker pro-
gram is needed at this time for California
agriculture.10
10 If there were to be labor shortages that put upward pressure on farm wages, Martin argues,
consumers would likely see little increase in the costs of fruits and vegetables as wages make
up a minute fraction of retail prices.  In the short-run, higher wages might attract more year-
round and more productive labor.  Over the longer-term, he believes growers could even
reduce the demand for labor with capital investments in new technologies and engineered
crops and possibly reduce retail prices.
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Opinions on the H-2A visa tend to be
strongly held.  Indeed, North, who would
abolish the program in its entirety, states,
“This program simply transfers funds
from American farm workers to agri-busi-
ness; it is small but a disgrace.”
On the other hand, Papademetriou does
not find an agricultural worker program
in and of itself objectionable.  He propos-
es that:
. . . serious thought be given to
replacing this category with a pro-
gram that focuses on enhancing
employment opportunities for
U.S. agricultural workers, while
acknowledging the unique nature
of that labor market, its bination-
al (primarily Mexican) composi-
tion, and the historical (and fu-
ture) reliance of that sector on a
foreign workforce.
At the time of the writing of this volume,
his proposals for reform of the H-2A were
still in development.  However, it is pos-
sible to speculate about a range of op-
tions, such as levying a user fee for a U.S.
workers’ fund, testing the labor market
for shortages as DeFreitas suggests, and,
both to facilitate growers access and en-
hance monitoring, bringing into the pro-
cess multiple actors, such as employers,
the Mexican government, and a greater
INS and DOL enforcement presence.
Martin argues pragmatically that the cur-
rent program may be better than some of
the alternatives being considered. He con-
cludes that:
. . . the H-2A program may . . .
not be perfect, but it does look
better than the alternatives . . .
and I find it hard to believe that,
given the history of controversy
surrounding employment of for-
eign workers in U.S. agriculture,
the U.S. will in the late 1990s in-
troduce an attestation program
for alien farm workers.
Recall that the H-2A application requires
a vigorous up-front DOL screening and
must meet each of several wage and U.S.
worker protection requirements: the de-
tails of the visa application must be certi-
fied prior to entry into the U.S.  Simplifi-
cation of the H-2A program could involve
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changing the certification to an attestation
that is not vigorously screened up-front
and comes into play only if there is a visa
violation reported after the worker begins.
If Congress did introduce an attestation
program, Martin would recommend levy-
ing a sizable user fee to be invested in a
workers’ training fund.  Indeed, he ar-
gues for serious consideration to the de-
velopment of additional safeguards if an
attestation-like program were introduced.
FOREIGN
STUDENTS
As Barry Chiswick notes, ”The United
State is a magnet for foreign nationals
seeking university level and advanced
(graduate) level training.”  Chiswick pre-
sents a profile of foreign students based
on administrative data and an annual
survey of universities.  He argues that the
flow of new students has not increased
significantly since the 1960s, but the stock
of students has risen due to longer stays.
Several authors in this volume offer rea-
sons why foreign students are a benefit to
the U.S. university system.  Keely argues
that the number of foreign students can
be taken as evidence that U.S. colleges
and universities are a successful service
export industry with significant global
ramifications:
The American college and univer-
sity system is a valuable service
export that has down-stream
spinoffs as alumni/ae of U.S.
schools move into responsible po-
sitions in the private and public
sectors of their societies.
Barry Chiswick notes that the U.S. most
likely will remain a magnet for foreign
students, especially in the sciences.  Still,
foreign students’ share of the total stu-
dent body is very small and he believes
that there should not be a lot of
handwringing over its possible adverse
effects, most certainly not among under-
graduates.  While foreign students are only
a small portion of the general student
body, a little more than 3 percent in 1995,
Chiswick reports that nearly one-half of
all foreign students are in U.S. graduate
programs where they make up more than
9 percent of the entire graduate student
body in all disciplines.
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The U.S. reputation for graduate training
is well known and many foreign students
come here to pursue degrees in science
and engineering [S&E].  Chiswick points
out that, not only is the U.S. at the fore-
front of research in the scientific disci-
plines, but the jargon of mathematics and
science are both universal and often writ-
ten in English (while the humanities re-
quire knowledge that is highly specific to
a culture or national setting).  Beyond
these commonplace observations, howev-
er, foreign graduate students are an inte-
gral part of the teaching and economic
functions of the modern university: they
learn by teaching and doing research; they
provide a critical tutorial function; and
they constitute a needed supply of re-
search assistants.  With a relative short-
age of native-born seeking advanced study
in science, he notes that foreign students
step in and help keep instructional costs
low and maintain the preeminence of U.S.
university-based research.
Jagdish Bhagwati and Milind Rao specif-
ically address the foreign Ph.D. graduate
in the sciences and engineering
disciplines where they are concentrated.
These numbers have increased since the
1950s until, as of 1990, about one-third of
all U.S. university-awarded S&E Ph.D.s
went to foreign students.  The authors
argue that enrollment and graduation data
support the notion that the increase in
foreign graduate students results from the
greater number of high-quality universi-
ties globally and the lure of flagship U.S.
universities whose very leadership relies
on government-funded S&E education.
For example, the pool of S&E undergrad-
uates has grown enormously in many
Asian countries and the level of research
and training at the best foreign colleges
has come to be highly regarded.  India
graduates 25,000 bachelor-level engineers
each year, of whom only 2,000 graduate
from the elite Indian Institute of Technol-
ogy [IIT].  Yet, the authors report that
eight-tenths of the Ph.D.s awarded to In-
dians in the United States went to these
elite IIT graduates.  They note that “other
nations ‘brain drain’ is our ‘brain gain.’”
Also, the large proportion of foreign S&E
students can be explained by the combi-
nation of the availability (pool) of highly
qualified students, the choice of a field of
study, and the funding structure of ad-
vanced education in the United States.
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They observe that, whereas only 1 per-
cent of the entering class in the profes-
sions receives university funding, and 20
percent of those pursing a Ph.D. in the
humanities and education, 70 percent of
all S&E students report the university as
their primary source of funding—and fully
81 percent of foreign Ph.D. students, most
with limited rights to work in the United
States and often with few personal re-
sources, are in S&E programs.
Indeed, large differences in the availabil-
ity of university funding by discipline may
explain part of the apparent advantage
foreign students have over U.S citizens in
terms of securing university funding.
Bhagwati and Rao note that more than
one-half of African American Ph.D.s in
particular are concentrated in education,
a field in the humanities with low levels
of university funding, which heavily af-
fects statistics on African Americans.11
Frank Morris in this volume argues, nev-
ertheless, that even in education 12 per-
cent of African Americans report being
primarily funded by the university as com-
pared to 28 percent of foreign doctorates.
He and North share a concern that native
and minority graduate students are not
financed as readily as foreign students.
Otherwise, North reiterates his belief that
the general impact of foreign students on
natives and minorities in graduate
schools—or in the labor market—is small.
The specific areas of impact and the ap-
propriate policy response both deserve
more study.
There is evidence that U.S. universities
prefer minority doctoral applicants over
foreign applicants (North 1995:49), and
other trends make it difficult to assert
direct and substantial minority displace-
ment in graduate schools.  Bhagwati and
Rao note that the pool of African Ameri-
can students with S&E bachelor degrees
declined slightly over the 1980s, although
14 percent of native African Americans
opt for S&E degrees (where the propor-
tion relying primarily on university fund-
ing is the same as that of other students).
Yet interestingly, while the total number
of Ph.D.s awarded to African Americans
11 In 1993, 9 percent of all Ph.D.s granted in education were received by African-Americans,
more than four times the percentage of African-American S&E Ph.D. recipients, and more
than double the percentage (4.2) of all African-American Ph.D.s (Thurgood & Clarke 1995:23).
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continued a two-decades-long decline,
Bhagwati and Rao report that total S&E
Ph.D.s awarded to African Americans
increased through 1990.  Because the num-
ber of all natives in S&E Ph.D. programs
has remained constant for roughly two
decades, some observers conclude that the
lack of more native S&E Ph.D.s, of any
race or ethnicity, is due mostly to the avail-
able pool of resident S&E students com-
ing up through the ranks (NSF 1996:2-
15).12
Clearly, there is some agreement between
several of the authors and none strongly
argues for a ceiling on foreign students.
Bhagwati and Rao conclude that foreign
S&E graduates are a boon and that their
availability may actually expand S&E ca-
pacity.  Nevertheless, it is acknowledged
that the potential for abuse of the student
visa exists: Chiswick recommends that
carefully-crafted administrative proce-
dures be put into place and given a chance
to curb abuse of the foreign student visa,
particularly by those who fail to pursue
their academic studies.  The specific ad-
ministrative procedures he recommends
would require that an appropriate college
or university representative regularly cer-
tify that its foreign students are making
satisfactory progress toward their intend-
ed degree.  North, in turn, suggests
strengthening oversight of the education-
al institutions that petition for the right to
admit nonimmigrant students.  To
strengthen the principle of temporary stay,
both North and Chiswick consider requir-
ing return conditions, calling for a pre-
paid return airline ticket for each appli-
cant.  Chiswick also recommends baring
the issuance of any visa to persons who
violated the conditions of a previous visa.
North and Morris share a concern for the
possibility that foreign students may have
some adverse effects for some U.S. resi-
dents in certain fields of graduate study.
Morris’ argument points to a long chain
of causal events starting with a decline in
12 The total number of bachelor degrees awarded in the natural sciences actually declined through
the 1980s; increased and then fell off in mathematics, computer sciences, and engineering; and
only the social and behavioral sciences have showed an increase in bachelor degrees since the
late 1980s (NSF 1996:2-15).  Bhagwati and Rao also note that many S&E undergraduates may
choose employment or pursue careers in more lucrative professions.
R E S E A R C H
P A P E R
- 26 -
U.S.  C O M M I S S I O N  O N  I M M I G R A T I O N  R E F O R M
direct federal grants in the 1970s to to-
day’s university controlled distribution of
research and teaching assistant positions.
The major problem he argues is that col-
leges and universities are now providing
direct funding to foreign students that
could be spent instead on minority, and
particularly African American, students.
He advocates that an “American incen-
tive computation” be made in every state
or federal contract with a university that
supports doctoral students: points would
be given based upon the proportionate
representation of minority students.
North speculates about the balance of U.S.
government monies spent on foreign stu-
dent education and, likewise, considers
regulation on funding.  He suggests a
ceiling on the proportion of foreign grad-
uate students funded by federal research
grants.
CONCLUSIONS
On balance, these articles argue that the
nonimmigrant system meets a wide vari-
ety of goals that are in the national inter-
est.  At the same time, they raise serious
questions about specific visa categories
and some of the regulatory mechanisms
that govern an individual’s temporary
stay.  Readers who go carefully through
each chapter will find a wealth of infor-
mation not covered in this introduction
and summary.  Those steeped in the com-
plexity of the system may wish for more
detailed attention to some mechanisms,
things as nuanced as how and where
employers advertise for residents before
applying for a nonimmigrant worker.
However, these articles add to our under-
standing of the overall effects of the non-
immigrant visa system and provide guid-
ance regarding policies to strengthen its
operation.
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Twentieth-century America, no less than
the America of earlier times, has benefited
greatly from the presence of foreign work-
ers.  Even in the 1950s, when fewer immi-
grants entered the United States than in
any decade since, the U.S. economy may
have been far less self-sufficient in terms
of both talent and brawn than is generally
acknowledged. For example, in addition
to the talent brought in through the fam-
ily and modestly-sized employment cat-
egories, as well as that decade’s refugee
inflows, there were the large-scale “immi-
gration” of Puerto Ricans and the even
larger bracero program for U.S. agriculture,
which admitted between 300,000 and
400,000 Mexican workers a year through-
out the 1950s.  Braceros, who were classi-
fied within the immigration system as
temporary workers or nonimmigrants,
provided a nonresident labor force for an
industry that had faced war-time short-
ages.  Although the bracero program was
ended in the mid-1960s, other programs
for temporary workers have continued to
supplement the flow of permanent resi-
dents, contributing to the robustness of a
complex U.S. economy that spans the
gamut of capital, knowledge, and techno-
logical content—from advanced computer
technology to agricultural production.
Today, the reality of full international eco-
nomic interdependence is an inescapable
fact.  The figures are nothing less than
astounding.  U.S. exports grew from about
$27.5 billion in 1965 to more than $700
billion in 1994.  Imports during the same
period registered similar growth, from
about $22 billion to more than $800 bil-
SKILLED TEMPORARY WORKERS
IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY:
CREATING A BALANCED AND FORWARD-
LOOKING SELECTION PROCESS
DEMETRIOS G. PAPADEMETRIOU
CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE1
1 This chapter is based directly on my work with Stephen Yale-Loehr (Papademetriou & Yale-
Loehr 1996)
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lion (Council of Economic Advisors
1995:274-75).  The total value of interna-
tional economic transactions (imports plus
exports) grew from a little more than 8
percent of the Gross Domestic Product
[GDP] to more than 22 percent of GDP.
By 1991, total international sales by U.S.
multinationals (from exports, direct invest-
ments, or joint ventures) were responsible
for an estimated $1.2 trillion, accounting
for nearly 30 percent of corporate revenue
(Ellis 1994:62-63).   Even more telling, U.S.-
owned firms now are competing with
foreign-owned firms, not only abroad, but
also in the United States.  It has thus
become as difficult and, in many respects,
much less useful to distinguish “Ameri-
can” from “foreign” firms as it is to sepa-
rate “domestic” from “foreign” markets
for one’s products.2  Further, a firm’s pro-
ductivity and competitiveness depend in-
creasingly on its  products’  knowledge
content, on the innovativeness of its pro-
cesses, on “first-to-market” corporate
strategies and on the ability to develop
and exploit global connections by what
Moss Kanter (1995b:153) calls “managing
the intersections” at the “crossroads of cul-
tures.”  The constant need for specific
expertise means that firms must be able
to obtain some of the necessary talent
easily from outside the United States—in
effect, adopting a “just-in-time” approach
to the composition of the work force.
There is no argument among economists
regarding the job-multiplying effects as-
sociated with the employment of such
highly-endowed professionals; thus, U.S.
business should have access to the best
qualified individuals for key job openings.
Hiring talented foreigners at market wages
is also in the long-term interest of U.S.
workers.
Yet, attracting immigrants with the higher-
level skills that our economy needs now,
and from which it can benefit well into
the future, is an option that should be
pursued as just one part of a broad com-
petitiveness strategy.  The U.S. simulta-
2 The “American corporation” has become less and less “American” as companies move
operations overseas and foreign capital pours into the United States.  Between 1980 and 1992,
U.S. overseas investments more than doubled, from $215 billion to $487 billion.  At the same
time, however, foreign investment in the United States more than quintupled, from $83 billion
to $420 billion (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1994:808, 811).
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neously must diligently pursue  policies
designed to enhance the education and
training of U.S. workers while avoiding
interfering too much—through undisci-
plined immigration policies or other ini-
tiatives—with the market’s propensity to
adjust to tighter supplies of highly-quali-
fied workers.  These are the parameters
within which we should expect our cor-
porate citizens to make decisions about
whom they propose that we admit,
through what process, and whether the
person should be admitted permanently
or temporarily—the former typically in
response to longer-term and perhaps
structural needs, the latter typically in
response to shorter-term needs in areas of
ongoing adjustments (Papademetriou &
Lowell 1991).  If the recruitment and ad-
mission principles and the accompanying
mechanism are well thought out, they will
have self-regulating parameters that will
reduce access to immigrants in times of
low demand for labor while expanding
access in times of high demand.
Without a flexible and well-managed eco-
nomic immigration selection mechanism,
many of our most competitive firms with
vast global operations may reconsider
their investments in additional capacity
in the United States.  Firms whose prod-
ucts are primarily knowledge-based, such
as software developers, can choose to ex-
pand anywhere the main intangible asset
they need (knowledge workers) is in
ample supply.  Immigration policy—no
less than policies to improve the quality
of our human resources, maintain an ex-
cellent infrastructure, and provide a busi-
ness-friendly regulatory environment—
must thus support, rather than undermine,
efforts to convince firms that they can re-
main and expand their operations in the
United States and still be competitive in
the global marketplace.
The Immigration Act of 1990 already has
acknowledged the existence of a class of
“global citizens” who are essential assets
to successful economic entities in today’s
constantly changing world.   It more than
doubled the number of economic stream
immigrants; it encouraged and simplified
the immigration of exceptionally-qualified
people; and it responded to the require-
ments of the global economy through
extensive changes to the U.S. nonimmi-
grant system (Yale-Loehr 1991,
Papademetriou & Yale-Loehr 1996).  How-
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ever, it passed without a focused discus-
sion about the human capital characteris-
tics that will be needed from the workers
of the future.  We must engage in that
discussion now and think through more
systematically the foundations—both in
the permanent and temporary admissions
systems—on which the economic immi-
gration stream should rest in the context
of global economic changes and their im-
plications for U.S. firms and U.S. workers.
The essential, and not yet answered, ques-
tion is how to promote U.S. competitive
interests by facilitating access to key for-
eign-born personnel without unnecessary
procedures while simultaneously not un-
dermining the broader social policy goal
of advancing the interests of U.S. workers
overall.
REFORMING THE
SYSTEM: REVISED
CRITERIA AND
PRESELECTION
The selection of most economic stream
immigrants and nonimmigrants must shift
away from the shortage-based, case-by-
case certification system of the past forty
years.  Nonimmigrants who are allowed
to work (H, B2, D, O, P, E, F, J) should be
admitted to the United States to:
n Fill a specific labor need, generally
for a temporary period;
n Discharge our international obliga-
tions under a variety of trade, in-
vestment, and cultural exchange
regimes;
n Facilitate international commerce
and trade; or
n Enhance the cultural and artistic life
of the United States.
To varying degrees, the current nonimmi-
grant visa categories already satisfy one
or more of those requirements.  In some
instances, the present system also incor-
porates job and wage protection mecha-
nisms that tend to focus on the unskilled
and semiskilled workers who have domi-
nated employment-based admissions
throughout most of that system’s life.  In
the future, however, the rationale—and
appropriate selection procedures—for
choosing among possible entrants should
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focus squarely on their capacity for con-
tributing to a technologically sophisticated
and global economy.
Certain administrative and programmatic
guidelines also are necessary to help the
United States select economic
nonimmigrants efficiently and should be
part of any new immigration system.  The
selection process should be efficient,
timely, fair, and transparent for all par-
ties.  Enforcement, including postentry en-
forcement, should become a credible de-
terrent against fraud and abuse.  The se-
lection system constantly should be re-
viewed and adjusted to make sure that it
continues to serve the country’s changing
economic and labor market needs. (Thus,
priority should be given to the collection
and reporting of accurate data critical to
monitoring and evaluating the impact of
any new selection system.)  Finally, the
functions of the various federal agencies
that, in one way or the other, play a direct
or indirect role in the admissions process
should be reconfigured.
Further, the current work-permitting non-
immigrant categories should be divided
into two subsets: those for which substan-
tial changes are proposed; and those that
require fewer adjustments.  The first sub-
set focuses on the H visas —visas avail-
able to U.S. employers for positions for
which U.S. workers are generally pre-
sumed to be unavailable.  (See this
volume’s introduction for a discussion of
the various H visas as well as, more gen-
erally, the entire “nonimmigrant” system.)
The second subset (B2, D, E, F, J, O, P)
incorporates visas for workers whose pri-
mary purpose should be generally other
than to work within the United States with
a U.S.-based employer (B2, D, E, F, J).
PRESELECTING (H)
FOREIGN WORKERS
The H nonimmigrant visa category is the
main temporary foreign worker category
in the Immigration and Nationality Act
[INA].  With some notable exceptions, the
United States had for many decades pro-
hibited the temporary employment of for-
eign workers.  That ban was lifted in the
1952 Act, which authorized the Attorney
General to admit temporary workers to
“alleviate labor shortages.”  In FY 1994,
143,492 H nonimmigrant workers (plus an
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additional 40,490 spouses and children)
were admitted. The size and significance
of the H category hence requires the care-
ful con-sideration of appropriate models
for selecting the foreign workers who re-
ceive that visa.
Currently, the U.S. selects some H work-
ers on a case-by-case basis on a decades-
old understanding of the U. S. economy
and the role that foreign workers play in
relieving labor shortages.  Many European
countries use similar case-by-case meth-
ods.  That concept is strikingly at odds
with today’s competitive realities, where
firms choose workers (U.S. or foreign)
because of small differences in qualifica-
tions (both in quality and, especially, in
the specificity of skills).  Firms generally
believe that such differences can, in turn,
lead to substantial differences in their abil-
ity to compete without any loss in mo-
mentum.
There are other selection methods.  For
instance, one can select immigrants on the
basis of certain analytically-derived
“shortage” occupations (demand test); or
one can select them on the basis of their
ability to meet a set of  skill and adapt-
ability requirements (supply test).
Most of the discussion that follows has
evolved primarily out of proposals for
revamping the selection system for per-
manent immigrants and particularly the
selection formula for what my colleague
Stephen Yale-Loehr and I call the “second
tier” economic or permanent immigrants
(1996:144).  Our proposed system would
have three tiers:
First Tier/The Truly Outstanding.
The top tier of our new economic im-
migrant visa system would be similar
to the current Employment Based [EB-
1] immigrant visa category for “pri-
ority workers.”  Foreign nationals with
extraordinary ability enhance the eco-
nomic strength of the United States
and should be admitted with a mini-
mum set of procedures.
Second Tier/Professionals Who Meet
Certain Selection Criteria.  Qualify-
ing for the second tier would require
a job offer; the worker considered
should have at least three years’ work
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experience and the sponsoring em-
ployer would have to make certain
attestations.  Individuals also would
need to qualify under a selection for-
mula, outlined below, that awards
value points for certain human capi-
tal attributes.
Third Tier/Investors.  Investors en-
hance the economic well-being of the
United States through their capital in-
vestments and should continue to be
admitted, although under an amended
set of requirements that focuses more
directly on the visa’s intent.
As this chapter focuses on nonimmigrant
categories, there is no detailed discussion
of the proposed changes in the perma-
nent system—except for those for the sec-
ond tier.  That tier’s threshold require-
ments and calculable point total for desir-
able traits also is the basis for selecting
workers for the H nonimmigrant catego-
ries.  The proper question to ask in this
regard is how to devise a system that
facilitates the selection of foreign workers
best suited to contribute to the U.S.
economy without harming U.S. worker
interests.
U.S. INDIVIDUAL
WORKER LABOR
MARKET TESTS
The United States uses a variety of sys-
tems for screening foreign workers admit-
ted for work.  I discuss primarily two of
these systems: labor certification (an indi-
vidual worker test that emphasizes
preentry screening) and attestation (a test
that emphasizes postentry enforcement).
Although the former is more stringent,
both are intended to safeguard U.S.
worker interests.
Preentry Tests:
Labor Certification
One way to select foreign workers is to
test individual applicants against a par-
ticular job opening at a particular place
and point in time.  Following the 1965
immigration amendments to the INA,
granting an employment-based immigrant
visa is prohibited unless the immigrant’s
prospective employer first obtains a certi-
fication from the Department of Labor
[DOL] that there are no U.S. workers who
are able, willing, qualified, and available
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to perform the work and that the
immigrant’s admission will not adversely
affect similarly-situated U.S. workers. The
United States uses variants of this model
for its H-2A and H-2B temporary labor
certification systems.
Assessments of the certification system
consistently have found that the system is
excruciatingly complicated (Papade-
metriou & Yale-Loher 1996:104).  The con-
clusions of a twenty-five year old assess-
ment of the permanent labor certification
system by David North (1971) still are
applicable: labor certification had “abso-
lutely no impact on the macro labor mar-
ket” and affected the work force “only
marginally” because it governed the ad-
mission of so few and because there were
no controls over the worker after he or
she arrived in the United States.  Only
about 59 percent of the labor certifications
granted at the time were actually used,
and about 45 percent of the labor certifi-
cations approved were issued simply to
legalize foreign workers who were already
in the United States (North 1971:iii).
North concluded that, while the labor
certification program was “an interesting
(if limited) experiment in social engineer-
ing,” an alternative approach was needed
(North 1971:172).
The Prevailing Wage Issue.  Then and
now the most-often-heard technical cri-
tiques focus on determining an
occupation’s prevailing wage for certifi-
cation purposes and on the effectiveness
of testing the labor market for appropri-
ate U.S. job applicants.  Determining the
prevailing wage is not easy.  For labor
certification purposes DOL uses the arith-
metic mean wage, usually derived from
small, nonrandom samples (U.S. DOL
1995a).  Moreover, State Employment Se-
curity Administrations [SESAs] differ dra-
matically in the care with which they con-
duct their prevailing wage surveys.  Some
states use more sophisticated survey tech-
niques and may allow for fine gradations
within occupations (and as a result recog-
nize more bases for wage differentials)
than others.  As a rule, the statistical va-
lidity of SESA surveys varies from totally
invalid to valid with strong reservations.
The problem has grown more acute since
1990, when Congress imposed a prevail-
ing wage requirement as part of the H-1B
attestation process.  Currently, the SESAs
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receive more than 60,000 requests annu-
ally for prevailing wage determinations
and must conduct more than 10,000 sur-
veys annually, at a cost of nearly $20 mil-
lion to DOL (U.S. DOL 1995a).  In 1992,
DOL created a prevailing wage advisory
panel to review existing methods and pro-
cedures.  The panel made twenty-nine rec-
ommendations for improving the deter-
mination of prevailing wages, including
focusing on skill levels rather than years
of experience to determine where an indi-
vidual fits within an occupational range,
using the median wage rather than the
weighted arithmetic mean in certain wage
surveys, and allowing employers to use
fringe benefits in certain circumstances as
part of the overall wage.  Despite these
recommendations, DOL made no signifi-
cant changes.
Instead, DOL issued a long memorandum
trying to clarify various prevailing wage
issues (U.S. DOL 1995c), some of which
serves only to aggravate the problems.  For
example, the new memo instructs SESAs
to acknowledge just two skill levels for
any particular occupation: entry and ex-
perienced (U.S. DOL 1995c).  While this
makes determinations easier, it does not
accord with business reality, in which
employers may set a variety of skill levels
within an occupation depending on pro-
fessional accomplishments, length of ex-
perience, responsibilities involved in the
job, and other individual and contextual
factors.3  The new DOL memo causes
additional problems by instructing SESAs
to ignore distinctions between public and
private and academic or nonacademic
firms, although nonprofit entities typically
pay less than private companies do, often
in return for making the individual more
competitive for future jobs.
The Job Description Issue.  Most labor
certification-type applications require the
employer to post and/or advertise a job
opening for a specified amount of time.
Many resulting job descriptions are obvi-
ously designed to fit the foreign worker.
Anyone skimming the classified ads in a
large metropolitan newspaper quickly can
distinguish a regular help wanted ad from
3 For example, a computer software company may have five different levels of computer
programmers and pay each level a different wage.  For immigration purposes, however,
SESAs are supposed to calculate just two prevailing wages: entry-level and experienced.
R E S E A R C H
P A P E R
- 38 -
U.S.  C O M M I S S I O N  O N  I M M I G R A T I O N  R E F O R M
a labor certification ad: the former typi-
cally is short and to the point; the latter
are much longer because they must track
the exact language of the detailed job de-
scription filed by the employer on the
labor certification application.  Labor cer-
tification ads, moreover, instruct interested
applicants to contact their local SESA, not
the employer whose name cannot even be
mentioned.
The process often pits clever employers
and immigration lawyers against DOL’s
restrictive recruiting requirements.  For
example, if a newspaper ad is required,
employers may try to place the ad on days
when fewer people are likely to read the
help wanted ads.  Because all U.S. appli-
cants must be considered, an employer
intent on hiring a preselected foreign na-
tional seeks to minimize the number of
U.S. applicants—just the opposite of nor-
mal recruiting practice.4  Thousands of
U.S. workers a year are nonetheless re-
ferred to advertised job openings, but few
are hired.  The complexity and increasing
irrelevance of labor certification regula-
tions thus regularly transform the certifi-
cation process into a cat-and-mouse game.
In the final analysis, SESA and DOL regu-
lators can never be as familiar with an
employer’s business or industry as the
employer, and they have many cases to
decide with relatively few resources.
Thus, everyone is  a loser in this process.
The government loses, in that it is forced
to play by and defend a process that is
resource-intense and perverse in both ex-
ecution and outcome and that offers ample
grounds for cynicism among those who
participate in and observe it.  Many U.S.
applicants see themselves as pawns in this
process, and virtually all SESA and DOL
officials acknowledge that the labor certi-
fication system does not protect U.S. work-
4 Additional “protections are equally likely to fail.  For example, the employer cannot reject
U.S. applicants unless their resumes clearly show that they fail to meet the minimum
requirements for the job.  Even if the resume is ambiguous, the employer must nonetheless
interview the applicant, either in person or by phone.  Further, the employer must contact a
qualified applicant promptly after referral by the local SESA or face possible denial of the
labor certification application.  Finally, employers can reject U.S. applicants only for “objective”
job-related reasons, not for subjective criteria, such as apparent lack of motivation or a person’s
seeming disinterest in the job.
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ers.  The system is vulnerable to those
who would “play” it; thus, some employ-
ers might use the system to bring in their
relatives, while others might—and some
do—pass on the costs of the certification
process to their foreign-born employees
through lower wages which, in turn, ad-
versely affects the wages of U.S. workers.
The current system, especially if it is ap-
plied more stringently,5 as some advocate,
arguably could hamper the efforts of some
U.S. firms to become fully competitive in
the global economy and might even harm
our country’s long-term economic inter-
ests without simultaneously offering substan-
tial additional benefits to U.S. workers.  This
well may be the most telling critique of
labor certification and the most compel-
ling argument for its replacement.
Postentry Tests:
Attestation
Aware of many labor certification short-
comings, the U.S. Congress created a new
method for protecting some U.S. workers
while facilitating employer access to cer-
tain nonimmigrant foreign workers: attes-
tation.  Attestation is a simpler mecha-
nism that reduces up-front barriers to the
entry of needed foreign workers, but still
attempts to protect U.S. workers through
postentry enforcement of terms and con-
ditions of employment. The first attesta-
tion system was enacted as part of the
Immigration Nursing Relief Act of 1989,
which expired in 1995.  Under this sys-
tem, a health care facility had to attest to
six criteria before it could hire an H-1A
foreign registered nurse. Three more at-
testation systems for non-immigrants were
created in the Immigration Act of 1990:
5 Proponents of the status quo claim that the current system has some advantages.  The very
cumbersomeness of the process, for instance, probably discourages frivolous applications.
However, frivolous applications should be weeded out through clear rules and effective,
targeted enforcement, not by making the whole system so bureaucratic that it deters both
meritorious and frivolous applications.  DOL recently has begun a reengineering effort to
streamline procedures, save money, improve effectiveness, and serve its customers better
(U.S. DOL 1995b).
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one for crewmembers in the D visa cat-
egory; another for foreign students in the
F visa category; and a third for specialty
occupation workers in the H-1B category.6
Attestation, at least as presently practiced,
also has a number of shortcomings.  Some
of these are similar to those in the labor
certification process.  For example, deter-
mining the appropriate prevailing wage
can be quite difficult for both the employer
and DOL.  Further, some documentation
requirements of an attestation are quite
burdensome.  For example, an H-1B
employer’s documentation must include
information about all other employees in
the same job in question, from the date
the H-1B labor condition application was
filed throughout the period of employ-
ment.  An employer also must specify the
basis on by which he or she calculated
the actual H-1B wage.  Attestations also
have the potential for becoming pawns in
instances of troubled labor relations if
worker representatives choose to interfere
systematically with management’s access
to foreign workers by frivolously challeng-
ing attestations.
Nonetheless, attestation has several posi-
tive attributes.  If conceived and imple-
mented well, attestation can balance the
need to safeguard and advance the inter-
ests of U.S. workers while offering most
employers timely and predictable access
to needed foreign workers. Attestation
also meets an important public process test
by giving potentially affected parties an
opportunity to know about and challenge
the matters to which an employer attests.
A properly conceived and executed
postentry test can be among the mecha-
nisms most responsive to changing con-
ditions in labor markets, while requiring
the least amount of hands-on engagement
by the U.S. government in an area where
both data and procedures are the weak-
est.  It can also be an inducement to co-
operative labor relations in instances
where workers’ representatives and man-
agement work together to obtain the best
worker available for a job opening.
6 The H-1A attestation process arguably was the most complex and intrusive of the four systems
because it required an employer to take “significant steps” to recruit and retain U.S. nurses.
None of the others places an affirmative obligation on employers to try to reduce their use
of foreign workers.
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Labor Market
Information Model
An alternative way to select foreign work-
ers for job needs/openings is to use gen-
eralized labor market information [LMI].
Unlike the individual worker evaluation
model, this method focuses on making
judgments about labor shortage and sur-
plus occupations on the basis of general
labor market information gathered prima-
rily from national level data.  Employers
would be allowed to bring in foreign
workers freely for occupations that are de-
termined to have a labor shortage.  In
theory, an LMI method has several ad-
vantages over labor certification, particu-
larly in terms of costs and responsiveness.
However, the disadvantages of an LMI
approach strongly outweigh its potential
advantages.  First, the use of LMI to cat-
egorize occupations appears more “scien-
tific” and “rigorous” than it really is.  First,
it creates an illusion of  objectivity while,
in fact, it relies to a very substantial de-
gree on subjective judgments.  Second, the
data on which a LMI approach would rely
were developed for other purposes and
do not measure the precise concepts
needed.  Third, most occupational short-
ages are relatively brief in duration and
all shortages are dynamic; some of the
data used to identify shortages simply
may be picking up indications that the
market is adjusting.  Fourth, even if the
U.S. government could identify occupa-
tional shortages appropriately and in a
timely manner, it could not ensure the
timely admission of immigrants with those
skills.  Finally, the fundamental weakness
of a LMI approach is that national data
tend to “average out” and, thus, routinely
mask often-substantial regional and local
variations.7
7 In practical terms, the geographic concentration of immigrants probably means that only a
few local area lists of shortages would be used frequently.  Legally, however, it might be
necessary to develop comparable lists for all localities.  Moreover, such a nationwide list
would be quickly outdated, resource-intensive to update, and still would not prevent employers
from claiming that, despite the LMI evidence, they could not obtain a worker for a specific
need.  Such a claim would return the entire process to its case-by-case determination roots.
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Point System Model
A point system model of economic stream
immigration, at least as practiced by
Canada and Australia—the other two ma-
jor “countries of immigration”—differs
from both the individual worker job evalu-
ation model and the labor market infor-
mation concept.  Unlike the former, a point
system does not focus on matching a spe-
cific immigrant with a specific job offer in
a case-by-case process.  Unlike the latter,
a point system neither directs, nor neces-
sarily limits, immigrants to working in
predetermined labor shortage occupations.
Instead, the point system evaluates and
selects immigrants based on certain hu-
man capital characteristics deemed to
advance the host country’s interests.
A point system theoretically has several
advantages over either an individual-
worker job evaluation or a LMI model. A
point system can inspire confidence as a
policy instrument that applies universal
and ostensibly objective selection criteria;
hence, it is less susceptible to criticisms
associated with the case-by-case system’s
gamesmanship between employers and
bureaucrats.  Further, a point system’s ap-
pearance of impartiality may discourage
most of those who otherwise might have
been apt to challenge it, while its techni-
cal complexity and apparent responsive-
ness to long-term labor market needs is
reassuring to many who worry about
possibly adverse effects on domestic work-
ers.  Finally, depending on the attributes
the point system emphasizes, the model
may reassure members of the receiving
society that economic stream immigrants
are selected on the basis of criteria that
place high priority on the country’s glo-
bal competitiveness.  This makes the sys-
tem more politically defensible than any
of the alternatives discussed above.
Can a point system work in the United
States?  The answer is a qualified “yes,
but only if the concept is adapted to the idio-
syncrasies of the U.S. economy, philosophy,
and labor market realities.”  On the one
hand, despite inevitable variations that
stem from location and history, the ori-
gins, scale, and composition of most im-
migration to Canada and Australia has
not looked all that different from ours.
On the other hand, a point system would
require special discipline to be effective in
the United States.
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Our system of government is different
enough from the Canadian or Australian
ones to affect a key feature of a point
system, its flexibility.  The appeal of a
point system is that it can respond quickly
to shifting priorities and the Canadian and
Australian parliamentary systems are
well-suited to make these changes.  At
the minister’s direction, the immigration
ministry professionals come up with a
plan to adjust the point categories and
their relative weights, and Cabinet ap-
proval can be obtained quickly.  In many
instances, the changes can be accom-
plished administratively, under broad
grants of authority delegated by the rel-
evant statute.  By contrast, the U.S. sys-
tem is deliberately designed to work more
slowly.  On immigration, most of the in-
put comes from the legislative (and even
judicial) branches, as well as from affected
constituencies.  Under a point system,
Congress would have to be willing to del-
egate many of the details to the executive
branch, and the executive branch would
have to take on significant responsibility
for managing such a system.8
PRESELECTION AND
H NONIMMIGRANTS
Despite these cautionary notes, the advan-
tages of adopting a point-like system in
the United States are clear and compel-
ling in the case of H nonimmigrant work-
ers.  Such a system would shift the focus
from an almost exclusive emphasis on
shortages to enhancing the United States
economic posture.  Properly conceived
and implemented, a point-like system
would allow the U.S. government to do
what it can be fairly good at, particularly
when it does so in cooperation with the
private sector, rather than forcing it to do
what it is least good at, i.e., performing
burdensome and ultimately unsatisfactory
case-by-case and similar preentry evalua-
tions.
8 A point-like system places a great burden on the immigration agency.  Done properly, it
requires the creation of a data collection, analysis, and evaluation mechanism that allows
policymakers to determine whether the chosen categories are the right measures of economic
growth and personal success and whether the categories are weighted properly.  Further, the
immigration agency would have to develop a more appropriate administrative infrastructure
and a more open and cooperative institutional culture.
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Employer Sponsors and Flexible Limits.
Under our proposed reforms, employers
would continue to make all selection de-
cisions,9 but they would have to select
from a pool of individuals who can pass
a threshold of requirements,  including a
points test.
Employers also would be required to at-
test to certain recruitment, wage, and em-
ployment conditions.  Numerical limita-
tions would be imposed, as, from a politi-
cal perspective, Congress and the Ameri-
can people would not tolerate even the
theoretical possibility of open-ended im-
migration however robust the safeguards
or well-administered the system. For that
reason, Congress should set initial caps
for the H-1 and H-2B categories but allow
a year’s ceiling to be based on the previ-
ous year’s actual usage plus an increment
of, say, 10 percent.  This would offer
greater flexibility than a  hard  cap, which
would require legislation to amend. This
method would also allow employers ad-
equate access to foreign workers if the
economy suddenly improves or if they
encounter a true shortage of talented U.S.
workers in an emerging growth area and
need more foreign workers with highly-
specific skills.
Selection Criteria for a Point Test. In ad-
dition to employer sponsorship and attes-
tations, there should be prior requirements
that employers and prospective immi-
grants must meet if they wish to enter the
immigration sweepstakes.  Employers
must select from a pool of possible non-
immigrant workers who must have per-
sonal characteristics that are essential to
making a sustained and substantial con-
tribution to the United States:
n An educational background that has
instilled both specific knowledge
or technical skills and a facility for
abstract thinking;
9 Not all companies need to be eligible to prequalify for the second tier attestation requirement,
even if they have excellent recruitment, compensation, and employment policies.  For example,
Congress might consider withholding the prequalification benefit from firms: (1) that file
more than a certain number of immigrant visa petitions per years; (2) whose foreign national
workforce exceeds a certain percentage of the total workforce in the company; or (3) that have
been found in violation of any immigration law within a specified period.
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n An age that permits one to make
a substantial contribution to the
economy immediately;
n The language ability and commu-
nications skills necessary to inter-
act effectively with colleagues and
customers; and
n A demonstrated commitment to im-
proving one’s own human capital
endowments.
Numerical weights can be assigned for
each of these preselection criteria, with
different thresholds set for different visa
classes—although it makes little sense to
legislate fixed weights or criteria.10  Con-
gress moves too slowly to enact detailed
changes on immigration and, just as we
want the economic immigrants we choose
to be able to adapt, so too we need flex-
ibility in our selection system.  Hence,
immigration officials should be given au-
thority to change both the criteria for
preselection and the number of points
needed to qualify as economic conditions
change.  Flexibility is essential for the suc-
cess of a modern immigration system and
Congress’ need to stay engaged can be
discharged by requiring that proposed
changes be vetted in advance with the two
subcommittees charged with oversight re-
sponsibilities.  If actual usage increases
by the maximum percentage one year, to
help control the growth in foreign work-
ers in the following year, administrators
could investigate the causes for such an
increase and might choose to raise the pass
mark needed to qualify for a given non-
immigrant visa category.
Attestation requirements.  Employers
would have to attest that they would com-
ply with the four conditions that they do
now for H-1B purposes, as well as a new
recruitment condition.11  First, the em-
ployer still would have to offer the higher
10 It is up to Congress to engage in a dialogue about the number of points for each factor and
the minimum number of qualifying points.  Keep in mind that no selection system can
accommodate all situations; hence, prospective employers of foreign nationals in certain
occupations who are just one or two points shy of the pass mark might be permitted to
submit evidence why the individuals nevertheless should be allowed entry.  Alternatively,
INS might have access to a variation of the current “national interest waiver” test for exceptional
cases.
11 Employers would have two ways to satisfy the proposed attestation requirements:
prequalification or case-by-case.
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of either (1) the actual wage the employer
pays to other individuals similarly em-
ployed with similar qualifications or (2)
the “prevailing wage” for that position.
The current reliance on SESA prevailing
wage determinations should be aban-
doned in favor of developing prevailing
wage and total compensation package
information from reliable industry-specific
sources.12  Second, employers would have
to attest that there is no strike or lockout
at the place of employment.  Third, em-
ployers would have to attest that they
have given their employees notice of the
filing of the attestation.  Fourth, employ-
ers would have to attest that the process
through which the foreign worker was
selected is the employer’s and the
industry’s customary way of making hir-
ing decisions for this kind of position.13
Significantly, contracting with “job shops”
that supply a predominantly foreign work
force would not be considered a custom-
ary recruitment practice.
International Commitments.  These rec-
ommendations for the H-1 category are
fundamentally consistent with U.S. inter-
national commitments in this area.  As
part of the General Agreement on Trade
in Services [GATS], the United States
agreed to freeze the essence of the current
H-1B program but created room for three
possible changes in the future: (1) reduc-
ing the maximum length of the visa from
six to three years; (2) instituting a provi-
sion that would prohibit employers from
laying off U.S. workers and then using H-
1B workers in the same occupation; and
(3) requiring employers to take significant
steps to recruit and retain U.S. workers.
These proposals are consistent with the
first two of these provisions.  Further, the
proposed recruitment attestation require-
12 Currently, H-1B employers also must attest that the working conditions for an H-1B worker
will not adversely affect the working conditions of other workers similarly employed.  This
requirement should be deleted as most of its provisions would be covered under the “total
compensation package” concept and because it has not proven to be a meaningful protection.
13 To understand the industries they regulate better, we propose that INS and DOL, as a matter
of course, include organized discussions with panels of human resources personnel from
various industries in all of their training sessions and meetings on customary hiring regulations.
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ment is consistent with the spirit of the
third element.14
Dual Track H-1.  Historically and practi-
cally we know that permanent immigrants
in the economic stream typically adjust in
a manner that turns the holders of many
temporary visas into “preimmigrants.”  In
many instances, employers hire them for
specific needs, but also to determine
whether they are suitable for permanent
employment.  This occurs primarily in the
current H-1B nonimmigrant visa category.
We propose that, at any time after the first
year and before the three-year period
ends, an H-1 employee could petition for
an immigrant visa, putting employers on
notice that they will not be able to em-
ploy a foreign worker for long periods
unless the worker can ultimately qualify
for such a visa.  Such prospective immi-
grants should be assigned their own non-
immigrant visa [NIV] category and be se-
lected from a pool of individuals with
characteristics that will enhance their long-
term contributions to the economic
strength of the United States, facilitate in-
ternational business and trade, and gen-
erally promote U.S. interests and priori-
ties.
H-2B Visa Category.  The H-2B visa would
be restructured along the lines of the H-
1 and  should be refashioned to be more
than just a catchall category, but rather a
category that focuses on truly temporary
jobs.  Following thorough assessment,
subcategoriess of the current H-2B cat-
egory that are primarily cultural in na-
ture, such as camp counselors, should be
incorporated into a revised and appropri-
ately reconfigured J category, etc.  It is
here that the second strand of the H-1
workers—those who employment would
be truly temporary—would be expected
gradually to find a home.  In reconfiguring
this category, a variation of the double-
temporary standard now in existence (i.e.,
14 These modifications theoretically could conflict with GATS.  A computer programmer with
a bachelor’s degree who speaks only a little English currently can obtain an H-1B visa easily;
however, under the proposed selection criteria he/she might not.  If not, his or her country
could claim nationality discrimination.  The proposed criteria, however, filter an applicant’s
personal characteristics and do not violate the equal treatment principles of our multilateral
obligations.
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both the foreign worker and the job are
temporary) should be maintained, as
should be the maximum number of two
one-year renewals.
By developing incentives and disincen-
tives for the long-term employment of
many H-2B workers, the proposition can
be tested that there are some occupations
in which some of the labor demand might
be satisfied by training U.S. workers.  This
would be particularly relevant and appro-
priate for many low-skilled occupations—
ranging from household workers to spe-
cialty chefs—where a person’s personal
characteristics, such as language, ethnicity,
familiarity with an “ethnic” cuisine, etc.,
is presumably valued by the employer.  It
may be found that, in most cases, one
could no longer show that “shortages”
exist in these occupations.
H-2A Visa Category.   This visa category
allows employers temporarily to employ
agricultural workers following a test of
the labor market and strictly regulated at-
tempts to hire a U.S. worker.  Serious
thought should be given to replacing this
category with a program that focuses on
enhancing employment opportunities for
U.S. agricultural workers, while acknowl-
edging the unique nature of that labor
market, its binational (primarily Mexican)
composition, and the historical (and fu-
ture) reliance of that sector on a foreign
workforce.
CHANGES ON OTHER
WORKING VISAS
The discussion below proposes modest
changes to several other NIV categories
to make each of these visas comport with
the priorities outlined above.  Unlike the
H visa, where the primary purpose is U.S.-
based employment, other nonimmigrant
working visas have other primary pur-
poses.  Failure to mention an existing
category means that no changes are pro-
posed.
B Visa Category.  No changes are neces-
sary in the B-2 tourist visa category.  This
category facilitates international tourism.
In 1994, more than 16 million foreign tour-
ists visited the United States, generating
an estimated $60 billion in revenues (U.S.
Bureau of the Census 1994:264).  The B-1
temporary business category also is gen-
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erally fine in concept, as it facilitates in-
ternational commerce and trade.  How-
ever, concerns about certain types of
abuses—improper use of the B-1 in lieu
of the H-1B visa15—must be taken seri-
ously and addressed through clearer regu-
lations and more active enforcement, not
by severely restricting or eliminating the
category.
Extreme care in changing the B-1 visa is
particularly necessary because of the re-
ciprocal nature of international trade.  If
the United States eliminates or severely
curtails access to this category, other coun-
tries may retaliate and impose similar bans
on U.S. workers wishing to enter and
conduct similar activities in those other
countries.  Our trade commitments have
bound this use of the B-1.  For this rea-
son, radical changes to this visa would
require difficult renegotiations and, if
undertaken unilaterally, could lead to
trade-related sanctions against the United
States.
D Visa Category.  It is unclear whether
this category for foreign crewmen needs
any changes. Very few attestations for
longshore workers under the D category
have been filed since the attestation re-
quirement took effect after the 1990 Act.
As a result, DOL and the Department of
State [DOS] should prepare a report on
the implementation of the D attestation
process that should contain a cost/benefit
analysis of the current regulations and
assess whether such an interventionist
regulatory regime is necessary—especially
considering the small number of people it
affects.  One possible change might be to
negotiate more balanced reciprocal ar-
rangements with key shipping countries,
rather than continuing to impose burden-
some requirements on a wide universe of
countries.
E Visa Category.  The category of treaty-
traders and investors is essential to inter-
national commerce and trade and, insofar
as we have institutionalized that visa’s
15 This particular use of the B-1 visa should be reconceptualized and better formulated to
(1) accommodate the constantly changing nature of international business and (2) provide for
the sound discretion of properly trained visa-issuing officials in deciding whether the proposed
activity is consonant with the visa’s intent.
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regulations in our international commit-
ments, our ability to change the E visa is
severely limited.  Pending proposals for
new regulations by INS and DOS are
nonetheless worth testing.  Among them
are heightened scrutiny of E visa employ-
ees with “specialized” qualifications who
are “essential” to the company.   More
specific issues, such as whether or not the
employer can find qualified U.S. work-
ers, and issues regarding E visa inter-
changes with the L visa category for cer-
tain multinational executives, managers,
and employees possessing specialized
knowledge, might be handled better in
negotiations with other countries to
achieve full reciprocity.  As with the D
visa, multilateral regulatory changes in
many of these visa categories generally
are preferable to unilateral attempts at
closer regulation.
F Visa Category.  Foreign students should
continue to be allowed to work off-cam-
pus if the work is related to their aca-
demic studies.  INS also should  consider
extending practical training options for
foreign students in F-1 and J-1 status so
that employers still would be able to hire
qualified foreign nationals on a short-term
basis.  However, there is at least the po-
tential for adverse effects on U.S. workers
from the unregulated employment of F-1
students.16  For that reason, we propose
requiring employers of F-1 students to file
a wage attestation similar to the one pro-
posed for second tier immigrants and sev-
eral “H” nonimmigrants.  Work authori-
zation for “economic hardship” also
should be maintained, although INS
should tighten its oversight of  such
grants.17
16 Any problem with “oversupply” of foreign nationals in graduate science and engineering
programs should be dealt with by the government and the private sector encouraging more
Americans to enter those fields (1) by getting young people excited about sciences when they
are in elementary and secondary schools and (2) by making more public funds available for
fellowships and traineeships so that more Americans can pursue advanced studies.
16 A report by Casals and Associates (1994) of the off-campus work program found that, while
on average only about 10 to 20 percent of F-1 foreign students obtain work authorization
based on economic necessity, almost 75 percent of F-1 foreign students at one college worked
off-campus under the economic necessity exemption.  Such a statistic raises fundamental
issues about possible abuse of the exemption and suggests that the “primary purpose” for
which some of these students came to the U.S. may have been employment, rather than
education.
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The pilot off-campus work program
should be eliminated because it allows
foreign students to engage in general la-
bor unrelated to any verifiable unmet la-
bor need.  The F-1 attestation process has
not worked; very few employers use it
and, in many instances, schools can issue
work authorization for their students
through other available means.  This rec-
ommendation is consistent with the rec-
ommendations of DOL and INS as ex-
pressed in their 1994 joint report to Con-
gress evaluating the program.
J Visa Category.  This visa for various
types of exchange visitors should be re-
tained because of the very nature of inter-
national cultural exchange, education, and
training.  Other nonimmigrant visa cat-
egories that contain a cultural component,
such as the H-2B and Q visa categories,
should, however, be incorporated into a
revised, expanded, and more stringently
administered J category.  In keeping with
the purposes of the J visa, work authori-
zation should be truly incidental to the
primary cultural exchange, educational, or
training purposes.  To   serve U.S. worker
interests better, any work authorization for
J-1 visitors should require compensation
at full market rates. However, if J-1 spon-
sors pay part of the J-1’s wage, this should
be factored into any determination of the
total compensation package.
One of the J-1 visa programs—the au pair
program—does not comport with the
spirit and aims of the J visa category.
Despite the U.S. Information Agency’s
[USIA] recent attempts to control abuses
in this program and make it more cultur-
ally focused, most U.S. families who use
the program view it first as a work pro-
gram and only then as cultural exchange.
This is one of the main reasons why USIA
has been stating publicly for many years
that it does not feel comfortable adminis-
tering the au pair program.   A radical
restructuring of the regulations is required
so that the au pair program serves the
same purpose it does in many other coun-
tries: providing a mutually valuable cul-
tural exchange for au pairs and the fami-
lies with whom they live.
Further, the administration of the revised
and expanded J program should be trans-
ferred from USIA to INS, the agency with
the broadest mandate and expertise in this
area.  INS already has experience admin-
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istering visa applications of this type, such
as in the current H-2B and Q categories.
It could administer J programs without
significant additional expenditures, espe-
cially since much of the current J program
is run by responsible officers at sponsor-
ing organizations.   The transfer should
be at least revenue-neutral and, in all like-
lihood, could save a modest amount of
money.   Additionally, INS would have
the enforcement oversight capability now
lacking in the USIA-administered pro-
gram.  Thus, the recommended transfer
also would move the U.S. toward the con-
solidation of all functions in the immigration
agency, an objective that undergirds the
comprehensive rethinking of the country’s
immigration function that the
Papademetriou and Yale-Loehr study
(1996) envisions.
REORGANIZATION OF
IMMIGRATION
MANAGEMENT
At present, immigration functions are scat-
tered not only between INS and DOL, but
also among the DOS’s Office of Popula-
tion, Refugees and Migration, the Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services’
Office of Refugee Resettlement, the De-
partment of Education, and USIA.  Al-
most all of these functions could be per-
formed more efficiently and economically
by a larger, reengineered, and more inde-
pendent INS.  Such a change is essential
to a revamped way of managing our im-
migration system.
The immigration function at the federal
level should be reorganized as follows.
The Immigration and Naturalization Ser-
vice.  Congress should give INS an inde-
pendent status that accords with its size
and responsibilities, consolidating most
immigration functions in the agency.  To
make this proposal work effectively, INS
needs to develop a specialized corps of
adjudicators, to be posted overseas, whose
sole responsibility would be to handle
economic stream immigrant and nonim-
migrant visa applications.  This corps of
INS visa adjudicators gradually would
absorb most of the functions now per-
formed by the DOS’s Bureau of Consular
Affairs.  Having this specialized corps also
would help speed adjudication of all pe-
titions at INS regional service centers,
which is critical to avoid delays.
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The Department of Labor.  The labor cer-
tification and related functions now per-
formed by DOL’s Employment and Train-
ing Administration [ETA] would no longer
exist. Its enforcement mission should be
upgraded and the Secretary of Labor
should continue to play a role in the
administration’s deliberations on immigra-
tion policy.
The Department of State.  A streamlined
Consular Affairs Bureau would continue
to perform its core diplomatic-related
functions, such as passport issuances and
citizen services.  The Bureau of Popula-
tion, Refugees and Migration [PRM]
would continue to discharge its special-
ized mandate, but its refugee resettlement
functions, together with the resettlement
functions now residing within the Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services,
should be folded into INS.
Such changes are truly daunting.  They
require careful thinking as to allocation of
specific responsibilities, personnel, and
resources. They also require comparable
changes in the legislative function—a func-
tion that now is divided among too many
congressional committees and subcommit-
tees.  Therefore, an independent study
group, which should include representa-
tives from affected parties, should be con-
vened to examine and report on this dif-
ficult reorganization issue.
Data Collection and Evaluation.  Regard-
less of any changes in the administration
of immigration, there must be a commit-
ment to better data collection and critical
program evaluation.  Few weaknesses of
our current system are more frustrating
to analysts, policymakers, and the public
than the various immigration agencies’
inability to answer many questions regard-
ing the characteristics, behavior, and needs
of their client base with any degree of
confidence or reliability.  It is inconceiv-
able that a country for which immigra-
tion constitutes such an extraordinary
component of economic, social, cultural,
and political change would continue to
tolerate legislating in the dark.  Congress
must make it clear in legislation that it
values such information and analysis, that
it expects the relevant agencies to attain
these goals, and that it will monitor their
progress.
Compliance Enforcement.  A credible en-
forcement regime is absolutely necessary
to deter fraud and deny immigration ben-
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efits to those who do not qualify.  To  put
its limited resources to best use, DOL
should be given explicit authority to tar-
get “high-risk” employers, i.e., those with
high fraud and severe exploitation prac-
tices.  One way to focus investigations
would be to check an employer’s W-2
statements, submitted with H-1 attesta-
tions, against the required wage on the
attestation form.  Permitting anonymous
complaints also would make sure that em-
ployers do not retaliate against whistle-
blowers.  To promote efficiency and pay
for compliance efforts, INS should develop
a fee structure that reflects the agency’s
true costs both for doing a much better
job and for supporting DOL’s enforcement
apparatus.  At present, INS charges only
minimal fees for helping U.S. businesses
to obtain foreign workers, and DOL
charges none at all.  Congress should es-
tablish a funding mechanism that uses
dedicated parts of the application fees for
audits, investigations, and enforcement.18
Better Cooperation between Business
and Government.  An honest and open
dialogue between business and govern-
ment on immigration-related labor regu-
lations is badly needed.  DOL and INS
should focus their regulations and enforce-
ment sharply on targeting egregious con-
duct, allowing the majority of compliant
businesses to make personnel decisions
without having to contend with disrup-
tive and, ultimately counterproductive,
regulations.  Business must, in return, help
DOL and INS to obtain the appropriate
legislative and regulatory tools for carry-
ing out a renewed enforcement agenda.
For their part, the immigration agencies
must seek the assistance of business in
better understanding each industry’s cus-
tomary hiring practices, in identifying
business practices that are out of the ordi-
nary and may thus require additional scru-
tiny, and in devising ways to perform their
responsibilities more effectively.  Such
18 However, INS should not try to make employers pay more than their fair share by creating
numerous “indirect expenses” that the agency claims support adjudication of economic stream
petitions.  Criticism already exists concerning the current examinations fee account.   Congress
also should assist INS in making sure that fees from economic stream petitions go immediately
to the examinations division at INS—without going through the normally lengthy budget plan-
ning or preprogramming procedures.
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negotiated rule-making would accord with
President Clinton’s recent guidelines
which called on  “all regulators to . . .
create grass-roots partnerships with the
people who are subject to [their] regula-
tions and to negotiate rather than dictate
wherever possible” (OFR 1995).
The Problem with Job Shops.  One way
to start a business-government dialogue
might be by focusing on the implications
of recent corporate trends toward flexible
staffing, particularly in high-technology
sectors.  In the name of efficiency, many
corporations are moving away from main-
taining large, permanent workforces and
toward acquiring the services of techni-
cally-skilled workers as and when needed.
It is now quite obvious that a large share
of the most egregious violations of both
letter and spirit of regulations governing
temporary work-related admissions is
committed by labor contractors, some-
times called “job shops,” who offer flex-
ibility to employers by recruiting and im-
porting foreign workers.  Job shops some-
times undercut prevailing wages, create
oppressive employment contract terms,
and refuse to invest in recruiting and train-
ing U.S. workers.  Industry must recog-
nize its  responsibility to work with gov-
ernment to develop ways to curb such
predatory practices, while DOL and INS
must acknowledge reality and the ben-
efits that flexible staffing provides.
Protections for U.S. Workers.  Any pro-
grammatic revisions must minimize em-
ployer incentive and ability to exploit for-
eign workers by paying them less than
comparably situated U.S. workers.  There-
fore, a number of protections must be built
into the system that ensure fairness for
foreign workers and a level playing field
for U.S. workers.  Employers should have
to attest that they are paying foreign work-
ers prevailing wages that include the value
of all the benefits received by their U.S.
workers (bonuses, health insurance, vaca-
tion, etc.).  In addition to strengthening
wage attestation requirements, we propose
limiting the stay of temporary workers to
three years, rather than the six years that
are permitted under the present system,
and strengthening their ability to bargain
with employers by allowing them to
change jobs after the first year if they are
offered higher wages by another employer.
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CONCLUSIONS
Although the current system’s basic ar-
chitecture is fundamentally sound, policy
analysts and others have come to realize
that certain components of the immigra-
tion system may no longer serve broader
U.S. interests well—or, for that matter, the
interests of many of those who partici-
pate in it.  Specifically, reform must em-
phasize: (1) the right mix of incentives and
disincentives for businesses to play by the
rules yet succeed in international compe-
tition; (2) a more realistic, and ultimately
more effective, understanding of what
constitutes U.S. worker “protection” in the
context of immigration and how best to
advance it; (3) a new habit of cooperation
between regulators and the regulated that
could serve as a “partnership” model for
other contentious policy areas; and (4) a
new resolve to identify, isolate, and pun-
ish corporate citizens who habitually vio-
late U.S. immigration laws.
The proposals made here would help to
limit entry of all but the most talented—
or truly needed—foreign workers.  The
threshold for the points test and related
requirements virtually would eliminate the
entry of low-skilled immigrants and tem-
porary workers who are most likely to
compete with qualified U.S. workers for
entry-level jobs.  More stringent require-
ments also should be considered for mak-
ing sure that temporary workers who
come in under certain parts of the H visa
actually leave the country when their vi-
sas expire; such workers should also be
denied readmission for at least a year.
Further, employers should be required to
recruit according to industry standards,
something they are not now required to
do for temporary workers; in particular,
contracting with “job shops” that supply
a predominantly foreign work force
should not be considered a “customary
recruitment practice” for purposes of wage
attestation.  Taken together, these require-
ments would create very significant new
protections for U.S. workers.
Ultimately, the proposed scheme should
be seen as a framework for a more
thoughtful and forward-looking approach
to selecting permanent and nonpermanent
economic stream immigrants.  Although
some criteria for guiding selection—and
priorities and numerical values for them—
are suggested here, the more important
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objective is to generate a dialogue about
a more appropriate way of looking at our
country's needs and priorities for the fu-
ture and the place that economic stream
immigration should play in promoting
those interests.  As these proposals be-
come vetted, specific details may require
reconsideration.  The end result of such a
dialogue should be a more transparent and
robust selection system that is flexible, has
adequate self-regulating and enforcement
features, is consistent with what our
economy “values” and rewards, and is
thus fully consonant with our country's
long-term interests.
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Background
The Commission requested comments on
the nation’s nonimmigrant policies regard-
ing students and temporary workers. For
the purposes of this essay I focus atten-
tion on the following classes of
nonimmigrants: F, H, J, L, and, to some
extent, M.  These are, respectively, the
classes for: academic students (F), most
temporary workers (the various H sub-
classes),1 exchange visitors (the Js, which
includes people doing many things, in-
cluding studying and working), intracom-
pany transferees (L), and the small class
of vocational students (M).2
To complicate matters, “temporary” is not
very temporary in many of these pro-
grams; for example, a foreign worker with
an H visa can use it to work in the U.S.
for as many as six years.  Further, many
nonimmigrants move through two or
more of the nonimmigrant visa categories
noted above while in the U.S., providing
opportunities to spin out nonimmigrant
status to as much as a dozen years.  A
final complication: a not insignificant frac-
tion of those admitted to the U.S. as
nonimmigrants adjust their status to that
of permanent resident alien [PRA] or
immigrants, but they do not necessarily
do so from the nonimmigrant status that
brought them to the U.S. in the first place.
SOME THOUGHTS ON
NONIMMIGRANT
STUDENT AND WORKER
PROGRAMS
DAVID S. NORTH
1 Excluded from this essay are the O, P, Q and R classes.  These are new, relatively small, and
quite specialized, dealing as they do with, among others, entertainers, the more prominent
athletes, and people in religious occupations.  The total number of admissions in these classes
came to 34,443 in FY 1993, compared with 171,829 admissions in all the H subclasses for the
same year.  Similarly excluded for the same reasons are the relatively new class of Free Trade
Agreement nonimmigrants.
2 For a comprehensive, recent analysis of the labor market roles of all the nonimmigrant
programs, see: Leibowitz 1994.
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Before discussing policy matters it may
be helpful to summarize the numbers in-
volved in these programs, the over-lap-
ping natures of the programs, and the
agencies managing them.
The Numbers: The Big Picture.  Exhibit
1 presents two sets of numbers over the
last ten years, showing admissions in the
four broad classes of interest and adjust-
ments from these statuses to that of PRA.
(In the exhibit, as in many of the data sets
of the Immigration and Naturalization
Service [INS], the rela-tively tiny M pro-
gram is merged into the much larger F
program.)
At first glance at the exhibit reveals two
things: (1) most numbers have grown over
time; and (2) the number of adjust-ments
is a small fraction of the admis-sions.  Both
of these concepts are correct, but the nu-
ances are interesting as well.3
A closer look at the table reveals that
adjustments for Hs, Js, and Ls soared in
1992; this was the first year that the 1990
Immigration Act was in full effect, and it
granted adjustments to people in the back-
logs for the employment-related immigra-
tion visas.  Similarly, the num-bers of Fs
adjusting in 1993 peaked as a result of the
post-Tiananmen Square Chinese Students
Act, which permitted such students to
secure PRA status.
The Numbers in More Detail.  While
Exhibit 1 shows the long-term trends in
these programs generally, it lumps sev-
eral subcategories together.  These were
the FY 1993 admissions in each of the
subclasses of interest:
3 Admissions figures are for an event—someone passing through a port of entry—while the
adjustment data count the number of people moving from one immigration category to
another.  A single nonimmigrant can record several admissions in a given year or only one
for a long-term stay in the U.S.; in the classes of interest, the norm is for several admissions
for every individual granted a nonimmigrant visa.  Adjustments, however, except for very
unusual circumstances, are once-in-a-lifetime events.  Hence the admissions and adjustment
numbers are not comparable.
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Exhibit 1.
Admissions of Selected Classes of Nonimmigrants and
Adjustments to PRA from those Classes
(FYs 1985-1994Numbers Rounded to Hundreds)
Fiscal               Admissions of Classes                                Adjustments from those Classes
Year                    of Nonimmigrants                                                     to PRA Status
   F & M       H       J       L    F & M        H        J        L
1985  315,500    87,000  141,800  106,900   22,600     8,000     2,100     6,300
1986  288,400    99,100  163,000  108,000   21,000     9,200     2,000     6,200
1987  288,600  113,500  183,000  108,800   19,600     9,100     1,900     5,400
1988  337,900  133,100  202,900  101,700   20,400   10,100     2,100     5,200
1989  362,800  162,500  214,600  100,700   21,900   11,000     2,800     3,900
1990  355,200  168,300  214,600  102,600   25,100   14,600     2,800     3,900
1991 *366,100  195,200  224,200  112,900   20,900   14,900     2,600     2,900
1992 *393,000  203,100  231,900  120,800   23,600   34,700     6,200   10,900
1993 *394,800  205,100  240,500  132,400   37,900   38,900   10,300     9,400
1994  427,700  260,100  259,200  154,200   29,600   30,300     7,300     8,600
Visa Classes: F = Academic students and
M = Vocational students
The former class outnumbers the latter by about 60-1 and INS merges
the two classes in some of its statistics.
H = Several classes of temporary workers, some highly skilled, some not.
J = Exchange visitors, usually professionals.
L = Intracompany transferees are managers and professionals previously
employed overseas by multinational firms.
             Note: All statistics above include accompanying family members.
         Source: Most data are taken from Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization
Service; admissions data from Table 39 (1993) and predecessor tables and adjustment
data from Table 10 (1993) and its predecessors.  All 1994 data and the totals with
asterisks (corrected data on F and M admissions) were provided by the INS Statistics
Division by telephone and fax.
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  Admissions Classes of interest
257,430 F-1 academic students
 33,379 F-2 their spouses/children
  6,437 H-1A nurses
(category terminated 9/30/95)
 93,069 H-1B specialty occupations
(usually professionals)
 16,257 H-2A farm workers
 15,038 H-2B other blue collar workers
(mostly)
  3,135 H-3 industrial trainees
 37,893 H-4 the spouses/children
of H aliens
197,545 J-1 exchange visitors
  42,911 J-2 their spouses/children
  82,781 L-1 intracompany transferees
  49,642 L-2 their spouses/children
   4,382 M-1 vocational students
     557 M-2 their spouses/children
676,074 Subtotal, primary beneficiaries
164,382 Subtotal, their spouses/children
840,456 Total FY 1993 admissions
in these classes
Clearly people in some of these classes
bring along more family members than
others; presumably this relates to such
factors as age of the prime beneficiary (one
acquires more family members the fur-
ther one is beyond one’s twentieth birth-
day), expected length of stay in the U.S.,
and level of prosperity.  (For example, F
students are young, and H-2A farm work-
ers, who do not usually bring family
members to the U.S. when cutting sugar
cane or harvesting apples, are
nonprosperous.)
The ratio of dependents to principals, as
a result of such factors, is quite different
for the five visa classes.  The ratios among
the nonimmigrant admissions were as
follows in 1993:
Dependents perNonimmigrant
Prime beneficiary Class
.13 F
.28 H
.22 J
.60 L
.13 M
.24 all five classes
Overlapping Classes.  It is useful to note
the overlapping nature of these five visa
classes.  With the exception of the intra-
company transferees (L), none of the full
visa classes consists of only workers, and
none consists only of students who do not
work in the economy.  A hierarchy, from
full-time workers towards full-time stu-
dents, looks like this:
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Work only L-1 intracompany transferees
H-1A nurses (category
terminated 9/30/95)
H-1B specialty occupations
H-2A farm workers
H-2B other blue collar
workers (mostly)
An uneven J-1 exchange visitors
mix of work H-3 industrial trainees
& study
Study + some F-1 university students
part-time & M-1 vocational students
vacation work4
In addition there are the family cate-gories,
F-2, H-4, J-2, L-2, and M-2.  Some of these
family members (spouses and children)
may work (e.g., J-2) and some may not
(e.g., F-2.)
There are often situations in which an alien
could be admitted in one of two or more
of the five classes of interest, usually de-
pending on the decision of the U.S. insti-
tution involved.  For example, a dean of
a graduate school grumbled to me about
a  decision by the Department of Labor
[DOL] raising the salaries of some
postdocs hired as H-1Bs.  He said that, if
the salary were raised too much, he would
simply bring in the desired worker under
his university’s J-1 pro-grams.5  While
there are some mild labor standards in
most H programs, there are none in the J-
l program.
Agencies Controlling the Programs.  One
final item of general background: What
agencies play roles in the control of these
programs?  Thumbnail sketches of these
management patterns will suffice here.
The F and M programs are handled by
INS and The Department of State [DOS].
Educational institutions on the INS-ap-
proved list are permitted to issue the I-20
form to foreign students to indicate ad-
mission to the institution.  The student,
with the I-20 in hand, then applies to a
consular officer for a F-1 visa, which, if
obtained, he uses to gain admission at a
port of entry.  The M program operates in
much the same way.  A student want-ing
to change schools, or to work during a
postdegree training period, needs to se-
cure INS approval.
4 F-1students may work on campus with university permission and off campus with INS
permission.
5 For more on the often very low salaries paid in the postdoctoral positions, see: North 1995:91-
95.
R E S E A R C H
P A P E R
- 66 -
U.S.  C O M M I S S I O N  O N  I M M I G R A T I O N  R E F O R M
All parts of the H program involve both
INS and State, and the Department of
Labor plays a role in some parts of it.
Labor’s strongest hand is in the farm
program, H-2A, where it helps decide the
number of workers to be admitted for a
particular farm and then inspects the
working and living conditions on the farm.
Labor plays a lighter role in the H-1B and
H-2B programs, where it sets the prevail-
ing wage for the jobs in question; this was
a passive process in the past (with DOL
doing little other than collecting paper on
the subject) but has become a more vigor-
ous activity in the last couple of years.
Labor has no role in the small H-3 pro-
gram for industrial trainees.  An employer
in all of these programs must file a peti-
tion with INS for the worker in question
and, if the petition is approved, the worker
then goes to a consular officer for a visa
and then to a U.S. port of entry.
The J-program is handled by the United
States Information Agency [USIA], by
State, and by INS.  USIA approves a list
of institutions that may participate; they,
in turn, issue the IAP-66, the certificate of
eligibility for exchange visitor status; the
alien then takes the IAP-66 to a consular
office, which (usually) issues a J-1 visa
that the alien then presents to an INS
officer at a port of entry.
The L program is handled by INS and
State.  The multinational corporation files
a petition with INS and, if approved, this
leads to a visa issuance by a consulate.  If
the would-be L-visa holder is in the U.S.
legally, then INS can adjust the status here.
Policy Challenges
There are four domestic impacts of non-
immigrant programs:
1. The short-term impact of the program
on the U.S. while the nonimmigrants
remain in that status (or in some other
nonimmigrant classification);
2. The long-term impact on the size of
the nation’s population created when
some of the nonimmigrants adjust to
PRA status;
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3. The long-term impact when other
nonimmigrants opt to stay in the U.S.
in illegal status, a factor that is some-
times ignored;6 and
4. The long-term impact made on the
labor market by those staying in the
U.S.
In addition, one could discuss a fifth
impact, that on international relations.
Ideally nonimmigrants have a good time
in the U.S. and return to their homes with
good images of this country and a desire
to buy its exported goods.  That would
suggest that we: (1) try to make sure that
the nonimmigrants are happy in the U.S.;
and; (2) that they return when their visa
expires.  This is an intriguing line of
thought, but probably marginal to this
task.
The logic of the four kinds of impacts and
the four major programs suggests a six-
teen-unit matrix, and this can be seen in
Exhibit 2.  The descriptions of the im-
pacts are my own sense of the situation
and are designed only to set the frame-
work for the discussion that follows.
There is no opportunity in a paper of this
nature to present detailed documentation
on the costs and benefits of each of these
programs.  The objective is to sketch what
appear to be problem and nonproblem
areas prior to a discus-sion of what might
be done to resolve the problems.
Short-term impacts.  In general terms, all
of these nonimmigrant programs seem to
be performing well for the institutions that
designed them: corporations; the educa-
tional establishment; and the immigration
bar.
Further, with some exceptions in the H
programs, the corporations and educa-
tional institutions inevitably obtain what
they seek from these programs.  Colleges
issuing I-20s, for instance, do not have to
fight to get their students F-1 visas; it is
almost automatic.  As we have pointed
out elsewhere, the universities and the
corporations are the effective gatekeepers
in nonimmigrant programs for science and
6 For example, this possibility is not explored in the otherwise useful paper: Bratsberg
Forthcoming.
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Exhibit 2.
The Impacts of Four Nonimmigrant Programs on Four Aspects of
America
(A Proposed Conceptual Framework)
Nonimmigrant      F & M         H           J           L
Classes/
Domestic
Impacts
Short-term Bland to good Adverse Some adverse Bland on the
impact while on the impact on impact on a labor market;
nonimmigrant educational many labor specialized none on the
status system; markets; no labor market; educational
remains minimal on impact on good for the system; good
labor market; educational educational for business
minimal system; good system;
impact on for business minimal
business impact on
business
Long-term Mild impact Mild impact Minimal Minimal
impact on size (see data
of immigrant below)
population
Long-term Of some Of some Not Not
impact on size concern concern significant significant
of illegal alien
population
Long-term Bland, Of some Bland, small, Bland, small,
impact on scattered concern scattered scattered
labor market
Ratio of Adjustments in the Four Classes of Interest to Total
Immigration 1985-1994
     F & M          H          J          L
Adjustments,    243,000    182,000     40,000     63,000
1985-1994
Percentage of       2.5%       1.9%       0.4%       0.7%
Total
Immigration
Sources: Adjustment data are drawn from Exhibit 1 and its sources; impact descriptions are those
of the author.
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engineering; people they want are allowed
to come to this country, most others are
kept out; INS simply rubber-stamps the
gatekeepers’ decisions (North 1995:37-67).
In some cases, there are few, if any, disad-
vantages to the society or to elements
within it.  There may be some adverse
effects on U.S. citizen executives in the L
program, but I have not heard of them.
Easy access of foreign students to Ameri-
can undergraduate education is a good
thing for the nation’s foreign relations and
for the American students who rub elbows
with the overseas stu-dents. There are
doubts, however, about who is really pay-
ing how much for this exchange.
There are some labor market problems
implicit within several of these programs,
however.  In some, the interests of Ameri-
can workers (including student workers)
have been ignored out of deference to
corporations and universities.  (How to
strike the right balance among these do-
mestic interests, of course, is a chal-lenge
to the Commission and to the Congress.)
The levels of labor market difficulty with
the eight specific nonimmigrant pro-grams
could be arrayed in the following man-
ner, with the most troublesome at the top
of the list:
H-2A (farm workers). This program
simply transfers funds from American
farm workers to agri-business; it is
small but a disgrace;
H-1B. Group entries, as in the case of
computer programmers, are needless
and lead to worker exploi-tation;
single entries are less harmful but
need to be reexamined;
J-1. The problem with this program is
the total lack of labor standards; many
admitted under its provisions are, in
fact, full-time workers;
M. This is a small program and its
short-term labor market impacts are
mild;
F. The short-term labor market im-
pacts are mild;
H-3. This is a small and bland
program;
L. This program has no noticeable
labor market impacts.
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Unfortunately, I have done no work at all
on the 15,000-a-year H-2B program; it
brings a largely blue collar workforce into
the U.S.  The workers include, for ex-
ample, the Jamaican waiters at the Grand
Hotel on Michigan’s Mackinac Island.  I
worry about the need for such programs
and will leave it at that.
It may be helpful to expand the comments
on the two most troublesome of these
programs, H-2A and H1B.
As to the agricultural worker programs, I
should note that I have had a dim view of
them ever since I worked as the Assistant
to the Secretary of Labor (then W. Willard
Wirtz); my principal assignment was phas-
ing out the bracero program, a large-scale
farm worker program then lingering on
from World War II.   We found then, as
others have found since, that American
employers can do quite well without such
programs; that they usually tend to de-
press wages and working conditions; and
that, particularly since the Seasonal Agri-
cultural Workers [SAW] program flooded
America’s agricultural labor markets,
there is no need for temporary worker
programs.
My feelings on this subject were, to my
great surprise, supported by the recent,
grower-dominated Commission on Agri-
cultural Workers.  I was sure that the
Commission would call for an expanded,
easier-on-growers H-2A program, if not a
whole new and grower-friendly foreign
worker program.  Instead it concluded
(Commission on Agricultural Workers
1992:133):
Neither an extension of the RAW
program nor any new sup-
plementary foreign worker
programs are warranted at this
time.7
7 The RAW [Replenishment Agricultural Workers] program was a short-term element of the
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 [IRCA] that was never implemented; it would
have brought in additional farm workers (presumably from Mexico) had the Departments of
Labor and Agriculture determined that there was a shortage of farm workers.  The Departments
found, in the late ‘80s and early ‘90s, that there was no such shortage.  The RAW program
is no longer part of the law.
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The H-1B program presents a much more
complex situation.
On the plus side, there are times when an
employer genuinely needs an alien who
is a specialist in something exotic and no
one in the U.S. labor market really has
the skills.  An oil company, for ex-ample,
may really need a Kazak-speaking petro-
leum geologist to work in both Houston
and Alma-Alta.  This kind of need, how-
ever, is more rare than industry lobbyists
will admit.
Also on the plus (or mixed) side of the
ledger, is the use of the H-1B program as
a transitional status for a U.S.-trained
physicist, for example, who is on his way
to PRA status.  This allows a talented alien
to work in the U.S., though it also can
add an extra body to a swollen labor force
(e.g., the apparent current surplus of
Ph.D.s in science and engineering).
The H-1B program also can be used to
bring in large groups of foreign-born
workers (such as computer program-mers)
to do essentially mundane jobs and, of-
ten, to displace citizen and PRA workers
from these jobs.  The employers, given
the current minimal levels of labor stan-
dards and enforcement, can save substan-
tial funds by providing wages and work-
ing conditions that look attractive, say in
India, but are well below U.S. levels.
The question then is: How can we pre-
serve the beneficial short-term impacts of
the H-1B program while eliminating the
well-publicized harmful ones?
In addition to the labor market impacts of
some of these programs, there are also
some harder-to-quantify impacts on the
public purse.  Lowered wages and greater
unemployment among residents caused by
worker displacement in the H and J pro-
grams can lead to an unknown amount of
lowered tax receipts and increased trans-
fer payments.  Further, we have no idea
of the amount of public funds spent on
educating people admitted in the F and J
programs.
Long-term Impact on the Size of the
Legal Immigrant Population.  Contrary
to the somewhat subjective discussion of
the short-term impact of nonimmigrants
on the U.S., hard numbers in Exhibit 2
illustrate the first of the long-term impacts,
the demographic one.
R E S E A R C H
P A P E R
- 72 -
U.S.  C O M M I S S I O N  O N  I M M I G R A T I O N  R E F O R M
A very large segment of the nonim-mi-
grant admissions in the four classes of
interest does not create permanent, legal
additions to the U.S. population.  There
were more than eight million nonimmi-
grant admissions during the decade cov-
ered by the exhibit and only a little more
than one-half million cases of adjusted
status.  There are two reasons for this,
one statistical, the other real.  First, as
noted earlier, admissions, by their nature,
overstate the number of people involved.
Second, most non-immigrants in these
classes do not, in fact, stay in the U.S.
Looking at the demographic impact of
these nonimmigrant adjustments in an-
other way demonstrates that, in the same
decade, they accounted for only 5.5 per-
cent of the immigrants to the U.S. (count-
ing the legalizations under the Immigra-
tion Reform and Control Act of 1986
[IRCA] as immigrants).  Adjust-ments
from these four classes appear to produce
relatively small numbers and a useful
segment of the inflow of immi-grants.
This is a portion of the immigrant popu-
lation with a great deal of human capital
and, by definition, sustained contact with
U.S. institutions and systems.
I understand the Commission’s desire to
continue a substantial flow of legal immi-
gration, but to reduce its size.  I would,
however, look to flows other than these
adjustments when making most of the
cuts.  Substantial reductions in these
classes would tend to lower the average
educational level of the incoming cohorts
of immigrants.
People in the four major nonimmigrant
classes of interest, however, are not equally
avid to become Americans.  The statistics
on this point are not the best; for instance,
an earlier draft of this paper noted the
following comparison (drawn from Ex-
hibit 2) between admissions and adjust-
ments in the decade 1985-1994:
Class Adjustments as
% of Admissions
J 1.9%
L 5.5%
F and M 6.5%
H 11.2%
All of these comparisons of adjustments
to admissions cover both workers and
dependents, as we are discussing the de-
mographic impact of the nonimmigrants.
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Reviewers of the percentages above sug-
gested that it would be better to compare
admissions in a given year or series of
years to adjustments five years later, on
the grounds that this is something like
the interval between arrival as a nonim-
migrant and adjust-ment of status (for
those who follow this course).  They also
suggested that visa issuance numbers
were better than admissions numbers
because they approximate more closely the
number of people involved in the nonim-
migrant population.  Good points, both,
but they tend to move in opposite direc-
tions.  The lagging tends to increase the
percentages shown above because it re-
lates the number of adjustments to the
number of admissions in years when the
latter were smaller than in the year of
adjustment. The use of visa issuance data
tends to move in the opposite direction
because the numbers of visa issuances are
usually smaller than the number of nonim-
migrant admissions.
So, taking nonimmigrant admissions in the
four classes for FYs 1985-1989 and the
adjustments for the same classes five years
later (FYs 1990-1883), I derive the follow-
ing percentages:
Class Adjustments as
% of Visa Issuances
J  4.0%
F and M 16.7%
L 21.2%
H 38.0%8
8 Data for visa issuances were drawn from Report of the Visa Office, 1988 table XVI(B) and for
adjustments from sources cited in Exhibit 1.  One of the problems with the visa issuance data
system is the fact that in two of the years covered the Department of State failed to record
the number of blue collar H visas it issued (then H-2s) and in the other two years recorded
only a tiny fraction of them.  To adjust for this, I took half the H-2 admissions reported by
INS in those years and added those numbers to the number of H visas that DOS did record.
(Thus, I estimate one H-2 visa equivalent for every two H-2 admissions.)  The rationale for
this ratio is that most of these H-2s were farmworkers and there is a pattern of repeated
employment of specific workers in that program.  Regarding sugar cane cutters, for example,
the U.S. employers and the Jamaican government had directly opposite views on this turnover.
The Jamaicans wanted to spread the work among the rural poor, the employers wanted to
hire back those workers known to be energetic (and docile); so they split the difference, with
50 percent of each cohort of cane cutters being newcomers and 50 percent being predesignated
experienced cutters.  One wonders if DOS recognized the implicit symbolism of its statistical
policy in those years, i.e., that farmworkers do not count.
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In both the cruder and in the more care-
ful comparisons, the class relationships are
about the same; exchange people are the
least likely to adjust, workers are the most,
with the student and international execu-
tive classes in the middle.
It makes sense that members of the H class
were the most likely to adjust; they are
employed on a temporary basis by  U.S.
employers and many are in a trial period.
If things go well, the employer will seek
a green card for them.  My work with
foreign-born scientists and engineers sug-
gests that many of the foreign-born, U.S.-
trained Ph.D.s who stay in the U.S. use
the H-1B status as the springboard toward
the green card.  Most of the H class
nonimmigrants adjusting to PRA status do
not have the education level of the scien-
tists and engineers, but they do have, by
definition, good ties to the U.S. labor
market because, in most cases, it is their
H class employer who files for the labor
certification.
It is not clear why the adjustment rate is
not higher than it is for the Ls; they, too,
are employed in the U.S. and the immi-
gration law makes it easy to adjust them
to PRA status.  Maybe many of them are
genuinely multinational people working
for multinational corporations, simply
spending some time in the U.S. during a
career that will take them to several coun-
tries.
The lower rates of adjustment for the stu-
dent classes does make sense; they usu-
ally are not linked to an American em-
ployer while here unless they wish to
follow an academic career.
Drifting Into Illegal Status.  One suspects
that some substantial, but unknown, por-
tion of the lower income nonimmigrants
in the classes of interest—blue collar work-
ers and vocational students—tend to drift
into illegal alien status.  Certainly this
happened with substantial numbers of the
Mexican nationals who came to the U.S.
to work as braceros (farmworkers) in the
1943-1964 period.
There are, however, no data sets that are
helpful in this regard, and the current and
recent INS enforcement strategies—with
the concentration on the borders and on
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criminal aliens—suggest that INS depor-
tation data can be of little help.  The sus-
picion lingers, however, that some of the
blue collar nonimmigrants, and a few of
the white collar ones, stay illegally in the
U.S.
Long-Term Impact on the Labor Market.
In three of the major nonimmigrant classes
(F & M, J, and L) I sense that the long-
term impact of their adjustment to PRA
status is generally bland (perhaps a little
less so with J than the others).  But I am
worried about the lingering labor market
impacts of many of the H adjustments.
My understanding is that, when there are
concentrations of alien workers in a given
labor market (be it defined occupa-tionally
or geographically), there are likely to be
problems of labor market distortion—
lower than normal wages, higher than
normal unemployment. These problems
are likely to be aggravated when the
workers involved have few rights or few
perceived rights (such as the H-2A farm
workers and the newly-arrived Indian
programmers).
Further, when these problems exist, there
is usually some controversy; the com-
plaints may be ignored by the decision-
makers, but the complaints are there.
There appears to be little to worry about
with the adjusting students or the intra-
company transferees on either ground.
The adjustees seem to be scattered and
the complaints minimal to nonexistent.
But there is plenty of noise about some of
the lingering aspects of the H-1B program,
at least within the fields of science and
engineering.  It appears that the whole,
seamless web of easy access of talented
aliens to U.S. graduate schools, generous
U.S. funding for these aliens at those
graduate schools, world-wide peace, and
(unfortunately) reduced government fund-
ing for research and development has led
to an overpro-duction of Ph.D.s in science
and engineering.  The H-1B program then
facilitates the entry of the foreign-born
Ph.D.s into the U.S. labor market.  The
only clear beneficiaries of this situation
are the institutions doing the training.
There appears to be a need to reduce this
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overproduction; how this should be
done—by changing nonimmigrant or
other government policies—is discussed
later.
How Nonimmigrant
Policy Is Made; Also,
Three Precedents,
Two Works in
Progress, and One
Continuing Problem
Nonimmigrant policies are made in the
United States by legislators, but in most
of the rest of the world this is done by
administrators.
Such policies in the U.S. are highly legal-
istic, detailed, and subject to substantial
reviews by the courts.  This is not the
case in the other democracies.
In the U.S., immigration policy usually
consists of four elements: (1) definitions
of eligibility for a benefit; (2) statutorily-
fixed numerical ceilings on that benefit;
(3) waiting lists; and (4) little admin-
istrative flexibility except for the possibil-
ity, sometimes, of waivers and paroles.
The other two prime, self-recognized na-
tions of immigration (Australia and
Canada) have used more flexible targets
(annually adjusted) to control the size of
immigration and more flexible points sys-
tems to decide on whom to admit.
Until recently, U.S. nonimmigrant policy
contained no legislated ceilings—if one
alien or ten thousand could prove their
eligibility, they were admitted.  The 1990
Immigration Act, however, broke that
pattern by imposing a 65,000 ceiling on
the number of H-1B petitions to be issued
in a single year.
U.S. nonimmigration policy also is suf-
fused heavily with efforts to create, artifi-
cially-level playing grounds for U.S. work-
ers and their nonimmigrant peers.  Thus,
the Department of Labor for years ad-
justed the H-2A adverse effect wage rate;
if a grower could show that he was pay-
ing at that rate and was unable to secure
needed workers (usually a month or so
before they were needed), he could se-
cure the foreign workers he wanted.  The
artificiality of this process was further
accentuated because in real life farm work
is compensated by piece rates and the
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adverse effect wage levels were hourly
rates.
Similarly, H-1B employers are supposed
to pay their foreign workers at no more
than 95 percent of the prevailing wage for
the job in question, a shaky concept at
best.  And why only 95 percent?
The Commission needs to bear these tra-
ditions in mind as it approaches the mat-
ter of reforming nonimmigrant policies.
I now turn to three interesting precedents
in nonimmigrant and labor standards
policymaking and to two works in
progress.
The Visa Waiver Precedent.  A few years
ago the U.S. decided to try an experi-ment:
to retain its general policy of demanding
a visa for all incoming nonimmigrants, but
to waive it under certain conditions for
people from certain nations.  The twin
driving forces were to make it easier for
tourists to come to the U.S. and to reduce
largely useless work-loads for the Depart-
ment of State overseas.
So the U.S. worked up a (now slowly
expanding) list of nations whose residents
rarely become illegal aliens; they could
come to the U.S. without a visa if they
bought a nonrefundable airline ticket and
if they signed away their right to contest
a (highly unlikely) INS decision to exclude
them on their arrival at a U.S. airport.
The experiment has worked well, millions
use it, and only a handful have abused it.
(I get to the utility of this precedent later.)
The Australian Student Visa Program
Precedent.  Australia’s nonimmigrant
program for students makes sharp dis-
tinctions, just as the U.S. visa waiver pro-
gram does.  There are “gazetted” and
“nongazetted”  countries, with the latter
having lower incomes than the former
and, presumably, higher degrees of abuse
of Australia’s immigration law.
Australia also makes a sharp distinction
between “nonaward” students (those not
heading towards a degree) and “award”
students.  If you are from Tonga and want
to take a thirteen-week English language
course, for example, you fall into both the
nongazetted and the nonaward categories
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and you are told in a government an-
nouncement that your chances of getting
a student visa are slim (Commonwealth
of Australia 1994).9
The California Labor Standards Prece-
dent.  The California Department of In-
dustrial Relations enforces the state mini-
mum wage, which is sometimes higher—
and always more vigorously enforced—
than the federal minimum wage.  One of
the reasons for the greater vigor of en-
forcement is that California has found a
way to supplement tax funds to support
this operation.
Fees and fines collected by the Depart-
ment of Industrial Relations go into the
agency’s own budget.  An employer of
hourly workers, for example, is fined $100
every time a state inspector finds that a
worker is on the shop floor but that there
is no timecard for that worker (North
1991:54-55).
Work in Progress # 1.  The U.S. Depart-
ment of Labor is making efforts to bring
higher labor standards into the H-1B pro-
gram and to penalize abusers of the pro-
gram.
In a recent action, for example, it worked
out a settlement with Syntel, Inc., of Troy,
Michigan, in which the firm agreed,
among other things, to: pay additional
wages to previously underpaid H-1B com-
puter programmers; pay $30,000 in civil
penalties; not hire any more H-1B work-
ers for ninety days; and invest $1,000,000
in its training programs for U.S. workers
(Interpreter Releases 1995b:1261-64).10
Work in Progress # 2.  Worried by the
possibility of terrorist acts by a small
minority of foreign students and citing the
World Trade Center bombing and the
murders at the gates of the CIA, INS has
created a Task Force on Foreign Student
Data System Reengineering.
The general notion is that the govern-ment
should keep closer tabs on foreign stu-
dents and should create a data system that
will track them while they are in this
9 I am grateful to Christopher Smith, Counsellor and Consul at the Australian Embassy in
Washington, for providing me with this publication.
10 For an earlier report on a similar subject, see: Interpreter Releases 1995b:1-4.
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country.  While the subject is not men-
tioned explicitly in the draft report of the
task force, the thrust of the pro-posed
activities also would tend to discourage F
students from drifting, unwatched, into
illegal alien status.
The task force makes a number of pro-
posals, in addition to a compre-hensive
reporting system for individual students,
such as:
n Eliminating the power of public
schools to issue the I-20;
n Reviewing the list of INS-
approved schools from time to
time to remove educational
institutions that rarely issue the I-
20;
n Collecting a fee from each foreign
student, via the educa-tional
institution, to finance the tighter
regulation of the program.
Presumably the task force’s program will
have no impact on the easy flow of genu-
ine international students (except making
it a little more expensive) but will tend to
discourage the drift into illegal status.  It
apparently will have no labor market
impacts.
One Continuing Problem.  It is always
easier to obtain public funding for some
activities than others; it is, for example,
usually easier to hire more cops than to
employ more librarians.
So it is within the Immigration Service.
Time and again the Congress will vote to
hire more Border Patrol Agents and to
equip them with newer and fancier tools,
helicopters, sensors, and the like.  But it
is very hard to obtain what INS gently
calls “alien travel money.”  These are the
funds used to buy plane tickets for aliens
being deported.
For instance, earlier this year, INS
launched a major new initiative to reduce
the backlog of asylum applications and to
discourage ineligible applicants from fil-
ing.  The principal new tools were: (1) a
delinking of the application for asylum
and the issuance of a work permit, thus
eliminating the incentive of an instant
work permit when filing for asylum; and
(2) the hiring of additional officers and
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judges to handle the new cases more
quickly.
One of the INS assumptions was that with
the new system—a multimillion dollar
investment—there would be more people
being found ineligible and, thus, deport-
able.  Although the system came into being
on January 4, 1995, and was due to start
causing some deportations in a matter of
months, only $100,000 was made avail-
able in alien travel funds for the balance
of the fiscal year.
The lack of alien travel funds is a recur-
ring problem within INS; I remember a
few years ago the inves-tigators in the
New York District Office were told: Con-
centrate your enforcement activities on
locating two types of illegal aliens, ship
jumpers and stowaways.  I asked if they
were especially dangerous and was told,
“No, but the carriers have to pay for their
removal and the district is out of alien
travel money for the rest of the fiscal year.”
I return to this point later.
General
Recommendations
Bearing in mind the previous discussion,
I have several general recommendations
for the reform of the work and education-
related nonimmigrant programs.
1. Limit the number of nonimmigrant
classes.  The more classes, the harder
they are to administer; the more
classes, the more loopholes; the more
classes, the more confusion in the
using publics, institutions, and aliens.
2. Limit the number of government
agencies involved. Many nonim-
migrant programs now involve the
Departments of State, Justice, and
Labor; the multidepartment involve-
ment is not desirable but it is, in the
short-term, probably unavoidable.
What can be done, however, is to
eliminate the United States Infor-
mation Agency and its control over
the J-1 program.  USIA has said it
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wants, desperately, to get out of the
au pair program; let us assent to that—
and more—and remove USIA from
the supervision of all exchange
programs.  If it wants to operate an
exchange program of its own (under
the general eye of INS), that is all right.
3. Enforce the rules.  In addition to
fewer programs and fewer agencies,
it is vital that we have more
governmental control over the non-
immigrant programs to discourage the
slippage of legal aliens into illegal
status and to protect against labor
market abuse.
4. Raise enforcement funds from those
using the programs.  Individuals, and
particularly institutions, using
nonimmigrant programs should pay
fees to support enforcement measures.
INS has, over recent years, raised a
great deal of money from individual
aliens seeking benefits, and it is
starting to collect some fees at the
borders.  Good.  It also should begin
to charge break-even fees on some
transactions, such as the issuance of
the I-20, to fund enforce-ment within
the F program.  The California
Department of Industrial Relations has
set the precedent for such fees.
Further, and for a different reason, INS
should start charging substantial fees
for accepting (not necessarily for
approving) H-1B petitions, as is
proposed in pending Senate legisla-
tion.11  The notion here is that the
employer will probably pay more
attention to his options within the
American labor market if there is an
upfront fee, of say 10-25 percent of
the H-1B worker’s wages.12
5. Make distinctions, painful though it
may be.  It makes sense to con-
centrate resources where there are
problems and to invest lightly in
nonproblem areas.  It also makes
sense, as in the U.S. visa waiver
program and in Australia’s foreign
student program, to make distinc-
tions among nations, and, as in the
11 This paper was written in January 1996.
12 If these fees are levied, there needs to be a mechanism to see to it that the employer, not the
newly hired foreign worker, pays the fee.
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case of Australia, among educational
programs. (Remember the non-
gazetted, nonaward students.)  The
U.S. also should make distinctions
among types of work and types of
corporations—we know that some are
much more troubling than others.
In the H-1B program, for example, we
do not do the obvious; we do not set
much more stringent standards for
group usages of the program than for
singleton usages.  If, as some have
suggested, binational corporations in
the temporary worker business are
more likely to cause problems than
domestic corporations, we should not
shrink from focussing on the former,
even though one set of executives may
be foreign-born while the other is
native-born.
6. Introduce the nonrefundable, life-
time, round-trip air ticket.  To ease
the return of aliens when their visas
are over and to fund their departure
if they become deportable, the U.S.
should impose a universal require-
ment on all nonimmigrants arriving
by air (and sea).  That is, they must
buy a nonrefundable, round-trip ticket
that is good for the rest of their lives.
Why should any one arriving on a
nonimmigrant visa object?  They have,
after all, sworn that they are not going
to stay in the U.S.  Why not use the
visa waiver precedent in this regard?
The presence of the ticket (probably
both a hard copy and a record in a
computer) would mean that the alien
could always afford to return to his
or her homeland.  Broke in the U.S.?
Tempted to take a job illegally to raise
some money to go home?  Don’t
bother, you have that life-time return
ticket waiting to fly you back home.
The ticket also would mean that alien
travel money never again would be
used to transport overstays, those
funds could be focused entirely on
those entering without inspection
[EWIs].
The airlines, of course, will object.  It
would add an externally-caused
complication to their internally-caused
tangle of ticket prices.  They would
have to train their com-puters and
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their staffs to handle a new set of
variables.
But it would allow them to raise their
international fares and to keep the
extra money as an interest-free loan,
a short-term one in some cases, but a
very long-term one for someone who
successfully entered the U.S. by air
and then became a long-term
undocumented alien.
7. Cease legislating immigration via
treaties.  While the Free Trade
Agreement nonimmigrant provisions
have made major changes in the way
we make policies in this area, no
substantial adverse impacts have been
seen—yet.  But the whole notion of
giving a set of diplomats control over
migration policies is startling to say
the least.  There are no congressional
hearings and no organized input from
interest groups; migration decisions
are buried deep in agreements that
deal largely with totally different and
more pressing issues.  Further, the
whole process is in the hands of a
department (State) that is always
emotionally distant from the lives of
working Americans.
The Commission should take a stand
that Congress should never again let
immigration or nonimmigration policy
fall into the hands of the treaty
makers.
8. Create a whole new nonimmigrant
system.  Legislative policymaking in
the U.S.—at least before January,
1995—was usually a piecemeal
process.  Laws and systems would
evolve slowly and change a little bit
at a time.  With that in mind, the final
section of this report makes a series
of suggestions about modi-fying (or
in some cases dropping) the current
group of nonimmigrant programs.
But supposing we could ignore the current
litter of nonimmigrant programs and
create a new system from scratch.  What
would it look like?
Let us limit this exercise to the five
nonimmigrant categories discussed above
(as well as the new Os, Ps, and Qs).
Instead of these eight classes, with their
subclasses, I propose:
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n Students and Scholars;
n Temporary Workers;
n Transitional Workers;
n Intracompany Transferees.
In general terms, Students and Scholars
[S&S hereafter] would be a merger of the
F, M, and Q programs with most of the J
program.
Temporary Workers [TW] would cover
most of the H programs, the workers now
within the J program, as well as the Os
and Ps.13
Transitional Employees [TE] would be
people holding short-term jobs in the U.S.
but on their way to PRA status; most
people in this category currently are a
subset of the H-1B class.
Intracompany Transferees would be essen-
tially the current L program, which would
not be changed.
S&S would be administered by INS alone;
the Department of Labor would set labor
standards and help enforce the other three
programs in cooperation with INS.  USIA
would not be involved, and State would
continue to play the visa issuance role.
There would be no need for labor stan-
dards in the new S&S program because,
except for incidental work by undergradu-
ates, all working graduate students,
postdocs, and faculty on short-term as-
signments would be regarded as workers
in the TW class.
Labor standards would be set for the TW,
TE, and Intracompany Transferee classes.
(The last named could get along with a
simple minimum wage for multinational
executives, say $40,000 a year, to rise
annually with inflation.)  And with labor
standards being set by a single agency,
institutions would not have the oppor-
tunity, as they do now, to comb through
various categories seeking the best deal
(or the lowest wages).
13 Os are workers of outstanding ability, Ps are entertainers and athletes, and Qs are a group of
culture exchange people.  These categories were added by the 1990 Act.
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The TE class would be set up deliberately
as a way station to green card status.  It
would recognize and preserve the most
useful part of the H-1B program, while
separating it from the group admissions
aspect of the current program.
Demetrious Papademetriou and Stephen
Yale-Loehr have suggested an interesting
way to select members of the TE class;
successful candidates would have to earn
enough points in a system that also
handles labor-related permanent immi-
gration.14  A point system could be man-
aged by the government in such a way as
to minimize the current glut of science
and engineering Ph.D.s, for example, and
yet open the doors for more of them
should the need arise later.  More signifi-
cantly, it would cause corporations to hire
from among a group of aliens with char-
acteristics needed by the nation in the long
haul—as opposed to choosing H-1Bs to
meet the narrow needs, some-times the
whims, of an individual cor-porate man-
ager.
As a part of my larger scheme, then, only
TE and Intracompany transferees could
adjust to PRA status on the basis of labor
needs; people in the temporary worker
[TW] and scholars and students [S&S]
categories could adjust to PRA because of
family reasons, as they can now, or to the
new TE status should they qualify.  One
also could come to the U.S. with a TE
visa in addition to adjusting to it from
some other nonimmigrant category with-
in the U.S.
This would leave us with four nonim-
migrant classes of workers and scholars,
with an integrated system for the making
of governmental decisions, and with a
clear-cut set of standards for all involved.
But if all we can do is adjust the current
system, the next section provides some
more narrow suggestions.
Specific
Recommendations
Within the current framework, I would
suggest the following changes.
First, and foremost, adopt the mandatory,
nonrefundable, lifetime-long, return airline
ticket for all incoming nonim-migrants.  If
they have such a ticket, they will be a
little more likely to return when their vi-
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sas expire.  If they do not return, and fall
out of legal status, they can be sent back
at no public expense.
Now, regarding the specific classes of in-
terest:
F-1: Academic Students. It is a good idea
to keep foreign students coming in, learn-
ing in, and then leaving the country.  This
is what most of them do, and this is to be
encouraged.
I am concerned, however, with the ques-
tion of who is paying the bill and suggest
an approach to this problem in Appendix
A.  I share the view of the INS Task Force
that the F program should be tightened
administratively and that funds for this
be raised by charging a fee for the issu-
ance of the I-20.
In addition, there is something that INS
and the Department of Education [DOE]
should do that I believe is not yet in
anyone’s plans. DOE has identified a
group of educational institutions where
students have a high rate of failure in
repaying DOE loans.  My suspicion is that
these are the kinds of institutions (often
proprietaries, often providing vocational
training) that do not provide foreign stu-
dents a good education, either, and that F
and M students in these places are more
likely to drift into illegal status than other
foreign students.  DOE and INS should
get together and jointly assure that these
institutions no longer can issue the I-20
(or the M program’s version thereof) nor
use the federal loan program.15
H-1B: Specialty Occupations.  This is a
large program with many nooks and cran-
nies. Sometimes it is used for the actual
importation (from overseas) of individual
workers with remarkable skills for short-
term assignments in the U.S.; sometimes
it is used to hire individual talented work-
ers already in the U.S. in another status;
sometimes it is part of a many-stage pro-
cess by which a foreign-born, U.S.-trained
worker moves towards PRA status (as is
15 Late in this writing I recalled the McDonald’s amendment to INA, setting up a special work
program with that kind of firm for F students.  I also recall that the Bureau of International
Labor Affairs [ILAB] at DOL has studied this matter.  I would hope that the Commission has
seen that report, which, I think, was discouraging in tone.
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often the case with scientists and engi-
neers).  All of these uses are acceptable to
commendable.
The worrisome part of the same H-1B
program is its use to bring in groups of
journeymen technicians and computer
programmers at relatively low wages;
such workers depress wages and work-
ing conditions in the U.S. and often dis-
place U.S. workers.  This part of the pro-
gram should be eliminated or severely
curtailed.
For detailed suggestions as to how to do
this, see Appendix C.
H-2A: Farm workers.  Abolish the pro-
gram.
H-2B: Other Temporary Workers (mostly
blue collar).  I worry about the exploitive
nature of such programs here and abroad
but have no first-hand knowledge of this
particular program and, hence, make no
suggestions.
H-3: Industrial Trainees.  This appears to
be a small and noncontroversial program,
so reform energies should be directed else-
where.
J-1: Exchange Visitors. Again, as with the
F-1 program, it is a good thing that a
cosmopolitan mix of people is coming to
the U.S. to study, confer, and work with
their U.S. peers on a wide variety of sub-
jects and in a wide variety of institutional
settings
Within this useful program, however, there
are places where nonimmigrant graduate
students, postdocs, and others are treated
very badly.  There are no labor standards
in the J-l program, though many people
in the program work for wages and do so
for years at a time.
Labor standards should be introduced into
this program as it stands or, perhaps bet-
ter, exchange visitors, who are in fact
workers, should be moved out of this
program and into a temporary worker
program run by the Department of Labor.
The universities, of course, would not like
that, and the people who would benefit—
the foreign scholars and their U.S. peers—
are hopelessly ill-organized for such a
struggle with the splendidly-organized
educational establishment.
M-1: Vocational Students.  It probably
was a good idea—if against the thrust of
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the suggestion that there are too many
programs—to separate vocational schools
from academic ones.
Someone should examine this program to
see if it is worth continuing.  Caution is
suggested by the general record of pri-
vate, forprofit vocational schools.
What clearly must be done, as suggested
with the F-class institutions, is for INS and
the Department of Education to share
information on marginal insti-tutions and
for both to move swiftly against those
entities that either create a high percent-
age of illegal aliens or whose students fail
to repay DOE loans.
Adjusting from Nonimmigrant to Immi-
grant Status.  This subject is at the edge,
perhaps beyond our charge.  But, with
the seamless movement from one nonim-
migrant status to another and then on to
PRA status that I found so common among
the scientists and engineers, perhaps a
final set of comments is in order.
I am concerned about the apparent cur-
rent overproduction of Ph.D.s in science
and engineering and worry that the cur-
rent easy adjustment from non-immigrant
to immigrant status will aggravate that
surplus, given the large number of highly-
qualified, foreign-born Ph.D.s in the coun-
try and in our educa-tional pipelines.
On the other hand, reduction in research
and development investments at the fed-
eral level, which would slowly reduce the
surplus,16 seems a terrible idea, and bar-
ring Ph.D.s and other highly-educated
aliens from immigrant status simply
would press down the average educa-
tional attainment levels for the arriving
cohorts of immigrants.
Several other suggestions have been made
about how to cope with this surplus.  One
I favor has the disad-vantage of being very
slow-acting:  impose on federal research
grants a quota on nonimmigrant gradu-
ate students—to no more than, say, one-
third of the graduate students funded.
16 By reducing the funding of such research, the number of foreign-born graduate students
funded to study in this country would be similarly reduced.
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This would, over time, reduce the num-
ber of nonimmigrant Ph.D.s educated here
at our expense and probably would push
the universities to look a little more care-
fully at the domestic talent pool.  It also
would allow the continuation, at slightly
lower levels, of a useful pattern—the train-
ing of some of the world’s best minds in
some of the world’s best university labo-
ratories.
Another option would move much more
quickly: impose a two-year overseas re-
quirement before any adjustment could
be made from nonimmigrant to immi-
grant status.  This is a dusting off, expan-
sion of, and enforcement of the old two-
years-overseas rule, which once played a
major role in the J program but since has
been watered down by a series of waiv-
ers.  The problem with this is that it would
be immediately disruptive, in that for two
years no one in the current path from
nonimmigrant to immigrant status could
make that move.
Yet another proposal would be to levy a
substantial fee on adjustments from non-
immigrant to immigrant status of, say, 25-
40 percent of the individuals’ salaries.17
This seems to make sense; corporations
and universities probably would ask for
fewer adjustments and those that they did
seek would be the very best.  The change
would be more gradual than the abrupt
imposition of the two-year rule, but more
assertive than my suggestion of a one-
third limit on funding of nonimmigrant
graduate students.  The combination of
both of these proposals (the one-third
quota and the stiff fee) would continue a
useful international educational program
but limit its impact on American labor
markets.
APPENDIX A: A Note
About Who FInances
Foreign Students in the
U.S.
One of the difficulties with working with
nonimmigrant policies vis-a-vis foreign
students is the abundance of misin-for-
mation distributed by the educational
establishment on who pays the bill for
17 The Department of Labor wants to use such fees for training Americans in the apparently
needed skills; I would lean to the use of most of such money for the enforcement of labor
standards in nonimmigrant programs.
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educating foreign students in this coun-
try.
It will be difficult to impossible to make
appropriate policy in this area as long as
the impression remains that American
universities—like Iowa’s soy beans and
Hollywood’s movies—are major earners
of export dollars.  I do not think this is
the case; the data offered to support that
case are faulty (North 1995:77-85).
What policymakers need, and do not have,
is a nationwide set of per-student esti-
mates of the elements listed below.  They
will, of course, differ from insti-tution to
institution, but if we had them for a good
sample of America’s colleges and univer-
sities, we would have a better sense than
we do now of who really pays for foreign
students.  The per-student, per-year esti-
mates we need are:
1. Public moneys subsidizing the
institution;
2. Private moneys (such as earnings on
endowments) doing the same;
3. Public and private funds subsidizing
individual foreign students (on
average);
4. Moneys earned in the U.S. by such
students during college years and
spent on college-related expenses;
5. Moneys brought to the U.S. from
overseas to support the education of
such students.
Were we to have this information, then
we would know the extent to which for-
eign students were supporting their edu-
cation with money from foreign sources.
We would probably find that numbers 1
+ 2 + 3 + 4 (U.S. sources of funds) in most
circumstances over-whelmed item num-
ber 5 (foreign sources) because of the hid-
den subsidies that wash over much of
higher education in this country, benefit-
ting foreign and domestic students alike.
But the educational establishment does not
approach the question in that way.  It does
so in a way that produces headlines like
this: “Foreign Students Pump up
Economy” (USA Today 1995).  This un-
critical story was a rewrite of an Institute
of International Education [IIE] press re-
lease on the subject.
Let’s switch gears for a moment and as-
sume that someone decided to conduct a
survey on what the voters thought of
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President Clinton (instead of who pays
for the education of foreign students).  The
pollster would ask his question (dealing
with only part of Clinton’s work) and
would provide four alterna-tive responses:
The question:
“Voters think Bill Clinton is doing very
well with his foreign policy, don’t
they?”
The alternative answers:
___“Yes, he is doing very well;”
___“Yes, he is doing well;”
___“He’s doing okay;”
___“No, he’s not doing well.”
The question in our metaphoric survey is
not to be asked of people generally; it is
to be asked of Democratic precinct cap-
tains.
A survey with such loaded methodology
would not be used by the most desperate
of political consultants, but that is exactly
what IIE does annually.
It does not seek information on the whole
question, on the relative significance of
the five previously cited flows of funds.
Nor does IIE seek hard data on this sub-
ject from university budget officials or
from the students themselves, the people
who would know best; no, it asks for
perceptions on this point.
It does not ask the perception question of
neutral observers, either; it seeks the per-
ceptions of the foreign student advisers—
the moral equivalent of polling the Demo-
cratic precinct captains.
Finally, after loading the design of the
survey, IIE also loads the ballot.  Follow-
ing the question (primary source of funds)
it provides the potential answers:
“Personal and Family;”
“U.S. College/University;”
“Home Government/University;”
“U.S. Government;”
“Private U.S. Sponsor;”
“Private Foreign Sponsor;”
“International Organization;”
“Current Employment.”
And, lo and behold, every year the pat-
terns of the response fall almost perfectly
into place, mirroring the sequence of po-
tential responses, with the answers being
respectively 66.2 percent, 19.0 percent, 5.2
percent, 1.4 percent, 2.8 percent, 2.0 per-
cent, 0.5 percent, and 2.3 percent (IIE
1992).18
I have called this to the attention of IIE by
letter,19 and, sought, on three different
times, to interest three different editors of
the Chronicle of Higher Education (which
ran a long, careful report on our recent
book), but no one would touch the pre-
sumably interesting, perhaps explosive,
question of how IIE was loading the
survey’s dice.
I had been vaguely aware of the Open
Doors survey results on this point for
years, and had accepted them unthink-
ingly.  Then I ran into a com-pletely dif-
ferent set of results on this subject.
These were from the Summary Report 1991:
Doctorate Recipients from United States
Universities (NRC 1993:18).20  The National
Research Council [NRC] had asked the
same fuzzy question.  (Regarding the pri-
mary source of funding—why Ph.D.s can
not be asked about the percentage of their
funding from various sources is beyond
me.)  The NRC answers were totally dif-
ferent from those elicited by the IIE:
Population Primary Source of Funding
Personal         University
All foreign
students (IIE)    66.2% 19.0%
Nonimmigrant
Ph.D.s in
physical
science
and math (NRC)     4.0% 89.1%21
There are three reasons for these dif-
ferences: first, science and engineering
students are more likely to receive fund-
ing than others; also graduate students
18 See, for example, page 149 for the questions asked the foreign student advisers and page
37 for responses.  The same ballot pattern and roughly the same responses can be seen in
other editions of this annual report.
19 I suggested that the least IIE could do would be to change the sequence of the multiple-
choice responses from year to year, as responsible pollsters do, but there was no answer.
20 The nonimmigrant Ph.D.s in life sciences (7.0 percent) and in engineering (8.6 percent)
reported slightly higher dependence on personal resources than those in the physical
sciences.
21 Most of this consists of federal research dollars spent through the university and is identified
by the Ph.D.s as university, not federal, moneys.
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(as IIE’s own data suggest) are more likely
to be assisted than under-graduates.  But
the third reason relates to the fundamen-
tal point made earlier—NRC asked the
question of people with direct, unbiased
knowledge on the point, the graduate stu-
dents themselves.
A Suggestion.  It would be useful to have
a better notion than that provided by IIE’s
flawed data and by NRC’s narrow data
(on Ph.D.s only) regarding who pays for
the higher education of nonim-migrants
in this country.
While a total census of the finances of
foreign students would tell us exactly how
these matters play out, a far more modest
study could provide us with the basics
needed.  What I would suggest would be
a sample of some forty to sixty institu-
tions of higher education, with the appro-
priate mix of private and public entities,
those large and small, those rich and poor,
and those with large and small percent-
ages of nonimmigrant students.
The research would involve four tasks:
first, and easiest, an analysis of the extent
to which public and private funds were
used in a recent year in each institution to
fund the education of all students, for-
eign and domestic; the basic question,
what portion of the total cost of a year’s
education (including room and board) was
subsidized?  This would cover items num-
ber 1 and 2 [see above].
The second task would be a files search in
the student aid or foreign student office
of a sample, say twenty-five, of the for-
eign students on campus.  This should
provide information on the extent to
which individual assistance was offered
to the students in the sample and the
extent of on- and off-campus employment.
The third task would be to calculate the
total cost of a year’s education for the
average foreign student, including insti-
tutional subsidies, tuition paid, and room
and board.  From this one would deduct
the subsidies, loans made to these stu-
dents from U.S. sources, as well as finan-
cial aid and wages for employment; the
residue presumably would represent the
moneys coming to the U.S. as a result of
the arrival of the nonimmigrant student.
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The fourth task would be to interview a
subsample of the foreign students stud-
ied through the file searches to check on
the accuracy of the files search process.
Perhaps GAO or the Department of Edu-
cation could be encouraged to mount such
a study as the Commission ponders the
nation’s nonimmigrant policies.
APPENDIX  B: A Note
About the U.S. Islands
While the Commission presumably is
spending 99.5 percent of its energies on
the immigration challenges to the fifty
states, it should not lose track of the dif-
ficult immigration policy questions of the
U.S. islands in the Pacific—Guam, where
the mainland immigration law applies and
American Samoa and the Commonwealth
of the Northern Mariana Islands [CNMI],
where the law does not, but should.22
While the mainland has some controver-
sial nonimmigrant worker programs (com-
puter programmers and sugar cane cut-
ters, for example), they are models of
generosity compared to the way that for-
eign workers are treated in American
Samoa and, particularly, in the Marianas.
The exploitation in CNMI’s sewing facto-
ries is well known on the mainland—the
miserable wages, the life behind barbed
wire, the long hours, the terrible working
conditions and the products all labelled
“Made in the U.S.A.”
Perhaps less well-known are these two
simple facts: (1) there are more guest
workers in the Marianas than citizens; and
(2) Congress can restore its control over
22 The INA covers Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands; international migration to Puerto
Rico is minimal and, although the Virgin Islands once had a controversial temporary worker
program, that matter was resolved long ago.  While there are universities in Puerto Rico, the
Virgin Islands, and Guam, I have not encountered any discussion of the foreign student
programs as a problem on any of these islands.  CNMI and American Samoa do not have
four-year colleges and, besides, they have much more vigorous deportation policies than the
mainland, so, if they have problems with foreign students, they presumably do something
about it.
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the CNMI immigration policy by merely
passing a statute.23
The exploited workers in CNMI are
mostly women and primarily from China
and the Philippines.  They are different
from the citizen population in the
Marianas, the Chamorros.  And, under
current CNMI law, they never can be-come
citizens of the Marianas or of the U.S.24
Further, there are elements of sexual ex-
ploitation in CNMI that have not surfaced
with mainland temporary worker pro-
grams.  The largely Chamorro male CNMI
immigration service is notorious for the
way that many of its officers harass the
nonimmigrant women; some of those
women wind up as prosti-tutes.  It is grim
situation.
The problems in American Samoa are less
publicized and less brutal.  Among other
things, the exploited class at the moment
is another group of Samoans, citizens of
Western Samoa; the migrants speak the
same languages as, and intermarry with,
the dominant population.  Western Samo-
ans do the dirty work in the fish-canning
plants in Pago Pago, while American Sa-
moans have the softer jobs in the over-
staffed local government.  Western Samo-
ans cannot become citizens of American
Samoa, or more formally, U.S. Nationals,
but their children can, provided they were
born in the U.S. ter-ritory.  Both CNMI
and American Samoa have real nonimmi-
grant policies—in that they do not have
significant provisions in their local immi-
gration laws for immi-grants, only for
guest workers.
While there is extensive unemployment
in American Samoa, the local govern-ment
recently has approved the impor-tation of
several hundred Chinese women to work
23 The new CNMI Governor, Froilan Tenorio, is making a much stronger effort to limit the
abuses in the nonimmigrant program than his predecessors, but he wants CNMI to continue
to make immigration decisions.
24 The imbalance of power between the citizen population and the guest workers in CNMI is
more like the situation in the Trucial Sheikdoms than it is on the U.S. mainland.  For instance,
there are frequent stories in the local press of Chamorro families on welfare hiring (and failing
to pay) nonimmigrant servants (see, for example: Phillips 1995).  Governor Tenorio has been
trying to end this practice.
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in a new, offshore-owned sewing factory;
their stated role is to be instructors in
industrial sewing, but they will stay for
years, housed in a company barracks.  It
is well-known that it takes only a couple
of weeks, at most, to teach someone how
to use these machines.  The Chinese will
be a docile workforce; they will be used
to press the Samoan workers to greater
heights of productivity as they sew in the
labels: “Made in the U.S.A.”  The main-
land minimum wage of $4.25 does not
apply in either Samoa or CNMI; the local
minimum wage levels are much lower
than in the fifty states and much less well
enforced.
Meanwhile, in the third remaining U.S.
island in the Pacific, Guam, the INA con-
trols, but there are strong local traditions
of heavy use of the H-2B program in con-
struction and in the services.  (Guam, like
CNMI, is a tourist attraction to a subset
of the Japanese population—the ones with
enough money to travel, but not enough
to travel very far.)
Many interest groups in Guam would like
the island to control its own immi-gration
policy; there is a strong desire for more
cheap labor, in the CNMI tradition, and a
strong nationalist desire not to grant citi-
zenship to newcomers.
I have been covering immigration and
labor market trends in these islands—from
Washington—for a decade as the Ameri-
can correspondent for Fiji’s Pacific Islands
Monthly.  My advice to the Commission is
to see to it that Guam stays under the
wing of U.S. law on this point and to
encourage the Congress to restore its do-
main over the Marianas’ immigration
policy.  It also might be a good idea to let
the American Samoan Government know
that Washington is watching its handling
of its foreign workers.
APPENDIX C: Detailed
Recommendations on the
H1-B Program25
As noted earlier, the Department of La-
bor has proposed some useful initial steps
25 Adapted from North 1995:171-73.
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towards reducing some of the abuses in
the H-1B program.  It needs to go much
further, but first it must acknowledge the
basic difference between the use of the
program to bring in single workers—and
groups of workers.  The latter is always
more harmful both to resident workers
and to nonimmigrant workers themselves.
To this end, DOL and other government
entities should take the following steps:
Fee structure.  There should be a grad-
uated fee schedule—the more nonim-mi-
grant workers an employer wants, the
more each costs.  Fees should be levied
on all applications, whether or not they
are approved.
Differential Scrutiny.  As a matter of
conscious practice, the Department of
Labor should announce that it will pay
much more attention to applications for
groups of people than single applications.26
If an application for more than ten work-
ers is received from a single facility, for
example, DOL investigators should make
site visits, preferably unannounced, to talk
with individual workers, both foreign-
born and native-born (away from
management’s eyes and ears) about wages
and working conditions.  The fees to be
paid by those seeking H-1B applications
should be used to fund these investiga-
tions.
Notice.  To make sure that all taxes are
paid and to make certain that arriving H-
1Bs know exactly what their actual pay
checks will be, employers seeking three
or more H-1B workers in the course of a
year should be obliged to have an ex-
change of correspondence with their
would-be workers outlining wages and
deductions.  Currently there is no obli-
gation on the part of an H-1B employer to
tell his nonimmigrant worker about the
extent of federal income tax, state income
taxes, FICA, and Medicare deductions, nor
about the standard 30 percent deduction
required by IRS for nonresident aliens.
Further, copies of these exchanges of cor-
respondence should be filed by the em-
ployer with:
26 One potential problem, of course, is that mass users of H-1Bs will seek to camouflage their
activities by creating subsidiary corporations, assigning workers to subcontractors, and the
like.
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n All pertinent federal, state, and
local taxing authorities;
n Unions, where present;
n Pertinent technical or profes-sional
organizations, and;
n The trade press.
Prevailing Wage.  The arrangements cur-
rently made for determining the mini-
mum wage are inadequate, as is the puz-
zling requirement that the employer has
to pay only 95 percent of whatever is
found to be the prevailing wage.  Why
not 105 percent to encourage the employer
to pay attention to resident workers, be
they citizens or legal immigrants?
Instead of using the hard-pressed and
underfunded State Employment Security
Agencies to establish prevailing wages,
why not use the generally available, occu-
pationally-specific, salary surveys of the
various professional and engineering so-
cieties?
In this scenario, if the employer wanted
to hire a chemist with a bachelor’s degree
and two to four year’s experience in 1993,
for example, the employer would be re-
quired to pay the prevailing wage for such
workers as established by the American
Chemical Society’s annual salary survey,
or $33,300.  Chemists with a master’s
degree, two or four years after the B.S.,
would get $39,000.  The ACS survey, as
currently conducted, does not provide a
prevailing wage for a new Ph.D, but a
chemist with a doctorate five to nine years
after the B.S. received $53,000 in 1993
(Heylin 1993:10).
These salary surveys reflect the workings
of the national labor market and pre-
sumably would be regarded as appro-
priate by the workers involved.  The sal-
ary scales are easily obtainable by employ-
ers (from the trade press) and are not
vulnerable to manipulation; neither state-
ment can be made about the current sys-
tem.
Why not use 105 percent of these prevail-
ing wages in setting salaries for nonimmi-
grant workers?  In that way all concerned
could be assured that wage levels would
never be depressed by the use of nonim-
migrant workers.  Even at 100 percent of
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the salary-survey wages, employers could
argue that they were not paying below
the prevailing levels (even though tapping
into a foreign labor force might well, ul-
timately, depress wages generally).
The 65,000 Limit.  The 1990 Immigration
Act, for the first time, established a nu-
merical limit on the approval of a set of
nonimmigrant petitions, in this case for
H-1B visas.  Given a piece of legislation
that generally was a disaster for Ameri-
can workers competing with foreign-born
workers, this was a remark-able provision.
Now that there is some possibility that
the limit actually will work to reduce the
growth in the number of nonimmigrant
workers, the immigration bar and their
corporate allies are sure to seek to repeal
or soften this provision (Interpreter Releases
1993:1438-39).  These efforts should be re-
sisted stoutly.  If there is a prospect of
reaching the ceiling, INS should allocate
the limited number of petition approvals
near the end of the fiscal year by granting
them to employers offering the highest
wages.
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The use of nonimmigrant visas by foreign-
ers to reside and work legally in the
United States has burgeoned in the last
decade.  Further, the interconnections be-
tween nonimmigrant visas—including
educational, training, and occupational
categories—and permanent residence is
widely noted, the object of criticism, and
a topic of recent legislative initiatives in
the Senate.
The objectives of this analysis are to  pro-
vide: (1) perspectives about the history,
interconnections, and implications of cur-
rent nonimmigrant visa policy; (2) criteria
for developing nonimmigrant visa policy
for contemporary realities, and (3) an out-
line of a nonimmigrant policy.1
Perspectives on
Nonimmigrant
Visa Policy
The interrelations between nonimmi-
grant and immigrant visas.   It is easy to
forget that current views about nonimmi-
grant visa policy and practice were not
always the conventional wisdom.  For
example, during discussions of the 1965
amendments to the Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952 (the McCarran-
Walter Act), the connections between edu-
cational and labor-related nonimmigrant
visas on the one hand and permanent im-
migration on the other was not a major
issue.  The concept that nonimmigrant and
immigrant visas for occupational skills
NONIMMIGRANT VISA POLICY OF
THE UNITED STATES
CHARLES B. KEELY
GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY
1 This paper focuses on temporary visa categories that permit a visa holder legally to reside and
work in the U.S. and on categories connected with formal education and training.  Visitor visa
holders (tourists) are not discussed.
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should be seen as a whole, rather than
two separate spheres of activity, was not
part of the discussion thirty years ago.
This is not such a surprise.  The level of
globalization of the economy and of firms2
and the extent of international labor mar-
kets were in their infancy compared to
today.  In addition, temporary labor in
the mid-1960s still meant unskilled, pri-
marily agricultural labor.  The U.S. ended
the Bracero Program in 1964.  In that con-
text, temporary laborers hardly conjured
up images of managers developing over-
seas markets for new products or research-
ers for communication technology.
When the 1965 Act replaced national ori-
gins with the visa preferences as the domi-
nant selection criteria, little thought was
given to the interconnections among stu-
dent visas, exchange visitor visas, labor-
related nonimmigrant visas, and immi-
grant visas based on occupational skills.
That is not to say that absolutely no con-
nections were noted.  For example, a two-
year return requirement was mandated for
J-visa holders in order to avoid distorting
the intent of exchange programs to train
professionals in the context of develop-
ment aid.  In addition, the extent of ad-
justment cases among legal immigrants
became a matter of comment, as if in some
way adjustment, as opposed to first-time
entry, was a perverse way to become an
immigrant to the United States.  In fact,
in the past it was necessary for some im-
migrant visa recipients to leave the U.S.
and travel to another country to pick up
a visa and then go through the fiction of
entering the country as a “new entrant”
(and not a visa adjuster).
Now, when it is commonplace to note the
interconnections between nonimmigrant
2 In the 1960s, the focus was on multinational, rather than global, firms.  The distinction is
between a multinational firm still anchored in the country of its founding, but with operations
in a variety of countries (e.g., Swiss Nestle, American Ford, German Siemans, Dutch Phillips,
Canadian Seagrams) and a global firm in which the founding country connection becomes
more and more tenuous.  The decisions on investments, assets, accounting, and so on are
made in a way the laws of the country mandate as a condition of business.  A global firm
is the logical outcome economically of multinational operations.  An example of the problem
of determining whether a firm is one or the other is reflected in the difficulty in deciding what
is an “American” automobile if content is the criterion.  Most examples of what were considered
multinational firms would now be seen as global firms.
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and immigrant visa categories,  the odor
of corruption attached to visa adjustment
persists.  The implication is that it is not
right if the proportion of adjustments ver-
sus new entries is “too high.”  The justi-
fication for this bias is not articulated, but
the transformation of a statistic into a sub-
stantive conclusion about the national in-
terest persists, even among informed and
intelligent observers.
Another instance of noting the connections
between nonimmigrant and immigrant
visas was in the context of “brain drain”
discussions.3  The main focus was on the
recruitment of highly-skilled immigrants,
but it was sometimes noted that the re-
cruitment often took place among foreign
students trained in developed countries
rather than recruitment of advanced pro-
fessionals in their own country.4
Despite instances of making connections
between nonimmigrant and immigrant
policy, the linkages had little practical
impact on policy development in the pe-
riod immediately following the end of the
national origins quota system and the
emergence of the preference system as the
dominant mechanism for immigrant visa
distribution.
Labor certification, the adversarial
model, and the growth of the organized
immigration bar.   The 1965 Immigration
Act had a profound effect on judgements
about the consequences for the American
labor force of immigration based on occu-
pational skills.  The 1965 Act changed
labor certification from a passive to an
active program.  Under the 1952 Immi-
gration and Nationality Act, persons ad-
mitted under a labor preference from an
oversubscribed country were subject to re-
view by the Secretary of Labor only if there
was a complaint or if a single employer
petitioned for twenty-five or more visa
applicants.  In high-quota countries like
3 Brain drain rhetoric persists even though internationalist arguments have all but prevailed
among economists.  The idea that change of immigration policies in developed countries
could appreciably affect the labor force development policies of developing countries, much
less affect economic performance in any but the most marginal and indirect way, has gone
the way of doctrines about centrally planned economies.
4 It is somewhat ironic that the phrase “brain drain” originally was used to describe the United
Kingdom post-World War II loss of physicians and other professionals to the U.S.
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the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Ger-
many, no review was necessary because
there was no need to have recourse to the
preference system to gain access to easily
available visas.  In short, in the very few
cases where the preference system even
came into play in oversubscribed coun-
tries, an occupational preference applicant
could enter unless the Secretary of Labor
took affirmative steps to prevent entry on
the basis of a complaint or the large level
of petitioning by a single employer.5
Under the 1965 amendments to immigra-
tion law, the emphasis of labor certifica-
tion changed as the preference system
became the dominant selection mecha-
nism.  A petitioner for a labor-related
preference and all nonpreference appli-
cants, including all Western Hemisphere
applicants who were not the spouse or
minor child of a citizen or legal perma-
nent resident alien, could not receive a
visa unless the Secretary of Labor ap-
proved via the labor certification process.
The support of organized labor for immi-
gration reform leading to the 1965 Act was
obtained by inclusion of a labor certifica-
tion process that required approval by the
Secretary of Labor before a visa could be
issued for any nonfamily immigrant visa.
The labor certification process introduced
in the 1965 Act institutionalized anxiety
about the impact of immigration on the
labor force.  Dimensions of the economy
were pitted against one another in an
adversarial way, as if labor force develop-
ment is a zero sum game.  Any help to
meet employers’ felt needs was presumed
to be achievable, albeit usually at the ex-
pense of U.S. workers.  However, this
anxiety was focused only on immigrant
visas and did not extend to nonimmigrant
visa practices.
5 Recall that the preference system hardly affected the vast majority of immigrants under the
national origins quota system maintained in the 1952 McCarran-Walter Act.  Under that law,
the overwhelmingly dominant criterion for admission to the United States was place of birth.
All else paled in comparison to the importance of national origin for an American immigrant
visa.  Continued assertions that the 1965 Act changed the emphasis from occupational criteria
to family criteria in the preference system are beside the point and mislead.   National origins
so dominated choice of immigrants that the preference system had virtually no impact on the
selection of immigrants under the McCarran-Walter Act.  To note the change in the preference
systems of 1952 and 1965 is formally correct but irrelevant for the practical effect on policy
outcomes.
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One result of this innovation was the ex-
pansion of the organized immigration bar.
Labor certification cemented the practices
surrounding labor-related migration into
an adversarial relationship.  The role of
lawyers in immigration proceedings grew
tremendously, initially around administra-
tive processes related to labor certifica-
tion.  The organized bar led the charge to
introduce the L visa (intracompany trans-
ferees) in 1970 as a “noncontroversial
amendment” to deal with the virtually
undisputed needs of multinational corpo-
rations to engage in management trainee
programs, management internationaliza-
tion, and so on in order to open new
markets.  The rhetoric reflected a view
that these were cases of “real” need.  These
were serious corporations that did not
throw money away frivolously on inter-
national moves of key personnel.  They
were not sleazy schemers trying to cir-
cumvent the intent of the law and hurt
American workers.  In effect, the justifica-
tions of the purported need for L visas
reinforced the perception of a need for
strong vigilance about labor-related visas.6
The immigration process was progres-
sively captured by the legal profession.
In addition, corporations, educational and
nonprofit research institutions, and other
organizations developed trade associations
regarding international personnel.  No
longer was immigration to the United
States a matter of filling out forms and
producing documents to prove marriage,
educational achievement, or other bases
for petitioner status.  Not just employers,
but private voluntary agencies increasingly
provided legal services as a basic need of
their clients to navigate an adversarial
bureaucracy.  Refugee admissions likewise
became en- meshed in the culture of the
legal profession.  Lawyers are deemed a
virtual necessity in presenting an asylum
petition.
The adversarial process, dominated by
attorneys on both sides, is now so in-
grained that it is virtually naive to sug-
gest that it could be otherwise.  Perhaps
it cannot, given what we have done in the
last three decades.  But it was not always
so.  Despite the jokes, there is, of course,
6 Immigration law prescribes that the consular officer must presume all applicants for visas,
including visitor or other temporary visas, are actually intending immigrants.  The next step
to a presumption that all petitions and statements, whether made by a U.S. citizen sponsor
or an alien applicant, are fraudulent is not such a huge step.
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nothing wrong with lawyers, per se.  On
the other hand, it is not an unalloyed ben-
efit to transform civic interactions and citi-
zens’ petitions into legal battles, with the
culture of the adversarial system dictat-
ing procedures and behavior.
The presumption of labor self-suffi-
ciency.  Like it or not, the assumptions
surrounding immigrant and nonimmi-
grant petitioning for labor-related entrants
are that applicants and employer spon-
sors are suspect.   Even if honest, their
petitions remain questionable because of
a presumed harm of immigration based
on labor skills to the U.S. labor force in
general and to vulnerable American work-
ers in particular.  A presumption persists
that a country, particularly a populous
country like the United States, is or should
be self-sufficient in regard to labor.  The
assumption of labor autarky is com-
pounded by a view of the labor force as
static, a fixed pie.   Immigrants presum-
ably take places that Americans can, or
should be able to, fill if only employers
would do their part to recruit properly
and to create opportunity.
Questioning these assumptions is suspect
as self-serving propaganda on behalf of
employers.  To suggest that immigrant
workers may produce jobs is sometimes
judged, in the most charitable phrasing,
as wishful thinking.  But clearly, foreign-
ers who install and train American work-
ers on the use and maintenance of ad-
vanced knitting machinery, for example,
maintain jobs in clothes manufacturing.
An American equivalent is U.S. person-
nel of advanced aircraft residing tempo-
rarily overseas to train others in mainte-
nance of American jet aircraft.  If General
Motors [GM] sponsors twenty-five Ger-
man engineers/designers to assist in prod-
uct development for the German auto
market, those immigrant workers may
help produce many American jobs to
manufacture components for cars destined
for the German market with its particu-
larly stringent performance demands
about cars.  Is it good policy to say that
such migration takes jobs from American
engineers/auto designers and should be
prohibited or should the focus be on the
particular talents and familiarity with the
demanding criteria of German auto buy-
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ers and the potential for U.S. exports if
GM autos command more of the German
market?
It is difficult to adjust uninformed per-
spectives on the issues of job creation, ex-
port development, and other aspects of
economic policy and their relation to in-
ternational labor recruitment.  Even if a
more balanced perspective received some
attention, difficulties would persist in
changing viewpoints now so deeply in-
grained in public policy, in the legal prac-
tice of an organized immigration bar in
the public and private sector, and in policy
rhetoric.
Regulating international migration, sub-
sidies, and free trade in services.  Gov-
ernment regulation of markets often re-
sults in subsidization of segments of a
society.  Tariff and nontariff barriers to
protect domestic firms are obvious ex-
amples.  Inefficient, as well as nascent,
industries are protected from foreign com-
petition.  Even though free trade is a gen-
erally accepted principle, the mention of
protection for nascent industry indicates
that free trade is not an absolute prin-
ciple.
Regulating immigration and the access of
foreign labor also is justified as a protec-
tion of a domestic market: labor.  Regu-
lating international migration has the eco-
nomic effect of subsidizing domestic la-
bor.  To note this does not lead to a con-
clusion that, by analogy to free trade, lim-
iting immigration is undesirable.  People
are not goods and their entry into a soci-
ety as actors is quite different than im-
porting shoes, vegetables, or automobiles.
Freer mobility of labor is politically unac-
ceptable and justifiably so if a government
is to protect vulnerable segments of the
labor force.  Adjustment to freer trade (as
for example in reaction to NAFTA in all
three signatory countries) is often costly,
even brutal, for affected workers.  Freer
movement of labor would be more so, es-
pecially for the least adaptable and less
skilled.  Free movement of labor has been
agreed to and endured only in the con-
text of economic agreements between eco-
nomically advanced countries of relative
economic parity (specifically in the EC/
EU and the Nordic countries).  Free labor
movement provisions in economic agree-
ments among less developed countries
either have not been implemented or have
been abandoned.  To note the political im-
R E S E A R C H
P A P E R
- 108 -
U.S.  C O M M I S S I O N  O N  I M M I G R A T I O N  R E F O R M
practicality of free labor movement or the
persuasive arguments against such a
policy, except in special circumstances,
does not negate the fact that it supplies a
subsidy to domestic labor.
The issue of labor mobility becomes com-
plicated when the topic of trade in ser-
vices is discussed.  Trade in services often
requires the presence of a person to pro-
vide the service, whether high-level man-
agement consultation, artistic perfor-
mance, or on-site installation and training
for specialized equipment.  There are other
services that are more flexible regarding
performance sites.  Take as an example a
simple and relatively unskilled service
function: data entry.  The service can be
performed by American workers in the
U.S.  The function can be performed by
imported workers in the U.S.  The service
can be exported to a foreign country to be
performed by foreign workers in their own
country and the transformed data elec-
tronically transported to the U.S., bypass-
ing even the importation of a data tape or
other physical product containing the
transformed knowledge resulting from
data entry.
It is a small leap to the example of com-
puter programming that has been not only
a thorn for nonimmigrant policy and prac-
tice, but also a controversial topic for U.S.-
based firms regarding employment prac-
tice.7   When Seatrain Corporation moved
programming operations to India, U.S.
workers lost jobs.  Intel justifies move-
ment of some programming operations
overseas as a way to allow U.S. workers
7 An important aspect of the controversy about computer programmers entering the U.S.,
especially on H1-B visas, is the spreading practice in the American economy of contracting
out.  Like leasing of equipment, contracting out reduces investment costs and allows for
flexibility regarding labor costs.  Workers need not be added to the payroll.  Lesser skilled
workers do not benefit from spread effects of the more costly salaries and benefits that large
firms, which have a spectrum of skills in their work force, usually pay.  A janitor in an IBM
facility, for example, benefits from the spillover of IBM practices in ways not available to a
counterpart in a janitorial company that employs primarily unskilled workers.  Contracting
out exists independently of immigration.  Methods to lower labor costs, which is another way
of saying recruitment of cheap labor, is not confined to importing labor.  Combining contracting
out and foreign labor may maximize labor cost cutting.  To block low-wage labor importation,
however, will not end or counter the independent effects of contracting out for goods,
equipment, or services.
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to engage in the cutting-edge development
that requires their advanced skills and
justifies their higher pay in a globally
competitive environment.  The savings in
routine programming, the company ar-
gues, allows investment in the more ex-
pensive R&D work by American work-
ers.  If a company wins a contract to
develop customized programming ser-
vices and uses B visa workers to perform
programming routine tasks, is that an
abuse or a creative use of existing law to
meet an unanticipated situation that com-
bines the elements of contracting out and
knowledge-based services?  Is it any more
of an abuse than the less controversial in-
creased use by foreign-based corporations
of E visas for intracompany transferees, a
visa category with distinct advantages
over the L visa for the firm (but not nec-
essarily for the employees and their fam-
ily)?  Whatever one’s opinion about what
policy should be in such situations, an
honest answer would acknowledge that
the law and policy did not anticipate the
business situation or the business response
that combined the general move to sub-
contracting  and the importation of short-
term labor to supply a knowledge-based
service.
Regardless of one’s opinion about profit
versus greed, obligations to shareholders
versus obligations to fellow citizens and
the country that provides the opportuni-
ties to prosper as a firm, the complica-
tions for immigration policy introduced
by the relation between trade in knowl-
edge-based services and migration, espe-
cially when combined with contracting
rather than staff expansion, are real.  There
is no simple solution that maximizes trade
in services with virtually no migration.
Conversely, open migration will not trans-
late into maintaining a competitive tech-
nological edge.  A one-size-fits-all policy
on temporary labor is an anachronism that
ignores the reality of contemporary eco-
nomics and the process of wealth produc-
tion and job creation in knowledge-based
industries.
High-tech economies, increasing returns
and international migration.  Dominant
economic thinking assumes diminishing
returns.  The ideas about investment and
the creation of wealth were developed at
a time when agriculture, extraction of
resources, and bulk-manufacture domi-
nated the economy.  Diminishing returns
meant that the more you did something,
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the harder it became and the less reward-
ing it got.  As coal was extracted, for ex-
ample, it became harder to find and take
out good coal.  As coal became more ex-
pensive, hydroelectric became competi-
tive.  Coal and hydroelectric competed for
shares of the energy market.  In such a
situation, economic theory and methods
predicted an equilibrium and the relative
prices of competing energy sources.  There
is one equilibrium solution until another
energy source is found or until the law of
diminishing returns leads to one source
being so expensive that it commands no
market share.
At that point, a new equilibrium is needed.
The context is changed.  High-tech econo-
mies are driven more by “congealed
knowledge” than by “congealed re-
sources.”  High-tech products include
pharmaceuticals, telecommunications,
computer software, aircraft, and electron-
ics.  In these high-tech economies the main
costs are up front.  The cost of pro-duction
per unit becomes cheaper as volume in-
creases, not more expensive.  The first
version of Windows 95 cost perhaps about
one-half billion dollars.  The second cost
about twenty dollars for the disk, the
manual, and the packaging.  The more
units of Windows 95 that Microsoft sells,
the more it can make per unit.  This is an
example of increasing, rather than dimin-
ishing, returns.8
A characteristic of knowledge-based in-
dustries is that they enjoy protection for
the conversion of their knowledge cre-
ations in copyright and patent law and
policy.  In addition, in these industries,
history counts.  The first to achieve a dis-
covery often sets a standard that results
in other technologies not being pursued
or adopted.  First discovery or first in-
vention gives a tremendous market ad-
vantage.  A discovery,  if registered, gets
some protection that allows bringing a
product to market.   If that product sets
a standard, the return is even greater.
8 Economists trying to develop theory and methods to deal with assumptions of increasing
returns and the possibility of more than a single equilibrium solution are dealing, in technical
jargon, in dynamic stochastic discrete choice models, sometimes more simply referred to as
path dependent models.  The discussion in this section relies on a profile of one of the
principal economists (Arthur 1994a;  1994b) in this area.
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Microsoft’s advantage with the DOS op-
erating system for computers and the re-
turn to the developers of the VHS format
that bested the Beta format for home video
are clear.  Recently, developers of com-
peting standards for compact disks agreed
to a common standard that allowed them
all to participate in the rewards of a single
format for CDs to carry audio, data, and
video content.9
While the first to market will not neces-
sarily set the standard and reap the re-
wards of increasing returns, being first
provides an advantage.  Many examples
illustrate that becoming a standard gives
tremendous market advantage, if not
monopoly.  Video tape format and com-
puter operating systems, already noted,
are two often-cited examples.  Once a stan-
dard is adopted, other technology, inher-
ently as good, goes undeveloped, often
forever or until its benefit for some other
task becomes clear.  The adoption of the
internal combustion over the steam en-
gine is an example of the neglect of one
technology, steam, because another be-
came the standard.  Sequential process-
ing rather than parallel processing contin-
ues to dominate in commercially produced
computers, although advantages of paral-
lel processing for some complicated tasks
has led to renewed interest in that tech-
nology.10
For knowledge-based industries, time is
of the essence.  Both technology develop-
ment and product development have an
important element of timeliness to them,
along with the job creation, export growth,
and other consequences of standard set-
ting in a product area if the financial re-
wards are to be reaped.  In those environ-
ments, personnel recruitment for R&D,
product design, international marketing,
and so on do not operate on an assump-
tion that labor is to a large extent substi-
tutable.
9 Ironically, the VHS will decline and eventually go the way of 78 rpm phonograph records to
be replaced by the disk, smaller than the old Beta video disks and not exactly the same
technology, but a disk nonetheless.  Note also that the triumph of the disk means that digital
tapes for audio reproduction will not be widely marketed.
10 The pioneer ENIAC computer was a parallel processing machine.
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Arguments about immigration and labor
often operate at a level similar to the de-
velopment of classical economics in which
a worker was a worker and in most cases
substitutions were available.  This
undergirded the assumption that most
countries, and especially those with large
populations, were and could be labor self-
sufficient, except in extraordinary circum-
stances like total mobilization for war.
Thus, in the United States, when Turner
published his thesis about the closing of
the frontier, arguments for immigrants to
fill up the land diminished.  When indus-
trial unemployment appeared, the need
of immigrant labor was disputed.  Con-
temporary proponents of immigration
reduction point to the difference between
today and the heyday of immigration into
the United States.  The labor needs of a
postindustrial economy, where intellectual
skills are more important, differ from an
economy in which agriculture, infrastruc-
ture building, and heavy manufacturing
dominate and labor is more readily sub-
stitutable.
The notion that labor self-sufficiency can
be presumed for an economy, particularly
one characterized by a heavy reliance on
knowledge-based sectors, is questionable.
A postindustrial economy needs few or
no foreign unskilled and lower-skilled
workers.  That does not preclude a need
for those with very high skills or special-
ized experience.  Quick access to advanced
human capital is important for timely
development of technology, given the pro-
tection of patents and copyright, as well
as the relative advantage of early entry
into the market for products with com-
peting standards.  Similarly, effective
marketing in different cultures requires
collaboration of international personnel
who know various markets and the prod-
uct line.  Perhaps it is necessary to re-
think what we mean by labor and our
notions about how the economy returns
profit on investment, creates jobs, and gets
access to personnel.  To dismiss calls for
migration policy and law that responds
to international labor markets as simply
the desire of corporations for cheap, even
if highly-skilled labor, may be a mistake.
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U.S. higher education as service export
industry and its relation to immigration.
The American college and university sys-
tem is a valuable service export that has
downstream spinoffs as alumni/ae of U.S.
schools move into responsible positions
in the private and public sectors of their
societies.  More immediately, college and
especially postbaccalaureate degree hold-
ers provide a supply of potential immi-
grants based on the advanced or scarce
skills that they acquire.
The acceptability of linking international
educational programs and nonimmigrant
and immigrant policy is questioned for
three reasons.  First, the objective of pro-
viding education in a context of aid for
development conflicts with allowing ad-
justment from a student visa status to a
nonimmigrant or immigrant status based
on skills.  The view makes little distinc-
tion between students sponsored by their
governments, international organizations,
or U.S. scholarship programs aimed at
skills for development and independently
financed students, even from advanced
countries.11   Second, a cloud hangs over
all adjustments of status, as if they per-
vert the migration system or indicate de-
vious intentions.  Third, the assumption
of labor self-sufficiency leads to question-
ing why U.S. students are not in the pro-
grams that lead to skill qualifications for
nonimmigrant or immigrant status.  U.S.
educational capacity seems to feed a sup-
ply-side process.  Educational programs
cater to foreign students (and may not be
otherwise viable).  The availability of these
students to industry leads to reliance on
recruiting foreign students, with the justi-
fication that Americans with the requisite
skills are unavailable.
While educational programs that enroll
high proportions of foreign students can
be self-serving for both the universities
involved and employers, that is not nec-
11 Proposals have been made requiring foreign students to return home for one to three years,
making no distinction on source of funding.  Pending legislation has dropped a return
requirement.
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essarily the case.12  Recourse to foreign
graduates is not inherently negative.
There is no a priori reason to apologize
for seeing foreign graduates as a pool for
the United States of potential immigrants
or temporary workers with very high
skills.  What perhaps is needed in regard
to nonimmigrant and immigrant visa pro-
grams is a balance between control and
facilitation mentalities.  Disturbing devel-
opment aid goals makes no sense, for ex-
ample, but neither does a requirement that
a foreign degree holder from an Ameri-
can university leave the country for three
to five years in order to eliminate their
recruitment as nonimmigrant workers or
immigrants.  Such a policy overlooks other
benefits, long- and short-term, of an ac-
tive education export sector for the U.S.
economy and international relations.
Conclusion.  These disparate comments
about the history, characteristics, and as-
sumptions that accompany discussion of
12 Some of the characterizations of higher education in the debate over foreign students and
immigration have the flavor of the criticisms leveled at private voluntary organizations [PVOs]
in the refugee field in the early 1980s.  PVOs often performed resettlement services for the
federal government when people were admitted as parolees and before any Congressional
authorizations to pay for those services.  In effect, the private sector advanced money with
no guarantee of repayment in every case.  When some PVOs developed contingency funds
through savings from prior grants, they were accused of being “Refugee, Inc.,” as if PVOs
and their parent organizations were getting fat at the public trough.  The university in western
tradition has always being internationalist.  Scholars were and are recruited for talent, regardless
of nationality.  The most cursory overview of American experience, especially in this century,
confirms the continuation of that tradition.  It has been beneficial for basic national defense
and the economy.  Similarly, students have been international.  The University of Paris student
body in the Middle Ages was organized by “nationes,” broad groupings by area of Europe
from which they came.  Foreign students attend U.S. universities for many reasons besides
development-related aid programs and many are not sponsored by government or multilateral
organizations.  To equate foreign student training with a new-found way for higher education
to be self-serving is historically ignorant.  A better case has to be made than mere notation
of a correlation of foreign students in universities and recruitment by corporations to hand
down an indictment of U.S. higher education.   To prohibit recruitment of superstar engineering
students from elite graduate schools by Raytheon or Motorola for advanced communications
technology research as a way to counter degree mills in the private sector specializing in
elementary computer programming or cosmetology is myopic.  In the name of the national
interest, such policy opposes the nation’s true interests.
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nonimmigrant visas do not command
universal assent.  They are presented to
stimulate discussion and to question many
of the assumptions and much of the con-
ventional wisdom surrounding nonimmi-
grant visa policy discussions that pass for
facts.  As a result, these observations do
not translate effortlessly into a nonimmi-
grant worker policy.  They provide guides
for criteria to sustain a nonimmigrant
policy that recognizes that competing in-
terests cannot be simultaneously met and
that the structure and operation of the
economy and labor force have changed
and continue to develop.  The next sec-
tion outlines criteria to use in the devel-
opment and evaluation of proposed non-
immigrant visa policy for occupationally-
related reasons.
Criteria for
Developing a
Nonimmigrant
Visa Policy
Acknowledge competing interests and
conflicting values.  International recruit-
ment of labor may have differential im-
pacts on different parts of the U.S.
economy and even on different segments
of the labor force.  General Motors re-
cruitment of German engineers/auto de-
signers can be used as an example.  Sup-
pose that the request to recruit twenty-
five Germans was denied and that GM
went ahead with product development to
increase German market share with U.S.
engineers.  In that case twenty-five
“American” jobs were saved.  Suppose,
however, that the result of that product
development was lower penetration of the
German market than would have taken
place if the German personnel were al-
lowed into the U.S. and that, as a result,
400 U.S.-based jobs were not created to
manufacture components for cars destined
for German retail.  There are competing
interests between 25 engineering jobs and
400 manufacturing jobs, as well as lower
U.S. exports, lower reputation for U.S.
products as well engineered in the impor-
tant German market, and lower profit for
GM.  Any policy on international person-
nel and the immigration system must
acknowledge that such trade-offs are in-
herent in such a system, that judgement
is required, that solutions cannot always
be legislated in advance.
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Decision-making processes authorized in
legislation, however, can tip the balance
regarding which interests and values are
likely to be favored.  Quite simply, export
promotion might be favored if “interna-
tional personnel recruitment” decisions
were in the Commerce Department rather
than protecting American jobs by “labor
certification” decisions remaining in the
Labor Department.  Note how even the
phrases in quotation marks in the previ-
ous sentence put a different spin on a de-
cision whether to permit issuance of an
immigrant or nonimmigrant visa based on
occupational skills.  To pretend that no
one will be advantaged or hurt by how
the process is organized or what decisions
are made is wrong-headed.  There will be
winners and losers regardless of the pro-
posals made or the policy finally adopted
and implemented in legislation and regu-
lation.  Those winners and losers are not
confined to capital versus labor.  In the
GM engineer example, the creation of 400
manufacturing jobs is sacrificed for 25
higher-skilled, probably nonunion, higher-
payed, and most likely less-disadvantaged
U.S. college graduates.  Deflecting foreign-
ers from the labor force is not as clear-cut
as sometimes presented.
Set labor-related migration to meet do-
mestic goals as the context for nonim-
migrant visa policy and integrate  policy
for visa categories within the nonimmi-
grant domain and between immigrant
and nonimmigrant categories.  The crite-
rion of recognizing and addressing inter-
relations is founded on the contention that
all immigrant and nonimmigrant admis-
sions for labor force reasons ought to be
included in a unified policy.  The control-
ling reality is labor force recruitment and
insertion, not administrative and legal
distinctions between visa categories and
immigration statuses.  The recent growth
in the use of nonimmigrant visas and the
underutilization of occupationally-based
immigrant visas under IMMACT 90 leg-
islation indicate that recruitment behav-
ior by the private sector and legislative
assumptions vary.  Legal distinctions
drawn for administrative and legislative
purposes have been regarded as set in
concrete.  The adver-sarial process in-
grained in immigration practice has not
resulted in a cooperative and collabora-
tive fashioning of legislation in which gov-
ernment, employers, and labor contribute.
Collaboration does not imply agreement
on all issues.  But policy based on assump-
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tions made by Members of Congress, their
staffs, and nonbusiness “experts” does not
guide international labor recruitment prac-
tices.  The result of the adversarial pro-
cess is that employers and their lawyers
analyze legislation and devise ways to use
it or to get around it to meet their objec-
tives.  This is done not just by marginal
employers.  This is mainstream practice;
everybody ivolved in immigration policy
knows it.
What ought to guide policy development
is the need of the economy for both timely
availability of certain skills and for pro-
tection of U.S. workers.  Those needs can
be translated into various mechanisms for
permitting recruitment of noncitizens,
when appropriate, in nonimmigrant and
immigrant statuses, including adjustment
of status.  The movement from one status
to another ought to be based on meeting
labor force goals —including labor pro-
tection—not on an arbitrary concept about
the propriety of adjustment of status by
foreign students, intracompany transfer-
ees, or any other nonimmigrant or immi-
grant.  Even so radical a departure from
current practice as requiring work experi-
ence under a nonimmigrant visa as a con-
dition for obtaining a labor-related immi-
grant visa ought not to be rejected on
principle.
The unbundling of family and employ-
ment visa preferences in the 1990 Immi-
gration Act eases the process of tackling
skills-based entry in its entirety as the
domain to be addressed.  The configura-
tion of immigrant and nonimmigrant sta-
tuses based on skills becomes a tool to
achieve goals, not separate domains in
which the immigration status dominates
the labor force goals.
Regard adjustment of status as an op-
portunity, rather than as a restraint.   The
design of a labor-related program ought
not to try to minimize (nor maximize) ad-
justment of status.  The capacity to adjust
ought to be seen as neutral in itself and
used to the extent that it may further the
policy goals of accessing foreign labor at
minimal harm to U.S. workers.  Adjust-
ment from a student, training, or exchange
visa ought not to be excluded outright.
Particular conditions may attach to some
student visa holders, depending on their
R E S E A R C H
P A P E R
- 118 -
U.S.  C O M M I S S I O N  O N  I M M I G R A T I O N  R E F O R M
sponsorship, for example.  Entire visa
classes as currently configured should not
be excluded.
Distinguish between knowledge-based
workers performing nonroutine tasks
that result in otherwise unavailable
goods (products, exports, technology,
scientific knowledge, etc.) and other
workers.  If the concepts of increasing
returns and congealed knowledge make
sense, then workers who perform non-
routine knowledge-based services merit
particular attention.  Current immigration
policy acknowledges the exceptional
worker and people of world-class talent.
A computer programmer of exceptional
creativity demonstrated by prior output
and reputation is not a run-of-the-mill pro-
grammer with a B.S. degree.  The latter
ought not be allowed into the U.S. on
nonimmigrant or immigrant visas to com-
pete with competent U.S. programmers.
To be sure programming, even of routine
kinds, is no mean skill, but it is widely
available in this country.  A superstar,
however, may merit a visa.  Similarly, the
United States has many trained chefs and
there is no reason to recruit even specialty
chefs for a particular cuisine.  Trained
chefs can receive the additional training
to perform tasks for whatever cuisine is
desired.  This does not preclude the truly
world-class chef from occasionally receiv-
ing a visa.
One can multiply examples.  The crite-
rion should be clear.  Knowledge-based
services of a nonroutine nature ought to
result in visas.  By implication, routine,
knowledge-based services and personal
services should not command U.S. immi-
grant and nonimmigrant visas, except in
the rarest cases of truly world-class prac-
titioners.
View higher education as a labor re-
source.   If the policy focus is on labor
force needs and both nonimmigrant and
immigrant visas are seen as instruments
to achieve policy goals, then the service
export sector of higher education ought
to be seen as a resource.  It is counterpro-
ductive to adopt an arbitrary policy that
any foreign student ought to be required
to return to her or his own country.  It
makes no sense to erect barriers to entry
into the U.S. labor force for any foreign
student graduate of a U.S. university that
are greater than for a foreign graduate of
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a foreign degree program.  All foreign stu-
dents are not enrolled in U.S. educational
institutions for economic development
goals.  All foreign students are not sup-
ported by government scholarships.  If
there are problems or abuses in visa ad-
justment from a student or training visa,
the solution is not wholesale discrimina-
tion against foreign students.  Permitting
adjustment does not imply a right to ad-
justment or the suppression of such other
goals as protection of domestic labor.
Do not rely on immigrant and nonim-
migrant visas for labor-related migration
as a revenue-generating scheme.  The
concept of imposing a tax on applicants
or sponsors for labor-related visas is gov-
ernment extortion.  If the Commission or
the Congress thinks that a visa for labor-
related migration is detrimental, it should
not make it available to those that can
afford an official bribe.  To pretend that
such funds are needed to underwrite train-
ing or retraining programs by the federal
government, after years and billions of
dollars on training, is a sham.  The prob-
lem of Black youth unemployment, for ex-
ample, has not been lack of funds for
youth training.  Similarly, a pot of money
funded by a fee for a labor visa will hardly
translate into higher enrollment of disad-
vantaged American youth in nursing pro-
grams.  To implicitly promise such results
from a fee for a labor visa is disingenu-
ous.  Further, in proposed legislation the
Department of Labor  has unfettered dis-
cretion over the use of such funds for DOL
programs, including for example, summer
jobs programs.  As worthy as summer jobs
programs may be, their connection to a
fee for labor visas as a means to reduce
reliance on foreign labor or to increase
domestic preparation for high-skilled jobs
is charitably described as a stretch.
International Labor
Migration Policy
Outline
A design for nonimmigrant visa policy
ought to be couched in the wider idea of
a policy for controlled recruitment of
needed and useful noncitizen labor that
does not harm the domestic labor force.
The “do no harm” injunction has to be
understood in a way that allows for some
cases of adjustment in the U.S. labor force.
However, displaced workers must be
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placed in equivalent paying jobs with all
relocation costs paid and new jobs must
result if the visa is to be granted.
A characteristic of labor visa policy ought
to be a continuation of labor certification
to assess that the foreign workers are
complementary or, if replacements, that
they nevertheless produce more jobs be-
cause of the special skills of the incum-
bents and that displaced workers get new,
equivalent jobs.  Certification should con-
tinue to ascertain that wages and stan-
dards are not undercut.
A new balance must be struck between
labor force protection and enhancement
of the economy through judicious recruit-
ment and use of noncitizen labor.  If
decisionmakers are incapable of accept-
ing that no country on the cutting edge of
competitive, high-tech industry is labor
self-sufficient, then this set of presenta-
tions will fall on deaf ears.  If
decisionmakers think it impossible to de-
sign regulations that distinguish among
workers and their capacity to create jobs
or reject the idea that all workers are not
equal in their contribution to job creation,
wealth production, or potential contribu-
tions, then a one-size-fits-all policy should
be adopted that fundamentally limits all
labor migration to a minimum.
Confine restriction of adjustment of sta-
tus to achieving articulated goals.  Con-
versely, permit adjustment of status within
nonimmigrant categories and to immi-
grant categories, unless a specific goal dic-
tates otherwise.  For example, require stu-
dents, trainees, or exchange visitors spon-
sored by their own government, the
United States, or multilateral organizations
and agencies (e.g., UN agency scholarships
or fellowships) with funds meant to de-
velop skills for development to provide
evidence of work in their home country
for a number of years before becoming
eligible for adjustment of status to a work-
related immigrant visa.
Eliminate distinctions in nonimmigrant
visas for intracorporate transfer between
U.S.-based and foreign companies.  This
may require analysis of trade and invest-
ment treaties to renegotiate provisions
conforming to the realities of global firms.
Broader international discussion of this
issue may be needed in multilateral and
even nongovernmental forums to develop
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common understandings and practices
about international migration in the con-
temporary world.
Limit an immigrant visa for occupational
skills to persons whose skills are un-
available in the United States, or who
have a demonstrable level of attainment
that is recognized as world class, or who
have a combination of skills and experi-
ences and a connection to a corporation
that justifies working in the U.S. as part
of a career advancement that is a normal
business practice.  Do not impose fees on
the immigrant or sponsor.  No specific
recommendation regarding annual allot-
ments is made.
Require nonimmigrant labor visa appli-
cants to demonstrate competence or ex-
perience unavailable in the United States
or involvement in normal corporate ca-
reer development for intracompany
transferees who have a connection with
the company for a year or more.  Allow
sponsoring institutions training and ex-
change visas for promising talents, dem-
onstrated by scholastic records, letters of
established referees, and ordinary review
procedures by the sponsoring institution.
Competitively chosen Postdoctoral fellows
are an example.
Do not bar nonimmigrant visa holders
who develop a level of expertise to
qualify for an immigrant visa from ad-
justment by the mere fact of their hav-
ing held a nonimmigrant visa.
Evaluate the time limits on nonimmi-
grant, labor-related visas by analysis of
industry practice, the history of prior
nonimmigrant, labor-related visa hold-
ers (what proportion adjusted to perma-
nent resident, went to a non-U.S. posi-
tion in the corporate sponsor, etc.), and
practice by other countries.  The issue of
time limits requires attention not only to
length, but also to renewals and recertifi-
cation.
In concert with other countries,  move to
a policy that permits an accompanying
spouse a work permit in the United
States.  Spousal work prohibitions are
anachronistic and, given current realities,
more often than not sexist in their impact.
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Have one immigrant visa category for
occupationally-related applicants in a la-
bor-related visa package that incorporates
nonimmigrant and immigrant visas.  This
would require sponsorship by the em-
ployer and labor certification about avail-
ability or the world-class credentials and
prevailing wage and conditions issues as
is done currently.  Nonimmigrant visas
would have:
1. Students, perhaps divided into (a)
government or multilateral agency
sponsorship as a development
program and, therefore, a limit on
adjustment and (b) nonsponsored;
2. Exchange visitors, again with an
(a) and a (b) category for govern-
mental, development-oriented
sponsorship related to adjustment;
3. Intracompany tranferees, elimi-
nating the current distinction in-
volved in L and E visas;
4. Temporary visitors for business,
the current B visa, with a prohibi-
tion against performing work as
part of a joint venture or subcon-
tract except to manage the joint
venture or job for the B visa pe-
riod; and
5. Distinguished workers who are
eligible for an immigrant visa
but do not wish or require one
(similar to the current H visa
holder who may be recruited by
a new employer but have a lim-
ited-time horizon for work in the
United States).
No changes are proposed in the current
arrangements for performers and profes-
sional athletes, news media, representa-
tives of international organizations, and
so on.  No limits ought to be imposed for
nonimmigrant visas at the outset, but lev-
els ought to be monitored and Congress
encouraged to review and evaluate trends.
The general thrust of these proposals is
that nonimmigrant visas be available for
recruiting world class people to take up a
new position in the U.S., for intra-corpo-
rate transfers by current staff, for educa-
tion and training, and for short-term busi-
ness trips.  Education, experience, and
training in the United States may qualify
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a person for an immigrant visa and high
attainment should qualify a person to be-
come a permanent resident.  Conversely,
people with skills that can be reproduced
easily or that are available in the U.S.
should not be given visas.  The labor force
is protected by the retention of certifica-
tion regarding availability, qualifications,
and labor standards.
The attempt in this review and recom-
mendations is to balance reasonable need
and reasonable protection under current
circumstances that include international
recruitment as a normal and necessary
aspect of international competitiveness.
The United States should expect and de-
mand reciprocal access from other coun-
tries.  Access to the U.S. labor force should
be limited to those whose skills are in
short supply, who produce jobs, exports,
and advances in the growth sectors of the
economy in knowledge-based industry,
and whose entry is useful because of re-
ciprocal obligations regarding multina-
tional corporations and keeping U.S. com-
panies competi-tive.  This view accepts
the role of education and training as inte-
gral to knowledge-based industrial growth
and competitiveness.  At the same time,
current procedures to protect the U.S. la-
bor force should remain in place.  People
who would receive visas under these pro-
posals not only would not harm the
American labor force but would energize
job creation through discovery and prod-
uct development and opening of new mar-
kets to American goods and services.
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The California economy is undergoing
basic changes as a result of rapid down-
sizing in the U.S. defense industry, a glo-
bal corporate trend to restructure opera-
tions and become more flexible, the de-
ployment of manufacturing and process-
ing functions of the state’s highly vaunted
high-tech industry to other states and
nations with weaker regu-latory environ-
ments, a volatile economy, and growing
job insecurity.  These developments con-
stitute a wider context helping to explain
the anti-immigrant backlash now occur-
ring in California and elsewhere.  One
facet of that backlash has been a call from
diverse quarters, including environmen-
tal organizations, professional associations
representing U.S. skilled workers, and
grassroots anti-immigrant groups (see:
Bellinger 1993:69-70; Carey 1993) for a
reexamination of 1990 changes in U.S.
immigration law [IMMACT] that in-
creased the number of highly-skilled non-
immigrant workers that U.S. employers
could hire for “temporary” periods of as
many as six years under the H-1B visa
provisions of current immigration law.
The political-economic trends now con-
densed under the rubric “global restruc-
turing” (Feagin & Smith 1987:3-34; Dicken
1992) locally have produced an uneven,
volatile, and fluctuating labor market
demand for highly-skilled professional
and technical workers in the California
economy of the 1990s.   Existing empiri-
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cal studies are few and none have been
drawn with sufficient detail or categori-
cal occupational focus to map precisely
the impact on the skilled labor markets in
the state’s economy of the use of nonim-
migrant workers drawn from the global
workforce.  To be sure, a central issue of
concern to workers and federal and state
regulatory agencies in California is the
possibility that the presence of highly-
skilled foreign workers made available by
current provisions of immigration law
com-pounds an already unfavorable labor
market for U.S. skilled workers. How well-
founded is this concern?  This study seeks
to separate this question from the wider
questions of job loss caused by such other
processes as growing cor-porate
downsizing, defense industry restructur-
ing, and the overproduction of scientists
and engineers by U.S. universities.
The claim has been made that the use of
nonimmigrant workers is a cause of both
job displacement and wage depression
among U.S. skilled workers.  How valid
is this claim?  How does the answer vary
by type of skilled occupation?  What has
been the impact of the employment of
nonimmigrant skilled workers in the sec-
tor of the California economy that has been
most heavily reliant on the use of H-1B
temporary skilled workers since 1990,
namely, the computer industry in Silicon
Valley?  This research paper seeks to shed
light on each of these key questions.
The paper is divided into four parts.  The
first section provides a contextual over-
view of the changing California economy.
The second section details the study meth-
ods used in the larger qualitative research
project from which this paper is drawn.
The body of the paper then focuses on the
central question raised in the title: “The
New High-Tech Braceros? Who Is the Em-
ployer? What is the Problem?”  Finally, to
underline the importance of investigating
broad questions, such as immigrant labor
displacement on a case-by-case basis, se-
lected comparative data are presented to
show that other employment sectors, in
this instance university teaching and re-
search and the biotechnology sector, op-
erate quite differently from the computer
sector and offer quite different answers to
the ques-tions at hand.
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The Changing
Economic Context of
Reception
As the California economy plunged in the
early 1990s, people and businesses began
leaving the state in unprecedented num-
bers.  According to the California State
Department of Finance, 600,000 Califor-
nians left the state in the fiscal year end-
ing June 30, l993.  Every county in the
state except San Francisco lost population.
Two-thirds of the out migration occurred
in the five-county Los Angeles metropoli-
tan region, where defense cuts were most
pronounced.  Despite the declining
economy and the overall out migration,
200,000 legal foreign immigrants entered
California in the following fiscal year.
In Silicon Valley, the early 1990s was a
period characterized by efforts by major
employers in the computer industry to
downsize, streamline, and outsource op-
erations.  According to industry analysts,
this restructuring of operations was, in
part, driven by the impact of defense cuts
on the computer industry but also by such
factors as: (1) the overall maturation of
the industry; (2) a desire of firms to shift
from the manufacture of mainframes to
desktop computers; (3) the pressures of
competition from new entrants into the
global marketplace; and (4) an ensuing
personal computer price war that cut
deeply into profits.  The chief labor mar-
ket effect of these developments was to
reduce opportunities for full-time employ-
ment in computer-related jobs in Silicon
Valley.
An early strategy used by computer in-
dustry firms in the 1980s was to move
low-wage manufacturing jobs offshore or
to other states with weaker regulatory
environments while retaining high-pay
programming and engineering jobs for
Silicon Valley.  By the early 1990s, this
approach was superseded by a newer
computer industry strategy of relying
more extensively in Silicon Valley itself
on temporary employees, including for-
eign computer consultants, to perform an
increasing number of project-specific op-
erations.  The downsizing of the per-
manent workforce resulting from these
strategies allowed major computer manu-
facturers to shed thousands of permanent
jobs in both Silicon Valley and worldwide.
By the end of 1993, com-puter firms head-
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quartered in Silicon Valley were able to
cut between 15 and 25 percent of their
permanent worldwide workforce while
maintaining produc-tivity, although not
always market share.
Silicon Valley’s Santa Clara County was
one of the worst hit parts of Northern
California throughout the period.  The
county’s employment in computers and
office machinery plunged from 73,600 in
1990 to 43,000 in September 1994.  The
shakeup of the computer industry labor
market in Silicon Valley continued
throughout 1994 as a major new round of
mergers and acquisitions enabled firms,
particularly in database software and on-
line services, to reduce workers and re-
turn to profitability.
Paradoxically, industry analysts point out
that the demand for software engineers
in Silicon Valley was high throughout the
downsizing period and continues to be
high today.  A recently released study by
the public-private Joint Venture Silicon
Valley Network points out that from 1989
through 1993, computer software engi-
neering emerged as the region’s biggest
job generator (Sinton 1995).  Software em-
ployment in Santa Clara County actually
grew by 9,556 jobs during this period,
although this growth did not compensate
for the loss of 17,332 defense-related jobs
and 11,775 semiconductor hardware jobs
during the same period.  This appears to
be a result not simply of the shift from
hardware to software development, but
also a reflection of consistently high de-
mand for temporary software engineers,
programmers, and coders as companies
laid off full-time employees.
The decline of the defense sector has been
a related factor contributing to the ero-
sion of high-skill, high-wage jobs in Cali-
fornia.  Clearly, the state has taken the
brunt of the nation’s defense layoffs, suf-
fering 25 percent of all jobs lost nationally
in the defense sector (National Commis-
sion for Economic Conversion and Disar-
mament 1994).  Although the three met-
ropolitan labor markets  studied in the
larger research project from which this
study is drawn—Silicon Valley, the San
Francisco Bay area, and greater Los An-
geles—have been affected by defense
downsizing, major defense and aerospace
related layoffs and plant closures have
been especially severe in Los Angeles
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because of the dependency of that region’s
economy on the military budget as a cen-
tral engine of economic growth.  Between
1989 and 1993, 240,000 jobs disappeared
in Los Angeles county.  The once seem-
ingly recession-proof aerospace and elec-
tronics industries abruptly reversed course
and the construction and real estate in-
dustries floundered with them.  In 1993
alone, 110,000 high-wage, defense-related
jobs were lost to the Los Angeles economy
(Smith 1996).
The loss in California of highly-skilled jobs
through federal government budget cuts,
corporate downsizing, and consoli-dations
and mergers in the defense, electronics,
and computer industries was paralleled
by a major belt-tightening of the Univer-
sity of California and state college sys-
tems.  This university down-sizing was
necessitated by cuts in state funding for
higher education in the face of declining
state government revenues produced by
the prolonged recession.  In California, the
public university down-sizing policy was
characterized by the introduction of in-
centives to encourage early retirement of
tenured faculty members, increasing reli-
ance on tem-porary lecturers to teach some
vacated courses, the cancellation of other
courses, and an increase in both class sizes
and the time required for students to com-
plete their course requirements.
Among the rare exceptions to the adverse
employment trends in California during
the early 1990s were the biotechnology and
health services sectors.  In these sectors,
skilled research and service jobs increased
throughout the period, even in Southern
California.
Investigating
Nonimmigrant
Employment:
Study Methods
In a comprehensive qualitative field re-
search study, commissioned by the U.S.
Department of Labor (Smith & Ciepiela
1995:1-57),  I directed a study team that
investigated the process and efficacy of
the Alien Labor Certification Program and
the Temporary Worker Visa Pro-grams
used to bring foreign professionals into
skilled labor markets in California.  Our
recently completed research focused on
the computer software and hardware en-
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gineering industries in Silicon Valley and
on the biological and chemical industries,
universities, and medical centers in the
San Francisco Bay Area and greater Los
Angeles.  These locations and employment
categories were chosen because, in the two
years preceding our study, our selected
sample of employers in these regional
labor markets, including private firms,
universities, and medical centers, were
found to have the highest numbers of
Labor Condition Appli-cations [LCAs],
permanent labor certifi-cation applications,
or both in the state of California.  By this
selection method, five skilled occupational
sectors in California were found to rely
heavily on foreign worker immigration
programs in general and the H-1B visa
category in particular.  These included
computer soft-ware and hardware engi-
neering, elec-trical engineering, university
teaching and research, biotechnology re-
search and development, and medical
research and services.  Our larger  quali-
tative ethno-graphic study generated sub-
stantial evi-dence concerning the nature
and extent of job displacement by highly-
skilled foreign workers in each of these
occupa-tional sectors in California.
Qualitative and historical data for this
study were gathered during 1994 and
early 1995 primarily by conducting quali-
tative, open-ended interviews with all
parties involved in the recruitment, em-
ployment, and regulation of foreign non-
immigrant skilled workers.  Ethno-graphic
interviews also were conducted with
samples of both U.S. and nonim-migrant
skilled workers affected by this employ-
ment process.  Our overall sample thus
included: U.S. employers; foreign work-
ers; U.S. workers; officials from the Re-
gional Office of the U.S. Department of
Labor [DOL] and the Immigration and
Naturalization Service [INS]; immigra-tion
attorneys; and representatives of profes-
sional associations and unions whose
members were impacted by the process.
Our study goal was to compile a balanced
set of viewpoints enabling us to assess
the impact of the 1990 IMMACT legisla-
tion on the business and personnel prac-
tices of U.S. firms, on the employ- ment
opportunities of U.S. skilled workers, and
on the selected U.S. labor markets during
an ongoing period of global economic
restructuring and economic recession and
corporate and university downsizing in
California.
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Our study sample of employers included
interviews with fifty-eight individuals
representing thirty-seven employers in
Northern and Southern California.  These
data were supplemented by twelve par-
ticipant observation interviews conducted
with all categories of employer at a two-
day seminar in San Francisco sponsored
by the American Council on International
Personnel (1994) for employer immigra-
tion represen-tatives.  Employers thus
comprised the largest and most diverse
segment of our sample.  Among these,
the computer industry, which forms the
central focus of this paper, was the most
extensively and intensively investigated.
Our computer industry sample included
thirty-nine individuals representing
twenty-two computer and engineering
firms and five computer consulting busi-
nesses.
To elicit the views of immigration attor-
neys, most of whom represented employ-
ers seeking nonimmigrant skilled work-
ers, we interviewed ten attorneys in ses-
sions lasting from one to two hours. We
also attended several panels on H-1B visa
issues at the annual meeting of the Ameri-
can Immigration Lawyers Asso-ciation
held in San Francisco during the period
of our study.  Attorneys were asked to
describe their experience with the 1990
IMMACT regulatory changes as well as
their clients’ needs for sponsoring foreign
workers.
Our sample of workers included fifteen
skilled U.S. workers and twelve foreign
nonimmigrant skilled workers, one of
whom represented an Indian professional
association.  Sixteen of these interviews
were in-depth qualitative ethnographies
of respondents’ work histories and con-
temporary experiences in the globalized
labor market.  Eleven additional inter-
views were conducted by a combination
of e-mail correspondence and telephone
interviews with highly-skilled U.S. and
foreign workers who are members of two
computer user groups of highly-skilled
workers.
To supplement the perspective of work-
ers we interviewed six repre-sentatives of
professional associations and unions.  These
respondents varied in terms of their orga-
nizations’ active involvement in issues of
immigration and labor market conditions
for their con-stituencies.   Two associa-
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tions represent computer consultants and
have been actively lobbying the DOL and
the  INS for more vigorous enforcement
of IMMACT prevailing wage provisions
and more rigorous determination of
“shortage” occupations.  The other four
representatives of engineering trade asso-
ciations and unions, while less directly
involved in such questions, nevertheless
provided insightful analyses of how
changing structural conditions in the glo-
bal economy have affected labor market
conditions, particularly in the computer
and engineering fields.
Finally, our sample of government regula-
tors included seventeen respon-dents.  The
interviews with federal regulators in-
cluded sessions in San Francisco with a
supervisory immigra-tion examiner from
the INS, a top administrator in the DOL
Western Regional Office, and an INS case
officer who screens permanent residence
appli-cations of H-1Bs.  At the state level
we conducted group interviews on three
separate occasions in Sacramento with
eight certifying officers and six labor
market information specialists from the
California Employment Development Di-
vision [EDD].  These respondents were
asked their perceptions of local labor
market and wage conditions, the efficacy
of the LCA and labor certification pro-
cesses for protecting U.S. jobs and wages,
and the impacts of the 1990 IMMACT
legislation and DOL regulatory practices.
In sum, our research strategy was two-
fold.  Immigration attorneys and federal
and state regulatory officials were asked
largely to describe in detail the actual
implementation of the nonim-migrant tem-
porary employment pro-visions of the
1990 IMMACT legislation, particularly the
H1-B visa process.  Employers, workers,
and trade associ-ation representatives
were asked for their opinions in a wider-
ranging series of questions.  In addition
to their views of the immigration law
provisions relating to nonimmigrant work-
ers, these included  the following:
n The supply and demand of labor
in their industry;
n The effects (positive and/or
negative) of foreign workers in
their industries with respect to
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such things as job competition,
quality of work, and cultural
diversity;
n The standard educational and
professional training (and
retraining) required for affected
occupations;
n Prevailing wages for  particular
occupations and industries;
n Prevailing job search strategies
and the operation of professional
networks among both foreign and
U.S. workers; and
n The effects of current macro-
economic conditions and reces-
sion on the ability to find
employment in the affected
industries.
It is this second set of questions and re-
spondents that forms the basis of the find-
ings and policy recommendations pre-
sented below.
Nonimmigrant
Computer Workers:
Who Employs?
Who Benefits?
Who Pays?
How do the Silicon Valley employers,
computer consulting businesses, domes-
tic and foreign workers in the computer
industry, and representatives of profes-
sional associations and unions whom we
interviewed view the uses of nonimmi-
grant “temporary” workers in the com-
puter industry?  How do these findings
address the issues of job displacement and
wage depression?  What policy implica-
tions follow from these qualitative find-
ings?
Silicon Valley
Employers
Perceptions
In light of the increased globalization of
economic and cultural relations, it is
hardly surprising that, in addition to the
computer industry per se, employers as
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different as universities, government agen-
cies, banks, and insurance com-panies are
recruiting the greatest num-bers of foreign
nonimmigrant computer specialists in
California.  Because these workplaces dif-
fer significantly as forms of economic and
social organization, they are recruiting dif-
ferent types of foreign workers, at vary-
ing levels of educational backgrounds and
skills, for different purposes, and with
different time horizons and career path-
ways in mind.  Nevertheless, nonimmi-
grant foreign workers with computer pro-
gramming and software design skills have
been recruited by all of these employers.
It is thus necessary to distinguish among
three distinct types of “firms” operating
with significant numbers of H-1B nonim-
migrant computer workers in contem-
porary California: (1) computer industry
firms per se (including software compa-
nies and hardware manu-facturers); (2)
computer consulting businesses; and (3)
the corporate and government clients of
computer consultants and consulting busi-
nesses.
Based on thirty-nine direct and par-
ticipant observations and on individual
and group interviews with these catego-
ries of employer in Silicon Valley, our
study found that the bulk of H-1B work-
ers hired by the California computer in-
dustry per se have a master’s degree in
software engineering, design engi-neering,
computer engineering, computer science,
materials engineering, and integration
engineering with specific product experi-
ence.  Computer engi-neering firms hire
few Ph.D.s.  They also hire B.S. entry-level
workers infrequently, doing so only when
the local market can-not supply adequate
computer engi-neering degree holders
with experience in their emergent prod-
uct fields.  These firms reported that al-
most all of their bachelor-level workers
are hired locally.
Employers argue that there is a “dearth”
of qualified U.S. computer engineers at
the master’s entry level.  Many em-ployers
believe that U.S. workers do not pursue
master’s degrees and that they do not
combine computer science and engineer-
ing enough to qualify for product devel-
opment jobs.  Conse-quently, firms ex-
plained that they hire these foreign
master’s-level workers “strictly out of
need.”  Some also feel that foreigners are
more attractive employees because they
exhibit more “drive” than U.S. workers
in searching for jobs.  Our respondents
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do not believe that foreign workers ob-
tained jobs through different recruiting
networks than U.S. workers, claiming that
they get resumes and referrals through
stan-dardized processes of running adver-
tisements, maintaining resume banks, ac-
cessing professional networks, and recruit-
ing at universities.  Several claimed that
they “did not go out looking for foreign-
ers.”  Most of the foreign workers enter-
ing the market at the master’s level ob-
tain their degrees from U.S. universities
and are hired as F-1 students in practical
training.  Our sources estimated that more
than 70 percent of their H-1Bs were hired
as F-1s.  Aside from minimum degree
requirements, respondents stated that they
hired workers based primarily on special
requirements relevant to proprietary prod-
uct development.  They argued that they
cannot simply retrain employees and stay
competitive because computer technology
changes too rapidly.  The need for “timely
product development” forces them to
eliminate candidates who do not already
possess the specialized experience they
require.
Some firms that have engaged in
“downsizing” over the last several years
stated that they have eliminated some of
their foreign workers as jobs dropped off
and are trying to redirect other foreign
workers away as they focus on out-place-
ment and retraining.  Many conten-ded
that firms are not enthusiastic about hir-
ing foreign workers because it is expen-
sive.  Some of these employers believe
that H-1Bs do take U.S. workers’ jobs.  On
the other hand, many conten-ded that
their firms benefit from hiring foreign
workers by acquiring technical skills
quickly, adding cultural diversity to the
workplace, and expanding foreign mar-
kets.  Moreover, they reported that well
more than 60 percent of their H-1Bs even-
tually are sponsored for permanent resi-
dence.
Computer
Consulting Firms
Our study also included in-depth inter-
views with representatives of five com-
puter consulting businesses that supply
foreign workers to the computer indus-
try, the U.S. corporate sector, and agen-
cies at all levels of government.  The con-
sulting firms included four U.S.-based
subsidiaries of Indian corporations and
one U.S.-owned firm run by an Indian
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M.B.A.  The latter employs both Indian
and U.S. computer consultants in rela-
tively equal proportions.  All of these firms
provide software design services in sev-
eral profitable niches within the computer
industry.  These firms offer teams of soft-
ware engineers, applications program-
mers, and systems analysts to two primary
markets: (1) computer manufacturers
wishing to develop systems software but
without software departments; and (2)
large corporations, such as banks and
utility companies, developing alternative
d-base systems in UNIX and graphic in-
terface windowing environments [GUI].
India now is regarded widely as a lead-
ing source of expertise in these areas.  The
firms that are subsidiaries of larger In-
dian companies can facilitate both
incountry consulting teams and offshore
processing teams in India.  Represen-
tatives of these firms reported a virtual
“explosion” in business from major U.S.
corporations that are converting data bases
from large mainframes to more flexible
UNIX d-base systems.  According to these
firm representatives, the labor pool of
UNIX and GUI experts in the U.S. is ab-
sorbed and U.S. d-base designers tend to
stay away from the more menial coding
and testing tasks that the consulting firms
execute.
Note that, between 1993 and 1995, the
consulting firms whose executives we
interviewed have changed their compen-
sation and visa use practices in response
to tightening of wage compliance and
stricter B-1 visa enforcement.  They have
eliminated the use of B-1 visas for all but
short-term assignments that involve the
training of U.S. workers in installed sys-
tems (with compensation from Indian
subsidiaries).  These executives stated that
80 to 90 percent of their foreign consult-
ants enter the U.S. with an H-1B visa for
several assignments of varying duration
over a term of one to three years.  In re-
sponse to the changing poli-tical climate
and the increased availability of “tempo-
rary” U.S. computer workers with corpo-
rate downsizing of the per-manent
workforce in the industry, one consulting
business now hires 50 percent of its con-
sultants locally and several others have
plans to hire U.S. consultants.  They ex-
pect that this will improve their workforce
and profile in the industry.
All of these respondents stated that they
also have eliminated in-kind payments as
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components of salary and pay the full cash
salaries stated on H-1B and labor certifi-
cation applications.  However, even these
firms acknowledged that other consulting
firms that supply nonim-migrant com-
puter workers to U.S. employers still count
in-kind payments as salary and defend it
on the grounds that they must assist In-
dian workers materially because they have
difficulty securing apartment leases and
car loans or because they have no local
credit.  None of the firms stated that they
fine consultants who break their contracts.
They all acknowledged that some of their
workers, in their words, “desert” their
companies when U.S. firms offer them
employment with permanent residency
sponsorship.
Only recently have these consulting firms
started sponsoring H-1Bs for permanent
residence.  Firms currently are spon-soring
H-1B workers and claim that the longer-
term residence facilitated by the H-1B visa,
as opposed to the B-1 visa, is decreasing
the flowback to India and inserting these
foreign workers into  the permanent U.S.
workforce.
These respondents firmly believe that U.S.
business practices of requiring up-front
experience without offering ade-quate
training and nurturing of recent gradu-
ates will keep U.S. companies dependent
on temporary Indian personnel.  While
there is no difference in the quality of U.S.
and foreign workers, they believe that U.S.
companies focus too much on short-term
quarterly performance instead of human
develop-ment, thereby creating a pool of
U.S. workers with requisite degrees—but
without experience—who are viewed as
functionally unqualified for time-intensive
product development.
Skilled Worker
Perspectives
Our ethnographic interviews with U.S.
and foreign workers in California included
interviews with a sample of eight foreign
and eight U.S. skilled workers, mostly
employed in the computer industry.
Additionally, relying on the Internet, we
conducted eleven other focused but open-
ended interviews by e-mail and telephone.
This generated data from eight additional
U.S. workers and three additional nonim-
migrant workers.  As our Internet call for
inter-view respondents was sent out na-
tion-wide to two skilled-worker user
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groups, eight of the  eleven workers we
attracted by this method worked in states
other than California, mostly in the fields
of university teaching and postdoctoral
research.
The Foreign
Workers
Perspective
In our California sample we interviewed
directly eight foreign workers, one of
whom represented an Indian professional
association.  Four of the Indian consul-
tants came to work in the U.S. on H-1B
visas sponsored by Indian-based consult-
ing firms in Silicon Valley.  All followed a
similar pathway to gain employment as
H-1Bs.  They had prior experience work-
ing for the parent company in India and
expect to return to the Indian operations
after completion of  their U.S. assignments
unless they apply for permanent residence.
Cur-rently, only one intends to pursue per-
manent residence.  These respondents
have bachelor’s degrees in computer sci-
ence and electrical engineering from In-
dian universities and specialize in writing
software for relational databases (UNIX),
products being developed extensively for
major corporations within and outside the
computer field.
These consultants described their work in
the U.S. as providing software services
that complement existing U.S. software
programmers and engineers within com-
pany-specific contexts.  They do not be-
lieve that they displace U.S. workers but
rather offer “made-to-order skills” that
enable U.S. firms to acquire necessary
expertise quickly and economically by
eliminating the need for recruiting, retrain-
ing, and reshuffling workers.
These foreign consultants are split on
whether the supply of qualified U.S. com-
puter workers meets the demand in the
industry.  Those who do not believe there
is a shortage of qualified U.S. workers
claim that H-1B consultants are hired
because they can be acquired more quickly
than U.S. workers as consulting firms keep
diversified pools of consul-tants on hand.
All of them believe that the demand by
U.S. firms for Indian consultants will re-
main high as long as firms continue to
treat their workforce as a short-term “dis-
pensable” cost measured by quarterly sta-
tistics and insurance premiums.  They
criticized U.S. firms for neglecting the
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training and development of profession-
als in ex-change for drawing upon a re-
volving and temporary workforce that
itself feels no need for loyalty to firms
and only seeks higher wages.
While none of the  foreign nonimmigrant
respondents who work for computer con-
sulting businesses believe they are being
paid below prevailing wage, they concur
that they are paid “on the low side” be-
cause they do not have degrees from the
U.S., usually receive entry-level pay, and
do not have access to the investment and
bonus benefits of other U.S. skilled com-
puter workers.
The testimony of  four other H-1B direct
hires by computer industry firms illus-
trates a second major pathway for foreign
skilled workers to enter the U.S. labor
force, particularly the computer and engi-
neering labor force.  These respon-dents
received bachelor’s degrees in their home
country, then enrolled in U.S. universities
as F-1 students for graduate study in com-
puter science and various engineering
fields.  After graduating, they obtained
full-time jobs in Silicon Valley firms as F-
1s in practical training.  They later
changed status to H-1B with sponsorship
from the hiring firm.
One of this latter category of nonim-mi-
grant workers firmly believes that there is
a definite shortage of U.S. com-puter and
engineering workers who have master’s
degrees and that foreigners make up for
that gap in the marketplace.  He added
that U.S. workers are not highly repre-
sented in graduate-level programs, that
close to 90 percent of pro-fessionals with
advanced computer and engineering de-
grees are foreign, and that foreigners also
are filling more faculty positions in these
areas.  Three of the four respondents fol-
lowing this employment pathway reported
that they feel that the U.S. firms they
worked for actually preferred to hire non-
resident aliens.  One believes her firm
managers hire nonresidents because they
pay low salaries and often require ten-
hour work days with no overtime com-
pensation.
The Views of
American Workers
We interviewed a total of fifteen U.S.
workers.  Eight of these worked in Cali-
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fornia.  These included computer consul-
tants, full-time employees in the computer
industry, and postdoctoral researchers
working and seeking employment in both
university and industry settings.  We also
interviewed seven U.S. workers from
outside California who are members of
the Young Scientists Network computer
user group.  There is general agreement
from the U.S. skilled-worker respondents
that their labor markets  are oversupplied,
that jobs are scarce, that unemployment
and underemployment are more common,
and that wages have stagnated.  Two of
the computer consultants interviewed
worked as full-time employees in the
defense industry in southern California
until the early 1990s when they were laid
off and began working as contractors.
Other macroeconomic factors aside, re-
spondents believe that, in light of eco-
nomic conditions, foreign workers contrib-
ute to job displacement and wage depres-
sion.  This sentiment was strongly echoed
in the area of postdoctoral research in
universities and industry by the seven U.S.
members of the Young Scientist Network
whom we interviewed by Internet.
Computer consultants feel they are being
displaced by a growing number of for-
eign consultants in the industry since the
early 1990s.  They believe the 1990 immi-
gration legislation helped to encourage the
expansion of foreign-based consulting
firms that now underbid U.S. firms for
contracts with major U.S. corporations.
These workers also pointed to outsourcing
of certain kinds of computer programming
as an accom-panying cause of job insecu-
rity.  The U.S. computer consultants feel
that cost and time savings are the major
factors driving corporate contracting of H-
1B consul-tants.  The full-time computer
worker, who has worked in the industry
for eight years and who is also a project
manager, reported that her firm has been
replacing full-time workers with tempo-
rary contractors.  One of their major
contrac-ting firms is an Indian-based com-
pany that supplies them with workers
upon request.  Several projects operate
completely offshore through the parent
company in India, while others in the U.S.
are entirely staffed by H-1Bs.  She claimed
that the availability of workers in the U.S.
is not the issue, but rather time and money
are, as the firm can hire new H-1Bs as
early as the next day and foreign workers
are paid “far below” fees and salaries paid
to U.S. workers.
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U.S. computer consultants also blamed the
federal tax code for worsening their pros-
pects for job security and prosperity be-
cause it prevents them from operating
independently from third-party contrac-
tors and from charging higher fees.  They
feel this tightening of tax regu-lations by
the federal government is particularly
damaging in light of current immigration
policy that they believe facilitates the
growth of foreign-based computer
consultancies operating in the market.
Given these conditions, all of the com-
puter-related respondents concurred that
their job searches take much more time
and do not necessarily result in satisfac-
tory employment situations.  A worker
consultant who looks for jobs in the news-
paper, at job fairs, and with the help of
“head hunters,” described the systems as
“hit and miss” because jobs are snapped
up almost immediately.  Like other con-
sultants interviewed, he con-tacts up to
thirty consulting firms in seeking a place-
ment.  Another respon-dent commented
that he and his fellow workers often take
jobs for which they are overqualified be-
cause of the prevalence of programmers.
Another expressed frustration at answer-
ing adver-tisements that seem to require
wide ranges of skills and experience that
he described as “humanly impossible.”
These jobs require sophisticated lan-
guages that he feels are rarely used in
programming but are the basis upon
which he is rejected for an interview.
U.S. computer worker responses also
stood in contrast to the commentary from
U.S. firm representatives regarding the
need for acquiring specialized skills
through the H-1B and labor certification
processes.  This sentiment was particu-
larly prevalent among workers in the com-
puter and engineering fields who perform
relatively standardized work that does not
require a high degree of specialization.
The consensus among computer and en-
gineering workers is that the skills for-
eign workers bring are no better than those
available locally.  Two of the computer
consultants also stated that they do not
believe that Indians have a corner on the
market for skills in UNIX-based relational
databases, a claim articulated consistently
among the Indian-based computer con-
sultant interviews.
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Workers generally also disagreed that U.S.
firms need to hire foreigners with up-front
skills because they cannot afford the time
or money to train U.S. workers at the
outset of projects (i.e., that they need to
“hit the ground running”).  They believe
very firmly that retraining and general
adaptation to specific company products
is standard operating procedure in the
industry.  This means that no computer
worker is ever completely ready to enter
a job without some training in and orien-
tation to new and customized systems.
They disagreed that foreign workers do
not require the same preproject training
and investment.  In summary, every
worker interviewed holds that pure cost
reduction, i.e., “profit” is the primary rea-
son firms hire foreign workers.
Interestingly, U.S. computer consultants
characterized their role in the computer
industry in terms similar to those of the
Indian consultants—providing comple-
mentary skills to existing product teams.
Like foreign consultants, they make their
skills quickly available and engage in con-
tinual retraining to maintain a wide range
of skills built up through work at mul-
tiple companies.  Therefore, they believe
that U.S. firms hire foreign consultants
because they cost less, not because they
provide sub-stantively different or better
services than U.S. consultants.
These U.S. respondents, particularly those
who work in the computer consul-ting
fields, believe that foreign consultants are
being paid “well below” prevailing wage
rates.  Most respondents quoted hourly
wage figures for foreign consultants that
were as low as one-half of the standard
hourly fees for the industry.  Their views
contrasted sharply with the information
provided in interviews with the manag-
ers of foreign-owned computer consult-
ing businesses.  The foreign workers we
interviewed in this field were not always
aware of prevailing hourly fees for the
kind of consulting work they did, but
some stated that they believe they are
being paid “somewhat less” than compa-
rable U.S. software consultants and all
place themselves at the “low end of the
scale.”
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The View from
Professional
Associations
and Unions
In addition to employers and workers, we
interviewed representatives from six pro-
fessional and union associations.  As al-
ready noted, these respondents varied in
terms of their associations’ concern about
and active involvement in issues of immi-
gration and labor market conditions for
their U.S. worker con-stituencies.  The two
associations that represent computer con-
sultants have been lobbying the DOL and
the INS vigorously over the past two
years, fighting what they see as policies
that bolster foreign competition and abuse
of wages and working conditions in the
consulting field, including widespread use
of the B-1 visa and the continued practice
of paying below-market hourly wages to
foreigners despite the LCA provisions
implemented by IMMACT 1990.  They
argue that foreign workers are paid “far
below” prevailing wages in computer
consulting.  This, in turn, constitutes un-
fair competition and drives down hourly
consulting rates for U.S. computer con-
sulting businesses and displaced computer
engineers who have become consultants
by default.
These representatives faulted the U.S.
Department of Labor and the California
EDD for contributing to this problem for
three reasons.  First, they believe that the
LCA process is unenforceable in the third-
party consulting environment because it
masks the real employer.  As the LCAs
cannot be posted in the actual workplace,
they end up being posted in the adminis-
trative offices of consulting firms.  This
undermines their potential effectiveness,
as U.S. workers never see them.  Second,
computer consultants are hesitant to make
formal complaints about depressed fees
because they have very little job security
in the consulting environment.  Third, they
argue that EDD generates too low a pre-
vailing wage figure for consultants be-
cause it averages together the salaries of
full-time workers with the fees of consult-
ants who generally lack fringe benefits and
thus command higher hourly rates than
full-time workers.
The other representatives of engineering
trade associations and unions that we
interviewed were less immediately in-
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volved in the particular issues raised by
U.S. consulting firms in California.  Nev-
ertheless, these respondents stressed the
adverse impacts of defense down-sizing,
corporate strategies of hiring temporary,
debenefited workers, un-favorable tax
policies for consulting businesses, and the
overall national recession as adversely
affecting the life chances of their mem-
bers.  (For factors related to the global
flow of engineers see: National Research
Council 1988.)
While they were unable to account pre-
cisely for the relative employment impact
of these structural factors as against im-
migration policies toward skilled work-
ers, they nonetheless argued that:
n There is a trend for what one
respondent described as “U.S. job
shops” to be underbid by “foreign
job shops” because foreign
workers will accept lower wages
and, thus, foreign job shops can
underbid competitors;
n That foreign workers are hired not
because they possess special skills
unavailable locally but because
they are cheaper;
n That foreign workers do con-
tribute to wage depression by
entering the U.S. market at a time
of unfavorable labor market
conditions for U.S. engineers;
n That the current “oversupply” of
engineers is causing the most
talented workers to leave engi-
neering and enter other fields like
law, business, and finance.
These organizational representatives of
U.S. highly-skilled workers shared the
perception of the foreign workers we in-
terviewed with respect to U.S. cor-porate
practices regarding labor training and
human resource development.  One even
said the U.S. corporations “think of work-
ers as throwaway items.”  Note also that
some of these respondents regarded
outsourcing as a far greater threat to U.S.
engineers and computer professionals than
competition from H-1B nonim-migrant
workers.  They pointed out that software
programming already is being outsourced
“over the wire” and that design functions
may soon follow the same route.  Implicit
in this concern is the danger that enforce-
ment targeted at foreign “job shops” may
only accelerate the trend of American cor-
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porations outsourcing contracted work to
the foreign consultants’ offshore firms.
Comparing
Nonimmigrant
Recruitment
Across Scientific
Occupations
As suggested above, in light of the in-
creased globalization of economic and
cultural relations, it is hardly surprising
that “employers” as different as com-puter
and engineering firms, biotech-nology
companies, and public and private uni-
versities are recruiting the greatest num-
bers of H-1B temporary scientific work-
ers in California.  Because these “work-
places” are historically specific institu-
tional settings that differ significantly as
forms of economic and social organiza-
tion, they are recruiting different types of
foreign “temporary” workers at varying
levels of educational backgrounds and
skills, for different purposes, and with
different time horizons and career path-
ways in mind.  While space does not al-
low a detailed discussion of each of the
other scientific occupations included in
our larger study, it is, nonetheless, impor-
tant to offer a brief discussion of our key
findings regarding nonimmigrant recruit-
ment in a selection of the other fields we
studied to illustrate the specificity of our
findings regarding the computer indus-
try, to capture the complexity of develop-
ing global labor markets, and to add depth
to our overall analysis.
The Biotechnology
Industry
In our larger study we interviewed five
representatives of three high-end H1-B
user biotechnology companies in San Fran-
cisco and Los Angeles.  Each of these firms
hire “temporary” foreign workers almost
exclusively in research and development.
They actively recruit high-level Ph.D.s
from the global marketplace  as research
project managers and post-doctoral re-
searchers with specialized expertise in
ongoing firm projects.  Beyond this, they
recruit all other scientists and assistant
scientists locally, except when particular
support people are requested from for-
eign labs by their H1-B project directors.
The transnational talent pool of scientists
in biotechnology is small and close-knit.
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Recruitment relies heavily on inter-na-
tional professional networks.  The recruit-
ment process for project managers is very
thorough, with firms spending as many
as six months to find an exact match of
expertise.  The population of foreign pro-
fessionals in California biotechnology
firms tends to be very diverse with no
nationality constituting even close to a
majority.  This finding underlines the pro-
fessional nature of recruitment networks
and the limited impact of ethnic recruit-
ment networks in this scientific field.
These firms afford two possible pathways
from H-1B status to permanent residency.
Some of the sci-entists recruited are of-
fered sponsorship upon their initial em-
ployment as a re-cruitment incentive.
Others are afforded the possibility of this
option after a trial period ranging from
six months to two years.
Perhaps not surprisingly, in light of the
above recruitment process, the biotech-
nology firms whose representatives we
interviewed are not experiencing any
problems with the H-1B process.  As they
recruit top scientists and pay high sala-
ries, they do not experience any “prevail-
ing wage” problems with state regulators.
Although they did complain that the la-
bor certification process has been slowing
down and becoming increasingly “aggres-
sive,” these firms have been successful in
using the “outstanding” immigration cat-
egory to recruit the vast majority of their
foreign scientists.  They argued, and of-
fered evidence to support their claim, that
far from causing any labor displacement
of U.S. Ph.D. scientists, the research and
product development projects they create
actually expand job opportunities for do-
mestic biotechnology specialists because
of the firms’ practice of rounding out re-
search project teams directed by foreign
scientists through local recruitment.
Although our findings are limited because
of the small size of our firm sample, the
biotechnology firms we did select were
the highest users of H-1B scientists in the
state.  Moreover, the recruitment processes
described for each firm were remarkably
consistent with each other.  The findings
suggest that neither wage depression nor
job dis-placement is a serious problem in
this scientific occupation.  If this is the
case, there is little need to consider any
sweeping policy change for this sector.
Put colloquially: “If it ain’t broke, don’t
fix it.”
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University Teaching
and Research
Our employer sample of university ad-
ministrators of immigration programs in-
cluded eight individuals representing the
state’s four largest university users of H-
1B visas for their faculty and research staff:
two large public uni-versities; one large
private university; and one moderate-
sized elite private university.  We also ad-
dressed the employment conditions of
Ph.D. sci-entists in university teaching and
research with a sample of nine U.S. re-
spondents and three foreign respon-dents
with doctoral degrees, drawn from both
our ethnographic and Internet samples of
scientific “workers.”  To sup-plement these
qualitative interviews, we attended a half-
day meeting of the Bay Area Foreign
Scholar Advisors, repre-senting the four
universities in our sample and twelve
other public and private universities
throughout Cali-fornia.  Finally we con-
ducted participant-observation research at
a half-day workshop held at one of our
major public universities for foreign Ph.D.s
moving into U.S. labor markets.
The universities we sampled hire foreign
workers mostly as faculty and postdoc-
toral researchers.  The averages derived
from data provided to us by the four larg-
est university users of the H-1B visa cat-
egory were 30 percent faculty and 70
percent postdoctoral researchers.  All of
the faculty are selected by a scrupulous
process for the recruitment of tenure-track
employees and nearly all are sponsored
for permanent residence as a condition of
employment.  The use of H-1B visas for
this category of employees functions
largely as a “holding pattern” while per-
manent residency approval is sought.  In
contrast, postdoctoral researchers gener-
ally are sponsored for H-1B visas with
departmental approval and verification of
the availability of three years of research
funding.  The two principal pathways by
which foreign doctoral-level scientific
workers receive H-1B visas are conver-
sion from F-1 and J-1 visas.  University
representatives reported that the positions
filled by the J-1s and F-1s are advertised
for general recruitment before foreign
candidates are approved for H-1Bs to al-
low access of others in the market to the
positions.  While foreign-born faculty and
post-doctoral researchers are spread
through-out departments, university em-
ployers reported that there is some clus-
tering in engineering, computer sciences,
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business, and medicine and among Indi-
ans and other Asians.
University immigration administrators
expressed great concern over the issue of
prevailing wage determinations.  While
the EDD, the California State Employment
Security Agency [SESA], employs a na-
tional survey, Academe, our four sampled
California campuses argued that the sur-
vey generates exces-sive salary quotes for
junior faculty because it amalgamates fac-
ulty salaries for all levels without recog-
nizing traditional tenure step systems.
Em-ployer respondents were adamant that
the EDD fails to understand how uni-
versities function and disregards their own
wage scales that reflect statewide salary
conditions and the multiple layers of uni-
versity rank and step systems.  Further,
they pointed out that conducting ad hoc
local wage surveys is not a feasible way
for them to offer alternatives to the amal-
gamated Academe surveys because often
the university is the only institution of its
kind in its local labor market.
The university administrators with whom
we spoke advanced the argument that
they should not be subject to H-1B regu-
latory constraints at all because universi-
ties, as institutions, always have  sought,
and indeed require, foreign scientific pro-
fessionals for intellectual exchange and to
fulfill their research and academic mis-
sions.  As nonprofit organi-zations in the
service of the advancement of knowledge,
they further argued, they should not be
expected to compete with corporate  pro-
fessional salaries in private industry.  They
advocated instead the creation of a spe-
cial H-1C visa category for universities
that does not have a nu-merical cap, strin-
gent wage verification procedures, or se-
vere penalties.
The employment conditions of the Ph.D.
scientists whom we interviewed in our
university sample of scientific occupa-tions
varied greatly, ranging from full-time, ten-
ure-track faculty members and research
scientists to postdoctoral researchers
working in their fields, to those working
in temporary positions outside the field
of their Ph.D.s.  Despite notable differ-
ences in personal work history, these re-
spondents converged in describing four
contemporary trends in their respective
scientific fields: (1) an oversupply of Ph.D.
scientists in their labor market; (2) reduced
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opportunities for permanent positions in
university teaching and research; (3) a re-
sulting substantial prolongation of time
spent as low-paid postdoctoral research-
ers prior to entry into their field, where
they are treated as temporary workers
with reduced or nonexistent benefits; and
(4) a growing abandonment of some
highly oversupplied fields by Ph.D. scien-
tists for better paying work in other fields
that do not require the graduate educa-
tion they spent so much time and money
to acquire.
While the U.S. respondents with Ph.D.s
acknowledged the positive impact of for-
eign scholarship on university life, they
also worried about competition from for-
eign Ph.D.s for increasingly elusive fac-
ulty positions.  Some of our respon-dents
reported that U.S. scientists with doctoral
degrees shy away from university-based
research positions because of low wages,
thereby selecting themselves out of the
market.  Some of the U.S. Ph.D.s we in-
terviewed, who have entered other fields
in private industry, said they were forced
out of this market by a combination of
low wages, extreme overproduction of
both U.S. and foreign Ph.D. scientists by
American universities, particularly in
physics and mathematics, and exploi-
tative working conditions in postdoctoral
research labs.  They argued that foreign
Ph.D.s are willing to accept such con-
ditions because they see low-paid
postdoctoral research as a key pathway
to a green card.  A few of our U.S. re-
spondents have accepted work in fields
completely unrelated to their fields sim-
ply to earn a living wage.  Two high en-
ergy physicists, for example, have gone
into computer programming and man-
aging a biology laboratory because they
cannot find any work in their own fields.
Several others in our sample were encoun-
tering extreme difficulty securing any but
the most temporary, insecure, and
nonbenefited university postdoctoral re-
search positions.
Further exacerbating this problem is the
practice by universities in California and
elsewhere of downsizing their operations
and increasing their use of temporary em-
ployees, both domestic and foreign.  As
there are no established Dictionary of Oc-
cupational Titles [DOT] codes for
postdoctoral workers, universities can
offer very low salaries to postdoctoral
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researchers, often financed by soft money.
They also can offer limited fringe benefits
and remain unchallenged as U.S. sci-entific
workers continue to exit this mar-ket,
discarding their long human capital in-
vestment in Ph.D. study, while foreign
postdoctoral researchers remain qui-
escent, and, sometimes, even accept ex-
ploitative working conditions.  We were
told, for example, of Chinese post-doc-
toral medical researchers in a major Cali-
fornia university who were hired as quar-
ter-time researchers under prevailing
wages but who spent more than fifty hours
per week in their labs in hope of obtain-
ing sponsorship and remaining perma-
nently in the U.S. with green cards.
University representatives have made a
coherent case in support of the general
proposition that universities are per-
manently in need of a steady infusion of
foreign talent to engage in their basic tasks:
cutting-edge research; the general ad-
vancement of scientific knowledge; and
the production of new knowledge that has
general public benefit.  They argued that
they should be exempt from the stringent
regulations that apply to profit-making
businesses regarding H-1Bs and labor
certifications.  Based on the findings of
our study, the case for their argument is
considerably stronger in the case of their
recruitment of full-time, tenure-track fac-
ulty members than in the case of part-
time faculty and temporary postdoctoral
researchers.
In the former case, the universities engage
in extensive formal search requirements,
multiple interviews, and, at the time of
our study, the need to conform to strict
affirmative action guidelines.  In this
search they clearly are advantaged in
obtaining the best available talent world-
wide by the great oversupply of Ph.D.s
that they have generated, particularly in
some scientific fields like mathematics and
physics.  While their graduate degree
programs may be faulted for insensitivity
to existing labor market conditions, when
they recruit new tenure-track faculty, the
quality of candidates’ research and, to a
lesser extent, their teaching skills are para-
mount. Thus, the recruitment by univer-
sities of permanent teaching and research
faculty tends to be driven by an open
search for the best talent world-wide,
rather than by a desire to reduce costs.
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In contrast, in the case of university
postdoctoral researchers, wide discretion
is left in the hands of principal inves-
tigators, often operating on soft money
from external grants.  These “employers”
depend on a steady infusion of relatively
low-paid postdoctoral researchers to keep
their research going.  Hiring often is done
by means of personal social networks,
both professionally and ethnically based.
The quest for excellence often is super-
seded by the mutual cultivation of men-
tor-mentee relations between principal in-
vestigators and postdoctoral candidates.
The search for candidates is limited as
well by the differential willing-ness and
ability of U.S. and foreign Ph.D. research-
ers to work long, often uncom-pensated,
overtime hours for relatively low salaries.
In view of the above findings, our larger
study makes three policy recom-
mendations:
n That immigration policy makers
limit any proposed establishment
of a less restrictive scientific
worker immigration category for
universities, such as a proposed
H-1C visa,  to full-time, tenure-
track, teaching and research
occupations;
n That, in enforcing existing
regulations, state and federal
regulators of prevailing wages pay
attention to the reasonable
arguments university represen-
tatives have made concerning the
uniquely layered and segmented
tenure-step systems that con-
strain the salaries that can be
assigned within the full-time,
tenure-track teaching and re-
search system; but that
n Because of the potential for
general wage depression, abusive
working conditions for foreign
postdoctoral scientists, and job
displacement of U.S. scientific
researchers in the postdoctoral
occupational cate-gory, the
regulatory process should
concentrate scarce enforcement
resources upon and insure
prevailing wages for the
postdoctoral researcher occupa-
tional category.  Creating such a
less-restrictive visa category for
faculty employment would
complement this recommen-
dation by freeing up resources to
be deployed in the job category
where they are most needed.
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The New High-Tech
Braceros Revisited
Having focused this research paper largely
on the processes of nonimmigrant recruit-
ment and employment in the computer
sector, what are the policy implications
and recommendations that follow from
our findings?  First and foremost, com-
puter software work is complexly articu-
lated in distinct occu-pational niches in
the U.S. and world economy and should
be understood and dealt with as such.
When designing policy change it is thus
crucial that the “real employer” of non-
immigrant skilled computer workers be
recognized and addressed in the future.
We have seen that one of the key changes
in the computer industry springs from its
corporate restructuring by expanding the
number of temporary workers while re-
ducing its full-time workforce.  In the
industry itself there is a labor surplus, not
a shortage, as software engineers leave
full-time employment in computer com-
panies, particularly defense-related firms.
At the same time, occupational data show
that the positions of software engineer,
programmer, and coder are growing at a
rapid rate both in California and nation-
ally.  How do we explain this anomaly?
The answer is twofold.  First, computer
firms in Silicon Valley are shifting from
hardware to software applications,
downsizing their permanent workforce in
Silicon Valley and worldwide, and rely-
ing increasingly on contract labor to per-
form software design, programming, and
coding functions.  Second, corpora-tions
of all kinds outside the computer indus-
try are picking up many of those displaced
from the industry as well as hiring H-1B
and U.S. computer consul-tants as tem-
porary workers to help them to downsize
and create a more flexible workforce.  Both
primary data drawn from our interviews
with U.S. and foreign workers and em-
ployers and abundant secondary docu-
mentary sources (e.g., ICIM International
1992:1-4; APL Management Consultants
1992:1-4) reveal that the downsizing firms
relying on computer consultants run the
gamut of the U.S. economy, including fi-
nance and banking, real estate, account-
ing, manufacturing, public utilities, phar-
maceuticals, health care, the travel indus-
try, and even government agencies at all
levels.
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Thus, the key question is: “Who is the
employer?”  The real employers of the
computer workers in these occupations are
neither the U.S. consulting companies nor
the foreign-owned “job shops” that sup-
ply workers, but rather the clients who
subcontract their services.  It is the
downsizing corporate and government
clients who are generating the demand
for temporary software consultants to
assist them in restructuring.  The “job
shops” and consulting businesses are
merely middlemen responding to the de-
mand generated, especially from large cor-
porate firms.  The DOL tendency to re-
gard the “job shop” as the “employer”
plays into the hands of the real employ-
ers, as subcontracting is a device used to
avoid legal responsibility for wage com-
pliance and visa petitioning.  Ironically,
downsizing—both within and outside the
industry—has reduced employment of
full-time computer software engineers,
programmers, and coders, thereby ex-
panding the supply of potential consult-
ants even further.  The combined effect of
this dynamic has been to depress hourly
fees in this field—in some cases even
lower than seven years ago.
A second irony is that state and federal
regulatory agencies have spent a great deal
of time trying to separate out “job shops”
from “legitimate consulting businesses”
(see, for example: Zachary 1995:A2).  We
have found that consulting agencies and
“job shops” do differ from each other in
the rates they pay their consultants, which,
based on qualitative data from interviews,
can be quite significantly lower for for-
eign H-1B consultants.  However, we do
not find the distinction to be centrally im-
portant except to the extent that wages
are affected.  Foreign competition does
lower the prevailing wage of software
engi-neers, programmers, and coders,
particu-larly at the lowest levels.  How-
ever, the more salient issue is that both
types of consulting businesses merely are
supply-ing the overarching corporate (and,
to a lesser extent, government) demand
for more efficient ways to organize work,
reduce their obligation to provide fringe
benefits to full-time workers, and create a
more flexible global workforce.
Defense-related firms clearly have failed
to retrain their existing workforce in the
face of the need for conversion to civilian
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production.  Evidence from the profes-
sional association representatives and even
the foreign workers we inter-viewed in-
dicates that nondefense-related industries
tend to be equally inattentive to such long-
range considerations as worker retraining
and human resource development.  In the
epoch of global re-structuring earlier cor-
porate strategies of building allegiance
from permanent workers by human de-
velopment policies have been replaced by
a race to become more flexible in the glo-
bal marketplace by relying on an expend-
able workforce of temporary workers and
shrinking an increasingly insecure perma-
nent skilled workforce.  Among computer
software engineers and programmers,
permanent job displacement has expanded
the pool of computer consultants, in-
creased the search time for contracts, and
reduced the time available to keep skills
up-to-date in a rapidly changing field.
Policy
Recommendations
In light of these developments, the fol-
lowing policy recommendations address
the real problem at hand:
n Regulatory and enforcement
mechanisms should focus on the
“real employer,” i.e., the clients of
contract workers, including hold-
ing them accountable for paying
prevailing wages to nonimmigrant
workers and for retraining dis-
placed American workers;
n To this same end, the Education
and Training Administration
[ETA] in the U.S. Department of
Labor well might focus its efforts
on creating retraining opportuni-
ties for displaced U.S. workers;
n Displaced skilled workers also
should be offered tax credits or
deductions to cover the costs and
time of retraining.
As a corollary to these interrelated policy
recommendations, as H1-B consultants do
appear to contribute to wage depres-sion,
it is finally recommended:
n That the DOL focus its efforts on
monitoring this aspect of the so-
called computer “job shops” to
insure that they pay their work-
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ers prevailing wages, rather than
targeting them as the sole culprit
responsible for U.S. worker dis-
placement.
Conclusions
By and large, high-skill workers in the
computer field have been displaced by cor-
porate downsizing, both inside and out-
side the computer industry, not by com-
petition from foreign H-1B workers.  There
is no doubt that expanding the size of the
labor pool by the entry of H-1B software
engineers, programmers, and coders in-
creases the difficulty U.S. computer con-
sultants are experiencing in finding a
steady supply of work.  Yet, they are find-
ing work, as the demand for temporary
computer software con-sultants remains
high.  The main prob-lems U.S. computer
consultants face are stagnant consulting
fees and a highly-competitive environment
for consulting work that contributes to
continuing income stagnation.  The com-
plaints U.S. workers voice about foreign
competition stem from the fact that, in the
current political climate, this is an issue
they can do something about by acting to
“stop immigration.”  But the structural dis-
placement produced by downsizing is a
much larger problem—in the computer
field and elsewhere—that can be addres-
sed by serious efforts to enforce pre-
vailing wage standards and develop pro-
active policies to retrain an increas-ingly
insecure segment of the U.S. workforce.
In the final analysis, because of the grow-
ing reliance of U.S. industry, commerce,
and government on outside consultants,
it is important to map the complexity of
the emerging consulting sector of the U.S.
and global labor market.  In today’s age
of flexible production, all categories of
employer are turning increasingly to con-
sultants to perform project-specific opera-
tions.  This study focused intensively on
computer consulting as a business and
software engineers as workers.  But the
policies and practices identified in the
foregoing analysis may be applicable more
generally to address the rising tide of
temporary consulting workers nationally
and worldwide.
Despite this likely convergence, it is im-
portant to raise a cautionary note by re-
calling our comparative analysis of the
recruitment and employment of nonim-
migrant scientific workers in other fields.
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Clearly, global recruitment and employ-
ment processes in biotechnology research
and development, university teaching and
research, and computer software engineer-
ing operate in fundamentally different
ways.  Thus, to design reason-able policy
responses to contemporary conditions,
policy changes concerning nonimmigrant
employment regulations need to be con-
sidered carefully, on a case-by-case basis,
both across scientific fields and between
different job categories within particular
sets of workplaces.  To do otherwise is to
fly in the face of the complexity of the
global world we have created and the
transnational networks that now sustain
it.
That very complexity poses the paradox
now facing national regulatory environ-
ments in today’s global economy.  By al-
lowing a steady flow of highly-skilled
specialty workers to enter the United
States for relatively long temporary peri-
ods at prevailing wage standards, contem-
porary immigration law has made regu-
latory officials responsible for administer-
ing a de facto guest worker program.  If
regulators set prevailing wage standards
too low, they become subject to the politi-
cal charge that they are running a “high-
tech bracero program” that hurts Ameri-
can workers.  On the other hand, if they
set them unreasonably high or make do-
mestic access to nonimmigrant workers
too bothersome for U.S. employers, they
run the risk that U.S. firms presently em-
ploying nonimmigrant workers simply
may switch from a policy of importing
skilled temporary workers to one of ex-
porting the work that they do to knowl-
edge production sites in less-developed
countries like India and Pakistan or in
Eastern Europe where needed skills and
technological means of communication
already are concentrated.  In the field of
computer consulting such outsourcing
already is happening.  If the pace and scale
of outsourcing is accele-rated by cumber-
some or exclusionary immigration policy,
both regulators and policymakers will be
held politically responsible for creating a
“high-tech Maquiladora program.”  In our
contem-porary political climate, the para-
doxes of economic globalization indeed
are coming home to roost.
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Employers increasingly rely on a well-
educated and highly-skilled workforce to
meet the competitive demands of today’s
global economy.  The Immigration Act of
1990 responded to a perceived shortage
of skilled workers by increasing the num-
ber of both economic-based immigrant
and nonimmigrant visa categories.  Most
significant and controversial among these
changes was the reclassification of the H
visa category, which remains since it’s in-
ception in the Immigration Act of 1952,
the largest program supplying temporary
foreign workers to U.S. employers.
Originally, the H program was conceived
as a mechanism for tapping into a labor
pool of temporary foreign workers to meet
bottlenecks in the supply of U.S. workers
in particular occupations.1  The 1990 Act
streamlined the procedure by which em-
ployers gain access to skilled foreign la-
bor by replacing the “distinguished merit
and ability” requirement with a simpli-
fied “specialty occupation” clause and
increased dramatically the number of for-
eign workers that U.S. employers could
bring into their workplaces for periods of
as long as six years.2
SKILL LEVEL AND EMPLOYER USE
OF FOREIGN SPECIALTY
WORKERS
JACQUELINE HAGAN AND SUSANA MCCOLLOM
UNIVERSITY OF HOUSTON
1 In addition to the H-1B subdivision (the H-1A being discontinued), the H program includes
three other types of temporary foreign worker categories: the H-2A subcategory is reserved
for temporary agricultural workers, the H-2B for temporary nonagricultural services not
exceeding a year, and the H3 for a relatively small number of certain trainees.
2 A specialty occupation under the 1990 Act is one that requires the practical and theoretical
application of specialized knowledge and attainment of at least a bachelor’s degree in the
specified specialty.
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However, following passage of the 1990
Act, the United States, along with a num-
ber of other industrialized nations, was
swept into a global recession that trans-
lated into severe cutbacks in research
funding, corporate downsizing, and high
unemployment.  The hardships of the lat-
est economic cycle reinforced an ongoing
trend of significant realignment and reor-
ganization of the production of work.
Moreover, such shocks were felt especially
hard in the fields of science and technol-
ogy: many skilled workers in these areas
lost their jobs and well-trained recent col-
lege graduates confronted shrinking em-
ployment opportunities.  Despite this, the
number of H-1Bs filed has risen steadily
each year since 1990 and they are concen-
trated in the fields of science and technol-
ogy.  These interrelated developments
raised a number of questions regarding
the effects of the H-1B program.
In response to these developments, in late
1993, the U.S. Department of Labor [DOL]
sponsored several in-depth field studies
to examine how the H-1B system works
and how it affects the various actors, in-
cluding domestic and foreign workers,
professional associations, government of-
ficials, and immigration attorneys.  In
selecting the research sites, DOL sought
states with a high number of H-1B appli-
cations in the areas of science and research
but with different labor market conditions.
The research reported on below was con-
ducted in Texas in 1994, a time of eco-
nomic expansion following a prolonged
recession in the state.
The Economic
Context of Foreign
Specialty Workers
in Texas
In the 1980s, almost a decade before the
rest of the nation, the Texas economy
experienced what became a world-wide
recession.  Beginning in 1982, an oversup-
ply of oil in the world market sent the
prosperous Texas economy into a severe
five-year recession.  Unemployment in-
creased steadily during this period, peak-
ing at roughly 9 percent by 1986 (Smith
1989).  Given Texas’ historical dependence
on oil and petro-chemical production, no
metropolitan area, industry, or occupa-
tional group was spared the recession’s
repercussions.  As the center of the world
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petrochemical industry, Houston was es-
pecially hard hit: the area’s unemployment
rate stood as high as 13 percent in 1986;
declines in manufacturing, business ser-
vices, and construction resulted in a loss
of more than 200,000 jobs in the city be-
tween 1982 and 1986 (Hagan & Rodriguez
1992).
In response to the recession, large petro-
chemical and engineering firms headquar-
tered in Houston initiated a restructuring
strategy—a process that continues to the
present.  Typically, these multinational
corporations [MNCs] retained those com-
ponents of the business that they did best.
In most cases, this involved keeping and
retraining very highly-skilled employees
in software design and engineering and
outsourcing lower-level tasks, such as
programming and coding.  The elimina-
tion of salaried positions enabled these
companies both to maintain production
levels and remain competitive.
In some cases, downsizing—or “right-siz-
ing” as it is euphemistically referred to by
the corporate executives interviewed—
involved laying off more than 40 percent
of a firm’s workforce.  This strategy had
particularly severe consequences for en-
gineers, computer programmers, and ana-
lysts who comprised the information sys-
tems and research and development com-
ponents of multinational corporations
headquartered in Houston.  Software ana-
lysts and programmers, who had earned
high annual salaries (as much as $80,000)
during the boom years, entered the ranks
of the unemployed.  Computer consult-
ants, who had carved their own niche in
the booming information and support
components of the petrochemical indus-
try, no longer were able to secure long-
term projects at the high hourly wages
(as much as $65) that they once had en-
joyed.
A shift from a goods-producing to a ser-
vice-producing economy, beginning in the
late 1980s, started Texas on the road to-
ward economic recovery.  By 1990, the
Texas labor market ranked third nation-
ally in employment.  The unemployment
rate dropped to 6 percent by the close of
1990, a level it still maintains (Texas
Comptroller of Public Accounts 1996).  In
1995, Texas led all states in the number of
new jobs added annually; currently Texas
ranks tenth in the nation in the rate of
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employment growth.  The state’s early
emergence from the recession was due, in
part, to the development of a more diver-
sified economic base and the continuing
relocation of high-tech industries to Texas.
While oil and gas production are still an
important sector of the state’s economy,
Texas is now less closely tied than it was
to these volatile industries.  For example,
it is projected that, from 1993 to 2000,
employment in the mining industry, espe-
cially in the areas of crude petroleum and
natural gas extraction and oil and gas
services, will decline by as much as 40
percent in some areas of the state.  On the
other hand, employment in service-pro-
ducing sectors is large and growing: 96
percent of employment growth in Texas
by the year 2000 is expected to occur in
service industries (Texas Employment
Commission 1992, 1995).
Expansions in business, engineering, and
health services drive overall growth in
service-sector jobs.  While total wage and
salaried employment for the state is pro-
jected to grow by 16 percent between 1993
and 2000, employment in business, engi-
neering, and health services is projected
to increase by 41 percent, 40 percent and
31 percent, respectively.  Many of the
growth occupations in these sectors are
those in the higher-skill and knowledge-
base areas.  For example, computer-related
jobs currently rank first among the fast-
est-growing skilled occupations.  Com-
puter system analyst and computer engi-
neering positions are projected to increase
by more than 58 percent from 1993 to 2000.
The number of computer programmers
also is expected to increase by 40 percent
during that period.  Other high-growth
skilled occupations include science-related
jobs in teaching and research, which are
expected to grow by more than 30 per-
cent before the year 2000 (Texas Employ-
ment Commission 1995).
It was within this context of economic
expansion and healthy employment pros-
pects for well-trained U.S. workers in
science and research that a team of re-
searchers studied the role of H-1B foreign
specialty workers in the Houston and
Austin area labor markets.  That research
forms the basis for the findings and rec-
ommendations discussed below.  The
chapter first discusses the project’s meth-
ods, its manner of selecting firms in the
research, academic, and computer indus-
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tries, and its mode of inquiry.  The chap-
ter then separately presents the findings
on, and recommendations for, the H-1B
program in research universities and
medical centers and in the complex com-
puter industry.  The conclusion identifies
lessons from the study of the H-1B certi-
fication process that can be used to im-
prove the program.
Methodology
The research reported on below is based
on a 1994 field study supported by the
U.S. Department of Labor’s Bureau of In-
ternational Labor Affairs and conducted
by a team of researchers in Texas.  Texas
was selected as one of several research
sites for the larger study because of its
high national ranking in the number of
H-1Bs filed and because it is the location
of a DOL/ETA [Employment Training
Agency] regional office.  This agency is
responsible for approving the Labor Con-
dition Applications [LCAs] of H-1B peti-
tioners and supplied the Texas team with
list of ranking H-1B user firms in the state.
The primary goal of the DOL study was
to understand better how the H-1B sys-
tem works and how it affects those in-
volved.  To identify the interplay of the
various actors in the H-1B process, the
study centered on the firm as the unit of
analysis and relied on a qualitative field
methodology that was best suited to cap-
ture process and variation over time.
Open-ended interviews were conducted
with all actors involved in the recruitment,
employment, and regulation of H-1B
workers.  The total sample included re-
gional DOL and Texas Employment Com-
mission officials, managers, U.S. and for-
eign workers in heavy- and light-user H-
1B firms, private immigration attorneys,
firm representatives responsible for pre-
paring H-1B applications, and representa-
tives of professional associations.
The original firm sample size of thirty
included a variety of public and private
educational institutions and a range of
computer engineering firms.  The firms
were selected according to their size, pub-
lic-versus-private status, and variable us-
age of  the H-1B specialty skilled workers
in science research and teaching, engineer-
ing, and computer-related occupations.
Most of the large corporations and engi-
neering firms and a number of the firms
involved in computer applications and
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servicing are located in Houston; a smaller
number of firms concentrating in software
development are located in Austin.  Pub-
lic and private universities included in the
sample are distributed in various cities
across the state.
Once in the field, however, we were re-
fused interviews by a number of the
employers.  Still others blocked access to
their employees and their attorneys.  By
the end of the eleven-month field study,
we had conducted thirty-one interviews
with individuals representing twenty-three
firms. In addition, we visited research
laboratories of medical centers and uni-
versities in which H-1Bs are temporarily
employed as postdoctoral fellows and
associate scientists and conducted tele-
phone interviews with several of the prin-
cipal investigators of these research en-
deavors.
We had the most success in gaining ac-
cess to workers.  Within the twenty-three
sample firms, we interviewed approxi-
mately seventeen H-1B foreign specialty
workers and thirteen U.S. skilled work-
ers.  Most were interviewed a second time
by telephone to monitor employment and
immigration developments.  The occupa-
tions of both the foreign and U.S. work-
ers in the sample range from high-level
computer analyst and life scientist to com-
puter programmer and university post-
doctoral fellow.  We attempted to ensure
that both foreign and U.S. workers were
represented in high-skill and lower-skill
professional occupations within the firms.
The U.S. worker interviews were supple-
mented with three interviews with lead-
ing representatives of professional asso-
ciations for university professors, mechani-
cal engineers, and computer consultants.
One respondent is a past president of a
national association of computer consult-
ants and active in lobbying efforts for
greater enforcement of prevailing wage
provisions in the H-1B and permanent
certification programs.  Additionally, we
attended the political action committee
meetings of U.S. computer programmers
and analysts vigorously lobbying for the
elimination of  the H-1B program.  The
U.S. worker perspective was explored
further by reviewing dozens of official
complaints to DOL from U.S. workers.
Our sample of attorneys includes eight
private immigration attorneys, seven of
whom represent the sample firms in their
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petitions for H-1Bs.  The study sample
also includes a number of government
officials charged with processing and regu-
lating H-1B applications.  We conducted
telephone interviews with regional and na-
tional INS representatives charged with
screening and processing permanent cer-
tification, including those of H-1Bs.  We
visited the DOL/ETA regional office and
interviewed the regional DOL certifying
officer, the H-1B officer, and the office
computer programmer.  The regional of-
fice was instrumental in explaining the
steps of the certification process.  It also
provided the research team with updated
lists of employer names to use for the
selection of  firms.  The research team
also conducted intereviews with staff of
the Texas Employment Commission
[TEC], the state agency responsible for
providing prevailing wage data for spe-
cialty occupations.
The questions asked during the interviews
varied by respondent category.  Govern-
ment officials were asked to describe the
H-1B process from the perspective of their
official task and to identify weaknesses or
bottlenecks in the system with an eye
towards improving interagency commu-
nication.  Wage and hour officials were
asked to describe in detail problems par-
ticular to the prevailing wage issue in
various occupations and industries and
variations across public and private firms.
Employers, employees and professional
association members were asked a series
of open-ended questions concerning: (1)
the dynamics of the supply and demand
of workers and their industry; (2) eco-
nomic transformations in their industry;
(3) company-level restructuring strategies;
(4) recruitment methods; (5) prevailing
wage issues; (6) workforce composition;
(7) changing skill demands; and (8) per-
ceived effects of the H-1B program on their
industries.  Employees were further asked
to track in detail their education and work
history.  H-1B workers were asked to
provide a detailed immigration history, in-
cluding information on transitions to and
from other immigration statuses.
The Texas research team was most suc-
cessful in gaining access to all involved
parties in computer industry firms and in
medical and university research settings.
The following two sections outline our key
findings regarding the usage of H-1Bs in
these labor market sectors.
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Internationalization
of Scientific
Research: Demand
for Highly-Skilled
Foreign Workers
Within the science and medical areas, our
firm list included four very large medical
centers and three research universities.
Foreign researchers on H-1B visas were
found overwhelmingly in the following
departments and laboratories: Biochemis-
try, Molecular and Human Genetics, Cell
Biology, and Engineering.  They were re-
cruited as research associates and research
fellows by departmental heads and prin-
cipal investigators to work on funded
research projects, most of which are fed-
erally supported by the National Institutes
of Health [NIH] and National Science
Foundation [NSF].  All are involved in
high-level research and development po-
sitions on the basis of  their highly spe-
cialized expertise.
The projects on which H-1Bs work along-
side U.S. scientists in these laboratory
settings are often at the cutting edge of
science and involve research of a defined
and complex area (e.g., megabase DNA
sequencing of certain chromosomes).
Research personnel must be not only
highly skilled, but well-trained and well-
versed in their area of expertise to meet
the deadlines of funded research.
Project directors and department heads
argue that there are not enough qualified
U.S. candidates that meet these criteria.
The following comments by a chair of a
Biochemistry Department and by a Pro-
fessor of Cell Biology explain the diffi-
culty in recruiting qualified candidates:
Having a Ph.D. alone is insuffi-
cient to qualify individuals for ca-
reers in science. The background
and training, as well as the re-
search interests, become very im-
portant factors in hiring such in-
dividuals because a principal
investigator must produce mean-
ingful results within a prescribed
period of  time.  To train and re-
train takes more time than is avail-
able to most principal investiga-
tors.  These cutting-edge research
projects do not involve routine
experiments, but require continu-
ous probing of the unknown. . . .
Such probing requires highly so-
phisticated experimental tech-
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niques that only a few individu-
als are trained to perform.  There-
fore only a few qualified scien-
tists are available to hire.
We have tremendous difficulty
hiring qualified personnel for
postdoctoral fellow positions in
my laboratory.  We’ve done local,
national, and word-of-mouth
searches.  Many of the candidates
have not been qualified.  We re-
quire a candidate to have previ-
ous training and experience in cell
culture and molecular biology.
This training is essential to meet
NIH deadlines.  We simply can-
not afford to spend three to four
months training personnel when
you consider that three-year NIH
RO1 grants are due for renewal
at the end of twenty-four months;
well, it takes two to three months
to find and hire someone, anoth-
er few months to train them.
In all of these departments and labora-
tory research settings, both foreign and
U.S. workers and their employers agree
on the importance of H-1B visas in ad-
vancing research.  Both U.S. coworkers
and employers of foreign workers state
that without access to the specialized skills
of foreign labor, the quality of scientific
research in the United States would se-
verely decline.  They believe it to be a
vital component in the functioning and
success of the research process, as the
following quotes illustrate:
There is not a large enough sup-
ply of U.S.-born students in the
hard sciences. The best person
should be taken for a post-d o c -
toral position.  I would rather be
surrounded by the best there is
than simply by Americans.   It
doesn’t work in this field to give
U.S. workers all of the jobs (a U.S.
postdoctoral student in cell biolo-
gy).
Our research in Cell Biology and
Neurology is fundamental to our
understanding of learning pro-
cesses and the diseases that affect
them, that is diseases such as
Alzheimer’s and Parkinson’s.  We
are considered by others in our
field as one of the leading labora-
tories among the international
community.  If my four H-1B as-
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sociates had not been able to ob-
tain the visa, it would have had
an enormous impact on my re-
search program.  Suffice it to say
that the quality and quantity
would have been substantially
diminished, my ability to secure
federal and nonfederal funding
for the research would have been
sharply curtailed, and I believe
that my laboratory would not be
recognized, as it is, as one of the
leaders in our field.  H-1Bs are
essential if U.S. laboratories are
to remain competitive among in-
creasingly sophisticated laborato-
ries in the rest of the world (Pro-
fessor of cell biology and neurol-
ogy).
Foreign workers appear essential to the
functioning of scientific research in  uni-
versities and medical centers.  Without
them, we were repeatedly told, research
institutions would lose their competitive
global edge in technological and scientific
research.  All representatives of these in-
stitutions, including departmental heads,
laboratory advisors, and coworkers agree
on the important contributions foreign
workers bring to their research environ-
ments.  Not only does it allow the United
States to maintain its competitive edge in
the global science and technology com-
munity, but it may also provide jobs for
U.S. counterparts for collaborative re-
search and technical support positions.
Shortage of U.S.
Researchers
Employers in scientific research repeatedly
commented on the shortage of U.S. gradu-
ate students to fill research positions in
the hard sciences.  There is a declining
number of U.S. students entering U.S.
graduate programs in science, countered
by a simultaneous increase in foreign stu-
dents—whose nations’ educational insti-
tutions and economies have grown tre-
mendously over the past few decades—
coming to U.S. universities to study sci-
ence, math, and engineering.  Similarly,
many new Ph.Ds, especially U.S.-born
graduates, increasingly are lured to the
higher salaries and less demanding work
schedules afforded by private industry.
Foreign-born graduates of U.S. universi-
ties, most of whom are on a J-1 student
visa, are at a disadvantage when it comes
to locating permanent employment in
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private industry, which appears to favor
U.S.-born candidates.  The culture of sci-
entific research is far more diverse and
flexible; research teams in laboratory en-
vironments are typically composed of
diverse groups of foreign and national
scientists.
Scientists employed in research universi-
ties and medical centers, especially
postdoctoral fellows, do not seem to be
motivated by the often rather meager
earnings offered by these institutions.
Nevertheless, if the monetary rewards
were greater, we might have more U.S.
workers seeking careers in hard science.
If, somehow,  the supply of foreign work-
ers dried up, it might well place upward
pressure on wages for principal research-
ers and, especially, support staff.  How-
ever,  it does not follow that the federal
funding that is a major source of U.S. basic
research monies would increase to meet
that need.  Would the forprofit market-
place then be pressured to invest more
money in basic research within the U.S.
or would it move operations offshore?
Further, it is unclear whether the declin-
ing number of U.S. researchers in the sci-
ences is merely a problem of financial
incentive.  The declining number of U.S.
scientists is, some argue, more fundamen-
tally a result of changing secondary school
curriculum, attitudes towards the rigor of
scientific work, and a lack of federal sup-
port for science education.
Departmental heads and educators ac-
knowledge that foreign students attend
and support our universities because of
the premier research and learning oppor-
tunities available.  They subsequently
compete to work in university and medi-
cal center environments because of their
advanced technological environments and
opportunities to work on cutting-edge
research projects with some of the best
scientists in the world.  Employers fear
that it is only a matter of time before
graduate programs and research labora-
tories in their home countries reach suffi-
ciently sophisticated levels to keep foreign
researchers home or to draw those in the
United States back home.  Department
chairs and laboratory advisors express
their good fortune in having foreign re-
searchers as part of their research teams
and fear the day when foreign research-
ers and scientists will no longer seek re-
search opportunities in the United States.
These same fears were expressed by sev-
eral U.S. postdoctoral fellows working in
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a biochemistry lab at a prestigious medi-
cal center.  As one recent graduate ex-
plained:
There is a new trend among grad-
uates in Chemistry.  While many
of the U.S. graduates increasingly
favor private industry employ-
ment, more and more foreign-born
graduates are returning home
once they complete their educa-
tion and training.
Professors in several of the study univer-
sities told us that this pattern is increas-
ingly adopted by Korean- and Taiwanese-
born doctoral graduates of U.S. science
and engineering programs.  Indeed, the
return migration of foreign scientists to
their homelands made national news in
1994 when distinguished chemist Yoan
Lee, a long-time U.S. resident and Nobel
Prize winner, made the U-turn and headed
back home to direct Taiwan’s prestigious
Academia Suniea, an impressive conglom-
erate of twenty-one research institutes.
In sum, the H-1B visa does not appear to
be abused by employers in universities
and large medical centers.  Positions are
filled on a competitive basis and recruit-
ment occurs at both a national and, in-
creasingly, global level.  Moreover, com-
petition varies by the reputation of the
project director and prestige of the grant.
Often, interested candidates approach sci-
entists under whom they wish to work.
In this context, professors lacking an es-
tablished research record have the most
difficulty locating qualified candidates.
Salaries are low compared to those in the
private sector, especially for postdoctoral
fellows, whose salaries are largely deter-
mined by federal funding sources and can
run as low as $21,000 per year.  Despite
these meager earnings and uncertainty of
employment once the H-1B runs out,
many foreign postdoctoral fellows con-
tinue, at least for now, to be drawn to the
technology and research opportunities
available in U.S. research institutes, espe-
cially the opportunity to work with dis-
tinguished scientists on prestigious grants.
As we might expect, some H-1Bs are
drawn to the U.S. because of the lack of
research opportunities back home.  For
these workers, the elusive green card even-
tually becomes a common goal.  As one
H-1B postdoctoral fellow working in a
robotics research laboratory told us:
U.S.  C O M M I S S I O N  O N  I M M I G R A T I O N  R E F O R M
R E S E A R C H
P A P E R
- 171 -
In Tunisia [his home country],
there is a glut of scientists with
Ph.Ds from American Universi-
ties, but no research opportunities
for them back home. Many of us
came on J-1 student visas.  Our
education was paid for by our
government or yours.  But how
could they expect us to return
home to nothing once we had
been exposed to the most ad-
vanced research in the world?
More common, however, are statements
by many who predict a future in which
more Yoan Lees will return home to work
in high-tech companies and research in-
stitutes created by their governments.  The
ability of U.S. research institutes to con-
tinue to recruit workers from an interna-
tional labor pool of highly-qualified per-
sons remains an open question.  This is-
sue, while rarely raised in immigration
policy debates, permeated our interviews
with research personnel.   As the U.S.
government hints at divestment in science
research, the so-called Tigers of Asia
(Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan) con-
tinue to plow billions of dollars into the
development of technical and research in-
stitutes.  In the absence of renewed fed-
eral support for scientific research, what
we might increasingly see is the return
migration of many American-educated sci-
entists and engineers.  Such a scenario
would signify a dramatic reversal in the
direction of the scientific brain drain that
historically has favored the United States.
Since at least World War II, foreign scien-
tists have contributed to scientific ad-
vancement in the United States and our
central position in the international scien-
tific community.  Many convincingly ar-
gue that to maintain this position in the
context of a shortage of U.S. qualified
scientists and increased global competi-
tion, especially from our Asian neighbors,
research centers must have the means to
recruit and appoint foreign scientists effi-
ciently.  The H-1B appears to be the best
mechanism to achieve this goal.
Reorganization of
High-Tech Work:
Outsourcing Computer
Programming
With the increased computerization of
work, it is not surprising that we found
both foreign and U.S. computer analysts
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in various types of firms that cut across
industrial categories.  Foreign H-1B com-
puter programmers and analysts and their
U.S. counterparts whom we interviewed
occupy positions ranging from low-level
data entry positions in the petrochemical
industries, to sophisti-cated software de-
signers for high-technology MNCs.  As-
sessing the role of these foreign workers
in the U.S. labor market and their impact
on labor dis- placement and U.S. wages is
complicated by a number of major recent
changes in the computer industry.
The organization of computer work has
been changed dramatically and compli-
cated by corporate downsizing and the
increased demand for computer skills in
all sectors of the economy.  Many of the
firms in which we conducted our field
investigations, as might be expected from
the history presented above, initiated dra-
matic downsizing during the late 1980s
and early 1990s.  Downsizing in the in-
dustries employing computer workers
affected workers in different ways: many
salaried workers were laid off perma-
nently; computer consultants, who had
worked for premium wages during the
boom years of the seventies and eighties,
faced wage depression resulting from an
oversupply of computer workers and
greater competition from outsourcing
agencies.
We encountered a number of U.S. pro-
grammers and analysts who are out of
work, mostly as a result of downsizing,
not H-1B competition.  These workers
have not maintained the skill level re-
quired by advancing technology in today’s
computer industry.  In many cases, they
cannot afford the retraining costs.  Thus,
they are forced to compete with recent
graduates with better skills or with for-
eign workers willing to work under the
types of conditions that prevail in the
industry today.3
Clients, Consultants
and Job Shops
The way in which computer work is or-
ganized has become increasingly complex.
3 Many displaced U.S. workers, unwilling to accept the possibility that downsizing has depressed
wages, attribute declining opportunity and wages to foreign workers.
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The key employers of foreign and U.S.
computer programmers and analysts in-
clude: (1) client firms, large corporations
that since the late 1980s advent of
downsizing outsource the bulk of their
software development, especially pro-
gramming tasks; (2) consulting firms that
have for several decades provided high-
skill software development and applica-
tion services to large corporations; and
(3) outsourcing agencies or “job shops,”
new, but fast-growing competitors in this
profitable and competitive labor market
niche.  In contrast to the high-skill ser-
vices provided by consulting agencies, job
shops appear to supply the client with a
lower range of skills, primarily in pro-
gramming and some software application.
In our firm sample, the clients typically
were large petrochemical corporations that
underwent considerable downsizing in the
late eighties and early nineties.  They
employ only a small minority of highly-
skilled H-1B engineers and software de-
sign specialists in their workplaces.  For-
eign and U.S. workers are recruited and
paid on a competitive basis.  We located
several consulting firms that had serviced
two of the client sample firms and one
job shop that was a major outsourcing
firm for the largest client in our sample.
We interviewed workers, both U.S. and
foreign, employed by these firms.
The computer consulting firms we stud-
ied in Austin and Houston provide ser-
vices to client firms.  They primarily use
their own employees on a salaried or an
hourly consulting basis and usually per-
form the work at the client site.  The four
consulting firms we studied primarily are
involved in very advanced software de-
sign, production, and application.  Two
of these firms used to provide low-end
software application services to client
firms but claim that they are no longer
able to compete at this skill level with
outsourcing firms.  We heard this story
more than once.  None are heavy users of
H-1Bs although they employ a number of
foreign-born, as well as U.S. analysts.  The
employers interviewed allowed access to
current employees.  Both foreign-born and
U.S. workers are paid comparable high
salaries or hourly consulting fees, depend-
ing on the arrangement made between the
employee and employer; employers re-
peatedly commented that they try their
utmost to find the best workers and pay
R E S E A R C H
P A P E R
- 174 -
U.S.  C O M M I S S I O N  O N  I M M I G R A T I O N  R E F O R M
maximum wages regardless of a worker’s
nationality.  Interviews with workers con-
firmed their employers’ statements.  Given
that the firms we studied rely on highly-
specialized skills in software design, em-
ployer recruitment and worker salaries re-
main very competitive.  A more varied
sample, including consulting firms in-
volved in the low-end of software appli-
cation, might yield very different results.
Large corporations increasingly have be-
come clients of job shops.  Downsizing in
these large petrochemical and medical cor-
porations has resulted in a reliance on both
local consulting firms and outsourcing
agencies to supply or perform that com-
ponent of the production process that
primarily requires low-level computer
skills and does not require on-site super-
vision.  The production processes in the
information and research divisions of these
firms do not require full-time, permanent
employees.  Often they need certain types
of computer-related skills only on a tem-
porary basis.  These needs increasingly
are filled by outsourcing agencies (job
shops) that are the main employers of H-
1B visa holders.  Most of the work done
by the H-1B workers is at the job shop,
not the client site, which distinguishes
them from consulting firms that are more
likely to provide services at the client site.
This a key distinction between the two
service providers; job shops have a great
deal of autonomy in structuring the work
process.
As mentioned above, employers of two
of the consulting agencies we interviewed
claim to have been undercut by
outsourcing agencies that pay lower wages
to their employees and are able to bill their
clients less without cuts to their own prof-
its.  Our interviews with U.S. computer
programmers who work for clients under
these various managements indicate that
the current trend is towards increased
reliance on the services of job shops.  A
small minority of U.S. workers recognize
that the real employers in this computer
game are the clients, i.e., the large corpo-
rations that use job shops to meet the
needs of a flexible production process and,
in some instances, as a dodge to avoid
legal accountability.  Managers in large
corporations were proud to tell us that
they employ very few H-1Bs, “only those
with exceptional skills.”  Yet, this com-
plex way in which computer work now is
organized makes it very difficult to deter-
mine who truly employs computer work-
U.S.  C O M M I S S I O N  O N  I M M I G R A T I O N  R E F O R M
R E S E A R C H
P A P E R
- 175 -
ers.  We believe this is an extremely im-
portant issue, as the ultimate employer
should be held accountable for the em-
ployment conditions of U.S. and foreign
workers.  To date, the media have focused
on job shops—in fact, the suppliers—while
ignoring the larger firms—the clients who
create the demand for these low-level
“production” type positions.
Sweated Labor at
the Entry Level?
Job displacement and wage depression are
potentially important issues within some
parts of the computer industry.  This is
especially the case regarding lower-level
programming and coding positions in job
shops.  Outsourcing firms employ both
highly-skilled programmer analysts and
low-level coders and programmers.
Highly-skilled programmers work as sala-
ried employees or contractors; in either
case, H-1B worker earnings do not ap-
pear significantly lower than those of their
U.S. counterparts.  In contrast, we found
a great discrepancy between the wages
paid to foreign and U.S. workers in such
low-level positions as coding, program-
ming, and routine applications.  We in-
terviewed four H-1B worker programmers
who were paid salaries almost $10,000 a
year less than their U.S. counterparts in
the same firm.  Another job shop pays H-
1Bs, who are on call for six days a week
for one firm, salaries; they pay U.S. co-
workers, who work at a variety of sites,
hourly consulting fees.  At neither place
do the working conditions of the H-1Bs
appear to meet those attested to by the
employer, thus creating a two-tiered em-
ployment system in the industry.  Further,
these positions—that at most require a
BA—do not involve the application of spe-
cialized skills that justify the temporary
hiring of an H-1B worker.  The following
case illustrates our point.
We gained access to a job shop that was
a major supplier of programming ser-vices
for one of the largest clients firms in our
sample.  Most of its workers are Filipino
computer programmers who were re-
cruited abroad by the outsourcing firm’s
headquarters in New York.  Word of
mouth from other programmers lured
these programmers to a well-known and
quite fashionable Manila hotel where they
all gathered in a seminar room and were
“courted” by the recruiters—offered hand-
some salaries averaging $33,000 a year
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with benefits (compared to $400-600 per
month in the Philippines), a relocation fee
of several thousand dollars, a one-way
ticket to the U.S., initial housing, and the
opportunity  to lease a car through the
company.  In exchange, they had to sign
a contract stating that they would work
for the firm for a minimum of eighteen
months, during which time the firm prom-
ised to petition for their permanent resi-
dence status.4  None of the workers inter-
viewed has received permanent certifica-
tion, but they are reluctant to broach the
subject with their employer for fear of
loosing their job and, thus, their H-1B visa.
The Filipino programmers work in an
underground, high-tech sweatshop, lo-
cated on the basement level of  the mod-
ern skyscraper in which the outsourcing
firm is located.  In the shop’s front room,
three Anglo supervisors sit at widely-
spaced desks.  In an adjacent back room
of the same size, approximately twenty
Filipino employees work in cubicles.  All
the H-1B Filipinos we interviewed at this
outsourcing firm are on salary that they
believe is at least $10,000 less than their
American counterparts.  This is difficult
to determine precisely since the latter are
sometimes paid on a consulting-fee basis.
Consultant positions generally are more
lucrative than salaried ones in computer
work and also are more desirable because
of the greater autonomy pro-vided to the
workers.  Nonetheless, the H-1B workers
are willing to take less in earnings in ex-
change for the promise of a green card.
For these workers, the H-1B definitely is
seen as a pathway to permanent residency
(even though some state that they plan to
return to the Philippines).  Upon receiv-
ing permanent labor certification, all work-
ers intend to move out of this firm be-
cause of the poor working conditions and
ambiguous policy decisions.  Their most
frequently cited reasons include too much
supervision, a pattern of arbitrary promo-
tions, and a practice of not paying work-
ers for overtime.  They complain that,
while American workers always go to the
client’s site, foreign workers rarely do so.
On those few occasions when they are sent
to the client’s site, they told us, they typi-
4 This was the time required for the initial cohort of recruits; subsequent cohorts had to promise
to work anywhere from two to three years.
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cally are accompanied by an Anglo em-
ployee who interfaces with client repre-
sentatives.5
The H-1B workers also feel that their jobs
could be done by U.S. workers.  The
majority told us that their previous work
experiences or skills used in the Philip-
pines are not applied in their positions at
this outsourcing firm.  In one case, a
worker, who was recruited with the un-
derstanding that she was being hired be-
cause of her skills in COBALT program-
ming, has been with the job shop for two
years and has never used these skills.  On
the contrary, the firm trains the foreign
workers; the majority of  these workers
claim they learned entirely new skills to
fit clients’ needs.  At the same time, these
Filipino workers see themselves as more
desirable than other foreign workers be-
cause of cultural similarities, including
English fluency and colonial linkages.  In
summary, the possibility for abuse of H1-
B workers exists in these low-level com-
puter positions.  Moreover, at least in the
case of Houston, the market has not pro-
vided training and employment opportu-
nities for U.S. workers structurally dis-
placed by downsizing strategies.  Our
findings suggest that, in cases where firms
(all types) use outsourcing agencies for
low-skill level computer programming
and coding, the potential for wage depres-
sion and some job displacement may ex-
ist.
Policy
Recommendations.
I. Given the increasing globalization of
scientific research, coupled with the
enormous contributions foreign scien-
tists have made to U.S. research insti-
tutions, we recommend that efforts be
made to facilitate temporary positions
in these settings.  Specifically, we
recomend:
n Creation of a special H category
for research universities and in-
stitutes.  This category should not
have a numerical cap to assure the
5 As these foreign workers come into contact with their U.S. counterparts in the industry, they
express increasing interest in becoming contract workers, positions seen as more lucrative and
autonomous than salaried positions.
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continued entry of high-level for-
eign scientists into research insti-
tutions.  Creation of this category
could make thepaperwork pro-
cess less cumbersome for institu-
tions’ administrative personnel,
usually the Direc- tors of Interna-
tional Services6 who have little
training in immigration proce-
dures and less burdensome for
foreign workers, especially
postdoctoral fellows.
II. Corporate downsizing has had an
impact on American workers’ earn-
ings and job security.  Nowhere is this
more observable than among work-
ers in computer-related occupations.
Downsizing and the use of temporary
workers is increasingly observable in
other industries as well.  While it is
impossible to turn the tide of market
forces, a few suggested changes could
minimize the potential for the abuse
of the H-1B worker and for the neg-
ative impact of restructuring on Amer-
ican workers, specifically computer
programmers and analysts:
n The U.S. Department of Labor
should monitor closely the sup-
ply of U.S. workers in low-level
computer positions.  In the ab-
sence of a real occupational short-
age, perhaps the educational re-
quirements for H-1Bs should be
increased from a bachelor’s to a
master’s degree. We found that it
was H-1B workers with less train-
ing who are most likely to face
workplace abuse.  Clearly, there
are special skills and techniques
that highly-skilled foreign work-
ers possess.  We have, however,
come across too many foreign H-
1Bs with only  bachelor’s of sci-
ence degrees who are performing
tasks that can be easily done by
U.S. workers.
n Emphasis should be given to
retraining unemployed workers
who are displaced during corpo-
rate downsizings.  In the absence
of federal funding for this retrain-
ing, we recommend giving tax
breaks to unemployed U.S. com-
6 In Texas, the Attorney General’s Office does not allow public institutions to hire lawyers for
this purpose.
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puter workers to help support
their personal retraining costs.
n The client company, as well as
the outsourcing agency, should
be held accountable for the
working conditions or violations
of the terms of the H-1B visa.
The abuse of H-1Bs is most prev-
alent in the joint ventures of cli-
ent and outsourcing firms.  Great-
er regulatory efforts on the part
of the Department of Labor could
track the employment history of
firms, not industries, to capture
the effects of downsizing and cor-
porate leasing of services on U.S.
workers.
Conclusions
Given what looks like a robust labor
market in Houston for computer analysts
and programmers and for high-level re-
searchers in faculty positions, we initially
were at a loss to explain what we encoun-
tered in the field: unemployed and un-
deremployed computer programmers and
analysts and an increasingly tight labor
market for faculty positions.  We also were
perplexed by professional association re-
ports of increasing unemployment among
scientists, engineers, and computer ana-
lysts.  The only way to explain what looks
like a simultaneous surplus (unemploy-
ment) and shortage of workers (projected
demand) is by the increasing prevalence
of spot shortages in particular high-skilled
occupations within science and technol-
ogy.  Unfortunately, we were unable to
locate any objective data to illustrate clear
instances of spot shortages resulting from
an uneven mix of supply and demand.
What we did encounter in the field, how-
ever, were displaced older computer ana-
lysts who were not retrained to compete
in this rapidly changing technological en-
vironment and unemployed computer
analysts who would not work for wages
less than they had received during the
boom years.  At the same time, we also
encountered employers scraping to locate
competent computer analysts to work with
an emergent complex computer language
such as C++.  Similarly, we came across
positions at universities that had gone un-
filled for months or years because the
department was looking for someone with
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a particular skill, e.g., an engineer skilled
in robotics development.
These seemingly contradictory and diver-
gent employment trends among skilled
workers are not so perplexing once we
look beyond immigration policy and fo-
cus on the implications of corporate
downsizing and global labor markets for
skilled workers.  While corporate
downsizing in Texas cut across all indus-
tries, it had particularly severe conse-
quences for computer programmers, sys-
tem analysts, and engineers employed in
the research and development and infor-
mation services divisions of many large
petrochemical firms headquartered in
Texas.  These skilled workers, many of
whom had carved out their own niches in
the petrochemical industry and were com-
manding unprecedented high salaries
during the oil boom years of the seventies
and eighties, found themselves either un-
employed or unable to command their
previous consulting fees.  Although the
Texas economy has taken a turn for the
better in recent years, skilled workers
encounter much greater competition than
before as a result of a burgeoning consult-
ing sector that increasingly services client
firms. Faced with increasing competition
and stagnant wages, many disgruntled
workers target the H-1B program as the
source of their problems.
This is not to say that corporate down-
sizing alone is responsible for the displace-
ment and wage depression of skilled com-
puter programmers and analysts in Texas
labor markets.  The growth of the con-
sulting sector in Texas labor markets also
has created greater competition among
these skilled workers.  Within this sector,
some consulting firms capitalize on the
H-1B program to bring in foreign work-
ers to perform entry-level tasks that could
be done by native workers with a
bachelor’s degree.
The recruitment and employment condi-
tions of skilled H-1B workers in science
and research operates at a very different
level.  Candidates for these high-level
research positions are carefully recruited
on a competitive basis and paid the pre-
vailing wages.  In these research settings,
the H-1B program achieves its intended
policy goal, providing employers with im-
mediate access to the best and brightest
among an international labor pool of
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highly-qualified scientists and researchers.
While the focus of this study is limited to
the recruitment and employment experi-
ence of engineers, computer programmers,
and scientists and researchers in less than
thirty firms in Texas, the findings strongly
suggest a more general trend.  Despite an
apparently “robust” Texas economy with
a high demand for technical and profes-
sional workers, the labor market oppor-
tunities for most will remain limited.  The
most qualified and most experienced seg-
ment of the workforce will be the most
prepared to escape the consequences of
increased restructuring of the workplace.
They are the ones most able to take ad-
vantage of the demands and opportuni-
ties of a  dynamic global market that in-
creasingly is driven by rapid research
advances in technology and science requir-
ing new, specialized skills.  Slight increases
in the number of temporary foreign work-
ers in U.S. labor markets, as provided by
the H-1B visa, appear to have little effect
on these structural changes in the organi-
zation of work.  Further restrictions and
regulations in skilled immigration, how-
ever, might well have dramatic effects.
Restricting employer access to temporary
skilled foreign labor might expand U.S.
corporate offshore production to include
highly-skilled production in recently es-
tablished research sites in Asia and else-
where.  Extreme caution must, therefore,
be exercised when contemplating changes
to existing policy.
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Any attempt to improve this country’s
nonimmigrant policy first must be clear
about the basic purpose of that policy
within the broader context of the national
immigration system.  The principal goal
of the immigration system has, for at least
thirty years, been the humanitarian one
of reuniting families and providing safe
haven to refugees.  Some have argued that
this emphasis has been excessive, result-
ing in declines in the skill levels of recent
cohorts and in worsening competition
with native workers.  They favor making
economic characteristics of prospective
immigrants a much more important crite-
rion for admission.
As an economist, I find such proposals
tempting but ultimately wrong-headed.
My own research and reading of the lat-
est empirical literature convinces me that
immigration has, at least at current lev-
els, had relatively small net impacts on
overall domestic wages and employ-ment
(DeFreitas 1995).  This does not lead me
to favor unrestricted admissions, nor does
it mean that we should neglect to evalu-
ate carefully and be ready to make ad-
justments for the economic impacts of
future migration streams.1  But humani-
tarian goals remain far preferable to any
strategy (probably futile) of making im-
migration another lever of economic
policy.  In the event that proposed reduc-
tions in annual entry slots are enacted in
the near future, it seems to me far more
important to preserve ample family and
refugee visas than to earmark scarce visas
based solely on an applicant’s occupa-
tional skills.2  Moreover, a basic national
NONIMMIGRANT VISA PROGRAMS:
PROBLEMS AND POLICY REFORMS
GREGORY DEFREITAS
HOFSTRA UNIVERSITY AND RUSSELL SAGE FOUNDATION
1 I have detailed my recommendations for reforming the permanent resident visa system
elsewhere (DeFreitas 1995).
2 See the findings of Jasso and Rosenzweig (1995) on the reduction in the occupational dif-
ferences between employment-based and family-sponsored immigrants within a few years of
arrival.
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employment goal should be eventually to
fill any short-term skill shortages through
training or retraining of native workers
rather than relying on foreign profession-
als.
Since most economic research has focused
on the impacts of immigration on un-
skilled or semiskilled labor markets, rela-
tively little is known about the domestic
consequences of  importing large num-
bers of skilled workers.  We do know from
the 1990 census that more than one-tenth
of U.S. scientists and engineers are for-
eign born, well above the immigrant share
of the population (Bouvier & Simcox
1995).  There are more immigrants in pro-
fessional occupations (1.35 million) than
there are African American professionals
(1.1 million).  And it is clear that well-
educated immigrants have carved out
niches in certain well-paid occupations.
For example, more than one-fifth of U.S.
physicians are now foreign born, and the
fraction is much higher in such specialties
as immunology, neurology, and pedi-
atrics.  About 12.3 percent of all engineers
are immigrants, with a disproportionate
foreign presence in education and in pri-
vate research and development.  The for-
eign born account for 9 percent of regis-
tered nurses, of whom nearly one-half are
from a single country, the Philippines.  In
New York City, it has been estimated that
20 to 30 percent of nurses are temporary
foreign workers (U.S. DOL 1989).  Even
in the government sector, there is evidence
of ethnic networks insulating immigrant
niches.  In New York City government in
the 1980s, the foreign born achieved grow-
ing concentrations in technical professions,
with competitive equivalents in the pri-
vate sector, such as accountants, chem-
ists, and engineers.  Nearly one-half of all
new engineers hired by the New York
Transportation Department in the period
1986-1990 were Asians (Waldinger 1994).
Immigrants appear to be attracted to se-
cure, well-paid, public sector jobs, at least
until they can improve their language
skills enough and attain the licenses re-
quired to enter the private sector.
The studies of immigrant professionals
typically conclude that their rising share
of high-level jobs may induce employers
to become dependent on foreign labor
sources instead of actively recruiting and
training natives for these jobs (see: Levine,
Fox & Danielson 1993; National Research
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Council 1988; U.S. DOL 1989; Waldinger
1994).  Insofar as this diminishes natives’
access to high-skill, high-pay jobs, the
implications for American workers at all
skill levels are worrisome.  For it may
mean that not only is there competition
between native- and foreign-born profes-
sionals, but also that there is some reduc-
tion in the chances of the less-skilled for
upward occupational mobility.  Until more
research becomes available on this issue,
it seems prudent to, at a minimum, resist
any attempts to expand the number of
employment-based permanent resident
slots or even to lower the number some-
what.
Nonimmigrant policy reform becomes all
the more important as the immigration
system undergoes change.  The non-im-
migrant programs need to meet three
goals: (1) to provide American busi-nesses,
universities, and cultural institutions ac-
cess to international talent; (2) to provide
foreign visitors access to U.S. schooling
and training; and (3) to ensure that pur-
suit of the first two goals does nothing to
expose U.S. workers to unfair competi-
tion with foreigners or to reduce  their
opportunities for training and upward job
mobility.  In what follows, I briefly dis-
cuss some of the main reasons why cer-
tain current non-immigrant programs are
failing to serve these ends and make a
number of recommendations for policy
reforms.
THE H-1B PROGRAM
H-1B temporary visas for specialty occu-
pations have been the source of great
concern of late for a number of  reasons.
First, it presently is completely legal for
employers to lay off U.S. workers and
replace them with H-1B workers.  As re-
cent corporate restucturings, global com-
petition, and defense cutbacks have threat-
ened the job prospects of many American
technicians and professionals, more and
more cases of alleged displace-ment by
temporary foreign workers have appeared.
For example:
n Aggressive downsizing at Digital
Equipment Corporation slashed
nearly 21,500 jobs between late
1991 and November 1993.  But,
this coincided with the firm
applying for more than 1,100 H-
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1B visas to bring in foreign
computer workers.
n In June 1995, at CSX Corpo-
ration’s Sealand unit in New
Jersey, about 100 American
computer programmers lost their
jobs as Sealand hired an equal
number of replacements from
India and the Phillipines.  Worse
still, the U.S. workers were
required to spend their last weeks
at the firm training their own
replacements.  Many of these jobs
ultimately  will leave the country
with the newly-trained foreigners
on their planned return home.
Sealand estimated that the export
of jobs would save the company
30 percent on salaries (Zachary
1995).
n Likewise, American International
Group, Inc. recently laid off
almost 250 computer service
workers in its insurance opera-
tions in New Jersey.  H-1B
replacements were brought in and
received their training from the
soon-to-be-terminated U.S.
employees.
A second source of concern with the pro-
gram is the apparently widespread abuses
by so-called “job contractors.”  Some of
these (such as Syntel Inc., provider of the
replacement workers to American Inter-
national Group, Inc.) are alleged to bring
large numbers of foreign workers into the
country solely to lease them to U.S. firms.
They appear to shuttle these workers in
and out of the country, especially to fill
many computer and health care jobs.  The
Department of Labor [DOL] has docu-
mented numerous cases of job contrac-
tors violating the law by paying foreign
workers far below the prevailing wage.
In the physical and occupational therapy
fields alone, nearly 400 H-1Bs recently
were found to be owed $2 million in back
pay by contractors.
The relative ease with which unscru-
pulous job contractors have exploited the
program highlights another problem.
Employers are not required to show that
U.S. workers are unavailable for the jobs
H1-B workers will fill, nor are employers
required to demonstrate that they are seek-
ing to train or recruit Americans for these
jobs.  In fact, the program is driven largely
by employers themselves.
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Finally, any program that is supposed to
meet only “temporary” employment needs
should keep foreign worker stays as brief
as possible.  Yet, current law allows for a
period of stay of as many as six years,
well beyond any reasonable notion of a
temporary visit to fill a short-term skill
shortage.  This likely induces some firms
to become dependent on a steady supply
of foreign workers rather than to seek to
recruit natives.  Moreover, it is evident
that H-1B visas have become a conduit
for obtaining employment-based green
cards.  DOL estimates that more than 90
percent of the recipients of such green
cards are already in the U.S. and that
perhaps two out of three of these are al-
ready employed (often illegally) by the
very firm that files the immigrant petition
for them.
These problems lead me to suggest the
following changes in the H-1B program.
Some of these correspond to recent pro-
posals by the commission and by DOL
(Fraser 1995; Reich 1995), but, in general,
I favor stronger measures.
Recommendations
1. Restrict the eligibility for H-1B visas
to those occupational categories in
which DOL verifies that there is a
labor shortage.  This would require a
new system parallel to the existing
labor certification program.  The latter
long has been far too employer-driven
and inefficient, as the DOL itself now
recognizes.  Hence, the new system
must be designed carefully to avoid
these past flaws and to exploit better
both govern-ment and independent
economic analysis of local labor
market conditions.  More resources
need to be allocated to improve the
avail-ability of up-to-date labor
market data for localities, particularly
that subset in which most temporary
foreign workers tend to concentrate.
2. Reduce the validity period of labor
condition applications [LCAs] from six
to two years and bar renewal
applications.  Under recently adopt-
ed DOL rules, the validity period for
each application was cut to three
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years, but employers are still allowed
to keep an H-1B worker for a total of
six years if they submit an LCA for a
three-year renewal.  Anything more
than two years is excessive and en-
courages some employers to become
dependent on foreign labor.
3. Require that all employers filing H-
1B LCAs attest that, within the six
months before an H-1B worker begins
employment, they have not laid off
legal permanent resident aliens or U.S.
citizens with similar qualifications and
work experience in the job for which
the temporary foreign workers are
being sought; and require that they
attest that they will not lay off such
legal immigrant or citizen workers
within the six months after H-1B
employees are hired or leased by the
firm and for the duration of the visas.
4. Bar access to H-1B workers where a
firm’s employees are involved in a
labor union election campaign, strike,
or lockout.  The DOL now supports
prohibitting access to such workers
during strikes or lockouts, but
protection of workers’ democratic
right to choose collective bargaining
representation without interference by
their employers also necessitates
guaranteeing, once employees have
filed an application for an election to
choose whether or not to be
represented by a union, that foreign
workers not be used as a real or
perceived threat.
5. Require employers filing H-1B LCAs
to demonstrate that they are
undertaking substantial and contin-
uous efforts to fill the jobs for which
they currently desire foreign workers
with U.S. employees in the near
future.
6. Require employers of H-1B workers
to pay a fee, equal to 20 percent of
the value of the total compensation
package it will pay to those workers,
into a public or private fund certified
by the DOL as dedicated to the goal
of improving the training and
recruitment of U.S. workers into the
occupations for which the H-1B
workers currently are being em-
ployed.  This parallels the proposals
of the commission for employment-
based immigrants.
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7. Raise the standards to be met by “job
contractors” to prevent past abuses at
any of the multiple work sites that
may lease their H-1B workers.
Current DOL regulations generally are
limited to the place of employ-ment
at the time an employer files an LCA.
This allows job contractors who place
foreign workers with other employers
to enjoy laxer controls.  The new
policy reforms recommended above
should be applied to all work sites
where H-1B nonimmigrants are
working, wheth-er or not they are
employed by a job contractor (see
discussion in U.S. DOL 1993).
8. Require nonimmigrants holding H-1B
visas to leave the U.S. for a minimum
of one year following expiration of
that visa and before applying for any
permanent resi-dency visa.  This will
help end the common practice by
which H-1B visas are used merely as
a holding mechanism while
nonimmigrants stay in the U.S.
seeking receipt of green cards.  It also
should help reduce U.S. employers’
dependence on nonimmigrant labor.
OTHER
EMPLOYMENT-
BASED
NONIMMIGRANT
PROGRAMS
The wide array of other temporary visas
granted for ostensibly employment
purposes also bring into the country large
numbers of individuals.  For example, J-
1 visas (for exchange visitors to teach,
study, or conduct research) totaled more
than 197,000 in FY 1993, and another
43,000 relatives came with them. To
coordinate all these programs so as to
protect American workers better, I suggest:
9. All other employment-based nonim-
migrant visa applications must pass
the same labor shortage test recom-
mended [see 1 above] for H-1B LCAs
before the nonimmigrant is permitted
to work here during the duration of
the visa.
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CONCLUSIONS
Widespread concern about the nation’s
worsening income inequality and under-
employment have generated renewed
debate about the optimal volume and
composition of immigration.  Thanks to
fierce lobbying by business groups and
encouragement from econo-mists claim-
ing immigrants’ “quality” had fallen, the
U.S. government in the 1990s expanded
the  permanent visa category for people
with “needed skills” and granted large
numbers of employment-based nonimmi-
grant visas.  This was done with very little
research knowledge of the possible conse-
quences on skilled native workers or on
the prospects of the unskilled for occupa-
tional mobility.
There is evidence that skilled immigrants
recently have been hired by firms that
were simultaneously cutting their skilled
native work force.  And many on H1-B
temporary visas, after mastering key ele-
ments of the work process at U.S. firms,
return home to train others to do the same
work.  This then facilitates the export of
jobs abroad by American firms seeking
low-cost, high-tech labor.  Computer pro-
grammers, cinematog-raphers, and aircraft
machinists appear to be among those most
at risk of replacement.  So great has their
concern become that it has helped spark
at least one strike (Boeing) and led the
DOL to undertake a long-overdue scru-
tiny of the abuses of some job-contracting
firms.
These modest steps have provoked an
opposition campaign by the National As-
sociation of Manufacturers, the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce, Microsoft, and
other computer companies.  They insist
that global firms need large numbers of
skilled foreigners to stay competitive and
grow, thereby enabling them to expand
their U.S. base.  However, in an era of
widespread corporate downsizing, claims
of skilled labor shortages have raised
growing suspicions.  Unlike the early
1980s, the majority of permanent layoffs
now are occurring among college-edu-
cated employees.  The share of job loss
accounted for by those earning at least
$50,000 has doubled since the eighties.
Many scientists, engineers, and computer
specialists have found themselves quite
vulnerable to cutbacks by defense contrac-
tors, high-tech civilian firms, and univer-
sities.
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What is needed now is more, not less,
limitation on and monitoring of skill-based
temporary immigration programs.  Inter-
national exchange of ideas and skills still
can be ensured by granting brief visas for
foreigners willing to train U.S. workers.
And the more than 300,000 student visas
now granted each year provide ample
opportunity for those from abroad seek-
ing access to training here.
Instead of exporting more high-wage jobs
or importing professionals to meet sup-
posed “skill shortages,”  business and
government must be induced finally to
provide first-class schooling, training, and
retraining for the vast numbers of low-
wage and underemployed Ameri-cans.
And, as well, they must help generate
enough new high-wage jobs for these
workers to fill.
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Agriculture in California has from its be-
ginnings relied on newcomers to the state
who had few nonfarm job options to sea-
sonal farm work.  For this reason, the
state’s farmers long have had a keen in-
terest in U.S. immigration policies, usu-
ally seeking exceptions to general U.S.
immigration policies on the grounds that
the nature of California agriculture was
such that foreign workers were needed.
Since 1980, California agriculture’s most
successful influence on immigration policy
was reflected in the Immigration Reform
and Control Act [IRCA] of 1986.  IRCA
imposed sanctions or fines on U.S. em-
ployers who knowingly hired unautho-
rized alien workers and offered legal im-
migrant status to many illegal aliens who
worked in U.S. agriculture.  The intent of
IRCA was to deter illegal immigration, to
legalize the status of long-term illegal U.S.
residents and illegal farm workers, and to
regulate the access of farmers to legal
nonimmigrant and probationary immi-
grant workers.  Growers were able to win
concessions for because IRCA threatened
to stem their flow of labor.  The long-
standing H2-A program was simplified
and a guestworker program, contingent
upon a reduction in the supply of labor,
was instituted.
More recently, Congress has moved to
further strengthen border patrol efforts,
as well as sanction enforcement.  As a
result, and despite strong statements
against agricultural guestworkers in June
CALIFORNIAS FARM LABOR
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REFORM1
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1995 by both President Clinton and the
Commission on Immigration Reform,
California farm organizations tried and
failed to include a guestworker program
in immigration reform legislation moving
through Congress.  As in the mid-1980s,
the growers argue that, despite employer
sanctions and high unemployment rates
among U.S. farm workers, at least 30 to
50 percent of their seasonal workers are
unauthorized.  If effective, strengthened
border enforcement sanctions might, they
believe, remove these workers.
They argue a guestworker program, one
that is flexible and easy to administer, will
be necessary in order to make their needed
worker numbers and to meet legal require-
ments for authorized status.
CALIFORNIA
AGRICULTURES
LABOR MARKET
California has the nation’s largest and
most diverse agriculture.  California farm-
ers produce the same commodities that
are found in other states—milk, wheat,
and cotton—but the distinguishing feature
of the state’s agriculture is the production
of specialty crops: California produces
about 40 percent of the nation’s fruits and
nuts, vegetables and melons, and such
horticultural specialties as flowers and
mushrooms.  These so-called FVH com-
modities, in turn, represent one-half of
California’s $20 billion in farm sales, and
the orchards, vineyards, and greenhouses
in which they are produced are where
most farm workers find jobs.
There are many ways to describe a Cali-
fornia farm labor market in which 800,000
to 900,000 individuals find at least tem-
porary jobs with 25,000 crop and livestock
employers or agricultural service firms,
such as farm labor contractors and cus-
tom harvesters.  One way is to focus on
three “C”s: concentration, contractors, and
conflict.
Concentration refers to the fact that most
farm workers are hired by a relatively
small number of large farms.  Contrac-
tors refers to the presence in many farm
labor markets of “intermediaries” who
match seasonal workers with jobs.  Con-
flict refers to the stormy history in which
workers protested low wages or poor
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working conditions but then individually
got out of agriculture when their collec-
tive efforts to obtain wage and benefit im-
provements were rebuffed.
Concentration.  Agriculture is probably
California’s largest employer of adult
immigrants.  According to state Unem-
ployment Insurance [UI] tax records,
24,500 California farm employers paid $4.6
billion in wages to employees in 1990
(Martin & Miller 1993:22).   But these farm
labor data conceal as much as they re-
veal.  Most of these farm employers or
“reporting units” are small; one-half pay
less than $10,000 in farm wages.  The larg-
est 1,250 farm employers—just 5 percent—
pay about two-thirds of California’s farm
wages.
Concentration is also the rule among farm
workers.  A “farm worker” is anyone who
works for wages on a farm.  Farm work
is seasonal, and so most farm workers also
do nonfarm work or, as many are immi-
grants, return to their country of origin
when there are no farm jobs for them in
California.  Most workers are in the farm
work force for only a short time.  More
than one-half have less than $1,000 in
annual farm earnings which, at $5 hourly,
means that they do 200 or fewer hours of
farm work, or the equivalent of 5 weeks.
Concentration means that the largest 5
percent of employers, and the 10 percent
of farm workers who are employed year-
round, account for most of the farm wages
paid and earned.  The “average” farm
employer is very small, while the large
farm employers, who hire most of the
state’s farm workers, each may employ a
peak 5,000 workers and have a weekly
payroll of $1 million—making them large
employers by any definition.
In Figure 1, small farms were those that
sold less than $50,000 of FVH commodi-
ties in 1992—they were 61 percent of all
production units, but they accounted for
only 3 percent of total sales.  At the other
extreme, the 39 percent of FVH farms that
each sold more than $50,000 of FVH com-
modities in 1992 accounted for 97 percent
of California’s FVH sales.
The “average” California farm worker
earned about $3,000 from farmers in 1990,
but there are few workers with such earn-
ings.  Instead, workers tend to fall in to
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one of three groups (Martin &  Miller
1993).  Just more than one-half are very
low earners—earning $1,000 or less for
working on one or more farms for a few
weeks during the year.  About 40 percent,
or 360,000, are in the seasonal worker cat-
egory, earning $4,000 to $6,000 for one-
half year’s farm work.  The third group
are the year-round workers who earn
$12,000 or more annually.
Who are these large farm employers who
hire most of the state’s farm workers?  A
1992 survey of 900 California farm em-
ployers reported that only about 30 per-
cent of all farm employers were corpora-
tions, but 60 percent of the sample farms
with annual payrolls over $500,000 were
corporations, usually family-run
(Rosenberg, et al. 1995:14a).  An example
is the Zaninovich table grape farm in
California’s San Joaquin Valley, an opera-
tion that annually sells about 5 million
25-pound boxes of grapes at an average
price of $10 per box; Zaninovich hires
1,000 farm workers to help generate $50
million in annual grape sales.
Fresno-area raisin farms represent the
small end of the farm size spectrum.  In
the most labor-intensive activity in U.S.
agriculture—some 50,000 farm workers
spread through 200,000 acres of vineyards
to cut bunches of 20 to 25 pounds of green
grapes and lay them on paper trays to
dry into raisins for six to eight weeks each
August and September.  Workers receive
$0.15 to $0.18 per paper tray of raisins cut
and laid, and the farm labor contractor
[FLC] who typically recruits them receives
$0.04 to $0.05 for payroll taxes, business
expenses, and profits.  Most of the vine-
yards are small—twenty to fifty acres—
and workers are often “recruited” with a
sign at the entrance to the vineyard say-
ing, in Spanish, “workers wanted.”
Workers employed in short harvest crops
such as raisins can earn more if they find
other farm jobs, such as harvesting
peaches and plums before, and olives and
citrus after, the raisin harvest.  Many farm
workers are able to string together a se-
ries of farm jobs, but it is not easy for
many of them to travel from farm to farm
looking for work.
Contractors.  Intermediaries who find jobs
for farm workers and supervise them
while they work, are the second “C” of
the California farm labor market; most
farm workers find a succession of farm
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jobs with the help of a contractor inter-
mediary.  Contractors are not a new phe-
nomenon; Chinese farm workers in the
1870s designated one person in the crew
who could speak English to search for the
next farm job for the crew.  Over time,
farm labor intermediaries evolved from
one of the crew to independent business-
men who seek to profit from the differ-
ence between what a farmer pays to have
a job done and what the worker gets
(Fisher 1952; Fuller 1942; McWilliams
1949).
Contractors have been the major farm
labor story of the 1980s and 1990s.  There
were only 935 FLCs in California in 1990
who were registered with state Unemploy-
ment Insurance authorities to pay taxes
on the wages they paid to workers, but
they employed one-third of all farm work-
ers reported to the UI system, and their
role in matching farm workers and jobs
has been increasing (Thilmany 1995).
Critics assert that there are far more FLCs
who are not registered and that farmers
have encouraged the rise of labor contract-
ing by switching from hiring workers di-
rectly to hiring them through hard-to-regu-
late contractors.  According to farm
worker advocates, farmers know that
these “merchants of labor” must be cheat-
ing the government or the workers, as the
FLCs in some cases agree that their work-
ers will do farm work for what appears
to be a money-losing fee.  Cesar Chavez
made the elimination of farm labor con-
tractors one of keystones of his efforts to
reform the farm labor market and ensured
that the California Agricultural Labor Re-
lations Act [ALRA] in 1975 included a
clause that asserted that FLCs could not
be employers for labor relations purposes.
The theory was that only such strict farmer
liability for FLC labor relations law viola-
tions would encourage farmers to be re-
sponsible for the activities of FLCs who
bring workers to their farms.  Many farm
worker advocates would like to impose
strict liability on farmers for minimum
wage and immigration law violations.
Under current circumstances, a FLC can
be the employer solely liable for minimum
wage and immigration law violations, but
not for labor organizing violations.
Conflict.  The third “C” is the inevitable
conflict between employers and workers
over a “fair” wage.  This conflict can be
resolved in three major ways: first, by em-
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ployers acting unilaterally, as happens in
workplaces where the employer says, “Do
it my way or leave;” second, by deter-
mining a fair wage through collective
bargaining; and third, by using govern-
ment rules that stipulate minimum wages
and mandatory benefits for workers.  The
usual way of resolving workplace conflict
in agriculture has been for dissatisfied
workers to exit the farm workforce.
Conflict in farm labor markets has sev-
eral unique characteristics.  Farm employ-
ers often band together and set a “stan-
dard” wage, thus creating peer pressure
to resist worker demands for higher wages
or they decide not to use the H-2A pro-
gram  to “prove” that it cannot work in
California.  In many instances  as farm
worker leaders have been radical outsid-
ers in conservative rural communities, the
entire community, not just the farmers, of-
ten was willing to tolerate violations of
individual rights to resolve “farm labor
troubles.”  The workers who were dissat-
isfied with the wages they were offered
on farms sometimes faced eviction from
their temporary homes, making their
choice about whether to refuse to work a
decision that affected both their income
and their housing.
California Fruits
and Vegetables
California has led the nation in farm sales
since 1950.  While the state has only 2
percent of U.S. farmland; it accounts for
more than 10 percent of the nation’s farm
sales because it produces high-value fruit
and vegetable commodities.  Thus, Cali-
fornia farmers obtain far more revenue
per acre than most U.S. farmers.  For
example, California harvested 1.2 million
acres of vegetables and melons in 1990,
and they had a farm value of $3.5 billion.
Nebraska farmers, by contrast, tilled fif-
teen times more land but had only about
the same level of farm sales.
U.S. agriculture can be profiled as an eco-
nomic sector producing mostly livestock
and field crops.  California agriculture is
different.  About two-thirds of Califor-
nia’s 1994 farm sales of $20 billion repre-
sents the sale of crops; only one-third
represents the sale of livestock products.
Within California’s crop sector, fruits,
vegetables, and horticultural specialties
worth $9 billion were three-fourths of the
state’s $12 billion in crop sales.  Field
crops, such as cotton, hay, wheat, and rice,
are important users of California farm
R E S E A R C H
P A P E R
- 200 -
U.S.  C O M M I S S I O N  O N  I M M I G R A T I O N  R E F O R M
land and water, but they account for only
one-sixth of California’s farm sales.
California began producing labor-intensive
fruits and vegetables and shipping them
long distances a century ago, but much of
the expansion of California’s FVH agri-
culture occurred since World War II.  In
some cases there have been truly dramatic
production increases:  broccoli production
grew more than sixfold between 1960 and
1993; almond and strawberry tonnage rose
more than fivefold; nectarine and wine
grape production more than quadrupled.
The land used to produce fruits and veg-
etables is valuable.  In 1990, for example,
land in the Monterey area used to pro-
duce vegetables was worth an average
$10,000 per acre and vineyards and or-
chards in the Fresno area sold for $5,000
or more per acre.  A rough indicator of
the amount of money tied up in Califor-
nia FVH agriculture can be seen in the
following estimates: if the value of CA
vegetable land averages $10,000 per acre,
then 1 million acres of California vegetable
land is worth about $10 billion.  If the
value of fruit and nut land averages
$5,000, then 2 million acres of fruit and
nut land also is worth $10 billion.
Labor Costs and
Harvest Cycles
Most of the fruits and vegetables grown
in California generate farm sales of $2,500
to $3,000 per acre.  The production of
fruits and vegetables is considered “labor-
intensive,” an adjective that is rarely de-
fined but suggests that the costs of hired
workers are the single largest production
expense.  Labor costs in FVH production
range from 20 percent to 50 percent of
total production costs—higher than the 20
percent average in manufacturing, but less
than labor’s 70 to 80 percent share of costs
in many service industries.
In most commodities, expenditures for
hired workers—seasonal and year-round,
and production plus supervisory labor—
are about one-third of total production
costs.  A farmer grossing $3,500 per acre
from the sale of table grapes pays about
$1,500 to the workers who tend and har-
vest them.  From the point of view of
consumers, labor costs are only a small
fraction of supermarket prices.  In the
early 1990s, farmers got about $0.40 per
pound for table grapes and $0.13 repre-
sented the cost of labor.  However, the
retail price of grapes averaged $1 per
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pound, so that farm worker wages repre-
sented only about 13 percent of the retail
price.
If farm worker wages were to double, if
farmers continued to use the same amount
of labor as before, and if all of the in-
creased cost of farm labor was passed on
to consumers, then the typical wage of
grape workers would jump from $6 to
$12 hourly.  However, the cost of grapes
for consumers would rise only 13 percent,
to $1.13 per pound.
Labor costs, important to farmers, are
much less important to consumers because
farmers obtain only about one-third of the
typical retail price of a fruit or vegetable.
Thus, whether farm worker wages go up
or down, they affect only one-ninth of the
retail price of a fruit or vegetable.
If farm worker wages were to double, as
in the above example, experience shows
that most of the adjustments on the farm
would take the form of a reduced demand
for workers, not an influx of U.S. workers
into the farm workforce.  If wages were
higher, farmers would have incentives to
find substitutes for farm workers.  Per-
haps they would use machines to harvest
their crops, even if the machine did not
pick as carefully as farm workers.
In other cases, farmers might not pick as
often or, to make workers more produc-
tive, farmers might develop mechanical
aids for them.  In some cases, higher
wages might lead to importing a commod-
ity from a lower-wage country.  In short,
rising farm worker wages would cause
far more changes in the way farmers get
work done than in the prices consumers
pay for food.
California fruits and vegetables do not
ripen uniformly, so the peak demand for
labor shifts around the state in a manner
that mirrors harvest activities.  Figure 2
provides one estimate of the seasonal
pattern of employment on California
farms.
Harvest activity occurs year-round, begin-
ning with the winter vegetable harvest in
southern California and the winter citrus
harvest in the San Joaquin Valley.  But the
major winter activity is pruning—cutting
branches and vines to promote the growth
of larger and more uniform fruit.  In fruits
such as peaches, pruning accounts for 10
to 20 percent of the seasonal labor required
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to produce the fruit but, because pruning
occurs over several months, there are
fewer workers involved.  During the rainy
months between November and April,
employment on farms is only one-half its
peak September levels.
Surveys find a declining percentage of
migrant farm workers.  A 1965 statewide
survey of farm workers found that 30
percent migrated from one of California’s
farming regions to another; a 1981 survey
of Tulare county farm workers found that
20 percent had to establish a temporary
residence away from their usual home
because a farm job took them beyond
commuting distance (California Assembly
1969;  Mines and Kearney 1982).  A na-
tional survey of farm workers in the early
1990s found that fewer than 10 percent
followed the ripening crops (Gabbard,
Mines & Boccalandro 1994).
There is some worker migration between
farming regions organized by employers,
such as the lettuce harvesters’ move from
Salinas to Imperial to Huron, but such
employer-organized migration seems to be
decreasing.  Instead, a lack of housing and
surpluses of labor everywhere have dis-
couraged the migration of workers from
one farming region to another.  Farm la-
bor contractors continue to move crews
of solo men from area to area, but there
are now far fewer “free-wheeling” fami-
lies travelling up and down the state look-
ing for farm jobs without prearranged jobs
and housing than in the 1960s and 1970s.
Workers tend to stay in one area of Cali-
fornia for three reasons: the harvesting of
some crops has been stretched out for mar-
keting and processing reasons; temporary
housing for migrants is scarce; and the
availability of unemployment insurance
and service programs makes migration
less necessary.
Many workers still migrate, but they tend
to shuttle into the U.S. from Mexico and
then remain in one location rather than to
follow the crops after their arrival in Cali-
fornia (U.S. Department of Labor 1993a;
1993b).  Thus, the reduction in follow-the-
crop migration does not mean that there
is no migration, only that the nature of
migration has changed.  In theory, migrant
camps open for six months annually
should experience considerable turnover
as families move on to the next harvest.
That they do not highlights the impor-
tance of housing—the lack of it—in ex-
plaining behavior: once a “migrant fam-
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ily” finds suitable housing, it is reluctant
to move out and have to search again for
housing.
Farm Employment
California farmers employ about 900,000
individuals to fill an average 350,000 farm
jobs over the year.  Total and average em-
ployment have been remarkably stable
since the mid-1960s as mechanization that
eliminated farm jobs has been offset by
expanded production and the switch from
farm families to hired workers to do more
of the state’s farm work.
Mechanization—picking a crop by ma-
chine rather than by hand—has reduced
employment in many commodities, but
the production of other commodities has
expanded enough to create new jobs and
to stabilize farm employment (Brown
1984).  Processing tomatoes provides an
example of what happens to farm worker
jobs as a result of mechanization (Thomp-
son & Schering 1978).  In 1960, a peak
45,000 workers—80 percent of whom were
braceros—handpicked 2.5 million tons of
the processing tomatoes used to make
catsup in California.
In 1990, about 5,500 mostly female farm
workers were employed to sort four times
more tomatoes. (Mamer & Wilke 1990).
In this case, mechanization reduced the
number of jobs for farm workers and
changed the harvesting task from hand-
picking tomatoes into field boxes to riding
on a machine and sorting machine-picked
tomatoes.
During the 1960s, many thought that the
choice was to mechanize or stop growing
hand-harvested crops (Thomas 1985).  For
example, a major 1970 study predicted
that “California farmers will continue the
intensive search for labor solutions, par-
ticularly mechanical harvesting” (Dean, et
al. 1970:52).  Another 1970 study con-
cluded that “the door to employment is
rapidly closing for those persons whose
only qualifications for employment are a
will to work and enough muscle to com-
pete” (Cargill & Rossmiller 1970:22).
The expectation that soon there would  be
no need for those who could bring only
strong backs to farm work was so wide-
spread that the federal government began
programs to help farm workers adjust to
the nonfarm jobs they, it was expected,
soon would have to seek (Martin & Mar-
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tin 1994).  But the mechanization of the
tomato harvest proved to be the excep-
tional type of labor-displacing change in
California agriculture, not the rule.
The publicity, generated in the late 1970s
by lawsuits against the University of Cali-
fornia for its part in using tax dollars to
develop plants and machines that dis-
placed farm workers, reinforced the false
sense that soon there would  be no need
for seasonal farm workers (Martin &
Olmstead 1985).  In reality, the surprise is
how little labor-saving mechanization
there has been in California since the
1960s.  In 1990, most of the major fruits
and vegetables grown in the U.S. were
hand-harvested.
There have been important labor savings
in California agriculture, but they are
usually less visible than machines replac-
ing hand-harvesters.  Changes in produc-
tion practices for perennial crops have
saved labor—such as drip irrigation that
saves irrigator labor, dwarf trees and vines
trained for easier hand or mechanical
pruning, and precision planting and im-
proved herbicides that save thinning and
hoeing labor.
As machines and changes in production
practices eliminated some jobs for farm
workers, there was an important counter
trend creating jobs for field workers: field
packing.  Crops traditionally have been
picked by field workers into bins or boxes
and then hauled to a packing shed, where
nonfarm workers sorted, graded, and
boxed the table grapes and broccoli.
During the 1970s and 1980s, many crops
began to be picked and packed in the field.
Picking and packing grapes, vegetables,
and melons in the field may not affect the
overall level of employment in preparing
these crops for market, but field packing
increases “farm” and decreases “nonfarm”
employment.
The most important reason that there are
as many farm workers in the 1990s as in
the 1960s is that so many more fruits and
vegetables are produced today.  It is some-
times hard to appreciate how the ex-
panded production of labor-intensive
crops—reflected in both larger acreages
and higher yields—creates additional jobs
for farm workers.
Broccoli production provides an example.
The average American’s consumption of
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fresh vegetables rose 23 percent to 136
pounds per person during the 1980s, but
the increase was sharpest for broccoli:  the
per capita consumption of fresh broccoli
almost tripled from 1.6 to 4.5 pounds
during the decade.  Broccoli is hand-har-
vested, and its production in California
required an average fifty-two hours of
hired labor per acre in 1990 (Mamer &
Wilkie 1990).2
Will Americans continue to consume more
hand-harvested fruits and vegetables? The
U.S. consumption of most farm commodi-
ties increases about 1 percent annually due
to population growth, but the demand for
many FVH commodities increases another
2 or 3 percent annually, or about as much
as personal incomes typically go up, be-
cause Americans tend to spend about the
same percentage more on fresh fruits and
vegetables as their incomes rise.  For ex-
ample, if the population increases by 1
percent and personal incomes rise 2 per-
cent, then expenditures on fresh broccoli
and strawberries rise by 3 percent.
The Farm
Labor Force
Most persons who work on U.S. and Cali-
fornia farms for wages are immigrants
from Mexico.  Farm labor data are noto-
riously unreliable, and the two major
sources of such data paint very different
pictures of who farm workers are.
The Current Population Survey [CPS], the
source of most data on worker character-
istics, reports that most farm workers are
non-Hispanic U.S. citizens.  The monthly
CPS of 60,000 households includes about
1,500 who worked in agriculture during
the previous week and, based on CPS-
expansion factors, an estimated 2.5 mil-
lion persons sometime during the year
worked on a farm for wages during most
years in the 1980s (Oliveira 1989).
These farm workers were 78 percent
white, 14 percent Hispanic, and 8 percent
black and other races.  White workers
were the majority or plurality in every
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region of the U.S., including the Pacific
states of California, Oregon, and Wash-
ington, where white farm workers out-
numbered Hispanics 54 to 44 percent (Ilg
1995).
The U.S. Department of Labor [DOL]
National Agricultural Worker Survey
[NAWS], by contrast, finds that hired
workers on crop farms are recent immi-
grants from Mexico.  The NAWS found
that 70 percent of the crop workers em-
ployed on U.S. farms in 1993-1994 were
born in Mexico or Central America and
that most had been in the U.S. for less
than ten years.  Many of these immigrant
farm workers are so-called Special Agri-
cultural Workers [SAWs]—aliens who
were illegally in the U.S. in the mid-1980s
and who were legalized under special pro-
visions of the Immigration Reform and
Control Act of 1986.
The NAWS emphasizes that most farm
workers are “working poor” adults who
are trying to support families with their
seasonal farm earnings (Griffith & Kissam
1995); more than 60 percent of the Mexi-
can-born farm workers in 1993-1994 were
settled in the U.S., and newspaper ac-
counts emphasize that more and more
previously-migrant farm workers are set-
tling in the U.S. (Mydans 1995).  How-
ever, these immigrant farm workers have
relatively low farm earnings—typically
$4,000 to $5,000 annually—and they lack
the English, skills, and contacts needed to
obtain nonfarm jobs that would offer them
higher earnings (Huffman 1995).
California farm workers are more likely
to be Mexican-born, to be employed by
farm labor contractors rather than directly
by growers, and to live in nonemployer-
provided housing than farm workers in
other parts of the U.S.  The percentage of
male and unauthorized farm workers is
about the same in California as in the rest
of the U.S.  As with most hired farm
workers interviewed in the NAWS, most
California farm workers do not speak
English (only 11 percent in 1990-1991) and
few finished high school (only 13 percent).
Despite the legalization of 1.1 million farm
workers in 1987-1988, there is a signifi-
cant and growing percentage of unautho-
rized workers in the farm labor force.  The
estimated percentage of unauthorized
workers who harvested fruits and veg-
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etables ranged from 0 percent in Georgia
peaches in the early 1990s to 35 percent in
Fresno raisins (Commission on Agricul-
tural Workers 1992:74).  Most California
estimates were that, six years after IRCA,
less than 30 percent of the work force was
unauthorized and less than 10 percent of
the Stockton tomato harvesting workforce
was unauthorized.
The percentage of unauthorized workers
in the farm workforce seems to be climb-
ing.  The apparent percentage of unau-
thorized workers in the NAWS, doubled
between 1989-1990 and 1993-1994, about
12 to 25 percent nationwide, and 27 per-
cent in California.  One reason for the
rising percentage of unauthorized farm
workers is that so-called “new-new” mi-
grants—indigenous peoples from south-
ern Mexico and Central America, such as
non-Spanish-speaking Mixtec Indians—
have begun to enter the U.S. farm
workforce in significant numbers (Zabin
& Hughes 1995).  There were relatively
few such workers in the mid-1980s, so
they did not get legalized.
The dominance of foreign-born workers
affects the structure and functioning of the
farm labor market, e.g., non-English-
speaking immigrant workers often require
intermediary bilingual FLCs or foremen
to help them find housing and other so-
cial services; they are usually more will-
ing to accept variation in days worked
and piece-rate earnings than U.S.-born
workers; and immigrants are more likely
to pay without question charges for hous-
ing, transportation, and eating arrange-
ments in areas with farm jobs.  Such be-
havior makes immigrants preferable to
U.S. citizens in the eyes of many farm
employers (U.S. DOL 1994;  Commission
on Agricultural Workers 1992).
Most immigrant farm workers do not
remain farm workers for their working
lives.  Instead, farm workers frequently
do farm work for a few weeks or months
or even a season and then return to
Mexico or find a nonfarm job in the U.S.
Most farmers do not worry about such
worker turnover.  As they rely on a fore-
man or crew boss to bring a crew of
workers to their farm, they do not know
or care if the same workers return year-
after-year.  Turnover, or the number of
individuals hired to keep a crew of twenty
at full strength, sometimes reaches 100 per-
cent or more monthly.
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One reason why worker turnover is so
high is that there are few incentives for
workers to remain employed by any one
employer.  Wages are usually uniform for
the task being done, and there are few
benefits, such as health insurance or va-
cation pay, that a worker would forfeit by
quitting.  Seniority usually does not lead
to a preferred place in the crew next year;
in most cases, personal ties or favors earn
a worker a preferred job, not length of
service.
Most of the farm work is done by so-called
“professional” farm workers—those who
begin doing farm work between the ages
of eighteen and twenty-five, do the hard-
est and highest wage hand-harvest work
until age thirty to thirty-five, and then
switch from so-called heavy harvesting
tasks to such easier tasks as irrigating and
pruning.  It is these “professional” farm
workers who predominate in the NAWS
data.  A combination of few transferable
skills and high unemployment in the early
1990s kept more than 95 percent of them
who were doing farm work one year in
the farm workforce the next year.
The job ladder for professional farm work-
ers involves a trade-off between hours
worked and hourly earnings.  Young men
often aim to earn $100 daily picking
grapes, citrus, or melons for piece-rate
wages.  After ten or more years, many
switch to farm tasks that generate lower
hourly earnings but provide easier work
and, perhaps more hours.  A few of these
workers are able to earn higher wages if
they acquire a skill, such as equipment
operation, or become a crew boss who
recruits workers.
Few young Americans dream of growing
up to be farm workers.  In the past, it was
often feared that farm worker children
would be trapped by the inadequate edu-
cation they get because of migrancy and
be forced into the migrant farm worker
stream for lack of skills useful elsewhere.
Most of the evidence today indicates that
farm worker children may do farm work
alongside their parents as teens but, if they
go to U.S. schools, they tend to take non-
farm jobs by age eighteen or twenty to
avoid being trapped as their parents were.
The farm workforce is reproduced abroad;
most new entrants to the farm workforce
are born in rural Mexico.
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The Farm
Labor Market
How do 900,000 mostly immigrant farm
workers find jobs with the 25,000 Califor-
nia employers who hire them?  The farm
labor market is like other labor markets
in the sense that it matches workers and
jobs.  However, it handles the three es-
sential functions of a labor market in
unique ways.
First, farmers rarely recruit or speak di-
rectly with prospective employees.  One
farmer described his hiring policy: “When
we need thirty workers, we call up the
FLC, and they supply the workers.”  This
means that recruitment is usually done
by bilingual foremen or FLCs in the lan-
guage of the worker.
Second, agriculture has dealt with the
problem of training and motivating di-
verse workers to work either by paying
piece-rate wages—e.g., $10 per bin of or-
anges picked—so that each worker’s pay
reflects her productivity, or by paying an
hourly wage, but in a manner that per-
mits farmers to control the pace of work,
e.g., by, having workers follow a conveyor
belt that moves slowly through the field.
Third, many farmers have concluded that
it is better to work collectively to maxi-
mize the supply of farm workers than to
try to identify the best workers and retain
them individually.
Contractors or such intermediaries as fore-
men and crew bosses handle the  recruit-
ment of most harvest workers in several
ways.  In some “farm worker towns,” es-
pecially those along the U.S.-Mexican
border, there is a so-called day-haul labor
market.  Workers begin to congregate in
parking lots at 3:00 or 4:00 A.M., contrac-
tors arrive with buses and tell the work-
ers the task and the wage, and the work-
ers then board the bus that seems to offer
the best job.  Some workers board the
same bus every day; others switch from
bus to bus.
The most common way in which farm
workers are recruited is for the crew boss
to tell current workers that more workers
are needed and the workers then inform
their friends and relatives that jobs are
available.  Such “network recruiting” is
very helpful to employers.  There is no
need to spend money on “help wanted”
ads and workers, who often are grateful
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for the chance to tell friends and relatives
about jobs, tend to bring only “good”
workers to join the crew.
Decentralized hiring by contractors and
crew bosses means that there are many
farm labor markets.  These markets may
appear to be similar in the sense that many
of the jobs involve harvesting, most of the
workers are Mexican immigrants, and the
piece-rate wages tend to be similar from
field to field.  Nonetheless, take-home pay
can vary significantly from worker to
worker.
Once hired, workers must be motivated
to work.  There are two major wage sys-
tems used to pay seasonal farm workers.
According to the NAWS, 70 percent of
the jobs held by California farm workers
in the early 1990s offered hourly wages,
and the remaining 30 percent piece-rate
wages or a combination of hourly and
piece-rate wages (U.S. DOL 1993b:36-7).
According to earnings data collected from
employers, the average hourly earnings
of farm workers traditionally have been
about one-half of nonfarm private sector
earnings, both in California and through-
out the U.S.  However, in the mid-1970s
and the mid-1980s, the ratio of farm to
nonfarm hourly earnings rose above 50
percent.  Beginning with the end of the
bracero program in the mid-1960s, the ra-
tio of farm to nonfarm earnings in Cali-
fornia crept steadily upward, reaching 58
percent of nonfarm levels in 1977.  The
California farm to nonfarm earnings ratio
fell to 51 percent in 1983, rose in 1989
after the minimum wage was increased,
and then fell sharply in the early 1990s
[see Figure 3].
In the rest of the U.S., by contrast, the
farm to nonfarm earnings ratio behaved
differently, remaining below 50 percent
throughout much of the 1970s and rising
to 50 percent only in 1989, again in re-
sponse to the 1988 minimum wage in-
crease to $4.25 that affected most farm
workers.
Some employers pay more—$4.50 or even
$5—in order to be able to select the best
workers, but reports that U.S. farm work-
ers’ hourly earnings averaged, for ex-
ample, $6.54 in 1995 and $6.83 in Califor-
nia, can be misleading because these av-
erage earnings data are weighted by the
hours that the various subgroups of work-
ers work.  For example, average hourly
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earnings of workers on a farm with a trac-
tor driver paid $7 hourly for seventy hours
of work weekly, and two $4.25 hourly
hoers who each work thirty-five hours,
would be reported by USDA  to be $5.62
($490 + $297.50 divided by a total 140
hours of work), even though neither the
tractor driver nor the hoers is earning this
average reported wage.
Piece-rate wages seem to be more straight-
forward, but there are few consistent time-
series data on piece rates that vary by
commodity, availability of housing, sea-
son, etc.  Under piece-rate wages, work-
ers are paid, e.g., $12 per bin of oranges
picked, or $0.16 per each 25 pounds of
raisin grapes cut and laid on a paper tray
to dry, and guaranteed at least $4.25
hourly.
In addition to wages, many farm workers
receive unemployment insurance pay-
ments when they are without jobs.  In
California, virtually all employers are re-
quired to cover their workers under the
UI system, which in 1994 collected $2.8
billion in employer contributions and paid
$3.3 billion in UI benefits to unemployed
workers.
The third dimension of the farm labor
market is retention—what do farm em-
ployers do to identify the best workers,
and persuade them to return to the farm?
The answer is not much.
Perhaps the easiest way to describe pre-
vailing attitudes toward worker retention
is by analogy to irrigation.  Water is vital
to produce crops in California and there
are two major ways to supply water to
the crops: “flooding” a field with so much
water that at least some trickles to each
plant or laying pipes under the soil so
that only the water needed by each plant
is allowed to “drip” to it.
The choice depends largely on the cost
and availability of water.  Where water is
scarce and expensive, farmers tend to
invest in drip irrigation systems; where
water is cheap, farmers tend to flood their
fields.  The choice is either to work collec-
tively so that there is plenty of water for
all or to invest farm-by-farm and use
water as efficiently as possible.
Farmers acknowledge that securing labor
presents the same basic choice:  working
collectively to maximize the number of
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workers available or treating labor as
scarce and trying to select and retain the
fewest workers necessary.
IS THERE A
SHORTAGE OF
AGRICULTURAL
LABOR?
The most recent manifestation of Califor-
nia agriculture’s interest in immigration
occurred during the debate that preceded
the enactment of the Immigration Reform
and Control Act of 1986.  IRCA imposed
sanctions or fines on U.S. employers who
knowingly hired unauthorized alien work-
ers and offered legal immigrant status to
many illegal aliens who worked in U.S.
agriculture.
IRCAs Agricultural
Provisions
IRCA included three major agricultural
provisions: deferred sanctions enforcement
and the requirement that the INS obtain
search warrants to check the status of
workers in open fields; the SAW legaliza-
tion program; and the H-2A and Replen-
ishment Agricultural Worker [RAW] for-
eign worker programs.  Each provision
had both anticipated and unanticipated
consequences.
IRCA made significant changes in agri-
cultural enforcement practices.  Before
IRCA, immigration enforcement in agri-
culture usually involved the Border Pa-
trol driving into fields and apprehending
aliens who tried to run away.  Farmers
pointed out that the INS was required to
obtain search warrants before inspecting
factories for illegal aliens and argued that
the INS similarly should be obliged to
show evidence that illegal aliens were em-
ployed on a farm before raiding it.  IRCA
extended the requirement that the INS
have a search warrant before raiding a
workplace for illegal aliens from nonfarm
to agricultural workplaces.
IRCA created two legalization programs:
a general (I-687) program that granted
legal status to illegal aliens if they had
continuously resided in the U.S. since
1982, and the Special Agricultural Worker
(I-700) program that granted legal status
to illegal aliens who did at least ninety
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days of farm work in 1985-1986.  It was
much easier for illegal alien farm workers
to satisfy the SAW work requirement than
it was for nonfarm aliens to satisfy the I-
687 residence requirement.  Some 1.3
million SAW applicants came forth, al-
though it is likely that only a portion were
legitimate agricultural workers.
All were supposed to be experienced farm
workers, and farmers expected a signifi-
cant movement of now-legal workers to
restaurants, hotels, and other employers
who could offer year-round and less
strenuous work.  Employer sanctions, if
successful, could have further depleted a
source of argicultural labor.3
Part of the last-minute farm worker com-
promise that allowed IRCA to become law
were a Replenishment Agricultural
Worker program and changes to the non-
immigrant H-2A program that permits
farmers with vacant jobs to bring foreign-
ers to fill them if U.S. workers are not
available.  Both the RAW and the H-2A
program permit the admission of legal
foreign workers.
RAW program admissions depended on
national calculations of farm labor “need”
and supply made by the Secretaries of
Labor and Agriculture (Martin 1990).
However, continuing illegal immigration
and the proliferation of “documented
illegals” in the farm workforce made it
unnecessary to admit RAWs during its
four-year life from 1989-1993.  At no point
could an IRCA-related shortage of agri-
cultural labor be detected.
3 No one knew how many illegal aliens were employed in U.S. agriculture in the mid-1980s.
Most farmers and farm worker advocates accepted a USDA estimate that 350,000 illegal aliens
were employed in U.S. agriculture sometime during a typical year, and this number became
the anticipated maximum number of applicants.
However, the major surprise was that 1.3 million aliens applied for SAW status, a discrepancy
mostly attributable to the ease of fraudulent application, not to a much larger illegal labor
force than anticipated.  California Unemployment Insurance data, for example, suggest there
should have been 200,000 legitimate SAWs, but 700,000 applications were submitted (Martin
1990).  Employers argued that independent estimates of SAWs in agricultural employment,
which were likewise only one-third the number of applicants, implied that two-thirds of their
labor supply had left for better union jobs.  Some SAWs did leave agriculture, but the major
reason that so few SAWs were “still working” there is that many who legalized had not been
farm workers at all.
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Instead of national calculations triggering
RAW admissions, U.S. farm employers
facing shortages could individually initiate
requests for H-2A workers.  This indica-
tor of local labor shortages did not jump
to requests for 200,000 alien farm work-
ers per year as expected; instead H-2A
admissions dropped from 30,000 in 1989
to about 15,000 in FY 1995.  Most of the
reasons the H-2A program did not expand
lie in continuing illegal immigration and
false documents.  Shrinkage of the H-2A
program, on the other hand, is partly due
to mechani-zation of the Florida sugar-
cane harvest.
November 1995
Employer Survey
In November 1995, California’s Employ-
ment Development Department mailed a
two-page survey to a 5 percent sample of
reporting units with SIC codes 01 (crop
production), 02 (livestock production), or
farm-oriented 07 (agricultural services).4
Some 1,000 surveys were mailed and 197
were returned for a 20 percent response
rate.
Agricultural employers were asked about
their employment of seasonal workers—
persons employed for less than 150 days
in 1995.  About 55 percent of the respond-
ing farms—102 farms—employed 5,100
seasonal workers in 1995, or an average
50 seasonal employees per reporting unit.
The purpose of the survey was to deter-
mine if INS’s Operation Gatekeeper or
other border control efforts affected the
supply of seasonal workers in 1995 com-
pared to 1994.  For this reason, there were
a number of questions asked about the
characteristics and availability of seasonal
workers.
Virtually all seasonal farm workers hired
in 1995 were immigrants who were re-
4 There were 36,200 reporting units in California in 1994 with SIC codes between 01 and 09,
agriculture, forestry, and fisheries.  They paid total wages of $6.6 billion and, as most workers
are low earners, about 56 percent of the wages paid were taxable for UI purposes (California
employers pay a tax on the first $7,000 paid to workers to cover the cost of UI benefits).
Agricultural employers made $167 million in contributions in 1995, and unemployed workers
received about twice as much in UI benefits—$335 million.
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cruited by fellow workers (36 percent),
foremen (31 percent), or labor contractors
(11 percent)—the “other category” in-
cluded 22 percent of respondents, and they
relied mostly on seasonal workers return-
ing to their farms—about two-thirds of
the seasonal workers employed in 1995
were reported by employers to have
worked on their farms in 1994.  None of
the responding employers used the Em-
ployment Service or a union hiring hall;
just one used the H-2A program to obtain
two workers.
Responding farms provided estimates of
the number of seasonal workers with
various types of work authorization docu-
ments.  According to employers, about 5
percent of the seasonal workers hired in
1995 were U.S. citizens, 46 percent were
legal immigrants, and 9 percent were be-
lieved to be falsely documented.  Farmers
reported that they did not know the legal
status of 41 percent of their seasonal
workers.
Farmers were asked to estimate how many
workers were employed in California
agriculture for the first time in 1995, and
they reported that about 1 percent were
first time U.S. workers.5
According to farm employers, about 46
percent of the seasonal workers hired in
1995 presented greencards (INS I-551
forms) to establish their right to work in
the U.S., while 45 percent presented so-
cial security cards.  About 7 percent pre-
sented SAW documents, which are no
longer valid.  To prove their identity, 72
percent of the workers presented drivers’
licenses.
The seasonal workers hired in 1995 have
characteristics similar to those reported
in the NAWS.  For example, 68 percent
were male, 87 percent were born in
Mexico, and 69 percent were under age
40.  The most common hourly wage paid
to seasonal workers in 1995 was $5.38 per
hour, and 45 percent of farm employers
reported that this was a higher wage than
was paid in 1994.
5 Surveys done for Employment Services in the mountain states in summer 1995 found higher
turnover—in some crops, as few as 15 percent of the seasonal workers were employed the
year before (Thilmany 1995).
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Few farm employers house seasonal work-
ers on their farms—only 26 percent re-
ported that they provided housing for
seasonal workers, but 61 percent reported
that their seasonal workers lived “in
town.”  One farmer used the H-2A pro-
gram to obtain two foreign workers in
1995, and four others investigated the H-
2A program, but ninety-two did not.
Among those who commented on the H-
2A program, most did not know about
the program, and those who did know
about it asserted that it was too expen-
sive or bureaucratic to use to get farm
workers.
About 35 percent of the responding farms
used a farm labor contractor or custom
harvester to obtain seasonal workers in
1995 and they got an average sixty-seven
workers from such intermediaries.  Con-
tractor employees received an average
$5.59 per hour, slightly more than work-
ers hired directly, and an average over-
head rate of 40 percent was paid to cover
the FLC’s payroll taxes and costs associ-
ated with hiring and providing toilets, etc.,
for farm workers.
The survey asked how IRCA was affect-
ing farming operations, and most employ-
ers asserted that the government needs to
develop a better employee verification
system and that an agricultural guest
worker program is necessary.
Yet, most employers had no trouble find-
ing seasonal workers in 1995—91 percent
of employers who hired seasonal workers
in 1995 reported that they were able to
find enough seasonal workers.  The nine
employers who reported difficulties find-
ing sufficient seasonal workers cited the
general unavailability of workers as well
as a unique reason, such as planting ad-
ditional acreage or bad weather.
County and commodity specific details
from the survey emphasize the same
points, viz, most used informal recruit-
ment methods to obtain seasonal work-
ers, most paid about $5 per hour, and
virtually all employers had enough sea-
sonal workers in 1995.
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PROPOSED
GUESTWORKER
PROGRAMS
There are two major types of
guestworkers, nonimmigrants and proba-
tionary immigrants, and two major meth-
ods to admit them to the U.S., through
certification or attestation procedures.
Nonimmigrants are foreigners in the U.S.
for a specific time and purpose, and ex-
perience in the U.S. as a lawful nonimmi-
grant is not supposed to advance a
person’s priority to enter the U.S. as an
immigrant.6
Probationary immigrants, on the other
hand, if they are still needed and do a
sufficient amount of qualifying work, can
“earn” an immigrant status.  European
guestworkers were probationary immi-
grants, and RAWs would have been.
There are also two major ways to admit
guestworkers.  Certification means that the
border gate stays shut until a government
agency agrees with the employer that there
is a shortage of U.S. workers, and then
the foreign workers are admitted to fill a
specific job vacancy under contracts ap-
proved by the government. 7  Attestation,
on the other hand, means that employers
open the border gates with their petitions
asserting that they could not find U.S.
workers after attempting to recruit them
at prevailing wages, and the border gate
stays open until complaints and enforce-
ment prompt the government to shut the
door.
California farmers developed a propo-sal
in February 1995 to substitute an attesta-
tion procedure for the current certifica-
tion procedure.  Under the growers’ pro-
6 Thus, H-2 workers employed in 1985-1986 were not eligible to apply for the SAW legalization
program, which was restricted to persons who were unauthorized workers on U.S. crop
farms.
7 Under the H-2A program, growers must ask DOL to certify their need for workers at least
sixty days before the shortage is anticipated.  DOL does not certify that  growers need H-2A
workers unless the grower tried to recruit U.S. workers at prevailing wages and with offers
of free housing, transportation, and contracts for work.
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posal, employers would attest that they
face labor shortages after attempting to
recruit workers at prevailing wages.  As-
sociations, farmers, or farm labor contrac-
tors would fax applications that include
promises to recruit local workers and to
pay prevailing wages to the U.S. Depart-
ment of Labor.  DOL could review the
request for completeness and accuracy, but
not initiate an investigation unless there
was a complaint.  Unless DOL disap-
proved the application within seven days,
growers would be free to employ foreign
workers, either workers in the U.S., or
those abroad.
Growers would pay for the administra-
tive cost of the program with a fee equiva-
lent to their payroll tax savings for social
security and unemployment insurance
taxes—perhaps 12 to 15 percent—that
would not be paid on behalf of the for-
eign farm workers.  Foreign farm work-
ers admitted under the program could be
shifted from farm to farm and could re-
main in the U.S. for up to thirty-six
months.  Up to 30 percent of each
worker’s wages would be withheld and
sent to the U.S. consulate nearest the
workers’ hometown for pickup, or for-
feited by workers who failed to appear to
collect the withheld wages.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The certification procedure used to deter-
mine whether to admit H-2A workers is
rife with controversy and litigation.  Farm
employers criticize it for being too bureau-
cratic, costly, and uncertain.  Farm worker
advocates criticize it for permitting em-
ployers to obtain the foreign workers who,
they assert, employers prefer because the
H-2A workers must please their employ-
ers to remain legally employed in the U.S.
The government is not well suited to
mediating between these parties.  If expe-
rience has demonstrated anything, it is
that, if the only party that wants to make
the H-2A program work is government,
the program will not work smoothly.
However, the H-2A program may be a bit
like democracy—it’s not perfect, but it
does look better than the alternatives.  To
my knowledge, no country admits un-
skilled foreign workers on the basis of
employer attestations of labor shortages.
I find it hard to believe that, given the
history of controversy surrounding the
employment of foreign workers in U.S.
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agriculture, the U.S. will in the late 1990s
introduce an attestation program for alien
farm workers.
All governments make employers who
want temporary foreign workers pay for
the privilege.  However, employers cur-
rently pay lobbyists to push for the few-
est and lowest hurdles between them-
selves and the foreign workers they want.
This means that employers pay for the
privilege of obtaining access to foreign
workers up front and then reap the re-
wards of using foreign workers afterward.
This accentuates dependence on foreign
workers and means that, once an em-
ployer becomes hooked on foreign work-
ers, there is no continuing economic in-
centive to look seriously at U.S. workers.
If the likely outcome of the debate over
certification versus attestation is a change
in certification procedures, then I suggest
careful consideration of such changes as
substituting employer-paid user fees for
some of the regulations that now govern
admissions.
I suggest that employers who bring H-2A
workers into the U.S. pay a user fee
equivalent to 15 to 25 percent of the wages
paid to H-2A into an industry-specific
trust fund.  This fund, administered by
employers, labor, and government repre-
sentatives in a manner similar to current
trust funds that promote, inter alia, milk
and pork, should be charged with spend-
ing the funds collected in a manner that
would end the industry’s dependence on
nonimmigrant workers.
Trust funds would, I believe, have several
advantages over the current system.  First,
they would encourage employers to re-
turn to the U.S. labor market to look for
workers—experience shows that, once
employers master the intricacies of the H-
2A program, they rarely return to hiring
U.S. workers.  Second, trust funds tie the
funds available to find alternatives to for-
eign workers directly to dependence on
foreign workers.  If there were 200,000
foreign farm workers, each earning $5,000,
then a 25 percent user fee would generate
$250 million to administer the program
and to find alternatives to foreign work-
ers.
Third, tripartite administration of the pro-
gram permits the parties closest to the
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problem of insufficient U.S. workers—
those who have the most expertise in the
causes and solutions for labor shortages—
to deal with ending dependence on for-
eign workers.  Tripartite administration
may reduce the controversy and litigation
that usually surrounds the H-2A program.
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“Foreign students” are foreign nationals
who are in the United States on tem-
porary visas for the expressed purpose of
attending a U.S. college or university or a
related training program.  They are a fa-
miliar presence on American campuses
and they play an integral part in the intel-
lectual life of these campuses, both as stu-
dents and as scholars, often serving in
academic apprenticeship roles.  Unlike
other foreign nationals in the U.S., such
as illegal aliens, refugees, and permanent
resident aliens, who have been extensively
studied and discussed, there has, unfor-
tunately, been remarkably little research
on, or public policy discussion of, foreign
students.  Foreign students play an im-
portant role in one major sector of the
economy (the higher education sector) and
many enter the broader labor market,
some in an illegal status (e.g., violating
the work restrictions on their student vi-
sas) and others on temporary work visas
or as permanent resident aliens.  Public
policy regarding foreign students needs
to be made, not in a vacuum, but with an
understanding and weighing of both the
positive and negative aspects of their pres-
ence.  The positive aspects need to be
encouraged, while the negative aspects
need to be curtailed.
The United States
as a Magnet
The United States is  a magnet for foreign
nationals seeking university level and
advanced (graduate) level training.  This
is particularly true in the fields of science
(biological and nonbiological), engi-
neering, computer science, mathematics,
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certain social sciences (e.g., economics)
and, more recently, business and manage-
ment.  Hereafter these fields are referred
to collectively as “science.”
Tables 1 and 2 present data on the ad-
mission of foreign students into the United
States over time and by country of origin.
Although there have been ebbs and flows,
there is little trend in the number of for-
eign students admitted annually—241,000
in 1981 and 257, 000 in 1993 (including
4,383 in the vocational training program).
With the growth in college and university
enrollment over this period (from 12.4
million to 14.4 million students) there also
has been little change in the number of
admissions of foreign students per hun-
dred students enrolled in U.S. colleges and
universities, a small decline from 1.9 per
hundred in 1981 to 1.8 per hundred in
1993.  By country of origin [Table 2], for-
eign student admissions now come pri-
marily from Asia (61 percent), with Japan
(16 percent), China, Taiwan and Hong
Kong (14 percent), Korea (9 percent), and
India (5 percent) the primary sources.
Other important source countries outside
of Asia are Canada, Mexico, the United
Kingdom, Germany, and Spain.
There has, however, been an increase in
the stock of the foreign student popu-
lation in the United States, from about
300,000 in 1981 to just more than 450,000
in 1995.1  Relative to the total enrollment
in colleges and universities, foreign stu-
dents have increased from 2.5 percent of
the student population to just more than
3 percent.
The growth in the foreign student popu-
lation relative to annual admissions re-
flects a lengthening in the average stay in
student visa status.  This has been due, in
part, to the increase in the proportion of
foreign students in graduate-level educa-
tion, which generally involves a longer
stay in a U.S. educational insti-tution than
does enrollment, often for just one semes-
ter or one year, in an undergraduate pro-
gram.
Foreign students now comprise about 1
percent of enrollment in associate degree
(two-year college) programs, 2.5 percent
1 The data in this paragraph and the next two paragraphs are from the Institute of International
Education (1995).
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Table 1.
Students and Family Members Admitted to the
United States
Selected Years, FY 1981 to FY 1993
       Spouses and
Year                     Students    Children of Students
1981 240,805 31,056
1985 257,069 28,427
1989 334,402 26,369
1990 326,264 28,943
1991 282,077 32,315
1992 241,093 33,431
1993 257,430 33,379
Source: U.S. Department of Justice.  1995.  1993 Statistical Yearbook of the         Immigration
and Naturalization Service: Table 40.
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Table 2.
Students Admitted to the United States by Country of
Citizenship, FY 1993
Country Number of Percent of
Students Total
Europe 45,677 17.7
France  4,688  1.8
Germany  5,942  2.3
Spain  5,422  2.1
UK  6,205  2.4
Asia 157,355 61.1
China & Taiwan  29,860 11.6
Hong Kong   5,842  2.3
India  12,826  5.0
Indonesia   6,679  2.6
Japan  40,492 15.7
Korea  22,286  8.7
Malaysia   6,263  2.4
Thailand   6,732  2.6
Africa   7,067  2.7
Oceania   2,177  0.8
North America  30,469 11.8
Canada  11,659  4.5
Mexico   8,975  3.4
South America  12,999  5.0
Stateless and Unknown   1,686  0.7
TOTAL 257,430 100.0
Note: Only countries providing at least 4,000 foreign student admissions are identified separately.
Source: U.S. Department of Justice.  1995.  1993 Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service: Table 39.
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in bachelor’s (four-year college) pro-
grams, and just more than 9 percent in
graduate level programs.  Or, expressed
as a proportion of foreign students, 13
percent are in associate degree programs,
41 percent in bachelor’s programs, and
nearly one-half (46 percent) are in gradu-
ate level programs.  By field of study,
nearly 30 percent are in the physical and
life sciences, engineering, mathematics,
and computer sciences, 20 percent are in
business and management disciplines.  In
contrast, less than 4 percent are in the
humanities.
There are two fundamental reasons, not
necessarily mutually exclusive, why for-
eign nationals seek a student visa: (1) to
obtain high quality education in the
United States that may not be available at
all or in the same form in the home coun-
try; (2) the student visa may be the easi-
est or least costly mechanism for entering
and remaining for some time in the United
States.
In spite of the many shortfalls and fail-
ings in its system of higher education, the
United States is recognized inter-nation-
ally for having the highest quality and
most flexible college and university sys-
tem in the world.  This is even more so
for graduate-level education than for un-
dergraduate education, although it is true
at the undergraduate level as well.
The students feeding into this system
come from two primary sources—U.S.
trained (grades Kindergarten through four
years of high school) students and for-
eign students.  The U.S.-trained students
often come from middle schools and high
schools that are not up to the quality stan-
dard expected at the university level.  In
particular, while U.S. schools emphasize
original thinking rather than rote learn-
ing, compared with some schools in some
other countries they are not as demand-
ing of their students in terms of classroom
hours and homework, and they do not
provide high quality learning in math-
ematics or science.
Moreover, many foreign students, particu-
larly at the graduate level, are drawn from
among the best and the brightest from
around the world and often have had
outstanding training in secondary schools
and institutes in their countries of origin.
The foreign students can compete very
successfully with U.S.-trained students for
college and uni-versity admission, particu-
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larly at the graduate level.  Indeed, in spite
of a preference on the part of colleges and
universities for U.S.-trained students, they
admit foreign students on the basis of their
outstanding records.
It is not by coincidence that foreign stu-
dents are disproportionately in science-
oriented fields rather than uniformly dis-
tributed across all fields.  The United
States has a particular comparative ad-
vantage in training in the science-based
fields in contrast to the humanities; the
U.S. is at the forefront of scientific research
in many fields.  Moreover, science involves
inter-nationally transferable skills in con-
trast to the tendency for the humanities
to be much more country specific.  Medi-
cine, for example, involves the human
body and, although environmental factors
may differ, the human body and the bio-
logical processes it involves are not coun-
try specific.  In contrast, the legal system
and the institutional environment in which
the legal system operates is very much
country specific.  As a result, a “dispro-
portionate” number of high- quality for-
eign students apply for U.S. science, rather
than humanities, pro-grams.  The result is
a larger proportion of foreign students in
science and a larger proportion of native-
born students, who have more of the U.S.-
specific skills, in the humanities.  These
differing relative proportions do not im-
ply discrimination nor do they imply an
“imbalance” that needs to be corrected.
Rather they imply a rational allocation by
students across disciplines based on their
relative skills.
Another reason the U.S. draws such a
large number of international science stu-
dents is that the language of instruction
(English) has become the international
language, or the lingua franca, of science.
Although lesser fluency in English is gen-
erally required in U.S. science programs
than in U.S. humanities programs, the
experience of studying in a U.S. science
program improves English speaking, read-
ing, and writing skills that now are re-
quired of scientists who wish to operate
on an international level, if only by read-
ing international journals.  Indeed, even
science journals published in non-English
speaking countries increasingly are pub-
lished in English.
There are, however, less laudable reasons
for foreign nationals to seek a foreign stu-
dent visa.  A foreign student visa can be
the easiest long-term visa that many for-
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eign nationals can obtain.  It has a longer
duration than a tourist visa, puts one at
less risk and provides greater freedom of
movement than being in an illegal status,
and does not require demonstrating a
“well-founded fear of persecution” if one
returns to one’s home country (refugee
visa).  Moreover, a foreign student visa
does not involve having one’s name
placed on a waiting list or backlog, as is
often required for  a permanent resident
alien visa.  Indeed, most potential immi-
grants cannot claim refugee status, do not
have close relatives in the United States,
and either cannot qualify for or, especially
if living outside the U.S., cannot find an
employer willing to petition for the labor
certification that is needed for an occupa-
tional preference visa.  As a result, most
potential immi-grants have little prospect
for obtaining an immigrant visa.
At least some applicants for a foreign stu-
dent visa are motivated by the desire to
obtain a “cheap” visa to enter the U.S.
rather than by a genuine interest in study-
ing in a U.S. institution and then return-
ing to their country of origin.  While in
the United States they may “search” for
ways of obtaining a resident alien visa,
such as marrying a U.S. citizen or finding
an employer who will petition on their
behalf for a labor certification.  Both
mechanisms for obtaining a visa are easier
if one is inside the U.S. in a legal status
than if one is in an illegal status or out-
side the United States.
Advantages to the
United States
The foregoing outlined reasons why for-
eign nationals have a “demand” for for-
eign student visas.  The crucial question
is:  Why does the United States “supply”
or make student visas available?
Foreign students, especially graduate stu-
dents in science, are important in fulfill-
ing the two key roles of a university, the
transmission and generation of knowl-
edge.  With a relative “shortage” of na-
tive-born students seeking advanced study
in science there is a relative shortage in
these fields of teaching assistants [TAs],
research assistants [RAs], and postdoctoral
fellows.  Yet, the current economic situa-
tion in higher education in the United
States has made graduate students essen-
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tial in the functioning of most colleges and
universities, particu-larly the large re-
search universities.
The economics of teaching under-gradu-
ates requires a large number of teaching
assistants, graduate students who grade
homework and examinations, tutor stu-
dents, lead discussion sessions, supervise
laboratory experiments, and teach small
independent sections of basic courses.
Without the graduate student teaching
assistant services the cost of higher edu-
cation would increase significantly.
Moreover, there is much validity to the
often-made argument that part of the
training of graduate students involves
their learning how to teach and that the
best way to do that is through supervised
hands-on experience or on-the-job train-
ing.  Supervised teaching experience
sharpens an individual’s own basic skills
in science and provides the necessary
training for the teaching many graduate
students will be doing upon completion
of their advanced degree program.
Similarly, science-based research projects
at the major universities depend on re-
search assistants and postdoctoral fellows,
many of whom are foreign nationals.  This
research, generally funded by the federal
government and private foundations, now
often requires the input of research teams,
and an important component of these
teams are the RAs and postdoctoral fel-
lows.  A de-cline in foreign graduate stu-
dents would raise the cost of research to
the funding agencies and decrease the
amount of research funded and per-
formed.  Yet, this university-based re-
search is vital to maintaining the frontline
position of the United States in science
and technology.
The comparative advantage of the United
States in international trade is in prod-
ucts (goods and services) that are inten-
sive in “human capital.”  To maintain this
comparative advantage requires a labor
force well-educated in science and a sci-
entific community that is advancing the
frontier of knowledge.  Foreign students,
whether in teaching or in research, help
maintain the competitive edge of the
United States.
There are also potential benefits to the U.S.
when the foreign students graduate from
their science-based programs of study.  If
they return to their country of origin or to
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a third country, they carry with them links
to the United States that can be invalu-
able in enhancing both trading opportu-
nities and international collaborative re-
search.  A negative aspect, however, may
be a technological “leak”—with foreign
countries learning U.S. technological se-
crets.  One partial pro-tection is security
clearances for those working on highly
sensitive projects involving national secu-
rity.  But in another sense, it is very dif-
ficult for any democratic country to main-
tain non-classified technological secrets de-
veloped in universities, regardless of
whether or not there are foreign students.
These ideas get disseminated rapidly in
international conferences, working papers,
technical journals, and, most recently, elec-
tronic publications.
Among the foreign students in science
who remain in the United States, most
eventually enter a career that makes at
least some use of their training.  Their
training in the U.S. as graduate students
serves as an apprenticeship program in
U.S.-specific, as well as international,
skills.  They develop credentials that are
easier for U.S. employers to interpret than
the purely foreign credentials of job ap-
plicants from outside the U.S.
There is no question that the U.S. economy
has been kept at the leading edge of sci-
ence and technology over the past cen-
tury in part through the influx of foreign-
born scientists.  Yet, one objection to oc-
cupational-based visas and to foreign stu-
dent visas is that foreign nationals are
“crowding out” U.S.-born scientists by de-
pressing their wage and employment op-
portunities.  It should be noted, however,
that for about the past fifteen years there
has been a widening of skill differentials
in the U.S. and in the other Organization
for Economic  Cooperation and Develop-
ment [OECD] countries, that is, the earn-
ings of highly-skilled workers (including
those in science-based professions) have
increased relative to lesser-skilled work-
ers.
Several reasons have been offered for this
phenomenon.  One is the internationali-
zation (globalization) of the world
economy that has put lower-skilled U.S.
manufacturing workers in more direct
competition with lower-income workers
in emerging third world economies.  An-
other is the rapid pace of technological
advance due to the computer revolution
that has given more highly-skilled work-
ers an advantage in the labor market, per-
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haps because they have adapted more
readily to the new technological changes
(which would have only a short-term ef-
fect on relative wages) or because the new
technology is “biased” in favor of highly-
skilled and professional workers (which
would have long-term effects).
The widening of skill differentials in earn-
ings in the U.S. has been responsible for
an increase in income inequality and a
higher rate of return to science-based train-
ing.  The increase in income in-equality
has negative social conse-quences.  The
higher rate of return to science-based oc-
cupations has not attracted enough na-
tive-born Americans to college and uni-
versity training to either fill the available
slots or to prevent the widening of skill
differentials.
Policy Considerations
Thus, in general, foreign students are not
“crowding out” U.S. nationals either in
colleges and universities or in the labor
market.    Fewer foreign-origin scientists
would undoubtedly increase the earnings
of U.S. scientists, but the price to the
American economy would be a slower rate
of technological advance and further wid-
ening in income inequality.  There may be
particular subsectors that, at particular
times, appear to experience a larger ad-
verse impact from foreign students than
others.  It is difficult, how-ever, to iden-
tify these subsectors in advance and even
more difficult to develop ameliorative
policies; and, because of rapid responses
in enrollments and the labor market to
economic incen-tives, most such policies
would come into play only after market
forces already have mitigated the impacts.
There are, however, potential abuses in
the foreign student visa program that can
be mitigated through some changes in
policy.
It is important to enforce rigorously re-
quirements that students be in good stand-
ing with the university.  Students on aca-
demic probation should not be considered
to be in good standing for the purpose of
a foreign student visa.  For students en-
rolled in courses or at the thesis or disser-
tation (independent research) stage a
document should be required, signed by
the relevant person in the student’s de-
partment (e.g., advisor or department
chair), certifying that satisfactory progress
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is being made toward completing the
degree require-ments or research project.
A condition of entry for a foreign student
should be a prepaid return airline ticket
from the airport nearest to the university
to the country of origin.  This ticket should
be nonrefundable unless the INS certifies
that the student has left the United States,
become a permanent resi-dent alien, or is
deceased.  This is impor-tant to prevent
the lack of a return airline ticket from
discouraging a return to the home coun-
try and encouraging remain-ing in the U.S.
in an illegal status.
To reduce even further abuse of a student
visa as an instrument for providing legal
cover while seeking another visa, two
changes in immigration law would be
beneficial.  The current labor certification
requirements for the labor market (occu-
pational) preference visas give a substan-
tial advantage to aliens already living in
the United States compared to potential
applicants living abroad.  A skill-based
points system, along the lines used in
Canada and Australia, would be an excel-
lent substitute.  Even if the skill-based
point system included a small number of
points for “prearranged employment” in
the U.S., it would provide less of an in-
centive than cur-rently exists to abuse the
foreign student visa program.
Under current law there is a three-year
waiting period to demonstrate that a
marriage to a U.S. citizen is bona fide be-
fore it qualifies an alien for a permanent
resident alien visa.  It would be desirable
to raise this to a five-year waiting period
to reduce even further the incentive to
use a foreign student visa as a mecha-
nism for being in the U.S. while searching
for a U.S. citizen spouse.
Another deterrent would be a permanent
bar to obtaining a resident alien visa or a
temporary visa for those found to have
violated a significant provision of their
foreign student visa, including by being
employed in violation of the visa or by
submitting a visa application based on a
fraudulent marriage.
Regulations currently require that a for-
eign student visa applicant be able to
demonstrate a level of financial support
from legally-authorized sources sufficient
to cover tuition, fees, room, board, and
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other living expenses.  This support level
can serve as a policy instrument to in-
crease or decrease the number of foreign
students by lowering or raising the re-
quired minimum level of financial sup-
port or by extending its duration beyond
the first year in a foreign student visa
status.
There are some things that should not be
done.  It has been suggested by some that
a quota be set on the number of foreign
student visas.  Establishing this quota
would be difficult: How would the num-
ber be determined?  How would the lim-
ited number of visas be allocated by coun-
try of origin, academic discipline, and
university?  A rationing mechanism would
be needed.  The visa backlog, now a
prominent feature of the resident alien visa
system, would make no sense for a stu-
dent visa program.  It would be unrea-
sonable to ask a graduate student or a
university to wait, say five years, before
the visa could be approved.  Administra-
tive procedures could be used to develop
a rationing allocation formula or visas
could be auctioned off to universities, al-
though either would be likely to be even
more hotly contested than the mechanism
for rationing immigration visas.
A more fundamental question, however,
is why one would want to place a limit
on bona fide foreign student visas.  With
the adoption of the administrative proce-
dures discussed above, abuse and fraud
in the foreign student visa program would
be reduced.  It is not obvious that having
done so there would be “too many” for-
eign students in the United States.  These
visas have served the national interests of
the United States and could be expected
to continue doing so in the future.
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As the U.S. moves to a de facto low-wage
industrial policy characterized by high
immigration, a low-wage-influenced re-
gional free trade agreement, and a soci-
etal value on graduate, more than
precollegiate, education, American
education’s current practices will insure
that the majority of African Americans are
relegated to second-class citizenship in the
next, as in the past, century.  The extreme
underrepresentation of African Americans
(and other minorities) among those who
receive doctorates from U.S. universities
will be a major factor in a reduced living
standard and quality of life for African
Americans.
The disproportionate use of federal re-
search funding to provide better  access
to higher education to non-American citi-
zens over American minorities, especially
in the sciences, is a tragic and counter-
productive example of actions against our
collective American interest.
African Americans have paid, and con-
tinue to pay, dearly in human costs be-
cause most Americans are not aware that
in the new world order skilled people,
not low wages, are the only sustainable
comparative economic advantage.  Ameri-
can public investments, especially race-
and class-equitable investments in human
capital and education, often are discred-
ited and receive low public policy prior-
ity.  Lester Thurow, Dean of MIT’s Sloan
Business School puts it best, noting that if
economic success was determined by who
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was able to invent the best new products,
then it would make sense to concentrate
our educational resources on the top 25
percent of our labor force—as the U.S.
currently does.  If, however, the key to
economic success is being the cheapest and
best producer of products, then the edu-
cation of the bottom half of the labor force
is more critical to effective and efficient
production because, if they cannot learn
new, high-technology, highly-productive
processes, those processes cannot be em-
ployed (Thurow 1992:227).
Thurow points out that in a low-wage
industrial policy, the societal education
resource priority is on the upper 25 per-
cent of the educational distribution.  Thus,
America has some of the greatest research
universities—and many of the worst el-
ementary and secondary schools—in the
world.  Our private sector and federal
government research support to a rela-
tively small number of universities has
permitted these selected and elite institu-
tions to become a world-recognized asset.
Unfortunately, our world-renowned re-
search universities have not served our
African American population well, a situ-
ation (almost as bad for other American
minorities) that continues because we do
not hold our research universities account-
able for how well they serve our African
American population.  In the past, when
industrial and manufacturing jobs were
more plentiful, this lack of accountability
may not have made much difference.
Now, and in the immediate future, as our
economy becomes more and more depen-
dent upon knowledge-based skills, we no
longer can ignore the consequences of
gross under-representation in access to the
higher-order academic training increas-
ingly vital for economic development.
Even so, Thurow aptly observes that we
now know that the past historic explana-
tion for American’s economic success was
inadequate; historians traditionally over-
stated the impact of cheap, plentiful, well-
located raw materials and farmland in
explaining American economic success.
America did not become rich because a
small population lived in a rich resource
environment or because Americans
worked harder or saved  more than their
neighbors.  The real reason was that
America’s resource advantages were com-
bined with the first compulsory public K-
12 and mass higher educational systems
in the world.  Both these advantages, plus
some others, gave America its great eco-
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nomic edge, especially after World War
II.  Americans did not work harder, but
they worked smarter and they were bet-
ter skilled.  Once rich, it was easier for
America to stay rich (Thurow 1992:40).
The benefits most Americans receive come
from the differential access of their ances-
tors, parents—or even themselves—to
natural resources that they could exploit
without paying either replacement or en-
vironmental degradation costs, and from
government subsidies, ranging from free
or low-cost land, education, help in re-
search, development, and promotion, and,
especially, extensive tax subsidies.  Our
common future heritage depends on ef-
fectively utilizing and developing all of
our human resources—especially our poor
and minorities.  Current policies and prac-
tices in doctoral education are counter-
productive to this goal.
The Need for More
African American
Doctorates
Many current practices place all Ameri-
can graduate students at a disadvantage
vis-a-vis international students.  Many
American research universities abuse the
concept of merit in responding to the
needs of our African American popula-
tion.  There are numerous reasons for
comparing African American and inter-
national doctoral recipients:
n Non-American doctoral recipients
benefit most from the best gradu-
ate financial assistance, while Af-
rican American doctoral recipients
benefit least;
n This best university support—in
the form of research assistant-
ships—is financed primarily
through federal research grants
funded from taxes taken from all
Americans—including American
minorities;
n Research universities have less in-
centive either to care about or to
help produce more American mi-
nority scholars if they can find all
the students they need—and
more—overseas;
n The lack of public accountability,
financial incentives, or penalties
does not create adequate motiva-
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tion for American research univer-
sities to produce more American
minority Ph.D.s.
Only in America is it necessary to make
the argument that it is in our national
interest to develop our underutilized hu-
man resources (who disproportionately
happen to be American minorities). It is
already clear that future quality of life, as
well as economic development, requires
greater utilization of knowledge-based
communication and information skills.
American Ph.D.s are more likely to stimu-
late our economy, more likely to pay taxes,
and more likely to be creditable role
models for future faculty and students.
The converse is also true.  If current
American research university patterns of
benign neglect of African American doc-
toral students in the sciences is allowed
to continue, we are mortgaging our fu-
ture.
The Problem
African American citizens constituted
more than 13 percent of the U.S. popula-
tion but received less than 3 percent of
the doctorates from U.S. universities in
1990; non-American citizens received 28
percent of all doctorates from U.S. uni-
versities that year (Thurgood & Weinman
1991:10,84).
Although African American doctorates
have increased from 1975 to 1991, the to-
tal is still 16 percent less than the peak
year of 1977.  This loss is in spite of a 27
percent increase in Ph.D.s to African
American women since 1977.  African
American males are the only
underrepresented American minority
group that suffered a loss of more than 44
percent in the receipt of Ph.D.s from
American universities since 1975-1977
(NRC 1992:64).  The number of Ph.D.s go-
ing to all other underrepresented Ameri-
can minority groups increased consider-
ably [figure 1]; the number of Ph.D.s from
American universities going to non-
American citizens increased more than 70
percent during that time.2
African American males constitute 6 per-
cent of the U.S. population, 47 percent of
the U.S. prison population (Hacker
2 There were 684 African American male doctorates in 1977 and 385 in 1991 (NRC 1992:71).
There were at least 9,398 non-American citizen doctorates in 1990 compared to approximately
5,338 in 1975 (Thurgood & Weinman 1991:84)
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Figure 1.
Doctorates Awarded by U.S. Universities
to U.S. Citizens
Source: Thurgood & Weinman 1991.
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1992:197), 5 percent of the private sector
top corporate positions, but less than 3
percent of those with access to
postsecondary education and less than 1
percent of those who received doctorates
from American universities in 1990.  In
comparison, non-American citizen males
received 21 percent of all doctorates from
American universities in that same year.3
The 1990 Doctoral Project of the National
Research Council [NRC] of the National
Academy of Sciences documented that
American research universities provided
better support to the international students
who received doctorates compared to
African Americans who received doctor-
ates.  This greater support for non-Ameri-
can citizens over African Americans held
for every doctoral and professional field,
including the humanities, education, and
the social sciences. (Thurgood & Weinman
1991:24,47).
The result was that in 1990, of the more
numerous 9,500 international students, 70
percent received doctorates without incur-
ring any debt.  In contrast, almost 70
percent of the much smaller number of
African Americans (820) and Hispanic
doctoral recipients incurred debt.  For 25
percent of the African American recipi-
ents and 33 percent of the Hispanic re-
cipients doctoral education debt was more
than $10,000 (Thurgood & Wein-man
1991:26,34).  The 1991 data is even more
discouraging.  The greater the amount of
debt that doctoral students owe, the
greater the gap between America minor-
ity students and international non-citizen
recipients of doctorates from U.S. univer-
sities (NRC 1992: Table 17).
Direct federal grant funding for doctoral
support has declined in favor of more loan
funding (for American citizens) with the
result that almost 70 percent of all fund-
ing for graduate doctoral education is in
the form of federally-subsidized research
assistantships that research university fac-
ulty are much more likely to give to inter-
national students than to American mi-
norities.4
3 The 6 percent black male population figure is a conservative estimate without the benefit of
adjustments to reflect a significant black male U.S. census undercount (Thurgood & Weinman
1991:10,84-85).
4 In the tables in the NRC study, “university” funding is primarily federally-sponsored research
dispensed as research assistantships (NRC 1992).
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American universities produced non-
American citizen doctorates in fields
where they did not produce a single Af-
rican American doctorate in 1990—in
some cases, for more than this one year.
Over the last decade this trend is even
more devastating.  The list in the APPEN-
DIX shows the future critical scientific
fields where American universities aver-
aged less than one and, in some cases,
less than two African American Ph.D.s per
year for the entire decade.    Remember,
13 percent more Ph.D.s were awarded to
international students in 1991 than in 1990.
Doctoral Financing:
Racial Bias Without
Accountability
In its excellent annual report on minori-
ties in higher education, the American
Council on Education (1993) reported  that
even though more African Americans have
been attending college in recent years, the
number of African American faculty mem-
bers has remained stagnant for a decade.
In 1980, African Americans represented
4.3 percent of college professors; in 1990
they accounted for 4.5 percent of college
professors, only a marginal improvement,
and more than half of these teach at his-
torically black colleges and universities.
American universities contend that they
cannot find African American faculty be-
cause of an alleged “pipeline” problem.
Yet, only 55.8 percent of the African
Americans who received doctorates from
American universities in 1990 were hired
by American universities, compared with
68 percent in 1975.  The percentage of the
much larger number of international doc-
torate recipients hired by American uni-
versities increased from 52 percent in 1975
to 56 percent in 1990.  Thus American
universities hired a slightly higher per-
centage of a much larger number of non-
American citizen doctoral recipients from
American universities  than African
American doctoral recipients (Thurgood
& Weinman 1991:22,50).
Statistics clearly demonstrate that doctor-
ate degrees for African American males
declined more than half once the federal
government began to cut back on direct
assistance.  As African American doctoral
students had to depend upon American
universities as the prime source for financ-
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ing their studies, they became much worse
off because Ameri-can universities allo-
cated more of their resources to fields
where they admit and support foreign
students.  Ironically, as much of this univer-
sity-administered support for international
students is in the form of research assistant-
ships, universities use federal funds directly
or indirectly to disproportionately fund inter-
national, rather than American minority, stu-
dents.
If there were no readily available pool of
foreign students, American universities
would have greater incentives to help
develop and increase the supply of Ameri-
can students—possibly even American
minority students—in many science fields.
Instead, American universities and the
major organizations that primarily speak
for American education, unanimously
supported changes in the immigration law
of 1990 that accelerates the recruitment of
international scientists and scholars, thus
insuring that American minorities con-
tinue to be shut out of these academic
openings.  These are serious charges; let
us examine some of the evidence.
Although American university depart-
ments do not attribute the dearth of Afri-
can American doctoral students to the lack
of financial aid, data suggests otherwise.
In his excellent study commissioned by
the Graduate Record Examination Board,
Michael Nettles concludes that the reduc-
tion in [federal] financial assistance since
the 1960s has had a negative effect on
prospective African American graduate
students at both the master and doctoral
levels.  That reduction also may explain
why more than 60 percent of African
American and Hispanic graduate students
attend graduate school part-time.  In 1970,
twice the number of students received fel-
lowships, scholarships, and traineeships
as in 1981; the federal budget for these
forms of assistance declined by more than
50 percent from 1970 to 1981.  While these
federal grants decreased, federal loans in-
creased from $717 million in 1976 to nearly
$3.5 billion in 1984 (Nettles 1987:1.5).
Nettles notes that as federal direct stu-
dent funding declines, students became
more dependent upon universities for
assistance, a shift, he asserts, that pro-
foundly affects the ability of African
American students to afford graduate
school.  As universities became the prime
determining financing factor for doctoral
degrees, African American males fared far
worse than any other—especially interna-
tional—students.
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The annual National Research Council
1990 data that traces the fiancing of those
who were successful in achieving the doc-
torates is informative.  For international
students, American universities were the
primary source of doctoral support for
68.8 percent, while for African Americans,
universities were the primary source of
support for less than 25 percent (Thurgood
& Weinman 1991:24,47).  For more than
60 percent of African Americans (and Na-
tive Americans) the primary source of
support for their doctoral education was
their own personal funds, such as loans;
only 13.8 percent of international students
primarily depended on personal funds
[figure 2].
American universities attempt to explain
these trends by contending that minori-
ties are in fields where less university and
federal support is available.  The differ-
ent fields misnomer is apparent if we com-
pare the fields where a much higher pro-
portion of American minority students
than international students are found.  Of
African Americans who received their de-
gree in education in 1990, 81 percent listed
personal resources as the prime source of
financing for their doctoral studies; only
12 percent were primarily funded by
American universities.  In contrast, only
41 percent of international students who
received doctorates in education that year
listed personal resources as their primary
source of funding; more than 28 percent
were primarily funded by American uni-
versities.  Keep in mind that the absolute
number of international students is many
times greater than African Americans—
or all American minorities combined.  This
large positive funding percentage in fa-
vor of international students translates
into almost geometric differences in ac-
tual dollars.
Thus, if we just look in the doctoral field
where about 50 percent of all African
Americans achieve their doctorates, the
proportion of African Americans who had
to finance their doctoral studies person-
ally was twice that of non-American citi-
zens.  Equally important, American univer-
sities were more than twice as likely to pro-
vide funds to international students in educa-
tion than to African Americans (Thurgood
& Weinman 1991:24,47).
We find similar patterns in fields such as
the social sciences and the humanities.  In
the social sciences, 48.5 percent of 1990
African American Ph.D.s financed their
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Figure 2.
Sources of Support for
1990 Doctoral Recipients
Source: Thurgood & Weinman 1991.
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education by personal funds, while only
22.5 percent of international students had
to pay for their  education with personal
funds.  American universities were the
prime source of financing for 37 percent
of African American Ph.D.s but for 56
percent of international student Ph.D.s
(Thurgood & Weinman 1991:24,470.
It is difficult to understand why Ameri-
can universities should favor non-
American citizens in the humanities, but
they do.  Only 28 percent of international
doctoral students in the humanities pri-
marily used personal funds to finance their
doctoral studies, compared to 50 percent
of African American doctoral students.
Universities were the primary source of
support for almost 57 percent of interna-
tional students in 1990 compared to only
50 percent of African American doctoral
students.  Remember these figures are for
those who successfully completed their
doctorates!
While American universities were giving
preferential doctoral financing to interna-
tional doctoral students over American
doctoral students in education, African
American and Hispanic doctoral awardees
in education were accumulating signifi-
cant graduate debt to go with high un-
dergraduate debt.  One-third of all His-
panic doctoral awardees and more than
one-quarter of the African American
awardees reported debt of more than
$10,000 (Thurgood & Weinman 1991:
24,47).  These high debts are often in fields
where salaries are lower than in the sci-
ences.
Other indicators show the preference or
bias of American university graduate de-
partments toward international students
over American minorities—especially Af-
rican Americans and Native Americans.
In both real and total time to complete
the degree, international students appear
to have the advantage over African Ameri-
cans and Hispanics.  In education, for
example, the median total time for non-
citizen international students was 12.8
years, compared to 19.6 for African Ameri-
cans and 16.4 for Hispanics.  The real time
median differentials were 6.1 for interna-
tional students in education compared to
8.5 years for both African American and
Hispanic doctoral degree recipients
(Thurgood & Weinman 1991:15,46).  Part
of this difference could be related to the
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university preference for support for in-
ternational students in the form of research
assistantships that also encourage inter-
action with faculty and promote the pos-
sibility of both mentoring and provision
of a basis for a dissertation.
Yet, American universities contend that
factors other than their differential alloca-
tion of financial aid account for the dearth
of minorities in graduate programs.  This
is despite the indication from Nettles and
others that the much lower median fam-
ily income and extreme difference in black
and white family wealth in the U.S. re-
quire that minority students, especially
African Americans, non-Cuban Hispanics,
and Native Americans, assume much
greater undergraduate debt burdens than
White American graduate students.
Nettles strongly suggests (1987:4) that this
differential debt burden affects minority
and majority students differently when
they make education and career decisions.
It is an entirely rational decision not to go
on to a doctoral degree program when
you see that the majority of your peers
who do are not favored in comparison
with international students and that stu-
dents of your race are forced to take longer
to complete their degrees.
American universities’ contention that a
“pipeline” problem keeps them from find-
ing “qualified” African American gradu-
ate students has less merit after an exami-
nation of the American university fund-
ing preference for international students
(see above).  The NRC report notes that
such “qualified,” potentially successful
African American graduate students are
disproportionately located on the cam-
puses of historically black colleges and
universities.  Although such colleges and
universities enrolled only about 16 per-
cent of all African American students in
American higher education, they were the
baccalaureate-granting schools for almost
60 percent of the African Americans who
received Ph.D.s in 1975 and almost 40
percent who received Ph.D.s in 1990
(Thurgood & Weinman 1991:32).  This
author proudly taught and worked on one
such campus that, according to recent fig-
ures, produces more African American
Ph.D.s than any other public American
university.  Yet American universities do
not try actively to recruit extensively or
to offer support to all of our African
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American science graduates who have the
capability to succeed in doctoral programs.
So much for the alleged pipeline prob-
lem.
Keep in mind that in 1990 international
students received more than twice as
many doctorates from American univer-
sities as all American minorities combined,
a trend that clearly seems to freeze out
American minorities, especially African
American males, from future faculty po-
sitions.  African Americans resentment is
even greater when we see American uni-
versities recruit international scholars of
color and then label them as “minority,”
rather than the more accurate “interna-
tional,” faculty.
Three countries provided 44 percent of all
non-American citizen doctorates in 1990:
Korea and the two Chinas (Thurgood &
Weinman 1991:11).  Why is there this
overwhelming preference in American
graduate university departments for in-
ternational students, especially interna-
tional Asian students in the sciences?
The lobbying of major educational asso-
ciations/organizations that represent
American universities in support of the
1990 immigration law changes to make it
much easier for foreign professors and
students to get both access to and perma-
nent status in the U.S. clearly worked to
the detriment of U.S. minorities.  This
trend is likely to accelerate as David
Simcox, former Executive Director of the
Center for Immigration Studies, noted in
a paper presented at the Northeast Asso-
ciation of Graduate Schools meeting
(1991:3-4):
There are several factors that will
make these trends worse in the
future, the greatest of which is the
rapid population growth among
the young, highly mobile work-
ing-age population in the third
world.  Almost all third- world
countries are falling further and
further behind in the race to cre-
ate jobs for the expanding popu-
lations.  For example, in the next
few years Mexico’s labor force will
grow at the rate of over 1 million
persons per year, but Mexico’s
economy, even with the most
optimistic assumptions about a
free trade agreement, will create
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less than half that number of new
jobs per year.  The International
Labor Organization anticipates
that the third-world labor force
will grow by fifty million per year
with less than half that number
able to find jobs.  Many of these
economies have been overproduc-
ing college graduates for many
years.  Some, such as India, Paki-
stan, Korea, and the Philippines,
seem to be deliberately overtrain-
ing some of their surplus skilled
workers with the expectation that
they will find advanced training,
and possibly employment, in
countries such as the U.S.  Most
of this oversupply will be science
graduates and students because
those disciplines are viewed as
more culturally neutral, because
American universities are still
considered as the best in science
and technology, and last, but not
least, the transition to permanent
residence in the U.S. is easiest for
those with science skills.
This is consistent with the histori-
cal preference pattern of Ameri-
can research university faculty for
international faculty and students
over American minorities,  espe-
cially African American males.
This situation will not change
unless major funding and fund-
ing incentives for American uni-
versities change.
Recommendations
African American and other legislators
concerned about American long-term in-
terests must take steps to insure that the
resources committed to American minor-
ity students in doctoral training by Ameri-
can universities are at least equal to the
commitment of taxpayer research support
subsidies to international students in all
fields.  Academic administrators, such as
college presidents, provosts, and deans,
should make academic department dis-
cretionary funding conditional until these
departments provide all American minori-
ties doctoral opportunities that are at least
equal to their commitment to non-Ameri-
can citizens.
Legislation that will guarantee research
assistant-type support for all qualified
American doctoral students should be
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supported.  We should not require Ameri-
can students, especially American minor-
ity students from families with less wealth
and income, to go into debt to finance
their education while we subsidize non-
citizen guests to the extent that the over-
whelming majority of them get their doc-
torates debt-free.
Whenever American universities use fed-
eral (or state) funds for graduate student
research support, and whenever that sup-
port covers more than one student, then
for every international student that Ameri-
can faculty members chose to support
with these government monies, they
should also support an underrepresented
American minority student.
It is clear that major American research
universities are not now going to provide
research opportunities for American mi-
nority students comparable to those they
provide international students.  These
major heavily-federally-subsidized Ameri-
can research universities never have pro-
vided opportunities for American minori-
ties of color comparable to those provided
by the historically Black colleges and uni-
versities.  The under-funded Black insti-
tutions, however, have been given neither
the resources nor the state authority to
provide comparable comprehensive
graduate research opportunities.  Now it
is time to address this issue by providing
major research commitments to histori-
cally black colleges and universities that
have successfully demonstrated their abil-
ity to graduate quality undergraduates,
especially in the sciences.  It is likely that
only these institutions will provide the
quality research environment that will
develop the minority talent currently be-
ing lost to this nation.
There should be an American incentive com-
putation in every federal (or state) research
contract that supports doctoral students.
Universities where the under-represented
minority percentage of Ph.D. graduates in
the state equals the proportion of
underrepresented minorities in their state
population should receive a ten-point
bonus in every federal or state competi-
tive research contract.  Conversely, uni-
versities that use federal funds to support
more non-American citizens than
underrepresented American minorities in
research should have ten points deducted
from their score.  Such a system would
finally create the financial incentives nec-
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essary for research universities to develop
and recruit underrepresented American
Ph.D.s in a manner more comparable to
the way they willingly recruit
underrepresented minorities from all
kinds of limited academic backgrounds for
revenue-generating athletics.
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APPENDIX
Fields Where the Average Number of African
American Ph.D.s from All U.S. Universities is Less Than One or Two
Per Year: 1982-1991
Less than 1 Less than 2
MATH
Applied Math (86) Probability & Statistics
Algebra (15)     ( 87)
Analysis/Functional Analysis (45) Topology (16)
Geometry (23)
Logic (6)
Number Theory (11)
Computing Theory & Practice (3)
Operations Research (16)
General Math (91)
Other Math (14)
COMPUTER SCIENCE
Information Systems (23) Computer Science (240)
PHYSICS & ASTRONOMY
Astronomy (12) Elementary Particles (63)
Astrophysics (17) General Physics (128)
Acoustics (8)
Atomic & Molecular Physics (25)
   Nuclear (24)
   Optics (28)
   Plasma (13)
CHEMISTRY
Agricultural & Food Inorganic (48)
   Nuclear (4)
   Pharmaceutical (15)
   Polymer (30)
BIOCHEMISTRY
Biophysics (37)                 Biometrics & Biostatistics
Plant Genetics (8)    Immunology (21)
Plant Pathology (11)    Neurosciences (27)
Plant Physiology (9)    General Biological
Botany (25)       Sciences (67)
Ecology (19)
Developmental Bio/Embryology
   Endocrinology (2)
   Entomology (1)
Microbiology & Bacteriology
   Parasitology (5)
   Human & Animal Genetics (17
   Genetics (2)
HEALTH SCIENCES
Environmental Health (11) Pharmacy (48)
Public Health/Epidemiology (22)
Rehabilitation/Therapeutic Services
Veterinary Medicine (24)
General Chemistry (167)
EARTH, ATMOSPHERIC & MARINE SCIENCES
Atmospheric Physics & Chemistry (8)
Meteorology (6)
Atmospheric & Metrology Science (10)
Geology (21)
Geophysics & Seismology (29)
General Geological Sciences (7)
Environmental Sciences (7)
Hydrology & Water Resources (4)
Oceanography (33)
ENGINEERING
Aerospace, Aeronautical & Astro (86) Civil (258)
Agricultural (42)
Bioengineering & Biomedical (41)
Computer (62)
Engineering Mechanics (60)
Engineering Physics (7)
Engineering Science (13)
Environmental Health Engineering (19)
Industrial (77)
Materials Science (146)
Metallurgical (42)
Mining & Mineral (19)
Nuclear (3)
Operations Research (10)
Petroleum (22)
Polymer (24)
Systems (21)
General Engineering (24)
AGRICULTURAL SCIENCES
Animal Breeding & Genetics (6) Agricultural Economics (61)
Animal Nutrition (11)
Animal Sciences (36)
Agronomy (54)
Plant Breeding & Genetics (27)
Plant Pathology (23)
Plant Sciences (8)
Food Sciences (69)
Soil Sciences (36)
Horticultural Science (30)
Fisheries Science (9)
Fish & Wildlife (21)
Forestry Science (21)
Renewable Natural Resources (11)
Sources: Unpublished data from the Doctoral Research Project (NRC 1992).
Note: Parentheses show  number of non-American citizen doctorates
from U.S. universities in 1990.
   Less than 1    Less than 2
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The Preponderance of
Foreign Students in
Science and
Engineering [S&E]
Programs:  The
Phenomenon
Were the Nobel Laureate Paul Samuelson
to walk into a graduate economics class
at MIT today, he would be struck by a
dramatic difference in the composition of
students since he first taught the class.  In
the 1940s, the class was predominantly
American; today, however, more than
FOREIGN STUDENTS IN SCIENCE
AND ENGINEERING PH.D.
PROGRAMS: AN ALIEN INVASION
OR BRAIN GAIN?1
JAGDISH BHAGWATI
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY
AND
MILIND RAO
COLGATE UNIVERSITY
one-third of the students in the class are
foreign students.
This phenomenon is not confined either
to MIT or to economics.2  Thus in 1990,
more than one-half of the engineering
Ph.D.s in the U.S. were awarded to for-
eign students.  The figures are almost as
high in mathematics, physics, chemistry,
and computer science [see Figure 1 for
S&E and the components Science and
Engineering and Figure 2 for major sci-
ences].
1 Thanks are due to Daniel Greenberg, Phillip Griffith, Brendan O’Flaherty, Duncan Foley, and
Andre Burgstaller for helpful conversations.  The ideas developed in this paper and the
statistics to support them owe greatly to Rao’s research.
2 Indeed, several recent studies of academic labor supply (Bowen & Rudenstine 1992;  Ehrenberg
1991;  Ehrenberg 1992) note the preponderance of foreign students in Ph.D. programs.
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But the phenomenon of foreign student
dominance in the U.S. is ill-understood
and ill-explained.  Its public policy impli-
cations are, therefore, couched in alarmist
terms, turning the phenomenon into a
problem that must be contained when it
is, as we argue in this paper, a cause for
celebration that calls for a policy of toler-
ance, even encouragement.
Current
Explanations
and Policy
Suggestions
The conventional explanation of the phe-
nomenon seems to proceed as follows:
n The U.S. has a comparative ad-
vantage in promoting gradu-ate
education.  Foreign students,
therefore, come to get it.
n The preponderance of foreign stu-
dents get into technical and sci-
entific programs because they
(chiefly Asians) happen to be
“good at” mathematics and far
less so at “verbal” skills.3
n Finally, Derek Bok (1993) argues
that the earnings of doctors, law-
yers, and top corporate executives
have grown substan-tially relative
to those of professors, drawing
talented Americans to these pro-
fessions and away from teaching.
Presumably, this argument ex-
tends to technical and science
Ph.D. programs as well.
The net result then is to increase
foreign student—and reduce na-
tive enrollment—in S&E Ph.D.
programs.  The consequences that
are expected to ensue from this
phenomenon are fearful.
n Since Ph.D.s plough back into
teaching, Bowen and Sosa (1989),
in a book featured on the front
3 An element of this “cultural” argument may be detected in the recent Report of the Committee
on Graduate Economics Education (Krueger, et al. 1991), which attributes the increasing
mathematization of economics partly to the presence of technically-skilled, but verbally-
unskilled, Asian students from the Far East, chiefly Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and China.
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page of the New York Times, pre-
dict a major shortage of academic
faculty in the U.S. by the mid-
1990s, due in no small measure to
the presence of foreign students
who pre-sumably would return to
their native lands.
n The preponderance of foreign stu-
dents in S&E Ph.D. programs also
is alleged by many critics to en-
danger our leadership in research
and development.
n Finally, a number of black critics
attribute the failure of blacks to
get an increasing number of
Ph.D.s in  S&E programs to the
increased dominance of foreign
graduate students (e.g., Morris
1993).
The policy prescriptions that naturally
follow from these diagnoses center around
the notion that “reliance” on foreign
graduates is a mistake the U.S. cannot
afford.  Proposals to restrict the influx of
foreign students through visa denial and
reduced financial aid have, therfore, been
advanced.
OUR RIVAL
EXPLANATION
Our view, however, is that the conven-
tional explanation—and the prejudicial
implications following from it—are
flawed.  Our rival explanation of the phe-
nomenon leads, instead, to more sanguine
implications and to policy conclusions
altogether opposed to currently proposed
restrictionist ones.
Alarmist predictions that there would be
a shortage of S&E Ph.D.s for the academe
(Bowen & Sosa 1989) already have proven
false.  A recent study by Massy and
Goldman of Stanford and RAND, widely
reported in the media (Greenberg 1995;
Browne 1995), con-cludes that “doctoral
production in S&E averages about 25
percent above employment opportuni-
ties.”  Our rival explanation also is better
able to suggest why such a large “sur-
plus” could have developed and is likely
to persist even though the labor market
normally adjusts to correct imbalances
because students confidently can be ex-
pected to walk away from education that
yields low and diminishing returns.
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The Theory
At the outset, we must note that the U.S.
graduate programs generally admit stu-
dents on merit.  There is no discrimina-
tion against foreign students (though in
recent years there may have been affir-
mative action to assist native minorities,
which then are marginally favored in re-
lation to both foreign and native
nonminority students).4
This being so, as the applicant pool shifts
in favor of foreign students relative to
native students, assuming quality to be
unchanged, so would the admissions and
hence, all else equal, the Ph.D.s awarded.5
The explanation of the rising share of for-
eign students in S&E Ph.D. programs must
then be found in the relative shift in favor
of foreign students in the application pool.
Indeed, it can.
The Explanation
Our explanation proceeds by citing the
many factors that have dramatically in-
creased the applicant pool for foreign stu-
dents.
Immigration economists know that rivu-
lets of immigrants build up into streams
as information networking goes to work.
Casual empiricism underlines how tal-
ented students follow others who ven-
tured into specific graduate programs as
pioneers and then spread the word.
In turn, the success of the foreign students
from specific institutions abroad serves to
supply the necessary “certification” for the
admissions committees that new appli-
cants from these institutions are, indeed,
likely to be as good as they appear, thus
turning them into effective and potentially
successful applicants.  Thus, new appli-
4 This complication is of trivial importance, however, as the S&E graduate applicant pool has
itself shrunk  (Bhagwati & Rao 1996b).
5 The pooling model explains well why, when the 1965 Immigration Act introduced PTK
(Professional, Technical, and Kindred) preferences for which there was worldwide competition,
and the national quotas generally were not applicable to this competition, the composition of
such immigration shifted to such third world countries as India and the Philippines; there
were more applicants from these countries in the pool.  The model also has been successfully
applied econometrically to explain the source-composition of the guestworker (gastarbeiter)
immigration programs in West Germany (Bhagwati, Schatz & Wong 1984).
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cants from Seoul National Uni-versity are
treated more seriously in competition than
the former ones on whom universitites
took a chance and who went on to do
well in the programs.
But, for some of the successful “sending”
countries, the most significant factor is that
they steadily have been building up their
technical education to levels comparable
to some of our best institutions—often
with these institu-tions’ help!  Entry into
these foreign elite schools (such as the
prestigious Indian Institutes of Technol-
ogy [IIT]) often is based on nationally ad-
ministered entrance examinations with the
programs subsidized by the government,
permit-ting the most gifted students to
attend.  A favorable evaluation of the
graduates of these institutions when they
apply for admission to S&E Ph.D. pro-
grams is therefore inevitable; these stu-
dents often are superbly trained and
greatly gifted.
Indeed, all these factors are seen to work
in the case of the four Asian countries
that provide currently more than one-half
of the S&E Ph.D.s: China; India; South
Korea; and Taiwan [see Figure 3 for S&E
totals and components and Figure 4 for
major sciences].
Thus, while each of these top “source”
countries today has numerous colleges/
universities offering undergraduate S&E
programs and degrees, most of the Asian
students in American Ph.D. programs are
graduates of a very small group of schools
that increasingly have come to be regarded
as having exceptionally high and im-
proved standards of instruction.
India, for instance, produces about 25,000
engineers (at the bachelor’s level) every
year; only 2,000 (or about 8 percent) of
these graduate from the elite Indian Insti-
tutes of Technology.  However, 78 per-
cent of recent U.S. engineering Ph.D.s
awarded to Indians went to graduates of
the IIT.  Almost one-half (48 percent) of
all Taiwanese students who received
Ph.D.s in the U.S. attended either National
Taiwan University or Cheng Kung Uni-
versity.  Even more telling, 65 percent of
the Korean students who received S&E
Ph.D.s in the U.S. are graduates of one
university—Seoul National University!
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The figures are almost as high for the elite
schools of China—Peking University and
Tsinghua University6
From these countries’ perspective, the flow
to the U.S. from these elite insti-tutions
has increased significantly.  At least, 70
percent of their graduates now leave for
the United States.  For the IIT, the figures
are about 85 percent.  About 30 percent
of all IIT graduates, since its founding in
1954, currently are in the U.S. (Ananth,
Babu & Natarajan 1989;  Bhagwati & Rao
1996b).
It also is worth noting that the quality of
students turned out by these elite foreign
institutions has increased over time, in
turn increasing these students’ ability to
compete against native students.  In 1964,
there were 18,000 applications for the 2,000
places at the IIT in India.  By the end of
the 1980s, applications for these places had
increased to 100,000 (Bhagwati & Rao
1996b)!
Moreover, this phenomenon of a rising
and high share of foreign students in our
graduate programs has surfaced differen-
tially in the S&E (also in the mathematics
and economics) programs.  Why has it
not arisen equally in the “professional”
schools of law and business?
Part of the reason lies, of course, in the
fact that the “source” countries them-
selves have not allocated equal energies
and financing to attract their most talented
students into these professions, as against
the S&E, programs.7
But the principal reason is that the quali-
fied and talented students from these
source countries face a major liquidity con-
straint.  Tuition at the gradu-ate schools
in the United States is generally beyond
their financial capabilities.8  Besides they
do not qualify for U.S. governmental and
bank loans.
6 Figures provided by the National Research Council (Ries & Thurgood 1993;  Thurgood &
Weinman 1991).
7 Such exceptions as the two Indian Institutes of Management and the famous All-Indian
Institute of Medical Sciences in New Delhi must be mentioned.
8 According to a Wall Street Journal (Lee 1955) story on applications at top business schools,
the price of an MBA rises to as high as $60,000 for two years at private schools.
U.S.  C O M M I S S I O N  O N  I M M I G R A T I O N  R E F O R M
R E S E A R C H
P A P E R
- 265 -
As it happens, graduate programs in the
U.S. have different financial aid possibili-
ties.  Professional schools (law, business,
and medicine) offer very little financial
aid; only 1 percent of the entering class
receives primary support from the uni-
versity.  Only somewhat better are the
Ph.D. programs in the humanities and
education: 20 percent of the students in
non-S&E programs receive financial as-
sistance from the university.  A striking
contrast is offered by S&E Ph.D. pro-
grams; more than  70 percent of the stu-
dents (and 80 percent of the foreign stu-
dents) in S&E Ph.D. programs list the
university as the primary source of finan-
cial assistance  (Ries & Thurgood 1993).
This picture is reinforced when we look
at Figure 5 that shows alternatively the
source-composition of support in differ-
ent fields for doctoral students.  Univer-
sity sup-port, reflecting labwork and other
research assistance, clearly is a much more
important source of support in Engineer-
ing, Physical Sciences, and Life Sciences
than in the Social Sciences, Humanities,
and Education.
To explain the increased share of foreign
students in S&E Ph.D. programs, the fore-
going analysis of the factors augmenting
the supply of qualified foreign applicants
into these programs is not entirely suffi-
cient.  Of course, the explanation does not
require but would be strengthened if we
also could argue that the supply of native
applicants into these programs has shrunk.
But we do need to dismiss the possibility
that the native supply of comparably
qualified and talented applicants also has
not increased simultaneously.
This seems wholly reasonable to assert.
There is no counterpart in American edu-
cation, prior to graduate school, to the
factors augmenting the supply of foreign
student applications in S&E graduate pro-
grams.  At the same time, the common
complaint is that the starting salaries and
possibly even the rates of return to “pro-
fessional” education—MBAs, medical and
law degrees—have attracted growing pro-
portions of the best graduating native stu-
dents.
POLICY
IMPLICATIONS
Our explanation of the rising share and
predominance of foreign students in the
S&E graduate programs then shows that
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it reflects “supply” factors that are criti-
cally tied into the meritocratic and non-
discriminatory approach underlying U.S.
graduate school admissions.  The impli-
cations below then follow.
The meritocratic approach to admissions
to graduate programs results in their at-
tracting the best talent and the best trained
candidates from around the world.  While
itself a reflection of the scientific and aca-
demic strength of these programs, it rein-
forces that strength in turn.  The increased
influx of talented foreign students into
S&E, mathematics, and economics Ph.D.
programs is a sign of strength, not of
weakness.
The general notion that the share of for-
eign students is rising because native stu-
dents are “no longer interested in” S&E
Ph.D.s and careers lacks force.  At mini-
mum, it omits the Prince from Hamlet.  The
rising share of foreign students reflects
the dramatically increased supply of com-
petitive foreign students.  The decline in
the supply of competitive native students,
even if true, is at best a minor part of the
story.  As admissions are not wholly in-
elastic, it is worth noting that the overall
graduate S&E admissions of natives have
not fallen as the admissions of foreign stu-
dents have risen.
The increased supply of the foreign stu-
dents as a source of the phenomenon of
their rising and risen share in S&E Ph.D.s
also implies that the responsive-ness of
such graduate production to a fall in the
rate of return to such education is likely
to be very low.  Hence, one could predict
sharp falls in these rates of return and
“surplus” production without the normal
corrective mechanism provided by the fact
that the students will simply walk away
from enrolling in these programs and,
thus, reduce the output of Ph.D.s to lev-
els at which better and competitive rates
of return are restored.
This is because foreign students will com-
pare their rates of return from S&E Ph.D.s
in the U.S. to the much inferior rates of
return to staying or returning home.  The
earlier-cited RAND-Stanford study of the
“excess demand for Ph.D.s in many sci-
ence fields” (Browne 1995) argues that
currently a science doctorate yields a one-
in-four chance of not getting suitable
employment: “. . . universities in the
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United States are producing about 25 per-
cent more doctorates in science and engi-
neering fields than the United States
economy can afford.”  But a rate of re-
turn here that is diminished by one-fourth
will still exceed the alternative rates of
return at home.  This also is partly be-
cause the direct cost of graduate school-
ing in the U.S. is substantially taken care
of by financial support (usually linked to
labs and projects).
Thus, the prospect of quick reversal of
“surpluses,” such as the one described in
the RAND-Stanford study, is diminished.
But why should we worry?  The effect of
such a “surplus” is certain to force one-
in-four (if that estimate is properly arrived
at and argued plausibly to endure) even-
tually to work their way downstream to
jobs below their expectations.  But, as
these Ph.D.s cannot find jobs at such
places as Stanford, MIT, Caltech, and Bell
Labs and, therefore, go downstream to
smaller colleges and lesser institutions,
they upgrade the quality of instruction and
research at these institutions.9  Surely, that
is a reason for us to rejoice rather than
lament.
Nor do we need to worry that we are
becoming “too dependent” on foreign stu-
dents.  They typically stay on, are even
called “stay ons” in the immigration lit-
erature!  Even when Ph.D.s go back to
their home countries, they often return.
Professional markets are heavily global-
ized now and one often gets either “yo-
yo” immigrants or migrants who, having
returned home or gone elsewhere, even-
tually come back here to the magnet coun-
try they chose in the first place for their
graduation into a Ph.D.10
As is well-established in immigration stud-
ies, few nations can match the facilities
for professional research and ad-
vancement that the U.S. offers.  Nor can
other nations match the opportunities that
are open to second-generation children in
9 The downstreaming model is at the heart of the analysis of education in the context of an
alternative paradigm to the “human capital” and other theories of education (Bhagwati &
Srinivasan 1975).  It has been utilized in the context of the theoretical analysis of international
migration of professionals (Hamada & Bhagwati 1976).
10 While we stress here the advantages to us of foreign students “staying on” in the U.S., there
also are many indirect advantages to us when and if they return home.
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the United States.  Just imagine bringing
up your children in Tokyo instead of New
York or in Kobe instead of Austin.  It’s no
contest.
Foreign students typically see their U.S.
education as a stepping stone to immi-
gration into the U.S.11  Since the 1965
Immigration Act, which opened up a
number of “preferences” for admissions
of Professional, Technical, and Kindred
[PTK] immigrants, this incentive for for-
eign students to acquire first-rate U.S.
degrees and to improve their ability to
stay in the United States thereafter has
been a powerful one.12
11 See Hamada & Bhagwati (1976) where educational enrollment by foreign students in the U.S.
was first described as an instrument for immigration, rather than as a method of human
capital formation.  Numerous instances exist of students from first-rate foreign institutions
coming to third-rate U.S. universities, the only motive being to acquire the qualifications that
makes immigration less difficult.
12 Broadly speaking, a nonrefugee foreigner can immigrate legally to the United States under
one of two principal categories: family-based or employment-based.  The former requires
“sponsorship” by a U.S. citizen family member.  The latter requires sponsorship by an American
employer.  The Department of Labor must, on the basis of an American employer’s sponsorship,
certify that “no American can do or is available for this job.”  The Department of Labor
regulations provide, in addition, for special handling of labor certification applications for
college or university teachers; an employer can select the best qualified candidate, regardless
of citizenship, for the position.
Hence, for those without U.S. citizen family members, the only feasible route to immigrate
legally to the U.S. is to secure employment certification from an American employer.  And
this route is much more readily travelled when one has a U.S. graduate degree.
The fear that foreign students will disap-
pear from the U.S., leaving us with inad-
equate scientific personnel, often is ex-
pressed or lies behind exhortations to
encourage natives to go for S&E Ph.D.s.
But, if these students stay on, for the most
part, the fear is misplaced.
The United States is uniquely a country
of immigrants.  There is enormous ethnic
diversity in the country.  Naturalization
is the easiest in the world.  The distinc-
tion between “us” and “them,” directed
against foreign students, is wholly incon-
gruous with the country’s history and
culture.  It also flies in the face of the
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culture of excellence and nondiscrimi-na-
tion that has characterized and enriched
the American educational scene.
In light of these considerations, we dis-
agree with the reported view of Dr. Phillip
Griffith, Director of the Institute for Ad-
vanced Study at Princeton and Chairman
of a recent study conducted by the Na-
tional Academy of Science, that “since
foreign students account for a large pro-
portion of graduate enrollments, he and
his colleagues [would] urge better science
education so that even more Americans
will be drawn to Ph.D. training”
(Greenberg 1995).13  Getting young Ameri-
cans to appreciate science is a laudable
objective; but surely it is not to be urged
because we have foreign students in S&E
Ph.D. programs.
Our analysis suggests, contrary to the agi-
tation about the current “surpluses” of
S&E Ph.D.s and about the prepon-derance
of foreign students in these pro-grams,
that the foreign students phe-nomenon is
not a problem.  Rather, it benefits the
country.  Other nations’ “brain drain” is
our “brain gain.”
Instead of curtailing the inflow of these
talented foreign students or trying to re-
duce their share in S&E Ph.D. programs,
we ought to make their immigration
easier, so that we reap the benefits to us
from their settling here.14 Towards this
end, we propose that the immigration of
S&E Ph.D. students from several desig-
nated high-performance institutions
should be practically automatic, their
abundant human capital justifying their
immigration, just as immigration law per-
mits those bringing substantial financial
capital to immigrate readily.  That could
reverse the balance in favor of importing
the talented, rather than the rich, bring-
ing us closer to the ideas that built this
nation.
Finally, we must turn to a question that
bothers many black leaders: Is the entry
of foreign students harming the entry of
13 We should stress that Dr. Griffith’s views (conveyed in personal communication) concerning
the desirability of foreign students in S&E programs are thoroughly consonant with ours.
14 These benefits accrue to us in numerous ways, for instance, through the spillover effect of
their ideas and research (Bhagwati & Rao 1994a;  1996a;  1996b).
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blacks into our S&E Ph.D. programs?
Some in the black community express the
view that blacks are being “crowded out”
by foreign students (e.g., Morris 1993).
Our view is that this argument is incor-
rect (see also: Bhagwati & Rao 1996b).
The facts on black students are of course
alarming (National Science Foundation
1991b:310;  1994a:318).  Of the 36,027
Ph.D.s in all subjects awarded in 1990,
only 320—less than 1 percent—were
awarded to black men; and 508, or just
more than 1 percent, were given to black
women.  Even more ominous is the trend:
the number of blacks getting Ph.D.s in all
subjects has dropped since 1977.  This
contrasts strikingly with the experience
regarding foreign students highlighted
above.  But the inference that foreign stu-
dents come at the expense of blacks is
unwarranted.
To begin with, we must reject the notion
that there are a fixed number of places in
graduate programs and, therefore, that an
increase in the numbers of foreign stu-
dents must be at the expense of natives—
black or otherwise.  The facts show that
the supply of places in graduate S&E
programs, which attract the greatest con-
cern, is not rigorously fixed.  Over the
past two decades, the number of natives
in these Ph.D. programs has remained
constant (at about 13,000).  The Ph.D. pro-
grams have, thus, expanded in size as
foreign students have increased (National
Science Foundation 1991b:310).  Thus,
there is no prima facie presumption that
the increase in the numbers of foreign
students in these Ph.D. programs has been
at the expense of natives.
Could we then argue instead that the black
students are crowded out in a financial
sense, that the limited financial support
available in the universities for their Ph.D.
programs is competed away by better-
trained foreign students and would oth-
erwise be available to the black students
(e.g., DePalma 1992)?  We do not think
so.
At first glance, of course, the “crowding
out” thesis appears plausible as, unlike
most foreign students, most black gradu-
ates do not receive extensive finan-cial as-
sistance from the universities.  In 1990, 69
percent of all foreign graduate students
were supported by the universities,
whereas only 25 percent of all black gradu-
ate students received grants and assistant-
ships (National Science Foundation
1994b:301).
But this contrast is mostly explained by
the fields of study of the two groups
(National Science Foundation 1991b:310;
1994a:318).  Thus, 81 percent of foreign
graduate students are in S&E Ph.D. pro-
grams;  only 14 percent of black graduate
students are in these programs.  Most
black graduate students are in humani-
ties and, especially, in education Ph.D.
programs; more than 50 percent of black
graduate students are in education gradu-
ate programs.  As it happens, graduate
programs in the U.S. have different finan-
cial aid policies (National Science Foun-
dation 1994a:318; 1994b: 301).  S&E gradu-
ate students are over-whelmingly sup-
ported by their univer-sities; more than
70 percent of the students in S&E Ph.D.
programs list the university as a primary
source of finan-cial assistance.  In contrast,
only 25 percent of the students in Ph.D.
programs in the humanities and a mere
13 percent of the students in education
Ph.D. pro-grams receive financial assis-
tance from their university.
Hold the field of study constant, and the
disparities in financial assistance awarded
by the universities greatly diminish, in-
deed virtually disappear.  Black Ameri-
can students in S&E Ph.D. programs do
receive primary financial support from the
university; for instance, more than 70
percent of black graduate students in the
physical sciences receive primary support
from the university (Thurgood &
Weinman 1991).
Besides, much (about 40 percent) of the
financial support in S&E comes in shape
of research assistance in federally sup-
ported projects; the S&E share is more
than 75 percent of such support (National
Science Foundation 1994b:301).  These
projects are funded by the Department of
Defense, Department of Energy, NASA,
and the National Science Foundation.
These awards generally go to those who
are best prepared to undertake the re-
search, including, of course, black stu-
dents.
On the other hand, federal “affirmative
action”-based funding, for which foreign
students are ineligible, is based on differ-
ent criteria and awarded and administered
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by different government agencies—the
U.S. Department of Education, in particu-
lar—as well as the Higher Education Op-
portunity Program [HEOP] funded by the
states.  The budget for this type of aid is
distinct from, and not in the least affected
by, the federal “projects-oriented” grants.
The latter, where the foreign students pre-
dominate, does not cut into the former,
where the black students do.
Most telling, the numbers of black Ameri-
cans securing S&E Ph.D.s—precisely the
fields to which foreign graduate students
flock—actually have increased over the
past two decades (National Science Foun-
dation 1991b:310).  Hence, while the total
number of Ph.D.s awarded to blacks did,
indeed, fall from 999 in 1975 to 828 in
1990, in engineering they increased from
11 in 1975 to 28 in 1990, in life sciences
from 56 in 1975 to 63 in 1990, and in so-
cial sciences from 153 in 1975 to 172 in
1990.
The real problem appears to be that the
pool of black students that the Ph.D. pro-
grams draw upon is small and, worse,
getting smaller (National Science Board
1991:1).  The number of blacks securing
baccalaureate degrees in S&E actually fell
slightly, from 18,700 in 1975 to 18,400 in
1990 (so that the fraction of black S&E
baccalaureates who secured Ph.D.s actu-
ally increased).  And, this occurred during
a period when the total number of bacca-
laureate degrees in S&E awarded in the
U.S. increased; so the proportion of blacks
in these areas decreased signifi-cantly.
Evidently, the problem for the black com-
munity arises at levels below the graduate
S&E programs; its solution, therefore, will
not lie in restrictions on the number of
foreign students or on their access to fi-
nancial support at the graduate level.
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EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
Each of the most recent major amend-
ments to the Immigration and Nationality
Act includes a requirement for the fed-
eral government to assess the environmen-
tal impact of alien immigration on the
United States.  Specifically, the Immigra-
tion Reform and Control Act of 1986
[IRCA] specifies that the Triennial Report
to Congress shall provide a “. . . descrip-
tion of the impact of immigration on en-
vironmental quality and resources . . .”
(Sec.401(b)(3)).  The Immigration Act of
1990 gives the Commission on Legal Im-
migration Reform the mandate to consider
the “. . . social, demographic and natural
resources impact of immigration . . .”
(Sec.141(c)(1)(C)).
The goal of this report is to contribute to
this area of policy analysis by reviewing
existing scientific literature concerning
immigration and environment, to identify
research issues emerging from extant
scholarship, and to develop recommen-
dations for areas of needed research that
will benefit the immigration policy pro-
cess.  It is important to note at the outset
that remarkably little hard evidence ex-
ists about the environmental effects of
alien migration on the United States.  A
great deal of speculation exists about the
nature of the relationship and there is
increasing popular commentary about the
degree to which immigration is associated
with environmental problems in local ar-
eas as well as in the nation as a whole.
The direct or causal effects of U.S. immi-
gration on the environment have not been
established, however, through scientific
study.   Moreover, there are significant
limitations in U.S. statistics on immigra-
tion and population for the study of envi-
ronmental impacts.
The report is organized around four di-
mensions of the research process that are
relevant for examining the relationship
between U.S. immigration and environ-
mental issues.  First, the section, Perspec-
tives on the Role of Migration in
Population-Environment Dynamics, consid-
ers the relevance of theories of popula-
tion and environmental change for the
study of immigration and its effects.  Sec-
ond, the section, Empirical Research Con-
cerning Migration and the Environment,
reviews the results of research relevant
for the study of immigration and envi-
ronment.  Third, the section, Methodolo-
gies for Assessing the Environmental
Consequences of U.S. Immigration, briefly re-
views selected approaches to measuring
environmental impact.  Fourth, the sec-
tion, Information Requirements for Studying
the Environmental Consequences of U.S
Immigration, outlines strengths and weak-
nesses of the federal statistical system for
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analyses of the role of immigration in
population and environmental change.
Recommendations for needed research are
presented at the end of each section.  The
Conclusions section reviews research issues
and priorities within the context of a na-
tional program of research on U.S. immi-
gration and environment.
Perspectives on
the Role of
Migration in
Population-
Environment
Dynamics
The general model of environmental im-
pact identifies three broad sets of factors
influencing environmental change:  Envi-
ronmental impact [I] is conceptualized as a
function of population characteristics [P],
patterns of consumption [A, for affluence]
and technology [T], the use and manipula-
tion of energy and other natural resources.
While this model has provided an orga-
nizing framework for much of the debate
concerning population and the environ-
ment, it has also been criticized for in-
complete conceptualization of the
components and lack of grounding in
social scientific theory.  The degree to
which the population concept is well
specified or connected to theory is also
contested: uses of the model focus prima-
rily on the increase in population size
without specification of the different
sources of population growth, for example
natural increase (births minus deaths)
relative to net migration.
Theories on population and environment
vary in assumptions about the relative
importance and direction of the effect of
each of the factors (P,A,T) as well as the
significance of interrelationships among
the factors.  Neo-Malthusian perspectives
emphasize the significant influence of
population growth for environmental
impact and conceptualize a negative rela-
tionship between population growth and
the availability and, increasingly, the qual-
ity of environmental resources.  In
constrast, more “optimistic” perspectives
emphasize the enhanced potential inher-
ent in positive population growth for so-
cial, economic, and technological progress,
and hence, the means to solve environ-
mental problems.  Primary importance is
given to changes in technology and social
and economic organization in mitigating
the effects of the other two factors.  A
third approach conceptualizes population
pressure and short-run negative effects as
a stimulus to technological innovation and
more effective use of resources.
Perspectives thus vary in the degree to
which population is proportional to envi-
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ronmental change.  According to the de-
mographer Keyfitz:
If all else is equal, action damaging the
environment is directly proportional to the
number of people.  That at least seems
the most appropriate initial hypothesis. .
. . The burden of proof is one anyone who
argues against the proportionality hypoth-
esis in either way. (Keyfitz 1993: 547)
In thinking about the impact of alien im-
migration on the U.S. environment, rel-
evant questions center on the degree to
which the impact of alien migration is
proportionally less than, greater than, or
equal to the number of immigrants.
Not surprisingly, different theoretical per-
spectives lead to different conclusions
about the national and regional environ-
mental impacts of U.S. immigration.  Some
economists have emphasized the poten-
tial contributions to human capital and
the potential for technological innovation
deriving from positive population growth
in the United States and from alien immi-
gration.  Many ecologists, in contrast,
highlight the role of alien immigration in
U.S. population growth with its negative
environmental consequences and often
focus on the contribution to future growth
resulting from the descendants of current
immigrant streams.
In addition to the need to specify more
clearly the role of migration in theories of
population and environment, several ad-
ditional issues emerge from the review of
theory.  Both geographic level and tem-
poral frame of analysis must be specified
in theoretical models and ultimately in
empirical research.  The effects of immi-
gration on environmental processes may
be expected to be significantly different
for metropolitan areas, rural communities,
states, and in the short-term versus the
long-term.  A third issue is the impor-
tance of understanding linkages or con-
nections among geographic areas,
economic sectors, and through time.  For
example, the concentration of immigra-
tion in certain metropolitan areas in the
United States may have environmental
consequences for areas and natural re-
sources geographically removed from the
cities.
The most fundamental recommendation
for theory development is to revise mod-
els of population and environment to
break population growth into its compo-
nent parts in order to consider more
clearly the effects of migration.  Of par-
ticular relevance for the United States,
moreover, is the specification of effects
for different types of international popu-
lation movements, including permanent
resettlement, refugee migration, tempo-
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rary labor migration, and tourism, within
theories of environmental impact.
Empirical
Research
Concerning
Migration and the
Environment
There is a strong and long tradition of
research on the consequences of immigra-
tion for U.S. society, economy, and pol-
ity.  Scholarly interest in the environmental
consequences of U.S. immigration has a
relatively more recent history, originating
in the late 1960s with environmental con-
cern over national population growth and
the role of annual alien immigration in
the path to population stabilization.
There is increasing interest among scien-
tists and policymakers in the environmen-
tal implications of immigration for states,
metropolitan areas, and local communi-
ties in the United States.  Most research
to date, however, tends to focus either on
population growth and trends in alien
immigration, viewed as the causes of en-
vironmental change and problems, or on
the environmental outcomes of interest,
such as land use patterns and urban
sprawl, water supplies and quality.  So-
cial demographic research is being con-
ducted concerning the role of alien immi-
gration in metropolitan and regional
growth patterns in the United States.
Inferences about environmental impacts
resulting from alien migration are often
drawn without direct measurement of the
relationships between the two sets of fac-
tors: patterns of population growth and
immigration are observed to co-vary with
environmental outcomes, while data on
causal relationships are not presented.
Similarly, environmental research often
focuses on direct measurement of envi-
ronmental processes and quality with only
cursory measurement of population and
social processes that are set out in the
introductory statements as direct causes
of environmental change.
In short, there exists very little direct
causal analysis of relationships among
population, immigration, and environ-
ment in the United States. Virtually no
research has been conducted on the role
of immigration status or nativity in the
analysis of consumption and production,
such as differential patterns of energy
consumption, commuting and land use
patterns, and water conservation practices.
Probably the best research on migration
and environmental outcome has been con-
ducted in areas of the developing world.
Very often these are case studies of the
complex relationships among migration,
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social, economic and technological change
and environmental processes.  These stud-
ies may serve to inform conceptual mod-
els, research design, and measurement in
empirical studies of population, migration,
and the environment in the United States.
The general observation concerning the
status of empirical research on U.S. im-
migration and the environment is the need
for more of it.  There is critical need for
the initiation of well-designed studies that
will yield both descriptive information
concerning trends and patterns of demo-
graphic and environmental processes in
U.S. states and local areas, as well as
causal analyses of the relationships be-
tween types of alien immigration and
environmental impacts.  It is particularly
important that research on the environ-
mental effects of immigration identify
different sources of alien migration, for
example, permanent resident aliens, for-
eign students and workers, and tourists.
This significance of subsequent internal
migration among immigrants should also
be studied.
Methodologies for
Assessing the
Environmental
Consequences of
U.S. Immigration
Two frameworks that have been devel-
oped to study environmental change are
relevant for the study of U.S. immigra-
tion and the environment: environmental
impact assessment [EIA] and population-
environment monitoring systems [PEMS].
Environmental impact assessment most
often attempts to forecast the impacts of
development projects or structural or
engineering initiatives, generally new ac-
tivities within a geographic area.  Moni-
toring systems represent ongoing social
and environmental accounting frame-
works for the collection and analysis of
data over time for specific geographic
areas.
The goal of the EIA process is the provi-
sion of objective, typically quantifiable,
information for policymakers and pro-
gram administrators concerning the range
of environmental consequences of some
proposal, often a building project, for a
region or place.  Inherent in the EIA pro-
cess are theoretical models of the nature
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of causes of environmental change.  It is
important to place the proposed source
of environmental change, i.e., the project
or policy initiative, within a multivariate
framework in which all exogenous influ-
ences on environmental outcomes are
documented.  The process of EIA involves
predictive and, thus, causal analysis.  The
approach may be useful in assessing vari-
ous immigration policy options, for ex-
ample, changes in overall levels of annual
alien immigration to the United States, as
well as changes in the structure of immi-
grant admissions in terms of individual
and family characteristics.
Population-environment monitoring sys-
tems measure changes in these factors
over time and are useful in providing an
empirical foundation for evaluation of
existing policies and collecting baseline
data for identifying subsequent environ-
mental impacts.  If the approaches to
monitoring are standardized across ad-
ministrative units, results of PEMS can be
compared among local areas and also
aggregated for analysis of regional dimen-
sions of national policies.  This character-
istic of PEMS is critically salient for
purposes of U.S. immigration policy
evaluation.
A critical issue in exploring the use of
EIA or PEMS for the study of immigra-
tion and environment is the degree to
which the assessment or monitoring sys-
tem documents all significant dimensions
of environmental impact for the regions.
Beyond the contribution of alien immi-
gration to population growth for a region
or area are issues concerning patterns of
resource consumption, technological inno-
vation, conservation behaviors, land use
patterns, and how these vary between
immigrants and U.S. residents, and among
types of immigrants.  Moreover, the meth-
odologies must be open to document other
sources of environmental impact for the
study area, such as in- and out-migration
of U.S. residents and economic change.
Finally, the relevance of any EIA, moni-
toring system, or other more appropriate
research design for determining the effect
of U.S. immigration on the environment
will rest, finally, in the degree to which
national, state, and local data collection
systems can support multivariate analy-
sis of complex dimensions—demographic,
economic, institutional, behavioral—of en-
vironment change.
Information
Requirements for
Studying the
Environmental
Consequences of
U.S. Immigration
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The specification of data needs should be
guided both by theory and by the impor-
tant policy questions concerning U.S. im-
migration and the environment.  While
the emphasis of this report is generally
on the relevant research concerning im-
migration, it is important to note the se-
rious concern among environmental
scientists about the status of environmen-
tal data for the United States and the ca-
pacity for monitoring environmental
quality and resources for different geo-
graphic areas.
Fundamental to the analysis of immigra-
tion and the environment, however, is
statistical information on the contribution
of alien immigration to population growth
for states, regions, cities, and local com-
munities in the United States.  Further,
because the present policy debate concerns
the impact of alien migration, disaggrega-
tion of the components of population
growth—fertility, mortality, and migra-
tion—by immigration status is also a nec-
essary characteristic of statistical
information.  Accordingly, the report fo-
cuses on the adequacy of U.S. data on
population processes for measuring the
role of alien immigration in population
dynamics on national, regional, and local
scales of analysis.
Problems in the adequacy of national
demographic accounts for the comprehen-
sive measurement of trends and compo-
nents of population change have been well
documented.  Three sets of issues pose
particular problems for the empirical
evaluation of the role of alien immigra-
tion in population growth and generally
in environmental processes.  First, con-
ceptual problems exist in official data on
alien immigration. U.S. statistics on im-
migration collected by the U.S. Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service [INS]
represent legal and administrative catego-
ries, including permanent resident alien,
nonimmigrant, refugee, asylee, and pa-
rolee.  As a result these data are less than
ideal measures of demographic concepts
of long and short-term immigration that
use criteria such as length of stay and
activity in the country.  Work has been
done to manipulate INS administrative
data better to represent demographic con-
cepts of alien immigration.  Comparison
of demographic measures with official INS
data on admissions yields important dif-
ferences in the national origins character-
istics of annual alien immigration to
regions and states in the United States.
Second, U.S. statistics on international
migration lack closure: it is not possible
to assess the impact of alien immigration
on population growth in an area if not all
sources of population change are known.
For example, no systematic source of data
exists on the process of out-migration of
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aliens or citizens from the United States;
measurement of levels and patterns of
undocumented migration relies on demo-
graphic estimation.  Very useful work has
been conducted by the U.S. Census Bu-
reau to estimate emigration using census
and survey data.  There has also been
consideration of other federal sources of
administrative data as a basis for estimat-
ing emigration.  As with alien emigration,
estimates of undocumented migration
have been developed using methods of
demographic estimation for U.S. census
data, immigrant data records, and as-
sumptions about mortality levels, emigra-
tion, and census undercount.
Demographers at INS have also estimated
the size of the undocumented alien popu-
lation by state of residence.
Third, the role of alien migration in an-
nual population growth for states and
local areas is not easily measured.  De-
cennial census data are extremely valu-
able for measuring components of
population change for small geographic
areas at ten-year intervals.  Currently,
however, annual measures of the immi-
grant population at the subnational level
are available for large states and metro-
politan areas through the Current Popu-
lation Survey.  The lack of data on internal
migration patterns of immigrants is par-
ticularly frustrating for comprehensive
study of the effect of immigration on states
and local areas.
Longitudinal survey design holds strong
potential as a means more effectively to
collect data on the social demographic
behavior and experiences of immigrants
and U.S. citizens relevant for the study of
immigration and environment. The re-
search community has recognized the
value of a survey of immigrants to di-
rectly study patterns of settlement and
internal mobility among immigrants, as
well as social characteristics and economic
behavior among immigrant cohorts and
how these change over time.  To yield
results appropriate to environmental re-
search, survey design must address, first,
the need for reliable data at different geo-
graphic scales, and, second, the critical
need to compare environmental relevant
behaviors and characteristics among dif-
ferent groups of immigrants and with U.S.
citizens over time.
Conclusions
Four broad areas of recommendations for
scientific research concerning U.S. immi-
gration and environment emerge from this
review:
First, research on the environmental con-
sequences of U.S. immigration will ben-
efit from the revision of models of the
population-environment to specify the role
of migration and, specifically, types of
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international migration, in processes of
environmental change.  Theoretical devel-
opment concerning migration and the
environment needs to occur to derive
relevant and testable hypotheses about
causal relationships and effects.
Second, research on U.S. immigration and
the environment should provide both
descriptive results concerning trends in
demographic and environmental change
at different geographic scales and for spe-
cific places, as well as causal insights about
the nature of relationships between levels
and types of alien immigration and envi-
ronmental outcomes.  Studies should be
undertaken on the national, regional, and
local levels to compare the effects of im-
migration at different geographic levels,
adding to our understanding of geo-
graphic variation of impacts.
Third, it is critical that attention be given
to developing the necessary research de-
signs for ongoing study of the interrela-
tionships among population, immigration,
and environmental processes for the na-
tion, states, and local areas in the United
States.  Survey methodology has been
shown to hold useful potential for studies
of the social and economic consequences
of migration and should be explored for
studying environmental impacts.
Fourth, the statistical foundation for the
analysis of the environmental conse-
quences of U.S. immigration must be
strengthened.  Migration statistics—data
on alien immigration, internal migration,
and emigration—must be improved to
accommodate local and regional analysis
for intercensal periods.   As relevant in
these times of fiscal restraint in federal
spending is the critical need to advocate
the continuation and maintenance of cur-
rent statistical programs: INS statistics on
the admission of aliens to the United States
must continue to be collected and made
accessible for public use; questions con-
cerning nativity, citizenship, and geo-
graphic mobility must continue to be
asked on the decennial census and the
Current Population Survey.  Finally, an
assessment of the status of  indicators of
environmental quality and resource avail-
ability is a critical component of develop-
ing an agenda of policy relevant scientific
research.
These broad recommendations beg the
question of strategy for stimulating and
organizing research efforts to address the
important analytic issues concerning U.S.
immigration and the environment.  Inter-
disciplinary collaboration is essential for
the development of a research program
on U.S. immigration and the environment.
Interaction among environmental and
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social scientists in government agencies
and planning offices, as well as in univer-
sities and research institutes, must be
encouraged to initiate theoretical devel-
opment, to reflect on research design, to
document the status of available data, and,
ultimately, to establish a framework for
interpretation of research results in con-
nection to the policy process.
Given the need for both baseline docu-
mentation and exploratory analytic re-
search, it seems highly appropriate to
initiate a coordinated research program
on immigration and environment for spe-
cific regions, metropolitan areas, and lo-
cal communities in the United States.
Selected places should be identified as
research sites in which an integrated pro-
gram of population and environmental
research would be implemented.  Inter-
disciplinary collaboration among scientists
must be organized within research sites
and coordinated with relevant planning
and scientific agencies at the federal, state,
and local areas.
A Final
Observation
Barry Commoner once stated that he knew
“. . . of no scientific principle which can
tell us how much to rely on population
control and how much on technological
change (and the required economic con-
trols) in order to reduce environmental
impact.  The choice between these alter-
native paths is clearly a political one, not
a matter of science.”  A somewhat con-
trasting perspective is evident in this re-
port.  Research on relationships between
U.S. immigration and the environment is
an essential component of rational and
responsible decisionmaking concerning
U.S. immigration.  Whether environmen-
tal criteria are appropriate grounds for
revising immigration policy encompasses
questions that are within the grasp of
social and environmental research.
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INTRODUCTION
Each of the most recent major amend-
ments to the Immigration and Nationality
Act includes a requirement for the fed-
eral government to assess the environmen-
tal impact of alien immigration on the
United States. Specifically, the Immigra-
tion Reform and Control Act of 1986
[IRCA] specifies that the Triennial Report
to Congress shall provide a “. . . descrip-
tion of the impact of immigration on en-
vironmental quality and resources . . .”
(Sec.401(b)(3)).  The Immigration Act of
1990, which focused on legal immigration,
gives the Commission on Legal Immigra-
tion Reform the mandate to consider the
“. . . social, demographic and natural re-
sources impact of immigration . . .”
(Sec.141(c)(1)(C)), and also requires the
government to provide statistical informa-
tion that is “. . . useful in evaluating the
social, economic, environmental, and de-
mographic impact of immigration laws . .
.” (Sec.142(c)(1)).
These statutory mandates to consider the
relationship between U.S. immigration and
environmental processes and issues pro-
vide an opportunity for social and envi-
ronmental scientists to expand theoretical
and empirical knowledge concerning
population-environment dynamics by giv-
ing specific attention to processes of in-
ternational migration, mobility, and
circulation.  The goal of this report is to
contribute to this area of policy analysis
by reviewing existing scientific literature
concerning immigration and environment,
to identify research issues emerging from
extant scholarship, and to develop recom-
mendations for areas of needed research
that will benefit the immigration policy
process.  It is important to note at the
outset that remarkably little hard evidence
exists about the environmental effects of
alien migration to the United States.  A
great deal of speculation exists about the
nature of the relationship and there is
increasing popular commentary about the
degree to which immigration is associated
with environmental problems in local ar-
eas as well as the nation as a whole.  The
direct or causal effects of U.S. immigra-
tion on the environment have not been
established, however, through scientific
study.   Moreover, there are significant
limitations in U.S. statistics on immigra-
tion and population for the study of envi-
ronmental impacts.
The report serves as an initial review of
four salient dimensions of a policy rel-
evant research agenda concerning the re-
lationship between U.S. immigration and
environmental issues.  First, we consider
the relevance of contemporary theoretical
perspectives on the relationships among
population change, migration, and envi-
ronmental processes and problems.  Sec-
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ond, we review the extant scientific lit-
erature concerning these relationships.
While primary attention is directed to
studies pertaining to the United States,
the review seeks to be comprehensive by
considering relevant research concerning
migration and the environment in other
countries and regions; particular attention
is given to research concerning immigra-
tion and the environment in Australia.
Third, we consider the relevance of exist-
ing methodological approaches to study-
ing environmental change for the analysis
of the environmental consequences of alien
immigration and international population
movements to and from the United States.
Environmental impact assessment and
population-environment monitoring sys-
tems are considered specifically.  Fourth,
given existing theory and methods, we
reflect on the information requirements for
analysis of immigration-environmental re-
lationships at various geographic scales
in the United States.  The degree to which
federal statistics can support analyses of
the role of immigration in national, re-
gional, and local population dynamics is
considered a critical issue for policy re-
search concerning immigration and the
U.S. environment.
Throughout the review, we draw on sci-
entific literature specific to the United
States as well as studies and perspectives
on human environmental impact specific
to other  countries and regions, including
areas within the developing world.  We
thus attempt to glean from this array of
scholarship insights about theory, meth-
ods, and empirical research that are rel-
evant for developing a research agenda
for the U.S. context.  The paper concludes
with an outline of research priorities con-
cerning the consequences of immigration
for environmental processes and trends
in the United States.
A Further
Rationale
As implied above, the legislative mandate
for information on the environmental con-
sequences of U.S. immigration provides
an important opportunity for policy rel-
evant research and also for the expansion
of scientific literature concerning popula-
tion-environmental dynamics.  In short,
there is an opportunity for both basic and
applied research concerning human-envi-
ronmental interactions.  There is also a
need for such research because conclusions
or inferences about the environmental
consequences of immigration may be pre-
ceding systematic study of the issues (for
example, Mann 1990; Population-Environ-
ment Balance, Inc. 1992; Simcox 1992;
Federation for American Immigration
Reform 1991).  It is relevant to note that
U.S.  C O M M I S S I O N  O N  I M M I G R A T I O N  R E F O R M
R E S E A R C H
P A P E R
- 3 -
the premature use of environmental argu-
ments in debates over immigration was
anticipated in Canada a few years ago.
The Canada Employment and Immigra-
tion Advisory Council observed that given
evidence about the positive economic
impacts of immigration, the Canadian
public might be expected to shift its at-
tention to another rationale to restrict
immigration, and that argument could
likely settle on environmental issues (see
Canada Employment and Immigration
Advisory Council 1991:30-31).
It is also interesting to note that the  dis-
cussions about environmental effects are
somewhat reminiscent of the tone of state-
ments made in the early decades of this
century concerning the social and cultural
effects of immigration, e.g, in such state-
ments as the one below made in 1926 by
George Cutten, President of Colgate Uni-
versity concerning the effects of immigra-
tion for the quality of the U.S. population
and society.  [Currently on display in the
exhibit on immigration restrictionism at
the Ellis Island Museum, perhaps it is not
the most appropriate illustration, but it
holds intrinsic interest for this writer.]
The melting pot is destructive to our race.
. . . We must either build up from own
resources and conserve our race power,
or else we must admit only such immi-
grants as shall strengthen and not weaken
our race, or both.  The danger the ‘melt-
ing pot’ brings to the nation is the breed-
ing out of the higher divisions of the white
race and the breeding in of the lower di-
visions. (Wood 1923)
A recent statement by the Federation for
American Immigration Reform concern-
ing the environmental effects of current
alien immigration to the United States
directs attention to the relationships
among immigrant fertility and population
growth within the context of declining
environmental quality and resources:
WHY A LIMIT?
Our Natural Environment
Says There Must Be Limits
on Increasing Numbers
of Immigrants
We are plagued by water
shortages, overflowing landfills,
crowded transportation systems,
deteriorating wilderness and
recreation areas and toxic
pollution, ailments that point very
clearly to the fact that the U.S. is
overpopulated. . . .
Some experts point to the
increasing number of immigrants
and refugees admitted to this
country during the last ten years
as one reason for the rising
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fertility rate.  Most of the recent
entrants to the U.S. have come
from countries with high fertility
rates, and many who come are in
their childbearing years. . . .
(Federation for American
Immigration Reform 1991:41-42)
Even somewhat more scientific accounts
of U.S. immigration draw illusions to eco-
logical concepts.  Note, for example, the
reference to limits on the absorptive ca-
pacity in a recent publication of RAND-
Ford Foundation Program for Research on
Immigration Policy:
Policy Questions Regarding the
Flow of Immigrants
Policies of the last decade leave
three central issues regarding new
immigration unresolved.
Aggregate Total Numbers.  Each
of the three significant
immigration measures passed by
Congress during the 1980s has
been considered independently,
and each has had an expansionary
and compounding effect on the
size of legal immigration.  For the
most part, each has been
considered without a unifying
debate on the overarching
question of how much total
immigration . . . the nation can
productively absorb.  Of particular
note, policy makers have not
examined the absorptive capacity
of the major metropolitan
receiving centers.
. . . The policy question will be
how to respond to the growing
pressures [for immigration to the
United States]:  Is  there a limit
to the nation’s absorptive capacity
, and , if so, what is the limit?
[emphasis added] (Rolph 1992:50-
51)
These are appropriate questions reflect-
ing ecological perspectives concerning the
human environment.  While Rolph does
not define explicitly absorptive capacity,
we can infer the concept to refer to the
capacity of societal institutions to receive
and integrate alien migrants (as opposed
to the addition of native births) into local
communities, regions, labor markets, and,
ultimately, national society.  Absorptive
capacity is thus related to an area’s carry-
ing capacity [see pages 24-25 below] but
encompassing the availability of social,
economic, and political resources effec-
tively to accommodate newcomers.
Increasingly, however, there are popular
interpretations of the effect of immigra-
tion on both the social and physical envi-
ronment.  While questions concerning
absorptive capacity are similar to the
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above statements, definitive answers are
being forwarded identifying immigration
as the cause of a range of social and en-
vironmental problems.  Excerpts from the
San Francisco Examiner-Chronicle are illus-
trative:
Bursting at the Seams
. . . It is time to consider a
moratorium on immigration until
we have provided a lamentably
lacking element in our governance
system—a population policy.  We
need to determine the carrying
capacity of the state.
Fiscal problems aside, how many
people can our dwindling natural
resources support at a reasonable
standard of living?
Consider water, for example. As
we have learned recently, the
filling of the reservoirs by this
year’s rains will not solve the
long-term water shortage.
Even with reservoirs at capacity
there is not enough water to
satisfy present demands, much
less an unending demand for
more.  The population grows; the
water supply does not. . . .
Water conservation can extend
existing supplies, but you can only
tighten the belt up to a point.  A
continually growing population
will overtake all efforts at
conservation.
Another declining resources is
topsoil. . . .
. . . Where once there were miles
of orange groves beneath snowy
mountains, there are now miles
of besmogged suburbs, and the
mountains are seldom visible. . . .
Half of the state’s population
increase comes from net births . .
. [net increase].  But most of the
births that increase the population
are attributable to immigration.
(Gilliam 1993:7,12)
The point is that statements currently are
being presented about the relationships
among population, immigration, and the
environment in the United States.  It is
critical that scientific evidence concerning
these relationships enter into the policy
arena both to inform the immigration
policy process and to clarify the multiple
causes and correlates of environmental
issues.  As Preston (1993:601)  observes,
“[d]iscussions of appropriate levels of im-
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migration inevitably will become heated,
and it is important to begin now to estab-
lish a sound basis for any revisions.”
PERSPECTIVES
ON THE ROLE OF
MIGRATION IN
POPULATION-
ENVIRONMENT
DYNAMICS
Introduction
Theoretical perspectives on the relation-
ship between population and the environ-
ment generally fall into three broad camps,
each with different implications for poli-
cies concerning population regulation and
migration.  These perspectives have been
critically presented by Hogan (1992), Lowe
and Bowlby (1992), Fincher (1991:9-16),
and Lowenthal (1992, 1990) among oth-
ers, and will be described only briefly
here.  Neo-Malthusian perspectives con-
ceptualize a negative relationship between
population growth and the availability,
and, increasingly, the quality of environ-
mental resources (see, for example, Ehrlich
& Ehrlich 1992; Grant 1992).  More opti-
mistic perspectives emphasize the en-
hanced potential inherent in positive
population growth for social, economic,
and technological progress and, hence, the
means to solve environmental problems
(see for example, Simon 1990, 1992;
Repetto 1987);  Boserup conceptualizes
population pressure as a stimulus to tech-
nological innovation and more effective
use of resources (Boserup 1981).  A third
perspective, less associated with proscrip-
tions concerning population control poli-
cies, identifies population growth as a
factor that retards efforts at social and eco-
nomic development and exacerbates so-
cial inequality within poor societies (see
Mink 1992; Caldwell 1985; cf. National Re-
search Council 1986; United Nations Sec-
retariat 1991).
The general model of environmental im-
pact has been presented and applied by
Ehrlich & Ehrlich (1990) among others (see
Marden & Hodgsen 1975).  Environmen-
tal impact [I] is conceptualized as a func-
tion of population characteristics [P],
patterns of consumption [A, for affluence]
and technology [T], the use and manipu-
lation of energy and other natural re-
sources.  This model has provided an
organizing framework for much of the
debate concerning population and the
environment. Neo-Malthusians emphasize
the significant influence of population
growth for environmental impact, while
“optimistic” perspectives give primary
importance to changes in technology and
social and economic organization in miti-
gating the effects of the other two factors.
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The model has been criticized for the in-
complete conceptualization of the causal
components and the lack of grounding in
social scientific theory.  Meyer and Turner
(1992:52) note that the model “. . . suffers
from the handicap of a mismatch between
its categories of driving forces (apart from
population) and the categories customar-
ily used in the social sciences.  Neither
“affluence” nor “technology” as defined
is associated with a substantial body of
social science theory; any bridges between
the IPAT and other approaches would
have to be built between these categories
and those better-conceptualized aspects of
behavior and social structure that may
drive and limit changes in production and
consumption.”  Demeny (1991:410-12)
comments on the implication of indepen-
dence among the three components of en-
vironmental impact and hence the lack of
conceptual attention to the ways in which
changes in population, consumption and
technology are interrelated.
The degree to which the population con-
cept is well specified or connected to so-
cial theory can also be contested: uses of
the model focus primarily on the increase
in population size without
conceptualization of the different sources
of population growth, for example, natu-
ral increase relative to net migration.  For
example, critical attention to the interre-
lationships among migration, patterns of
consumption, and shifts in technology is
not accommodated in the model; in gen-
eral, testable hypotheses about the effect
of population movements on social and
technological change are not derived from
the model.  Relatedly, the model frustrates
a dynamic perspective concerning the con-
sequences of changes in the factors over
time. Pragmatic considerations of short-
term versus long-term relationships are
not prominent in the theoretical discus-
sions.
In spite of these conceptual deficiencies,
however, the IPAT model has become an
important conceptual construct influenc-
ing general thinking about population-
environment relations.  Keyfitz (1993:547)
clarifies the strengths and weaknesses of
the general model and states the hypoth-
esis clearly:
If all else is equal, action
damaging the environment is
directly proportional to the
number of people.  That at least
seems the most appropriate initial
hypothesis.
Keyfitz provides examples of circum-
stances in which population has a more
than proportional effect on environmen-
tal change, that is, a 1 percent increase in
population results in more than 1 percent
change in some environmental character-
istic, for example, the stock of some natu-
ral resource; similarly, one can illustrate
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circumstances in which population growth
is associated with a less than proportional
environmental impact.  According to
Keyfitz, however, “(t)he burden of proof
is one anyone who argues against the
proportionality hypothesis in either way”
(1993: 547).
Population-
Environment
Models and
Migration
This discussion of general perspectives on
population and environment suggest that
an appropriate modification of theory is
the improvement of the ways in which
population processes and concepts are
specified.  For example, the effect of in-
migration on environmental change is
likely to be different from the effect of
above replacement fertility or of mortal-
ity decline, thus, using the vocabulary of
Keyfitz, immigration may have a differ-
ent level of proportionality than other
demographic processes.  Hence, results
specific to demographic behaviors (mor-
tality, fertility, and geographic mobility
and migration) will be relevant to differ-
ent policy responses.
Theoretical discussions of population-en-
vironment relationships vary in the de-
gree to which migration is critically con-
sidered.  For example, neo-Malthusian
perspectives give greater conceptual
prominence to the negative effects of ag-
gregate (positive) population growth and
hypothesize that any source of growth,
such as positive net migration, has nega-
tive consequences for the environment.
The application of these perspectives to
the United States, for example, leads to
conclusions about the negative effects of
alien immigration for preservation of re-
sources and environmental quality.   Not
surprisingly, more optimistic
conceptualizations draw the converse
hypothesis about the role of migration on
technological and environmental change
(see Simon 1990).  Fundamentally, how-
ever, the role of migration in environmen-
tal change derives directly from the
underlying conceptual model of popula-
tion-environmental dynamics:  the effect
of migration is specified on the basis of
its (positive) contribution to population
growth.
Among the recommendations of the Na-
tional Research Council Committee on the
Human Dimensions of Global Change was
the need to “. . . ’unpack’ broad concepts,
such as technological change, economic
growth, and population growth, that are
frequently offered as explanations of how
human activities cause global change”
(Stern, Young & Druckman 1992:97; see
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also Ness, Drake & Brechin 1993b:377-406).
Such recommendations hold particular
relevance for specifying the role of migra-
tion in environmental process and change.
For example, in a critique of perspectives
on population and the environment,
Hogan (1992:113-14) identifies, first, the
theoretical disadvantages of the concept
of aggregate population growth and, sec-
ond, the advantages of considering more
meaningful demographic processes:
But in all of these cases
[theoretical perspectives], with a
pure or moderated or even
inverted Mathusianism, what we
see is an emphasis on the volume
or growth rate of population.  The
refrain is always the race between
population and resources.  The
question of the population/
resource or population/
environment relation is reduced
to a unidimensional relation.  the
ways in which patterns of fertility,
morbidity, mortality, migration,
nuptiality, and age structure relate
to environ-mental change, have
received little attention.  What
seems to  have occurred, on the
one hand, is that for the Neo-
Malthusians, there is not reason
to go beyond this point; the
relation is clear, and the solution
obvious.  On the other hand, the
critics look for the causes of
environmental problems in other
processes.  It is as though
population growth causes
everything or population is
unimportant.
What is needed is an analysis of
the relationships of demographic
dynamics, in all their complexity,
with environmental change. . . .
An important starting point in
efforts to go beyond such
generalizations is to decompose
what we mean by “population
pressure” which has been nearly
universally understood to mean
excess numbers with clear
conclusions about policies to
reduce fertility rates.
Hogan’s observation about the derivation
of fertility policy proposals is increasingly
applicable to policy recommendations to
restrict or to promote immigration.  Such
proposals similarly derive from inherent
conceptualizations of the environmental
effects of aggregate population growth.
The theoretical necessity to disaggregate
the components of population growth in
order to specify the role of migration (or
any demographic behavior) in environ-
mental processes is reinforced by Mink
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(1992) in his discussion of the interrela-
tionships among population, development,
and the environment.  In reference to
developing countries, Mink identifies the
range of effects of migration on environ-
ment processes that are conditioned by
social and economic factors in both places
of origin and destination:
Migration often represents a
response to imbalances between
population levels and the capacity
of local environmental resources
to support them.  There are also
potent environmental impacts in
areas receiving the migration,
which will differ according to the
form the migration takes—
whether of individuals or
households, seasonal or
permanent, to frontiers or
established communities—and
which can either mitigate or
exacerbate the environmental
impact of population growth.
Some forms of episodic migration,
such as flight from political strife,
can expose environmental fragile
areas to massive population
increases . . . (Mink 1992:26-27).
Implicit in Mink’s discussion is both an
emphasis on the importance of shorter-
term effects of migration on developing
areas, particularly refugee migration, as
well as the importance of incorporating
causes and characteristics of migration
processes in studies of environmental
change.  Finally in their critical analysis
of population-environment perspectives,
Arizpe, Stone, and Major (1994:340) state:
Population must not be reified as
if the simple numbers of human
bodies were all that mattered.
From the standpoint of
population/environment analysis,
people are significant in terms of
what these humans do in a matrix
of social and environmental
interactions.  This means that
population must be understood as
a process of biological and social
reproduction whose components
are principally interactions.
Research must focus on these
interactions as the relate to the
three determinants of
population—fertility, mortality
and migration.
They emphasize the relevance of study
on the relationship between migration and
environmental change and the role of
gender and income inequality in migra-
tion processes and changing  environmen-
tal processes, such as patterns of
consumption, resource extraction, and
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waste production (Arizpe, Stone & Major
1994: 339-40).
Perspectives on the relationship between
global dimensions of urbanization do fo-
cus on the significance of migration as a
component of regional population growth
and redistribution (see Keyfitz 1991; Berry
1990; Detwyler 1971 ) but generally in the
form of regional rural-urban movements
and labor circulation.  Perspectives on
optimum city size, in contrast, grapple
with the effect of the aggregate concept,
urban population growth, on urban effi-
ciencies in accessibility of services and
resources, and urban environmental char-
acteristics, such as residential and indus-
trial density, air and water quality,
pollution, waste disposal, and sewage
processing.  Less attention is given to the
nature of the relationships between spe-
cific sources of urban growth, for example,
alien immigration versus internal migra-
tion, and social and environmental out-
comes in urban areas and metropolitan
regions, although issues of population ho-
mogeneity and urban problems have been
raised (see for example, Speare & White
1990, 1992; Fincher 1991; Murphy, et al.
1990; cf. Muller 1993:211-13).
Migration and
Global
Environmental
Change
The degree to which migration processes
are considered in conceptualizations of
population-environmental linkages is a
function of  both theoretical perspective
and geographic scale of analysis.  Perspec-
tives on global environmental change gen-
erally focus on overall population growth
without significant or specific attention to
component processes underlying patterns
and trends in geographic distribution (see,
for example, National Academy of Sci-
ences 1991; Ehrlich & Ehrlich 1990; Stern,
Young & Druckman 1992; Barry, Mather
& Sdasyuk 1991; Mathews 1991a; also
Royal Society of London and National
Academy of Sciences 1992).  Moreover,
models of global population change em-
phasize the implications of regional varia-
tions in population growth but tend to
obscure the role of international or inter-
regional migration in the global outlook
and regional trends (see Keyfitz 1991;
Demeny 1990; Goudie 1990; Smil 1990,
1991; Bongaarts 1992; also Coale 1975).  In
this sense, some contemporary perspec-
tives are reminiscent of earlier consider-
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ations of population growth for the envi-
ronment (see, for example, Turk, Turk &
Wittes 1972; Waldron & Ricklefs 1973;
Detwyler 1971a; cf. Dubos 1971; see also
Goudie 1990).
Perspectives on
U.S. Immigration
and the
Environment
Perspectives on the national and regional
environmental impacts of U.S. immigra-
tion similarly reflect underlying theoreti-
cal frameworks.  Simon (1990) has
emphasized the potential contributions to
human capital and the potential for tech-
nological innovation deriving from posi-
tive population growth in the United
States and alien immigration.  Short-run
costs of immigration are distinguished
from long-term benefits; age composition
of immigrants, rather than such charac-
teristics as national origin or education, is
considered the important policy issue rel-
evant for questions of immigration im-
pacts.  Ehrlich and Ehrlich (1992), in
contrast, have used the IPAT model to
illustrate the degree to which the United
States is over populated and the need to
constrain population growth.  These au-
thors recognize both the long-term ben-
efit of reducing levels of fertility as well
as the political and sociological difficul-
ties in recommending the cessation of
immigration as a route to stationary (zero)
population growth (Ehrlich & Ehrlich
1992:130-31).
Most neo-Malthusian perspectives on the
environment, however, generally highlight
the role of alien immigration in U.S. popu-
lation growth and often focus on the con-
tribution to future growth resulting from
the descendants of current immigrant
streams (see for example, Bouvier 1991,
1992). The results from these studies, of-
ten population projections, present images
of unending population growth deriving
from the rising demand for immigration
within developing countries and positive
annual levels of permanent immigrant ad-
ditions.  Inherent in these perspectives are
critical conceptual and analytic issues con-
cerning immigration and population
growth.  For example, there is contention
over appropriate approaches to conceptu-
alizing the source of population growth
resulting from international migration in
annual measures of population growth as
well as in population projections.  Inter-
pretations of population projections must
also be resolved with results of formal de-
mographic studies of the relationship be-
tween annual immigration and the
achievement of a national stationary popu-
lation.
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Conceptual Issues
Emerging from
Models of
Population-
Environmental
Change
Several analytic issues emerge from this
review of the conceptualization of migra-
tion in population-environment models.
Very fundamentally, the conceptu-alization
of immigration as a component of popu-
lation growth must be revisited.  Second,
both geographic level of analysis or geo-
graphic scale and temporal reference, for
example, short-term or long-term, must
be specified in theoretical models and,
ultimately, in empirical research.  The ef-
fects of immigration on environmental
processes may be expected to be signifi-
cantly different for metropolitan areas,
rural communities, and states.  Similarly,
the setting of policy goals regarding im-
migration and the environment and the
process of policy evaluation require ex-
plicit time frames for analysis and assess-
ment.  A third analytic issue is the
importance of understanding linkages or
connections among geographic areas, eco-
nomic sectors, and through time.  For
example, the concentration of immigra-
tion in certain metropolitan areas in the
United States may have environmental
consequences for areas and natural re-
sources geographically removed from the
cities.
Immigration as a Component of Popula-
tion Growth
There is not consensus among demogra-
phers concerning the most appropriate
approach to conceptualizing, and hence
measuring, the proportion of population
growth due to migration or the role of
immigration in future population growth.
For example, partitioning annual popula-
tion growth among demographic compo-
nents to yield the proportions (in percents)
of growth due to immigration ignores the
overall level of population growth and
also assumes all sources of population
change are measurable (see pages 57-59
below).  Warren (1994b) suggests the com-
parison of annual immigration to total
additions to the population, that is, immi-
grants and births is a more appropriate
approach to thinking about immigration’s
contribution to population growth (see
also Keely 1974).  Weeks (1992 ) advo-
cates the migration ratio: net migration as
a proportion of natural increase, (births
minus deaths) for areas.  Simon (1990)
argues for the use of the ratio between
either the flow of immigration (immigra-
tion admissions or arrivals) or the stock
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of immigrants (such as the foreign-born
population) to the residential population
in a given year as a gauge of immigration
of both demographic and social impact.
Similarly, there are differing approaches
to conceptualizing the impact of immigra-
tion on future population growth in both
the short and long-run. Population pro-
jections simulate future patterns of popu-
lation growth by making assumptions
about  changes in behavioral patterns of
demographic processes (mortality, fertil-
ity, and migration), by age and sex, and
often by other social demographic char-
acteristics such as race and rural or urban
residence.  The effect of the demographic
components of growth on future popula-
tion size and structure (age and sex com-
position) is shown by comparing the
results of different projection series in
which different assumption are modelled.
For example, the U.S. Census Bureau con-
ducts population projections assuming the
continuation of current levels of net im-
migration (see page 59 below) and projec-
tions assuming zero net immigration.
Problems in interpreting the results of
population projections concerning the con-
tribution of immigration population
growth have been discussed by demogra-
phers (see, for example, Edmonston &
Passel 1992; Keely & Kraly 1978; Kraly
1981).  A fundamental issue concerns the
choice of reference data for measuring the
demographic impact  of immigration:
nearly 100 percent of U.S. population
growth since 1790 has resulted from im-
migration and the descendants of immi-
grants.  There are empirical difficulties in
developing assumptions about fertility
among first and subsequent generations
of immigrants.  Further, emigration is
often not modelled as an age specific pro-
pensity, but is subsumed with a concept
of net immigration.  Given the wide use
made of population projections in discus-
sions of U.S. immigration policy issues, it
is critical that conceptual issues in both
approaches to modelling and in the inter-
pretations of results be clearly set out.
Similarly the results of formal demo-
graphic analysis of immigration and popu-
lation growth should be incorporated into
models of population and environment.
As mentioned above, there is a solid body
of demographic theory that has revealed
the relationship between positive immi-
gration and the achievement of popula-
tion stabilization at zero annual growth,
that is, a stationary population (Keyfitz
1971; Coale 1972; Pollard 1973;
Espenshade, Bouvier & Arthur 1982; Mitra
1983; Espenshade 1986; Feichtinger &
Steinman 1992).  A stationary population
is consistent with annual immigration
given fertility at replacement or below
replacement levels.  The ultimate size of
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the population is a function of the level of
fertility and mortality, annual levels of
immigration, and the age composition of
immigrants.  These results suggests the
importance of better understanding de-
mographic characteristics of immigrants,
specifically fertility and age characteris-
tics, in order to interpret more effectively
results of models of immigration, popula-
tion growth.
Geographic Scale and Temporal
Specification
Geographic scale is a critical conceptual
and analytic dimension of contemporary
perspectives on population and environ-
ment.  The importance of considering the
role of demographic processes in environ-
mental change on regional and local scales
of analysis is increasingly emphasized in
literature on the relationship between eco-
nomic development and the environment
in less developed countries (see, for ex-
ample, Arizpe, Stone, and Major 1994;
Mink 1992; Ogata 1989:48; United Nations
Secretariat 1991; Glaser 1980; Milliman
1992; Huguet 1992).   Mink (1992:13), for
example, calls for both spatial and tem-
poral specification:
The impact of population
intervenes along three main
dimensions: its scale in relation to
the resource base, its rate of
growth, and its redistribution
across resources through
migration.  Population’s impact on
the environment is critical in some
countries or regions within
countries, but is less important in
others.  Moreover, the three
dimensions will not be equally
important for the environment in
different places and points in time.
Thus, assessments of population’s
impact on the environment, and
the appropriateness of addressing
such impact through direct
population interventions, need to
take local circumstances into
account.
In reflecting on the study of environmen-
tal processes among island ecosystems,
Glaser (1980:9) offers a very clear state-
ment on the “limitations of global synthe-
sis” in the study of population and the
environment:
The population/resource/
environment situation differs from
country to country and varies
even from area to area within
most countries, in particular the
larger ones. The problems of
assessing population/resource
ratios, and of defining measures
for their beneficial adjustment,
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must be tackled on a
disaggregated and areal basis.  In
fact, there seems to be a need for
almost every country to develop
a p o p u l a t i o n / r e s o u r c e s
environment model for its
particular national situation for its
major geographic subdivisions.
Bilsborrow (1992) argues for local and
regional studies as opposed to cross-coun-
try analysis  on the basis of principles of
research design and the analytic goal to
move beyond descriptive studies of
covariation to conclusions concerning
causal processes:
While cross-country-level data
have the appeal of generaliza-
bility, there are important reasons
for focusing research efforts at the
individual country level.  One is
the much greater possibility of
controlling for other factors that
influence demographic and
environmental change, such as
national resource endowment,
climate and topography; soil
quality; transportation linkages to
markets and cities and availability
of off-farm employment; access to
family planning, health and
education facilities; . . . and
national and local government
policies relating directly to the
environment, such as restrictions
against tree cutting, cost of logging
concessions, and protection of
parks and nature reserves.  All of
these factors, and undoubtedly
others, may influence
demographic processes,
agricultural and land use change,
and environmental degradation in
rural areas.
A second reason for preferring
within-country studies is that
aggregate country-level data
cannot relate well (differences in)
natural resources trends to
(differences in) demographic
variables.  If it were true that
countries with faster rates of
population growth appeared to be
experiencing faster rates of forest
loss, this would not necessarily
mean that the two are related,
particularly from the production
or supply side, as per the focus in
this paper.  One would need to
see if those areas within the
country experiencing forest loss
are also the areas experiencing
population growth (in-migration).
This can only be addressed at the
country level . . . (Bilsborrow
1992:144-45)
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Critical perspectives on the concept of
carrying capacity further underscore the
need to relate population and environmen-
tal processes on local and regional scales
defined most appropriately by ecological
analysis (see Bayliss-Smith 1980; Glaser
1980; Brookfield 1980;  McCall 1985; Tal-
bot 1986; Santos 1990:39-40,75-76; see also
McConnell 1991).  Carrying capacity is the
size of population that can be supported
by the resources of an ecological system.
In human population, the concept must
be understood to be dynamic, that is, open
to change through technological and so-
cial factors.  Hogan argues for the value
of the concept of carrying capacity in or-
der to relate demographic processes, re-
sources, environmental trends,
technological change, and patterns of pro-
duction and consumption within specific
regions:
The value of the concept of
carrying capacity is that it should
direct our attention to specific
ecosystems, exploited with
specific technologies, to produce
a specific standard of living.  Here
one may meaningfully relate
population pressure to
environmental degradation.
(Hogan 1992:116)
Because carrying capacity is altered by
technological and institutional change, the
conceptual framework requires the speci-
fication of the temporal context for analy-
sis.  Hence, the short-term outcomes of
migration for environmental change may
be conceptualized quite differently for
places and regions in comparisons to
models with longer-term time horizons in
which feedback between migration and
social and technological change may be
envisioned (cf. Simon 1990:188-92).  A
useful discussion of  issues in the inter-
pretation of the concept of carrying ca-
pacity is provided by Cater and Goodall
(1992:312-13) who consider carrying ca-
pacity within specific destinations for tour-
ists in Australia (see also Bayliss-Smith
1980; Huguet 1992:388).  Because of the
relatively short-term impact of increas-
ingly large numbers of certain types of
international migrants—tourists, business
persons, students—in selected places in
the United States, it may also be useful to
explore the use of the concept of carrying
capacity in relationship to the demo-
graphic notion of “person-years” of im-
pact (K. Woodrow 199 ).
Meyer and Turner summarize these issues
of scale concerning perspectives on popu-
lation and the environment and also with
relevance to conceptual models and re-
search design:  “Comparative assessments
assume that if population is a key driver
of environmental change, then the pres-
sures of population (e.g. density) should
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closely match the magnitude of various
kinds of environmental change across re-
gions and locales” (Meyer & Turner
1992:53).
Spatial, Sectoral, and Temporal Linkages
Finally, there is emerging emphasis on the
significance of linkages across geographic
scale and among regions that holds theo-
retical potential for informing conceptual
models of the relationships between mi-
gration and environmental processes.  The
published results of interdisciplinary sym-
posium, The Earth As Transformed by Hu-
man Action (see Turner, et al. 1990)
address conceptual issues concerning in-
terregional and intersectoral linkages by
disentangling, both conceptually and em-
pirically, the temporal and spatial patterns
of the effects of human society on global
and regional environmental processes at
different scales.  In this regard, Merchant
(1990) provides critical insight to the char-
acteristics and limitations of models of
society-environment interactions.  Again,
however, the role of interregional and in-
ternational population movement in pro-
cesses of transformation in selected
regions is not highlighted either in theory
or application (see, for example, Ezcurra
1990).
Emphasis on linkages among regions and
across geographic scales is often matched
with attention to the dynamic dimensions
of societal and environmental processes.
For example, the University of Michigan
Population-Environment Dynamics Pro-
ject (Ness, Drake & Brechin 1993b) has
emphasized the need for interdisciplinary
study of human-environmental interaction
and for theoretical refinement of general
models of environmental impact (cf.
Ehrlich & Ehrlich 1990).  Transitional
analysis, that is, interaction among pro-
cesses of change, is underscored (cf. Lutz
1994:63; United Nations Secretariat
1991:58).  Drake (1993) identifies several
areas of global transition which charac-
terize population-environmental dynam-
ics including the demographic transition,
epidemiological transition, and the urban-
ization transition.  While trends in inter-
national labor and refugee movements are
noticeably absent from this
conceptualization, the framework is con-
ducive to similar consideration of the
prominence of international population
movements in regional and global dynam-
ics.  The importance of determining the
degree of synchrony in rate of change in
transitions is particularly salient for the
analysis of the role of international mi-
gration in social and environmental change
in the United States (Drake 1993:334-48).
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It is interesting to note that studies that
place theoretical emphasis on the linkages
between developed and developing coun-
tries and increasing international integra-
tion among economic sectors vary widely
in the attention given to international
migration.  Some perspectives do not
explicitly consider the role of  international
migration and population circulation as
an important dimension of  global and
interregional economic relationships (see,
for example, Bowlby & Mannion 1992:332;
Contanza 1992; Cater & Goodall 1992:320;
Sadik 1989:4,5; cf. Berreby 1994:49).  Other
perspectives on economic development in
developing countries emphasize the im-
portance of international and interregional
labor migration in economic change in
both send-ing and receiving societies and
in trends toward increasing global eco-
nomic integration and interconnectedness
(see, for example, Massey, et al. 1987, 1993;
Massey 1988; Castles & Miller 1993; Bailey
& Ellis 1993; see also Simon 1990:274-76).
Perspectives on the role of the United
States in global environmental protection
place emphasis on the significance of the
United States in global economic integra-
tion, international trade, and the poten-
tial for sustainable development in
southern regions (Ridker 1975; Keyfitz
1991; Cooper 1991; Sadik 1989:4,5).  The
relationship between U.S. foreign policy
and migration pressures in developing
countries has also received increasing ana-
lytic attention (see, for example, Tucker,
Keely & Wrigley 1990; Loescher & Scanlan
1986; Teitelbaum & Weiner, forthcoming).
Absent from these discussions, for the
most part, is explicit conceptualization of
the role of U.S. immigration policy as an
agent of global and regional environmen-
tal change.  Ehrlich and Ehrlich (1992:331)
do relate issues of brain drain to the ac-
quisition by immigrants of patterns of con-
sumption associated with U.S. lifestyles:
“. . . even though immigration to the
United States does not produce a net in-
crement to the global population, it does
produce a net increment in total environ-
mental impact.”
There is a need for additional thinking
about the role of international migration
and, specifically, immigration to the
United States on patterns of environmen-
tal change in both sending and receiving
communities.  The role of environmental
degradation in serving as a stimulus to
out-migration from agricultural areas,
rapid urbanization in developing coun-
tries, and international migration is receiv-
ing increasing attention (see for example,
Myers 1991; M. Schwartz, 199 ).  The role
of U.S. immigration policy and patterns
in these processes is an area of needed
theoretical development.
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Implications for
Theoretical
Research on U.S.
Immigration and
the Environment
This wide-ranging discussion of perspec-
tives on population, migration, and the
environment suggests several areas of
needed scholarship, the most fundamen-
tal of which is the need to revise models
of environmental change and impact to
incorporate more effectively concepts of
migration.  Of particular relevance for the
United States, moreover, is the specifica-
tion of effects for different types of inter-
national population movements
(permanent resettlement, refugee migra-
tion, temporary labor migration, and tour-
ism) within theories of environmental
impact.
Recommendations for Theoretical
Research
1.  General models of environmental
change and impact should be reformulated
to specify the role of migration and, spe-
cifically, international migration in pro-
cesses of population growth, consumption
and production, and technological change.
a. Hypotheses concerning the short-
and long-run effects of migration
processes for these relationships
and environmental outcomes
should also be derived.
b. The reformulation of theoretical
models should also recognize the
importance of geographic scale for
both scientific analysis and policy
and program development.
c. Attention should be given to the
dynamic relationships among
sources of population growth and
social, economic, and technologi-
cal change.
d. The relevance of intersectoral link-
ages, illustrated, for example, in
the global division of labor in
manufacturing, for environmental
process at different scales of anal-
ysis should be investigated.
2.  Specific theoretical research should be
devoted to conceptualizing the role of
international migration as an agent of
change in environmental-related processes:
technological change, and the promotion
of shifting patterns of consumption and
production within both countries of ori-
gin and destination.  As emphasized
above, conceptual models should consider
these relationships specific to major types
of international migration and mobility.
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a. The environmental consequences
of immigration should be speci-
fied within economic sectors, as
well as among geographic areas;
for example, the environmental
implications of the relationship
between international migration
and changes in agricultural prac-
tices in countries of origin and
countries of destination should be
conceptualized, as well as the en-
vironmental consequences of re-
lationships between labor migra-
tion associated with the spatial
and technological reorganization
of manufacturing.
3.  Theoretical research should be under-
taken to conceptualize immigration as a
component of population dynamics at
different scales of geographic analysis.
a. A critical assessment of approach-
es to measuring sources of popu-
lation growth in relationship to
different models of environmen-
tal change should be initiated.
4.  Theoretical attention is needed con-
cerning the concepts of urban efficiency
and scale in relationship to environmen-
tal quality, available resources, and pat-
terns of urban and metropolitan spatial
growth.  These concepts should be related
to sources of population growth as out-
lined in previous recommendations.
EMPIRICAL
RESEARCH
CONCERNING
MIGRATION AND
ENVIRONMENTAL
PROCESSES AND
CHANGE
Introduction
Deep analytic traditions exist in western
social science for conceptualizing and
measuring the consequences of interna-
tional migration for national society,
economy, polity, and for interregional
migration for local communities.  Schol-
arly interest in the environmental conse-
quences of immigration, certainly, in the
case of the United States, has a much more
shallow history, originating in the late
1960s with environmental concern over
national population growth and the role
of annual alien immigration in paths to
population stabilization (see Coale 1972;
U.S. Commission on Population Growth
and the American Future 1972; see also
Keely & Kraly 1978).  Complementary to
these concerns is demographic interest in
the historical contribution of immigration
to national population growth (see Gibson
1975; Keely 1974).
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As described above, there is current in-
terest in the environmental implications
of immigration for regions, states, and
local communities in the United States.
Most research, however, tends to focus
either on population growth and trends
in immigration, i.e., the independent vari-
ables, or on environmental processes and
problems, the dependent variables.  There
exists very little direct causal analysis of
relationships among population, immigra-
tion, and environment in the United States.
Sparse empirical attention has been given,
for example, to the unique effect of immi-
gration in studies of subnational popula-
tion dynamics.  Similarly, the role of
immigration status, nativity, and ethnicity
in analyses of consumption and produc-
tion remains to be fully specified and
empirically evaluated.  For example, com-
parison of patterns of energy consump-
tion, commuting, land use patterns, and
water conservation practices between for-
eign and native born, among immigrant
cohorts and generations, and among
groups of immigrants would add to dis-
cussions of the environmental conse-
quences of immigration.  Similarly,
analyses of the significance of immigra-
tion status relative to social and economic
characteristics for levels and patterns of
consumption should be undertaken.
Because of the relative absence of empiri-
cal studies concerning the environmental
consequences of U.S. immigration and,
generally, international migration to and
from the United States, we have looked
broadly at the research literature for em-
pirical studies that are relevant for inform-
ing the development of a national research
agenda.  This review has taken us to sci-
entific areas that at first glance do not
appear highly relevant for framing stud-
ies on U.S. immigration and the environ-
ment.  The selected areas of research do,
however, illustrate salient issues in
conceptualization, research design and
analysis, and interpretation of findings.
It should also be acknowledged that com-
parative research on the implications of
trends in international migration and
mobility has not given prominent atten-
tion to the environmental consequences
of population movements in comparison
to issues concerning economic and devel-
opment processes, social integration and
immigrant adjustment, and foreign rela-
tions (see, for example, Vernez 1990; de la
Garza, Rodriguez & Pachon 1990; Massey,
et al. 1987; Appleyard 1992; Tucker, Keely
& Wrigley 1990; Kritz, Lim & Zlotnik 1992;
Kritz & Keely 1983; Kubat 1993; Elliott
1989; Zolberg, Suhrke & Aguayo 1989).
There is empirical research, most often
field studies, however, concerning the
converse relationship, that is, the contri-
bution of environmental degradation and
crisis to patterns of migration.  Studies of
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environmental refugees acknowledge the
economic and political dimensions of pov-
erty in tandem with population growth in
the erosion of local and regional environ-
mental conditions that then result in out-
migration.  Environmental refugee move-
ments thus emerge from changes in land
use and land degradation associated with
shifts in agricultural organization, such as
farm ownership and land tenure systems,
and such patterns of production, as single
versus multiple cropping (see, for ex-
ample, Catanese 1990-91; Tamondong-
Helin & Helin 1990-91; Jacobsen 1988;
Purcell 1991; Appleyard 1992; Sadik 1989;
Talbot 1986; World Resources Institute
1994-95; Zolberg, Suhrke & Aguayo
1989:103-25).  Studies of the relationship
between natural disasters and migration
and population displacement similarly re-
veal the role of social and economic fac-
tors in mediating the differential effects
of natural calamities for local and regional
populations and communities (see, for ex-
ample, Clarke et. al. 1989).  Research has
also addressed the role of environmental
factors such as groundwater use in popu-
lation dynamics and community sustain-
ability (see White 1994).
Research on
Regional and
Local Population-
Environmental
Dynamics
Commenting on research concerning eco-
nomic development in rural areas of de-
veloping societies, the United Nations
Secretariat (1991:65) makes an important
observation about the relationship be-
tween population processes and land deg-
radation, relevant for empirical research
concerning population, migration, and the
environment:
While the outlines of this
environmentally destructive
interaction between growing
populations and land degradation
are clear, the magnitude of the
problems, their geographical
distribution and their causes
remain unclear.  These ambiguities
must be investigated analytically
if Governments are to address
these environmental problems in
an effective way.
R E S E A R C H
P A P E R
- 24 -
U.S.  C O M M I S S I O N  O N  I M M I G R A T I O N  R E F O R M
There are, however, empirical studies of
the interrelationships among population,
migration and environmental processes
that transcend the analytic problems iden-
tified by the UN above.  For example,
Arizpe, Stone, and Major (1994) have
sought to synthesize important empirical
research on population and environment
in developing socieites. Their critical
analysis of existing research serves to in-
form the development of conceptual mod-
els of population, migration, and the
environment, as well as appropriate re-
search design and data requirements (see
also Palloni 1994).  Among their conclu-
sions is the need for continued research
on the connections between population
and environmental processes within local
and regional contexts (Arizpe, Stone &
Major 1994:8-9; see also Lutz 1994:63).
For example, in a series of papers,
Bilsborrow and his colleagues have ex-
plicitly established goals to conceptualize
and measure relationships between demo-
graphic processes, notably migration, en-
vironmental outcomes, and agricultural
practices in particular (see Bilsborrow &
Geores 1994; Bilsborrow 1992; Bilsborrow
& Stupp 1989; Bilsbor-row & DeLargy
1991).  Bilsborrow’s conceptual model of
land extensification in developing societ-
ies, shown in Figure 1, specifies the na-
ture of the relationships among population
growth and trends in land and resource
use, change in land use and agricultural
practices, migration, and environmental
degradation.  While the model might be
criticized for the omission of other factors
influencing land use change, such as na-
tional agricultural and food policies and
urban-directed development programs,
the empirical research to test the model is
significant in measuring the structural and
behavioral linkages among social pro-
cesses and environmental change and, as
a result, providing a basis for causal ex-
planation and theoretical development.
Bilsborrow (1992:145-46) also emphasizes
the necessity of measuring changes in
these processes over time and the value
of survey methodology to identify micro-
level relationships:
A number of other scholarly
studies have used individual
country data on changes over
time, sub-national data, to study
relevant population-migration-
environment linkages, but few
identified specific mechanisms by
which population factors cause
environmental change. . . . I
believe we came close to doing
this in a study of Guatemala . . .
linking rural population growth to
land fragmentation and out-
migration, but the subsequent link
from household to deforestation
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is more circumstantial.  For this
reason I am proposing a
household survey in areas of both
in-migration and out-migration in
rural Ecuador to examine this
possible linkage.  This is necessary
to determine where the migrants
come from and why, how they
acquire land, and what they are
doing with it, including past and
present forest-clearing practices.
Interestingly, in a study of the environ-
mental consequences of rural out-migra-
tion in Nepal, Thapa (1993) implements
several of these analytic recommendations.
Thapa utilizes a household survey to
measure directly the relationships between
household characteristics, agricultural
practices, migration patterns, patterns of
consumption and remittances, and water-
shed management practices.  The augmen-
tation of household income through
remittances did not promote watershed
conservation that were devoted primarily
to meeting basic household needs; instead,
emigration in the study areas was found
to be associated with watershed degrada-
tion resulting from insufficient labor avail-
able for land management and the reliance
on pooled labor and economic resources.
Similar analytic strengths are evident in
research by Young (1985) and Talbot (1986)
that considers migration processes in the
form of settlement schemes in Africa.
Young studies the environmental conse-
quences of refugee settlement programs
in Somalia by collecting detailed data on
the agricultural and domestic practices of
refugee households in relationship to mea-
surable environmental outcomes: changes
in grazing, vegetation, erosion, and soil
quality; trends in irrigation and saliniza-
tion; and loss of forest resources.  Included
in the analysis is information on environ-
mental conditions in the selected regions
prior to the refugee agricultural program,
as well as documentation of trends in ag-
ricultural practices and environmental out-
comes.  In a similar fashion, Talbot (1986)
studies the social and environmental ef-
fects of population growth in rangeland
areas in east Africa.  Changes in popula-
tion size among the Maasai are related to
resources, primarily livestock, necessary
to support traditional ways of life.  Bal-
ance between demographic and social
structure and natural resources has been
disrupted in large part by forces external
to Maasai society and include population
growth among agricultural groups, devel-
opment programs concerning settlement
of pastoralists, and environmental degra-
dation associated with agricultural change.
A similar framework and approach is fol-
lowed by McCall (1985) in his detailed
analysis of the environmental effects of
villagization programs in Tanzania.  Like
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Bilsborrow, McCall raises important ana-
lytic issues concerning the empirical basis
for interpreting relationships between such
social demographic processes as resettle-
ment and environmental degradation in
this region of Africa.  His conclusions
(1985:139) are provocative: “. . . villages
are here to stay and there can be no solu-
tion which involves eliminating them.  The
[environmental] impacts emphasized have
been mainly the negative ones; there are
of course positive effects on services, in-
formation and accessibility.  A full evalu-
ation would also have to address the
methodological problem of comparing
‘with and without’—what direction would
rural development have taken in the past
decade without villagization?”
Research on
Environmental
Outcomes
Environmental research that focuses on di-
rect measurement of environmental pro-
cesses and quality is often characterized
by indirect or cursory measurement of
population and social processes that are
often presented initially as causes of envi-
ronmental change (see Keough & Quinn
1991:539-41).  For example, research in
Japan (Bower & Takao 1993) has docu-
mented patterns of land reclamation in
Tokyo Bay and the implications for coastal
resources and environmental quality.
Causes of land use change include trends
in urbanization and migration, industrial-
ization, dredging technology, and politi-
cal organization among fishing
cooperatives.  The analytic focus of the
research, however, concerns the analysis
of environmental outcomes, not the speci-
fication and measurement of the relation-
ships among causal influences or between
social and demographic causes and envi-
ronmental effects.  In a similar fashion,
Tamura (1993) hypothesizes about the ef-
fects of urbanization, economic develop-
ment, and innovations in earthwork
technology on residential development in
hill regions in Japan but measures envi-
ronmental processes not causal relation-
ships.
Environmental research concerning coastal
zones and marine systems almost uni-
formly identifies population growth, mi-
gration, and temporary population
movements (tourism) as ultimate causes
of environmental degradation.  In their
study of fresh and waster water discharge
along the California coast, Griggs and
McCrory (1975) identify population
growth as the fundamental cause of pol-
lution in nearshore marine environments.
The empirical substance of the study,
however, is the analysis of the spatial
variation in volume and composition of
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nearshore water discharge rather than an
analysis of causal effects of demographic
and economic factors.  Linden (1990) dis-
cusses the complex interactions among
social, political, economic, and demo-
graphic factors in relationship to environ-
mental processes in tropical coastal zones,
but presents detailed documentation only
for the environmental problems observed
in specific coastal regions.  Using a more
explicit model of spatial covariation, Saliba
(1990) similarly emphasizes the impact of
tourism, industrial activity, and agricul-
tural practices for land use change and
environmental problems in Mediterranean
coastal areas.
Finally, an excellent collection of papers
by marine scientists concerning human
impacts on the seafloor emphasizes pat-
terns of global and regional social, eco-
nomic and demographic change as
potential causes of environmental degra-
dation of the deep ocean floor (see Hsu &
Theide 1992).  Aggregate world popula-
tion growth, trends in migration to coastal
areas, and patterns of consumption and
economic activity are identified as ulti-
mate causes of marine environmental
change (see Milliman 1992; Bunt 1992: 229;
Vadus, Bregman & Takahashi 1992).  For
example, in a summary group statement,
Burnett (1992:245) reports:
Pressures caused by exponential
population growth over the past
several decades have resulted in
two great needs which will affect
human interaction with the deep
ocean: (a) demands for additional
resources; and (b) localities for
waste disposal.  Although large-
scale deep ocean mining and solid
waste disposal are not presently
occurring, depletion of land
resources and environmental
damage on land require that we
give consideration to future use
of the seafloor as a course of
minerals and as a repository for
anthropogenic wastes.
The focus of the analysis, however, is the
documentation of available data concern-
ing the characteristics and patterns of
change in deep ocean environments and
the delineation of information needs for
monitoring change.
Urbanization and
Environmental
Issues
There is extensive research on the rela-
tionship between patterns of urban popu-
lation growth and urban and metropolitan
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environmental problems in both devel-
oped and developing nations.  In not all
studies of urbanization, however, is the
role of urbanward migration considered
separately from natural increase.  Speare
and White (1992:91) examine the concept
of optimum city size given environmental
criteria and specify the nature of the rela-
tionship between city size and environ-
mental quality by identifying the effect of
two concepts, population density and
homogeneity:
Smaller cities have two
advantages in dealing with the
environment. First, because of
smaller size and typically lower
density, they have less
concentration of pollutants to deal
with, other things being equal.
Second, because they have a
smaller and often more
homogeneous population, they
may have an easier time
mobilizing support for programs
to regulate and reduce pollution.
The role of migration is considered only
indirectly through concepts of urban popu-
lation growth and racial and ethnic com-
position.  Moreover, while the nature,
extent, and trends in urban environmen-
tal problems are often documented, the
causal relationships between population
growth and environmental outcome are
not empirically tested and established (see
Milne 1988; Sarre & Smith 1991; Huguet
1992:388-90).
Increasing research is being conducted
concerning the consequences of immigra-
tion for metropolitan and regional growth
patterns in the United States (see Frey
1994; McHugh 1994; Kraly & Hildebrandt
1993; cf. Frey & Speare 1992).  Scientific
assessment of the effects of immigration
for cities and regions has focused on spe-
cific infrastructural effects and relation-
ships (see Clarke, et al. 1994; Fix & Passel
1994; Vernez 1993).  Studies that seek to
address environmental consequences of
immigration for urban areas, however, are
often plagued with the analytical prob-
lems described above:  patterns of popu-
lation growth and immigration are
observed to covary with environmental
outcomes, while causal relationships are
not directly tested.  To illustrate, in a study
of the sources and distribution of popula-
tion growth in California, Goodenough
(1992:124) states:  “[i]n the last decade one-
quarter of the US population growth has
occurred in the state, generating problems
in school provision, transportation, air and
water quality and agricultural land con-
version.”  The author interprets shifts in
commuting patterns as a response of na-
tive residents to intrametropolitan pres-
sures and problems.  No direct data on
residential choice or commuting behav-
ior, however, are presented.
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Research on
Immigration and
the Environment
in Australia
A final body of scholarship that is directly
relevant for framing research questions
concerning U.S. immigration and the en-
vironment derives from Australia.  De-
bates strikingly similar to those emerging
in the United States (see Jones 1992:362)
circle around the degree to which immi-
gration to Australia should be manipu-
lated in order to achieve national
environmental goals and maintain natu-
ral capital, relative to such other sources
of environmental impact as internal popu-
lation movements, temporary and sea-
sonal international migration, market
forces, patterns of consumption, techno-
logical change, etc.  Recent government
response to increasing public concern
about environmental issues in Australia
has emerged in the form of goals con-
cerning “ecologically sustainable develop-
ment.”  Moreover, according to the
National Population Council (1991:x), a
group appointed by the Prime Minister to
assess the implications of population
growth, immigration is considered the
essential component in the development
of a national population policy for Aus-
tralia.  Correspondingly, government
sponsored research has been initiated to
assess the effect of population growth,
hence, levels of immigration, on the “eco-
logical integrity” of Australia, its sparsely
populated regions (Clarke, et al. 1990) and
metropolitan areas (Murphy, et al. 1990;
see also National Population Council 1991;
Nieuwenhuysen 1992).
Fincher (1991) has synthesized these and
other research findings concerning the
relationships among immigration, popu-
lation, and environmental processes and
issues in Australia.   Consistent with the
discussion above, she underscores concep-
tual, analytic, and data difficulties inher-
ent in the available empirical research
concerning these relationships.  For ex-
ample, research on optimum city size
struggles with the identification of justifi-
able criteria for determining thresholds in
population associated with environmen-
tal damage.  On the one hand, immigra-
tion to Australia is clearly associated with
the centralization of the population in
metropolitan areas.  On the other, the
hypothesis that immigration results in in-
creased suburbanization and, hence, de-
centralization of population within
metropolitan areas has yet to be effectively
tested through either survey research con-
cerning residential choice or analysis of
trends in the supply of and demand for
housing and service infrastructure
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throughout metropolitan areas (see
Murphy, et al. 1990).  In this regard,
Fincher (1991:33) observes that “[i]f refu-
gees, for example, require public housing,
then the public and private rental market
nearby may suffer.  If wealthier business
migrants bid up housing prices in certain
localities others may be not longer able to
afford housing there.  Indeed the degree
to which immigrants’ arrival ‘pushes’ oth-
ers to the urban fringe by bidding up
house prices further in, or by taking up
scarce public and private rental housing,
is unclear.”  Hence, both patterns of im-
migrant settlement and the degree of
variation in characteristics of  immigrant
groups also prompts Fincher to note the
importance of conducting local and re-
gional analysis of the impacts of immi-
gration on urban infrastructure in
Australia cities.
The available research on energy and
water consumption in Australian cities has
yet to measure directly the effects of ur-
ban population growth and immigration.
Fincher (1991) identifies the multiple
causes of air pollution and increases in
the demand for water.  For example, the
lack of clear evidence on the connection
between immigration and residential re-
location to the fringes of metropolitan
areas erodes conclusions about the gen-
eral relationship between immigration and
automobile energy use (Murphy, et al.
1990:163).
The role of immigration in environmental
degradation in nonmetropolitan environ-
ments in Australia has been considered
by Clarke, et al. (1990) and Flannery (1992)
among others (see also Blaikie &
Brookfield 1987).  Clarke, et al. (1990) place
the analysis of environmental issues in
both agricultural practices and ecologically
fragile environments in Australia, first, in
historical context and, second, within a
framework of international and regional
economic relationships.  For example, in
assessing the relation of Australian popu-
lation growth to agricultural sustainability,
it is important to reveal the connection
between agricultural practices and produc-
tion for export markets.  The relationships
between international trade and stock of
natural resources must also be considered.
Similarly, these issues are also relevant for
the analysis of the implications of tourist
migration to remote and/or fragile envi-
ronments throughout Australia.
Whether those tourists are
Australian-born or not, or whether
they are attracted here because
they are friends of recent
immigrants, seems rather a trivial
point.  The importance of
wilderness areas to our growing
tourist industry, a  further use of
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our resources for economic
growth, is undeniable. . . .
Curtailing the immigrant intake of
permanent settlers would not stop
this.  But there is cause to examine
the impact on these sites of the
growing number tourists and
temporary visitors. (Fincher
1991:44)
Coming somewhat full circle, Fincher’s
perspectives also reveal the conceptual
and analytic importance of developing
more refined specification of demographic
sources of environmental impact.
Implications for
Empirical
Research on the
Relationship
between U.S.
Immigration and
the Environment
As shown here, very little direct research
has been initiated concerning the relation-
ships between U.S. immigration and the
environment, a situation that is not un-
common in other major immigrant receiv-
ing countries (cf. Canada Employment and
Immigration Advisory Council 1991; Na-
tional Population Council 1991).  Perspec-
tives on U.S. immigration and
environmental processes remain largely on
the conceptual, if not rhetorical, level of
analysis, with results of demographic
models translated into environmental
outcomes concerning resources availabil-
ity and environmental quality (see, for
example, Pimental & Pimental 1992; cf.
Parkes & Dennis 1993).  In this regard,
population-environmental research in the
United States lacks precise or explicit
specification of relationships between de-
mographic processes and environmental
change.
The general observation concerning the
status of empirical research on U.S. immi-
gration and the environment is the need
for more of it.  There is critical need for
the initiation of well-designed studies that
will yield both descriptive information
concerning trends and patterns of demo-
graphic and environmental processes in
U.S. regions, as well as for causal analy-
ses of the relationships between migra-
tion and environmental change.  Given
this starting point, the recommendations
for empirical research for the United States
are relatively basic, unlike recommenda-
tions for research developed by Fincher
for Australia (1991:57-50).  In contrast, the
suggestions presented below reflect fun-
damental needs for baseline data on trends
and patterns and causal analysis to test
hypotheses deriving from conceptual
models of immigration-environment rela-
tionships. In important ways, several of
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the recommendations for research are con-
nected to issues concerning both
conceptualization and data availability
and quality discussed in sections above
and below, respectively.
Recommendations for Empirical Research
1.  Research should be undertaken to syn-
thesize what is known about the compo-
nents of population growth and change
on the regional, state, metropolitan, and
local levels in the United States.
a. Analytic attention should be giv-
en to trends in each source of mi-
gration to and from geographic ar-
eas, including permanent resident
aliens, temporary visitors (includ-
ing foreign students and tempo-
rary workers), and refugees.
b. Patterns of secondary or internal
migration of immigrants should
be documented and distinguished
from patterns of initial settlement
among immigrants.
c. The process of  temporary inter-
national movements and mobili-
ty, such as international tourism
and temporary workers, should
be measured and described for re-
gions, states, and metropolitan
and local areas in the United
States.
2.  Research should be initiated to docu-
ment what is known about trends and
changes in environmental processes, re-
sources, and quality for regions, states,
and metropolitan and local areas in the
United States.  Environmental data should
also be organized in relation to such eco-
logical systems as marine and coastal
environments, aquifer basins, as well as
other relevant units, for example, national
parks and wilderness areas.
3.  Research to measure causal relation-
ships between immigration processes and
selected environmental outcomes should
be initiated for regions and local areas.
a. Macro-level analyses that measure
the relationship over time between
each source of population change
and regional and local environ-
mental indicators should be con-
ducted; control for other exoge-
nous sources of environmental
change should be considered care-
fully in such research.
b. Micro-level studies of patterns of
consumption and use of  environ-
mental resources should be initi-
ated to provide estimates at the
national and subnational levels.
R E S E A R C H
P A P E R
- 34 -
U.S.  C O M M I S S I O N  O N  I M M I G R A T I O N  R E F O R M
c. Studies of environmental behav-
ior should relate the effects of  im-
migrant characteristics (country of
birth, length of residence, patterns
of internal migration) to the effect
of social demographic factors (age,
gender, household composition,
education, occupation, etc.).
4.  The effect of  immigration trends in
urban environmental quality and re-
sources should be measured, again, within
the context of other sources of environ-
mental change and given a dynamic ana-
lytic framework.  Case studies of
environmental change within specific ur-
ban and metropolitan areas should be
undertaken.
a. Analysis of the role of immigra-
tion in the geographic expansion
of U.S. metropolitan areas should
be initiated.
b. Research on the effect on immi-
gration on urban housing markets
and patterns of commuting should
be initiated for specific cities and
metropolitan areas.
METHODOLOGIES
FOR ASSESSING
THE
ENVIRONMENTAL
CONSEQUENCES
OF U.S.
IMMIGRATION
Introduction
The emerging wisdom from studies and
perspectives on population-environment
dynamics includes recommendations to
pursue research, assessment, and moni
toring of interrelationships on local
andregional scales (for example, National
Research Council 1992; Fincher 1991;
Turner, et al. 1990; National Population
Council 1991; cf. Linden 1990:10; Bunt
1992:229) and with comparative methods
and cooperative synthesis of findings
(Ness, Brechin & Drake 1993c; Harf &
Trout 1986).  These analytical visions of
the necessity for regional and local analy-
sis and comparison of effects are particu-
larly consistent with what has been
learned from research efforts to assess the
economic effects of immigration on U.S.
labor markets and communities.
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We have initially considered two analytic
frameworks that have been developed to
study dimensions of environmental
change: environmental impact assessment
(see Westman 1985; Mather & Sdasyuk
1991; Clark & Herrington 1988; Black 1981)
and population-environment monitoring
systems (see Westman 1985; Ness, Brechin
& Drake 1993b).  Environmental impact
assessment most often attempts to fore-
cast the impacts of development projects
or structural or engineering initiatives,
generally, new activities within a geo-
graphic area (see, for example, Newson
1992 :261-70; cf. Ofori-Cudjoe 1990).
Monitoring systems represent ongoing
social and environmental accounting
frameworks for the collection and analy-
sis of data over time for specific geo-
graphic areas.
Environmental
Impact
Assessment
Lein (1991-92:168) describes environmen-
tal impact assessment [EIA] as “the prin-
cipal means of understanding human
impacts on the environment within a
structured decision-making framework.”
The formal adoption of EIA as an ap-
proach to anticipating environment change
came in 1970 with the requirement in the
National Environmental Protection Act for
federal agencies to formulate environmen-
tal impact statements [EIS] for proposed
activities (see Rosenbaum 1991:14).  The
analytic objective of the EIA process is the
provision of objective, typically quantifi-
able, information for policy-makers and
program administrators concerning the
range of environmental consequences of
some proposed source of change for a
region or place.  The results of the pro-
cess thus contribute to the identification
of an “informed trade off among conflict-
ing aspects of a proposed activity” (Lein
1991-92:168).  Environmental assessment
is thus conducted for a specific place, time
and proposed event.  The emphasis on
short-term environmental effects is, ac-
cording to Lein, a disadvantage of the
methodology for long range environmen-
tal planning and the avoidance of irre-
versible environmental damage.
The steps followed within the EIA pro-
cess are often described schematically as
a decisionmaking tree or flow chart.  To
illustrate, Figures 2a schematically shows
the EIA process for the United States, and
Figure 2b shows the process as organized
by the Scientific Committee on Antarctic
Research.  The actual process of assess-
ment, that is, measurement of environ-
mental outcomes of a proposed program
or activity, is usually not specified but
represented as an activity box with the
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flow chart.  Discussions of environmental
impact assessment indicate only in broad
strokes the methodological approach.
Newson (1992 :268) describes the tasks of
assessment as including:
Identification methods—to assist
in identifying the project
alternatives, project characteristics
and environmental parameters to
be investigated in assessment
Data assembly methods—to assist
in describing the characteristics of
the development and of the
environment that may be affected.
Predictive methods—to predict
the magnitude of the impacts
which the deveopment is likely  to
have on the environment
Evaluation methods—to assess the
significance of the impacts which
the development will have on the
environment
Communication methods—to
assist in consultation and public
participation, and in expressing
the findings of the study in a form
suitable for decision-making
purposes
Management methods—to assist
in managing the scoping of the
study, the preparation of the
impact study, the efficient conduct
of the consultation process, etc.
Decision-making method—to
assist decision-makers in assessing
and understanding the
significance of environmental
impacts relative to other factors
relevant to a decision on the
proposed development
Similarly, Bonner (1989:86-87) identifies
within the process of EIA: first, specifica-
tion of the proposed program or activity
as well as alternatives; second, provision
of baseline environmental data on the local
region or site and an estimate of changes
in those measures in the absence of the
proposed activity; estimates of the “na-
ture, extent, duration and intensity” of the
predicted environmental outcomes; and
evaluation of the significance of the pre-
dicted impacts and possible approaches
to mitigate the effects.
Inherent in these methodologies of envi-
ronmental assessment are theoretical mod-
els of the causes and effects of
environmental processes.  Predictions
about the impact of human activities on
the environment of a defined region re-
quire not only specification of significant
causes of environmental impact, change,
or disruption, but also of the nature, that
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is, form and direction, of the relationships
between the causes and outcomes.
Newson cautions, moreover, of the prob-
lems in predicting environmental change
without an appreciation of the full spec-
trum of sources of change.  Hence, an-
swering the basic questions of
environmental assessment—“What will be
the direction of future change?  By how
much?  How certain are we?” (Newson
1992 :264) requires an assessment analy-
sis that is embedded in a dynamic and
comprehensive model encompassing all
the important sources of environmental
change for the study area.  This, accord-
ing to Newson, is the process of ‘scoping’
(Newson 1992 :264,268; see also McNabb
1989:109; Colthern 1993b:6).
The results of EIA are often summarized
in the form of a matrix in which scores
are assigned to each combination of im-
pact and outcome.  McNabb (1989), among
others, has been critical of the tendency
in this approach to simplify complex, es-
sentially multivariate relationships be-
tween social processes and environmental
outcomes.  What is as critical is the de-
gree to which the approach subdues the
influence of both theory and method.  For
example, in an ex post facto environmental
assessment of an electric power plant
Ofori-Cudjoe (1990) presents the EIA
matrix relating each of the components of
the plant construction and operation to
seventeen environmental outcomes, in-
cluding impacts on the physical, biologi-
cal, and social environments.  The matrix
is shown in Figure 3.  The methods of
determining the scores for each cell of the
matrix, that is, the level and direction of
the impact, rely on observation, documen-
tation, and interviews with members of
the resettled communities: “[t]he only
positive impacts on the physical environ-
ment are on agricultural land-use and
surface water quantity.  The people ex-
pressed a lot of misgivings during our
fieldwork.  Their oil palm plantations
stood in danger of destruction without
sufficient compensation” (Ofori-Cudjoe
1990:124).  The underlying conceptual
relationships, however, remain implicit in
the assessment process.
Critical perspectives on EIA underscore
the importance of studying environmen-
tal change within a multivariate frame-
work in which all exogenous influences
on environmental outcomes are docu-
mented and comparatively evaluated.  The
observation of Preston (1993:600) is rel-
evant: “Even if links can be established
between demographic and environmental
change, there remains the difficult task of
evaluating the costs of environmental
change relative to other things that hu-
mans value.”  The approach inherently as-
sumes, moreover, that the counterfactual
can be known; that is, that the causes and
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consequences of environmental change are
sufficiently well understood to be able to
predict outcomes resulting from both the
presence, as well as the absence, of the
causal influence.   Using the issue at hand
and also following Simon’s example
(1990:190), one might ask whether enough
is known about the role of immigration in
technological and environmental change
to conclude what the urban environment
would have been like in the absence of
immigration to the United States during
the nineteenth century.
Population-
Environment
Monitoring
Systems
The process of EIA involves not only pre-
dictive and hence causal analysis, but also
monitoring and auditing of the outcomes
of the program or activity through some
future point in time (Newson 1992 :264).
Population-environment monitoring sys-
tems [PEMS] are useful in providing an
empirical foundation for evaluation of
existing policies (Zinn, Brechin & Ness
1993) and baseline data for identifying
subsequent environmental impacts.  If the
approaches to monitoring are standard-
ized across administrative units, data for
smaller geographic units can be aggre-
gated and, thus, results of PEMS can sup-
port analysis of regional dimensions of
national policies.  This characteristic of
PEMS is critically salient for purposes of
U.S. immigration policy evaluation and
recalls the effort by Clark et. al. (1994) to
apply common methods of measurement
among states in their study of the fiscal
impacts of U.S. immigration.  Further,
population-environment monitoring as-
sumes the collection of logitudinal data
concerning interrelationships among so-
cial demographic and environmental pro-
cesses.  Newson’s emphasis on the
importance of identifying all significant
causal influences is also salient for the
PEMS approach. The analysis of observed
trends in population and environment pro-
cesses must be embedded within the con-
text of social, economic, political,
environmental change occurring on each
relevant level of analysis: local, regional,
national, and global.
Relevance of
Methodologies for
Analysis of
Immigration and
Environment
There are challenges to interpreting the
predictive results of environmental impact
assessment or even the results of environ-
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mental monitoring.  In reference to EIA
statements, Westman (1985:9) states, “[f]or
an accurate prediction of cumulative im-
pacts to be made, impact analysts must
be able to refer to some plan for the fu-
ture development of the region.  The plans
in turn usually derive from a set of poli-
cies for regional development and national
goals, and values.  To speak to the com-
bined effects of independent proposals for
a region, impact assessment is dependent
on regional planning.”  The implication is
the need for clearly articulated goals and
priorities concerning immigration and the
environment for the geographic area.  It
is important to acknowledge in this re-
gard the potential for conflict between na-
tional (and international) goals concerning
immigration, for example, family reunifi-
cation, refugee resettlement, and local and
regional concerns, which are increasingly
characterized by NIMBY [“not in my back-
yard”] frames of reference (cf. Castles &
Miller 1994).
Turning to the application of the approach
to the analysis of the environmental con-
sequences of U.S. immigration, environ-
mental impact assessment may serve as
an appropriate approach if the analytic
goal is to determine or predict the envi-
ronmental effects of changes in the levels
and patterns of immigration to an area
within the country.   In this case, the EIA
methodology may be useful in assessing
various immigration policy options that
might include changes in overall levels of
annual alien immigration to the United
States, as well as changes in the structure
of immigrant admissions in terms of indi-
vidual and family characteristics.  Such
analysis would also include models of
internal or secondary migration among
immigrants and generally consider the
consequences of immigration in a longi-
tudinal perspective for the nation, region,
and local areas.  Comparison of different
assumptions about both patterns of geo-
graphic settlement and secondary migra-
tion among immigrant groups may be
particularly relevant for efforts to balance
federal immigration goals with economic
and environmental goals and programs
for states and metropolitan and local ar-
eas.
In conducting such analyses of immigra-
tion and environmental change, however,
the most critical issue in exploring the use
of EIA or PEMS is the degree to which
the environmental impact study or moni-
toring system incorporates all factors (so-
cial, economic, institutional, etc.) in
relationship to population processes (com-
ponents of growth, rates of growth, etc.)
and demographic characteristics (age,
gender, education, income, etc.) that are
hypothesized to have environmental im-
pact, using the concept of Ness, Drake,
and Brechin, the population-environment
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dynamic.  In the general IPAT model, pat-
terns of consumption [A] and technology
[T] may be conceptualized as mediating
the effects of demographic characteristics
and processes on the environment (cf.
Demeny 1991:410; Arizpe, Stone & Major
1994:8; Ehrlich & Ehrlich 1990).  Methods
of assessing or monitoring environmental
change require, however, explicit specifi-
cation of the nature of the relationships
between demographic processes and be-
haviors, patterns of consumption and pro-
duction, sources of technological and
social change, and environmental out-
comes.  Moreover, as discussed above,
emerging perspectives on global and re-
gional dynamics have focused more criti-
cally on reexamining the institutional
realm of mediating factors (see Arizpe,
Stone & Major 1994; Ness, Brechin &
Drake 1993b; Merchant 1990; Simon 1990;
Espenshade 1991; Jones 1992), noting the
variation in effects at different scales of
analysis (see Meyer & Turner 1992:53-54).
As discussed above, these requirements
for analysis assume a strong base of
knowledge about population, migration
and environment dynamics.  Another way
of expressing these analytic problems is
the recognition of the limitations of knowl-
edge about the counterfactual: What
would have been the status of an area’s
environment in the absence of immigra-
tion?  What will be the patterns of envi-
ronmental change associated with different
levels and patterns of immigration?  Is
there sufficient empirical evidence and
accumulated knowledge to model or
project these relationships in order to pre-
dict environmental outcomes associated
with different immigration policies?
These issues provide an imperative for
analytic approaches seeking to address the
relationships among population, migra-
tion, and environmental change to incor-
porate—measure—the significant factors
that determine the environmental impact
of immigration to the nation or locale,
beyond the direct effects of increasing
population size.  From the emerging lit-
erature we can quickly identify such fac-
tors as patterns of resource consumption,
technological innovation and production
of knowledge, conservation behaviors,
land use patterns, etc.  Further explor-
atory research may be required, however,
to complete the model of causal factors,
that is, behaviors and institutional arrange-
ments with environmental impacts.
The challenge is thus to develop behav-
ioral and structural models and incorpo-
rate them in methodological approaches
to studying environmental change.  In this
regard, survey methodology has been
shown above to hold particular promise
for revealing the relationships among
population, migration, and the environ-
ment.  Macro-level analyses of these rela-
tionships will provide relevant results if
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research designs are dynamic, longitudi-
nal, and encompass or control for the ef-
fects for other exogenous sources of
environmental change. Finally, the rel-
evance of any EIA, monitoring system, or
other more appropriate research design
for determining the effect of U.S. immi-
gration on the environment will rest, fi-
nally, in the degree to which national, state,
and local data collection systems or ongo-
ing surveys can support multivariate
analysis of complex dimensions—demo-
graphic, economic, institutional, behav-
ioral—of environmental outcomes.
Recommendations for Research on
Methodologies
1.  A review of research methodologies
inherent in environmental impact assess-
ments and population-environment moni-
toring systems should be conducted.
a. An inventory should be taken of
the degree to, and manner in
which, demographic processes
have been incorporated in EIAs
or statements in the United States
or in other immigrant-receiving
countries.
b. A comparison of PEMS and other
demographic accounting systems
should be undertaken to assess the
degree to which statistical systems
embody consistent or complemen-
tary concepts of population
growth and migration.
c. Specific analysis should document
the temporal and spatial context
of EIAs and monitoring systems.
2.  Analysis of assumptions in environ-
mental methodologies concerning causal
determinants and correlates of environ-
mental outcomes should be conducted to
reveal the degree to which models of
environmental change are completely
specified.
a. Strategies for incorporating hy-
potheses concerning migration and envi-
ronmental change and consequences in
environmental methodologies should be
considered.
3.  Analysis of alternative research designs
for the study of immigration-
environmental relationships should be
undertaken.
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INFORMATION
REQUIREMENTS
FOR STUDYING THE
ENVIRONMENTAL
CONSEQUENCES
OF U.S.
IMMIGRATION
Introduction
The specification of data needs should be
guided both by theory and by the impor-
tant policy questions concerning U.S. im-
migration and the environment.  While
the emphasis of this report is generally on
the relevant research concerning immigra-
tion, it is important to note the serious
concern among environmental scientists
about the status of environmental data for
the United States and the capacity for
monitoring environmental quality and
resources for different geographic areas.
Colthern has critically addressed the need
for a more coherent statistical base for
environmental monitoring and compara-
tive risk assessment (Colthern 1993b:3-10;
see also Day 1993; Bunt 1992; Milliman
1992; Burnett 1992).  Rosenbaum (1991:60)
has raised similar issues specifically for
the United States:
One of the nation’s major
environmental problems remains
the neglect of basic research on
environmental quality.  Almost all
current evaluations of
environmental quality are
compromised in some way by
missing data, constricted time
frames, and incompatible
measurements.  At times,
estimates of environmental
conditions, or the risks from
human or environmental exposure
to chemical substances, or
predictions about future
environmental trends must be
made on the basis of data so
meager that predictions are little
more that the scientists’ best
guess.  Data essential to
understanding basic
environmental trends, the kind of
information “everybody should
have,” often nobody has.
Frequently, the data were never
created.
Sadik (1989:5) has called for the incorpo-
ration of environmental accounting in
economic reports and forecasts.   McCall
(1985:133-34) also describes the need for
baseline data on local environmental pro-
cesses in developing societies.
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Fundamental to the analysis of popula-
tion and the environment, however, are
data concerning the components of popu-
lation change—fertility, mortality, and
migration—for regions and communities.
Further, because the focus of the present
policy debate concerns the impact of alien
migration, disaggregation of demographic
processes by immigration status is also a
necessary characteristic of statistical infor-
mation.  Accordingly, the general focus
here is on the adequacy of U.S. data on
population processes for the measurement
of the role of alien immigration in popu-
lation trends and dynamics on the na-
tional, regional, and local scales of
analysis.
Problems in the adequacy of national
demographic accounts for the comprehen-
sive measurement of trends and compo-
nents of population change have been well
documented (see Valdez, et. al. 1993;
Levine, Hill & Warren 1985; U.S. General
Accounting Office 1988; Teitelbaum 1986;
for a comparative analysis of international
migration statistics, see Kraly &
Gnanasekaran 1987).  Three sets of issues
pose particular problems for the empiri-
cal evaluation of the role of immigration
in environmental processes.  First, con-
ceptual problems exist in official data on
alien immigration to the United States.
While collected on a continuing basis, U.S.
statistics on immigration suffer from prob-
lems in validity and reliability in repre-
senting demographic concepts of interna-
tional migration and mobility.  Second,
U.S. statistics on international migration
lack closure: it is not possible to assess
the impact of alien immigration on popu-
lation growth in an area if not all sources
of population change are known.  No
systematic source of data exists on the
process of out-migration of aliens or citi-
zens from the United States; measurement
of levels and patterns of undocumented
migration relies on demographic estima-
tion.  Third, and related to the first two
issues, alien migration as an annual com-
ponent of population change is not easily
measured at all relevant geographic scales
of analysis.  Decennial census data do
provide very useful data at ten-year in-
tervals; intercensal measures of immigra-
tion and local population change are
available from Current Population Survey
data, however, for large states and metro-
politan areas.
Reasons for the persistence of  problems
in international migration statistics for the
United States derive largely from the sepa-
ration of responsibilities for demographic
accounting among federal agencies and
programs that differ in mission, resources,
and priorities for demographic research.
Most industrialized nations, in contrast,
have central statistical offices in which
data collection, analysis, and dissemina-
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tion are coordinated. The absence of a
comprehensive population policy is also
a critical influence on the status, organi-
zation, and management of national de-
mographic statistics.  It is also important
to add that the United States is not dis-
tinctive in the persistence of weaknesses
in statistics of international migration.
International migration statistics generally
are recognized by many nations, both
developed and developing, as the weak-
est component of national population ac-
counts; the lack of international
comparability in international migration
statistics is also a source of multilateral
concern (United Nations 1985; Kraly &
Gnanasekaran 1987).
Conceptual Issues
As discussed in the previous section, the
effect of immigration on the environment
must be considered within the context of,
or relative to, other components of popu-
lation change for specified geographic
areas in the United States.  Ideally, this
requires a demographic perspective guid-
ing the measurement of the process of
international migration to and from the
United States in which demographic char-
acteristics, specifically length of stay or
departure, are documented for all mi-
grants.  To address immigration policy
issues, citizenship status and category of
visa also must be known along with the
full battery of social and economic char-
acteristics, including age, gender, educa-
tion, household composition, occupation,
employment status, income, etc.  Clearly,
information must be collected for states
and local areas and made available for
comparative analysis of population dy-
namics for current time periods.  The ideal
system of social demographic accounts
remains beyond reasonable grasp.  It is
useful, however, to dwell on the first con-
ceptual issue—the degree to which U.S.
immigration statistics represent demo-
graphic concepts of international migra-
tion.
Statistics on international migration to the
United States are collected on an ongoing
basis: the U.S. Immigration and Natural-
ization Service [INS] is mandated to in-
spect every person seeking entry to the
United States.  Primarily because of this
mission to enforce the Immigration and
Nationality Act, official statistics generally
reflect legal and administrative categories:
U.S. citizen; permanent resident alien;
nonimmigrant; refugee; asylee; and pa-
rolee.  Data on admissions of permanent
resident aliens usually serve as the mea-
sure of annual international migration to
the United States. These statistics, how-
ever, refer to date or year of admission to
the status of permanent resident alien and
not year of actual arrival in the United
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States.  In many years, the proportion of
immigrant admissions that is composed
of adjustments of temporary migrants or
nonimmigrants to permanent resident is
on the order of 35-40 percent.  In 1992, for
example, 47 percent of immigrant admis-
sions were aliens adjusted from other sta-
tuses; a large proportion of these were
persons who had been in the United States
at least since 1982 and were adjusting
status under the provisions of IRCA (U.S.
Department of Justice 1993).
Work has been done to manipulate INS
administrative data to better represent
demographic concepts of international
migration (Kraly & Warren 1991, 1992).
Data on new immigrant arrivals, arrivals
of nonimmigrants who ultimately adjust
to permanent resident status,
nonimmigrants who remain in the United
States for more than one year and subse-
quently depart, and refugees and asylee
approvals have been combined by calen-
dar year of entry to measure the concept
of long-term immigration, a statistical
concept recommended by the United
Nations Statistical Commission (United
Nations 1980).  Comparison of data mea-
suring this demographic concept with
official INS data on admissions yields
important differences in the national ori-
gins characteristics of annual alien immi-
gration to the United States and, perhaps
relatively more salient to this discussion,
patterns of geographic distribution.  Large
absolute differences in immigration levels
have been shown for New York, Califor-
nia, Illinois, and Massachusetts, with large
relative differences in levels for smaller
areas, notably the District of Columbia.
This work reveals important differences
between alternative measures in the mag-
nitude of the demographic effects of im-
migration for U.S. regions and states.
Whether INS will continue to experiment
with producing measures of long-term
immigration to compare with administra-
tive measures is not known.  As men-
tioned above in the discussion of theory,
it may also be useful if data on length of
stay of nonimmigrant aliens were analyzed
to measure demographic impact using
person-years concepts for specific catego-
ries of nonimmigrant aliens for major
places of destination in the United States.
The U.S. Census Bureau also combines
different sources of data, including INS
administrative data, to operationalize the
concept of net immigration in its program
of population estimates and projections
(see, for example, Word 1993).  The con-
cept of net immigration includes six cat-
egories of international migrants for which
data are collected or estimated for esti-
mates of annual population change for
intercensal years and to operationalize the
concept of net immigration for national
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population projections.  The categories
include legal alien immigration, undocu-
mented alien immigration, foreign- and
native-born emigration, net migration
from Puerto Rico, net movement of armed
forces personnel and dependents, and net
movement of civilian federal employees
and dependents.  By seeking to measure
international migration on the basis of
residence criteria of the decennial census,
the concept of net immigration is more
relevant for demographic analysis of
population change.  By omitting some
categories of international migration, how-
ever, the validity of net immigration as a
demographic concept fall shorts.  For
example, international migration to the
United States of nonfederal employees and
dependents and increasingly important,
categories of nonimmigrants with long-
term length of stay in the United States
(e.g., students and foreign government
officials) are not represented in the con-
cept of net immigration (Word 1994).
Closure in
Demographic
Accounts
Migration from the United States is not
directly measured in the federal statisti-
cal system and as a result we have no
comprehensive source of statistics on
emigration from the United States (War-
ren & Kraly 1985; Edmonston 1989: 30-36;
Kraly & Warren 1991).  The measurement
of emigration of immigrants and the for-
eign born derives primarily from residual
methods of estimation (Warren & Peck
1980; see also Warren & Kraly 1985).  In
the past few years, the U.S. Census Bu-
reau has explored the use of multiplicity
techniques to estimate emigration using
the Current Population Survey [CPS]
(Woodrow 1991; Woodrow 1990).  Other
attempts to estimate emigration of immi-
grants have relied on linkages among
administrative data sets (see Jasso &
Rosenzweig 1982).  Each of these analytic
approaches, however, provides data that
are of limited usefulness for the measure-
ment of emigration of either aliens or U.S.
citizens from the United States at either
the national or sub-national levels or for
documenting changes in emigration pat-
terns over time.
There has been consideration of other fed-
eral sources of administrative data as a
basis for estimating emigration (see
Levine, Hill & Warren 1985; Edmonston
1989; Kraly 1991).  Social Security files
hold promise for the estimation of out-
migration from the United States of U.S.
citizens and alien workers in social secu-
rity-covered employment and social secu-
rity beneficiaries; U.S. Department of State
records on U.S. citizens who have regis-
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tered at U.S. consulates may be useful for
monitoring changes in the size and distri-
bution of the expatriate community; the
Nonimmigrant Information System has
been shown to be an effective source of
information on length of stay of tempo-
rary migrants to the United States (see
Warren 1990, Kraly & Warren 1991); and
the passenger surveys conducted by the
U.S. Travel and Tourism Administration
may provide a useful sampling frame for
survey of intentions concerning departure
and residence abroad (Kraly 1991).
No direct data, other than statistics on
apprehensions, are available to measure
level, trends and characteristics of undocu-
mented alien migration to and from the
United States.  As with alien emigration,
estimates of undocumented migration
have been computed using residual meth-
ods of demographic estimation for U.S.
census data, immigrant data records of
the INS, estimates of emigration, and cen-
sus undercount and assumptions about
mortality levels.  Reliability of estimates
of undocumented migration is thus chal-
lenged by the nature of error in measur-
ing the other components of population
change, notably legal alien immigration
and emigration.
Research by Warren and Passel (1987) has
provided the conceptual framework for
subsequent development of estimates of
undocumented migration (see, for ex-
ample, Passel & Woodrow 1987; Wood-
row & Passel 1990).  Increasingly apparent,
however, are constraints on the method-
ology to provide reliable estimates, par-
ticularly at the subnational level.  Error in
the estimates reflects problems in assump-
tions about emigration and coverage er-
ror in census enumeration and in
measuring nonimmigrants and agricul-
tural workers with long-term length of
stay in the country (Woodrow 1992).  A
different estimation methodology using
INS data has been applied by Warren to
develop estimates of overstay among
aliens admitted on nonimmigrant visas,
by country of origin (Warren 1990).  Ex-
tending this analysis, Warren has also
estimated the size of the undocumented
alien population by state of residence (see
Warren 1994a).
Availability of
Data for Regional
and Local
Analysis
These issues concerning the conceptu-
alization and measurement of the process
of international migration to and from the
United States hamper the analysis of the
components of population change on the
national level.  These issues are also rel-
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evant for the measurement of the compo-
nents of population change for states, re-
gions, metropolitan areas, and local
communities throughout the United
States.  As discussed earlier, the issue of
geographic scale is critical to rigorous
study of the role of population and immi-
gration in environmental change.
The lack of direct data on the place of
residence and internal migration patterns
of immigrants poses particular problems
for analyses which seek to relate flow sta-
tistics on alien migration to population
characteristics for regional or local areas.
For example, the Population Estimates
Program of the U.S. Census Bureau incor-
porates international migration into esti-
mates of annual population for states and
counties in the United States using the
geographic distribution of previous alien
immigration streams.  Estimates of annual
net immigration are derived from both
direct measurement of some categories of
alien immigration (e.g., permanent resi-
dent alien immigration refugees and
nonimmigrants adjusting to permanent
resident status) and indirect estimates of
other categories (e.g., net undocumented
migration and foreign-born emigration).
The estimates are allocated to states and
counties on the basis of the geographic
distribution of alien immigrants, by se-
lected region and country of birth, for alien
residents in the United States entering in
the five years prior to the decennial cen-
sus.  Assumptions about  geographic dis-
tribution become increasingly out-dated
for measures of annual population growth
at the end of the censal decade (see Word
1993).
INS statistics do document intended state
and city of residence for immigrants and
nonimmigrants admitted to the United
States.  The reliability and validity  of these
data on residential intentions, however,
are not well understood (see Kraly &
Hildebrandt 1993).  For the most part, de-
mographers must rely on decennial cen-
sus data for such analyses using fixed
period data on residential change (see, for
example, Frey 1994; also Plane & Rogerson
1994:91-95).   Census data on previous
residence abroad are not ideally suited for
the analysis of the demographic impacts
of alien immigration for local populations.
The temporal limitations of decennial cen-
sus data also inhibit the measurement of
the components of local population
change.  Increasingly, state and city plan-
ners have turned to other administrative
sources of data to tap the role of migra-
tion in local population dynamics during
intercensal years  (see Weeks 1992 :492-
96; see also Heer & Passel 1987).
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Implications for
Research on U.S.
Statistical
Information
Concerning
Population
Immigration and
the Environment
It is productive to continue to evaluate
issues concerning the measurement of the
international migration component of na-
tional, regional, and local population dy-
namics.  But to summarize, several issues
emerge from this brief review of general
problems in U.S. immigration data, each
of which has serious implications for the
analysis of the relation between immigra-
tion and the environment.  There exists a
lack of a demographic conceptualization
of international migration and mobility in-
herent in INS information systems, the
primary source of data on the flow of in-
ternational migration to the United States.
As a result, there is lack of congruence
between INS statistics and demographic
data collected through the decennial cen-
sus or the CPS.  Comprehensive popula-
tion characteristics and patterns of in- and
out-migration for local areas are measured
at ten-year intervals through decennial
census data; the Current Population Sur-
vey generates very valuable data for
intercensal periods on the role of immi-
gration in population change but only for
the nation as a whole and the largest states
and metropolitan areas.  Finally, lack of
closure exists in demographic accounts,
notably, the absence of data on emigra-
tion from the United States, the interna-
tional mobility patterns of U.S. citizens,
and undocumented migration patterns.
As stated earlier, the nature of the prob-
lems in U.S. statistics on international
migration for purposes of demographic
analysis of national and local population
change are relatively well documented.
Left unspecified, however, is the nature
of the information necessary to determine
the environmental impacts of population
and migration trends given appropriate
demographic data.  As embodied in the
models of population-environmental dy-
namics discussed earlier, such “mediat-
ing factors” include behavior patterns
concerning consumption, production, and
conservation among immigrants and in-
ternal migrants and residents, as well as
such contextual characteristics as indus-
trial mix, patterns of economic and tech-
nological change, political organization,
and policy and program implementation
(see also Ness, Drake & Brechin 1993c:377-
406).  Moreover, specification of data
needs also assumes a clear identification
of relevant environmental outcomes for a
specific locale, region, or metropolitan area
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(see Rosenbaum 1991:60-61; Day 1993;
Risler 1993; Colthern 1993b).
A longitudinal survey of immigrants holds
strong potential as a means to collect data
more effectively on the social demographic
behavior and experiences of immigrants.
The research community  has recognized
of the value of a survey on immigrants to
study directly patterns of settlement and
internal mobility among immigrants, as
well as social characteristics and economic
behavior among immigrant cohorts and
how these change over time.  Valdez, et
al. (1993:2-3) recognize the need for more
appropriate data to address the compli-
cated policy questions concerning U.S.
immigration and argue strongly for the
use of survey methodology to assess the
impacts of immigration on regional and
local communities (see also Chokor
1985:18).  Their study of Salvadorean and
Filipino communities in Los Angeles rep-
resents an important effort to use survey
methods to document the role of immi-
gration in social, political, and economic
processes in local areas.
The use of social survey methodology is
also highly appropriate for the collection
of data concerning environmentally-
relevant behavior, attitudes, and impacts
of immigrants.  To yield results appropri-
ate to environmental research, however,
survey design must address, first, the need
for reliable data at different geographic
scales and, second, the critical need to
compare over time behaviors and charac-
teristics among different groups of immi-
grants and with U.S. citizens.  Similarly,
survey results also must foster the com-
parison of causes and correlates of envi-
ronmental change in geographic areas
experiencing different levels of in- and out-
migration, including areas lacking signifi-
cant alien immigration.
Certainly, there is a great deal of work
remaining to develop a comprehensive
statement concerning the nature of infor-
mation and methodologies appropriate for
the study of the role of population, and
specifically immigration, in environmen-
tal processes and change in the United
States.  Several initial recommendations
for policy relevant research clearly emerge,
however, from this initial review of infor-
mation requirements.  The recommenda-
tions that follow generally focus on the
requisite needs for improving the statisti-
cal basis for measuring the role of immi-
gration in population change at different
scales of analysis; complementary issues
should be addressed concerning the sta-
tus of data on environmental change for
places and regions in the United States.
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Recommendations for Improvements in
Data
1.  An inventory and comprehensive de-
scription should be conducted to docu-
ment the availability and accessibility of
data on environmental processes, quality,
and resources for the regions, states, and
metropolitan, urban, and local areas in the
United States.
2.  An inventory and comprehensive de-
scription of demographic data available
to measure regional, state, and local popu-
lation dynamics (births, deaths, and mi-
gration) for different periods of time
(intercensal, annual, etc.) should be de-
veloped; social demographic characteris-
tics of population (age, sex, education,
occupation, country of birth, length of
residence, etc.) that are available also
should be identified.
a. Documentation should be made
of the degree to which alien im-
migration can be identified as a
component of population change
at different geographic scales and
for different periods of time.
b. Documentation should be made
of the degree to which sources of
internal migration,  both in-migra-
tion and out-migration, can be
identified as components of pop-
ulation change at different geo-
graphic scales, for different peri-
ods of time and for immigrants
and U.S. citizens.
c. Documentation should be made
of the degree to which sources of
emigration from the country can
be identified as components of
population change at different
geographic scales, for different pe-
riods of time, and for immigrants
and U.S. citizens.
2.  Data available for the measurement of
the components of regional and local
population change should be evaluated in
terms of both validity and reliability.
3.  The implications of different concepts
of migration, for example, administrative
measures versus demographic concepts,
should be evaluated empirically for the
measurement of regional and local popu-
lation change.
4.  An exploration of the collection or use
of alternative sources of population and
migration data for measuring local and
regional population change should be ini-
tiated.
U.S.  C O M M I S S I O N  O N  I M M I G R A T I O N  R E F O R M
R E S E A R C H
P A P E R
- 55 -
a. Evaluation should be conducted
of the use of sampling techniques
in estimation of components of
population change for different
geographic scales.
b. Evaluation should be conducted
of the use of survey methodology
for the estimation of components
of population change for different
geographic scales.
c. Analysis of the degree to which
proposals for a longitudinal sur-
vey of immigrants can address
issues concerning environmental
impact should be conducted.
5.  Research on data availability should
be coordinated with analytic efforts by en-
vironmental scientists to identify regions,
places, and locales in the United States
for which study of population, immigra-
tion, and environmental relationships is
particularly salient.
CONCLUSIONS
The general criticism of Meyer and Turner
(1992:51) concerning the state of scholar-
ship on human impacts on the global
environment is particularly useful in as-
sessing the current state of scholarship on
U.S. immigration and the environment:
Two extremes in approach are
ultra-empiricism and ultra-
theoreticism.  In the  former vein,
Newell and Marcus [1987] present
a correlation of +0.9985 between
world population growth and
tropospheric CO2  since the 1950s
as proof of population’s
fundamental role.  In the latter,
Harvey [1974] deprecated neo-
Malthusian arguments for  the
primacy of population growth in
resource depletion as politically
founded.  The former is apt to
mistake correlation for cause (or
absence of correlation for causal
unimportance) in a highly
complex area; the latter is apt to
narrow excessively the scope of
investigation without recourse to
data.  Theory—including theory
from the social sciences—and
evidence need both to be drawn
upon.
This review has sought to develop recom-
mendations for scientific research on U.S.
immigration and the environment that
address the salient analytic issues identi-
fied by Meyer and Turner.  Four broad
themes emerge from the specific recom-
mendations set out in each section of the
review.
Research on the environmental conse-
quences of U.S. immigration will benefit
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from first, attending to the adequacy of
conceptual models of the population-en-
vironment relationships, and more gener-
ally, perspectives on human environmental
impacts, in specifying the role of migra-
tion in processes of environmental change.
On the basis of this review, it is apparent
that theoretical development concerning
migration and the environment needs to
occur in order to derive relevant and test-
able hypotheses about causal relationships
and effects.
Second, given the significance of geo-
graphic scale for empirical findings about
the relationship between demographic
processes and environmental change, stud-
ies for the United States should be initi-
ated on national, regional, and local levels.
Results of studies should be interpreted
with an explicit appreciation of the differ-
ences in the effects of population dynam-
ics for environment processes at different
geographic scale: “[Popu-lation’s] connec-
tions to land-cover change become weaker
at increasingly smaller spatial scales be-
cause of the importance of the other vari-
ables that affect demand or spatially
deflect its impacts” (Meyer & Turner
1992:54).  Similarly, research results should
synthesize the effects of immigration pro-
cesses spatially, among regions and local
areas, and, structurally, across economic
sectors.
Research on U.S. immigration and the
environment should provide both descrip-
tive results concerning trends in demo-
graphic and environmental change at
different geographic scales and for spe-
cific places, as well as causal insights about
the nature of relationships among factors.
It is critical that analytic attention be de-
voted to studying the implications of re-
search design for the production of useful
and relevant information for improving
our understanding of immigration and
environmental processes.  Specifically,
research results must be relevant first, for
the accumulation of knowledge about in-
terrelationships among population, migra-
tion and the environment in the United
States and second, for the analysis of
national policies concerning immigration,
population and environmental protection,
and programs to allocate federal resources
among states and localities.  In other na-
tional and regional contexts, survey meth-
odology has been shown to hold useful
analytic potential for explanatory studies
of migration and environmental change
and should be explored for the U.S. con-
text.
Finally, the statistical foundation for the
analysis of the environmental conse-
quences of U.S. immigration must be
strengthened.  Migration statistics—data
on alien immigration, internal migration
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and emigration—must be improved to
accommodate local and regional analysis
for intercensal periods.  As relevant in
these times of fiscal restraint in federal
spending is the critical need to advocate
the continuation and maintenance of cur-
rent statistical programs: INS statistics on
the admission of aliens to the United States
must continue to be collected and made
accessible for public use; questions con-
cerning nativity, citizenship, and geo-
graphic mobility must continue to be
asked on the decennial census and the
Current Population Survey.  Finally, an
assessment of the status of  indicators of
environmental quality and resource avail-
ability is a critical component of develop-
ing an agenda of policy relevant scientific
research.
These broad recommendations beg the
question of strategy for stimulating and
organizing research efforts to address the
important analytic issues concerning U.S.
immigration and the environment.  Inter-
disciplinary collaboration is essential for
the development of a research program
on U.S. immigration and the environment
(cf. Preston 1993:600).  Interaction among
environmental and social scientists must
be facilitated to initiate theoretical devel-
opment, to reflect on research design, and
to document the status of available data,
and ultimately to establish a framework
for interpretation of research results in
connection to the policy process.
Given the need for both baseline docu-
mentation and exploratory research, it
seems highly appropriate to initiate a re-
search program on population, immigra-
tion, and environment for specific regions,
metropolitan areas, and local communi-
ties in the United States.  Selected places
should be identified as research sites in
which an integrated program of research
on population dynamics and environmen-
tal processes would be implemented.  In-
terdisciplinary collaboration among
scientists must be organized within re-
search sites and coordinated with relevant
planning and scientific agencies at the fed-
eral, state, and local levels.  Taken together,
national and local priorities for environ-
mental planning and management, na-
tional goals for immigration policy, and
local needs for population forecasting un-
derscore the importance of a coordinated
research program concerning population,
immigration, and the environment for
regions and communities in the United
States.
A Final
Observation
Barry Commoner (1975:111) once stated
that he knew “. . . of no scientific prin-
ciple which can tell us how much to rely
on population control and how much on
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technological change (and the required
economic controls) in order to reduce en-
vironmental impact.  The choice between
these alternative paths is clearly a politi-
cal one, not a matter of science.”  A some-
what contrasting perspective, inherent in
the analysis presented here, holds that re-
search on the relationships between U.S.
immigration and the environment is an
essential component of rational and
honestdecisionmaking concerning U.S. im-
migration.  “Green” arguments are cur-
rently more acceptable than the
ethnocentric rationale for restrictionism of
Colgate’s President Cutten (Wood 1923).
Whether environmental criteria are appro-
priate grounds for revising immigration
policy encompasses questions that are
within the grasp of social and environ-
mental research.
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Abstract
This paper analyzes major developments
in European migration policies over the
last decades with an eye towards U.S.
public policy concerns.  It summarizes
trends in legal immigration, legalization
policies, policies towards asylum-seekers,
temporary foreign worker admissions, and
measures taken to curb illegal migration.
Western European states have developed
a limited capacity to deter illegal migra-
tion through such measures as employer
sanctions, carrier sanctions, visa policies,
reform of asylum policies.  These mea-
sures will continue to be incrementally
strengthened.  However, they cannot her-
metically seal Europe.  Despite statements
like the French Minister of the Interior’s
call for zero immigration, legal immigra-
tion will continue—as will some illegal
migration.  Further steps will be taken to
enhance integration of legally resident
aliens, who are the most affected by ille-
gal migration.
Rising unemployment and economic re-
structuring have disproportionally af-
fected foreign workers in Europe.  Their
employment characteristics are very dif-
ferent today from what they were in the
1970s.  Despite employer calls for a re-
turn to guestworker and seasonal worker
policies, there does not appear to be a
prospect for massive recruitment of for-
eign labor.  There also is no serious pros-
pect for rollbacks on migrants rights
achieved in the 1970s.  Support for anti-
immigrant parties may have crested and
does not seriously challenge democratic
institutions.  There exists a dense web of
bilateral and multilateral treaties that will
prevent achievement of zero immigration.
This paper seeks to dispel exaggerated
notions of Voelkerwanderung and of ge-
stapo-like treatment of aliens in Europe.
It reveals a remarkable convergence in
migration policy concerns between Europe
and the U.S. at a time when transatlantic
coordination on migration issues is ur-
gently needed.  Europe confronts enor-
mous challenges in the migration area.
Situations like Algeria are most worri-
some.  But uncontrollable mass migration
has not bowled over Europe.  Instead only
a fraction of the migrants who aspire to
take up residency there make it.
Introduction
President Clinton’s moving visit to West-
ern Europe in early June 1994 reaffirmed
long-term United States interests in Euro-
pean democracies and in further develop-
ment of transatlantic partnership.  Within
this context, it seems imperative for
Americans and Europeans, as well as the
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rest of this interdependent world, to ar-
rive at an accurate assessment of Europe’s
migration problem.  There are several
reasons why Americans, in particular,
should be concerned.
First, regulation of international migration
arguably is Europe’s most pressing do-
mestic and foreign policy issue.  Other
competing priorities, such as Europe’s
alarming unemployment, often are bound
up inextricably with the migration issue.
Given global realities, there is no reason
to expect international migration regula-
tion concerns to diminish over the short
to medium term.  Indeed, prospects for
the twenty-first century in this regard are
most daunting.  If not dealt with in a
constructive, comprehensive, and sus-
tained manner, the international migration
issue risks endangering Europe’s demo-
cratic institutions, appreciably destabiliz-
ing societies, and adversely affecting
Europe’s ties with other regions.  Europe-
ans increasingly view international migra-
tion as affecting their national security
(Hamilton 1994).  Americans must take
note of this, as what affects European
security indirectly affects us.  We have a
long-term and vital stake in European se-
curity.
Second, Americans are in the same boat
as Europeans.  For all the differences in
our respective immigration histories, we
confront similar long-term challenges in
the realm of international migration.  A
palpable convergence in U.S. and Euro-
pean immigration issues and concerns has
occurred since World War II.  These simi-
larities make European policies on inter-
national migration instructive, although
analysis must be guarded and nuanced
both by appreciation of underlying and
often highly significant transatlantic dif-
ferences and by variations within Europe.
In this regard, two images of Western
European response to the international
migration challenge are unsettling.  One
portrays Western European and other
Western democracies as unable to prevent
illegal migration.  The most extreme ver-
sion of this image is conjured up by the
German term Voelkerwanderung—the bar-
barian invasions.  This term re-emerged
in the aftermath of the collapse of Com-
munist regimes in Eastern Europe.  The
tottering Soviet government helped propa-
gate the image as part of a gambit for
increased assistance (Brubaker 1992).  Es-
sentially, the message was, “Help us or
millions of us will descend upon you.”
This recalls Mexican President Salinas’
often repeated remark that the U.S. will
either get Mexican tomatoes or Mexican
migrants.
The Voelkerwanderung image, however, is
not to be dismissed lightly.  It is taken
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very seriously by more than a handful of
respected immigration scholars (Cornelius,
Martin & Hollifield 1994).  In its academic
version, the image holds that Western Eu-
ropean and other Western democracies
currently are, and will be, unable to cope
with international migration.  The immi-
gration control strategies of Western de-
mocracies are flawed and fated to fail.  The
deep structural forces at work in the in-
ternational economy and in global society
are such that immigration control mea-
sures are more symbolic than real.  Inter-
national migration essentially is a func-
tion of employment demand.  Democratic
states can do little to correct or adjust con-
tinuing employer demand for cheap for-
eign labor.  Hence, the flows will continue
in one form or another.  As one high-rank-
ing French official phrased it, “One closes
the door but opens the windows.”  Viewed
through this optic, immigration control
strategies serve mainly to legitimate the
state but they ignore or obscure the reali-
ties of illegal migration.
The scenario of mass uncontrollable mi-
gration is disquieting for manifold rea-
sons.  It fuels right-wing extremist parties
that advocate draconian measures, not
only to stop illegal migration, but usually
also to roll back the rights of resident
aliens and even of the rights of certain
freshly naturalized citizens.  The most
extremist envisage mass involuntary re-
patriation of “unwanted aliens”—particu-
larly Muslims.  The appeal of anti-immi-
grant politics, in turn, frustrates integra-
tion policy goals by deepening the chasm
separating immigrant and nonimmigrant
communities.  Moreover, the notion that
little can be done by governments to pre-
vent illegal migration has insidious effects
on the credibility of governments and ad-
versely influences the morale of those
charged with the implementation of pub-
lic policies.  In brief, the image threatens
to become a self-fulfilling prophecy if of-
ficials and publics at large come to view
governmental policies as doomed to fail-
ure or, worse yet, as orchestrated hypoc-
risy.
The second image or scenario is the con-
verse of the first.  Western Europe has
become a Fortress Europa of draconian
immigration policies, hermetically sealed
borders, and oppressive measures towards
all immigrants—illegal, resident alien, or
naturalized citizen (Ireland 1991).  Key to
the Fortress Europa image is an interpreta-
tion of mainstream Western European
political parties and their electorates as
afflicted by contagion from the extremist,
anti-immigrant right.  Parties and leaders
with generally principled and construc-
tive stands on immigration are portrayed
as pandering to xenophobia.  Measured
efforts to prevent illegal immigration or
render inevitably restrictionist policies
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more effective are interpreted as racist or
neo-Nazi in inspiration.  Legitimate dis-
tinctions between resident and nonresident
aliens are obscured in order to denounce
the alleged callousness of governments
and their contempt for the human rights
of migrants.  In this second image, mi-
grants themselves seem incapable of do-
ing wrong and Western European govern-
ments incapable of immigration restriction
consistent with human rights and demo-
cratic norms.
If this second image were accurate, the
cornerstone of America’s relationship with
Western Europe would be in jeopardy.
Democratic societies falter when there is
systematic disregard for human rights and
persistent legal status inequality.  The rule
of law would be in doubt.  One could
expect the massive migrations of the post-
1945 period to end in Spartacus-style re-
volt or sullen acquiescence to a new form
of apartheid.
Fortunately, both commonplace images
badly distort contemporary Western Eu-
ropean immigration realities.  Moreover,
there appears to be only a remote chance
that either scenario will come about in
the future.  One cannot completely rule
out anti-immigrant extremist parties
achieving power one day.  If the National
Front in France or the Republikaners in
Germany were to achieve power, the
democratic nature of those two societies
would very much be in doubt.  However,
even in this most extreme and unlikely
scenario, international constraints, the en-
meshing of these states within the Euro-
pean Union and NATO, as well as other
bilateral and multilateral treaties and re-
lationships, make effective implementation
of extreme anti-immigrant policies, such
as the National Front’s 50- point program,
dubious.
Despite the outcome of the most recent
Italian general election, the spectre of a
resurgence of the extreme right in West-
ern Europe has been blown out of pro-
portion.  There are ample grounds for
vigilance and worry, particularly with
regard to rising anti-immigrant violence
in some countries.  But most voters for
extreme-right parties are not committed
ideologues (Veen, et al. 1993).  Rather,
many are protest voters fed up with per-
ceived governmental laxity in immigra-
tion matters, particularly vis-a-vis asylum-
seekers.  The perception of laxity is incon-
gruent with the image of Fortress Europa,
but it probably is more consistent with
the facts than the latter image.  Western
European governments were unprepared
for the asylum-seeker influx and it took
them a decade or more to adjust.  But
steps have been taken to reduce abuse of
asylum and these measures have had re-
sults.  This should weaken the appeal of
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anti-immigrant extremism in the future.
Recent elections suggest that support for
the National Front in France may have
crested at 15 percent of the electorate.
The spectre of mass uncontrollable migra-
tion and the related notion of democratic
state incapacity to regulate international
migration also cannot be dismissed
readily.  Western European states do face
daunting challenges in regulation of in-
ternational migration and many of their
control efforts to date have been inad-
equate.  Some Western European states
appear more effective than others in this
respect (Freeman 1994).  Substantial ille-
gal immigration to Europe continues two
decades after the onset of serious efforts
by Western European states to curb ille-
gal immigration.  But the apocalypse has
yet to happen.  Indeed, it is very difficult
to ascertain how extensive illegal immi-
gration is, although the figure of 2.6 mil-
lion illegal residents within the European
Union has gained credence.1
Estimates of illegal immigrant populations
are educated guesswork and often are
made to suit political purposes, whether
it be to embarrass a government or a
political rival or to discredit efforts to curb
illegal migration.  The indeterminate na-
ture of the illegal alien population ren-
ders interpretation of Western European
efforts to control illegal immigration much
more akin to an art than a science and
condemns scholarship in this area to un-
relenting controversy.  Nonetheless, it
seems fair to observe that much more is
known about illegal immigration to West-
ern Europe today than two decades ago.
Indeed, improved understanding of what
might be termed the sociology and politi-
cal economy of illegal migration consti-
tutes a major reason for believing that
Western European states will be able to
cope with the challenge of international
migration in the twenty-first century.
Key Trends in
Migration to Europe
since 1970
The great watershed events in the post-
1945 history of international migration to
Europe were the domino-like decisions
from 1972 to 1975 to curb most further
foreign worker recruitment.  These curbs
did not apply to community workers in
various member states of the European
Community, nor within the Nordic Com-
munity, and there were other exceptions,
such as continuing recruitment of seasonal
foreign workers in France and Switzer-
land.  Roughly concurrently with the re-
1 The estimate is W.R. Boehning’s—the ILO’s
migration specialist and the leading
authority on migration to Western Europe
(Salt, et. al. 1994).
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cruitment curbs, Western European
states—some more grudgingly than oth-
ers—came around to acceptance of the
principle of family reunification rights for
resident aliens.  In some instances, sig-
nificant family reunification had occurred
prior to the recruitment curbs.  Indeed,
this growing reality contributed to deci-
sions to stop or curb further recruitment.
European governments belatedly began
integration policies.  Acceptance of fam-
ily reunification was viewed as part and
parcel of integration.  The third prong in
Western European policymaking at this
juncture was the advent of an effort to
deter illegal migration.  Recruitment curbs,
integration of resident aliens and their
families, and prevention of illegal immi-
gration became the cornerstones of policy
in most Western European states.  The
overarching goal was stabilization, if not
reduction, of alien populations.
For more than a decade, a rough stabili-
zation did occur.  This did not mean in-
ternational migration to Western Europe
stopped or that alien populations them-
selves were immutable.  To the contrary,
considerable legal immigration continued
in the form of family reunification.  Some
scholars have chosen to interpret post-1972
family reunification as evidence of gov-
ernmental incapacity to regulate interna-
tional migration.  But, for the most part,
this interpretation is misleading, despite
the discomfiture of many governments
and the currency gained by terms like
“immigration stop” and “sealing the bor-
ders” (Hollifield 1993; van Amersfoord &
Pennix 1994).  Foreign worker settlement
meant that all Western European states
became de facto immigration lands inso-
far as they recognized a right to family
reunification.
As far as resident alien populations were
concerned, while overall numbers stabi-
lized, their characteristics changed signifi-
cantly from 1975 to 1985 and even more
so thereafter.  The key trends were con-
traction of alien populations from nearby
European countries offset by growth of
populations from more culturally and
physically distant countries.  The number
of Spaniards in Germany declined while
the Turkish population grew.
Whereas in Western Europe there were
roughly two employed to one economi-
cally inactive alien residents prior to 1970,
this ratio was reversed by the mid-to- late
1980s, partially because of the continuing
arrival of foreign worker dependents and
of births to resident aliens.  But alien un-
employment was rare until the recession
of the mid-1970s.  By the 1980s, as sug-
gested by Table 1, rates of foreign worker
unemployment typically far exceeded
rates for citizens.  Foreign workers were
disproportionally adversely affected by the
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massive layoffs stemming from recession
and economic restructuring after 1973.
This was due to their concentration in
employment sectors particularly vulner-
able to recession, such as the building
industry, as well as their generally lower
levels of professional qualification and
education.  For instance, many of the for-
eign workers in automobile manufactur-
ing had been recruited for assembly line
work.  When robots replaced teams of fin-
ishing painters in plants like Renault-Flins,
the unemployed foreigners had few pros-
pects for reemployment in industry or for
retraining.  Most lacked the educational
background to find employment in com-
puter-assisted manufacturing (Miller
1986a).
The growth and persistence of resident
alien unemployment profoundly affected
Western Europe.  It contributed to the
growth of anti-immigrant movements.
One of the paradoxes of the period from
1975 to 1985 is that massive resident alien
and citizen unemployment did not end
the illegal migration and illegal alien em-
ployment that had become significant in
a number of Western European states prior
to 1973.  One key factor behind this was
the difficulty of rapidly altering employer
behavior.  As many foreign workers
gained more secure legal status, their
rights of residential and labor market
mobilty increased.  For example, during
this time many seasonal workers in Swit-
zerland acceded to resident alien status.
Table 1.
Unemployment Rates of Nationals and Nonnationals in
France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden, by Age
(below and above 25 years of age) as well as by EEC and
Non-EEC Origin, 1991
         Nationals      Foreigners
Above Below Total Above Below EC Non-EC Total
25 25 25 25 Nationals Natonals
France 7.8 19.4 8.7 15.5 25.8 9.5 22.8 16.7
Germany 3.2   3.8 3.7  8.1  7.1 4.3  9.6   8.0
Netherlands 5.7 10.4 6.6 22.3 31.7 7.8 32.6 24.0
Sweden 1.9   5.7 2.4   5.8 11.5 4.41  8.52   6.6
1Nordic Countries
2Non-Nordic Countries.
Source: Heinz Werner, Integration of Foreign Workers into the Labour Market-France, Germany, the Netherlands
and Sweden, Geneva: ILO, 1994, p.51.
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As they did, they left their jobs for better
paying and more attractive (e.g., day jobs
rather than night shifts) employment.
The key to any seasonal worker or
guestworker program is to restrict the
labor market and residency mobility of
foreign workers, thereby ensuring certain
employers access to labor outside the
wage and working conditions constraints
set by normal national (and now regional)
labor market mechanisms.  At the same
time, Swiss employers faced dwindling ac-
cess to legal seasonal labor as their gov-
ernment, under considerable political pres-
sure from anti-immigration campaigns
throughout the 1970s, reduced annual con-
tingents of seasonal workers.  Seasonal
foreign worker admissions fell from
206,000 in 1964 to 90,000 by 1976 (Miller
1986b).  Many Swiss employers probably
illegally hired foreign workers rather than
restructure their employment practices.
Hence, the paradoxical coexistence of high
resident alien unemployment and continu-
ing illegal alien employment arose.  Some
governments began efforts to improve
manual labor conditions, such as the
French in their revalorisation du travail
manual program of the mid-to-late 1970s,
but the effects of several decades of mas-
sive foreign worker recruitment upon la-
bor markets and employment practices
could not be undone quickly.  It is diffi-
cult to say whether employer recourse to
illegal alien labor rose or fell across West-
ern Europe from 1975 to 1985 as com-
pared to the previous decade.  The suspi-
cion is that it fell in France but rose in
Germany and Switzerland.
Another key change in employment char-
acteristics was the dramatic increase in
foreign labor employment in service in-
dustries and the decline in the traditional
sectors of foreign worker concentration—
manufacturing and construction.  The
French data in Table 2 are emblematic of
a broader trend.  The implications of this
massive shift for nascent European efforts
to curb illegal immigration are important.
Aliens increasingly found employment in
firms and sectors more prone to illegal
alien employment.  Additionally, the de-
velopment of temporary employment,
manpower leasing, and—more generally—
greater flexibility in labor market and
management practices created new and
more extensive illegal employment oppor-
tunities.  The decline of unions probably
was both a cause and an effect of these
trends.
This decade of stabilization also witnessed
the affirmation of Islam.  This was part
and parcel of the settlement process.  As
more and more immigrants gained secure
residency and employment rights and as
prospects for return home dimmed, they
built mosques, formed
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Islamic associations, and created Islamic
educational and cultural institutions.  This
affirmation was aided in many cases by
Western European governments and em-
ployers, in some instances as part of inte-
gration policy, in others to forestall the
appeal of trade unions and radical politi-
cal movements (Kepel 1987).  Homeland
governments and states like Libya and
Saudi Arabia also played key roles.  There
were violent spillovers of homeland poli-
tics to Western Europe as well as the pen-
etration of Islamic fundamentalism.  Many
Western Europeans, in mounting appre-
hension over the long-term political inte-
gration of Muslim immigrants, viewed this
religious affirmation with alarm.   The
anti-immigrant movements of the 1980s
and 1990s often had anti-Islamic as well
as antisemitic overtones.
Another hallmark of the stabilization de-
cade was a North-South convergence
within Western Europe.  The countries of
massive emigration in Southern Europe
prior to the 1970s became significant coun-
tries of immigration.  In part, this was
due to closing of the development gap
between countries like Italy and Germany
within the European Community.  In part,
this was due to the recruitment curbs
instituted in Northern Europe.  Foreign
workers, who might have gone to France
or Belgium in the 1960s, went to Italy or
Spain instead.
Within a decade, Spain, Italy, Greece, and
even Portugal became immigration lands
in their own right and confronted many
of the immigration control questions faced
by their partners to the North.  This inter-
Table 2.
Evolution of Employed Aliens and Citizens in France by Sector from 1975 to 1990
Economic Sector 1975 % Aliens 1990 % Aliens Evolution from 1975 to 1982 (%)
Total French Aliens
Total Employment 20,943,900     7.2 22,232,974     5.8 + 6.1 + 7.7 -14.2
Agriculture   2,108,680     4.1   1,250,994     3.5 -40.7 -40.3 -48.8
Industry   8,074,040   12.3   6,692,221     9.0 -17.1 -14.1 -38.8
(of which Automobile)      499,010   17.3      394,492   10.8 -20.9 -14.7 -50.7
(of which Building)   1,906,070   21.3   1,638,468   16.3 -14.0 -  8.6 -34.0
Services 10,761,180     4.1 14,289,759     4.5       +32.8           +32.1         +49.0
Source: Adapted from Claude-Valentin Marie, Restructuration du système productif, emploi des étrangers et
travail illegal: L’experience française
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European Community convergence in im-
migration circumstances, while very un-
even, created more of an objective basis
for inter-European state cooperation and
coordination on questions and issues of
prevention of unwanted immigration than
earlier.  Nevertheless, enormous differ-
ences between Western European states
persisted by the mid-to- late 1980s in
migration policy and the Southern Euro-
pean states generally manifested less
alarm over international migration than
Northern Europe.  There may be empiri-
cal reasons for this; annual rates of legal
migration vary sharply in Western Europe,
from more than 1 percent per year in Ger-
many (more than 1  million newcomers in
a population of 81 million), to 0.5 to 0.6
percent in the Benelux and Scandinavian
countries, to 0.1 to 0.3 percent in South-
ern Europe.
For all the North-South convergence, Ital-
ians, Spaniards, Greeks, and Portuguese
tended to view international migration
somewhat differently and more gener-
ously.  Their permeability to illegal immi-
gration and the relative complacency
about it deeply worried immigration offi-
cials in such countries as France.  Ulti-
mately, this disjuncture would impede
efforts by European Union member states
to coordinate policies towards illegal im-
migration in the 1990s.  While the spring
1994 postponement sine die of the elimi-
nation of international frontiers foreseen
under the Single European Act [SEA] was
attributed to technical reasons, lurking in
the background were the concerns of
Northern Europeans that their Southern
European Union partners simply are not
far enough along the path to controlling
illegal immigration to risk elimination of
frontier controls.
One final defining feature of the period
bears underscoring, particularly in light
of the Fortress Europa image.  While West-
ern European governments clearly became
drastically more restrictive in terms of
foreign worker admissions by 1975, more
and more legally-admitted aliens gained
greater security of residency and employ-
ment rights.  This constituted a major
achievement for European democracy, as
it was long unclear that many foreign
workers would be allowed to renew resi-
dency and employment permits.  Most
foreign workers secured greater residen-
tial and labor market freedom by qualify-
ing for more favored status through con-
tinuous employment and residency.
By the early 1960s, the Swiss government
for instance, had come under pressure
from the Italian government to accord a
more liberal status to long-term Italian sea-
sonal workers.  The 1964 revision of the
Italo-Swiss bilateral labor agreement en-
abled more and more Italian seasonal
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workers, who technically are not residents
and thereby are not counted as part of the
total population of Switzerland, to qualify
for resident alien status.  The movement
for migrant rights began in the 1960s and,
in some respects, resembled the civil rights
movement in the United States.  It made
great progress across Western Europe by
1985.  The French government’s decision
in 1984 to accord qualified resident aliens
a ten-year, automatically renewable resi-
dency and employment permit—le titre
unique—represented one capstone of a
process long in the making.
The advances made in legally-admitted
alien rights conferred a more liberal
status upon resident aliens in Western Eu-
rope that narrowed transatlantic differ-
ences pertaining to resident alien status.
While the goals of Western European in-
tegration policies were not achieved in
many areas, significant progress, as at-
tested to by the German data in Table 3,
was made in terms of resident alien rights.
Western European strategies of immigra-
tion control were predicated on the no-
tion that prevention of illegal immigra-
Table 3.
Improvements in Residence Status of Germany’s Aliens
1982 1992
Aliens with residence permit of any kind 3,245,959 3,870,765
Aliens from non-EC countries
with a limited residence permit. 1,482,9449 99,685
(=45.7%) (=25.8%)
Aliens from non-EC countries
with an unlimited residence permit. 804,975 991,799
(=24.8%) (=25.6%)
Aliens from non-EC countries
with a right of residence. 40,178 809,236
(=1.2%) (=20.9%)
Aliens with an EC residence permit 917,862 1,070,045
(=28.3%) (=27.6%)
Aliens with a consolidated residence status
(items 3, 4, and 5). 1,763,015 2,871,080
(=54.3%) (=74.2%)
Source: Survey of the Policy and Law Concerning Foreigners in the Federal Republic of Germany, 1993, p.24.
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tion was complementary to integration of
resident aliens.
The Crisis of
International
Migration to Europe
A confluence of five factors ushered in a
new period by 1990.  Historical period-
ization is highly interpretative and seldom
uncontroversial.  Many of the hallmarks
of the current migratory period can be
traced back to the 1970s or earlier.  On
the whole, there was more continuity than
discontinuity between what are labelled
here the decade of stabilization and the
current period.  However, since the late
1980s, a new sense of urgency over inter-
national migration has set in.  Crisis is
too strong a term if one compares the
contemporary situation to that which ex-
isted in Europe in the late 1930s.  What
the term connotes here is the growing
saliency of international migration issues
in domestic and foreign policies by
roughly 1990.
International migration increasingly was
viewed as linked to national security and
moved up the agendas of high-ranking
officials—including diplomats.  Indeed,
the idiom of the international migration
specialist—terms like “boatpeople,”
“guestworkers,” “nonrefoulement” and
“asylum-seekers” that were not in most
persons’ vocabularies several decades
earlier—increasingly had become the
idiom of diplomacy.  There was a marked
increase in diplomatic efforts on the inter-
national migration front beyond what
there had been during the Cold War era.
In part, this was imputable to a long over-
due redefinition of national security as the
threat of East/West military confrontation
waned.
The asylum-seeker influx had reached per-
ceived crisis proportions in Germany by
1980.  What is important is how rapidly
asylum requests snowballed.  As late as
the early 1970s, as seen in Table 4, there
were minuscule numbers of asylum-seek-
ers.  The increase was clearly linked to
the recruitment curbs, but there also were
numerous adverse developments in po-
litical order around the world.  The glo-
bal refugee population doubled in the
1980s.
Rightly or wrongly, the asylum-seeker
influx undercut the credibility of Western
European immigration control strategies.
As Table 5 indicates, the vast majority of
asylum-seekers were not found to be bona
fide refugees entitled to asylum.  Adjudi-
cation of claims and maintenance of the
claimants cost enormous sums.  Further,
more than one-half of those claimants
denied refugee status managed to stay on,
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Table 5.
Asylum-Seekers Recognized as Refugees in Germany 1979-1993 (%)
1979 16.5%
1980 12.0%
1981   7.7%
1982   6.8%
1983 13.7%
1984 26.6%
1985 29.2%
1986 15.9%
1987   9.5%
1988   8.6%
1989   5.0%
1990   4.4%
1991   6.9%
1992   4.3%
1993 (first six months)   2.1%
         Source: Survey of the Policy and Law Concerning Foreigners, 1993, p.61
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thereby frustrating immigration control
goals.  The perception that asylum-seek-
ers were circumventing the recruitment
curbs through abuse of asylum provisions
caused a political firestorm that today still
threatens the viability of the international
refugee system.  Its sustainability vitally
interests the United States as well as Eu-
rope.
The second factor contributing to a quali-
tative change was the collapse of Com-
munist systems.  Since the early 1970s —
the time of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment
in the United States—Western democra-
cies had pressed for softening of the rigid
mobility controls imposed by Communist
governments upon their citizenries.  Ger-
man Ostpolitik, US-Soviet détente and
signing of the Helsinki Accords gradually
opened the door to emigration from the
Soviet bloc states.  During the 1980s, as
seen in Table 6, Germany granted ever
greater numbers of visas to citizens of
Soviet bloc states.  This outflow probably
contributed to the momentous events of
1989 and 1990.  Mass exit of citizens of
the German Democratic Republic through
Czechoslovakia and Hungary to Austria
triggered a fateful chain of events that led
to an East German decision to open the
Wall.  Within a year, the euphoria over
German national reunification had given
way to the spectre of Voelkerwanderung.
A third factor contributing to change was
the progress made toward implementa-
tion of the SEA.  Within the Schengen
Group (established to hasten progress
towards realization of a single market),
discussion of the modalities of eliminat-
ing internal frontiers had advanced.  While
the SEA had been rapidly signed and
ratified without consequential political op-
Table 6.
Visas Delivered to Citizens of Eastern Bloc States by Germany 1980-1989
Hungary
116,700
127,600
131,500
131,400
151,226
182,739
214,362
213,221
314,160
Year
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989*
Poland
283,800
458,700
135,500
210,400
327,400
375,554
408,232
501,780
725,000
Czech
121,700
130,700
131,600
133,700
164,700
154,790
165,882
183,742
266,369
Rumania
43,100
43,600
41,100
40,300
43,979
39,622
35,528
39,499
36,360
USSR
29,800
33,000
30,700
30,700
26,097
31,156
31,462
57,801
84,067
Bulgaria
17,200
19,600
20,700
20,400
20,300
24,774
24,315
25,658
33,949
     Total
   591,600
   813,200
   492,100
   566,900
   733,702
   808,635
   879,781
1,021,702
1,459,965
2,000,000
Adapted from Michael Vial and Werner Walzel Illegale Beschaeftingung, p.159.
*Estimate as of May, 1990
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position, some citizens feared that the
elimination of internal frontier controls
would result in large influxes of aliens
from nearby states.  The National Front in
France, for instance, stoked the fear that
the single market would result in a new
influx of Turks from Germany, such as
had happened during the legalization
period of 1981 to 1983.  While these fears
for the most part seemed unfounded, they
nevertheless contributed to a sense of
unease.
The persistence of integration problems
constituted a fourth factor.  Immigrant dis-
advantage in housing, education, employ-
ment, health, and other areas was noth-
ing new.  But these problems seemed more
intractable by 1990 than they did fifteen
or twenty years earlier.  U.S.-style urban
disturbances involving predominately
immigrant-origin minority populations
erupted in the United Kingdom, France,
and Belgium.  Muslim demonstrations
against Salman Rushdie shocked many
Western Europeans.  A growing rift be-
tween the Islamic and Western worlds in-
creasingly seemed to rend the fabric of
Western European societies.  The progres-
sion of the electoral inroads of extreme
right anti-immigrant parties augured
poorly for integration.
And then there were the illegal immi-
grants.  Nobody knew how many there
were, but their presence in certain indus-
tries and jobs persisted despite enforce-
ment of employer sanctions, legalizations
in some countries, and other steps.
A siege mentality set in, fostered in no
small part by exaggerated fears of
Voelkerwanderung.  The Fortress Europa
image was clearly exaggerated too.  That
the two could co-exist in the early 1990s
was symptomatic of a profound malaise.
Mercifully, Europe’s migration problem
can, and probably will, be managed in a
fashion consistent with human rights and
democratic values.  One can best begin to
fathom this by examining the new bar-
barian invasion potential from Eastern
Europe and beyond.
Why the New
Barbarian Invasions
Have Not Materialized
from the East or the
South
Table 7 reveals a steady increase in the
numbers of East to West migrants.  But
many of these post-1989 immigrants are
welcomed abroad.  They are Jews migrat-
ing to Israel, ethnic Germans being reinte-
grated into German society, ethnic Greeks
returning to Greece, and so on.  Although
both German and Israeli authorities sus-
pect that a fraction of those emigrating
from Eastern Europe and beyond have
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falsified their origins to qualify to emi-
grate, the overall numbers of ethnic kin,
in principle, are finite.  Despite the zeal
shown by Israeli authorities to attract Jew-
ish emigration from the former Soviet bloc,
numbers of Jewish immigrants have de-
clined sharply.  The Israelis probably will
not get the one or two million immigrants
foreseen by former Prime Minister Shamir.
The German government, perhaps because
it bears the full cost of reintegrating the
ethnic German Aussiedler, unlike the Is-
raelis, has taken steps to limit the inflow.
It has signed agreements with the Rus-
sian Federation to aid the reestablishment
of the Volga Germans along the Volga
River.  It also has instituted an annual
quota on the number of Aussiedler permit-
ted to reintegrate into Germany.
Most aspiring migrants from Eastern Eu-
rope and beyond cannot qualify for privi-
leged treatment on ethnic grounds.  If they
are to emigrate, they will need a visa or
they will have to emigrate illegally.  For
most, visas will be difficult to come by.
Illegal emigration is an option, but it is
difficult and, for many, expensive.  Thriv-
ing human smuggling rings have sprung
up to funnel immigrants into Western
Europe much as Chinese gangs do with
illegal Chinese migrants to the United
States.  Indeed, punishment and preven-
tion of human smuggling was one of the
major goals of both the October 1991 Ber-
lin Conference attended by twenty-seven
Table 7.
Total Annual Immigration of Aliens to Western European States (EC and EFTA), 1985-1992
  1985   1986   1987   1988   1989   1990   1991   1992
Regular registered
Immigration for Residence 650,000 720,000 760,000 910,000 1,080,000 980,000 1,020,000 1,240,000
Constitutional
 immigration right 50,000 53,000 101,000 217,000 392,000 417,000 239,000 252,000
Asylum seekers 160,000 190,000 170,000 220,000 310,000 430,000 550,000 680,000
War refugees
from former Yugoslavia --- --- --- --- --- --- 42,000 370,000
Illegal immigration
(estimate) 50,000 65,000 55,000 90,000 150,000 210,000 280,000 370,000
TOTAL 910,000 1,028,000 1,086,000 1,437,000 1,932,200 2,037,000 2,131,000 2,912,000
Source: J. Widgren, Shaping a multilateral response to future migrations.  In K. Hamilton (ed.), Migration and the New Europe,
pp.40-41.
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West and East European countries and of
the February 1993 follow-up meeting in
Budapest.
According to German crime statistics,
more than one-half of recorded offenses
for smuggling of people in 1992 were per-
petrated by aliens.  Parenthetically, those
same statistics record 550,583 foreigners
as having broken German laws in 1992.
Aliens comprised one third of all suspects.
While aggregate crime statistics need to
be interpreted with care as they include
violations of immigration laws, and while
sociological factors like the relative youth
and lower socio-economic status of aliens
in general must be considered, alien crimi-
nality clearly also is contributing to the
malaise over migration (Federal Misistry
of the Interior 1993).
While human smuggling obviously will
be a long-term concern, steps are being
taken to stanch it.  Two other factors ap-
pear to mitigate against mass unwanted
migration from the East.  The first is de-
mography.  International migration largely
involves young adults.  Much of Eastern
Europe’s demographic profile is not that
dissimilar from Western Europe although
there are exceptions like Romania.2  One
simply does not find the same demo-
graphic pressure to migrate that one finds
in Egypt or Morocco, for example.  De-
mography suggests that the threat of mass
unwanted migration is much greater from
the swath from Turkey to Morocco than
from Eastern Europe.
Moreover, studies of illegal immigration
underscore the importance of networks to
illegal immigration.  Networks can be
comprised of family, kin, fellow villagers,
or even fellow nationals who provide in-
formation about employment opportuni-
ties, offer lodging, and help aliens melt
into an immigration society.  In the case
of the former Soviet bloc lands, they were
cut off from most of the rest of the world,
including Western Europe, until only a few
years ago.  This leads to a suspicion that
networks are not in place to facilitate
massive illegal migration from the East.
Again the threat appears greater from the
South than it does from the East because
of the durable legacy of the guestworker
period.
A further reason why Voelkerwanderung
from the East has not materialized to the
extent feared is proactive policy.  Since
1990, Western European governments,
including the European Union, have
stepped up efforts to ensure that
Voelkerwanderung does not occur.  This
effort is multipronged, encompassing fi-
2 This observation was first made by Georges
Tapinos, the leading French immigration
expert, in a speech at the Salzburg Seminar
in Austria in April 1991.
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nancial and other forms of assistance, bi-
lateral and multilateral negotiations, and
other initiatives.  The undeclared strategy
seems to be to fashion the traditional tran-
sition zone from Eastern to Western Eu-
rope into a kind of international migra-
tion buffer zone—an illegal migration cor-
don sanitaire.  Poland, Hungary, and the
Czech and Slovak Republics have signed
association treaties with the European
Union.  Their nationals will benefit from
visa-free entry into the European Union
(although the United Kingdom has not
been cooperating on many immigration-
related initiatives).  The unstated quid pro
quo is cooperation with EU member states
in regulation of international migration.
Specifically, readmission treaties have been
signed (or prepared) that will enable states
such as Germany to deport unauthorized
alien entrants to the countries through
which the detained illegal entrant tran-
sited.
Implementation of the readmission agree-
ments has been difficult and incomplete,
but a conceptual and legal system has been
put in place that should facilitate exclu-
sion of detected illegal residents.  This has
long been the achilles heel of Western Eu-
ropean migration control strategies—a
problem to which Americans should pay
a great deal of attention  as they reform
asylum procedures.  Recent reporting on
bilateral Polish-German and Czech-Ger-
man cooperation in control of illegal im-
migration suggests numerous barriers to
effective cooperation remain, but progress
also has been made.
All four of the buffer states have become
significant immigration lands in their own
right.  Hundreds of thousands of Russians
and others enter Poland to barter goods
or to work temporarily in much the same
way that Poles did in Germany in the late
1980s.  Much will depend on whether
these buffer states develop their govern-
mental capacity to regulate international
migration.  The European Union states are
encouraging them to do so through fora
like the Berlin, Budapest, and Vienna con-
ferences and more discretely by informally
linking economic assistance and good re-
lations to effective cooperation on regula-
tion of international migration.
Another prong of proactive policy con-
cerns steps to prevent the generation of
refugees.  The Treaty of Paris, to which
the United States is a signatory, created
the Conference on Security and Coopera-
tion in Europe [CSCE].  The third basket
of this treaty in essence envisaged the
creation of a zone from the Urals to the
Atlantic in which there would be minimal
criteria for respect of human rights and
personal welfare.  If attained, the criteria
theoretically would preclude bona fide re-
quests for asylum by persons living in the
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zone.  As Table 8 indicates, asylum appli-
cations by persons from five Central and
Eastern European countries in EU mem-
ber states more than doubled between
1991 and 1992.  The goal of CSCE is to
ensure respect for rights and maintenance
of a minimal level of personal welfare so
that such requests become transparently
frivolous.
Alas, CSCE has not worked as hoped.  The
breakup of Yugoslavia has created an es-
timated 3.8 million refugees and displaced
persons.  As Table 9 suggests, significant
numbers of persons fleeing the fighting in
Yugoslavia have been accorded refugee
status in Western Europe, particularly in
Germany.  Others have been afforded tem-
porary protected status as seen in Table
10.  However, without wishing to appear
insensitive to the suffering of others, the
key lesson of the Yugoslav crisis, if it is
not to premature to draw one, is that most
refugees and displaced persons have not
reached Western Europe, despite Trieste
being a day’s drive from Sarajevo.  Visas
are required for the refugees and displaced
to get out.  Most do not get them.  In-
stead, the bulk of the victims of war and
ethnic cleansing have had to find haven
nearby in Croatia or UN-protected safe
havens.  Thus, while the Yugoslav trag-
edy testifies to the shortcomings of the
CSCE launched with such fanfare, perhaps
it also suggests what may be the pattern
for the future.
Most observers agree that there is enor-
mous potential for Yugoslav-style conflict
from Bosnia to the Caucuses and through-
out Soviet successor states.  It is not far-
fetched to imagine millions and millions
of additional refugees and displaced per-
sons being created in the next decade.
Like the Bosnians, many of these hypo-
thetical refugees would undoubtedly pre-
fer to find haven in Western Europe and
other Western democracies.  However,
they probably will be unable to reach
Western Europe and will have to find safe
havens nearby.  In extremis, confronted
with an imminent mass inflow of aliens—
be they refugees or not—of such magni-
tude as to endanger security, most West-
Table 8.
Number of Asylum-
Seekers from Central
and Eastern Europe
(Excluding Former
Yugoslavia) in the
European Union
Country of Origin 1991   1992
Bulgaria 15,094 33,203
Czechoslovakia   1,873   3,109
Hungary      646   1,163
Poland   5,899   5,979
Romania 50,872          111,346
TOTAL 76,375          156,792
Source: Commission of the European Communities, On
Immigration and Asylum Policies, p.5, Annex 1.
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ern European states would conceivably
use their armies to stanch unwanted en-
try.  As a well-informed Dutch official once
put it, there are three scenarios for migra-
tion from the East—bad, worse and cata-
strophic.  Contingency planning for the
latter scenario includes utilization of the
military.
It is too early to declare Voelkerwanderung
from the East a false alert.  But contem-
plation of further variables and factors also
suggest it is not going to happen in dis-
ruptive ways.  Several Western European
countries have authorized fairly substan-
tial temporary foreign employment from
Poland in particular.  The number of Poles
Table 9.
Balkan Refugees
Outside Former Yugoslavia. Within Former Yugosalvia
      (Aug. 1992 est)      (Sept. 1992 est.)
                                From:
Location Location  Croatia     B&H      TOTAL
Austria 57,500 Croatia                  271,798 335,985    607,783
Belgium   1,800 UN-Areas                    87,000      87,000
Czech Rep.    4000 Servia                  162,337 252,130    414,467
Denmark   1,795 B&H  93,000 588,000    681,000
Finland   1,892 Montenegro    6,743   50,857      57,600
France   1,108 Slovenia    1,000   69,000      70,000
Germany           220,000 Macedonia    2,500   28,000      30,500
Greece          7 TOTALS                   624,378     1,323,972    1,948,350
Holland   6,300
Hungary 50,000
Ireland        10
Italy 17,000
Lux.   1,200
Norway   2,617
Poland   1,500
Spain      120
Sweden 47,600
Switz. 70,450
Turkey 15,000
U.K.   2,000
Others 30,013
Total                  531,912
Source: The Economist, September 19, 1992, p.66.
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officially admitted as temporary workers
in agriculture and other industries in Ger-
many has soared to between 200,000 and
300,000.  Many of the new temporary
foreign workers are contract workers and
trainees.  Many are skilled.  There are
some indications that Western European
states are reorienting foreign labor poli-
cies to the East, particularly to Poland.
Highly-skilled and professionally-edu-
cated workers are in demand in many
Western European countries despite high
unemployment.  Many Eastern European
and Soviet successor states seek to export
their labor much like East Asian states do.
The Vienna Conference on East-West Mi-
gration in January 1991, which was backed
by the Council of Europe, pushed the idea
Table 10.
Number of Places Offered to Vulnerable Groups from Former Yugoslavia by the End of April 1993/EU and
Other Receiving Countries (figures marked with + do not include family members).
COUNTRY NUMBER OF PERSONS
Belgium 200
Denmark 200
France                1,320
Germany              17,000
Greece                   150
Ireland                   340
Italy                   400
Luxembourg                     10
Netherlands                  200+
United Kingdom           1,000+
COUNTRY NUMBER OF PERSONS
Australia                   250
Austria                  200+
Canada                  500
Czech Republic              500
Finland                   72+
Malaysia                  100
New Zealand                   50+
Sweden                 150+
Switzerland
    (incl. refugees
    and temporary
     protected status      5,635
Turkey                  270
USA               1,000
Source:  Commission of the European Communities, On Immigration and Asylum Policies, p.6, Annex
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of bilateral foreign labor programs.  But
there are no current expectations for large-
scale recruitment of foreign labor from
Central and Eastern Europe.  Long-term
labor market prospects for blue-collar
workers in Western Europe are grim, de-
spite the much ballyhooed aging of Euro-
pean societies within the European Union.
(The total population of the European
Union—347 million—is expected to fall to
340 million by 2025).  The European Com-
mission has recommended that third coun-
try nationals, e.g., Turkish residents of
Germany or Algerian residents of France,
be granted priority in access to employ-
ment if job vacancies occur anywhere in
the EU (Commission of the European
Communities 1994, p.34).  As Heinz
Werner has argued, and as suggested by
the contrasting trends in unskilled and
skilled employment of foreign workers
from member states within the EU in
Table 11, the future of labor migration be-
longs mainly to professional-level mi-
grants.
All in all, the scenario of mass unwanted
migration seems much more plausible for
migration from the South than from the
East.  Demographic pressures and net-
works make the prospect real.  Here again
the worst has not yet happened.  The
Algerian impasse, however, is most wor-
risome.  Already in 1990, middle-class
Algerians (e.g., professors) were getting
out (Talha 1990).  Now millions want out
and some, like Sheik Turabi in Sudan, have
predicted that up to four million refugees
will flee the establishment of an Islamic
government.  Unlike the former Socialist
Minister of the Interior, who declared that
France would not accept mass migration
Table 11.
Foreign Employees in the F.R. of Germany by Occupational Qualification 1977-1992
(indices 1980 = 100)
Level of Qualification Foreign Employees
Total EC Nationals
1977 1987 1992 1977 1987 1992
Trainees     87   157   292   92   82   93
Employees with
     low qualification     96     74     94 103   62   60
Middle-level qualification     93     87   109   94   78   82
Graduate employees     86     98   122   84   96 115
Total Employees 9580   102   100     67   67
Absolute Numbers (in 1000) 1889 1589 2036 730 492 494
Source: Heinz Werner
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from Algeria, the current Foreign Minis-
ter, M. Juppé, estimates that France might
receive one million refugees from Algeria
in the event of regime change (Eizenstat
1994).
There is a great deal of uncertainty be-
cause, under the Evian Accords that en-
abled Algeria’s independence, Algerian
citizens born before 1962 (when Algeria
was legally part of France) are entitled to
request French citizenship (Abdi 1994).
And, the numbers of Algerian citizens re-
questing asylum are growing both in
France and throughout the EU.  In 1991,
1,730 and in 1992, 8,158 applications were
made by Algerians in the EU (Commis-
sion of the European Community 1994,
p.9, Annex I).
How, though, would a million Algerians
flee to France?  It would have to occur as
a trickle, gradually, and this is happen-
ing.  Some Algerian citizens with valid
residency permits are returning, as are
dual citizens.  But as in Bosnia, most who
might want to get to France cannot; they
stand a better chance making it to Tunisia
or Morocco.  The French, and probably
the Spaniards and Italians as well, will
not permit a mass spontaneous arrival of
tens of thousands of Algerians.  They will
use their militaries, if necessary, to pre-
vent it.  In the French case, in particular,
one cannot ignore historical precedents.
Draconian measures were taken against
French citizens of Algerian Muslim origin
as late as 1961 albeit in the context of the
Algerian war (Einaudi 1991).
At this point, the Fortress Europa image
might seem apt after all.  But, even in this
acute scenario, it is not.  The French will
allow entry to those entitled (the poten-
tial numbers are unclear).  They will ac-
commodate as many refugees as possible,
but there is an undefined limit beyond
which they will not go.  Governmental
handling of the Algerian impasse may
damage integration goals.  The arrival in
power of an Islamic government would
certainly complicate Franco-Algerian re-
lations and management of transnational
Franco-Algerian society.  It is conceivable
that fundamentalist influence would grow
amongst resident aliens and citizens of
North African Muslim origin, but the secu-
larizing influence of French culture should
not be underestimated.  It appeals par-
ticularly to Berber minorities like the
Kabyles who historically emigrated to
France in dispro-portionally high numbers
relative to other Algerians.
Realistically, a more frightening scenario
concerning Algeria would be spillover of
the violence across the Mediterranean to
metropolitan France.  This has not yet
happened, but there is ample historical
precedent.  The French government al-
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ready has taken steps to round up sus-
pected Islamic militants.  This cannot be
said to endanger the rights of Algerian
residents of France any more than it does
those of French citizens.  After several
years of armed conflict and a steadily
mounting human toll, however, a resolu-
tion to the impasse has not materialized.
This casts a long shadow over the future
of North Africa and Europe.
Assessing West
European Capacity to
Prevent Illegal
Migration
Nightmare scenarios over Algeria aside,
there are many reasons to expect Europe
to cope with its migration dilemmas.  The
imagined Fortress Europa cannot come
about short of a revolution.  French Min-
ister of the Interior Pasqua may declare
that the goal of his government is zero
immigration, but this represents ill-con-
sidered rhetoric, nothing more.  Western
Europeans realize they have a great stake
in immigrant integration.  Indications
suggest that they will do more not less to
achieve this goal in the future.  Western
European democracies, as Table 12 indi-
cates, are scarcely hermetically-sealed so-
cieties.  Quite significant numbers of aliens
enter legally each year.  It is the illegal
immigrants and asylum-seekers that most
worry Europeans.
On the asylum front, virtually all Western
European states have streamlined asylum
procedures.  Critics worry that govern-
ments have gone too far, thereby endan-
gering respect for nonrefoulement.  They
also worry about displacement of asylum-
adjudication to the fledgling democracies
of Central and Eastern Europe.
Table 13 reveals a drop in overall asylum
applications in 1993.  A consistent pat-
tern, however, did not emerge as asylum
applications in the Netherlands, for in-
stance, rose.  Nonetheless, reforms under-
taken in Germany and France in recent
years clearly have had the desired effect.
Apparently, asylum applications are down
more than 50 percent in Germany since
the revision of asylum law in July 1993
(Papademetrios 1994).  Better data on the
effects of recent reforms on France are
available and, from the standpoint of im-
migration control, also are  quite encour-
aging.
As seen in Table 14, asylum applications
skyrocketed in France, reaching a high
point of 61,422 in 1989.  In 1988 and 1989,
the specialized French agency for refugees
—known by its acronym OFPRA—re-
ceived a large budget increase.  The addi-
tional monies were spent to modernize
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procedures and to recruit and train addi-
tional personnel.  This, in turn, enabled
more decisions to be taken, and the num-
ber of decisions nearly tripled from 1989
to 1990.  The average time that applica-
tions took to be adjudicated decreased to
less than six months.  Table 15 indicates
that the applicant recognition rate also
plummeted in the late 1980s and early
1990s, although France continued to rec-
ognize a higher percentage of asylum
applicants than Germany.  The quicken-
ing of the average adjudication duration
may have had a deterrent effect upon
frivolous claims.  However, roughly si-
multaneously, the French stopped the
automatic grant of employment permits
to asylum applicants.
Recent trends in asylum applications in
Germany and France suggest that revi-
sions of rules and procedures and beefing
up personnel do make a difference.  The
change in the German asylum law will
make it very difficult for applicants who
transit countries abutting Germany to
have their cases heard as most such indi-
viduals will be returned to the neighbor-
ing state.  The Dublin Convention signed
by EU member states to discourage mul-
tiple applications is not yet functioning.
But, when it comes into effect, it should
ease the enormous burden shouldered by
Germany.  The question is: Will the Aus-
trians and the Czechs be able to cope?
Legalization policies represent another
way that Western European states attempt
Table 12.
Total Immigration in the European Union
Member State         1989        1990       1991     1992
Belgium       54.149     62.682       67.460      66,763
Denmark       38.391     40.715       43.567      43,337
Germany   1522,190                   1256.250   1182.027    666,585
Greece       38.644     42.021       24.346      32.132
Spain       33.910     33.988       24.320      38.882
France     94.855     102.108    110.867
Ireland     33.300       40.800
Italy       81.201   168.754     128.935
Luxembourg         9.143     10.281       10.913      10.698
Netherlands       98.916   117.350     120.237    116.928
Portugal      13.700
United Kingdom     249.752   288.787     288,522    215.900
“Total”  2.128.285                  2,150,973  2,035,236 1,317,784
Source: EUROSTAT
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Table 14.
The Recovery from the Asylum Emergency in France
Number of Number of                        % of
Asylum Decisions                          Decisions/
Applications                                          Applications
1981 19,863 18,767   94.5
1982 22,505 21,210   94.2
1983 22,350 20,860   93.3
1984 21,714 21,928 101.0
1985 28,925 26,662   92.2
1986 26,290 27,274 103.7
1987 27,672 26,628   96.2
1988 34,352 25,425   74.0
1989 61,422 31,170   50.7
1990 54,813 87,352 159.4
1991 47,380 78,442 165.6
1992 28,873 37,202 128.8
Source:  Adapted from OFPRA Documents
Table 13.
Number of Asylum-Seekers in European Union
Year    1991    1992    1993
Belgium   15,354   17,647   22,039
Germany 256,112 438,191 322,599
Denmark     4,609   13,884     6,121
Spain     8,138   11,708     5,778
France   47,380   27,000
Greece     5,944     4,000        827
Ireland          31        250          65
Italy   28,000     2,500     1,005
Luxembourg        238     2,000        381
Netherlands   21,615   20,346   35,399
Portugal        163        200     2,091
United Kingdom   57,700   32,000   22,350
Total     447,275 571,718 420,718
Source: Commission of the European Communities,  . . . On Immigration and Asylum Policies, p.12.
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Table 15.
Evolution of Asylum Adjudications: Refugee Status Accorded and Asylum Recognition in France, 1981-1992
Number
Cases Refugees Recognition
Year Abjudicated Recognized    Rate
1981 18,767 14,586   77.72%
1982 21,210 15,670   73.88%
1983 20,860 14,608   70.03%
1984 21,928 14,314   65.28%
1985 26,662 11,539   43.28%
1986 27,274 10,645   39.03%
1987 26,628  8,704   32.69%
1988 25,425  8,794   34.59%
1989 31,170  8,770   28.14%
1990 87,352 13,486   15.44%
1991 78,442 15,467   19.72%
1992 37,202 10,819   29.08%
Source: Adapted from OFPRA documents
Table 16.
Summary of Legalizations in Selected Western European States
Austria: Small-scale and unpublicized administrative legalizations permitted in the 1980s.
Belgium: Overtime legalization in 1974.  Government has since opposed the option.
France: Routine legalization 1946-1968, exceptional legalization policy thereafter, 1.4 million
legalizations 1948-1981, exceptional legalizations 1972-1973, 40,000; 1977-1979 (Mauricians
1,000; 1980-1981, Sentier, 3,389; 1981-1983, 150,000.
Germany: Legalization-like policy through nominative recruitment process until 1973, small-scale,
unpublicized legalizations on individual basis for humanitarian reasons thereafter,c officially
eschews legalization policy.
Italy: Unpublicized small-scale legalization possible until (around) 1985, on and off legalization
policy in 1987 and 1988 (105,000 applicants), major legalization policy in 1990, 204,000
aliens legalized.
Netherlands: 15,000 aliens legalized in 1975, 850 legalized in 1980.
Spain: 44,000 aliens legalized in 1985-1986.  Political movement in support of legalization and
Spanish-Moroccan negotiations lead to limited reopening of legalization opportunity for
Moroccans by 1991.
Sweden: Several hundred aliens legalized in 1976.  Government has since eschewed legalization.
Switzerland: Legalization eschewed, but cases of excessive rigor policy grants legal status to more than
10,000 aliens, mainly asylum-seekers denied refugee status, since 1982.
United Kingdom: Small-scale legalization 1974-1978.
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to cope with illegal migration.  Table 16
summarizes the major Western European
legalizations in recent years.  Several states
have expressly eschewed legalization.  In
France, “exceptional” legalizations are
recurrent.  The most recent one there dates
from 1991 and was available to asylum
applicants who had not been recognized
but who could demonstrate integration
into French society.
Legalization policies are attractive in that
they hold out the hope of reducing the
illegal alien population.  However, assess-
ment of a legalization policy’s impact is
difficult.  There is some evidence that the
French legalization of 1981 to 1983 served
to attract additional illegal immigrants.
French scholars disagree bitterly on how
successful the legalization was.  Some
allege that there was widespread fraud—
particularly in applications from agricul-
tural workers—much as was witnessed in
the SAW program in the United States.
Overall, the results of European legaliza-
tion efforts appear mixed.  They clearly
did enable tens of thousands of aliens to
accede to legal status—a matter of more
than passing interest to the individuals
and states concerned.  But they were also
plagued by problems and most decidedly
did not resolve the illegal alien issue in
one fell swoop.
Western European states also consider
temporary foreign worker policies
germane to their immigration control
strategies.  Fewer and fewer Western Eu-
ropean officials seem to recall today that
it was the guestworker idea from which
so many of their current migration dilem-
mas arose.  Few appear to remember that
Western European employers and govern-
ments actively recruited foreign workers
until 1973 or so.
Some scholars and officials would hold
that the reverse is true, that the cause of
illegal immigration is unmet employer
demand and that, if only temporary for-
eign workers were admitted to take those
jobs, much of the problem of illegal im-
migration would be resolved.
Whereas the debate over the wisdom of
temporary foreign worker policies in
Western democracies was once thought
closed, the 1991 German decision to lift
the 1973 blanket curb on foreign worker
recruitment opens up a new chapter.
Generally, however, high unemployment
rates, particularly among foreign residents,
discourage a resumption of large-scale for-
eign worker policies.  Adverse
political reaction to aliens also is a factor.
Table 17 chronicles the evolution of sea-
sonal foreign worker employment in
France.  Retention of seasonal foreign
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worker policy constituted a major excep-
tion to the recruitment curb declared in
1974 and testifies to the clout of agricul-
tural interests in French politics.  None-
theless, seasonal worker admissions
dropped steadily during the 1980s.  This
reflected an effort by French officials to
wean growers from utilization of foreign
seasonal workers.  Mounting unemploy-
ment made it increasingly difficult to jus-
tify seasonal foreign worker admissions.
At the same time, changes in Spain were
affecting the Spanish grape pickers who
used to comprise the bulk of seasonal
workers.  As their numbers dwindled,
French growers increasingly looked to
Eastern Europe, especially Poland, for new
sources of labor.
Other policy instruments commonly used
by Western European governments to limit
illegal immigration include employer sanc-
tions, airline carrier sanctions, more strin-
gent visa policies, interior controls, and
border controls.  In a period of twenty
years, most Western European states have
developed panoplies of laws directed
against illegal immigration and a limited,
but still significant, capacity to enforce
these laws.  Many factors affect how well
a particular Western European state fares
in terms of overall deterrence of illegal
immigration.  The insular British, for in-
stance, would appear to acquit themselves
well without employer sanctions.  The
Germans, because of their geography, ap-
pear to be having a harder time.  But even
where illegal immigration is thought to
be extensive, illegal alien employment ap-
pears concentrated in certain industries
and jobs with poor wages, difficult work-
ing conditions, and work that is held in
low esteem.
Off-the-books employment of Americans
is not uncommon across Western Europe,
but there is not much worry over it.  The
real worries are over the millions of un-
employed and underemployed youth of
North Africa, Turkey, or Rumania.  Mil-
lions of them aspire to come to Western
Europe, but most cannot make it.  There
are many hurdles in their way now that
were not there in the 1950s or 1960s.  Some
do make it, but their existence is often
quite bleak.  Legalization of their status
no longer appears to be either a moral
imperative or advisable as Western Euro-
pean democracies have made it clear that
they no longer intend to tolerate illegal
immigration—although some refuse to be-
lieve this.
The gap between stated policies and re-
alities may narrow in coming years de-
spite the daunting prospects alluded to
earlier.  Western European governments
appear to attach a high priority to inter-
national migration and they are linking
immigration control aims to foreign policy,
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trade, and foreign assistance initiatives.
Only time will tell whether they succeed
in coordinating and implementing a sus-
tained and comprehensive approach to
ameliorating their migration problem.  But
chances are that they will.
Implications for the
United States
Regulation of international migration
looms as one of the principal post-Cold
War challenges to the transatlantic part-
ners and other Western democracies.
Sustained, systematic, and comprehensive
bilateral and multilateral coordination and
cooperation is imperative if the challenge
is to be met.
Asylum policy reform, legalization poli-
cies, temporary foreign worker programs,
employer sanctions, and other policies all
are of broad interest, as are initiatives on
the migration and development nexus.
This is an area where the vision of multi-
lateral coordination and cooperation with
international agencies articulated in recent
U.S. foreign policy statements can be given
substance.
Western Europeans appear to desire dia-
logue and cooperation with the United
States in this realm.  In light of situations
like the Algerian impasse, it would ap-
pear urgent to step up the pace of dia-
logue and concrete cooperation.
International migration to Europe indi-
rectly affects U.S. national security inter-
ests.  While this analysis suggests that the
West Europeans will be able to cope with
their migration problem, this outcome is
not foreordained.  As in other areas, the
U.S. could play a constructive leadership
role in the international migration area.
Our immigration history is an important
U.S. foreign policy asset and, in light of
transatlantic dilemmas on migration, a
multilateral resource.  The key is to build
a framework of predictable, sustainable,
and democratically legitimate policies in
the international migration area and
thereby create a pillar for a return to or-
der and comity in world affairs.  Failure
to accomplish this will gravely compro-
mise any future prospects for world or-
der.  In view of the possible immensity
and complexity of the international mi-
gration challenge for the United States and
Western Europe, the post-Cold War chal-
lenge to transatlantic partnership can be
said to be very different than that of the
past, but no less vital.
Currently, Western democracies view in-
ternational migration mainly as a prob-
lem.  Both positive and untoward poten-
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Table 17.
Immigration of Seasonal Workers to France by Nationality 1946-1989
Year
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
Belgian
10.880
17.474
20.217
15.898
11.119
12.424
15.494
13.188
11.973
 9.584
 9.577
 8.505
 8.116
 6.675
 6.665
 5.903
 4.609
 3.752
 3.309
 2.725
 2.019
 1.629
 1.382
 1.041
   779
   708
   598
   494
   442
   379
   304
   294
   243
   196
   193
   161
   140
   122
   102
Italian
     662
  1.968
  1.584
  4.152
  4.796
13.289
18.290
20.952
16.775
22.812
30.208
33.378
37.008
35.152
32.977
23.314
14.638
  8.050
  5.673
  4.875
  3.155
  2.689
  2.408
  1.295
     843
     601
     482
     409
     298
     169
     105
       57
       34
       29
       32
       28
       28
       12
       14
Spaniard
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
.       35
    1.126
    2.880
    8.946
  15.086
  18.405
  21.844
  69.150
  66.400
  74.366
  87.120
107.027
119.039
114.902
104.672
119.301
122.438
124.236
126.386
130.407
120.486
107.298
109.215
104.565
  94.310
102.816
101.098
  93.751
  90.655
  89.539
  83.378
  76.843
  70.167
  64.681
  59.321
  51.978
  42.073
Moroccan
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
         2
-
       16
       34
     811
     593
     949
  1.220
  2.097
  3.720
  5.385
  5.702
  8.626
15.405
19.168
10.515
11.472
11.247
11.745
12.597
12.923
12.771
  5.536
  4.540
  4.126
  3.908
  3.716
  3.752
  3.734
  3.874
Portugese
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
     126
     937
  1.328
  1.368
  2.269
  3.729
  4.190
  3.035
  3.131
  3.110
  3.068
  3.004
  2.821
  2.837
  2.674
  2.094
  2.138
  2.846
  3.802
  5.478
  8.235
10.666
10.823
10.497
10.593
11.199
11.316
12.453
12.777
14.020
14.719
Tunisian
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
   332
     65
     39
     62
     94
   173
   252
    555
1.145
2.218
1.589
    973
1.291
1.250
1.282
1.504
1.605
1.552
   900
   739
   581
   518
   481
    509
    548
    606
Yugosalv
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
       2
       7
     67
   308
1.319
   870
   440
   211
   189
   402
   196
    259
    289
   270
   276
   255
   275
   261
   173
   148
   139
     75
     84
     84
     79
   115
Other
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
    67
    11
    96
    49
    67
    77
  104
  260
  165
  266
  119
  213
  208
  370
  698
  478
  602
  886
  784
  801
  991
1.291
  271
  325
  216
  210
  187
  200
  188
  482
Total
  11.542
  19.442
  21.801
  20.050
  15.915
  25.713
  33.784
  34.175
  29.874
  35.276
  48.731
  56.969
  63.529
  63.797
109.798
  96.956
  95.093
101.274
120.950
131.571
124.270
113.971
129.858
132.871
135.058
137.197
144.492
142.458
131.783
124.126
121.474
112.116
122.658
124.715
120.436
117.542
107.084
101.857
  93.220
   86.180
  81.670
  76.647
  70.647
  61.868
Source: Office National d'Immigration, Statistiques-Année 1984 and André Lebon, Regard san l'immigration et la
présence  étrangère en France 1989/1990.
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tialities inhere the phenomenon, however.
Legal immigration policies express demo-
cratic will and recognition of such rights
as family reunification.  The legal immi-
gration tradition of the United States is
one that deserves emulation.  One conse-
quence of closer U.S.-European coopera-
tion might well be to nudge Western Eu-
ropeans towards embracing a legal immi-
gration system that now exists de facto.
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The Mexico/United States Binational Study on Migration was a joint effort
undertaken by twenty scholars from both countries who worked together in
teams on five separate subject areas and collaborated on the production of this
shared report.  Their efforts have produced a collective and state-of-the-art
assessment of many aspects of Mexico-to-United States migration.  We are ap-
preciative of the efforts of the members who, despite their different academic
disciplines and subject area expertise, worked in a productive and collegial
atmosphere.  This report demonstrates the commitment of the Binational mem-
bers to producing a thorough and groundbreaking document.
The Binational Study was funded by both the Mexican and United States gov-
ernments in conjunction with private sector funding in both countries.  This
structure was created to optimize the independence of the research teams and
to make the final report immediately available to institutions interested in the
critical role of migration in the bilateral relationship.  The Mexican Ministry of
Foreign Affairs contributed to and supported the work of this study.  The U.S.
Congress appropriated funds coordinated by the U.S. Commission on Immigra-
tion Reform, and both the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service and the
Department of State made contributions.  We also acknowledge funding re-
ceived from the Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnología and the United States
Information Service in Mexico.  Private sector funders were very interested in
the project.  The Fundación Miguel Alemán in Mexico contributed and the Ford
and the Hewlett Foundations in the United States also supported the entire
project.
We are grateful for the data and information supplied to the Binational Study
by government institutions in Mexico and the United States.  We also appreciate
the commissioned analyses prepared by Mexican and American consultants to
the Study.
Finally, we acknowledge the many individuals in both countries who gave of
their time and assisted the Study in gaining invaluable insights above and be-
yond the more mundane aspects of academic research.  The Binational Study
alternated its meeting sites between Mexico and the United States and visited
several communities in both countries.  Government officials were forthcoming
in sharing information and hosting opportunities to learn in Mexico City,  San
Diego, Tijuana, Oaxaca, Washington, San Antonio, and Chicago.  The members
of the Binational Study especially appreciated the frank exchanges with commu-
nity residents and migrants in Tijuana, Oaxaca, Guadalajara, and Chicago.
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Mexican migration to the United States is a complex and dynamic phenomenon
with long historical roots.  There has been migration northward since the settle-
ment of both countries, across the frontier established in 1848, and especially
from the first sizable labor migration flows during the 1870s.  Today, much of
the migration flow remains economically motivated by wage differences that
affect supply and demand, and it is sustained by the family and social networks
that connect the two countries.
The two governments have approached this northward migration with unilat-
eral policies, as well as bilaterally negotiated programs, such as the well-known
temporary agricultural “Bracero” program that existed from 1942 to 1964.  Since
then, the major U.S. policies affecting the flow have emanated from the Immi-
gration Act of 1965 and the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 [IRCA]
that legalized some two million Mexicans in the United States under a long-term
or “pre-1982 resident” program and a Special Agricultural Worker program
[SAW].  IRCA also applied sanctions against employers who knowingly hired
unauthorized workers.  More recently, the U.S. Congress adopted the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act [IIRIRA] to strengthen
border and worksite enforcement, facilitate removals of unauthorized aliens,
and deter utilization of public programs.
This new approach occurred simultaneously with a period of heightened Mexico-
United States engagement, driven in large measure by the positive bilateral
relations promoted through the North American Free Trade Agreement [NAFTA].
In the last five years, there has been an upsurge of initiatives to formalize the
bilateral dialogue and consultation on migration, as well as on such other issues
as water management and health along the border.  The Working Group on
Migration and Consular Affairs of the Binational Commission has proven an
important and effective forum for frank discussion of various migration issues.
This study is both a reflection and manifestation of the new spirit of coopera-
tion.  A joint undertaking by the governments of Mexico and the United States,
the study's aim is to contribute to a better understanding of the nature, dimen-
sions, and consequences of migration from Mexico to the United States.  The
research was conducted by a team of twenty independent researchers, ten from
each country, who reviewed existing research, generated new data and analyses,
and undertook site visits and consulted with migrants and local residents to
gain a joint understanding of the issues raised in this study.
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Migration includes residents and sojourners, both legal and
unauthorized.  We constructed estimates of the Mexican-born population in
the United States using well-known national-level data sources, with special
efforts to adjust for undercounts and the number of SAW workers included.
Our results suggest that the total size of the resident Mexican-born population
in the United States in 1996 was within the following ranges:
Total  Mexican-Born Population 7.0 - 7.3 million persons,
       Legal Residents 4.7 - 4.9 million persons,
       Unauthorized Residents 2.3 - 2.4 million persons.
The numbers of Mexican-born migrants represent approximately 3 percent of
the overall United States population, about  40 percent of the U.S. population
of Mexican-American ancestry, and are equivalent to 8 percent of the overall
national population of Mexico.  More than one-quarter arrived in the past five
years.
About 0.5 million were naturalized U.S. citizens.  In recent years, naturalization
of legal Mexican-born immigrants has increased dramatically from just over
67,000 in FY 1995 to 233,000 in FY 1996.  These figures for the foreign-born
population are in addition to the 11 million native-born citizens of Mexican
American ancestry as of 1996.
The decade of the 1980s showed a massive increase in Mexican legal immigra-
tion, largely because of the legalization program.  During the 1990s, legal immi-
gration from Mexico remained sizeable as the family members of legalized
Mexicans obtained permanent resident status.  In FY 1996 alone, more than
160,000 Mexicans became legal immigrants, all but about 5,300 under family-
based admission categories.  The future demographic consequences of IRCA
could be considerable, with at least an estimated 1 million Mexican family
members of legalized persons eligible to apply for U.S. admission.
Legal temporary visits between Mexico and the United States also are substan-
tial.  The border crossings between Mexico and the United States are among the
busiest in the world.  In FY 1996, for example, there were 280 million land
crossings through the southwest border.  The exact number of unauthorized
entries of Mexicans into the United States is unknown, but in FY 1995 more than
1.3 million apprehensions of persons attempting to enter without inspection
took place at the Mexico-United States border.  These are records of events,
however, and not of individuals.
Assessing
Mexico-
United
States
Migration
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Mexican census data and indirect measurement methods show that the loss of
Mexican population from international migration has been systematic since 1960.
According to our best estimates, the migration of persons to the United States
who have established permanent residence there has been within the following
ranges:
1960-1970    260,000 -   290,000
1970-1980 1,200,000 - 1,550,000
1980-1990 2,100,000 - 2,600,000
For 1990-1995, net outmigration was 1.39 million people, with essentially equal
participation by gender, which is equivalent to an annual average of 277,000 for
the five-year period.  Our estimates based on U.S. data indicate a similar net
growth in the size of the Mexican-born population from 1990 to 1996 of approxi-
mately 1.9 million persons, or about 315,000 persons per year.  Breaking down
the 1.9 million figure into components, we estimate that approximately 510,000
were legal immigrants, 630,000 unauthorized migrants, and 760,000 migrants
who either were legalized under the SAWs program or legalized as an IRCA
family member.  Many of SAWs legalizations occurred in the first half of the
1990s; future flows of this type should be negligible.
The rate of back-and-forth labor movement seems to be slowing.
Mexican border surveys on sojourners show a decrease in the number of per-
sons moving in both directions between 1993 and 1995 (south-north migrants
decreasing from 790,000 to 540,000 and north-south migrants decreasing from
624,000 to 433,000).  This reduction in the rate of circulation can be explained
by several hypotheses, the most likely of which is that many people are deciding
to establish residence in the United States or to prolong their stay there.  It is
possible that, as the Binational Study members heard in their visits to commu-
nities in Mexico, the increasing difficulty of crossing the border has led tempo-
rary migrants to reduce the number of times they move back and forth between
the two countries.  New enforcement techniques have caused an increase in the
number of times an individual Mexican is apprehended before making a suc-
cessful entry or determining to return home.  Legalization, too, may have per-
mitted Mexican workers to bring their families, thereby reducing their need to
return frequently to Mexico.  Increasingly, participation of migrants in urban
jobs, which are less seasonal than rural jobs, may also contribute to lengthier
stays in the United States.
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Characteristics vary by migrant type.  We are able to approximate the
characteristics of three “types” of migrants using combinations of several data-
bases: sojourner migrant (legal or unauthorized whose principal residence is in
Mexico); settled resident (legal or unauthorized who habitually reside in the U.S.);
and naturalized U.S. citizen (who have met five-year legal residence and other
requirements).
The characteristics of Mexican migrants reflect their “type,” gender, the histori-
cal patterns of U.S. recruitment for Mexican labor, and the job market in which
Mexicans continue to find work.  For example, some 73 to 94 percent of sojourn-
ers are young men and more than one-half work in agriculture.  About 55
percent of settlers are slightly older males, and about 13 percent work in agri-
culture.  Women, who are a smaller proportion of employed migrants, tend to
work in the service economy.  Naturalized citizens are long-term residents and
only 54 percent are males in their early forties on average and less than 10
percent work in agriculture.  A greater proportion of sojourners and settlers are
employed in certain sectors of construction, manufacturing, and services than
are U.S. natives or naturalized Mexican-born citizens.
Clearly, the primary motive for the migrant stream is economic; however, that
does not mean Mexican migrants necessarily lack jobs in Mexico.  Most mi-
grants had some kind of work in Mexico prior to migrating.  Border crossing
data with large numbers of unauthorized migrants find that most had work
prior to leaving.  Nevertheless, the majority migrated with the intention of
working in the U.S., mainly to obtain higher wages.
Mexican-born migrants tend to have low skill levels, relative both to the U.S.
population at large and to other migrant groups.  The sectors employing Mexi-
can-born migrants tend to seek lower-skilled workers.  They also pay low wages,
accounting for the low incomes and high poverty rates of Mexican-born settlers
in the United States.  This situation is exacerbated by the unauthorized status
of many of these migrants.  Less than one-tenth of sojourners complete high
school, but just over one-quarter of the settlers and well over one-third of new
legal immigrants and naturalized citizens do.  More than one-seventh of new
legal immigrants are college graduates.  About one-half of the families accom-
panying sojourners in seasonal agriculture live in poverty while in the U.S., but
their roughly U.S. $200 in weekly earnings are substantially higher than wages
in Mexico for comparable work.  About one-quarter of settler families live on
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poverty incomes.  While the average U.S. household saw income gains between
1990 and 1996, Mexican-born resident households lost income: in 1996, 11 per-
cent of recently arrived households had incomes less than $5,000, whereas in
1990, about 5.5 percent had such low incomes.  Unauthorized status is a factor,
the annual earnings of legal immigrants in 1996 was more than $19,000.
Despite much continuity in origins and characteristics, migration
shows increased diversity over time.  Traditionally, migrants have been
rural males from a subset of communities in the west central states of Jalisco,
Michoacán, and Guanajuato.  The new diversity shows up in changing demog-
raphy, origins and destinations, and labor force characteristics.  Today, Mexican
migrants appear to be older, have more education, more are women, and more
are coming from “new sending” states and urban areas.  In the United States,
Mexican migrants are highly concentrated in California, Texas, and Illinois: about
85 percent of all Mexican-born immigrants resided in these three states com-
pared to 45 percent of all immigrants to the U.S. in 1990.  At the same time,
Mexican-born migrants have become attracted to new geographic destinations.
Midwestern, southern and eastern states that have had few Mexican-born work-
ers now are destinations for Mexican-born persons employed in agriculture and
food processing, construction, manufacturing, and low-skill service occupations.
The demand of United States employers and the economic moti-
vation of Mexican migrants is sustained by network and supply
factors.  The catalyst for much of unauthorized Mexican migration is better-
paying U.S. employment, but over time new factors have created a larger and
more complex set of reasons that sustain the flow.  Migration is a dynamic
process and the factors that drive it change.  Today new employers and labor
brokers, along with cross-border social networks of relatives  and friends, link
an expanding list of U.S. industries, occupations, and areas to a lengthening list
of Mexican communities that send migrants to the U.S.   Push factors that
increase the supply of labor seem to have become more important since the mid-
1980s as a result of recurring Mexican economic crises and Mexican policies,
such as the restructuring of rural Mexico that made small-scale farming less
attractive.  This means that Mexicans migrate to the U.S. within well-established
networks, as well as through new networks that are developing to move mi-
grants to the U.S. from regions without a tradition of migration.  One of IRCA’s
effects was to strengthen such networks and to transform a portion of the flow
from sojourner to settler.
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Demographic and economic factors may reduce future migration.
There is reason to believe that currently high levels of migration may represent
a “hump” or peak in the volume of Mexico-United States migration.  In the U.S.,
American employers are adjusting to higher minimum wages, to greater global
competition, and to a likely increased supply of low-skilled U.S. residents shifted
out of welfare programs.  In the past, employers have adjusted to higher wages
and increased competition by switching to means of production that lessen their
reliance on low-skilled labor.  All of these factors may decrease the availability
of jobs for some types of Mexican migrants.
Within the next decade, changes in Mexican demographics and other structural
changes should begin to reduce emigration pressures.  Net increases in the labor
forced aged 15 to 44, which was between 500,000 and 550,000 in 1996, is pro-
jected to decrease to 430,000 in 2010.  Mexico has adopted an ambitious restruc-
turing and privatization program in the 1990s that promises to increase eco-
nomic efficiency and job growth in the medium- to long-term. The International
Monetary Fund and Mexico’s 1997 development plan both project 5 percent
annual economic growth that, if achieved, would soon create sufficient new jobs
to match or exceed the growth of the labor force.  Analyses done for this study
show that even a more modest 3 percent rate of growth could generate just
under 800,000 new jobs annually by 2005.  Sustained job growth can help Mexico
catch up on job creation for currently unemployed and underemployed work-
ers, those displaced from agriculture and other industries, and nonworking
women who rejoin the labor force.  These changes in Mexico may reduce sup-
ply-side pressure, while the changes in the U.S. may lessen the demand for
Mexican workers.
Migration has varied effects, producing both benefits and costs.
It is difficult to establish a balanced evaluation of migration’s impacts because
of the lack of data and the need for focused research in both countries.  We
caution against overly simplistic conclusions about costs and benefits and note
that the perspectives on the balance differ in each country.  In Mexico, those
who return most often are the sojourners, many of whom benefit from their U.S.
experience.  In the U.S., the settler population—often older and sometimes
unauthorized, but increasingly with legal status—has relatively low skills that
place it at a disadvantage relative to other U.S. residents in an “information
age” economy.  At the national level, economic impacts are diffuse in both
Mexico and the United States.  However, strong impacts are found at local and
regional levels.
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Remittances play an important role in many Mexican communi-
ties, but migration creates costs due to the loss of human capital
and social disruption.  The most important direct impact of migration is
the income sent home to Mexico by migrants in the United States.  Remittances
were equivalent to 57 percent of the foreign exchange available through foreign
direct investment in 1995, and 5 percent of the total income supplied by exports.
In Mexico, the impacts are concentrated in about 100 municipalities in the west
central and northern regions of the country.  The average remittances received
by migrants’ families are equivalent to the household’s other earnings.  Remit-
tances have financed some productive investments, as well as housing and
urban development.  Although the direct beneficiaries are households that re-
ceive remittances, markets spread some effects to other households and busi-
nesses.
Remittances vary widely among migrants depending on their U.S. earnings and
the cost of trips back-and-forth.  Most migrant earnings do not accrue directly
into Mexico’s economy as they are spent in the U.S.  Migration represents some
loss of human capital for Mexico as migrants are mostly a working-age popu-
lation with education and good health.  Other adverse effects in Mexico include
the social disruptions that affect the outmigrants’ families and communities.
Migrants themselves, businesses, and consumers benefit most in
the United States, with costs incurred by state and local govern-
ments and low-skilled workers.  The primary beneficiaries of Mexico-to-
United States migration are the migrants themselves and the U.S. owners of
capital and some agricultural land, as well as American consumers and the
American economy that grows through the employment and the consumption
generated by Mexican migration.  In the labor market, the costs associated with
the migration are primarily to labor “substitutes,” i.e., new Mexican migrants
compete primarily with other low-skilled workers, especially already resident
Mexican migrants.
On the fiscal side, Mexican migrants were not more prone to use welfare than
similar natives.  A statistical analysis of 1990 Census data finds that, compared
to similar native households, Mexican-born households with young heads are less
likely to obtain means-tested benefits.  By contrast, those with heads older than
65 years are more likely to receive assistance, probably Supplementary Security
Income [SSI].  Sojourners and recent migrants pay some taxes yet rely little on
government services because they are young and, oftentimes, their unautho-
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rized status makes them ineligible.  However, research on settlers finds that
many state and local governments pay more in services to Mexican-born house-
holds than they receive in taxes, largely because their lower incomes result in
lower taxes paid.  The single largest fiscal cost is related to education, which can
be seen both as a public expenditure and as an investment in the future.
The Mexican-origin population is projected to be of increasing importance early
in the next century.  Because of the combination of migration and higher than
average fertility rates, the proportion of the U.S. population that is of Mexican
origin will grow.  Low past rates of naturalization and of voter turnout, coupled
with voting districts apportioned according to Hispanic population totals that
have few eligible and voting-age persons, have weakened the potential impact
of the Mexican migration in the U.S. political system.  This could change.  In
some cases, Mexican-Americans have helped rebuild decaying inner-city neigh-
borhoods.
Border relations are largely positive, although tensions do erupt.
Migration within the border area is a special case because of the strong family,
commercial, and social connections of the residents of many neighboring com-
munities.  The vast majority of border crossers go for short visits, often purchas-
ing goods on the other side of the border.  The contributions to local economies
on both sides of the border that emanate from this cross-border commerce are
substantial.  Nevertheless, some byproducts of cross-border migration, includ-
ing petty crime, vandalism, vice, violence, and uncompensated use of health
care and other services, can create tensions.
Violence and human rights abuses of unauthorized migrants are
major sources of concern.  Unauthorized migrants are sometimes victims
of crimes—from attacks and abandonment by smugglers to theft, rape, and even
murder—and suffer the physical consequences of difficult border crossings.
Human rights abuses by federal, state, and local officials have been recorded,
which is a matter of great concern for both countries.  Officials in both countries
have been attacked by smugglers as well.  Both governments have taken action
to curb these various abuses but border violence continues to be a source of
tension.
Policymaking has been episodic in nature.  The political responses of
Mexico and the United States to migration have an episodic character; the de-
bate on migration is greatly influenced by the changing economic conditions in
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both countries.  Policymaking also has been reactive with the action of one
country leading to the reaction of the other.  The pace of the reactive process has
accelerated in recent years.  Often the U.S. has acted unilaterally.  And due to
the influence of various interest groups, migration policy at many times has
been contradictory and yielded unexpected results.  There may be many unan-
ticipated impacts for  resident—authorized and unauthorized—populations in
the wake of a trilogy of legislation passed in the United States in 1996 (on
immigration, terrorism/crime, and welfare).
The Mexican government has shifted from a position of deliberate nonengagement
on migration matters, based on the principle of noninterference in the internal
affairs of other countries, to a stance of increasing dialogue with U.S. counter-
parts to better address migration issues.  The Mexican government also has
developed a presence in Mexican communities in United States.  In addition,
diplomatic and consular protection activities and cultural and business promo-
tion, have increased.  The North American Free Trade Agreement [NAFTA]
signed in 1993 did not contain major policy on migration; nevertheless, it cre-
ated new institutional arrangements facilitating political and economic contacts
and breathed new life into consultative groups.  These developments are of
major consequence for the bilateral relationship.  However, with the policy of
opening the border for commerce and investment but not for people, the poten-
tial for bilateral tension remains.
The study findings argue for increased dialogue and forward-
looking consultative mechanisms to facilitate bilateral coopera-
tion in finding mutually beneficial solutions to unauthorized
migration between Mexico and the United States.  The Working
Group on Migration and Consular Affairs of the Binational Commission has
been an effective platform for frank discussions on migration issues.  However,
the Working Group’s efforts could be supplemented and enhanced with fre-
quent discussion around an agenda of issues that would be informed by the best
possible empirical and policy analyses.  At a minimum, the framework for
discussion must acknowledge that no single approach will address adequately
the issue of unauthorized migration.   Demand, supply, and networks all con-
tribute to these movements, and, thus, solutions must be multifaceted and found
in both countries.  And there must be a careful approach to migration problems
that is sensitive to differences in perspectives and build on the joint Mexican-
United States commitment to foster human rights.
Institutional-
izing
Cooperative
& Effective
Dialogue
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More specifically, the following issues should be on the agenda for joint discus-
sion:
Outcomes of 1996 Legislation.  The U.S. adopted a trio of laws affecting
migration, including the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsi-
bility Act, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, and the Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, while Mexico adopted
a Constitutional amendment that will allow dual nationality for Mexicans who
naturalize.  Regular, joint monitoring could help identify the intended and un-
intended results of newly enacted legislation in a more timely fashion.
Migration Impact Statements.  One way of bringing these issues to dis-
cussion would be to formalize them as “impact statements” along the lines of
the suggestion in 1990 by  the U.S. Commission for the Study of International
Migration and Cooperative Economic Development.  These impact statements
should assess direct changes in immigration policy as well as changes in eco-
nomic and other policies that may affect migration patterns.
Addressing the Demand, Supply, and Network Factors.  On the top
of any rolling agenda list should be unauthorized migration that both countries
have an express interest in addressing.  The governments should assess the
effectiveness of strategies to reduce employer demand for unauthorized work-
ers, to provide increased economic opportunities within Mexico, and to reduce
the efficacy of formal and informal networks that now link the supply of unau-
thorized labor in Mexico with U.S. demand for such labor.
Facilitating Legal Movements between Mexico and the United
States.   Economic and social integration means increased need to accomodate,
and even to facilitate, mobility of persons between the two countries.  Mexico
and the United States should engage in systematic analysis of policies that will
support trade, investment, and commerce by facilitating legal movements and
easing barriers to legal entry.
Continued Bilateral Research and Data Collection.  The develop-
ment of a binational policy agenda would be greatly enhanced, as we have
learned from the Mexico-United States Binational Study, with the use and analy-
sis of data from both nations.  The dynamic process of migration, also docu-
mented in this study, calls for building capacity and infrastructure to assess
migration’s nature, effects, and responses.
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Maximizing Benefits and Minimizing Costs.  It is to the clear benefit
of both countries to work towards eliminating unauthorized migration, which
creates costs for both countries and makes migrants vulnerable to exploitation.
That process should be helped over the long-term by demographic and potential
economic trends in Mexico and the United States.  In the interim, the two
countries should explore ways to capitalize on the economic return to migration
(for example, by reducing the cost of transferring remittances and helping fami-
lies use them towards productive purposes) in order to stimulate economic
development in Mexico.  Further, ways to enhance labor standards in the United
States should be explored to reduce the incentives to employers for hiring un-
authorized workers.
A “Guestworker” Program is unlikely to be a Solution to Unau-
thorized Migration.  The United States and Mexico should study carefully
the concept of a bilateral foreign worker program, recognizing that such a pro-
gram is unlikely to be an effective remedy to unauthorized migration or to have
sufficient labor standards to protect the rights of workers.  A guestworker pro-
gram could stimulate new migration networks, adding to, rather than substitut-
ing for, unauthorized workers.  Continued outflow of workers also might make
investors reluctant to invest in emigration areas.
Recognizing and Addressing Social Costs of Migration.  Mexican
migration has social costs, particularly the separation and breakup of families.
Attention should be given to ways to alleviate the disruption to families and
communities.  For example, the two governments could explore ways to iden-
tify and obtain support for families, mostly female-headed, who have been
deserted by migrating husbands/fathers.
Immigrant.  A person who migrates over international-boundaries into a country
of which he or she is not a citizen.  In the United States, the legal-technical
meaning of “immigrant” is restricted to persons admitted for legal permanent
residence.  Because international migrants from Mexico sometimes are not
legally admitted or are not permanent residents, the text often refers simply to
migrants.
Legal Status in the United States.  There are several major legal status
categories (Mexico has a parallel division of legal status as well):
Unauthorized Migrant.  Person who has entered without inspection [EWI]
or overstayed his or her U.S. legal temporary visa.  Also a person who
works without authorization, regardless of mode of entry.  Commonly re-
ferred to as “undocumented” or “illegal alien.”
Glossary
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Legal Nonimmigrant [NIV].  Person admitted into the United States legally
on a temporary visa for a temporary stay for tourism, study, or work.
Legal Permanent Resident [LPR].  Most Mexican-born settlers are LPRs
and are predominantly sponsored in the family reunification categories of
the U.S. admission system.
Legalized Resident.  The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986
granted a one-time amnesty to formerly illegal residents who, after one
year, become LPR-eligible (DOL 1996:87).
Pre-1982 Residents [245A].  1.09 million Mexican-born were legal-
ized under this program that required continuous five-year residency
at the time of application.
Special Agricultural Workers [SAW].  877,000 Mexican-born were
legalized with the requirement that they had worked at least ninety
days in agriculture in the preceding three years.
Naturalized Citizen.  Legal permanent residents must wait five years and
meet certain qualifications before becoming “naturalized citizens” with the
full voting and societal rights of the native-born citizenry (born on U.S. soil).
Mexican-Born.  Persons born in Mexico and, with few exceptions, originally
nationals of Mexico at birth.
Mexican-Origin.  Residents in the United States, who are Mexican or native
born of Mexican ancestry.  Includes Mexican Americans.
Migrant Types.  Persons vary in the time they spend abroad and/or their
purpose for migration.  Of the many different patterns that exist, we distinguish
two broad ones:
Sojourner.  Includes many different types whose primary residence is in
Mexico, the largest subgroup may well be “circular” or “target” migrants who
work in the United States for short periods.
Settler.  Encompasses both unauthorized and legal permanent residents of
the United States whose primary residence is in the United States.
Networks.  The social connections between people that provide information
and, often, a way of facilitating migration northward.  For example, a “migrant
network” might link an aspiring migrant in Oaxaca with a friend or relative in Los
Angeles, from whom the aspiring migrant can learn of job and housing possi-
bilities.
Remittances.  Monies sent by migrants abroad back to their families or friends
in their country of origin.
Stock and Flow.  Migration is measured either as a “stock,” or persons who
reside in a place, or “flow,” persons who have moved in or out of a place within
a given period.
Supply and Demand.  Employers need workers or, as economists say, they
demand labor.  The supply of labor refers to the number of workers with certain
characteristics from whom the employer can choose.  Just how many workers
employers “demand” or how many workers are “supplied” depends on the wage
employers offer and the wage that workers will accept.
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The Mexico/United States Binational Study on Migration was a joint effort
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teams on five separate subject areas and collaborated on the production of this
shared report.  Their efforts have produced a collective and state-of-the-art
assessment of many aspects of Mexico-to-United States migration.  We are ap-
preciative of the efforts of the members who, despite their different academic
disciplines and subject area expertise, worked in a productive and collegial
atmosphere.  This report demonstrates the commitment of the Binational mem-
bers to producing a thorough and groundbreaking document.
The Binational Study was funded by both the Mexican and United States gov-
ernments in conjunction with private sector funding in both countries.  This
structure was created to optimize the independence of the research teams and
to make the final report immediately available to institutions interested in the
critical role of migration in the bilateral relationship.  The Mexican Ministry of
Foreign Affairs contributed to and supported the work of this study.  The U.S.
Congress appropriated funds coordinated by the U.S. Commission on Immigra-
tion Reform, and both the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service and the
Department of State made contributions.  We also acknowledge funding re-
ceived from the Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnología and the United States
Information Service in Mexico.  Private sector funders were very interested in
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project.
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by government institutions in Mexico and the United States.  We also appreciate
the commissioned analyses prepared by Mexican and American consultants to
the Study.
Finally, we acknowledge the many individuals in both countries who gave of
their time and assisted the Study in gaining invaluable insights above and be-
yond the more mundane aspects of academic research.  The Binational Study
alternated its meeting sites between Mexico and the United States and visited
several communities in both countries.  Government officials were forthcoming
in sharing information and hosting opportunities to learn in Mexico City,  San
Diego, Tijuana, Oaxaca, Washington, San Antonio, and Chicago.  The members
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Few issues hold greater implications for bilateral relations between Mexico and
the United States than does migration.  As a member of this team recently
wrote, “the tension created by migration from Mexico to the United States is
perhaps the most intractable theme in the relationship between the two neigh-
bors, one highly developed, the other less developed.  At times, the friction
between the two countries over this issue is modest and, at others, incandescent,
but it is never absent” (Weintraub 1997:284).
Migration from Mexico to the United States is more than one hundred years old.
This history is replete with efforts by one or both countries to regulate the
movements northward.  Sharing one of the longest land borders between two
countries with disparate earnings and income levels, Mexico and the United
States have found many ways to address migration concerns.  Table I-1 gives a
brief summary of policies in the major historical periods of Mexican migration
to the United States.
Over the years, when labor shortages have grown as a result of war or other
factors, unilateral recruitment and such bilateral agreements as the Bracero Pro-
gram have resulted in large-scale movements of Mexican workers into the United
States.  When economic conditions have reduced the need for additional labor,
created anxieties among U.S. workers, or made it difficult for migrants to find
work, large-scale repatriation has occurred, sometimes by U.S. government action
and with Mexican government assistance to returnees.
During the past two decades, unauthorized migration between the two coun-
tries has tended to dominate the policy agenda on Mexico to United States
migration (Bean et al. 1997).  Through much of the period from 1975 to 1986,
U.S. authorities debated what would be the best approach to reduce unautho-
rized migration.  Eventually, in 1986, Congress passed IRCA, which adopted a
variation of the grand compromise that had been advanced by such bodies as
the congressionally-mandated Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee
Policy: employer sanctions and mass legalization.  Because the largest national
group in the unauthorized immigrant population was from Mexico, both of
these provisions were seen as having a major impact on Mexicans.
IRCA had significant intended and unintended consequences for Mexico to United
States migration.  The size of the Mexican population in the United States
increased dramatically during the late 1980s and early 1990s due to IRCA’s
legalization provisions.  Starting in 1987, about 1.7 million long-term unautho-
rized migrants and an additional 1.3 million unauthorized Special Agricultural
Workers [SAWs] applied for legalization under the amnesty provisions of IRCA.
I.
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Table I-1.
Major
Historical
Periods in
Mexico-to-
United States
Migration
1870-1890 U.S. recruitment for southwestern rails and agriculture, Mexican
Consular Law of 1871 provides for protection of Mexicans abroad
with respect for local sovereignty;
1891-1917 U.S. laws restrict Mexican (and Canadian) land admissions, U.S.
World War I recruitment (including some Canadians and Baha-
mians), Mexican Consular report of salary abuses of Mexican
workers in U.S. (Gomez Arnau 1991);
1920s U.S. Border Patrol established, undocumented entry considered
a misdemeanor with penalties attached, and exclusions of Mexi-
cans on “public charge provisions” are common;
1929-1933 U.S. Depression-times repatriation of Mexicans partly funded by
Mexican and private aid groups with frequent promotion by
Mexican consulates (Gamio 1930);
1940s World War II era Bracero agricultural workers program begun,
jointly negotiated by both governments (also a smaller railroad
program from 1943-1946);
1951-1952 Upon third renewal of Bracero program, Mexico suggests U.S.
measures against the employment of unauthorized workers, but
U.S. adopts “Texas Proviso” making it a felony to import “illegal
aliens” while exempting employers from culpability (García y
Griego 1981);
1954 Negotiations for a new Bracero agreement break down though
U.S. continues recruitment, Mexican government attempts un-
successfully to stop outmigration, massive U.S. deportations of
unauthorized workers under “Operation Wetback;”
1964 Termination of the Bracero program;
1980s U.S. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 [IRCA] im-
poses sanctions on employers who knowingly hire unauthorized
workers and legalizes two million unauthorized residents, U.S.
Asencio Commission recommends economic development to ad-
dress unauthorized flow, Mexico reinforces and expands its con-
sular protection of Mexicans abroad;
1990s Bilateral dialogue on migration increases, North American Free
Trade Agreement [NAFTA] signed, U.S. strengthens border con-
trol, new U.S. laws expedite removal of unauthorized migrants
and restrict welfare benefits to legal immigrants, the Mexico/U.S.
Binational Study on Migration is established.
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Most of these persons had already been in the U.S.; during the 1990s, their close
family members began to obtain legal status in sizeable numbers.  INS reports
that nearly 1.6 million Mexicans were admitted as legal U.S. residents between
1981 and 1990; an additional 1.5 million were admitted in Fiscal Years 1991 -
1995.  Beginning in 1995, the number of Mexican immigrants becoming citizens
also increased substantially, at least in part because those legalizing their status
under IRCA became eligible for naturalization.
At the same time, unauthorized migration continued, pointing to weaknesses in
IRCA’s enforcement approach.  A proliferation of fraudulent documents permit-
ted unauthorized workers to obtain jobs despite the requirement that employers
check the employment authorization of new hires.  After an initial decline in
border apprehensions, the number of apprehended migrants began to climb and
returned to almost pre-IRCA levels, with 1.3 million apprehensions in 1995.
The continuing unauthorized entries, not only of Mexicans, but also other na-
tionalities, led to  passage of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act [IIRIRA] of 1996.  Building in part on IRCA’s provisions, the
new legislation augmented border controls, required new pilot programs to test
more secure forms of employment verification, clarified eligibility for public
benefit programs, bars unauthorized residents for three or ten years from legal
admission, and made sweeping changes in provisions for the removal of unau-
thorized migrants.  In conjunction with two other new laws—the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 [AEDPA] and the Personal Responsibil-
ity and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 [Welfare Reform Act]—
IIRIRA represents a new phase in recurrent efforts by the U.S. government to
address migration issues.
The last two decades also brought different measures on the part of Mexico.
Some were internal, such as the border-industry or Maquiladora Program that
was intended to absorb workers returning from the Bracero program.  Yet, most
measures were directed to strengthen and broaden the consular protection of
Mexicans in the United States.  More Mexican consular offices have been opened
in the United States, mobile consulates reach out to Mexicans outside of the
major cities, and more personnel have been dedicated to the protection of Mexi-
can nationals.  Consular officers have increased their visits to U.S. worksites and
Migrant Detention Centers.  Hospitals and jails are likewise included in regular
visits.  These visits provide an opportunity for consular officers to assist mi-
grants in their relations with U.S. authorities and nationals, to advise migrants
on U.S. laws, to help recover unpaid salaries or solve other labor-related prob-
lems, and to assist migrants to contact their relatives in Mexico or the U.S.
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Despite the continuity reflected in these legislative initiatives and protection
policies, the overall context for addressing migration issues between the two
countries has shifted markedly.  The 1990s brought closer relations and a coop-
erative economic relationship after the 1993 approval of the North American
Free Trade Agreement [NAFTA] between Mexico, the United States, and Canada.
NAFTA alone will not solve the problems of unauthorized migration although
increased trade and economic development continue to pose the best hope for
reducing migration pressure in the long run.
The two governments are engaged, as never before, in working together to solve
common problems.  Binational working groups meet regularly to coordinate
and cooperate on issues ranging from facilitating border crossing to antismug-
gling initiatives.  A further measure of these new arrangements can be seen in
new responses.  In contrast to earlier periods, when the U.S. acted unilaterally
and Mexico was largely silent regarding U.S. legislation, both governments
promote dialogue through various bilateral groups and mechanisms, including
the summit meeting between Presidents Zedillo and Clinton in May 1997.
This study itself derives from the new spirit of cooperation.  After a meeting of
the Migration and Consular Affairs Group of the Mexican-United States Bina-
tional Commission in March 1994, the governments of Mexico and the United
States agreed to undertake a joint study of migration between the two countries.
The main objective of the Mexico/United States Binational Study (1995-1997) is
to contribute to a better understanding and appreciation of the nature, dimen-
sions, and consequences of migration from Mexico to the United States.  It also
provides an opportunity to identify options to respond to these movements.
This study is the joint effort of a team of twenty researchers, ten from each
country.  They have worked in five subgroups focusing on distinct elements of
the migration phenomenon: quantification of the scale of migration between
Mexico and the United States; characteristics of the migrants; the factors that
cause, sustain, or hinder migration; the impacts on the two countries; and the
responses adopted individually or jointly by Mexico and the United States. The
study team reviewed existing research conducted on migration between Mexico
and the United States, and it generated new data and analysis conducted by
team members and outside consultants to the project.  The research team also
undertook site visits to Mexican and U.S. communities experiencing the effects
of migration in order to gain a joint understanding of the issues raised in this
study.
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In both Mexico and the United States, questions about both the numbers of
migrants from each country residing in the other (the “stock” of migrants) and
the size of the migration streams crossing the border (the “flow” of migrants)
arise frequently in public debates about migration.  Moreover, analyses of the
causes and impacts of migration in both countries depend, to a considerable
extent, on calculations about the size of the stocks and flows of migration within
and between both countries.  In assessing and developing estimates of the stocks
and flows of migrants between the two countries during the mid-1990s, we
build  on the approaches and results of earlier assessments as well as on newly
available data and research conducted in the 1990s.
The stock of Mexican-born persons refers to the number who have ever come
to the United States who reside in the U.S. at any given point in time. The flow
refers to the number coming in only within a given period of time, usually
expressed as a net figure by subtracting the number leaving within the same
period from the number coming in.  In developing estimates of stocks and
flows, this study bases its conclusions on data collected in both Mexico and the
United States.  As a result, our confidence in the estimates is considerably
enhanced because we are able to assess consistency by comparing information
from each country.
Mexican Data Sources.  The study uses a variety of Mexican data sources.
Since the late 1970s, Mexico has carried out various household sample surveys
with the goal of directly quantifying how many migrants move to the United
States.  The 1992 ENADID (National Survey on Demographic Dynamics), the
most up-to-date survey developed by INEGI, provides a basis for classifying
Mexican residents (who at the time of the interview were living in Mexico) as
either sojourners (people who had been in the United States to work but had not
intended to stay) or as return migrants (people who had gone to the U.S. to
establish residence but eventually returned), or both.  This survey also provides
estimates of the number of Mexican emigrants who established their residence
in the U.S. between 1988 and 1992 and still live there.  Other surveys, like EMIF
(Survey of Migration to the Northern Border) developed by CONAPO (National
Council on Population), COLEF (College of the Northern Border), and the Min-
istry of Labor, provide additional data to measure the number of persons in-
volved in circular migration.  Because direct survey measures of migration to
the United States are based on data such as these that are difficult to collect,
researchers also apply indirect demographic methodologies to Mexican census
data to estimate migration stocks and flows.
II. THE
MEXICAN-
BORN
POPULATION
IN THE
UNITED
STATES
Methodology
& Data
Sources
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United States Data Sources.  The study also utilizes a combination of
United States data sources, including the U.S. Census, the Current Population
Survey, and administrative data from the Immigration and Naturalization Ser-
vice.  We develop new information on the survey undercounts of migrants and
immigrants and on the relative inclusion of newly-legalized workers to get a
balanced sense of the most probable range of legal and unauthorized persons.
Rigorous analytic approaches are necessary because, as is well known, early
efforts to determine the size of the total unauthorized migrant population pro-
duced results that were highly speculative and ranged widely (Bean et al. 1990).
Unfortunately, this can be misleading for decisionmakers.  Several kinds of
estimation difficulties are addressed separately in the cases of the legal and
unauthorized populations to reach the soundest possible estimates of these
Mexican-born populations in the United States.
In estimating numbers, or discussing characteristics and impacts, it is not pos-
sible to talk of a “homogenous”  Mexican-born population in the United States.
It is highly diverse, varying in terms of permanence of residence, legal status,
and education and skills.  It is made up of persons who stay from only a few
hours to a few days to a few years, to those who reside permanently.  It also
includes persons with different legal statuses: (1) legal temporary visitors; (2)
legal permanent residents, otherwise known as legal immigrants; (3) naturalized
United States citizens; and (4) unauthorized migrants, including individuals
who enter without permission, through the use of fraudulent documents, or
with permission but who violate the terms of their visas.  Legal status shapes
the environment in which the migrant makes decisions when searching for a job,
deciding where to live, and investing in schooling and English language skills.
These legal status groups are often dissimilar; yet, occupational backgrounds as
different as agricultural worker or skilled operator may be found within any
given legal status.
Two major migration patterns, apart from legal status, can be found in the data
to distinguish migrants.  Sojourners may remain in the United States for any-
where from hours to months but consider Mexico to be their place of principal
residence and are mostly “circular” migrants who work short periods in the
U.S. (other subtypes of sojourners may include short-term visitor such as shop-
per, visitor, businessperson, temporary-resident worker, student, family mem-
ber, vacationer).  Settlers consider the U.S. to be their permanent residence even
if they return to Mexico for short visits (also known as long-term residents)
(Chavez 1988).  Mexican-origin persons are found in all combinations of the four
Migrant
Types:
Sojourner
Settler &
Citizen
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legal statuses and the two migrant patterns.  For example, sojourners include
unauthorized migrants, legal temporary workers, students (nonimmigrants), per-
sons who become legal permanent residents, and even naturalized citizens.  And
individuals within a household may differ by legal and migration status, as well
as move across legal-status and migration-patterns over their life.
Our estimates are presented first for the stock of Mexican-born population in the
United States and then for the flow of Mexicans northward, with distinctions
made where possible among the various types of migrants.
Estimates of Stock.  Our results indicate that the total size of Mexican-born
resident population in the United States in 1996 (both enumerated and unenumerated,
legal and unauthorized) was 7.0 - 7.3 million persons.  Of this population, legal
residents accounted for about 4.7 - 4.9 million persons, about 0.5 million of whom were
naturalized United States citizens.   Unauthorized migrants accounted for 2.3 - 2.4
million persons (Bean et al. 1997).  These estimates are derived from a combina-
tion of Mexican and United States data sources.  We emphasize that these are
estimates.  The U.S. Census and other surveys, such as the CPS, do not ask
residents about their legal status.  However, because the total population is
known, and because it is possible to estimate legal residents, residual methods
provide an estimate of the part of the unauthorized population that is enumer-
ated (i.e., unauthorized = [total foreign born] - [legal residents]).  Each of the
components of the residual equation may be too low, primarily because a sub-
population is undercounted or “underenumerated” due to the practical problem
of finding all countable persons with survey methods.  To address this in our
estimates of these populations, we undertook demographic investigations to
find plausible levels of undercount.  We also addressed the likely number of
newly-legalized Special Agricultural Worker [SAW] immigrants in the United
States as of 1996, a rather substantial issue in making residual estimates.
Total (in millions) 7.0 - 7.3
   Legal Permanent Residents 4.7 - 4.9
    Unauthorized Migrants 2.3 - 2.4
Table II-1. Total
Mexican-Born
Population in
the United
States: 1996
Population
Estimates
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The Flow of Migrants Northward.  Mexican migration to the United States
has increased notably since the decade of the 1960s, and it has continued to grow
significantly in recent years.
Direct measures based on Mexican data indicate that 2.6 million persons living
in Mexico as of 1992 had migrated to the United States sometime in the past—
1.0 million migrated just to work, 1.3 million migrated to work and settle, and
0.3 million migrated to take up residence but not to work.  Between 1988 and
1992, 1.1 million Mexicans migrated to the United States, but by 1992 had
returned to live in Mexico—250,000 had migrated just to work, 707,000 to work
and settle, and 140,000 to settle only.  At the same time, another 1.0 million
Mexicans entered the United States and were still resident in the U.S. in 1992—
their numbers represent a lower limit of the net flow of Mexican migrants
during the period.1
Estimates from indirect measures using census data from Mexico indicate that
the loss of Mexican population from international migration has been systematic
since 1960 and that the estimated size of the flow during the past decade was
substantial and lowered Mexico’s rate of population growth (Corona & Tuirán
1996a).
During 1990-1995, total net outmigration was 1.39 million people, with roughly
equal shares comprised of males and females, and equivalent to an annual
average of 277,000 for the five-year period.  This estimate is substantially higher
than that observed during the decade 1980-1990.  The estimates based on U.S.
data (from the 1990 U.S. Census and 1996 U.S. Current Population Survey)
indicate a net growth in the size of the Mexican-born population from 1990 to
1996 of approximately 1.9 million persons, or about 315,000 persons per year, a
figure somewhat above the figure based on Mexican data. (The U.S. figure is
higher because U.S. data sources include both some sojourners and settlers.)
Breaking down the 1.9 million net figure into components, we estimate that
approximately 510,000 are legal immigrants, 630,000 are unauthorized immi-
Table II-2.
Growth in
Permanent
Mexican
Migration to the
United States
                 Migrants Who Have Established United States Residence
1960-1970    260,000 -   290,000
1970-1980 1,200,000 - 1,550,000
1980-1990 2,100,000 - 2,600,000
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grants, 210,000 are IRCA family members, and 550,000 are migrants who had
legalized under the SAW program.
Subdividing these figures into net annual flows can be misleading because on
a yearly basis some flows are so uneven.  For example, many of the SAWs
probably came in the early 1990s; future flows of this type should be negligible,
because of the termination of the SAWs program nearly a decade ago.
In addition to these numbers, data from the EMIF indicate that the number of
Mexican sojourner migrants involved in the circular flow (those who live in
Mexico and travel periodically to the U.S. to work or look for work) appears to
have declined in recent years: the south-north flow (i.e., from Mexico to the
U.S.) decreased from 792,000 in 1993 to 543,000 in 1995, and the north-south
flow (i.e., from the U.S. to Mexico) also decreased from 624,000 to 433,000
during the same years. This reduction can be explained by any of the following
three hypotheses: (1) a growing number of sojourners have decided to establish
residence in the U.S. or decided to prolong their stay there; (2) an increasing
number of migrants decided to remain in Mexico instead of travelling periodi-
cally to the U.S.; (3) a combination of the two previously-mentioned possibili-
ties, although with specific weights yet to be determined by research.  The
observed increase in the estimated size of the net flow of permanent residents
in the U.S. during those years, associated with both unauthorized immigrants
and legalized immigrants under the SAWs program, suggest that the reduction
in the magnitude of the flow of circular migration is mainly explained by the
first hypothesis suggested above.
Legal Permanent Immigration.  An upward trend in legal immigration to the
United States and, in the case of Mexico, the additional impact of IRCA’s amnesty
programs, resulted in an increasing presence of legal residents.   The decade of the
1980s showed a massive increase in Mexican legal immigration, largely because
of the amnesty program.  During the 1990s, legal immigration from Mexico
remained sizeable as the family members of legalized Mexicans obtained perma-
nent resident status.  Table II-3 presents INS data showing the number of Mexi-
cans admitted with legal permanent resident status.  In FY 1996 alone, about
160,000 Mexicans became legal immigrants, all but about 5,300 under family-
based admission categories.  Many of the legal immigrants are believed already
to have been living in the United States at the time they gained legal status.
Other
Issues &
Trends
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Table II-3.
United States
Legal
Admissions:
FY 1996
MEXICAN
PERCENT
OF ALL
IMMIGRANTS
26.0
18.5
33.7
3.0
0.1
17.6
MEXICAN-
BORN
IMMIGRANTS
154,400
  55,400
 99,000
  3,501
1,830
159,731
ALL
IMMIGRANTS
593,692
299,941
293,751
117,300
198,927
909,959
CATEGORY
FAMILY-BASED
   Immediate relatives
   Preference visas
EMPLOYMENT-BASED
OTHER
TOTAL
Source: Public use admission data, U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service.
The exact level of net legal immigration has been difficult to pinpoint because
alternative estimates for net legal immigration as of 1990 and 1996 vary as to
return migration assumptions, incorporation of agricultural worker beneficiaries
as United States residents, and nonspecific sources of net legal immigration.
The extent of United States residence among agriculturally-legalized individuals
(SAWs) has only recently been approximately estimated in research conducted
for this project.  The volume of transitions from unauthorized status into lawful
permanent residence among family members of legalized immigrants and the
timely accounting of nonimmigrants in the United States are not known with
certainty.  The future demographic consequences of the IRCA legalization pro-
grams could be considerable, involving as many as 3 million eventual immi-
grants, including at least 1 million Mexican relatives.
Legal Temporary Visitors.  Legal temporary visits between Mexico and the
United States also are substantial.  The border crossings between Mexico and the United
States are among the busiest in the world.  In FY 1996, the Department of State
issued 508,400 temporary “nonimmigrant” visas to Mexicans; 38,600 were for
business or work in the United States.  Additionally, an estimated 500 - 600
thousand Mexicans living in border areas have border crossing cards that per-
mit them regular entry to the United States.  In FY 1996, there were some 280
million land crossings from Mexico through the Southwest border of the U.S.
(approximately 70 percent of all land crossings).  At the San Ysidro port of entry
alone, there were almost 40 million crossings in FY 1996, and in the first sixth
months of FY 1997 there already have been almost 25 million.   The top five land
ports of entry into the U.S. are all on the Southern Border, including  San Ysidro,
PERCENT OF
MEXICAN
IMMIGRANTS
IN CATEGORY
96.7
34.7
62.0
2.2
1.1
100.0
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Bridge of the Americas, Caléxico, Juárez-Lincoln Bridge, and Laredo.  (When the
Detroit Tunnel and Bridge along the United States-Canadian border are com-
bined, however, that will become the third largest port of entry.)   Given the
increase in crossings for the first half of FY 1997, this year’s numbers could be
the highest ever.
Unauthorized Entries.  The exact number of unauthorized entries of Mexicans
into the United States is unknown.  Traditionally, these entries have been measured by
number of apprehensions; however, apprehensions refer to events, not individuals.  In
FY 1995, more than 1.3 million apprehensions of Mexicans attempting to enter
without inspection were recorded by U.S. immigration authorities.  However,
the same individual may be apprehended more than once, and many individu-
als who cross are never apprehended.  Also, many apprehended individuals are
local crossers, not migrants per se (Bean et al. 1994).  During our site visits to
Tijuana and San Diego, the research team learned that new enforcement tech-
niques implemented in that area have caused an increase in the number of times
an individual Mexican is apprehended before making a successful entry.  An-
other new enforcement tool, the IDENT system, which stores the fingerprints of
apprehended persons, may yield further data to provide an unduplicated count
of the number of persons apprehended.
Trends in Naturalization.  In recent years, the naturalization of Mexican born
immigrants has increased dramatically.  As noted above, recent estimates place the
number of Mexican-born naturalized U.S. citizens resident in the United States
at about one-half million (Passel & Clark 1997).  Traditionally, only a small
portion of eligible Mexican-born immigrants become United States citizens.  The
INS has been tracking the cohorts of legal immigrants admitted in 1977 and 1982
to determine if and when they became naturalized citizens.  Overall, 46 percent
of the 1977 cohort and 41.5 percent  of the 1982 cohort had naturalized as of
1995.  For Mexicans, the comparable proportions are 22.2 and 14.4 percent,
respectively.
In the period 1961-1995, a total of 470,515 Mexican nationals naturalized, not
including children deriving U.S. citizenship from their parents’ naturalization.
Annual naturalizations hovered between six and ten thousand during the 1960s
and 1970s, but in the 1980s they more than tripled.  Since then, naturalizations
have continued and will continue to increase due to the confluence of several
factors (from 39,310 in fiscal 1994, to 67,238 in 1995, and to 233,000 in 1996).
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Interestingly, more women than men have naturalized, almost twenty-thousand
more in the 1961-1995 period, and the female was greater than the male propor-
tion in every year since 1966 except 1990-1993.
1  This is a lower limit because the figure does not include the emigration of complete
families or of migrants who lived in Mexico alone, as there is no reporting of these
people in household surveys such as the ENADID (Corona and Turián 1996c).
Endnote
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The demographic, educational, and income characteristics of Mexican-born
migrants form a picture of their likely achievement and impact in both coun-
tries.  These characteristics also mirror the forces driving migration.  Unfortu-
nately, no single data set from either side of the border provides information on
all the major characteristics or on all of the varied Mexican-born subgroups.
Thus, the characteristics of Mexican-born migrants have to be pieced together
from a number of data sources in the United States and Mexico.  These are
examined here to describe how migrant groups have changed over time and
how they differ from one another today.
We utilize well-known data sources and only those that reliably reflect the char-
acteristics of the Mexican-born.  All provide data on different migrant subpopu-
lations.  However, they either do not distinguish legal status or imperfectly
capture the varied “types” of migrants (by time spent in the United States).  For
example, the U.S. Census has excellent information on characteristics, but does
not capture legal status perfectly.1  Thus, Census data do not permit contrasting
the characteristics of, for example, legal permanent resident aliens and legal
temporary aliens, to say nothing of unauthorized persons.
Analysis of the incomplete yet complex wealth of information available leads to
three broad conclusions:
• Mexican-born migrants differ systematically along two fundamental
dimensions: legal status in the United States (from unauthorized per-
sons to naturalized citizens), and a basic migration pattern or “type”
(from short-term visitors to occasional sojourners to settlers).
• Mexican-born migrants tend to have low skill levels, relative both to the
U.S. population at large and to other migrant groups.  These low skill
levels reflect the demand for labor in sectors where Mexican-born mi-
grants are employed and, in turn, are reflected in the low incomes and
high poverty rates of Mexican-born settlers in the U.S.  This situation is
exacerbated by the unauthorized status of many of these migrants.
• The characteristics of migrants show increased diversity over time, con-
sistent with the increasingly diverse demand, supply, and network fac-
tors that are shaping migration flows.
III.
CHARACTERISTICS
OF MEXICAN-
BORN
MIGRANTS
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Character-
istics of
Migrant
Types
Though data constraints are considerable, we can contrast, with representative
and primarily national-level data, the following types of migrants to the United
States:2
• Sojourner migrant (legal or unauthorized whose principal residence is in
Mexico);
• Settled resident (legal or unauthorized who habitually reside in the U.S.);
and
• Naturalized U.S. citizens (who have met five-year legal residence and
other requirements).
Sojourners may be of any legal status and encompass those who come for short
periods of stay for reasons varying from brief family visits and tourism, to work
in unauthorized status or with legal visas—although most migrate to work.  We
draw on several sources to describe these mobile individuals.  The primarily
ones from Mexico are the 1992 national survey (ENADID), surveys at the north-
ern border (EMIF), the Zapata Canyon project, a special survey in the state of
Michoacán, and the Mexican Migration Project.
Table III-1.
Demographics
& Education for
the
United States &
Mexican
Populations &
Mexican-Born
Migrants
28 - 32 YRS
73 - 94%
56 - 85%
43 - 66%
6 YRS
39%
91 - 99%
  1 -   9%
93%
42 YRS
54%
76%
80%
—
5
24%
67%
33%
57%
CHARACTERISTICS
DEMOGRAPHICS
  Age (average)
  Male Proportion
  Married4
      Men
      Women
SCHOOLING4
Years (average)
    Fewer than 5
    Fewer than 12
    12 or more
ENGLISH
    Not speaking well
    or very well
U.S. RESIDENT POPULATION (1990)3
SETTLERS NATURALIZED
MEXICAN-BORN TOTAL
RESIDENTS
25 YRS
49%
83%
72%
5 YRS
46
90%
10%
—
MEXICO
RESIDENT
POPULATION (1992)1
MEXICAN-BORN
SOJOURNER
(1992-1994)2
1Source: Encuesta Nacional de Indicadores Demográficos [ENADID].
2Multiple sources.  See Bustamante et al. 1997.
3Source: 1990 United States Census.
4Population 25 years and older.
5
— means data not available.
30 YRS
55%
59%
61%
8 YRS
28%
76%
24%
71%
33 YRS
49%
56%
57%
  —
  3%
28%
72%
6%
15
B I N A T I O N A L  S T U D Y
E S T U D I O  B I N A C I O N A L
CHARACTERISTICS
LABOR FORCE4
Total Participation
    Male
    Female
Unemployment Rate4
Employment Sector4
    Agriculture
    Construction/Manufacturing
    Services
INCOME & POVERTY
Individual Earnings U.S. $
              (year)
Household Income, Mean U.S. $
              (year)
Poverty
NATURALIZEDSETTLER
Settlers establish a usual or permanent residence in the United States, although
many return regularly to Mexico and as many as one-half reestablish residence
in Mexico after a ten-year stay or longer in the U.S.  Eventually, many legal
settlers become naturalized citizens, a process that takes time and commitment;
they tend to be older and more assimilated.  To describe these populations we
draw primarily upon the 1990 U.S. Census, the 1996 Current Population Survey
[CPS], public and special analyses of INS administrative data, and several other
sources.3
Selected characteristics are presented in Tables III-1 and III-2 as ranges, when
drawn from more than one data source, and are compared with the total or
average U.S. population (native and foreign-born).  The text below summarizes
and explains the tabular results and presents additional information.
Mexico to United States migrants have tended to be selected from the middle-
to-lower segments of Mexico’s socioeconomic hierarchy, a selection process that
originated at the start of this century with the recruitment of low-skilled work-
ers by U.S. employers for seasonal jobs, mostly in agriculture (Bustamante et al.
1992).  This flow was facilitated by the long and historically porous border that
put U.S. labor markets within reach of individuals with limited financial re-
MEXICO RESIDENT
POPULATION (1992)1
MEXICAN-BORN
SOJOURNER
(1992-1994)2
Table
III-2.
Labor Force
& Income/
Earnings
for the
United
States
& Mexican
Populations
& Mexican-
Born
Immigrants
U.S. RESIDENT POPULATION (1990)3
            MEXICAN-BORN TOTAL
 RESIDENTS
65%
75%
59%
6%
  3%
25%
72%
$24,4087
$38,940
13%
69%
82%
53%
9%
10%
36%
54%
$16,5537
$28,210
25%
70%
85%
50%
11%
13%
37%
51%
 $14,1387
$27,120
27%
83%
91%
58%
  6 -11%
47 - 53%
25 - 26%
23 - 26%
$185 - 240
(week)
—
 —
 43%
68%
20%
3%
23%
29%
48%
—
$8,8806
36%
1Source: 1990 Mexican Census, note that these figures reflect the greater enumeration of formal sector activity.
2Multiple sources.  See: Bustamante et al. 1997.
3Source: 1990 United States Census.
4United States population 16 years and older and Mexican population 12 years and older.
5
—means data not available.
6Source: Escobar Latapí 1996.
7Source: Special tabulations by Jeffrey S. Passel, Urban Institute, persons ages 25 and over.
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sources, by an expanding demand for low-skilled migrant workers in and out
of agriculture, particularly in the southwestern United States (Alba 1992), and
by extensive migration networks connecting families with low-skill U.S. jobs.
Sojourner migrants tend to be young males with little schooling who work in agricul-
ture.  Today, more than one-half of the highly mobile sojourners, particularly the
seasonal workers captured in the data sources shown in Table III-2, still find
employment in agriculture.  Their short-term employment, however, is associ-
ated with very low earnings of as little as $185 per week, and more than one-
half of their families have incomes below the poverty line.
Settled or permanent residents tend to look more like the U.S. population as a whole,
even though differences between Mexican-born migrants and the total U.S. population
remain substantial.  Many, if not most, settlers begin their stay in the United
States as circular or sojourner migrants, often as legal entrants (but also in
unauthorized status) to work or live with their families.  As their time in the
U.S. lengthens, they gain in experience.  Over time they and their families and
households develop greater resources and their ability and willingness to adapt
to the economy increases.
The settler population is more equally balanced between the sexes and appears
to be better educated than sojourners (Donato 1993).  Although, as Table III-1
shows, they generally complete only six years of education and three-fourths of
those 25 years and older have not completed high school, 31 percent of those
aged 18-24 are high school graduates.  Moreover, 6.5 percent of all Mexican-born
persons 18 and older were enrolled in college at the time of the 1990 Census.
Within the settler population, legal immigrants are better educated.  Among
1996 legal immigrants aged 25 and over, 35 percent are high school graduates
and 15 percent are college graduates (Jasso et al. 1997).  Fewer settlers than
sojourners work in agriculture and, with longer-term residence and more re-
sources, their households bring in more income.  Nevertheless, as Table III-2
shows, settler household income ranges from two-thirds to about three-quarters
that of the average U.S. household and twice as many live below the poverty
line.
The legalization programs of IRCA formalized and speeded the transition from so-
journer, to settler, to legal resident, and, finally, to naturalized citizen.  There is
limited information on the Mexican SAW workers who, upon legal admission,
typified the seasonal agricultural or sojourner type migrant.  Primarily males,
most were employed in agriculture while many were likely employed in casual
17
B I N A T I O N A L  S T U D Y
E S T U D I O  B I N A C I O N A L
urban-based jobs as well.  SAWs have little education and income, but with time
they are moving out of agriculture to potentially more stable households and
more secure jobs—they comprised 33 percent of seasonal U.S. farm workers in
1989, but only 19 percent by 1995.
The pre-1982 legalization population typifies a settler population with a rela-
tively balanced proportion of males and with only 7 percent employed in agri-
culture.  Yet even in 1992, five years after legalization, they remained a popu-
lation with little education; only 45 percent have completed primary education.
Research finds that legalization has afforded some modest improvements, partly
due to increased use of English and job training: the rate of earnings growth of
legalized men 1989-1992 was greater than other U.S. workers.  Two-thirds re-
ported that legalization afforded them “easier” advancement at work.  Earnings
increased from U.S. $7.14 to U.S. $9.43 per hour in 1992 (constant dollars).
Median family earnings were U.S. $19,112 (U.S. DOL 1996).
The number of Mexican-born becoming naturalized U.S. citizens is rapidly in-
creasing as shown in Chapter II.  Historically, the Mexican-born, along with
Canadians, had among the lowest rates of naturalization of any foreign-born
group.  Proximity to their country of origin is a key factor.  Mexican-born
migrants who live in the Southwestern United States are even less likely to
naturalize than their counterparts who settle in the Midwest or in New York or
New Jersey, although there has been a recent surge in naturalizations among the
Mexican-born.  One of the more important of the many other reasons for recent
trends4 is the legacy of IRCA, those granted legal permanent resident status first
became eligible to naturalize starting in 1994.  Forty-three percent of legalized
Mexican-born adults reported an intention to naturalize as of 1992.  The surge
in naturalizations, however, is not limited to the IRCA cohorts.
Longitudinal INS data on naturalization for Mexican-born persons admitted to perma-
nent residence in 1977 and 1982 indicate that those who naturalize are drawn from
among the more highly-skilled.  They also experience occupational upgrading during
the years between admission and naturalization.  Moreover, for women, those
who report work upon admission are more likely to naturalize, and labor force
participation also increases between admission and naturalization.  According
to the 1990 Census, more than 42 percent of naturalized citizens speak English
“very well” compared with 25 percent of those who do not report being natu-
ralized.  Similarly, the naturalized citizens are better schooled: 33 percent of
those 25 years and older are high school graduates, compared with 24 percent
of those not naturalized.
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There are some indications that the characteristics of migrants—in terms of origins and
destinations, gender, age, education, and employment—are becoming more diverse over
time.  Migration, thus, is a dynamic process: the forces selecting people into and
out of migration change over time.   Migrant characteristics partly reflect the
characteristics of the population-at-large from which migrants are drawn and
partly are determined by selective migration forces.  For example, if migrants
are drawn randomly from a population that becomes increasingly educated
over time, the average education of migrants will increase.  The spread of
migration networks may make migration “less selective” of individual charac-
teristics over time.  Increased diversity may also partly reflect changes in the
kinds of worker in demand by U.S. employers.  Studies document cases in
which differences in characteristics between migrants and nonmigrants from
specific locales in Mexico, at one time pronounced, have faded or disappeared.
They also show increasing diversity of migrant origins, destinations, and demo-
graphic characteristics.
Places of Origin in Mexico.  The traditional sending states continue to domi-
nate, but Mexican-born migrants increasingly have come from other states in Mexico.
In 1926, more than one-half of all monetary remittances from the United States
were directed to the three core states of the west-central region Guanajuato,
Michoacán, and Jalisco.  The role of these three has diminished somewhat and
today they are joined by Durango, Zacatecas, the state of México, México City,
Chihuahua, Tamaulipas, and Guerrero: these ten entities represent 49 percent of
Mexico’s total population, but more than 70 percent of the migrant total.5
A broader picture of migrant sources can be constructed by dividing Mexico
into six regions based on the geographic distribution of migrant birthplaces and
using 1992 data:
(1) West-central core states—38 percent of all migrants: Guanajuato,
Michoacán, Jalisco, and Colima;
(2) Northern-border states—21 percent of all migrants: Baja California,
Sonora, Chihuahua, Coahuila, Nuevo León, and Tamaulipas (including
Baja California Sur);
(3) States between regions One and Two listed above—22 percent of all
migrants: Sinaloa, Durango, Nayarit, Zacatecas, San Luis Potosí, and
Aguascalientes;
Changes in
Characteristics
over Time
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(4) Interior states—9 percent of all migrants: in and surrounding the Valley
of México, the Federal District, the state of México, Querétaro, Hidalgo,
and Tlaxcala;
(5) Four southern states—8 percent of all migrants: Oaxaca, Guerrero, Puebla,
and Morelos;
(6) Six southwestern states—2 percent of all migrants: Veracruz, Tabasco,
Chiapas, Campeche, Yucatán, and Quintana Roo.
In recent years, the share of migrants from rural areas appears to have fallen
and a progressively larger share comes from urban areas.  Traditionally mi-
grants predominantly originated from rural areas (places with population less
than 20,000).  As of 1992, 59 percent of the Mexican-born who had lived in the
U.S. reported coming from rural areas.6   Nevertheless, 25 to 31 percent of mi-
grants born in rural areas had changed their homes to urban areas.
Places of Destination in the United States.  For historical, geographic,
and labor-market reasons, Texas was the leading destination for Mexican-born
migrants prior to the 1920s, joined much later by California and Illinois.  While
the southwest remained the core sending area, during the Bracero program
Mexican-born migrants fanned out across a broader geographic area from Texas
and California to Arizona, Indiana, Delaware, Michigan, Arkansas, Montana,
and Washington.  The connections to California and Texas are widespread across
Mexico, but vary depending on sending traditions and networks: case studies
in Michoacán indicate that communities “channel” their migrant streams to
particular U.S. destinations.
Mexican-born migrants in the United States remain concentrated in a few states and
localities, but increasingly they are found in new destinations.  Border surveys find
that the traditional predominance of Texas, California (70 percent of experienced
migrants), and Illinois has continued for sojourner and settler alike.  The 1990
U.S. Census indicates that the Mexican-born are highly concentrated in Califor-
nia, Texas, and Illinois: about 85 percent of all Mexican-born immigrants resided
in these three states compared to 45 percent of all immigrants to the U.S.
California is the single major destination with 50 percent of all Mexican mi-
grants.
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Los Angeles is the single most important urban destination of all Mexican-born
migrants.  It is followed by San Antonio, the south Texas Rio Grande Valley,
Houston, Dallas-Fort Worth, El Paso, Fresno, and Phoenix.
At the same time, Mexican-born migrants have become attracted to new geo-
graphic destinations.  Midwestern and eastern states with few foreign-born
workers have become destinations for thousands of Mexican-born persons
employed in agriculture, food processing, construction, and manufacturing op-
erations.  Mexican data show sojourners are increasingly headed to Florida,
Arizona, New Mexico, and North Carolina.  Although the majority of legal
immigrants continue to list California, Texas, and Illinois as their selected places
of residence, increasingly they go now to destinations such as Florida and Georgia.
Demographic Profile of Migrants.  Mexico to U.S. migration flows tra-
ditionally were dominated by young, solo males.  For example, a classic study
published in 1975 analyzing apprehended migrants found that more than 90
percent were 40 years of age or younger, 92 percent were males, and 62 percent
were single.  The Zapata Canyon border survey, dominated by unauthorized
circular migrants and sojourners, finds high concentrations of males: 97 percent
in 1996.
The importance of males persists at least among sojourner migrants, although there is
a trend toward more female migrants, and women dominate among new legal immi-
grants.  The 1992 ENADID survey found that 21 percent of the Mexicans had
lived or worked in the United States were women.7  The share of males in
Michoacán surveys—a traditional sending area—was 63 percent in 1983 and 56
percent 1993, indicating that more women are joining the migration stream.  In
contrast, the U.S. Census and other standard surveys, undoubtedly better at
capturing settlers, show Mexican-born migration to be much more gender-bal-
anced [see Table III-1].  INS admissions data on legal Mexican immigrants to the
United States show that women outnumbered men for eight consecutive years
between 1964 and 1971, and they outnumbered men again in 1993 and 1994.
Mexican migrants appear to be a young group, younger than migrants to the
U.S. from other countries and  than the U.S. population at large [see Table III-
1].  This relative youthfulness may partly reflect the presence of young pioneer
migrants in early migration streams and children accompanying legal immi-
grants.8  The INS legal admissions data also show Mexican immigrants to be a
young group with a lower mean and median age than other immigrants in the
U.S.
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Mexican community surveys and INS data indicate, however, that migrant ages may
be increasing.  The average age of Michoacán migrants rose from a mean of 29
in 1983 to 32 years in 1993.9  Border crossing surveys for 1988 to 1996 reveal
sharply rising shares of unauthorized migrants between the ages of 25-29 and
decreasing shares of younger migrants.  The age of women in U.S. legal admis-
sions increased from 21 to 26 years from 1971 to 1994.  Among these legal
immigrants, increases in age may reflect longer waits for visa issuance and/or
fewer children.
One last demographic characteristic: most migrants are married [see Table III-
1].   Among sojourners, men are more likely to be married, while among settlers,
women are more likely to be married.  Additionally, a substantial proportion of
persons who become legal U.S. immigrants do so as the spouses of U.S. citizens.
Although the Mexican-born spouse flow has declined, from more than 30,000
per year in 1986-1988 to less than one-half of that in 1995, Mexico remains the
leading source country for spouses of U.S. citizens.   While most spouse immi-
grants from other countries are women, a majority of those from Mexico are
men.10
Educational Profile.  Mexican migrants have less schooling relative to the U.S.
population and other immigrant groups. Nevertheless, it appears that the average schooling
of  northbound migrants is increasing over time.  Sojourners average around six
years of schooling.  In the early 1980s, relatively well-educated villagers were
likely to migrate, but their destinations were urban areas of Mexico.  Over the
decade, several Mexican data sources indicate increases in the schooling of U.S.
migrants.11
Among migrants in the Michoacán surveys, average schooling increased from
4.1 to 5.8 years between 1983 and 1993.  At the same time, average schooling
among nonmigrants who remained in Mexico decreased from 4.5 to 4.3 years.
These changes reflect shifts in migrant selectivity.  During Mexico’s crisis years
in the mid-1980s, better-educated migrants appear to have shifted destinations
to the United States.
The 1990 U.S. Census data present a similar picture of increasing educational
levels: recent arrival cohorts have been better schooled.  At the upper end of the
educational spectrum, 4 percent of the 1980-1990 and 6 percent of the 1987-1990
migrants were college graduates.  As already noted, 1996 legal immigrant com-
plete college at a rate approaching the native-born and a higher rate of post-
graduate school (9 percent compared to 7 percent) (Jasso et al. 1997)  Mean-
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while, the absolute number of Mexican-born doctorate holders in the U.S. 1990
Census was 3,869 (of which 27 percent were women).12
Labor Force Characteristics.  Work is the single most important attraction in
the U.S.; however that does not mean Mexican migrants lack jobs in Mexico or combine
jobs in the U.S. with usual residence there.  Most migrants had some kind of work
in Mexico prior to migrating, although the share who were unemployed before
migrating may be rising.  Border crossing data (which include large numbers of
unauthorized migrants) find that while most had work prior to leaving, the
majority migrated with the intention of working in the U.S.  Data also show that
among females, about one-third worked outside the home in Mexico prior to
migrating.
Mexican data sources reveal that those who have lived in the United States have
worked there.  Of course, work experience may include periodic unemployment
and U.S. data show Mexican migrants have nearly double U.S. unemployment
rates.  As of 1992, men are more likely than women to report a habitual resi-
dence in the U.S. and work experience (92 percent versus 54 percent). Still, the
1992 survey found more than one million Mexican-born migrants who declared
having worked in the U.S. without having “lived” in or established a usual
residence.
Mexican-born migrants in the United States have, over time, become less likely to be
agricultural workers and are found in an increasing diversity of jobs.  From the turn
of the century and through the end of the Bracero program, Mexican-born mi-
grants were employed primarily in agriculture.  Today [see Table III-2], most
settlers and Mexican-born citizens work outside of agriculture.  Concurrently,
even northward bound sojourners increasingly are found outside of agriculture.
Mexican data sources show evidence of an upward trend in U.S. urban-sector
employment—particularly in services and construction—for unauthorized mi-
grants [see Appendix B].  Still, Table III-2 shows that Mexican-born workers
retain an industrial profile that differs from the U.S. average.
Income Characteristics.  Mexican-born households are much more likely
than all U.S. households to be found at the bottom of the income distribution.
The 1990 Census shows that the share of households in the lowest income
groups was greater for the recently arrived 1980-1990 cohort and lower for the
pre-1980 cohort.  The share in the highest income groups was higher for the
earlier cohort.  This suggests the possible operation of two mechanisms: expe-
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rience in the U.S. leads to higher earnings and/or the less successful migrants
in the earlier cohorts returned to Mexico, leaving the higher earners.
A 1996 U.S. survey finds that, while the average U.S. household saw income
gains between 1990 and 1996, Mexican-born households lost income.  On aver-
age, all U.S. households brought in $38,453 in 1990 and $44,938 by 1996.  In
contrast, the average U.S. Mexican-born household brought in $27,122 in 1990,
but only $26,481 in 1996.  Comparison of median household income shows the
same relative loss in the incomes of Mexican-born households (all figures in
current dollars).  The 1996 data reveal a concentration of new (1990-1996) mi-
grant households at the bottom of the income spectrum: 11 percent of recently
arrived migrant households have incomes less than $5,000, double the propor-
tion of earlier arrivals.  This may reflect differences in the legal status mix, for
example, a larger proportion of undocumented among the recent arrivals.  It
also may reflect the lower earnings at entry among some of the IRCA-legalized
aliens.  Recent legal immigrants in 1996, for example, have higher earnings.  A
recent survey indicates earnings of $19,130 for adult male and $13,620 for adult
women immigrants (Jasso et al. 1997).
1 Information on the characteristics of citizens is biased because of substantial
misreporting of naturalization by noncitizen settlers (special tabulations by Jeffrey
Passel, Urban Institute). However, the systematic differences between settlers and
citizens appear to be reasonable approximations.
2  To obtain a picture of the sojourner, we piece together data from numerous sources:
the National Survey of Demographic Indicators [Encuesta Nacional de Indicadores
Demográficos, or ENADID], the Survey of Migration at the Northern Border [Encuesta
sobre Migración en la Frontera Norte, or EMIF], the Mexican Migrant Survey
undertaken jointly by COLEF and a team of researchers from the University of Southern
California [USC], the Mexican Migration Project, the Michoacán Project, INS Data on
Nonimmigrants (Temporary Visitors), the UC-EDD Survey of California Farmworkers
carried out by the University of California, Davis [UC], the State of California
Employment Development Department [EDD], and the National Agricultural Workers
Survey [NAWS] conducted by the U.S. Labor Department.
3 For pictures of the settlers and U.S. citizens, we rely on two main U.S.-side data
sources: (1) the decennial censuses, including microdata as well as historical time
series published in Historical Statistics of the United States; (2) official government
information, including microdata compiled by the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization
Service [INS], tabulations published by the INS in its Annual Report (published 1943
to 1977) and the successor Statistical Yearbook (published since 1978), tabulations
published by the U.S. Department of State in its annual Report of the Visa Office, and
a special microdata sample assembled from INS data by the General Accounting
Office [GAO].  Of these, only INS data provide information on legal status; and
measurement of naturalization in the censuses is problematic.
Endnotes
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4 These factors include: visa backlogs for spouses and minor children of permanent
resident aliens, largely due to IRCA legalizations; the Green Card Replacement Program,
initiated in 1992, which requires that permanent resident alien cards issued before
1978 be replaced and which leads some to naturalize rather than obtain a new green
card; initiation of an expiration date, ten years after issuance, on green cards issued
since 1988, which may similarly lead some to choose naturalization over green-card
renewal; recent U.S. legislation which dramatically reduces the civil rights and social
entitlements of nonnaturalized immigrants; and recent amendment of the Mexican
Constitution that provides that Mexican nationals who become naturalized citizens of
another country do not automatically forfeit Mexican nationality.
5 The share of migrants in a state’s total population varies.  It is highest in Zacatecas,
where 9.7 percent of the population had lived or worked in the United States.  It is
8.3 percent in Durango, 8.2 percent in Michoacán and 6.5 percent in Jalisco.  In
contrast, the share is only 0.9 percent in México City, and 1 percent in the state of
México.
6 As of 1992, there were marked differences in rural versus urban origins across regions.
While the Valley of México and border regions have small shares of rural migrants,
32 percent and 34 percent respectively, in other regions the rural share is more than
60 percent.
7 The share for those who had lived in the U.S. over the previous five years was 24
percent, suggesting that the female share is increasing slightly.
8 For example, in the nineteen communities studied by Massey and Durand, the average
age of migrants in the United States at their most recent trip was 29 years.  The
average age of unauthorized migrants in the Michoacán surveys, who comprised just
over 58 percent of all 1993 migrants, was younger at 28.5 years than legal migrants
at 37 years of age.
9 The 1983 migrants were somewhat younger than nonmigrants, whose average age
was 32, but the 1993 migrants were considerably older than nonmigrants, whose
average age was 20.
10 INS public-use data do not include sponsor’s nativity, but a special study carried out
by the General Accounting Office [GAO] on data from 1985 indicates that almost 78
percent of the U.S. sponsors of Mexican-born spouses were U.S. citizens by birth
(worldwide, the rate was 80 percent).  In an intergenerational twist on the international
character of these couples, among the birth-citizen sponsors in the GAO sample, 4-
5 percent were themselves born abroad to U.S. citizen parent(s).
11 The Mexican Migrant Project show increased schooling and increased schooling is one
of the more salient findings of the Zapata Canyon border survey.  Mexican data for
1978-1979 found migrants had 4.9 years of schooling on average, slightly greater than
the 4.7 years for the Mexican population over 14 years old.
12 Note that Census data do not reveal whether these are persons undergoing further
training or engaged in postdoctoral work with nonimmigrant visas as opposed to
permanent residents of the United States.
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For most of the twentieth century, the major linkage between the two most
populous countries in North America has been the migration of people from
Mexico to the United States.  “Go north for opportunity,” is an idea deeply
embedded in Mexican youth, especially in the rural areas of west central Mexico.
Many factors cause and sustain this movement of Mexicans across the border
to work temporarily or to settle in the United States (Massey et al. 1993).  We
group the factors that sustain Mexico-United States migration into three broad
categories: (1) demand-pull factors in the United States; (2) supply-push factors
in Mexico; and (3) the networks of human contacts that bridge the border.
Our analysis leads to a simple conclusion: the migration of persons from Mexico
to the United States is a dynamic process.  What began largely as the U.S.-
approved or U.S.-tolerated recruitment of Mexican workers for seasonal U.S.
farm jobs has become a far more complex migration flow that is sustained by
supply and network factors.  Our key findings are that:
• The catalyst for much of today’s unauthorized Mexican migration for
United States employment lies in the United States, but over time new
factors have created a larger and more complex set of reasons that
sustain the flow;
• The same tendencies that currently seem to be increasing and diversi-
fying Mexico-United States migration flows may be dampened or re-
versed starting in the next fifteen years.  These demographic and eco-
nomic trends, if sustained, could reduce pressure for Mexico-United
States migration.
Mexico-to-United States migration is primarily economically motivated and the initial
motivations for the migrant flow lie largely inside the United States—Mexican work-
ers were recruited by U.S. farmers earlier in the twentieth century,  creating
linkages between jobs in U.S. agriculture and workers in particular Mexican
communities.  We find that there is still a demand-pull for Mexican workers in
the low-unemployment U.S. labor market in the sense that most recently-ar-
rived legal and unauthorized Mexican migrants can find jobs in high turnover
farm, manufacturing, and service jobs.  Low-skill Mexican workers are em-
ployed both in areas where Mexican-born workers traditionally have played
important roles, as in southwestern agriculture, and now in industries in the
Midwest, the southeast, and east coast, including construction, meatpacking,
IV. CAUSES
OF THE
MIGRATION
NORTHWARD
Starting &
Sustaining
Factors
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and services.  In some cases, including poultry and meat packing, private labor
brokers and recruiters continue to play an active role in moving Mexican work-
ers to jobs in the Midwest and southeast.
However, the factors that initiated Mexico-United States migration are not necessarily
the only ones that sustain the flow.  Today cross-border networks of relatives,
friends, and labor brokers and recruiters link an expanding list of U.S. indus-
tries, occupations, and areas to a lengthening list of Mexican communities that
send migrants to the U.S.  In Mexico, residents of some communities have better
information about the availability of certain types of U.S. jobs than do nearby
U.S. residents.
Supply-push factors in Mexico play as fundamental a role as the availability of
U.S. jobs in sustaining Mexico-United States migration.  Supply-push factors
seem to have become more important since the mid-1980s as a result of rapid
population growth in the 1970s, recurring Mexican economic crises, peso de-
valuations, and Mexican policies aimed at economic modernization, such as the
privatization of government-owned industries that resulted in layoffs and the
restructuring of rural Mexico that made small-scale farming less profitable (Rob-
erts & Escobar Latapí 1997).
This means that Mexicans migrate to the U.S. (1) within well-established net-
works, as well as (2) through new networks that are developing to move mi-
grants to the U.S. from regions without a tradition of Mexico-United States
migration, such as Mexico’s urban areas and the southern states identified in
Chapter III.  Friends and relatives established in the U.S. often provide financ-
ing, advice, shelter, and jobs to newly-arrived unauthorized migrants.  Settled
family members in the U.S. use family unification policies to have spouses and
children join them and eventually to secure legal migrant status.
In some areas of west central Mexico, the data suggest that migration to the U.S.
has become a way of life.  Based on migration histories collected in thirty-nine
communities that have long histories of sending migrants to the U.S., we esti-
mate that by the time they are 40, most of the men in some of these communities
have made at least one trip to the U.S.  Based on a statistical model that predicts
migration to the U.S. on the basis of age and community characteristics, it
appears that in some communities the probability that a young man will make
a first trip to the U.S. increased after 1992.
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The United States labor markets where Mexican migrants work are changing and may
change even more as a result of technological advances, trade trends, and  labor force
and legislative changes.  On the demand side of U.S. labor markets, employers are
adjusting to higher minimum wages and more global competition.  On the
supply side, the U.S. retains a sizable low-skilled labor force.  Recent welfare
reforms may add to the supply of low-skilled U.S. workers seeking employ-
ment, most notably in sectors where Mexican-born workers are concentrated
(nine of ten Mexican-born workers in the U.S. hold nonfarm jobs, often in low-
skill industries).  High immigration since the 1980s, legalization in 1987-1988,
and changing hiring practices have made Mexican-born workers significant com-
ponents of the U.S. food processing, construction, service, and manufacturing
labor forces.
Employment Trends.  It is not clear whether the U.S. labor market will continue
to evolve in ways that absorb large numbers of Mexican migrant workers.  On the one
hand, the U.S. unemployment rate dropped to its lowest levels in twenty-five
years in 1997, and there are reports of labor shortages, especially in low-wage
labor markets in areas with unemployment rates of less than 2 percent, such as
the Midwest.  Job growth has been very rapid: between January 1994 and June
1997, the U.S. economy added about 8 million jobs.  With Mexican-born workers
spreading throughout the U.S. in a period of rapid job growth and low unem-
ployment, networks that bridge the border may be strengthened, increasing the
demand for migrant workers and making Mexican migrant workers a perma-
nent feature of more U.S. industries and areas.
On the other hand, the U.S. is committed to implementing more border and
interior controls, to moving 2 to 3 million adult welfare recipients into jobs, and
to creating jobs for the rapidly growing domestic labor force.  The U.S. labor
force, which usually expands by about 1 percent per year, has been expanding
about twice as fast due to international migration, welfare recipients moving off
the rolls, more older men working, and an increase in the percentage of work-
ing-age women seeking jobs.  In January 1997, a record 67.2 percent of the U.S.
population 16 and older was in the labor force, employed, or looking for work,
for a total of 136 million persons.
It is hard to project the evolution of labor markets that migrants traditionally
enter.  In many areas of the U.S., migrant workers, a fear of labor shortages, and
high welfare caseloads go together.  For example, in the San Joaquin Valley of
Evolving
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California, about 85 percent of the 400,000 individuals who work as farm work-
ers sometime during a typical year are foreign-born, including 100,000 or more
unauthorized migrants.  Farmers fearful of labor shortages are calling for modi-
fications of the H-2A program that would make it easier to obtain temporary
foreign farm workers (reducing wage and housing protections for both the H-
2A and other workers).  At the same time, local conditions suggest that workers
are available: 25 percent of the 761,000 residents of Fresno county are receiving
some form of welfare assistance, and many may soon be seeking employment
in a competitive labor market with an unemployment rate of over 14 percent as
of April 1997.
Border Enforcement Strategies.  The United States border enforcement strat-
egies begun in 1994 are affecting migration patterns, but not preventing unauthorized
entry.  The major programs begun since 1994, 1995, and 1996 are “Hold-the-
Line” in El Paso, “Gatekeeper” in San Diego, and “Safeguard” in Arizona,
respectively.  Our research along the border found that migrant smuggling has
achieved enough regularity and volume to become an established business with
three segments: local agents; local and border smugglers; and border-only smug-
gling businesses—each with a menu of prices and services.  As border control
operations were stepped up in 1994, more migrants turned to smugglers or
“coyotes,” whose services became increasingly diversified.  Thus, unauthorized
migrants have several available packages of services and several options to pay
for the cost of illegally entering the U.S., including working in a coyote-pro-
vided or coyote-arranged job in the U.S.
Our survey in Jalisco in January 1996 found that most Mexicans attempting
unauthorized entry into the U.S. hire smugglers to help them cross the border.
Migrants with the fewest network links to bridge the border are most likely to
rely on the smugglers who operate as border-only businesses; one-half of the
migrants who have no networks in the U.S. turn to these border-only coyotes.
The increased use of coyotes generally, and particularly at the border, helps to
explain why most migrants attempting unauthorized entry succeed despite sig-
nificantly more U.S. Border Patrol agents and technology on the border.  It
remains to be seen whether or not triple fences, augmented border strategies,
and more effective internal employer sanctions enforcement will have deterrent
effects over the long run.
Outlook.  These trends suggest several scenarios.  One is that migrant labor
markets will segment with different employers /industries pursuing different
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strategies.  Some U.S. employers, reacting to low unemployment and welfare
reforms that limit assistance for migrants, may offer English and other services
to help their migrant employees become naturalized U.S. citizens.  Other U.S.
employers, such as farm labor contractors, may go further into the underground
economy to avoid labor law and immigration enforcement, hiring recently ar-
rived migrants despite high unemployment rates that prevail in their regions.
Further segmentation of migrant labor markets could mean that networks may
become more important, with the ability to get into the upper segment of the
unskilled migrant labor market being the key to economic mobility in the U.S.
We find that there is reason to believe that currently high levels of Mexico- United
States migration may represent a “hump” or peak in the volume of Mexico- United
States migration.  Within the next fifteen years, we think that demographic and
economic factors within Mexico are likely to reduce emigration pressures.
Structural Changes and People Seeking Work.  A major long-term
supply-push factor explaining the mid-1990s migration hump and the eventual decline
in emigration pressure is demography—the number of new job seekers entering the labor
force in Mexico has been very high, but will decline.  Between 1993 and 1997,
Mexican National Employment Surveys indicate that employment increased from
32.4 million to 36.7 million, by about 3 percent per year, adding about 1.1
million paid and unpaid jobs per year.1
A declining birthrate since 1970, when Mexican women averaged nearly seven
children each reduces the need to create additional jobs,but Mexican women
today average less than three children each, a downward trend that appears to
be continuing.  Net growth of the labor force ages 15 to 44  is projected to drop
to 500,000 to 550,000 per year by 2010.
Our longer-term perspective emphasizes that these demographic trends, in com-
bination with other patterns in Mexico and the United States, may reudce Mexico-
to-United States migration.2  Within Mexico, the effect of demographic factors
on reducing emigration pressure could be magnified if, for example, more young
persons follow the trend of staying longer in Mexican schools.  Migration net-
works are most established in rural areas with long traditions of sending young
men to the U.S., including the areas of Mexico currently undergoing structural
change.  But Mexico’s rural restructuring can displace workers from agriculture
only once.  After the Mexican farm labor force has been reduced from 25 per-
Migration &
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cent of all workers in the mid-1990s to 12 to 15 percent by 2015, supply-push
emigration pressures from the areas that have some of the best network connec-
tions to the U.S. should diminish.
As the number of persons employed in Mexican agriculture shrinks, and some
ex-farmers are absorbed into Mexico’s service economy, there should be fewer
Mexicans with strong network connections ready to migrate to the US.  The
destabilizing impacts of Mexican institutional and market reforms should run
their course.  If current and projected moderate economic growth is sustained—
both in the rural sector and in the new export-oriented activities in Mexican
urban areas—then jobs and upward pressure on wages should encourage many
potential migrants to remain in Mexico.
Projections of Job Growth.  Mexico adopted an ambitious restructuring and
privatization program in the 1990s that promises to increase economic efficiency and job
growth in the medium- to long-term (although it will displace workers in the short-
term).  If Mexico maintains market-driven economic policies, the International
Monetary Fund projects 5 percent annual economic growth and 2.5 percent
employment growth for 1997 and thereafter—given this two to one ratio be-
tween real GDP growth and employment growth, there would be 750,000 new
jobs created each year, based on 30 million employers, self-employed workers,
and wage and salary employees. Even if economic growth is less than the IMF
forecast, the Mexican economy may be able to generate enough jobs for the
smaller entry labor force cohorts projected for the years after 2000.3  If Mexico
is able to generate this additional employment, emigration pressures should
diminish.  Substantially lower growth rates, however, would slow down this
process.
Another promising sign is the recent growth of jobs in the formal economy.  The
number of permanent workers enrolled in the Mexican Institute for Social Se-
curity [IMSS] rose by a record 661,024 in 1996 to 9,163,459, an expansion char-
acterized by the OECD as “strong job creation in the ‘formal’ economy” (OECD
1997:98).  However, interest rates remain high, and the recovery is unequal,
accentuating inequality (Escobar Latapí 1996).4  Mexicans linked to the world
economy via exports of manufactured goods are doing much better than those
operating only in the domestic economy, such as personal services, traditional
manufacturing, construction, and small-scale agriculture.  The latter still repre-
sents the largest sector for employment.
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Differences in the speed of recovery among economic sectors is accompanied by
differences among Mexican regions.  For supply-side pressures to lessen, eco-
nomic and employment growth should reach those sectors and regions with
strong migration networks.
These medium- to long-term economic and demographic considerations suggest that
supply-push emigration pressure should decline from current levels.  We emphasize this
point because it is easy to focus on recent events that point to increases in emigration
pressure, including the peso devaluation and economic crisis of 1995, and the
uneven recovery from recession.  And, of course, economic factors are less
certain:  Mexico has experienced uneven economic growth over the past several
decades and could experience recessions and crises again.
Sustained economic growth and the current growth-jobs ratio, plus a projected
decline in the number of new job seekers, means that early in the twenty-first
century Mexico could be creating enough net new jobs to absorb new labor force
entrants.  Mexico could then begin to catch up on job creation for currently
unemployed and underemployed workers, those displaced from agriculture and
other industries, and nonworking women who rejoin the labor force.
We find it useful to think of migration processes between Mexico and the U.S.
as being analogous to a river that creates a delta on its way to the ocean.  When
the Bracero program was in operation, the flow of Mexicans north was largely
confined to the channel created by legal recruitment.  Blocking that channel by
abolishing the Bracero program in 1964 enabled the U.S. to stop the migration
flow temporarily.  The migration soon resumed, however, with a myriad of
small streams becoming the channel for Mexicans migrating north.  Visualizing
Mexico- United States migration as having evolved from a narrow channel to
rivulets meandering through a delta provides insights into a complex and dy-
namic migration process.
Both the U.S. and Mexico took steps over the past decade that reinforced the network
and supply-push factors that encourage Mexicans to go north for opportunity.  As we
saw in Chapter II, the U.S. legalized more than 2 million Mexicans in 1987-1988,
including almost 1 million farm workers.  The long-term (pre-1982 arrival) le-
galized population is poised to sponsor a large number of legal admissions.  The
legalized agricultural SAW workers were the equivalent of one-sixth of the
adult men with paid jobs in rural Mexico; they also gained the right to settle in
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the U.S. and  petition to bring their families to the U.S. legally.  Ironically, one
U.S. government commission concluded that the SAW farm worker legalization
program promoted unauthorized Mexico-United States migration by giving the
impression that doing unauthorized farm work in the U.S. was a way to become
a legal immigrant (Commission on Agricultural Workers 1992).
In the early 1990s, Mexico undertook measures that may compress into a decade
or less what would otherwise have been a slower shrinking of employment in
agriculture.  Mexico eliminated most input subsidies and price guarantees in
agriculture, switched to direct payments to farmers, and eased trade restric-
tions, signaling the eventual shrinking of the production of many commodities,
notably corn, that today absorb a great deal of labor, but in which Mexico does
not have a comparative advantage.
Extensive networks of family, community, and private agents have developed
to assist Mexicans wishing to migrate legally and illegally to the U.S., including
a variety of advisors, smugglers, and transportation agents.  The migration
infrastructure has become very sophisticated.  Migrants have choices in decid-
ing who will help them to cross the border, in choosing how to finance the trip,
and in finding U.S. employment.
If the underlying demand-pull, supply-push, and network factors change in strength
and relative importance, policies designed to deal with just one factor at one level of
migration may lose their effectiveness over time.  For example, U.S. policies that
were based on the assumption that the major factor sustaining Mexico- United
States migration was legally-authorized demand-pull U.S. employer recruitment
became less effective in the 1970s and 1980s as the key factors sustaining migra-
tion shifted to informal U.S. employer recruitment and supply-push and net-
work forces.  In such circumstances, simply stopping legally-authorized foreign
worker recruitment did not stop migration.  There is a need for policymaking
that avoids the “law of unintended consequences,” that uses a combination of
approaches, is effectively implemented, and to the extent possible has the sup-
port of both governments.
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1 The 37 million persons currently in the  labor force include about 4 million unpaid
family workers and 2 million unemployed workers (those classified as employers or
wage and salary workers totaled about 30 million in 1997).
2 The U.S. labor market is expected to absorb a large number of unskilled workers over
the next few years, as the normal complement of new job seekers are joined by
persons removed from welfare rolls.  This increased supply of U.S. workers, as well
as even more border and interior enforcement, may reduce the availability of jobs for
newly-arrived Mexican workers.
3 Mexico’s total labor force may grow, as persons not in the labor force seek work if
jobs are available.  A “tight” labor market will not ensue immediately because there
is a reserve of inactive, unemployed, and underemployed persons that these shifts in
supply and demand should gradually accommodate.
4 Inequality has increased.  According to the 1997 UNDP Human Development Report,
the richest Mexican person has assets equivalent to the combined incomes of the poorest
17 million Mexicans.
Endnotes
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Migration has repercussions through labor market supply and demand, through
fiscal implications for national and local governments, and on political and
social institutions.  Some of the differences in perspectives on migration’s im-
pacts—favorable or adverse—come from very real differences observed in the
populations in each country.  In Mexico, those who return most often are the
sojourners who may bring some benefits of their U.S. experience back with
them.  In the United States, it is the settler population, often older and some-
times unauthorized, whose relatively low skills place them at a disadvantage in
an “information age” economy.  Thus, disparate pictures emerge depending
upon which end of the telescope one looks through.
Migration has many impacts on Mexican national development, the most stud-
ied of which are the economic consequences flowing from migrant remittances
and from the interaction of labor supply and demand in Mexico and the United
States.  Numerous caveats must accompany any conclusions about the impacts
of migration in Mexico, including variations in impacts across regions and through
time and national-level versus regional or community- specific effects.  Migrants
originate from villages, towns, and cities throughout Mexico, but intense migra-
tion is most heavily concentrated in just 109 of Mexico's more than 2,400 mu-
nicipalities (similar to U.S. counties) and in 9 western and northern states.  And
today’s migration, while increasingly of an urban character, remains strongly
influenced by rural conditions.
Distinctions also need to be drawn between communities with a “long tradi-
tion” of migration and those more recently incorporated into migratory flows,
for migration experience shapes impacts.  The nature of a community’s migrant
flows—temporary, recurrent or permanent—will create variations in impacts.
Most of the information available to estimate effects of migration comes from
community studies, many of which do not cover the full range of possible
impacts.   Special attention has been given to remittances and their effects on
the well-being of migrants, their families and their communities.  Most detailed
studies to date have focused on rural areas in a few states, and more research
clearly remains to be done.
V. ECONOMIC
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Remittances to Mexico and National Multiplier  Effects.  Migrant
remittances represent the most direct and measurable benefits of international
migration on Mexico (Lozano 1993). The benefits received by the communities
from remittances depend on: (1) the number of households with migrants em-
ployed abroad; (2) the relative importance of remittances as compared with
other sources of income (estimates of remittances as a proportion of income
from all sources range from 5 to 93 percent); and (3) on whether or not the
community is capable of retaining the multiplying effects of remittances.  It is
common for the benefits derived from consumption and investment to be con-
centrated in the important regional cities.  The diversion of remittances to these
regional centers is a topic that merits special attention.
Remittances of permanent migrants represent about two-thirds of the total, and
as these migrants tend to reduce their remittances as time passes, it is antici-
pated that their contributions will diminish in the future.
Temporary migrants, on the other hand, incur higher costs of mobility (espe-
cially if they are unauthorized), lesser residential costs, and lesser costs for the
United States due to their limited demands on health, education, and other
services.
At the national level, remittances reached a considerable overall figure of be-
tween U.S. $2.5 and U.S. $3.9 billion in 1995.  Remittances are equivalent to
more than one-half (57 percent) of the foreign exchange available through for-
eign direct investment in the same year.  This represents a little less than 5
percent of the foreign exchange obtained by Mexico for the export of goods.
Remittances over time are mostly concentrated in the same few states and areas
of origin.  There the remittances have greater economic importance.  For ex-
ample, in the state of Zacatecas, migrant income was higher than federal rev-
enues in 1988.
The amount remitted per migrant was around U.S. $700 in 1995, but this figure
is very different for permanent and temporary migrants.  Alternatively, the net
amount of remittances per receiving household is equivalent to one average
wage in places of origin.  In a context in which 60 percent of households’
earnings are below that average, the amount remitted is of great importance.
To gauge the full effect of remittances, one needs to measure more than just the
quantity of remittances and how they are spent.  Economic simulations of
Economic
Effects
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remittances attempt to estimate these complex effects (Taylor 1996).  Estimates
represent not only the direct effect of migrant remittances on the households
that receive them, but also the indirect effects across all households that result
from their spending.  Remittances produce the largest income multiplier when
they flow into Mexico’s rural households, whose consumption and expenditure
patterns favor goods produced domestically with relatively labor-intensive pro-
duction technologies and few imported inputs.  When migrant remittances go
to urban households, more of the money leaks out of the country in the form
of import demand.  Based on these multiplier estimations, which are partial
pictures of a complex reality, it estimated that for every dollar sent or brought
into Mexico the gross national product [GNP] increases by about U.S. $2.90.
Each dollar in remittances may translate into an increase of U.S. $0.3 to U.S. $0.4
in the income of small farmers and rural workers; and U.S. $1.10 in the income
of urban-worker households (although urban households do not receive most
remittance dollars, they benefit from rural household’s demand for urban goods
and services) (Adelman & Taylor 1990).
As the North American economy becomes increasingly integrated, remittance
multipliers in Mexico are likely to decrease as production in Mexico responds
more to demand in the North American market as a whole and less to demand
in Mexico alone.  In a North American free trade area, migration may affect
production and incomes in Mexico in new ways.
There is a wide variety of migration experiences among the migrants; these
differences are reflected in remittances.  Frequently, especially now,  remit-
tances are limited to  covering families’ expenditures with nothing going to
savings.  In such cases, remittances may still have a relatively high impact on
those families as this income becomes a sort of survival insurance.
Remittances are also dependent upon circumstances that might reduce their
importance.  At the extreme, up to one-third of return migrants do not manage
to send remittances or take money home with them upon return.  In other cases,
the earnings that finally reach families are not high, partly because there are
considerable losses in the remittances, but above all because migrants have
heavy expenses both on the journeys to the U.S. and back and during their
working stay in the U.S.  These expenses are generally greater for unauthorized
migrants than for residents or for temporary migrants with documents.  There
is some evidence that migrant wages recently have dropped and of labor com-
petition among Mexican migrants themselves.  Also, particularly in agriculture,
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it is common to face periods without work and, therefore, without income.  For
these reasons, remittances for such families are cyclical, unstable, and unequal.
In contrast, some studies suggest that there are workers in more stable work
and some who manage to obtain employment more quickly, perhaps because of
their previous experience or their contracts through established networks.  In
such cases, their savings, after deducting expenses, can be anticipated and more
efficiently channeled to their families.
Remittances, Investment, and Development.  Remittances have two
types of  impact on communities.  In most cases remittances become a source
of support for family consumption, housing improvement, and basic urban ser-
vices.  Yet, other communities show productive changes in which the remit-
tances play an important role as a source of investment.  On occasion that role
is complementary to the development process driven by other local and re-
gional forces.
The impacts can be shown by using social accounting matrices.  These have been
constructed for a handful of specific communities, estimating different multiply-
ing effects of remittances.  These effects vary depending on the degree of devel-
opment previously reached by the localities, as well as on their economic links
with other communities and on the importance of remittances in relation to
other income in the community.  It is clear that when a sending village does not
have an adequate source of income, remittances are of paramount importance.
Other studies we have carried out suggest similar trends with respect to the
relationship between “migratory intensity,” migratory “trajectory” in time, and
the economic performance of communities.  In localities where the wage of the
formal sector is greater, lower rates of migratory activity are observed.  Simi-
larly, higher wages are related to a reduction in migratory intensity over time.
Of course, the causality may run in either direction, but it is important to
suggest that economic improvement eventually will reduce migration.
According to the literature, most migrants’ families invest their remittances
primarily in improving their housing and, to a lesser extent, in productive
investments.  For the nine major sending states, we found that migratory inten-
sity is associated with improved provision of services for housing and a greater
use of modern agricultural technology.  These are probably the most important
effects stemming from remittances we found.
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Remittances also enable many communities to overcome capital constraints and
to finance public works projects, such as parks, churches, schools, electrification,
road construction, and sewers.  The impacts and changes reported at the com-
munity level are generally in keeping with findings reported in other parts of
the world.  Our interpretation coincides with others who view remittances as a
vehicle for furthering the development of migrant areas.  The benefits increase
as long as the channeling of remittances goes hand-in-hand with other condi-
tions, such as the concentration of private and public resources in the same
areas, notably on infrastructure.
Possible Productivity Gains from United States Work Experience.
There is some evidence that working experience in the United States may pro-
duce additional benefits to migrants when they return to Mexico.  Such a bonus
would be realized as improved earnings (Greenwood & Tienda 1997), if they are
able to capitalize on their experience acquired.
It is estimated that 7.0 to 7.3 million Mexicans were residents in the United
States in 1996.1  Although a small figure in comparison with the total Mexican
population, this represents more than 7.9 percent of the population from Mexi-
can sending states.  Most of this loss involves persons in their working ages.
Projections for the major sending states suggest slowing population growth in
the next century.  Assuming current rates of migration, growth rates would fall
from 2.1 percent today to 0.6 percent in 2010.  Assuming no migration, growth
rates would fall from what would otherwise be 3.1 percent today to 1.4 percent
in 2010.  In these states, the loss of population due to past and ongoing
outmigration is projected to reduce the potential growth of the working age
population by 46 percent.
Costs of Migration for Mexico.  The loss of human capital is the most
important cost to Mexico.  These costs have commonly been estimated to be
small by assuming an excess of redundant labor in the developing sending
country.  However, for Mexico this  assumption is questionable because of the
selectivity or characteristics of its migrants.  Family and community costs have
only recently received attention.
Demographic
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The loss of human capital could be estimated by looking at the costs of educa-
tion, health, and social infrastructure incurred throughout the life of individuals
to achieve an economically active person in good working conditions.  The cost
for Mexico in human capital is the “opportunity cost” represented by having
invested in preparing that person and having foregone the value added of the
migrant’s productive economic activity.  The net returns on Mexico’s invest-
ments in that person are those remittances or savings sent or brought to the
country.
There are relative costs or returns.  By return we understand the quotient
between what is obtained as a wage or added value and what is invested or
spent in exchange for that product.  For Mexico as a country, the return is small
if we consider the quotient between the amount saved from the wage paid to
migrants and the costs of education, health, etc., incurred.  The return on mi-
grants is only in relation to the net amount in remittances or savings, as ap-
proximately 90 percent of what they receive in the United States is consumed
there.  In this regard, it is incorrect to associate the total U.S. wage with Mexican
earnings.
Family and Community Costs.  Migration is accompanied by significant
changes in family organization, such as a necessary additional work effort by
families to compensate for the migration of one or several of their members.
Similarly, in the communities with the greatest migration, major changes occur
in those communities’ social and political organizations, which frequently make
themselves felt in adverse ways.  It is common for the young people with the
most initiative to leave, with the result that communities lose their current and
potential leaders as well have a weakened capacity for interaction with the
exterior.  The actual or potential loss of labor to migration may push up wages
and create uncertainties that discourage investment and training of workers in
places of high out-migration.  It is also common for migration to be accompa-
nied by serious problems of family disintegration, as well as by different psy-
chological and social problems that previously were nonexistant in the commu-
nities of origin.  Although such social costs are difficult to estimate accurately,
observers  realize  their great importance in the communities of out-migration.
Systematic research would be invaluable.
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The impacts of Mexican migration in the United States today may differ from
those of the past because of changed economic and sociopolitical circumstances.
There is extensive evidence that since the mid-1970s the earnings and employ-
ment of more educated workers have been improving relative to the less-skilled.
This may translate into more limited economic mobility for today’s migrants
which, coupled with reductions in welfare and health benefits, increases the
challenges of integration and adaptation.
These conditions fuel perceptions that the costs of migration exceed the benefits.
Much evidence refutes this view—with the qualification that not all segments of
society share equally in the benefits or bear equally the costs.  To capture this
distributional nature of impacts, we distinguish national, regional, and local
impacts.  We also separate economic, demographic, sociocultural, and political
consequences, although these dimensions are interrelated.
Our major observation is that the failure to recognize distributional issues is an
important source of misunderstanding about the benefits and costs of migration
in general and of Mexican migration in particular.
• Therefore, we take as our point of departure the simple premise that
Mexican migration produces economic benefits for the United States,
but that these benefits come at a cost for some.  Our main task then is
to identify the particular benefits and costs of Mexican migration, and
to specify which groups gain and which lose.
Such a balanced and nuanced portrait of impacts is crucially important for
contemplating policy strategies.  Simply stated, most impacts of Mexican migra-
tion will be more pronounced in locales and industries where migrants reside
and work.  However, short- and long-term impacts differ, some impacts are
transmitted intergenerationally, and many benefits and costs cannot be quanti-
fied.
Most researchers report that industry case studies uncover evidence of competi-
tive effects of migrants.  Most national-level analyses, however, typically find
that the wage and employment effects of increased migration on native-born
groups are not great; rather, the largest impacts are on other foreign-born workers
(like the migrants themselves).2  To evaluate these generalities, we reviewed all
of the most recent empirical literature and performed a new econometric analy-
sis.
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Industry Case Studies.  Employment displacement effects of migrant workers
are evident in certain industries in regions, such as Los Angeles and New York,
where migrants are concentrated.  These may occur because the ready supply
of migrant workers places downward pressure on industry wage rates.  Alter-
natively, the displacement may occur because employers “prefer” or find it
advantageous to hire new migrants even when natives are available at compa-
rable wages.  A shortcoming of most case studies is that they do not trace the
ultimate outcomes for native workers who presumably find new jobs, but some-
times at a considerable cost.
The favorable aspects of these effects accrue most clearly to the migrant worker
and to foreign and native-business owners.  It is often observed that immigrants
are highly entrepreneurial and that foreign-owned businesses contribute to the
U.S.’s legendary job-creating, small business sector.  Some Mexican migrant worker
networks have positive effects for small and large foreign- and native-owned businesses.
In many such businesses, migrant workers and employers appear to strike a
bargain that benefits both: in exchange for lower starting wages, the migrant
gains informal job training from the employer.  The efficiency and speed with
which networks operate gives employers ready access to a pool of workers
vouched for by the employers’ current workers.  These hiring networks reduce
search costs, reduce the likelihood of “problem workers,” and provide redun-
dancy during times of peak production or when employees are out sick.3
Impacts on Business and Workers Nationally and Regionally.
Because they are so specific, it is difficult to generalize from case studies.
Therefore, we undertook a statistical analysis of 122 metropolitan areas using
the 1990 census.  We introduced several analyses that permit us to unbundle
effects to regions and metropolitan areas.  The results of these econometric
excercises are discussed below.
The primary beneficiaries of migration are, of course, the Mexican-born migrant work-
ers.  As discussed earlier in this chapter, migrants and their families consider the
opportunity cost of migration; they balance the costs and benefits of working in
the United States against their opportunities if they remain in Mexico.  With a
wage differential of at least five to one, the Mexican-born migrant working in
the United States benefits from a higher standard of living.
Owners of capital, that is business owners and investors, are clear winners.  We
measure the effect of Mexican-born migrants on the “real rental price of capi-
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tal.”  For example, a positive migrant effect means that an owner of a machine
shop is able to charge a higher amount for a tractor or water pump rental.  In
California’s metropolitan areas a 20 percent increase in Mexican-born migrants
increases the return to capital by 0.8 percent on average.  Agricultural areas
benefit more, Merced and Salinas by 1.7 percent each and Visalia-Tulare by 1.4
percent.  For Texas, a 20 percent increase in migrants is associated with a 0.3
percent increased return to capital on average.  But the returns to border areas
are greater:  Brownsville 1.4 percent, El Paso 1.6 percent, and McAllen-Endinburg-
Mission a 1.8 percent increase.
Shifting to the effects of Mexican-born migrants on the wages of other labor
force groups, we find that the principal adverse impact is on already-resident mi-
grants from Mexico or elsewhere.  In our model, a simulated 20 percent increase
in the number of foreign-born, low-skill Mexican workers lowered the average
wage of this labor group by 3 percent, but left the wages of other labor catego-
ries almost unchanged.  Next we simulated the direct wage impacts of Mexican-
born labor, on average, for several metropolitan areas within a given region.
For the average United States region, even relatively large increases in Mexican-born
labor have only relatively small impacts on native workers.  Metropolitan areas in
California and Texas have relatively heavy concentrations both of Mexican-born
persons and of native-born persons of Mexican ancestry.  The major impact of
a 20 percent increase in foreign-born, low-skill Mexican labor in California is on
other foreign-born, low-skilled Mexicans.  Their wages fall by 6.9 percent and
their employment declines by 1.3 percent.  Otherwise, there are only minimal
impacts on other skill or immigrant groups.  The results for Texas, Arizona,
New Mexico, and Colorado are similar to those for California, but for the most
part are more moderate.
Empirical evidence appears to indicate that in areas where Mexican migrant concentra-
tions are extremely high, such as along the southwestern border, wage depression and
job displacement effects are evident.  These impacts are strongest among less-skilled
and already-resident Mexican male migrants.  Areas of very high concentration
of foreign-born, low-skill Mexican workers clearly experience the largest im-
pacts.  For thirteen metropolitan areas for which this labor group constitutes 60
percent or more of the foreign-born population, a 20 percent  increase in this
group results in wage decline among this same group of 11.4 percent.  Employ-
ment of the group is reduced by 2.4 percent.  Native, low-skill females of
Mexican ancestry experience a 1.3 percent wage decline and a 0.4 percent job
displacement effect.4
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Economic Adaptation and Social Mobility.  Social integration depends
among other things on economic advancement.  One quite optimistic analysis
favorably compares wage growth for first, second, and third generation Mexican-origin
men with that of native whites and blacks.5 The findings show improvements, espe-
cially by the third generation, in both educational attainment and  economic
mobility.  Nevertheless, the educational attainment of Mexican-origin men re-
mains the lowest of any ethnoracial group.  Our above-cited research  and a
study in Los Angeles, suggest that the wages of Mexican-origin men are dragged
down by the combination of the group’s low educational levels and competition
with others with very low educational levels.  These disadvantages are likely to
persist and possibly increase if the volume of unskilled, and especially unautho-
rized, migration from Mexico continues.6
Enclaves and Entrepreneurial Activity.  Mexican-owned businesses exist
throughout the southwest and are making a strong showing in southern Cali-
fornia.  Research is finding successful Mexican enclaves in, for example, Los
Angeles fruit markets.  In Chicago, our work on “The Little Village Study”
shows that dense settlement patterns (economies of scale) are conducive to the
emergence of informal, and ultimately, formal, economic activity that caters to
the needs of other coethnics.  Evidently, economies of scale can have both
offsetting and positive effects (Rosenthal & Tienda 1997).  Clearly, more re-
search is needed to address the positive attributes of Mexican entrepreneurs
and consumers.
Presumably motivated by the belief that legal and unauthorized immigrants
participate  “too much” in public assistance programs, Congress passed provi-
sions related to immigrants as part of the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996.  This Act restricts the access of even
legal immigrants to welfare.  Accordingly, we performed analyses of the public
assistance utilization of Mexican-born households.
Welfare Participation.  The empirical results indicate that Mexican-born house-
holds are no more likely to use welfare than either otherwise comparable native-born
households of Mexican ancestry or otherwise comparable native-born households in
general.  They are, however, more likely to participate than native whites, but
less likely than native blacks.  Moreover, recent cohorts from Mexico are less
likely to use welfare than otherwise similar groups, whereas earlier cohorts are
more likely users (Davies & Greenwood 1997).
Welfare
Participation
& Fiscal
Costs
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There is a general consensus that relatively young and recently arrived Mexi-
can-born migrants are not more prone to use public assistance than natives of
similar socioeconomic characteristics.  Yet, migrants’ characteristics determine
their eligibility for welfare and, to a large extent, their propensity to apply for
means-tested income transfers.7
Unauthorized Migrants and Fiscal Costs.  Most studies agree that immi-
grants, and especially unauthorized migrants, impose a fiscal burden on state and local
governments, but there is considerable disagreement about the magnitude of this burden.
In recent years, states have brought suit against the U.S. federal government to
recover the costs of providing services to unauthorized migrants.  At the na-
tional level, however, there is less consensus on costs that may not be fully
resolved for several technical reasons.  Despite the limits of fiscal impact stud-
ies, we prepared a secondary analysis of unauthorized migrants for California,
Texas, and Illinois as an illustration.
Our calculations, using a best estimate of the unauthorized alien population,
show that unauthorized migrants in California use $1,124 of state and local
services per capita, which is higher than the $906 per capita used by the rest of
the population.  Public school expenses account for about two-thirds of these
costs.  In Texas, the unauthorized and the rest of the population both use some-
what more than $1,000 per capita in services.  School costs account for more
than 80 percent of these costs.  In Illinois, unauthorized migrants use less state
and local resources than the rest of the state population because of a compara-
tively older and smaller school population.  The unauthorized in Illinois use
relatively little in the way of state and local services.
California’s total net fiscal burden of the unauthorized is the heaviest ($829
million) of all states, Texas’s is much smaller ($194 million), and Illinois’s is
almost trivial ($17 million) relative to the state budget.  These net figures are
smaller than the states’ estimates used in claims against the federal government
because the states’ costs (but not revenues) are based on figures for the unau-
thorized population that seem to be too high.8
There is no disagreement that California bears the brunt of immigration, includ-
ing unauthorized migration.  The fiscal impact of the state’s many migrants is
magnified by a relatively large per capita fiscal gap between the unauthorized
and the rest of the population.  This gap results from the higher rate and more
progressive nature of the tax system in California, which leaves the unautho-
rized paying a smaller share of the total state and local tax burden.
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A final caveat to these studies is that the fiscal impacts of migration that should
concern us occur over the life span of migrants.  In all static models to date,
education is a cost.  Yet, education is fundamentally an investment in future
skills and earnings and we can reasonably expect that its current cost  will be
recovered in future greater productivity, especially if children complete school
and become taxpayers.  This expectation is born out by recent work by an expert
National Research Council [NRC] (1997) panel.
Contribution to Population Growth.  Recent trends in immigration have
left an indelible demographic imprint.  From 1970 to 1990, total international
migration accounted for 25 to 33 percent of net annual population increase.
However, Mexican migration itself is only part of total immigration and  con-
tributed less (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1996).  During the 1960s and 1970s,
approximately 14 percent of all legal immigrants admitted were from Mexico.
This share rose to 23 percent during the late 1980s owing to the impact of the
legalization program.  In FYs 1995 and 1996, Mexican-born immigrants were 12
and 18 percent respectively of total U.S. immigration.
Although Mexican migration has been a relatively small component of net ag-
gregate population growth, its impact on the size of the Mexican-origin popu-
lation is far more substantial.  Migration was responsible for less than one-half
(and substantially less for legal immigrants) of the growth of the Mexican-origin
population between 1970 and 1980.  At the latter date, only one in four persons
of Mexican origin were foreign-born.  By 1990, and in the wake of both the large
volume of IRCA legalizations and continued migration from Mexico, more than
one in three persons of Mexican origin were foreign-born (Greenwood & Tienda
1997).
Secondary (or indirect) demographic impacts derive from the fertility of native-
and foreign-born women of Mexican origin.  In 1990, the average number of
children ever born to Mexican origin women aged 25 to 34 were 1.7 and 2.1 for
the native and foreign-born, respectively.  Among women aged 35 to 44, the
nativity differentials in children ever born were greater still, 2.5 for U.S.-born
women compared to 3.3 for Mexican-born women.  Current and future demo-
graphic impacts, particularly those associated with the school-aged population
and future workforce entrants, will be most pronounced in localities where
Mexican migrants are concentrated.  Female predomination in recent cohorts
Demographic
Impacts
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(with the exception of the IRCA legalizations) has implications for the future
demographic impacts of Mexican migration.  For example, the median age of
legal female Mexican immigrants in 1995 was 25, the peak of women’s repro-
ductive years.12
Population Projections.  The U.S. Census Bureau estimates that the U.S.
population will increase by 50 percent between 1995 and 2050, from 263 million
to 394 million (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1996, 1997).  Declining overall fertility
and increased longevity mean that immigration will be a larger component of
future growth.  These projections do not separately identify immigrants, but we
know that Mexicans comprise slightly more than 60 percent of all Hispanics, a
share relatively stable  since the early 1970s (Bean & Tienda 1987:Table 2.2).
According to the Census Bureau’s projections, the Hispanic population will
contribute 37 percent of growth from 1995-2000, 44 percent from 2000-2020, and
62 percent thereafter.  As a result, the absolute and relative sizes of Asian and
Hispanic populations will more than double (rising from 5 to 8 percent of the
total population for Asians and from 10 to 26 percent for Hispanics).13
A National Research Council panel (1997:26) made independent projections.  The
panel first estimated how large today’s population would be in the absence of
immigration since 1950.  They concluded the U.S. population would have been
14 percent smaller than its 1995 size and would have been considerably older.
Projecting forward current levels of immigration for fifty to fifty-five years
would increase population by 80 million above what would occur without any
immigration.  This net increase reflects the direct result of 45 million new im-
migrants plus the dual indirect effects of higher immigrant fertility and a more
youthful first- and second-generation immigrant population.  As the single larg-
est national origin group in recent years, Mexicans would account for approxi-
mately 10 - 12 percent of the increase at the base year, compounded by their
higher fertility and young age structure.
Two important compositional changes follow from the current level and coun-
try of origin composition of immigrant streams.  First, current immigration
levels will increase future enrollments in primary, secondary, and college enroll-
ments relative to lower immigration levels.  Second, the race and ethnic com-
position of the United States population will change substantially with espe-
cially large proportions of Asians and Hispanics.
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Social Relations and Status.  In our study of social impacts, we address
social status and the place of the Mexican-origin community relative to other
ethnic and racial groups.  It appears that Mexican migrants occupy some kind
of intermediate social position between native whites and native blacks.  Sur-
veys indicate, for example, that all groups, including blacks, rate whites as the
most desirable neighbors, blacks as the least desirable, and Hispanics in be-
tween.  Whites in Los Angeles have been observed to be more opposed to
housing integration with blacks than with Hispanics (in Los Angeles, Hispanics
are almost entirely of Mexican origin).  Other groups, such as Asians, seem to
share the same preference for Mexicans over blacks as neighbors.
Let us be clear: Mexican immigrants do not occupy an intermediate social po-
sition because they are somehow middle class.  On the contrary,  that their
social position seems higher than their relative socioeconomic status raises in-
teresting questions about the significance of race and national origin, and sug-
gests that Mexicans play a “buffer” role in the U.S. stratification system.  And,
the positive view of immigrants as neighbors may be explained, in part, by their
role in revitalizing communities.11
Migrants and Crime.  Relatively little research addresses the association
between crime and migration.  According to the 1991 Survey of State Prisons,
Mexicans account for nearly half of the foreign born in state prisons.  However,
their overrepresentation may reflect differences in treatment through the crimi-
nal justice system.  Migrants along the border are more likely to be arrested,
detained prior to trial, convicted, and incarcerated (two to four times more
likely) as citizens.12  Unauthorized migrants also are less likely to be released
from jail prior to trial.13
Voting and Political Impacts.  Their neighborhood-building role in the
inner city accords well with the reality or myth of the hardworking       migrant,
striving to get ahead.  Survey work has shown that very few Mexican Ameri-
cans believe that they have been victimized by racism or discrimination.  Mexi-
can Americans seem eager to embrace a meritocratic vision of American society.
While Mexican Americans in the U.S. Congress tend to find common ground
with black congressional leaders—both groups are predominantly Democratic,
mostly urban, and largely progressive on fiscal issues—on the local level such
black-Mexican coalitions have proved much harder to create or sustain.
The various political impacts of Mexican migration are felt primarily in Mexican-
American communities.  That most Mexican migrants cannot vote seems to imply
Social &
Political
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that no direct impact exists.  Yet, the foreign-born affect electoral politics through
census enumerations and decennial redistricting (congressional and state dis-
tricts are based on all persons, not only adult citizens).  Thus, Mexican-Ameri-
can districts have many fewer voters; in the 1992 United States elections, Mexi-
can Americans cast only about 16 votes per hundred persons compared to 50
per hundred for non-Hispanic whites.  While Mexican-born migrants increase
the population base that creates Mexican-American districts, their disinterest in
electoral politics, some argue, may dilute the natural bonds between elected
officials and adult citizens.14
The Mexican-American community has increased its power in electoral politics
since 1970 and the political impacts of Mexican migration—mediated through
their relationship with Mexican-American communities—may have indirect ef-
fects on elections and legislation.  In presidential politics, their concentration in
California, Texas, and Illinois could give Mexican-American voters leverage, but
only if the state in question were very closely contested.  While Mexican-Ameri-
can voters have generally favored Democratic presidential candidates in pro-
portions almost high enough to qualify as “bloc voting,” their low turnout and
fundraising potential means that national candidates have been likely to view
them as marginal players.  It remains to be seen whether or not the recent surge
in the naturalization of Mexican-born adults, coupled with a political climate
that might well cause new citizens concern, will affect these dynamics.
Many of the impacts of Mexico to U.S. migration are experienced at the border
itself and thus affect both countries.
Border communities are binational entities, with many residents on each side of the
border having strong family, commercial and social connections to those on the other
side.  The volume of movements both ways across the long Mexican-United
States border is substantial.  The vast majority of border crossers go for short
visits, often purchasing goods on the other side of the border.  The contributions
to local economies emanating from this cross-border commerce are also sub-
stantial.
The border relationship is not without its tensions, however.  Cross-border
petty crime, vandalism, and vice is a continuing source of concern in many
border communities.  Border cities complain about the fiscal impact when resi-
dents of the other country access such public services as health care and edu-
Cross
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cation.  The growth of poor, unincorporated areas that straddle the border
presents challenges to public health and the environment.  For the most part,
however, the neighboring states, cities and townships have found it mutually
beneficial to resolve tensions before they disrupt the important ties that bind the
communities.
Violence en route to and at the border are among the most negative effects of migration
between the two countries, largely but not exclusively related to the unauthorized
movements.  Migrants are victims of a variety of crimes, from attacks and
abandonment by smugglers to theft, rape and even murder.  Recorded and
unrecorded deaths associated with attempted border crossings are of concern.
So, too, are violent attacks by smugglers and others on officials  who are respon-
sible for border operations in both countries.
Incidents of human rights abuses by federal, state, and local officials have been recorded
as well.  A well-publicized incident in Riverside, California, when local police
were videotaped beating migrants after a high speed chase, highlighted the
potential for such abuses.  Both governments have taken action to curb  the
abuse of migrants by both private and official auspices on both sides of the
border.  Grupo Beta, for example, is a Mexican police unit charged with protect-
ing migrants at the border itself.  The recurrent allegations of abuse have led to
the establishment of a number of monitoring groups, as well, including the
Border Liaison Mechanism.
1 According to U.S. data, 85 percent of Mexican-born persons are between 15 and 64
years of age; only 4.6 percent are 65 years and older (CPS 1995).
2 The research literature repeatedly finds that migrants have only small national-level
impacts on U.S. workers.  Three reasons have been suggested: migrants are a small
fraction of the labor force; offsetting effects occur in labor demand and supply
relationships; and efficient U.S. markets may arbitrage the effects across the nation,
making them difficult to detect.  The first two reasons are most plausible.  A large
body of research on regional adjustments suggests that effects would not necessarily
be rapidly “arbitraged” and large, direct impacts of new arrivals should be measurable.
3 It is true that new migrants often work at lower than average wages that, in theory,
reduce production costs for employers.  However, this occurs mainly in labor-intensive,
competitive industries with typically low-productivity and low-profit margins overall.
4 The sectoral distribution of migrant labor ultimately determines the impact of migration
on the wage rates of domestic unskilled labor.  That dramatic differences exist in the
regional concentration of migrants and in the interindustry distribution of migrants
implies distinct effects across regions.  Because of their sources and border entry
points, unauthorized migrants may be even more concentrated than the legal migrants,
and their impacts will be concentrated accordingly.
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5 Mexican migrants are disadvantaged relative to native blacks in terms of educational
and language skills, yet in most states they have higher rates of labor force participation
and lower unemployment rates.  That the most economically and socially disadvantaged
groups are not immigrants, but rather  African-American, Native-American and Puerto
Rican, suggests that Mexican migrants have a reasonable chance of adapting to U.S.
labor market and society.  This research also finds that the intergenerational changes
in the wage structure take longer to play out for Mexicans than for other white
migrant workers.
6 This research effort also suggests that wage penalties for lack of fluency in English
may have increased during the 1980s when returns to skills rose appreciably.  This
bodes ill for the pace of integration of Mexican migrants in the future (Trejo 1997).
Exposure to other immigrants, not generational status, is the most powerful predictor
of language maintenance.  The forces for retaining Spanish in public and private
settings is particularly high for Mexicans, not only because of the volume and
concentration of recent flows, but also because Mexican Americans are less likely to
migrate internally and more likely to reside in multigenerational households that
include one or more foreign-born persons.
7 For instance, Mexican migrants to the United States are characterized by low levels
of educational attainment, large families, and poor English-language abilities. All
these factors, among others, are generally found to be positively related with the level
of welfare use.
8 Considering that careful estimates of the unauthorized migrant population vary by as
much as 15 percent or more, caution is necessary in drawing conclusions about state
level fiscal impacts.  The largest cost is of unauthorized migrants is primary and
secondary education.  In our “best estimate” only children who are foreign-born and
unauthorized are counted.  In our “citizen children” estimate we include the citizen
children of unauthorized migrants.  This change raises the unauthorized population
by only 5 percent, but the unauthorized school-age population rises by 25 percent.  In
California, this increases the total cost of services by 18 percent and the net fiscal
burden from $829 million to $1.08 billion.  In our “states’ estimate” we use the states’
own estimates of the unauthorized population, which is considerably higher than the
Census Bureau’s high-end estimate for 1992.  This increases California’s unauthorized
population by almost 50 percent.  Nevertheless, both the “citizen children” and “states’
estimate” yield similar aggregate fiscal impacts.
9 The larger completed family sizes of Mexican immigrant women result from
childbearing after migrating to the United States rather than initially entering the
United States with larger families.  This is contrary to predictions based on assimilation
theory and differs from the fertility behavior of other immigrant women.
10 The growth of the Mexican-origin population is likely to increase far more than the
other Hispanic origin groups for several reasons.  Mexicans are the largest source
country of current immigration.  Fertility of both native and foreign-born Mexican-
origin women will likely contribute to relatively faster population growth.  The 1995
Mexican-origin population is larger and relatively younger than other Hispanic origin
groups, providing a bigger base from which to compound future indirect effects.
Finally, Mexicans have been and are likely to remain the largest source of unauthorized
migration.
11 Research in Chicago’s “Little Village” reveals that Mexican migration either contributes
to community revitalization or prevents decaying inner city neighborhoods from
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becoming underclass neighborhoods.  From 1970 to 1990, Chicago experienced a
tremendous polarization in neighborhoods inhabited by natives.  By 1990, most of the
neighborhoods that in 1970 were working class and stable middle class neighborhoods
had either gentrified or been absorbed into black ghettos and abandoned by all but
the poorest residents.  The parts of Chicago in which working-class neighborhoods
have grown or even been maintained are those areas settled by migrants—primarily
Mexicans.
12 Gross differences in the incarceration rates of Mexican and U.S. citizens disappear
once differences in age structure (because Mexicans are younger and petty crime rates
are higher among the young) and especially the differences in treatment in the criminal
justice system of Mexicans and Anglos are taken into account (Hagan and Palloni
1996).
13 Incorrect perceptions about criminality, nevertheless, contribute to what appears to be
public misperceptions about immigrants generally.  Especially during times of high
unemployment and job competition, i.e., the changed climate of California in the late
1980s, public opinion is for reduced immigration.  Surveys in 1995 found that Mexican-
born migrants were the least preferred of any immigrant group.  Several polls conducted
during the 1990s found that respondents believed that two-thirds of migrants to the
United States were unauthorized, an obvious impossibility, but partly an outcome of
public leadership and discourse that continually blurs the line between illegal and
legal immigrants.
14 In turn, Mexican Americans seem to be ambivalent about new migrants from Mexico
and, at times, at odds with the views of their leadership.  Various surveys have found
that Mexican Americans view unauthorized migration in particular very unfavorably.
Perhaps this is associated with various election-day polls that found that as many as
30 percent of Mexican Americans voted for California’s 1994 “Proposition 187,”
arguably one of the most egregious pieces of anti-immigrant legislation in the post-
Civil Rights era.
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Societal responses on migration matters are manifested in the two countries in
many ways.  These include: legislation at the federal, state, and local levels;
policies implemented at all these levels; decisions by the courts; advocacy from
the private sector; and public opinion as reflected in polls and referenda.
To reach our overall conclusions, we draw upon the lengthy history of the two
neighbors reaching back to the Bracero period and earlier.  From this longer
vantage, and with an eye toward today’s events, our major conclusions are as
follows.
• Episodic nature of U.S. responses.  The debate on immigration into the
United States waxes and wanes with the economic cycle.  When the U.S.
economy falters, restrictionist sentiment grows more intense.  When the
Mexican economy goes into a slump, this too leads to fear of an emigra-
tion push and anti-immigrant concern in the United States.
• Unintended consequences.  Several important U.S. policy changes since
1965 have had unforeseen consequences often at variance with the policy
intentions.  One recent example is the growing immigrant visa backlog
prompted by family unification requests stemming from the IRCA legal-
ization provisions. The disjunction between policy intentions and actual
outcomes has been a perennial feature of immigration history.
• Mexican engagement.  The Mexican government has shifted from a posi-
tion of deliberate nonengagement on migration matters to a stance of
increasing dialogue with United States counterparts. The contrast is
evident in Mexican unwillingness to comment when IRCA was under
consideration compared with the Mexican authorities commentary re-
garding U.S. immigration and related legislation in 1996. The practical
outcome of increased dialogue is still uncertain.
• Interplay between economic integration/political cooperation and immigration
control.  The bilateral engagement on migration began before NAFTA
went into effect, but cooperation on this issue picked up after NAFTA
facilitated a more elaborate framework for economic and political dia-
logue.
• Border opening for commerce and investment but not people.  The flow of
goods, services, capital, and the legal entry of people has been    facili-
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tated by NAFTA and other measures adopted in the 1990s.  Simulta-
neously, the United States is increasing efforts to control unauthorized
entries.  This has the potential for increasing binational tensions.
• Official action and ineffectiveness of immigration restriction in practice.  In
the past, U.S. responses to deal with illegal immigration were riddled
with loopholes or not carried out with vigor.  It remains to be seen
whether the current efforts will be more durable or will be pursued
more seriously.
Based on observation of migration responses, the following model was used as
a basis of analysis:
• An underlying context, one usually rooted in the U.S. economic situa-
tion, triggers a U.S. immigration response;
• This, in turn, leads to a period of debate in the United States and po-
litical compromises resolve some differences but leave other issues on
the table;
• A Mexican reaction to the U.S. action, and perhaps a U.S. counter-
reaction follows;
• A new context for the next series of triggering events is thus born.
U.S. and Mexican responses also have a long-term trend: the intervals between
the periodic debates has diminished.
United States responses to immigration are largely unilateral.  This suits the U.S.
style and had a practical logic when the Mexican authorities preferred not to be
involved.  This may now be changing, although to what extent is unclear.
Interest Group Influence.  United States immigration responses usually are
directed at immigration generally and sometimes Mexican immigration specifi-
cally.  The U.S. has a diverse collection of politically active groups seeking to
influence many aspects of policy and a long history of admitting large numbers
of foreigners as permanent residents.  Nongovernmental organizations, both
Analytical
Model
Responses
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States
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those favorable to increased immigration and others that support a more restric-
tive policy, play a large role in shaping U.S. immigration policies.
The political process translates these conflicting goals into policies that often
have unanticipated outcomes.  Given public opposition to increased legal immi-
gration, the legalization provisions of IRCA in 1986 and the 1990 Immigration
Act (both of which increased substantially the number of permanent legal resi-
dents admitted) were surprising.  These outcomes stemmed from interest group
influence on the legislation.  In 1996, an effort to reduce certain categories of
legal immigrants was unsuccessful, but new efforts are likely.  Federal policy
changes in the 1990s have reduced immigration backlogs, handled a quantum
increase in naturalizations, and facilitated legal entries at the border through the
use of commuter lanes and expedited preauthorized clearances.
State and Local Reactions.  A less surprising development has been the
government response to deter unauthorized immigration as manifested in IRCA
and the rise in appropriations for border enforcement.  Two other recent devel-
opments are the distinctions made between legal immigrants and U.S. citizens
in their access to social services contained in the recent welfare legislation (the
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996), and
the expanding role played by state and local governments in  (1) restricting
services to immigrants (e.g., the passage of Proposition 187 in California) and
(2) the discretion given to state governments in welfare payments to legal im-
migrants.  Because migration effects are local, a greater effort to bring states and
localities into migration policy discussions would be desirable.
Immigrants are concentrated in a small number of states and metropolitan areas
and, consequently, state and local officials differ in their reactions to immigra-
tion.  States and localities with large numbers of immigrants typically face
higher public costs to provide education and other services than those with
fewer immigrants.  But there have been significant variations in the responses
of states and local governments with large immigrant populations.   Proposition
187 was actively supported by Governor Pete Wilson and other California pub-
lic officials.   It was promoted with arguments that underscored the view that
denying public services to unauthorized immigrants would deter further illegal
immigration.  State and local officials elsewhere, e.g., the governor of Texas and
the mayor of New York City, disagreed sharply with these views and tactics.
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More on Public Opinion and Interest Groups.  Despite the substantial
public support beginning in the 1970s for penalizing employers who “know-
ingly” hired illegal aliens, employer sanctions were not adopted until 1986.
However, the means to identify persons unlawfully in the United States were
slipshod and the law, even as written, was not rigorously enforced.  These
compromises reflected different views of the many interest groups and public
officials involved.  Public opinion has been less supportive of legal immigration
than Congress and more inclined toward strong measures to deter illegal immi-
gration.  Public opinion on immigration tracks reasonably well with local eco-
nomic conditions: restrictionist views rise as the economy worsens.  The corre-
lation between growing unemployment and restrictionist sentiment shows up
clearly in U.S. data for at least the last fifty years.
Generally, small-and-medium size businesses and fruit and vegetable growers
in the southwest, especially California, favor increased immigration.  They sought
unsuccessfully to obtain a new temporary worker program in the last Congress.
(They have not, however, supported an expansion of the existing H-2A pro-
gram.) Agricultural growers of labor-intensive crops have had much success in
the past in achieving their objectives in legislation, as the Special Agricultural
Worker [SAW] and Replenishment Agricultural Worker [RAW] provisions of
IRCA testify.  Labor unions generally oppose substantial immigration.  Mexican-
origin persons legally resident in the United States are ambivalent and as likely
to oppose as to favor large-scale immigration.  There is no uniformity in the
positions of similarly situated interest groups, but the broad outlines described
above tend to prevail.  Nongovernmental organizations [NGOs] vary in their
views depending on their functions.  There are anti-immigrant NGOs, pro-
immigrant advocates, and others concerned with related issues, such as the
protection of civil and human rights.
Many of the vocal interest groups have an ethnic orientation.  At times, the
immigration interests of one ethnic group conflict with those of others.  For
example, there is a large backlog of spouses and minor children of Mexicans
legalized under IRCA, whereas the traditional backlog among legal Asian im-
migrants is more heavily weighted by siblings.  Nevertheless, the NGOs of the
two groups and their respective congressional caucuses have stuck together to
fight against any reforms in legal immigration priorities.  They have a common
conviction that political empowerment is the best path for achieving their objec-
tives, and this has led to a dramatic increase in citizenship applications of
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immigrants legally in the United States.  This particularly affects legal Mexican
immigrants who, as a group, have heretofore been slow to naturalize.
The 1996 United States Legislation.  The year 1996 was an active one for
legislation concerning immigrants [see table VI.1].  The full extent of the legis-
lation enacted in 1996 will not be apparent for many months.  The new immi-
gration legislation should be viewed in combination with two other laws passed
in 1996, those dealing with welfare reform and antiterrorism.  Some of the
significant elements of these three laws (the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996, and the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconcili-
ation Act of 1996, i.e., the Welfare Act), coupled with related policy actions
taken by the INS are summarized below in Table VI-1.
U.S. Supreme Court decisions have shifted away from the initial presumption
that immigration officers are bound by traditional fourth amendment require-
ments enunciated in cases such as Almeida Sánchez v. U.S. (1973), and U.S. v.
Brignoni Ponce (1975).  These more recent decisions have allowed the INS con-
siderable discretion in the conduct of workplace enforcement activities (INS v.
Delgado, 1984), and more recently suggested that the fourth amendment may not
extend to all unauthorized aliens present in the United States (U.S. v. Verdugo-
Urquidez, 1990).
Migration is so prominent in Mexico’s domestic and foreign affairs that a public
stance is unavoidable.  This need must be weighed against a long-standing
tradition of noninterference in the domestic affairs of other countries.  The way
out of this dilemma has been to pursue certain objectives related to migration,
but not to have a migration policy as such.
Major Objectives and Strategies.  The Mexican government has pursued
three major objectives over the recent decades: historically, and most promi-
nent, the protection of the rights of emigrants; second, avoiding abrupt changes
in U.S. immigration policy and in the flow of migrants; lately, in reaction to the
recent negative U.S. climate against immigrants, seeking recognition for their
contributions to the receiving society.
Until the mid-to-late 1980s, the Mexican government had a policy “to have no
policy” on undocumented migration to the United States.  This approach was
Responses
in Mexico
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1. Number of border patrol officers increased annually for five years, a provision
that has particular effect on illegal immigrants from Mexico.
2. New triple fencing installed between San Diego and Tijuana.
3. At same time, entry of legal immigrants and border crossers from Mexico
facilitated.
4. Old border crossing cards removed, to be replaced with new card with a
biometric.
5. Expedited removal is carried out without hearing of immigrants illegally in the
U.S., unless there is a credible asylum claim or two-year presence.
6. Distinction between exclusion and deportation abolished.
7. New areas created for which administration decisions cannot be reviewed by
the courts.
8. This includes lack of judicial review of final orders of deportation for most
criminal aliens.
9. In addition, definition of “aggravated felony” is expanded even if imprisonment
is suspended.
10. Certain legalization class action suits pending in courts are no longer subject to
judicial review.
11. Standards for suspension of deportation (now "cancellation of removal") made
more restrictive and burden of hardship increased from extreme to exceptional
and extremely unusual hardship and harm must be to a U.S. citizen, legal
permanent resident spouse, parent, or child.
12. Criminal penalties for immigration violations enhanced.
13. Legal immigrants barred from usage of supplemental security income [SSI] and
food stamps until they obtain citizenship.  (Proposals to ease some of these
provisions are pending.)
14. Legal immigrants entering after enactment of Welfare Act barred for five years
from most federal means-tested programs, including Medicaid.
15. Welfare reform amended to provide certain exemptions for battered spouses
and immigrant children abandoned by parents.
16. Immigration affidavits of support raised to 125 percent of poverty level and
made binding on sponsors until naturalization or forty quarters of employment
by sponsored alien.
17. Aliens made inadmissible as legal immigrants for 3 years if illegally present in
U.S. for 180 days to 1 year, for 10 years if present for 1 year or more,
permanently if previously convicted of an aggravated felony; plus other grounds
for inadmissibility.
18. Pilot programs to verify employment eligibility implemented.
19. Persons unlawfully in U.S. are not eligible for social security benefits or post-
secondary education.
20.  Attorney General permitted to enter into written agreements with state and local
agencies to perform functions previously exclusive to federal immigration agents.
Table VI-1.
1996
Legislation
Affecting
Immigration
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believed to suit the principle of mutual respect and recognition of both national
sovereignties.  This approach began to shift when Mexico started to liberalize its
economy and play a more active role in world economic affairs, exemplified by
entry into the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and closer engagement
with the United States in NAFTA.  The cooperation and consultation with the
Commission for the Study of International Migration and Cooperative Eco-
nomic Development (Asencio Commission) was an early signal of increased
Mexican engagement with the United States on migration issues.
Mexican authorities now lobby in the United States on political and economic
matters, which they did not do prior to the NAFTA negotiating process.  The
Mexican government no longer operates solely via its Secretariat for Foreign
Relations [SRE] communicating with the U.S. Department of State, but rather
fans out across the spectrum of U.S. private interest groups, public agencies,
and the Congress.  The increased closeness of the economic relationship and its
salience for Mexican economic recovery and growth also means that it is impor-
tant to handle other problems in a way that avoids prejudice to economic co-
operation.  On migration, it is worth noting the participation of the Secretariat
for Government Affairs [Gobernación].
Public Perceptions.  Mexican public opinion and the media have become
quite sensitive and critical of the way the two governments respond to migra-
tion.  U.S. measures tend to be perceived not only as anti-immigration, but also
as unfair to immigrants.  This perception derives in part from a broad belief that
the U.S. benefits even more than Mexico from Mexican migration. [See figure
VI-1.]
Figure VI-1.
Perceptions
about the
Effects of
Migration
ON THE MEXICAN ECONOMY     ON THE UNITED STATES ECONONY
   Source: Mori de México 1977, sample size is 1,150.
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Immigrant and Immigration Legislation.  Immigrants and immigration
legislation in Mexico have a radically different significance than in the United
States.  Immigrants in twentieth century Mexico have been few in number and
of marginal demographic significance.  Foreigners usually have come to Mexico
with capital and skills and, therefore, have had an impact disproportionate to
their numbers.  At various times, Mexico has received sizeable number of refu-
gees, most recently from Central America.  Central Americans also come as
temporary workers.  Central Americans, among others, also use Mexican terri-
tory in their transit to the United States.  Immigration legislation emphasizes
family connections and employment skills as a basis for admission, but also
confers great administrative discretion on Mexican officials.
Mexican law requires that nationals demonstrate at departure that they have
permission of the receiving country to enter.  This requirement has not been
enforced and probably is not enforceable, especially when departures take place
away from designated exit points.  For several decades, Mexicans have inter-
preted the constitutional right to free transit within Mexico as extending to the
right to leave the country.  This interpretation has not been tested by the Mexi-
can judiciary, but there is a national consensus that the Constitution forbids the
government from stopping the departure of nationals from its territory.
A feature of Mexican immigration legislation is that it indicates goals and pri-
orities without going into much detail.  Mexican immigration law gives great
administrative discretion to the executive branch to decide whether particular
decisions are consistent with the overall policy goals.  However, most recently
in 1990, 1992, and 1996, immigration legislation has been modified to liberalize
the entry of certain categories of foreigners, particularly to facilitate the entry of
business visitors, investors, technicians, professionals, and others to conduct
business in Mexico—under NAFTA, special facilities are given to American and
Canadian businesspersons—but at the same time to strengthen the criminal
penalties for the smuggling of human beings.
Responses to Mexican Communities Abroad.  Through the years, a
sizeable Mexican community—Mexican citizens and Mexican-origin population—
has been created in the United States. To strengthen the links between migrants,
recent or earlier, and their country of origin, as well as to support some of their
demands, the Mexican government has developed various responses for these
Mexican communities.  Consular, cultural, and business  activities have been
expanded.  One of the most recent responses has been to change the norms
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regarding Mexican nationality.  In December 1996, consti-tutional amendments
were passed that when implemented will allow Mexicans to naturalize in an-
other country and not automatically lose their Mexican nationality.
The bilateral interaction on migration issues has altered in recent years from a
lack of consultation to considerable discussion between the two governments.
Negotiating NAFTA required a shift in bilateral political relations.  Mexico’s
earlier reflexive opposition to U.S. international initiatives has given way to a
more cooperative relationship.  The United States gave political relations with
Mexico a higher profile, and showed increased receptivity to Mexican overtures.
Economic-political contacts have been facilitated by embedding them in institu-
tional arrangements.  NAFTA created a number of such institutional arrange-
ments and breathed new life into established consultation groups.  The Working
Group on Migration and Consular Affairs of the Binational Commission is the
single most important body for consultation on migration matters.  In May 1997,
when President Clinton visited Mexico, the Working Group discussion dealt
with the exchange of information on migration policies and legislation, consular
protection, and increased cooperation at the border.  The Joint Statement on
Migration adopted by the two Presidents signals a commitment to enhance
bilateral cooperation in the management of migration.
The bilateral engagement has led to a number of unilateral and cooperative
actions.  Fast lanes were set up to facilitate crossing into the United States.  The
wait to cross at San Ysidro was reduced from two hours to twenty minutes.
Cooperation to prevent drug smuggling was increased at the border.  Grupo
Beta is a Mexican effort to make the border safer.  Mexicans participate in the
Citizens’ Advisory Panel on the U.S. side.  There is a joint Border Liaison
Mechanism.  Both sides took steps to reduce smuggling of immigrants.
Based on the premise that economic development is the best and only long-term
strategy to deter mass migrations, NAFTA is seen as a way to stimulate devel-
opment and thereby slow emigration through enhanced employment and higher
wages.
Currently, goods and services can pass more or less freely across the Mexico-
United States. border, as can capital—but not labor.  NAFTA is a free-trade
area, not a common market within which all factors can move freely.  In the
Current
Context
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buildup to the NAFTA negotiations, Mexico raised labor inclusion, but the U.S.
rejected this on the grounds that the Congress would not accept it.
There are proposals from time to time for a U.S. guestworker program with
Mexico for the admission of less-skilled workers.  A modest temporary worker
program exists between Canada and Mexico.  Such proposals recently have
been suggested by some groups on the Mexican side based on the premise of
more equal treatment of all factors—labor as well as capital—on the inability of
Mexico to control emigration.  They have also been proposed by some groups
in the United States based on their inability to seal the border and the desire of
some employers to have ready access to legal-temporary workers..
Despite the increased dialogue, disagreement between the two countries on
migration issues increased dramatically as a consequence of the 1996 U.S. enact-
ment of legislation on immigration, welfare, and antiterrorism.  All these laws
will affect Mexican nationals.  This increased tension came on top of the U.S.
debate on whether to certify Mexico as cooperating with the United States in
combating drug trafficking.  This combination of problems—drugs on the one
hand, migration on the other—set back the cooperative atmosphere that had
been developing.  Although the Clinton presidential visit sought to mitigate the
conflict, it remains under the surface.
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Mexican migration to the United States is a long-standing phe-
nomenon that remains complex and dynamic.  In general terms,
Mexicans in the United States fall into one of two migrant categories  (sojourn-
ers or settlers) and in one of three legal conditions (unauthorized, legal immi-
grant, and naturalized citizen).  Our results suggest that the total size of Mexi-
can-born resident population in the United States in 1996 was 7.0 - 7.3 million
persons.  Of this population, legal residents accounted for about 4.7 - 4.9 million
persons, about 0.5 million of whom were naturalized United States citizens.
Unauthorized migrants accounted for 2.3 - 2.4 million persons.  Estimates based
on Mexican or U.S. data indicate an annual flow from 277,000 to 315,000 per-
sons.
The characteristics of Mexican-born migrants differ systematically by migration
pattern and legal status.  This study demonstrates that, despite much continuity,
the characteristics of migrants show increased diversity over time.  Mexican-
born migrants tend to have low skill levels, relative both to the U.S. population
at large and to other migrant groups, although migration also absorbs a substan-
tial portion of Mexico’s skilled population.  The low skill levels of most Mexican
migrants reflect the demand for labor in sectors where Mexican-born migrants
are employed and, in turn, are reflected in the low incomes and high poverty
rates of Mexican born settlers in the United States.  This situation is exacerbated
by the unauthorized status of many of these migrants.
These changing characteristics are consistent with the increasingly diverse de-
mand, supply, and network factors that are shaping migration flows.  The
catalyst for much of today's unauthorized Mexican migration for United States
employment lies in the United States, but over time new factors have created a
larger and more complex set of reasons that sustain the flow.  The same tenden-
cies that currently seem to be increasing and diversifying Mexico-United States
migration flows may be dampened or reversed starting in the next five to fifteen
years, reducing Mexico-United States migration.
There is substantial evidence of benefits to both the United States and Mexico
from this migration, but the research also reveals costs to local communities and
social sectors.  Migration has repercussions through the labor market and sup-
ply and demand, through fiscal implications for national and local governments,
and upon political and social institutions.  In Mexico, the distribution of impacts
are concentrated in a relatively small number of households, communities, and
regions.  The most important direct impact of migration is the income sent home
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to Mexico by migrants in the United States (i.e., remittances).  In terms of the
remittance income they provide, migrants are Mexico’s third leading export
after oil and tourism and ahead of agriculture.  In addition, migrant financing
of new investments and reduced pressure for internal migration provide ben-
efits.  Given low productivity and low returns to labor in Mexico, migrants are
an important source of income, investment capital, and income insurance. The
negative impacts take the form of loss of human capital, as well as the social
disruption that comes when families are separated.
In the United States, owners of capital, that is business owners and investors,
as well as consumers, clearly benefit from Mexican migration.  This benefit
comes at a cost, however, to certain categories of workers, particularly already-
resident migrants whose wages have fallen with the competition of new mi-
grants.  In areas where Mexican migrant concentrations are extremely high, such
as in certain cities along the southwestern border, wage depression and job
displacement effects are evident.  For the average United States region, how-
ever, even relatively large increases in Mexican-born labor have relatively small
impacts on native workers.  With regard to fiscal impacts, Mexican migrants do
present significant costs to certain states and localities.  These costs do not
derive from disproportionate use of welfare programs, however.  The empirical
results indicate that Mexican-born households are no more likely to use welfare
than either otherwise comparable native-born households of Mexican ancestry
or otherwise comparable native-born households in general.  Mexican-born use
of education is the greatest cost, but this can also be seen as an investment in
the future.
Responses to Mexican migration have evolved over time, often reflecting eco-
nomic cycles in the two countries.  The unintended consequences of policy
changes have been significant and often at variance with the intentions of those
policies.  One recent example is the growing immigrant visa backlog prompted
by family unification requests stemming from the legalization provisions of
IRCA.  In recent years, there has been greater engagement on migration policy.
The Mexican government has shifted from a position of deliberate nonengagement
on migration matters based upon the principle of noninterference in the internal
affairs of other countries, to a stance of increasing dialogue with U.S. counter-
parts on migration issues.  The bilateral engagement on migration began before
NAFTA went into effect, but cooperation on this issue picked up after NAFTA
facilitated a more elaborate framework for economic and political dialogue.
Simultaneously, the United States is increasing efforts to control unauthorized
entries.  This has the potential for increasing binational tensions.
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The study findings support an enhancement of institutionalized
and forward looking consultative mechanisms to identify and
develop mutually supportive policy options.  Migration between
Mexico and the United States is clearly a sensitive topic for both countries.  Yet,
finding effective ways to curb unauthorized migration that take into account
both countries’ commitment to foster human rights is essential.  This topic
requires, therefore, delicate management of the process that takes into account
historical, demographic, economic, social, cultural, psychological, and political
factors in both countries.  Consistent with the greater dialogue and cooperation
that has characterized United States-Mexico relations in recent years, and with
the spirit of this study, it is important that both countries work together to
explore policy options and initiatives that could be jointly undertaken to meet
the needs of both countries and increase the information available about the
migration phenomenon.
Although the catalyst for much of today’s unauthorized Mexican migration is
due to the attraction of United States jobs, demand, supply, and networks are
all responsible for the continued migration and, thus, solutions are to be found
in both countries.  The United States and Mexican governments should jointly
address the three factors that influence migration between Mexico and the United
States—demand, supply, and networks.  We have learned from past experience
that a comprehensive approach is needed; addressing one of the factors will not
achieve the desired results as long as other factors are present.
In recent years, the Working Group on Migration and Consular Affairs of the
Binational Commission has proven to be an important and effective forum for
frank discussion of various migration issues.  These discussions, however, have
generally focused on alleviating the effects of policy decisions rather than on
potential future policies within each country and their implications on each
country’s migrant and/or resident populations.  We envision that this group’s
work would be supplemented with more frequent and structured conversations
to:  explore policy options, scenarios, and alternatives to handle migration;
identify prerequisites to change; and determine foreseeable implications of the
continuation of the current situation.
More specifically, the study team presents the following agenda of policy issues
that should be considered by the Binational Commission Working Group on
Migration and Consular Affairs:
Policy
Implications
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• Determining the consequences of migration-related legis-
lation adopted by each country.  Regular, joint monitoring pro-
grams could help identify the intended and unintended consequences of
newly enacted migration legislation in a more timely fashion.  In par-
ticular, study is needed on the trio of U.S. legislation passed in 1996
related to immigration: the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996 [IIRIRA]; the Anti-terrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996 [AEDPA]; and the Personal Responsibility
and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 [Welfare Reform].
IIRIRA augmented border controls, required new pilot programs to test
more secure forms of employment verification, clarified eligibility for
public benefit programs, bars unauthorized residents from legal admis-
sion for three or ten years, and made sweeping changes in provisions
for the removal of unauthorized migrants.
Study is also needed on the implications of changes to the Mexican
Constitution related to nationality.  Constitutional amendments were
adopted in December 1996 that will allow Mexicans to naturalize in the
United States and other countries and not lose their Mexican nationality.
Once implemented, this provision could have notable impacts on natu-
ralization patterns in the United States, as well as on return migration
of Mexicans who become U.S. citizens.
• Determining how best to address the demand, supply, and
network factors precipitating continued unauthorized
movements.  As research shows that the majority of Mexican mi-
grants are economically motivated, both governments should focus their
attention on this issue.  For example,  the governments should assess the
extent to which the demand of U.S. employers can be reduced through
enhanced enforcement of labor standards, including wage and hour
requirements, child labor prohibitions, sanctions against the knowing
recruitment and hire of unauthorized workers, and bars on discrimina-
tion based on national origin or citizenship.  Also to be assessed would
be the extent to which the supply factors motivating Mexican migration
can be addressed through enhanced domestic economic development.
Means of reducing the efficacy of networks in promoting unauthorized
movements also need attention.  Networks have been strengthened in
recent years  through both the traditional contacts of  relatives and
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coworkers and new smuggling networks.  Recent surveys find that many
Mexican migrants attempting unauthorized entry into the United States
now pay for “professional” assistance.  Continued strong efforts by both
governments against the smugglers could reduce these networks as well
as the exploitation of the migrants that often occurs with smuggling.
These asssessments of ways to address the combined demand, supply
and network factors should recognize that dependence on immigration/
emigration varies widely.  Certain United States industries, occupations,
and areas are more reliant on Mexican-born workers than others, just as
Mexican regions, states, and communities differ in their dependence on
the U.S. labor market.  It may make sense to develop different tools in
addressing demand in industries in which the employment of Mexican
migrants is a long-standing practice versus those that are beginning to
hire unauthorized workers.  Similarly, different approaches may be jus-
tified in traditional versus nontraditional sending and receiving areas.
• Developing migration impact statements in both  coun-
tries.  Migration is affected by more than immigration policy.  Al-
though the social and economic policies of the United States and Mexico
historically have affected Mexico United States migration patterns, the
U.S. and Mexico repeatedly have been surprised by the others’ changes
in policies that affect migration patterns.  There often have been unin-
tended consequences of policy and legislative decisions that potentially
could be avoided or lessened through this type of mechanism.  Migra-
tion impact statements, discussed during annual United States-Mexican
consultations and throughout the year, might alleviate some of the
impacts of such policies as land reform or trade policies and include
some mid-to-long-range perspectives.
This recommendation echoes that of the U.S. Commission for the Study
of International Migration and Cooperative Economic Development in
1990. That Commission called for U.S. government migration impact
statements to prevent the shock of unanticipated migration such as the
Caribbean migration following U.S. government increase in support for
U.S. sugar producers.  The feedback on these issues brought back by the
delegations to their respective governments could be a useful addition
to the debate of each country as it considers changes in immigration
laws or policies.
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• Encouraging and promoting binational research on issues
that can best be resolved through joint data collection and
analysis.  This study amply demonstrates the benefits of joint data
collection and studies on demographics and economic and social im-
pacts.  Data limitations often constrained the teams’ abilities to draw
firm conclusions on many issues.  The research findings were strength-
ened, however, by the ability to work on both sides of the border and
compare various data sets.  Combining the different techniques and
perspectives of researchers from both countries further strengthened the
research findings. The very changes in migration trends that this study
has documented call for a continuing capacity and infrastructure to
examine the issues raised in this report
Many of the most pressing questions about Mexican migrants simply
have no adequate answers without data that track the same individuals
over time.  Without such data we cannot fully answer whether or not,
or how, work experience and new skills lead to significantly better earn-
ings either on return to Mexico or in the United States; how English
skills at entry and Mexican American communities shape English ability
over time; and, importantly, how schooling and parents’ status affect the
progress of migrant children.
More specifically, joint data collection and analysis would enhance
understanding of demographic, economic, social, and political/civic
trends in the two countries that affect migration.  Cooperative efforts to
collect data in a way that enables comparisons between the experiences
of migrants and nonmigrants would greatly enhance the ability to re-
port on the changing characteristics and impacts of those who move
between the two countries.  A fuller research agenda is included in
Appendix A.
• Identifying measures to accommodate, and even to facili-
tate, the demand for increased mobility between the two
countries.  Surely the size of the Mexican born population legally in
the U.S. alone creates a need for facilitated flows for family and com-
mercial purposes.  The process of deeper economic integration—in trade,
finance and investment—also will increase the pressures to deal with
the migration consequences of this process.  The number of border
crossings in the southwest already has grown in the last few years.
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One issue for the Binational Commission to consider is the degree to
which Mexico should be treated as a special case in U.S. immigration
policy (and vice versa), particularly given the existence of NAFTA and
the long-shared border.  The U.S. and Mexico already have begun to
take measures to facilitate legal entry at the border, such as special lanes
for frequent crossers.  Prescreening of the applicants permits identifica-
tion of those who are not likely to abuse the speedier inspection process.
The U.S. and Mexico, with Canada, also negotiated special nonimmi-
grant categories under NAFTA that allow for eased entry of business
visitors, investors, intracompany transferees, and professionals.  Cana-
dians and Mexicans with a baccalaureate degree or appropriate profes-
sional credentials or experience may enter under the special TN visa
rather than the numerically limited H-1B visa used to admit profession-
als from other countries.  A transitional limit of 5,500 TN visas for
Mexicans expires in 2003.  Thereafter, an unlimited number of profes-
sionals who otherwise qualify for entry will be admitted.
The growing economic integration of Mexico and the United States calls
for continued, systematic analysis of further arrangements that will fa-
cilitate trade, investment, and commerce between the two countries by
facilitating the movements of people as well.  The various barriers to
easing constraints on legal movements also need to be identified and
addressed.
• Identifying mechanisms that maximize the benefits and
minimize the costs of migration between the two coun-
tries.  As noted above, the study team recognizes that it is to the benefit
of both countries to work towards eliminating unauthorized migration,
which creates costs to both countries and makes migrants vulnerable to
exploitation.  The longer-term trends that suggest that emigration pres-
sures may lessen in the years ahead are encouraging.  In the interim,
Mexican and U.S. policies should seek to capitalize on the economic
return to migration to stimulate economic development.  A thorough
review of policies to identify how efforts to maximize the short term
benefits and minimize their costs could be used to reduce the longer
term pressures for migration.
From the sending communities perspective, considerations should be
given to how to decrease costs of transferring remittances, encourage
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their use for productive investments, and help migrants use their U.S.
working experience more effectively towards an economic return in
Mexico.  The cost of transferring remittances is often 20 percent of the
amount transferred, meaning that as much as $1 billion is lost to the
migrants themselves.  Targeting more resources to poorer areas by re-
ducing transfer costs, particularly if combined with new strategies to
encourage their most productive use, may be one of the best ways to
reduce migration pressures in the long term.
On the United States side, a long-term strategy to reduce unauthorized
migration should consider policies that facilitate legal entry for those
who are qualified for nonimmigrant and immigrant visas.  The U.S. also
should assess whether recently adopted policies are undermining the
productive value of legal immigrants by withdrawing their eligibility
for benefits when they are in need.  The U.S. as well should consider
how a more vigorous enforcement of labor standards could ensure that
workers are paid full wages and work in humane conditions.  Further,
it should be recognized that excluding unauthorized children from school
and basic health care may ultimately create larger costs for the society
at large without substantially reducing the unauthorized flows.  Both
countries also should seek ways to facilitate transfer of school and health
records as migrant children move from one country to the other.
• Analyzing the advisability of a bilateral United States-
Mexico foreign worker program, with due recognition that
such a program is unlikely to be an effective remedy to
unauthorized migration.  Perceptions in the United States and
Mexico often differ widely regarding the ability of a temporary worker
program to serve as a remedy for unauthorized Mexico-United States
migration.  We believe that the U.S. and Mexico should study the tem-
porary worker idea very carefully to dispel myths about what might be
involved in launching a new temporary worker program.  Such a study
is likely to puncture the notion that both sides easily could reach agree-
ment on a truly binational program.
While there is still employer demand for Mexican workers, there are
few “certifiable” labor shortages in the U.S. industries, occupations, and
areas in which Mexican and other nonimmigrant workers are employed.
In some of these immigrant labor markets, real wages have declined and
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work-related benefits have disappeared.  Certification of the jobs cur-
rently filled by foreign workers is often the subject of litigation, and the
use of legal nonimmigrant workers in these jobs may become more
contentious as welfare reform augments the supply of unskilled U.S.
workers.  There also may be less seasonality in many of the labor mar-
kets in which Mexican-born workers are employed than is assumed,
making it difficult to expect or enforce worker rotation.
Moreover, history has shown that U.S.-sanctioned Bracero recruitment
in the 1950s oriented many Mexican workers toward the U.S. labor
market instead of toward local jobs and development.  This began a
tradition of migration, raised expectations, and set into place a baseline
of individuals and families who would eventually reside permanently in
the U.S.  Although meant to be a temporary supply of workers, one
unintended consequence was to create a resident population.  Many
have argued that a “temporary” nonimmigrant program would not be
temporary and would lead to an increase in permanent residents.  If
temporary workers in the United States were to come from nontradi-
tional migration areas in Mexico, new migration streams might be set in
motion.
Today, when Mexico is modernizing its economy and promoting export
oriented economic development, a Bracero program might make inves-
tors reluctant to invest in areas from which migrants leave for the United
States, thus reinforcing migrants’ dependence on emigration.  There is
as yet no convincing evidence that U.S. border and interior control
efforts have reduced unauthorized Mexico-United States migration, so
that opening a legal channel for Mexican temporary workers would
probably add to, rather than substitute for, unauthorized workers, per-
haps depressing conditions for legal Mexican-born workers in the U.S.
labor market.  Indeed, the Special Agricultural Worker program [SAW]
legislated in IRCA had that effect.  Even though hundreds of thousands
of farmworkers received legal status, agricultural growers continued to
hire unauthorized labor.
Finally, various temporary worker proposals voted upon by Congress in
1996 had little in the way of protections for either United States or
Mexican workers .  For example, the proposed legislation would have
weakened recruitment, wage, and housing requirements in current
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farmworker programs.  Also, 25 percent of the worker’s wages would
be withheld in a trust fund to be paid upon return—but only to the
extent that the funds were not needed to cover health care costs asso-
ciated with the temporary worker program.   Such programs may “sub-
stitute legal for illegal workers,” but it is not in the interest of either
country to codify easily exploitable labor exchanges.
• Addressing the social costs of migration,    particularly
regarding the separation and breakup of families.  Although
there are not a great many studies on this issue, the information that
does exist provides sufficient evidence that this is a serious issue need-
ing attention.  Migration too frequently has broken up families and left
behind women and children and also lead children hoping for success
as a migrant to leave their homes at a young age.  Attention should be
given to ways to alleviate the disruption/separation of families and the
local economy and other social costs imposed by the migration.  For
example, the United States could seek ways to strengthen the family
unit by eliminating the backlog of spouses and minor children awaiting
family reunification (most of whom are Mexican).  Further, the two
governments could explore ways to identify and obtain support for
families, mostly female headed, who have been deserted by migrating
husbands/fathers.
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APPENDICES
A. Agenda
for Future
Research
The binational team’s agenda for future research includes studies of:
• Demographic issues, including the causes and consequences of dif-
ferential fertility of Mexican-origin women in the United States and
adjustment of their fertility behavior over time; the effects of intermar-
riage patterns on the assimilation of the Mexican-origin population; and
the consequences of differential internal migration patterns by Mexican-
born and United States born counterparts.  Particular focus also is needed
on Mexican immigration trends overall, as well as on: the demographic
impacts of the IRCA legalization in both countries; the foreign-born
populations’ legal composition; modeling transitions among legal sta-
tuses; return migration, via surveys of relatives who emigrated from the
U.S.; and migration-related interregional demographic changes in Mexico.
• Economic issues, including: whether capital and labor behave as sub-
stitutes and/or as complements; the scale effects resulting from concen-
trations of Mexican migrants in the United States; the reasons for the
negative impacts of recent migrants on employment and earnings of
earlier migrants; benefits and costs of migrants to particular industries
and sectors of the economy; changes in welfare participation and levels
of welfare based on duration of residence; the short and long-run fiscal
impacts of legal and undocumented migrants from Mexico at the local,
state, and national levels; the effects of NAFTA and other economic
developments in Mexico on migration patterns and trends; Mexico's
economic absorption of immigrants from other countries, including the
degree to which new jobs generated in Mexico are taken by immigrants
from other countries; better and more consistent estimates of costs of
education, health, and social infrastructure related to migrants; the eco-
nomic impacts of migration in nontraditional sending communities; the
extent to which Mexican migrants working in the United States gain
skills and capabilities that produce increasing benefits upon return; the
contributions of remittances; the effectiveness of particular economic
development strategies and programs on reducing migration pressures;
and the relation between intensity of migration flow from communities
and their economic and social performances over time.
• Social issues, including:  the educational gains of the Mexican-born and
their offspring compared to other immigrant groups; linguistic   assimi-
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lation of the Mexican-born population and the implications of Spanish
language maintenance; possible bias against female sponsors in the new
sponsorship requirements in the U.S.; the impacts and costs of migra-
tion to family, culture, and community in Mexico; and Mexico's social
absorption of immigrants from other countries.
• Civic and Legal Rights issues, including Mexican immigrants’
decisions on whether or not to naturalize; human rights violations of
Mexican migrants en route and in the United States and of third-country
nationals transiting Mexico; the main obstacles to correcting human rights
violations in both countries; and the advocacy efforts of industry, agri-
cultural, environmental, human rights, ethic, and other groups on immi-
gration legislation.
There appear to be substantial changes occurring in the U.S. occupations of
migrants since 1988.   There are notable gender differences in occupation.  For
example, Mexican-born male migrants appear to have shifted out of agriculture
to some degree from 1988 to 1997 and into manufacturing occupations.  Women
migrants, however, remain unlikely to have been employed in agriculture and
women are more likely than men to work in manufacturing and increasingly
likely to find employment in service occupations.
These observations are based on the following graphs that draw upon question-
naires systematically administered from September 1988 to the present.  The
surveys were done in the cities of Tijuana, Mexicali, Ciudad Juárez, Nuevo
Laredo, and Matamoros.  Unauthorized migration through Tijuana alone makes
up an estimated 50 percent of the total flow from Mexico to the United States.
To determine the occupations in which migrants worked, the following ques-
tions were asked:
(1) Have you had a job in the United States?
(2) When did you leave your last job in the United States?
(3) What type of occupation did your last job involve?
B. Migrant
Occupations,
United
States Labor
Demand, &
Border
Crossers
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1The Quantification of Migration
between Mexico and the United States
Frank D. Bean, Rodolfo Corona, Rodolfo Tuirán
& Karen A. Woodrow-Lafield
The migration of Mexicans to the United States is a complex phenomenon,with a long history and structural roots on both sides of the border. Notsurprisingly, Mexico and the United States have often held dissimilar views
of this migration. On each side of the border, government officials, policy specialists
and the public have often revealed distinct perceptions as to the nature, magnitude,
causes and consequences of the movement of persons between the two nations.
This complicates the task of the analyst. This report seeks to simplify analysis by
focusing only on the question of the quantity of migration. How large is the flow
and what is the sizes of the populations in the two countries that result from it?
These are among the most often discussed aspects of migration, ones that lend
themselves to intense speculation. In Mexico and the United States, the question of
numbers arises frequently as part of the public debate on migration, and analyses
of the causes and impacts of migration in both countries depend, to a considerable
extent, on the calculations (well founded or not) about the size of the phenomenon.
One of the first conclusions of this report is that Mexican migrants to the United
States are not homogeneous, but rather consist of diverse subgroups that migrate
2for different reasons (Bean, et al., 1994; Corona, 1993). Distinguishing among
migrants is necessary in order to demarcate flows conceptually and in order to
interpret the results of efforts to measure them. Recognizing differences among
migrants also helps to evaluate the impacts of migration on the societies of origin
and destination. From the outset, the question of the magnitude of immigration,
therefore, has facets that imply a number of subquestions. How many Mexicans
(authorized and unauthorized) are located at any given time in the United States?
Of these, how many habitually reside in that country? How many work or look for
work in the United States but actually live in Mexico? How many Mexicans enter
the United States annually to reside in that country or to work in it? How many
return within the same time period? What is the net flow, or the difference between
the total entries and the total return flows?
Researchers trying to answer such questions on international migration are
confronted with diverse methodological and technical problems. Besides the prob-
lems confronting efforts to quantify migratory flows that are well-known, other
problems arise from the special characteristics of the movement of Mexicans to
the United States. Analysis is difficult because of the surreptitious nature of much
of the flow, the constant change in the nature of migratory populations, the diffi-
culties in determining how long Mexicans stay in the United States, and the diffi-
culties in estimating the considerable size of return flows to Mexico (even after
lengthy periods of residency in the United States). This report seeks to overcome
these difficulties insofar as possible. Its two main objectives are (1) to assess the
results and adequacy of efforts of the past 25 years to estimate the magnitude of
migration between Mexico and the United States, and (2) to develop estimates of
the stocks and flows of migrants between the two countries circa the mid-1990s,
based on the approaches and results of earlier assessments as well as on newly
available data and research conducted in the 1990s.
Before proceeding further, two additional comments are in order. The first
concerns terminology. We use the term “unauthorized migrant” throughout this
report to refer to those Mexican migrants who are in the United States without
authorization at a given point in time, either because they have surreptitiously en-
tered the country or because they overstayed their legally authorized periods of
stay. We are aware that many observers prefer other terms. Our choice of nomen-
clature is based on our conclusion that the term “unauthorized migrant” most accu-
rately describes the category of persons who are not in the United States legally.
We use the term migrant rather than immigrant because many of the persons in this
category enter the United States for temporary purposes, that is they stay only
short periods of time.
The second matter concerns the consequences of the Immigration Reform and
Control Act (IRCA) of 1986 for Mexican migration flows. This legislation has had
3such profound implications for the numbers and kinds of Mexican migrants going
back and forth between Mexico and the United States that we wish to signal and
underscore the importance of IRCA for our topic at the outset of this report. In
almost every one of our discussions, we will be noting not only the ways in which
we endeavor to measure the stocks and flows of migrants, but also the ways in
which IRCA has influenced their magnitude. And because IRCA’s legalization pro-
visions have so increased the numbers of persons eligible for immigrant visas un-
der the current provisions of U.S. immigration law, IRCA will also have implica-
tions for immigration flows in the future, as we note below.
The rest of this report is divided into six sections. We first consider the recent
sizes of the total Mexican-origin and Mexican-born populations in the United
States. Second, we discuss estimates of legal immigration from Mexico to the
United States. Third, we examine estimates of unauthorized migration to the United
States that are based mostly on U.S. data. Fourth, we present estimates of migration
from Mexico to the United States that are based on recent data collected in Mexico.
Fifth, we examine the available evidence about the migration to Mexico of persons
from the United States and other countries. Sixth, we summarize and synthesize
the results from the above sections, together with other recent data, to develop
what we think are reasonable numbers as to the magnitude of the stock and flows
of Mexican migrants to the United States just after the middle of the decade of
the 1990s.
The Total Mexican-origin Population
in the United States
The Mexican-origin population living in the United States has grown
substantially during the 20th Century. The population consists of several groups
with different experiences. First, there are those individuals born in the United
States who can trace their ancestry to Mexico. This group in turn consists of those
persons whose ancestors lived in those parts of the United States that once were
part of Mexico, as well as those persons whose ancestors migrated to the what is
now the United States. Second, there are those individuals born in Mexico who
have subsequently moved to the United States. This group in turn can be broken
down into three sub-groups—naturalized citizens, legal immigrants and
unauthorized migrants from Mexico. The following discussion examines the size
and growth of the total Mexican-origin population living in the United States,
focusing on changes in the size of each of these components where possible. Our
major purpose here is not to examine the estimates of these components in detail,
because we undertake that exercise below. Rather, it is to demonstrate the rough
size of the migration components in relation to the total. We begin by examining
4changes in the way this group has been measured over time. Since the United
States Census is the primary source of this information, we focus first on changes
in census definitions. Then, we discuss the patterns of growth in the Mexican-
origin population over the past century.
“Ethnicity” denotes a social identity deriving from group membership based
on common race, religion, language, national origin, or some combination of these
factors (Bean and Tienda, 1987:38). In part because ethnicity is a multi-dimensional
concept, the way in which the Mexican-origin population has been defined by the
United States Census Bureau has changed over the years in part because
measurements have been based on a number of different indicators at different
points in time (see Table 1). Prior to 1970, Mexican ethnicity could be
operationalized through the use of various objective markers, including place of
birth, parents’ place of birth, language and Spanish surname. While serving to
identify well Mexican-origin persons who were either foreign born or whose parents
were born in Mexico, these identifiers failed to identify adequately third or higher
generation Mexican-origin persons, especially those who no longer spoke Spanish
at home or who no longer had a Spanish surname due to intermarriage. These
limitations were especially problematic for identifying the Mexican-origin
population given the group’s long history in the United States. In response to
Table 1
Identifiers Available in the United States Census or Current Population
Survey for the Hispanic Population, 1950-1996
Home Spanish
 Language  Origin
Birth- Foreign Mother Other than Spanish1 or
Year place Parentage Tongue English Surname Descent Ancestry
1994-96 yes yes no no no yes no
1990 yes no no yes no yes yes
1980 yes no no yes yes yes yes
1970 yes yes yes no yes yes no
1960 yes yes  yes 2 no yes no no
1950 yes yes no no yes no no
Source (1950–1980) Bean and Tienda, 1987; (1990 Census and 1994-96 CPS) Constructed
by the authors.
1 Only available for five southwestern states.
2 Available for 25% of the foreign-born population
5these concerns, a new measure of ethnicity was added to the 1970 Census in which
Mexican ethnicity could be identified through the use of a subjective item, Spanish
origin. The census measure on Spanish origin allowed respondents of any
generation to identify themselves as possessing Mexican or several other Spanish-
origin ethnicities.
Such changes in the basis for measuring the Mexican-origin population of the
United States do not mask the fact that the Mexican-origin population has grown
steadily over the last several decades (Table 2). Some of this growth can be attrib-
uted to natural increase in the U.S.-born Mexican-origin population. Mexican-
American fertility rates are approximately 35 to 40 percent higher than those of
Anglos (Bean and Tienda, 1987; Bachu, 1995; Clark and Ventura, 1994), while
each of these groups appears to experience comparable mortality rates. Thus, even
in the absence of migration, the share the Mexican-origin population contributes to
Table 2
Total Mexican-origin Population in the United States: 1900-1996
Total Mexican-
origin Population Percent of
Year (in Thousands) Total U.S. Population
1996 18,039 1 6.8
1990 13,393 5.4
1980 8,740 3.9
1970 4,532 2.2
1960 1,736 2 1.0
1950 1,346 0.9
1940 1,077 0.8
1930 1,423 1.2
1920 740 0.7
1910 385 0.4
Source: U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service. Historical Statistics
of the United States, Part 1 (1975), U..S. Bureau of the Census, 1980 and
1990, and March Current Population Survey, 1995 and 1996.
1 These figures are based on CPS data that are adjusted for undercount
and thus are not comparable to census figures.
2 Mexican-origin population calculated as a sum of the Mexican-born
population and natives of Mexican parentage.
6growth in the total population would increase relative to the share contributed by
the Anglo population.
The present day size of the Mexican-origin population in the United States,
however, is mostly attributable to immigration from Mexico during the 20th Century.
Corona (1994) and Edmonston and Passel (1994) estimate that the Mexican-origin
population in 1990 would only have been 12-14 percent of its current size had
there been no immigration from Mexico since 1900. Table 3 presents the size of
the Mexican-born population in the United States for each decade of the 20th Century.
The flow of immigrants from Mexico has fluctuated substantially throughout this
period, but it is clear that the Mexican-born population has become over time an
increasingly large component of the foreign-born population of the United States.
The growth of the Mexican-born population in the United States has varied as
a consequence of economic and political conditions on both sides of the border
Table 3
Total Mexican-born Population in the United States: 1900-1996
Mexican-born Percent of the
Population Percent of the  Total Mexican-
Year (in Thousands) Total Foreign-born  origin Population
1996 6,679 1 27.2 37.0
1990 4,298 21.7 32.1
1980 2,199 15.6 25.2
1970 759 7.9 16.7
1960 576 2 5.9 33.2
1950 454 4.4 33.7
1940 377 3.2 35.0
1930 617 4.3 43.4
1920 486 3.5 65.7
1910 222 1.6 57.7
1900 103 1.0
Source: U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service. Historical Statistics of the United States,
Part 1 1975), U.S. Bureau of the Census. 1980 and 1990, and March Current Population
Survey, 1995 and 1996.
1 These figures are based on CPS data that are adjusted for undercount and thus are not
comparable to census figures.
2 Mexican-origin population calculated as a sum of the Mexican-born population and natives of
Mexican parentage.
7(Freeman and Bean, 1997; Szekeley and de la Garza, 1997). The border between
Mexico and the United States attained its modern definition in 1848, but records
on the Mexican immigration to the United States were not kept until 1908. The
accuracy of such data is dubious, however, as the border region at that time was
largely unsupervised and the nature of immigration from Mexico at the very begin-
ning of the 20th Century is unknown. Two of the border states (Arizona and New
Mexico) were only territories under U.S. supervision until 1912. The first large
scale officially measured immigration from Mexico into U.S. territory occurred
between 1910 and 1919. Increased demands for labor brought about by the exclu-
sion of Chinese workers in 1882, Japanese workers in 1907 and a shortage of Eu-
ropean immigrants during World War I encouraged Mexican migration. Num-
bers of Mexican migrants continued to increase as the federal government exempted
the Western Hemisphere from the national quota laws of the 1920s and early 1930s
in the name of Pan Americanism which was also encouraged by many in the south-
west who looked towards Mexico for cheap labor (Reimers, 1992). However, when
the demand for labor decreased during the Great Depression of the 1930s, The
United States repatriated many Mexican-origin individuals. Many of those sent
involuntarily to Mexico were American-born children.
Levels of migration from Mexico once again increased with the introduction
of the Bracero Program from 1943-1964 (Figure 1). Starting in World War II,
non-Mexican farm workers in California sought higher paying jobs in the defense
Figure 1. Legal Immigrants Admitted from Mexico, Europe and Total, 1821-1994
8industry, reducing the available labor supply for farmers. This prompted growers
to place pressure on Congress to admit temporary workers, or braceros, from
Mexico. During the peak of the program in 1956, the number of workers recruited
was 445,197 (Reimers, 1992). Although these workers were expected to be
temporary residents in the United States, many stayed along with their family
members. While growers fought to retain the supply of cheap Mexican labor,
Congress refused to extend the program beyond 1964.
Despite the end of the Bracero Program, both unauthorized and legal migration
from Mexico has continued to grow during the past three decades (Figure 2). In
particular, the size of the legal population increased dramatically during the late
1980s and early 1990s, in part due to the legalization provisions of the 1986
Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA). Between 1989 and 1994, IRCA offered
legal status to approximately 2 million undocumented Mexican migrants who had
been either working in agriculture or living illegally in the United States before
1982. Table 4 illustrates the effect of IRCA’s legalization programs on the size of
the flow of immigrants from Mexico. When those legalizing their status under the
amnesty provisions are removed from the official numbers of immigrants arriving
in the decade, the size of the Mexican migrant population entering between 1981
and 1994 is greatly reduced. Another segment of the Mexican-born population in
the United States is the unauthorized migrant population. We discuss below in
Figure 2. Legally Resident Foreign-born by Mexican Birth: 1970-1990
9Table 4
Immigration from Mexico to the United States: 1900–1995
Number Arriving Percent of All
from Mexico Immigrants Arriving
Years in the Decade in the Decade
A. Published Totals
1991-1995 1,490,040 28.5
1981-1990 1,655,843 22.6
1971-1980 640,294 14.2
1961-1970 453,937 13.7
1951-1960 299,811 11.9
1941-1950 60,589 5.9
1931-1940 22,319 4.2
1921-1930 459,287 11.2
1911-1920 219,004 3.8
1901-1910 49,642 0.6
B. Numbers of Mexican Arrivals Excluding IRCA legalizations1
1991-1995 440,662 11.3
1981-1990 693,213 11.6
Source: U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1995 Statistical Yearbook of
the Immigration and Naturalization Service. U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington, D.C., 1997.
1 Numbers of those legalizing their immigration status from the Statistical Yearbook
of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (1989–1995).
considerable detail estimates of the size of the unauthorized Mexican migrant
population and the methods used to arrive at these estimates
Another component of the Mexican-born population in the United States
includes those immigrants who have become citizens of the United States. Table 5
presents the numbers of Mexican-born persons who have naturalized over the past
35 years. Compared to other immigrant groups in the United States, Mexican
immigrants have been slow to naturalize (Grebler, 1966; Bean and Tienda, 1987).
English language ability is frequently cited as the largest barrier to citizenship
among Mexican immigrants (Reimers, 1992). It is clear from Table 5 that the
proportion of persons from Mexico who are naturalizing in any given year relative
to the total Mexican-born population has increased over time. During 1996 the
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number of immigrants becoming citizens increased substantially as those legalizing
their status under IRCA become eligible for naturalization, and as permanent resident
aliens seek to attain citizenship in order to be eligible for benefits as required by
legislation passed in the 104th Congress (U.S. Immigration and Naturalization
Service, 1997).
Growth in the Mexican-origin population in the United States is expected to
continue into the next century due to both natural increase and increased net immi-
gration. According to Census Bureau population projections, the Hispanic-origin
population will add more people to the population in the next 60 years than all
other racial and ethnic groups combined (Day, 1995). Table 6 presents projections
of the size of the Hispanic-origin population based on U.S. Census projections.
These projections assume that the Hispanic population will receive the highest
number of immigrants than any other racial/ethnic group (350,000 annually). In
addition, the Census Bureau projections are based on the assumption that the higher
fertility rates of the Hispanic-origin population compared to other groups will per-
sist. Fertility in the Hispanic-origin population is matched only by the Asian-origin
population in the United States.
The projections indicate that the Hispanic-origin population will make up
approximately 25 percent of the population by 2050 (Day, 1995). The last two
columns of Table 6 present the population projection for just the Mexican-origin
population based on its size relative to the Hispanic-origin population. Two
projections are presented based on slightly different assumptions. The first is based
on the assumption that the relative size of the Mexican-origin population as a segment
Table 5
Number of Naturalizations among Mexican-born Persons in the United
States: 1950–1996
Number of Number per 10,000
Naturalizations Mexican-born Persons
Year Among Mexicans In the United States
1995 67,238 110.9
1990 17,564 40.9
1980 9,341 4.2
1970 6,195 0.8
1960 5,913 1.0
Source: U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (1996).
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of the total Hispanic-origin population in the United States will stay the same. The
Mexican-origin population represented roughly 60 percent of the Hispanic-origin
population in 1990. Table 6 also presents a projection assuming that the Mexican-
origin population will continue to increase as a proportion of the Hispanic-origin
population over the next several decades. Based on these assumptions, the Mexican-
origin population in the United States will more than double in size over the next
sixty years. In fact, using these projections, the Mexican-origin population alone
will be larger than the projected size of the Black population by the year 2050.
The projections make it clear that the Mexican-origin population in the United
States will continue to increase for some time based on the characteristics of the
population as of 1990. In addition, there are other ways that the Mexican-origin
population can change in the near future without changes in fertility or mortality.
For example, as those who legalized under IRCA become eligible for citizenship
in the United States, they will also be eligible to petition to bring family members
Table 6
Projected Size of the Mexican-origin Population
in the United States: 1995–2040
Projected Size (in Thousands) for the:
Mexican Mexican
Population Population
Year Hispanic Population (Estimate 1)1 (Estimate 2)2
1995 26,936 16,135 16,337
2000 31,366 18,788 19259
2010 41,139 24,642 25,876
2020 52,652 31,539 33,908
2030 65,570 39,276 43,211
2040 80,164 48,018 54,031
Source: Projection of the Hispanic Population from Day, Jennifer Cheeseman, Popu-
lation Projections of the United States by Age, Sex, Race and Hispanic Origin: 1995
to 2050. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, pp. 25-1130, U.S.
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1996.
Projection of the Mexican-origin population constructed by the authors.
1 Assuming that the proportion of the Hispanic population that is of Mexican origin
remains the same as observed in 1990 (59.9%).
2 Assuming the Mexican-origin population will continue to increase as a proportion
of the total Hispanic population by 1.5 percentage points per decade.
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to this country (Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1992). Mexican immigrants
have the largest pool of relatives who could become migrants to the United States
under the family reunification provisions than any other foreign-born group in the
United States (Schulte and Wolf, 1994; Woodrow and Peregay, 1991).
Another source of change that could affect the projected size of the Mexican-
origin population is changing rates of intermarriage and/or changing self identifi-
cation among the children of mixed-ethnicity parents. The projections in Table 6
do not account for the possibility of changes in patterns of exogamy. Intermarriage
between racial/ethnic groups may alter the way future generations identify them-
selves given the present categories of race and ethnicity. Differential patterns of
exogamy may alter the projected size of these groups (Bean et al., 1997). Edmonston,
Lee and Passel (1994) have presented population projections adjusted for differen-
tial exogamy rates among Hispanics and other racial/ethnic groups. Increases in
exogamy are built into their projections (see Table 7) and show that the Hispanic-
origin population in the United States could vary from between 50.9 million and
77.4 million people by 2040 depending on actual rates of exogamy. Table 7 also
presents the projected size of the Mexican-origin population based on the same
patterns of exogamy built into the Edmonston, Lee and Passel projections. These
projections demonstrate that, if the Mexican population remained approximately
Table 7
Projected Size of the Mexican-origin Population in the United States
Adjusted for Potential Exogamy: 1995–2040
Hispanic-origin Pop’n (in millions) Mexican-origin Pop’n (in millions)
Single Ancestry Single and Single Ancestry Single and
Only1 Mixed Ancestry2 Only3 Mixed Ancestry4
1990 22.4 22.4 13.4 13.4
2000 28.6 31.9 17.1 19.1
2010 35.0 42.1 21.0 25.2
2020 41.1 53.0 24.6 31.7
2030 46.5 65.0 27.9 38.9
2040 50.9 77.5 30.5 46.4
Source: Bean, Cushing, Haynes and Van Hook (1997), Edmonston, Lee and Passel (1994).
Notes: 1 Both parents are of Hispanic origin.
2
 At least one parent is of Hispanic origin.
3
 Both parents are of Mexican origin.
4
 At least one parent is of Mexican origin.
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60 percent of the total Hispanic-origin population, individuals of Mexican origin
would number between 30 and 46 million persons by the year 2040 depending
upon actual rates of exogamy.
Estimates of Authorized or Legal Mexican Immigration
Measuring Legal Immigration: Knowns
Administrative Statistics
Admissions for lawful permanent residence, legalization approvals, adjustments
to lawful permanent residence, and nonimmigrant arrivals are easily accessible
administrative statistics. These would be considered “knowns” in the sense that the
data sets are regarded as highly complete within the domain. Interpretive cautions
must be noted for using these administrative statistics for social science research.
First, those immigrants arriving as permanent residents may have had prior U.S.
residence experience or may anticipate short or long stays abroad. Survey responses
to questions about the timing of immigration may differ from recorded date of
lawful permanent residence. Second, generally-legalized immigrants are usually
presumed as having settled here for their lifetimes and at minimal risk of return
migration as a consequence of their sustained presence. Third, those adjusting to
lawful permanent residence from a nonimmigrant class may have substantial U.S.
residence histories, either continuous or on an intermittent basis. Fourth, arriving
nonimmigrants are presumed to be temporary residents, and the majority of non-
immigrant departures occur following short durations of saty.
Measuring Legal Immigration: Unknowns
The following sub-sections address the major uncertainties stemming from
“temporary” migration, emigration after legal immigration, incorporation of the
agriculturally-legalized population, and the ultimate immigration consequences of
the IRCA legalizations.
Presence of Nonimmigrants
A one-year entry cohort of nonimmigrant arrivals is comprised of (1) aliens
who depart and (2) aliens who stay or are lifetime migrants. Among those who
depart, most depart within a brief interval and others depart after stays of at least
one year. Among those who stay, some adjust to permanent resident status, and
others stay as unauthorized or undocumented, but either may have changed among
nonimmigrant classes. Those nonimmigrant arrivals followed quickly by departure
are not considered as counting toward population change and such individuals
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would not meet residence rules for either census enumeration or inclusion in
national surveys. Those eventually departing after longer residence periods and
those ultimately becoming lawful permanent residents present accounting
difficulties. The critical questions is: As of a specific date, how many
nonimmigrants have stayed in the United States for at least one year or are likely
to do so? The magnitude of the accumulated number of present stayers across
various nonimmigrant arrival cohorts is needed to estimate the legally resident
foreign-born populations for dates falling within the transition between
nonimmigrant status and departure or adjustment to permanent status. Their
presence is hidden until their adjustments are recorded in immigrants statistics.
This problem is difficult conceptually, analytically, and empirically. The
appropriately detailed arrivals and departures statistics are not yet published for
monitoring the nonimmigrant population, although considerable improvements
have been made. Departures statistics have not been published regularly and are
incomplete because the departure portion of the I-94 form may not be collected
at exit or INS may receive it much later. Interpreting the net difference of 3.3
million for 1994 (22.1 million arrivals less 18.8 million departures [U.S.
Immigration and Naturalization Service 1996b]) is impossible without modeling
nonimmigrant processes of arrival, departure and adjustment over time with
modification for undercoverage.
The residence rules for the census stipulate that individuals shoulds be living
here on a permanent basis or should have lived here for at least six months. There-
fore, even when migration may not be for the purpose of permanent residence, six
months of residence might be considered a threshold for considering nonimmigrants
as usual residents. The 1980 estimate of Warren and Passel included about 612,000
nonimmigrants whose class of admission was taken to imply “usual” residence—
243,000 refugees, 192,000 students, and 177,000 other aliens (Woodrow 1990).
Throughout the 1980s, the presumption was that newly-arriving nonimmigrants
becoming “usual” residents for several months were offset by departures, includ-
ing adjustments of status of similarly “usually resident” nonimmigrants. This could
be a shaky assumption because the annual number of nonimmigrant arrivals has
tripled relative to 1970. A total of 1,150,000 nonimmigrants adjusted to lawful
permanent residence during 1990-1994. Thus there are about 230,000 annually
who are identified as long-term temporary migrants.
Emigration after Legal Immigration
The volume of authorized or legal immigration rose over the 1960s, 1970s and
1980s. Following the post-war period of low immigration and low emigration, the
magnitude of emigration after legal immigration, also known as return migration
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or re-migration, also began to shift upward. Absent official counts for departing
immigrants, several indirect approaches described possible emigration levels for
the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s decades (Warren and Peck, 1980: Warren and Kraly,
1985; Warren and Passel 1987; Woodrow-Lafield, 1996a; Ahmed and Robinson,
1994, Borjas and Bratsberg, 1996).
The crucial question is whether emigration levels for 1960-1980 are sufficiently
descriptive of emigration levels for 1960-1990 and 1960-1999, or whether
emigration has perpetually increased in the latter half of the 20th Century as the
foreign-born population increased dramatically. Emigration levels might be
unchanged because emigration rates may be lower among contemporary immigrant
residents than among earlier cohorts. Origin or other characteristics associated
with lower propensity to emigrate may be more highly represented among foreign-
born residents. Indeed, the compositional mix of the foreign-born population has
shifted to include greater proportions of (1) Latin Americans and Asians for whom
emigration has seemed lower than for Europeans (Jasso and Rosenzweig, 1990);
Warren and Kraly, 1985) and (2) immigrants who entered under visa categories
associated with lesser likelihood of return migrating, such as refugees, asylees,
adjustees from nonimmigrant statuses, and formerly undocumented or temporarily
resident individuals.
The preponderance of evidence about emigration is more adequate for posit-
ing a broad range than for stating that emigration levels are higher in the 1980s
than in the 1970s. The empirical evidence is mixed. First, several studies support a
range for 1980 census coverage research of about 0.9 to 1.9 million foreign-born
emigrants. Second, there is variance among estimates of emigration for the 1980s.
A newly applied approach in the U.S. context, multiplicity sampling-based sur-
veys of U.S. residents about nonresident relatives, supported a broad range for
emigration occurring over 1980-1989 (Woodrow-Lafield 1996a). In combination
with sensitivity analyses in Woodrow (1991b) based on using emigration rates by
age, sex, period of entry, and country or region of origin, the preliminary evalua-
tion of 1990 census coverage employed an estimate of 1.33 million for net emigra-
tion of legally resident foreign-born for the 1980s and allowed for variation be-
tween 0.8 million and 2.2 million. A re-application of Warren and Peck’s (1980)
intercensal approach yielded a result toward the upper end of this range (Ahmed
and Robinson 1994). Although this study was taken to support higher emigration
in the 1980s than in the 1970s and a higher allowance for population programs, the
U.S. Bureau of the Census took an evenhanded approach in also increasing the
allowance for net population change due to net undocumented migration.
For the present purposes of positing estimates for net legal immigration as of
the 1980s and 1990s, we make assumptions about the level and composition of
emigration flows that are generally consistent with prior research for the 1960s
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and 1970s. For post-1989 analyses, alternative series will show the effects of varying
assumed emigration from 95,000 to 195,000 annually. Legal foreign-born emigrants
will be distributed to Mexico as country of origin and to all other countries of
origin on the same basis as for undocumented research (Woodrow and Passel 1990;
Woodrow 1992c).
The Mexico-born population has increased dramatically since 1950, but that
increase has been dominated recently by legal immigration—primarily family-based
and legalization-based. In one sense, there might seem to be lesser propensity for
return migration given a greater density on legal status, greater demographic di-
versity, and possibly greater representation of sending communities at migration
maturity. Alternatively, the Mexico-born population could ultimately reach a time
at which Mexican return migration could emerge as more easily discernible, de-
spite limitations of methodologies, simply because of its volume as a function of
the larger size of immigrant cohorts over the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. Such a shift
could be detectable, if not precisely measurable, by comparing multiplicity sam-
pling-based estimates of Mexican emigrants over time, as Woodrow-Lafield (1996a)
found for the post-IRCA period between 1987 and 1988.
The SAWs Population
In referring to the agricultural legalization, meaningful distinctions exist among
SAW applicants, SAW-approved beneficiaries, SAW-default beneficiaries, and resi-
dents becoming SAW-approved beneficiaries. The SAW beneficiaries may not be
presumed automatically as living in the United States because their “proof” of
agricultural work experience was insufficient for establishing usual residence in
the United States. Migrant agricultural workers have historically commuted for
lengthy periods of time as part of the settlement process (Massey 1986; Lowell
1992; Tilly 1990). Because about 700,000 SAW applications were filed in May
1988-November 1988 (498,000 in the last two months), the SAW program may
have been a magnet for aliens seeking U.S. residence status and may have ulti-
mately promoted migration to and settlement in the United States (Also, see Mar-
tin 1990, 1994, 1996.)
Further confusing the issue of whether SAW beneficiaries live in the United
States or their origin country, which was Mexico for 81.6 percent, the INS
automatically granted lawful permanent resident status to all SAW beneficiaries.
That benefit was extended to both SAW-approved beneficiaries and SAW-default
beneficiaries, whose applications INS simply failed to deny, with about 900,000
becoming “lawful permanent residents” by the default deadline of December 1,
1990. Thus, the single action of SAW application yielded entitlement for U.S.
permanent residence.
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There are limited insights to SAWs’ behavior following legalization. The
National Agricultural Workers Survey (NAWS) acquired individual migrant workers’
legal status; almost one-half of the migrant workforce in 1989—1991 has legalized
under IRCA (Gabbard, Mines, and Boccalandro 1994). Samardick (1995) reported
that about 32 percent of Mexico-born migrant workers in 1993-1994 had received
SAW status and that about 7 percent had generally legalized after long-term
undocumented residence. Many of the SAW beneficiaries appear to have continued
working in seasonal agricultural services.
Another indicator of SAW beneficiaries’ residence in the U.S. rather than their
origin country will be their behavior in seeking to naturalize. Naturalization statis-
tics for fiscal year 1996 showed a continued upward trend, but application levels
for naturalization among eligible generally-legalized immigrants or SAW benefi-
ciaries are not known. Application rates among the generally-legalized population
have been tracked in only a very limited fashion (U.S. Department of Labor
(1996:107).
Immigrant Flow Effects from IRCA
The presence of IRCA beneficiaries’ family members in the United States must
be viewed carefully in building an accounting model for the legally resident foreign-
born population. The demographic consequences of the general legalization program
under IRCA will be considerable with as many as 2.5 million future immigrants
Figure 3. Legally Resident Foreign-born in 1989
by Mexican-born and Resident SAWs
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related to these legalization beneficiaries, including 1.6 million Mexican relatives
(Woodrow-Lafield 1994a). Approximately 136,000 spouses, 223,000 children,
30,000 parents, 130,000 siblings, and 102,000 other relatives are estimated as living
in the IRCA beneficiary households and having non-resident statuses (family
fairness, temporary visa, other, or missing). Within households of legalized Mexican
immigrants, there were 91,000 spouses, 159,000 children, 19,000 parents, 99,000
siblings, and 69,000 other relatives in nonpermanent statuses, totaling 436,000
(unpublished analyses by Woodrow-Lafield). In a demographic accounting analysis
of the resident population, resident dependents of IRCA beneficiaries will be
incorporated in the estimated legally resident foreign-born population in a lagged
fashion as they become legal immigrants with the allocated visas for 1992-1994,
with second preference (or first, third, or fourth preference) visas in some year, or
under provisions for immediate relatives (parents, spouses, or minor children) of
U.S. citizens.
IA90 specified that up to 55,000 visas might be granted for spouses and
children of legalization beneficiaries to avoid family disruption. This largesse
was apparently insufficient because (1) a lesser amount resulted—140,000; (2)
the second preference visa waiting list counts associated with legalization
beneficiaries were 739,774; 853,382; and 824,000 in fiscal years 1993, 1994 and
1995 (U.S. Department of State 1993, 1994, 1995 U.S. Commission on Immigration
Reform 1995). Many (one half million) of these spouses and children are probably
related to beneficiaries of the SAW or agricultural legalization (Woodrow-Lafield
1995b). The waiting list under second preference is so clogged that waiting times
for new applicants are growing progressively longer.
A more expedient way for these close family members to legally immigrate
to the United States will be the two-tier processes of the IRCA beneficiary’s
naturalization and sponsorship of their spouses and minor children under immediate
relatives provisions for which there are no limitations except for those who were
minor children at the time of visa petition filing who aged into adulthood and
were ineligible for visa issuance. Among Mexican respondents in the 1992 LPS,
nearly three-quarters indicated they would either “definitely” or “probably” apply
for naturalization upon becoming eligible (Woodrow-Lafield 1995c). This study
supported a cost-benefits strategy in naturalization decision-making in that having
a co-resident sibling without permanent status and having a parent or sibling
intending to immigrate are significantly associated with intending to apply for
naturalization. The numbers of spouses and children who could become legal
immigrants under immediate relatives’ provisions during 1996-1999 could exceed
one half million.
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Demographic Accounting for Unauthorized
or Legal Migration
Legally Resident Foreign-born Population in 1980
Warren and Passel (1983, 1987a, b) first formulated a baseline estimate for the
alien component using the Annual Alien Address Registration Program for January
1980 according to self-reported residence status. The 1980 alien data were adjusted
for estimated underregistration of 11.1 percent, resulting in an overall increase of
12.5 percent. For Mexico, Warren and Passel estimated that 7.3 percent of legally
resident aliens had failed to register (Passel 1991). An estimate of naturalized citizens
in the 1980 census was based on both census reporting as naturalized citizens and
a demographic estimate constructed by surviving naturalizing immigrants over time,
as identified with INS administrative naturalizations statistics. A major criticism
directed at this work on the undocumented population was that the authors assumed
that INS sources correctly recorded naturalizations over 1960-1980 (Hill 1985b),
but classification by citizenship was unnecessary for derivation of an undocumented
estimate, and subsequent demographic accounting was for the foreign-born category.
The Warren-Passel estimate for 1980 of 12,084,000 legally resident foreign-
born persons, including 7,816,000 aliens and 6,118,000 naturalized citizens was
meant to represent the complete population of legally resident foreign-born per-
sons as of January 1980. Included were 2,326,000 persons of Mexican birth, with
2,121,000 aliens and 205,000 naturalized citizens. An obvious weakness is an in-
consistency with 1980 census data for foreign-born persons entered before 1960 in
that the census counts were lower than Warren and Passel’s estimate for all coun-
tries or regions other than Mexico. Demographic research on legal status of the
foreign-born population has emphasized the “Entered After 1960” population, with
inclusion of Mexicans who entered pre-1960.
The nature of the data collection over a one-month period also raises concerns
because the population estimate would probably over-represent shorter durations
and lead to over-estimating the population entered for the most recent time period.
Hill (1985b) raised questions about over-reporting for Mexico, among other coun-
tries, possibly as a result of misreporting by temporary residents in the category for
permanent resident. Subsequently, Passel (1991) allowed for greater variability in
the legally resident alien component for the Mexican population (+10 percent)
than for the non-Mexican population (+3 percent), noting that undocumented mi-
grants might have erroneously registered.
The estimate of legally resident foreign-born persons as of 1980 by Warren
and Passel can be considered a “standard” in several senses, and it became a
foundation for using a components-of-change method to derive post-1980 estimates
for legally resident foreign-born populations in the United States. The major
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components of change are estimated mortality, assumed emigration, admissions of
lawful permanent residents and certain groups of arriving refugees, and other
transitions to lawful permanent residence by persons already living in the United
States (including adjustments and legalizations). This methodology was designed
for consistency with the Census Bureau’s methodologies for demographic analysis
and postcensal population estimates.
An accounting for components of change for the resident population was equiva-
lent to accounting for components of change in the legally resident population
before 1980 because an undocumented presence had not yet been measuraæble.
After the 1980 census apportionment counts exceeded the independent estimate,
the Census Bureau endeavored to improve estimates of the number of illegal aliens
and make public a sufficient number of undercount estimates to illustrate the un-
certainties in the methods (ASA Technical Panel, 1984). To this end, a systematic
research program at the Census Bureau monitored net legal immigration in the
1980s and indirectly monitored net undocumented migration by partitioning sur-
vey estimates for the foreign-born population into legal and undocumented com-
ponents (Passel and Woodrow 1987; Woodrow, Passel and Warren 1987; Woodrow
and Passel, 1990; Woodrow 1992c).
Table 8 summarizes the 1970-1990 time series of estimates of the foreign-
born population, legally resident foreign-born estimates, and estimates of unau-
thorized residents in surveys or censuses. Post-1986 estimates required accounting
for IRCA-legalized aliens’ transitions from undocumented resident to legal resi-
dent. Those legalizing on the basis of having lived here continuously in an undocu-
mented status since before 1982 are prima facie permanent residents. The figures
in Table 8 incorporate most of the general legalizations, but alternative estimates
based on allowing for agricultural legalizations are discussed below.
To the degree that there is undercoverage of either the legally resident or un-
documented residents, there will be underestimation of the unauthorized compo-
nent (Woodrow-Lafield 1995a). Because foreign-born undercoverage is not known,
a potpourri of rationales have been discussed for a range on the total number of
unauthorized residents over 1980-1990. Despite the passage of time, these ranges
are not really very different. The most consensual is the range for 1980 that relies
on several studies suggesting that the probable upper bound of the unauthorized
population was 3.5 to 4 million (Bean, King, and Passel 1983; Levine, Hill, and
Warren 1985; Passel and Robinson 1988; Heer and Passel 1987.
These studies were the foundation for the net unauthorized migration component
for evaluating the 1990 census (Woodrow 1991a) which is discussed more later. It
must be noted that an estimate for legally resident foreign-born population was
implicit rather than explicitly stated and that the net “unauthorized” migration
component possibly included agriculturally legalized residents. The last two studies
21
Ta
bl
e 
8
Es
tim
at
es
 fo
r F
or
ei
gn
-b
or
n,
 L
eg
al
ly
 R
es
id
en
t, 
an
d 
Un
au
th
or
iz
ed
 P
op
ul
at
io
ns
B
as
ed
 o
n 
De
m
og
ra
ph
ic
 A
cc
ou
nt
in
g:
 1
97
0-
19
90
Le
ga
lly
 re
sid
en
t
Es
tim
at
ed
Fo
re
ign
-b
or
n 
in 
ce
ns
us
 o
r s
ur
ve
y
fo
re
ign
-b
or
n 
in 
U.
S.
un
au
th
or
ize
d
Hy
po
th
et
ica
l
re
sid
en
ts
to
ta
l n
um
be
r
Da
te
 o
f
in 
su
rv
ey
or
 r
an
ge
Es
tim
at
e
Al
l P
er
iod
s
%
Po
st-
19
60
Al
l p
er
iod
s
Po
st-
19
60
or
 c
en
su
s
(in
 m
illio
ns
)
Re
lev
an
t S
ou
rc
es
19
70
 C
en
su
s
9,
73
9,
72
3
4.
0%
3,
31
6,
92
8
9,
73
9,
72
3
3,
31
6,
92
8
0
0.
8
Pa
ss
el 
& 
Ro
bin
so
n 
(19
88
)
No
v. 
19
79
13
,1
98
,0
00
5.
8%
8,
76
0,
00
0
11
,4
74
,0
00
7,
03
6,
00
0
1,
72
4,
00
0
no
ne
 g
ive
n
Pa
ss
el 
& 
W
oo
dr
ow
 (1
98
7)
W
oo
dr
ow
,
 
Pa
ss
el,
 &
 W
ar
re
n 
(19
87
)
19
80
 C
en
su
s
14
,1
39
,0
00
6.
2%
9,
23
0,
00
0
12
,0
82
,0
00
7,
17
3,
00
0
2,
05
7,
00
0
2.
5 
to
 3
.5
;
W
ar
re
n 
& 
Pa
ss
el 
(19
83
, 1
98
7)
Pa
ss
el 
(19
85
b)
Pa
ss
el 
& 
Ro
bin
so
n 
(19
88
)
2.
0 
to
 5
.0
;
Fa
y, 
Pa
ss
el,
 &
 R
ob
ins
on
 (1
98
8)
1.
5 
to
 3
.5
;
Hi
ll (
19
85
)
2.
0 
to
 4
.0
Le
vin
e,
 H
ill,
 &
 W
ar
re
n 
(19
85
)
Ap
ril 
19
83
 (1
4+
)
13
,6
33
,0
00
7.
4%
9,
94
9,
00
0
11
,5
40
,0
00
7,
85
5,
00
0
2,
09
3,
00
0
no
ne
 g
ive
n
Pa
ss
el 
& 
W
oo
dr
ow
 (1
98
7)
Ju
ne
 1
98
6
16
,2
37
,0
00
6.
8%
13
,0
69
,0
00
13
,0
79
,0
00
9,
91
1,
00
0
3,
15
8,
00
0
3.
0 
to
 5
.0
W
oo
dr
ow
,
 
Pa
ss
el,
 &
 W
ar
re
n 
(19
87
)
Pa
ss
el 
& 
W
oo
dr
ow
 (1
98
6)
Ju
ne
 1
98
8
17
,1
85
,0
00
7.
0%
14
,3
79
,0
00
15
,2
79
,0
00
12
,4
73
,0
00
1,
90
6,
00
0
no
ne
 g
ive
n
W
oo
dr
ow
 &
 P
as
se
l (1
99
0)
No
v. 
19
89
17
,7
85
,0
00
7.
3%
15
,1
54
,0
00
15
,7
35
,0
00
13
,1
04
,0
00
2,
05
0,
00
0
1.
7 
to
 3
.1
W
oo
dr
ow
 (1
99
0, 
19
91
b, 
19
92
b)
Pr
oje
cte
d
 
19
,0
90
,0
00
 
7.
5%
 
15
,7
54
,0
00
16
,6
90
,0
00
13
,3
54
,0
00
2,
40
0,
00
0
3.
3
W
oo
dr
ow
 (1
99
1b
)
Ap
ril 
19
90
1.
9 
to
 4
.5
19
90
 C
en
su
s
19
,7
68
,0
00
8.
0%
16
,6
28
,0
00
17
,6
90
,0
00
14
,3
54
,0
00
2,
27
4,
00
0
2.
3 
to
 5
.0
W
oo
dr
ow
-L
af
iel
d 
(19
95
)
19
90
 C
en
su
s
19
,7
24
,0
00
8.
0%
no
ne
 g
ive
n
17
,7
49
,0
00
no
ne
 g
ive
n
1,
97
5,
00
0
no
ne
 g
ive
n
Cl
ar
k e
t a
l. (
19
94
)
N
ot
e:
  M
os
t f
or
ei
gn
-b
or
n 
po
pu
la
tio
n 
fig
ur
es
 in
clu
de
 e
st
im
at
ed
 a
m
ou
nt
s 
fo
r m
isr
ep
or
tin
g 
as
 n
at
ive
 fo
re
ig
n-
bo
rn
 p
er
so
ns
.
So
ur
ce
:  
W
o
o
dr
ow
-L
af
ie
ld
, F
or
th
co
m
in
g
22
mentioned in table 8 (Woodrow-Lafield 1995a; Clark et al., 1994) make allowances
for nonspecific sources of legal immigration, including agriculturally legalized
residents, and we return to these results a closer examination of studies for the
1979-1989 period.
The legally resident Mexico-born population in the United States increased
from about 1.4 million in 1980 to 3.0 to 3.5 million for 1990 (Table 9), depending
on particular assumptions. The unauthorized population of Mexican birth appears
to have fluctuated and to have declined slightly for 1990 relative to 1980, but this
appearance may be artifactual due to the survey or census estimate. Prior to IRCA,
extrapolation of studies of average population change due to net unauthorized
migration from Mexico implied there were as many as 2.5 to 3.5 million unauthorized
Mexican residents, but the post-IRCA range was lower—1.0 to 2.2 million (Woodrow
-Lafild 1996e). These estimates for legally resident foreign-born populations are
only as accurate as they are unbiased from data gaps on emigration or return
migration and unknown long-term immigration associated with nonimmigrants or
agriculturally legalized persons. Exercising expert judgment is inescapable, but
guiding strategies are nonexistent. The number of unauthorized residents in 1990
was certainly below six million (Woodrow-Lafield, 1997).
Without Accounting for IRCA Legalizations
Prior studies showed post-1986 estimates for the legally resident foreign-born
population without any amnestied aliens pursuant to IRCA only for the purpose of
estimating net population change due to undocumented immigration. Without al-
lowing for legalization pursuant to the amnesty provisions of IRCA, the foreign-
born population legally resident would have grown from 7,036,000 to 11,440,000
over 1979-1989 (second tier, Table 9). This increase is only from post-1981 immi-
gration. Recently admitted legal Mexico-born immigrants accounted for slightly
more than one-tenth of net legal immigration for the post-1981 entry period.
With Accounting for Generally
Legalized Immigrants
The featured or preferred estimates for the legally resident foreign-born
population showed an increasing trend over 1979-1989. The rate of increase was
greater for the Mexico-born population legally resident as the number more than
doubled over that decade from 1,388,000 to 2,522,000. Without considering origin,
most of the increase is attributable to post-1981 immigration. With closer
examination, most of the increase for the Mexico-born population falls within
the pre-1981 entry reference period—almost wholly from the IRCA legalization
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Table 9
Estimates of Net Legal Immigration with Legalizations,
1979–1989, Total and Mexican-born
Total (in thousands) Mexico-born (in thousands)
Entered Entered Entered Entered
Before After Before After
Data and Source Total 1982 1981 Total 1982 1981
Preferred
1979, Passel and Woodrow (1987) 7,036 7,036 – 1,388 1,388 –
1980, Passel and Woodrow (1984) 7,173 7,173 – 1,400 1,400 –
1986, Woodrow, Passel and Warren (1987) 9,911 7,595 2,316 1,657 1,397 260
1988, Woodrow and Passel (1990) 12,473 9,114 3,359 2,985 2,597 389
1989, Woodrow (1991a, 1992c) 13,104 8,887 4,217 2,999 2,522 477
Without any IRCA legalizations
1979, Passel and Woodrow (1987) 7,036 7,036 – 1,388 1,388 –
1980, Passel and Woodrow (1984) 7,173 7,173 – 1,400 1,400 –
1986, Woodrow, Passel and Warren (1987) 9,911 7,595 2,316 1,657 1,397 260
1988, Woodrow and Passel (1990) 10,728 7,369 3,359 1,766 1,378 389
1989, Woodrow (1991a, 1992c) 11,440 7,223 4,217 1,837 1,360 477
With general legalizations and low
number of SAW beneficiaries as residents
1979, Passel and Woodrow (1987) 7,036 7,036 – 1,388 1,388 –
1980, Passel and Woodrow (1984) 7,173 7,173 – 1,400 1,400 –
1986, Woodrow, Passel and Warren (1987) 9,911 7,595 2,316 1,657 1,397 260
1988, Woodrow and Passel (1990) 12,473 9,114 3,359 2,985 2,597 389
1989, Woodrow (1991a, 1992c) 13,354 8,887 4,467 3,211 2,522 689
With  general legalizations and moderate
number of SAW beneficiaries as residents
1979, Passel and Woodrow (1987) 7,036 7,036 – 1,388 1,388 –
1980, Passel and Woodrow (1984) 7,173 7,173 – 1,400 1,400 –
1986, Woodrow, Passel and Warren (1987) 9,911 7,595 2,316 1,657 1,397 260
1988, Woodrow and Passel (1990) 12,473 9,114 3,359 2,985 2,597 389
1989, Woodrow (1991a, 1992c) 13,604 8,887 4,717 3,449 2,522 927
With general legalizations and high number
of SAW beneficiaries as residents
1979, Passel and Woodrow (1987) 7,036 7,036 – 1,388 1,388 –
1980, Passel and Woodrow (1984) 7,173 7,173 2,316 1,400 1,400 260
1986, Woodrow, Passel and Warrent (1987) 9,911 7,595 3,359 1,657 1,397 389
1988, Woodrow and Passel (1990) 12,473 9,114 4,217 2,985 2,597 477
1989, Woodrow (1991a, 1992c) 13,879 9,662 4,992 3,774 3,297 1,252
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of aliens proving continuous undocumented residence since before January 1,
1982. As a reminder, these estimates of the legally resident foreign-born population
were produced under the auspices of the Census Bureau’s 1980 and 1990 census
coverage evaluation programs and, accordingly, are intended to represent those
individuals meeting the Census Bureau’s criteria for living in the United States
on a usual basis.
With Incorporation of Agriculturally Legalized
Beneficiaries as Residents
Recalling earlier discussions about the SAW legalization program, the issue of
SAW applicants’ inclusion in the legally resident estimate, national surveys or the
census, and in survey-based undocumented estimates were not very important dur-
ing 1988-1990. For example, the review of the unauthorized immigration compo-
nent by Himes and Clogg (1992) mentioned only the generally legalized immi-
grants. Until the deadline of December 1, 1990, the INS might have refused many
of the applicants on the basis of having shown insufficient grounds. Making any
allowance for agricultural legalization beneficiaries’ residence affects primarily
the overall foreign-born and Mexico-born legally resident populations.
Shown in the lower four tiers of Table 9 are illustrative estimates based on
alternative assumptions about inclusion of SAW applicants as legally resident for
November 1989. The scenarios, similar to those presented in Woodrow and Passel
(1990) and Woodrow (1992c), are:
• Low assumption of SAW beneficiaries as residents, for which each SAW
beneficiary is assumed to have resided in the United States, on average,
for three months, implying that 250,000 would be included;
Table 9 (Continued)
Total (in thousands) Mexico-born (in thousands)
Entered Entered Entered Entered
Before After Before After
Data and Source Total 1982 1981 Total 1982 1981
With general legalizations and nearly all
SAW beneficiaries as residents
1979, Passel and Woodrow (1987) 7,036 7,036 – 1,388 1,388 –
1980, Passel and Woodrow (1984) 7,173 7,173 – 1,400 1,400 –
1986, Woodrow, Passel and Warren (1987) 9,911 7,595 2,316 1,657 1,397 260
1988, Woodrow and Passel (1990) 12,473 9,114 3,359 2,985 2,597 389
1989, Woodrow (1991a, 1992c) 14,104 8,887 5,217 3,799 2,522 1,277
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• Moderate assumption of SAW beneficiaries as residents, for which each
SAW beneficiary is assumed to have resided in the United States, on
average, for six months, implying that 500,000 would be included;
• High assumption of SAW beneficiaries as residents, for which 550,000
SAW beneficiaries (including 100,000 Group I and 450,000 Group II)
are assumed as continuously resident in the United States and for which
450,000 SAW beneficiaries are assumed to have resided in the United
States, on average, for six months, implying that a total of 775,000 would
be included;
• “All” assumption of SAW beneficiaries as residents, for which nearly
all SAW beneficiaries are assumed to have resided in the United States
permanently, for inclusion of 1,000,000.
The effect of incorporating SAW beneficiaries as residents increases the post-
1981 portion of net legal immigration with especially marked increase for the
Mexico-born population. In light of the heavily male composition of the SAW
applicant pool, the 1988 and 1989 studies also considered composition by sex.
Given implications of these legally resident estimates for derivation of undocu-
mented estimates, it appeared in the late 1980s as if the demographic and origin
characteristics of the SAW applicant pool constrained the feasible assumptions to
the “low” and “moderate” ones. Allowing for inclusion of more than 500,000 SAW
applicants (perhaps 425,000 from Mexico) in the legally resident estimate led to
unbalanced sex ratios and implausible undocumented estimates based on the 1988
and 1989 CPS (Woodrow and Passel 1990; Woodrow 1991a, 1992c). Some or many
SAWs may certainly have been living in the United States prior to final INS pro-
cessing and simply have been omitted from the CPS estimates of the foreign-born
population. The likelihood of high census and CPS undercoverage for SAW ben-
eficiary residents is obvious, particularly if they resemble agricultural migrant
workers (Kissam 1993; La Cooperativa Campesina de California 1991). Gabbard,
Kissam, and Martin (1993) discussed the travel patterns of migrant workers as
explanations for their finding of extremely high census undercoverage for this spe-
cial population.
Demographic analysis of 1990 census coverage required an estimate of the
total resident population, including the undocumented population residing in the
United States on April 1, 1990 by May 1991, prior to the Secretary of Commerce’s
decision on whether to adjust the 1990 census apportionment counts for
undercoverage. However, demographers could not replicate previous analyses, that
is, compare the legally resident foreign-born population estimate as of Census Day
1990 with the 1990 census count of the foreign-born population which was unknown
until early February of 1992 (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1993a. b). For the
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demographic analysis program over 1990-1991, the major emphasis was on
measuring overall undercoverage of all residents by age, sex, and race with lessor
emphasis on legally resident undocumented populations differentiation. In Robinson
et al’s (1993) analysis of 1990 census coverage, the implicit estimate for legal
foreign-born residents as of Census Day 1990 would be 16.7 million as a minimum
after incrementing the November 1989 estimate of Woodrow (1991a, 1992c) with
250,000 additional legal immigrants over December 1989-March 1990 as described
in Woodrow (1992b) and Woodrow-Lafield (1995a). That figure would have included
at least 3 million Mexico-born legal residents. For the “entered since 1960”
population, the overall figure would be 13.4 million.
A prime source of uncertainty about the legally resident foreign-born population
for 1990 is the size of the resident population having benefited from the agricultural
legalization provisions of IRCA. With assumptions about resident SAW beneficiaries,
the overall estimate could increase to 17.6 million and the Mexico estimate would
increase markedly to 3.8 million. The component for legal immigration over the
1980s was bounded by 5.9 and 8.3 million for modeling uncertainty in the total
resident estimate (Robinson et al., 1991, 1993). The two published estimates for
legally resident foreign-born persons 1990 shown in Table 8 and for the Mexico-
born portion shown in Table 9 are similar in their methodological divergence from
pre-1990 census studies. Citing nonspecific sources of legal immigration, including
SAW beneficiaries, nonimmigrants becoming permanent residents in the 1990s,
special EVD and TPF statuses, and dependents of IRCA-legalized beneficiaries,
Woodrow-Lafield (1995a) used estimates of 14.354 million and 17.690 million for
the legally resident foreign-born population entered since 1960 and entered in all
time periods. Clark et al. (1994) similarly allowed explicit amounts for SAW
beneficiaries’ presence, foreign students, and other nonimmigrants for estimates of
17.749 million, including 3.469 million Mexicans.
Most of the lawful permanent resident admissions in Fiscal Years 1990 and
1991 were legalization adjustments. In 1990, most of these legalization adjustments
were to generally legalized immigrants, and 1991 was the peak year for agricultural
legalization adjustments, primarily of the SAW-default approved beneficiaries.
Net Legal Immigration Alternative Series,
Varying Emigrants, SAW Beneficiaries as
Residents, or Other Nonspecific
Alternative series of estimates for net legal immigration as of 1990 and for
1995 are presented in Table 10 that consider uncertainties as to emigration of legal
immigrants, incorporation of SAW beneficiaries as U.S. resident, and nonspecific
sources of net legal immigration. The range for the low (95,000), moderate (133,000),
27
Ta
bl
e 
10
N
et
 L
eg
al
 Im
m
ig
ra
tio
n,
 1
99
0 
an
d 
19
95
, A
lte
rn
at
iv
e 
Se
rie
s,
 V
a
ry
in
g 
A
ss
um
pt
io
ns
 o
n 
Sp
ec
ifi
ci
ty
,
R
es
id
en
ce
 o
f A
gr
ic
ul
tu
ra
l L
eg
al
iz
at
io
n 
Be
ne
fic
ia
rie
s,
 a
nd
 E
m
ig
ra
tio
n
To
ta
l
M
ex
ic
o-
bo
rn
To
ta
l
M
ex
ic
o-
bo
rn
En
te
re
d
En
te
re
d
En
te
re
d
En
te
re
d
D
es
cr
ip
tio
n 
an
d 
As
su
m
pt
io
ns
19
60
-1
99
0
Be
fo
re
 1
99
0
19
60
-1
99
5
Be
fo
re
 1
99
5
W
ith
 lo
w
-z
er
o 
al
lo
w
an
ce
 fo
r n
on
sp
ec
ifi
c,
W
ith
ou
t a
ny
 a
llo
wa
nc
e 
fo
r S
AW
 b
en
ef
ic
ia
rie
s 
as
 re
si
de
nt
s,
1.
 W
ith
 lo
w
 a
ss
um
pt
io
n 
fo
r e
m
ig
ra
tio
n 
(95
,00
0)
14
,0
04
3,
30
7
16
,8
25
3,
92
8
2.
 W
ith
 m
od
er
at
e 
as
su
m
pt
io
n 
fo
r e
m
ig
ra
tio
n 
(13
3,0
00
)
13
,6
41
3,
26
4
16
,2
81
3,
86
4
3.
 W
ith
 e
xt
re
m
e 
as
su
m
pt
io
n 
fo
r e
m
ig
ra
tio
n 
(19
5,0
00
)
13
,0
92
3,
19
9
15
,4
57
3,
76
6
W
ith
 lo
w
-z
er
o 
al
lo
w
an
ce
 fo
r n
on
sp
ec
ifi
c,
W
ith
 lo
w
 a
llo
w
an
ce
 fo
r S
AW
 b
en
ef
ic
ia
rie
s 
as
 re
si
de
nt
s
(30
0,0
00
, 2
50
,00
0 M
ex
ica
n),
4.
 W
ith
 lo
w
 a
ss
um
pt
io
n 
fo
r e
m
ig
ra
tio
n 
(95
,00
0)
14
,3
04
3,
55
7
17
,1
25
4,
17
8
5.
 W
ith
 m
od
er
at
e 
as
su
m
pt
io
n 
fo
r e
m
ig
ra
tio
n 
(13
3,0
00
)
13
,9
41
3,
51
4
16
,5
81
4,
11
4
6.
 W
ith
 e
xt
re
m
e 
as
su
m
pt
io
n 
fo
r e
m
ig
ra
tio
n 
(19
5,0
00
)
13
,3
92
3,
44
9
15
,7
57
4,
01
6
W
ith
 lo
w
-z
er
o 
al
lo
w
an
ce
 fo
r n
on
sp
ec
ifi
c,
W
ith
 m
od
er
at
e 
al
lo
wa
nc
e 
fo
r S
AW
 b
en
ef
ic
ia
rie
s 
as
 re
si
de
nt
s
(55
0,0
00
, 4
50
,00
0 M
ex
ica
n),
7.
 W
ith
 lo
w
 a
ss
um
pt
io
n 
fo
r e
m
ig
ra
tio
n 
(95
,00
0)
14
,5
54
3,
75
7
17
,3
75
4,
37
8
8.
 W
ith
 m
od
er
at
e 
as
su
m
pt
io
n 
fo
r e
m
ig
ra
tio
n 
(13
3,0
00
)
14
,1
91
3,
71
4
16
,8
31
4,
31
4
9.
 W
ith
 e
xt
re
m
e 
as
su
m
pt
io
n 
fo
r e
m
ig
ra
tio
n 
(19
5,0
00
)
13
,6
42
3,
64
9
16
,0
07
4,
21
6
28
W
ith
 lo
w
-z
er
o 
al
lo
w
an
ce
 fo
r n
on
sp
ec
ifi
c,
W
ith
 e
xt
re
m
e 
al
lo
w
an
ce
 fo
r S
AW
 b
en
ef
ic
ia
rie
s 
as
 re
si
de
nt
s
(85
0,0
00
, 7
00
,00
0 M
ex
ica
n),
10
. W
ith
 lo
w
 a
ss
um
pt
io
n 
fo
r e
m
ig
ra
tio
n 
(95
,00
0)
14
,8
54
4,
00
7
17
,6
75
4,
62
8
11
. W
ith
 m
od
er
at
e 
as
su
m
pt
io
n 
fo
r e
m
ig
ra
tio
n 
(13
3,0
00
)
14
,4
91
3,
96
4
17
,1
31
4,
56
4
12
. W
ith
 e
xt
re
m
e 
as
su
m
pt
io
n 
fo
r e
m
ig
ra
tio
n 
(19
5,0
00
)
13
,9
42
3,
89
9
16
,3
07
4,
46
6
W
ith
 m
od
er
at
e 
al
lo
wa
nc
e 
fo
r n
on
sp
ec
ifi
c 
(70
0,0
00
, 2
50
,00
0 M
ex
ica
n),
W
ith
 lo
w
 a
ss
um
pt
io
n 
of
 S
AW
 b
en
ef
ic
ia
rie
s 
as
 re
si
de
nt
s
(30
0,0
00
, 2
50
0,0
00
 M
ex
ica
n),
13
. W
ith
 lo
w
 a
ss
um
pt
io
n 
fo
r e
m
ig
ra
tio
n 
(95
,00
0)
15
,0
04
3,
80
7
17
,8
25
4,
42
8
14
. W
ith
 m
od
er
at
e 
as
su
m
pt
io
n 
fo
r e
m
ig
ra
tio
n 
(13
3,0
00
)
14
,6
41
3,
76
4
17
,2
81
4,
36
4
15
. W
ith
 e
xt
re
m
e 
as
su
m
pt
io
n 
fo
r e
m
ig
ra
tio
n 
(19
5,0
00
)
14
,0
92
3,
69
9
16
,4
57
4,
26
6
W
ith
 m
od
er
at
e 
al
lo
wa
nc
e 
fo
r n
on
sp
ec
ifi
c 
(70
0,0
00
, 2
50
,00
0 M
ex
ica
n),
W
ith
 m
od
er
at
e 
al
lo
wa
nc
e 
fo
r S
AW
 b
en
ef
ic
ia
rie
s 
as
 re
si
de
nt
s
(55
0,0
00
, 4
50
,00
0 M
ex
ica
n),
16
. W
ith
 lo
w
 a
ss
um
pt
io
n 
fo
r e
m
ig
ra
tio
n 
(95
,00
0)
15
,2
54
4,
00
7
18
,0
75
4,
62
8
17
. W
ith
 m
od
er
at
e 
as
su
m
pt
io
n 
fo
r e
m
ig
ra
tio
n 
(13
3,0
00
)
14
,8
91
3,
96
4
17
,5
31
4,
56
4
18
. W
ith
 e
xt
re
m
e 
as
su
m
pt
io
n 
fo
r e
m
ig
ra
tio
n 
(19
5,0
00
)
14
,3
42
3,
89
9
16
,7
07
4,
46
6
W
ith
 m
od
er
at
e 
al
lo
wa
nc
e 
fo
r n
on
sp
ec
ifi
c 
(70
0,0
00
, 2
50
,00
0 M
ex
ica
n),
W
ith
 e
xt
re
m
e 
al
lo
w
an
ce
 fo
r S
AW
 b
en
ef
ic
ia
rie
s 
as
 re
si
de
nt
s
(85
0,0
00
, 7
00
,00
0 M
ex
ica
n),
19
. W
ith
 lo
w
 a
ss
um
pt
io
n 
fo
r e
m
ig
ra
tio
n 
(95
,00
0)
15
,5
54
4,
25
7
18
,3
75
4,
87
8
20
. W
ith
 m
od
er
at
e 
as
su
m
pt
io
n 
fo
r e
m
ig
ra
tio
n 
(13
3,0
00
)
15
,1
91
4,
21
4
17
,8
31
4,
81
4
21
. W
ith
 e
xt
re
m
e 
as
su
m
pt
io
n 
fo
r e
m
ig
ra
tio
n 
(19
5,0
00
)
14
,6
42
4,
14
9
17
,0
07
4,
71
6
Ta
bl
e 
10
 (C
on
tin
ue
d)
To
ta
l
M
ex
ic
o-
bo
rn
To
ta
l
M
ex
ic
o-
bo
rn
En
te
re
d
En
te
re
d
En
te
re
d
En
te
re
d
D
es
cr
ip
tio
n 
an
d 
As
su
m
pt
io
ns
19
60
-1
99
0
Be
fo
re
 1
99
0
19
60
-1
99
5
Be
fo
re
 1
99
5
29
W
ith
 e
xt
re
m
e 
al
lo
w
an
ce
 fo
r n
on
sp
ec
ifi
c 
(1,
00
0,0
00
, 8
00
,00
0 M
ex
ica
n),
W
ith
 lo
w
 a
ss
um
pt
io
n 
of
 S
AW
 b
en
ef
ic
ia
rie
s 
as
 re
si
de
nt
s 
(30
0,0
00
, 2
50
,00
0 M
ex
ica
n)
22
. W
ith
 lo
w
 a
ss
um
pt
io
n 
fo
r e
m
ig
ra
tio
n 
(95
,00
0)
15
,3
04
4,
35
7
18
,1
25
4,
97
8
23
. W
ith
 m
od
er
at
e 
as
su
m
pt
io
n 
fo
r e
m
ig
ra
tio
n 
(13
3,0
00
)
14
,9
41
4,
31
4
17
,5
81
4,
91
4
24
. W
ith
 e
xt
re
m
e 
as
su
m
pt
io
n 
fo
r e
m
ig
ra
tio
n 
(19
5,0
00
)
14
,3
92
4,
24
9
16
,7
57
4,
81
6
W
ith
 e
xt
re
m
e 
al
lo
w
an
ce
 fo
r n
on
sp
ec
ifi
c 
(1,
00
0,0
00
, 8
00
,00
0 M
ex
ica
n),
W
ith
 m
od
er
at
e 
al
lo
wa
nc
e 
fo
r S
AW
 b
en
ef
ic
ia
rie
s 
as
 re
si
de
nt
s
(55
0,0
00
, 4
50
,00
0 M
ex
ica
n),
25
. W
ith
 lo
w
 a
ss
um
pt
io
n 
fo
r e
m
ig
ra
tio
n 
(95
,00
0)
15
,5
54
4,
55
7
18
,3
75
5,
17
8
26
. W
ith
 m
od
er
at
e 
as
su
m
pt
io
n 
fo
r e
m
ig
ra
tio
n 
(13
3,0
00
)
15
,1
91
4,
51
4
17
,8
31
5,
11
4
27
. W
ith
 e
xt
re
m
e 
as
su
m
pt
io
n 
fo
r e
m
ig
ra
tio
n 
(19
5,0
00
)
14
,6
42
4,
44
9
17
,0
07
5,
01
6
W
ith
 e
xt
re
m
e 
al
lo
w
an
ce
 fo
r n
on
sp
ec
ifi
c 
(1,
00
0,0
00
, 8
00
,00
0 M
ex
ica
n),
W
ith
 e
xt
re
m
e 
al
lo
w
an
ce
 fo
r S
AW
 b
en
ef
ic
ia
rie
s 
as
 re
si
de
nt
s
(85
0,0
00
, 7
00
,00
0 M
ex
ica
n),
28
. W
ith
 lo
w
 a
ss
um
pt
io
n 
fo
r e
m
ig
ra
tio
n 
(95
,00
0)
15
,8
54
4,
80
7
18
,6
75
5,
42
8
29
. W
ith
 m
od
er
at
e 
as
su
m
pt
io
n 
fo
r e
m
ig
ra
tio
n 
(13
3,0
00
)
15
,4
91
4,
76
4
18
,1
31
5,
36
4
3.
0.
 W
ith
 e
xt
re
m
e 
as
su
m
pt
io
n 
fo
r e
m
ig
ra
tio
n 
(19
5,0
00
)
14
,9
42
4,
69
9
17
,3
07
5,
26
6
So
ur
ce
s:
 W
o
o
dr
ow
 (1
99
1a
, 1
99
2c
); W
o
o
dr
ow
-L
af
ie
ld
 (1
99
5, 
19
96
).
N
ot
e:
 S
ee
 te
xt
 fo
r e
xp
la
na
tio
n 
of
 v
ar
io
us
 a
ss
um
pt
io
ns
 a
nd
 o
th
er
 d
et
ai
ls 
of
 th
es
e 
ca
lcu
la
tio
ns
.
Ta
bl
e 
10
 (C
on
tin
ue
d)
To
ta
l
M
ex
ic
o-
bo
rn
To
ta
l
M
ex
ic
o-
bo
rn
En
te
re
d
En
te
re
d
En
te
re
d
En
te
re
d
D
es
cr
ip
tio
n 
an
d 
As
su
m
pt
io
ns
19
60
-1
99
0
Be
fo
re
 1
99
0
19
60
-1
99
5
Be
fo
re
 1
99
5
30
and extreme (195,000) assumptions about annual levels of emigration is narrow,
although those differences would accumulate over the number of years. For the
Mexico-born, these assumed amounts of emigration are slight—9,000, 13,000, or
20,000 in accordance with Warren and Passel (1987b). The range for incorporation
of SAW beneficiaries as residents is 300,000 (250,000 for Mexico), 550,000 (400,000
for Mexico), or 850,000 (700,000 for Mexico). The range for nonspecific sources
of legal immigration is zero for the low, 700,000 (250,000 for Mexico), or 1,000,000
(800,000 for Mexico). This latter set of assumptions is intended to encompass those
individuals whose status might be considered as neither legal nor undocumented at
the present time who would become legally resident especially as possible through
naturalization of a relative who is an IRCA legalization beneficiary.
The columns for net legal immigration for entry 1960-1990 are based on car-
rying forward the estimated legally resident foreign-born population of Woodrow
(1991a, 1992c) from December 1, 1989 to April 1, 1990 primarily with additional
legal admissions and additional general legalizations for most tiers. The columns
for net legal immigration for 1960-1995 are constructed by surviving the 1989
base estimate until 1995, adding surviving numbers of admissions of lawful per-
manent residents 1990-1995 (net of legalization adjustments), subtracting estimated
emigrants, and adding generally legalized, agriculturally legalized, and nonspe-
cific components as indicated.
The first tier of estimates (1) through (3) for the legally resident foreign-born
population or net legal immigration as of 1990 or 1995 are most consistent with the
Census Bureau’s procedures for counting individuals as contributing to the resident
population as immigrants or settlers. This set is the lowest representation of net legal
immigration. The second tier of estimates (4) through (6) is slightly higher to reflect
a low allowance for agriculturally legalized residents. With set (5), the estimate is
about the same as that of Clark et al. (1994). Among all the estimates, including the
other tiers, sets (7) through (30), the amount of net legal immigration as of 1990
ranged between 13,092,000 (3) and 15,854,000 (28). The amount of net legal immi-
gration from Mexico as of 1990 ranged between 3,199,000 (3) and 4,807,000 (28).
Figure 4 depicts net legal immigration for 1979-1995 with sets (2) and (17) for all
countries and for Mexico. Depending upon which alternative series might be the most
accurate, the divergence from prior estimation strategies would be greater or lesser.
Net legal immigration from all countries over 1960-1995 shows an increase of
more than 2 million. The low estimate appears in set (3)—15,457,000—and the
high estimate in set (28) is 18,675,000. Net legal immigration of Mexicans as of
1995 ranged from 3,766,000 (3) to 5,428,000 (28). The extreme allowance for
nonspecific sources of legal immigration may be beyond the range of reality, so
that these upper limits might be shifted downward to set (19)- 18,375,000 for all
countries and 4,878,000 for Mexico.
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To summarize, the upward trend in legal immigration to the United States and,
for Mexico, the focused impact of IRCA’s amnesty programs, account for a gradu-
ally increasing presence of legally resident immigrants since 1980. The precise
magnitude is difficult to pinpoint because the extent of U.S. residence among agri-
culturally legalized individuals, the volume of transitions from undocumented sta-
tus into lawful permanent residence among family members of legalized immi-
grants, and timely accounting of nonimmigrants in the United States are not known.
Ways of improving estimation for legally resident foreign-born populations are
straightforward in concept, but few of the statistical improvements recommended
in Levine, Hill, and Warren (1985) or others recommended have been accomplished.
The quantity of legal migration is more conservatively estimated with traditional
definitions of permanent migration than with less restricted, but probably truer,
inferences from multiple data sources.
Estimates of Undocumented Migration
The purpose of this section is to provide an overview of the best analytical
approaches and estimates of the stock and flow of the unauthorized Mexican mi-
grant population from the late 1970s to the present. In describing the prevailing
methods used for estimating the unauthorized migrant population, including the
unauthorized Mexican migrant population, during the late 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s,
we illustrate how the methodology and data used for making estimates of the stock
and flow of the unauthorized migrant population in the United States in general
and the unauthorized Mexican migrant population in particular have changed over
the past two decades. We highlight how these changes have led to improvements
and, in some cases, to increased inaccuracy associated with estimates of particular
components of the unauthorized population. We do not review every individual
Figure 4. Net Legal Immigration, 1979-1995, Alternative Series
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estimate of the unauthorized Mexican migrant population because many studies
have already been summarized and evaluated competently in other reviews (Keely,
1977; Briggs, 1984; Corona, 1982; Siegel, et al., 1980; Tuirán, 1984, 1994; Hill,
1985b; Bean, King, and Passel, 1986; Bean, Telles, and Lowell, 1987; Edmonston,
Passel, and Bean, 1990; Passel, Bean, and Edmonston, 1990; Durand and Massey,
1992; GAO, 1993; Clark, et al., 1994). Rather, we summarize and assess the con-
clusions of these reviews and describe individual studies where appropriate.
Concepts and Definitions
An unauthorized migrant is a person who resides in the United States but is
not a U.S. citizen or permanent resident alien or authorized visitor. Various terms
have been used to describe such persons, including undocumented immigrant,
undocumented alien, undocumented migrant, unauthorized immigrant, and
unauthorized migrant, each of which has a slightly different meaning and
connotation. As noted above, we use the term “unauthorized migrant” because it
best applies to the population whose size and growth we here attempt to estimate.
Not all unauthorized migrants are undocumented; some arrive in the U.S. with
legal documents but later either stay beyond the expiration date of their visa or
otherwise fail to comply with the terms of their entry (such as persons who legally
cross the border with border crossing cards but do so to work, which violates the
terms of the card). Also, not all unauthorized migrants are immigrants; many are
temporary migrants who intend to and do in fact return to their countries of origin
within reasonably short periods of time.
The types of data available and the methodology used to obtain estimates of
the unauthorized migrant population sometimes depend on the route through which
unauthorized status was attained. There are several ways to become an unauthorized
migrant. These include entering without inspection, using fraudulent documentation,
or violating the terms of border crossing cards. All violators of these types end up
in a category the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) calls entrants without
inspection (EWIs). Another way involves entering legally as a nonimmigrant but
subsequently violating the terms of the entrance visa or other terms of entry (usually
through failing to leave the U.S. by the time the visa expires). These are often
called “visa overstayers.” Still another way involves entering as a legal resident
alien but subsequently violating the terms of entry (e.g., through committing a
criminal act or using a fraudulent marriage as a basis for entry). Most studies that
attempt to estimate unauthorized migrants separately by type of entry focus on the
two largest of these groups, EWIs and visa overstayers.
The data and methodology used to estimate the unauthorized Mexican migrant
population also depend on whether the estimate refers to the stock of the population
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or the flow of the migratory stream. Stock refers to the size of the population at a
particular point in time. Flow refers to the number of entrances into (in-flow) and
exits from (out-flow) the population during a given time period. Most estimates of
the volume of the migratory flow have focused on in-flow. In-flow in turn may be
subdivided into gross in-flow and net in-flow. Gross in-flow is the total number of
entrances made during a given time period whereas net in-flow is the number of
persons entering during a given time period. Because an individual may enter the
country as an unauthorized migrant more than once in a single time period, net in-
flow is almost by definition smaller than gross in-flow. In contrast to in-flow,
relatively little attention has been paid to the size and components of the out-flow
of unauthorized migrants. Persons may exit unauthorized status through death,
emigration, deportation, or legalization. Out-flow is a critical component because
the majority of entrances are offset by exits, as indicated by estimates of net flow.
Observers who fail to account for out-flow risk highly exaggerated estimates of
the rate of growth of the unauthorized migrant population. More attention has been
paid to estimating net flow (in-flow minus out-flow). Net flow has typically been
estimated as the change in stock as it is estimated at two or more points in time
(Passel and Woodrow, 1987; Woodrow, Passel, and Warren, 1987).
Another conceptualization which is related to the idea of stocks and flows but
is analytically distinct is the notion of temporary or permanent migrants, or sojourners
and settlers, to use the more sociological distinction (Bean, Vernez, and Keely,
1989; Chavez, 1988). Here the reference is to the duration of stay in the destination
country, but especially to the migrant’s intended duration of stay (Roberts, 1995).
Such intentions have consequences because the kinds of immigration and settlement
policies that might be invoked in the cases of temporary and permanent migrants
are not necessarily the same (e.g., see Passel, 1986). Further complicating the
situation is that many temporary migrants undergo a transition to permanent migrant
status over time. Although it is important to keep in mind that temporary and
permanent migrants have a different sociological and policy significance, at another
level it is useful to think of these two kinds of migrants as differing only in their
durations of stay. At a given point in time, estimates of the stock of Mexican migrants
will include both permanent and temporary migrants, the latter of whom are
disproportionately likely to return to Mexico within short periods of time. One of
the challenges facing the estimation of stocks and flows of migrants, as we note
below, is to develop more complete information on the duration of stay distribution
of migrants, especially by sex, age at migration, and mode of entry. If such
information were available, it would be relatively straightforward to develop
estimates of stocks and flows of migrants. Of course, the sociological differences
(and their attendant policy implications) between migrants who intend short or
long durations of stay would nonetheless remain significant.
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Based on the distinctions of mode-of-entry (EWI vs. overstayer) and intended
duration of stay, we may construct a four-fold classification of unauthorized en-
trants (see Figure 5). The groups represented by the boxes (bottom row) in this
classification are important because they have implications for policy. Much of the
historical and current debate in the United States about illegal migration derives
from differences in perceptions about which of the kinds of flows described by
these categories dominates the overall flow of migrants, thus affecting growth in
the stock of unauthorized migrants. During the 1970s, for example, many observ-
ers confused the concepts of stock and flow, mistaking evidence indicating large
numbers of entrances for a sizable stock of migrants. In effect, the error was to
assume that permanent EWIs substantially predominated over temporary EWIs,
when at that point in time the evidence indicated just the opposite was true. Now
immigration analysts debate the relative importance of the EWI versus the overstayer
flow, a debate that is not likely to be resolved until we can ascertain the relative
size of the temporary versus permanent (or short-term versus long-term) compo-
nent of each flow. Thus, if almost all of the visa overstayers were found to return to
their countries of origin within two or three years of having violated the terms of
their visas, estimates of the stock of overstayers would consist primarily of tempo-
rary migrants, however numerous such persons might be at a given moment in
time. This scenario would have different policy implications than one in which
visa overstayers were generating large numbers of permanent migrants.
Approaches to the Estimation of Stock
Early efforts (during the 1970s and early 1980s) to determine the size of the
total unauthorized migrant population produced results that were highly specula-
tive, ranged widely, and were usually much higher than analytic estimates (Keely,
1977; Siegel, et al., 1980, Tuirán, 1984). Despite methodological difficulties and
Figure 5. Analytic Typology of Kinds of Unauthorized Entrants
Based on Mode of Entry and Intended Duration of Stay
Unauthorized Entrants
EWIs Visa Overstayers
Permanent Temporary Permanent Temporary
EWIs EWIs Visa Overstayers Visa Overstayers
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persistently large ranges, more empirically-based and analytic studies produced
estimates of stock that failed to support the speculative assertions that there were
more than 6 million unauthorized migrants in the country. Some early estimates of
the Mexican unauthorized population also relied on Mexican census or survey data
as we note below.
Estimates of the size and growth of the unauthorized migrant population in the
late 1980s and 1990s attempted to address some of the shortcomings of previous
work. During the 1980s, the majority of these new studies employed a residual
method of one form or another. Residual methods provide an estimate and description
of the “enumerated” unauthorized migrant population, that is, the part of the
unauthorized population that is enumerated in the Census or represented in a sample
such as the Current Population Survey (CPS) (the unenumerated portion of the
population must be estimated by other means, as we discuss below). As noted in
the previous section, the enumerated unauthorized population is estimated as the
difference between the total foreign-born population enumerated in the Census or
the CPS and the legally resident population (total enumerated foreign born - legally
resident immigrants = enumerated illegally resident migrants). This computation
may be done separately by national origin, period of entry, age, sex, and, depending
on the level of detail available in estimates of the legal population, by state and
metropolitan area. Hence, a substantial amount of information about the enumerated
unauthorized migrant population may be produced by residual methods. Studies
that use a residual method are listed in Table 11. Most of these studies were conducted
by the Bureau of the Census. Except in the case of Heer (1979) and Warren (1982),
residual methods were generally not employed with data collected prior to the
1980s because the 1980 Census was the first decennial census in which a sizable
enumerated unauthorized migrant population could be detected through demographic
analysis (Fay, Passel, and Robinson, 1988).
Residual estimates of the enumerated unauthorized population are sensitive to
estimates of their two components, the total enumerated foreign born and the le-
gally resident foreign-born population ( as discussed above). In the series of re-
sidual estimates made by Census Bureau researchers, the foreign-born population
enumerated in the Census or the CPS is routinely adjusted for errors associated
with respondents not reporting country of birth, misreporting citizenship status,
and misreporting nativity. The task of approximating the number of legally resi-
dent migrants presents greater difficulties. Because respondents are not asked about
legal status in the Census or the CPS, estimates of the legal immigrant population
must be obtained from external sources. Due to changes in the external data sources
available and changes in the legal population brought about by the IRCA amnesty
program, different methods have been developed to estimate the size and compo-
sition of the legal immigrant population, as noted above.
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After 1981, the Alien Registration Program was discontinued. As a result,
estimates of the legal alien population had to be constructed by projecting forward
the 1980 adjusted Alien Registration population to the appropriate year. For each
year of projection, numbers of new legal immigrants, refugees and other long-
term legal nonimmigrants were added and numbers of emigrants and deaths due
to the legally resident foreign born were subtracted. The Census Bureau used this
method to estimate the unauthorized population enumerated in the CPS during
the 1980s up until the enactment of the IRCA legalization programs in 1988. These
studies include analyses of the April 1983 (Passel and Woodrow, 1987) and the
June 1986 CPSs (Woodrow, Passel, and Warren, 1987), which were the only CPS
data collected before 1988 that included information about nativity. These studies
conclude that by June 1986, about 3.158 million unauthorized migrants, 2.196
million of whom were born in Mexico, were detected by the CPS. More importantly,
by this time the Census Bureau had compiled consistent estimates of the
unauthorized population enumerated in the CPS from 1979 to 1986. Assuming
that the rate of undercoverage was consistent across the CPS samples, reliable
estimates of net growth of the unauthorized population could be made. The studies
indicate that the unauthorized migrant population grew during the early 1980s by
about 218,000 per year, and the Mexican-origin unauthorized population by about
115,000 per year. Due to uncertainties associated with assumptions about
emigration and disproportionate undercoverage, however, the authors conceded
that the annual net growth of the unauthorized population could have been in the
range of 100,000 to 300,000, with about half of the growth due to growth in the
Mexican-origin unauthorized population.
Most of the error associated with estimates that use this method is due to un-
certainties associated with emigration rather than immigration or mortality. The
INS keeps accurate records of the number and types of legal immigrants. Also, the
component due to mortality is small in comparison to the other two components of
change, so the proportion of total error due to error in the number of deaths is small
(Himes and Clogg, 1992). However, the INS has not collected data about emi-
grants since 1957. During the 1980s, the Census Bureau routinely used a mid-
range estimate of 133,000 foreign-born emigrants per year. This approximation
was based on the results of research pertaining to the 1960s (Warren and Peck,
1980) and the 1970s (Warren and Passel, 1987). During the 1980s, attempts were
made to update estimates of the emigration component by analyzing special items
included in the CPS during the late 1980s that asked respondents about relatives
who emigrated (Woodrow-Lafield, 1996). Although the results of this work do not
contradict the estimate of 133,000, it also indicates that other estimates of the an-
nual number of emigrants ranging from about 110,000 to 200,000 would be plau-
sible. To the extent that the actual annual number of emigrants during the 1980s
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were consistently higher than 133,000, the legal migrant population would have
been overstated and the enumerated unauthorized migrant population would have
been set too low. The opposite would be the case if the actual annual number of
emigrants had consistently been lower than 133,000. Because annual estimates of
emigration are subtracted from the legal alien population for each year the popula-
tion is carried forward, the error associated with emigration increases with each
additional year. In other words, the longer the time data sources on the legal mi-
grant population or emigration are not available, the greater the uncertainty associ-
ated with residual estimates.
Another source of error in estimates produced by the method relates to as-
sumptions about undercoverage of the legal immigrant population. The method
assumes that all the legal noncitizens are enumerated. In addition, the method as-
sumes that all immigrants who arrived since 1980—regardless of citizenship sta-
tus—are represented in the CPS. The bias associated with this additional assump-
tion most likely increases over time as the proportion of the immigrant population
who arrived after 1980 grows. The error due to this bias is increased even more for
the above cited studies because they analyzed CPS rather than census data and the
CPS has higher levels of undercoverage than the census (Woodrow, 1991). That is,
residual estimates of the enumerated unauthorized population are understated the
most when undercount rates of the legal population are the highest. Of course, if
the error associated with emigration leads to an overestimate of the unauthorized
population, then part or all of the underestimation due to assumptions about
undercount of the legal population may be canceled out.
Starting in 1987, about 1.7 million long-term unauthorized migrants and an
additional 1.3 million unauthorized special agricultural workers (SAWs) applied
for legalization under the amnesty provisions of the 1986 Immigration Reform and
Control Act (IRCA). As a result, post-1987 residual estimates of the unauthorized
migrant population have to be adjusted to account for this increase in the legal
population. In this variation of the residual method, the legal population is con-
structed in the same way as in the one above, only the number of IRCA legalized
migrants are added to the estimate of the legally resident foreign-born population.
Studies using this method include analyses of the June 1988 (Woodrow and Passel,
1990) and the November 1989 CPS files (Woodrow, 1990, 1991, 1992), and the
1990 Census (Woodrow, 1991; GAO, 1993; Clark, et al., 1994). The results of
these studies show that about 2.3 million (ranging from 1.8 to 3.2 million) unau-
thorized migrants were enumerated in the 1990 Census, of whom no more than 80
percent were born in Mexico. This research also indicates that had IRCA not taken
effect, the unauthorized population would have grown by roughly 200,000 annu-
ally between 1986 and 1990, reaching a size 70 percent larger in 1990 than was
observed. Most of this difference was due to the large numbers of Mexicans who
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legalized under IRCA; Mexicans comprised more than 70 percent of the IRCA
legalized population (Woodrow and Passel, 1990).
Estimates produced by this approach may be inaccurate because it is unclear
what fraction of the SAW legalized population remained resident in the United
States after legalization. Many SAW applicants presumably were seasonal migrant
workers who spent a portion of each year in Mexico. Whether to include the SAW
population in estimates of the legally resident population is important because each
addition to the legal population results in a one-to-one decrease in the estimated
unauthorized population. Even though researchers tend to focus on the number of
SAWs who were resident in the United States at the time of the Census, it is more
important to focus on the number of SAWs who were actually enumerated in the
Census. The Census Bureau assumes that an insignificant number of SAWs were
enumerated in the Census or CPS. Hence, they do not include the 1.3 million SAWs
in estimates of the enumerated legally resident alien population (although they do
provide ranges of estimates that result from varying assumptions about coverage
of the SAW population).
Clark, et al. (1994) attempt to make estimates based on more plausible as-
sumptions. They assume that in the SAW legalized population all pre-1984 en-
trants, all non-Mexicans, and about half of the remaining post-1984 entrants were
resident in the United States at the time of the 1990 Census. This amounts to 728,000
or about half of the SAW population. Clark, et al. (1994) include all 728,000 in
estimates of the legally resident population, resulting in an estimate of only 1.975
million enumerated illegals in 1990 (in comparison, the Census Bureau made a
“preferred” estimate of 2.390 million). Although it does seem implausible that no
SAWs were resident nor enumerated in 1990, the Clark, et al. estimate of 728,000
could be too high. Even if half of the SAW population were resident in the United
States in 1990, it is doubtful that more that 40 to 50 percent of this group were
enumerated. Migrant agricultural workers have the highest rates of undercount
among all groups, reaching 60 to 70 percent (Gabbard, Kissam, and Martin, 1993).
There is evidence that a large number of SAW applicants were not really farm
workers, plus there is no guarantee that farm workers in 1988 continued to be farm
workers in 1990. Hence, more SAWs may have been resident in the United States
in 1990 than many analysts have thought, and since many of the SAWs may have
been working outside agriculture, they may have had higher coverage rates than
has previously been assumed.
In sum, residual methods provide reliable, consistent estimates of the size and
growth as well as detailed descriptions of the resident unauthorized migrant
population. In comparison with earlier analytic studies, the studies that used residual
methods during the 1980s and early 1990s were more successful at describing,
quantifying, and reducing the range of error associated with their estimates.
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Unfortunately, the range of error is likely to grow over time as information about
emigration and the size and geographical residence of the legal immigrant population
become increasingly out-of-date, and as other changes occur in the legal population,
such as those brought about by IRCA. Unless other methods for obtaining accurate
information about emigration or the legal immigrant population are developed,
residual methods will probably dominate the literature to a lesser extent in the
future than they did during 1980s. Another important limitation of residual estimates
is that they describe a selective part of the unauthorized population, namely the
portion that is probably least mobile and most permanently established. As we
describe below, other methods must be used to estimate the total and unenumerated
portions of the stock of the unauthorized migrant population.
Approaches to the Estimation of Flows
In comparison of estimates to stock, few speculative estimates have been made
about the rate of growth of the unauthorized population. Chapman (1976) guessed
that the population grew by 500,000 per year, and Reubens (1980) estimated an
annual growth of 600,000 during the 1970s. Despite empirically based analytical
evidence that the annual growth of the unauthorized population was considerably
less than the speculative estimate of 500,000, the media and others continued to
cite the number. As Passel (1985a:6) chided, “The figure of 500,000 per year is
widely used even though there is no strong empirical support for selecting this
figure over any other. It seems to be popular because it is a nice ‘round’ figure that
is easy for the public to accept.”
Analytic estimates of the volume of in-flow and net flow of the unauthorized
population tended to refer to different parts of the unauthorized population and
ranged widely. These studies are listed in Table 12. Garcia y Griego (1980), using
Mexican survey data on migration histories, estimated that the annual in-flow of
unauthorized migrants to the United States from Mexico in 1975 ranged from 75,000
to 284,000. Others used INS apprehensions data as a proxy for general patterns in
the level of flow of EWIs from Mexico (e.g., North, 1975; Frisbie, 1975). The
difficulties associated with using apprehensions data as a proxy for the flow of
EWIs are that (1) apprehensions data do not include those who succeed in evading
detection, and (2) apprehensions data count arrests, not individuals; arrest data are
potentially misleading because they include multiple arrests of the same person.
The INS (1976) attempted to estimate the component of fraudulent successful en-
tries by conducting field studies at 15 Mexican border entry points and 10 major
international airports. Two teams of immigration inspectors were stationed at each
entry point and carried out careful inspections of entrants for fraudulent docu-
ments and intent to violate visa terms. Based on this work the INS concluded that
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there were 500,000 fraudulent entries into the United States in 1975, although these
estimates have been severely criticized because of small sample sizes and variable
rates of detection depending on the day of the week, the immigration inspector,
and point of entry (Keely, 1977).
Chapman (1976) attempted to measure the visa overstay component of the
in-flow of unauthorized migrants by matching INS records of nonimmigrant
visa entries and departures. He estimated that from 1974 to 1976, 740,000
nonimmigrants (about 250,000 annually) failed to leave the United States on
time. These estimates were almost certainly too high because they included
nonimmigrants who left the country but whose departure forms were never filed,
were lost, or otherwise never successfully matched with an arrival form. The
size of this error was probably large. At the time, the INS collected about 6
million entrance forms from nonimmigrants per year, and departure forms were
linked with arrival forms by matching the name of the nonimmigrant (Siegel,
et al., 1980).
Summed together, the estimates of in-flow of EWIs and visa overstayers eas-
ily matched and even exceeded the speculative estimate that the unauthorized popu-
lation grew at a rate of 500,000 per year. However, analytic estimates of net flow
showed that the out-flow component of the unauthorized migrant migration stream
offset much of the in-flow component. Based on an analysis of CPS data, Heer
(1979) estimated that the unauthorized Mexican population grew by about 116,000
annually from 1970 to 1975. Although Siegel, et al. (1980) criticized the estimate
because of its large sampling error, they concluded on the basis of the study and
other evidence that much of the unauthorized migration to the United States ap-
peared to be circular and was offset by return migration to Mexico.
Studies of flow published during the 1990s have exploited the availability
of new data and new estimation techniques. The INS has long matched arrivals
with departures, terming arrivals that do not match with departures apparent
overstays. The latest research using this data goes one step further by attempting
to eliminate system error in the data (Warren, 1990). System error refers to false
overstays. INS data for 12 countries which are assumed to have no overstays are
used to determine the extent of system error (Belgium, Netherlands Antilles,
Norway, Sweden, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Switzerland, Australia, New Zealand,
Surinam, Singapore and Finland). System error is computed separately by class
of admission. First, overstays are estimated for each country using the
Nonimmigrant Information System (NIIS). Next, system error is subtracted from
the rate of apparent overstay. The remainder is multiplied by the number of
expected departures to equal the estimated number of overstays. For estimation
by state of destination and age, a calculation was made for each category by
state or age. The rate of system error was adjusted to match those of the countries.
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Nonimmigrant arrivals increased from 9.4 million in 1985 to about 14.3 million
in 1988. The annual number of overstays has fluctuated around 217,000-255,000
(increasing 12% in 1986 and dropping 7% in 1987 (following IRCA) and increasing
13% in 1988). The level of system error has dropped continually (10.3% in 1985 to
8.1% in 1988). North America has been the primary region of origin for overstayers
(with the most growth occurring among those from Mexico). The top five countries
of origin (Mexico, Haiti, the Philippines, Poland and India) were also among the
leading countries for application for legal residence under IRCA. Looking at the
geographic distribution of those overstaying their visa time limits, those states with
the largest foreign-born population also attracted the most overstays. Finally, Warren
finds that most overstays were between ages 15 and 44.
Two primary assumptions are associated with this estimation procedure: (1)
that there are few actual overstays from the 12 benchmark countries selected so all
apparent overstays from these countries are assumed to represent system error and
(2) that a single point estimate of system error applies to every country within a
category of admission. In addition, the estimates exclude immigrant students who
overstay and all those who enter the United States without inspection (EWIs). In a
modification of the procedure undertaken as a result of a GAO (1995) scrutiny of
the approach, system error was re-estimated on a airline-by-airline instead of country
basis. While the revision resulted in somewhat higher or lower figures for a few
countries, the overall result was nearly identical to the figures obtained using the
previous method.
Apprehensions data have also continued to be used as a way of roughly gaug-
ing undocumented migration flows (Jenkins, 1977; Fogel, 1982; Davila, 1986 and
Borjas, Freeman and Lang, 1987). Studies focusing on INS apprehensions data
published during the 1990s (Bean, et al., 1990; Espenshade, 1990; 1995a; Crane,
et al., 1990; Massey and Singer, 1995) have improved considerably over earlier
efforts by better controlling for the influence of contaminating variables. Some of
these studies also convert apprehensions into border crossings by assessing the
probability of getting caught and the population at risk of getting caught, thereby
adjusting for multiple apprehensions of the same person in the data (Passel, Bean
and Edmonston, 1990; Espenshade, 1995a). In order to gauge the influence of fac-
tors that affect flows across the border, these estimates rely on models with sets of
demographic, economic, and behavioral variables (the size of young adult popula-
tion in Mexico (15-34); the number of legalized SAWs; relative wage and unem-
ployment ratios; dummy variables for months to capture seasonality; the number
of officer hours and other measures of enforcement on the border for apprehen-
sions) (Bean, et al., 1990).
Apprehensions data are limited because many unauthorized migrants are never
apprehended, others may be apprehended many times, and the volume of
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apprehensions depends on the amount of effort expended by the INS to apprehend
border crossers. Researchers compensate by using some measure of the amount of
border patrol effort (Bean, et al., 1990; Jenkins, 1977; Fogel, 1982; and Borjas, et
al., 1987) and include measures of the population at risk for apprehension (Bean,
et al., 1990). Espenshade (1990, 1995a) takes the analysis one step further by using
a repeated trials model that “captures the phenomenon that, once arrested by the
U.S. Border Patrol and taken back across the Mexican border, most undocumented
migrants are likely to keep trying to enter the United States until they succeed”
(Espenshade, 1990:175). Making use of INS data on the number of repeaters to
estimate the probability of apprehension, and then using this to convert the number
of apprehensions to estimates of the numbers of crossers. Espenshade constructs a
time series on the monthly flow of undocumented migrants. He arrives at an estimate
for the period January 1977 to September 1988 of about 175,000 per month, or a
total inflow of 20.6 million undocumented migrants (that is, gross flow of 20.6
million). In another repeated trials study, Massey and Singer (1995) utilize INS
apprehensions data combined with data from surveys of migrants, which enable
them to estimate return migration. They arrive at an estimate of net flow for the
period 1965 to 1989 of 5.2 million (or an average of about 18,000 per month, net).
Further Issues Affecting Estimates
of Stock and Flow
The aforementioned results on the large differences in measurements of gross
and net flows underscore the importance of data on return migration to Mexico for
stock and flow estimates, including information on the length of time migrants
stay in the United States. This is a critical area where more research is needed.
Another area needing research involves the question of the degree of
underenumeration of the unauthorized population. In what follows in the rest of
this section, we discuss these issues and present new evidence on both patterns of
return migration and underenumeration.
Return Migration and Duration of Stay Issues
The distribution of the length of duration of stay in the United States among
unauthorized migrants by mode of entry and the change in this distribution over
time are crucial factors in understanding the significance of various estimates of
the size of the unauthorized migrant population. If almost all EWIs were circular
migrants staying only a short time, and if almost all visa overstayers returned to
their countries of origin within a couple of years or so, the policy significance of
unauthorized migration would be greatly different than if either EWIs or visa
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overstayers, or both, contained substantial fractions of long-duration migrants.
Similarly, long-duration migrants (say those who stay 10 to 20 years or more) but
who then return to their countries of origin are different yet again in their implications
for policy from migrants who stay permanently.
At present, very little is known about the distribution of duration of stay of
EWIs and visa overstayers (although data on this variable are now available for the
sub-group of EWIs who have returned to Mexico from the studies conducted by
Massey and his colleagues) (e.g., Massey and Espinosa, 1997; Lindstron, 1996).
Also, information on the duration of stay of visa overstayers has reportedly been
calculated but not released by the INS. One of the reasons duration information is
important is because migrants with different durations of stay exert different de-
mands on public benefits. At the extremes, if the periodic flow of EWIs and visa
overstayers were each very large, the cumulative stock of unauthorized migrants in
the United States at any one point in time could be very sizable sizable even if all
durations of stay were relatively short (i.e., even if all migrants were temporary). If
EWIs were to exhibit typically longer durations than visa overstayers, they would
contribute more to the stock of unauthorized migrants on that count alone.
What does the available evidence suggest about the comparative distributions
of duration of stay among EWIs and visa overstayers? In the case of EWIs, almost
all of whom are from Mexico, several pieces of evidence point to increasing dura-
tions of stay over the past 15 to 20 years: (1) increasing proportions of entire fami-
lies, including women and children in the Mexican flow (Bean, et al., 1990; Woodrow
and Passel, 1990; Cornelius, 1992); (2) possibly decreasing rates of
underenumeration of the undocumented Mexican-born population in official U.S.
Censuses and surveys, as noted below, a trend that could result from increasing
proportions of migrants with longer durations of stay, especially given that census
undercount rates in general have not been declining over the same period (Robinson,
et al., 1993); and (3) ethnographic studies whose results indicate that Mexican
migrants now embarking for the United States show longer intended durations of
stay than prior migrants (Cornelius, 1992). Unless a comparable shift has occurred
in the duration distribution among overstayers, this would have the effect of rais-
ing the proportion of the illegal stock attributable to EWIs. In the case of visa
overstayers, the only relevant evidence to our knowledge is Warren’s (1995) find-
ing that when overstayers were traced for a year or two longer than the one year
that is typically examined for purposes of defining an overstay, about 46 percent
had either converted their status or returned to their country of origin. This sug-
gests that if they were followed a bit longer, the vast majority might be found to
have converted their status or returned.
Even though durations of stay may be increasing among EWIs, many may still
eventually return to Mexico (a pattern we might term long-term circular migration),
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particularly in response to life course and economic opportunity factors. Evidence
of such a pattern would also have significant policy implications. Tables 13 to 15
present information on the extent of cohort succession among Mexican-born persons
based on results from the 1970, 1980, and 1990 U.S. Censuses and the 1994/95
CPSs. Does the evidence in these tables indicate that Mexican migrants tend to
return to Mexico after having spent time in the United States, a phenomenon we
would expect to be more likely among the undocumented? Because there were
hardly any undocumented migrants enumerated in the 1970 Census, we would not
anticipate evidence of cohort attrition beyond what we would expect based on
mortality in the 1980 data, and this is in fact what we observe. In the cases of 1990
and 1994/95 data, however, evidence of cohort attrition emerges among migrants
who have reached age 45 at the end of the period. Since there is no known reason
to think this occurs because of migration to some other country, it is reasonable to
think it stems from return migrations to Mexico. This phenomenon, of course,
would reduce the stock of Mexican EWIs compared to the case where long-term
circular migration did not occur and most migrants were permanent.
Underenumeration Issues
Because residual techniques generate estimates of the enumerated portion of
the unauthorized Mexican population, such approaches underestimate the true size
of this population at any given point in time by an amount equal to the size of the
unenumerated portion of the population. In order to develop estimates of the total
size and growth of the unauthorized Mexican population, it is thus important that
methods be developed for assessing the size and growth of the unenumerated por-
tion of the population. A number of different researchers have made and continue
to make assumptions about the underenumeration rate in the unauthorized migrant
population that are not substantially empirically-based. For instance, some have
argued that the undercount rate for illegals must be at least as high as the highest
rate among native-born groups. On the basis of this logic, some analysts argue that
undercoverage must be as high as 20 percent, the rate exhibited by native-born
African-American males aged 20-29 (e.g., Passel, Siegel, and Robinson, 1982).
Others have argued that the undercount rate in the 1990 Census may be at least as
high as it was in the 1980 Census (Woodrow, 1991). However, if the unauthorized
migrant population were more settled and less concentrated in agricultural occupa-
tions in 1990 than in 1980, then the undercount rate in 1990 might be lower than it
was in 1980.
Evidence about the size of the unenumerated portion of the unauthorized popu-
lation for the census years 1980 and 1990 has been obtained by employing one of
two different approaches. The first involves direct attempts to estimate first the
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Table 13
Components of Change from 1970 to 1980 in the Mexican-born Population
Due to Immigration, Mortality, and Other Causes
Population Components of Change 1970 to 1980
Increase Decrease
Change  Due  Due Other
1970 1980 1980-1970 To Immig’n To Mortality (6) =
Sex, Age in 1980 (1) (2) (3) = (2)-(1) (4) (5) (3)-(4)-(5)
Both Sexes, Total 759,711 2,199,221 1,439,510 1,270,246 -90572 259,836
0-4 – 55,325 55,325 55,325 0 0
5-9 – 119,309 119,309 119,309 0 0
10-14 15,084 148,775 133,691 124,540 -62 9,213
15-19 31,459 214,195 182,736 162,857 -149 20,028
20-24 41,926 312,309 270,383 243,658 -376 27,101
25-34 116,503 547,228 430,725 350,977 -1,374 81,122
35-44 138,300 315,402 177,102 127,323 -2,142 51,921
45-54 118,238 191,476 73,238 50,734 -4,393 26,897
55-64 94,431 128,407 33,976 22,159 -8,582 20,399
65+ 203,770 166,795 -36,975 13,364 -73,495 23,156
Males, Total 371,463 1,158,765 787,302 695,567 -53,626 145,361
0-4 – 28,513 28,513 28,513 0 0
5-9 – 61,963 61,963 61,963 0 0
10-14 7,749 75,678 67,929 63,201 -37 4,765
15-19 15,962 117,785 101,823 90,773 -101 11,151
20-24 20,878 177,796 156,918 142,505 -275 14,688
25-34 57,458 300,934 243,476 199,159 -998 45,315
35-44 64,532 162,660 98,128 70,031 -1,340 29,437
45-54 57,683 93,961 36,278 24,478 -2,790 14,590
55-64 48,949 65,546 16,597 9,949 -5,768 12,416
65+ 98,252 73,929 -24,323 4,995 -42,316 12,998
Females, Total 388,248 1,040,456 652,208 574,679 -36,946 114,475
0-4 – 26,812 26,812 26,812 0 0
5-9 – 57,346 57,346 57,346 0 0
10-14 7,335 73,097 65,762 61,339 -25 4,448
15-19 15,497 96,410 80,913 72,084 -48 8,877
20-24 21,048 134,513 113,465 101,153 -100 12,412
25-34 59,045 246,294 187,249 151,818 -376 35,807
35-44 73,768 152,742 78,974 57,292 -802 22,484
45-54 60,555 97,515 36,960 26,256 -1,602 12,306
55-64 45,482 62,861 17,379 12,210 -2,814 7,983
65+ 105,518 92,866 -12,652 8,369 -31,179 10,158
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Table 14
Components of Change from 1980 to 1990 in the Mexican-born Population
Due to Immigration, Mortality, and Other Causes
Population Components of Change 1980 to 1990
Increase Decrease
Change  Due  Due Other
1980 1990 1990-1980 To Immig’n To Mortality (6) =
Sex, Age in 1990 (1) (2) (3) = (2)-(1) (4) (5) (3)-(4)-(5)
Both Sexes, Total 2,199,221 4,298,014 2,098,793 2,144,919 -146,551 100,425
0-4 – 102,388 102,388 102,388 0 0
5-9 – 155,561 155,561 155,561 0 0
10-14 55,325 203,705 148,380 155,913 -158 -7,375
15-19 119,309 381,253 261,944 255,960 -441 6,425
20-24 148,775 650,539 501,764 495,186 -1,097 7,675
25-34 214,195 1,239,616 1,025,421 657,455 -5,688 373,654
35-44 312,309 749,645 437,336 189,441 -7,594 255,489
45-54 547,228 393,338 -153,890 78,033 -9,267 -222,656
55-64 315,402 209,278 -106,124 33,412 -14,280 -125,256
65+ 486,678 212,691 -273,987 21,570 -108,027 -187,530
Males, Total 1,158,765 2,369,514 1,210,749 1,233,235 -83,211 60,725
0-4 – 52,447 52,447 52,447 0 0
5-9 – 78,906 78,906 78,906 0 0
10-14 28,513 105,632 77,119 81,144 -93 -3,932
15-19 61,963 216,179 154,216 151,736 -297 27,767
20-24 75,678 396,386 320,708 314,872 -796 6,632
25-34 117,785 720,819 603,034 387,207 -4,476 220,303
35-44 177,796 405,138 227,342 103,226 -5,548 129,664
45-54 300,934 200,583 -100,351 40,369 -6,109 -134,611
55-64 162,660 99,858 -62,802 14,804 -9,074 -68,532
65+ 233,436 93,566 -139,870 8,524 -56,818 -91,576
Females, Total 1,040,456 1,928,500 888,044 911,684 -63,340 39,700
0-4 – 49,941 49,941 49,941 0 0
5-9 – 76,655 76,655 76,655 0 0
10-14 26,812 98,073 71,261 74,769 -65 -3,443
15-19 57,346 165,074 107,728 104,224 -144 3,648
20-24 73,097 254,153 181,056 180,314 -301 10,423
25-34 96,410 518,797 422,387 270,248 -1,211 153,350
35-44 134,513 344,507 209,994 86,215 -2,046 125,825
45-54 246,294 192,755 -53,539 37,664 -3,158 -88,045
55-64 152,742 109,420 -43,322 18,608 -5,206 -56,724
65+ 253,242 119,125 -134,117 13,046 -51,209 -95,954
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Table 15
Components of Change from 1990 to 1995 in the Mexican-born Population
Due to Immigration, Mortality, and Other Causes
Population Components of Change 1990 to 1995
Increase Decrease
Change  Due  Due Other
1990 1995 1995-1990 To Immig’n To Mortality (6) =
Sex, Age in 1995 (1) (2) (3) = (2)-(1) (4) (5) (3)-(4)-(5)
Both Sexes, Total 4,766,014 6,669,468 1,903,454 1,707,618 -99,031 294,867
0-4 – 112,349 112,349 112,349 0 0
5-9 113,537 296,585 183,048 198,907 -151 -15,708
10-14 172,500 302,377 129,877 124,975 -129 5,031
15-19 225,886 447,095 221,209 219,920 -480 1,769
20-24 422,767 895,238 472,471 404,402 -1,676 69,745
25-34 1,463,595 2,022,661 559,067 411,641 -7,525 154,951
35-44 1,119,252 1,285,707 166,454 1,436,578 -8,693 31,490
45-54 600,093 655,699 55,606 552,367 -8,935 9,304
55-64 313,748 336,475 22,727 253,423 -11,354 8,739
65+ 334,637 315,282 -19,355 11,187 -60,089 29,547
Males, Total 2,627,524 3,720,895 1,093,371 9,721,378 -58,249 179,482
0-4 – 68,095 68,095 68,095 0 0
5-9 58,158 166,829 108,671 116,356 -88 -7,597
10-14 87,498 163,080 75,582 72,411 -76 3,247
15-19 117,134 259,654 142,520 134,184 -336 8,672
20-24 239,718 530,888 291,169 238,671 -1,313 53,811
25-34 879,166 1,164,056 284,890 210,175 -6,146 80,861
35-44 623,849 715,896 92,047 97,404 -6,581 1,224
45-54 318,102 346,287 28,186 18,442 -6,082 15,826
55-64 154,746 156,329 1,583 8,252 -7,122 453
65+ 149,154 149,781 627 8,148 -3,050 22,984
Females, Total 2,138,490 2,948,573 810,083 735,480 -40,782 115,385
0-4 – 44,254 44,254 44,254 0 0
5-9 55,379 129,756 74,377 82,551 -62 -8,112
10-14 85,002 139,297 5,425 52,564 -53 1,783
15-19 108,752 187,441 78,689 85,736 -144 -6,903
20-24 183,049 364,350 181,302 165,731 -363 15,934
25-34 584,428 858,605 274,177 201,466 -1,379 74,090
35-44 495,404 569,811 74,407 46,253 -2,112 30,266
45-54 281,991 309,412 27,421 36,795 -2,853 -6,521
55-64 159,002 180,146 21,144 17,091 -4,232 8,286
65+ 185,483 165,501 -19,983 3,039 -29,584 6,562
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undercount rate through comparisons of U.S. Census results with external data
about small or localized populations, such as school enrollment records, in-depth
survey results, and the findings from ethnographic field research. Estimates of the
rate of undercount are then applied to the estimates of the size of the unauthorized
population enumerated in the Census in order to approximate the size of the entire
unauthorized population. The second approach entails first making independent
assessments of the entire unauthorized migrant population or national origin groups
within the population based on data sources and methods that are thought to be less
sensitive to undercount, and then comparing these estimates with the enumerated
population in order to estimate the rate of undercount. The results of both of these
approaches are reviewed below, first with respect to the 1980 Census enumeration
and then the 1990 Census enumeration.
Direct examinations of the level of undercount indicate that between 20 and
50 percent of the stock of unauthorized residents appeared to be missing from the
1980 Census enumeration. One study compared Los Angeles public school
enrollments with estimates of families with school-aged children in the 1980 Census
(Muller and Espenshade, 1985) (see Table 16). The results indicated that nearly all
families in Los Angeles were enumerated, including families of unauthorized
migrants. These results are consistent with the observation that the census is better
at enumerating settled populations such as unauthorized migrant families than single
migrants. The results of the study also suggested that the undercount rate of the
entire unauthorized population was probably no greater than 50 percent. This view
was substantiated by the results of a survey of Mexican adults living in Los Angeles
County (Heer and Passel, 1985, 1987). Foreign-born respondents were asked whether
they were legal residents and if so, to show the interviewer their “Green Card” or
equivalent evidence of legal status. Foreign-born respondents who indicated they
were undocumented or failed to show evidence of legal status were enumerated as
unauthorized migrants. Comparisons of the results of the survey with the number
of unauthorized Mexican migrants enumerated in the 1980 Census (Passel, 1985b)
suggested that the undercount rate among Mexican unauthorized migrants was
probably no greater than about 44 percent (Passel, 1985a; Passel and Robinson,
1988) (See Table 17).
Indirect evidence of undercoverage suggests a narrower range of undercount
for the unauthorized population, falling roughly between 30 and 40 percent. As
noted above, Bean, King, and Passel (1983) attempted to estimate the number of
Mexicans who had emigrated to the United States by analyzing the age and sex
composition of the population enumerated in the 1980 Mexican Census. Due to
uncertainties about the patterns of undercount in the Mexican Census and the
age-sex composition of the emigrant population, Bean, et al. (1983) concluded
that the number of unauthorized Mexicans living in the United States could be as
53
Ta
bl
e 
16
St
ud
ie
s 
w
ith
 Im
pl
ic
at
io
ns
 fo
r U
nd
er
en
um
er
at
io
n
Au
th
or
(s)
, D
ate
 of
Es
tim
at
ion
Ty
pe
 o
r
Pu
bli
ca
tio
n 
or
 R
ele
as
e
Da
te
De
sc
rip
tio
n
M
et
ho
d
Es
tim
at
e
Be
an
, K
ing
, a
nd
 P
as
se
l
19
80
M
ex
ica
n 
un
au
th
or
ize
d 
m
igr
an
ts
Se
x-
ra
tio
, a
ge
 d
ist
rib
ut
ion
1.
5 
- 3
.8
 m
illi
on
(19
83
)
as
su
m
pt
ion
s
(no
 m
ore
 th
an
 4 
mi
llio
n)
Da
ta
:  
M
ex
ica
n 
Ce
ns
us
Ke
ely
 (1
98
3)
19
80
Un
de
rc
ou
nt
 ra
te
 in
 1
98
0 
Ce
ns
us
Ex
pe
rt 
op
ini
on
33
%
 - 
50
%
 u
nd
er
co
un
t
fo
r t
he
 u
na
ut
ho
riz
ed
 p
op
ula
tio
n
He
er
 a
nd
 P
as
se
l (1
98
5)
19
80
Ad
ult
 M
ex
ica
n 
un
au
th
or
ize
d
Su
rv
ey
 o
n 
leg
al 
sta
tu
s i
n
44
%
 u
nd
er
co
un
t
m
igr
an
ts 
in 
Lo
s A
ng
ele
s C
ou
nt
y,
Lo
s A
ng
ele
s
M
ale
s: 
18
-4
4;
 F
em
ale
s: 
18
-3
9
M
ull
er
 a
nd
 E
sp
en
sh
ad
e
19
80
Fa
m
ilie
s 
in 
Lo
s A
ng
ele
s
Co
m
pa
re
d 
Lo
s A
ng
ele
s s
ch
oo
l
19
80
 C
en
su
s e
nu
m
er
at
ed
 m
os
t
(19
85
)
en
ro
llm
en
t d
at
a 
wi
th
 C
en
su
s
fa
m
ilie
s i
n 
Lo
s A
ng
ele
s
es
tim
at
es
 in
 L
os
 A
ng
ele
s
Pa
ss
el 
(19
85
a)
19
80
M
ex
ica
n 
un
au
th
or
ize
d 
m
igr
an
ts
Re
vis
ion
 o
f B
ea
n,
 e
t. 
al.
 (1
98
3)
1.
9 
m
illi
on
Be
an
, K
ing
, a
nd
 P
as
se
l
19
80
M
ex
ica
n 
un
au
th
or
ize
d 
m
igr
an
ts
Re
vis
ion
 o
f B
ea
n,
 e
t. 
al.
 (1
98
3)
1.
5 
- 2
.8
 m
illi
on
(19
86
)
Pa
ss
el 
(19
86
)
19
80
Un
de
rc
ou
nt
 ra
te
 in
 1
98
0 
Ce
ns
us
Ex
pe
rt 
op
ini
on
no
 m
or
e 
th
an
 5
0%
 u
nd
er
co
un
t
fo
r t
he
 u
na
ut
ho
riz
ed
 p
op
ula
tio
n
He
er
 a
nd
 P
as
se
l (1
98
7)
19
80
Se
e 
He
er
 a
nd
 P
as
se
l (1
98
5)
54
Pa
ss
el 
an
d 
Ro
bin
so
n 
(19
88
)
19
80
To
ta
l u
na
ut
ho
riz
ed
 m
igr
an
t
Re
vis
ion
 o
f B
ea
n,
 e
t. 
al.
 (1
98
3)
To
ta
l: 
 2
.5
 to
 3
.5
 m
illi
on
po
pu
lat
ion
M
ex
ica
n:
  1
.9
 m
illi
on
Bo
rja
s, 
Fre
em
an
, a
nd
 La
ng
19
80
To
ta
l M
ex
ica
n 
un
au
th
or
ize
d
An
aly
sis
 o
f d
ea
th
s t
o
1.
9 
m
illi
on
(19
91
)
m
igr
an
t p
op
ula
tio
n
M
ex
ica
n-
bo
rn
pe
rs
on
s
W
oo
dr
ow
 (1
99
1)
19
90
To
ta
l u
na
ut
ho
riz
ed
 m
igr
an
t
Pr
oje
ctio
n f
rom
 19
80
 Es
tim
ate
3.
3 
m
illi
on
 (p
oin
t e
stim
ate
)
po
pu
lat
ion
to
 1
99
0
GA
O 
(19
93
)
19
90
To
ta
l M
ex
ica
n 
un
au
th
or
ize
d
Pr
oje
ctio
n o
f 1
98
0 M
ex
ica
n
2.
7 
m
illi
on
m
igr
an
t p
op
ula
tio
n
Ce
ns
us
 p
op
ula
tio
n 
to
 1
99
0
GA
O 
(19
93
)
19
90
Un
de
rc
ou
nt
 ra
te
 in
 1
98
0 
Ce
ns
us
Re
vie
w 
of
 e
th
no
gr
ap
hic
 st
ud
ies
25
%
 u
nd
er
co
un
t, 
m
os
t e
sti
m
at
es
fo
r t
he
 u
na
ut
ho
riz
ed
 p
op
ula
tio
n
fe
ll b
et
we
en
 5
%
 a
nd
 2
8%
Ta
bl
e 
16
 (C
on
tin
ue
d)
Au
th
or
(s)
, D
ate
 of
Es
tim
at
ion
Ty
pe
 o
r
Pu
bli
ca
tio
n 
or
 R
ele
as
e
Da
te
De
sc
rip
tio
n
M
et
ho
d
Es
tim
at
e
55
low as 1.5 million and as high as 3.8 million. Comparing this range with the number
enumerated in the 1980 U.S. Census—1.131 million (Warren and Passel, 1987)—
the Bean, et al. (1983) estimate implies an undercount between 25 and 70 percent.
However, residual estimates of the Mexican unauthorized population enabled
researchers to narrow the range of assumptions used in this analysis (Bean, King,
and Passel, 1986; Passel, 1985a; Passel and Robinson, 1988). The results of these
revisions indicated that there were probably as few as 1.5 million to 1.9 million
unauthorized Mexicans migrants in 1980. Assuming that Mexicans comprise about
Table 17
Direct and Indirect Estimates of the Undercount for the Unauthorized
Migrant Population in 1980 and 1990 U.S. Censuses
Estimated Unauthorized Pop’n Undercount
(in millions) Percentage
Total Mexican-born Total Mexican-born
1980 Census
Direct Estimates of Undercount 3.4-3.7a 2.0a 40-45% 44%
Heer and Passel (1985, 1987);
Passel (1985); Passel and
Robinson (1988)
Indirect Estimates of Undercount
Bean, et. al. (1983) na 1.5-3.8 na 25-70%b
Revisions of Bean, et. al. (1983)
Passel (1985) na 1.9 na 40%b
Bean, et. al. (1986) na 1.5-2.8 na 25-60%b
Passel and Robinson (1991) 2.5-3.5 1.9 18-42% 40%b
Borjas, Freeman and Lang (1991) na 1.9 na 40%b
1990 Census
Direct Estimates of Undercount
GAO (1993) 3.2a 2.6a 25% 25%
Indirect Estimates of Undercount
GAO (1993) 3.4 2.7 29%b 30%b
Woodrow (1991) 3.3 27%b
Warren (1995) 1.0 2.6 -92%b 8%b
na: estimate not available.
aImplied population based on estimate of undercount (see note below).
bImplied undercount rate based on estimate of population (see note below).
Note: The implied population and undercount rates are based on the assumption that 2.1
million unauthorized migrants (1.1 million unauthorized Mexicans) were enumerated in
the 1980 Census, and that 2.4 million (1.9 million Mexicans) were enumerated in the
1990 Census.
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60 percent of the unauthorized population, this suggests that between 2.5 and 3.2
million unauthorized migrants were living in the U.S. in 1980. A comparison of
these estimates with the approximation of the enumerated unauthorized population
suggests an undercount rate of 25 to 40 percent among Mexicans and 18 to 36
percent among all unauthorized migrants.
Using a different approach, Borjas, Freeman, and Lang (1991) analyzed vital
statistics data to determine the number of unauthorized immigrants missed in the
1980 Census. The method they used is similar to that used by Robinson (1980),
except that it yields more precise results because it employs data on the number of
deaths to Mexican-born persons residing in the United States (such data became
available in 1984 when vital statistics began to record place of birth on death cer-
tificates). The methodology used by Borjas, Freeman, and Lang rests on the as-
sumption that (1) all deaths to illegally and legally resident Mexican-born persons
that take place in the United States are recorded in the U.S. vital statistics and (2),
that the Mexican-born population experiences age specific death rates that are quite
similar to those experienced by the U.S. native-born population. If these assump-
tions hold, then the total Mexican-born population living in the United States may
be approximated by dividing the number of deaths to Mexican-born persons by the
death rate. By comparing this estimate with the number of Mexican-born persons
enumerated in the 1980 Census, the number of unenumerated Mexican-born per-
sons can then be estimated. Borjas, Freeman, and Lang’s results indicate that the
number of unenumerated unauthorized Mexicans in 1990 was about 800,000. They
add this to Warren and Passel’s estimate to yield a total of 1.9 million unauthorized
migrants from Mexico, which implies a 40 percent undercount rate. The results of
this method tend to be highly sensitive to the underlying assumptions. Neverthe-
less, if the effects of its limitations could be minimized, the method has potential
because it is empirically based, it can provide national level results, and it can be
used to obtain annual estimates of the unauthorized population by age, sex, and
country-of-origin, as we demonstrate below in an application to the 1990 Census
enumeration of unauthorized Mexican-born male and female migrants.
To summarize, the results of undercount studies as well as comparisons of
external estimates with estimates of the enumerated unauthorized population sug-
gest that at least 60 percent of unauthorized residents were enumerated in the 1980
Census. This implies that there were at most about 3.4 million unauthorized mi-
grants and 1.9 million unauthorized Mexican migrants living in the United States
in 1980.
In the case of the 1990 Census enumeration, both direct and indirect evidence
suggest that the undercount rate for the unauthorized migrant population was lower
than it was in 1980. The direct evidence comes from a series of ethnographic studies
conducted by researchers working with the Census Bureau. The main purpose for
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conducting these studies was to gain qualitative information about the causes of
undercount, although the results of the research can also be used to shed light on
undercoverage rates among various populations. The ethnographic evaluations were
conducted in 29 different neighborhoods across the United States and Puerto Rico,
each of which contained about 100 households. These 29 neighborhoods were se-
lected because they were thought to contain large concentrations of difficult-to-enu-
merate populations. Experienced ethnographers made an effort to become familiar
with the households and household members who lived within the sample area by
accessing informal networks and gaining information about the actual residences of
people. Their assessments of the numbers of residents were compared with the offi-
cial Census counts for the sample areas. The results of the comparisons showed that,
among those living in areas containing large concentrations of unauthorized mi-
grants, the undercount rate was at most 25 to 30 percent. One area, Long Island, had
an undercount rate as high as 72 percent, but this result was not typical. The other
areas showed undercount rates as low as or lower than 28 percent, and five areas had
undercount rates less than 18 percent (GAO, 1993; de la Puenta, 1993).
Indirect evidence of the undercoverage of the unauthorized population in 1990
comes from only a few studies. Although Warren (1995) produces estimates of the
entire unauthorized population in 1990, his estimates appear too low and cannot be
relied upon. For instance, he puts the total Mexican-born unauthorized population
at 1 million, which is 92 percent lower than the residual estimate for 1990 (GAO,
1993). Woodrow (1991) makes a “point estimate” of the illegally resident popula-
tion in 1990 of about 3.3 million (assuming a 25 percentage undercount). Woodrow
(1991) constructs this estimate by projecting forward the estimated 1980 illegally
resident population to 1990, adjusting for net growth during the 1980s and legal-
izations due to the amnesty provisions of IRCA.
Another study showing indirect evidence of the undercount rate in 1990 was
conducted by GAO (1993) in consultation with Corona Vasquez (1991). By com-
paring the Mexican population enumerated in the Mexican Census in 1980 with
those enumerated in the 1990 Mexican Census, Corona Vasquez (1991) estimated
that 1.5 to 3 million Mexicans emigrated during the decade. By adjusting this esti-
mate for differential undercount and legal migration to the United States, GAO
(1993) concluded that about that about 2.7 million unauthorized Mexicans were
present in the United States in 1990. Assuming that Mexicans comprise about 80
percent of the total unauthorized migrant population (based on the 1989 CPS re-
sidual estimates), GAO puts the total unauthorized migrant population at 3.4 mil-
lion. Like the results obtained from the ethnographic studies, these two estimates
imply an undercount rate of about 30 percent. This level of undercoverage implies
an unauthorized population of about 3.4 million (2.7 million Mexican unautho-
rized migrants) in 1990.
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In what follows, we apply the “death registration” method used by Borjas,
Freeman, and Lang (1991) to obtain another estimate of the total illegally resident
Mexican population and the underenumeration rate for 1990. One of the draw-
backs of the death registration method is that it is sensitive to its underlying as-
sumptions. Nevertheless, if the data used to produce the final estimates is carefully
selected, the method can be used to obtain annual estimates of the total size of the
unenumerated unauthorized population by country of origin.
We use the method to produce a series of estimates of the number of
unenumerated unauthorized Mexican-born persons living in the United States in
1990. An estimate is made for several combinations of assumptions regarding the
numbers of deaths, different mortality schedules, and sizes of the enumerated
Mexican-born population. Table 18 presents estimates of the unenumerated unau-
thorized Mexican-born population, the total unauthorized population, and the im-
plied undercount rate for each of several combinations of underlying assumptions.
The estimates of the total unauthorized Mexican migrant population range from
2.1 million to 2.9 million, with the interquartile range spanning 2.1 million to 2.6
million. The undercount rates corresponding with the interquartile range of esti-
mates ranges from only 14 to 26 percent. The highest estimate of 2.9 million unau-
thorized migrants implies an undercount rate of only 34 percent. The estimates of
the underenumeration rate are higher for males, among whom as many as 40 per-
cent may not have been enumerated. Finally, we note that of the three underlying
assumptions, those pertaining to the mortality schedule and the enumerated popu-
lation tend to exert the greatest influence on the estimates.
In conclusion, the death registration method produces estimates of the
underenumeration rate that correspond with other evidence about undercount.
Namely, the underenumeration rate for unauthorized Mexican migrants in 1990
appears not to be as high as it was in 1980, most likely is no greater than 35 percent
and may even be as low as 15 to 25 percent. In addition, the results corroborate
other evidence that the female unauthorized migrant population is better repre-
sented in the U.S. Census enumeration than the corresponding male population.
The results also show that the death registration method produces estimates that
are sensitive to their underlying assumptions. Although the method has a great deal
of potential for use in the future, the quality of the estimates could be greatly im-
proved if better information about the mortality rates experienced by the foreign-
born population and the enumerated population were available.
Estimates Based on Mexican Data
We are aware that there are is great variety of methodological and conceptual
difficulties that have to be addressed in order to arrive at more precise and up to
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date estimates of the different modalities of Mexican migration to the United States.
In addition to the difficulties in quantifying migration under any circumstances,
the very nature of the movement towards the United States complicates the pro-
cess. Among the most important factor that cloud it is the surreptitious character of
much of it, the migrant population’s constant renewal, the indeterminate length of
migrant’s stay in the U.S. and the considerable number of people who return to
Mexico, even after long residence abroad.
As we mentioned earlier, measurements carried out in the United States have,
among others, two systematic shortcomings: the first one is the difficulty of counting
unauthorized migrants, that because of their surreptitious nature avoid detection; the
second one is that it is not possible to identify those migrants who go back to Mexico,
which can be either “legal” (have not been naturalized yet) as well as unauthorized.
These shortcomings are reflected in the underrepresentation of Mexican mi-
grants in the statistical registers of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, as
well as in the Census undercount and in household surveys (in particular the Cur-
rent Population Survey, CPS). This situation has lead researchers, to make impor-
tant corrections and adjustments to the original figures by using indirect methods
and residual techniques.
On the other hand, the estimates carried out in Mexico face the great difficulty
that migrants are not found in their place of origin, either because they are living or
sojourning in the United States or because they are on their way there. This feature
has restricted the options available to researchers and government statisticians to
two methodologies. The first one involves direct measurements from retrospective
questions in household surveys that identify labor, permanent and return migrants
as well as direct measurement of migration flows through specialized methods for
finding, counting and interviewing those either on their way to work or on their
way from working in the United States.
The second uses indirect methods, which rely on incomplete or deficient in-
formation to estimate a population of interest. When combined with other data,
this information can be used to generate two different databases: one that suppos-
edly contains or includes the migrants that are headed toward the United States (P
+) and another that excludes them (P -). The difference, or residual [ (P +) - (P -) ]
is attributed to migration. Conceptually, the residual is composed of many kinds of
people, which means that the resulting estimate may erroneously include some
individuals who have not really migrated, or may exclude some people who have.
In general, these approaches have generated plausible results that are consistent
with the demographic dynamics of the Mexican population and generally agree
with obtained in the United States. This section presents the results of efforts car-
ried out for this project to estimate Mexican migration to the United States based
on Mexican data from the 1990s.
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Direct Measurement Efforts
The National Survey on Demographic Dynamics
Since the late 1970s, Mexico has carried out various household sampling surveys
with the goal of using direct measures to quantify how many migrants move to the
United States (for example, the Demographic Survey of Baja California, the
Migration Survey in Zacatecas, etc.). The 1992 ENADID (the Spanish acronym),
which is the most up-to-date version of these surveys and is used in the country for
mid-decade enumerations, improves over these earlier surveys in several important
ways. Among these are the following: a) its national coverage; b) its utilization of
a considerable sample size (64,000 housing units throughout the country), which
permits the use and interpretation of data on a federal scale, c) and its inclusion of
various foci, in certain complementary measures, to quantify some of the diverse
modalities of the migratory phenomenon (INEGI, 1994).
The ENADID provides a basis for classifying certain Mexican residents as
“labor migrants” (people aged 12 years or older who have worked or looked for
work in the United States) and others as “return migrants” (people who were
habitual reside in the United States, but at the time of the interview were living in
Mexico). The measurement of return migration focuses on three retrospective
questions traditionally used in Mexico for census gathering (i.e., place of birth,
length of current and previous residency, and the place of habitual residency over
the past five years). The measurement of labor migration also utilizes retrospective
questions to ascertain if a migrant had been a worker or looking for work in the
United States and the time period (month and year) of the last movement. As with
other similar procedure, this one has several shortcomings: (1) third persons respond
for the emigrants, in which case the information is not very precise: (2) the
household does not necessarily exist with the same configuration and in the same
geographic location during the reference period; and (3) it is impossible to detect
emigration of complete families or of people who live alone, since there is no
reporting on these people. the survey thus generates an underestimate of the
magnitude of migration.
Despite these limitations, the data from the survey are valuable and indicate
that of the 85.164 million residents of Mexico in 1992,1.572 million were return
migrants and 2.28 million were previously labor migrants in the United States.
These figures cannot be added together because the two types of migrants are not
necessarily mutually exclusive. In fact, about 1.28 million people are members of
both groups, who simultaneously lived and worked in the United States; about 1
million people were “labor migrants”—individuals who do not consider their stays
in the United States to be for habitual residence in that country but rather for labor
reasons; and about 290,000 migrants did not work in North America during the
62
period that they lived there. Together, the three categories of identified migrants
(those that lived and worked in the United States, labor migrants who did not reside
in the United States and non-working return migrants) total 2.57 million people,
which constitutes the number of Mexican residents in 1992 who had migrated to
the United States (see Table 19).
If we classify the migrants from the three categories by year of entry to the
United States or by year of return to Mexico, the numbers increase over time.
This increase is systematic and reflects two results: a) an increasing migration in
recent years, and b) the collecting of information in such a way that for each
individual only the last movements to the north is recorded, meaning that the
verifiable quantities of people who actually migrated in previous periods is
understated. Therefore, of the 2.574 million migrants mentioned above, 391,000
(15.2 percent) entered the United States before 1970; 396,000 (15.4 percent) did
so between 1970 and 1979; 603,000 (23.4 percent) between 1980 and 1987; and
1.098 million (42.7 percent) between 1988 and 1992. The rest fall under no specific
date of entry to the United States. Of those returning to Mexico, 349,000 (13.6
percent) did so before 1970; 331,000 (12.9 percent) did so between 1970 and
1979; 587,000 (22.8 percent) between 1980 and 1987; and 1.22 million (47.4
percent) between 1988 and 1992. The rest do not fall under any specific date of
return to Mexico. Table 20 shows the breakdown of the 1.22 million migrants that
returned to Mexico between 1988 and 1992 by year of return for each one of the
3 categories mentioned.
Table 19
Mexican-born Population Living in Mexico in 1992 by Living and Work
Experience in the U.S.
Worked in the U.S.?
Yes: No:
Living experience in the U.S. Total Labor Not Labor
Migrants Migrants
to the U.S. to the U.S.
Total 85,164,449 2,283,815 82,880,634
Lived in Yes: Return Migrant 1,572,192 1,282,469 289,723
the U.S.?
No: Not Return Migrants 83,592,257 1,001,346 82,590,911
Source: Estimates of the authors using data from ENADID, 1992
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For each reference or survey period there are differing groups of migrants who
enter or leave the United States. These differences are due to varying periods of
residency in North America. For example, we can estimate that between 1988 and
1992, a total of 1.098 million people entered the United States (an annual average of
220,000) and 1.220 million people returned to Mexico (an annual average of 244,000
people). Of these two figures respec tively, 707,000 and 786,000 fall under the cat-
egory “lived and worked” in the United States, with an annual average of 141,000 and
157,000, respectively; 250,000 and 265,000 are those that “worked but did not live”
in the United States, with an annual mean of 50,000 and 53,000; and 140,000 and
169,000 are those who “lived but did not work” in North America, with an annual
average of 28,000 and 34,000. The difference between outgoing and return flows is
explained by differing periods of U.S. residency. Those who traveled to and returned
from the United States during the 1988-1992 interval include people who left the
United States in the reference period but had entered the country earlier.
The ENADID results also portray some demographic and socioeconomic char-
acteristics of the migrants. Those who returned to North America between 1988
Table 20
Mexican-born Population Living in Mexico in 1992 that Lived and/or
Worked in the United States and Went Back to Mexico between
1988-92, by Year of Return from the United States
Work and/or
Residence Status Year of return to México Total
in the U.S. 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992*
Total 105,074 162,966 201,524 279,143 471,368 1,220,075
Worked and lived
in the U.S.** 70,702 102,934 146,433 201,981 264,135 786,185
Worked but not
lived in the U.S.** 19,597 31,707 31,559 37,042 145,225 265,130
Lived but not
worked in the U.S.*** 14,775 28,325 23,532 40,120 62,008 168,760
Source: Estimates of the authors using data from ENADID, 1992
*Labor migrants for 1992 include 47,767 persons that at the time of the interview where
working in the U.S. as well as 65,205 labor migrants that commute to work daily to the U.S.
*These figures refer to the year of return to Mexico after working in the U.S.
**These figures refer to the year of return to Mexico after living in the U.S.
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and 1992 (1.22 million) can be differentiated by the three migratory categories
above, showing that: the labor migrants (the “pure” ones and those who “worked
and lived” in the United States) are predominantly men (more than 80 percent). In
contrast, women represent the majority (60 percent) of the migrants who did not
work, indicating their greater role as companions; the labor migrants were basi-
cally young adults (more than 65 percent of those observed were between the ages
of 20 and 39), while those that did not work in the United States are in large part
adolescents and children (about 60 percent are less than 20 years of age); the labor
migrants are predominantly heads of families (about 60 percent), while in the ma-
jority of cases the spouses and children of the migrants did not work; of the “pure
labor migrants” and those who did not work, more than 50 percent were living in
the traditional zone of emigration (west central Mexico) during the time of the
interview, close to 25 percent were in the northern states, and between 15 and 20
percent were in the central region. Those migrants that worked but did not live in
the United States were interviewed primarily in the northern region (53 percent),
the traditional zone (24 percent) and the central area (20 percent). In all categories,
there was little participation from those residing in the southeast (between 1.5 per-
cent and 3 percent).
The ENADID results also provide a basis for determining how many people
left Mexico to reside in the United States. Interviewees were asked if one or more
members of a household went to live in the United States in a specific period of
reference. Once identified, emigrants were questioned about their characteristics
(age, gender, family relations, date of emigration, current place of residency). The
question on “current place of residency” identifies emigrants who stay out of the
country as well as those who are return migrants. Return migrants were questioned
about their date of return. As with other similar procedures, this one had limita-
tions: a) it relies on third person responses for the emigrants, in which case the
information may not be accurate; b) the household did not necessarily exist with
the same configuration and in the same geographic location during the reference
period; and c) it is not possible to identify emigration of complete families in tran-
sit or people living alone but in transit, since no one was at home to be interviewed.
In all, these limitations generate an underestimate of the magnitude of permanent
emigration. Nevertheless, the data thus established provide a pool of knowledge,
offering valuable information about the phenomenon. For example, the major re-
sults were:
• 1.823 million people left Mexico for the United States between Janu-
ary 1988 and November 1992, of whom 972,000 continued to live in
North America at the time of the interview (permanent emigrants) and
851,000 returned to Mexico after living in the United States (return
immigrants).
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• Table 21 shows the breakdown of these migrants by the year of departure
to or return from the U.S. We can see that emigration appears to increase
over time: 226,000 left in 1988 (130,000 lived in Mexico and 96,000
still resided in the United States), 310,000 in 1989 (177,000 and 133,000,
respectively), 354,000 in 1990 (201,000 and 153,000), 351,000 in 1991
(186,000 and 165,000) and 581,000 in 1992 (156,000 and 425,000).
This could be due to various combinations of four circumstances: a) a
possible real increase in emigration to the United States; b) a reduction
in the permanent return emigrants in later years (there is a tendency to
remain indefinitely in the United States for about 40 percent of migrants,
but the percentage of those only remaining rises after at least three years);
c) the existence of a repetitious movement to the United States, which
diminishes the number of people from previous years because the single
migrants are placed in the most recent migration; and d) the greater
impact of questions about more recent events.
• With the goal of minimizing the distorting effect of the period of resi-
dency in the United States and to have a better approximation of the
magnitude of the phenomenon, we obtained the annual averages of the
years 1988-1992. These figures indicated that in the 1988-1992 refer-
ence period, an annual average of 365,000 people traveled to the United
States and established residency, of which 195,000 still lived in that
Table 21
Mexican-born population that went to live in the United States
between January 1988 and November 1992, by year of migration
and year of return to Mexico
Year Went back to live in Mexico Live in the
Migrated Total Year of return to México United Total
U.S. 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 States
1988 129,660 41,708 40,603 24,453 16,158 6,738 96,189 225,849
1989 177,507 – 65,002 58,158 42,978 11,369 132,579 310,086
1990 201,158 – – 82,911 89,672 28,575 153,108 354,266
1991 186,600 – – – 93,660 92,940 164,978 351,578
1992 155,797 – – – – 155,797 425,323 581,120
Total 850,722 41,708 105,605 165,522 242,468 295,419 972,177 1,822,899
Source: Estimates of the authors using data from ENADID, 1992
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country at the time the survey was carried out and 170,000 had already
returned to Mexico. This latter figure, although smaller, is similar to
the average mean return migration previously estimated for the same
period under questioning about place of birth and place of previous
residency (that is to say, 191,000 people, excluding “pure labor mi-
grants”).
• The distribution of permanent emigrants and return immigrants under-
scores a well-known profile: a larger number of men, a structure marked
by youthful age (concentrated in the first years of economic activity), a
higher proportion of heads of households among the return migrants
and of children among the permanent emigrants; and, in general, a dis-
tribution by place of origin in Mexico that is similar to that previously
described.
The Migration Survey for the
Northern Mexican Border
The Migration Survey for the Northern Mexican Border is a continuing method
of generating data using procedures for quantifying mobile populations. In this
sense, the migrants are observed while they are traveling to work in the United
States or during their return to Mexico. When they arrive at Mexican border towns
and they gather in specific places in those cities, as for example bus or railroad
stations, airports or customs check points, it is then possible to select places for the
enumeration, sampling and interviews (Corona 1997; Santibañez 1997).
A first phase of this survey began March 28, 1993 and ended on March 27,
1994. The second phase spanned all of 1995. It conceptualized labor migrants as
units of movement observed at certain times and places in their migratory cycles
and identifies various target populations. The survey contributes useful information
that helps to answer the following questions: What is the magnitude of the flow
of Mexican labor to the United States in a specific reference period and how does
it vary in each phase of the survey? Has the labor flow increased, decreased, or
remained constant in the two phases of the survey? Which are the observed changes
in the composition of the flow that could be relevant to explaining the observed
changes in the magnitude of the flow? What proportion of the labor flow is
documented labor and what proportion is undocumented? How have these two
components of the flow evolved between the two survey phases or references
periods? What is the net outmigration when we compare outward flow to that of
the return flow in each phase? How has the net outmigration changed between the
two survey phases or between the two reference periods? What does this
outmigration signify?
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In answer to these questions, we present some results based on the Northern
Border Survey. We examine first the magnitude and characteristics of the outward
flow (south-north flow) and then the return flow (north-south) flow. The available
data reveals that between the two phases, the flow toward the United States was
considerably reduced, rising to approximately 792,000 people in Phase One and
dropping to nearly 543,000 in Phase Two. If we analyze the data from the Northern
Border Survey just for the years 1993 and 1995, we obtain a similar conclusion.
The reduction in flow does not have a single interpretation. To identify the
significance of our results, we must consider that migrants must have in common
two basic conditions in order to be counted as part of the same flow: a) they must
reside in Mexico; b) and they must be headed toward the United States to work
or look for work. A member of the labor flow to the United States can be considered
the same whether he or she does not return to Mexico and “settles” in the United
States or whether he or she stops traveling periodically to that country to work or
look for work.
With these observations in mind, the previously mentioned trends can be in-
terpreted in three different ways. First, the observed decrease in the magnitude of
the labor flow to the United States could be due to a reduction in the number of
people who form the group from Mexico. Among other factors, this would be asso-
ciated with a) the difficulties (real or perceived) of entering the United States as an
undocumented migrant; b) the difficulties (real or perceived) of encountering em-
ployment there; and c) an increase in the direct or relative costs of movement from
the Mexican interior to the United States, which could be from loss of buying
power among potential migrants and from the devaluation of the peso relative to
the dollar. Second, the reduction in the magnitude of the labor flow to the United
States also could be attributed to large outmigration during previous reference pe-
riods. These migrants may have established residency in the United States or pro-
longed their stay, a fact that itself can be associated with, a) the difficulties (real or
perceived) of finding adequate remunerative employment in the migratory zone of
origin during a profound economic crisis; b) the strengthening of the role played
by the social and family networks in the United States; and c) the growing ob-
stacles to leaving and returning to the neighboring country because of restrictive
immigration measures, particularly the strengthening of the U.S. Border Patrol.
Third, the trend could be a combination of the two previously mentioned possibili-
ties. Specific weights for each factor would have to be determined in the future.
We questioned whether the Migration Survey for the Northern Mexican Border
contained sufficient data for testing our hypotheses. Our idea was that identifying
eventual changes in the internal composition of the labor current directed at the
United States would shed light not only on the characteristics of those who enter
or stay within the labor flow, but also those who leave it between phases. With
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this idea in mind, we examined socioeconomic, demographic and family
characteristics of labor migrants, attempting to identify the most relevant changes
occurring between research phases or reference periods, the available data showed
among other things, that:
• the labor flow continues to be predominantly masculine;
• the migratory flow consists primarily of young people and adults of
economically active ages
• the members of the labor flow in general worked in Mexico before ini-
tiating their trips to the United States, although the relative weight of
those who lacked jobs increased in the recent period;
• most labor migrants come from the urban zones of the country (15,000
inhabitants or more), although in recent years the number of migrants
from rural areas has increased;
• the labor flow continues to originate predominantly in the federal enti-
ties that make up the traditional emigration zone (their relative weight
increased in the recent period), the numbers coming from northern, cen-
tral and southern Mexico had decreased significantly.
• the state of California is the principal destination for labor migrants,
which also was characteristic of the earlier reference period;
• the number of labor migrants who intend to stay in the United States for
more than six months is increasing and the number who want to stay for
shorter periods is decreasing.
• the flow contains people who generally live alone or in other cases are
accompanied by people—family or non-family members—of 12 years
of age or more;
• the majority of labor migrants go to the United States regularly, although
in the most recent survey period this tendency lost relative weight in the
flow;
• the migratory flow consists of many workers who generally did not
have documents to enter or work in the United States, a characteristic of
labor flows in earlier periods;
• first-time migratory workers increasingly lack documents for entering
or working in the United States;
• workers who habitually travel to the United States for work increas-
ingly lack entry or work documents as well.
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• Summarizing, the flow of workers towards the United States not only
decreased in size, but there where also important changes in its charac-
teristics. Some of these changes are very likely the result of migrants
with specific characteristics dropping out of the flow (e.g., those with
migratory experience in the United States, or those authorized to work).
In the case of the return flow from the United States (north-south) we ob-
served that an important decline in absolute values, from more than 624,000 to
433,000 between Phases 1 and 2. This data is similar to data for the last three
quarters of 1993 and 1995, (518,000 migrants for 1993 down to 296,000 migrants
for 1995).
The demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of the return migrants
are generally similar to those of people in the south-north flow. In addition to
the already mentioned reduction in the magnitude of the return flow, we noted
that:
• the flow is formed primarily by men, although in recent years the rela-
tive weight of female participation has increased;
• first-time members of the return flow are concentrated within the eco-
nomically active ages (between 12 and 34 years), but important changes
were detected in the age distribution between reference periods;
• as reflective of what took place in their outbound voyage, the return
flow is composed of people that generally undertake the trip alone or
are accompanied on their return trip by people—family or non-family
members—of 12 or more years of age;
• the majority of labor migrants stated that on their most trips to the United
States that they had entry documents, although the relative weight of
those individuals who did not have them grew. As a result, the flow has
a more balanced participation between the two groups;
• labor migrants with work documents on their most recent trip to the
United States were roughly equal to those without them in the earlier
survey period. In the most recent survey period, the number without
work documents dominated the flow;
• about 85 percent of first-time return migrants do not have work docu-
ments;
• about 87 percent of labor migrants did not need the services of a pollero
or coyote to enter the United States on their most recent trip; this is a
significant change from earlier periods;
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• about 70 percent of return migrants had been to the United States only
once or twice before. This is consistent with trends from earlier periods;
• as with the south-north flow, many return migrants lack U.S. entry or
work documents and the number of first-time migrants without them is
increasing;
• but still, the majority of migrants with previous U.S. migratory experi-
ence had entry or work documents, although the relative weight of those
without documents has grown significantly.
• the majority of the return migrants are from urban areas of Mexico;
• the migrants who come from the states of traditional emigration consti-
tute the largest portion of the return flow although their relative weight
has declined in recent years;
• California has been displaced in recent years by Texas as the primary
state of residence for migrants to the United States, and is identified as
such by a growing proportion of migrants;
• the main portion of the return migrants worked in Mexico before under-
taking their most recent trip to the United States, but recently the rela-
tive weight of this group has diminished significantly;
• the largest part of the return flow did work during their most recent stay
in the United States (about eight out of every 10), although a slight
reduction is estimated for the relative participation of this group;
• a large number of return migrants sent monetary remittances to Mexico,
although the relative weight of this group has diminished enough to no
longer represent the majority in the observation period;
• the migrants declared as their principal reason for returning to Mexico,
in order of importance: 1) to visit their families; 2) to rejoin the work
force in their respective places of habitual residency; 3) because they
had not worked in the United States; 4) because they had been appre-
hended by the U.S. Border Patrol. In recent years, the number of mi-
grants who said they were apprehended has increased significantly and
those returning to visit families.
Available information indicates similar demographic and socioeconomic char-
acteristics had decreased between the groups of return labor migrants and depart-
ing labor migrants. But one difference in the most recent flow is the decline of the
relative weight of the return migrants who originated in the traditional states of
emigration and those from rural areas (in contrast to the growing participation of
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those who come from the northern region and the urban zones of the country). This
suggests lengthier stays in the United States among those migrants originally from
the north or the urban zones. And they may be supported by more solid social
networks and family linkages between origin and destination.
The difference between the figures of the two directions of the flow represent
the net migration, which may produce either a gain or a loss of population, which
is due almost exclusively in the labor migration flow during the period of refer-
ence. In the first round the net balance was negative and reached some 167 thou-
sand people, whereas in the second round it was also negative and reached 109
thousand, which is 65 percent of the balance of the earlier round.
Indirect Measurement Efforts
Because direct measurement of migration to the United States is so difficult,
researchers have largely relied on indirect measurement and have developed a num-
ber of methodologies for estimating migratory flows. Indirect measurement proce-
dures have been refined over time with new types of statistical databases and with
new data on specific aspects of migration. Nevertheless, the accuracy of the mea-
sures still depends on certain assumptions about an “invisible statistic”—the mi-
grant population—that cannot be verified through available information sources.
One way to confront this limitation is to make changes in the theoretical assump-
tions used and then analyze the variation in research outcomes under the modified
assumptions. Even though the procedures for indirect measurement have little to
offer in terms of definitive or conclusive results, the measurements have consider-
ably reduced the margin of uncertainty about the magnitude of the migration phe-
nomenon. (Castro 1990; CONAPO, 1992a, 1992b, 1995a, 1995b; Corona, 1991,
1994, 1995; Partida, 1990). The estimates from indirect measures that have been
based on data from Mexico (see Table 22):
• indicate that the loss of Mexican population from international migra-
tion has been systematic since 1960;
• establish limits to the estimates of permanent Mexican migration to the
United States between 260,000 and 290,000 in the decade of 1960-
1970; between 1.2 million and 1.55 million during the decade of 1970-
1980; and between 2.1 million and 2.6 million in the decade 1980-
1990. These figures indicate that the net annual flow has increased with
the passage of time, going from about 28,000 in the decade of 1960-
1970, to close to 140,000 in the following decade and at 230,000 in the
decade 1980-1990.
• confirm that the estimated magnitude of the flow in the past decade is
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considerable and that the effect of this flow on the dynamic of
demographic growth in the country is perceptible.
• The results of these indirect measures of the net migration flow be-
tween Mexico and the United States are very reasonable, they are con-
sistent with the demographic changes of Mexico’s population and they
are in general agreement with the estimates carried out with United States
data sources.
With the idea of counting with an indirect measure of migration between Mexico
and the United States during the most recent period, (for the five years between 1990
and 1995), in research carried out for this report we used a residual procedure (that
is derived from the use of a balancing equation) with information from the Population
and Housing Count of 1995 (published at the end of April 1996 and referring exclu-
sively to the total inhabitants of Mexico classified by sex and federal entity) and data
from the Eleventh General Census of 1990. The main results obtained from this
Table 22
Estimates of net permanent migration from Mexico
to the United States, 1960-1990
Author Decade Half Decade
1960-70 1970-80 1980-90 1975-80 1980-85 1985-90
Corona 1991 1,500-3,000
CONAPO dec. 1992 2,301 1,069 1,232
Corona 1994 275 1,476 2,378
2,113
286 1,533 2,444
Corona 1995 287 1,366 2,307
Partida 1990 1,277 585
Castro 1990 1,215 563
CONAPO Aug. 1992 2,599 563 1,214 1,385
CONAPO March 1995 2,093 889 1,204
CONAPO Jul. 1995 2,108 899 1,209
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procedure (for the national totals) are the following: For 1990-1995 net outmigration
was 1.387 million people, with an almost equal participation by sex (694,000 men
and 693,000 women) and the net count gave a distribution by groups of entities
located inside the known migratory pattern (47.9 percent in the traditionally highest
zone of migration; 24.4 percent in the northern states and 27.7 percent in the central
entities). The figure of 1.39 million people is an estimate of net outmigration during
the five-year period between 1990-1995, which is equivalent to an annual average of
277,000 people ( see Table 23). This estimate (1) is substantially higher that that
observed during the decade 1980-1990; (2) agrees with that developed independently
by the Mexican Population Council (CONAPO); and (3) is relatively close to the
figure of 316,000 estimated with U.S. data sources in research conducted for this
report. It also should be noted that this estimate is also higher than that directly
derived from ENADID, which in turn suggest that an important number of Mexican
migrants lived alone in their places of origin before leaving to the U.S. or left the
country with all members of their households.
Other results obtained from this procedure (for the national totals) are the
following:
Table  23
Estimates of the Mexico’s Net International Migration Flow
between 1990 and 1995 by State of Residence
State of Residence1 Total Annual average
Total -1,387,481 -277,496
North -338,584 -67,717
Traditional -664,824 -132,965
Central -383,792 -76,785
Southeast -281 -56
1State of Residence:
North: Baja California, Baja California Sur, Coahuila, Chihuahua, Nuevo León,
Sinalóa, Sonora and Tamaulipas.
Traditional: Aguascalientes, Colima, Durango, Guanajuato, Jalisco, Michoacán,
Nayarit, San Luis Potosí and Zacatecas.
Central: Distrito Federal, Guerrero, Hidalgo, México, Morelos, Oaxaca, Puebla,
Qurétaro and Tlaxcala.
Southeast: Campeche, Chiapas, Quintana Roo, Tabasco, Veracruz and Yucatán.
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• If the natural growth (and the interstate migration) of the five-year period
is correct and if the states of the southeast do not have significant
migration to the United States, then the positive outmigration
encountered for these six entities (35,000 women and 70,000 men)
constitutes a better measurement in the enumeration of the 1995 count
than in the enumeration of the 1990 census. The census population,
corrected for undercounts stemming from the 1990 census (0.52 percent
for the total, 0.70 percent for men and 0.34 percent for women), was
used to obtain an estimate of net outmigration of 1.166 million emigrants,
with a balanced participation of men and women (576,000 male
emigrants and 590,000 female emigrants) and a distribution by groups
of origin (54.2 percent coming from the states with traditionally high
migration; 25.3 percent from northern states and 20.5 percent from
entities located in the center of the country), which is consistent as much
with the migratory trend up to 1990 as with the data from the survey
carried out for the period 1990-1995.
• The second estimate was carried out using the same operations and con-
siderations from the previous calculation, but with some modification.
Instead of calculating the population by gender and entity in 1995 as a
sum of the residents in 1990 plus the natural increase (and increase due
to internal migration), the population is determined as a product of the
residents in 1990 by a factor that accounts for the growth in declining
international migration. This was the basis for establishing a percentage
of undercoverage from the 1990 census that was almost double the figure
used in the previous estimate (0.92 percent for the total, 1.22 percent for
men and 0.63 percent for women). With this method, the net outmigration
rose to 1.387 million people, with an almost equal participation by gen-
der (694,000 men and 693,000 women) and the new count gave a distri-
bution by groups of entities located inside the known migratory pattern
(47.9 percent in the traditionally highest zone of migration; 24.4 percent
in the northern states and 27.7 percent in the central entities).
The two previous estimates did not yield such disparate results, in spite of
the utilization of different assumptions about the undercoverage of the 1990 census.
The differences rose to 19 percent of the total, 20.5 percent for men and 17.5
percent for women. Nevertheless, if the differences between one calculation and
the other with respect to the distribution of outmigration by groups of entities are
accurate, the differences are not tremendous for the northern states and for the
states of traditionally high migration (14.8 percent and 5.1 percent, respectively),
but the difference is tremendous for the central entities (60.7 percent). This marked
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contrast between the results of the two estimates shows the need to carry out a
more detailed analysis of the same, revising the internal coherency, in order to
choose one of these estimates as the definitive product of this residual
methodological application. The figure of 1.387 million people corresponds to
our estimate of net outmigration during the five-year period between 1990-1995,
which is equivalent to an annual average of 277,000 people. This quantity, slightly
higher than that observed during the decade 1980-1990, results in a negative annual
international migration rate of 0.31 percent.
Immigration to Mexico
Immigration to Mexico is not very large. Table 24 shows the number of foreign
immigrants that lived in Mexico in 1970, 1980, 1990 and 1992 by sex and country
of birth. During the decades of the 1970s and 1980s, annual average increases of
7,000 immigrants were reported. The 1990 Census data indicated that by 1990, a
total of 340,00 foreigners resided in Mexico, which represents scarcely 0.42 percent
of the country’s inhabitants. Data from the National Survey of the Demographic
Dynamic reinforced this estimate, but also indicated that in recent years,
immigration to Mexico has intensified substantially (between 80,000 and 100,000
in the period between March 1990 and November 1992, inclusive). The
demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of migration to Mexico are:
• a similar proportion of men and women immigrated, and did not show
significant variation by place of origin or by period of entry to Mexico;
• the United States is, by far, the principal country of origin for the immi-
grants (more than 50 percent of the immigrants are natives of that coun-
try), followed by natives of Central and South America, and after them,
in lesser numbers, natives of Europe, Asia and Africa;
• the composition by age differs by place of origin. The natives of the
United States exhibit a peculiar distribution: more than 40 percent are
less than 10 years of age and almost 30 percent are children or adoles-
cents between 10 and 19 years of age. This fact seems to be associated
with return migration of Mexicans—who bring with them children born
in the United States. The apparent intensity of immigration observed
between 1990 and 1992 appears to explain, in large measure, the in-
creased numbers of children. In contrast, the immigrants of non-Ameri-
can countries display a structural aging and the Central and South Ameri-
cans conform to a youthful age profile.
• 10 geographic entities in Mexico attract about 80 percent of the
immigrants: Baja California, Chihuahua, Nuevo León and Tamaulipas
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in the northern border region; Guanajuato, Jalisco and Michoacán in
the plateau region of northern Mexico and the west; the Federal District
and the state of Mexico in Central Mexico; and Chiapas in the southeast.
The distribution of the immigrants in the 10 areas varies by country of
origin. The natives of the United States reside basically in the north and
the west, also zones of outmigration to North America (the later reinforces
the hypothesis that part of the immigration coming from the United
Table 24
Foreign-born  Residents in Mexico, by Sex and Country of Birth, 1972-1992
Sex and 1970 1980 1990 Census 1992
Country of Birth Census Census Enumeration One percent ENADID
Absolute numbers
(in thousands)
Total 191.2 268.9 340.8 349.3 463.4
Male 97.3 134.2 171.8 168.2 235.7
Female 93.9 134.7 169.0 181.1 227.7
United States 97.2 157.1 194.6 191.5 278.7
Rest of Americas 31.5 45.1 90.7 86.7 143.5
Rest of the World 62.5 66.2 54.9 56.8 41.2
Not Specified – 0.5 0.6 14.3 –
Percentage Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Male 50.9 49.9 50.4 48.2 50.9
Female 49.1 50.1 49.6 51.8 49.1
United States 50.8 58.4 57.1 54.8 60.1
Rest of Americas 16.5 16.8 26.6 24.8 31.0
Rest of the World 32.7 24.6 16.1 16.3 8.9
Not Specified – 0.2 0.2 4.1 –
Immigration rate
(per 100)* 0.4 0.4 0.42 0.43 0.54
Source: Census of Population and Housing, 1970, 1980 and 1990
(Data from the total enumeration and the one percent sample) and ENADID, 1992
* Total foreign born divided by total resident population in Mexico (per 100)
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States is linked to migration from Mexico to the United States). In the
Valley of Mexico, more than 60 percent of immigrants were born on the
American continent. About 40 percent of the immigrants living in
Chiapas come from the south, especially from Central America.
The flow of immigrants from Central America have received special attention
in the past several years because of their growing importance and apparent re-
gional impact on Mexico’s southern border. The available research on this issue
has progressively characterized the typology of these flows, pointing to the fol-
lowing: a) the seasonal agricultural workers; b) the Guatemalan refugees; and c)
the undocumented transmigrants.
• the flow of agricultural workers is directed principally at Chiapas. Mea-
suring these workers has been difficult because a significant number of
them (the proportion cannot be determined) habitually move without
documents. Past estimates, coming generally from migration officials,
are derived more from individual observation and practical experience
than from procedures that rely on analytical and empirical bases. More
recently, the efforts of migration authorities to standardize this flow has
generated some additional data, but not enough to estimate the flow
reliably. The most recent migration records identify between 50,000
and 75,000 documented entries annually into Mexico (although a single
entry can include several people). This figure is derived from an infe-
rior threshold, however, because it does not include undocumented en-
tries, which at the present time are impossible to quantify.
• the Guatemalan refugee populations, which is encamped at Chiapas,
Campeche and Quintana Roo, rose at the beginning of 1996 to about
32,000 people. But it is believed that an undetermined additional num-
ber of refugees exist but are not known as such because they can be
found scattered throughout the territory and because they arrived in
Mexico during the 1980s in conditions very similar to those of refugees
established in the camps.
• the undocumented transmigrants are those people who have penetrated
the national territory with the idea of moving to a third country. As with
the migration to the United States, the surreptitious nature of this
movements obscures the ability to measure them. We can rely on only
those figures that match the number of deportations and expulsions
carried out by migration authorities. These figures only give an indirect
idea of the significance of this movement. The expulsions have been
constantly rising and demonstrate two points of inflection: one is in
1980, when the expulsions exceeded 10,000 actions, and the second is
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in 1990, when the figure surpassed 100,000 annual actions. Almost all
of the expulsions carried out in the past several years have been
systematically against migrants coming from Guatemala, El Salvador
and Honduras.
Summary of Results from Estimating
Procedures and Update to 1996
As of 1980, stock and flow estimates of the unauthorized migrant population
tended to be unreliable due in part to lack of methodologies for correcting for
biases in the available data sources. For instance, better methods had to be devel-
oped in order to make more valid estimates of in-flow on the basis of INS appre-
hensions and nonimmigrant entrance/exit forms. Also, early analytic estimates tended
to be inconsistent in their assumptions, methodologies, and consequently, in the
populations they described. Hence, the various estimates were difficult to compare
and evaluate (Bos, 1984). Finally, reviewers (Siegel, et al., 1980; Hill, 1985b) found
that most early analytic estimates of stock and flow were sensitive to their under-
lying assumptions. More complete data about the foreign born and the unautho-
rized migrant population had to be obtained in order to better support underlying
assumptions, such as those made about undercount (Goldberg, 1974; Heer, 1979)
and death rates (Robinson, 1980). As a result of these and other problems, Siegel
and his co-authors concluded in 1980 that there were “currently no reliable esti-
mates of the number of unauthorized residents in the country or of the net volume
of unauthorized immigration to the United States in any past recent period” (1980).
Nevertheless, they conceded that the analytic studies supported the view that by
the end of the 1970s, 2.5 million to 5 million unauthorized migrants and 1.5 mil-
lion to 2.5 million unauthorized Mexican migrants resided in the United States.
The residual studies conducted during the 1980s obtained results at the beginning
of the 1980s that tended toward the lower end of this range, subject of course to
considerable uncertainty about the fraction of the unauthorized Mexican migrant
population not enumerated in the official U.S. Censuses and surveys on which they
were based, as discussed at length above. The results of these studies also showed
the effects of IRCA’s legalization programs, which removed substantial numbers
of undocumented migrants from the estimates of stock. They also revealed that the
unauthorized migrant population (both overall and from Mexico) continued to grow
annually during the 1980s, diminished in total numbers only by the legalization
programs of IRCA.
Several broad classes of factors affect the significance and meaning of these
(and in fact any) estimates. One, of course, is their accuracy. To what degree can
we be confident that the figures reflect the sizes of the populations they are intended
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to represent? While uncertainties remain (as noted in discussions above), there is
little question that the results of research on the magnitude of stocks and flows
during the 1980s have narrowed considerably the range of plausible estimates.
However, because of data gaps (e.g., the deletion of I-53 registration system,
inadequate information on emigration, and little empirical data on the undercount
of the unauthorized population), estimates during the 1990s that rely on residual
approaches may be subject to increasing uncertainty, and thus perhaps are
increasingly likely to generate broad ranges of estimates (Woodrow-Lafield, 1996).
Another factor that effects the significance of estimates is the context in which
they occur. Estimates are most appropriately viewed not in isolation, but in rela-
tion to other kinds of changes, including population changes. We discussed above
the policy significance of possibly shifting proportions of EWIs and visa overstayers.
More broadly, it is of interest to examine how the estimates of unauthorized Mexi-
can migration compare to population size generally in both the United States and
Mexico. The estimated enumerated unauthorized Mexican population (1.131 mil-
lion) in 1980 represented about 51 percent of the total Mexican-born population in
the United States, 8 percent of the U.S. foreign-born population, 12.9 percent of
the total Mexican-origin population, 0.4 percent of the total U.S. population, and
1.7 percent of the total Mexican population.
What evidence is there about the size of the unauthorized Mexican migrant
population during the 1990s? Estimates of Mexican unauthorized migrants should
readily square with evidence about (1) the overall size of the Mexican-born
population in the United States, (2) estimated rates of underenumeration in the
legal unauthorized populations, and (3) estimates of the size of the legal Mexican-
born population. A 1996 figure for unauthorized Mexican migrant stock may be
constructed by starting with the overall size of the enumerated Mexican-born
population from the March 1996 CPS of 6.68 million. Based on the evidence in
Hogan and Robinson (1993) and Van Hook and Bean (1997) about undercount
rates, we set plausible underenumeration rates for the legal and unauthorized
Mexican populations at 4 and 12 percent respectively. Consistent with the evidence
that about 700,000 SAWs were in the United States in the 1990s, we also adopt
a mid-range estimate of 4.8 million legal Mexican immigrants (Woodrow-Lafield,
1997). Given these values, the enumerated number of legal immigrants is estimated
as 4,608 million (4.8 x 0.96 = 4.608) and the number of unauthorized immigrants
as 2.35 million (6.679 - [4.8 x 0.96]/0.88 = the number of unauthorized migrants
= 2.35). Placing a 90 percent confidence interval around the overall total of 7.15
million Mexican-born persons in the United States in 1996 (obtained by adjusting
for undercount) adds and subtracts about 150,000 from each side of this value,
giving and estimated range of 7 milliion to 7.3 million total Mexican-born persons
in the United States. In 1996, then, a figure of 2.35 million unauthorized Mexican-
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born migrants would represent 37.8 percent of the U.S. Mexican-born population,
10.2 percent of the U.S. foreign-born population, 11.6 percent of the Mexican-
origin population, 0.8 percent of the total U.S. population, and 2.3 percent of the
Mexican population.
References
Ahmed and Robinson. 1994. Estimates of Emigration of the Foreign-Born Population: 1980-
1990. Technical Working Paper No. 9, Population Division, U.S. Bureau of the Cen-
sus, Washington, D.C.
Bean, Frank D. and Marta Tienda (eds.). 1987. The Hispanic Population of the United States.
New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
Bean, Frank D., Allan G. King, and Jeffrey S. Passel. 1983. The Number of Illegal Migrants
of Mexican Origin in the United States: Sex Ratio-Based Estimates for 1980, Demog-
raphy, 20, 1 (February): 99-109.
———. 1986. Estimates of the Size of the Illegal Migrant Population of Mexican Origin in
the United States: An Assessment, Review and Proposal, Pp. 13-36 in H.L. Browning
and R. de la Garza (eds.), Mexican Immigrants and Mexican Americans: An Evolving
Relation, Austin: University of Texas Press.
Bean, Frank D., Edward E. Telles, and B. Lindsay Lowell. 1987. Undocumented Mi-
gration to the United States, Population and Development Review, 13: 4 (Decem-
ber): 671-690.
Bean, Frank D., George Vernez and Charles B. Keely. 1989. Opening and Closing the
Doors: Evaluating Immigration Reform and Control, Washington, D.C.: The Urban
Institute Press.
Bean, Frank D., Thomas J. Espenshade, Michael J. White and Robert F. Dymowski. 1990.
Post IRCA Changes in the Volume and Composition of the Undocumented Migration
to the United States: An Assessment Based on Apprehensions Data, Pp. 111-158 in
Bean, Edmonston, and Passel (eds.), Undocumented Migration to the United States:
IRCA and the Experience of the 1980s, Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute Press.
Bean, Frank D., Rodolfo O. de la Garza, Bryan R. Roberts, and Sidney Weintraub, 1997. At
the Crossroads: Mexican Migration and U.S. Policy. New York: Rowman and Littlefield.
Borjas, George J. and Marta Tienda, 1987, The Economic Consequences of Immigration.
Science 235: 645-651.
Borjas, George J., Richard B. Freeman, and Kevin Lang. 1991. Undocumented Mexican-
Born Workers in the United States: How Many, How Permanent? Pp. 77-100 in J.M.
Aboud and R.B. Freeman (eds.), Immigration, Trade, and the Labor Market, National
Bureau of Economic Research, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Bos, Eduard. 1984. Estimates of the Number of Illegal Aliens: An Analysis of the Sources of
Disagreement, Population Research and Policy Review, 3: 239-254.
Boyd, Monica. 1989. Family and Personal Networks in International Migration: Recent
Developments and New Agendas. International Migration Review 23: 638-670.
81
Briggs, Jr., Vernon. 1984. Methods of Analysis of Illegal Immigration into the United States,
International Migration Review, 18: 3 (Fall): 623-641.
Castro Martignoni, Jorge. Mexico: estimación de la migración internacional en el
período 1960-1980. Ponencia presentada en la III Reunión Nacional de
Investigación demográfica en México. Sociedad Mexicana de Demografía. Mexico,
D.F. April 1990.
Chapman, Leonard F., 1976. Illegal Aliens: Time to Call a Halt! Readers Digest, No. 109
(October): 654.
Chavez, Leo. 1988. Settlers and Sojourners: The Case of Mexicans in the United States,
Human Organization, 47:2 (Summer): 95-107.
Clark, Rebecca L., J.S. Passel, W.N. Zimmerman, and M.E. Fix, with T.L. Mann and R.
Berkowitz. 1994. Fiscal Impacts of Undocumented Aliens: Selected Estimates for Seven
States, Project Report, September 16. Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute.
CONAPO. 1995. Estimación de la Población Base de las Proyecciones de Población 1990-
2030, Consejo Nacional de Población, México, July 1995.
———. 1995. Estimación de la Población Base de las Proyecciones de Población 1990-
2030, Consejo Nacional de Población. México, March 1995.
———. 1992. Analisís y Estimación de la Migración Internacional en México, 1960-1990.,
Consejo Nacional de Población. México, December 1992.
———. 1992. Ejercicio de Conciliación Demográfica 1969-1990. Consejo Nacional de
Población. México, August 1992.
Corona, Vasquez, Rodolfo. 1997. El volumen de la inmigración mexicana indocumentada
en los Estados Unidos: especulación vs. Conocimiento científico Pp. 35-52 in Taller de
medición de la migración internacional El Colegio de la Frontera Norte y ORSTOM
(Institut Francais de la Recherche Scientifique pour le Developpement en Coopera-
tion). México.
———. 1995. Migraciones Permanentes Interestatales e Internacionales Desde y Hacia el
Estado de Oaxaca, 1950-1990 [in] Consejo Estatal de Población de Oaxaca y El Colegio
de la Frontera Norte, La Migración Nacional e Internacional de los Oaxaqueños, Oaxaca.
———. 1994. Una Estimación de Crecimiento de la Población de Origen Mexicano que
Reside en Estados Unidos, 1850-1990 [in] Revista RIO BRAVO, Vol. III, Num. 2,
University of Texas Pan A. (Center for International Studies) y Universidad de Monterrey,
Austin, Texas.
———. 1993. La migración de mexicanos a los Estados Unidos: cambios en la década 1980
a 1990 in Revista Mexicana de Sociología LV:1, 213-233.
———. Confiabilidad de los Resultados Preliminares del IX Censo General de Población y
Vivienda de 1990, Estudios Demográficos y Urbanos 16, El Colegio de México, 6:1
(Jan.-Apr. 1991), 33-68.
———. 1982. Estimación de la emigración definitiva de mexicanos a Estados Unidos en la
década de 1960-1970. Revista de Estadística y Geografía. 2:7, 9-23.
Crane, Keith, Beth J. Asch, Joanna Zorn Heilbrunn, and Danielle C. Cullinane. 1990. The
Effect of Employer Sanctions on the Flow of Undocumented Immigrants. UI Report
90-8. The Urban Institute.
82
Davila, Alberto. 1986. The Seasonality of Apprehensions of Undocumented Mexican Work-
ers, International Migration Review, 20:40 (Winter): 986-91.
Durand, Jorge and Douglas S. Massey. 1992. Mexican Migration to the United States: A
Critical Review, Latin American Research Review, 27: 2: 3-42.
Edmonston, Barry and Jeffrey S. Passel (eds.). 1994. Immigration and Ethnicity: The Inte-
gration of America’s Newest Arrivals. Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute Press.
Edmonston, Barry, Jeffrey S. Passel and Frank D. Bean. 1990. Perceptions and Estimates of
Undocumented Migration to the United States, Pp. 11-31 in Bean, Edmonston and
Passel (eds.), Undocumented Migration to the United States: IRCA and the Experience
of the 1980s, Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute Press.
Espenshade, Thomas J. 1995a. Unauthorized Immigration to the United States, American
Review of Sociology, 21: 195-216.
———. 1995b. Using INS Border Apprehension Data to Measure the Flow of Undocu-
mented Migrants Crossing the U.S.-Mexico Frontier, International Migration Review
29(2): 545-565.
———. 1990. Undocumented Migration to the United States: Evidence from a Repeated
Trials Model, Pp. 157-181 in Bean, Edmonston and Passel (eds.), Undocumented Mi-
gration to the United States: IRCA and the Experience of the 1980s, Washington, D.C.:
The Urban Institute Press.
Fay, Robert E., Jeffrey S. Passel, and J. Gregory Robinson. 1988. The Coverage of Popula-
tion in the 1980 Census, Evaluation and Research Report PHC80-E4, Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census.
Fogel, Walter. 1982. Twentieth-Century Mexican Migration to the United States, Pp. 193-
221 in B.R. Chiswick (ed.), The Gateway: U.S. Immigration Issues and Policies, Wash-
ington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research.
Forbes, Douglas and W. Parker Frisbie. 1991. Spanish Surname and Anglo Infant Mortality:
Differentials Over a Half-Century. Demography 28(4): 639-660.
Freeman, Gary P. and Frank D. Bean. 1997, Mexico and U.S. Worldwide Immigration Policy,
In At the Crossroads: Mexican Migration and U.S. Policy. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman
and Littlefield.
Frisbie, Parker. 1975. Illegal Migration from Mexico to the United States: A Longitudinal
Analysis, International Migration Review, 9:1 (Spring): 3-13.
Gabbard, S., E. Kissam, and P. Martin. 1993. The Impact of Migrant Travel Patterns on the
Undercount of Hispanic Farm Workers, Pp. 207-246 in Proceedings of the Research
Conference on Undercounted Ethnic Populations, May 5-7, U.S. Bureau of the Census.
Gabbard, S., R. Mines, and B. Boccalandro. 1994. Migrant Farmworkers: Pursuing Secu-
rity in an Unstable Labor Market. U.S. Department of Labor, Research Report No. 5,
Washington, D.C.
Garcia y Griego, Manuel. 1980. El Volumen de la Migración de Mexicanos no Documentados
a los Estados Unidos (Nuevas Hipotesis). Secretaria del Trabajo y Prevision Social.
Centro Nacional de Información y Estadísticas del Trabajo. Mexico City.
Goldberg, Howard. 1974. Estimates of Emigration from Mexico and Illegal Entry into the
United States, 1960-1970, by the Residual Method, Unpublished graduate research
paper, Center for Population Research, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C.
83
Grebler, Leo. 1966. Mexican Immigration to the United States: The Record and its Implica-
tions. University of California, Los Angeles: Mexican-American Study Project, 1966.
Greenwood, Michael J. and John M. McDowell. 1985. U.S. Immigration Reform: Policy
Issues and Economic Analysis, Contemporary Policy Issues 3(Spring): 59-75.
Greenwood, Michael J., John M. McDowell, and Eloise Trabka. 1991. Conducting Descrip-
tive and Analytic Research with the Immigration and Naturalization Service Public
Use Tapes. Journal of Economic and Social Measurement 17(3-4): 131-153.
Hagan, J.M. and S. Gonzalez Baker. 1993. Implementing the U.S. Legalization Program:
The Influence of Immigrant Communities and Local Agencies on Immigration Policy
Reform, International Migration Review, 27(3, Fall): 513-536.
Hahn, Robert A. and Donna F. Stroup. 1994. Race and Ethnicity in Public Health Surveil-
lance: Criteria for the Scientific Use of Social Categories. Public Health Reports 109(1):
7-15.
Hahn, Robert A., Joseph Mulinare and Steve M. Teutsch. 1992. Inconsistencies in Coding
of Race and Ethnicity Between Birth and Death in U.S. Infants. Journal of the Ameri-
can Medical Association 267(2): 259-263.
Heer, David M. 1979. What is the Annual Net Flow of Undocumented Mexican Immigrants
to the United States Demography, 16:3 (August): 417-424.
Heer, David M. and Jeffrey S. Passel. 1985. Comparison of Two Different Methods for
Computing the Number of Undocumented Mexican Adults in the Angeles PAMSA,
Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Population Association of America, Bos-
ton, Massachusetts.
Hill, Kenneth. 1985a. Illegal Aliens: An Assessment, Pp. 225-245 in Immigration Statistics:
A Story of Neglect, Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press.
Hill, Kenneth. 1985b. Indirect Approaches to Assessing Stocks and Flows of Migrants, pp.
205-224 in Immigration Statistics: A Story of Neglect, D.B. Levine, K. Hill, and R.
Warren (eds.) Washington, D.C.: National Academy of the Sciences.
Himes, Christine L. and Clifford C. Clogg. 1992. An Overview of Demographic Analysis as
a Method for Evaluating Census Coverage in the United States, Population Index, 58:
4 (Winter): 587-607.
Hoefer, M.D. 1989. Characteristics of Aliens Legalizing Under IRCA. Presented at the an-
nual meeting of the Population Association of America, Baltimore, Maryland.
Houston, M.R., R.G. Kramer, and J.M. Barrett. 1985. Female Predominance in Immigration
to the United States Since 1930: A First Look, International Migration Review, 18(4):
908-963.
INEGI. 1994. Encuesta Nacional de la Dinámica Demográfica, 1992. Metodología y
Tabulados. México: Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e Informática.
Jasso, G. and M. Rosenzweig. 1990. The New Chosen People: Immigrants in the United
States. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
———. 1987. Using National Recording Systems for the Measurement and Analysis of
Immigration to the United States, International Migration Review 21(4):1212-1244.
———. 1986. Family Reunification and the Immigration Multiplier: U.S. Immigration Law,
Origin-Country Conditions, and the Reproduction of Immigrants, Demography 23:291-
311.
84
Jenkins, J. Craig. 1977. Push/Pull in Recent Mexican Migration to the United States, Inter-
national Migration Review, 11:2 (Summer):178-89.
Keely, Charles B. 1983. Affadavit submitted for plaintiffs in Cuomo, et al., v. Baldrige, et
al., U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York, 80 Div. 4550(JES).
Keely, Charles B. 1977. Counting the Uncountable: Estimates of Undocumented Aliens in
the United States, Population and Development Review, 3, 4 (December): 473-481.
Kraly, E.P. 1997. Issues in Estimating Emigration. In E. Loaeza and S. Martin (eds.), Mexico-
U.S. Migration Pattern: Research Papers. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Commission on Im-
migration Reform (forthcoming).
———. 1986. Available Data, Problems and Strategies for Meeting United Nations Recom-
mendations on International Migration Statistics: The Case of the United States of
America, Pp. 63-94 in United Nations, National Data Sources and Programmes for
Implementing the United Nations Recommendations on Statistics of International Mi-
gration, Studies in Methods Series 7, No. 37, (ST/ESA/STAT/SER.F/37). New York:
United Nations.
Kraly, E.P. and R. Warren. 1992. Estimates of Long-Term Immigration to the United States:
Moving U.S. Statistics Toward United Nations Concepts, Demography, 29:613-626.
Martin, P.L. 1996. Migration News 3(8), August.
Martin, P.L. 1994. Good Intentions Gone Awry: IRCA and U.S. Agriculture, The Annals of
the American Political and Social Science Association, 534: 44-57.
Martin, P.L. 1990. Harvest of Confusion: Immigration Reform and California Agriculture,
International Migration Review, 24(1, Spring): 69-95.
Massey, Douglas S. 1986. The Settlement Process Among Mexican Migrants to the United
States, American Sociological Review, 51:670-684.
Massey, Douglas S. and Audrey Singer. 1995. New Estimates of Undocumented Mexican
Migration and the Probability of Apprehension, Demography, 32:2 (May):203-214.
Muller, Thomas, and Thomas J. Espenshade. 1985. The Fourth Wave: California’s Newest
Immigrants, Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute Press.
New York Times, Nov. 12, 1989 (page 15).
North, David S. 1975. Illegal Aliens: Final Report Outlining a Rationale for and a Prelimi-
nary Design of a Study of the Magnitude, Distribution, Flow, Characteristics and Im-
pacts of Illegal Aliens in the United States, (Contract J-LEAA-015-75 awarded by LEAA,
U.S. Department of Justice), Washington, D.C.: Linton and Company, pp. 1-3).
Partida, Virgilio. 1990. Estimación de la migración internacional Mexicana, 1960-
1980, Instituto Nacional de Estadística Geografía e Informática (INEGI), Mexico,
January, 1990.
Passel, Jeffrey S. 1991. Technical Memorandum titled Approximate Range of Error for the
Estimated Number of Undocumented Aliens Included in the 1980 Census, dated July
30, submitted in partial fulfillment of JSA No. 90-37, The Urban Institute and the U.S.
Bureau of the Census.
———. 1986. Undocumented Immigration, The Annals, 487 (September): 181-200.
———. 1985a. Undocumented Immigrants: How Many? Paper presented at the Annual
Meeting of the American Sociological Association, Las Vegas, Nevada.
85
———. 1985b. Internal memorandum to Roger A. Herriot, dated October 15, Population
Division, U.S. Bureau of the Census, Washington, D.C.
Passel, Jeffrey S. and J. Gregory Robinson. 1988. Methodology for Developing Estimates of
Coverage in the 1980 Census Based on Demographic Analysis: Net Undocumented
Immigration, Preliminary Evaluation Results Memorandum No. 114, Revised Septem-
ber. Washington, D.C.: United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census.
Passel, Jeffrey S. and K.A. Woodrow. 1987. Change in the Undocumented Alien Population
in the United States, 1979-1983, International Migration Review, 21: 4 (Winter): 1304-
1334.
———. 1986. Answers to Inquiries on the Number of Undocumented Residents. Memoran-
dum for the Record, Population Division, U.S. Bureau of the Census, Washington,
D.C.
———. 1984. Geographic Distribution of Undocumented Immigrants: Estimates of Un-
documented Aliens Counted in the 1980 Census by State, International Migration Re-
view, 18: 3 (Fall): 642-671.
Passel, Jeffrey S., Frank D. Bean and Barry Edmonston. 1990. Undocumented Migration
Since IRCA: An Overall Assessment, Pp. 251-65 in Bean, Edmonston and Passel (eds.),
Undocumented Migration to the United States: IRCA and the Experience of the 1980s,
Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute Press.
Passel, Jeffrey S., Jacob S. Siegel and J.G. Robinson. 1982. Coverage of the National Popu-
lation by Age, Sex, and Race in the 1980 Census: Preliminary Estimates by Demo-
graphic Analysis, Current Population Reports, P-23, No. 115. Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office.
Puente, Manuel de la. 1993. Why are People Missed or Erroneously Included by the Cen-
sus: A Summary of Findings From Ethnographic Coverage Reports, Proceedings of the
Research Conference on Undercounted Ethnic Populations, May 5-7, Richmond, Vir-
ginia, U.S. Bureau of the Census.
Reimers, David M. 1992. Still the Golden Door: The Third World Comes to America, 2nd
Edition. New York: Columbia University Press.
Reubens, Edwin P. 1980. Immigration Problems, Limited-Visa Programs, and Other Op-
tions, Appendix F in U.S. Immigration Policy and the National Interest: Report of the
Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Gov-
ernment Printing Office.
Roberts, Bryan R. 1995. Socially Expected Durations and the Economic Adjustment of
Immigrants, Pp. 42-86 in Alejandro Portes (ed.), The Economic Sociology of Immigra-
tion, New York: Russell Sage.
Robinson, J. Gregory. 1980. Estimating the Approximate Size of the Illegal Alien Popula-
tion in the United States b the Comparative Trend Analysis of Age-Specific Death
Rates, Demography, 17: 2 (May): 159-176.
Robinson, J. Gregory, Bashir Ahme, Prithwis Das Gupta and Karen A. Woodrow. 1993.
Estimation of Population Coverage in the 1990 United States Census Based on Demo-
graphic Analysis, Journal of the American Statistical Association, 88:423 (Septem-
ber): 1061-1071.
86
Samardick, R.M. 1995. Mexican-Born Farmworkers in U.S. Agriculture: Data from the
National Agricultural Workers Survey (NAWS). Presentation to the Binational Study
on Migration, June 22.
Santibañez, Jorge. 1997. Metodología de la encuesta obre migración en la frontera norte de
México. Pp. 206-299 in in Taller de medición de la migración internacional El Colegio
de la Frontera Norte y ORSTOM (Institut Francais de la Recherche Scientifique pour
le Developpement en Cooperation). México.
Siegel, Jacob, Jeffrey S. Passel, and J. Gregory Robinson. 1980. Preliminary Review of
Existing Studies of the Number of Illegal Residents in the United States, Draft, January.
Singh, Gopal K. and Stella M. Yu. 1996. Trends and Differentials in Adolescent and Young
Adult Mortality in the United States, 1950 through 1993. American Journal of Public
Health 86(4): 560-564.
Sorlie, P.D. and Rogot E. Johnson. 1992. Validity of Demographic Characteristics on the
Death Certificate. Epidemiology 3: 181-184.
Szekeley, Gabriel and Rodolfo O. de la Garza. 1997. Policy, Politics and Emigration: Re-
examining the Mexican Experience. in At the Crossroads: Mexico Immigration and
U.S. Policy. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
Tuirán, Rodolfo. 1994. La población mexicana indocumentada en Estados Unidos: el
resurgimiento de la preocupación por los números. Pp. 123-145 in La Migración laboral
Mexicana a Estados Unidos de América: Una Perspectiva Bilateral desde México,
México: Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores.
———. 1984. El volumen de la inmigración mexicana indocumentada en los Estados Unidos:
especulación vs. Conocimiento científico. Pp. 279-309 in Los factores del cambio
demográfico en México México: Siglo veintiuno and Instituto de Investigaciones
Sociales-UNAM.
Tilly, C. 1990. Transplanted Networks. Pp. 79-95 in Immigration Reconsidered: History,
Sociology, and Politics, edited by V. Yans-McLaughlin. New York: Oxford University
Press.
U.S. Bureau of the Census. 1996. The Hispanic Population of the United States in 1995,
Current Population Reports, Series P-23, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office.
———. 1993. Population Projections of the United States, by Age, Sex, Race, and Hispanic
Origin: 1992 to 2050, by Jennifer Cheeseman Day. Current Population Reports, Series
P-25, No. 1092. Washington, D. C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.
———. 1993a. We the American Foreign Born. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Bureau of the Cen-
sus.
———. 1993b. The Foreign-Born Population in the United States, 1990 Census of Popula-
tion, 1990 CP-3-1, U.S. Bureau of the Census. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office.
———. 1993c. We the American Hispanics. U.S. Department of Commerce, Economics
and Statistics Administration, Washington, D.C.
———. 1989. Projections of the Population of the United States, by Age, Sex, and Race:
1988 to 2080, by Gregory Spencer. Current Population Reports, Series P-25, No. 1018.
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.
87
U.S. Commission on Agricultural Workers. 1992, Final Report. Washington D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office.
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. 1992. Health 1992: United States and
Healthy People 2000 Review. Washington, D.C.: Public Health Service.
U.S. Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service. 1994. Duration of Stay
of Non-Immigrants Departing the United States, Washington, D.C.: Office of Policy
and Planning, Statistics Branch.
———. 1976. Domestic Council Committee on Illegal Aliens: Preliminary Report, Wash-
ington, D.C.
U.S. Department of Labor. 1996. Characteristics and Labor Market Behavior of the Legal-
ized Population Five Years Following Legalization. Division of Immigration Policy
and Research, by S.J. Smith, R.G. Kramer, and A. Singer.
U.S. Department of State. 1995. Immigrant Visa Waiting List in the Family-Sponsored and
Employment-Based Preferences as of January 1995, Visa Bulletin 7(49A): A1-A12.
U.S. General Accounting Office. 1995a. Border Control: Revised Strategy is Showing Some
(page 46) Positive Results, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Immigration and
Claims, Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, GAO/T-GGD-95-92,
March, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.
———. 1995b. Illegal Immigration: INS Overstay Estimation (p. 51) Methods Need Im-
provement, Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Immigration, Committee on the
Judiciary, U.S. Senate, GAO/PEMD-95-20, September, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Print-
ing Office.
———. 1993. Illegal Aliens: Despite Data Limitations, Current Methods Provide Better
Population Estimates, Report to the Chairman, Information, Justice, Transportation
and Agriculture Subcommittee, Committee on Government Operations, House of
Representatives, GAO/PEMD-93-25, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office.
U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service. 1996b. Duration of Stay of Nonimmigrants
Departing the United States, Statistics Branch, Office of Policy and Planning.
———. 1996a. Immigration to the United States in Fiscal (page 15) Year 1995, March.
(preliminary data in preparation for the 1995 Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration
and Naturalization Service).
———. 1995. 1994 Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Service.
U.S. Government Printing Office: Washington, D.C.
———. 1994. 1993 Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Service.
U.S. Government Printing Office: Washington, D.C.
———. 1993. 1992 Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Service.
U.S. Government Printing Office: Washington, D.C.
———. 1992a. 1991 Statistical Yearbook of the (page 15) Immigration and Naturalization
Service. U.S. Government Printing Office: Washington, D.C.
———. 1992b. Immigration Reform and Control Act: Report on the Legalized Alien Popu-
lation. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.
———. 1991. 1990 Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Service.
(INS Centennial Year Edition) U.S. Government Printing Office: Washington, D.C.
88
Warren, Robert. 1995. Estimates of the Undocumented Immigrant Population Residing
in the United States by Country of Origin and State of Residence: October 1992,
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization
Service, April (Draft).
———. 1990 Annual Estimates of Nonimmigrant Overstays in the United States, pp. 35-75
and 77-110 in Bean, Edmonston and passel (eds.) Undocumented Migration to the
United States: IRCA and the Experience of the 1980s, Washington, D.C., The Urban
Institute Press.
———. 1982. Estimation of the Size of the Illegal Alien Population of the United States.
Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Population Association of America, San
Diego, California.
Warren, Robert and Jeffrey S. Passel. 1987. A Count of the Uncountable: Estimates of Un-
documented Aliens Counted in the 1980 United States Census, Demography, 24: 3
(August): 375-394.
Warren, Robert and J.M. Peck. 1980. Foreign-Born Emigration from the United States: 1960
to 1970, Demography, 17: 1 (February): 71-84.
Woodrow, Karen A. 1992. A Consideration of the Effect of Immigration Reform on the
Number of Undocumented Residents in the United States, Population Research and
Policy Review, 11: 117-44.
Woodrow, Karen A. 1991a. Preliminary Estimates of Undocumented Residents in 1990:
Demographic Analysis Evaluation Project D2, Draft, Preliminary Research and Evalu-
ation Memorandum No. 75, May 22.
———. 1991b. Project D5: Preliminary Estimates of Emigration Component. Research and
Evaluation Memorandum No. 78. U.S. Bureau of the Census.
Woodrow, Karen A. and Jeffrey S. Passel. 1990. Post-IRCA Undocumented Immigra-
tion to the United States: An Assessment Based on the June 1988 CPS, Pp. 33-75
in Bean, Edmonston and Passel (eds.), Undocumented Migration to the United
States: IRCA and the Experience of the 1980s, Washington, D.C.,: The Urban
Institute Press.
———. 1989. Estimates of Emigration Based on Sample Survey Data from Resident Rela-
tives, Report prepared for the Office of Management and Budget, Office of Informa-
tion and Regulatory Affairs, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Bureau of the Census.
Woodrow, Karen A., Jeffrey S. Passel, and Robert Warren. 1987. Preliminary Estimates of
Undocumented Immigration to the United States, 1980-1986: Analysis of the June 1986
Current Population Survey, Paper presented at the 1987 annual meetings of the Ameri-
can Statistical Association, San Francisco, California, August.
Woodrow-Lafield, Karen A. .1997. Undocumented Residents in the United States in 1990:
Issues of Uncertainty in Quantification, International Migration Review. Revised ver-
sion of paper presented at the 1994 annual meeting of the American Sociological Asso-
ciation, Miami.
———. 1996b. Demographic Effects of Legalization, Forthcoming Monograph Chapter,
Bureau of International Labor Affairs, Division of Immigration Policy and Research,
U.S. Department of Labor, Based on Final Report (revised March 1995).
89
———. 1996a. Emigration from the U.S.A.: Multiplicity Survey Evidence,  Revised version
of paper presented at the 1990 annual meeting of the Population Association of America,
Toronto. Population Research and Review, 15: 171-199 (April).
———. 1995a. An Analysis of Net Immigration in Census Coverage Evaluation, ( Revised
version of paper presented at the 1990 annual meeting of the Population Association of
America, Toronto) Population Research and Policy Review, 14: 2 (June): 173-204.
———. 1995b. Potential Sponsorship by IRCA-Legalized Immigrants, U.S. Commission on
Immigration Reform, Washington, D.C.
———. 1994a. Post-Legalization Household Change and Potential Family Reunification,
revised (March 1995) version of paper presented at the 1994 annual meeting of the
Population Association of America, Miami, May 7.
———. 1994b. Undocumented Residents in the United States in 1989-1990: Issues of Un-
certainty in Quantification, presented at the 1993 annual meeting of the Population
Association of America, Miami, May 7.

91
Characteristics of Migrants:
Mexicans in the United States
Jorge A. Bustamante, Guillermina Jasso,
J. Edward Taylor & Paz Trigueros Legarreta
Introduction
The objective of this chapter is to present a comprehensive statistical portraitof Mexicans in the United States, summarizing their demographic andsocioeconomic characteristics and examining changes in these
characteristics over time.1
The observed characteristics of migrants are a product of the selectivity of the
migration process, reflecting behavioral mechanisms and the influence of personal,
household, and societal variables on migration decisions and outcomes. They are
the first determinants of international migrants’ impacts on both origin and desti-
nation countries.
Migrant characteristics partly reflect the characteristics of the population-at-
large from which migrants are drawn. For example, if migrants are drawn ran-
domly from a population that becomes increasingly educated over time, the aver-
age education of migrants will increase; if randomly drawn from a population that
is aging, the average age of migrants will increase, etc.
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However, the process that selects people into and out of migration is not random.
Forces of labor supply and demand at home and abroad shape the economic returns
to skills and other characteristics, encouraging some people to migrate and others
not to. Contacts with individuals at migrant destinations reduce both the economic
and noneconomic costs of migrating, while increasing the benefits. The spread of
“migration networks” may make migration a self-perpetuating process less selective
of individual characteristics; as a result, the characteristics of migrants and
nonmigrants may become more similar to each other over time. Studies document
cases in which statistical differences between migrants and nonmigrants from specific
locales in Mexico, which at one time were pronounced, have faded or disappeared.
Economic changes in migrant-sending areas may profoundly influence migrant
characteristics, e.g., by altering the returns to individuals’ specific human capital
characteristics in the United States relative to the place of origin or to migrant
destinations in Mexico, or by reducing expected incomes in Mexico by a large
enough margin to tip the scales in favor of migration for new groups of individuals
with new sets of socioeconomic characteristics.
Just as the people who migrate tend to be different from those who do not, so,
too, the characteristics of migrants in different migration statuses differ. Character-
istics of short-term, temporary migrant workers tend to be different from those of
more settled migrants in the United States. Among relatively settled migrants, the
characteristics of naturalized citizens (arguably the most settled group) differ from
those of noncitizens. Among legal immigrants, characteristics differ by visa type.
In many cases, these differences in characteristics by migrant status are striking.
The migration process is dynamic: the forces selecting people into and out of
migration change over time. The spread of migration networks, which make mi-
gration accessible to an increasingly broad and diverse population in Mexico, is
but one example. Data from a variety of sources indicate that socioeconomic and
demographic characteristics of migrants vary across migrant cohorts and at differ-
ent stages of sending areas’ migration histories. Migrants, themselves, may change
as well—in terms of legal status, labor-market experience, migratory behavior,
human capital, etc.
The changing characteristics of Mexico-to-U.S. migrants have important long-
run implications for both the United States and Mexico. Changes in who migrates
to the United States and who remains in Mexico, as well as in who settles and who
eventually naturalizes in the United States and who—eventually or intermittently—
returns to Mexico, have potentially far-reaching ramifications for the impacts of
Mexican migration on U.S. labor markets and on economic development in Mexico.
The selectivity of migration, and thus migrant characteristics themselves, are
inextricably linked to determinants of migration. For this reason alone, migration
theory cannot be ignored if one hopes to understand migrant characteristics and
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their changes over time. However, there are other compelling reasons not to carry
out our statistical analysis in isolation of migration theory. Researchers’ theoretical
frameworks (and governments’ policy priorities) shape the collection of data on
migrant characteristics. They determine, for example, whether households in the
U.S., households in Mexico, or migrants at the border will be the unit of analysis
for data collection. In addition to who is surveyed, they also determine what infor-
mation is collected. The U.S. Census, the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization
Service, the National Agricultural Worker Survey (NAWS), the COLEF surveys,
ENADID, and village surveys in Mexico all provide data on different Mexico-to-
U.S. migrant subpopulations and on different variables, often with little overlap.
Generalizing from these disparate data sources to construct statistical profiles of
different migrant groups requires understanding the theoretical frameworks and
policy concerns that “produced” the data. Although theories of migration are not
the focus of this chapter, we nevertheless draw from theory, where appropriate, to
interpret and compare our findings on migrant characteristics derived from differ-
ent data sources.
We also undertake, wherever possible, comparisons between migrants and other
groups as background for later chapters. Assessment of the determinants and con-
sequences of migration requires comparing the characteristics of migrants to the
characteristics of other major actors and groups. For example, a full assessment of
the determinants and consequences of migration from Mexico to the United States
would require not only description of the characteristics of Mexicans who reside in
the United States but also comparisons with: (i) Mexicans who remain in Mexico;
(ii) in-migrants to Mexico, especially those from the United States; (iii) Mexican
out-migrants to countries other than the United States; (iv) nonmigrants in the United
States; (v) out-migrants from the United States, especially out-migrants to Mexico;
and (vi) in-migrants to the United States from countries other than Mexico.
Unfortunately, data constraints do not permit such detailed comparisons. No
single data set from either side of the U.S.-Mexico border provides reliable infor-
mation on all of the variables or comparison groups that are the focus of our re-
search. Because of this, characteristics of Mexican migrants have to be pieced
together from a number of data sources in the United States and Mexico. Data
deficiencies sometimes compromise the reliability of estimates, and they put a
premium on migration theory and on developing and using statistical techniques
capable of addressing related estimation biases (as well as on developing new data
collection initiatives).
Our analysis of migrant characteristics is based partly on a review of existing
studies. However, it also draws heavily from original analysis using the most
reliable data available in the United States and Mexico. Many of our findings are
presented here for the first time. The U.S. data we use include U.S. Census data,
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INS administrative data on legal immigrants and apprehended unauthorized
migrants, preliminary data from the New Immigrant Survey (NIS) of legal
immigrants admitted in 1996, agricultural-worker survey data, and data from the
Colegio de la Frontera Norte (COLEF)/USC Los Angeles Project. The Mexican
data sources include the Mexican government’s 1992 National Survey of
Demographic Indicators (ENADID), the COLEF Survey of Migration at the
Northern Border (EMIF) and Zapata Canyon project, and household surveys
conducted by researchers from Mexico and the United States, primarily in rural
Mexican communities.
To date, little research has been conducted on the selectivity of international
migration, and the research that has been carried out has focused primarily on
“human capital” characteristics of migrants: schooling, skills, and demographic
traits. We believe that an expanded set of characteristics is appropriate for this
study, including characteristics of individual migrants (human capital, or migrant
characteristics), of the families from which migrants come (household capital, or
family characteristics), and of the migration process, itself (“migration capital,”
including migration experience of both the individual and the family of which he
or she is part). All three sets of characteristics interact in complex ways to shape
the impacts of migrants in their communities of origin and abroad as well as influ-
encing future migration propensities.
Major Conclusions
Our major conclusions include the following:
First, the Mexico-born population in the United States is not homogeneous; it
is comprised of many different behavioral and legal-status subgroups. Some mi-
grants are short-term, temporary or “circular” (i.e., sojourners, whose habitual resi-
dence is in Mexico), while others are relatively long-term or settled (habitual resi-
dents of the United States). These largely behavioral categories map imperfectly
onto migrant legal-status categories. For example, circular migrants include unau-
thorized (or undocumented) migrants, legal temporary agricultural (H-2A) work-
ers, and other legal temporary residents, including workers with H-1 visas, stu-
dents, and tourists. The settled Mexico-born population includes some legal tem-
porary residents and unauthorized migrants who spend long periods of time in the
United States, as well as legal permanent resident aliens, some of whom are natu-
ralized citizens. Both these groups are diverse, ranging in skills from agricultural
workers to Ph.D. scientists and symphony musicians.
Second, measured characteristics differ—in some cases markedly—not only
among these different Mexican migrant subgroups, but also across data sources
focusing on different groups (see Table 1).
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Table 1
Measurement of Migrant’s Legal Status in the United States:
Selected Data Sets
Legal
Nonimmigrants
Naturalized Legal Permitted Cannot Deportable
Data Set Citizens Immigrants To Work Work Migrants
A. Samples Drawn in the United States
Census/CPS
INS formerly formerly formerly
LPS formerly formerly
LA
UC-EDD
NAWS
B. Samples Drawn in Mexico
ENADID
EMIF
CañonZapata
Michoacán
MMP
NOTES: Subsets identified in the data are denoted by closed rectangles. Missing rectangle
denotes the absence of persons in the data set currently in that legal status. The set of deport-
able migrants includes legal nonimmigrants who violate the terms of their visa and entrants
without inspection. The “other Mexican household surveys” discussed in the text resemble
ENADID in their information on legal status.
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Most short-term, temporary or “circular” migrants are males (73 to 94%,
depending on the data source), young (28 to 32 years of age), with low levels of
schooling (typically between 5 and 8 years), and a disproportionately strong
attachment to U.S. agricultural jobs (up to 53% of circular migrants are employed
in agriculture). They have a very high labor force participation rate compared to
other U.S. groups (81 to 89%) but low earnings (as little as $185 per week) and
high poverty rates (more than one half of families in some circular migrant
subgroups have incomes below the poverty line). Very few (as few as 7 percent)
speak English well.
Circular migrants tend to be selected from the middle-to-lower ranges of
Mexico’s socioeconomic hierarchy. This selection process originated with the
recruitment of low-skilled Mexican workers by U.S. employers for seasonal jobs,
mostly in agriculture. It was facilitated by the long and historically porous border
between Mexico and the United States, which put U.S. labor markets within reach
of individuals with limited financial resources in Mexico; by an expanding demand
for low-skilled migrant workers in both agricultural and nonagricultural sectors
in the United States, particularly in the southwest; and by extensive “migration
networks” connecting families throughout Mexico with low-skill U.S. jobs.
Characteristics of relatively settled migrants tend to look more like those
of the U.S. population as a whole, even though differences between Mexican
migrants and the total U.S. population, in many cases, remain significant. On
average, compared with circular migrants, the settled-migrant population is more
equally balanced between genders (55% male among all Mexico-born persons
enumerated in the 1990 Census), slightly older (30 to 31 years of age) and better
educated (yet with important differences across legal status and data source—
35% of recent legal immigrants are high-school graduates and 15% are college
graduates, compared with 26% and 6%, respectively, among recent entrants in
the 1990 Census). Settled migrants have a slightly lower labor force participation
rate, again varying by visa type and data source, with 85% of the men in the
1990 Census reporting labor force participation and 90% of recent legal
immigrant men reporting U.S. employment, and are much less attached to
agricultural jobs (4-13 percent employed in agriculture). On balance, relatively
settled migrants have higher earnings and higher family incomes than circular
migrants (among recent legal immigrants, U.S. annual earnings averaged
$19,000 for men and $13,600 for women). However, family incomes are below
the median for all U.S. households ($27,000 in the 1990 Census, compared
with $38,000 for all U.S. households), and 27 percent lived below the poverty
line in 1990 (the poverty rate for all U.S. households was 13%). Between 10
and 29 percent speak English well; among recent legal immigrants, 51% speak
English at least “average or so-so.”
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Among Census-enumerated persons, those who report that they are naturalized
(it is known that naturalization is seriously overstated in the Census) tend to look
most like the total U.S. population with regard to their socio-demographic
characteristics, labor-market experience, and incomes. Just over half (54%) are
males, their average age (42 years) is higher than that of the all Americans (34
years), and 32 to 47% have a high school degree or more. More than 40% speak
English well. Their average household incomes are $28,000 to $29,000, compared
with $38,000 to $39,000 for all U.S. households. One in four naturalization-reporting
Mexican migrants lived in households with income below the poverty line in 1990,
a slightly lower percentage than for all Mexican migrants.
Both circular and settled migrant groups tend to be dominated by individuals
with low levels of skills, relative both to the U.S. population as a whole and to the
nonmigrant population in Mexico. However, they contain some highly educated
individuals. For example, legal temporary residents (e.g, individuals with H-1 and
J-1 visas) are drawn largely from the upper tiers of the Mexican skill ladder. (Legal
temporary agricultural (H-2A) workers are the exception.) Some of these individu-
als are circular migrants. Others are relatively long-term U.S. residents. The num-
ber of highly skilled Mexican migrants is small relative both to the number of
skilled people in the United States and to the total Mexico-to-U.S. migrant flow;
however, it is significant relative to the skilled population in Mexico. Highly edu-
cated Mexico-born persons in the United States include Mexicans pursuing uni-
versity degrees abroad. The subsequent migratory behavior of these individuals is
of obvious importance to the two countries and deserving of future research.
There is a marked difference between the educational attainment of Mexico-
born persons enumerated in the U.S. 1990 Census reporting entry in 1987 to 1990
and that of recent legal immigrants born in Mexico. As already noted, 35% of
recent legal immigrants are high-school graduates compared to 25.7% of the Census-
enumerated, and 14.5% of recent legal immigrants are college graduates compared
to 6.3% of the Census-enumerated. Similarly, while 28% of the Census-enumerated
have completed less than five years of schooling, the comparable figure among
recent legal immigrants is 21%. At the upper end of the educational spectrum,
while only 3% of the Census-enumerated have postgraduate schooling, 9% of recent
legal immigrants do—exceeding the figure for native-born (7%).
Third, characteristics of Mexican migrants change over time. Some of these
changes appear to be long term. For example, there is evidence that schooling
levels of Mexican migrants are increasing over time, and migrants’ origins and
destinations are increasingly urban. Long-term changes in migrant characteristics
partly reflect changes in the population at large in Mexico from which migrants are
drawn, but they may also reflect changes in the selectivity of migration over time.
Other changes are short-term, cyclical (i.e., related to recessions and expansions)
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or discrete, resulting from exogenous shocks like droughts or floods. For example,
one study found that characteristics of migrants change with U.S. business cycles,
becoming more feminine, urban, and schooled in periods of economic expansion.
Still other changes in migrant characteristics may be law- or policy-induced, for
example, the large-scale legalization of migrants under IRCA. There are some in-
dications that migration is becoming less selective and the characteristics of mi-
grants more heterogeneous over time. This could be due to the operation of migra-
tion networks, buttressed by the family reunification provisions of U.S. immigra-
tion law, which reduce migration costs and risks.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: We begin in “The Populations
of Interest” by discussing alternative definitions of the populations of interest, high-
lighting legal and behavioral definitions and noting the lack of easy correspon-
dence between them. Next, in “Theoretical Frameworks, Policy Priorities, and Data”
we briefly review the theoretical frameworks that undergird the studies and data
from which our work draws. “Data Sources—Deficiences and Constraints” de-
scribes data sources, noting their strengths and weaknesses as well as their corre-
spondence with different definitions of the populations of interest; we distinguish
between origin-country and destination-country data sources. The heart of this chap-
ter is “Measured Characteristics of Mexican Migrants in the United States,” in
which we present the characteristics of migrants. This chapter attempts to provide
a concise statement of the population of interest, theoretical frameworks, data
sources, and major findings. Details appear in the extensive set of research materi-
als in Volume 2, pages 695 to 867, which are referred to frequently in this text.
The Populations of Interest
The first task is to define the populations of interest. What do we mean when
we say, “Mexicans in the United States”?
The population whose characteristics are the focus of this study may be de-
fined in several ways, and migrant characteristics may differ across differently-
defined populations. The different definitions may be classified into two main kinds,
legal and behavioral.
Legal Definitions
Pertinent identifiers include: country of citizenship (both at birth and cur-
rently); country of birth; country of last permanent residence; visa history in des-
tination country. Measured characteristics may differ across populations defined
by one or another legal criterion. For example, age, sex, and occupation may differ
between Mexico-born and Mexico-nationals in the United States, or between
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Mexico-born legal permanent residents of the United States and all Mexico-born
in the United States.
It is obvious that in studying migrants and their descendants, a key classify-
ing variable is citizenship status at birth. Accordingly, in Volume 2, pages 695 to
698. We review briefly the process of acquiring citizenship and/or nationality at
birth in the two countries.
Behavioral Definitions
Pertinent migration types include: temporary migration in youth, long-term
seasonal or “circular” migration, permanent residential migration, retiree migra-
tion. Moreover, populations may be defined by mother tongue rather than by nativ-
ity or citizenship. Again, measured characteristics may differ across migration
streams that are differently defined. For example, naturalization patterns may dif-
fer between permanent prime-age migrants and retiree migrants.
Interrelation between Legal and Behavioral
Definitions
There is no simple correspondence between legal and behavioral definitions,
and, indeed, observed behavior may differ from the behavior presumed to be asso-
ciated with particular legal statuses. For example, legal permanent resident aliens
of the United States may behave like temporary or like long-term seasonal mi-
grants, while legal nonimmigrants of the United States may behave like long-term
permanent migrants, progressing through a long series of temporary visas.
Theoretical Frameworks, Policy Priorities, and Data
The data available to construct statistical profiles of migrants are the product
of surveys designed for specific research and policy purposes. Theory and policy
concerns determine the population(s) from which survey samples are drawn. Be-
cause of this, they also determine the migrant populations to which the findings of
research using these data may be generalized. Theoretical frameworks and their
implications for the selectivity of international labor migration and characteristics
of Mexico-to-U.S. Migrants are the subject in Volume 2, pages 699 to 708. We
briefly outline them here.
Migration research highlights five interrelated themes. First, migration decisions
and migrants’ activities in the destination country are shaped by an array of factors
including the economic and legal conditions at both origin and destination, migrants’
information about those conditions, the direct costs of moving, and characteristics
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of migrants and their households. Second, migration is selective, reflecting
differences in information and in the costs and benefits from migration. Third,
migration networks play a key part, as they not only provide information but also
affect the benefits and costs of moving. Fourth, migration is a dynamic process,
unfolding over time and changing over time as the basic factors and the networks
and the ensuing selectivities change over time. Fifth, much Mexico-to-U.S. migration
is circular.
The village surveys from which we draw were guided by a household model
in which family members allocate their labor time across destinations in such a
way as to maximize the household’s predicted or expected well-being (see Volume
2, pages 699 to 706). This view of migration may be viewed as a household version
of the view enshrined in the Latin saying, Ubi bene ibi patria, “Where one is well
off, there is one’s country.” However, it raises the possibility—indeed likelihood—
of circular migration and of an on-going involvement of migrants in the affairs of
their households of origin in Mexico. In order to raise income, insure against in-
come risks, or gain access to scarce investment funds, households in Mexico par-
ticipate in migration by sending one or more family members abroad. Often this
migration is initially conceived by both household and migrant as temporary and
for specific ends. However, there is a tendency for it to become more and more
permanent as the migrants’ economic and social (i.e., opportunity) costs of return-
ing to Mexico increase and as migrants create new, often mixed-legal-status, house-
holds in the United States. This view of migration leads to a survey design focus-
ing on “transnational households” in Mexico and gathering data on all family mem-
bers associated with each selected household, regardless of whether they are in
Mexico or the United States at the time of the survey. It sometimes requires com-
bining village household surveys in Mexico with tracer surveys of migrants in the
United States.
Well-being is shaped by many factors: social, economic, religious, political.
Moreover, both the household’s and potential migrant’s future well-being—with
versus without migration—are shaped by household and personal endowments and
characteristics as well as by the ability to predict future well-being. The benefits
from migration will differ across individuals, households, and countries, because
of differences in migration costs, differences in the amount and type of benefits
and differences in the availability of information. In this way, certain types of in-
dividuals, from certain types of households in Mexico, are selected into and out of
international migration.
Circumstances shaping the costs and risks of migrating include distance and
laws governing exit and entry. Important factors increasing benefits and mitigating
costs and risks include migration networks, information, experience, and the avail-
ability of potential sponsors—relatives or employers.
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The migration process is dynamic because many of the factors shift over time.
For example, transportation costs may change, laws may change, patterns of re-
wards to skills may change. The evolution of economies in Mexico and the U.S.
may alter the returns to particular skills (e.g., schooling in Mexico) or the mix of
skills or worker characteristics demanded by employers of migrants (schooling,
gender, etc.). Moreover, individuals and households may alter their own character-
istics in order to enhance the probability of success in a migration strategy, invest-
ing in migration networks or schooling, developing fictive-kin (compradazgo) re-
lations with village families who have relatives in the U.S., taking language courses,
or gravitating to social clubs where potential sponsors may be found.
Viewed from a macro perspective, migration may be characterized as a set of
localized migration streams, each stream possessing a history that can be traced to
pioneer migrants and in which stages or phases can be discerned. Other things
being the same, pioneer migrants tend to be more intensely positively selected than
those who follow them. Because at any point in time different migration streams
may be in different phases, migrant characteristics may differ across migration
streams and hence across studies that target different streams. To complicate mat-
ters further, a large but unknown part of global migration flows is circular. Mi-
grants often move back and forth across the Mexico-U.S. border as members of
“transnational migrant circuits.”
Most U.S. data sources (the U.S. Census of Population, CPS, and INS admin-
istrative records) are not designed to take into account the circularity of migration
flows. The unit of analysis of the Census and CPS is dwellings in the United States,
and the universe of individuals included in the Census consists of all who regularly
reside in those dwellings. The Census lacks information on characteristics particu-
larly relevant to the study of migration, such as legal status and visa type. It has
other shortcomings for analyzing immigrant characteristics, as well, including
undercounts of immigrants, particularly unauthorized ones (see the following “Data
Sources—Deficiencies and Constraints”).
In Mexico, government surveys including the ENADID have similar draw-
backs, focusing on fixed households in Mexico and excluding many migrants in
the United States who may actively participate in those households. They are guided
by a definition of households based on co-residence or propinquity, a criterion that
has been questioned in recent migration literature.
A theoretical framework of migration circularity underlies the three Colegio
de la Frontera Norte (COLEF) surveys, whose focus is on measuring both
northward and southward flows of migrants (see Volume 2, pages 702 tp 708).
Circularity is understood as a social process involving interactions of people who
orient their migration behavior toward an international labor market. It is a
theoretical construct (not a descriptive category) that applies primarily to
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international labor migration and not necessarily to all migrants. It is intended
to depict the dynamics of social processes of interactions (including the subjective
process of learning and deciding about whether or not to migrate internationally)
taking place in the structure of an “imperfect labor market,” in which wages are
shaped by power asymmetries. In this market, labor demand is personified by
employers of the host country who interact with a supply personified by migrant
workers from a different country.
Circularity suggests a purposeful migratory movement related to the
intersubjective meaning of work shared by the main actors (employers and mi-
grant workers) in the complex structure of an international labor market. It is a
dynamic result of the interplay between supply and demand in that labor market.
This interplay is the “force” that makes people move back and forth across interna-
tional boundaries. Migratory flows are conceived here as operationalizations of
the processes of circularity of international migrations for purposes of empirical
research. Migratory flows are understood as being associated in two dimensions,
one of time and the other of space. The time dimension is operationalized by (a)
the notion of a “migratory career,” understood as the time lapsing from the first
migration for the purpose of obtaining a job in the other country, to the time one
drops out of the circulatory process on a permanent basis, and (b) the notion of a
“segment” of that process, equivalent to what is referred to in the literature as
“temporary migration.”
From such an understanding of circularity comes the use of “sampling of mobile
populations,” adapted from bio-statistics, which focuses on patterns of empirically
defined “migratory flows” (spacial dimension) and empirically defined timing of
such flows (time dimension). The same scientific principles on which volumes of
migratory species, including blood cells, are measured by biologists, are used in
the COLEF studies to measure the socio-economic characteristics of Mexican mi-
grants to the United States.
Similarly, a hallmark of the research design of the New Immigrant Survey is
that new legal immigrants, once drawn randomly into the sample, will be followed
over time wherever they reside, as will members of their families. Indeed, initial
interviews with 28 sampled immigrants were conducted in a total of 20 countries,
including Mexico.
Data Sources—Deficiencies and Constraints
Accurate and comprehensive description requires longitudinal information on
probability samples of migrants, starting with preparations for the first visit and
continuing to the end of life, and including family, educational, and occupational
histories as well as visa history. Moreover, to understand the decision to migrate,
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data on nonmigrants are also required. Finally, to understand the long-term
consequences of migration, data on the descendants of migrants are also necessary.
The data needed to construct a conclusive and comprehensive portrait of
migrants between Mexico and the United States do not exist. This report presents
the characteristics of migrants as they appear in a variety of data sources. To the
extent that these different data sources capture distinct populations—for example,
INS administrative data on immigrants cover all persons granted permanent resident
status in a given year, whereas U.S. census data cover all persons, of any visa
status (adding nonimmigrants and undocumented migrants to legal immigrants)
residing in the United States as of a given day and captured by Census enumerators—
the portrait may differ by data source.
We distinguish between data based on samples drawn in Mexico and samples
drawn in the United States. We shall refer to the former as Mexico data sources and
to the latter as U.S. data sources. Notice that we do not say that the data are “col-
lected” in the given country, for, although in most cases the data are collected in
the same country in which the sample was drawn, in some research designs, as
noted above, migrants are interviewed in both countries, as well as in other coun-
tries to which they may move.
Mexico Data Sources
We rely on five key Mexico data sources: the INEGI/ENADID, COLEF’s EMIF
and Zapata Canyon project surveys, and regional (mostly community) household
surveys. Short descriptions are presented here; fuller detail is presented in Volume
2, pages 709 to 735.
INEGI/ENADID
The National Survey of Demographic Indicators (Encuesta Nacional de
Indicadores Demográficos, or ENADID), carried out in 1992, provides a basis both
for estimating selected migrant characteristics and for comparing characteristics
of migrants with those of nonmigrants.2 It offers advantages, particularly with regard
to sample design and methodology, over its precursor, the 1978-79 National Survey
of Emigration to the Northern Border and to the United States (Encuesta Nacional
de Emigración a la Frontera Norte del País y a los Estados Unidos, or ENEFNEU)
by the Centro Nacional de Información y Estadísticas del Trabajo of the Mexican
Secretaría del Trabajo y Previsión Social (CENIET, 1978; also see Ranney and
Kossoudji, 1983). The ENADID survey’s coverage includes both return migrants
and individuals who were in the U.S. at the time of the survey. Return migrants
responded directly to questions about their migration activities. Information on
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sociodemographic characteristics of migrants who were in the U.S. at the time of
the survey was provided by other members of the migrants’ families in Mexico.
Information provided by return migrants includes migration histories, making it
possible to analyze changes in some migrant characteristics and in the migration
environment over time. The survey also provides information on the domestic units
from which migrants originate in Mexico; households in Mexico are the units of
analysis for the survey.
The ENADID survey has three chief drawbacks. First, because it relies upon
family members in Mexico to report on migrants who are in the U.S. at the time of
the survey, information on migrants is limited. The ENADID survey probably is a
good source of information on basic sociodemographic information of migrants,
but not on specifics of migrants’ labor-market experience in the United States, and
it misses migrants not considered to be members of households in the sample.
Although in theory its universe includes migrants in the United States, in practice
it appears that few individuals who were in the United States at the time of the
survey were enumerated; coverage included only individuals who had migrated to
the United States in the previous five years; and, for those who were enumerated,
data were gathered only on a few sociodemographic characteristics. Second, the
survey misses entire domestic units that have migrated. If characteristics of indi-
viduals in these units differ from characteristics of individuals whose families re-
main in Mexico, estimates from the ENADID survey will be biased. It is possible,
for example, that families with few assets and income possibilities in Mexico are
more likely to migrate as complete family units than families having a stronger
financial footing in Mexico. The third major drawback of the ENADID survey is
that, while rich in demographic information, it lacks the detailed economic infor-
mation, available in some community surveys (see below), to test for the selectiv-
ity of migration or migration impacts. For example, family assets (e.g., landhold-
ings), income, and remittances from internal migrants and Mexico-to-U.S. migrants
are not available.
EMIF and the Zapata Canyon Project
The Survey of Migration at the Northern Border (Encuesta sobre Migración
en la Frontera Norte, or EMIF), attempts to capture the characteristics of distinct
flows of Mexican labor migrants. The theory and methodology for this survey was
developed by a team at the Colegio de la Frontera Norte (COLEF) headed by Jorge
Bustamante, in collaboration with Jorge Santibáñez y Rodolfo Corona. Its objec-
tive is to study the circularity of migration using a method of sampling mobile
populations. Labor migrants are identified on the basis of their migratory behavior,
that is, their displacement from a city or community of origin to another city or
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community for the purpose of working. This is a continuous survey, making it
possible to capture variations in total migration flows and in the participation of
different population subgroups in migration across the Mexico-U.S. border at dif-
ferent times of the year. Individuals leaving Mexico to work in the U.S. as well as
return migrants are surveyed at carefully selected points at or near the border. The
survey has been carried out in two stages, the first, from 1993 to 1994, and the
second, from 1994 to 1995.3 The chief drawback of the EMIF is that it focuses on
labor migration; non-labor migrants are not enumerated. EMIF data on circular
migrants are available for 1993-94 and 1994-95. Unless otherwise noted, findings
reported here are from the 1993-94 data set.
While the ENADID survey includes all types of migrants, independent of du-
ration or purpose for migrating to the U.S., the EMIF provides information only on
individuals who have worked in the United States or who reveal an interest in
migrating to the U.S. for purposes of working. The two surveys also have very
different methodologies. The ENADID survey targets individuals at their place of
normal residence in Mexico. The EMIF focuses on migrant flows, that is, persons
in transit to, or returning from, the U.S. EMIF makes it possible to estimate the
volume of migrant flows. In this respect, it is unique.
The precursor to EMIF was the Zapata Canyon project, also conducted by
COLEF. During several decades, the largest south-north flow of undocumented
migrants across the border was in the Zapata Canyon area, a plateau in U.S. terri-
tory with access from the Colonia Libertad in Tijuana. Groups of undocumented
workers would gather here, waiting to cross the border under cover of darkness.
Researchers systematically observed undocumented migrant flows and recorded
them using photographic techniques, here as well as at several other points along
the Mexico-U.S. border. After several pilot tests, in September 1987 El Colef re-
searchers began surveying randomly chosen undocumented migrants about to cross
the border, using quick interviews based on small questionnaires (3 minutes) in the
towns of Tijuana, Mexicali, Ciudad Juárez, Nuevo Laredo and Matamoros, on Fri-
days, Saturdays and Sundays of every week, from September 1987 to the present.
Some findings from this project are presented below. This survey’s main drawback
is also its main strength: It includes only undocumented migrants, providing valu-
able data on this difficult-to-survey, clandestine population. It also offers a time-
series view not available from most other data sources.
Household and Community Surveys in Mexico
Formal household surveys, usually encompassing one or more small geographic
areas, have been the basis for most recent research on characteristics of Mexico-to-
U.S. migrants and their evolution over time. Most of these surveys center on villages
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or towns in rural Mexico. They have been carried out by researchers in a range of
social science disciplines, including sociology, anthropology, and economics.
Whereas geographic coverage and sample size are the strengths of the nationally
representative data sets discussed above, depth and detail are the great advantage
of community survey data.
Household surveys offer potentially the most reliable basis for estimating char-
acteristics of Mexico-to-U.S. migrants from the places covered by these surveys. A
good survey design involves random sampling of village households (typically,
dwellings) and a survey instrument that gathers information on all close relatives
of those living in the household—whether currently in Mexico or in the United
States. Even if an entire family moves to the United States (which is rare), data
from other households (e.g., containing parents or siblings) may be used to ascer-
tain a person’s characteristics if comprehensive lists of family members are as-
sembled as part of the survey. Data from a well-designed village survey should:
• Make it possible to construct a detailed portrait of the characteristics of
migrants and of the households and communities from which they come
• Provide a basis to compare those who migrate to the United States with
those who do not (the latter include nonmigrants and internal migrants)
• Provide a means to correct for sample selection bias when estimating,
for example, migrant earnings, remittances, and net income contribu-
tions to village household incomes.
Surveys of small numbers of households (50-100 households per community
are typical of community surveys in Mexico) are relatively easy to reproduce.
Because of this, community household surveys offer some of the most reliable—
and in some cases, the only—basis for analyzing changes in migrant characteris-
tics over time.
The major disadvantage of using household surveys to estimate migrant
characteristics is that it is not obvious how to generalize from surveys of small
places (e.g., villages, rural towns or urban neighborhoods) to the migrant population
at large. The best bet for individual researchers at this time is to replicate surveys
in many places situated in diverse settings, and to compare findings across surveys.
This approach has been adopted by several sociological and economic researchers
in Mexico. Unfortunately, most of their research has focused on states that
traditionally have sent large numbers of migrants to the United States. Because of
this, the communities canvassed by these surveys tend to have a high prevalence of
migration. Estimates of migrant characteristics from these data may represent
characteristics of migrants from “old” migrant-sending areas (e.g., Michoacán)
better than from “new” ones (e.g., Oaxaca) if the types of individuals who are
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selected into migration change over time. Community survey questionnaires reflect
specific research interests of those who carry out the surveys. The breadth and
detail of data vary from survey to survey.
The alternative to replicating surveys of places in Mexico is to carry out more
geographically expansive and coordinated surveys (e.g., the ENADID study) or
to conduct surveys of migrants at points of entry and exit between the two coun-
tries (EMIF). Not only do these surveys sample different subpopulations of mi-
grants, but they also illustrate the difficulties inherent in obtaining a very high
level of detail on a large number of variables in surveys covering very large geo-
graphic areas and in which expanding the survey questionnaire comes at a high
cost (ENADID) or simply is impractical for a universe in transit (EMIF). As a
result, to date there is nothing approaching a national Mexican data set from which
to reliably estimate the array of Mexico-to-U.S. migrant characteristics in which
we are interested, analyze the selectivity of Mexico-to-U.S. migration, or assess
impacts in Mexico or the United States. The level of detail required to address
many of the questions with which our research is concerned can be found only in
data sets covering a few villages or towns.
The two major community-focused surveys we utilize are from the Mexican
Migration Project (Durand and Massey) and the Michoacán Project (Fletcher,
Orlove, and Taylor). The Mexican Migration Project provides cross-sectional data
from random samples of households surveyed in 1982-83 and 1987-91 in 19
communities in the Mexican states of Jalisco, Michoacán, Guanajuato, and
Nayarit, areas that have traditionally sent large numbers of migrants to the United
States. Within each community, 100-200 households were randomly selected and
interviewed, resulting in a total sample size of 3,400 households across 19
communities. Detailed socio-demographic data were gathered, together with
migration life histories.
The Michoacán project provides time-series data on 30 households from each
of two Michoacán communities over three different years (1982, 1988, and 1992),
together with cross-sectional data on 200 households in four communities (1,820
individuals) in 1992. The focus of this survey was more economic (and somewhat
less demographic and qualitative) than the Durand-Massey survey: The survey
provides detailed data on incomes from all sources, the allocation of family time
across all income-producing activities, including migration, as well as
sociodemographic characteristics of all family members (whether present or not at
the time of the survey) and household assets. The Mexico Migration Project and
Michoacán survey data sets have been the source of information for most of the
statistical studies of Mexico-to-U.S. migration and its impacts in rural Mexico that
have appeared in major economic, sociological, and demographic journals over
the past decade.
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U.S. Data Sources
We rely on four main U.S.-side data sources: (i) the decennial Censuses and
the Current Population Surveys, including microdata as well as published tabula-
tions (such as the historical time series published in Historical Statistics of the
United States); (ii) information on legal immigrants, including official govern-
ment information (microdata compiled by the U.S. Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service (INS), tabulations published by the INS in its Annual Report (pub-
lished 1943 to 1977) and the successor Statistical Yearbook (published since 1978),
and tabulations published by the U.S. Department of State in its annual Report of
the Visa Office), a special microdata sample assembled from INS data by the Gen-
eral Accounting Office (GAO), and preliminary data from the New Immigrant
Survey; (iii) farmworker survey data, and (iv) information from the COLEF/USC
Los Angeles Project. Brief summaries are presented here; fuller detail is provided
in Volume 2, pages 735 to 745.
Foreign-Born in the Decennial Censuses and the
Current Population Surveys of the United States
The U.S. decennial censuses and the Current Population Surveys (CPS) are
among the major sources of data used by researchers to study the characteristics of
migrants. Public-use microdata files are available for the Censuses of 1900, 1910,
and 1940 through 1990.
Data drawn from the decennial Censuses and the Current Population Surveys
of the United States share several strengths and weaknesses. The major strength is
the richness of information on the foreign-born, including socioeconomic and
demographic information such as schooling, labor force participation, occupation,
earnings, and knowledge of English. Additionally, the censuses have large sample
size for the migration-relevant characteristics, enabling examination of relatively
small subgroups. The principal shortcomings of these data are their cross-sectional
nature and the absence of information on the migrant’s legal status. Cross-sectional
data are vulnerable to biases arising from emigration selectivity as well as from the
confounding of cohort and experience effects. With respect to visa status, the only
information available on the foreign-born is whether they are naturalized; thus, we
cannot distinguish between the occupational and other behavior of immigrants and
that of legal nonimmigrants (with and without permission to work) and
undocumented (or deportable) migrants. Moreover, Census information on
naturalization is problematic. The Census also suffers from problems related to
undercounts of immigrants, raising questions about differences in characteristics
between immigrants enumerated in the Census and CPS and those missed.
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Legal Immigrant Samples Based on
Administrative Records of the INS
Samples based on administrative records of the INS constitute the major source
of information about legal immigrants. These data are of two main types: (i) ad-
ministrative records covering new legal immigrants and new naturalized citizens;
and (ii) surveys of samples drawn from INS records.
INS Administrative Data.
Data collected by the INS as part of its administrative work provide an impor-
tant complement to census data. The strengths and weaknesses of INS data are also
complementary to those of census data. The principal strength is the rich detail on
legal status, coupled with information on country of birth, country of last resi-
dence, country of chargeability (for immigrants holding numerically restricted vi-
sas), and country of citizenship. The principal weakness is the absence of informa-
tion on schooling, earnings, and other pertinent socioeconomic variables.
In this report we utilize microdata from three annual cohorts of new perma-
nent resident aliens (FY 1977, 1982, and 1994), two of which (FY 1977 and 1982)
are matched to subsequent naturalization data, and from a data set compiled by
the General Accounting Office which provides information on the sponsors of
new immigrants admitted in FY 1985 as the spouses, parents, and children of
U.S. citizens. As well, we utilize time series from data published in the INS an-
nual reports.
INS data on legal immigrants include, for the subset who is adjusting status
from a nonimmigrant status, the type of nonimmigrant visa and the year of its
inception. As a supplement to this information, it would be useful to have infor-
mation about the larger population of legal temporary residents. At any given
time, an unknown number of Mexico-born persons are in the United States as
temporary visitors. The wide range of available visa types covers a variety of
permissible durations of stay and includes both visas that proscribe employment
and visas for the express purpose of employment. It would be useful to have a
time series of the number of persons holding such visas. Unfortunately, INS data
record arrivals rather than persons, and “nonimmigrants in several classes of
admission, especially students, intracompany transferees, and visitors for busi-
ness, often enter (and leave) many times in any given year” (INS 1994 Statisti-
cal Yearbook, p. 101). Thus, for example, while the 1994 INS Statistical Year-
book reports 14,773 arrivals of Mexico-born persons holding student visas, that
number is an upper bound, and the true but unknown number may be consider-
ably smaller.
110
Surveys of Samples Based on
INS Administrative Data
The principal weakness of INS administrative data—the lack of information
on schooling, earnings, and other variables—can be overcome by collecting that
information from individuals randomly selected from the administrative data. Such
a design loses none of the strengths of designs based on INS administrative record,
overcomes the deficiencies, and, when embedded in a longitudinal data collection
framework, overcomes as well the problems associated with cross-sectional data,
such as emigration selectivity and confounding of cohort and experience effects.
In this report we draw on a special study carried out by the GAO on the
immediate-relative immigrants of FY 1985 and on two main INS-based sample
surveys. These are the special two-wave survey of the IRCA legalized popula-
tion, LPS-1 and LPS-2, and the baseline interview data from the New Immigrant
Survey Pilot Study.
GAO Study
As was noted above, INS data do not include information on an immigrant’s
sponsor. The General Accounting Office assembled a microdata set containing in-
formation on the U.S. citizen sponsors of a probability sample of immediate rela-
tives who became permanent resident aliens in FY 1985. The GAO data include
information on whether the sponsor was him/herself an immigrant and on his/her
country of birth. If the sponsor was an immigrant, then information is also pro-
vided on the date of admission to immigrant status and the date of naturalization.
The data thus make it possible to distinguish not only between birth-citizens and
naturalized citizens but also, within birth-citizens, between those born in the United
States and those born abroad to U.S. citizen parents.
Legalized Population Surveys
The Legalized Population Surveys, LPS-1 and LPS-2, represent two rounds of a
longitudinal survey of a sample of persons legalized under Section 245A of the
1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act. These are persons who had lived in the
United States continuously since January 1, 1982, had applied to the INS for legal-
ization, and had been granted legalization in the first phase of the IRCA program
(i.e., had been granted legal temporary resident status). During the first round,
carried out in February to June of 1989, a total of 6,193 persons were interviewed.
The second round selected for interview a subset of the initial interviewees; a re-
quirement for participation in the second round was successful admission to legal
permanent resident status. Thus, the population covered by LPS data represent a
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subset of unauthorized migrants who were in the United States in 1989. It is not
necessarily representative of the entire unauthorized migrant population either before
or after 1982. Nevertheless, the Mexican subset of the LPS sample provides an
important complement to other data sources to estimate characteristics of Mexican
migrants, and it includes some variables (e.g., on remittance behavior) not avail-
able in other data sets.
NIS Pilot Study
To improve the data base on immigrants, a program of comprehensive, multi-
cohort, longitudinal surveys of new legal immigrants to the United States based on
probability samples of INS records was recently developed. This program—the
New Immigrant Survey—is designed to monitor changes across cohorts, with new
samples drawn periodically, and to monitor adaptation over time, interviewing
sample members at regular intervals over the life cycle and also obtaining infor-
mation about and from their children. To test the design, and in particular to assess
the cost-effectiveness of alternative methods of locating and tracking immigrants—
with the aim of maximizing both initial and longitudinal response rates—a Pilot
Study is being carried out. The Pilot Study includes a baseline interview and fol-
low-up interviews over the course of a year. The sample is a probability sample
drawn from among the set of persons who became new permanent resident aliens
during July and August of 1996. In this report we draw on preliminary results from
the baseline interview of the Pilot Study, which collected information on school-
ing, English language skill, labor force participation, and earnings both in the United
States and abroad.
Farmworker Survey Data
Almost two thirds of all seasonal agricultural service (SAS) workers are foreign
born, and over two-thirds are of Hispanic origin. In California, 92 percent of SAS
workers are foreign born, and 80 percent are from Mexico (US Department of
Labor, 1993). Because of this, farmworker surveys are an important source of data
on Mexican migrants, especially undocumented migrants. Year of entry in U.S.
Census data has been used as a proxy for legal status in some research on Mexican
migrant impacts and labor-market performance in the U.S. (e.g., Bean, Lowell and
Taylor, 1988). However, direct estimates of characteristics of unauthorized Mexican
migrants are complicated by a lack of data. Besides INS border apprehension data,
U.S. data to estimate characteristics of undocumented migrants in the United States
have come primarily from farmworker surveys. Because farmworker surveys sample
both legal and undocumented migrants and attempt to ascertain the legal status of
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migrants, they provide a potentially reliable source of data to estimate the
characteristics and labor-market performance of these two groups and a basis for
comparison with native workers (Mines and Martin, 1986; Taylor and Espenshade,
1987; Taylor, 1992a).
The UC-EDD Survey of California Farmworkers was carried out by the Uni-
versity of California, Davis (UC) and the State of California Employment Devel-
opment Department (EDD) in August 1983. The usable sample includes 554 male
farmworkers in 37 counties; workers in all crops and production-related activities
were interviewed in each survey area. The survey was designed to obtain as repre-
sentative a statewide sample of farmworkers as possible, given the well-documented
difficulties inherent in studying this population. The data provide information on
farmworker human capital and other sociodemographic characteristics, including
immigration status and country of origin; on the type of work and commodity in
which farmworkers were employed at the time of the interview; and on farmworker
earnings. Just over 80 percent of all farmworkers in the survey were Mexican-
born, and 29 percent were undocumented.
The National Agricultural Workers Survey (NAWS) was carried out in response
to the legislative requirement under IRCA that the Secretaries of Agriculture and
Labor determine annually if there is a shortage of Seasonal Agricultural Service
(SAS) workers. The NAWS collects comprehensive job history information on
SAS workers to estimate fluctuations in the labor supply. It also gathers socio-
demographic and earnings data, similar in most respects to the UC-EDD survey.
Only farm workers employed in SAS labor are interviewed for the NAWS. More
than 2,000 such workers were interviewed in fiscal year 1990.
The main concerns surrounding the research use of farmworker survey data
have concentrated on difficulties in sampling a mobile and in many cases illegal
population of farmworkers. This raises questions especially about the self-selec-
tivity of interviewees and reliability of information provided by respondents about
their immigration status. If undocumented migrants misrepresent themselves as
legal immigrants in these surveys, this will tend to reduce estimated differences
between legal and undocumented migrants in terms of socioeconomic characteris-
tics and labor market impacts and performance. Despite this limitation, studies
using farmworker survey data reveal significant differences between the two Mexican
migrant groups.
The second major limitation of farmworker survey data is that they are sector
specific. Although they may provide a reliable means to sketch a statistical portrait
of Mexican migrants in agricultural labor markets, they are not generalizable to the
Mexican migrant population outside of agriculture, because characteristics and labor
market performance of Mexican migrants selected into farm work differ from those
of Mexican migrants in other sectors. This limitation is compensated for partly by
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the fact that agriculture serves as a traditional port of entry for many new Mexican
migrants, and as such, it offers a window into changing characteristics of what
probably is the most disadvantaged segment of the Mexican migrant population in
the U.S. Although there are other immigrant- and unauthorized-migrant-intensive
sectors in the U.S., no data collection effort in those sectors approaches the scale
and rigor of farmworker surveys.
A third unfortunate limitation is that the most recent comprehensive data on
Mexican immigrant farmworkers in the U.S., the NAWS, have not been made avail-
able for public use—all studies using these data have been carried out either in-
house, at the Department of Labor, or else by a small group of non-DOL research-
ers authorized to use the data for research purposes. The DOL would not make
NAWS data available to us for this project. Because of this, most of our informa-
tion on characteristics of Mexican-migrant farmworkers comes from the 1985 UC-
EDD Farmworker survey.
The Los Angeles Survey (COLEF)
The Mexican Migrant Survey was undertaken jointly by COLEF and a team
of researchers from the University of Southern California (USC). It’s design is
based on the same methodology of “sampling of mobile populations” followed in
EMIF. Ethnographic field work helped identify four kinds of places through which
internal streams of migrants usually flow within the city of Los Angeles: a) shop-
ping centers within the Los Angeles SMSA (Standard Metropolitan Statistical
Area) where the highest percentages of people of Mexican origin are found, b)
soccer fields, c) food wagons near work centers where Mexican migrant workers
are concentrated, and d) “quadrants,” places where migrant workers gather, gen-
erally at specified street corners, seeking day work. Interviewers were sent to a
randomly selected sample of places and food wagons, where they surveyed ran-
domly chosen migrants.
Towards a Typology of Data Sources
As the foregoing description of data sources suggests, the data sources we
use cover many different subsets of Mexico-born persons in the United States.
Table 1 provides a representation of the types of migrants, by legal status, that
can be identified in our data sources. The data sources are grouped by the country
where the sample was drawn. The table identifies the major types of foreign-born
persons—naturalized citizens, legal immigrants, legal nonimmigrants with
permission to work, legal nonimmigrants without permission to work, and
deportable migrants (which includes legal nonimmigrants who violate the terms
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Table 2
Characteristics of U.S.-born Immigrant and Unauthorized Immigrant and
Farm Workers (1985) UC-EDD Survey Data
Sample Mean
Full U.S. Mexican Unauthorized
Variable Sample Born Immigrants Immigrants
Skill (1=skilled job) 0.10 0.17 0.10 0.04
Sex (1=male) 0.75 0.83 0.75 0.83
Foreign-born (1=foreign born) 0.98 0.00 1.00 0.99
Illegal immigrant (1=illegal) 0.26 0.17 0.27 1.00
Education (yrs.) 4.86 6.11 4.83 4.22
U.S.farm experience (yrs.) 12.58 11.06 12.62 8.22
Years since ommigration 14.67 12.89 14.71 9.86
U.S. citizen (1=yes) 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.10
Commodity:
Tree fruit 0.13 0.00 0.13 0.15
Nuts 0.04 0.11 0.04 0.05
FLDVEG 0.01 0.06 0.01 0.01
FFRUIT 0.43 0.28 0.43 0.33
Other 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.07
Characterstics of county in
which worker was interviewed:
Share Illegal 0.29 0.36 0.29 0.33
Per capita income 7418.10 7010.40 7427.80 7254.40
Average rent (monthly) 218.93 204.85 219.26 211.86
Share in:
So. San Joaquin Valley 0.21 0.56 0.21 0.33
No. San Joaquin Valley 0.32 0.17 0.32 0.33
Sacramento Valley 0.10 0.06 0.11 0.10
Central Coast 0.12 0.06 0.12 0.10
North Coast 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06
Inland So. Calif. 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.39
Average weekly earnings 189.82 225.61 225.61 190.20
Average hourly wage 5.23 4.57 5.25 5.10
Share hired by farm labor
contractor 0.26 0.26 0.27
Sample Size 770 18 752 203
Source: Analysis of UC-EDD Survey Data. The survey is described in detail in Mines and
Martin (1986).
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of their visa as well as entrants without inspection). As shown, and as discussed
earlier, the only group of foreign-born that can be distinguished in census and
CPS data is that of naturalized citizens; all others, including legal immigrants,
legal nonimmigrants, etc., are lumped together in one group.
An alternative way to categorize data sources is by migration-behavior crite-
ria, i.e., data sources representing relatively settled Mexican migrant populations
and households and those representing less permanently settled populations of cir-
cular migrants. Data sets specifically designed to gather information on flows of
circular migrants include the EMIF, Zapata Canyon and Los Angeles projects. The
ENADID data focus primarily on return migrants; thus, they would tend to fall into
this group, as well. Data sources that could be considered as largely focusing on
relatively settled migrant populations and households include the United States
Census and CPS, INS administrative data, the LPS, and data from community sur-
veys in Mexico. These data sources may be interpreted as providing information
on the stock of migrants in the United States more than on the flow of migrants
across the border. Of course, relatively settled migrants also emigrate.
Although findings on migrant destinations vary widely from one data source
to another, they are often similar within these two groups of data sets. We
therefore refer to these behavioral categories when presenting our findings on
migrant characteristics.
The data sources not only fall along a continuum from representing more settled
to less settled, circular migrant populations; they also cover different points in
time. Surveys focusing on migrant flows and surveys focusing on migrant stocks
yield different findings at different points in time. We emphasize this time dimen-
sion of surveys, particularly when it may offer insights into how the characteristics
of migrant stocks or flows change over time.
In this chapter we follow the convention of using the terms “foreign-born” and
“migrant” as generic terms, that is, encompassing all Mexico-born persons in the
United States. We use the term “immigrant” to refer to legal immigrants (i.e., per-
manent resident aliens—”green card” holders) and “nonimmigrant” to refer to le-
gal nonimmigrants. Persons who do not migrate are called “nonmigrants.”
Measured Characteristics of Mexican
Migrants in the United States
Mexico-to-U.S. migrants have tended to be selected from the middle-to-lower
ranges of the socioeconomic hierarchy; from rural areas and agricultural jobs in
Mexico; and for low-skill jobs in the United States. (For an historical overview of
Mexican-migrant characteristics from Mexican authors, see Volume 2, pages 769
to 778) This selection process originated at the start of this century with the
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recruitment of low-skilled Mexican workers by U.S. employers for seasonal jobs,
mostly in agriculture. It has been facilitated by the long and historically porous
border between Mexico and the United States, which puts U.S. labor markets within
reach of individuals with limited financial resources, by an expanding demand for
low-skilled migrant workers in both agricultural and nonagricultural sectors in the
United States, particularly in the southwest; by direct contracting, and by extensive
migration networks connecting families throughout Mexico with low-skill U.S.
jobs. This selectivity is evident in the youthfulness and low skill levels of Mexican
migrants, relative both to other migrant groups and to the U.S. population at large.
In this section, we present a summary of migrant characteristics; fuller detail
is provided in the tables in Volume 2, pages 747-778.
Migration Patterns: Origins in Mexico and
Destinations in the United States
Places of Origin in Mexico
Although migrants originate from throughout Mexico, the west-central region
(Michoacán, Guanajuato and Jalisco) traditionally has had the highest levels of out
migration.4 Gamio found that, in 1926, 54.3 percent of all monetary remittances
from the United States were directed to this zone. This indicator of migrant origins
coincides with findings from other researchers, although the importance of this
region appears to have diminished over time.
Virtually all of the data available to identify migrants’ places of origin in Mexico
are from surveys that we regard as representing relatively unsettled, circular mi-
grants (ENADID, EMIF, and Zapata Canyon Project). Sources of data on rela-
tively settled migrant populations either do not offer information on migrant ori-
gins within Mexico (U.S. Census and INS data) or else represent only selected
places of migrant origins (community surveys in Mexico).
Data from the 1992 ENADID indicate that the west-central zone accounted
for only 36.9% of all migrants who had resided or worked in the U.S. and 38.9% of
those who had lived in the U.S. over the previous five years. The traditional mi-
grant-sending states had been joined by Zacatecas, Durango, Mexico City, Chi-
huahua, Tamaulipas, Guerrero, and the State of Mexico, in that order, as the most
important sources of Mexican migrants for the United States. Together, these ten
states accounted for over 70 percent of the migrant total. The share of migrants in
the total populations of migrant-sending states varied. It was highest in Zacatecas,
where 9.7 percent of the population surveyed in ENADID had lived or worked in
the United States. It was 8.3 percent in Durango, 8.2 percent in Michoacán, and 6.5
percent in Jalisco. In contrast, the share was only 0.9 percent in Mexico City and 1
percent in the State of Mexico.
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ENADID data reveal that shares of recent migrants (those reporting living in
the U.S. between 1987 and 1992), were highest for individuals born in Michoacán
(3.05%), Durango (2.85%), Zacatecas (2.7%) and Colima (2.5%). At the other
extreme, the smallest shares of recent migrants in migrant-sending states were in
Tabasco (0.01 percent), Quintana Roo (0.04%), Chiapas (0.07%), and Campeche
(0.08%).
A broader picture of migrant sources can be constructed by dividing Mexico
into six regions, based on the geographic distribution of migrant birthplaces, using
ENADID data:
I. The regions of greatest out-migration, with 37.8% of all migrants, com-
posed of Guanajuato, Michoacán, Jalisco and Colima.
II. The northern-border states—Baja California including Baja California
Sur, Sonora, Chihuahua, Coahuila, Nuevo León and Tamaulipas—which
account for 20.8% of all migrants.
III. The six states located in between regions I and II—Sinaloa, Durango,
Nayarit, Zacatecas, San Luis Potosí and Aguascalientes—with 21.5%
of the total.
IV. The five interior states in and surrounding the Valley of México—the
Federal District, State of México, Querétaro, Hidalgo and Tlaxcala—
with 9.2% of all migrants.
V. Oaxaca, Guerrero, Puebla and Morelos, with a combined share of 8.2%.
VI. The six southwestern states—Veracruz, Tabasco, Chiapas, Campeche,
Yucatán and Quintana Roo—accounting for only 2.4% of the migrant
total.
If one considers only recent migration, the weight of Region I increases to 39.9%.
The EMIF data indicate that the importance of Region I in circular migration
flows is smaller, however. Region I accounts for 37.4 percent of migrants returning
from the United States and 27.7% of deported migrants in the EMIF data.
Findings from EMIF data on migrant origins for 1993-94 reported here are
based on place of birth, while those for 1994-95 are based on place of residence
prior to migration, not birthplace. ENADID data on recent migrants show flows
from region III exceeding those from region II (19.2 percent, compared with 16.8
percent). Among deported migrants, however, region II leads region III (22% versus
20.4%). In the EMIF data on migrants returning from the United States, like in the
ENADID data set, the share of those from region IV is larger than the share from
Region V (11.9 percent, versus 9.7 percent). However, in flows of those en route to
the United States and in the deported-migrant sample (EMIF), the Region-V share
118
is greater than the Region-IV share (e.g., for deported migrants, the shares are 16.3
percent for Region V and 10.2 percent for Region IV), despite Region V’s greater
distance from the border. In the most recent EMIF data, the Region-V states of
Guerrero and Oaxaca rank seventh and eighth, respectively, as sources (places of
prior residence) of north-bound migrants, but they do not rank in the top ten states
for returning migrants.
Many people migrate internally before migrating to the United States, as evi-
denced by comparing places of origin defined by birth with those defined by resi-
dence prior to migration. When one uses the residence instead of the birthplace
criterion, the weights of Regions I, III, and V decrease, while those of Regions II
and IV (the border and the Valley of Mexico) increase substantially (EMIF). The
share of migrants originating from Region I decreases from 37.8 to 33.8 percent,
and the share from Region III declines from 21.5 to 16.1 percent. Meanwhile, the
share increases from 20.8 to 29.1 percent in Region II and from 9.2 to 12 percent in
Region IV.
The Zapata Canyon project gathered data on the state in which migrants lived
prior to migrating (as opposed to birthplace). They reveal that, on average between
1988 and 1996, Michoacán and Jalisco were the largest suppliers of undocumented
migrants in the Tijuana sector, where far and away the largest flows of migrants
crossed the border—they represented 14 and 12 percent, respectively, of undocu-
mented migrants crossing at this point. However, these two states generally do not
dominate at the other border-crossing areas targeted by the survey. They tie for
second (with 9.4 percent) behind Sinaloa (13.8 percent) in Mexicali, but they do
not figure prominently farther east, in Ciudad Juarez, Nuevo Laredo, or Matamoros.
Moreover, the data reveal that Mexico City surpassed both these regions in 1995 as
the principal source of undocumented migrants at the Tijuana crossing. This is
probably because of the use of residence prior to migration rather than birth place
to determine migrant origins in this survey. Migration from Oaxaca and Guerrero
increased during the period covered by the Zapata Canyon project. Other states in
the Southeast of Mexico with Indian populations as poor as, or poorer than, the
Mixteco and Zapoteco of Oaxaca and Guerrero show no significant migration to
the United States. One of the most striking features of the Zapata Canyon findings
is the diversity of Mexican migrants’ origins, particularly at the westernmost cross-
ings, but also the shift towards urban origins and the increasing importance of
Oaxaca and Guerrero as migrant sources between 1988 and 1996.
Rural Versus Urban Origins
Migrants traditionally originated from rural areas in Mexico5. Although this
trend has weakened, a slightly larger share of migrants continues to originate from
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rural areas. ENADID data put the rural share at 59.1% for individuals living in the
United States in the previous five years. EMIF data place the rural share at 61.7
percent. Only among deported migrants is the urban-origin share higher than the
rural share (58.7%).6
The classification of migrant origins as rural versus urban is sensitive to
whether birthplace or residence is used as the classifier, because many internal
migrants shift their place of residence from a rural birthplace to an urban area,
and some of these individuals subsequently migrate to the United States. Using
residence as the criterion, the urban share in ENADID rises from 40.7 percent to
47.4 percent.
ENADID data indicate marked differences in rural versus urban origins across
regions. While the Valley of Mexico and border regions have small shares of rural
migrants (32.1 percent and 38 percent, respectively), in other regions the rural
share is over 60 percent, reaching 73.1 percent in the six Region-III states.
Destinations in the United States
U.S. destinations of Mexican migrants are available both from surveys of
circular migrants and from data on relatively settled migrant populations.
For historical, geographic, and labor-market reasons, Texas was the leading
destination for Mexican migrants prior to the 1920s. Gamio (1930), drawing from
U.S. Census data, estimated the share of Mexican migrants going to Texas at 68.7%,
followed by Arizona (13.7%), California (7.8%) and New Mexico (6.4%). The
1920 Census showed Texas’ share falling to 52.5%, while California’s share more
than doubled (to 18.8%), exceeding Arizona (12.8%). New Mexico’s share fell to
4.2%. Meanwhile, Colorado became a migrant destination, with 2.3% of the total.
Based on money orders sent to Mexico in 1926-1927, California took first place
(36.2%), followed by Texas (15.7%), Illinois (12.2), Indiana (5.1%), Arizona (4.8%),
Michigan (3.4%), Pennsylvania (1.8%) and New Mexico (1.4%).7 The geographic
distribution of migrants suggested a high proportion employed in agriculture, in
towns and small cities, with a smaller proportion working in industrial jobs in
cities like Chicago, Los Angeles, San Antonio, and the outskirts of Pittsburgh (Gamio,
1930). Overall, there was a significant dispersion of migrants in this early period.
Nevertheless, most migrants appear to have returned to Mexico—some during the
recession years of 1921-22 and others during the Great Depression following 1929
(Fonseca: 1986).
During the Bracero Program, Mexican migrants fanned out across a broad
geographic area: Texas, California, Arizona, Indiana, Delaware, Michigan, Arkan-
sas, Montana and Washington, among other states. Nevertheless, the importance
of the southwest, particularly California, continued (Fonseca, 1986; Trigueros, 1994;
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Alarcón and de la Peña, 1989). Following the end of the Bracero Program, migrant
destinations remained diverse, but migrants became increasingly concentrated in
California and Texas. In the 1978 ENEFNEU survey, California was the premier
destination (47.3%), followed, in a distant second, by Texas (27.4%) and then Illi-
nois (7.4%), New Mexico (2.7%) and Arizona (2%).
The predominance of California and Texas has continued, both for relatively
settled migrants and for circular migrants. INS data indicate that the top two desti-
nations for the Mexico-born men and women of the 1977, 1982, and 1994 legal-
immigrant cohorts were California and Texas. Illinois was the third choice in all
three years. Secondary but substantial contingents chose Arizona, New Mexico,
and the state of Washington.
The EMIF found that, among circular migrants crossing the border from the
south with prior migration experience, 42.3 headed for California, followed by
Texas at 30 percent, New Mexico (4.4 percent), Arizona (4.2 percent) and Florida
(3.1 percent).
Most deported migrants (81.9%) were in the United States only for a few
hours; thus, we have information on destinations for only 18.1% of these cases.
Nevertheless, their destinations are consistent with those from other data sources.
California is first with 44% of deported migrants, followed by Texas (31.9) and
Arizona (12.7%).
The findings presented above—especially from data on deported migrants—
may be biased in favor of the U.S. border states; apprehensions are less common in
states farther from the border than in the border area, where INS surveillance is
highest. Because of this, the U.S. destinations of migrants—including circular
migrants—may be more dispersed than indicated above.
Among cities, according to the EMIF, Los Angeles is the single most impor-
tant destination for circular migrants, claiming a share between 6.2 and 7.9 per-
cent, depending on the flow. It is followed by San Antonio, the Texas Valley, Hous-
ton, Dallas-Fort Worth and El Paso, with shares of 4.2 to 5.4%; Fresno, California
(3 to 4.3 percent); and Phoenix (2.9 to 7.3%).
The importance of California and Texas as destinations for circular migrants
is widespread across regions of origin in Mexico, but it varies depending on migration
traditions and family migration networks. In the EMIF data, among migrants
originating from the south and among deported migrants, California is the primary
destination for regions I, III, IV and V and is most important in regions I and V (for
region V, California draws 77% of those who migrate and 76.2% of deported
migrants). Texas ranks first as a destination for migrants from the border region in
all three flows enumerated by EMIF (south-north, north-south and deported
migrants). Texas also ranks first for regions III and IV, if measured by return (north-
south) flows (60.7 percent in the latter region). The dispersion of migrants across
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U.S. states is greatest for the Valley of México region. The concentration of migrants
in a small number of states is greatest for migrants originating in regions I and V.
Micro-regional studies in the state of Michoacán indicate that communities
tend to specialize in terms of migrant destinations. Migrants from Napízaro and
Puácuaro, two communities in the Pátzcuaro region, go almost entirely to the San
Fernando Valley north of Los Angeles. Migrants from Chavinda, a small commu-
nity near Zamora, migrate to the San Joaquin Valley, Salinas Valley, the San Fran-
cisco Bay area, and a barrio in Central Los Angeles (Alarcón, 1986:345). For mi-
grants from Jaripo, the poles of attraction are Los Angeles, Oxnard, San José, and
San Joaquín county (Fonseca and Moreno;1988). The chief destinations for mi-
grants from Gómez Farías are Watsonville and the San Francisco area (López Castro,
1986).
Return Behavior
Data on return migration behavior are scarce. Since the United States
discontinued exit review in 1957, it has not been possibly to directly measure
emigration from the United States. Indirect estimation suggests high levels of
emigration among legal permanent residents as well as among the broader Mexico-
born population. The Los Angeles project offers insights into migration circularity
and migrants’ plans to return to Mexico for migrants in the United States. A
significant share of all migrant cohorts (27 to 43 percent) report that they plan to
migrate back and forth between Los Angeles and their place of residence in Mexico.
The share is higher, on average, for more recent cohorts (those last entering the
United States after 1986) than for older cohorts. Among those last entering the
United States after 1986, more than two thirds (67 percent) report they plan to stay
in the United States, compared with only 27 percent of the most recent (1993-94)
cohort. These findings suggest that circularity decreases with time in the United
States. A recent study using the Mexican Migration Project data concluded that
most migrants eventually return to Mexico (Public Policy Institute of California,
1997). These findings are influenced by return behavior of past migrant cohorts
(e.g., bracero workers), however. Their relevance for predicting return behavior of
the current cohort of migrants in the United States is not clear. Increased U.S.
border enforcement may discourage return migration by making re-entry into the
United States more difficult.
Demographic Profile of Migrants
The demographic profile of Mexico-to-U.S. migrants differs for sojourners
and settlers; and it varies significantly across data sources and also over time.
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Traditional sojourner flows were dominated by young, solo males. For example,
Dagodag (1975), analyzing INS I-213 forms for apprehended migrants, found that
over 90 percent of all apprehended immigrants were 40 years of age or younger, 92
percent were males, and 62 percent were single. In contrast, the legal-immigrant
cohort of FY 1995 was 57% female, as wives of IRCA-legalized persons became
permanent resident aliens.
Gender
The importance of males in Mexico-to-U.S. migration persists, although there
is a trend toward more female migrants, and women dominate among new legal
immigrants. Variation in gender patterns across migrant type and data source and
over time is substantial, sometimes dramatic.
Most Mexico-based data sources show the share of males among Mexican
migrants to be large. The few women interviewed by Gamio in the 1920s traveled
to the United States to accompany their husbands or families. More recently, the
ENEFNEU (1978-79) found that 83.9% of migrants to the United States were males.
The ETIDEU (1984) placed the share of males at 89.1%.
Post-1990 estimates of the share of males among Mexican migrants range
from 44 to more than 90 percent. High to very high proportions of males are
found in surveys of circular migrants. In the EMIF data, women constitute only
1.88% of the return migrant flow and 5.6% of the south-north flow. Although the
share of women is larger in the deported-migrant sample, it is nevertheless low
(10.7%). The 1995 EMIF data found that the proportion of women in the north-
bound flow (4 percent) was significantly lower than in the returning flow (10
percent). They also found that return rates were higher for men whose permanent
residence is a rural community in Mexico than for men living in Mexican urban
areas. The Zapata Canyon project found similarly high concentrations of males in
undocumented-migrant flows for most years covered by the survey (97 percent in
1996). The ENADID found that 21.8% of the Mexican population that had ever
lived or worked in the United States were women. The share for those who had
lived in the United States over the previous five years was 23.9%, suggesting that
the female share is increasing.8 Among those who worked in the United States,
the female share was 16.7%.
The share of women in circular-migrant cohorts decreases with cohort age.
Women are 51.5% of migrants younger than 12 years of age, 30.7 percent of mi-
grants aged 15 to 19, and only 12.3 percent of migrants in the 45 to 49 age group
(ENADID, recent migrants).
The participation of women in migration also differs by region. In the ENADID
data, it is lowest in region V (16.5%), followed by regions I (19%), II (20.2%) and
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the Valley of México (20.3%). The highest female shares are in the border region,
where women make up 26.9 percent of all migrants.
The 1985 UC-EDD farmworker survey indicates a gender composition of
Mexican migrants that is similar to that constructed from some Mexican data sources.
It found that males constituted 75 percent of all Mexican immigrant farm workers
and 83 percent of unauthorized Mexican farm workers in California.
For the most part, shares of females among Mexican migrants are higher when
estimated from data on relatively settled migrant populations. The proportion male
among the migrants in the Michoacán surveys was .63 in 1983 and .56 in 1993.
Thus, more women are joining the migration stream. This increasing participa-
tion of females in migration over time mirrors cross-section findings from the
Mexican Migration Project. In the 19 communities surveyed by Durand, Massey,
et al., the proportion male among migrants making their first trip was 73 percent.
However, the greater the migration prevalence in a sending community, the lower
the proportion male. The male share ranged from 93.3 percent at the lowest levels
of community migration prevalence to 55.7 percent at the highest migration preva-
lence levels.
Disproportionately large male migrant shares are at odds with U.S. Census
data, which put the share of males among all Mexican immigrants at 55.1 percent
in 1990. This share varies slightly by immigration status and by period of entry. It
is lower for pre-1980 immigrants (52.8 percent) than for 1980-89 immigrants (57.5
percent). It is also lower for naturalized citizens of Mexican origin (53.7 percent)
than for noncitizens (55.5 percent). The single most male-dominated legal-status/
period-of-entry category is the naturalized, 1980-89 cohort, which was 59.7 per-
cent male. It no doubt reflects the effects of IRCA’s legalization programs. The
least male-dominated group is the naturalized, pre-1980 group (51.4 percent). All
in all, Census data show Mexican immigration to be much more gender-balanced
than do most Mexico-side or farmworker data sources.
INS data show that, among Mexico-born legal immigrants, women actually
outnumbered men for eight consecutive years between 1964 and 1971, and they
outnumbered men again in 1993 and 1994 (Table 3). Extreme peaks (e.g., 79 per-
cent male in 1991) and valleys (e.g., 43 percent male in 1995) appear due to special
legislation, such as IRCA legalization and the subsequent legalization of depen-
dents. The LPS data indicate a male share of 59 percent among newly legalized
migrants from Mexico. Nor surprisingly, this male share is almost identical to that
of the naturalized, 1980-1990-entrant cohort in the 1990 Census.
Also visible in INS data on legal immigrants is the strong attractiveness of
Mexico-born men as spouses for U.S. citizen women. For every year in which data
were available except 1994, the proportion men among the Mexico-born immediate-
relative spouses of U.S. citizens substantially exceeded fifty percent, fluctuating
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between 56 and 62 percent in the years 1971-1979 (Volume 2, page 766, Figure 2),
subsequently increasing to 63 percent in 1982 and to almost 70 percent in 1985,
but dropping to 49.4 in 1994. In contrast, the majority of spouse immigrants from
other countries are women, reflecting patterns of travel and military duty.
In short, large discrepancies in estimates of migrants’ gender ratios appear to
reflect differences in the subpopulations represented by each survey. For example,
the Census and CPS capture more relatively settled immigrant families, in which
the gender balance is close to 50-50, while the EMIF and ENADID focus on circu-
lar migrants, who by all accounts appear to be predominantly males.
Age
There is little variability in estimates of the average age of Mexican migrants
across data sources. All post-1990 data, with the exception of INS data, yield esti-
mates of the average age of Mexican migrants that are in the 29-to-33-year range.
Mexico-born migrants to the United States are young, younger than nonmigrants
in Mexico (with some exceptions), younger than migrants to the United States
from other countries, and younger than the U.S. population at large. This relative
youthfulness may reflect a number of distinct factors, including the presence of
young pioneer migrants in early-stage localized migration streams and the pres-
ence of children in cohorts of legal immigrants (both children in migrating fami-
lies and children sponsored by U.S.-citizen parents).
In 1970, Samora found that 85.8 percent of all first-time migrants were 30
years old or younger (Samora, 1971: 90). In 1978-79, according to ENEFNEU, the
share of migrants younger than 30 years had fallen to 54.7%. In 1984, however,
according to the ETIDEU, this share was 74.2%, with an average age of 26.2 years.
Estimates from more recent data sources indicate that the average ages of
Mexican migrants are only slightly higher today. In ENADID, the average age of
the population that migrated between 1987 and 1992 was 29.5 years. It was 31.6 in
the population that worked in the United States and 19.4 in the population that did
not. EMIF data find an average age of 31.7 years for the north-south flow of circu-
lar migrants. Deported migrants are younger: 25.4 years. Returning migrants are
significantly older than outmigrants from Mexico.
Age differences between migrant flows originating in rural versus urban areas
in Mexico are small in the EMIF data. Rural-urban age differences are larger in the
ENADID data. Male migrants from rural areas averaged 32.5 years of age, com-
pared with 26.8 years for migrants of urban origin. For female migrants, average
ages were 30.2 years for rural and 23.3 for urban.
Age differences across regions of origin are also small. ENADID data show
the youngest migrants originating from the Oaxaca-Guerrero region (25.1 years)
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and the oldest from the northern region (26.9 years in region II and 26.1 in region
III). Here, as in the EMIF data, the youngest groups of migrants hail from the
regions that are newest to migration (regions IV and V, both with average ages of
28 years), and the oldest are from the more traditional migrant-sending regions (I
and III, with average ages of 33 and 32 years, respectively). Among deported mi-
grants, the picture is different; the lowest ages are associated with region III (24.6)
and the highest with region V (27.7).
Average age of all (not only recent) migrants in the Michoacán surveys was 29
years in 1983 and 32 in 1993. The 1983 migrants were somewhat younger than
nonmigrants, whose average age was 32, but the 1993 migrants were considerably
older than nonmigrants, whose average age was 20. Unauthorized migrants, who
comprised just over 58 percent of all 1993 migrants, were younger (28.5 years), on
average, than documented migrants (37 years). In the 19 communities studied by
Massey and Durand, the average age of migrants in the United States at their most
recent trip was 29 years.
The 1990 U.S. Census of Population shows a median age for Mexican mi-
grants of 31.5 years, compared with just under 34 years for the U.S. population as
a whole. Median ages differ both by legal status and by period of entry into the
United States. Median age in 1990 is strikingly higher for Mexican immigrants
who reported they were naturalized U.S. citizens (41.7 years) than for noncitizens
(30.4 years). Mexican immigrants are concentrated in the prime working-age groups.
In the 1990 Census, 71.4 percent are between the ages of 20 and 54, compared with
only 50.4 percent of the total U.S. population.
INS data show legal Mexico-born immigrants to the United States to be a
young group at admission to permanent residence, with lower mean and median
age than immigrants born elsewhere in every admission cohort since 1971. This
may reflect larger family size as well as larger number of minor children of U.S.
citizens. Mean age is higher among women than among men, but the difference is
small except in 1994 (Table 3). In the LPS, average age for newly legalized mi-
grants was 30 years, very close to the median age for the naturalized 1980-90
migrant cohort in the 1996 CPS but higher than that of the naturalized 1980-90
cohort in the 1990 Census.
Average age is higher for female than male migrants. In the U.S. Census of
1990, women born in Mexico have a median age of 31 years, compared with 29.3
for men. Among naturalized citizens, average ages for men and women are 28.8
and 29.4, respectively. A similar pattern emerges from the 1996 CPS, despite slightly
higher ages. The median ages for men and women are 30.8 and 32.4, respectively;9
for the non-naturalized group, median ages are 29.9 and 30.9, respectively. In the
EMIF, average ages of migrants returning to Mexico are 32.6 for women and 31.7
for men; for deported migrants the average is 27 for women and 25.7 for men.
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Table 3
Age Distribution, Legal Immigrants: Fiscal Years 1971, 1977, 1982, 1994
Summary Characteristics
Maxi-
Subset Mean S.D. Q(.25) Q(.5) Q(.75) mum
A. FY 1971 Legal Immigrants (N = 370,478)
Men born in Mexico 20.97 14.06 13 18 27 69
Men born elsewhere 26.32 15.44 15 27 34 95
Women born in Mexico 21.05 16.39 9 18 29 74
Women born elsewhere 26.59 15.82 17 25 35 90
B. FY 1977 Legal Immigrants (N = 462,315)
Men born in Mexico 22.58 13.19 14 23 29 98
Men born elsewhere 28.86 17.76 16 27 39 99
Women born in Mexico 23.26 14.94 13 23 31 95
Women born elsewhere 30.55 18.53 18 27 41 99
C. FY 1982 Legal Immigrants (N = 594,131)
Men born in Mexico 23.74 12.26 17 24 29 98
Men born elsewhere 26.75 16.27 15 25 35 98
Women born in Mexico 24.56 15.12 14 23 32 95
Women born elsewhere 28.37 17.48 16 26 37 98
D. FY 1994 Legal Immigrants (N = 804,416)
Men born in Mexico 20.59 14.06 11 18 25 95
“, excl. legalization dep. 23.38 15.19 13 20 28 95
Men born elsewhere 30.10 17.66 17 29 40 99
Women born in Mexico 25.82 15.49 14 24 34 98
“, excl. legalization dep. 27.32 16.22 16 25 36 98
Women born elsewhere 31.58 18.01 19 29 42 99
NOTES: Figures for 1977, 1982, and 1994 are calculated from the INS microdata public use
files; 1971 figures are calculated from a one-in-one-hundred sample of the immigrant co-
hort. Cohort sizes refer to the complete cohorts; missing data on sex or age may slightly
reduce the size of the populations/sample on which calculations are based. Data for 1982
include 2300 Silva case adjustments. Data for 1994 exclude 6,022 IRCA-legalized per-
sons but includes 34,074 legalization dependents. The minimum age observed in all groups
in all years is zero, which represents infants less than one year old.  Q(.) denotes the
quantile function; thus, Q(.25) denotes the 25th percentile and Q(.5) denotes the median.
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Among recent migrants enumerated by ENADID, however, the average age of
women is less than the average for men: 26.9 versus 30.3 years, although for those
who worked in the U.S. the gap is smaller, 30.7 compared with 31.8 years.
Among legal immigrants, age varies importantly across visa categories (Table
4). Average age is a full 10 years higher among immigrants admitted as siblings of
U.S. citizens (in the 41-45 age range) than among employment-based immigrants
(in the 31-34 age range). This difference may reflect both differences in the wait-
ing time for visa issuance (e.g., visas are immediately available in all the skilled
and professional employment categories except that for religious workers, for whom
the wait has been only one or two years, but there is a 10-year waiting period for
sibling visas and for the unskilled “Other Worker” visas) and differences in age at
application (employment-based applicants in the unskilled category would be
younger than other employment-based applicants, who must satisfy substantial
educational and experience requirements). The youngest immigrants, excluding
children, are those admitted as spouses of U.S. citizens (average age of 27 for men
and 29 for women). Of course, the oldest are those admitted as parents of U.S.
citizens (average age 63 for men and 60 for women).
The Mexican community surveys and INS data indicate that migrant ages may
be increasing slightly. Average age of migrants rose from a mean of 29 in 1983 to
a mean of 32 in 1993 in longitudinal studies in Michoacán. In the INS data, mean
age of women increased from 21 in 1971 to 26 in 1994; mean age of men increased
from 21 in 1971 to 24 in 1982, but it was less than 21 in 1994. Among these legal
immigrants, increases in age may reflect longer waits for visa issuance and/or re-
duced family size. The Zapata Canyon data reveal decreasing shares of undocu-
mented migrants in the “under 20” and “20-24” year-old groups, and a sharply
rising share in the “25-29” group, between 1988 and 1996.
Marital Status
Data sources which include information on marital status uniformly indicate
that most migrants are not single. For example, the ENADID found that 65.5% of
those who went to the United States in the previous five years were either married
or in union out of wedlock. There are differences in marital status between sexes,
however: the average was 68.6 percent for men and 54.3 percent for women. The
share of separated, divorced or widowed was higher for women: 14.8 percent,
compared with 2.4 percent for men. The share of singles was similar for the two
sexes: 27.9% for men and 31.1% for women. In the return flow of circular migrants
enumerated by EMIF, the share of singles was also well under 50 percent, although
it was different for men than for women. The share of singles was 40% for women
and 33% for men. The only region of origin for which the share of singles exceeded
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Table 4
Age Distribution, FY 1994 Legal Immigrants, by Visa Category
Summary Characteristics
Maxi-
Subset Mean S.D. Q(.25) Q(.5) Q(.75) mum N
A. Employment Visas, Except Third Pref “Other Workers” and Fourth Pref: Principals
Men born in Mexico 32.62 8.47 27 31 38 68 641
Men born elsewhere 36.97 8.45 31 35 42 86 21,940
Women born in Mexico 33.29 6.89 29 33 37 57 100
Women born elsewhere 34.67 7.71 29 33 39 77 10,183
B. Employment Visas, Except Third Pref “Other Workers” and Fourth Pref: Spouses
Men born in Mexico 34.05 8.41 27 34 37 61 41
Men born elsewhere 38.43 8.83 32 37 43 92 5,345
Women born in Mexico 32.00 7.58 27 31 37 57 465
Women born elsewhere 35.27 8.16 29 34 40 76 18,768
C. Employment Visas, Third Preference “Other Workers”: Principals
Men born in Mexico 32.32 6.98 27 30 36 55 194
Men born elsewhere 36.38 8.70 30 34 41 69 1,438
Women born in Mexico 34.03 8.70 29 32 37 66 73
Women born elsewhere 39.61 9.36 32 38 45 82 2,431
D. Employment Visas, Third Preference “Other Workers”: Spouses
Men born in Mexico 32.76 5.05 29 32 38 40 21
Men born elsewhere 41.66 10.59 33 40 49 85 938
Women born in Mexico 31.44 7.32 26 30 36 58 117
Women born elsewhere 35.48 8.41 29 34 40 73 876
E. Sibling Visas: Principals
Men born in Mexico 43.06 11.50 34 43 51 76 1,026
Men born elsewhere 46.08 9.56 39 46 53 83 9,502
Women born in Mexico 42.19 11.66 34 42 51 80 1,071
Women born elsewhere 46.13 9.82 39 45 53 84 9,362
E. Sibling Visas: Spouses
Men born in Mexico 45.02 11.48 36 45 53 77 525
Men born elsewhere 48.64 9.62 42 48 55 87 5,656
Women born in Mexico 40.76 10.19 33 40 48 70 702
Women born elsewhere 42.50 8.76 37 42 48 77 7,026
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50 percent was region IV, where 53 percent of male migrants and 46.9 percent of
female migrants were single.
In the LPS, 53 percent of newly legalized migrants from Mexico were mar-
ried. The National Agricultural Worker Survey (NAWS) found that, in California,
where 82 percent of all Seasonal Agricultural Service (SAS) workers are from
Mexico, 66 percent of all SAS workers and 70 percent of male workers were mar-
ried in 1991. (Separate estimates for the SAS workers who were Mexican migrants
are not available.)
F. Spouses of U.S. Citizens
Men born in Mexico 27.04 7.14 23 25 29 84 9,786
Men born elsewhere 32.04 8.56 26 30 36 91 48,943
Women born in Mexico 29.26 9.05 23 27 33 85 10,041
Women born elsewhere 31.31 10.00 25 29 35 96 76,470
G. Parents of U.S. Citizens
Men born in Mexico 63.09 10.14 56 63 70 95 1,742
Men born elsewhere 64.45 8.49 59 64 70 99 18,112
Women born in Mexico 60.17 10.41 53 60 67 98 3,199
Women born elsewhere 61.97 9.17 56 62 68 99 33,313
H. Minor Children of U.S. Citizens
Boys born in Mexico 12.06 5.36 8 13 17 20 2,732
Boys born elsewhere 12.29 5.24 8 13 17 20 17,364
Girls born in Mexico 11.57 5.28 7 12 16 20 2,550
Girls born elsewhere 12.06 5.20 8 13 16 20 17,299
I. Adopted Children of U.S. Citizens
Boys born in Mexico 4.46 5.45 0 2 7 19 48
Boys born elsewhere 1.94 3.27 0 0 3 19 3,492
Girls born in Mexico 3.66 4.48 0 2 6 17 47
Girls born elsewhere 1.93 3.30 0 0 2 19 4,613
NOTES: Figures are calculated from the INS microdata public use files.  Q(.) denotes
the quantile function; thus, Q(.25) denotes the 25th percentile and Q(.5) denotes the
median.
Table 4 (Continued)
Summary Characteristics
Maxi-
Subset Mean S.D. Q(.25) Q(.5) Q(.75) mum N
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In the Michoacán surveys, 62% of all undocumented workers and 82 percent
of all documented workers were married. The 1990 U.S. Census of Population
reports that 59 percent of the Mexican-born male population and 61 percent of the
Mexican-born female population 15 years or over was married. The married shares
were only slightly lower for noncitizens than for those reporting as naturalized
citizens. They were lowest for the most recent cohorts of noncitizens from Mexico.
For example, among noncitizens, 45 percent of men and 58 percent of women
entering the United States between 1980 and 1990 were reported as married in the
1990 Census.
The NIS Pilot Study of the 1996 legal immigrant cohort indicates that among
those immigrants aged 25 years and older, the proportion married was higher for
males than for females—92% versus 85%. This may reflect, in part, the larger
numbers of males than of females admitted as spouses of U.S. citizens.
Schooling
At a time when the Mexican population had a very low average schooling
level, especially in rural areas, Gamio found that migrants averaged fewer than
five years of schooling and included a large share of illiterates. Despite significant
increases in public spending on education during the 1960s, Samora found that 28
percent of migrants he surveyed never had attended school, and 90 percent had not
completed primary education (Samora, 1971: 90). It appears that migrant educa-
tion levels improved by the 1980s; in the 1984 ETIDEU data the share of illiterates
was 14 percent for males and 17.6 percent for females.
All data sources provide evidence of less schooling among Mexican migrants
than in the U.S. population as a whole and among other immigrant groups. Never-
theless, U.S. data sources as well as the ENADID find numbers of highly schooled
individuals that are significant relative to the skilled population of Mexico and
evidence of increasing average schooling among migrants over time. Moreover,
estimates of average schooling using post-1990 data sources are uniformly higher
than those based on earlier data, among both relatively settled migrant populations
as well as circular migrants, and legal immigrants appear to have substantially
higher schooling than unauthorized migrants.
The ENEFNEU (1978-1979) found an average schooling level among migrants
of 4.9 years, slightly higher than that of the Mexican population over 14 years old
(4.7 years). 34.3% had studied fewer than 4 years, and only 24.6 percent had stud-
ied 7 years or more. By contrast, in the U.S. population as a whole, only 3.4 per-
cent had 4 years or fewer of schooling, 14.1 percent had between 5 and 8 years,
and 82.5% had more than 8 years (CENIET, 1982).
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The ENADID survey estimated that well over half (61.4 percent) of all persons
11 years or older who lived in the United States at any time during the 5 years
prior to the survey had six years of schooling or fewer. 87.4 percent had 9 years
or fewer of schooling. On the whole, women were better schooled than men: 55
percent of female migrants and 63.1 percent of male migrants had primary schooling
or less; 9.1 percent of women and 4 percent of men had studied beyond high
school (preparatoria).
The EMIF data on circular migrants show an average of 7.6 years of com-
pleted schooling for women and 6.26 for men headed for the United States; for
returning migrants, the averages are 7.09 years for women and 5.9 for women, and
for deported migrants, 6.88 for women and 6.53 for men. These numbers indicate
that, overall, female migrants are better schooled than male migrants, despite the
fact that in the Mexican population as a whole schooling levels are lower for women
than for men. ENADID found wide variability across regions of origin; for ex-
ample, 19.1 percent of the migrants from the top three states had not completed a
single year of school, compared with 3.8 percent of those from the northern border
area. These regional differences are attributable in large part to differences in ur-
banization; the share of Mexicans who had not completed any schooling was con-
siderably larger in rural (9.7 percent) than in urban (1.6 percent) areas. The EMIF
data show average schooling levels of 5.96 years for migrants of rural origin and
7.02 years for migrants of urban origin in the northward migrant flows.
The ENADID study shows lower schooling levels for labor migrants than for
migrants who did not work in the United States. Among recent migrants, 6.5 per-
cent of those who worked and 3.6 percent of those who did not work had never
attended school. The shares with some college education were 3.7% for labor mi-
grants and 17.4% for nonlabor migrants. This may reflect students migrating to the
United States to complete their studies.
Low average schooling among Mexican migrants is documented by U.S.
farmworker data. The UC-EDD farmworker survey found that Mexican immigrant
farmworkers had an average of 4.8 years of schooling; unauthorized migrant workers
averaged 4.2 years. In California, the NAWS found that the median level of educa-
tion among all SAS workers (of whom 82 percent were Mexico-born) was sixth
grade in 1991. This includes all education received abroad and in the United States.
Most farmworkers originate from rural communities in Mexico.
Schooling estimates from rural community surveys in Mexico mirror the low
schooling levels found in farmworker surveys. Among the migrants in the Michoacán
surveys, average schooling was only 4.1 years in 1983, but it increased to 5.8 years
in 1993. Average schooling among nonmigrants decreased over the same period,
from 4.5 to 4.3 years. Thus, while in 1983 migrants had less average schooling
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than nonmigrants, the reverse was true in 1993. Undocumented migrants had
significantly more schooling than legal migrants in 1993 (just under 7 years,
compared with just under 5 years for legal migrants). This finding partly reflects
increasing schooling levels in the populations of migrant-sending areas in Mexico—
undocumented migrants made up most of the recent-migrant flow. However, it
also reflects changes in the ways in which transnational migration selects on
schooling. In the early 1980s, relatively well-educated villagers were likely to
migrate, but their destinations were urban areas of Mexico rather than the United
States, where returns to schooling for undocumented migrant workers were low.
In the Massey-Durand survey of 19 Mexican communities, average schooling
among migrants at the time of their first trip to the United States was 5.8 years.
These data, like data from the Michoacán surveys, suggest that schooling levels
and the heterogeneity of migrants with respect to education are increasing over
time. Migrants from the highest migration-prevalence communities averaged more
than 50 percent more years of completed schooling (and nearly twice the educa-
tional diversity) than migrants from the lowest migration-prevalence communi-
ties. An upward trend in high school graduates among undocumented migrants is
one of the most salient findings from the Zapata Canyon project.
The 1995 EMIF data reveal that north-bound migrant flows are better edu-
cated than returning flows. The share in the low-education (0-to-6-year) category
is lower for north-bound migrants. The share in the higher education (7-or-more-
year) category is higher for out-migrants from Mexico than for returning migrants.
Nevertheless, for migrants originating in urban areas of Mexico, the north-bound
flow is less educated, on average, than the returning flow.
U.S. Census data indicate that, among the Mexico-born population aged 25 or
older and enumerated in 1990, 28.2 percent had less than a fifth-grade education,
compared with 2.7 percent for the U.S. population as a whole. More than three-
quarters lacked a high-school diploma, compared with just over 18 percent of the
U.S. population; 11.6 percent were high school graduates with no further school-
ing, and 2.1 percent were college graduates with no postgraduate education, com-
pared with 30.0 and 13.1 percent, respectively, of the U.S. population. The propor-
tion of Mexico-born persons in the United States holding doctorate degrees was
0.14 percent, compared to 0.76 percent for the United States as a whole. The abso-
lute number of Mexico-born doctorates, however, was 3,824, a rather large num-
ber for a small country. Note that Census data do not reveal whether these are
persons undergoing further training or engaged in postdoctoral work with nonim-
migrant visas as opposed to permanent residents of the United States.
Overall, the 1980-89 cohort of Mexican immigrants had higher levels of
schooling than the pre-1980 cohort in the 1990 U.S. Census. The share with less
than a fifth-grade education was lower for the more recent immigrant group (26.9,
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compared with 29.0), and in most cases the shares with post-secondary schooling
were higher for the more recent group, as well. At the upper end of the educational
spectrum, 4.4 percent of recent (1980-89) Mexican migrants had a Bachelors,
Masters, Professional School, or Doctorate degree, compared to just over 20 percent
of all U.S. residents 25 years or older. Recent migrants were more than twice as
likely as pre-1980 migrants to have a professional degree (1.2 percent, compared
with 0.4 percent), more than two thirds as likely to have a Masters degree (0.7
percent, compared with 0.56 percent), 50 percent more likely to have a Doctorate
degree (0.17, compared with 0.12), and more than one fifth as likely to have a
Bachelors degree (2.4 percent, compared with 1.9 percent). Naturalized citizens
almost always have smaller shares in the low-education categories and larger shares
in the high-education categories than noncitizens; however, these differences are
not large in most cases.
Among persons reporting they were naturalized citizens, the share with less
than a high-school education is lower in the 1996 CPS (52.9 percent) than in the
1990 Census (67.5), and the share with at least a Bachelor’s degree is higher in the
CPS (6.5 percent, compared with 4.9 percent in the Census). Differences between
the Census and the 1996 CPS are particularly large in naturalized, 1980-89 entrants
with college degrees; the share with a Bachelor’s degree is 7.5 percent in the CPS
and 2.0 percent in the census. However, the CPS data also indicate low average
schooling among Mexican migrants entering the United States after 1990. Seventy-
four percent of the post-1990 group had less than a high-school education, compared
with 69 to 70 percent of the pre-1990 cohorts.
Migrant cohort-specific schooling levels differ sharply between the 1990 Census
and 1996 CPS. For example, for both immigrant-status groups, the share of 1980-
89 entrants who are high-school graduates is higher in the 1996 CPS than in the
1990 Census. The same is true for the share of high-school graduates among pre-
1980 entrants.
Average schooling for newly legalized migrants in the LPS was 6 years, and
59 percent had 6 or fewer years of schooling. Only 5 percent had more than a high-
school education.
NIS data on the FY 1996 cohort of legal immigrants indicate that Mexico-born
legal immigrants—or at least those admitted to permanent residence in 1996—are
considerably better educated than previously thought. Among persons aged 25 and
older, 35% are high school graduates and 14.7% are college graduates, compared
to 26% and 6.3%, respectively, among comparably-aged recent entrants enumerated
in the 1990 Census (Table 5). Moreover, 9.1% of the legal immigrants have
completed 17 or more years of schooling, compared to 3% of those enumerated in
the 1990 Census. School enrollment rates among persons 18 to 24 years of age are
also higher among legal immigrants than among the census-enumerated—25%
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versus 16%. Thus, the U.S. Census, given that it includes both legal and unauthorized
migrants, provides a portrait of schooling that seriously understates the schooling
of legally admitted permanent residents.
The FY 1996 legal immigrants born in Mexico have a rate of college gradua-
tion approaching that among the native-born—15% compared to 20%—and a higher
rate of advanced schooling than the native-born—9% compared to 7% (Tables 5
and 6). On the other hand, legal immigrants born in Mexico have a substantially
larger proportion with low levels of schooling than either immigrants born else-
where or the native-born U.S. population—65% without a high-school education
compared to 34% among all the FY 1996 legal immigrants and 23% among the
native-born U.S. population in 1990.
Table 5
Schooling Distributions and School Enrollment Rates, Persons
Born in Mexico: NIS 1996 Cohort and 1990 Census
Recent Entrants (Entered 1987-90)
NIS 1996 U.S. 1990
Schooling Characteristic Cohort Census
A. Years of Schooling Completed, Persons Aged 25 and Over
Less than 5 years 21.2 28.1
5-8 years 29.5 28.6
9-11 years 14.6 17.6
12 years 11.0 11.1
13-15 years 9.1 8.3
16 years 5.7 3.3
17-18 years 5.3 1.1
19+ years 3.8 1.9
Mean years 8.9 –
Median 7.0 –
B. School Enrollment, Persons
 Aged 18 to 24 Years 25.4 15.7
NOTE: 1990 Census figures for foreign-born are drawn from published tabulations
(1990 CP-3-1).
SOURCE: Jasso, Massey, Rosenzweig, and Smith (1997).
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Schooling levels among legal immigrants also differ substantially across visa
categories, and patterns among the Mexico-born are qualitatively similar to pat-
terns among those born elsewhere (Table 7). In general, and as expected, immi-
grants with employment-based visas have the highest schooling levels—averaging
16 years for both Mexico-born and the 1996 cohort as a whole. Immigrants admit-
ted as parents of U.S. citizens have the lowest average schooling, 7.5 years on
average for the cohort as a whole and 4.5 years for the Mexico-born. Immigrants
admitted as spouses and siblings of U.S. citizens have intermediate average schooling
levels, with spouses higher, reflecting screening implicit in their selection as mates
by U.S. citizens. Although the qualitative patterns are similar, there are some quan-
titative differences. For example, the difference between the average schooling of
Table 6
Schooling Distributions and School Enrollment Rates: NIS 1996
Cohort, 1990 Census Foreign-born (Entered 1987-90),
and 1990 Census Native-born
NIS 1996 Foreign-born Native-born
Schooling Characteristic Cohort 1990 Census 1990 Census
A. Years of Schooling Completed, Persons Aged 25 and Over
Less than 5 years 6.8 12.1 1.8
5-8 years 12.7 11.9 6.9
9-11 years 14.1 12.9 14.3
12 years 12.4 17.6 31.1
13-16 years 32.9 32.8 38.8
17-18 years 12.1 7.5 4.7
19+ years 9.0 5.2 2.4
  Mean years 12.7 – –
  Median years 13.0 12.0 12.0
B. School Enrollment, Persons
 Aged 18 to 24 Years 38.2 37.8 42.9
NOTE: 1990 Census figures are drawn from published tabulations (1990 CP-3-1 for the for-
eign-born, 1990 CP-3-2 for the native-born).
SOURCE: Jasso, Massey, Rosenzweig, and Smith (1997).
136
Mexico-born spouses and spouses born elsewhere is smaller (not quite one year of
schooling) than the difference between sibling immigrants born in Mexico and
those born elsewhere (almost six years different in average schooling).
English Language Skills
Not surprisingly, information on English-language skills is available primarily
from U.S.-side data sources. Data from the 1990 U.S. Census indicate that, among
Mexico-born persons aged 5 years and older, 71 percent report not speaking English
“very well.” As would be expected, the percentage with poor English skills is larger
for those who entered the United States during the ten-year period prior to the
Census (78.5 percent) than for those who entered before 1980 (63.2 percent).
In the 1990 Census, English language deficiency is lower among those who
report they are naturalized citizens (57.5 percent) than among noncitizens (74.6
percent). It is highest for the 1980-89 cohort of non-naturalized migrants (80 percent).
The LPS found that it was higher still for the newly legalized group of migrants
Table 7
Years of Schooling Completed Among Mexico-born and All Immigrants
Aged 25 Years and Over at Admission, by Visa Class: NIS 1996 Cohort
All Immigrants Born in Mexico
Visa Class Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Spouse of U.S. citizen 13.6 4.6 12.7 4.9
Parent of (adult) U.S. citizen 7.5 5.1 4.5 4.3
Sibling, principal and spouse 13.4 5.4 7.5 2.1
Employment, principal and spouse 16.1 4.3 16.0 6.1
Refugee/asylee, principal
and spouse 13.1 4 - -
Diversity, principal and
spouse 14.5 3.3 - -
Other 11.1 4.7 7.3 3.9
All Immigrants 25 and over 12.7 5.1 8.9 5.5
NOTE: Figures are for all immigrants in the NIS 1996 cohort (July and August 1996) who were
aged 25 years and over at admission to permanent residence.
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from Mexico; only 10 percent of these migrants reported speaking English well.
English language deficiency appears to be particularly high among farm workers.
The 1990 NAWS found that only 7 percent of Mexican-born farmworkers could
speak English, and only 4 percent could read it. Mexicans represented 57 percent
of the total U.S. workforce in seasonal agricultural services (SAS) and 92 percent
of the foreign SAS workforce in 1990.
The NIS data on FY 1996 legal immigrants indicate that over half of those
aged 18 years and older speak English “average or so-so” or better (Table 8). As
would be expected, immigrants with previous experience as unauthorized migrants
have lower proficiency in English—while 51% of those with EWI experience re-
port speaking English “not very well” or “not well at all,” 44% of those without
measured EWI experience do so.
Marriage and Family
Immigrant Spouses, Parents, and
Minor Children of U.S. Citizens
Information on marriage and family for Mexican migrants is available almost
exclusively from U.S. Census and INS data. The largest single component of normal-
flow legal immigration of the Mexico-born consists of the immediate relatives—
spouses, minor children, and parents—of adult U.S. citizens. The largest component
Table 8
English Language Skill Among Immigrants Born in Mexico Aged 18
Years and Over at Admission, by Whether They Ever Entered the
United States Without Inspection (EWI): NIS 1996 Cohort
No EWI Some EWI
English Language Proficiency All Experience Experience
Speaks English “very well” 9.1 12.9 5.6
Speaks English “fairly well” 9.7 16.7 5.6
Speaks English “average or so-so” 32.9 26.2 38.1
Speaks English “not very well” 17.9 13.2 21.4
Speaks English “not well at all” 30.3 30.9 29.3
NOTE: Respondents classified as having EWI experience met at least one of two criteria: (i)
their first trip to the United States was without legal documents, or (ii) adjustment to perma-
nent residence was from an EWI status.
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of immediate-relative immigration consists of the spouses of U.S. citizens. Mexico
is the leading source of spouses of U.S. citizens.
While the number of visas under the preference system is limited both world-
wide and per country (20,000 prior to the Immigration Act of 1990; 7 percent of
the total annual family-sponsored and employment-sponsored preference limits
subsequently—e.g., 31,627 for FY 1996), the number of immediate relatives has
no ceiling. In FY 1985 (the only year for which data are available on the nativity of
the U.S.-citizen sponsors), 73 percent of all Mexico-born immediate relatives were
sponsored by native-born U.S. citizens. In contrast, worldwide, 64 percent of all
immediate relatives were sponsored by native-born U.S. citizens.
Immediate-relative immigration from Mexico has exceeded 20,000 every year
since FY 1978 and has exceeded 30,000 every year since FY 1982 except for FY
1992 and FY 1995; it peaked during Fiscal Years 1986-1988, when it exceeded
40,000 per year.
Spouses of U.S. Citizens
Most of the immediate relatives from Mexico are spouses of U.S. citizens; the
spouse flow alone exceeded 30,000 in FYs 1986-1988. Time series data indicate a
strong decline since FY 1989, to lows of 15,350 in FY 1992 and, after an upturn, to
13,841 in FY 1995.
Sex Ratio Among Spouses and Sponsors
As noted above, INS legal-immigrant data indicate that marriage to a U.S.
citizen is predominantly an activity involving U.S. women and Mexican men. In
the period FY 1971-1979, the proportion husbands fluctuated between 56 percent
and 61.8 percent. Microdata from the FY 1982 cohort indicate that the proportion
husbands was 63.4 percent, and a probability sample drawn by the General Ac-
counting Office (GAO) for the FY 1985 immediate-relative immigrants indicates
that the proportion husbands in 1985 was 69.85 percent. However, the proportion
husbands declined to 49.4% in 1994, and in the NIS cohort of 1996 to 44.2%.
Nativity of U.S. Citizen Sponsors of Spouses
The GAO data also indicate that a substantial majority of the U.S. sponsors of
spouses in FY 1985 were U.S. citizens by birth—almost 78 percent (Table 9). Among
the male sponsors of Mexican brides, 73.17 percent were born in the United States,
and an additional 4.88 percent were U.S. citizens by birth, born to Americans abroad;
among the female sponsors of Mexican husbands, 74.74 percent were born in the
United States, and an additional 2.11 percent were born abroad to U.S. parents. For
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Table 9
Sex and Citizenship Type of the U.S. Citizen Sponsors of Immediate
Relatives, for All Immediate Relatives and Those Born
in Mexico: Evidence from the GAO FY 1985
Immediate-relative Immigrants File
Sponsor’s Own Adopted
Citizenship Type Spouses Children Children Parents
A. All Immediate-relative Immigrants
Birth-citizen,
Born in U.S. 76.28 52.57 97.89 2.91
Birth-citizen,
Born Abroad to U.S. Parent(s) 4.02 12.64 0 1.65
Birth-citizen,
Place of Birth Not Known 0.18 0 0 0
Naturalized
Immigrant 19.52 34.79 2.92 95.44
Total
Sponsored Immigrants 124,093 25,778 9,286 38,986
B. Immediate-relative Immigrants Born in Mexico
Birth-citizen,
Born in U.S. 74.26 48.48 0 6.67
Birth-citizen,
Born Abroad to U.S. Parent(s) 2.94 24.24 0 6.67
Birth-citizen,
Place of Birth Not Known 0.74 0 0 0
Naturalized
Immigrant 22.06 27.27 0 86.67
Total
Sponsored Immigrants 28,957 6,425 137 2,464
C. Immediate-relative Immigrants Born in Mexico, Sponsored by U.S. Men
Birth-citizen,
Born in U.S. 73.17 48.00 0 11.11
Birth-citizen,
Born Abroad to U.S. Parent(s) 4.88 20.00 0 0
Birth-citizen,
Place of Birth Not Known 2.44 0 0 0
Naturalized
Immigrant 19.51 32.00 0 88.89
Total
Sponsored Immigrants 8,730 4,868 NA 1,479
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both Mexico-born spouses of U.S. citizens and those born elsewhere, the NIS Pilot
Study registers smaller proportions of native-born sponsors—66% of the sponsors
of Mexico-born spouses and 52% of sponsors of spouses born elsewhere are native-
born U.S. citizens.
Nativity of U.S. Citizen Sponsors of Parents
and Minor Children
Not surprisingly, the overwhelming majority of sponsors of Mexico-born par-
ents—almost 87 percent in the GAO data—are naturalized citizens (Table 9). Al-
most half of all sponsors of minor children (excluding orphans) were born in the
United States, and an additional 24 percent were born abroad to U.S. parents.
Migrant Families and Family Size
As noted above, ENADID and EMIF data place the share of Mexican mi-
grants who are single at between 28 and 40 percent, depending upon the data source
and gender, with female migrants being significantly more likely to be single than
male migrants.
D. Immediate-relative Immigrants Born in Mexico, Sponsored by U.S. Women
Birth-citizen,
Born in U.S. 74.74 50.00 0 0
Birth-citizen,
Born Abroad to U.S. Parent(s) 2.11 37.50 0 16.67
Naturalized
Immigrant 23.16 12.50 0 83.33
Total
Sponsored Immigrants 20,227 1,557 NA 985
NOTE: All figures are sample estimates except the total numbers of immigrants in Panels
A and B. All naturalized-citizen sponsors of Mexico-born immediate relatives were
themselves born in Mexico except for 13.64 percent of the women sponsors of spouses,
of whom two-thirds were born in Germany and the remaining one-third in Cuba. Of
the birth-citizens born abroad who sponsored Mexico-born immediate relatives, all
were themselves born in Mexico.
Table 9 (Continued)
Sponsor’s Own Adopted
Citizenship Type Spouses Children Children Parents
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LPS data on the IRCA (Section 245A)-legalized aliens indicate that the Mexico-
born had the highest average household family size—3.8 persons, compared with
2.8 for the rest of the group.
The 1990 Census data show 18.8 percent of Mexican immigrant households
having only 1 or 2 persons, 47.7 percent having more than 5 persons, and 17.4
percent having 7 or more persons. The share of small (1-or-2-person) households
is larger for pre-1980 immigrants (20 percent), but the share of large (7-or-more-
person) households is similar across migrant-cohort groups. Noncitizen households
are less likely to be small (16.6 percent are 1-2-person households) and more likely
to be large (18.8 percent have 7 or more persons) than households headed by per-
sons reporting themselves naturalized.
Fertility
Mexico-born women enumerated in the U.S. Census have higher fertility than
the U.S. average in all age groups. Mexico-born women 15 to 24 years of age
averaged .63 children ever born, compared with .30 for all U.S. women in this
age group, and women 25 to 34 years of age averaged 2.13 children ever born,
compared with 1.33 for all women. Mexico-born women 35 to 44 years old aver-
aged 3.29 children ever born, compared with 1.96 for all U.S. women. In the 25-
34-year age group, fertility is lower the more recent the year of entry. Children
ever born for this age group range from 2.32 for pre-1980 entrants to 1.69 for
1987-90 entrants. There is no discernible fertility pattern by year of entry for the
oldest group. For the youngest group, children ever born is .56 in the pre-1980
entry cohort, peaks at .85 in the 1982-84 cohort, then declines to .52 in the 1987-
90 cohort.
Among legal immigrants in the FY 1996 cohort, the average number of chil-
dren is 2.5, with an average of 2.2 children residing in the United States and the
rest abroad.
Naturalization
Traditionally immigrants from Mexico had low naturalization rates, rates ex-
ceeded by immigrants from every country except Canada. Annual naturalizations
hovered between 6,000 and 10,000 during the 1960s and 1970s, but in the decade
after the preference category system of visa allocation was extended to the Western
Hemisphere—effectively augmenting the sponsorship privileges of citizens with
roots in this hemisphere—naturalizations more than tripled. Since then, natural-
izations have continued to increase, to 39,310 in 1994 and 67,238 in 1995 (see
Figure 3 in Volume 2, page 767). Note that these figures understate the number of
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naturalizations, as the data do not include children under the age of 16 who derive
naturalization from their naturalizing parents.
Naturalizations are expected to continue to increase, due to the confluence of
several factors: (i) the backlog pressure on the categories of spouse and minor chil-
dren of permanent resident aliens, intensified by the IRCA legalizations; (ii) the
Green Card Replacement Program, initiated in 1992, which requires that permanent
resident alien cards issued before 1978 be replaced and which, given that the requisite
investment of time and money is no more for applying for naturalization than for
replacing the green card, has led many immigrants to choose naturalization; (iii)
initiation of an expiration date, 10 years after issuance, on green cards issued since
1988, which is also likely to lead immigrants to choose naturalization over green-
card renewal; (iv) recent U.S. legislation which dramatically reduces the civil rights
and social entitlements of non-naturalized immigrants; and (v) recent amendment of
the Mexican Constitution which provides that Mexican nationals who become natu-
ralized citizens of another country do not forfeit Mexican nationality.
Overall, in the period 1961-1995, a total of 470,515 Mexican nationals natu-
ralized; this number omits children deriving U.S. citizenship from the naturaliza-
tion of their parents. Interestingly, more women than men have naturalized—al-
most 21,000 more in the 1961-1995 period. Time series data indicate that the pro-
portion male was less than half in every year since 1961 except, trivially, in 1964
and 1965 and in 1990-1993.
Naturalization rates have also increased steadily, and, although lower than
worldwide averages, have overtaken the rates for immigrants from Canada and
Germany. Among Mexico-born immigrants aged 16 and over at admission, 17.6
percent of the 1977 cohort and 11.9 percent of the 1982 cohort had naturalized by
October 1993; the corresponding figures for the worldwide cohorts are 41.5 and
37.6 percent (INS 1994 Statistical Yearbook, pp. 132-133).
The 1990 U.S. Census counted almost 1 million Mexico-born persons who
reported that they were naturalized citizens of the United States. This number con-
stitutes 22.4 percent of the total enumerated Mexico-born population but, of course,
a larger fraction of the relevant population—i.e., the total Mexico-born population
in the Census includes persons who are not eligible to naturalize, not only legal
immigrants who are too recently arrived to have met residency requirements but
also nonimmigrants and undocumented migrants. This figure, however, is thought
to be a serious overestimate (Clark and Passel 1997).
Participation in Migration Networks
U.S. immigration law virtually enshrines migration networks, given that the
majority of non-refugee visas are allotted to relatives. The main visa categories
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that do not require a network are the employment categories and the spouses of
U.S. citizens—though networks may underlie the former and may emerge from
the latter.
Nearly all data on migration networks are from community studies in Mexico.
Sixty-seven percent of all individuals enumerated by the 1993 Michoacán survey
had at least one immediate family contact in the United States. Those with kin
networks averaged 1.6 contacts each. In one village included in the longitudinal
Michoacán survey, the share of individuals with at least one family contact in the
United States increased from 56 percent in 1983 to 80 percent in 1989.
Characteristics of Migrant-Sending
Households in Mexico
Information on characteristics of migrant-sending households in Mexico is
available from community survey data. Migration networks, or access to family
contacts in the United States, are almost universally found to be the most impor-
tant single household variable influencing migration and one of the households’
most important economic and social assets. “Ownership” of migration networks
and past migration experience are fundamental characteristics of migrant house-
holds in Mexico. The most detailed data on these as well as other characteristics
of migrant-sending households come from community studies in Mexico. It is
not possible to generalize findings from surveys of small numbers of communi-
ties to the population-at-large of migrant-sending households. Nevertheless, some
patterns emerge that provide insights into changes in characteristics of migrant-
sending households at different points in the migration process and differences in
characteristics between households that send migrants to the United States and
those that do not. The verdict on whether and to what extent these findings can be
generalized will have to await the availability of new community-survey data
from Mexico.
Mexican Migration Project data suggest that landlessness is positively related
to the likelihood of undertaking a first trip to the United States. That is, controlling
for personal characteristics, first-time migrants are significantly more likely to
come from households with limited or no landholdings than from large-holder
households. They are also more likely to have fathers with U.S. migration
experience. The probability of taking subsequent trips, however, was found to
be unrelated to these household characteristics. It depended entirely on the
individual’s migratory experience and on migration networks (Massey, 1987). A
comparison of land ownership across the 19 communities surveyed in the Mexican
Migration Project suggests that migrants are more likely to come from landless
households in communities with high levels of migration prevalence. These data
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also indicate that, although the vast majority of migrants come from households
in Mexico that do not own businesses, the share that do is not negligible—
particularly at the lowest (9.3 percent) and highest (8.1 percent) community
migration-prevalence levels.
The Michoacán Project data reveal significant differences in household charac-
teristics between migrants and nonmigrants. The 1983 surveys found that Mexico-to-
U.S. migrants, on average, came from larger families (9.1 adult members 13 years of
age or older compared with 8 for non-Mexico-to-U.S. migrants), with above-average
landholdings (7 hectares, compared with 5 for nonmigrants), and relatively wealthy
households (3,470 in 1982 pesos, compared with 2,190 for nonmigrants). However,
for the most part they were not the most privileged families in migrant-sending vil-
lages. In fact, controlling for household income and wealth, migrants were signifi-
cantly more likely to come from households that were “relatively deprived” within
their village reference group—i.e., located at the bottom-to-middle of the village
income distribution. Even for otherwise similar households, migration behavior is
not uniform across socioeconomic (e.g., village) settings.
The larger, 1983 Michoacán study, like its predecessor, found that both
undocumented and documented migrants originate from households in Mexico
with above-average family size (11 and 12 family members for the two migrant
groups, respectively, compared with 10.7 for the full sample). They also come
from families with above-average education (.86 and .84 members with some
secondary schooling, compared with .76 for all households); with more family
members with migration experience (5.6 and 7.3 members, respectively, compared
with 3.4 for all households); larger landholdings (1.9 and 2.4 hectares, compared
with 1.4 for all households); and more wealth, as indicated by the value of animal
herds (5,309 and 8,781 in 1992 pesos, compared with 4,148 for the full sample).
The differences between migrant and nonmigrant households implied by these
numbers reflect both the selectivity of migration on family characteristics and
impacts of past migration experience on the accumulation of family assets. For
example, one study (Taylor, 1992) found a significant positive effect of past
migration on the accumulation of livestock.
A common characteristic of migrant households in Mexico is their receipt of
remittance income from migrants in the United States. The LPS found that 66 per-
cent of newly legalized Mexican migrant families remitted, and average remit-
tances to Mexico were $1,304, or seven percent of the total income of Mexican
migrant families in the United States. Average remittances to Mexico were higher
than to any other region. For example, average remittances were $1,144 to Central
America, $930 to other western hemisphere countries, and $874 to eastern hemi-
sphere countries. Mexico Migration Project data on 22 migrant-sending communi-
ties show that, in the 12 months prior to the survey, household heads who were
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migrants remitted an average of US $2,383, and non-heads remitted an average of
$2,100. Returning migrants who were household heads brought back an average of
$1,392 in savings; non-heads brought back an average of $858 (Massey and Parrado,
1994). Most surveys that gather data on migrant remittances do not provide infor-
mation on total incomes in surveyed households, making it impossible to ascertain
the share of remittances in total incomes of migrant-sending communities. Never-
theless, available evidence suggests that migrant remittances and savings repre-
sent an important share of total income in many migrant-sending households and
regions. For example, income remitted by migrants in the United States accounted
for 17 to 20 percent of total household income in the Michoacán Project villages,
both in 1982 (Stark, Taylor and Yitzhaki, 1986) and 1988. Studies of villages in
other regions of Mexico suggest typical international remittance shares on the or-
der of 15 to 25 percent; e.g., see Taylor and Yunez (1995).
Labor-Market Characteristics
Migrants’ occupational configurations, both in Mexico and in the United States,
differ markedly by data source and by gender. In general, data on circular migrants
show a stronger attachment of migrants to agricultural work, both in the United
States and in Mexico, prior to migrating. Data on relatively settled populations
indicate that most Mexican migrants are employed outside of agriculture, particu-
larly in manufacturing and services. Data from nearly all sources suggest an in-
creasing diversity of employment, both before and after migration, over time, as
well as growing orientation towards urban jobs.
Work in Mexico Prior to Migration
At the start of the 1900s, agricultural workers were predominant in migrant
flows. This trend continued during the Bracero Program. In the years following the
Bracero Program, however, the share of agricultural workers in migrant flows has
diminished. In 1971, Samora found that only 57% of migrants had worked in agri-
culture prior to migrating. The ENEFNEU survey found a similar share of agricul-
tural workers (58.5%); 15.1% had held industrial jobs and 23.5% had worked in
services. These shares contrasted with those for the Mexican population as a whole
(39.3%, 21.4%, and 38.7%, respectively). The ETIDEU found that by 1984 the
share of the primary sector had fallen to 39.4 percent. Only 5.6 percent of women
worked in agricultural jobs, 30.6 percent worked in industry, and 60.2 percent in
services (mostly domestic).
Most migrants had work in Mexico prior to migrating. In the ENEFNEU, only
20% did not work and only 3.2% were openly unemployed in Mexico prior to
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migrating. The share without work was higher in the 1994 EMIF: 27.4% of returning
migrants, 21.3 percent of deported migrants, and 32.4 percent of migrants en route
to the United States did not work during the 30 days prior to migrating from Mexico.
In the large majority of cases, migration cannot be attributed to an absence of
employment in Mexico.
EMIF data show a relatively high share of agricultural workers in circular
migrant flows. More than half of all male migrants in both the south-north and
north-south flows worked in agriculture prior to migrating (57.6 and 55.2 per-
cent, respectively). This share is lower in the deported-migrant flow (35.5 per-
cent). About 25.6 percent of returning migrants and 21.4 percent of south-north
migrants were in industrial jobs prior to migrating. The shares in service-sector
jobs for the two flows were 19.2 percent and 18.3 percent, respectively. Activities
associated with the urban sector absorbed more of the deported-migrant flow prior
to migrating: 33.9 percent were in industrial jobs (20.5 percent in construction),
and 30.5 percent were in service-sector jobs. The shares of undocumented mi-
grants employed in farm work and in urban jobs, respectively, were 39 percent
and 56 percent in the Zapata Canyon project data for 1996. Both of these shares
were appreciably lower—and the share unemployed in Mexico higher—in 1988
than in 1996.
The high share of migrants employed in construction jobs prior to migrat-
ing—16 to 17.4%—suggests that the migration propensity is higher for this group
than for other workers in manufacturing. Construction jobs in Mexico are charac-
terized by a high degree of instability, low wages and poor working conditions.
In the EMIF study, 61.8% of women migrating northward worked in Mexico
prior to migrating. The shares for deported and returning migrants were 46.2% and
38.9%. Most female migrants worked in services (68 percent of returning migrants,
64 percent of deported migrants, and 44 percent of north-bound migrants; see EMIF).
Among north-bound female migrants, previous employment was nearly equally
divided between industrial and service (41 percent) jobs. Sectors of employment
prior to migrating vary across region. For example, agriculture employed 66.7%,
61.4% and 45.6%, respectively, of north-bound migrants, return migrants, and de-
ported migrants born in rural areas.
Occupations of Return Migrants in Mexico
The majority of return migrants do not do agricultural work. The ENADID
data reveal that most return migrants in urban areas of Mexico (61 percent) are
wage workers, while most return migrants in rural areas are either self employed
(32.3 percent) or non-agricultural wage workers (38 percent). Only 19.5 percent of
return migrants in rural areas and 6.5 percent in urban areas are agricultural wage
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workers. Non-remunerated work absorbs 9 percent of return migrants in rural areas
and 3 percent in urban areas. Very few (1.1 percent in rural zones and 3.7 percent
in urban zones) are businessmen (empresarios).
Predictably, the most urbanized regions (II and IV) have the largest shares of
nonagricultural workers among return migrants. Regions III and V have the largest
shares of non-remunerated workers (11.8% and 9.4%, respectively, similar to those
regions’ agricultural-worker shares). These are regions where subsistence farming
is predominant. Among women, all regions display a high level of unemployment
prior to migration. The highest is region III (73 percent) and the lowest, Oaxaca-
Guerrero (63.7 percent). The largest share of women in nonagricultural jobs is
found in the border zone (74.6 percent), due no doubt to the presence there of
maquiladoras employing large numbers of female workers.
Work in the United States10
Work is a primary motivation for migrating to the United States. Of those who
have lived in the United States, 81.5% have worked there (ENADID). The EMIF
found that 88.8 percent of voluntarily returning migrants had worked in the United
States. In addition, the ENADID survey found over 1 million people who declared
having worked in the United States without living there. The labor-migrant share is
higher for men (91.6 percent) than for women (53.8%). The LPS found a labor
market participation rate of 95 percent for Mexican men and 63 percent for women,
with unemployment rates of 2.3 percent and 6.6 percent, respectively. Average hours
worked per week were 44 for men and 40 for women.
Data on employment of Mexican migrants in the United States reveal an increas-
ing diversity of jobs over time. At the end of the 1800s and up through the end of the
Bracero Program, Mexican migrants were employed primarily in agriculture.
The ENEFNEU study fount that, in 1978-79, only 37.1 percent of migrants
worked in the agricultural sector; 24.8 percent were employed in industry and 37.6
in services (CENIET, 1982, 144). ETIDEU data show a larger share in agricultural
jobs (45%), reflecting a relatively high incidence of farm work for undocumented
(deported) migrants, the population represented by that survey.
Nevertheless, Census and CPS data reveal high levels of unemployment for
Mexican migrants. The 1990 Census reports an unemployment rate of 11.3 percent
for Mexican migrants, compared with 6.3 percent for the U.S. population at large.
The 1996 CPS reports a larger unemployment gap: 21.9% unemployment for
Mexican migrants, compared with 5.9% for the population as a whole. Of course,
Census and CPS data include substantial numbers of persons without permission
to work, some of whom may simply be obeying the law—for example, spouses of
a variety of legal nonimmigrants, such as students (F visas), temporary workers
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(H and O visas), intracompany transferees (L visas), artists and entertainers
(P visas), religious workers (R visas), and treaty traders and investors (E visas).
Thus, the increase in unemployment among Mexico-born persons enumerated in
the CPS in 1996, relative to the 1990 Census, may reflect increasing numbers of
legal nonimmigrants. It may also reflect increasing numbers of persons who may
be working illegally and reporting that they do not work.
Data sources differ sharply on the distribution of migrant jobs across sectors.
EMIF data show that more than half (52.7 percent) of all returning migrants were
agricultural workers in the U.S., with industry (24.6 percent) running a distant
second. Two thirds of the migrants reported in industrial jobs worked in construc-
tion. Of the 22.7% who worked in services, 5.8% held domestic-service jobs. The
largest share of deported migrants worked in services (47.6 percent); 32.1 percent
of deported migrants had been agricultural workers.
The agricultural employment share is larger in EMIF data than in most other
data sources, including the U.S. Census and INS data and data from community
studies in Mexico. This may reflect greater tendency towards agricultural work
among circular migrants than among more settled ones. Today, although Mexican
migrants are the majority of U.S. farmworkers, U.S. agriculture absorbs far less
than half of all Mexican immigrants.
Among the migrants in the 1983 Michoacán survey, 90 percent worked in
light manufacturing and service jobs in and around California’s San Fernando
Valley. This was in contrast to the older cohorts of returned migrants, who worked
almost exclusively in U.S. agriculture—first as braceros and later as
undocumented migrants. In one of the villages, a Purépecha (Tarascan)-speaking
community that was almost entirely bypassed by the Bracero Program, households
did not participate heavily in Mexico-to-U.S. migration at the time of the 1983
survey; only a handful of individuals from this village worked in the United States
in the early 1980s, almost all as H-2 workers harvesting tobacco in Virginia. By
1993, many households in this village had family members working in the United
States, mostly in manufacturing and service jobs in Southern California, a few
harvesting apples in Washington and Oregon, but no H-2(A) workers in the Eastern
United States.
The Zapata Canyon project data show evidence of an upward trend in
urban-sector employment for undocumented migrants, particularly in
construction and services.
INS microdata on the FY 1977, 1982, and 1994 immigrant cohorts indicate
that approximately half of the prime-age men are in the operators-fabricators-laborers
classification (Table 10). The proportion in farming-forestry-fishing was highest
in 1982 (9.9 percent) and lowest in 1994 (4.9 percent). The combined executive
and professional classification was also highest in 1982 (7.0 percent) and lowest in
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Table 10
Occupational Distributions, Immigrants Born in Mexico, Aged 21-65 at
Admission to Permanent Residence: FY 1977, 1982, 1994 Cohorts
FY 1977 Cohort FY 1982 Cohort FY 1994 Cohort
Summary Occupation Group Men Women Men Women Men Women
A. Percent reporting an occupational title and percent students, all immigrants aged 21-
65 years at admission
Percent reporting
occupational title 98.00 22.49 96.49 32.52 84.38 44.71
Percent students 0.72 0.66 1.18 1.77 0.75 0.41
Number aged 21-65 years 13,426 11,589 19,018 13,105 15,836 33,319
B. Percent in summary occupation groups, immigrants aged 21-65 years at admission
reporting an occupational title
Managerial and professional
specialty occupations 6.61 7.64 6.96 7.39 4.75 2.64
Technical, sales, and admin-
istrative support occs. 3.92 10.90 3.11 14.41 4.74 10.71
Service occupations 12.10 18.76 9.99 25.65 15.13 21.82
Farming, forestry, and
fishing occupations 8.10 2.80 9.87 4.34 4.90 9.84
Precision production, craft,
and repair occupations 15.20 3.11 13.26 2.39 15.09 3.09
Operators, fabricators, and
laborers 54.06 56.79 56.81 45.82 55.39 51.89
Average occupational
earnings, 1979$ 16,617 16,149 16,492 16,144 16,251 15,614
NOTE: Panel B earnings figures for 1977 exclude 3 cases for which detailed occupation could
not be unambiguously ascertained.
1994 (4.75 percent). The proportion employed in service occupations fluctuated
between 10 and 15 percent. Among women, the proportion reporting an occupational
title increased steadily, more than doubling between 1977 (22.5 percent) and 1994
(44.7 percent).
The 1977 and 1982 INS data, which include naturalization information,
suggest both that those who naturalize are drawn from among the more highly
skilled and that those who naturalize experience occupational upgrading during
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the years between admission to permanent residence and naturalization (Table
11). Moreover, among women, labor force participation at admission not only is
associated with subsequent naturalization but also increases between admission
and naturalization.
Data on IRCA (Section 245A)-legalized aliens provide a somewhat different
picture; this is not surprising given the population (illegal aliens) and given that
information about occupation pertains to the week before application for temporary
residence under the legalization program. Only 2 percent are in the executive and
professional category, and 28 percent are in the service occupations.
The 1990 Census reports that manufacturing, services, and construction ab-
sorb well over half (58 percent) of all employed Mexican immigrants 16 years or
older. Another 17.5 percent work in retail trade. Only 13 percent are reported working
in the “agriculture, forestry, and fisheries” sectors. This sector’s share is lowest for
naturalized citizens who entered the United States prior to 1980 (8.3 percent) and
highest for noncitizens entering the United States between 1980 and 1989 (15.7
percent). The corresponding agricultural, forestry, and fisheries share for the em-
ployed U.S. workforce 16 years or older was 2.7 percent. In the LPS, the largest
sector share by far for newly legalized migrants was in manufacturing (34 per-
cent), followed by sales (24 percent) and services (20 percent). Agriculture claimed
only 9 percent of IRCA (Section 245A)-legalized aliens from Mexico. The vast
majority of agricultural-worker legalizations were through the Special Agricul-
tural Worker (SAW) program, not under Section 245A. SAWs were not enumer-
ated in the LPS.
Overall, the Census shows employed Mexican immigrants as more likely than
the U.S. population as a whole to work in agriculture, forestry, and fisheries jobs;
in construction (10.4 percent, compared with 6.2 percent); and in manufacturing
(26.6 percent, compared with 17.7 percent). It shows them less likely than the
U.S. workforce as a whole to be employed in services (20.6 percent, compared
with 32.7 percent); transportation, communication, and other public utilities (3.3
percent, compared with 7.1 percent); finance, insurance, and real estate (2.1 per-
cent, compared with 6.9 percent); and public administration (1 percent, compared
with 4.8 percent). The employment shares in the other major sectors (retail and
wholesale trade and mining) are similar for Mexican immigrants and the U.S.
workforce at large.
Both the 1990 Census and the 1996 CPS data suggest a negative association
between time in the United States and employment in agriculture—or else a high
rate of return migration for agricultural workers from Mexico. In the CPS, the
agriculture, forestry, and fisheries share is 18.6 percent for 1990-96 entrants, 12.3
percent for 1980-89 entrants, and 8.9 percent for pre-1980 entrants. It is highest
for naturalized citizens in the 1990-96 group (41.6 percent), reflecting the effects
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Table 11
Occupation of Legal Immigrants Born in Mexico Aged 21-55 Years at
Admission, with Percent Distributions at Admission and at Naturalization,
by Sex:  FY 1977 and 1982 Cohorts
FY 1977 FY 1982
Summary Occupation Group Men Women Men Women
A. Occupation at Admission, All Immigrants
Managerial/Professional 6.4 1.7 7.2 4.3
Technical/Sales/AdminSupport 3.9 2.5 3.0 4.9
Service Occupations 11.9 4.1 9.6 8.1
Farming/Forestry/Fishing 7.9 0.7 9.5 1.4
PrecisionProduction/Craft/Repair 15.0 0.7 16.2 3.3
Operators/Fabricators/Laborers 53.2 13.1 51.7 12.9
B. Occupation at Admission, Immigrants Who Later Naturalized
Managerial/Professional 9.5 3.5 10.7 6.2
Technical/Sales/AdminSupport 6.2 5.1 5.4 8.9
Service Occupations 13.2 5.4 11.4 9.6
Farming/Forestry/Fishing 4.6 0.3 4.8 0.8
PrecisionProduction/Craft/Repair 14.6 0.9 16.3 5.5
Operators/Fabricators/Laborers 49.3 13.7 46.9 12.3
C. Occupation at Naturalization, Naturalized Immigrants
Managerial/Professional 12.7 6.3 11.8 7.5
Technical/Sales/AdminSupport 8.0 12.8 8.1 16.7
Service Occupations 19.1 15.7 15.0 16.6
Farming/Forestry/Fishing 2.0 0.8 2.6 0.6
PrecisionProduction/Craft/Repair 14.7 3.8 10.9 3.0
Operators/Fabricators/Laborers 29.6 13.5 25.4 10.3
NOTE: Percentages shown are based on all persons in the age group.
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Table 12
Characteristics of the Mexican Legalized Population in 1987
Social and Demographic Characteristics
Age (Median, April 30, 1987) 30
Sex (% Males) 59%
Marital Status (% Married) 53%
Household Family Size (Persons) 3.8
 Education (Median Years) 6.0
English Language Proficiency
(% Speaking English Well) 10%
Work Characteristics
Labor Force Participation
(and Unemployment) Rate
Males 96% (2.3%)
Females 65% (6.6%)
Total 83% (3.6%)
Industry of Employment
Agriculture 9%
Construction 10%
Manufacturing 34%
Sales 24%
Services 23%
Hours Worked/Wk. Among Those Working
Males 44
Females 40
Total 43
Mean Hourly Wage $7.14
Median Earnings $8,435
Family Income
Mean $17,551
Median $14,875
Family Remittances
Mean $1,304
Median $500
Share of...
Income Remitted 7%
Families Remitting 66%
Source: INS Legalized Population Survey (INS 1990)
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of the Special Agricultural Worker (SAW) legalization program. It is lowest for
the pre-1980 naturalized group (3.2 percent). Employment shares in services are
higher for older immigrant cohorts. For example, in the 1990 Census, the service
sector absorbed 18.6 percent of 1980-89 entrants and 22.4 percent of pre-1980
entrants; in the CPS, 15.4 percent of 1990-96 entrants, 21.5 percent of 1980-89
entrants, and 28.7 percent of pre-1980 entrants 16 years or older who were em-
ployed worked in services. In most cases, employment profiles of “older” Mexi-
can immigrant cohorts are more similar to the average U.S. profile than are em-
ployment profiles of “younger” cohorts.
Sector of employment differs sharply across sexes. The EMIF found that most
returning female migrants (62.6 percent) worked in U.S. service jobs (33.9 percent
in domestic services). 28.7 percent were in industrial jobs, and only 8.7 percent
worked in agriculture. It is noteworthy that the industrial-job share for returning
female migrants exceeds that for returning male migrants in the EMIF data.
Migrants originating from rural areas in Mexico are more likely to have worked
in U.S. farm jobs (58 percent of returning migrants and 46.3 percent of north-
bound migrants) than are migrants from urban areas (46.6 percent of returning
migrants and 38.7 percent of north-bound migrants). Among returning migrants,
both industrial and service-sector shares are higher for urban than for rural-origin
migrants. Among north-bound migrants, however, industrial-sector and domestic-
service employment are higher for rural than for urban-origin migrants.
Comparison of Migrants’ Occupations
in Mexico and the United States
International migration more often than not is associated with mobility across
employment sectors. In fewer than one half (48 percent) of all cases does sector of
work prior to migration coincide with sector of work in the United States (EMIF,
returning migrants). Most agricultural workers in Mexico (67 percent) do not change
sector of employment when they migrate to the United States, but most industrial
workers and service workers do. For example, only 22.8 percent of service workers
who migrated to the United States held service jobs there. However, 79.6 percent
of domestic-service workers in Mexico did not change sector when they migrated.
More than half of all industrial workers who migrate end up in U.S. agriculture,
but only 27 percent of service workers do.
Earnings and Income
Data on earnings in 1995 from the 1996 CPS indicate that among persons 25
years and older reporting earnings or self-employment income, the mean and median
for the Mexico-born were $15,612 and $13,020 versus $30,641 and $24,001 among
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Table 13
Comparison of Selected Characteristics of the Mexican
Legalized Population in 1987 and 1992
Average Average
Social and Demographic Characteristics 1987 1991
Age (Median, April 30, 1987) 30
Sex (% Males) 59% 57%
Marital Status (% Married) 53%
Household Family Size (Persons) 3.8
Education
Median Years 6.0
6 or Fewer Years (%) 57
12 or More Years (%) 17
English Language Proficiency
(% Speaking English Well) 10% 27%
Work Characteristics
Labor Force Participation (and Unemployment) Rate
Males 96% (2.3%) 93%
Females 65% (6.6%) 62%
Total 83% (3.6%) 80% (7%)
Industry of Employment
Agriculture 9% 7%
Construction 10% 10%
Manufacturing 34% 27%
Sales 24% 27%
Services 23% 24%
Hours Worked/Wk. Among Those Working
Males 44 41
Females 40 37
Total 43 40
Mean Hourly Wage $7.14 $8.11
Median Earnings $8,435 $12,091
Family Income
Mean $17,551
Median $14,875 $19,112
Family Remittances
Mean $1,304 $783
Median $500
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the native-born. Comparable figures from the 1990 Census are $14,138 and $12,776
among the Mexico-born and $24,408 and $22,365 among the native-born (all figures
in current dollars). Thus, the ratio of median earnings among the Mexico-born to
median earnings among the native-born declined from 57% in 1989 to 54% in
1995; the estimated decline using mean earnings is steeper, from 58% in 1989 to
51% in 1995. This relative decline in earnings may be due in part to changing
legal-status and/or gender composition among the employed Mexico-born included
in the Census and CPS.
Among the new legal immigrants of the FY 1996 cohort, average earnings
among persons 25 years and older were $19,129 among men and $13,619 among
women. Among those age 18 and older, the comparable figures are $18,694 and
$14,798. This compares with average earnings for the entire U.S. working popula-
tion aged 18 and above in 1995, based on Current Population Survey data (Current
Population Reports, Consumer Income, Money Income in the United States, 1995,
P60-193, Table 9) of $33,259 and $10,414, respectively. The Mexico-to-native
earnings ratios are 0.56 among men and 1.4 among women. These ratios suggest
not only that legal immigrants have higher earnings than unauthorized migrants
but also that, while legal-immigrant men display the classical pattern of lower earn-
ings at entry, possibly reflecting their relative youth and lack of U.S. experience
compared to the native-born, Mexico-born legal-immigrant women out-earn their
native-born counterparts, on average.
Data limitations make it difficult to directly ascertain differences in earnings
between legal and undocumented Mexican migrants. Insight can be gained, how-
ever, from the UC-EDD farmworker data and from surveys including formerly
unauthorized migrants, such as the Legalized Alien Population Surveys and the
New Immigrant Survey Pilot Study.
Research utilizing UC-EDD farmworker data found that undocumented migrants
were significantly less likely than otherwise comparable legal workers to hold
relatively skilled, machine operator and foreman jobs, and those who did hold
skilled jobs had significantly lower earnings than legal workers in those jobs.
Estimated weekly earnings for legal workers were $236 in relatively skilled
Table 13 (Continued)
Share of...
Income Remitted 7%
Families Remitting 66% 51%
Source: INS Legalized Population Survey, INS (1992)
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(“primary”) jobs and $185 in less skilled (“secondary”) jobs. Moreover, weekly
earnings for undocumented workers were not significantly different ($176-$177)
in the two types of jobs.
The first round of the Legalized Population Survey collected information about
earnings of the legalized persons (persons approved for the first-step legal temporary
resident status) at the time they applied for legal temporary residence (i.e., between
May 1987 and May 1988). Median prelegalization earnings (1987/1988) among
the LPS newly legalized migrants were $8,435, a figure substantially lower than
the median earnings of Mexico-born in the 1990 Census, $12,776, which includes
both unauthorized and legal migrants. If those unauthorized migrants who were
not eligible for legalization (e.g., newcomers) or who chose not to apply or who
applied but were denied legalization have lower earnings than the IRCA legalized
aliens, then the difference between with the average earnings of unauthorized and
legal migrants is even larger.
The NIS Pilot Study includes information concerning entry without inspec-
tion at the first trip to the United States and also concerning whether adjustment to
permanent resident status was from an EWI status. Accordingly, sample members
can be classified into two groups, those with some EWI experience and those with
none. Because full migration histories were not collected in the Pilot Study, the
latter group includes individuals who may have EWI experience during an inter-
mediate trip. Thus, the measure is conservative, and any differences between the
two groups understate the true differences between persons with and without EWI
experience. Among persons aged 18 and older, average male earnings for the group
without EWI experience was $21,867 and for the formerly unauthorized, $17,709.
The comparable figures among women were $12,393 and $17,461, respectively.
Thus, while, as expected, among men average earnings is lower for the formerly
unauthorized, the opposite is true for women. Moreover, U.S. earnings do not dif-
fer appreciably between the sexes among the formerly illegal, while among immi-
grants with no EWI experience, a large gender gap is observed (a ratio of female to
male earnings of 57 percent). In a nutshell and putting it roughly, the formerly
illegal of both sexes earn the same, and this amount lies halfway between the earn-
ings of legal women and legal men. These results suggest that both selection mecha-
nisms and earnings patterns by legal status may be gender-specific. Future research
on this topic is warranted.
Turning to income, according to the U.S. 1990 Census, the mean household
income among households with a Mexico-born head was $27,122, or about 70
percent of the U.S. mean of $38,453. Median household incomes for the two groups
were $21,926 and $30,056, respectively.
Households with a Mexico-born head are much more likely than all U.S.
households to be found at the bottom of the income distribution, and they are
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much less likely to be found in the highest income ranks. Twenty-seven percent
of all Mexican-headed households had incomes below the federal poverty line
in 1990, compared with 13 percent of all U.S. households. The shares of Mexican
migrant households are higher than those of all U.S. households in the lowest 5
income ranges reported in Table 1, Volume 2, page 750. They are lower in all of
the remaining (upper) income ranges.
The shares of households in the lowest income groups are lower for the pre-1980
cohorts than for the 1980-89 cohort, and the shares in the highest income groups are
higher for the “older” cohorts. This suggests that there are some economic returns to
U.S. experience and/or that there is a positive selectivity of settlement on earnings—
that is, low-income individuals and families are more likely eventually to return to
Mexico. In contrast to migrant year-of-entry cohorts, shares of households in differ-
ent income groups are remarkably similar between the two migrant-status groups.
The CPS data reveal a concentration of new (1990-96) migrant households
at bottom of the income spectrum. The share of the 1990-96 household cohort
with incomes less than $5,000 is 10.6 percent, double the shares of the 1980-89
and pre-1980 groups. The shares of households in the $5,000-$9,999 and $10,000-
$14,999 income groups are also high for the 1990-96 group.
Both average and median incomes are higher for U.S. households in the 1996
CPS than in the 1990 Census, but the opposite is the case for Mexican-migrant
households. The mean for all U.S. households is $38,453 in the Census and $44,938
in the CPS. The mean for Mexican-migrant households is $27,122 in the Census
and $26,481 in the CPS. The U.S. median household income is $30,056 in the
Census and $34,076 in the CPS, while that of Mexican-migrant households is
$21,926 in the Census and $20,601 in the CPS. Thus, even though the real in-
crease, after adjusting for inflation, may be smaller for the total U.S. population,
it is clear that households headed by Mexico-born persons experienced a decrease
in income. Of course, this may reflect changing household composition (e.g., fewer
adults) or changing visa-status composition (e.g., a larger proportion of men work-
ing without permission).
The hypothesis that unauthorized migrants have lower household income than
legal immigrants can be examined by comparing migrants legalized under IRCA
Section 245A to the entire population in the Census or CPS. The first round of
the Legalized Population Survey also collected information on family income of
the legalized persons. Average prelegalization family income (including income
contributions by all family members in the household) was $17,551 (median
income: $14,875), substantially less than the comparable figures in the 1990
Census (average, $27,122; median, $21,926), which include both unauthorized
as well as legal migrants (U.S. INS 1992). As discussed above with respect to
earnings, if those unauthorized migrants who were not eligible for legalization
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(e.g., newcomers) or who chose not to apply or who applied but were denied
legalization have lower average family income than the IRCA legalized aliens,
then the difference between with the family incomes of unauthorized and legal
migrants is even larger.
Conclusions
Our findings indicate that Mexico-to-U.S. migrants, unlike international mi-
grants from most other countries, have tended to be selected from the middle-to-
lower ranges of the socioeconomic hierarchy, in a selection process originating
with the recruitment of low-skilled Mexican workers by U.S. employers and fa-
cilitated by the long and historically porous border between Mexico and the United
States, which puts U.S. labor markets within reach of individuals with limited
financial resources in Mexico; by the expanding demand for low-skilled immi-
grant workers in the United States; and by extensive “migration networks” con-
necting families throughout Mexico with low-skill U.S. jobs.
Characteristics of Mexican migrants are not static, however; they change
over time. Some of these changes appear to be long term. For example, there is
evidence that schooling levels of Mexican migrants are increasing over time, that
migrants’ origins and destinations are increasingly urban, and, overall, that
characteristics of Mexican migrants may be increasingly heterogeneous. These
partly reflect changes in the population at large in Mexico from which migrants
are drawn but may also reflect long-term changes in the selectivity of migration,
including the influence of migration networks. Other changes are short-term,
cyclical (i.e., related to recessions and expansions in the two countries) or discrete,
resulting from exogenous shocks like droughts. Changing labor market conditions
in the United States are instrumental in shaping migration flows and observed
characteristics of migrants, given the importance of work as an objective of
migration. Still others may be law- or policy-induced, for example, the large-
scale legalization of migrants under IRCA. There are some indications that
migration is becoming less selective over time, as shown in the Michoacán and
Mexico migration surveys. This could be due to the operation of migration
networks, buttressed by the family reunification provisions of US immigration
law, which reduce the costs of migration for an individual prospective migrant.
The low average skill level of Mexico-to-U.S. migrants obscures the participa-
tion of highly educated individuals in migration. Even though the number of highly
skilled Mexican migrants is small relative both to the number of skilled people in the
United States and to the total Mexico-to-U.S. migrant flow, it is significant relative
to the skilled population in Mexico. The presence of highly educated individuals
among Mexico-born persons enumerated in the Census may reflect in part Mexicans
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pursuing higher education in the United States. The subsequent migratory behavior
of these highly educated individuals is of obvious importance to the two countries and
deserving of future research.
We have focused on the characteristics of migrants, but full comprehension of
the migration phenomenon must consider the migrants’ legacy for their families
and for their places of origin and destination. Mexico and the United States are
deeply intertwined. Many Mexicans have American relatives and ancestors, and
many Americans have Mexican relatives and ancestors. This is particularly visible
in border areas but extends geographically following historical migratory flows.
This intertwining is found across the broadest socioeconomic spectrum of each
country and reaches into artistic, literary, scientific, and governmental circles. The
migrants’ legacy includes migrants’ children, wherever they may settle, but it also
includes the enlarged perspectives of individuals in transnational families and so-
cieties. Studying the migrants’ legacies would seem to be an important task for
future research in both countries.
Of course, perceived characteristics often differ sharply from the actual char-
acteristics of a given population (see Volume 2, pages 819 to 867). Such discrepan-
cies may be endemic to migration, given that migrants are often viewed very dif-
ferently in the origin and destination countries, as well as by different groups within
countries. The challenge is to distinguish between actual characteristics, as de-
fined and measured through scientific procedures, and perceived characteristics
that may or may not have empirical foundation.
Because migration is dynamic and conditions in both the United State and
Mexico change, understanding Mexican migration to the United States requires
continual monitoring. We recommend establishing a bilateral program of longitu-
dinal research on successive cohorts of new migrants. This binational study is an
important first step in that direction.
Notes
NOTES: Subsets identified in the data are denoted by closed rectangles. Missing rectangle
denotes the absence of persons in the data set currently in that legal status. The set of
deportable migrants includes legal nonimmigrants who violate the terms of their visa
and entrants without inspection. The “other Mexican household surveys” discussed in
the text resemble ENADID in their information on legal status.
1. At the inception of this study, our intention was to encompass not only Mexicans
in the United States but also Americans in Mexico. Unfortunately, the study of Americans
in Mexico is seriously neglected by scholars in both countries. Of course, there is a large
American presence in Mexico—ranging from American clubs to a network of American
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schools—as American visitors to Mexico quickly learn. According to data collected by
the U.S. Department of State, Mexico is the leading country of residence for Americans
abroad, attracting 20 percent of the total: 522,274 civilian Americans (excluding employees
of the U.S. government and family members of U.S. government and military personnel)
resided in Mexico as of May 1, 1993. The second largest contingent is found in Canada—
335,490, or 13 percent of the total.
The ENADID data set described includes U.S.-born individuals residing in Mexico
(including U.S.-born children of Mexican migrants). These data, in particular, merit fur-
ther study.
2. The ENADID represents the most important and complete macro-social treatment
of demographic behavior in Mexico. It integrates the three aspects of demographic dy-
namics (fertility, mortality, and migration). It is the first national-level study, covering
practically every zone in the country. For purposes of our research, it encompasses the
following units of analysis: dwellings, domestic and foreign members of these dwellings,
habitual residents of these dwellings, and persons from these dwellings who left to live in
another country between 1987 and the date of the survey (additional information is avail-
able in Volume 2, pages 769 to 778).
3. For these few characteristics—sex, age, birthplace by state—individuals who re-
cently have migrated to the United States are very similar to return migrants.
4. See the methodological appendix elaborated by the National Population Council
(Consejo Nacional de Población—CONAPO).
5. Massey, Goldring, and Durand (1994) propose an index of community “migra-
tion prevalence” as a basis for comparing communities that are apparently at different
stages of the migration process. For a given community at a given point in time, interna-
tional “migration prevalence” is defined as the number of people with international mi-
gratory experience divided by the total number of people alive.
6. Naturalization appears to be seriously overstated in U.S. Census and CPS data—e.g.,
over 100,000 Mexico-born persons in the 1990 Census report that they entered in 1985-
1990 and that they are naturalized—even taking into account the fact that the Census
question on period of entry refers to the “latest year he/she came to stay,” so that admis-
sion to permanent residence might predate reported period of entry and be consistent with
the reported naturalization. For comprehensive analysis of the measurement of naturaliza-
tion in Census and CPS data, see Passel and Clark (1997).
7. As pointed out by diverse sources, this out-migration had its origins in the
recruitment of workers by North American employers for jobs in agriculture and railroad
construction.
8. See, for example, Samora (1971), the findings of the ENEFNEU (1978-79)
study reported in Zazueta and Corona (1979), and the findings of ETIDEU (1984) in
CONAPO (1986).
9. Colima is included because of its geographic location and because, although in
relation to the total migrant flow its weight is small, migrants represent 5.7 percent of its
resident population.
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10. South Baja California’s share is minimal, with only 0.2 percent of all migrants
coming from that region (0.95 percent of the region’s resident population).
11. In the Samora study, 84% of the sample originated from rural areas. In the
ENEFNEU this percentage was lower—69.8%. Nevertheless, it was greater than that
observed for the total Mexican population in 1978 (53 percent).
12. It is possible that this predominance is related to age (deported migrants are
younger) and the demographic growth of this region, in which the urban population is
predominant. It also may be affected by a relative importance of migration networks in
rural versus urban communities, with the result that urban-origin migrants find themselves
less protected by these networks when they enter the United States to work.
13. According to the U.S. Census, presented by Gamio (1930).
14. It is likely that the large weight for the northern states is due to the rising demand
there for low-skilled workers, relatively high wages for these workers, and perhaps also
to the fact that, in the border states, many of the Mexicans interviewed no longer main-
tained economic ties with families in Mexico. Unfortunately, this indicator of migrant
populations is very sensitive to remittance behavior.
15. The ENEFNEU was carried out by the Centro Nacional de Información y
Estadísticas del Trabajo (CENIET) of the Secretaría del Trabajo y Previsión Social, be-
tween December 1978 and January 1979. Its sample size is 62,500 housing units in 115
localities, randomly selected. It gathered information on approximately 300,000 individu-
als (CENIET, 1982: 57).
16 INS data also suggest that immigrants who choose to live in the Southwest are less
likely to subsequently naturalize than their counterparts who settle elsewhere (Table 2).
17. It is likely that the different weights of females in the ENEFNEU is due to this
survey’s inclusion of migrants with and without documents. It is common for women to
migrate with documents.
18. The differences result from both the type of data and the ways in which these
data were collected. The EMIF only captures labor migrants, while the universe for the
ENADID, in theory at least, is the total Mexican population. Moreover, the fact that the
EMIF is carried out at the border, at the moment of the border crossing, reduces the share
of females: A number of micro-regional studies have shown that women normally migrate
only when they have documents, and these make it possible to travel directly between
places of origin and destinations in the United States (i.e., by air). Finally, stays in the
United States typically are longer for women than for men. This reduces the probability
that women will be picked up in surveys of circular migrants at the border.
19. Information on sex is not available for the immigrant cohorts of Fiscal Years 1980
and 1981.
20. Sex-specific counts of spouses of U.S. citizens were published in the INS annual
reports until 1979. The figures for 1982 and 1994 are based on the microdata public-use
files, and the figure for 1985 is estimated from the GAO data.
21. In the total registered population the difference is greater: 34.2 for women, 31.8
for men.
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22. In the total population, average age is 34.9 for women and 32.8 for men.
23. In the ETIDEU the average is the same overall and 4.6 for women.
24. Information on average schooling from the EMIF was provided by Dr. Jorge
Santibáñez of the COLEF.
25. It is possible that many of those with high schooling levels worked simply as
research or teaching assistants during their post-graduate studies.
26 Difficulties in comparing Census and CPS findings make it inadvisable to infer
increases or decreases in schooling levels between 1990 and 1996 from these comparisons.
27 Respondents classified as having EWI experience met at least one of two criteria:
(i) their first trip to the United States was without legal documents, or (ii) adjustment to
permanent residence was from an EWI status. Because the NIS Pilot Study did not collect
complete migration histories, the measure of EWI experience yields an underestimate, and
hence measured differences between the two subgroups understate the true differences.
28. It should be pointed out that this is based on small samples: 9,687 north-bound
migrants and 2,972 voluntarily returning migrants. Among deported migrants the number
is much larger: 25,588.
29. The ENADID does not provide information on migrants’ type of work activity in
the United States.
30. There is some evidence of increasing diversification of employment for Mexican
migrants by 1920, particularly in the eastern and midwestern parts of the United States;
see Santibáñez, 1930 and Gamio, 1930 y 1969. However, there was a reconcentration in
agriculture under the Bracero Program (Fonseca, 1986).
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Factors that Influence Migration
Agustín Escobar Latapí, Philip Martin,
Gustavo López Castro & Katharine Donato
Executive Summary
This report examines the factors that cause people to cross the Mexican-U.S. border and work temporarily or settle outside their country of citizen-ship, and assesses the factors that sustain such migration over time. Most
of the cross-border labor and settlement migration involves Mexicans moving to
the U.S.; this report therefore focuses on factors that influence and sustain Mexico-
U.S. migration.1
In absolute terms, the United States is the world’s major country of immigration,
and Mexico is the world’s major country of emigration. The U.S. accepted 916,000
legal immigrants in FY96, more than any other country, plus 275,000 unauthorized
settlers. About 165,000 of these legal U.S. immigrants were Mexican nationals; if
another 125,000 unauthorized settlers were Mexican nationals, then Mexican immi-
gration to the U.S. in FY96 exceeded total immigration to Canada in 1996, which was
about 225,000, and was nine times the immigration of 100,000 foreigners to Australia.
The best estimates suggest that there were 7 million to 7.3 million Mexican-
born residents in the U.S. in 1996, including 4.7 to 4.9 Mexican-born residents
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authorized to be in the U.S., and 2.3 to 2.4 million unauthorized Mexican-born
residents.2 The number of legal and unauthorized Mexican-born residents living in
the U.S. is increasing by 277,000 to 340,000 per year.3
The U.S. labor market is proportionately more important to Mexican workers
than Mexican workers are to the U.S. labor market. Some 4 million to 5 million
Mexican nationals, equivalent to one-eighth of Mexico’s labor force of 37 mil-
lion,4 are employed in the U.S. in a typical year. However, even if there are 5
million Mexican-born workers in the U.S. labor force, they would represent less
than 4 percent of the average 130 million persons employed in the U.S.
Mexico to United States migration has a long history, and has become one of
the most important linkages between the two most populous countries in North
America, affecting employment patterns, demographic trends, regional dynamics,
and politics in both countries. “Go north for opportunity” is an idea deeply embed-
ded in Mexican youth, especially in the rural areas of west central Mexico. Closer
economic integration between the U.S. and Mexico, including more trade and in-
vestment, is interacting with migration patterns and altering them in significant
ways in the 1990s.
Findings
We group the factors that sustain Mexico-U.S. migration into three broad cat-
egories; demand-pull factors in the U.S., supply-push factors in Mexico, and net-
work factors that bridge the border. Our analysis leads to a simple conclusion; the
migration of persons from Mexico to the U.S. is a dynamic process. What began
largely as the U.S.-approved or U.S.-tolerated recruitment of Mexican workers for
mining, railroad, and seasonal U.S. farm jobs a century ago has become a far more
complex migration relationship that is moving rural Mexicans into traditional and
nontraditional industries, occupations, and areas of the U.S.
Our report is based on three key findings:
• First, the origins of Mexico-U.S. migration lie largely inside the United
States—Mexican workers were recruited earlier in the 20th century for
U.S. farm jobs, creating linkages between jobs in U.S. agriculture and
workers in particular Mexican communities.
Today cross-border networks of relatives, friends, and labor brokers and
recruiters link an expanding list of U.S. industries, occupations, and
areas to a lengthening list of Mexican communities that send migrants
to the U.S. While in Mexico, residents of these Mexican communities
often have better information about the availability of certain types of
U.S. jobs than do local U.S. residents.
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The U.S. labor markets in which Mexican migrants are finding U.S.
jobs are changing, and may change even more as a result of technologi-
cal and trade trends and as welfare reform adds to the supply of low-
skilled U.S. workers. First, most Mexican workers are employed out-
side of U.S. agriculture: about 80 percent of Mexican-born workers in
the U.S. hold nonfarm jobs.
Second, the demand side of U.S. labor markets is changing, as U.S.
employers adjust to higher minimum wages and more global competi-
tion. On the supply side, high immigration since the 1980s and legaliza-
tion in 1987-88 permitted Mexican-born workers to become significant
components of the U.S. food processing, construction, service, and
manufacturing labor forces throughout the U.S. Welfare reforms and
continued immigration promise to continue to add unskilled workers to
the labor supply in the 1990s.
Third, it is not clear whether the U.S. labor market will continue to
evolve in ways that absorb large numbers of Mexican immigrant work-
ers. On the one hand, the U.S. unemployment rate dropped to its lowest
levels in 25 years in 1997, and there are reports of labor shortages, espe-
cially in low-wage labor markets in areas with unemployment rates of
less than 2 percent, such as the midwest. U.S. job growth is very rapid:
between January 1, 1994 and June 1, 1997, the U.S. economy added
about 8 million jobs. With Mexican-born workers spreading throughout
the U.S. in a period of rapid job growth and low employment, networks
that bridge the border may be strengthened, increasing the demand for
immigrant workers, and making Mexican immigrant workers a perma-
nent feature of more U.S. industries and areas.
On the other hand, the U.S. is committed to stepped up controls at the
border and in the interior, to moving 2 million to 3 million adult welfare
recipients into jobs, and to creating jobs for the rapidly growing domes-
tic labor force. The 140 million strong U.S. labor force, which usually
expands by about 1 percent per year or 1.4 million per year, has been
expanding about twice as fast, due to immigration, welfare recipients
moving off the rolls, more older men working, and an increase in the
percentage of working-age women seeking jobs. In 1997, over 67 per-
cent of the U.S. population 16 and older was in the labor force, a record
percentage of adults employed or looking for work.
It is hard to project the evolution of labor markets that immigrants tradi-
tionally enter. In many areas of the U.S., immigrant workers, fears of
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labor shortages and high welfare caseloads go together. For example, in
the San Joaquin Valley of California, about 85 percent of the 400,000
individuals who work as farm workers sometime during a typical year
are immigrants, including 100,000 or more unauthorized migrants. Farm-
ers fearful of labor shortages are calling for modifications of the H-2A
program to make it easier to obtain temporary foreign farm workers. At
the same time, 25 percent of the 761,000 residents of Fresno county are
receiving some form of welfare assistance, and the unemployment rate
in Fresno is over 10 percent for most months.
One scenario is that immigrant labor markets will segment, with some
U.S. employers reacting to low unemployment and welfare reforms that
limit assistance for immigrants by offering English and other services
to help their immigrant employees to become naturalized U.S. citizens.
Other U.S. employers, such farm labor contractors, may go further into
the underground economy to avoid labor law and immigration enforce-
ment, hiring recently-arrived immigrants. Further segmentation of im-
migrant labor markets could mean that networks may become more im-
portant, with the ability to get into the upper segment of the unskilled
immigrant labor market the key to economic mobility in the U.S.
• Second, the factors that initiate migration flows are not necessarily
the only ones that sustain Mexico-U.S. migration. We find that there
is still a demand-pull for Mexican workers in the low-unemploy-
ment U.S. labor market, in the sense that most recently-arrived le-
gal and unauthorized Mexican migrants can find jobs in high turn-
over farm, manufacturing, and service jobs, both in areas where
Mexican-born workers have traditionally played important roles, as
in southwestern agriculture, and in new industries in the midwest,
the southeast, and east coast, including construction, meatpacking,
and services. In some cases, including poultry and meat packing,
private labor brokers play an active role in moving Mexican work-
ers to jobs in the midwest and southeast.
Supply-push factors in Mexico play a role as fundamental as the avail-
ability of U.S. jobs in sustaining Mexico-U.S. migration. Supply-push
factors seem to have become more important since the mid-1980s as a
result of recurring Mexican economic crises, peso devaluations, and
Mexican policies aimed at economic modernization, such as the
privatization of government-owned industries that resulted in layoffs
and the restructuring of rural Mexico that made small-scale farming
less profitable.
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This means that Mexicans migrate to the U.S. (1) within well-established
networks as well as (2) through new networks that are developing to
move migrants to the U.S. from regions without a tradition of Mexico-
U.S. migration, such as from Mexican cities and southern Mexican states.
Friends and relatives established in the U.S. often provide financing,
advice, shelter and jobs to newly-arrived migrants. Settled family
members use U.S. family unification policies to have spouses and
children join them, and eventually secure legal immigrant status.
The U.S. border enforcement strategies begun in 1994, 1995, 1996, and
1997 under the Hold-the-Line, Gatekeeper, Safeguard, and Rio Grande
labels are affecting migration patterns, but not preventing unauthorized
entry. First, we find that most (73 percent) of Mexicans attempting un-
authorized entry into the U.S. hire polleros or coyotes to help them cross
the border, and that migrants with the fewest network links to bridge the
border are most likely to rely on the smugglers who operate as border-
only businesses. The increased use of coyotes generally, and of border
businesses in particular, helps to explain why most migrants attempting
unauthorized entry succeed (70 percent or more) despite significantly
more U.S. Border Patrol agents and technology on the border.
Second, we find that smuggling has achieved enough regularity to be-
come an established business with three segments; local agents, local
and border smugglers, and border-only smuggling businesses, each with
a menu of prices and services. After U.S. border control operations were
stepped up in 1994, more migrants turned to coyotes, whose services
became more diversified. Thus, unauthorized migrants have several
packages of services available, and several options to pay for the cost of
illegally entering the U.S., including working in a coyote-provided or
coyote-arranged job in the U.S. to repay smuggling costs.5
In some areas of west central Mexico, survey data suggest that migra-
tion to the U.S. has become a way of life. Based on migration histories
collected in 39 communities in traditional emigration areas, we esti-
mate that, by the time they are 40, most of the men in these communi-
ties make at least one trip to the U.S. Based on a model that predicts
migration to the U.S. on the basis of age and community characteristics,
it appears that, in some communities, the probability that a young man
will make a first trip to the U.S. increased after 1992.
• Third, we find that there is reason to believe that currently high levels of
Mexico-U.S. migration may represent a hump or peak in the volume of
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Mexico-U.S. migration. Within the next decade, we think that
demographic and economic factors within Mexico are likely to reduce
emigration pressures.
One long-term supply-push factor explaining the mid-1990s migra-
tion hump, and the eventual decline in emigration pressure, is de-
mography: the number of new job entrants entering the labor force
in Mexico has been very high, but will decline. In 1997, the number
of new labor force entrants in Mexico is expected to be 970,000.
However, the declining birthrate since 1970,6 when Mexican women
averaged seven children each, means that the growth in the labor
force is slowing, and is projected to drop to 500,000 to 550,000 per
year by 2010.
Mexico adopted an ambitious restructuring and privatization program
in the 1990s that promises to increase economic efficiency and job growth
in the medium to long term, but displaces workers in the short term. If
Mexico maintains market-driven economic policies, the International
Monetary Fund projects 5 percent annual economic growth, and 2.5
percent employment growth, for 1997 and thereafter.
Given this 2 to 1 ratio between real GDP growth and employment growth,
an average 5 percent economic and 2.5 percent job growth per year would
lead to the creation of 750,000 new jobs each year, based on 30 million
employers and wage and salary employees.7 The actual ratio of economic
growth to employment growth in recent years has been a more favorable
1.35; this was the ratio of economic growth to labor force growth for the
period 1988 to 1995.8 Using a 1.35 ratio, 5 percent annual GDP growth
would generate 3.7 percent job growth, or 1.1 million new jobs each year.9
Sustained economic growth plus the declining number of new job seek-
ers means that, early in the 21st century, Mexico could be creating enough
net new jobs to absorb new labor force entrants. Mexico could then
begin to catch up on job creation for currently unemployed and under-
employed workers, those displaced from agriculture and other indus-
tries, and nonworking women who rejoin the labor force. We empha-
size that medium-to-long term demographic and economic indicators
suggest that supply-push emigration pressure should decline from cur-
rent levels because it is easy to focus on recent events that point to
increases in emigration pressure, including the peso devaluation and
economic crisis of 1995, and the uneven recovery from recession.
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This longer term perspective emphasizes changing structural factors in
Mexico that could reduce Mexico-U.S. migration. The demographic
factors are real, and their effect on reducing emigration pressure could
be magnified if, e.g., more young people stay longer in school. The
economic factors are less certain; Mexico has experienced uneven
economic growth over the past several decades, and could experience
recessions and crises again.
Other changes in Mexico may also reduce emigration pressure. Migra-
tion networks are best established in rural areas with long traditions of
sending young men to the U.S. As the number of persons employed in
Mexican agriculture shrinks, and some ex-farmers are absorbed in
Mexico’s service economy, there should be fewer Mexicans with strong
network connections ready to migrate to the U.S.
The Mexican economy is stabilizing and growing; the economy grew
by almost 9 percent in the second quarter of 1997. Mexico’s economy
grew by 5.1 percent in 1996, after shrinking by 6.2 percent in 1995, and
is projected to grow by 4.5 percent to 5.1 percent in 1997.
The number of permanent workers enrolled in the Mexican Institute for
Social Security (IMSS), which is considered a good guide to the num-
ber of formal sector jobs in the private sector, rose by a record 661,024
in 1996 to 9,163,459, an expansion characterized by the OECD as “strong
job creation in the ‘formal’ economy” (OECD Economic Outlook 61,
June 1997, 98). Job growth continued in 1997; some 282,782 perma-
nent workers were enrolled between January and April 1997, bringing
the total to 9,446,241 at the end of April 1997, including 103,000 addi-
tions in April. Of the permanent workers enrolled in IMSS, 40 percent
were in manufacturing (377,000 new IMSS jobs in 1996), 36 percent in
services (166,000), 19 percent in trade (103,000), and five percent in
agriculture (16,000).
However, interest rates remain high, the peso may be overvalued, and
the recovery is unequal, accentuating inequality. Mexicans linked to the
world economy via exports of manufactured goods are doing much bet-
ter than those operating only in the domestic economy, such as in con-
struction and small-scale agriculture.10 Inequality has increased since
1984; according to the 1997 UNDP Human Development Report, the
richest Mexican person has assets equivalent to the incomes of the poorest
17 million Mexicans.
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Thinking About Mexico-U.S. Migration
We find it useful to think of migration processes between Mexico and the U.S.
as analogous to a river that creates a delta en route to the ocean. When the Bracero
Program was in operation, the flow of Mexicans north was largely confined to the
channel created by legal recruitment. Blocking that channel by abolishing the Bracero
Program in 1964 thus stopped the migration flow temporarily. The migration soon
resumed, however, with a myriad of small streams the vehicle for Mexicans mi-
grating north.
Visualizing Mexico-U.S. migration as having evolved from a narrow channel
to rivulets meandering through a delta provides insights into a complex and dy-
namic migration process:
1. If the underlying demand-pull, supply-push, and network factors change
in strength and relative importance, policies designed to deal with just
one factor at one level of migration may lose their effectiveness over
time. For example, U.S. policies that were based on the assumption that
the major factor sustaining Mexico-U.S. migration was legally-autho-
rized demand-pull U.S. employer recruitment became less effective in
the 1970s and 1980s as the key factors sustaining migration shifted to
informal U.S. employer recruitment and supply-push and network forces.
In such circumstances, simply stopping legally-authorized foreign worker
recruitment did not stop migration.
2. Both the U.S. and Mexico took steps over the past decade that rein-
forced the network and supply-push factors that encourage Mexicans to
go north for opportunity:
— The U.S. legalized the presence of over 2 million Mexicans in 1987-
88, including 1 million farm workers. The 1 million legalized Spe-
cial Agricultural Workers who were Mexican meant that the equiva-
lent of one-sixth of the adult men in rural Mexico gained the right
to settle in the U.S. and petition to have their families join them.
One U.S. government commission concluded that the SAW farm
worker legalization program promoted unauthorized Mexico-U.S.
migration by giving the impression that doing unauthorized farm
work in the U.S. was a way to become a legal immigrant (Commis-
sion on Agricultural Workers, 1992).
— Mexico in the early 1990s changed its economic policies in a manner
that may compress into a decade or less what would otherwise have
been a slower shrinking of employment in agriculture. Mexico
eliminated most input subsidies and price guarantees in agriculture,
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switched to direct payments to farmers, and eased trade restrictions,
signaling the eventual shrinking of the production of many
commodities, notably corn, that today absorb a great deal of labor,
but in which Mexico does not have a comparative advantage.
— Extensive networks of family, community, and private agents have
developed to assist Mexicans wishing to migrate legally and ille-
gally to the U.S., including a variety of advisors, smugglers, and
transportation agents. The migration infrastructure has become very
sophisticated, so that migrants have choices in deciding who will
help them to cross the border, how to finance the trip, and in find-
ing U.S. employment.
3. It should be kept in mind that some of the factors that today are produc-
ing high levels of Mexico-U.S. migration should abate over the next 5
to 15 years.
— First, Mexico’s population growth has slowed, which promises fewer
new labor force entrants in the years ahead.
— Second, workers can be displaced from agriculture only once. Thus,
after the Mexican farm labor force has been reduced from 25 per-
cent of all workers in the mid-1990s to 12 to 15 percent by 2015,
supply-push emigration pressures from the areas that have some of
the best network connections to the U.S. should diminish.
— Third, the destabilizing impacts of Mexican institutional and market
reforms should run their course. If economic growth is sustained at
current and projected levels, jobs and upward pressure on wages
should encourage many potential migrants to remain in Mexico.
— Fourth, the U.S. labor market is expected to absorb a large number
of unskilled workers over the next few years, as the normal comple-
ment of new job seekers are joined by persons removed from wel-
fare rolls. This increased supply of U.S. workers, as well as more
border and interior enforcement, may reduce the availability of jobs
for newly-arrived Mexican workers.
Policy Recommendations
Bearing in mind our key findings:
• The catalyst for much of today’s unauthorized Mexican migration for
U.S. employment lies in the U.S., but solutions are to be found in both
countries.
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• The same tendencies that currently seem to be increasing and diversifying
Mexico-U.S. migration flows may be dampened starting in the next 5 to
15 years, thus reducing Mexico-U.S. migration.
• There is no magic bullet solution such as a guest worker program to
deal with unwanted Mexico-U.S. migration, we make three policy rec-
ommendations:
1. The social and economic policies of the U.S. affect Mexico-U.S. migra-
tion patterns, just as Mexican policies affect emigration. Repeatedly,
the U.S. or Mexico have been surprised by the other’s changes in poli-
cies that affect migration patterns. To prevent unanticipated migration
flows, a consultative mechanism should be established so that the U.S.
and Mexico make each other aware of policy decisions that are likely to
affect migration patterns.
This recommendation echoes that of the U.S. Commission for the Study
of International Migration and Cooperative Economic Development in
1990, which called for migration impact statements within the U.S. gov-
ernment to prevent the shock of unanticipated migration like that, for
example, that arose in the Caribbean after the U.S. government increased
its support of U.S. sugar producers by reducing sugar imports.
We recommend that a U.S.-Mexico group be established to develop
migration impact statements in both countries, and that these statements
be discussed during annual U.S.-Mexican presidential meetings so that
the migration issues discussed at these meetings include some mid-to-
long-range perspectives. This approach may help to reduce bilateral ten-
sions over migration issues, and may lead to a framework for bilateral
migration management.
2.  We recommend that both the U.S. and Mexico focus on the major
U.S. attraction for migrants, jobs and higher earnings, that more be
done inside the U.S. to prevent the employment of unauthorized
workers, and that Mexico seek to avoid the creation of new migra-
tion networks from areas of Mexico that have traditionally not sent
migrants to the U.S. Recognition of the different degrees of depen-
dence on immigration and emigration inside each country could lead
to migration management policies tailored to each major immigra-
tion/emigration area. For example, the U.S. may want to rethink its
policy of requiring the INS to search open fields for unauthorized
workers, since surveys suggest that the percentage of unauthorized
workers has climbed steadily in the 1990s. Mexico may want to
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prevent a culture of migration from developing in areas that are just
beginning to see an outflow to the U.S.
3.  At this time, we are not prepared to recommend a bilateral U.S.-Mexico
foreign worker program, although we are mindful of the recommenda-
tions of many in both the U.S. and Mexico that a new program with
Mexico be started.11
There are three major reasons why we are not recommending a program
at this time. First, there are few “certifiable” labor shortages in the U.S.
industries, occupations, and areas in which Mexican and other non-im-
migrant workers are employed. In some of these immigrant labor mar-
kets, real wages have declined, and work-related benefits have disap-
peared. Certification of employer need for the foreign workers currently
employed is often the subject of litigation, and the use of legal non-
immigrant workers in these jobs may become more contentious as wel-
fare reform augments the supply of unskilled U.S. workers. There may
also be less seasonality in many of the labor markets in which Mexican-
born workers are employed than is assumed, making it difficult to ex-
pect or enforce the worker rotation implicit in non-immigrant guest
worker programs.
Second, U.S.-sanctioned bracero recruitment in the 1950s is widely con-
sidered to have oriented many Mexican workers toward the U.S. labor
market instead of toward local jobs and development. Today, when
Mexico is modernizing its economy and promoting export-oriented eco-
nomic development, a Bracero Program may make investors reluctant
to invest in areas from which migrants leave for the U.S., thus reinforc-
ing their dependence on emigration. If guest workers were to come from
nontraditional migration areas, new migration streams may be set in
motion.
Third, there is as yet no convincing evidence that U.S. border and inte-
rior control efforts have reduced unauthorized Mexico-U.S. migration,
so that opening a legal channel for Mexican temporary workers would
probably add to rather than substitute for unauthorized workers, de-
pressing conditions for legal Mexican-born workers in the U.S. labor
market.
Perceptions in the U.S. and Mexico are often very different about the
ability of a temporary worker program to serve as a remedy for
unauthorized Mexico-U.S. migration, so we recommend that the U.S.
and Mexico study the guest worker idea very carefully to dispel myths
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about what might be involved. We think that such a study would puncture
the notion that U.S. employers, worker advocates and the U.S.
government could easily reach agreement on the details of a program
with the Mexican government and Mexican workers.
The demands from each side make the gaps clear. Mexico would like any
bilateral guestworker to be large enough to substitute legal for unautho-
rized labor migration, to ensure that both Mexican workers and U.S. em-
ployers participate in the program, and to protect the legal and work place
rights of legal migrant workers. A program agreed to by the U.S. would
aim to admit only workers needed to fill legitimate labor shortages, and to
ensure that foreign workers do not adversely affect similar U.S. workers.
In addition, the U.S. would require that migrant workers remain legal non-
immigrant workers, and leave when their terms of employment end.12
Report Outline
The findings and policy implications summarized above are based on our re-
view of the research that has accumulated on Mexico-U.S. migration as well as
empirical work commissioned for the binational study. Some of our findings are
based on the community studies that have been done in Mexico, and some on the
U.S. communities where the Mexican migrants settle. Many of the community
studies, including those based on the Mexican Migration Project (MMP) data, con-
cluded that non-economic factors have become as important as economic factors
in motivating and sustaining Mexico-U.S. migration.
Our report has five sections. The following section lays out our demand-pull,
supply-push, and network framework for examining the evolution of Mexico-U.S.
migration. We then turn to a review of case and community studies of Mexico-U.S.
migration, demonstrating that the major motivators of Mexico-U.S. migration have
shifted from demand-pull recruitment to a more complex situation in which supply-
push factors increase the number of migrants, in part because of mature and evolving
networks. We also present our re-analysis of Mexican Migration Project data on 30
Mexican communities that send migrants to the U.S.
The third section introduces the results of recent case studies conducted for
the Binational Study. We then turn to key informant and poll data on the current
migration peak or hump, explaining why Mexico-U.S. migration seems to be higher
in the mid-1990s than in the immediate past. We discuss the factors that might
reduce migration pressures.
The final section restates our conclusions, and Volume 3, pages 869 to 1000,
includes detailed analyses of several issues mentioned in the report.
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Demand-Pull, Supply-Push and Networks
There are as many reasons for migration as there are migrants. However, most
individuals who cross national borders for employment and/or settlement do so for
one of two major reasons—economic or non-economic. The factors that lead indi-
viduals to migrate, in turn, are motivated and sustained by three major types of
influences—demand-pull, supply-push, and network and other factors.
The result is a 2x3 matrix summarizing why people migrate, and the factors
that sustain migration flows. Specific kinds of migrants are found in each cell,
and individual migrants may fit into more than one cell. For example, economic
migrants may require all three influences to decide to move across borders for
employment—a supply-push reason for seeking employment elsewhere, a network
that provides information about job availability and perhaps the means to finance
migration to a foreign job, and demand-pull confidence that, once abroad, a job
will be waiting.
The demand-pull, supply-push, and network framework permits us to make
two important points about economically-motivated migration:
Table 1
Determinants of Migration
Factors Influencing the Decision to Migrate
Type of Migrant Demand-Pull Supply-Push Network/Other
Economic Labor Un- or under- Job and wage
Migrants recruitment, e.g., employment; low information; sons
guest workers wages; e.g., farmers following fathers;
whose crops fail family unification
Non-Economic Family Flee war and Communication;
Migrants unification; e.g., persecution; e.g., transportation;
family members displaced persons Assistance
join established and organizations;
spouse in refugees/asylum Desire for new
destination seekers experience/
country adventure
Notes:
1. Individual migrants may shift from category to category.
2. Pull, push, and network factors rarely have equal weights in any particular migration.
3. The weight of each factor in a particular migration stream tends to change over time.
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• First, the three factors that influence an individual’s decision to migrate
rarely have equal one-third weights in any particular migration flow.
• Second, the weight of each factor often changes over time.
A common pattern is for demand-pull foreign worker recruitment to set inter-
national migration for employment in motion. Migrants are willing to be recruited
because of the expected earnings gap at home and abroad, which reflects both
demand-pull and supply push factors; wages times the probability of being em-
ployed induce migration.13 However, network factors to become more important as
the migration stream matures: “each act of migration alters the social context within
which subsequent migration decisions are made, typically in ways that make addi-
tional movement more likely”14 (Massey et al. 1993, 451). This means that, when
recruitment is stopped, migration may continue, as supply-push and network fac-
tors sustain migration. 15
Virtually all research on Mexico-U.S. migration begins with the premise that
most Mexico-U.S. migration is driven by economic factors, broadly construed
(Massey et al., 1994). There is also some non-economic migration across the Mexico-
U.S. border, motivated by the desire to unify families in the U.S., and U.S. policies
that encourage family unification. In addition, factors such as political persecution
may push some residents to seek safety abroad, and other factors, such as the desire
of teenagers and students for a new experience abroad, may encourage emigration.
Demand Pull
Most labor migrations begin inside the destination country, the U.S. in this
case, as employers there, with or without explicit government approval, recruit
and employ migrant workers from the sending country. During the early years of
such labor recruitment, demand-pull factors tend to dominate reasons for migra-
tion, so that it appears that governments can open and close the foreign worker tap
at will. In other words, indicators such as the number of vacant jobs or the unem-
ployment rate can explain virtually all of the year-to-year fluctuation in the num-
ber of legally-recruited foreign workers arriving in an area.16
However, demand-pull, supply-push, and network factors usually evolve in a
manner that yields one of the “principles” of international migration for employ-
ment; there is nothing more permanent than temporary workers (Miller and Mar-
tin, 1982). There are many reasons why temporary migrants can become perma-
nent residents, or unauthorized workers can begin to accompany legal workers,
including:
• migrants may gain legal rights to stay, as when they have their legal
status renewed often enough to “earn” legal immigrant status,
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• migrants may obtain the information or contacts needed to enter and
stay unlawfully,
• employers may come to depend on migrants, and offer them jobs regard-
less of the government’s recruitment policies or the worker’s legal status,
• problems with the official recruitment system may encourage some em-
ployers and workers to avoid using it, promoting a parallel illegal mi-
gration system.
Why Demand-Pull?
There are several types of theories that seek to explain why immigration coun-
tries permit or tolerate the entry of foreign workers, and how the presence of for-
eign workers sets in motion factors that tend to make migration for employment a
more or less permanent feature of a recipient country labor markets.
Structural dependence theories use as explanatory variables the evolution of
attitudes of workers toward jobs, and adaptations of employers to immigrant workers,
to explain how particular industries or entire economies come to rely on immigrant
workers. Piore, for example, developed a worker attitude theory to explain struc-
tural dependence, arguing that only first-generation newcomers would fill certain
jobs at the bottom of the labor market, so that the continued existence of these jobs
sets in motion a migration for employment dynamic.
Piore’s theory is based on the notion that there is a hierarchy of jobs that changes
slower than do worker aspirations, creating a vacuum at the bottom of the labor
market that attracts immigrants. Piore defined “bad jobs” in terms of wages, ben-
efits, and promotion opportunities. Wayne Cornelius, among others, has a comple-
mentary theory that stresses that some jobs experience cyclical or seasonal layoffs,
and that aging native-born workers want job security, so that native workers shun
cyclical jobs, creating a demand-pull for immigrants to fill such jobs.
Cornelius considers industries to be structurally dependent on foreign workers
if the employment of foreign workers does not change as unemployment changes
over the business cycle—as when the demand for foreign workers persists despite
rising unemployment (Cornelius, Martin, and Hollifield, 1994, 34). Some immi-
gration researchers take this structural dependence idea one step further, arguing
that employers prefer to hire foreigners, regardless of the unemployment rate, be-
cause the foreigners work harder and have better attitudes. In addition, the net-
works that bring foreigners into the work place often recruit and train new workers
at no cost to the employer (Waldinger, 1996).
Rent-seeking theories of structural dependence begin from the notion that em-
ployers and other organized groups try to use government to obtain benefits for
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themselves (Freeman, 1994). Groups that would benefit from an influx of foreign
workers, such as farmers, seek government permission to employ them. Once enough
employers believe that immigrant workers will continue to be available, underly-
ing asset prices may change, giving asset owners an incentive to maintain the im-
migration status quo. For example, U.S. farm land prices have been estimated to be
10 to 20 percent higher because immigrant workers are readily available, so that
farm wages lowered by immigration may account for up to $20 billion of the $100
billion value of U.S. fruit and vegetable land in the mid-1990s (Martin, et al. 1995).
Marxist and class theories assert that the world economy is organized in a
manner that keeps emigration countries poor, and that distinct groups of workers
in competition with each other are necessary to maintain work force discipline. For
example, Marxist theories emphasize that development based on labor-saving tech-
nologies can never produce enough jobs, guaranteeing unemployment in emigra-
tion countries, and that the value-added in countries that export primary products
is low, so that the wage gap between rich and poor countries will persist. The rural
population remains poor and ready to emigrate because of slow growth in agricul-
tural productivity, and because farm innovations that increase productivity dis-
place rural labor.
In immigration countries, class theories argue that immigrant workers are needed
to break strikes and otherwise play a buffer role in the labor market to make both
native and immigrant workers docile. Dependency theories maintain that indus-
trial nations permit immigration to keep emigration countries poor by taking from
them their best and brightest (the so-called brain and brawn drains).
Some of these theories can be used to explain both why demand-pull factors
initiate international migration for employment, and why such migration contin-
ues. However, most of these theories are too general to permit researchers to draw
clear lines that demarcate initiating factors from sustaining factors. And, even if
they can draw lines between initiating and sustaining factors at a point in time, few
can explain why sustaining factors change.
For example, Mexican farm workers were first recruited legally by U.S. farm-
ers during war periods, when farmers could argue that war unexpectedly reduced
the supply of young men most available to be seasonal farm workers. Labor-inten-
sive U.S. agriculture expanded during periods of legal Mexican labor recruitment,
and in a manner that required a supply of workers willing to accommodate them-
selves to weather and other factors that determined exactly when the workers have
employment. The U.S. need for flexible seasonal workers persisted after legal re-
cruitment ended, and Mexican workers had become dependent on U.S. earnings,
so the migration continued.
Another example illustrates how U.S. government policies can reinforce
employer and U.S. worker perceptions about who does and should do certain types
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of work. Seasonal farm work emerged as a last resort job because of the legacy of
slavery and sharecropping, but also because farm work was the most common
occupation assigned to prisoners and others under government internment. During
World War II, when Mexican braceros (strong-armed ones) were recruited to work
on U.S. farms, the U.S. government also offered the Japanese residents of western
states who were interned in camps the chance to do farm work, and many did. In
1944 and 1945, Italian and German prisoners of war worked as farm workers. Finally,
federal, state, and county prisoners were lent out to local farmers during harvest
season to pay off their fines, a practice that continued until the late 1960s.
Once farmers make investments in orchards and vineyards that assume that a
flexible supply or workers would continue to be available, they rationally fight for
continued access to such workers to protect the value of their assets, as Freeman
points out. However, as Piore notes, it is very hard for an industry that has become
dependent on flexible immigrant workers to revert to native workers—unless there
is a massive change in technology, wages, or job structure.
Bracero Recruitment
There was some Mexico-U.S. migration during most of the 20th century, but
most Mexican-born persons in the U.S. today arrived after 1980. Recruitment was
considered necessary in the 1940s and 1950s to set Mexico-U.S. migration flows
in motion. There has always been considerable U.S. opposition to permitting farm
employers to recruit Mexican workers—in the three most significant cases, in 1917,
1942, and 1951, “wartime emergencies” were the justification for permitting U.S.
employers to recruit Mexican farm workers.
Seasonal U.S. employment seemed to be a perfect match for many farmers in
West Central Mexico, who plant crops in June, after the summer rains begin, work
in the U.S. during the summer months, and return to harvest their crops in October,
after the U.S. harvest season is over. Between 1848 and 1907, there were no U.S.
inspection stations on the Canadian and Mexican borders, and data on the number
of Mexican immigrants arriving before 1907 refer only to Mexicans who arrived
by sea, which was never more than 700 in any year before 1900 (Elac, 1961, 4, 33).
Between 1900 and 1914, the peak number of Mexican immigrants admitted was
23,238 in 1912, but immigration fell to about 12,000 in 1913.
The first U.S. government-approved recruitment of Mexican workers occurred
in 1917, when the U.S. Department of Labor suspended the head tax and the literacy
test on Mexican workers coming to the U.S. “for the purpose of accepting
employment in agricultural pursuits.” The 81,000 Mexican workers admitted legally
between 1917 and 1921 were required to work for the employer with whom they
had up to a one-year contract or face deportation. Mexican immigration rose sharply,
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from 17,900 in 1917 to over 52,000 in 1920, although the U.S. recession of 1921
led to the repatriation of an estimated 150,000 Mexicans.
Legal Mexican immigration increased in the 1920s, peaking at 89,300 in 1924—
Mexican immigration averaged over 50,000 per year between 1924-1929. During the
1920s, the Mexican-born population in California tripled to 368,000. Mexican-born
workers soon dominated the seasonal work force: a 1928 estimate was that Mexicans
were 70 to 80 percent of the 72,000 casual and seasonal workers in California (Fuller,
1940, 19871). Repatriations and depression practically stopped Mexico-U.S. migra-
tion in the 1930s. Taylor (1937, 9) reported that there were about 150,000 migrant
farm workers in California in 1935, and 200,000 to 350,000 nationwide, but did not
mention Mexican-born migrants as an important group.
In 1942, U.S. farmers once again appealed for Mexican workers to produce
“food to win the war.” During World War II, admissions peaked at 62,000 in 1944,
less than 2 percent of nation’s 4 million hired workers. Between 1942 and 1947,
some 220,000 Mexican braceros were admitted with government approval.
The Bracero Program that was created to deal with wartime labor shortages
expired in 1947. There followed several years of informal and illegal movement.
U.S. farmers were permitted to import Mexican workers, or employ illegal work-
ers already in the U.S., after the U.S. Department of Labor certified labor short-
ages, and if the U.S. farmers offered the Mexican workers the same contracts guar-
antees that were required under the government-to-government program. How-
ever, neither the U.S. nor Mexican governments played a role in recruitment or
contract enforcement.
There were tensions between the U.S. and Mexican governments. In the 1948
“El Paso incident,” the U.S. government permitted several thousand “illegal Mexi-
cans” to enter the U.S. over Mexican government objections, and then “paroled” or
legalized them so that they could go to work for U.S. farmers (Hawley, 1966, 158-9).
The presence of Mexican workers diminished somewhat in the late 1940s. For
example, a careful survey of some of the 100,000 farm workers in California’s San
Joaquin Valley in 1948 found only 15 percent Mexican-origin workers, and only
one-third of them—about 5 percent of the valley’s farm workers—were born in
Mexico (Metzler and Sayin, 1950, 17).17
On July 12, 1951, over the objections of a President’s Commission on Migra-
tory Labor, PL-78, the Mexican Farm Labor Program, became law. President Truman,
in reluctantly signing PL-78 into law, sent a note to Mexican President Alemán
suggesting that the Bracero Program be only six months long to keep up the pres-
sure on Congress to approve an employer sanctions bill.
President Alemán agreed that the U.S. and Mexico should combine “our efforts,
in putting a definite stop to the illegal movement of agricultural workers” (quoted
in Kiser and Kiser, 1979, 157). In 1951, Mexico’s interior ministry announced that
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it was “adopting new measures to have our border authorities keep a strict vigilance
over the departure of our compatriots and prevent the departure of those who are
not properly documented,” and cooperating with defense and other ministries to
“prevent the illegal departure of our compatriots from Mexican Territory” (Kiser
and Kiser, 1979, 159-160).
These control measures were not effective. Instead of a government-regulated
seasonal farm worker program, Mexican workers continued to arrive outside official
channels and find U.S. jobs. According to Scruggs, “in Mexico there was no shortage
of laborers eager to leave for the United States... many simply headed for the border
without contacts of any kind in the U.S.” (1960, 324). In the spring of 1954, the U.S.
launched “Operation Wetback” to reduce illegal entries, and simultaneously made it
easier for Mexican workers and U.S. farmers to employ legal braceros. As a result,
the ratio of apprehensions to braceros was reversed between the early 1950s and the
mid-1950s. In 1951-52, there were 5 apprehensions per bracero admission; by 1956-
57, there were 5 bracero admissions per apprehension.
A summary of how the Bracero Program was administered is in Volume 3. See
pages 869 to 974.
Together, the various “Bracero Programs” admitted about 4.6 million Mexi-
can farm workers—perhaps one to two million individuals—between 1942 and
1964, and institutionalized a way-of-life that combined farming in Mexico and
working for wages in the U.S. However, increased competition for the limited
number of bracero slots in Mexico—the number of admissions peaked at about
445,000 in 1955—and the fact that U.S. farmers preferred to pay transportation
to their farms only from the border, encouraged some Mexicans to move their
families to the border area to improve their chances of being selected for admis-
sion as braceros.
It is perhaps worth noting that apprehensions—5.3 million—exceeded bracero
admissions—4.6 million—between 1942 and 1964. The Mexican percentage of
those apprehended fell from 99 percent in the early 1950s to 33 percent in the early
1960s, and the percentage of illegal Mexicans located in U.S. agriculture fell from
35 to 40 percent in the mid-1950s to 15 to 20 percent in the early 1960s (U.S.
House of Representatives, Committee on Agriculture. 1963. 47). Both apprehen-
sions and admissions measure events and not unique individuals—the same person
could be apprehended several times, and the same person could be legally admit-
ted as a bracero several times.
Most U.S. farmers did not employ braceros. In the late 1950s, almost 95 per-
cent of all braceros worked on 50,000 farms in 5 states, meaning that 98 percent of
the farms in the U.S. did not employ bracero workers (Hawley, 1966, 157).
The Kennedy Administration, which took office in January 1961, was
determined to revise the Bracero Program to better protect U.S. workers by
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Source: Congressional Research Service. 1980. 36-37.
Figure 1. Mexican Braceros, Apprehensions, and Immigrants: 1942--64
preventing Mexican workers from depressing U.S. farm wages. In October 1961,
when President Kennedy “reluctantly” signed a bill to extend the Bracero Program
through December 31, 1963, he asserted that “the adverse effect of the Mexican
farm labor program as it has operated in recent years on the wage and employment
conditions of domestic workers is clear and cumulative in its impact”
(Congressional Research Service, 1980, 52). Kennedy order the U.S. Department
of Labor to “prescribe standards and to make the determinations essential for the
protection of the wages and working conditions” of U.S. workers (quoted in
Congressional Record, August 15, 1963, 15215).
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In March 1963, the House Committee on Agriculture held hearings on whether
the Bracero Program should be extended beyond December 31, 1963. Unions,
churches, and the American GI Forum, an Hispanic veterans group, testified against
extending the program. Farmers testified in favor of a two year extension, i.e.,
until December 31, 1965. On May 29, 1963, the House voted 174-158 not to ex-
tend the Bracero Program for two more years.
Mexico favored a two-year extension of the Bracero Program, pointing out
that braceros sent about $35 million annually in money orders through the Bank of
Table 2
Mexican Braceros, Apprehensions, and Immigrants; 1942-64
Mexican Deportable Mexican
Year Braceros Aliens Located Immigrants
1942 4,203 11784 2,378
1943 52,098 11,175 4,172
1944 62,170 31,174 6,598
1945 49,454 69,164 6,702
1946 32,043 99,591 7,146
1947 19,632 193,657 7,558
1948 35,345 192,779 8,384
1949 107,000 288,253 8,803
1950 67,500 468,339 6,744
1951 192,000 509,040 6,153
1952 197,100 528,815 9,079
1953 201,380 885,587 17,183
1954 309,033 1,089,583 30,645
1955 398,650 254,096 43,702
1956 445,197 87,696 61,320
1957 436,049 59,918 49,321
1958 432,857 53,474 26,721
1959 437,643 45,336 22,909
1960 315,846 70,684 32,708
1961 291,420 88,823 41,476
1962 194,978 92,758 55,805
1963 186,865 88,712 55,986
1964 177,736 86,597 34,448
4,646,199 5,307,035 545,941
Source; Congressional Research Service. 1980.
Temporary Worker Programs; Background and Issues. 36-37
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Mexico to their families in Mexico, and that total remittances topped $100 million
per year (Taylor, 1963, 42). In a June 21, 1963 note, the Mexican government
asserted that the Bracero Program was “a result of the migration phenomenon...
the absence of an agreement... would give rise to... the illegal introduction of Mexican
workers into the United States.”
Craig credits this Mexican note with tipping the balance in Congress in favor
of extending the Bracero Program one more year, until the end of 1964 (1971, 195-
6). The Senate voted 62-25 to extend the Bracero Program for one more year on
August 15, 1963, and the House concurred in October, 1963.
As the Bracero Program wound down, did illegal Mexico-U.S. migration in-
crease? The Mexican ambassador in 1963 noted that, as the number of braceros
went down in the early 1960s, the number of apprehensions was stable, leading
him to conclude that “Mexican workers have understood and accepted the fact
that if they cannot obtain work by contract, it is because they would not obtain it
either by entering the U.S. illegally” (quoted in Congressional Record, August
15, 1963, 15203).
Network Recruitment in 1996
Most of the community studies summarized below note that bracero-era
recruitment set in motion migration flows that took on a life of their own. By the
mid-1990s, these migration flows had evolved to move Mexican migrants across
the Mexican-U.S. border without the active recruitment of workers in Mexico by
U.S. employers.
Many U.S. employers today attract recently-arrived Mexican workers without
sending agents into Mexico to recruit workers, or asking the Mexican government
to recruit workers for them. For example, most rural areas in the midwest have
unemployment rates under four percent, so meatpacking plants advertise in local
media, but most rely on supervisors or current workers to recruit additional workers
for them.18 The worker recruitment network, in turn, handles entry across the border,
transportation to the work place, and informal help learning the job.
The Chicken Trail
The Los Angeles Times on November 10-12, 1996 profiled one Mexican worker
network in a three-part report on Mexicans and Mexican-Americans who followed
the “chicken trail” from southern Texas to Missouri. Hudson Foods, based in Noel,
Missouri, (population 1,169), paid a south Texas recruiter, B. Chapman & Co.,
$175 for each worker who showed up in Missouri for the $6.70 per hour jobs in its
chicken processing plant. The reporter told how workers made their way north on
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the “chicken trail” to work for Hudson and live in a converted motel, along with
135 other migrant poultry workers, for $45 per week per person (Rural Migration
News, January and July 1997).
In 1994, Hudson employed about 1,200 workers to process 1.3 million chick-
ens each week in Noel. Annual turnover exceeds 100 percent, so that Hudson hires
about 50 new workers each month. Hudson employees are represented by a union.
About 45 percent of the labor force are Latinos. Hudson paid a $20,625 INS fine in
1992 because many of them were not authorized to work. Hudson offers current
employees who bring new workers to the plant a $300 bonus.
Hudson, the country’s seventh largest-poultry producer, with headquarters in
Rogers, Arkansas, has 14 facilities in 11 states, more than 10,000 employees and
expects $1.4 billion in sales for 1996.
The reporter-worker described the wet, the 47-degree temperature inside the
plant, the semi-automated “disassembly” line and the lack of training for newly
hired workers. The number of broiler chickens processed in the U.S. each year has
more than doubled, from 3 billion per year in the early 1970s to 7 billion per year
in the mid-1990s.
Hudson’s human resources director was quoted as saying: “there’s a large num-
ber of jobs that very few citizens in the U.S. want to do, but they’re there and they
need to be done.... One of the social goods the poultry industry provides is employ-
ing people who would otherwise have a great deal of trouble getting employed.”
The labor recruiting company travels to industry shows in search of employ-
ers seeking unskilled labor and then offers to recruit workers for theses companies.
According to the reporter, the recruiting company checked workers’ identification
cards and took urine samples to test for drugs on the particular trip reported. The
Border Patrol checked the Greyhound passengers identification cards in Falfurrias,
about 75 miles north of the Mexican border.
In 1994, the owner of the motel where newly-arrived poultry processing workers
were housed bought what was then a run-down hunting lodge motel for $220,000
and reopened it to house migrant chicken workers. Because poultry work is
considered nonfarm work, it is not subject to special farm worker housing inspection,
only normal local health and safety screening. The motel management takes every
new Hudson worker to apply for food stamps at the Division of Family Services
and the number of Latinos receiving food stamps in Noel increased from 35 per
month in 1993 to 375 per month in 1996. In 1997, Hudson invested $3 million to
build 60, 920-square foot duplex units that it rents to newly arrived workers.
Hudson is the economic linchpin of Noel, Missouri, but Hudson pays no prop-
erty taxes to the city. The number of Latino students in Noel’s elementary school
rose from 25 to more than 100. Hudson and nearby Simmons Foods contributed
$12,000 to Noel schools in 1996.
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The Beef and Pork Trail
The U.S. meatpacking industry has experienced four major changes since
World War II. First, there has been a change in dietary habits—the average per
capita consumption of chicken increased to 70 pounds per person per year in 1995,
while that of beef and pork fell to 67 and 52 pounds per person. Second, there
have been technological changes that moved meat packing away from urban con-
sumers of meat and into rural areas closer to farmer-producers of cattle and hogs.
Boxed beef, vacuum packing, and lower wages in rural areas were among the
reasons why it became preferable to prepare retail packages of meat close to where
animals are slaughtered.
Third, changes in the labor force, especially after 1980, have led to more un-
skilled workers, women, and immigrants in the plants—women traditionally have
played a more important role in poultry processing than meatpacking. The union
master agreement disappeared as three new meat packers replaced a number of
century old businesses, and real wages fell. The real hourly earnings of meatpacking
workers peaked in 1979, when meatpacking workers earned almost $15 per hour in
1992 dollars, and almost 20 percent more than the average manufacturing worker;
in 1994, by contrast, real earnings were less than $10 per hour.
Fourth, both the raising and slaughter of animals became concentrated in fewer
and larger operations. In some cases, meatpacking plants were located next to huge
feedlots that were owned by the major packers. The cost of the animal remains the
largest single cost of meat packing—cows costs slaughterhouses $0.60 to $0.70
per pound, and hogs $0.40 to $0.50 per pound, and “disassembling” these animals
into meat products costs $0.05 to $0.10 per pound for beef, and $0.20 to $0.25 per
pound for pork.
In a modern plant, 1200 250-pound hogs can be processed per hour, or 16,000
to 18,000 per day on two eight-hour shifts. The hogs are stunned, hung by one leg,
stuck with a knife, and then carried through washing and singeing machines to
remove hair. Carcasses are then split, internal organs removed, and various cuts of
meat removed as the carcass travels past workers armed with knives. About one
production worker is required for each 10 hogs slaughtered on a daily basis. The
job hierarchy in most plants is relatively flat, meaning that there are relatively few
production jobs that pay twice the entry-level wage.
Turnover is very high, so meat packers are constantly recruiting workers.
Meatpacking plants advertise for workers in local media, and some offer bounties
of e.g., $200 for each new worker referred. Some have both local recruiters, and
recruiters who travel to e.g., Texas or California, to seek workers. The striking
difference between meatpacking and seasonal agriculture is that meatpacking of-
fers year-round jobs and annual earnings that are high enough to support a family,
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so that the issues associated with the arrival of families—housing, schooling, health
care—become important community issues early in the migration process.
Adjusting to Fewer Mexican-born Workers
There is one example of a U.S. industry adjusting to the removal of Mexican-
born workers—the U.S. processing tomato industry—that shows how the supply
of immigrant labor can create and sustain a demand for such labor.19 In 1960, a
peak 45,000 workers (80 percent braceros) were employed to hand-pick 2.2 mil-
lion tons from 130,000 acres of the processing tomatoes used to make ketchup. In
1996, about 5,500 will be employed to ride on machines and sort almost 12 million
tons of tomatoes harvested from 360,000 acres, a record crop.
In 1960, the average American consumed 44 pounds of processed tomato prod-
ucts. In 1994, per capita consumption of processed tomato products was about 75
pounds, versus 13 pounds per capita of fresh tomatoes. The real price of processed
tomatoes in California fell from $30 per ton in 1960-61 to $22 per ton in 1970-71
(Brandt and French, 1981, 92). Processed tomatoes account for three-fourths of
the 105 pounds of processed vegetables that the average American consumes. The
U.S. exports about 5 percent of its processing tomato products.
In the early 1960s, when there was discussion of ending the Bracero Program,
California growers argued that “the use of braceros is absolutely essential to the
survival of the tomato industry.” Headlines in farm magazines read; “Without
braceros, tomato growers will slash acreage” (California Farmer, July 6, 1963, 5),
from 177,000 acres in 1962. Tomato industry leaders were unanimous that California
would “never again reach the 100,000 to 175,000 acres planted when there was a
guaranteed supplemental labor force in the form of the bracero” (California Farmer,
July 6, 1963, 5), and the director of the California Department of Agriculture testified
that, without braceros, “we could expect a 50 percent decrease in the production of
tomatoes” (U.S. House of Representatives, 1963, 61).
In fact, the termination of the Bracero Program in 1964 accelerated the mecha-
nization of the harvest in a manner that quadrupled annual production in California
from 3 million tons in 1960 to 12 million tons in 1996. The mechanical harvesting
system spread quickly—in 1962, only 1 percent of California processing tomatoes
were harvested mechanically. By 1969, 100 percent of the tomatoes were harvested
by machine—the pace at which the machine was adopted traces out an S-shape.
Cheaper tomatoes permitted the price of ketchup and similar products to drop,
helping to fuel the expansion of the fast food industry.
The development of the tomato harvester was unusual. Unlike the usual
approach to mechanization, in which engineers try to adapt the machine to the
plant, so that e.g., a tobacco harvester can repick a field several times, tomato
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mechanization utilized a systems approach in which scientists redesigned the plant
so that most of the tomatoes would be of the same size, and most would ripen at
the same time, and engineers developed a mechanical harvester that cut the plant,
shook off the tomatoes, and then relied on electronic eyes to quickly pick up and
sort red and green tomatoes (Rasmussen, 1968). Most of the research was done at
the University of California-Davis, at a cost of about $700,000; the major private
manufacturer spent an additional $500,000 to produce machines (Seckler and
Schmitz, 1969, 14).
As one result, the work force and the wage system changed. In this case, local
women paid hourly wages to sort machine-picked tomatoes replaced bracero men
who earned piece rate wages to hand-pick tomatoes. According to one account,
“Before the tomato harvester, tomatoes were harvested largely by braceros... re-
cruited from rural villages in Mexico... [attracted by] unusually good wages.”
Employers asked their year-round tractor drivers and irrigators to bring their wives
to ride on the tomato harvesting machines, and many did—the tomato harvest la-
bor force changed from over 95 percent male in the early 1960s, to over 80 percent
female by the late 1960s (Friedland and Barton, 1975, 59-61).
The tomato case illustrates what happens when wages rise, and there is labor
supply shock. Farm wages in relation to farm machinery prices reached their low
points in 1949-51, and again in the late 1950s. Beginning in the late 1950s, when
the U.S. Department of Labor stepped up its enforcement of Bracero Program wage
regulations, the wages of farm workers rose in relation to machinery prices, peak-
ing in the early 1970s.
This illustrates a general point about the continuing demand-pull “need” for
immigrant workers; if they are not available, and wages rise, there is a strong in-
centive to find labor-saving substitutes. However, if workers are readily available
at low wages, the supply of labor can create its own demand—if immigrant work-
ers are available, some factories or industries will adjust to employ them.
After a decade or more of dependence on immigrant workers, these firms
and industries will argue that it is impossible to operate without immigrants. And
they are correct; after the tomato harvest was mechanized, tomato growers had
to get big enough to justify buying a harvesting machine, or they switched to
other crops—over half of the farms growing tomatoes in 1960 were not growing
them in 1970.
The tomato experience suggests that dependence on immigrant workers is of-
ten a one-way street, in the sense that market forces alone will increase rather than
decrease the employment of immigrants over time. However, government policy
can affect labor supply and technological choices, as the tomato case demonstrates,
meaning that the extent of U.S. demand-pull for Mexican immigrant workers can
be changed by U.S. immigration, trade, and technology policies.
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Figure 2. California Processing Tomatoes: 1962-1970
Changing government policies to reduce employer reliance on immigrant
workers is not easy. In the U.S. in the 1960s, the U.S. Secretary of Labor devoted
an enormous amount of time to a program that admitted fewer than 200,000 Mexi-
can workers for less than 1,000 farmers, in a time when the U.S. labor force in-
cluded 75 million workers. As long as there are U.S. occupations and industries
that are dominated by immigrants, there will be ports of entry for immigrant work-
ers. Government policies that change the supply of labor can lead at least some
producers to adapt with labor-saving technologies, investment abroad, or re-orga-
nizing work.
In some cases, technological and market changes can expand the demand for
immigrant workers if they are available. The U.S. meat-packing industry, for
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example, was able to reduce wages and hire an immigrant work force during a
technological shift that moved many jobs from retail stores to the packinghouses,
and shifted the location of many plants. The electronics industry in California
expanded during the 1970s and 1980s and hired immigrant workers to fill many of
the new jobs created.
Mexicans in the U.S. Labor Market
In July 1996, there were 134 million U.S. residents employed (127 million) or
actively looking for jobs (7.3 million), for an unemployment rate of 5.4 percent.
Most workers in the United States are native-born U.S. citizens. In no U.S. state or
city, and in none of the six major occupational or nine industrial sectors broken out
in published labor force data, are immigrants a majority of the labor force.
Most U.S. economic data array individuals by race/ethnicity or U.S. versus
foreign born rather than citizen–non-citizen categories. Thus, monthly labor mar-
ket data collected from 60,000 households (the Current Population Survey) re-
ports employment and unemployment data by sex, age (16 to 19 and 20 and older),
and race (Black) as well as ethnicity (Hispanic), but not by citizenship and coun-
try of birth.
In October 1994, according to the Current Population Survey, there were 14
million foreign-born persons, and 118 million U.S.-born workers, in the U.S. labor
Table 3
California Processing Tomatoes; 1962-1996
Machine-
Year Acres Production Harvested (%)
1962 100    100 1
1963 73 77 2
1964 81 93 4
1965 69 77 25
1966 92 97 66
1967 105 99 82
1968 131 152 95
1969 87 105 100
1970 80 105 100
1996 203 373 100
In 1962, there were 177,200 acres and 3.2 million tons.
Source: Friedland and Barton, 1975. Rural Migration News.
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force, making foreign-born workers about 11 percent of the 132 million labor force.20
Half of the foreign-born workers—6.4 million—were Hispanic, and two-thirds of
these immigrant Hispanics—about 4.1 million—were born in Mexico. This means
that Mexican-born workers are about 3 percent of the U.S. labor force.
Of the 4.1 million Mexican-born workers in the U.S. labor force in October
1994, 3.7 million were employed, and 380,000 were unemployed, for an
unemployment rate of 9.3 percent at a time when the overall U.S. unemployment
rate was 5.5 percent.
Mexican-born workers are a larger share of employment in some industries
and occupations than others. For example, about 12 percent of those employed in
agriculture and forestry in October 1994 were born in Mexico, as were 5 percent of
those employed in construction and manufacturing. By occupation, about 7 per-
cent of those with farming occupations were born in Mexico, and 5 percent of the
operators and craft workers in the U.S. were Mexican born.
It is easy to exaggerate the role of Mexican-born workers in the U.S. labor
market. Of the 400+ detailed occupations in U.S. labor statistics, there are only a
handful of major occupations in which Mexican-born workers are perhaps a ma-
jority of all workers, including janitors and cleaners, household workers, and farm
Table 4
Employment by Selected Occupation: 1994–2005 (000)
If 50% Total
Mex- New Replace-
1994 born 2005  Jobs Growth ment
Janitors and cleaners,
 including maids 3,043 1,522 3,602 1,140 559 581
Food preparation workers 1,190 595 1,378 282 188 94
Private household workers 808 404 682 245 -126 371
Farm workers 906 453 870 263 -36 299
Gardeners and nursery workers 569 285 623 128 54 74
Sewing machine operators,
 garment 531 266 391 106 -140 246
Helpers, construction trades 513 257 581 429 68 361
Vehicle washers and cleaners 249 125 299 133 50 83
Total 7,809 3,905 8,426 2,726 617 2,109
New jobs include job growth and worker replacement.
Silvestri, George. 1995. Occupational Outlook to 2005. Monthly Labor Review, Vol 118, No 11,
November. 64-78.
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workers. Indeed, if half of the workers in the eight “immigrant” occupations below
were Mexican born in 1994, then the following eight occupations would account
for all Mexican-born workers employed in the U.S.
These occupations, which employed 7.8 million workers in 1994, are expected
to employ 8.4 million in 2005, an increase of 600,000. But the number of new
workers expected to be hired in these occupations is 2.1 million, or 3.5 times
more, because these tend to be high turnover occupations that entry-level workers
abandon as soon as they can find better jobs.
Replacement explains why the demand-pull of jobs may exist even in a de-
clining occupation or industry. The highest worker replacement ratios are found
in occupations such as food counter and related food service occupations, the
typical case is a fast food restaurant with one manager over 25 and a crew of 10
to 20 workers under 25. Note that BLS projects that there will be about 37,000
vacancies per year for farm workers, or 25,000 per year for garment sewers, illus-
trating that, even in shrinking occupations, employers may be eager to employ
recently arrived immigrants.
Labor Shortages and Welfare Reform
In 1997, the U.S. labor market is in a period of transition. First, unemploy-
ment is dropping even as the labor force is expanding. The U.S. labor force ex-
panded by 1.3 million workers per year in the early 1990s, but expanded by 3.7
million in the 16 months of January 1996 through April 1997. Between January 1,
1994 and June 1, 1997, the U.S. economy has added about 8 million jobs.
The U.S. labor force of 140 million normally increases by about 1 percent or
1.4 million per year. The U.S. labor supply has been expanding about twice as
fast, due to immigration, welfare recipients moving more quickly to work, more
older men working, and an increase in the percentage of working-age women
seeking jobs.
At the same time, the U.S. unemployment rate was 4.8 percent in May 1997,
the lowest rate since November 1973. The result has been a flurry of reports of
labor shortages, even for unskilled and entry level workers. In response, some of
the largest U.S. employers of low wage workers—defined as hourly wages below
$8.50, roughly the wage used by the federal government to determine eligibility
for federal housing, child care and food subsidies—have formed the 26-member
Employer Group to better find and keep stable, low-wage workers. About 80 percent
of the 600,000 U.S. workers at McDonald’s earn about $6 an hour, 80 percent of
Marriott International’s 185,000 workers earn $8 per hour, half of Hyatt’s 40,000
employees earn less than $8.50 an hour. About 90 percent of Levi Strauss’s 19,000
U.S. clothing production workers earn about $8 an hour. Collectively, the Employer
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Group employs about 2.5 million U.S. workers, and says that “market realities”
make it impossible to raise wages significantly.
According to the employer group, worker productivity reaches maximum sus-
tainable levels after three years on the job. To retain workers, these employers are
exploring ways to help their employees to find adequate child care, reliable trans-
portation, and affordable housing. ConAgra estimates that it costs the company
$2,000 to $3,000 to train a worker to understand health and safety standards and to
learn how to properly trim meat off an animal carcass.
While U.S. employers are worrying about how to find and keep workers in
entry level jobs, welfare administrators are trying to find jobs for recipients. Under
the welfare reform, an additional 140,000 current welfare recipients are expected
to be pushed into the labor force each year over the next five years. Most special-
ists divide adult welfare recipients into three categories: a group capable of getting
jobs, but temporarily down on their luck because of illness or divorce; a second
group that needs training and incentives to find jobs; and a third group that may not
prove employable.
The number of welfare recipients has fallen sharply, as the most employable
recipients find jobs. There were a peak 14.4 million U.S. welfare recipients in
March 1994, 12.1 million in August 1996, and 10.7 million in May 1997, the low-
est number since 1970. In California, the number of recipients peaked at 2.7 mil-
lion in March 1995, and 2.4 million in May 1997. The Council of Economic Advis-
ers estimated that 44 percent of the decline in welfare was due to economic growth,
31 percent to welfare reform and the rest to other factors.
In many cases, immigrant workers, fears of labor shortages, and high welfare
caseloads go together. For example, in the San Joaquin Valley of California, about
75 percent of the 400,000 individuals who work as farm workers sometime during
a typical year are immigrants, including 100,000 or more unauthorized migrants.
Farmers fearful of labor shortages are calling for modifications of the H-2A pro-
gram to make it easier to obtain temporary foreign farm workers. At the same time,
25 percent of the 761,000 residents of Fresno county are receiving some form of
welfare assistance, and the unemployment rate in most months is over 10 percent.
Economic theory has little to say about why natives shun certain jobs, or how
to respond to employer pleas of labor shortages, because economics rests on the
assumption that changing prices or wages will eliminate any tendency of U.S. work-
ers to avoid certain jobs, and cure any labor shortages. For example, neither of the
1994 review articles by Borjas and Greenwood mention labor shortages or native
avoidance of “immigrant” jobs. In other words, the economic reasons for labor
shortages and the solutions to them are one and the same—raise wages.
A review of the why-do-natives-avoid-certain jobs literature suggests two
conclusions:
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• reasons offered for job avoidance tend to be discipline-specific, e.g.,
economists discuss why rational individuals might find it economically
rational to remain unemployed rather than accept immigrant jobs,
geographers stress spatial disparities in the location of workers and jobs,
sociologists point to rising expectations among nationals unwilling to
accept low-status jobs, and lawyers look to rules and regulations that
restrict immigrant access to particular jobs.
• the lack of a comprehensive theory of job avoidance means that there is
little consensus on the relative importance of variables such as
information, wages, working conditions, worker (im)mobility, or legal
and social status in explaining why nationals avoid certain jobs, and
little sense of the dynamics of change in such factors, as might occur if
some jobs were first avoided because guestworkers were restricted to
them and later became isolated as immigrant networks “took over.”
How can the U.S. deal with the twin problems of getting work done and find-
ing jobs for unskilled workers? The literature on filling “bad jobs” suggests that:
• preventing jobs from being shunned by nationals is far better than try-
ing to re-attract nationals into such jobs after immigrant workers have
gained a foothold.
• changing the supply of national workers for “bad jobs” becomes in-
creasingly difficult over time, as immigrant networks isolate and effec-
tuate changes in both labor supply and demand that make it very costly
and difficult to re-attract nationals into “immigrant” jobs.
• most policies that succeed in dealing with bad jobs do so by reducing
the number of or eliminating such jobs, not by re-attracting nationals
into them.
Reducing or eliminating “immigrant” jobs can often be accomplished most
efficiently with non-labor market measures, such as liberalizing trade to eliminate
agricultural jobs, subsidizing labor-saving automation or self-service means of
performing the work, taxing reliance on immigrant workers, or encouraging
investment abroad.
Supply Push
Why Supply-Push?
Individuals migrate, and most theories of why people cross borders for economic
reasons are based on the economic notion that individuals try to maximize their
economic well-being, and they will migrate if they expect their economic status to
195
improve. The classic theory was developed by Todaro (1969), who emphasized
that a rational person contemplating migration would compare the present value of
the earnings she expected to receive where she now lives with expected earnings in
another country, and move if expected earnings—wages times the probability of
finding a job—were higher. Expected earnings would be higher, of course, if the
migrant could legally cross borders and be assured of a job at higher wages, as
under guest worker systems.
According to economic theory, emigration puts upward pressure on expected
earnings in the origin, and downward pressure on expected earnings in the
destination, and migration continues until an equilibrium is reached in which the
expected earnings gap equals all costs of migrating, including psychic costs.
Empirical studies find that expected earnings are a good guide to the direction of
migration—individuals do tend to move from areas in which expected earnings are
lower to areas of higher expected earnings.
Some analysts argue that the two major factors that determine expected earn-
ings—wages and (un)employment—play different roles in migration decisions.
Wage differences, the argument runs, make an individual prone to migrate, while
job losses in the area of origin prompt emigration.
Many recent empirical studies begin with this expected earnings framework,
and then expand it by considering, e.g., an individual’s expected earnings’
contribution to a multi-person household (Taylor, 1987), or how households use
emigration to:
• overcome crises that result from e.g., a lack of insurance,
• obtain savings for investment when there are few local moneylenders
or,
• obtain the funds needed to buy the consumer goods that neighbors were
able to purchase with savings and remittances (Stark, 1991).
According to Taylor, et al., (1996, 404), the new economics of migration is
based on the hypothesis migration “originate(s) in the desire to overcome market
failures that constrain local production... [so that migration can be] an intermediate
investment that facilitates the transition from familial to commercial production...
[remittances can] loosen constraints on local production, once migrants become
established abroad” (1996, 405).
In evaluating these theories of why individuals migrate for economic reasons,
it seems prudent to remember that all begin from the expected earnings gap. In
most cases, on a scale of 1 to 10, expected earnings differences are 80 to 90 percent
of the reason why a person moves, with the extending explanations accounting for
the rest. The fact that the research literature focuses on the extensions rather than
the basic model should not obscure its importance.
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Mexican Labor and Social Conditions: 1980–1994
Mexico has had a roller coaster economy since 1980, falling from an oil-inspired
boom in the late 1970s into a debt crisis in 1982-83, then opening to the world
economy in the mid-1980s, entering a pre-NAFTA boom in the early 1990s, and
suffering a peso devaluation and economic depression in 1994-95. In 1997, the
Mexican economy appears to be back on track, expanding at twice the U.S. economic
growth rate.
During the roller coaster 1980s, standard social indicators improved, albeit at
a slower pace than in the 1970s, as the government rationalized and improved the
efficiency of its services. For example, the life expectancy of men rose from 63.7
to 66.4 between 1980 and 1990, and to 68.5 by 1995. Women life expectancy rose
from 69.9 to 73.0 during the 1980s, and faster rate after 1990, reaching 75.5 by
1995. By 1995, life expectancy in Mexico exceeds that of some of the wealthier
Latin American countries, including Argentina, Brazil and Colombia.
Similarly, illiteracy also fell during the 1980s, dropping from 17 to 12 percent
of the population. The growth primary school enrollment between 1988 and 1994
was 2 percent per year, while the growth of children in this age group was only 1
percent per year, suggesting that more children are in school. By 1995-6, preschool
attendance reached a historic high, including almost 80 percent of those of kinder-
garten age (Segundo Informe de Gobierno de Ernesto Zedillo). Mexico recently
raised compulsory schooling from six to nine years; about 42 percent of 15 to 19
year olds are in school. About 20 million children are expected to be enrolled in K-
12 Mexican schools in fall 1997, versus 52 million in the U.S.
In August 1997, President Ernesto Zedillo announced a $155-million
PROGRESA program aimed at breaking the cycle of poverty in Mexico. Up to
177,416 families in parts of 10 states will get $8 a month to keep young children in
school, with the payments higher for girls than boys, and rising with age. Unlike
Solidarity, the Salinas Administration antipoverty program, PROGRESA is to be
administered by the states.
During the eighties, the number of dwellings that lacked piped water sup-
plies fell from 28 percent to 20 percent, and fell further to 19 percent by 1994.
The share of housing units without sewage facilities fell from 36 percent in 1990
to 34 percent in 1992, while the share of households with electricity rose from 88
to 89 percent.
These improvements in social indicators can be attributed to improved service
delivery during the 1980s, rising incomes after 1987, and the social program
developed during the Salinas administration, Programa Nacional de Solidaridad
(PRONASOL), which involved local residents in the provision of basic
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infrastructure. This program has been criticized for serving electoral rather than
strictly social welfare objectives (Dresser 1991, Molinar Horcasitas 1994, Roberts
and Escobar 1997), since PRONASOL paid particular attention to municipios and
states where the dominant party (PRI) had lost elections in 1988. Spending was
also targeted to states with crucial upcoming elections, and there was no clear
relationship between the level of poverty of different states and their per capita
PRONASOL investment. Nevertheless, it must be said that PRONASOL delivered
services in many poor states and regions, and that these improvements are evident
in macro social figures and indicators.
From a supply-push perspective, worsening social indicators such as health or
education or housing did not play a significant role in the rise of emigration seen
during the 1980s. However, some of the states that became significant sources of
emigrants in the 1980s did experience at least a stagnation in the improvement of
social indicators, including the northern border states, where housing conditions
deteriorated, partly because of rapid urban growth. In the South and Southeast, life
expectancy stagnated and fertility and infant mortality remained very high in states
such as Oaxaca and Guerrero.
Finally, a full appraisal of social conditions during the 1980s should acknowl-
edge that, even though earnings continued to improve during the 1980s, the re-
structuring of employment meant new and often worse work conditions, including
more frequent spells of unemployment.
Developments in the Mexican labor market since 1982 can be divided into
three periods, one characterized mostly by adjustment, a second one by restructur-
ing, and a third, the “crisis of 1994.” Adjustment, restructuring, and crisis occurred
under a longer-term era of growing mismatch between labor force growth that ex-
ceeded job growth, especially after 1975. In 1995, were 1.2 million persons turn-
ing 15. However, the number of new labor force entrants will begin to decline by
2000, and then slow significantly by 2010.
In 1982, the peso was devalued by 80 percent against the dollar, and there
followed a period of adjustments marked by five factors that affected migration:
1. Earnings fell sharply, by an average 23 percent between mid-1982 and
mid-1983, mostly as inflation outpaced earnings growth, and the incomes
of those at the top of the earnings distribution fell even more, producing
what some analysts called “equality through impoverishment” (Cortes and
Rubalcava 1989). The ratio of U.S. to Mexican wages jumped from about
2.2 to 1 in 1981 to 6 to 1 by the end of 1983.
2. Unemployment did not rise significantly, except for an uptick in
1983, as adjustments occurred mostly through lower earnings
(Lustig 1992).
198
3. Some women entered the labor market to offset falling male earnings.
After 1982, married women with young children began entering the
labor market, including poorer women in their 30s with young children
who went to work for wages to maintain family income. In Guadalajara,
for example, poor women going to work were able to make offset about
two-thirds of the incomes that their husbands lost through lower real
earnings after 1982 (Gonzalez de la Rocha).
4. However, there were few new formal sector jobs created for these
women, except for an additional 400,000 jobs in maquiladoras, so that
many of the women went to work as maids or in personal services.
5. Most Mexican firms adjusted to the peso devaluation by using more
now-cheaper labor, which permitted them to be more flexible in meet-
ing ever-changing consumer demand in what was still largely a closed
market. However, in Monterrey, there was a comprehensive restructur-
ing in some manufacturing industries, so that industries there emerged
from the crisis more competitive. The overall manufacturing employ-
ment index, which was 100 in 1980, rose to 103 in January 1981, and
then fell to 86 in January 1988.
In 1987-88, Mexico began to open its markets to the international economy.
Mexico joined GATT in 1986, and again in 1988, Mexico lowered tariffs and re-
moved import license requirements on many products. The October 1987 stock
market crash led to capital flight from Mexico, and another peso devaluation, prompt-
ing the Mexican government, business leaders, and unions to sign the first pacto,
or agreement on wage and price adjustments. Finally, in 1988 Carlos Salinas was
elected President, ushering in a new era of privatization and opening markets to
international trade.
The next six years in Mexico were marked by income growth but relatively
few additional formal jobs. Between 1988 and 1994, real earnings began to rise,
but formal employment in the manufacturing sector fell, agriculture began to be
restructured, and the U.S.-Mexico wage gap narrowed from about 9 to 1 in 1988 to
5 to 1 in 1994, as the peso rose against the dollar, and as Mexican wages rose.
As Mexican wages rose after 1987, so did inequality, according to the Na-
tional Survey of Urban Employment (Roberts and Escobar, 1996a). Income dy-
namics for the poorest 40 percent in Mexico are hard to track because the Na-
tional Survey of Household Income and Expenditure reclassified many urban
residents as rural (Escobar 1996). Independent analysts agreed with government
findings that poverty increased from 1984 to 1989 (the number of those classified
as very poor and in intermediate poverty rose), but also found that proportion of
Mexicans with incomes below the poverty line rose between 1989 and 1992, when
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government data showed that the percentage of residents in poverty was falling
(Escobar 1996).
Beginning in 1988, many new labor force entrants found informal jobs in
(personal) services or became self-employed; the manufacturing employment index
fell from 86 in January 1988 to 73 in November 1994. The Mexican government
permitted and encouraged labor market flexibility to increase productivity, and
new labor agreements permitted many firms to restructure and reduce employment.
Agriculture underwent the beginnings of a withdrawal of government subsi-
dies after 1988. Credits that did not have to be repaid were withdrawn, input sub-
sidies and output price guarantees were reduced, and the land tenure system was
changed. The combination of these agricultural policy changes and a rising peso
discouraged exports, reducing the employment of hired farm workers, and also
reduced the value of the crops that small farmers grew to sell. One result was that
internal migratory circuits in Mexico that moved rural residents between small
farms, jobs in export-oriented agriculture, and urban jobs were disrupted.
The one place where formal sector manufacturing jobs were created was on
the border, in maquiladoras. But maquiladora jobs offered few opportunities for
upward mobility, so that Mexicans had to decide whether to take “dead end”
maquiladora jobs, or try their luck in interior Mexican cities, which offered fewer
jobs, but more opportunity for upward mobility.
Employment grew faster than the labor force between 1992 and 1994. Dur-
ing that time, the informal share of total employment did not increase, real earn-
ings rose, and unemployment fell—trends that were likely the result of more for-
mal sector jobs leaving those with the fewest qualifications in the informal sector.
This relatively good labor market performance in Mexico was not widely appre-
ciated, in part because of skepticism about government data, and because of con-
siderable economic restructuring that displaced workers, including in prosperous
Monterrey. Between 1992 and 1994, the availability of jobs in Mexico seems to
have reduced emigration—line-watch apprehensions per hour fell (Escobar, Bean
and Weintraub 1996).
In December 1994, the Mexican peso was devalued, and it eventually fell over 50
percent against the U.S. dollar, from 3.45 pesos to $1 to 7.7 pesos per $1 in August
1997. Employment in Mexico fell sharply, as workers in both the formal and informal
sectors lost jobs, even as real wages fell when inflation jumped. Bleak prospects for
job seekers kept the labor force stable. For the first time in a decade, open unemploy-
ment rose faster than informal employment in 1995, especially for young people
under 20, whose unemployment rate was above 20 percent for most of 1995.
The cheaper peso increased exports, but exporting firms added relatively few
new workers, except in the border areas. Mexico’s economy seems to be
rebounding—it is expected to grow by about 8 percent in the second quarter of
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1996, versus a 10 percent contraction in the same quarter of 1995. However, an
August 5, 1996, Wall Street Journal article praising Mexican policymakers for
sticking with economic reform—and thus, in the paper’s opinion, laying the basis
for higher savings and more productive investments—warned that, “in the next
two years, at least, the outlook is for high unemployment and stagnant salaries...
and a higher incidence of poverty” (Jonathan Friedland, “Latin America resists
reform backlash,” Wall Street Journal, August 5, 1996).
Mexican employers seem to be wary of hiring workers who might become
fixed costs that limit their flexibility, so that labor market recovery may be delayed.
Mexican Agriculture
Agriculture represents a special concern for the Mexican government, and for
northward migration. About 25 percent of Mexico’s population lives in rural areas,
the same as the rural share of the U.S. population, but most of Mexico’s 23 million
rural residents live on farms, while fewer than 10 percent of the 63 million rural
residents of the United States live on farms.
In Mexico, the rural population generated only 8 percent of the country’s $377
billion GDP in 1994, and rural incomes were less than one-third of Mexico’s $4,180
per capita GDP.21 From 1987 to 1992, per capita income among farmers declined
by 32 percent, but there was not a significant rural-urban migration within Mexico.
U.S. agriculture, by contrast, generates a slightly larger share of GDP than farm-
ers’ share of the population, so U.S. farmers have higher than average incomes,
and much higher than average wealth.
Some 40 to 50 percent of all Mexicans are considered to be poor, and two-
thirds of Mexico’s poor people live in rural areas, as do three-fourths of the very
poor (Levy and Van Wijnbergen, 1992, 498).22 Although most of Mexico’s popula-
tion and rural poor are mestizos, the rate of poverty is highest among indigenous
peoples in rural areas.23
Mexico’s farming system is a creature of government and, for most of the
20th century, Mexican agricultural policies had the dual objectives supporting
rural incomes by offering high government-guaranteed prices to farmers, and then
providing consumers with basic foods at low prices. In practice, the subsidy sys-
tem was more effective in reducing food prices for consumers than in raising
farm incomes. The Mexican government was involved in all aspects of agricul-
ture, from the distribution of land, to the provision of inputs such as fertilizer and
credit, to the marketing and processing of commodities, and to the distribution of
food to consumers.
Beginning in the mid-1980s, and especially in the early 1990s, the government
began to withdraw from agriculture, accelerating what is likely to be a massive
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movement off the land in Mexico. The government’s withdrawal from agriculture
in the 1990s was motivated primarily by the failure of the Mexican agricultural
system to produce enough food at competitive world prices. In the early 1990s,
Mexico’s agricultural production stagnated, raising the bill for imported food. At
the same time, rural poverty was widespread despite costly subsidies, and the
government did not have the funds to re-capitalize agriculture. The Mexican
government has announced several new initiatives, including a June 1997 policy:
“A Defined Direction for Growth in the Countryside,’’ which calls for the production
of 37 million tons of basic grains by 2000.
Many Mexican farmers have network ties to the U.S. labor market. A 1994
household survey of the ejido sector collected information on 5,267 adults in the
households interviewed (14 and older) and 9,216 adults in extended families. About
14 percent of the adults in the sample households, 19 percent of the adults in the
biological family, and 38 percent of the household heads—whose average age was
49—had migrated to the U.S. at least once by the time of the survey (de Janvry and
Sadoulet, 1997, 7).24 Over 70 percent of those who migrated to the U.S. had less
than 6 years of schooling. A detailed analysis of the 950 members of ejidatario
families who have migrated to the United States found that more adult men under
35 migrate that men older than 35.
The Mexican government hopes that many farmers remain will remain in rural
areas and switch from corn and beans to fruits and vegetables, especially as NAFTA
accelerated the shift of North American fruit and vegetable production to Mexico.
However, a careful analysis of trends in the North American horticultural industry
suggests that most labor intensive agriculture will remain in the U.S. (Cook, et al.,
1991). Mexico’s primary competitive advantage in producing fruits and vegetables
for the U.S. market is climate; Mexico can produce fresh vegetables during the
winter months when most U.S. production areas except Florida are not producing.
Even if Mexico were to completely displace winter vegetable production in Florida,
most fruit and vegetable production would remain in the United States, because
two-thirds of North American fruit and vegetable production occurs in the summer
and fall, when Mexico is not producing significant quantities.25
Mexico is not likely to completely displace Florida as the source of most win-
ter fruits and vegetables because, in many cases, low yields and low labor produc-
tivity make vegetable production more expensive in Mexico than in Florida. Most
Mexican migrants, in any case, come from areas not likely to become export cen-
ters for fruits and vegetables.
Florida producers have also been adept at using the U.S. government to limit
Mexican imports. The U.S. farm value of fresh vegetables and melons was $7.4
billion in 1995, and Florida’s production of six winter fresh vegetables—tomatoes,
bell peppers, cucumbers, snap beans, eggplant, and squash—represented about 10
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percent of the total. Florida produced 2.5 billion pounds of these six fresh vegetables
in 1995, other states produced 3.8 billion pounds, and 2.6 billion pounds were
imported—about three-fourths of these fresh vegetable imports were from Mexico.
Mexico exported about $1.5 billion of fruits and vegetables in 1995, including
$600 million of tomatoes. The 16.5 pounds of fresh tomatoes that the average
American eats each year, include about 4.6 pounds produced in Florida, seven
pounds produced in other states, especially California, and 4.6 imported pounds,
usually from Mexico.
Most of the year-to-year fluctuation in Florida and Mexico shares of the winter
vegetable market has been due to weather, but in December 1994, the Mexican peso
was devalued. Mexican fruit and vegetable exports surged in 1995-96, due to both the
peso devaluation and to cold weather in Florida (Love and Lucier, 1996, 20).
Florida has filed two separate actions against Mexican winter vegetables, has
lost one, and is likely to win the other—it should be noted that the 1996 “tomato
war” does not hinge on tariffs—U.S. tariffs on Mexican tomatoes are low—$0.01
per pound—and are scheduled to be phased out in 2004. In the winter of 1996,
prices for 25-pound boxes of tomatoes fell from the usual $10 to $12 to $3, below
the $8 cost of production in Florida, and the $6 cost of production in Mexico.
Florida and Mexico compete for less than half the year—for the five months be-
tween December and April—with the most severe competition in February-March.
Most observers attribute Florida’s falling share of the winter vegetable market
to weather and to Mexico’s “correct” technological choices. Until the early 1990s,
both Florida and Mexico produced mostly “mature green” tomatoes, which means
that green tomatoes were picked into buckets, sorted and packed into cartons, and
then gassed to turn them pink before being shipped to retail stores. However, Mexico
began in the 1990s to plant “vine-ripe” tomato varieties that can be picked pink,
and reportedly taste better than mature green tomatoes.
NAFTA permits governments to protect industries that are hurt by import surges,
and Florida growers argued that a Mexican import surge in 1995-96 was hurting
the U.S. tomato industry. But Florida growers lost this case in a 4-1 decision by the
International Trade Commission on July 2, 1996, because most U.S. tomatoes are
not produced in Florida—tomatoes are produced in California, South Carolina,
and other states, and the “injury” clause of NAFTA does not consider one seasonal
component of an entire industry. In response, Florida proposed, and the Clinton
Administration supported, the redefinition of the Florida tomato industry as an
“industry” for the purpose of invoking the NAFTA import-surge clause.
Florida producers filed a separate petition on April 1, 1996, that alleged that
Mexico dumped tomatoes in the U.S. at less than their cost of production in 1995-
96—they needed only show that there was “some injury” from imported tomatoes
to win this case. The U.S. Department of Commerce investigated to determine,
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e.g., whether Mexican tomatoes were sold at the same prices in Canada, Mexico,
and the U.S. in 1995-96 but, just before it issued its decision, Mexico agreed to a
price floor for its tomato exports—Mexican growers would charge at least $0.21
per pound, or $5.17 for a 25-pound box for their tomatoes shipped to the U.S.—
and Florida growers agreed to suspend their dumping case. The Florida Department
of Agriculture spent $1.5 million to press the tomato-growers’ complaints against
Mexican tomatoes.
Tomatoes and other winter vegetables are produced by a handful of large growers
who rely on migrant Mexican workers in both Florida and Mexico. In Florida, four
“family” farms dominate the Florida tomato industry—DeMare, Gargiulo, Heller,
and Esformes—together they account for half of Florida’s $400 million in annual
tomato sales.
Mexico’s export-oriented winter vegetable industry is centered in Sinaloa, about
600 miles south of the U.S. border. Large farms there employ about 170,000 Mexi-
can workers for four to five months. Most of these seasonal workers are migrants;
three-fourths migrate to Sinaloa from other parts of Mexico. In 1996, typical wages
for tomato picking in Sinaloa were reported to be about $3 -$5 per day, and chil-
dren often join their parents in the fields.26
The 1996 tomato war indicates that Mexican producers will not gain easy access
to the U.S. market simply because NAFTA is in place. Even though most U.S. observ-
ers are not very sympathetic to the Florida growers—a recent story in the Wall Street
Journal was headlined “With little evidence, Florida growers blame tomato woes on
NAFTA”27—U.S. producers can wage effective campaigns to retard imports.
Given the difficulty of making the transition to labor-intensive fruits and
vegetables, the key question is what will happen to farmers in Mexico. Most reports
from rural Mexico in 1996 are dominated by discussion of a lack of credit and
other obstacles that make it hard for farmers to switch crops and remain in
agriculture.28
NAFTA and Supply-Push Migration
On January 1, 1994, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
went into effect, laying the basis for an eventual free trade area encompassing 380
million people with a combined GDP of $7 trillion. The purpose of NAFTA is to
reduce trade barriers and promote investment in the region, thereby stimulating
economic and job growth throughout North America.
Migration played a background role during the Congressional debate over
whether NAFTA should be ratified.29 This was primarily because the migration
message from researchers could be used by both opponents and proponents of
NAFTA. The consensus among experts was NAFTA would contribute to an initial
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increase in Mexico-to-U.S. migration, and decrease the cross border flow beginning
in a decade or so (Martin, 1993). NAFTA proponents, who took a long-run
perspective, argued that the prospect of eventually reduced migration was an
argument in favor of NAFTA, while some NAFTA opponents opposed the agreement
because of the predicted short-run migration hump.
Many observers expected Mexico-to-U.S. migration to begin to decrease as
soon as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was signed. Former
Mexican President Carlos Salinas de Gortari explained the relationship between
NAFTA and migration in this way; “Today, Mexicans have to migrate to where
jobs are being created, the northern part of our country. With NAFTA, employment
opportunities will move toward where the people live, reducing drastically migra-
tion, within the country and outside of the country” (quoted in the San Diego Tri-
bune, November 14, 1993, 1).
Trade-stimulated economic growth should also reduce emigration from Mexico;
the U.S. Commission for the Study of International Migration and Cooperative Eco-
nomic Development looked for “mutually beneficial, reciprocal trade and investment
programs” to reduce unauthorized migration from Mexico and concluded that “ex-
panded trade between the sending countries and the United States is the single most
important remedy” for unauthorized immigration (1990, p. xv, emphasis added).
However, the commission warned that “the economic development process
itself tends in the short to medium term to stimulate migration.” Policies that ac-
celerate economic growth, including privatization, land reform, and freer trade,
can produce a migration hump, or temporarily more migration, creating “a very
real short-term versus long-term dilemma” for a country such as the United States
that wants to use free trade agreements as one means to curb unauthorized immi-
gration (U.S. Commission, 1990, p. xvi).
Table 5
Canada, Mexico, and the United States (1995)
Avg. Ann. Avg. Ann.
GDP GNP Per Ratio- Growth Pop. Growth
($ bil) Capita $ U.S.=100 (1985-95) (mil) (1990-95)
Canada 569 19,380 0.72 0.4 30 1.3
Mexico 250 3,320 0.12 0.1 92 1.9
U.S. 6,952 26,980 1.00 1.3 263 1.0
Total 7,771 385
Source: World Bank Development Report, 1997.
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NAFTA brought together 3 different countries in the world’s largest free trade
area. Canada and the United States have similar GNPs per capita, but their per capita
GNP and population growth rates diverged since 1985—Canada has experienced
slow economic growth and fast population growth compared to the United States.
Mexico, in comparison to the United States, had a very slow real per capita GNP
growth rate over the past decade, and its population grew at twice the U.S. rate.
The major economic effect of NAFTA should be to stimulate the flow of
investment, goods and services across North American borders. There were more
than 50 models that projected the effects of NAFTA on the economies and labor
markets of Canada, Mexico and the United States, and most concluded that the
economic effects of NAFTA in the United States were projected to be small, both
because the Mexican economy is only 1/20 the size of the U.S. economy and because
tariffs are already low—the average U.S. tariff on Mexican imports in 1991 was 4
percent, and the average Mexican tariff on U.S. imports was 10 percent.
Most of the models that considered NAFTA’s effects on migration expected
the agreement to increase the flow of Mexicans to the United States. The “smoking
gun” in this migration hump scenario anticipates that the free trade in agricultural
products envisioned by NAFTA will displace Mexican farmers who have a tradi-
tion of migrating to the United States.
The most widely-cited projection of NAFTA’s effects on Mexico-to-U.S. mi-
gration was that of Hinojosa and Robinson (1991). Using a CGE model of the U.S.
and Mexican economies and labor markets, and then projecting how freer trade
might affect Mexican agriculture, they estimated that NAFTA would displace about
1.4 million rural Mexicans, largely due to changes in Mexican farm policies and
freer trade in agricultural products.
If jobs are not created for these displaced farmers in the areas where they
live—and few observers expect a significant number of “real” jobs to be created in
these rural areas, Hinojosa-Robinson projected that 800,000 would stay in Mexico,
and that 600,000 would migrate (illegally) to the United States. These 600,000
additional U.S.-bound migrants—say 100,000 per year over 6 years—are presum-
ably NAFTA-caused additions to the “normal” flow of legal and illegal Mexican
worker arrivals.
The reason why NAFTA increases migration in the Hinojosa-Robinson model
is because of free trade in corn. Between 30 and 50 percent of all days worked in
rural Mexico are devoted to production of corn and beans. U.S. farmers can pro-
duce both crops cheaper than Mexican farmers—the U.S. corn price of $95 per ton
early in 1994 was less than half of the Mexican price of $205 per ton. Liberalizing
trade in corn, as NAFTA does over 15 years—is expected to shift North America’s
corn production northward, at U.S. prices, since Iowa alone produces twice as
much corn as Mexico.
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Instead of slowing down change in agriculture, as these migration models would
advise, the Mexican government speeded up agricultural changes. Mexico changed
its farm policies in four important ways in the early 1990s:
• First, Mexico accelerated the withdrawal of input subsidies from
agriculture, increasing costs for many farmers.
• Second, Mexico in 1991-92 freed up the land market, permitting ejido
land to be rented or sold, and permitting foreign and domestic corpora-
tions to own Mexican farm land, in an attempt to attract capital into
agriculture.
• Third, Mexico since 1987 has opened itself to freer trade in farm com-
modities, and NAFTA in 1994 locks in a schedule to achieve relatively
free North American trade in farm commodities by 2009.
• Fourth, Mexico in 1993 switched its system of farm support from price
guarantees to income transfers, eliminating the need for farmers to grow
crops over the next 10 years to receive government support.
These policy changes amount to a revolution in Mexican government policies
toward the one-third of the population in rural areas. Their net effect will undoubtedly
be to promote emigration from rural Mexico.
Although no one knows how many people will leave rural Mexico during its
expected “Great Migration,” many echo Luis Tellez, the former Undersecretary for
Planning in Mexico’s Ministry of Agriculture and Hydraulic Resources, who suggested
on several occasions that Mexico’s rural population might shrink by 1 million annually,
that up to 15 million rural Mexicans may migrate “within a decade or two” (Golden,
1991, p. A1).30 After Mexicans leave the farm, Mexico’s labor allocation should im-
prove—Tellez frequently reminded audiences that 27 percent of the Mexican popula-
tion depends on agriculture for a living, but this sector generated only 9 percent of GDP
in the early 1990s, and for this reason includes 2/3 of Mexico’s poor people.
The unanswered question is how many Mexicans displaced from agriculture will
migrate to Mexican cities and find jobs, and how many will migrate to the U.S. Many
new jobs in Mexico are being created in “mid-sized” Mexican cities both along
Mexico’s northern border, and in interior cities (Corona 1993, Browning and Corona
1995), but still not as many as were created in Mexico City, Guadalajara, and Monterrey
in the 1970s, when fewer Mexicans were joining the labor force every year.
Changing Mexico
Mexico is rapidly urbanizing, and more Mexican migrants in the U.S. were
born or have lived and worked in Mexican cities.
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According to Wayne Cornelius, the urban origins and experience of more
Mexican migrants matches neatly the demands of U.S. nonfarm employers for
unskilled nonfarm workers. Interviews with Mexican-born workers in San Diego
found that over half intended to stay permanently or as long as possible in the U.S.
upon arrival, and only 20 percent were in the U.S. to save a target amount of money
before returning to Mexico (Cornelius, 1997, 5). But intentions to stay in the U.S.
increase with experience; two thirds of those interviewed said that, based on current
circumstances, they would like to remain in the U.S.
Remittances and Development
Mexico receives $4 billion to $5 billion per year in remittances: the Mexican
central bank reported in June 1997 that Mexicans in the U.S. remitted $4.2 billion
in 1996, up from $3.7 billion in 1995. Mexicans reportedly had $10.3 billion in
savings in U.S. banks in 1996.
Many researchers do not believe that emigration and remittances are a short-
cut to faster economic development.
The new economics of migration stresses the multiplier role that their expen-
diture can have on local economic activity, the importance of foreign labor mar-
kets in overcoming the inability to borrow money locally, and the ability of foreign
jobs to cushion the effects of recessions in the country of origin.
However the open question is what kind of government environment is needed
so that remittances have their maximum development impact. Taylor et al. (1996,
411) assert that “Schemes to harness international migrant remittances for local
development are destined to fail if governments do not create an economic envi-
ronment that is conducive to investment in productive activities at home.” This
means that, under some circumstances, it may be better to “correct failures in local
capital and risk markets” rather than e.g., create jobs (1996, 405).
Most of the money is sent to Mexico in small sums, often less than $300,
and at a relatively high cost to sender and recipient. The cost of transferring these
remittances is often 20 percent of the amount transferred. For a typical $300
transfer, Western Union in the U.S. charges $29 or 10 percent, and Elektra in
Mexico turns remittances from dollars into pesos at an exchange rate that is about
10 percent less than the interbank rate.31 This means that as much as $1 billion
of the $4 to $5 billion destined for often poor areas of Mexico is absorbed by
transfer costs.
In May 1997, the U.S. Postal Service and its Mexican partner, Bancomer, ex-
tended their wire cash transfer service, Dinero Seguro or Safe Money, from Texas
to 200 post offices in Southern California. Dinero Seguro charges $15 for a wire
transfer of up to $250, or a maximum commission of six percent. However, the
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competitors to the Western Union-Elektra consortium often require several days to
clear fund transfers, so that many migrants continue to use the higher cost service.
Networks
The demand-pull and supply-push factors that motivate and sustain migration
have been likened to battery poles—they have the potential to start a car or a mi-
gration flow, but they act only when a link is established between them. Network
factors are the diverse forces that demographer Everett Lee called “intervening
variables,” networks of friends and relatives, employers, labor smugglers and
moneylenders who can tell potential migrants about conditions abroad, and pro-
vide them with the means to take advantage of opportunities abroad. According to
one review, if demand-pull and supply-push factors explain why Mexicans migrate
to the U.S., networks determine who migrates, and where Mexican migrants go in
the U.S. (Wilson, 1993, 119).
Networks provide part of the explanation for why more Mexican migrants go
to Los Angeles than Minneapolis. Neighboring Mexican villages illustrate the ef-
fect of networks: the village that sends many of its young men Los Angeles may
have sent farm workers to the United States in the 1950s, so that today young
workers from the village are informed in advance about where to go in Los Ange-
les to find jobs.
The village that sends few migrants, on the other hand, may not have many
anchor friends and relatives in the United States to provide potential migrants
with job and housing information. The fact that young people from this equally
poor but less well networked village may well wind up unemployed in the United
States helps to explain why fewer people from that village emigrate.
Most empirical studies find that network factors eventually increase in
importance over time. In a process that has been termed “cumulative causation,”
each time a migrant leaves he “alters the social context within which subsequent
migration decisions are made, typically in ways that make additional movement
more likely” (Massey et al., 1993, p. 451). The explanation for snowballing
migration is that migration “tends to increase in prevalence and become more
diverse because transnational movement causes relatively permanent changes in
individual motivations, social structures, and cultural milieus, and these changes
cumulate over time to change the context within which subsequent migration
decisions are made. As more people are induced to migrate, knowledge and network
connections expand further, inducing more people to migrate, and so on” (Massey,
Goldring, and Durand, 1994, 1528). Within the emigration area, there may be
secondary effects, including changes in the distribution of income, changes in the
distribution and usage of farm land, and changes in consumption habits.
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Network Hiring
Most jobs at the bottom of the U.S. labor market are found by word-of-mouth
and, after one or more immigrants is hired, an immigrant network is often estab-
lished to provide additional workers as vacancies appear. The employer of low-
wage and unskilled workers—a restaurant or hotel, a shoe or furniture manufac-
turer, or a farmer—typically experiences a high turnover of American workers
because the Americans are dissatisfied with the low wages, hard work, and few
benefits of these jobs.
The immigrants, by contrast, tend to report diligently every day, offer to bring
their friends and relatives to fill vacant jobs, and even to train newly-hired work-
ers. The loyalty and dependability of immigrants soon makes them, in the eyes of
some employers, preferred workers. Using immigrant networks to find new work-
ers offers employers several advantages; current workers know exactly what the
job requires; current workers have an incentive to recruit only good workers; cur-
rent workers transfer existing friendships, etc. into the workplace; and networks
are a cheap and efficient way to obtain new workers.
Between 1942 and 1964, U.S. employers recruited workers in Mexico with
the blessing of the U.S. and Mexican governments. Neither government endorses
private recruitment for work in the U.S. today. However, indirect recruitment through
migrant networks is widespread—U.S. employers often ask current workers to re-
cruit family and friends to fill vacant jobs. In addition, many U.S. employers out-
side traditional immigration areas use U.S. and Mexican labor brokers to recruit
immigrants, and they advertise on both sides of the border.
Case studies of immigration networks demonstrate how quickly certain jobs
become the “property” of non-nationals. In Los Angeles, unionized Black janitors
who cleaned high-rise buildings were displaced by non-union Mexican immigrants
over a five year period in the early 1980s. This displacement occurred quickly and
indirectly; according to a GAO report, the number of unionized Black janitors in
Los Angeles county fell from 2,500 in 1977 to 600 in 1985, even though janitorial
employment rose 50 percent in the county as a result of a building boom (GAO,
1988, pp. 40-1).
One reason for the displacement of unionized Black janitors in an expanding
service industry is that the structure of the cleaning industry changed. Instead of
hiring janitors directly, janitorial service firms that specialized in cleaning build-
ings developed, and they tended to employ recently-arrived immigrants to clean
buildings for 25 to 35 percent less, in part because they paid lower wages, and in
part because they offered fewer benefits. In the case of Los Angeles janitors, clean-
ing firms paid their immigrant workers up to two-thirds less than prevailing union
wages. A subsequent study reported that inflation-adjusted janitorial wages fell 36
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percent to $4.50 per hour between 1983 and 1988, and that the share of each rental
dollar going to janitorial services fell from six percent to three percent (other esti-
mates put the cost of cleaning at 10 to 12 percent of the cost of operating a build-
ing, when including costs from electricity and taxes to security).
The most recent study of network hiring was directed by Waldinger (1994). It
described how employers in Los Angeles asked current immigrant workers to bring
friends and relatives to fill job vacancies. These immigrants can draw from a seem-
ingly endless pool of friends and relatives in the U.S. and abroad, and Waldinger
found that network hiring tended to exclude e.g., native-born Blacks and whites, in
part, because they did not learn about job vacancies, and in part because their res-
ervation wages—the minimum wage they demanded to accept a job—were often
50 percent more than prevailing wages.
Why don’t employers who are hiring large numbers of new workers encour-
age the establishment of a network of Black or white workers? Many employers
believe that immigrants work harder, complain less, and in general have the “right
attitude” toward their jobs and managers; they also “get along” with co-workers, in
many cases friends and relatives who found them jobs. Interestingly, the “right
attitude” was considered more important for many jobs than education or English.32
Surveys of employers who hire new workers through immigrant networks sup-
port the hypothesis that immigrants often get into certain jobs by accident or de-
sign, and then a process of cumulative causation is set in motion that ensures that
nationals will not be recruited or attracted to “immigrant” jobs. It is in this way that
direct immigrant-native worker competition for jobs gives way to indirect compe-
tition, as occurs when immigrant networks become “exclusive suppliers” of new
workers for vacant jobs.
The U.S. in 1996 is taking two policy steps that may affect the demand for
immigrant workers and the willingness of U.S. workers to accept “immigrant jobs.”
First, the U.S. minimum wage is scheduled to rise from $4.25 hourly to $4.75 on
October 1, 1996, and to $5.15 on September 1, 1997, increasing the earnings of a
full-time minimum wage worker employed 2,000 hours per year from $8,500 to
$10,300 by 1998.33 In 1995, about 3.7 million U.S. workers 16 or older were paid
$4.25 or less per hour; they represented about 5.3 percent of all hourly-paid work-
ers. Teens aged 16 to 19 are about one-third of those paid $4.25 or less; about 73
percent of all minimum wage workers are white.
The second U.S. policy change that may affect the “immigrant labor market”
is welfare reform, which, inter alia, denies food stamps and Supplemental Security
Income to most legal immigrants, and permits states to eliminate cash assistance
and Medicaid for non-U.S. citizens. All states must file plans with the federal gov-
ernment to implement welfare reform by July 1, 1997, and review the citizenship
status of persons receiving benefits within 12 months. There are believed to be
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about 1.5 million legal immigrants in 1996 getting federal welfare benefits, and
some may be pushed into the labor market.
There are about 4.6 million adults receiving welfare assistance, including
650,000 who are working or in training. States are required to have 25 percent of
the adults receiving assistance working at least 20 hours weekly by 1997, and 50
percent working at least 30 hours weekly by 2002. The average adult receiving
assistance has eighth grade skills, so that the planned welfare-to-work transition
could add over 2 million largely unskilled workers to the U.S. labor market.
Communications, Transportation, and Rights
The U.S. is taking steps to make work pay more, and pushing more U.S. citi-
zens and legal immigrants into the labor force. It is not clear these minimum wage
and welfare policy changes will affect Mexico-U.S. migration networks.
Networks or linkages across the U.S.-Mexican border have been shaped and
strengthened by three of the major revolutions of the past two generations; the com-
munications revolution, the transportation revolution, and the rights revolution. The
communications revolution refers to the fact that potential migrants know far more
about opportunities abroad than did turn of the century migrants from southern and
eastern Europe who set out for North and South America and Australia.
The major source of information about life abroad is countrymen already settled
abroad who can tell the migrants about opportunities in the United States. Cultural
gaps are also diminishing, making it easier for especially young people to consider
working and living abroad.
The transportation revolution is simply the fact that the cost of traveling—
relative to the wages that can be earned—has dropped enormously, while access to
and the convenience of international travel has increased. The cost of traveling
legally to the U.S. from most parts of Mexico is less than $500, and even illegal
entry typically costs less than $1000. British immigrants who indentured them-
selves to migrate to the North American colonies in the 17th century, by contrast,
often promised to work three to five years to repay one-way transportation costs.
The third network revolution that can turn potential migration into actual mi-
gration is the rights revolution, or the spread of individual rights and entitlements
to all residents of the United States and other industrial democracies (Hollifield,
1994). Over the past 50 years, the industrial democracies have expanded their safety
nets, and strengthened personal rights vis-a-vis government agencies, so that more
residents, including foreigners, have human and work place rights, and are some-
times eligible for social welfare benefits. The rights revolution can strengthen net-
works by enabling even unauthorized foreigners who are present to increase the
probability that they can remain in the United States.
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Rights are created by governments, and frustration with their inability to affect
communications and transportation has prompted many governments to roll back
immigrant rights, especially for non-U.S. citizens. In the U.S., for example,
unauthorized foreigners have seen their rights to social and other services curtailed
over time, and new systems established to screen them out of social services and
the labor market. Proposition 187, approved by a 59-41 percentage vote in California
in November 1994, represented perhaps the most-discussed effort to discourage
immigration by establishing a state-run system to keep unauthorized immigrants
out of schools and social service programs.
Network factors may be very important in sustaining migration, but they are
very hard to measure. The definition suggests why. Massey and Espinosa quote a
definition of the social capital that undergirds networks; “the sum of the resources,
actual or virtual, that accrue to an individual or a group by virtue of possessing a
durable network... of mutual acquaintance and recognition” (Massey and Espinosa,
1995, 13). Such a definition can be operationalized to include a variety of hard-to-
measure variables.
Past Case and Community Studies
This section has two parts; a “meta analysis” of community and network case
studies completed before 1995, and a re-analysis of the Mexico Migration Project
(MMP) data. Both parts illustrate how a migration process that began largely as
demand-pull recruitment has evolved into a more complex migration relationship
in which supply-push and network factors play ever larger roles.
Studies of Mexican communities that send migrants to the U.S. emphasize
that most of the first migrants were men recruited to work on U.S. farms. However,
very little active recruitment was necessary, especially in some villages, since the
community studies emphasize that, even during the Bracero Program there was
illegal migration to the U.S. alongside legal bracero migration. Mines (1982, 446),
for example, notes that some migrants told him that “as undocumented migrants
[during the 1950s] they earned higher wages and stayed for longer periods” then as
legal braceros.
Past Studies
This section reviews community studies completed primarily by U.S. researchers
to determine what factors were considered to be most important in (1) initiating
and (2) sustaining Mexico-U.S. migration. We review them to highlight how the
major factors initiating and sustaining migration have changed. The studies are
summarized in the attached chart from oldest (top) to newest (bottom), and the
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major factor motivating migration runs from demand-pull (left) to supply-push
and network (right).
Case or community studies try to understand migration processes in a setting
where the researcher can understand—the individual, household, and community
context in which decisions to migrate are made. In most cases, researchers visit
the community that they are studying for extended periods of time, interview 5
to 10 percent of the households, and then collect Mexican and sometimes U.S.
community variables to explain the factors that initiated and sustained migration
to the U.S.
First Wave Studies
The first studies of emigration communities were done by Taylor in Michoacán
(1929, 1931, 1932, 1933). Taylor concluded that wage gaps motivated Mexico-
U.S. migration and, once in the U.S., wage gaps between the border areas and
northern states encouraged Mexican migrants to continue to Chicago and other
Midwestern cities in search of employment.
One of the three bracero recruiting centers in Mexico was in the border state
of Chihuahua, and Hancock concluded that Mexicans were eager to migrate to the
U.S. because of higher U.S. wages. Hancock reported that average daily farm wages
in the U.S. ranged from $5.90 in California to $4.67 in Arkansas, and from $0.89 in
the Northern Pacific states of Mexico to $0.42 in the southwestern Mexican states,
for wage ratios of between 7 to 14 to one (1959, 29). Although higher wages were
the impetus for migration, Hancock noted that a bracero soon learned that “work-
ing people [in U.S.] have greater economic opportunities,... justice is more impar-
tially administered, and that government officials treat ordinary citizens with more
respect than usually is the case in Mexico” (1959, 38).
Hancock examined four of Chihuahua’s 66 municipios—Aldama (population
of 13,600 in 1957), Meoqui (20,800 in 1957), Guerrero (31,800 in 1957), and Janos
(5,300 in 1957)—to determine the effects of emigration on them,
There were about 500 braceros—11 percent of the local labor force—from
Aldama each year in the mid-1950s, and most reported that they had more work at
higher wages in the U.S. than in Mexico (1959, 96). Meoqui had a bracero quota
of 600 in 1957 and, once the effect of bracero emigration was to attract to Meoqui
migrants from Durango, Coahuila, and Zacatecas to pick cotton.
Janos had no bracero quota and, while local officials asserted that no one
wanted to emigrate, Hancock found several residents who had migrated illegally to
the U.S., and observed that former braceros had a “friendly attitude” toward
Americans (Hancock, 1959, 118). Hancock concluded that Mexicans wanted to
work in the U.S. because of a range of factors—low wages, high living costs and
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escaping the monotony of village life, but that “the causes of emigration... can be
reduced to one salient fact: the Chihuahua economy is unable to provide employment
adequate to support the state’s population” (1959, 124).
By the 1960s and 1970s, community studies were noting that more factors
played a role in motivating and sustaining migration. Wiest (1973) describes the
effects of emigration on households in Acuitzio del Canje, a town of 3,600 in lo-
cated near Morelia, Michoacán, and emphasizes that the U.S.-bound immigrants in
the late 1960s were legal greencarders taking advantage of 15 to 1 income differ-
ences. Most of these “green card commuters” were former braceros who intended
to return to the village.
Wiest reported that 24 percent of the migrants in 1966-67 who were out of the
village were in the U.S., and that most had the right to live and work in the U.S.34
In 1966-67, Mexicans employed on U.S. farms could earn $15 to $25 per day,
versus $0.80 to $1.20 in local the day labor market—according to Wiest, “a rela-
tively unskilled temporary job in Mexico provides a higher income than jobs... in
Mexico” (1973, 203). Despite U.S.-Mexican wage differences, however, Wiest em-
phasized that most of the Mexican sojourners in the U.S. intended to return to
Mexico; “regardless of the type of labor in the United States, the tendency is to-
ward temporary residence there” (1973, 186).
Many former braceros became greencard commuters, traveling seasonally from
homes in Mexico to jobs in the U.S. Cornelius (1976a, 1976b) described the pro-
cess through which young men from several communities in Jalisco migrated to
the U.S. for farm jobs without their families, both legally and illegally.
Reichert (1979, 1981, 1981) conducted interviews with 26 informants a de-
cade later in Michoacán and, like earlier studies, and emphasized that most Mexi-
can migrants in the U.S. were sojourners employed in agriculture. Reichert noted
that, in the late 1970s, there was about 1 illegal migrant in the U.S. for every 2 legal
migrants, and that the wage gap between seasonal farm jobs in the U.S. and Mexico
had narrowed, to about $30 per day in the U.S., and $3.80 per day in Mexico.
However, Reichert concluded that the expenditure of remittances was not promot-
ing stay-at-home development; “money earned in the U.S. has enabled migrants to
raise their standard of living to a level that can only be maintained through recur-
rent migration” (1981, 63).
Reichert and Massey (1979, 1980) used these data to separate migration from
these villages into two phases; pre-1965 bracero outmigration, and post-1965
outmigration that increasingly involved women and children joining ex-braceros
who had become legal U.S. immigrants. The U.S. policy of permitting U.S.
employers to write letters offering ex-braceros jobs enabled many to become legal
immigrants with the right to unify their families in the U.S.—one estimate in
1962 was that as many as 80 percent of the 55,000 Mexican immigrants admitted
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to the U.S. were ex-braceros who obtained permanent labor certification (U.S.
Senate, 1965, 22).
Roberts (1982) analyzed data collected from farmers in 1974 in San Luis Potosí,
Guanajuato, Puebla, and Oaxaca, and found that, in all four Mexican states, a sig-
nificant number of farmers in the early 1970s were also employed off the farm, and
some hired seasonal workers to work on their farms. Roberts concluded that some
local farm income was needed to attempt to migrate to the U.S., and that incomes
in Oaxaca were too low to undertake migration to the U.S., so that young people
from Oaxaca migrated to Mexican cities where they had contacts (1982, 319).
However, a significant number of U.S.-bound migrants originated from Guanajuato,
an area in which Mexican farm incomes were considerably higher.
Mines (1981, 1984) and Mines and de Janvry (1982) reviewed the evolution
of migration from Las Animas, Zacatecas, a village of 1,300 in the late 1970s
about three hours north of Guadalajara. Mines interviewed 67 households in Las
Animas in 1979, plus additional Las Animas residents in the U.S., and found that
over half of the village’s income came from remittances sent home by persons
employed in the U.S.
Mines concluded that Las Animas had reached a “migratory equilibrium” in
1979—the population of the village remained stable, as a result of many young
residents leaving for the U.S., and many settling abroad—half of the village’s resi-
dents in the U.S. were legally present in 1979, before the U.S. legalization pro-
gram (1982, 446). Mines found that many of the workers older than 40 illegally
shuttled between homes in Mexico and seasonal farm jobs in the U.S., while many
of the younger workers were legally working in the U.S., and became less and less
likely to return every winter to homes in Mexico.
Mines and Massey (1985) used migration patterns in Las Animas and another
community to describe how migration networks mature. In both communities, men
began to leave for U.S. jobs in the 1920s, and then migration stopped in the 1930s.
Migration began again with bracero recruitment in 1942. The percentage of men
going to the U.S. illegally increased until 1954-55, when a combination of “Opera-
tion Wetback” in the U.S., and the expansion of the Bracero Program, shifted the
balance back toward legal but seasonal migration to the U.S. However, illegal im-
migration increased again after a severe drought in 1957.
By the 1970s, this migration network had matured, in the sense that a “sister”
community was established in south San Francisco. As the Mexicans settled in the
U.S., Mines observed that “cost[s] to the receiving area [California] increase and
benefits decline” (1982, 452). On a visit to Las Animas in 1987-88, Mines ob-
served that most of the young men seemed to have left Las Animas to try to qualify
for the SAW program, even though most had not done the qualifying U.S. farm
work in 1985-86.
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Dinerman (1982) interviewed migrants and stay-at-homes in two similar
Michoacán communities in the late 1970s and early 1980s, but she found that the
“rate and frequency of U.S. migration were much higher” in one community than
the other (1982, 42). Although both communities sent braceros to the U.S. in
roughly equal numbers, migrants from one community had, by the early 1970s,
shifted to nonfarm U.S. employment, and hired workers in Mexico to tend their
plots. In the other community, fewer ex-braceros owned land, and more ex-braceros
migrated within Mexico, until government support for handicraft activities cre-
ated local job opportunities.
Taylor (1992, 194-5) interviewed 61 households in one village in 1983, and
re-interviewed 55 of these households in 1989, and observed that the average in-
come of sample households rose far more, from $1,800 to $3,600, than did average
remittances, from $800 to $1,100. Taylor attributed sharply rising incomes to local
economic activities that were made possible in part by the investment of remit-
tances, primarily in cattle.35
Comparative Community Studies
As the number of studies multiplied, several authors compared the findings of
community studies. There were two major approaches; to examine individual com-
munity studies, including the studies summarized above, or to focus on larger bodies
of data, especially the MMP data summarized below, and to draw inferences from data
collected from a number of communities with a fairly standard survey instrument.
Perhaps the most cited set of community studies are those done by Massey,
Alarcon, Durand, and Gonzales in Return to Azatlan (1987). This book was built
around extensive interviews in four communities. It concluded that the integration
of the southwestern U.S. into the national economy in the late 1800s created a
demand in the U.S. for Mexican labor, the restructuring of Mexican agriculture
created a supply of workers willing to migrate, and the railroads provided the link
between U.S. demand and Mexican supply (1987, 39).
Return to Azatlan makes four points about the process of Mexico-U.S. migra-
tion. First, few Mexicans migrated from these communities before the 1950s and,
when they did migrate, they were as likely to move within Mexico as to migrate
(illegally) to the U.S. Second, Mexican migration to the U.S. was almost stopped
in the 1930s, as a result of the Depression and repatriations.
Third, Bracero Program recruitment began significant U.S.-bound migration
after 1942, and this migration continued at roughly bracero-era levels after U.S.-
government approved recruitment was stopped in 1964. Fourth, the share of illegal
migrants among first-time U.S.-bound Mexicans dipped below 50 percent only
during the late 1950s, when the Bracero Program was at its peak.
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Return to Azatlan emphasizes continuity and an upward trend in a migratory
process that began over 100 years ago—the significant blips in an otherwise
steadily rising migration flow occur in the 1930s, when Mexico-U.S. migration
slowed or stopped, and in the late 1950s, when many migrants went legally to
the U.S. as braceros.
Other data, especially U.S. labor market data, emphasize more discontinuities
in the flow. For example, studies of the U.S. farm labor market do not support the
notion that a large number of ex-braceros came legally or illegally after 1964. In
the mid-1960s, U.S. farmers were bussing workers from skid-row in Los Angeles
to their farms, recruiting Indians, and asking universities to develop labor saving
machines to harvest crops (Martin, 1996). Perhaps the most telling evidence that
Mexican migration slowed considerably between the mid-1950s to mid-1960s was
that the fledgling UFW was able to win a one-year 40 percent wage increase in
1966 from wine grape producer Schenley.
To the extent that Mexico-to-U.S. migration flows are mirrored in develop-
ments in the U.S. farm labor market, U.S. farm labor market evidence would sug-
gest that immigration from rural Mexico to rural areas of the United States re-
mained relatively low in the 1960s and 1970s, and then rose sharply in the 1980s.
The community studies, by contrast, emphasize continuity in the migration flow—
the probability of making a first unauthorized trip to the U.S., and the percentage
of young men who have been to the U.S. by age 40, rises steadily, according to
most community studies in west central Mexico.
Goldring (1990) noted that migrants from one community were “specialized,”
migrating to U.S. strawberry fields, while migrants from a nearby community mi-
grated to the U.S. to work in construction. The mostly strawberry migrants were
able to gain seniority and access to a state-run migrant camp open six months per
year and offering a variety of children’s and health services. Consequently, these
farm worker migrants remained sojourners in the U.S., while the construction mi-
grants settled near their U.S. jobs and sent for their families.
Cornelius (1990) studied three emigration communities in 1988—almost 600
household heads were interviewed in Tlacuitapa, Jalisco, Las Animas, Zacatecas,36
and Gomez Farias, Michoacán. The major conclusion is that one should be “realis-
tic” about accelerating economic development in communities that have long his-
tories of migration to the U.S.
Mature migrant networks begin to bring immediate family members, wives
and children, to join spouses in the U.S. (Reichert and Massey, 1980; Massey,
Donato, and Liang, 1990; Fonseca and Moreno, 1988; Gonzalez and Escobar, 1990;
Goldring, 1990; Donato, 1994). In one study, women were especially likely to
make a first illegal U.S. trip by 1990, in some cases joining men who migrated
seasonally for years (Kanaiaupuni, 1995). In another study, the probability that
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women would migrate to the U.S. increased considerably if they had an immediate
relative who received temporary amnesty as a result of IRCA (Donato, 1993).
Themes
Durand and Massey (1992) reviewed community studies, and argued that
Mexico-U.S. migration evolves similarly in each community, so that “discrepan-
cies” in factors motivating and sustaining migration are due to the “stage of migra-
tion.” For example, mostly young men migrating illegally without their families
for U.S. farm jobs probably indicates that the community has only recently begun
to send migrants to the U.S., while women and children migrating to U.S. cities is
indicative of a more mature migration stream.
Massey, Goldring, and Durand (1994), on the basis of data from 19 agrarian
communities in Jalisco, Michoacán, Guanajuato, and Nayarit, concluded that al-
though “the first international migrants tend to be married male household heads
of prime labor force age, usually from a nonagricultural background and often
from a property-owning class, as migration becomes more prevalent and social
capital accumulates, this profile changes” (p. 1528) to include more diverse mi-
grants. Individual characteristics lose importance over time as migration networks
mature, so that even the poor, the landless, women, and children are able to also
migrate, taking advantage of their community’s growing migration network.
Many of the communities that have sent migrants to the U.S. for long periods
have become “nurseries and nursing homes,” places in which a supply of workers
for the U.S. is created, and to which workers retire. Instead of trying to get experi-
enced migrants from such places to stay home, Cornelius urges policy makers to
focus on persuading “first-time” migrants to stay in Mexico, a goal that “will be
difficult but not impossible” (1990, 90).
Massey (1988, 408) argued that Mexico-U.S. migration is too well developed to
reduce or stop; “it is much too late in the process to have any realistic expectation of
markedly affecting the level of Mexican emigration to the United States,” so that
migration-avoiding policies should concentrate their efforts outside of traditional
migrant-sending areas. Cornelius disagrees, noting that population growth continues
in traditional sending areas, and that there is some in-migration to some emigration
communities to fill the vacuum left by departing migrants, so that the number of
migrants even from traditional sending areas could remain large (1990, 91).
These studies raise two questions:
1. How sensitive are migration flows to socioeconomic conditions and gov-
ernment policies in the U.S. and Mexico?
2. Do migration flows become more or less sensitive to socioeconomic
conditions and policy changes over time?
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Most studies based on interviews with Mexicans in Mexico conclude that U.S.
control policies have few effects on the migratory flow and that migration is be-
coming less sensitive to socioeconomic conditions over time.
The MMP data, for example, stress the importance of “social capital” rather
than economic variables in initiating the migratory flow, and emphasize that mi-
gration flows become less sensitive to policy changes over time. For example,
Donato, Durand, and Massey (1992) conclude that the probability of making a first
trip to the U.S. has been increasing in the 1990s despite IRCA and stepped up
border enforcement. Their data, based on 1987-89 interviews with 1,350 house-
holds in 7 communities in Jalisco, Michoacán, and Guanajuato, led to the conclu-
sion that stepped up border enforcement and employer sanctions, which were ap-
plied to all U.S. employers as of December, 1, 1988, were not deterring especially
experienced migrants from attempting illegal entry. In some communities, 100
percent of the experienced migrants intended to return to the U.S.37
Other community studies also suggest that IRCA did not reduce overall levels
of illegal migration (Gonzalez and Escobar, 1990; Massey et al. 1990). One study
of three emigration communities in Jaliso, Zacatecas and Michoacán found instead
that IRCA “augmented the flow of migrants... through legalization programs.” At
most, IRCA may have “cause[d] a recomposition of the migrant flow” in the short
run, because fewer Mexican were entering illegally (Cornelius, 1990, 23).
Studies based on apprehension data, on the other hand, suggest that IRCA was
a U.S. policy instrument that reduced the influx of illegal Mexican migrants (Bean
et al. 1990; White et al. 1990). Apprehension data analysts noted that much of the
drop in apprehensions was due to the legalization of over 2 million Mexicans
(Espenshade, 1990).
In an attempt to understand trends in apprehensions, Massey and Singer (1995,
18) used MMP data to estimate that the probability of apprehension on an illegal
attempt to enter the U.S. was 0.35. By their reckoning, over the 25 years between
1965 and 1990, some 36.5 million Mexicans entered the U.S. illegally, and 5.2
million illegal Mexican residents were in the U.S. in 1989. This suggested to them
that the probability of apprehension “was drifting downward” in the late 1980s—
that U.S. border had become “increasingly porous.” Singer, Durand, and Massey
(1996, 37) concluded that “interlocking processes of social and human capital ac-
cumulation build a self-feeding momentum into the migration process... [that] U.S.
enforcement practices in no way halt—and in many ways encourage.”
There is also disagreement among analysts about the effects of a peso devalua-
tion on emigration. Some, including Jorge Bustamante, argue that devaluations re-
duce emigration sharply in the short-run, because the cost of being smuggled into the
U.S. is fixed in dollars and the smuggling fee is paid in Mexico from Mexican sav-
ings, so that a devaluation raises a financial hurdle for potential migrants.
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However, if the cost of entering the U.S. is paid by U.S. residents, then a
devaluation that increases the value of U.S. work relative to that in Mexico can
stimulate migration. Taylor (1995), for example, estimates that a 10 percent peso
devaluation increases Mexico-to-U.S. migration by 17 percent.
MMP data suggest that illegal migration was lower in 1983 and 1988, just
after devaluations, supporting Bustamante. However, Donato, Durand, and Massey
(1992) emphasize that the slowdown in illegal immigration was short-lived—well
before the peso recovered, emigration increased.38
Mexico has had major devaluations at the end of each of the last 4 Presiden-
cies; in 1976, in 1982, again in 1986-87, and in 1994-95. After each devaluation,
illegal immigration as measured by apprehensions in the U.S. increased, but there
seems to be no immediate and consistent relationship between peso devaluations
and illegal immigration to the United States.
For example, after the 1982-83 peso devaluation, it took about 16 months for
the U.S. Border Patrol to notice a significant increase in illegal immigration. In
1987, apprehensions dropped despite a devaluation of the peso, largely because so
many Mexicans were becoming legalized U.S. immigrants under the 1986 Immi-
gration Reform and Control Act (IRCA).
The drop in apprehensions in the mid-1980s despite the peso devaluation em-
phasizes the importance of U.S. policies in determining whether Mexicans re-
spond to economic crisis by emigrating. IRCA was signed into law in November
1986, and for the next six months, internal INS enforcement was suspended—
unauthorized aliens who could get into the U.S. were not subject to INS raids or
employer sanctions.
Beginning on May 1, 1987, the U.S. offered legalization to illegal alien farm
workers, and over 800,000 Mexicans took advantage of it to become legal U.S.
immigrants. There was less need to risk apprehension when legalization applica-
tions could be filed in Mexico, or Mexicans could come to the border, assert that
they qualified for legalization but had no records to prove that they had worked
illegally in U.S. agriculture, and then obtain 90-day entry and work permits.
Smuggling fees dropped as Mexicans entered legally, and the fraudulent docu-
ment industry boomed. Most applicants for legalization under the special agricul-
tural worker (SAW) program submitted only letters from U.S. labor contractors
and farmers that asserted, for example, that “Juan Gonzalez picked tomatoes for
me for 92 days between May 1985 and May 1986.” By some estimates, over half of
the 1.1 million aliens legalized around the U.S. under the SAW legalization pro-
gram were not eligible.
The economic outlook in Mexico and U.S. responses to the first two peso
devaluations provide clues to the response to the 1994-95 devaluation. The 70-
percent peso devaluation of 1982-83 lowered real wages in urban areas, and put
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Mexican farmers in a cost-price squeeze, but the fact that most Mexican workers
kept their jobs and saw their standard of living erode only gradually helps to ex-
plain the delayed illegal emigration response (Lustig).
The 1986-87 peso devaluation, by contrast, occurred when the U.S. was offer-
ing amnesty to illegal immigrants, the INS was educating employers rather than
enforcing sanctions, and the U.S. and California enjoyed a period of rapid U.S. job
growth, all factors that encouraged a seemingly “legal” migration response.
The 55 percent peso devaluation of 1994-95 occurred in a different climate in
Mexico and the United States. In 1995-96, many Mexican firms laid off workers,
rather than simply allowing their wages to be reduced by inflation. The number of
workers in formal employment—permanent Mexican Social Security Institute or
IMSS beneficiaries—fell by about 400,000 between mid-1994 and the end of 1995,
from 8.8 to 8.4 million—estimates of the total number of Mexicans who lost their
jobs in 1995 range up to 1.7 million.
Assessment
This section reviewed leading studies of Mexican emigration communities to
determine what factors initiated and sustained migration to the U.S. The community
studies lead to several conclusions:
• Most researchers identify U.S. recruitment, in the 1942-64 bracero era,
as the key factor that unleashed “mass” migration to the U.S. For this
reason, most of the “pioneer” migrants were young men from rural ar-
eas coming to work on U.S. farms. In most studies, a combination of
stepped up U.S. enforcement and an expanded Bracero Program in the
mid-1950s reduced illegal immigration and increased legal migration.
• The studies differ on what happened after the Bracero Program ended
in 1965. Some emphasized that, in the late 1960s, only those who had
greencards could easily enter the U.S. and find work. Other studies
emphasize continuity in the migration process.
• All studies agree that, by the late 1980s, the probability that a young man
would make a first trip to the U.S. was rising, that more women and chil-
dren began to migrate to the U.S., and that factors other than a specific
economic event—such as a U.S. recruiter or a drought in Mexico—moti-
vated especially young men and women to migrate to the U.S.
This last finding—the changing reasons why Mexicans migrate to the U.S.—
is perhaps most important for thinking about the policy responses to the changing
factors that sustain Mexico-U.S. migration. The community studies suggest clearly
that U.S. recruitment in the 1950s stimulated Mexico-U.S. migration. If Mexico
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and the U.S. wants to avoid initiating and sustaining Mexico-U.S. migration, this
conclusion suggests that U.S. recruitment of Mexican workers should be avoided.
Given current role of supply-push and network factors in sustaining migration
between Mexico and the U.S., the community studies are much less clear about
how to reduce or reverse sustaining factors. Only a few of the studies suggest
doing nothing—that economic development stimulated by remittances in Mexico
will “naturally” reduce emigration pressures, although Taylor (1992) approaches
this conclusion.
More common is the conclusion of Cornelius; a “culture of outmigration” has
developed in some areas of Mexico so that “migration to the U.S. becomes a com-
plete substitute for local economic activity,” despite the fact that many young mi-
grants “have no apparent necessity for going” to the U.S. (1990, 77). Massey et. al
(1987) similarly conclude that migration has become a way of life in come com-
munities in west central Mexico, so that dramatic economic improvement in Mexico,
or much tougher U.S. immigration controls, would be necessary to break the cul-
ture and bonds that have evolved.
Massey argues economic improvement or effective controls are unlikely to
slow migration from established areas; “it is much too late in the process to have
any realistic expectation of markedly affecting the level of Mexican emigration
to the Untied States,” so that migration-avoiding policies should concentrate their
efforts outside of traditional migrant-sending areas, and give up where migration
networks are established. Cornelius disagrees, noting that population growth
continues in traditional sending areas, and that there is some in-migration to some
emigration communities to fill the vacuum left by departing migrants, so that
the number of migrants even from traditional sending areas could remain large
(1990, 91).
The central finding of the more recent community studies is that the probabil-
ity of taking a first trip to the U.S. has been rising:
• despite employer sanctions and stepped up border enforcement,
•  and in part because of legalization and family unification policies.
The question is, what policies should be pursued to reduce the factors that seem
to be sustaining Mexico-U.S. migration? There are at least three broad options; stepped
up U.S. border and interior controls, free trade and other growth-accelerating policies
in Mexico, or learn to live with high levels of Mexico-U.S. migration.
The U.S. has already stepped up U.S. border and interior controls, and is
adding both Border Patrol agents and interior inspectors. There are several more
notches of enforcement that could be tried, including the phasing-in of a counterfeit-
resistant work permit, effective enforcement of employer sanctions and, to the
extent that social services sustain some migration, more rules and screens to prevent
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immigrants and unauthorized migrants from participating in tax-supporter
programs.
Social service screens are controversial, since it is not clear what role welfare
and other tax-supported services play in stimulating migration. Excluding unau-
thorized children from K-12 education, for example, may not deter unauthorized
immigration, but may be counterproductive to keep unauthorized children out of
public schools, making them less productive workers in the U.S. or in their coun-
tries of origin.
In any event, if the community studies are correct, neither border controls, nor
employer sanctions, nor social service screening, is likely to be effective.
Most U.S. and Mexican observers believe that the best way to reduce the
importance of the factors that sustain migration is to accelerate economic and
jobs growth in Mexico, and to assure that the benefits of more rapid economic
growth are shared widely. Former Mexican President Salinas argued for the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) on the grounds that it would accelerate
job growth in Mexico, and “more jobs will mean higher wages in Mexico, and
this in turn will mean fewer migrants to the United States and Canada. We want
to export goods, not people” {quoted in Bush letter to Congress, May 1, 1991,
17).39 U.S. Attorney General Janet Reno made the same point: “We will not reduce
the flow of illegal immigration until these immigrants can find decent jobs at
decent wages in Mexico” (San Diego Union-Tribune, November 14, 1993, 1).
Most analyses concluded that NAFTA is the policy most likely to speed up
economic and job growth in Mexico and thus deter illegal immigration, even
though most researchers echoed the conclusion of the U.S. Commission for the
Study of International Migration and Cooperative Economic Development; “The
economic development process itself tends in the short to medium term to
stimulate migration” (Cornelius and Martin, 1993, Martin, 1993). After a 10 to
15 year “migration hump,” these researchers suggest that Mexico-U.S. migration
should decrease.
The most troubling community studies are those that, following Massey and
Espinosa (1995), downplay the importance of economic variables in sustaining
migration, argue that control policies cannot work, and stress the role played by
“social capital”—friends and relatives who can help Mexicans to migrate to the
U.S. Massey and Espinosa used interviews with 3,700 people in 25 Mexican
communities to conclude that migration is increasingly motivated by “social capital
theory” and “the new migration theory” rather that wage and unemployment
differences that might be reduced by economic and job growth.
These studies are troubling because, if Mexico-U.S. migration really is “self-
feeding,” as Massey and Espinosa suggest (1995, 14), then the most effective short-
run techniques to reduce or reverse the factors that sustain Mexico-U.S. migration
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would be a control-style response to unwanted Mexico-U.S. migration—a wall
along the border, and a moratorium on legalization and immigration. It may be that
even these control efforts would be ineffective but, if economic variables do not
affect flows, and social capital does, then controlling immigration rests on “de-
creasing” the amount of social capital available, and preventing the formation of
additional social capital.
Mexican Migration Project Data Re-Analysis
The MMP data were collected in the 1980s and early 1990s from about 200
households in each of 39 communities in west central Mexico, the region of Mexico
centered on Guadalajara from which most Mexican migrants to the U.S. have come
(Mexican Migration Project, 1995). The communities range in size from 1,000-
person hamlets in 1990 to a section of Guadalajara, a city with a 1990 population
of 2.9 million. As of 1993, the MMP data included information on about 42,700
men, women, and children, including 9,530 migrants.
In each of the 39 communities, about 23 percent of the housing units were
randomly selected after a house to house census established the total number of
housing units, and household interviews were conducted in December-January,
when sojourner U.S. migrants often return to Mexico. Individual migration histo-
ries were compiled for all members of the household, including children of the
household head who had formed their own households, and those absent when the
interview was conducted; information was gathered on an average 9 persons per
surveyed household.
Interviewers spoke with the household head and obtained information on all
children, whether they were present or absent and, if absent, whether they were in
Mexico or the U.S. (Massey and Espinosa, 1995, 4). For the household head, a
“migration history” was compiled for each year after age 15—did the person mi-
grate to the U.S. and, if yes, as a legal or illegal migrant. In addition, interviewers
talked to about 20 migrants from each of the communities in the U.S. the following
summer to obtain data on e.g., U.S. wages and remittances.
Modeling First Migrations
This section presents the results of models that predict the probability that a
young man aged 20 to 24 would migrate to the U.S. in any year, and the cumulative
probability that young men would take a first trip to the U.S. by age 40. For each
year of life, a household member being interviewed had three choices (1) not migrate
to the U.S.—coded 0—or (2) make an unauthorized trip40—coded 1—or (3) migrate
lawfully—coded 2. Once a person migrated, that person was excluded from further
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analysis, so that every year, both the numerator and denominator changed, as some
people migrated, while others turned 20.
These individual life-histories were used to estimate “age-period” models
of migration, i.e., the ages of residents and community characteristics were
assembled to estimate the probability of migration to the U.S., and whether the
first trip was legal or illegal, for each year after 1940. Two probabilities were
estimated:
• the probability that a man aged 20 to 24 migrates to the U.S. legally or
illegally in a given year
• the cumulative probability that men by age 40 would have made a first
legal or illegal trip to the U.S.
The typical person for whom “first U.S. migration” behavior was modeled
was a 32 year old married man, with about 5.5 years of education and 2.2 minor
children at home (Massey and Espinosa, 1995, 8). Across these MMP
communities, about one-third of the men made a first trip to the U.S. by age 40,
although in six of the 30 communities, over half of the men made a first U.S.
trip by age 40.
For example, in community 2, a section of a large city, the probability that a
young man 20 to 24 would migrate illegally to the U.S. was 1 percent in 1994, and
16 percent of the young men in this section of the city would migrate illegally to
the U.S. by age 40 (Table 2).
To better trends over time, consider a typical community—say number 11,
with a 1990 population of 20,000. Table 4 shows that about 12 percent of the
men aged 20 to 24 in this community took a first illegal trip to the U.S. in 1980.
About one in 10 young men continued to make a first illegal trip to the U.S.
from this community throughout the 1980s—the low point in illegal migration
was in 1993, when only 3 percent of the young men made a first illegal trip. The
probability of an illegal first trip more than doubled to 7 percent in 1994, which
means that 7 of 100 young men in community 11 made a first illegal trip to the
U.S. in 1994.
Braceros were recruited in community 11, and the first-legal-trip data indicate
that, during the bracero era, 1942-1964, about 2 percent of the young men made a
first legal trip to the U.S. However, there was also considerable illegal immigra-
tion—there were only two periods during the bracero era when first legal trip prob-
abilities were greater than first illegal trip probabilities—1940-44, and 1955-59.
In the early 1980s, three times more young men made their first trip to the U.S.
from community 11 illegally than legally. However, in 1988, more young men
went legally than illegally, and the legal probability has generally exceeded the
illegal probability since.
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Many U.S.-bound migrants are from very small places that, even in 1990, had
only 1,000 to 3,000 residents. For example, Community 10 is typical of the small
villages that depend on emigration and remittances to supplement earnings from
rain-fed agriculture.
According to migration histories collected in 1989 from 150 households in
Community 10, in the early 1940s, about 3 percent of the young men made a first
unauthorized trip to the U.S., and 6 percent made an unauthorized trip in the early
1950s. First unauthorized trips slowed in the early 1960s, but then jumped in the
1980s, so that, between 1984 and 1986, over 40 percent of the young men who
had not previously migrated made a first unauthorized trip to the U.S. Commu-
nity 3 has similar first illegal trip probabilities, peaking at over 30 percent be-
tween 1984 and 1986.
The figures in the Appendix show that the probability of making a first illegal
trip to the U.S. from communities 10 and 3 was higher than the probability of
making a first legal trip from 1971 through 1987. Since 1987, more young men
are making their first trips legally rather than illegally. In community 3, note that
the chance of an illegal first trip remained higher than a legal trip throughout the
1971-94 period.
The cumulative probability data estimate how many young men from a com-
munity would have taken a first trip by age 40, legally or illegally. The pool of
those who could migrate—the denominator—is all men in the community under
age 40 who have so far not migrated legally or illegally.
During the wartime Bracero Program, 1942-46, the cumulative probability
of migration legally was considerably higher than for illegal migration. However,
in the late 1940s, the probability of illegally migrating exceeded the probability
of legal migration, but legal migration once again became the norm after Opera-
tion Wetback in 1954 until the end of the Bracero Program in the early 1960s.
After 1964, the cumulative probability that young men migrated legally trended
downward, while the cumulative probability of a first illegal trip moved up, peak-
ing at 80 percent across these emigration communities in the early to mid-1980s.
After reaching a low in 1985, the cumulative probability that a young man would
have made a first legal trip to the U.S. by age 40 has fluctuated, with legal and
illegal cumulative probabilities following the same patterns.
Women have different migration patterns than men. A woman’s chance to
migrate legally is generally higher than her migrating illegally, and women are
most likely to migrate during periods of family unification, the mid 1960s and the
1990s. But from some communities, such as 3, women’s migration patterns are
similar to men’s—the probability of migrating illegally is always higher than mi-
grating legally throughout the 1971-1994 period.
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Assessment
Based on the model and the MMP data, it appears that the probability of young
men leaving west central Mexico for the U.S. by age 40 was 80 to 90 percent since
the early 1940s. On a year by year basis, the major difference was whether young
men made their first trips legally or illegally.
In the early 1940s, about two-thirds of the young men in the 39 communities
took a first legal trip to the U.S. by age 40, and another 25 percent took a first
illegal trip. Over the years, legal and illegal probabilities mirror each other—
when the probability of a first legal trip decreases, the probability of a first illegal
trip increases, ensuring that 80 to 90 percent of the young men make a first U.S.
trip by age 40. There are two exceptions to this pattern—in the mid-1960s, and
again after 1987.
The migration data from these 39 communities provide evidence that, from
traditional emigration areas of Mexico, the U.S. policy choice is whether young
men take their first trips legally or illegally, i.e., U.S. and Mexican economic con-
ditions and policies seem only to shift migrants between legal and illegal catego-
ries. However, the data and analysis leave several questions unanswered, includ-
ing whether and how U.S. and Mexican economic conditions and policies change
the duration of stay abroad, and whether and how migrants who return to Mexico
attempt re-entry.
New Community Studies
The mid-1990s represent a new era in Mexico-U.S. migration. There are sev-
eral reasons, including changes in U.S. immigration law and enforcement prac-
tices, the implementation of NAFTA, and the restructuring of the Mexican economy.
In order to determine how these and other changes are affecting Mexico-U.S. mi-
gration, we commissioned four new community studies for this report.
Themes
The community studies completed in 1995-96 reach several conclusions;
1. First, they agree that, although economic factors remain central to the
decision to migrate, the factors initiating and sustaining Mexico-U.S.
migration have become more complex. Most Mexican research on the
factors that initiate and sustain migration include economic, social, geo-
graphic, environmental, and other factors (Stern 1977, Arizpe 1978,
Winnie and Arroyo 1979, Lopez 1986, Gonzalez and Escobar 1990,
Arroyo 1994, Arroyo and Papail 1996), but not in a manner that at-
tempts, e.g., to assert the relative importance of each of these factors.
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2. The new cases studies emphasize that there are network turning points
which can be obscured in retrospective migration histories. Two ex-
amples make the point. First, Mexico City changed from the major des-
tination to the major origin of Mexican migrants between 1970 and 1990,
yet network studies failed to find network tipping points related to eco-
nomic, environmental, and social variables that would explain the
change.
Second, there is universal agreement that more women and children are
joining husbands in the U.S. in the mid-1990s. There is little agreement
on why Mexican women apparently decided that it was better to raise
their children in the U.S., and that Mexican men and women decided
that, with two earners, they could survive better in the U.S. than Mexico.
3. Our mid-1990s interviews find that the probability of successfully en-
tering the U.S. on a first unauthorized attempt is rising, to 59 percent in
1994-95. Almost two-thirds of first time migrants are using coyotes to
help them cross.
Evolution
Most of the community studies of emigration areas in Mexico before the mid-
1980s were done or supervised by U.S.-based researchers. Massey and his three
Mexican anthropologist collaborators—Alarcon, Durand and Gonzalez—cast a long
shadow in both countries. These researchers popularized the network concept on
both sides of the border, and emphasized the importance of “social capital” in mi-
gration decisions.
Mexican researchers in the 1970s and earlier examined internal migration, and
used concepts such as networks to explain the movement from rural to urban areas.
For example, Arizpe examined “relay migration” from impoverished indigenous
regions to Mexico City (1975, 1977), and Lomnitz studied social networks in a
small migrant community (1975, 1977). Both showed how the decision to migrate
depended on personal contacts—“microstructures of migration” or networks—how
migrants from the same community or family grouped together in their destina-
tion, and often practiced the same trades or entered the same businesses, and how
mutual assistance led to the formation of new urban communities based on groups,
values and cultures that the migrants brought with them.
Mexican community studies today pay deference to networks, but lay more
weight on economic factors such as employment, poverty, and wage gaps than do
the studies linked to Massey (Orozco 1993, Arroyo and Papail 1996). Mexican
researchers also put more weight on non-economic and non-network factors, such
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as distance from the border or destination community, community organization,
kinship and ethnic characteristics.
A typical Mexican study is that of Margulis and Tuiran(1986), which stresses
that there was an uneven distribution of capital and labor across space, and that
migrants were searching for survival and better opportunity. The demand for mi-
grant labor in the U.S. is considered an important factor after 1900, and became
especially important after 1940. Indeed, Margulis and Tuiran argued that the U.S.
used the bracero system to take advantage of Mexican labor when it was most
productive, and not bear its upbringing or retirement costs.
Network reasons for initiating and sustaining migration have been a mainstay
of the Mexican literature since the 1980s. There are two approaches to networks.
First, some researchers see networks as a channel that facilitates migration and
lowers the cost of a risky undertaking. In this sense, a network is a kind of social
organization that structures migrants’ experiences, and provides substantial help to
migrants, precisely because it is “open” to helping relatives, friends, and members
of the community (Lopez 1986, Alarcon 1989, Durand 1988, Rionda 1992).
The second approach to networks is to see them as bridges that link a single
community across space. In this binational community view, economic concerns,
politics, religion, ethnicity and identity are similar in the linked communities, lay-
ing the basis for mutual support despite distance (Lopez 1995, Espinosa 1996,
Mummert and Zendejas 1996, Durand 1992). Many researchers combine both ap-
proaches, seeing networks as both open social structures, and as the glue binding
binational communities together.
The fact that networks have become an umbrella concept that encompass a
great deal of human behavior tends to obscure certain features that are vital to
initiating and sustaining migration. For example, so some families and individuals
profit differentially from existing networks, perhaps by “placing” members in cru-
cial points, or should a network be viewed as a big and happy family? More refined
analyses are needed to determine when and how networks break up; when and how
individuals decide to migrate in spite of weak or no links to networks ; and when
and how a “binational community” reconstitutes itself in the U.S., as when most
women and children join men abroad.
History shows that migrant destinations change, yet network theory has been
unable to explain why. For example, between 1970 and 1990, Mexico City switched
from being the major destination for Mexican migrants—far more important than
the U.S.—to becoming the major origin for migrants in Mexico. However, net-
work studies provided few clues as to how such a major shift could occur so quickly,
although the major variables—fewer jobs, high housing and living costs, environ-
mental factors, and social fears such as crime—probably reversed networks with
ever-more social capital within 20 years.
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One key variable in network breaks is family—when and why do wives and
children join men in the destination area? It is clear that more Mexican women and
children are migrating to the U.S. possible (Gonzalez de la Rocha 1989, Mummert
1996 in appendix, Lopez 1996 in appendix), but it is not clear whether the return to
nuclear families in one place represents a significant change in gender relations, or
a return to a situation of protection by the male.
The community studies commissioned for this report suggest that two factors
are at work. First, more women seem to have decided that it is better to raise
their families in the U.S., where children can complete secondary school. Second,
many men apparently want the U.S. earnings of their wives to support themselves
in the U.S.
The body of research based on interviews in the late 1980s of the past 40 years
of migration cannot easily locate such “turning points” in migration networks. How-
ever, the new case studies suggest that a combination of economic instability since
1982, slow job growth, and restructuring that promises little economic future in
some emigration areas certainly played a role in the decision to move to the U.S.
In addition to network turning points, the new case studies indicate that a ris-
ing percentage of unauthorized migrants are entering the U.S. on their first at-
tempt. Based on interviews with 1,200 households in Jalisco in 1995-96, about 48
percent of those attempting illegal entry into the U.S. succeeded on their first try in
1980-84, 53 percent between 1985-93, and 59 percent in 1994-95. Reliance on
coyotes also increased—50 percent of those attempting a first illegal entry used a
coyote in 1990-93, versus 71 percent in 1994-95, and more migrants are attempt-
ing entry in Mexicali-Nogales.
Key Informants and Public Opinion
In early June 1997, key informants in west Central Mexico were asked about
the extent, effects, and likely future patterns of emigration. Three themes domi-
nated their responses:
1. Most migrants from central Mexico to the U.S. are rural, not urban
residents. Many live in small “bedroom” communities that have less
than 5,000 residents, and are dependent on rainfed agriculture and urban
and farm jobs in nearby towns. Most key informants emphasized that
the choice is occasional work in Mexico for 22 to 24 pesos ($3) per day
in rural Mexico, or minimum wage work in similarly uncertain labor
markets in the U.S.
2. There is a culture of emigration, in the sense that many rural young men
expect and are expected to migrate to get the money needed to buy a
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house and marry. In other words, going and coming to the U.S. is such
an everyday occurrence that someone with a U.S. network who does
NOT go is considered the exception. Despite much discussed stepped-
up U.S. border controls, and a great deal of misinformation about IIRIRA
e.g., barring illegal alien children from U.S. schools, several key infor-
mants noted that it takes only 1 successful entry and return with money
to offset 100 failures and induce more young men to make the trip.
3. The most surprising finding was that many key informants who seemed
knowledgeable about migration stressed the NON-importance of remit-
tances in launching local businesses, especially larger businesses that
employed 10 or more workers. Indeed, even returned migrants with suc-
cessful businesses stressed that they got the money to begin the busi-
ness in Mexico, not in the U.S. All acknowledged that the spending of
remittance money on food and housing has local multiplier effects on
economic activity, and that some remittance savings were invested in
agriculture, but we were struck by the inability of key informants to
mention by name a local business success that was founded by a re-
turned migrant with remittances, while all knew of the handful of mul-
tinationals such as Nestle that had operations in the area.
Key Informants
This section provides capsule summaries of several of the places that were
visited. All were in Jalisco, the largest state in west central Mexico, and a place
were agriculture means that farmers with a few hectares of land plant corn in mid-
June, and hope that enough rain falls in the summer so that there is a harvest in
October-November.
Zapotlanejo, about 20 minutes east of Guadalarja, Jalisco, is a city and mu-
nicipality of 80,000 that represented the optimistic end of the development-slows-
emigration spectrum. This “birthplace of the clothing industry” has 1,400 small
retail shops selling a wide range of sports-oriented clothing for children and adults.
The city of 47,000 has grown rapidly, as rural residents abandon farming and move
into shanty towns on the edge of the city—at least 5,000 people in Zapotlanejo live
without water or electricity. The 33,000 rural residents in the surrounding area,
everyone agreed, are suffering from low farm prices and high costs of producing
crops; some farm land is reportedly being abandoned.
Men began migrating to the U.S. from Zapotlanejo in the 1940s under the
Bracero Program and illegally, but there was a sharp increase in emigration in the
late 1960s, when many residents were able to obtain green cards from U.S. employers
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and work in the U.S. as greencard commuters. Today, there are ex-Zapotlanejo
residents settled in California, Chicago, and Texas; one estimate was that about 80
percent of those who worked in the U.S. stayed.
Zapotlanejo has experienced a boom in the past 10 years, as the number of
retail clothing shops expanded by over 100 each year, reflecting its reputation
for quality production. An estimated 5,000 local residents are employed in the
clothing industry, and others are employed in support industries, including
transport (2,000 visitors reportedly arrive every day). However, this still leaves
10,000 or more workers in the region—many on farms—who are unemployed
or underemployed.
One such migrant was a father of 10 who worked most of each year in a Dallas
factory, and who had at least one son working in Tennessee illegally. This farm
family with 11 cows had several children who completed high school and went to
college, as well as a newly-established retail clothing shop, but when asked how
many of the children would go if there were a new guest worker program that
offered legal entry and work permits, the mother thought that most or all of her
children would go. The father reportedly goes into debt to farm in Mexico, and
migrates to the U.S. to earn money to pay off the farm debts.
Perhaps the central migration issue in this town is the race between the U.S.
and the clothing industry to absorb workers. Despite high wages—$400 to $500
per month for the men who cut fabric, and $250 per month for the women who sew
at piece-rate wages, there seems to be a combination of shortages of skilled and
experienced workers for the clothing industry, and too many rural workers going
into debt in agriculture. In an area where the minimum wage is 22 pesos or $3 per
day, we were told that all workers expect to be paid more than the minimum wage
of 22 pesos per day ($3).
It is expensive to set up a sewing shop in Zapotlanejo; little commercial space
is rented, but if it were, 700 square meters of space to establish a sewing shop
would rent for 2,000 pesos or $250 per month, and sell for $60,000—real estate
prices may have tripled in the past 10 years in Zapotlanejo.
Most shops that have sewing machines buy rather than rent them, and estab-
lishing a sewing shop with 10 sewers can easily cost $10,000, including sewing
machines at $600 each. In addition, larger sewing shops in town are subject to
social security or IMSS taxes that add 25 to 30 percent to wages. But key infor-
mants said most sewing shops started with one or two machines in a home that
could be bought with less than $1,000, and used family labor to get established
(usually the cutting was done in larger factories, who also paid for the fabric, and
home workshops only did sewing for them). Over time, these home-based work-
shops expand or cease to exist.
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The goal of the town is to decentralize sewing, to lend sewing machines to
rural women, and to have them sew garments in their homes. This would prevent
the growth of shanty towns around Zapotlanejo, and help sewing shop owners to
avoid IMSS costs. IMSS are social security and other payroll taxes that add
approximately 20 to 30 percent to wages.
While the decentralization of sewing might provide more jobs for local women,
it is not likely to provide many additional jobs for local men in rural areas, who are
most likely to emigrate. About 20 percent of the farm land around Zapotlanejo is in
ejidos, and land prices seem to vary considerably, from $3,600 per hectare for
dryland crop land. There is a local dairy industry, but everyone agreed that milk
prices were too low to make milk production profitable.
There is one American firm in Zapotlanejo, employing 250 seamstresses; it
received a special municipal tax break to locate there. It does all its sewing in the
shop, pays all labor and employment taxes, and exports garments to South America
and U.S. markets.
Pegeuros is a town of 4,000, plus 4,000 in the surrounding countryside, that
has a long tradition of emigration. The local economy is based on rainfed agricul-
ture, but has developed a significant agribusiness industry centered on poultry,
dairy, and hogs; these agribusinesses developed in Pegeuros because their owners
were from the area, not because the area has either cheap animal feed or slaughter-
ing facilities. Some key informants reported low wages of $25 to $40 per week for
laborers were also a factor in the decision to locate in Pegeuros. Both large-scale
dairy and poultry production are reportedly profitable.
The returned migrants in Pegeuros stressed the non-importance of remittances
and skills acquired in the U.S. in starting local agribusinesses. Instead, they cred-
ited e.g., selling clothes in Mexico City with laying the foundation for local
agribusinesses. Several noted that the amount of money needed to begin a viable
agribusiness greatly exceed what a typical migrant can earn while in the U.S., so
that most remittances are spent on current consumption and improved housing.
Ironically, many of the workers employed for wages in these local agribusinesses
are migrants from nearby towns, since Pegeuros residents tend to go to the U.S., or
expect U.S. wages in Pegeuros (supervisors and accountants on large farms earn
$400 to $500 per month).
There are as many persons born in Pegeuros in the U.S. as in Pegeuros, and
some have been very successful, including several who started businesses in the
Los Angeles area. The U.S. Pegeuros-residents have a club that returns money to
Pegeuros for civic improvements, but some of the projects supported by the club
have not benefited local residents, including a clinic that was built with club sup-
port in 1995, but in 1997 had no equipment because Mexican customs refused to
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allow the entry of donated medical equipment. The U.S. clubs maintain ties to their
Mexican villages of origin with beauty pageants in both the U.S. and Mexico that
include contestants from the U.S. and Mexico; many week-long fiestas in Mexican
villages include a day for migrants living in the U.S.
A typical lot in Pegeuros on which to build a house cost $2,500, and the
house another $20,000, although one house built by an extremely successful
Pegeuros migrant in Hollywood cost $200,000. Many of the successful migrants
who settle in the U.S. invest in real estate and businesses there; some local resi-
dents complain that those who settle in the U.S. reduce remittances and invest-
ments in their village of origin.
Pegeuros leaders feared a mass return of Mexicans after April 1, 1997, but so
far, there have been almost no returns. There have been a few returned criminal
aliens, and they have caused trouble, and inspired imitation by local youth.
The Los Altos area of Central Mexico has been exporting young men for cen-
turies, for seminary and work. One village of 2,800 was mostly dependent on U.S.
remittances and money earned in nearby towns—it was a “bedroom community”
seemingly closer to the U.S. labor market than to local jobs that added residents
despite emigration through births exceeding deaths. At least 500 persons born in
the village were in the U.S.; there are also retired residents living in the village
who worked in the U.S., and now receive U.S. Social Security benefits.
There is a marked contrast between public squalor and private affluence in
these villages. The main street running through town was only quasi-paved, but the
homes of migrants were immediately noticeable because of their satellite TV dishes.
Migrant remittances were also being used to construct a fairly-elaborate hall for
weddings and 15-year old coming out parties for girls.
When asked how many young men would go if there were a new guest worker
program that permitted legal migration, most people expected most of the young
men without education to leave for the U.S.
Lagos de Moreno is a town of 125,000 that has a long tradition of resistance to
the federal government’s land and other reforms. Lagos de Moreno is actually two
distinct areas; a city bustling with factories that process agricultural products, in-
cluding milk, and shops selling a variety of goods, and a rural hinterland that in-
cludes over 300 villages often filled with struggling farmers. The major agricul-
tural enterprise is dairying; Nestle has a plant in the town.
Lagos de Moreno has several enterprises that send workers to the U.S. for
training, but it appeared that the workers sent to the U.S. for training were not
those who would otherwise have migrated.
Key informants in Lagos de Moreno spent some time discussing differences
between groups of residents, including Native Americans who married among them-
selves, and poor blond girls who were able to marry up because of their looks. All
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agreed that a root cause of rural poverty in the area was a poorly-executed land reform
in the 1950s and 1950s, when haciendas were divided up among peasants, but they
were not provided with the credit that the hacienda owners provided, so farm produc-
tion fell. One elderly Lagos resident recounted how her husband went to the U.S. as
a bracero in the early 1940s, and with 5,000 in peso savings from 18 months of U.S.
work was able to begin what turned into a profitable cattle business.
Opinion Polls
This section presents public opinion data from 1989 and 1995 on the factors
that sustain migration across the U.S.-Mexican border. The Los Angeles Times
interviewed some 1835 Mexicans August 5-13, 1989 in 42 Mexican cities and towns
to determine whether IRCA was discouraging illegal migration to the U.S. About
one-third of the Mexicans who responded to the poll reported they had already
visited the U.S., 42 percent said they had relatives in the U.S., and 7 percent re-
ported that they received funds from a U.S. relative.
About 6 percent of those polled in Mexico in the summer of 1989 reported that
they were “very likely” to take up U.S. residence in 1990, and 16 percent said that
they were “fairly” likely to move north within the next year. Since each one per-
cent of respondents was assumed to represent about 850,000 Mexican residents,
this was interpreted to mean that about 4.7 million Mexicans were “very likely” to
move to the U.S. illegally in 1990. These polling data were used to conclude that,
despite IRCA, many Mexicans planned to illegally enter the U.S. (Marjorie Miller,
“The Times Poll—Despite New Laws, U.S. Still a Lure in Mexico,” Los Angeles
Times, August 21, 1989).
Conclusions
Much has changed since Herbert Hoover in 1918 argued for removing
restrictions on Mexican immigration by asserting that “we need every bit of this
labor that we can get and... we will need it for years to come” (Quoted in Kiser and
Kiser, 1979, 14). However, there has been one constant—a debate over whether
Mexican workers were truly needed in the U.S. The Mexican Consul in Arizona, in
1918, noted that many Mexicans and Mexican Americans in that state were
unemployed, so that “there is an abundance of labor here [in the U.S.] and what is
lacking is a good wage and above all good treatment” (Quoted in Kiser and Kiser,
1979, 15).
The constants in Mexico-U.S. migration are at least threefold:
1. The pleas of U.S. employers, especially farmers, for supplementary for-
eign workers.
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2. Arguments by U.S. unions, churches, and sometimes the Mexican
government that there was no shortage of labor in the U.S., only a
shortage of wages and decent working conditions.
3. Migration off the land in Mexico (Escobar and Roberts, 1996, 1).
After almost 80 years of Mexico-U.S. governmental interaction over Mexican
migration to the U.S. for employment, there is still disagreement over facts, trends,
and recommendations.
We believe that Mexico-U.S. migration for employment is initiated and sus-
tained by three broad categories of factors; demand-pull factors in the U.S., sup-
ply-push factors in Mexico, and network factors that bridge the border. Our major
conclusion is that the factor that initiated Mexican worker movement to the U.S.—
government-approved U.S. employer recruitment—has been joined by supply-push
and network factors as major motivators and sustainers of migration.
Given the importance of supply-push and network factors in current Mexico-
U.S. migration flows, we argue that there is currently a peak or hump in Mexico-
U.S. migration that should be reduced by economic and job growth in Mexico
beginning in 5 to 15 years.
Notes
1. U.S.-Mexico migration for employment and retirement patterns are summarized in
Volume 3, pages 869-1000.
2. According to Massey, 95 percent of Mexicans’ first trips to the U.S. are unauthorized
(1996). The INS estimated in 1997 that there were 5 million unauthorized aliens residing in
the U.S. in October 1996. Of these, 54 percent—2.7 million—were Mexicans who the INS
believes were residing in the U.S. 12 months or more. The number of unauthorized aliens
settled in the U.S. was estimated to be increasing by 275, 000 per year, including 154,000—
69 percent—Mexican nationals (INS, 1997). In addition to resident illegal alien Mexicans,
there are additional seasonal or sojourner migrants who are in the U.S. part of each year—
perhaps 500,000 to 1.5 million.
3. Mexican estimates suggest an increase of 277,000 legal and unauthorized Mexican-
born persons in the U.S. each year, while U.S. estimates suggest 340,000 per year. Between
FY91 and FY95, the 1.5 million legal Mexican immigrants were almost 30 percent of the
5.2 million legal immigrants admitted to the U.S.
The number two country of emigration, the Philippines, reported that 4.2 million Fili-
pino-born persons were living outside the Philippines in 1996, and that 654,000 Filipino
workers were deployed abroad in 1995. The Philippine Central Bank reported that remit-
tances from Filipino overseas contract workers increased over 63 percent to U.S. $4.9 bil-
lion in 1995 (124 billion pesos), up from U.S. $3 billion in 1994 .
4. The 4 million to 5 million Mexican workers employed in the U.S. are equivalent to
40 to 50 percent of the Mexican workers permanently employed in private formal sector
jobs in Mexico.
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There were 9,163,459 permanent workers enrolled in IMSS at the end of 1996, a record
gain of 661,024 from 8.5 million at the end of 1995, reflecting in part the return of 274,493
IMSS jobs lost in 1995. Growth continued in 1996: some 282,782 permanent workers were
enrolled between January and April 1997, bringing the total to 9,446,241 at the end of April
1997, including 103,000 additions in April. Of the permanent workers enrolled in IMSS, 40
percent were in manufacturing (377,000 new IMSS jobs in 1996), 36 percent in services
(166,000), 19 percent in trade (103,000), and 5 percent in agriculture (16,000).
In addition to permanent IMSS participants, some 2 million to 4 million government
employees are permanent workers affiliated with ISSSTE, the government workers social
security institute.
It should be emphasized that not all Mexican workers in the U.S. are in formal sector
jobs. However, according to the NAWS, virtually all Mexican born farm workers have so-
cial security taxes deducted from their wages.
5. Sometimes migrants repay smuggling costs by working in coyote-related employ-
ment in the U.S., suggesting that funds to pay for entry, border crossing, and U.S. employ-
ment are becoming more closely linked
6. Based on mid-1990s fertility levels, Mexican woman average three births in a life-
time, down from seven in 1970. If lifetime fertility in Mexico stabilizes at 2.5 children per
woman, Mexico’s population will rise from 96 million today to 192 million in 2050, accord-
ing to PRB. If lifetime fertility stabilizes at 2 children per woman, the Mexican population
would be 154 million in 2050.
The secretary-general of Mexico’s National Population Board predicts that Mexico’s
fertility rate will fall to 2.1 births per woman by 2005, and then fall below replacement level.
The growth in the number of Mexicans 0 to 5 is currently zero, and the growth of the 6 to 14
age group is about 0.6 percent per year.
7. There are several measures of employment and unemployment in Mexico. A May
1995 Banamex review of data from the National Employment Surveys of 1988, 1991, and
1993 (ENE), household income and expenditure surveys of 1984, 1989, and 1992 (ENIG),
and the population censuses of 1980 and 1990, concluded that the labor force or economically
active population 12 and older in 1995 was 36.1 million, up from 33.7 million in 1993, and
31.2 million in 1991—in 1993, about 10 percent of the 12-14 year olds in urban areas with
100,000 or more residents were in the labor force, and 30 percent of the 12-14 year olds in
rural areas (152-3). According to Banamex, Mexico had 27.4 million paid employees in 1995,
and a labor force of 37 million in 1997, including those who are self employed, unpaid family
workers, and the unemployed. A 1995 report from the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City estimated
that 35 percent of economically active Mexicans are either unemployed or underemployed.
8. Between 1993 and 1997, Mexican National Employment Surveys indicate that the
labor force increased from 32.4 million to 36.7 million, or by over 1 million or 3 percent per
year. The 37 million current labor force number includes about 4 million unpaid family
workers and 2 million unemployed workers; those classified as employers or wage and sal-
ary workers totaled about 30 million in 1997.
9. Even if economic growth averages 4 percent per year, the Mexican economy should
be able to generate enough jobs for the smaller entry labor force cohorts after 2000. At 4
percent GDP growth, and the 1.35 economic-employment growth ratio, Mexico would be
generating about 950,000 jobs per year soon after 2000, which should fully absorb the entry
cohort. With 3 percent growth, and the 1.35 growth-employment ratio, Mexico should generate
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800,000 new jobs per year, which should absorb the entry cohort of 2005 (Mexico’s total
labor force may grow by more than 800,000 per year, as persons not in the labor force seek
work if jobs are available).
10. Mexican manufacturing is considered capital intensive, and with a high import
content, reflecting maquiladora assembly activities, e.g., television parts are imported, and
assembled televisions are exported. Tijuana has become the world’s TV-manufacturing capital,
churning out 14 million sets a year.
11. In FY95, the 19,200 Mexican non-immigrants admitted to the U.S. with H, O, P, Q,
and R visas were 10 percent of the total 196,800 non-immigrants admitted with such visas,
including 6,100 H-2A farm worker admissions, and 3,500 H-2B nonfarm worker admis-
sions. Current non-immigrant temporary worker programs permit U.S. employers to recruit
foreign workers anywhere.
12. It is easy to emphasize the gap between U.S. and Mexican positions, or ways to narrow
the gap. For example, most U.S. employers would agree that Mexican guest workers would have
to be paid prevailing U.S. wages, and work under prevailing U.S. working conditions, as Mexico
would likely insist. However, U.S. farm employers have proposed that temporary foreign work-
ers receive a housing allowance in lieu of U.S.-government approved housing, something that
may be hard to justify given that the foreign workers presumably have no knowledge of local
housing conditions, and that they are entering the U.S. for seasonal work.
In other words, if the seasonality that some U.S. and Mexican advocates think charac-
terizes Mexican-U.S. migration is real, then there may be pressure to adopt different and
lower housing and protection standards for guest workers, which may increase opposition to
a guest worker program.
Whatever protections are adopted, many worker advocates believe that U.S. enforce-
ment is adequate to ensure that they are obeyed.
13. There is a debate over whether low wages or unemployment is the major push
factor in Mexico that encourages emigration. Massey et al. 1994, 710 conclude that
“employment related variables [in Mexico] generally equaled or exceeded those of wage-
related indicators.”
14. Lowell (1995, 15) notes that the number of legal immigrant entries into the U.S. is
(1) negatively correlated with non-immigrant entries across 116 countries that send mi-
grants to the U.S., and (2) positively correlated with illegal entries, suggesting that legal
immigration is a proxy for “emigration pressure” from a country.
15. Both historically and today middlemen recruiters and transporters have been in-
volved in the migration process. Today, these understudied middlemen—who might be con-
sidered as arbitrageurs of differences between international labor markets—play an role in
facilitating illegal labor migration, extracting a fee from migrant workers or their employers
equivalent to 25 to 100 percent of what the migrant will earn in his first year abroad.
16. It should be emphasized that unauthorized workers accompany legal guest workers
in every country with a guest worker program. The ratio to unauthorized to authorized workers
is amenable to policy intervention, as in the mid-1950s, when the U.S. launched “Operation
Wetback” and simultaneously encouraged farmers to employ legal bracero workers.
17. In 1947, there was a smaller than usual cotton crop, and relatively little farm work
available in southern California during the winter months. However, the fall 1948 cotton
crop was much larger than usual, increasing the demand for labor in 1948.
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18. Some Midwestern meatpacking plants offer “bounties” of  $200 to existing workers
for each new worker referred. Many plants have recruiters who seek out workers within 50
or 100 miles of the plant, and some send recruiters to Texas or California in search of workers.
For more details on how Mexican and other workers are recruited to work in Midwestern
meatpacking plants, see Martin, Taylor, and Fix, 1996
19. Tomatoes are native to South America. Commercial U.S. production began in the
1880s. The U.S. produces about 20 percent of the world’s tomatoes.
Cannery or processing tomatoes are harvested by cutting the plant and shaking off the
tomatoes. The tomatoes are then sorted by color as they move past an electronic eye, and
then loaded unto 25 ton trucks for delivery to processing plants.
The tomatoes are washed, screened to remove debris, and then either sliced or pro-
cessed into tomato paste.
20. In addition, there were in 1993-94 about 500,000 non-immigrant foreigners work-
ing temporarily in the U.S. labor market—temporary non-immigrant workers are often found
in the same sectors as settled foreign workers, viz, construction, agriculture, and hotels and
restaurants.
21. The 23 million rural Mexicans shared the $30 billion rural GDP in 1994, giving
them an average $1,311 each, while the 67 million urban Mexicans who shared the remain-
ing $347 billion GDP had an average $5179 GDP each. Mexico’s economy shrank by about
7 percent in 1995.
22. According to a Mexican proposal to the World Bank in 1995, 41 percent of Mexi-
cans live in rural areas, and 84 percent of the extremely poor Mexican residents are in rural
areas. Mexico-Agricultural Development and Rural Poverty Project, MXPA7711.
23. At the other end of the spectrum, Mexico includes the fourth largest number of
billionaire families—24—after the U.S., Japan, and Germany. The wealthiest Mexicans in
1994 included Carlos Slim Helu ($6.6 billion in assets, Telmex), Emilio Azcarraga ($5.4
billion, Grupo Televisa), Lorenzo Zambrano ($3.1 billion, Cemex), and Aleko Peralta ($2.5
billion, Grupo IUSA)
24. About 12 percent of the sample households included an adult who had migrated to
the U.S. in the past four years, and 27 percent included an adult member who had migrated
to the U.S. at least once (de Janvry and Sadoulet, 1997, 7).
25. There are a few commodities that can be produced cheaper in Mexico, including
avocados. However, when the USDA held hearings on whether Mexican avocados could
be imported into the American northeast, where the pests common in Michoacán could
not survive the winter, California producers called for keeping trade barriers in place until
there was much more study and information available on the possible risks to U.S. avoca-
dos and citrus. California has 60,000 acres of avocados, and California avocado sales in
1995 were about $225 million.
26. Most Mexican vegetable exporters provide housing in 125 camps in the Culican
Valley at no charge to their harvest workers, often 150 square feet for each family, which
can range six to 10 family members. Government doctors visit the camps to dispense basic
medicines and to teach techniques of birth control; however, the schools in the camps teach
from 5 to 8 PM, so that children can help their parents in the fields
27. Helene Cooper and Bruce Ingersoll, “With little evidence, Florida growers blame
tomato woes on NAFTA,” Wall Street Journal, April 3, 1996.
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28. For example, a Mexican peasants organization, the National Union of Autonomous
Regional Campesino Organizations (UNORCA), in April 1996 asserted that more than 80
percent of Mexico’s of what it said were three million ejidatarios, and 2.5 million small
farmers, were vulnerable to bankruptcy. In late April, 1996, the Mexican government an-
nounced a plan to provide $1 billion in credit and technical assistance to 600,000 producers
of grains on 11.5 million acres.
29. There were dozens of hearings on whether NAFTA should be approved by the U.S.
Congress, but only one devoted specifically to how NAFTA would affect Mexico-to-U.S.
migration. During the November 3, 1993, hearing before the House Judiciary Subcommit-
tee on International Law, Immigration and Refugees, Chairman Romano Mazzoli (D-Ky)
repeatedly asked Administration officials why they had not reached an agreement with Mexico
on additional steps to control illegal immigration. They responded with variations on the
statement of Deputy United States Trade Representative Rufus Yerxa: “NAFTA does not
explicitly address the issue of illegal immigration, but in the long run, it is one of our best
bets to reducing illegal immigration.”
30. Tellez converted this to a labor displacement figure in May 1992, when he predicted
that over 1.4 million farmers and workers would be displaced by 2002 due to freer trade and
land reforms. Tellez projected that the farm work force would fall from 26 percent in 1992
(7.l8 of 30 million) to 16 percent by 2002 (6.4 of 40 million). Cited in Cornelius, 1992, p. 6.
31. About $12 billion is transferred outside the U.S. each year by money remitters or
transmitters such as First Data Corp’s Western Union and Moneygran Payment Services—
these two collectively account for $11 billion or 90 percent of the nonbank international
transfer market in the U.S. U.S. banks transfer an estimated $800 billion daily overseas.
Wall Street Journal, May 20, 1997.
32. Some surveys indicate that employers prefer immigrants because their “right atti-
tude” includes a tendency not to complain about labor law violations. Enforcement experi-
ence suggests that a majority of garment and agricultural employers inspected by labor law
authorities are violating some labor law, but it is often very difficult to quickly prove the
violation.
For this reason, labor inspection records indicate that many violations are “technical,”
such as failing to post safety notices, because such violations are clear, while others take
time to prove. For example, it can take hours of investigative time to determine whether
workers paid piece rate wages are earning the minimum hourly wage of $4.25 to which they
are entitled, and so, rather than go through incomplete records, the inspector may simply
issue a citation for a missing poster and move on. For a review of enforcement practices in
immigrant labor markets, see Martin 1994.
33. It might be noted that the Fair Labor Standards Law, which established minimum
hourly wages, overtime pay, and child labor rules, is routinely violated by some firms. DOL’s
800 labor inspectors open 20,000 investigations each year, mostly following complaints,
and win settlements for workers in about 90 percent of the cases. One employer group
estimates that U.S. workers are unlawfully denied $19 billion per year in overtime pay—
federal law requires that workers employed more than eight hours daily or 40 hours weekly
be paid 1.5 times their normal wage (G. Pascal Zachary, “Many firms refuse to pay for
overtime, employees complain,” Wall Street Journal, June 24, 1996).
34. Wiest distinguished between temporary-recurrent migrants who were typically away
for less than one year, indefinite migrants who those whom the household members
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interviewed say that do not know if the absent member will return, and permanent relocation
was the term applied to those who left the village.
35. Taylor (1987) emphasized that illegal migration to the U.S. does not contribute
disproportionately to a Mexican household’s income.
36. Cornelius concluded that Las Animas may be the exception in the sense that U.S.-
bound migrants from there followed well-trod network paths to a few areas of the U.S.
Cornelius argued that “social network-based migration does not necessarily tie a Mexican
sending community to a single receiving area within the U.S.”
37. Donato, Durand, and Massey concluded that IRCA was not deterring illegal en-
tries. The 1987-89 drop in INS apprehensions, they concluded, was probably due to legal-
ization, not to fewer Mexicans migrating to the U.S.
Espenshade agreed with the conclusion that the prospect of being apprehended seemed
to do little to discourage Mexicans attempting illegal entry in the late 1980s and early 1990s,
but he emphasizes that, once inside the U.S., the probability of apprehension goes down, but
the costs of being apprehended goes up, since apprehension inside the U.S. can mean loss of
a U.S. job (1994, 886).
Most evidence points to a probability of apprehension on any illegal attempt of about
0.3—about 74 percent of a sample of persons legalized under the general legalization pro-
gram—and 68 percent of Mexicans—reported that they had never been apprehended by the
INS between their entry—which should have been before January 1, 1992, and their appli-
cation for legalization in 1987-88 (INS, 1992, 15).
Reports in 1995 from the single most labor-intensive activity in North American agri-
culture—the harvest of about 200,000 acres of raisin grapes around Fresno, California from
mid-August to October—found that newly arrived and unauthorized workers were still get-
ting into the U.S. and going to work. The unauthorized workers in the raisin fields reported
that they paid higher fees to smugglers in summer 1995, $300-$400 versus $200-$300, but
the larger increased cost was the lost days of work in the U.S. because of delays in crossing
the border.
Most of the raisin workers, however, persisted until they succeeded in reaching the
Fresno area (INS Evaluates Gatekeeper, SouthPAW, Migration News, October 1995).
38. Massey and Espinosa (1995, 51) argued that many Mexican migrants from
West Central Mexico in the late 1980s and early 1990s were motivated to migrate to
the U.S. to seek capital to invest in Mexico, not simply searching for higher incomes.
These migrants could not obtain the capital they needed in Mexico because interest
rates were high. However, high interest rates are also typically associated with slow
economic growth and joblessness, so that high Mexican interest rates could just as
plausibly be associated with more emigration for very traditional low wage and job-
less reasons for migration.
39. In a September 10, 1992 speech to the Detroit Economic Club, President Bush said
that the economic growth accelerated by NAFTA should “cut down on the cross-border
flow of illegals that I think is burdening a lot of our country, particularly California.”
40. For those who migrate to the U.S., interviewers asked whether the migrant
was legally authorized to work in the U.S., so that persons crossing the border with
tourist visas, border crossing cards, or borrowed or false documents were coded as
making illegal entries.
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U.S. Impacts of Mexican Immigration
Michael J. Greenwood & Marta Tienda1
Introduction
An assessment of the impacts of Mexican immigration in the United Statesdepends on how many come, and when (first chapter); who migrates,where they come from and where they settle; how long they stay, how
they and their offspring adjust (second chapter); why they come and how they
select their U.S. destinations (third chapter). Previous chapters have elaborated the
complexity of each of these themes, which bear on the nature and magnitude of
demographic, social, and economic impacts of Mexican migration. An assessment
of the impacts is further complicated because, in addition to the difficult issues
considered in prior chapters, the consequences of Mexican immigration differ over
time, across diverse regions, and among various segments of the society and sec-
tors of the economy.
This chapter is concerned with the consequences of recent (largely 1960 to the
present) streams of Mexican migrants, although we acknowledge that many current
impacts have accumulated over several decades. Impacts deriving from decades of
Mexican migration are manifested in multiple spheres of social, political, and
economic life. Today these impacts are most clearly evident in locations where the
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Mexican-born population is densely settled, notably the cities along the U.S.-Mexico
border, and, several large cities in the Southwest (e.g., Los Angeles, San Diego,
Houston, Dallas), and Chicago. That many native-born Mexican origin residents
are themselves descendants of recent migrants renders the focus on recent entrants
arbitrary, yet necessary for policy considerations. We elaborate these issues in the
discussion of demographic impacts.
It is important also to acknowledge how changed economic and socio-political
circumstances may alter the contemporary impacts of Mexican migration relative
to earlier periods. There is extensive empirical evidence that the returns to educa-
tion have been rising in the United States since the mid-1970s, and this implies
more limited economic mobility for recent migrants relative to earlier migrants
from Mexico. Taken together, the lowered demand for unskilled workers coupled
with a less tolerant climate for welfare and health care benefits have increased the
challenges of migrant integration and adaptation while fueling public perceptions
that the costs of migration exceed the benefits.2
The preponderance of scientific evidence refutes this view, but acknowledges
that not all segments of society share equally in the benefits of immigration (Borjas,
1977; Hammermesh, 1997; Smith and Edmonston, 1997). Moreover, the costs are
borne disproportionately by certain groups in the United States. Herein resides an
important source of misunderstanding about the benefits and costs of migration
generally and Mexican migration in particular, namely the distributional aspects of
gains and losses. Therefore, we depart from the simple premise migration from
Mexico produces benefits to the United States, and that these benefits come at a
cost. Accordingly, our main task is to identify the benefits and costs and to specify
which groups benefit and lose from Mexican migration.
To decipher benefits and costs deriving from out-migration from Mexico and
in-migration to the United States, we lay out a heuristic framework that
differentiates national from regional and local impacts and also separates, for
analytic convenience, economic from socio-cultural, demographic and political
consequences. For most outcomes, the distinctions are largely theoretical because
all of these dimensions are highly inter-related. We also acknowledge that short
and long-term impacts differ, that some impacts are transmitted intergenerationally,
and that many benefits and costs can not be quantified. Although we mainly
emphasize measurable impacts, we also consider unmeasured benefits and costs,
including those based on perceptions rather than facts, because these also can be
highly influential in shaping responses to migration. Our attempt to provide a
balanced and nuanced portrait of benefits and costs is crucially important for
contemplating policy strategies, whose ultimate goal is to maximize benefits and
minimize costs for both countries.
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Impacts and the Changing
Character of Migration
Migration from Mexico to the United States has changed over time, which
suggests that the historical dimensions of the labor flow are important for under-
standing contemporary impacts. Initially Mexican workers were almost exclusively
destined to jobs in the agricultural industry. In this instance, the local costs might
be relatively contained, even though the benefits were enjoyed by the entire U.S.
population through lower food prices. However, over time, the Mexican flow has
changed in size, volume and characteristics (first two chapters, this volume). Even
though current migrants from Mexico largely seek urban destinations and find em-
ployment outside of agriculture, vestiges of the historical role of Mexican workers
in U.S. agriculture remain, as evident in their disproportionate representation in
farming industries. We elaborate on these points below.
The highly fluid social, demographic and political contexts in which U.S.-
bound Mexican migration has evolved render the task of drawing conclusions about
some impacts tentative, although other impacts are amenable to firmer conclu-
sions. For example, we are confident in our inferences (substantiated below) that
the magnitude of impacts in the United States are more pronounced in places that
send and receive large volumes of migrants. However, we also emphasize that so-
cial, economic and demographic impacts are not confined to migrant-sending and
receiving areas because local impacts may be arbitraged by secondary migration of
people and capital, and by multiplier effects that yield benefits to consumers of
less expensive goods produced by migrants. In addition to migration, other chan-
nels distribute the economic effects of migration, notably international trade, taxes
and transfers.
Two additional features of contemporary Mexican migration are relevant for
understanding social, demographic, political and economic impacts in the United
States. One is the changing composition of the flows between temporary and per-
manent migrants. Temporary migrants are themselves highly differentiated in ways
that shape their impacts in the United States: some sojourn back and forth through-
out their productive lives, while others take a single or a few trips over their life
cycle (Massey, et al., 1995). These patterns of migration have different implica-
tions for all types of impacts, be they social, economic, demographic, or political.
Unfortunately, owing to data limitations, few studies of impacts distinguish be-
tween permanent and temporary migrants, except in discussions of highly special-
ized flows, such as braceros or other temporary seasonal workers.
A second feature of Mexican migration that has important implications for
impact assessment concerns the legal status of the migrants. This feature is crucial
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because participation by unauthorized workers in social programs and their
consumption of tax-financed social services is a highly sensitive political issue
undergirding the latest round of restrictions on the access of the foreign born to
social welfare benefits (see note 2). Although, it is difficult to distinguish various
types of impacts according to legal status, several recent studies have attempted to
estimate the fiscal and labor market impacts of documented and undocumented
flows. We report on these studies below, and where data permit, refer to the
experiences of the legalized population.3
Chapter Organization
Our assessment of the myriad impacts of Mexican migration to the United
States is based on new syntheses of existing studies as well as several original
papers. First, we summarized existing studies about the impacts of Mexican migra-
tion to the United States. Because the literature about the impacts of the foreign
born in the United States is voluminous, we sought to distinguish, as much as
possible, whether and how impacts of Mexican migration differ from those of mi-
gration in general.
To preface our evaluation, we first present a typology that frames our discus-
sion of various dimensions of impacts according to level of aggregation, and we
discuss the distributional aspects of Mexican migration for understanding local,
regional and national impacts. This section is followed by a general overview that
describes how Mexican migration to the United States differs from U.S. immigra-
tion in general. The purpose is to identify what these differences portend for under-
standing impacts of Mexican migration in various social domains and areas of the
country that receive the largest shares of Mexican migrants. We use the 1990 Cen-
sus of Population and several additional surveys and published data sources to
depict demographic, economic, social and political impacts. All data sources have
their limitations, which are discussed in appropriate sections. In striving to present
our main findings in nontechnical prose, we have prepared a series of appendices
to present technical and tabular materials as well as detailed descriptions of the
various data sources used.
Conceptualizing Impacts of U.S.-Bound
Mexican Migration
We begin with a heuristic framework that depicts various domains through which
Mexican migration impacts receiving communities. Our purpose is two-fold. One is
to identify the various domains where impacts of Mexican migration will be identified.
Second, the framework serves as a basis for organizing the literature reviews and
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presenting findings from prior studies and those prepared specifically for the
binational study. We strive for the most balanced accounting possible, but because
the nature of the impacts (both benefits and costs) differs in magnitude, kind, and
amenability to quantitative analysis, we provide considerable detail and comment on
the conclusiveness of the evidence presented in various studies.
Dimensions of Impacts
We define impacts as consequences or changes in social, demographic,
economic, cultural or political arrangements that stem directly or indirectly from
Mexican migration to the United States. Not all of these impacts are measurable,
but for heuristic purposes, it is worthwhile to think broadly about the myriad
consequences of such migration. Moreover, the nature and magnitude of impacts
manifest themselves differently at national, regional, and local levels, and vary
over time, partly because some are cumulative, and partly because migrants (and
especially their offspring) assimilate economically and socially in the United States,
thereby changing the character and magnitude of impacts inter-temporally and/or
inter-generationally.
Levels of aggregation are important because benefits and costs differ accord-
ingly, and because policies governing migration may originate at one level, but
may produce various intended and unintended consequences at different levels.
Although some impacts measured at the national level may be quantitatively small,
at the regional and local levels these same impacts can be very large. Put another
way, studies based on specific local labor markets or school districts are more likely
to show large effects of Mexican migration than those based on regional or na-
tional levels analyses.4
Simply stated, most impacts of Mexican migration will be more pronounced
in locales and industries where migrants reside and work. For example, the im-
pacts of Mexican migration on U.S. public education outlays are much greater
(both in absolute per-capita terms and in relative terms) in Los Angeles than in
Fargo, ND, and, as we show below, they also depend on the legal status of the
migrants and their children. Average impacts (per capita or relative shares) lose
this important distributional dimension, which is crucial for understanding the
political hysteria in California leading to Proposition 187 and related initiatives to
limit access of migrants to social consumption services and means-tested income
transfers. Accordingly, we make every attempt to spell out channels through which
impacts are produced and to specify the level of aggregation at which generaliza-
tions and specific conclusions obtain.
1. Demographic impacts stemming from migration from Mexico manifest them-
selves through changes in the age structure and gender composition, as well as the
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ethnic and racial composition of a population, which can be quite substantial at the
local level if migrants leave from or settle in a few selected cities and states, even
if the national population composition does not change much. Although Mexican
migration also contributes to net U.S. population increase, this “outcome” has not
been a major preoccupation of national demographic impact assessments.5 Rather,
population losses and gains are more salient at local levels, where a relatively large
influx not only can lead to overcrowding (Myers and Lee, 1996), but also visible
changes in race and ethnic population composition.
Beyond these direct demographic impacts (i.e., changes in population compo-
sition, density, and natural increase), indirect demographic impacts derive from
other migrant characteristics. For instance, the higher fertility of Mexican-born
women relative to native-born women of Mexican or other origins have implica-
tions for future demographic impacts, and in particular, the size of the Mexican-
origin population (Forste and Tienda, 1996; Smith and Edmonston, 1997). How-
ever, these effects may be tempered by patterns of intermarriage that not only re-
duce the numbers who self-identify as Mexican origin, but also may result in lower
fertility among assimilated groups (Smith and Edmonston, 1997). Additional indi-
rect demographic impacts of migration may stem from residential mobility of na-
tive populations from localities that receive large shares of migrants to those that
receive few migrants. Also, native populations can respond by not moving to places
where immigrants locate which they might consider in the absence of immigration.
However, it is unclear whether concentrated settlements of the foreign born result
because natives move out first, creating residential opportunities for the newcom-
ers, or whether the rising migrant composition of a community results in out-mi-
gration of native populations. Unfortunately, this question can not be addressed
with existing data.
2. Economic impacts of Mexican migration to the United States are concerned
with quite diverse outcomes. Therefore we distinguish several broad channels of
influence through which migration has made an impact on the economy of the
receiving society. The dominant and most commonly studied broad channel of
influence focuses on the labor market, namely the direct effect of migrants on the
employment and wages of U.S. residents (both natives and prior migrants). One
common view of labor market impacts is that migrants take jobs away from native
workers and depress their wage rates. Although this belief is widely shared be-
cause it proliferated in the popular media during the 1980s, empirical evidence is
mixed, as we elaborate below.
Mexican migrants also influence employment and wages through their de-
mand for goods and services. Moreover, migrant workers can be complements as
well as substitutes for native workers, and the net effects of migrants on the wages
of natives are also difficult to assess. That migrants also create jobs through their
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contributions to production and their own demand for goods and services makes it
very difficult to estimate their net employment and wage effects. Industry-specific
studies suggest some substitution of migrants for domestic workers, but these stud-
ies fail to identify what happens to the displaced workers (Martin and Midgley,
1994:30). Moreover, these studies do not clearly indicate whether the substitution
resulted from wage competition (i.e., whether employers pay migrant workers less
for comparable work) or whether employers prefer migrants because of other un-
observed characteristics, such as attitudes, dependability and willingness to work
extra time (Krischenman and Neckerman, 1991; Tienda and Stier, 1996; Tienda,
1989).6 Neither is it obvious that Mexican migrants have lower reservation wages
than equally unskilled domestic workers (Tienda and Stier, 1996).
A second broad channel through which migration to the United States pro-
duces economic impacts is the fiscal channel. Narrowly defined, fiscal impacts are
the current account balance between what migrants pay in taxes and fees, and what
they consume in tax-supported amenities and services. Conceived more broadly,
fiscal impacts also involve the prices of public goods where immigrants live (e.g.,
higher taxes due to the increased costs of providing various public services), as
well as the quality of services received (e.g., overcrowding in schools). That the
majority of Mexican migrants earn low wages is undisputed. Therefore, as a group,
they also pay lower than average income taxes. Mexicans who reside in the United
States also have larger than average family size, so they may consume proportion-
ately more in public education services than they pay in local taxes. However,
many Mexican migrants who move back and forth may pay taxes and not receive
equivalent benefits.
Migrant participation in the welfare system has been an issue of considerable
concern in recent years. Migrants from Mexico come to the United States in search
of employment opportunities and higher wages. Welfare availability does not ap-
pear to play a major role in their decisions to enter the United States, and when
they are young, their propensity to participate in the welfare system (primarily Aid
for Dependent Children or AFDC) is lower than that both of otherwise comparable
natives in general and of otherwise comparable native-born persons of Mexican
ancestry. However, older persons born in Mexico tend to participate more in SSI
than otherwise comparable natives, perhaps in part because those who are 65 and
over do not qualify for Social Security, whereas native-born persons do qualify.
The fiscal issue is further complicated by the fact that Mexican (and other)
migrants pay Social Security taxes, but many are not eligible for Social Security
benefits either because they are too young to collect, because of their legal status,
or because they return to Mexico before paying the required number of quarters.
However, many receive Supplemental Security Income benefits, which results in
another source of income transfers. Finally, costs of migration services also have
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risen because tighter border surveillance is expensive. Although these expenditures
disproportionately benefit the Southwestern states that share a border with Mexico,
they are financed from federal taxes, and therefore the costs are incurred by all
citizens. This outlay is seldom considered in assessments of fiscal impacts, perhaps
because the outlay also involves opportunity costs that are not easily estimated
(e.g., funds that may be spent on welfare, highways, etc.).
Of course, fiscal impacts change over time, depending on (1) changes in the
demographic profile of the foreign born population (especially the relative balance
of school-age and elderly groups); (2) changes in the economic status of succes-
sive cohorts; and (3) future paths of government spending. In general, immigrants
are more costly than natives during childhood because school-aged children often
require special outlays for bilingual education, but immigrants are usually less ex-
pensive in old age. Over a lifetime these differences tend to balance out, but whether
costs exceed benefits ultimately depends on future earnings and successful eco-
nomic adaptation of migrants. Age at arrival is crucial for assessing lifetime earn-
ings: the younger the age at arrival, the more likely that future earnings will offset
costs of immigration (Smith and Edmonston, 1997).
A third and less studied broad channel of economic influence focuses on scale
effects, namely whether the volume of Mexican migration coupled with its high
geographic concentration has a positive economic effect. Virtually all of the formal
theoretical work on the effects of immigration assumes constant returns to scale,
which tends to make the predicted effects less positive than if increasing returns
were assumed. As consumers, the foreign born and their offspring expand the do-
mestic market and also encourage increased investment expenditures, thereby aug-
menting aggregate demand.
Some public goods, such as national defense, do not depend directly on the
size of the population (as does education). An increase in population ought not
increase the need for national defense, but would increase the number of people
paying for defense, thus lowering the cost per capita and lessening the burden on
the native residents. On the other hand, Mexico-born and Mexican-ancestry popu-
lations have low U.S. military participation rates, which also may deprive them of
an important path to occupational mobility. Scale effects associated with migration
emerge in highly complex ways, with variable impacts for national, regional and
local markets.
3. Social and political impacts are perhaps the most difficult to assess partly
because it is difficult to classify social and political consequences into costs and
benefits. Because most Mexican migrants are integrated into the United States
through existing Mexican migrant or Mexican-American neighborhoods, barrios,
and settlements, the interaction between the migrants and the wider U.S. citizenry
is partly mediated through the existing Mexican-American community. The Mexican-
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American community has experienced major changes since 1960: the population
became more urban; more educated; and, importantly, more politically active.
Another important consideration for understanding social impacts is that levels of
residential concentration of contemporary migrants are unprecedented by historical
standards (Higham, 1997). Also, the intense inflow of new migrants from Mexico
coupled with dense settlement patterns have permitted the proliferation of Spanish
in both public and private arenas while slowing the pace of language shift (to English)
among the native born (Lopez, 1996).
All the changes summarized above have important implications for discus-
sions about the social and political impacts of Mexican migration in the United
States. In particular, it is essential to consider the paradoxical way in which Mexi-
can-American political assimilation in the past 30 years has widened the breach
between Mexican migrants and the more settled Mexican-American communities.
The breach between migrants and natives has proved to be something of a limiting
factor in further Mexican-American political empowerment. If ethnic diversity has
been heralded as a major asset of American society, it is also considered a cost,
particularly when tied to migration. The migrant origins of the U.S. population are
quickly forgotten when negative public perceptions about migrants are fueled by
fears that they increase job competition, drive up taxes, and contribute to rising
crime rates. Such perceptions, however misguided, can exert powerful influences
on the climate of opinion toward migrants, including early and recent arrivals, and
trigger prejudice and, under the worst case scenario, ethnic uprisings (Higham,
1997; Smith and Edmonston, 1997).
4. Other impacts, our residual category, includes a myriad of consequences
ranging from cultural transformation of U.S. neighborhoods and communities to
human costs incurred by the migrants stemming from tightened border controls
that raise the risk (and consequences) of unauthorized entry and the impoverization
generated by new legal restrictions on access to means-tested benefits. Cultural
impacts of the sustained migratory streams between Mexico and the U.S. are evi-
dent in the proliferation of businesses that cater to ethnic concerns; the prolifera-
tion of Spanish-speaking in public places; and the emergence of “sister” communi-
ties in the United States which reproduce Mexico’s rich cultural variation in the
United States.
Theoretical Principles and Their
Distributional Implications
Labor migration, whether internal or international, involves three general types
of (income) redistributions: (1) from the origin area to the destination area; (2)
within the origin area between the various factors of production, usually from other
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factors to labor; and (3) within the destination area between the various factors of
production, usually from labor to other factors. These effects are seldom symmetrical,
but they are crucial for framing binational relationships politically. Moreover,
numerous issues arise regarding the assumptions that underlie these three
redistributions, such as whether the migrants own capital and bring it with them, or
acquire it and take it to their origin countries. Nevertheless, international migration
triggers income redistribution, although the specific redistributions depend on who
moves between which places.
These redistributions derive from three sources: (1) pecuniary externalities; 2)
technological externalities; and (3) the presence of market distortions and public
goods. Pecuniary externalities occur through the market as supply and demand
changes caused by migration affect relative wages and relative prices. With regard
to migration from Mexico to the United States, this type of externality has received
the most attention. The workings of the market to a large extent determine how
wages and employment opportunities are affected for natives and prior migrants.
Such wage and price changes produce income redistribution within both countries.
For example, the historical flow of Mexican migrants to jobs in southwestern agri-
culture redistributed income in favor of land and capital owners.
The redistribution between the countries involves individuals who were pro-
ductive members of Mexico’s labor force becoming productive members of the
U.S. labor force. If the migration was motivated by a positive wage differential
favoring the U.S.—a wage differential that reflects a labor productivity differen-
tial—then the aggregate output of the two nations taken as a whole rises. The mi-
grants themselves clearly benefit, and as long as the migrants have positive mar-
ginal products in each nation, Mexico’s aggregate output falls whereas that of the
United States rises. However, aggregate output or income is probably a less rel-
evant indicator of a nation’s economic welfare than per capita income. Whereas
per capita income of both nations combined presumably would rise because of
migration from Mexico to the United States, that of either nation could fall.
Technological externalities occur through nonmarket mechanisms, and not
because of market-induced wage and price changes. These externalities may cause
either positive or negative effects in origin and destination areas, but have not played
a major role in the debate regarding the effects of Mexican migration to the United
States. Many potential technological externalities have been discussed in connection
with the education of migrants, especially those migrants who are well-educated
relative to the population of the origin society. For example, the “brain-drain” debate
questioned whether scientists and engineers trained at public expense in poor
countries like India developed technologies at their destinations that were beneficial
to the new society. Because migration from Mexico has been primarily from areas
where education levels are low (especially by comparison to the U.S. averages),
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this issue has not been at the forefront of the debate about the economic consequences
of U.S.-bound Mexican migration.
The presence of market distortions and public goods is a third source of in-
come redistributions that result from migration. Market distortions occur when
workers are paid less than their private marginal product, due perhaps to monop-
sonistic hiring practices or discrimination. Moreover, progressive tax and spend-
ing policies can create a difference between an individual’s net real wage (i.e.,
actual wage minus any tax payments plus any benefits received that are financed
through the general tax system) and his marginal contribution to national product.
This net wage, rather than the actual money wage, is relevant for the assessment of
the costs and benefits of migration (Usher, 1977).
If migrants are relatively poor, a progressive tax system may induce an ad-
verse impact on the welfare of the native residents. Furthermore, by virtue of their
presence, migrants acquire a share of publicly owned property, thereby receiving a
wealth transfer. Whether a net transfer actually occurs depends on the migrant’s
impact on the cost sharing of social overhead capital. Furthermore, because the
financing of social capital frequently occurs over many years following actual con-
struction, it is not clear that a transfer exists. If one does exist, it would be offset to
some unknown extent because a large fraction of public expenditures is for the
provision of public goods and services that do not vary appreciably with the level
of immigration (e.g., Simon, 1982; Reder, 1963). Thus, for example, migrants con-
tribute to the cost of public goods such as national defense, reducing the cost to
each original resident without reducing the amount of defense provided. A second
major aspect of the debate regarding the economic consequences of Mexican mi-
gration to the United States focuses on fiscal effects, which we discuss below.
Migrants are the clearest beneficiaries from migration. Presumably, after tak-
ing into account the physical and financial risks associated with their northward
journey, individuals who migrate expect to improve their economic status in the
United States relative to what it was in Mexico. These economic benefits to mi-
grants are largely produced through participation in the labor market. However,
beyond workers as beneficiaries from migration, it is difficult to identify other
gainers and losers in the two-nation system, because even when gainers and losers
can be identified, the gains and losses are hard to measure. Moreover, many nor-
mative issues arise regarding the weights that society attaches to particular gains
and losses, or more generally, the welfare function that immigration policy seeks
to optimize.7
Admittedly, it is easier to theorize about the broad range of possible impacts
of Mexican migration than to quantify them. This is because some costs are
measurable, albeit quite imprecisely, while the vast majority are not measurable
at all. Direct benefits of migration are difficult to measure. For example, economic
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impacts that are exerted through increases in aggregate demand or expansion of
local markets are usually ignored by analysts due to measurement problems.
Impacts operating through international trade are seldom addressed separately,
except in connection with labor market influences. Social, political and cultural
impacts are most difficult to assess, and we treat these influences in less depth
than demographic and economic impacts because existing data do not permit much
in the way of original analysis, and because available studies about impacts are
similarly limited. Our discussion of social and political impacts is largely, although
not exclusively, based on evaluations and insights from existing studies. In the
remainder of this chapter we summarize what is known about the U.S.
demographic, economic, social, political and other impacts of Mexican migration
to the United States.
Guidelines for Impact Assessment
Several attributes of the Mexican foreign-born population are directly rel-
evant for understanding the nature and magnitude of demographic, economic and
social impacts in the United States. These include the relative and absolute size of
recent cohorts, their settlement patterns, the volume of unauthorized entries, as
well as socioeconomic characteristics of those admitted (or who manage to enter
without inspection). Before reviewing existing evidence and providing new evi-
dence about the demographic, economic and social impacts of Mexican migra-
tion to the United States, we briefly discuss the relevance of each of these char-
acteristics for impact assessment.
Changing Volume of Migration
Mexico currently contributes a larger share to the U.S. foreign-born popula-
tion than any other country—roughly as much as the entire continents of Asia and
Europe. During 1994 alone the United States admitted as legal resident aliens 111,398
persons born in Mexico. Between 1989 and 1993, boosted by legalizations under
terms of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, 2.4 million persons of
Mexican birth were legally admitted to the United States. The size of the immi-
grant flow is important for understanding impacts because arguments about scale
economies and about magnitudes of impacts derive directly or indirectly from the
volume of migrants, depending, of course, on residential patterns, return migration
rates, and other social and demographic characteristics, which we discuss below.
Although recent streams are the focus of most impact assessments, it is important
to recognize that contemporary impacts also derive from past migration streams.
In the decade 1911-1920, 219,000 Mexicans legally immigrated to the U.S. (Bean
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and Tienda, 1987). This flow more than doubled during the 1920s, but abated during
the 1930s and 1940s, when immigration virtually stopped (except refugees).
Migration from Mexico resumed during 1950s (299,000), and has steadily increased,
rising to more than a million immigrants during the 1980s. Between 1990 and
1994, over 2 million Mexicans became legal residents of the United States and
accounted for about one in three legal admissions during the period (INS, 1997).
This unusually large number, at least by comparison to prior decades reflects the
large impact of the amnesty program on Mexicans residing in the United States.
All Mexicans granted amnesty were supposed to have been continuous residents of
the United States since before 1982.
The temporal pattern of the stream is important for an assessment of impacts
because earlier migrants will have aged and retired by 1990; hence, profiles of
utilization of Social Security and other tax supported programs will be directly
affected. Furthermore, more established streams appear to have a built-in momen-
tum which, given current admission criteria, has accelerated the volume of new
migrants in more recent decades.
Settlement Patterns
For historical reasons, the Mexican-origin population is residentially
concentrated in the five Southwestern states, especially California and Texas, and
Illinois (Bean and Tienda, 1987). Within these locations, Mexican migrants tend to
reside in the inner cities of the largest metropolitan areas. Moreover, Los Angeles,
Chicago, San Antonio and Houston contain sizable established Mexican-American
communities. The residential concentration of Mexican migrants bears on impact
assessments for several reasons. First, existing studies are clear that the strongest
impacts occur in areas of greatest concentration, and often accrue to earlier
immigrants, who are good labor market substitutes for their recently arrived
compatriots. Second, geographic concentration of population makes possible scale
effects, although many of these are not easily measured and may be arbitraged
through other mechanisms, including secondary migration of native populations.
Third, political impacts and cultural imprints on the host society are contingent on
geographic concentration, to some extent, as we elaborate below.
Undocumented Migration
Not only is Mexico the single most important source of legal immigrants, it is
also the primary source of unauthorized migrants. Representative data on
undocumented migrants are necessarily sketchy, but studies of the legalized
population indicate that 70 percent of undocumented migrants granted amnesty
264
under the provisions of the immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986
were of Mexican origin (see Tienda, et al., 1991; Borjas and Tienda, 1993; Singer,
1994). Although IRCA included provisions for tighter border enforcement, the
undocumented stream has continued to increase in recent years. Between 1989 and
1994, the U.S. Border Patrol located 6.4 million entries from Mexico who were
deemed deportable. Tienda and Singer (1995: Table 1) reported that roughly 90
percent of Mexicans who adjusted their legal status under IRCA resided in three
states: California (61 percent); Texas (17 percent) and Illinois (11 percent). This
implies that these three states bear the brunt of costs and benefits associated with
undocumented migration.
Legal status of migrants is important for understanding the impacts of Mexi-
can migration because public attitudes and behavior toward migrants from Mexico
are often driven by images, accurate or not, of undocumented migrants. Employers
who fear sanctions for hiring migrants who entered the United States unlawfully
may deliberately avoid hiring all workers who look and sound like foreigners. Such
behavior could directly affect the employment and wage opportunities of earlier
arrivals who entered legally, as well as some native residents who speak English
with an accent or “look Mexican.” Although these effects are difficult to quantify,
there is little disagreement that the presence of a large share of undocumented
migrants among the Mexican migrant population shapes the policy and social cli-
mate surrounding Mexican migration to the United States. Moreover, beliefs that
undocumented migrants are heavy users of tax-funded social programs has trig-
gered legislative initiatives to restrict access to social programs by all migrants,
including legal, non-citizen immigrants and undocumented migrants. We discuss
this issue in some detail because Mexican migrants—both documented and un-
documented—are at the center of the debate by virtue of their residential concen-
tration in California, the state responsible for most initiatives to curtail access of
migrants to social programs.
Labor Market Skills
Among recent and prior migrants, Mexican-born migrants feature the lowest
levels of formal schooling and English proficiency. Both characteristics are impor-
tant determinants of labor market success and the likelihood that immigrants will
not become public charges. Tables 1A through 1F provide summary education and
English proficiency statistics for Mexican migrants, compared to other foreign born,
U.S.-born Mexicans, whites, and blacks separately for men and women residing in
California, Texas and Illinois in 1990.8 The lowest level of education corresponds
to the Mexican foreign-born population in all three states (as well as the national
population) and for both sexes.
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Table 1A
Selected Social and Economic Characteristics:
California Men, Ages 16+ 1990
Mexican Mexican Other White Black
Age Natives Foreign Born Foreign Born Natives Natives
Average Years of Education
16-24 11.2 8.8 11.2 12.1 11.6
CV 17.5 42.0 26.6 14.7 15.9
25-54 12.2 7.8 12.5 13.9 12.9
CV 22.9 57.8 35.5 18.5 20.1
55+ 9.4 5.5 10.8 12.7 10.8
CV 42.5 81.3 47.1 25.6 36.4
Percent with High-school Diploma or More
16-24 47.1 25.8 53.2 67.1 58.7
25-54 73.0 26.4 74.3 91.0 82.2
55+ 38.5 13.9 57.1 75.2 52.9
English Proficiency
— Well 16-24 96.4 49.6 81.0 99.4 99.6
25-54 96.9 52.2 77.0 99.4 99.6
55+ 92.1 48.3 62.8 99.5 99.6
Labor Force Participation
—Employed 16-24 52.9 70.2 49.0 57.5 34.1
25-54 80.0 83.7 82.5 86.6 64.9
55+ 43.1 43.8 41.7 39.0 34.1
—Unemployed 16-24 10.7 10.4 8.4 7.7 12.7
25-54 6.2 7.7 5.0 3.7 8.0
55+ 3.2 5.9 3.5 1.8 1.8
—Not in
      Labor Force 16-24 33.5 19.1 40.7 27.7 41.8
25-54 12.6 8.4 11.0 7.4 22.8
55+ 53.7 50.2 54.9 59.1 64.0
Percent in Professional Occupationsa
16-24 6.1 2.5 9.4 11.6 9.4
25-54 16.2 5.3 26.1 35.6 20.7
55+ 16.4 5.9 25.3 40.0 22.7
Percent in Extractive Industriesa
16-24 4.0 16.4 2.5 2.9 1.3
25-54 4.8 17.2 2.5 3.0 1.5
55+ 7.9 26.9 4.9 4.2 2.2
N 16-24 12,961 18,934 12,206 5,691 6,891
25-54 21,807 38,363 38,835 20,080 17,132
55+ 5,608 5,243 10,011 9,097 5,650
a
 Conditional on being in the labor force
Source: 1990 PUMS 5% file
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Table 1B
Selected Social and Economic Characteristics:
California Women, Ages 16+ 1990
Mexican Mexican Other White Black
Age Natives Foreign Born Foreign Born Natives Natives
Average Years of Education
16-24 11.4 9.4 11.4 12.2 11.9
CV 16.6 37.0 26.6 15.0 15.9
25-54 12.0 7.8 11.9 13.6 13.0
CV 20.8 56.2 37.6 16.6 17.9
55+ 8.9 5.2 8.9 12.0 10.7
CV 42.8 83.4 57.4 23.0 33.1
Percent with High-school diploma or More
16-24 52.1 31.4 57.0 70.1 62.9
25-54 71.6 26.9 70.5 91.0 84.6
55+ 32.6 12.4 44.3 72.5 51.1
English Proficiency
—Well 16-24 97.0 54.6 81.1 99.4 99.4
25-54 97.3 45.8 72.1 99.5 99.6
55+ 90.4 37.8 51.9 99.4 99.8
Labor Force Participation
—Employed 16-24 48.9 42.5 45.3 61.9 41.4
25-54 65.4 49.3 65.6 72.2 64.6
55+ 27.6 17.7 24.6 22.5 24.5
—Unemployed 16-24 7.7 9.8 5.9 5.5 10.9
25-54 4.7 8.5 4.5 3.1 6.8
55+ 2.3 3.8 2.4 1.0 1.4
—Not in
      Labor Force 16-24 43.2 47.7 48.6 31.8 46.1
25-54 29.8 42.1 29.8 24.4 28.0
55+ 70.2 78.5 73.0 76.5 74.1
Percent in Professional Occupationsa
16-24 9.9 4.9 12.4 14.5 12.2
25-54 23.1 7.6 23.8 38.7 28.8
55+ 17.6 6.3 15.7 31.4 25.6
Percent in Extractive Industriesa
16-24 1.5 5.6 0.7 1.0 0.3
25-54 1.7 8.6 0.8 1.4 0.3
55+ 2.5 9.5 1.8 1.3 0.4
N 16-24 12,657 12,947 11,077 5,515 6,226
25-54 23,155 31,401 42,786 20,270 19,134
55+ 6,748 6,145 13,854 113,316 7,701
a
 Conditional on being in the labor force
Source: 1990 PUMS 5% file
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Table 1C
Selected Social and Economic Characteristics:
Texas Men, Ages 16+ 1990
Mexican Mexican Other White Black
Age Natives Foreign Born Foreign Born Natives Natives
Average Years of Education
16-24 10.8 8.8 11.0 11.7 11.3
CV 18.7 41.0 30.0 17.0 16.2
25-54 11.3 7.4 12.9 13.5 12.2
CV 29.3 64.6 38.3 20.2 21.7
55+ 6.6 4.4 11.4 11.8 9.0
CV 69.3 98.5 50.3 30.7 45.2
Percent with High-school Diploma or More
16-24 42.6 24.4 52.5 59.9 51.2
25-54 64.2 25.1 75.1 87.4 74.5
55+ 23.5 10.3 61.5 65.3 32.7
English Proficiency
—Well 16-24 94.7 62.6 83.9 99.1 99.5
25-54 95.6 53.6 82.3 99.3 99.6
55+ 80.0 41.0 65.7 99.0 99.7
Labor Force Participation
—Employed 16-24 49.9 64.4 49.6 54.2 37.3
25-54 80.8 83.5 82.0 87.9 68.1
55+ 38.6 37.6 49.9 41.7 31.5
—Unemployed 16-24 12.4 9.5 7.5 7.0 13.8
25-54 7.3 7.9 5.3 3.7 9.4
55+ 4.1 4.9 4.0 1.9 2.7
—Not in
      Labor Force 16-24 36.6 25.7 39.7 33.7 43.0
25-54 10.8 8.4 10.1 6.4 19.3
55+ 57.2 41.0 46.1 56.4 65.7
Percent in Professional Occupationsa
16-24 5.5 2.8 11.4 9.9 5.2
25-54 14.6 5.4 29.3 32.1 13.4
55+ 11.7 5.6 31.6 31.6 11.9
Percent in Extractive Industriesa
16-24 5.5 10.9 4.6 6.6 1.9
25-54 6.8 11.9 3.9 7.0 3.4
55+ 11.1 19.8 4.5 11.3 6.1
N 16-24 12,417 4,967 2,041 3,604 6,860
25-54 23,501 14,072 6,481 12,463 16,364
55+ 6,692 3,080 911 5,848 5,811
a
 Conditional on being in the labor force
Source: 1990 PUMS 5% file
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Table 1D
Selected Social and Economic Charactertistics:
Texas Women, Ages 16+ 1990”
Mexican Mexican Other White Black
Age Natives Foreign Born Foreign Born Natives Natives
Average Years of Education
16-24 11.1 9.3 11.2 12.0 11.6
CV 18.6 37.5 28.9 16.5 15.8
25-54 11.2 7.4 12.2 13.2 12.5
CV 29.1 62.3 37.7 18.1 19.0
55+ 6.0 4.3 9.6 11.4 9.6
CV 73.9 98.4 53.4 27.1 39.3
Percent with High-school Diploma or More
16-24 48.8 30.5 55.8 65.1 58.3
25-54 64.0 26.1 71.9 88.0 78.4
55+ 18.9 10.6 50.5 63.2 35.6
English Proficiency
—Well 16-24 95.2 63.8 81.4 99.3 99.5
25-54 95.1 45.9 78.3 99.4 99.7
55+ 70.4 36.3 59.4 98.8 99.9
Labor Force Participation
—Employed 16-24 42.4 36.9 42.6 52.5 40.7
25-54 62.9 43.2 62.4 71.1 69.4
55+ 21.0 13.7 26.8 20.6 26.0
—Unemployed 16-24 8.9 7.6 6.6 6.2 13.6
25-54 5.1 6.9 5.7 3.1 7.8
55+ 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.0 1.6
—Not in
      Labor Force 16-24 48.6 55.3 50.2 40.4 44.1
25-54 31.9 49.9 31.6 25.5 22.2
55+ 77.5 84.7 71.5 78.4 72.4
Percent in Professional Occupationsa
16-24 8.9 4.3 11.2 15.8 7.4
25-54 21.8 8.0 26.7 36.7 21.2
55+ 12.3 5.7 20.5 26.7 16.0
Percent in Extractive Industriesa
16-24 1.1 3.1 0.9 2.1 0.5
25-54 1.5 3.4 1.6 2.7 1.1
55+ 1.5 4.4 0.5 3.0 0.7
N 16-24 12,513 4,149 1,743 3,391 7,131
25-54 25,326 12,755 6,542 12,871 19,201
55+ 8,293 3,874 1,253 7,528 8,506
a
 Conditional on being in the labor force
Source: 1990 PUMS 5% file
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Table 1E
Selected Social and Economic Characteristics:
Illinois Men, Ages 16+ 1990
Mexican Mexican Other White Black
Age Natives Foreign Born Foreign Born Natives Natives
Average Years of Education
16-24 11.1 9.5 11.8 12.0 11.3
CV 18.2 35.6 22.3 15.1 17.8
25-54 11.7 8.2 13.4 13.5 12.2
CV 26.7 53.6 31.3 17.6 23.6
55+ 8.8 6.4 10.9 11.6 9.7
CV 42.3 71.6 48.7 25.4 40.4
Percent with High-school Diploma or More
16-24 47.5 34.0 63.4 65.2 48.9
25-54 69.0 30.5 77.2 89.1 71.6
55+ 32.1 19.1 54.6 65.4 37.4
English Proficiency
—Well 16-24 96.0 51.2 88.1 99.2 99.5
25-54 96.7 57.5 85.4 99.7 99.7
55+ 95.8 55.8 71.7 99.4 99.7
Labor Force Participation
—Employed 16-24 54.2 75.7 50.7 62.5 34.7
25-54 83.8 89.1 85.8 89.8 63.7
55+ 53.1 54.7 45.9 40.0 33.4
—Unemployed 16-24 14.0 9.1 8.3 7.4 18.7
25-54 8.1 6.7 4.7 3.9 13.7
55+ 3.3 6.1 3.4 10.4 17.0
—Not in
      Labor Force 16-24 30.2 14.9 39.2 28.1 44.6
25-54 7.5 4.2 9.0 5.7 22.0
55+ 43.6 39.3 50.7 58.5 63.7
Percent in Professional Occupationsa
16-24 5.9 2.3 12.0 10.5 5.0
25-54 13.3 4.4 29.3 28.6 15.0
55+ 13.1 4.8 28.0 26.1 17.3
Percent in Extractive Industriesa
16-24 1.5 7.5 1.0 3.0 0.4
25-54 2.3 6.0 0.5 3.7 0.6
55+ 3.1 6.1 1.8 8.1 0.4
N 16-24 1,072 1,729 1,191 2,949 4,656
25-54 1,409 4,008 4,895 9,639 10,349
55+ 322 547 1,275 4,632 4,091
a
 Conditional on being in the labor force
Source: 1990 PUMS 5% file
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Table 1F
Selected Social and Economic Characteristics:
Illinois Women, Ages 16+ 1990
Mexican Mexican Other White Black
Age Natives Foreign Born Foreign Born Natives Natives
Average Years of Education
16-24 11.5 10.0 12.1 12.3 11.6
CV 16.5 33.6 20.6 14.1 16.8
25-54 11.9 8.2 12.7 13.3 12.6
CV 23.8 53.1 31.9 15.5 19.9
55+ 8.6 5.7 8.9 11.2 10.2
CV 46.9 75.8 56.5 23.0 36.1
Percent with High-school Diploma or more
16-24 52.5 40.3 64.7 69.1 54.2
25-54 71.0 30.2 74.0 90.2 77.0
55+ 34.0 13.9 40.9 62.9 43.1
English Proficiency
—Well 16-24 96.6 58.0 89.1 99.1 99.4
25-54 96.8 47.9 80.0 99.7 99.7
55+ 88.1 34.9 57.5 99.6 99.7
Labor Force Participation
—Employed 16-24 53.7 49.4 42.7 63.9 35.3
25-54 69.6 55.0 65.4 73.1 63.4
55+ 31.9 19.9 26.3 21.9 24.8
—Unemployed 16-24 9.0 11.8 7.6 5.5 14.5
25-54 3.9 8.8 4.7 2.8 9.7
55+ 3.1 5.1 2.1 0.9 1.5
—Not in
      Labor Force 16-24 37.1 38.8 49.2 30.3 49.6
25-54 26.4 36.2 29.8 24.0 26.8
55+ 65.1 75.0 71.6 77.2 73.7
Percent in Professional Occupationsa
16-24 8.5 5.1 13.2 15.4 8.6
25-54 20.8 5.4 28.9 33.4 23.9
55+ 15.3 10.1 19.6 19.6 24.6
Percent in Extractive Industriesa
16-24 0.5 1.5 0.0 0.9 0.3
25-54 0.4 0.4 0.2 1.2 0.1
55+ 0.7 0.9 0.2 1.5 0.0
N 16-24 1,013 1,026 1,109 2,937 4,867
25-54 1,584 2,924 5,267 9,897 13,543
55+ 366 468 1,686 6,174 6,089
a
 Conditional on being in the labor force
Source: 1990 PUMS 5% file
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Focusing on the population in the prime working ages (25-54), foreign-born
Mexican men and women averaged 7.5 to 8.2 years of education, compared to
between 11 and 12 years for the U.S.-born Mexican men and women. Residents of
Illinois average slightly higher education levels owing to the larger shares who
received high school diplomas (30 versus approximately 25 percent for California
and Texas residents). Other foreign-born men and women in their prime working
ages averaged 12 to 13 years of education, depending on their state of residence, as
did native white and black men and women.
Older men and women born in Mexico (ages 55 and over) completed even
fewer years of graded schooling than their younger counterparts, usually six or
fewer years. Mexican-born men and women who resided in the United States in
1990 were less proficient in English than their age counterparts born in other coun-
tries. Undocumented migrants from Mexico have especially low levels of formal
schooling. Tienda and Singer (1995: Table 10) reported that Mexicans legalized
under the IRCA amnesty program averaged 6.9 years of formal schooling com-
pared to 9.4 years for those from other Latin American countries. Undocumented
migrants from other regions of the world averaged 13.7 years of formal schooling.
The skill composition of Mexican migrants has important and profound
implications for addressing questions about labor market impacts, and in particular,
whether Mexicans compete mainly with other low wage workers (e.g., native-born
teens, women, blacks, unskilled Mexican Americans and migrants who arrived
earlier), or whether Mexican migrants fill labor market niches that domestic and
other foreign-born workers do not want. In light of recent trends in U.S. wage
inequality between skilled and unskilled labor groups, the question of whether
large numbers of unskilled Mexican migrants can be absorbed in the labor market
remains a central source of controversy about the U.S. impact of Mexican migrants.
Labor Market Profile
Based on their educational characteristics, Mexican migrants would appear to
be at a disadvantage in competing for U.S. jobs and wages relative to other population
groups compared in Tables 1A-1F. However, the evidence is mixed. Mexican-born
men have consistently higher age-specific labor force participation rates than native
blacks in all states considered in Tables 1A-1F, but this is not so for women, among
whom native blacks have the participation advantage. Moreover, at younger ages,
Mexican migrants have a substantial labor force participation advantage over their
U.S.-born counterparts. Tienda and Singer (1995: Table 1) reported high labor force
participation rates among newly legalized immigrants, around 95 percent for men.
Mexican migrants experience higher unemployment rates than Mexican Americans,
other immigrants, and native whites, but they do not always have higher
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unemployment than native blacks. The disparity in labor force participation and
unemployment rates between Mexican migrants and blacks is especially pronounced
in Illinois, where inner city joblessness has risen dramatically since 1970 (Wilson,
1987; 1996). These two comparisons—labor force participation rates and
unemployment rates—are highly relevant for a study of impacts not only because
Mexican migrants are disadvantaged relative to blacks and Mexican Americans in
terms of the language and educational credentials they bring to the labor market,
but also because they bear on questions about job competition and displacement.
For historical reasons detailed by Verduzco and Unger (this volume), Mexican
migrants are highly concentrated in agriculture and other extractive industries. Table
2A shows that among men ages 16 and over who resided in California in 1990, 17
percent of Mexican migrant men were employed in agricultural jobs compared to
under 3 percent of other foreign-born men, and under 5 percent of U.S.-born Mexi-
can origin men. Even among women, those born in Mexico were disproportion-
ately concentrated in agriculture, where they accounted for 8 percent of industry
employment compared to under 2 percent for U.S. Mexican-origin women (Table
2B).9 Less than 1 percent of other foreign-born women who resided in California
and were employed in 1990 worked in agriculture. Mexican- born men also find
jobs in construction, nondurable manufacturing and retail trade, each sector ab-
sorbing over 12 percent of the employed. For Mexican migrant women, durable
and nondurable manufacturing, retail trade and business repair services are impor-
tant employment sectors.
In Texas, another state where Mexican workers historically have been concen-
trated in agriculture, about 11 percent of all Mexican migrants were so employed
in 1990, compared to less than 3 percent of other migrants and about 5 percent of
Mexican Americans. However, in Texas nearly one in four Mexican migrant men
were employed in construction, the modal employment sector for them but no other
group. In Texas foreign-born men from places other than Mexico were concen-
trated in retail trade (their modal employment sector), business and repair services,
and nondurable manufacturing. Among employed migrant women who resided in
Texas in 1990, nearly one-in four worked in retail trade and there were no differ-
ences between those born in Mexico and elsewhere in this respect. However, Mexi-
can-born women living in Texas were more likely to work in manufacturing goods
compared to other migrant women, 15 versus 6 percent, respectively.
Because Illinois does not have as large an agricultural sector as either California
or Texas, the shares of Mexican migrants who work in this sector are somewhat
lower than those for California or Texas, but still much higher than the shares of
other male migrants and Mexican Americans so employed. Among the foreign born
residing in Illinois in 1990, nondurable manufacturing was the modal employment
sector, but relatively larger shares of Mexican-born men and women compared to
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Table 2A
Industry Distribution of the Labor Force by Race and National Origin:
California Men Ages 16+, 1990
Industry Distribution
Mexican Other
Mexican Foreign Foreign White Black
Industry Natives Born Born Natives Natives Total
Agriculture 4.5 17.5 2.6 2.7 1.2 4.6
Mining 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.5 0.3 0.4
Construction 12.8 13.5 7.2 11.7 6.9 11.3
Manufacturing
—Durable Goods 6.4 9.3 6.7 4.7 4.7 5.7
Manufacturing
—Nondurable Goods 13.7 16.8 17.7 13.5 11.3 14.3
Transportation 10.2 4.0 7.2 8.6 15.0 8.3
Wholesale Trade 5.7 5.0 5.3 5.5 3.8 5.3
Retail Trade 17.6 17.6 19.5 14.5 14.2 15.7
Finance 3.4 1.4 5.2 6.7 5.0 5.5
Business, Repair,
and Other Services 9.9 10.5 12.7 11.3 12.9 11.3
Professional
Business Services 15.2 4.2 15.8 20.3 24.6 17.6
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Dissimilarity Index (%)
(ref: native whites) 9.9 27.7 12.6 – 12.3 –
Source: 1990 PUMS 5 % file
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Table 2B
Industry Distribution of the Labor Force by Race and National Origin:
California Women Ages 16+, 1990
Industry Distribution
Mexican Other
Mexican Foreign Foreign White Black
Industry Natives Born Born Natives Natives Total
Agriculture 1.7 8.1 0.9 1.2 0.3 1.7
Mining 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Construction 1.4 0.9 0.9 1.8 1.1 1.5
Manufacturing
—Durable Goods 5.1 17.0 8.6 3.5 2.9 5.2
Manufacturing
—Nondurable Goods 8.2 13.2 11.3 6.7 6.8 7.9
Transportation 5.0 1.8 4.0 5.0 8.9 4.9
Wholesale Trade 3.3 4.7 3.7 3.3 2.1 3.4
Retail Trade 19.8 16.2 16.6 18.5 12.6 17.8
Finance 8.8 3.3 9.7 10.8 9.0 9.8
Business, Repair,
and Other Services 9.9 17.4 15.4 11.2 10.4 12.0
Professional
Business Services 36.8 17.2 28.8 38.0 45.9 35.7
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Dissimilarity Index (%)
(ref: native whites) 5.0 34.6 14.3 – 11.8 –
Source: 1990 PUMS 5 % file
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Table 2C
Industry Distribution of the Labor Force by Race and National Origin:
Texas Men Ages 16+, 1990
Industry Distribution
Mexican Other
Mexican Foreign Foreign White Black
Industry Natives Born Born Natives Natives Total
Agriculture 4.7 10.7 2.5 4.3 2.3 4.6
Mining 2.2 1.7 1.6 3.3 1.2 2.8
Construction 12.3 23.6 8.2 10.8 7.6 11.6
Manufacturing
—Durable Goods 7.2 7.8 6.1 7.1 8.0 7.2
Manufacturing
—Nondurable Goods 8.7 12.1 13.4 10.6 10.9 10.6
Transportation 9.8 4.4 6.6 9.4 14.0 9.3
Wholesale Trade 5.7 5.6 5.0 6.7 5.0 6.3
Retail Trade 19.2 16.0 21.5 15.2 18.4 16.3
Finance 3.2 2.2 4.3 5.6 3.4 4.8
Business, Repair,
and Other Services 9.6 10.2 11.9 9.2 10.5 9.5
Professional
Business Services 17.3 5.6 18.7 17.9 18.7 17.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Dissimilarity Index (%)
(ref: native whites) 7.0 23.2 12.7 – 11.1 –
Source: 1990 PUMS 5 % file
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Table 2D
Industry Distribution of the Labor Force by Race and National Origin:
Texas Women Ages 16+, 1990
Industry Distribution
Mexican Other
Mexican Foreign Foreign White Black
Industry Natives Born Born Natives Natives Total
Agriculture 0.9 3.2 0.6 1.4 0.3 1.3
Mining 0.5 0.3 0.8 1.3 0.7 1.0
Construction 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.6 0.7 1.4
Manufacturing
—Durable Goods 5.6 15.1 6.2 4.1 4.2 4.9
Manufacturing
—Nondurable Goods 4.5 7.2 7.7 4.4 5.1 4.7
Transportation 3.9 1.8 3.1 5.7 6.4 5.3
Wholesale Trade 2.6 3.6 3.0 3.6 1.9 3.3
Retail Trade 24.4 22.8 24.2 18.9 18.1 19.9
Finance 6.8 4.1 5.7 10.5 6.5 9.1
Business, Repair,
and Other Services 10.6 21.4 16.4 9.4 13.4 10.8
Professional
Business Services 39.2 19.4 31.2 39.1 42.7 38.4
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Dissimilarity Index (%)
(ref: native whites) 8.4 31.5 17.8 – 9.0 –
Source: 1990 PUMS 5 % file
277
Table 2E
Industry Distribution of the Labor Force by Race and National Origin:
Illinois Men Ages 16+, 1990”
Industry Distribution
Mexican Other
Mexican Foreign Foreign White Black
Industry Natives Born Born Natives Natives Total
Agriculture 2.0 6.3 0.6 3.5 0.4 3.2
Mining 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.7 0.1 0.6
Construction 9.5 9.7 4.1 9.5 5.5 8.9
Manufacturing
—Durable Goods 9.7 13.9 9.1 8.6 8.3 8.8
Manufacturing
—Nondurable Goods 18.9 26.8 18.8 15.2 12.2 15.6
Transportation 9.8 4.3 7.7 10.2 15.9 10.4
Wholesale Trade 6.9 5.6 5.3 6.7 4.4 6.3
Retail Trade 18.8 19.0 17.0 14.5 16.3 15.0
Finance 3.5 1.2 4.9 6.0 4.9 5.6
Business, Repair,
and Other Services 9.4 9.1 10.7 8.1 11.3 8.6
Professional
Business Services 11.4 4.0 21.8 17.1 20.5 17.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Dissimilarity Index (%)
(ref: native whites) 10.7 25.3 14.0 – 14.2 –
Source: 1990 PUMS 5 % file
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Table 2F
Industry Distribution of the Labor Force by Race and National Origin:
Illinois Women Ages 16+, 1990
Industry Distribution
Mexican Other
Mexican Foreign Foreign White Black
Industry Natives Born Born Natives Natives Total
Agriculture 0.5 0.7 0.2 1.0 0.1 0.8
Mining 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1
Construction 1.0 0.4 0.5 1.4 0.6 1.2
Manufacturing
—Durable Goods 8.2 23.8 9.1 5.6 5.0 6.1
Manufacturing
—Nondurable Goods 10.5 25.6 12.8 7.1 4.8 7.4
Transportation 5.2 2.2 3.5 4.8 23.0 7.5
Wholesale Trade 4.3 5.1 4.1 3.4 1.7 3.2
Retail Trade 22.1 14.3 14.4 20.4 12.9 18.9
Finance 11.8 3.1 7.8 10.6 8.2 9.9
Business, Repair,
and Other Services 9.9 12.1 10.8 9.3 8.2 9.3
Professional
Business Services 26.6 12.6 36.8 36.3 35.4 35.5
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Dissimilarity Index (%)
(ref: native whites) 10.8 41.3 11.9 – 18.2 –
Source: 1990 PUMS 5 % file
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migrants born elsewhere were so employed. In striking contrast to Mexican migrants
residing in Illinois, nearly one-third of the foreign born from other countries were
employed in professional business service industries. In this respect, Illinois’ non-
Mexican migrants were quite similar to native whites and blacks, and quite unlike
Mexican migrants. These differences are especially evident for the female labor
force in Illinois.
The index of dissimilarity reported in the lower row of each panel of Tables
2A and 2B provide a useful way to summarize the differences in the industrial
distribution of employed Mexican migrants relative to native-born white men and
women, respectively. This index indicates the share of the labor force that would
have to change industries to reach parity with the native white labor force. These
entries reveal that the industry distribution of employed Mexican migrants is more
dissimilar from that of native whites than are any industrial distributions of the
other groups. Moreover, the differences in industrial distributions between Mexi-
can migrants and native whites are larger for women than for men, although the
magnitude of the differences varies across states. These differences have implica-
tions for the nature of job competition between Mexican migrants and other demo-
graphic groups, but they are also related to human capital that migrants bring to the
U.S. labor market and their earnings possibilities upon employment.
These differences are illustrated in Tables 3A through 3F, which tabulate for
each of the three states the mean (1989) annual earnings of persons born in Mexico
according to industry of employment and compares them with native whites,
blacks, Mexican Americans and other foreign born. Although this table contains
an enormous amount of information, several important generalizations are
warranted. First, without exception, Mexican migrants received the lowest average
annual earnings in every industry and each state, but it is unclear whether this is
exclusively a result of their lower levels of education, limited proficiency in
English, variation in annual hours worked, higher levels of employment instability
in the course of a year, or wage discrimination. Second, annual earnings of
Mexican migrant women are consistently below those of their male migrant
counterparts employed in similar industry sectors. These differences can not be
attributed to unequal educational attainment, as gender differences in formal
schooling are relatively small among Mexican migrants. Third, Mexican migrants
residing in Texas received lower annual earnings in each industry than their
counterparts employed in similar industries in either California or Illinois. These
differences are important for labor market impacts because they suggest that the
Mexican-born population competes most directly with native-born persons for
low-wage jobs, with Mexican-born women competing for the lowest wage jobs.
These differences also are important for fiscal impact analyses inasmuch as they
represent unequal levels of taxable income.
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Table 3A
Social and Economic Characteristics of the Labor Force by Industry:
California Men Ages 16+, 1990
Total Population White Natives Black Natives
Mean Mean Mean
Engl. Mean Annual Engl. Mean Annual Engl. Mean Annual
Industry Prof.a Ed. Earn. Prof.a Ed. Earn. Prof.a Ed. Earn.
Agriculture
45.1 7.1 12,451 99.7 13.0 25,660 99.3 12.0 15,696
CV 62.9 97.0 22.1 109.2 24.9 86.9
Mining
90.5 11.5 29,919 98.8 12.7 36,520 100.0 12.9 27,658
CV 30.6 69.0 15.3 61.1 16.6 77.2
Construction
CV 73.7 10.2 21,826 99.5 12.6 31,260 99.6 12.3 23,350
39.6 90.3 16.6 81.4 19.4 94.4
Manufacturing
—Durable Goods
70.2 10.3 21,461 99.6 13.4 37,064 99.8 12.7 26,368
CV 41.5 90.0 17.1 83.7 17.4 80.2
Manufacturing
—Nondurable Goods
78.9 11.3 26,323 99.4 13.8 41,292 99.8 13.1 29,952
CV 37.1 80.2 16.4 70.7 17.3 66.3
Transportation
92.6 12.3 28,558 99.7 13.2 35,843 99.5 12.8 27,706
CV 24.9 67.6 15.4 65.1 16.0 66.7
Wholesale Trade
81.2 11.4 24,989 99.6 13.3 37,748 99.8 12.9 25,771
CV 35.1 94.7 16.0 82.4 15.9 94.7
Retail Trade
78.0 10.9 16,274 99.7 12.8 22,770 99.8 12.4 16,308
CV 34.7 105.4 15.6 106.0 16.2 101.5
Finance
CV 93.6 13.6 33,629 99.5 14.7 49,997 99.7 13.7 25,682
22.7 106.4 14.6 95.5 15.6 97.9
Business, Repair,
and Other Services
79.1 11.1 19,021 99.4 13.3 28,935 99.7 12.7 19,295
CV 35.9 113.9 17.0 112.2 17.9 123.6
Professional
95.3 14.5 30,151 99.7 15.4 39,327 99.5 13.7 27,482
CV 24.3 92.5 17.7 86.8 20.0 82.1
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Table 3A (Continued)
Mexican Natives Mexican Foreign Born Other Foreign Born
Mean Mean Mean
Engl. Mean Annual Engl. Mean Annual Engl. Mean Annual
Industry Prof.a Ed. Earn. Prof.a Ed. Earn. Prof.a Ed. Earn.
Agriculture
89.6 9.8 15,092 33.9 6.1 11,052 52.7 8.5 14,352
CV 37.5 100.1 66.4 78.6 59.5 105.4
Mining
98.1 11.8 29,858 62.9 7.7 19,255 88.1 12.9 34,127
CV 20.6 52.3 51.8 69.0 34.0 81.2
Construction
CV 97.2 11.5 24,328 48.6 7.9 16,061 66.7 10.9 22,478
20.6 81.3 52.6 77.3 43.3 98.5
Manufacturing
—Durable Goods
96.9 11.5 23,561 47.3 7.9 15,601 68.1 11.4 21,619
CV 22.2 72.8 53.0 70.5 38.6 94.8
Manufacturing
—Nondurable Goods
97.0 11.9 25,957 53.1 8.1 17,006 82.1 12.9 28,862
CV 21.2 65.7 51.7 67.9 30.5 77.4
Transportation
97.8 12.2 28,104 71.4 9.3 21,970 89.3 13.1 28,852
CV 17.2 61.4 44.9 71.4 23.9 66.4
Wholesale Trade
97.8 11.8 22,839 54.6 8.3 16,353 80.3 12.8 28,181
CV 20.0 72.8 52.3 73.9 30.6 99.5
Retail Trade
97.2 11.9 16,260 54.9 8.5 12,643 73.2 11.5 17,271
CV 17.5 100.7 49.5 85.8 34.1 107.9
Finance
CV 97.7 13.1 27,374 69.6 9.8 19,675 92.0 14.2 32,406
17.3 97.2 48.2 103.5 19.2 99.7
Business, Repair,
and Other Services
97.0 11.9 17,934 53.1 8.3 14,045 75.2 11.7 19,344
CV 20.7 96.8 50.9 94.5 35.3 109.1
Professional
98.3 13.5 27,472 76.9 11.2 19,809 92.9 14.9 30,467
CV 20.5 69.8 41.8 87.6 23.6 103.1
a
 Percent speak well
Source: 1990 PUMS 5% file
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Table 3B
Social and Economic Chracteristics of the Labor Force by Industry:
California Women Ages 16+, 1990
Total Population White Natives Black Natives
Mean Mean Mean
Engl. Mean Annual Engl. Mean Annual Engl. Mean Annual
Industry Prof.a Ed. Earn. Prof.a Ed. Earn. Prof.a Ed. Earn.
Agriculture
46.0 7.4 8,191 99.4 13.1 14,737 100.0 12.2 15,088
CV 59.8 88.7 17.6 90.5 25.2 62.1
Mining
97.5 13.3 22,781 100.0 13.8 24,674 100.0 13.5 22,284
CV 22.4 46.2 10.6 44.4 13.7 49.4
Construction
CV 89.5 12.3 18,599 99.2 13.1 20,797 99.5 13.2 18,749
25.0 80.3 15.0 84.0 11.7 63.3
Manufacturing
—Durable Goods
57.5 9.4 13,337 99.2 13.4 23,405 99.9 12.9 20,422
CV 46.5 85.6 16.1 87.3 15.2 65.9
Manufacturing
—Nondurable Goods
79.2 11.2 18,919 99.3 13.2 25,842 99.5 12.9 23,413
CV 34.0 69.9 16.4 66.8 16.4 60.9
Transportation
95.8 12.9 23,272 99.6 13.2 24,959 99.8 13.0 24,687
CV 18.4 61.7 12.6 63.5 14.1 62.7
Wholesale Trade
80.7 11.4 16,609 1.0 13.2 22,710 99.6 13.0 20,306
CV 33.6 74.5 13.8 69.9 17.7 64.1
Retail Trade
87.0 11.7 11,368 99.6 12.6 13,009 99.6 12.5 12,294
CV 25.5 99.3 13.1 108.0 14.1 95.8
Finance
CV 96.7 13.2 20,782 99.7 13.3 23,806 99.4 13.3 21,131
16.8 80.7 13.1 83.4 13.7 71.5
Business, Repair,
and Other Services
74.8 10.8 12,050 99.4 13.2 16,864 99.7 12.6 14,236
CV 37.7 105.5 16.7 105.5 17.8 111.8
Professional
95.9 13.5 19,472 99.6 14.3 21,146 99.7 13.6 21,127
CV 21.4 78.1 15.6 74.7 17.1 71.5
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Table 3B (Continued)
Mexican Natives Mexican Foreign Born Other Foreign Born
Mean Mean Mean
Engl. Mean Annual Engl. Mean Annual Engl. Mean Annual
Industry Prof.a Ed. Earn. Prof.a Ed. Earn. Prof.a Ed. Earn.
Agriculture
92.4 10.1 9,341 28.4 5.9 6,819 52.7 8.9 9,670
CV 34.6 89.0 65.1 71.6 54.4 92.3
Mining
1.0 11.8 20,887 b b b 95.0 13.7 23,617
CV 22.0 41.5 37.2 48.1
Construction
CV 99.0 12.3 18,283 55.1 9.0 12,163 85.1 13.1 20,554
16.5 86.4 43.9 78.7 26.9 70.4
Manufacturing
—Durable Goods
95.0 11.2 15,430 37.8 7.3 9,952 50.4 9.9 13,243
CV 24.8 71.5 54.2 67.9 47.0 84.0
Manufacturing
—Nondurable Goods
97.5 11.7 19,817 50.4 8.0 12,348 78.0 12.1 19,424
CV 18.4 59.6 50.9 62.7 30.8 67.6
Transportation
98.4 12.5 21,998 79.1 10.6 16,917 90.8 13.5 23,235
CV 13.3 58.6 36.7 73.9 20.5 56.0
Wholesale Trade
97.0 11.8 15,801 50.5 8.2 10,859 79.4 12.4 17,490
CV 19.8 62.8 51.3 72.7 30.9 71.6
Retail Trade
97.8 11.8 10,609 62.8 9.5 8,872 79.1 11.9 12,082
CV 15.5 95.1 40.7 88.6 29.3 95.1
Finance
CV 98.6 12.5 18,356 85.6 11.6 16,292 94.8 13.8 21,180
12.8 70.8 25.7 71.3 17.9 84.6
Business, Repair,
and Other Services
96.8 11.7 12,214 47.9 8.1 8,354 65.9 10.6 11,869
CV 21.9 97.5 51.8 77.8 41.3 100.7
Professional
98.4 12.9 17,006 81.4 11.2 13,344 92.7 14.2 21,064
CV 17.7 74.7 34.8 83.2 22.4 81.4
a
 Percent speak well
b
 Samples too small for reliable estimates
Source: 1990 PUMS 5% file
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Table 3C
Social and Economic Chracteristics of the Labor Force by Industry:
Texas Men Ages 16+, 1990
Total Population White Natives Black Natives
Mean Mean Mean
Engl. Mean Annual Engl. Mean Annual Engl. Mean Annual
Industry Prof.a Ed. Earn. Prof.a Ed. Earn. Prof.a Ed. Earn.
Agriculture
65.6 7.6 9,875 98.2 11.9 17,085 99.5 10.5 10,630
CV 54.7 102.9 23.3 117.3 26.4 169.4
Mining
91 11.6 27,792 99.4 13.4 38,484 99.8 12.9 28,155
CV 32.2 80.2 19.1 74.1 18.3 61.2
Construction
77.3 9.4 15,867 99.5 12.2 25,625 99.7 11.4 14,487
44.8 94.1 20.0 86.2 22.3 81.4
Manufacturing
—Durable Goods
86.2 11.1 22,737 99.7 13.1 35,019 99.6 12.4 24,389
CV 34.1 79.9 17.6 69.4 17.4 71.6
Manufacturing
—Nondurable Goods
86.7 11.0 21,726 99.5 13.2 32,580 99.8 12.1 20,870
CV 35.6 81.5 17.9 66.4 18.1 77.2
Transportation
95.1 11.9 24,023 99.8 12.9 31,637 99.4 12.3 22,937
CV 26.5 70.6 16.7 65.2 17.6 68.5
Wholesale Trade
88.40 11.3 21,273 99.8 13.2 33,459 99.3 12.1 18,917
CV 33.0 96.1 17.5 86.3 19.2 79.3
Retail Trade
89.3 11.2 13,246 99.3 12.5 19,934 99.4 12.0 11,438
CV 30.4 109.6 18.2 113.0 17.1 107.6
Finance
92.9 12.7 25,279 99.3 14.6 41,788 99.8 13.0 19,456
29.8 117.4 15.1 97.8 21.4 92.1
Business, Repair,
and Other Services
87.2 10.9 15,012 99.0 12.8 23,886 99.8 12.0 13,312
CV 35.6 107.6 18.9 103.7 21.5 98.3
Professional
96.1 13.5 23,832 99.2 15.2 33,253 99.5 13.7 27,482
CV 27.1 109.4 19.0 95.2 20.0 82.1
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Table 3C (Continued)
Mexican Natives Mexican Foreign Born Other Foreign Born
Mean Mean Mean
Engl. Mean Annual Engl. Mean Annual Engl. Mean Annual
Industry Prof.a Ed. Earn. Prof.a Ed. Earn. Prof.a Ed. Earn.
Agriculture
87.4 8.5 9,002 38.4 5.4 8,588 50.1 7.2 9,673
CV 40.9 77.6 71.6 56.7 68.7 92.7
Mining
96.4 11.1 22,271 57.0 7.2 17,607 92.6 15.1 37,629
CV 24.4 73.7 57.1 58.1 28.4 82.0
Construction
94.3 10.1 14,833 47.2 6.6 12,392 71.6 11.2 22,622
31.6 85.4 64.7 81.0 47.1 95.1
Manufacturing
—Durable Goods
94.2 11.0 20,191 50.9 7.6 13,882 77.8 11.8 25,579
CV 27.0 69.1 55.4 61.9 45.0 94.2
Manufacturing
—Nondurable Goods
96.1 11.1 19,357 55.8 7.4 14,630 79.6 12.6 26,268
CV 25.7 69.9 62.1 71.3 36.1 91.1
Transportation
96.9 11.5 22,587 66.1 8.7 17,073 91.0 13.2 26,423
CV 26.2 65.2 51.9 81.1 31.6 71.8
Wholesale Trade
95.2 11.1 17,785 57.3 8.0 14,197 81.5 13.0 28,633
CV 27.3 71.3 56.2 80.9 33.0 108.9
Retail Trade
96.3 11.4 12,057 60.7 8.2 11,495 78.6 11.7 14,717
CV 21.5 96.3 56.3 91.7 37.8 107.6
Finance
97.0 12.4 19,983 59.9 8.8 14,300 90.2 13.2 25,699
24.5 99.4 59.6 116.5 35.9 119.2
Business, Repair,
and Other Services
95.3 10.9 13,007 55.9 7.7 12,049 78.2 11.7 17,465
CV 28.1 97.1 59.6 83.3 41.5 110.9
Professional
96.7 12.8 21,045 73.6 10.8 19,160 94.4 15.6 30,339
CV 26.5 91.6 49.3 140.8 25.6 137.4
Source: 1990 PUMS 5% file
a
 Percent speak well
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Table 3D
Social and Economic Chracteristics of the Labor Force by Industry:
Texas Women Ages 16+, 1990
Total Population White Natives Black Natives
Mean Mean Mean
Engl. Mean Annual Engl. Mean Annual Engl. Mean Annual
Industry Prof.a Ed. Earn. Prof.a Ed. Earn. Prof.a Ed. Earn.
Agriculture
66.4 8.3 7,481 99.0 12.2 10,257 100.0 11.3 9,050
CV 54.1 178.5 20.6 99.2 26.8 70.2
Mining
97.2 13.5 24,237 100.0 13.7 26,690 100.0 13.8 24,174
CV 18.7 60.1 14.5 59.0 13.8 51.0
Construction
93.6 11.9 14,667 99.0 12.7 18,163 100.0 12.8 14,590
27.2 84.2 14.9 94.9 18.1 65.4
Manufacturing
—Durable Goods
79.2 10.6 12,878 99.3 12.9 19,381 99.7 12.5 15,350
CV 37.9 87.3 16.4 75.7 14.8 93.3
Manufacturing
—Nondurable Goods
89.0 11.2 15,567 99.3 12.8 20,883 99.8 12.3 17,270
CV 30.4 64.7 14.8 54.7 16.5 59.7
Transportation
98.1 12.9 20,391 100.0 13.3 21,151 99.5 13.1 21,692
CV 16.7 62.1 13.5 57.7 13.8 61.2
Wholesale Trade
89.8 11.6 15,454 99.5 12.8 20,004 99.5 12.8 17,779
CV 29.9 88.1 16.5 71.9 15.1 96.0
Retail Trade
92.4 11.3 8,852 99.6 12.3 11,100 99.6 12.1 8,970
CV 25.4 100.5 16.4 103.7 14.3 107.2
Finance
97.0 12.7 16,640 99.0 13.1 19,048 99.6 13.1 16,866
18.1 69.7 13.5 72.0 14.1 57.5
Business, Repair,
and Other Services
84.4 10.4 9,478 99.2 12.6 12,974 99.8 11.5 9,792
CV 37.5 115.9 18.6 100.8 22.6 127.7
Professional
96.9 13.0 15,077 99.5 14.2 18,076 99.7 13.1 14,789
CV 23.4 83.0 16.4 69.2 19.1 83.5
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Table 3D (Continued)
Mexican Natives Mexican Foreign Born Other Foreign Born
Mean Mean Mean
Engl. Mean Annual Engl. Mean Annual Engl. Mean Annual
Industry Prof.a Ed. Earn. Prof.a Ed. Earn. Prof.a Ed. Earn.
Agriculture
83.4 8.8 9,042 29.6 5.2 4,413 57.8 7.8 8,009
CV 43.0 235.8 74.7 76.8 75.9 60.2
Mining
96.2 13.1 21,171 69.4 9.7 15,410 95.4 14.6 28,599
CV 16.4 61.0 58.3 67.0 17.6 66.9
Construction
95.6 11.6 12,538 62.3 8.0 9,568 93.5 13.3 18,714
20.3 65.3 62.8 71.9 31.0 68.5
Manufacturing
—Durable Goods
94.1 10.5 11,936 44.8 7.3 9,362 64.0 10.3 13,105
CV 30.5 72.4 55.2 85.9 45.0 78.8
Manufacturing
—Nondurable Goods
95.6 11.0 13,454 53.7 7.8 10,123 78.7 11.4 16,772
CV 25.4 61.1 55.3 77.8 38.6 57.1
Transportation
98.0 12.4 18,730 75.6 10.3 12,468 96.7 13.6 21,982
CV 15.7 59.7 39.6 85.9 18.7 69.3
Wholesale Trade
95.5 11.4 13,377 51.7 7.8 8,058 83.2 12.2 17,554
CV 24.2 77.2 60.2 79.9 33.3 91.3
Retail Trade
95.9 11.3 7,984 65.2 8.6 7,583 80.8 11.6 10,041
CV 21.3 83.7 49.4 94.1 33.5 111.4
Finance
97.5 12.4 15,140 79.4 10.5 11,640 92.4 13.6 18,856
16.6 67.2 38.3 66.7 23.2 82.6
Business, Repair,
and Other Services
93.3 10.5 9,178 46.4 7.1 6,782 64.8 10.3 10,017
CV 33.6 109.6 61.3 83.3 47.3 118.4
Professional
97.1 12.5 13,714 74.2 10.5 10,531 94.0 14.3 19,434
CV 24.2 77.6 44.0 96.4 25.2 104.5
a
 Percent speak well
Source: 1990 PUMS 5% file
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Table 3E
Social and Economic Chracteristics of the Labor Force by Industry:
Illinois Men Ages 16+, 1990
Total Population White Natives Black Natives
Mean Mean Mean
Engl. Mean Annual Engl. Mean Annual Engl. Mean Annual
Industry Prof.a Ed. Earn. Prof.a Ed. Earn. Prof.a Ed. Earn.
Agriculture
66.6 9.2 13,074 98.8 12.5 16,269 100.0 11.8 15,559
CV 45.0 87.0 15.7 81.7 16.3 111.2
Mining
96.1 11.8 32,834 100.0 12.2 35,013 100.0 12.3 26,084
CV 19.4 62.3 11.7 54.5 19.5 35.4
Construction
90.0 11.3 24,019 99.9 12.5 29,029 100.0 11.6 21,437
CV 27.9 75.2 13.6 61.0 23.5 92.1
Manufacturing
—Durable Goods
87.2 11.4 25,059 99.9 13.1 34,404 99.6 11.9 21,999
CV 30.9 79.9 14.9 72.8 21.5 67.5
Manufacturing
—Nondurable Goods
85.7 11.2 25,310 99.6 12.9 33,095 100.0 11.7 23,977
CV 32.5 69.6 15.2 61.1 22.3 61.9
Transportation
96.8 12.4 27,570 99.3 12.8 32,245 99.7 12.5 26,059
CV 21.0 65.5 14.7 59.3 17.8 69.1
Wholesale Trade
90.5 12.1 27,158 99.8 13.3 34,678 99.7 12.2 22,648
CV 26.3 88.5 15.4 77.3 19.6 83.1
Retail Trade
87.8 11.5 14,783 99.3 12.5 20,055 99.6 11.9 11,646
CV 26.7 116.9 14.8 99.9 17.2 132.0
Finance
98.0 13.8 33,260 99.7 14.8 45,091 99.5 13.2 25,025
CV 20.8 103.8 13.8 88.1 21.9 93.0
Business, Repair,
and Other Services
90.6 11.8 17,880 99.7 13.1 26,606 99.5 11.9 13,368
CV 27.8 112.9 16.7 101.1 20.0 110.2
Professional
97.8 14.2 28,819 99.5 15.1 34,475 99.6 13.3 22,404
CV 24.2 104.5 17.6 81.7 23.7 90.5
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Table 3E (Continued)
Mexican Natives Mexican Foreign Born Other Foreign Born
Mean Mean Mean
Engl. Mean Annual Engl. Mean Annual Engl. Mean Annual
Industry Prof.a Ed. Earn. Prof.a Ed. Earn. Prof.a Ed. Earn.
Agriculture
89.1 9.5 9,916 37.4 6.6 10,596 80.9 10.1 17,364
CV 37.4 103.1 63.3 63.2 42.7 64.8
Mining
b b b 71.7 8.1 20,842 b b b
CV 40.9 53.9
Construction
95.7 11.1 23,162 59.0 8.6 18,269 89.1 12.1 26,134
CV 26.7 99.0 47.3 62.5 31.5 66.2
Manufacturing
—Durable Goods
97.1 11.2 23,304 54.3 8.1 17,990 84.9 12.4 26,598
CV 23.2 68.2 50.1 57.3 31.3 81.9
Manufacturing
—Nondurable Goods
95.1 11.1 23,790 56.1 8.1 18,168 82.8 12.1 26,540
CV 25.6 57.0 52.3 59.3 32.2 73.1
Transportation
97.3 12.0 25,690 75.1 9.1 21,694 89.5 12.8 27,728
CV 17.9 50.8 44.1 60.6 27.6 62.3
Wholesale Trade
96.2 11.3 19,890 56.0 8.5 17,305 83.8 13.0 31,946
CV 26.1 73.1 44.0 55.4 27.4 95.5
Retail Trade
97.5 11.6 13,603 51.9 8.5 12,379 79.2 12.2 16,444
CV 20.8 116.8 47.9 82.9 28.6 117.3
Finance
98.8 12.7 22,027 77.6 9.6 19,791 95.2 14.7 33,068
CV 20.7 83.0 47.6 70.1 19.2 114.7
Business, Repair,
and Other Services
98.3 11.8 17,280 56.9 8.7 13,712 84.5 12.7 20,825
CV 18.8 118.6 49.3 83.3 29.9 86.7
Professional
99.4 12.8 22,040 75.7 11.5 19,356 95.2 15.9 37,899
CV 25.0 75.8 40.8 76.1 23.9 119.6
a
 Percent speak well
b
 Samples too small for reliable estimates
Source: 1990 PUMS 5% file
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Table 3F
Social and Economic Chracteristics of the Labor Force by Industry:
Illinois Women Ages 16+, 1990
Total Population White Natives Black Natives
Mean Mean Mean
Engl. Mean Annual Engl. Mean Annual Engl. Mean Annual
Industry Prof.a Ed. Earn. Prof.a Ed. Earn. Prof.a Ed. Earn.
Agriculture
86.4 11.8 9,411 100.0 12.9 8,964 100.0 12.1 5,166
CV 26.7 71.3 14.2 63.5 16.3 62.5
Mining
94.3 12.7 22,623 100.0 13.4 17,253 b b b
CV 15.4 61.0 10.9 41.8
Construction
95.4 12.4 17,239 98.8 12.7 17,112 100.0 12.7 16,333
CV 22.4 61.8 12.2 56.8 18.5 58.2
Manufacturing
—Durable Goods
82.4 11.0 15,950 99.2 12.9 19,614 100.0 12.3 17,891
CV 33.3 76.6 15.0 79.3 18.2 73.2
Manufacturing
—Nondurable Goods
81.9 10.9 16,411 99.5 12.4 19,497 100.0 12.0 18,130
CV 30.6 68.5 12.9 60.0 17.1 70.7
Transportation
98.4 12.9 22,784 99.3 13.0 22,117 99.7 12.9 23,503
CV 15.8 56.1 13.3 56.0 14.5 55.0
Wholesale Trade
91.7 12.3 17,618 99.7 12.9 18,717 100.0 12.8 18,446
CV 22.3 80.3 12.5 59.7 16.4 81.0
Retail Trade
95.8 12.1 10,297 99.6 12.5 10,294 99.3 12.2 10,209
CV 18.0 106.2 12.5 95.1 15.4 113.4
Finance
98.9 13.2 18,977 99.7 13.3 20,167 99.6 13.2 18,970
CV 14.4 72.2 12.5 79.7 14.7 67.5
Business, Repair,
and Other Services
90.8 11.9 12,191 99.4 12.9 13,280 99.4 12.1 11,893
CV 25.5 95.2 15.3 107.2 19.5 95.3
Professional
98.2 13.7 18,417 99.6 14.1 17,624 99.6 13.4 18,037
CV 19.2 73.6 14.8 65.0 19.0 67.0
291
Table 3F (Continued)
Mexican Natives Mexican Foreign Born Other Foreign Born
Mean Mean Mean
Engl. Mean Annual Engl. Mean Annual Engl. Mean Annual
Industry Prof.a Ed. Earn. Prof.a Ed. Earn. Prof.a Ed. Earn.
Agriculture
92.2 11.2 8,268 33.6 7.7 9,897 b b b
CV 27.2 66.6 46.8 59.7
Mining
b b b b b b b b b
CV
Construction
91.3 11.7 20,927 34.9 8.0 8,455 92.5 12.3 22,976
CV 31.6 49.4 48.4 66.3 46.8 74.4
Manufacturing
—Durable Goods
94.8 10.9 15,047 49.1 7.8 11,187 69.0 10.8 14,684
CV 30.7 56.3 51.2 60.2 39.5 62.5
Manufacturing
—Nondurable Goods
95.9 11.2 16,131 45.3 7.8 11,716 71.9 11.1 15,753
CV 23.4 52.5 49.2 56.5 35.3 72.6
Transportation
98.6 12.6 19,800 74.8 11.0 17,072 92.6 13.4 21,929
CV 13.1 54.5 31.5 66.6 22.8 62.6
Wholesale Trade
97.1 11.5 16,280 63.5 9.2 12,695 82.2 13.0 18,383
CV 18.1 78.3 42.4 60.2 23.2 109.8
Retail Trade
98.2 11.7 9,026 70.5 10.3 9,679 84.6 12.3 11,765
CV 16.5 101.0 36.5 92.8 26.4 119.5
Finance
96.8 12.7 16,092 92.0 12.4 15,124 96.6 14.0 18,606
CV 10.9 59.3 19.5 50.5 16.6 61.6
Business, Repair,
and Other Services
96.9 11.7 12,953 45.9 8.7 9,909 77.6 11.9 12,457
CV 49.6 73.2 49.6 72.4 33.3 71.9
Professional
97.1 13.1 15,313 79.2 11.6 13,802 93.9 14.7 23,048
CV 19.9 71.3 38.3 106.3 21.2 88.4
a
 Percent speak well
b
 Samples too small for reliable estimates
Source: 1990 PUMS 5% file
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In sum, current rates of labor force participation and industry employment
profiles are crucial for understanding the labor market impacts of Mexican mi-
grants, although cross-sectional estimates do not reveal whether Mexican migrants
are subject to greater levels of employment instability, or whether they draw dis-
proportionately on the unemployment compensation system. Furthermore, labor
market activity rates also influence the likelihood that Mexican migrants will be
eligible for means-tested income transfers, which bears directly on questions of
fiscal impacts, and indirectly on social consequences. Like educational attainment
and rates of labor force participation, the employment profile of Mexican migrants
has direct implications for an assessment of economic and social impacts because
education and earnings positions situate Mexican migrants in the U.S. stratifica-
tion system, and because their disproportionate concentration in low-wage em-
ployment raises the possibility that Mexican migrants compete with domestic low-
wage workers, notably teenagers, minorities, and women. We address these and
numerous additional issues concerning the impacts of Mexican migration below.
Impacts Assessment
Our assessment of impacts, which is based on a scrutiny of existing literature
and several original analyses and tabulations, begins with an overview of demo-
graphic impacts, including those projected by the U.S. Bureau of the Census should
current levels of immigration continue. We concentrate on economic impacts be-
cause most existing studies emphasize this dimension of the consequences of im-
migration, in particular, the labor market and fiscal impacts. However, the final
section considers various social and political issues, including recent evidence on
residential segregation, neighborhood transformation, economic mobility, crime,
and attitudes toward Mexican migrants.
Demographic Impacts
Demographic impacts of migration from Mexico derive from changes in popu-
lation size and annual growth rates and changes in population composition, espe-
cially age structure and race/ethnic make-up. The demographic impact of Mexican
migration also derives crucially from (1) the intensity of the flow over time; (2) the
highly concentrated settlement patterns of recent and earlier arrivals; and (3) the
reproductive behavior of foreign-born women. Fertility of foreign-born women
determines the age structure of future generations, and thus the longer term impact
of recent migration trends for future population growth. The settlement patterns of
recent and prior arrivals determines the ethnic landscape of cities and states where
Mexicans settle and form communities. And, the volume of migration influences
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both the size and growth of the Mexican-origin population both directly through
numbers added and indirectly through differential fertility and mortality. All these
dimensions of demographic change are crucial for understanding the social and
cultural impacts of Mexican migration, as well as the integration experiences of
the migrants themselves, which in turn transmit different impacts.
In this section, we review recent population trends and projections with the
goal of identifying how migration, and that from Mexico in particular, has contrib-
uted to various aspects of demographic structure. First, we describe changes in the
size and composition of the Mexican-origin population during the past quarter cen-
tury, from 1970 to 1996. We pay special attention to changes since 1980 because
the Spanish-origin identifier allowed for more consistent and comprehensive mea-
surement of the Mexican-origin population (Bean and Tienda, 1987; Tienda and
Ortiz, 1986), and because the intensification of the migrant stream during this pe-
riod has direct implications for current and future impact assessment. Second, we
summarize population projections prepared by the U.S. Bureau of the Census, the
National Academy of Sciences, and the Urban Institute, and draw inferences about
the future Mexican-origin population.
Population Growth
In 1990 the foreign-born numbered just under 20 million, comprising about 8
percent of the U.S. population. By 1996 the foreign-born population approached
25 million, still well below the historic high of nearly 15 percent registered at the
turn of the century. Mexicans accounted for approximately 22 percent of the 1990
foreign-born population and about 27 percent of the estimated 24.5 million foreign
born residing in the United States in 1996 (Hansen and Faber, 1997). That about 27
percent of the 1996 foreign-born population arrived after 1990, and an additional
35 percent were admitted during the 1980s reveals how the intensity of migration
has been increasing over all, and for Mexicans in particular (see Table 4).
As a component of demographic change, international migration has
commanded relatively less attention than either mortality or fertility partly because
the U.S. population has been growing slowly during the past two decades, and
partly because net migration has not been a major component of population change
in the past.10 However, immigration can produce potentially large impacts on
population size, rate of growth, and composition and is likely to do so in the future
if current trends continue. Already recent trends have left an indelible demographic
imprint. In 1970, just under 5 percent of the U.S. population was foreign-born. By
1996, a quarter century later, this number nearly doubled. During this period
international migration accounted for between 25 to 33 percent of net annual
population increase (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1996; Fix and Passel, 1994). In
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the future, current levels of immigration can become an even larger component of
population growth if fertility remains below replacement (as it has been for nearly
two decades) and longevity remains constant or increases. Under these conditions,
the impacts of immigration as a component of net growth will increase.
Although slightly more than 1.1 million migrants arrived each year during
the past decade or so, the net annual increase of the foreign-born population is
about 700,000 each year (Fix and Passel, 1994:23). This is because mortality
and emigration (mostly involving recent entrants) reduce the foreign-born
population by an estimated 200,000 annually. Mexico has accounted for a highly
variable share of legal U.S. immigrants admitted during the past three decades,
which in turn result in highly variable contributions to population increase. During
the 1960s and 1970s, approximately 14 percent of all legal immigrants admitted
were from Mexico. This share rose to 23 percent during the 1980s owing to the
impact of the legalization program (INS, 1997: Table 2). The contribution of IRCA
legalizations to total Mexican immigration was most pronounced in Fiscal Years
1989 through 1991, when the Mexican share of legal immigration (including
adjustments to legal status) rose appreciably from 37 percent in 1989 to 44 percent
in 1990; then to 52 percent in 1991 and 22 percent in 1992. Thereafter, the Mexican
share of total immigrants admitted stabilized at its pre-IRCA level of 12 percent
or so (INS, 1997: Table 2). With total immigration accounting for between one-
third to one-quarter of annual population growth, the direct contribution of legal
immigration from Mexico to U.S. population growth is small during the non-
IRCA years (about 3 to 4 percent) and modest during the IRCA years (about 10
to 13 percent). Thus, legal immigration from Mexico accounted for between 3 to
13 percent of total population growth.11
Although Mexican migration has been a relatively small component of net
aggregate population growth, its impact on the size of the Mexican-origin population,
and the population of selected states where most recent arrivals settle is far more
substantial. Bean and Tienda (1987:66) concluded that migration was responsible
for less than half (and substantially less than half for legal immigrants) of the growth
of the Mexican-origin population between 1970 and 1980. At that time, only one in
four persons of Mexican origin were foreign born. By 1990, and in the wake of
both the large volume of IRCA legalizations and continued immigration from
Mexico, nearly one in three persons of Mexican origin were foreign born (U.S.
Bureau of the Census, 1993: Table 1). INS (1997: Table 2) reports that nearly 1.6
million Mexicans were admitted as legal U.S. residents between 1981 and 1990;
an additional 1.5 million were admitted in Fiscal Years 1991-1995.
Secondary (or indirect) demographic impacts attributable to Mexican migration
derive from the differential fertility of native- and foreign-born women of Mexican
origin. In 1990, the average number of children ever born to Mexican-origin women
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aged 25 to 34 were 1.7 and 2.1 for the native and foreign born, respectively. Among
women aged 35 to 44, the nativity differentials in children ever born were greater
still—2.5 for U.S.-born women compared to 3.3 for Mexican-born women. These
differences in child bearing influence future population growth through changes in
the age structure and its associated future momentum. Moreover, the current and
future demographic impacts, particularly those associated with the school-aged
population and the future force entrants, will be most pronounced in localities where
Mexican migrants are residentially concentrated.
Relative to the native-born Mexican-origin population, legal immigrants from
Mexico are older. The median age of the native-born Mexican-origin population
has risen slowly, from 18.4 in 1960 to 20.5 in 1980 (Bean and Tienda, 1987), to
23.7 in 1990 (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1993a). As a result of the changing age
structure of recent migrants and the aging of earlier migrants, the foreign-born
Mexican-origin population became more youthful between 1960 and 1980, with
the median age declining from 42 in 1960 to 29 in 1980 (Bean and Tienda, 1987:
67; U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1993: CP-3-3: Table 1). High fertility of all Mexi-
can-origin women relative to non-Hispanic white women also contributes to a youth-
ful age structure, which is reflected in the median age of 17-18 between 1970 and
1990 (Bean and Tienda, 1987; U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1993). These changes in
age composition are significant for assessing the economic consequences of Mexi-
can migration because they alter the relative shares of school-aged and working-
age population as well as the elderly.
That females predominate in recent cohorts (with the exception of those in-
volving the IRCA legalizations) also has implications for the future demographic
impacts of Mexican migration. For example, the median age of female Mexican
immigrants legally admitted in 1995 was 25—the peak of women’s reproductive
years. In this connection, two aspects of women’s reproductive behavior are note-
worthy. First, Mexican migrants bear more children than migrants from other re-
gions of the world of comparable social and economic characteristics (Bachu,
1991).12 Second, the larger completed family sizes of Mexican migrant women
result from childbearing after migrating to the United States rather than having
initially larger families when first entering the United States. This is contrary to
predictions based on assimilation theory and differs from the fertility behavior of
other immigrant women. More generally, this implies that the secondary effects of
Mexican migration are likely to be larger than those of other migrant women.
Residential Distribution
A second important facet of demographic impacts of Mexican migration stems
from the U.S. settlement patterns of recent migrants. The foreign-born population,
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but especially recent arrivals, is residentially concentrated in six states—California,
Florida, Illinois, New York, New Jersey and Texas. Two of every three immigrants
legally admitted in 1995 chose these states as their destination, which have
been the leading states of intended residence since 1971. Because California
has been the first choice of residence every year since 1976, it currently houses
the largest foreign-born population both in terms of numbers (an estimated 8
million as of 1996) and share of the state’s population (one-fourth of the total
population is foreign born). Other states with at least one million foreign-born
residents include Florida, Texas, New Jersey and Illinois (Hansen and Faber,
1997:2).
Mexican migrants were residentially concentrated in three of these states—
California, Illinois and Texas. In 1970, just over one-fourth of the foreign-born
population resided in these three states compared to 86 percent of the Mexican-
born population: 54 percent in California; 6.6 percent in Illinois; and 25.5 percent
in Texas. By 1980 the share of the total foreign-born population residing in these
three states rose appreciably from 28 to 37 percent, most in California, and the
share of the Mexican foreign-born population residing in these states increased
slightly to 88 percent (58 percent in California; 7.6 percent in Illinois; and 22.6
percent in Texas). During the 1970s, the Mexican share of the foreign-born
population rose from 7.9 to 15.6 percent.
The 1980s and 1990s witnessed an intensification of these two
demographic trends, namely, a rising share of Mexicans among the foreign-
born population (from 15.6 to 22 percent of the resident foreign-born
population) and the continued residential concentration of all migrants in
California, Illinois and Texas (up from 37 percent in 1980 to 45 percent in
1990). In 1990, about 85 percent of all Mexican migrants resided in these
three states compared to just under half (45.2 percent) of all migrants.13 The
increased residential concentration in these three states coupled with the
persisting residential concentration of all Mexican migrants has two important
implications for understanding the social impacts of Mexican migration. One
is that some of the demographic (as well as economic and social) impacts
deriving from other migrants (especially those from Central and South
America) may be attributed to Mexican migrants. Another is that the social
and economic impacts directly attributable to Mexican migration will be most
pronounced in these three states for the foreseeable future. This is so even
if migration were stopped completely because of the secondary effects
deriving from the changed age and race composition as well as differential
fertility and mortality associated with the youthful populations. Accordingly,
we spotlight these three states in our assessment of economic and social
impacts below.
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Population Projections
According to the Census Bureau’s most recent projections, the U.S. population
is expected to increase by 50 percent between 1995 and 2050, from 263 million to
394 million (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1997). The U.S. population is expected to
grow slowly even in the absence of immigration. However, zero immigration is an
implausible scenario at present. Below replacement fertility rates coupled with
continued, albeit modest, increments in longevity, means that immigration will be
a larger component of future population growth (U.S. Bureau of the Census,
1996:23). Census Bureau projections do not separately identify immigrants by
country of origin, but their projections are helpful in drawing inferences about
Mexican migration insofar as they identify plausible changes in the size of the
Hispanic-origin population. We know that Mexicans comprise slightly over 60
percent of all Hispanics, and this share has remained relatively stable at least since
the early 1970s (Bean and Tienda, 1987: Table 2.2). Recent trends also indicate
that migration was responsible for about half the growth of the Mexican-origin
population, and that foreign-born share has risen gradually over successive censuses
(Bean and Tienda, 1987; U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1993).
The recent National Academy of Sciences (1997: chapter 3, p.26) report on
the consequences of immigration considered how the U.S. population would have
evolved in the absence of immigration since 1950. The panel concluded that the
U.S. population would have been 14 percent smaller than its 1995 size and that it
would have been considerably older. Projecting forward current levels of immigra-
tion for 50 to 55 years would increase population by 80 million above what would
occur in the absence of any immigration.14 This net increase reflects the direct
result of 45 million new immigrants plus the dual indirect effects of higher immi-
grant fertility and the lower overall mortality of a more youthful first and second-
generation migrant population. Under this scenario, immigration will represent an
increasing share of population growth over time. As the single largest national
origin group in recent years, Mexicans would account for approximately 10-12
percent of the increase at the base year, compounded by their higher fertility and
young age structure.
Two important composition changes follow from the current level and country
of origin composition of migrant streams. First, current migration levels will in-
crease future enrollments in primary, secondary and college enrollments relative to
lower migration levels. Second, owing to the predominance of Latin American and
Asian migrants in recent streams, the race and ethnic composition of the U.S. popu-
lation will change dramatically, favoring the increase of Asians and Hispanics.
According to the U.S. Census Bureau’s (1996:15) projections, the growth of the
Hispanic population will probably be a major element of total demographic growth,
contributing 37 percent of growth from 1995 to 2000; 44 percent from 2000 to
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2020; and 62 percent thereafter. However, this growth may be fueled more by the
indirect effects of migration on fertility than by migration directly. As a result of
this growth, the absolute and relative sizes of Asians and Hispanics will more than
double (3 to 8 percent for Asians and 10 to 26 percent for Hispanics). Alternatively,
if there were no net immigration after 1994, the race and ethnic composition of the
U.S. population would be quite different than projected by the middle series (which
approximates the current admission regime).
Within the middle immigration scenario, the growth of the Mexican-origin
population is likely to increase far more than the other Hispanic-origin groups for
several reasons: First, Mexicans comprise the largest source country of current
migration. Among the top 20 countries of birth admitted in Fiscal Year 1995, only
the Dominican Republic and Cuba ranked in the top 10, but even the fourth-ranked
Dominican Republic sent less than half as many migrants as Mexico (INS, 1997).
Second, fertility of both native and foreign-born Mexican-origin women will likely
contribute to relatively faster population growth (U.S. Bureau of the Census,
1996:15). Third, the 1995 Mexican-origin population is larger and relatively younger
than other Hispanic-origin groups, providing a bigger base from which to com-
pound future indirect effects (fertility of migrants and lower mortality of the younger
population). Finally, Mexicans have been the largest source of undocumented mi-
gration in recent years, and this flow is unlikely to end even if the size of the future
undocumented population shrinks (owing to tighter border controls).
Of course, all projections become less reliable the further in time one extrapo-
lates, but the conclusion that immigration generally and Mexican migration in par-
ticular will be a major component of future population growth is all but assured.
Less clear are the relative components of growth due to fertility, as well as legal
and illegal migration.
Conclusions about Demographic Impacts
Several conclusions follow from this discussion. First, Mexican migration has
become spatially as well as temporally concentrated, thereby confining the first
and second order impacts to three states: California, Texas and Illinois. The resi-
dential concentration of Mexican migration coupled with rapid growth has changed
the ethnic landscape of major cities in these states.
Second, although immigration has not been a major component of population
growth in the past, its influence on demographic change has been increasing. And,
as immigration becomes a larger component of population growth and change, so
too will Mexican migration exert more pronounced demographic, and thereby
economic and social impacts. If current migration trends continue, the demographic
impact on the Mexican-origin population will increase over time, as it will be
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compounded by higher fertility and mortality of Mexican-origin women, and the
lower mortality at younger ages. That these trends are currently underway is evident
in that the Mexican share of the foreign-born population has been rising (from 22
to 27 percent during the 1990s alone) and the foreign-born share of the Mexican-
origin population has increased from one in four to one in three during the 1980s.
Third, because the share of ALL migrants who settle in California, Texas
and Illinois has been increasing over time, it is difficult to disentangle the impacts
due to Mexican migration from those due to other migrant groups who settle in
areas where Mexicans are highly concentrated, particularly those from Central
and South America.
Labor Market Channels of Influence
Theoretical Principles15
Before presenting empirical evidence about the labor market impacts of Mexi-
can migration to the United States, we develop a simple model of international
migration to describe theoretically some of the basic points of contention in the
debate regarding the economic effects of immigration (Greenwood and McDowell,
1986; 1993). For simplicity, consider the United States as a country of immigration
that produces a single, nonexported output by means of two inputs, capital and
homogeneous labor. The left panel of Figure 1 depicts a situation in which the
world supply of labor (e.g., Mexican labor) is perfectly elastic at wage rate W
e
. The
right panel shows a hypothetical model of the U.S. labor market. If labor were to
seek its maximum earnings, if transportation and other costs associated with mov-
ing were negligible, and if institutional impediments to the free flow of interna-
tional migration were nonexistent, cd = a'd' workers would migrate to the United
States. Consequently, U.S. labor supply would increase from S
us
 to S''
us
 and its
wage rate would fall to the world equilibrium level at W
e
. If the United States were
completely and effectively to close its borders, its wage rate would be W
us
. In this
simple model, because labor is homogeneous, foreign-born labor is a substitute for
native-born labor.
Suppose instead that for political, economic, humanitarian, or other reasons,
the United States imposed a binding quota of ab = a'b' workers, allowing an increase
in labor supply from S
us
 to S'
us
. This increase has two important consequences.
First, the domestic wage rate falls to W'
us
 and total employment rises from oe to
ob. However, domestic employment declines by ae workers from oe to oa. Thus,
to some extent (i.e., ae) immigrants displace domestic workers. Second, when the
wage rate falls from W
us
 to W'
us
, labor earnings change from 0xze to 0trb, of
which 0sta accrues to indigenous workers and asrb to immigrants. The earnings
of indigenous workers have fallen from 0xze to 0tsa. On the other hand, returns
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to nonlabor factors of production have risen from xyz to tyr. The clear implication
is that some groups in the United States benefit from immigration, while others
bear the costs.
An existing wage differential of (W'
us
 - W
e
), to the extent that it reflects its
real-world counterpart, is substantial. For example, Mexico is the single major
supplier of U.S. migrants, and wages available in the United States are between 5
and 13 times higher than those available in Mexican agriculture.16 Given such a
wage differential, the continued build-up of demand for entry into the U.S. labor
market from abroad would be expected. Of course, information concerning the
availability of the wage differential is not freely available to all potential migrants,
as the model implies, and transportation and psychic costs associated with interna-
tional migration may be appreciable. Nevertheless, the potential supply is still sub-
stantial, even if relatively nearby sources, like Mexico, the West Indies, and Cen-
tral America, are the primary origin areas.17
The magnitudes of the wage and employment changes consequent upon immi-
gration are dependent upon the elasticities of labor demand and domestic labor
supply, the magnitude of the quota, and other assumptions implicitly embedded in
Figure 1. In general, the more inelastic are the demand and supply relationships,
the greater will be the reduction of domestic wages due to a given amount of immi-
gration. Moreover, the displacement effect will be greater the more elastic is do-
mestic labor supply and the less elastic is labor demand.
One of the most troublesome assumptions in Figure 1 is that labor is homoge-
neous. This assumption rules out the possibility of uneven impacts among various
labor force groups. The introduction of two classes of labor (i.e., skilled and un-
skilled) permits greater focus on the low-wage labor market, which has commanded
considerable research attention by analysts of rising wage inequality.18 If the com-
position of Mexican migrants is oriented toward less-skilled workers, the most
directly relevant demand and supply elasticities are those in the low-wage labor
market. Relaxing the assumption of homogenous labor is further appealing be-
cause it raises the salience of skill transferability and questions about the economic
adaptability of immigrants and their offspring to the receiving society. Moreover,
with two classes of labor and with capital, immigrants and natives may be either
complements or substitutes in production. If immigrants and natives are comple-
ments, the demand curve for complementary native workers would shift out, such
as from D
us
 to D'
us
 in Figure 1. If they were substitutes in production, native de-
mand for substitutable native workers would shift in the opposite direction.
As noted above, the transfer of resources inherent in international migration
also results in a redistribution of income between origin and destination countries.
In Figure 1 the area ezrb represents a net addition to national output in the country
of immigration. As long as the migration is motivated by a positive wage
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differential, the loss of output in the country of emigration would presumably be
less than this magnitude, and global output would rise.19 The effects on the country
of origin would be greater or less, depending on the employment status
(unemployed, underemployed, not in the labor force) of migrants. The assumption
implicit in the left panel of Figure 1 is that the migrants do not affect employment
in the source countries. Relaxing this assumption opens up the possibility of the
brain-drain phenomenon.
Another problem with the simple, static, partial equilibrium model developed
here is that it ignores many important features of an expanding, dynamic economy.
For instance, Bernard (1953:57) attacks the so-called lump of labor fallacy, sug-
gesting that “job opportunities in any society are not fixed at any particular level
but expand with a rising population.” Bernard argues that through their consump-
tion, immigrants expand the market of the receiving society. They also stimulate
increased investment expenditures, thereby further contributing to increased ag-
gregate demand. Moreover, immigrants contribute importantly to technological
progress and entrepreneurial activity (i.e., technological externalities). Simon (1981)
shares the view that in the long run, immigrant contributions to technical progress
positively affect per capita income. In terms of Figure 1, Bernard suggests that
immigration shifts both the labor supply and labor demand schedules outward, but
he does not explain why the demand shift should dominate the supply shift (e.g.,
point v). If the supply shift dominated the demand shift (e.g., point u), wages would
fall and indigenous workers would be displaced, though not to the extent that would
have happened had no offsetting demand shift occurred (e.g., point r).
Bernard’s position (i.e., point v in Figure 1) is certainly plausible, but does not
appear to have an important place in the present debate, at least in so far as the
aggregate U.S. economy is concerned. Substantial quantitative evidence suggests
that this condition may have prevailed in the U.S. up to 1900 and perhaps even to
1920, during which time aggregate scale economies probably existed. The consen-
sus appears to be that such conditions have not existed during the last half century,
and therefore equilibria such as v are unlikely to hold at the present time.20 Not
only might the immigrants themselves contribute to an outward shift of D
us
 (Ber-
nard, 1953), but also aggregate labor demand is likely to be growing due to other
forces such as growth of aggregate income. Depending upon how fast domestic
labor supply is growing relative to demand, immigrant “absorptive capacity” could
be greater or less than might be implied by a static model.
Empirical Evidence
Empirical studies about labor market impacts of immigration have been
concerned with two related questions: (1) Do immigrant workers depress the wage
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rates of domestic workers and, if so, which domestic workers? (2) Do immigrant
workers displace certain domestic workers from their jobs, or through various
channels do immigrant workers increase employment opportunities over and above
their own contributions to employment. The answers to these questions are related
in part to whether immigrants and natives are complements or substitutes in
production. Although much effort has been devoted to addressing these questions,
the empirical evidence is inconclusive. Answers depend on the level of aggregation
of the analysis; assumptions about whether (and how) the labor market is segmented;
the temporal frame of reference; the methodology used; and the migrant
characteristics, notably education level and years since migration. That Mexican
immigrants have low levels of education and are heavily concentrated in the
Southwest implies that labor market impacts most likely will be concentrated within
the low-skill segments of these particular markets. Although the initial impacts of
immigrants differ from the ultimate impacts, few studies have examined this aspect
of immigration.21 Especially understudied are the intergenerational consequences
of immigration (for an exception, see Borjas, 1992).
Aggregate and Group-Specific Impacts
Several empirical studies employ a production-theory approach to determine
the substitutability between capital and various groups of native- and foreign-born
workers. In spite of nontrivial methodological differences and in time period ana-
lyzed, several major studies concluded that immigrants have had very small (nega-
tive) impacts on the earnings and employment opportunities of the native-born
population (Grossman, 1982; Borjas, 1986a; Greenwood, Hunt and Kohli, 1996,
1997). These studies assume an instantaneous adjustment to exogenous changes in
labor supply, and essentially ignore the important question about how quickly lo-
cal economies adjust to an exogenous change in labor supply. Even though the
resulting change in wages may be small, adjustment costs may be large.
Prior Evidence of Labor Market Impacts. The wage and employment impacts
of immigrants on native workers may differ according to race and national origin,
but the findings of prior studies are highly variable. The empirical evidence gener-
ally indicates that immigrant groups tend to be substitutes for some domestic labor
market groups and complements for other domestic workers (Borjas, 1987a). Spe-
cifically, Hispanic immigrants appear to be substitutes for white domestic male
workers, but complements with native Hispanic workers. Mexican immigrants have
a small negative impact on the earnings of both white and black native-born men.
However, all immigrants have a sizable negative impact on their own wage levels
(see Borjas, 1986a, and 1986b).
307
Although Borjas finds limited evidence that immigrants are substitutes for
the black native-born population, one study conducted within a human capital
framework claims that recent immigrants from countries other than Mexico,
Cuba, and the West Indies are substitutes for black males (see Stewart and
Hyclak, 1986). Yet another study conducted within a human capital framework
(King, et al., 1986) uncovers little evidence of substitution between migrants
and second or third-generation Hispanics. However, among a subsample of
laborers, negative effects of migrants on native workers emerge, but these too
are relatively small (-0.1). In sum, the preponderance of aggregate evidence
about the complementarity and substitution relationships between native and
foreign-born workers indicates that immigration decreases employment and
wages of low-skill domestic workers by very little. These findings, based on
1970 and 1980 data, imply a highly inelastic supply of domestic low-skilled
labor and a relatively elastic demand for such labor.
Regarding the hypothesized negative impact of immigrants on various skill
groups, Briggs has argued for over two decades (1975a; 1975b; 1995) that the low-
skill segment of the U.S. work force, and the minority work force in particular,
have borne the brunt of the labor market competition from immigrants to the United
States. That young workers, and especially minority teenagers, are disproportion-
ately represented among the least skilled and experienced domestic workers sug-
gests that the negative effects of migrants will be greatest among minority teenag-
ers. Contrary to this proposition, Borjas (1984b) estimates positive elasticities of
complementarity between immigrants and young (i.e., 24 years of age or younger)
native-born black men. This impact is not uniform across immigrant groups, how-
ever. For example, Borjas (1986b) finds that Hispanic immigrants exerted an insig-
nificant and sometime negative impact on wages and earnings of young black men,
whereas the impacts of non-Hispanic immigrants are consistently positive.
Other studies (e.g., Matta and Popp, 1988; Kimenyi, 1989) claim that the
complementarity and substitutability of immigrant and domestic labor have changed
over time, such that highly skilled immigrants from Europe were complements in
production to black youth, whereas more recent, less-skilled migrants from the
Americas are substitutes. That no study has adequately separated the effects of
legal and undocumented migration weakens inferences about the dynamics of
competition in low-wage labor markets, however. This is an especially important
consideration for drawing inferences about the labor market impacts of Mexican
migration. DeFreitas’ (1988) view of immigration as a sequential process in which
some newcomers integrate into ethnic job clusters and, over time, disperse from
these enclaves to exert competitive pressures on low-skilled native workers seems
to be a plausible explanation for some of the observed coexistence of complementary
and substitution relationships.
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Workers born in Mexico increase the supply of labor available in the United
States. This increased labor supply clearly is not spread evenly across the United
States, but rather is concentrated in proximity to the U.S.-Mexico border and in
areas that offer those types of employment opportunities that are attractive to mi-
grants from Mexico. Previous studies typically have shown that the wage and em-
ployment effects of increased immigration on native-born groups are not great.
The largest impacts are on other foreign-born workers (like the migrants them-
selves). The results of earlier studies, however, have been based on 1970 and 1980
census data and on other data sources that are sufficiently old to throw into ques-
tion their contemporary relevance. Moreover, the various studies that adopt a pro-
duction function approach usually have not focused specifically on areas of high
migrant concentration. The analysis reported below addresses both of these limita-
tions of prior studies.
1990 Labor Market Impacts. In the discussion that follows, we assume that in
each metropolitan area the technology can be represented by an aggregate produc-
tion function that expresses output as a function of various labor inputs and capital.
Using the Symmetric Normalized quadratic functional form introduced by Diewert
and Wales (1987), we estimate a nine-input production function. The methodology
for this analysis is detailed in Research Volume 3, pages 1078 to 1116. In addition
to capital, the labor inputs in the Mexican Model are (1) native, low-skill Mexican
males; (2) native, low-skill Mexican females; (3) native, low-skill non-Mexican
males; (4) native, low-skill non-Mexican females; (5) native, high-skill; (6) for-
eign-born, low-skill Mexican; (7) foreign-born, low-skill non-Mexican; and (8)
foreign-born high-skill.22 Workers from Mexico tend to be low-skilled, and hence
they compete most directly with low-skilled native- and foreign-born workers. The
methodology used to estimate the models reported below allows for eight skill
classes of labor, along with capital. Thus, six classes of low-skill labor are distin-
guished. Within the low-skill native group Mexican ancestry natives are distin-
guished from other natives, and each group is separated by sex. This separation by
sex allows a focus on low-skill females, who have been ignored in most prior analy-
ses. The foreign born are distinguished as Mexican and non-Mexican because we
wish to simulate on low-skill, foreign-born, Mexican labor (i.e., increase employ-
ment of this group by a given amount and observe how this and other groups ulti-
mately are affected through the workings of the model) and because we also wish
to identify the labor-market impacts on this group.
Data for the estimation are drawn from the 1990 U.S. census. Metropolitan
areas form the basic region that is the focus of the cross-sectional analysis. For
the econometric model that provides considerable detail on native-born persons
of Mexican ancestry as noted above, 122 metropolitan areas are used in the analysis.
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This is the maximum number of usable areas. California and Texas each contain
23 of these areas. The various areas included in the analysis are reported in
Appendix A.
Estimation of the production function relationships indicates that capital is a
complement for all categories of labor except foreign-born high-skill labor. Over-
all, however, far more substitution than complementarity is apparent in the esti-
mated relationships, and this is somewhat surprising. Most labor categories com-
pete with each other. The strongest complementarity links are between native, low-
skill men and low-skill foreign born, as well as between native, low-skill, non-
Mexican women and high-skill foreign born. Based on the production function
estimates alone, an increase in the number of low-skill Mexican migrants would
tend to benefit capital and low-skill native males and hurt all other categories of
labor. Except for low-skill Mexican migrants themselves, the estimated effects are
very small.
In addition to the production structure channel of influence, the full model
contains a labor force participation channel and an aggregate demand channel of
influence. Table 6 reports results for a simulation of the full model. The basic simu-
lation entails a 20-percent increase in the number of foreign born, low-skill Mexi-
can workers. For all 122 areas, the average real wage of this labor group falls by
3.0 percent. Due to this lower wage rate, workers in this category withdraw from
the labor force, so that ultimately employment of this group increases by 19.39
percent and not by 20 percent which reflects a displacement effect of about 0.6
percent (20.0 percent - 19.4 percent).23 The wage rates of other labor categories are
almost unchanged. For example, native, low-skill females of Mexican ancestry
suffer a wage loss of only about 0.3 percent and their employment falls by about
0.2 percent. Thus, for the average U.S. region, even relatively large increases in
Mexican-born labor do not appear to have large impacts on native workers.
Metropolitan areas in California and Texas have relatively heavy concentra-
tions both of Mexican-born persons and of native-born persons of Mexican ances-
try. As noted above, each of these states contains 23 metropolitan areas in the sample.
The major impact of a 20-percent increase in foreign born, low-skill Mexican labor
in California is on this group, whose wages fall by 6.9 percent (Table 6A) and
whose employment declines by 1.3 percentage points (20 percent less 18.7 per-
cent) (Table 6B). The largest wage impacts on other groups occur to foreign-born,
low-skill, non-Mexicans and to foreign-born, high-skill persons, but in each case
the effects amount only to about one percent. The labor displacement effect is
never more than 0.5 percent for any group (Table 6B).
The results for Texas are similar to those for California, but for the most part
are slightly more moderate. For example, when their employment is increased by
20 percent, foreign-born, low-skill Mexican workers in Texas suffer a 5.0 percent
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wage decline (Table 6A) and about 1.1 percentage point job displacement (Table
6B). Comparable effects for Arizona, New Mexico, and Colorado (11 areas) are a
3.7 percent wage reduction and approximately 0.8 percent displacement. Areas of
high concentration of foreign-born, low-skill Mexican workers clearly experience
the largest impacts of a 20-percent increase in this labor category. For 13 areas for
which this labor group constitutes 60 percent or more of the foreign-born popula-
tion, the wage effect for a 20-percent increase in this group represents a decline of
11.4 percent. Employment of the group is reduced by 2.4 percentage points. Na-
tive, low-skill females of Mexican ancestry suffer a 1.3 percent wage decline and a
0.4 percent job displacement effect. Even these last effects are not large.
Three possibilities have been suggested for the repeated empirical finding that
the effects of even relatively large increases in foreign-born labor do not appear to
have great impacts on native workers. First, the foreign-born population is a rela-
tively small fraction of the population and the labor force, and thus the effects may
not be detectable. The results presented above suggest that even in areas with heavy
concentrations of foreign-born, low-skill, Mexican labor, the wage and employ-
ment displacement effects of relatively large increases in this labor group are not
great either for the native-born groups or for other foreign-born groups. The only
noteworthy impact is on the own-wage rate because the members of the group are
very good labor market substitutes for one another. A second possible explanation
for the relatively small impacts of the foreign born on wages and employment is
that offsetting increases occur in labor demand and supply relationships with the
effect that the wage changes tend to cancel. A third explanation is that efficient
U.S. markets result in the effects quickly arbitraging themselves across the nation,
with the result that the effects are difficult to detect.
A closer examination of specific metropolitan areas in California and Texas
and of other areas of high foreign-born, low-skilled Mexican concentration, indicate
that the simulated wage and employment effects vary substantially. For example,
among metropolitan areas in California, the own-wage reduction resulting from
the 20-percent increase in foreign-born, low-skilled Mexican workers reaches as
high as 15.2 percent in Visalia-Tulare and as low as 0.24 percent in Redding (Table
6A). Employment of foreign-born, low-skilled Mexicans is reduced by as much as
3.1 percent in Los Angeles and as little as 0.04 percent in Redding (Table 6B).
Similar variation in the magnitude of wage and employment effects is apparent
among metropolitan areas in Texas. The wage reduction experienced by foreign-
born, low-skilled Mexicans varies between 25.4 percent for McAllen-Edinburg-
Mission and 0.5 percent for Beaumont (Table 6A). The group experiences
employment reductions of between 6.1 percent in McAllen-Edinburg-Mission and
0.1 percent in Beaumont Table 6B). Also of note, wages of foreign-born, low-
skilled Mexicans fall by 15.9 percent in Yuma, AZ, while employment falls by 3.4
319
percent. Greeley, CO, also has a high concentration of foreign-born, low-skilled
Mexicans, although the own-wage reduction there is only 3.2 percent and the
employment reduction is a mere 0.6 percent.
The range of the wage and employment effects on other groups resulting from
a 20-percent increase in foreign-born, low-skilled Mexican workers is much smaller.
Among metropolitan areas in California, the wages of native, low-skilled males
(both Mexican and non-Mexican) increase, though this increase is relatively small
and varies between 0.0 percent in Redding and 2.3 percent in Los Angeles (Table
6A). The wage effect is similar for metropolitan areas in Texas, reaching a high of
4.3 percent in McAllen-Edinburg-Mission. The employment effect on this group
varies little across metropolitan areas in California and Texas and is nearly zero in
most cases.
To the extent that wages and job opportunities of the native born are influ-
enced by low-skill migrants from Mexico, females and especially Mexican ances-
try females bear the impacts. However, these effects are not great even in areas
with high concentrations of foreign-born, low-skill Mexicans. For example, in ar-
eas where at least 60 percent of the foreign-born population consists of low-skill
migrants from Mexico, a 20 percent increase in this population reduces the real
wage of native-born Mexican ancestry females by 1.27 percent and their employ-
ment by 0.40 percent (Tables 6A and 6B).
As discussed above, native, low-skilled females (both Mexican and non-Mexi-
can) and other foreign-born groups tend to suffer wage and employment decreases
as a result of the 20-percent increase in foreign-born, low-skilled Mexican work-
ers. Although the effects are quite small on average for metropolitan areas in Cali-
fornia and Texas (around 1 percent or less), some areas of high foreign-born, low-
skilled Mexican concentration display relatively large effects. For example, in Los
Angeles, the wages of foreign-born, high-skilled workers fall by 3.4 percent while
employment falls by 0.8 percent. In McAllen-Edinburg-Mission, TX, the wages of
native, low-skilled, Mexican females fall by 4.0 percent, accompanied by a 1.3
percent reduction in employment.
A general presumption is that the two groups most likely to enjoy benefits due
to migration from Mexico to the United States are the migrants themselves and
their U.S. employers. However, because most models that focus on the U.S. impacts
of immigration assume separability of labor and capital, as well as not incorporating
capital explicitly in the empirical framework, empirical models typically do not
allow any assessment of the returns to capital. In the Mexican Model described
above, we explicitly introduce capital and therefore we are able to perform simulation
exercises that relate to the return to capital.
In some detail, Appendix C reports the percentage change in the real rental
price of capital due to a 20-percent increase in foreign-born, low-skill Mexican
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labor. Among all of the inputs, capital is the clearest winner. In California areas in
general the real rental price of capital increases by 0.82 percent, but the increases
are somewhat larger in agricultural areas like Merced (1.66 percent), Salinas (1.68
percent), and Visalia-Tulare (1.43 percent). However, the largest increase (2.54
percent) occurs in Los Angeles. The average increase in the real rate of return to
capital in Texas is 0.33, but for many areas close to the border the return is
considerably higher (Brownsville—1.44 percent; El Paso—1.58 percent; McAllen-
Edinburg-Mission—1.75 percent). Another border area that experiences a large
increase in the rate of return to capital is Yuma, AZ (1.66 percent). These results
provide confirmation that the U.S. owners of capital benefit due to low-skill
migration from Mexico.
A model containing racial detail also was estimated and simulated.24 This model,
although containing no detail regarding migrants from Mexico, may nonetheless
be simulated for areas of high concentration of low-skill migrants from Mexico.
These simulations indicate that a 20-percent increase in low-skill foreign-born la-
bor in the Los Angeles MSA would reduce the real wages of low-skill native black
females by 4.5 percent and result in a job-displacement effect of 4.25 percent for
them. Low-skill native black males would experience a 3.4 percent job displace-
ment effect. The low-skill foreign-born group itself would suffer a 3.4 percent real
wage decline and 2.2 percent job displacement effect.
In summary, labor market impacts are the most intensively studied effects of
the foreign born in the United States. Although these effects may be mitigated or
reinforced through less-highly studied channels of influence, the following con-
clusions have the strongest support. First, in both 1980 and 1990 the foreign born
had a tendency to put downward pressure on the wage rates of the native born and
a tendency to displace them from their jobs, but the effects were not large at the
national level. The Mexican-born had similarly small impacts at the national level.
Second, the foreign born are highly concentrated regionally, and although internal
migration and trade tend to distribute the consequences over broader regions, the
economic consequences also are concentrated. The largest impacts of low-skilled
migration from Mexico are on other low-skilled migrants from Mexico, because
the two groups are good labor market substitutes. In areas of high concentration of
new migrants from Mexico, such as El Paso, other migrants from Mexico suffer
job displacement and significant downward pressure on their wage rates. Such ef-
fects impede the upward economic mobility of less-skilled migrants themselves.
Third, in certain regions of foreign-born concentration, minorities appear to suffer
job displacement and downward wage pressure. This effect is especially important
in Los Angeles, where less-skilled African-American women bear the most note-
worthy impacts. Finally, owners of capital and land are the primary U.S. beneficia-
ries from the presence of less-skilled migrants from Mexico.
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Labor Market Impacts of Undocumented Migrants
The widespread belief that undocumented migrants depress the labor market
prospects faced by unskilled native workers also has been debated in the academic
and policy literature. Proponents of this view often argue that undocumented mi-
grants compete primarily with low-skill native-born workers, particularly minori-
ties and young workers, but there is quite a diversity of opinion about the magni-
tude of the effects. For example, Huddle, Corwin, and MacDonald (1985) estimate
a 65 percent rate of job displacement or, in other words, for every 100 undocu-
mented aliens working, 65 jobs are taken away from natives. However, many other
researchers (e.g., Bean, Telles, and Lowell, 1987; Giffen, 1992) argue that the avail-
able evidence does not support the popular perception of substantial negative im-
pacts on native workers due to the presence of undocumented migrants.
The United States General Accounting Office (GAO) (1986, 1988) prepared
two companion documents relating to the economic effects of illegal alien workers
in the U.S. based on studies extending through the mid to late 1980s. The 1986
report admits that knowledge about undocumented workers was mostly based on
Mexican workers in the Southwest. The study concluded that, “although informa-
tion is limited, illegal workers appear to displace (or take jobs away from) native or
legal workers” (1986:17-18). GAO’s 1988 report focuses on case studies in spe-
cific industries and localities, and not surprisingly, finds that there was substantial
evidence of labor market displacement of native and legal workers by undocu-
mented migrants. Such evidence raises questions about the possibilities for recon-
ciling conclusions based on econometric modeling (which conclude that migration
has benign displacement effects) and case study methodology (which concludes
that substantial displacement effects can be attributed to migrants in specific in-
dustries and regions).
The final issue examined in the 1988 GAO report is whether the presence of
undocumented workers is associated with a declining business environment. Although
the report never actually defines what is meant by a “declining business environ-
ment,” the term appears to refer to industries with shrinking employment. Using case
studies to address the question, the report concludes that little or no evidence indi-
cates that undocumented aliens concentrate in industries that are declining. Several
case studies suggest that certain activities could not have been maintained in the U.S.
without the availability of legal or undocumented migrant workers.
Using a simulation exercise in much the same way as Johnson (1980) did to
study the effects of immigration, Grossman (1984) develops and simulates a model
of undocumented migration to assess its effects on domestic employment. Her model
assumes two sectors and three factors, domestic skilled labor, domestic unskilled
labor, and undocumented migrant labor. The main contribution of the Grossman
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paper, given her assumptions, is in showing that the sectoral distribution of
undocumented migrant labor ultimately determines the impact of undocumented
migration on the wage rates of domestic unskilled labor. That dramatic differences exist
in the regional concentration of migrants and in the interindustry distribution of
undocumented migrants implies distinct effects across regions. Because of their sources
and border entry points, undocumented migrants may be even more concentrated than
the legal immigrants, and their impacts will be concentrated accordingly.
Advances in methods for estimating the number of undocumented migrants have
made it possible for Bean, Lowell, and Taylor (1988) to conduct a more direct test of
the impacts of undocumented workers on native workers. These authors found that
undocumented workers exert little impact on the earnings of natives in each of the
other five labor force groups. Furthermore, the earnings impact of undocumented
workers on domestic workers, when significant, more often was positive than nega-
tive. These authors conclude that the findings of small complementary effects be-
tween undocumented Mexicans and some native-born groups, together with the sub-
stitution effects found with legal immigrants, are more consistent with the notion that
undocumented migrants hold jobs that natives avoid than with the view that undocu-
mented migrants directly compete with natives for jobs.
Using the same procedure as Bean, Lowell and Taylor to estimate the num-
ber of undocumented Mexican workers, Taylor et al., (1988) also attempted to
identify the labor market impacts of undocumented and legal Mexican migrants
on the wages of workers in southwestern SMSAs. Despite the differences in meth-
odology, the findings are very similar to those of Bean, Lowell, and Taylor. They
conclude that the relative size of the undocumented population is positively asso-
ciated with the wages of native males, except for native black males (for whom
negligible effects emerged). On the other hand, legal Mexican immigrants have a
small negative impact on the wages of native non-Hispanic white males and U.S.-
born Mexican-origin males.
Industry and Occupation-specific Impacts
The aggregate supply of unskilled labor may be quite inelastic. Although the
aggregate demand for such labor is elastic, conditions may be considerably different
in specific industries, or occupations, or regions. Consequently, even though the
effects of immigrants on total employment of unskilled persons and on their national
average wage may be small, the effects on workers at a subnational level could be
considerable. Offsetting redistributions could occur either across regions or across
specific industries, such that the “net” effect of immigration will be a tiny fraction
of the corresponding national total employment, and its consequences obscured
from an aggregate perspective.
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Even in areas where immigrant concentration is high, the local effects of
immigrants may be quite difficult to measure due to various forms of arbitrage.
One way for such arbitraging to occur is through internal migration. For example,
if immigrants cause native wages to fall or displace native workers from jobs, the
natives may out-migrate from areas where immigrants locate, which in turn may
cause native wage rates to rise in the area of out-migration, and to fall elsewhere.
Moreover, unemployment rates in areas of native out-migration fall, whereas they
rise elsewhere, at least in the short run. Filer (1992) has described how areas with
high immigrant concentrations become less desirable for natives, thereby triggering
native out-migration.
The many industry case studies are largely descriptive, but taken as a whole,
generate several insights about the complementarity and substitution issue. First, in
certain industries located in specific regions, such as Los Angeles and New York,
employment displacement effects of migrant workers are clearly evident. This is
consistent with the conclusion of the 1988 GAO study of undocumented migration
based on case studies. These negative impacts are frequently experienced by earlier
cohorts of immigrants, but native-born workers also suffer job displacement. The
displacement may occur because the ready supply of immigrant workers places down-
ward pressure on industry wage rates in regions with heavy concentrations of immi-
grants, which in turn causes native-born and earlier immigrant workers to withdraw
their labor services from the industry. A shortcoming of the case studies is that they
are too narrow to trace the ultimate outcomes for native workers, who presumably
find new jobs, but at considerable cost. Alternatively, the displacement may occur
without any noticeable downward pressure on money wage rates, but rather because
employers perceive new migrants to be more efficient workers. This perception of
greater efficiency may reflect immigrants’ willingness to work harder, to accept lower
fringe benefits and less job security, and to resist unionization.
Another theme that repeatedly emerges from the industry studies is that
employers find immigrant hiring networks to be advantageous. This observation is
relevant in many sectors, such as agriculture, manufacturing, construction, and
services. No study has systematically analyzed why these networks are advantageous,
but several have inferred that relatively substantial cost savings must be realized
through the use of network hiring. Employers save the cost of recruiting workers
because no advertising is necessary when information about job availability is passed
through the network by word of mouth. Moreover, especially when the networks
consist of families, some informal training may occur before the migrant actually
begins working. Informal social controls on worker behavior (e.g., attendance, work
effort and resistance to unionization) may also be exercised through migrant
networks. As such, migrant networks serve as informal screening devices that deliver
reliable employees.
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Using 1990 census data for 65 rural California towns, Taylor and Martin (1996)
show in the context of a simultaneous-equations model that every 100-person
increase in farm employment attracts 143 additional immigrants and results in 132
additional poor residents and 69 more welfare recipients. The increase in cash
assistance accrues not so much to the new migrants as to residents and settled
migrants, and the immigrants do not appear to be attracted by the availability of
welfare. Their basic point is that California growers pay poverty-level wages, but
receive a “welfare subsidy” in the sense that their workers require and receive
public welfare in order to make ends meet. Indeed, this welfare subsidy amounts to
$987 per California farm job, or 13 percent of farm worker earnings.
Region-specific Impacts and Internal Migration
The regional concentration of the foreign-born population has direct implications
for an assessment of economic impacts. However, labor and capital flows along
with interregional trade may arbitrage many differences, and thus diffuse the local
impacts nationally. In general, empirical evidence appears to indicate that in areas
where immigrant concentrations are particularly high, such as along the southwestern
border, wage depression and job displacement effects are evident. These impacts
are strongest among the less-skilled and lower-income prior migrants in these regions.
Although the early evidence of such regional effects was based on data from the
1980 census, more recent models based on the 1990 census show the same tendencies,
as indicated in Tables 6A and 6B.
With respect to U.S. internal migration, several studies have tried to disen-
tangle the relationship between population growth and employment growth by ask-
ing: Do people follow jobs, or do jobs follow people? Are the two variables jointly
determined or perhaps independent of one another? Various researchers have de-
veloped measures of the migrant attractive power of an incremental job and of the
number of jobs induced by an additional (employed) migrant (Muth, 1971; Green-
wood, Hunt, and McDowell, 1986). Whether based on cross-sectional or temporal
data, the studies have generally found that jobs and migration are jointly deter-
mined. Such estimates have naturally kindled interest in the differential attractive
power of jobs for internal versus international migrants, and in the differential
number of jobs induced by each type of migrant. Unfortunately, no study provides
convincing evidence on this issue.
Internal migration may be important in another, more subtle way. Filer (1992)
suggests that to the extent that immigrants and natives are labor market substitutes,
the location of immigrants in various areas will place downward pressure on the
wage rates of natives, some of whom will also be displaced from their jobs. In turn,
natives will out-migrate from such areas and others who might otherwise have in-
migrated will not do so. Although Filer does not mention this possible cause of
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native out-migration, immigrants may not only drive down local wage rates, but
may also drive up rents, with the consequence that native out-migration rises and
native in-migration falls. Because few studies show strong impacts of immigrants
on native wage rates, the primary mechanism through which out-migration is
triggered may be rising rents.
An important implication of Filer’s results is that capital is attracted to areas
where immigrants settle because of the wage depressing effects they have. The in-
flow of capital coupled with the net out-movement of native workers places up-
ward pressure on the wage rates of local natives. On the other hand, the net in-flow
of native workers to areas with few immigrants, coupled with slower rates of capi-
tal accumulation in these areas, puts downward pressure on wages in these other
localities. The net result is that native wages are equalized across areas, and the
impacts of immigration are arbitraged across the nation. Because the effects of
immigration on native wage are spread thinly across the country, they are difficult
or impossible to detect empirically, which helps to explain why immigrants repeat-
edly appear to have little impact on native wage rates. It is unclear how much time
is required to arbitrage the economic effects of immigration, and no study has
examined this issue carefully.
Filer’s empirical results and interpretation have not gone unchallenged. Butcher
and Card (1991) argue that if New York, Los Angeles, and Miami, the three most
immigrant-intensive cities in the United States, are separated out, “native in-mi-
gration flows during the 1980s were actually positively correlated with inflows of
recent immigrants” (p. 294). Greenwood and Hunt (1995) provide a mechanism to
explain how the settlement of immigrants in certain areas could also attract rather
than repel natives. Even if immigrants and natives are substitutes in production,
immigrants may positively affect local labor demand through the wealth they bring
with them, by encouraging area exports, and through still other channels of influ-
ence. Greenwood and Hunt’s simulations suggest that the negative effects on wages
due to substitution of immigrant for native workers are largely offset by these other
channels of influence. Indeed, under reasonable assumptions, immigrants may
positively influence the wages of natives, which would cause in-migration of na-
tive workers to areas where immigrants settle.25
The idea that internal migration is an important mechanism through which the
effects of immigration are arbitraged across the country is intuitively appealing.
However, at least on its surface the argument appears to assume that immigration is
of a one-shot variety, similar to the Mariel Boatlift of Cuban refugees into the
Miami labor market during the early 1980s. If this were the case, over a period of
time internal adjustments would likely occur to spread the effects more widely.26 A
large body of research on regional adjustments suggests that the effects would not
necessarily be spread very rapidly. Still more troubling for the arbitraging hypothesis
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is the observation that new immigrants continue to settle in the same places as their
predecessors. Due to lags inherent in the adjustment process, the continuing inflow
of new immigrant arrivals should keep the direct impacts of immigrants relatively
high in areas of immigrant settlement. The validity of the arbitrage hypothesis
therefore rests on the speed of regional adjustment to equilibrium.
Relative to other foreign-born groups and relative to the native born, persons
born in Mexico have relatively low rates of U.S. internal migration (Greenwood,
Henning and McDowell, 1997). Indeed, the native born of Mexican ancestry have
low rates of internal migration in general. For example, among those household
heads born in Mexico who entered the United States between 1970 and 1974, only
4.1 percent made an interstate move between 1985 and 1990. During the same
period 5.2 percent of native-born heads of Mexican ancestry made such a move. In
contrast, the same entry cohort from other countries of origin had much higher
rates of internal migration over the 1985-1990 period. Representative rates of in-
ternal migration for these other groups are as follows: Philippines, 12.3 percent;
Germany, 18.0 percent; United Kingdom, 19.7 percent; India, 21.7 percent; Korea,
15.8 percent; and Vietnam, 15.2 percent. Among these countries, only for Mexico
do the foreign born have lower rates of internal migration than the native born of
each respective ancestry.
Neuman and Tienda (1994) also confirmed that undocumented migrants from
Mexico are less likely to move across state lines than undocumented migrants from
other regions. An analysis of administrative records (Legalization Application Pro-
cessing System, or LAPS) revealed that just over one-quarter of amnestied immi-
grants changed residence at least once between the time of most recent entry and
application for amnesty, but the likelihood of inter-state moves as undocumented
migrants varied by place of birth. Mexicans were least likely to move subsequent
to their initial entry while Asians and Africans were most likely to do so. Specifi-
cally, only 19 percent of undocumented Mexicans who applied for legal status had
moved across state lines before soliciting amnesty compared to over two-thirds of
undocumented migrants from Asia and Africa, and over half of undocumented
migrants from other Latin American countries (except Salvadorans, whose inter-
state migratory behavior was similar to that of Mexicans).
If secondary migration leads to greater residential dispersion throughout the
country, the social impacts of undocumented migration ultimately will be less severe
in the states that serve as gateways for initial entry. Overall, unauthorized Mexican
migrants who moved across state lines were less residentially concentrated at the
time of application for amnesty than were nonmovers. For Mexicans, California
and Texas were the main gateways for unauthorized entry. However, there was
limited evidence of dispersal of impacts through inter-state moves of unauthorized
Mexican migrants; nonmovers were more than twice as likely as movers to have
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entered through California (three out of four nonmovers from Mexico entered
through California compared to just over one-third of movers). Mexicans who entered
without inspection through Texas were more likely to have changed their state of
residence by the time of application for amnesty, thereby attenuating impacts in
this state. Specifically, just over half of Mexican movers entered through Texas
compared to more than one-fifth of nonmovers.
These low rates of internal migration among persons born in Mexico are due
to many factors, such as relatively low levels of education, lack of English lan-
guage skills, and strong ties to areas with high concentrations of persons born in
Mexico. Like education, migration is a form of investment in human capital and as
such migration presumably yields higher future returns. Historically, internal mi-
gration has been a mechanism through which Americans have taken advantage of
employment and wage opportunities elsewhere to improve their economic status.
Thus, the low internal migration rates of both those born in Mexico and those born
in the United States of Mexican ancestry may restrict their access to areas that
provide favorable economic opportunities. Lack of internal mobility also perpetu-
ates high concentrations of the Mexican-born population. The continued entry of
migrants from Mexico who are good labor market substitutes for earlier migrants
results in continued job competition between the groups, which in turn restricts
wage growth for them.
International Trade
Most empirical studies of the economic consequences of U.S. immigration
have failed to consider the international trade side. However, an exception is
Borjas, Freeman and Katz (1992), who attempted to carefully assess the labor-
market consequences of both immigration and trade. They first show that
international trade had a significant implicit effect on the labor market and that
this effect changed dramatically during the 1980s relative to the 1960s and 1970s.
Indeed, the trade deficits of the 1980s resulted in a considerable increase in the
implicit supply of low-skill labor to the manufacturing sector, which is the focus
of their attention.
Borjas, Freeman and Katz (1992) conclude that both trade and immigration
have greatly increased the effective supply of high school dropouts and that trade
and immigration flows may have contributed substantially to the poor labor market
performance of the least educated American workers during the 1980s (1992:240).
More specifically, they argue that the various changes in relative skill endowments
due to the combination of trade and immigration can explain over 40 percent of the
decline in the relative earnings of high school dropouts during the 1980s (p.240).
These findings indicate a significant impact of trade and immigration on some of
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the most disadvantaged U.S. workers. However, the separate effects of trade and
immigration, which in an important sense are not causally independent, are not
measured.27
Conclusions on Labor Market
Channels of Influence
Do low-skill workers from Mexico place downward pressure on the wage
rates of other U.S. workers and displace them from their jobs? Analyses based
on data from the 1980 census concluded that immigrants have little impact on
native workers, except in areas of high immigrant concentration. In such areas
some job displacement and slight downward pressure on wages was evident, but
the largest impacts were on the migrants themselves. Moreover, in sectors where
immigrants concentrated, evidence from case studies suggested some job
displacement for natives.
The major surge of international migration that occurred during the 1980s
has raised questions about the validity of conclusions based on 1980 data. More-
over, earlier economic models did not concretely address the impacts of migrants
from Mexico on various skill classes of U.S. labor. Data from the 1990 census
generally support the conclusions based on earlier data. Specifically, migrants
from Mexico have little impact on native workers. Only limited evidence points
to job displacement of natives and then mainly in areas of high concentration of
Mexican migrants. Case studies continue to indicate the displacement of native
workers in sectors that attract foreign workers. Where the migrants are more con-
centrated, the effects on the wage rates and employment of native workers, espe-
cially females of Mexican ancestry, are slightly negative, but even in these areas
large increases in low-skill workers from Mexico have little impact on native
workers.
One exception is that in Los Angeles the migrants displace low-skill black
females and put downward pressure on their wages, and they also tend to displace
low-skill black males. The largest labor market impacts of low-skill migrants from
Mexico are on other such migrants from Mexico, because the current and earlier
migrants are very good labor market substitutes. In areas of considerable concen-
tration of these migrants, the negative effects on the wages and employment of
earlier migrants are large, which appears to discourage upward wage mobility for
these newcomers to the United States. The continued flow of new migrants and
their location in the same areas as their earlier counterparts, coupled with rela-
tively low internal migration rates of persons born in Mexico, suggest that mi-
grants from Mexico will have some difficulty in improving their economic status,
at least relative to other foreign-born groups.
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Impacts through Economies of Scale
An increase in population ordinarily requires an increase in services provi-
sion—education, police protection, health care, electricity and sewer service to
name a few. In the case of these common services, the pertinent question from the
standpoint of impacts is whether the additional services are provided at increasing
or decreasing marginal cost. Studies of the fiscal impacts of immigration usually
assess the costs of immigrants on particular services by calculating the total amount
spent on the service and dividing that by the number of persons who use the ser-
vice. This procedure yields an average cost for a particular service for a designated
administrative unit. The problem is that many studies assume that the marginal
costs are equivalent to average costs. Under some circumstances marginal costs
are lower than average costs; under other circumstances, marginal costs are greater
than average costs.28 Scale effects are an important reason why these relationships
are variable, but most studies of the fiscal impacts of immigration assume equiva-
lency of marginal and average costs, which we discuss further in the section on
fiscal impacts.
Services like sewage, utilities, and roads can be more cheaply provided in
areas of higher population density. Rural electrification is much more expensive,
per capita, than urban electrification. Rural school districts may spend less per
pupil than urban districts, but it is difficult to account for possible differences in
quality of the educational services provided. As Preston (1989) notes, the distribu-
tion of people in the United States, with very high concentrations in large metro-
politan areas and very low population densities in other areas, is precisely the kind
of population distribution required for positive returns to scale. If there were con-
stant or decreasing returns to scale, population density would be more uniformly
distributed across the U.S. mainland, thus minimizing the local scale economies
affecting the average person. That Mexican immigrants are densely settled in a few
large cities of the Southwest and Illinois implies clear economies of scale.
If there are in fact positive returns to scale, the implication for immigration
is fairly clear: more people make the whole society more efficient, and immigra-
tion would therefore inevitably be a benefit to the host society. The issue is, of
course, more complex because there can also be diseconomies of scale, and be-
cause the extent of positive or negative returns to scale is the subject of substan-
tial disagreement in the empirical literature. The question of returns to scale is
central for assessing the impacts of Mexican immigration, which is distinguished
by its volume relative to other country-specific flows, and its high concentration
in a few large cities.
Pro-immigration analysts generally assume a positive return to scale for
population growth. Most anti-immigrant work emphasizes over crowding, excessive
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consumption of limited resources, and other implicit negative returns to scale for
population growth. The economic literature that employs explicit models for the
impacts of immigration, such as Borjas (1995), almost invariably assumes constant
returns to scale in the production functions. Measurement of real returns to scale
presents many problems mainly relating to the empirical problem of measuring
returns or output or services in units of constant quality, and mathematically
working with such models. However, this common assumption tends to bias
conclusions about scale effects against some of the possible economic benefits of
immigration. Kuznets’ economic history of the United States makes a strong case
for the importance of increasing returns to scale over time, and other authors have
pointed out that there is little reason to believe these historical arguments are any
less relevant today.
One clear example where scale effects may be strongly positive and where
there is a paucity of economic research is in the multiplier effects via
consumption and production associated with the proliferation of densely settled
ethnic neighborhoods. Sociological studies have been more diligent in studying
the growth and development of ethnic business economies in specific locations
and for specific groups (e.g., Cubans in Miami and Koreans in various urban
settings). However, the vast majority have ignored business ownership patterns
among Mexican immigrants despite their dense settlement patterns. Two reasons
explain this relative neglect. First, Mexicans have very low education levels
which are presumed too low for a substantial impact on business ownership;
second, census data show very low rates of self-employment among Mexicans
relative to other immigrants.
There are reasons to challenge the idea that business ownership will remain
low among densely settled Mexican immigrants. Although much of the economic
literature assumes that years of schooling directly measures skill and hence worker
productivity, the labor market profile presented above revealed some anomalies
in this relationship. Especially noteworthy is that Mexican immigrants complete
appreciably lower levels of education than U.S.-born blacks yet have higher rates
of labor force participation. One possible reason for this outcome is that Mexican
immigrants are preferred workers to native blacks, particularly in inner city labor
markets where both groups come together and compete for low wage jobs (Wilson,
1996; Tienda and Stier, 1996; Tienda, 1989). Another reason is that Mexican
immigrants find alternative ways of earning a livelihood, including informal
employment and self-employment (Tienda and Raijman, 1996; Raijman, 1996).
The latter option, which appears to be associated with residential concentrated
settlements and thereby economies of scale, has been relatively ignored by students
of Mexican immigration.
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Entrepreneurship among Mexican Immigrants
Julian Simon (1989) argues that immigrants bring with them knowledge based
on the experience of how things are done in other places and may therefore be
highly productive and predisposed to self-employment even with a limited formal
education. A corollary to Simon’s argument about working-class innovation and
entrepreneurship is the literature on immigration that treats immigrants as self-
selected for entrepreneurial spirit and work ethic. Presumably, the possibilities of
business formation among relatively unskilled Mexican migrants would be greater
in ethnic neighborhoods where demand for goods and services that cater to Mexican
tastes and preferences would generate demand for ethnic business concerns.
Although residentially concentrated, Mexican migrants have relatively low rates
of self-employment and business ownership (Borjas, 1986; Portes and Bach, 1985),
particularly by comparison to migrants from Cuba and Korea. Surprisingly, this
anomaly has produced few studies to explain why this is so. However, a recent
study of business activity in Little Village, one of Chicago’s two Mexican migrant
communities, showed much higher levels of self-employment among Mexican
migrants than revealed by conventional census data.29 This is because much self-
employment activity is informal, and because self-employment activities were vastly
under-reported, especially by individuals whose self-employment activity was pur-
sued in addition to jobs in the formal labor market. The unique design of the Little
Village study, which involved both a representative household survey and a ran-
dom survey of extant businesses, permitted a detailed inquiry into the determinants
of business formation among Mexican migrants. Rather than studying existing
businesses (as most studies have done), the design provided information about in-
dividuals at different states of business formation. Finally, the study design permit-
ted a comparative perspective about how and why different ethnic groups access
the world of business ownership.
Findings based on the 1994 household and business surveys in Little Village
challenge assertions of low entrepreneurial disposition among Mexican migrants
on several grounds. First, the study revealed that the level of potential self-
employment in the community is extremely high. Half of the population of Little
Village aspired to starting their own business and of these, one in three had taken
some concrete steps to actualize their goal. Both financial capital and lack of
information about requirements to establish a formal business inhibited the likelihood
of business formation for aspiring businessmen. The household survey also revealed
that respondents inclined to begin a business differed systematically from those
not predisposed to do so in their risk-taking disposition, in their family links to
business, and in their economic resources. Results also confirmed that residence in
environments where ethnic businesses proliferate is conducive to demonstration
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effects and sources of financial and nonfinancial support that puts business ownership
within the reach of individuals with modest education levels and limited resources.
Thus, scale effects associated with densely settled neighborhoods appear to be
conducive to enterprising activity even among low-education Mexican migrants.
A second major finding of the study is that the invisibility of Mexican self-
employment, as reported by conventional census data, stems from the inability
of current reporting categories to include informal activities and multiple job
holding. Specifically, by neglecting a variety of informal activities (such as street
vending, house repairs and child care services) that figure prominently in the
income packaging strategies of migrant families, rates of self-employment of
Mexican migrants (especially women) are seriously under-reported. The Little
Village study also showed that the majority of self-employment activity among
Mexican migrants residing in Chicago is marginal and results in response to the
precarious labor market status of this migrant group. Informal self-employment
provides income for migrants whose social circumstances, namely low education
or undocumented status, limit their access to paid jobs. Dense settlement patterns
also are conducive to the emergence of informal activity that caters to the needs
of other co-ethnics.
A third major finding from the study concerns the heterogeneous ethnic com-
position of the business community in Little Village, which serves a relatively
ethnically homogeneous Mexican neighborhood. During the last decade or so,
various ethnic groups (notably Koreans, Arabs, Chinese, Vietnamese and Paki-
stanis) joined the white and Mexican business owners in Little Village. These
groups differ notably in their prior entrepreneurial experiences in ways that Simon
(1989) indicated. Specifically, Mexican business owners in Little Village had less
experience in the world of business than other ethnoracial groups who owned and
operated businesses in the neighborhood. However, Mexican migrants’ experi-
ence deficit was compensated by the distinct pathways to self-employment along
ethnic lines. For them, the informal economy served as a pathway to business
ownership while entry through employment in a co-ethnic firm is more common
among Koreans. That is, most Korean immigrants who owned and operated a
storefront in Little Village acquired their business know-how by working in simi-
lar firms owned by co-ethnics, but nearly one-in three businesses owned and
operated by Mexican migrants began informally. Lacking a strong ethnic economy
to acquire training and skills, as do Koreans and Cubans, for example, many
Mexican migrants use the informal sector as a means of acquiring skills and capi-
tal needed for starting a business in the formal sector. Informal economic activi-
ties allow enterprising migrants to experiment and explore the viability of par-
ticular types of businesses. By testing the market, possibly accumulating capital
or learning about its availability, and acquiring rudimentary skills in a particular
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line of work, informal self-employment serves as a steppingstone to successful
business formation.
Conclusions on Impacts through Economies of Scale
Although relatively understudied in the literature on impacts of Mexican
immigration, economies of scale (generated by the emergence of dense Mexican
immigrant communities) can produce positive economic outcomes. The Little Village
study showed that dense settlement patterns are conducive to the emergence of
informal economic activity that caters to the needs of other co-ethnics. Some of
this activity eventuates into formal businesses because many Mexican immigrants
acquire business-relevant experience through informal market activities. Thus, scale
effects associated with densely settled neighborhoods appear to be conducive to
enterprising activity even among low-education Mexican immigrants.
Additional scale effects derive from the fact that Mexican immigrants con-
sume goods and services produced in the United States, thereby contributing to
aggregate income growth (although the net beneficiaries of immigrant consump-
tion are the owners of capital). There is relatively little study of the consumption
profiles of Mexican immigrants. This information is essential for appreciating how
the scale effects of Mexican immigration operate through demand for goods and
services, including those produced within and outside of ethnic labor market niches.
This is an important area for further research because it would help balance the
preponderant focus of impact studies on costs by acknowledging that many posi-
tive impacts are generated through increases in aggregate demand or expansion of
local labor markets.
Welfare Participation
Prior Studies
One line of research conducted at the national level that has important
implications for fiscal impacts (as well as perceptions about the costs and benefits
of immigration) focuses on immigrants’ use of social services. These studies are
largely based on census-type data and attempt to “explain” differentials in program
participation by immigrant and native families, emphasizing how eligibility
characteristics unequally dispose families to participate in means-tested income
transfer programs. A main conclusion from the various studies of public assistance
utilization is that immigrants in general are not more prone to use public assistance
than natives of similar socioeconomic characteristics. If controls for various
demographic and family characteristics are not included in the analysis, then
immigrant-to-native comparisons differ, depending on the gender of the head of
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household (Blau, 1984), race/ethnic group (Tienda and Jensen, 1986, and also Jensen,
1988), and the year of analysis (Borjas and Trejo, 1991, and Borjas, 1995b).
For example, for male headed households, Blau found that immigrant families
were more likely than native families to participate in a welfare program, but the
opposite obtains for female headed households. Borjas (1995b) shows that immigrant
families’ welfare participation rate has risen in recent years. Concerning various
race/ethnic groups, and Hispanics in particular, a higher percentage of Hispanic
immigrant families than native Hispanic families are found to receive public
assistance if controls for other characteristics are not included in the analysis.
Recent research has focused less on the issue of direct immigrant-to-native
comparisons, and more on whether immigrant propensities to use social services
have changed over time and/or whether the propensities of more recent cohorts
differ from those of earlier cohorts. This research has also considered how years
since migration has an impact on the utilization of public assistance programs. On
the one hand, many individuals have argued that the economic assimilation that
occurs with longer U.S. residence should result in higher incomes, thus reducing
the use of public assistance. However, additional U.S. experience also results in
greater knowledge of and familiarity with social programs, thus conceivably
increasing the receipt of public assistance. The early evidence concerning this issue
is especially mixed. Studies using a single cross-section of data (e.g., Blau, 1984,
and Tienda and Jensen, 1986) were generally unable to find a consistent pattern
linking length of U.S. residence and the probability of receiving welfare. These
analyses do not allow the impacts of U.S. residence to be distinguished from entry
cohort effects. The various works by Borjas provide the strongest evidence indicating
that the use of public assistance rises with length of U.S. residence, but these
conclusions are based on the strong assumption of uniform period conditions across
groups. Jensen also finds some evidence that years in the U.S. increases welfare
utilization, but this evidence does not separate cohort and assimilation effects.
Concerning the relative propensities of different cohorts to use public assistance,
Borjas and Trejo as well as Borjas (1995b) find that the most recent cohorts have
higher propensities to use the welfare system than earlier cohorts. They generally
attribute this finding to the shift in natural origin mix of the immigrant flow. Jensen
finds similar evidence for white immigrants, but he is unable to link the higher use
of welfare by Asians in 1980 to a higher utilization propensity by the recent
immigrants. Moreover, recent Hispanics were not found to have higher use in 1980.
In fact, recent Mexican immigrants actually appear to have a lower probability of
receiving transfer payments in 1979. Thus, Jensen (and also Jensen and Tienda)
find differences across immigrant groups as well as differences within groups. Such
potential differences across and within immigrant groups are not specifically
addressed in the either the Borjas and Trejo or the Borjas analyses. Moreover, the
335
methodology used by Borjas and Trejo (and also Borjas) constrains the period
effects on welfare participation by immigrants to be identical to those of natives.
Evidence presented by Jensen raises questions concerning the appropriateness, and
consequently the impact, of this restriction. All prior studies are limited because
their reliance on 1980 data means that “recent” immigrants arrived over 15 years
ago. Much has changed in the U.S. welfare policy climate since then.
Participation by the foreign born in welfare programs is the focus of considerable
scrutiny in the United States. Presumably motivated by the notion that legal and
unauthorized immigrants participate in some sense “too much” in such programs,
Congress passed the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation
Act of 1996. This Act restricts the access of even legal immigrants to welfare
utilization. In spite of the passage of this legislation, many questions regarding
immigrant utilization of public assistance programs remain only partially answered
or unanswered. Precisely which public assistance programs are used relatively much
by which entry cohort of which foreign-born group relative to which native-born
group? The answers remain obscure. Accordingly, in a paper prepared for the
Commission (Davies and Greenwood, 1997), we provide an unusually detailed
analysis of public assistance utilization by Mexican-born households relative to
various control groups of native-born households.
1990 Welfare Participation
This analysis uses the 1990 Public Use Microdata Samples to analyze partici-
pation in means-tested programs by Mexican-born households who resided in the
United States. Several control groups are explored, as are several subsamples of
the data, in order to provide a more complete analysis of welfare participation
differences between Mexican-born and native-born households. Separate analyses
of young and senior age groups for various nativity and ethnic subsamples permit-
ted us to approximate program participation differences due to AFDC and SSI. The
empirical results of this study indicate that Mexican-born households are no more
likely to use welfare than either otherwise comparable native-born households of
Mexican ancestry or otherwise comparable native-born households in general.
However, they are more likely to participate than native whites, but less likely than
native blacks. Moreover, recent cohorts from Mexico are less likely to use welfare
than any control group, whereas more distant cohorts are more likely users.
Similar results obtain when households are partitioned into those headed by
females and those headed by males. The highest incidence of welfare usage is among
single female-headed households, but Mexican-born females in this group are sig-
nificantly less likely to participate in welfare (AFDC) if they entered the United
States in recent cohorts. This finding holds relative to different control groups, and it
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holds as well for young female household heads (less than 30 years old) born in
Mexico. The same general finding holds for male-headed households from Mexico,
as well as for young male-headed households from Mexico. Recent entry cohorts
participate less in welfare (AFDC) than otherwise comparable households both of
Mexican ancestry and of all natives. However, Mexican-born male-headed house-
holds 65 years old and over who entered the United States in more distant cohorts
show some tendency to use welfare (SSI) significantly more than otherwise compa-
rable native-born households of Mexican ancestry. Although a similar relationship
holds relative to all native households 65 and over, it is less strong.
Borjas and Trejo (1993) concluded that immigrants assimilate into welfare.
Findings of the present study do not directly address the assimilation issue because
we do not employ two censuses to form synthetic cohorts that are followed through
time. However, results from the Davies and Greenwood study suggest some cau-
tion in drawing conclusions regarding the assimilation of Mexican immigrants into
welfare. When they are young, recent entrants in the United States, the Mexican-
born population is less likely to use welfare, which is almost certainly AFDC. When
they grow older, or enter at older ages, they are more likely to use SSI.
In studies of this type, where the foreign born are analyzed relative to a control
group of native-born households, investigators may impute behavior to the foreign
born when the native-born control is in some sense more responsible for a finding.
The apparently higher use of SSI by the Mexican-born population is almost cer-
tainly due to their not qualifying for Social Security during their retirement years.
The control group of natives has Social Security income available to it, which in
turn lessens its reliance on SSI. Indeed, it is not clear whether the results of the
present study are due to the lesser use of SSI by older natives or the higher use of
SSI by older persons born in Mexico.
Finally, it is important to note that, while there is a general consensus that
immigrants are not more prone to use public assistance than natives of similar
socioeconomic characteristics, immigrants’ characteristics determine their eligi-
bility for welfare and, to a large extent, their propensity to accept means-tested
income transfers. For instance, Mexican immigrants to the United States are char-
acterized by low levels of educational attainment, large families, and poor English-
language abilities. All these factors, among others, are generally found to be posi-
tively related with the level of welfare use.
Conclusions about Welfare Participation and
Implications of Recent Policy Changes
Migrants from Mexico to the United States tend to be young job seekers (sec-
ond and third chapters). In general, they do not appear to cross the border in order
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to enjoy welfare benefits, although a minority of past migrants may have been
motivated by the desire to collect welfare.30 Because they are primary-care provid-
ers to children, young females have considerably higher propensities to participate
in U.S. welfare programs than young males, and among young females, those who
are household heads with no spouse present have the highest propensities to use
welfare. However, young females from Mexico were significantly less likely to use
AFDC (in 1989) than either otherwise comparable native-born females of Mexican
ancestry or otherwise comparable native-born females in general. The same con-
clusion holds for young female household heads with no spouse present. House-
hold heads 65 and over who were born in Mexico were more likely to receive SSI
in 1989 than otherwise comparable native-born heads, but this tendency may have
been due to the failure of the Mexico-born heads to qualify for Social Security
relative to their native-born counterparts.
Welfare participation patterns and their consequences will change as a result
of recent changes in welfare legislation. The Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 defines a new eligibility category for legal
aliens—“qualified aliens”—which includes lawful permanent residents, refugees,
and asylees, as well as certain others. Most qualified aliens are barred from food
stamps and Supplemental Security Income (SSI). Moreover, this law bars qualified
aliens admitted to the U.S. before the law’s enactment on August 22, 1996, from all
means-tested federal programs for their first five years in the United States. States
also are permitted to deny qualified aliens Temporary Assistance to Needy Fami-
lies (TANF), which replaced Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC),
Medicaid, and various federally-funded state programs, such as child care and ser-
vices for the elderly. Exceptions are made for refugees and asylees during their
first five years in the United States. Naturalized citizens are eligible for benefits
available to native-born citizens, but naturalization typically requires five years as
a permanent resident alien.
Most federal public benefit programs have not been available to undocumented
migrants, but the old law was silent on such eligibility for certain minor programs.
The new law defines “not qualified aliens” to include undocumented migrants, and
explicitly bars their use of federal public benefit programs as well as programs
financed by state and local governments. If states wish to make benefits available
to non-qualified aliens, they must pass a law that allows them to do so, which is
highly unlikely.
The new eligibility requirements may discourage the entry of some potential
migrants from Mexico. However, because most young migrants from Mexico seek
better job opportunities in the United States and not welfare, we expect this effect
to be small. Moreover, some potential legal migrants who would have been eligible
for SSI under the old program may be discouraged from entering the United States
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under the new, more restrictive eligibility criteria. Again, we expect this effect to
be small since migrants from Mexico tend to be young and ineligible for SSI. With
respect to migration from Mexico, the major effect of the new legislation may be
the perception that the “climate” has changed and that the U.S. is less receptive to
migrants from Mexico than previously. This perception may be particularly true
for undocumented migrants.
A major limitation of prior studies of welfare participation is their failure to
consider undocumented migrants because most studies of welfare participation are
based on either 1980 or 1990 census data. Census data enumerate all foreign-born
individuals residing in the United States on a specific day, but do not permit dis-
tinctions among various types of migrants, notably legal resident aliens (immi-
grants), undocumented migrants, and temporary residents such as students and vari-
ous types of visitors. However, because a large fraction of all undocumented mi-
grants are young males born in Mexico, and because young males born in Mexico
have relatively low welfare participation propensities, it is unlikely that undocu-
mented migrants are heavy users of welfare. Finally, the new welfare reform legis-
lation explicitly denies benefits to undocumented migrants, which guarantees far
less participation by this population at the present time relative to 1990. Welfare
officials disinclined (or disallowed) to query legal status of applicants in the past
may be more inclined to do so in the future.
Welfare participation by the foreign born is usefully considered from two per-
spectives. The first is the perspective of the migrants themselves and the second is
that of the levels of government that are responsible for providing welfare benefits.
The migrants are clearly better off, at least in the short run, with welfare than
without it, but the major point of contention concerns the current costs to society of
providing welfare benefits relative to the tax payments made by the users and rela-
tive to future costs imposed on society (i.e., negative externalities) if it does not
provide the benefits.
A major rationale for welfare provision is to avoid future costs to society that
would be incurred if welfare were not provided. Thus, for example, school-lunch
programs presumably promote healthier, more attentive children who will learn
more, thereby enhancing their future employability, and discourage poor health
(and future public health costs) and criminal activities (and future costs associ-
ated with such activity). A delicate balance exists between the withholding of
current welfare from migrants and future costs that may be incurred on society if
the benefits are not provided. Estimates do not exist for this aspect of the public
balance sheet.
In spite of relatively low welfare participation by young migrants born in
Mexico, we can not infer the absence of a negative impact from data on behavioral
tendencies. Data relating to such tendencies indicate nothing about taxes collected
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from these migrants nor the cost of providing welfare services to them. Thus,
we now turn our attention to the broader question of the net fiscal impact of
Mexican migration to the United States.
Fiscal Impacts
Among the various channels through which immigration exerts economic ef-
fects, the fiscal channel has commanded considerable attention in the past five years.
The fiscal channel entails the cost of government services such as education, transfers
and benefits provided to immigrants, along with other costs for such things as the
incarceration of immigrant prisoners, minus the taxes and fees that immigrants pay.
Moreover, on-going residents may experience either higher or lower taxes due to the
presence of immigrants, but this potentially important effect has been largely ignored
to date. As states have brought suit against the U.S. federal government to recover the
costs of providing services to unauthorized migrants, an important debate has taken
place over how to quantify the fiscal impacts they initiate, as well as the fiscal impacts
of migrants from abroad in general. The political backlash against the foreign born,
especially in California, has increased the need for careful scholarly attention to the
issue (Smith and Edmonston, 1997). Because Mexican migrants, both legal and un-
documented, are disproportionately concentrated in California, Texas and Illinois,
we focus on these three states.
Principles of Agreement and Disagreement
The debate over the fiscal impacts of migration has generated relatively few
points of consensus. Most recent studies seem to agree that immigrants, and espe-
cially undocumented migrants, impose a fiscal burden on state and local govern-
ments, but there is considerable disagreement about the magnitude of the fiscal
deficit. Weintraub and Cardenas (1984) are a notable exception: they surveyed
undocumented migrants in Texas, and estimated a state level net fiscal gain of
between $120 million and $180 million per year.
At the national level there is less consensus, with some authors arguing that
immigrants subsidize natives, and other authors arguing the opposite. The reasons
for this disagreement are partly technical of course, but in large measure the tech-
nical questions stem directly from the more basic issues inherent in trying to mea-
sure the economic impacts of one demographic group on another when the two
groups are substantially intermingled. Rothman and Espenshade (1992) and Vernez
and McCarthy (1995) survey the literature on fiscal impacts and comment on the
inherent difficulties (see also, NAS, 1996; Smith and Edmonston, 1997). Five of
the most serious difficulties are summarized below.
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Inaccurate Estimates of the
Undocumented Population
INS and Census Bureau estimates of the undocumented alien population in
the United States in 1992 ranged between 3.2 million and 3.8 million, a difference
of 15 percent. In calculating their estimates of the costs of undocumented migration,
the states used population figures that were almost 50 percent higher than Census
Bureau’s best estimates. In the simple simulation we present below, we compare
results using the ”best” estimates and the very highest estimates of the undocumented
population. This exercise responds to the NAS (1996) recommendation to generate
a range of fiscal impacts using different assumptions.
Difficulties in Partitioning the Foreign
Born by Legal Status
Many households contain people whose migration and legal statuses differ.
For instance, many of the children of illegal immigrants are themselves U.S. citi-
zens because they were born in the U.S. Should the education of these children be
“charged” to the fiscal account of the immigrants? Because public primary and
secondary education is by far the most expensive local service that immigrant fami-
lies consume, decisions about how to identify the children has an enormous conse-
quences on the fiscal balance sheet. Moreover, the present value of this cost has to
be discounted by the future value of the productivity of well-trained workers, and
this may reverse the balance of this fiscal impact.
The Problem of Accounting Completeness
None of the known studies successfully account for all of the relevant costs
and benefits. Some costs, such as schooling or incarceration costs, can be esti-
mated by applying an average per-person cost to a fixed number of persons who
receive the service. But other services, such as highway construction, defense
costs and governmental debt service are more difficult to apportion. And while
some studies, such as that by the Urban Institute (Clark et al., 1994), made an
effort to quantify the tax payment rates of illegal aliens for some kinds of taxes,
their payment rates for other kinds of taxes and fees are unknown. Moreover,
depending upon the cost conditions under which various public services are ren-
dered, the taxes paid by on-going residents could rise or fall, because public ser-
vices are typically priced at average cost. Finally, quality deterioration could occur
in public services, such as due to crowding in schools or due to special program
requirements that spread already thin teacher resources over more children. The
states’ own estimates of the fiscal burden of illegal migrants have included only
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the cost of services provided, without accounting for any revenue from the group.
This accounting strategy produces a distorted balance sheet (GAO, 1994). Con-
sequently, each of the fiscal impact studies represents an incomplete fiscal ac-
counting, and each is incomplete in a different way because a slightly different
set of services and taxes is estimated, and/or a different level of government is
involved in the revenue and expenditure side of the ledger. Consequently, most
results are not directly comparable.
The Problem of Average versus Marginal Cost
To assess the cost that the children of illegal migrants impose on a local school
system, fiscal impact studies divide the total education budget by the total number
of students in the system, and apply that average cost to the number of children of
illegal migrants in the system. The problem with this strategy, which is the only
practical methodology to use, is that marginal costs seldom equal average costs.
That is, the cost of educating one additional child could be zero if classrooms and
teachers were already in place and could readily accommodate the additional stu-
dent. Alternatively, if the new student needed special instruction of some kind, or if
a new investment in physical plant were required to accommodate the student,
marginal costs could be higher than average costs. A related problem is that analy-
ses are often performed at administrative levels that encompass highly variable
mean costs. For example, Rothman and Espenshade (1992) criticize Simon’s (1981)
national level fiscal study for applying national average education costs and tax
rates to all natives and immigrants, despite that the different residential distribu-
tions of the groups imply different average cost and tax regimes.
The Problem of Time Frame
Except for a few exceptions, such as Loveless et al. (1996), which employed
a 10-year span of time-series data, all the fiscal impact studies examine a yearly
budget. The problem with the yearly approach is that immigrant’s cost/benefit
profile is likely to change over the life course (as Loveless and his colleagues
have shown), and therefore the annual budget is a poor basis for estimating even
short-term impacts. The National Academy of Sciences (1997) also conducted a
long-term analysis that used a recent set of annual calculations as a starting point
and projected both revenues and expenditures into the future under various as-
sumptions about the course of immigration and fiscal policy as well as the eco-
nomic assimilation of immigrants and their descendants. We highlight the main
findings of this study below, and also identify some of its limitations in our con-
cluding section.
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State-Level Fiscal Impacts
Despite the above caveats, which are crucial to understanding the limits of the
fiscal impact studies, for the purposes of illustration we prepared a secondary analysis
of the fiscal impact of undocumented migrants for three large states whose migrants
are most heavily Mexican: California, Texas and Illinois.31 The following analysis
is based largely on data assembled by Clark et al (1994), which includes a thorough
examination of how state-level costs and taxes can be measured, as well as an
evaluation of the states’ own estimates of fiscal impacts.32 We made a few minor
alterations to their figures in order to apply all per capita costs and expenses (in
1992 dollars) to the 1992 populations. The three sources of state and local revenue
included in their study account for less than 50% of the revenue of each of the
states, and the costs are also incomplete. Therefore, we cannot draw conclusions
about the total fiscal impact. The costs included in the model are primary and
secondary school education, the state portion of Medicaid costs, and incarceration
costs in state and local jails. The revenue side of the model includes state income
tax, sales tax and property taxes.
We have added data that allow for comparisons between estimates for the
(incomplete) net fiscal costs of illegal migrants compiled by Clark et al. and the
comparable net fiscal costs of the rest of each state’s population. These data, broken
into three different scenarios, are summarized in Table 7, with a more detailed
breakdown available in Appendix B. Scenario A in Table 7 represents figures based
on best estimates of the illegal alien population established by Clark et al. Because
the fiscal picture is not complete, the ‘net’ aggregate fiscal impacts contain obvious
anomalies, such as the total population of California running a $14 billion surplus
with the state.
The aggregate cost estimates of Clark et al. are considerably lower (more than
$1 billion less) than those generated by the State of California, largely because of
the wide discrepancy in the estimated size of the illegal migrant population in that
state. By comparison, Illinois has such a small undocumented population that dif-
ferences in cost estimation yield fairly modest gaps in the assessment of the cost of
providing services to the undocumented.
Useful comparisons can be made between the net fiscal impacts of the un-
documented and the rest of each state’s population, but it is important to bear in
mind that the fiscal balance is incomplete, and that other unmeasured revenue streams
and costs could conceivably offset these effects. In scenario A, illegal migrants in
California use $1,124 of state and local services per capita, which is higher than
the $906 per capita of state and local services that the rest of the population uses.
Public school expenses account for about two-thirds of these costs. In Texas, the
undocumented and the rest of the population both use somewhat more than $1,000
per capita in services, and school costs account for more than 80% of the costs. In
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Illinois, the undocumented use less state and local resources than the rest of the
Illinois population (and less than the undocumented in the other states) for two
reasons. Clark, et al. estimate that the age profile of the undocumented is older in
Illinois and the high school dropout rate is higher for the undocumented there (see
their Table 4.9). These two circumstances (i.e., an older age profile and higher
school dropout rate) imply that the undocumented are a smaller share of Illinois’
school population. Therefore the undocumented in this state use relatively little in
the way of state and local services.
Following further the lessons from scenario A, the gap in per capita service
usage between the undocumented and the rest of the population is roughly $200 in
California ($1,124 compared to $906), $100 in Texas, and negative in Illinois. The
revenue gap is much larger in all three states. In the three states considered as a
whole, the undocumented pay about $500 per person in state and local taxes, the
rest of the population pays far more: in California about $1,400 per person; in
Texas and Illinois about $1,000 per person. When costs are subtracted from taxes
paid, to yield a net cost or burden per capita, the undocumented in California run a
per capita deficit of $588, while the rest of California pays $518 more than it uses
in services. Of course, these figures must be examined with caution because, as we
noted above, this is not a complete fiscal accounting, and many kinds of services
and revenues are left out. Still, the calculations show that the undocumented popu-
lation most likely poses a fiscal burden on each of the states, because of the low
rate of state and local taxes that undocumented migrants pay. Among the three
kinds of taxes analyzed (sales tax, property tax, and state income tax), the migrants
pay less of each type on a per capita basis because they have low incomes.
The fiscal gap between the undocumented and the rest of the population is
much higher in California than in Texas or Illinois for two reasons: (1) the per
capita revenue gap is highest in California, and (2) the undocumented population is
far larger in California than in the other states. California has a sizable state in-
come tax, to which the undocumented contribute only about $30 per person, while
other Californians contribute more than $500 per person. Income taxes are very
progressive at low income levels because most working poor people tend to have
little taxable income. The undocumented may also be able to avoid compliance
with some or all of their income tax responsibilities. Texas, on the other hand, has
no income tax, but only sales tax and property tax. These taxes are much less pro-
gressive. For example, in the case of the property tax, renters pay it as part of their
rent. As a result, the per capita revenue gap between the undocumented and the rest
of the population is much less in Texas than in California. In Texas the undocu-
mented pay $579 per capita in taxes compared to $968 per capita for the rest of the
population. However, in California the undocumented pay $536 while everyone
else pays $1,424 per person.
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Focusing on the total net fiscal burden of the undocumented in each state,
California bears the heaviest burden ($829 million), while the burden in Texas is
much smaller ($194 million), and the burden in Illinois is almost trivial ($17 million)
relative to the state budgets. These net figures are much smaller than the states’
estimates used in claims against the federal government because the states’ costs
(but not revenues) are based on somewhat inflated figures for the undocumented
population (see Clark et al, 1994; GAO, 1994).
There is no disagreement that California bears the brunt of new immigration,
including undocumented migration. Therefore, it is logical that California experi-
ences the heaviest fiscal burden due simply to the sheer number of immigrants it
receives, as documented above. Table 7 shows that not only is California faced
with by far the largest number of undocumented migrants, but also that the fiscal
impact of this migrant stream is magnified by a relatively large per capita fiscal
gap between the undocumented and the rest of the population. This gap results
from the higher rate and more progressive nature of the tax system in California,
which leaves the undocumented paying a smaller share of the total state and local
tax burden.
Among the costs that can be directly attributable to illegal migrants, by far the
largest is the cost of primary and secondary education. Cognizant of difficulties in
accounting for the citizen children of illegal immigrants, in scenario B we recalcu-
lated the fiscal impacts by categorizing these children differently. In scenario A,
only children who are themselves foreign-born and undocumented are counted
among the undocumented school-age population. In scenario B, we augment this
population by including the citizen children of the undocumented migrants on the
grounds that their parents’ unauthorized presence incurred their schooling costs.
We assumed that this restriction would increase the ‘undocumented’ school age
population by 25% . These results are presented in Table 7, scenario B. Although
the undocumented population of primary and secondary students has increased
25% over that reported in scenario A, the total undocumented population has in-
creased only about 5% (from 1.41 million to 1.48 million in California). Conse-
quently, the total cost of services to the undocumented in California arose by 18%,
from $1.58 to $1.87 billion, and the net fiscal burden increased substantially, from
$829 million to $1.08 billion.
The final scenario reported in Table 7, scenario C, uses the states’ own
estimates of the undocumented population, which is considerably higher than
the Census Bureau’s high end estimate for the undocumented population in 1992.
This scenario increases the undocumented population in California by 673,000
over the 1.4 million in scenario A, a gain of almost 50% (note that the states’
total populations also change in this scenario, to accommodate the previously
uncounted persons). The total costs in scenario C are different from the total
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costs in the states’ claims because we use per capita costs and revenues based on
Clark et al. (1994), which differ from those provided by the states in some
particulars. Using the states’ inflated undocumented population estimates
combined with estimates of various costs established by Clark et al., scenario C
shows that the undocumented population in the three states (CA, IL, and TX)
consume, respectively, $2.17 billion, $173 million, and $611 million in state and
local services. The states’ own estimates of these particular costs, using these
population figures and their own methodologies yielded costs of $2.8 billion
(California), $151 million (Illinois), and $362 million (Texas).
It is noteworthy that although scenario C increases the undocumented popula-
tion much more drastically than scenario B, scenarios B and C yielded similar
aggregate fiscal burdens for undocumented immigration. For California, the un-
documented are more costly to the state and local treasuries under scenario B ($1.08
billion total cost) than in scenario C ($1.055 billion). Both scenarios B and C natu-
rally increase the fiscal burden over scenario A ($829 million). For Texas, scenario
C is the most costly. In scenario C the total costs and total taxes paid by the un-
documented both increase sharply. In scenario B, which increases only the crucial
school-age population (due to reclassification), the total costs increase substan-
tially but the total taxes paid by the undocumented population increase only slightly.
Although scenario C uses a figure for the undocumented population that is
48% higher than scenario A (2.083 million as compared to 1.41 million), for
California the total net fiscal burden of the undocumented is estimated to increase
only by 27% (from $829 million to $1.055 billion). This is because some of the
costs are assumed to be fixed. Even if the size of California’s undocumented
population is unknown, officials do know exactly how many of California’s state
prisoners are foreign-born and among these, how many are undocumented. Changing
the estimates of the undocumented migrant population does not affect how many
undocumented migrants were actually incarcerated in California in 1992 or 1993.
Therefore, future simulations of the possible fiscal impacts of migration on prison
costs would yield predictable and consistent variation in these parameters, such
that a 50% increase in the migrant flow would yield a 50% increase in net total
fiscal costs attributable to prison expenditures.
The previous analysis focused on undocumented immigration, which is im-
portant because it underscores ineligibility for tax-supported benefits and services.
This is, after all, the major source of tension about the economic costs of immigra-
tion. However, the National Academy of Sciences study considered fiscal impacts
for the state of California (as well as New Jersey) based on the total foreign-born
population in that state. This analysis can not differentiate between undocumented
and documented immigrants, yet it furnishes a different perspective of fiscal im-
pacts by focusing on households rather than individuals as the unit of analysis, and
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by considering the entire foreign-born population (rather than mainly undocumented
migrants) in the analysis. This is important because most immigrants residing in
California were admitted legally. This study concluded that the net fiscal burden
incurred by California households headed by immigrants was $1,178 per house-
hold headed by a native-born individual. The analysis indicated that households
headed by immigrants made small positive contributions to the federal government
(on the order of $2 to $4 per year reduction of federal taxes for resident house-
holds), but this benefit is tiny by comparison to the costs incurred by the state. The
study also concluded that the net burden is greatest for households of immigrants
from Latin America, among which Mexicans are the dominant group.
This analysis highlights several problems identified above. First, the current
year estimates understate future benefits and overstate current costs. Second, use
of households as analytic units defined by the nativity status of the head overstated
the education costs by attributing the education costs of native-born children of
immigrant heads in the expenditures of immigrants.
National Level Fiscal Impacts
In this brief section we have focused on state-level fiscal impacts for three
reasons: geographical specificity allows us to focus more narrowly on migration
from Mexico; fiscal impacts are strongest in migrant receiving states like Califor-
nia; and as a result there is more scholarly consensus about the sign, if not the
magnitude, of these local fiscal impacts. National level fiscal impact studies at-
tempt to answer a broader question: whether foreign-born migrant’s net contribu-
tion to the coffers of the United States are positive or negative. A wide range of
views have been proposed.
Simon (1981, 1989), using data from the 1976 Survey of Income and Education,
takes the most positive view. He argues that immigrants (who are a much younger
population than natives) contribute to the Social Security program without being
eligible (at least not in the short term) for benefits. Essentially this implies that
newcomers subsidize natives through their Social Security contributions. At the
other end of the spectrum, Huddle (1993, 1995) has presented the most negative
picture of immigrant’s national fiscal impact. Huddle’s first work did not take the
Social Security program into account, and his later work applied the current value
of a lifetime of potential Social Security benefits to each immigrant, while counting
the Social Security tax contribution only of the current year. Fix and Passel (1994)
and Passel and Clark (1994) have severely criticized Huddle’s methodology, and
the debate between these authors is described in detail in GAO (1995). On balance,
this discussion has not been productive in producing a balanced assessment of
fiscal impacts.
350
Attempting a response to the limitations of static assessments of fiscal impacts
of immigration, the National Academy study (1997) derived a set of projections
about long-term fiscal impacts using varying assumptions about future expenditures
and revenues, immigrant characteristics, including behavioral differences in fertility,
labor force activity and program participation. Adhering to the recommendation of
an earlier workshop about fiscal impacts (NAS, 1996), the panel generated a range
of estimates based on alternative assumptions about the characteristics of immigrants,
their behavior, and taxation regimes. Not surprisingly, the study concluded that
differences between native- and foreign-born populations in expenditure profiles
vary appreciably by program and depending on the assumed characteristics of the
immigrant population.
The bottom line conclusion is noteworthy, however. Combining the costs of
benefits from all programs, there is little difference between immigrants and na-
tives over their respective lifetimes. Immigrants are more costly than natives dur-
ing childhood owing to the costs of bilingual education, while they are less expen-
sive than natives in older ages. Over a lifetime, these differences balance out. There-
fore, the long-term net fiscal impact of any given group depends crucially on age at
arrival. The greatest benefits for natives result from immigrants who arrive be-
tween ages 10 to 25, while the largest costs derive from immigrants who are over
age 60 at the time of arrival. Moreover, the fiscal estimates of the impact of immi-
gration are affected more by future income and earnings differences between im-
migrant and native-born households than by nativity differences in program par-
ticipation. In turn, these depend crucially on the educational attainment of immi-
grants at arrival.
Discussion
While the issue of national level fiscal impacts is an important one, we have
concentrated on state and local impacts here for a number of reasons. The literature
on state and local level impacts has recently become more developed in response to
the demands of local politics, especially in California, where the economic impact
of immigrants is the source of considerable political tension. Even if the fiscal
burden of immigrants on the state and local level were offset by immigrant contri-
butions to the national coffers (especially through Social Security taxes), this would
not diminish the reality and importance of the local costs. Since the political de-
bate over immigration originates in the immigrant receiving states, the focus on
local effects is important in its own right, in addition to its part in the larger na-
tional economic picture.
One of the most important lessons from the current state of research on the
fiscal impact of immigration, and the impacts of immigration more generally, is
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that very little is known for certain. Of all the economic costs attributed to
immigration, the current year fiscal impacts should be the most straightforward to
calculate because a current year analysis of fiscal impacts need not consider (difficult
to estimate) indirect economic effects, secondary migration of natives, the effect of
immigrants on natives’ wages, or life cycle changes in earnings. And yet, as our
simple exercise above has demonstrated, different (plausible) assumptions lead to
very different results in even the most narrowly defined fiscal impact analysis.
We based our own secondary analysis on the empirical results of Clark et al.
(1994) because their study is among the most meticulous methodologically, and
also because they adhere to limited and cautious claims warranted by what is actu-
ally known. Considering that careful estimates of the undocumented immigrant
population vary by as much as 15 percent or more, caution and humility are neces-
sary in drawing conclusions about the fiscal impacts associated with immigration
generally, and particular segments of the immigrant population specifically.
Currently a good deal is known about immigrants’ usage of welfare and other
means-tested income transfers (as we show below) and it is also possible to esti-
mate reasonably the number of undocumented immigrant children in the schools
(which depend on how we define the statuses of families and children). However,
we know very little about how immigration influences the cost of providing other
services like highways, parks, clean air, libraries, and national defense. Studies
that claim to provide a full fiscal accounting of all services and all government
revenues, even at the state level, make broad assumptions about the consumption
of and marginal cost of providing these various public goods. The recent National
Academy of Sciences report on immigration presents a “complete” fiscal impact
study for California, based on the work of Clune (1996), which draws mainly on
the Current Population Survey. In the absence of a detailed survey of the marginal
cost of public goods specific to each state and locality, and the consumption of
these goods by immigrants who, after all, have a different demographic, geographic,
and economic profile from natives, even this allegedly “complete” fiscal impact
study must be viewed with caution.
Our final caveat relates to the static versus temporal portrayal of fiscal im-
pacts. Our discussion, and most empirical studies, have concerned themselves with
static, single year time frames, whereas the fiscal impact of immigrants that ought
to concern us is the impact over the life span of immigrants. In the static model,
education is a cost. Yet, a large body of empirical evidence shows that education is
fundamentally an investment in future skills and earnings. Therefore, estimates of
fiscal impacts should reasonably expect that the current cost of education will be
recovered in the future in the form of greater productivity.
The National Academy of Sciences has properly emphasized the future in por-
traying fiscal impacts over the life course of immigrants (Smith and Edmonston,
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1997). However, its main limitation is that long-term fiscal impacts are not based
on longitudinal data that accurately portrays immigrants investment behavior (edu-
cation) and economic activity over the life course. The National Academy of Sci-
ences based their analysis of life course fiscal impacts on two years of Current
Population Survey data. Yet, a substantial body of empirical evidence has taught
the social science community that cross-sectional data cannot distinguish between
longitudinal and cohort effects. New and innovative work, as the National Acad-
emy has done, is always to be applauded; we simply advise that the current state of
the knowledge in the area of fiscal impacts mandates caution and care when inter-
preting the results.
Conclusions about Fiscal Impacts
Despite the numerous caveats surrounding available estimates of fiscal im-
pacts, several generalizations follow from the evidence presented above. The broadest
generalization is that fiscal impacts of Mexican immigration differ by legal status;
by state of residence; by program; and by age groups. Second, conclusions about
fiscal impacts differ depending on whether a static or longitudinal time frame is
used to assess impacts; whether individuals or households are used as analytic
units in calculating revenues and expenditures; and the assumptions about the size
of the undocumented population. Third, because California receives the largest
share of Mexican—both legal and undocumented—and because of its tax struc-
ture, it also incurs the largest fiscal impacts. Finally, the net fiscal benefits associ-
ated with immigration generally accrue to the federal government (via federal taxes)
while the net costs generally accrue to local entities, i.e., states and counties (Smith
and Edmonston, 1997).
That conclusions about costs and benefits differ by program and between
levels of government is unsurprising, and questions the wisdom of seeking a single
answer about fiscal impacts at a single point in time. Rather, fiscal impacts should
be calculated over the lifetimes of immigrants so that, depending on age at arrival,
periods of dependency can be balanced against periods of economic productivity.
Thus, according to the National Academy of Sciences that “combining the costs
and benefits from all programs, there is little difference between immigrants and
natives over their respective lifetimes.” Short-term impacts of Mexican immigrants
depend crucially on age at arrival and schooling levels, which determine labor
market options. Longer term fiscal impacts depend on income and earnings
differences relative to native workers, fertility (which influences the educational
investments required by children of immigrants), and state of residence (which
determines the progressiveness of the tax structure).
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Socio-political Impacts
As noted in the introduction to this chapter, social impacts of the Mexican
foreign-born population are especially difficult to appraise because of the myriad
ways migration changes the host society; because migrants themselves change in
the process of adapting to the host society; because social impacts are highly con-
tingent on more general demographic and economic trends; and because many
social dimensions, especially those relegated to the cultural realm, are not easily
quantified. Social impacts also depend crucially on the resources Mexican migrants
bring with them as well as those they acquire and transmit to subsequent genera-
tions; on patterns of inter-marriage, particularly with non-Hispanics; and on natu-
ralization patterns and political participation. Finally, social impacts also are shaped
by public perceptions about job competition, views about undocumented migra-
tion, and attitudes about crime and its relation to rising immigration trends. In this
section we consider each of these themes and provide tentative conclusions about
how Mexican migration impacts these social spheres.
Residential Segregation and Neighborhood
Transformation
Residential patterns are important for appreciating social impacts because
social and economic resources are unequally distributed over space; hence,
residential location determines access to education, employment, and housing
opportunities as well as levels of safety. Residential segregation not only undergirds
unequal access to social and economic resources and opportunities, but also restricts
inter-group contact, which is important for promoting understanding and reducing
ethnic tensions.
Residential segregation may be voluntary, as frequently occurs when new
migrants settle in neighborhoods populated by compatriots, or it may be imposed,
as when restrictive covenants prevent particular groups from accessing the hous-
ing market (Massey and Denton, 1993; Clark, 1996). Currently as well as histori-
cally, most recent migrants to the United States (including Mexicans) settle in
ethnic neighborhoods, which serve as stepping stones for economic and social
adaptation of the first generation (Smith and Edmonston, 1997). Over time, the
residential trend is toward dispersion, as the second generation becomes more
socially and residentially integrated (Bean and Tienda, 1987; Clark, 1996; Smith
and Edmonston, 1997).
It is unclear, however, whether residential mobility experienced by Mexican
migrants who arrived prior to 1970 will be repeated by the second generation
offspring of recent migrants, notably those whose parents have confronted shrinking
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opportunities for earning a living and diminished educational institutions in decaying
urban neighborhoods. This is because, in contrast to the residential succession
patterns observed during the 1960s, most of the neighborhoods that had gained
Hispanic residents before 1970 subsequently lost Anglo residents throughout the
following decade. This trend was accelerated during the 1980s, when immigration
increased Mexican density of traditional enclaves (Ortiz, 1996). In Los Angeles
county, host to the largest share of recent migrants from Mexico, the 1980s witnessed
increased segregation of Mexicans from whites compared to the 1970s, but
paradoxically, inter-group contact (as measured by the exposure index, P*), declined
(Ortiz, 1996).
Even if Mexican migrants become residentially dispersed over the long term,
the short-term patterns of residential segregation are important nonetheless be-
cause they heighten visibility of recent arrivals and shape perceptions about them.
In the short to medium term the temporal and residential concentration of Mexican
migrants is a driving force behind residential succession, namely the process of
neighborhood turnover that occurs as Mexicans enter an area and replace (or dis-
place) its original inhabitants. In turn, residential succession fueled by Mexican
migration during the 1970s and 1980s has restricted inter-group contact between
Mexicans and Anglos in several major cities, including Los Angeles and Chicago
(Bean and Tienda, 1987: Chapter 5; Clark, 1996; Ortiz, 1996).
Changing residential patterns are important because they reflect the pace of
social and economic integration and lay the spatial foundations for inter-group
relations, including ethnic tensions and conflict. Bobo and Zubrisky (1996) have
explored racial segregation and ethnic interaction issues via surveys in Los Ange-
les, home to the largest Mexican population residing in the United States. They
observe that whites are more opposed to housing integration with blacks than with
Hispanics (in Los Angeles, Hispanics consist almost entirely of Mexican Ameri-
cans and migrants from Mexico). Other groups, such as Asians, seem to share the
same preference for Mexicans over blacks as neighbors. It appears that migrants
occupy some kind of intermediate social position between native whites (whom all
groups, including blacks, rate as the most desirable neighbors), and native blacks
(who are rated by all groups as the least desirable neighbors). However, Mexican
migrants do not occupy an intermediate social position because they are middle
class or reside in neighborhoods with whites. Rather, as Clark (1996) has shown,
Mexicans in Los Angeles are more likely to be residentially integrated with black
and Asian neighbors now than in the past. In other words, much of the residential
integration that has occurred in recent years is with other minorities, not with whites,
but this depends on social class.
Although residential segregation often limits access of migrants to
socioeconomic resources and opportunities, Mexican migrants also appear to forestall
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neighborhood decay. A recent study of Chicago reveals that Mexican migration
either contributes to community revitalization or prevents decaying inner city
neighborhoods from becoming underclass neighborhoods, characterized by persistent
poverty, chronic and pervasive joblessness, and generalized social disorganization.
Morenoff and Tienda (1997) use a cluster analysis to identify four distinct kinds of
neighborhoods (census tracts) in Chicago from the 1970, 1980 and 1990 censuses.
The different kinds of neighborhoods (underclass, working class, stable middle
class and “yuppie”) are defined using only socioeconomic variables, not race or
ethnicity. Morenoff and Tienda show that from 1970 to 1990 Chicago experienced
a tremendous polarization in neighborhoods inhabited by U.S. born residents. By
1990, most of the neighborhoods that in 1970 were working class and stable middle
class neighborhoods had either gentrified, or were absorbed into Chicago’s black
ghettos, abandoned by all but the poorest residents. The only parts of Chicago in
which working class neighborhoods have grown or even been maintained are those
areas settled by migrants from abroad. During this period Mexicans and Europeans
(mainly Poles) were the predominant migrant groups settling in Chicago.
Their results suggest that residential patterns of Mexican migrants may serve
as a buffer between the so-called “underclass” and middle class urban neighbor-
hoods. Thus, the impact of Mexican migration on urban communities and the ur-
ban stratification system more generally depends both on changing economic op-
portunities and the changing race and ethnic landscape (Waldinger and Bozorgmehr,
1996). Although Chicago’s experience may be a unique in many ways (because it
is the only large city where shares of Puerto Ricans and Mexicans approximate the
national population and because the city population was over 60 percent minority
in 1990), it is worthwhile to consider whether the residential patterns of Mexican
migrants buffer the neighborhood polarization process in other cities, especially
Los Angeles and Miami, whose population composition has been transformed by
immigration since 1960 (Waldinger and Bozorgmehr, 1996; Portes and Stepick,
1993). Political theory has always recognized the importance of a sizable interme-
diate and middle classes, and no political system is more inherently unstable than
a bifurcated system. At least in Chicago’s socio-political system, Mexican migrants
appear to be a stabilizing force in the process of urban transformation.
Immigrant Adaptation and Social Mobility
The reality or myth of the hardworking immigrant, striving and saving to
get ahead is a potent image that helps to reinforce the American creed of
meritocracy. Despite lower levels of education and lower earnings, some studies
show that Mexican Americans and Mexican migrants fare better economically
and socially than native blacks of comparable or higher education (Trejo, 1997a;
356
Tienda and Stier, 1996). The tabulations reported at the beginning of this section
consistently show that male Mexican migrants were disadvantaged relative to
native blacks in terms of educational attainment and language skills, yet in most
states had higher rates of labor force participation and usually lower
unemployment rates. That the most economically and socially disadvantaged
groups are not immigrants, but rather citizens of African American, Native
American and Puerto Rican origin suggests that Mexican migrants have a
reasonable chance of adapting to U.S. labor market and society, economic
opportunities permitting, as have several prior generations.
On this crucial issue, there is some disagreement among scholars, depending
somewhat, but not exclusively, on perspective. A recent study of Los Angeles painted
a bleak picture of Mexican migrants’ economic integration between 1960 and 1990.
Using a synthetic cohort analysis, Ortiz (1996) showed real increases in earnings
of Mexican migrant men between 1969 and 1989, but these were smaller than the
real earnings growth of white men. As a result, the earnings gap between native
born white men and Mexican migrants widened over the past 30 years. Women
followed a similar trajectory, except that their earnings were even lower than those
of men. Unfortunately, Ortiz does not carefully model earnings, thus her pessimis-
tic conclusions need to be tempered because she does not consider how much the
apparent slowdown in economic assimilation of Mexican migrants in Los Angeles
results from their low levels of human capital relative to changes in demand for
unskilled labor.33
Trejo’s (1997a) analysis of wages of Mexican-origin men is not only more
revealing about the process of economic assimilation, but also quite optimistic
about long-term integration prospects. Based on an analysis of 1979 and 1989 Cur-
rent Population Surveys, Trejo compares the wage growth of first, second, and
third generation Mexican-origin men with that of native whites and blacks. Trejo’s
(1997a) main finding is that Mexican-origin men earn low wages primarily be-
cause of their lower stocks of human capital, notably education and low profi-
ciency in English, not because they receive lower returns for their skills. Trejo also
suggests that wage penalties for lack of fluency in English may have increased
during the 1980s, when returns to skills rose appreciably, and this bodes ill for the
pace of integration of Mexican migrants in the future.
So, too, does the reality of low levels of education. Although a generational
perspective shows improvement both in educational attainment and in economic
assimilation of Mexican origin men, the educational attainment of Mexicans (both
native and foreign-born alike) is the lowest of any ethnoracial group (see Mare,
1995; Chiswick and Sullivan, 1995). Thus, owing to changes in the educational
composition of recent migrants from Mexico, the average wages of Mexican origin
men are dragged down by the presence of large numbers of immigrants with very
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low levels of education. In a subsequent paper, Trejo (1997b) compares nativity
differentials in the earnings of Mexican origin men and finds that the sizable earnings
advantage of native born men over their migrant counterparts arises not just from
intergenerational improvements in years of schooling and English proficiency, but
also from increased returns to human capital for Mexican origin workers who were
born and educated in the United States. However, he also observes that
intergenerational changes in the wage structure take longer to play out for Mexicans
than for other white migrant workers.
According to Trejo, the returns to experience are similar for U.S.-born workers
regardless of origin, but Mexican returns to education rise for each successive
generation and do not approach the schooling returns of U.S.-born whites until the
third generation. These results show promise of economic integration of Mexican
migrants, which, in turn, have direct and indirect implications for various types of
economic impacts (Smith and Edmonston, 1997). However, the pace of convergence
with native whites implies persisting economic disadvantages of Mexican origin
men and women. More importantly, these disadvantages are likely to persist and
possibly increase as the volume of unskilled migration from Mexico continues.
Similar conclusions were reached by Tienda and Singer (1995) based on their
analysis of the economic integration prospects of the legalized population. They
showed that the average education level of Mexicans, who made up over 70 per-
cent of the legalized population, actually increased over time, from an average of
less than 6 years for the pre-1975 arrivals to 9 years for those who arrived during
the 1980s. They also showed positive growth in real wages for cohorts that arrived
after 1975 coupled with real wage declines for those who arrived before 1975. In
other words, earlier arrivals experienced wage deterioration which paralleled that
experienced by unskilled native workers. Finally, in response to the question of
whether undocumented immigrants can be economically assimilated, Tienda and
Singer demonstrated positive real wage returns to U.S. experience in an undocu-
mented status for all regional origin groups.
The suggestion that returns to English proficiency may be rising over time
(Trejo, 1997a) is noteworthy from the standpoint of social impacts because Mexicans
have higher rates of Spanish language retention than other recent immigrants (Lopez,
1996; Ortiz, 1996). Lopez (1996) emphasizes that exposure to other immigrants,
not generational status, is the most powerful predictor of language maintenance.
Moreover, persons born in Mexico as well as native-born persons of Mexican
ancestry have low rates of internal migration, which is both a consequence and a
cause of Spanish language maintenance. In this regard, the forces for retaining
Spanish in public and private settings is particularly high for Mexicans, not only
because of the sheer volume and residential concentration of recent flows, but also
because Mexican Americans are less likely to migrate internally and more likely to
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reside in multi-generational households that include one or more foreign-born
persons (Lopez, 1996). These living arrangements slow the pace of language shifts
among Mexican American households. Ortiz (1996) shows that in Los Angeles,
the proportion of younger Chicanos who reported speaking Spanish at home rose
between 1980 and 1990. She argues that this change reflects an increase in the
share of young people with foreign-born parents rather than a change in the pace of
language shift, but this is not obvious from the evidence presented. In any event,
the role of Mexican migration in Spanish language maintenance is undeniable.
The tendency for Mexican migrants to reside in densely settled ethnic neigh-
borhoods promotes maintenance of Spanish language use in public spheres further
slows the shift toward exclusive language use. Public use of Spanish is more so-
cially significant for ethnic relations than is private usage (Lopez, 1996). In cities
that have been highly impacted by recent immigration from Mexico and other parts
of Central and South America, Spanish usage is common even in non-Latino neigh-
borhoods. This is because Spanish-speaking in public places is associated with the
manual industrial and service occupations in which Mexican migrants are dispro-
portionately represented, especially southern California, Texas and Chicago. Thus,
Spanish usage has come to symbolize membership in the lower rungs of the work-
ing class (Lopez, 1996).
Naturalization and Political Participation
There are many political dimensions of Mexican migration and Mexican
American life in the United States. Identification and measurement of political
impacts of Mexican migration are highly complex and often indirect, which
compounds the difficulty of measurement and assessment. Political life in the United
States, as elsewhere, includes the realms of routine electoral politics where candidates
seek votes, symbolic politics where images of migrants may be put to a variety of
uses, and legislative politics where rights and privileges of different groups may be
gained or lost.
If the migrants cannot vote, no direct effects seem forthcoming on routine
electoral politics in the United States, but several links between migration and
electoral politics exist, some direct and others indirect. Just as the econometric
literature has tended to show that the labor market impacts of migration, when they
are measurable, are mainly felt in communities where earlier migrants settled, so,
too, the various political impacts of Mexican migration are felt primarily in Mexi-
can American communities.
The foreign born affect electoral politics directly through census enumerations
and decennial redistricting. U.S. congressional districts and all state legislative dis-
tricts are apportioned on the basis of persons, rather than on the basis of citizens or
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adult citizens because of the wording of article 1, section 2 of the U.S. Constitution
(the U.S. is quite unusual in this regard). In the aftermath of the Voting Rights Act of
1965, which was extended in 1975 to include protections for Mexican Americans,
some legislative districts have been designed to be minority dominated to insure
greater minority representation in the various legislative bodies.
Because these districts are designed to contain a specified number of people,
rather than a certain number of adult citizens, Mexican-American districts have
many fewer potential (and actual) voters than other districts. Table 8 shows that in
the 1992 U.S. elections, Mexican Americans cast only about 16 votes per hundred
persons, while non-Hispanic Whites cast about 50 votes per hundred persons. The
low number of Mexican-American votes derives from several factors—younger
population, lower naturalization rates coupled with relatively low registration and
voting rates. The most important difference is the low adult citizenship rate, 54
percent as compared with 95 percent for non-Hispanic Whites and 92 percent for
non-Hispanic blacks. Even though they cannot vote, Mexican migrants ought to be
considered a political asset for the adult U.S. citizens in established Mexican-
American communities because the political clout of the established communities
partly depends on the creation of safe districts, and the legislative districts depend
on a sizable number of migrants.
The political demography of immigration also implies costs for established
Mexican-American communities. Skerry (1995) and others have argued that the
presence of large numbers of Mexican migrants, most of whom are quite disinter-
ested in American electoral politics, dilutes the natural bonds between the elected
officials and the adult citizens whom they most directly represent. Whether the
presence of large numbers of migrants makes it harder for elected officials to reach
out to their natural constituents (the adult citizens), and whether or not the repre-
sentatives from Mexican-American districts have limited clout because of the pau-
city of voters in their districts, there is no doubt that Mexican-American communi-
ties are far less politically powerful than they potentially could be. The low regis-
tration rates and voting rates by Mexican-American adult citizens are substantial
evidence, though not the only evidence, for weaknesses in political organization.
Mexican immigrants have the lowest naturalization rates of any foreign
national origin group of substantial size in the U.S. Low naturalization rates can
be seen as a proxy for the very limited attachment of Mexican immigrants to
American politics, although some other factors (such as the potential loss of
property in Mexico) have historically played a role in keeping the naturalization
rates of Mexican immigrants down. On the other hand, the U.S.-born children of
Mexican migrants are automatically U.S. citizens and these subsequent generations
will be primarily attached to the U.S. political system, and in principle will
augment the political power of established Mexican-American communities. But
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the naturalization profile of Mexican immigrants may change because immigrants
granted amnesty have recognized that citizenship broadens their possible
sponsorship of other family relatives and because citizenship safeguards eligibility
for social welfare benefits.34
How Mexican migrants influence the political life of Mexican Americans,
and by extension the American political system as a whole, largely depends on
the political solidarity, or commonality of purpose, between the migrants and
the co-ethnic U.S. natives. A comparison between the Cuban-American and the
Mexican-American communities is instructive. Refugees from Castro’s Cuba have
generally found a substantial amount of political solidarity in the already
established Cuban-American community (mainly in Florida) due to their shared
and often strident opposition to the Castro regime (Portes and Stepick, 1993).
Cuban immigrants have much higher naturalization rates than Mexican
immigrants, and as Table 8 shows, Cuban-American citizens have registration
and voting rates that far surpass those of Mexican Americans and sometimes
exceed those of native whites. (Income and class, of course, play an important
role along with sociopolitical factors in determining political participation). The
political solidarity between Cuban immigrants and Cuban Americans has helped
the Cuban-American community attain a political strength far beyond their
numbers (Portes and Stepick, 1993).
Mexican Americans, on the other hand, seem to be more ambivalent about
newer migrants from Mexico. Various surveys conducted and reported by de la
Garza and his colleagues (de la Garza et al, 1992) have demonstrated a consider-
able lack of support among Mexican Americans for the rights of new immigrants.
Various election day polls (Ayres, 1994) from 1994 showed that as many as 30
percent of California’s mostly Mexican-Hispanic voters supported Proposition 187,
arguably one of the most egregious pieces of anti-immigrant legislation in the post-
Civil Rights era.
It is noteworthy that the Mexican-American community has substantially
increased its power in electoral politics since 1970, and therefore the political impacts
of Mexican migration, mediated through a complex relationship with established
Mexican-American communities, may have indirect effects on elections and
legislation at the local and national level. In presidential politics, the concentration
of Mexican Americans in three important states (California, Texas, and Illinois)
could potentially give Mexican-American voters significant leverage. However,
such leverage, if it is forthcoming, would depend on the state in question being
very closely contested, and on high voter turn out and block voting among Mexican
American voters. While Mexican-American voters have generally favored
Democratic over Republican candidates in presidential elections in proportions
almost high enough to qualify as “block voting,” the low turnout of Mexican
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Americans, and the lower fund raising potential of the Mexican-American
community compared to other constituencies means that national candidates are
likely to continue to view the Mexican-American electorate as a marginal, rather
than a central player.35
The designation of Mexican Americans as a “minority” group is a designation
with social, demographic, and political implications. In many ways, Mexican
Americans first became an official minority in 1975, when Mexican-American
groups led by MALDEF (Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund)
made a successful effort to get the Congress to extend the protection of the Voting
Rights Act (widely viewed as the most successful civil rights legislation in Ameri-
can history) to Mexican Americans. In general, Mexican-American political orga-
nizations tend to identify themselves with a coalition of minority interests, but
Mexican Americans themselves are deeply ambivalent about their minority status
(Skerry, 1993). While Mexican-American politicians in the U.S. Congress tend to
find much common ground with black congressional leaders (both groups are pre-
dominantly Democratic, mostly urban, and largely progressive on fiscal issues),
on the local level, such black- Mexican coalitions have proven much harder to
create or sustain.
Crime
There is a general perception that high levels of migration and high crime rates
are causally associated. Between 1960 and 1990, the annual migration rate rose
from 1.7 to 3.0, while the homicide rate increased from 4.8 to 8.3 (Hagan and
Palloni, 1996). Unfortunately, relatively little research addresses the association
between changing crime and migration rates, and even less information focuses on
the involvement of particular groups of migrants in criminal activity.
According to the 1991 Survey of State Prisons, Mexicans account for nearly
half of the foreign-born population in state prisons. However, this does not estab-
lish that Mexicans are more prone to crimes than other migrants to the United
States or U.S. natives. Rather, the over-representation of Mexicans among the for-
eign-born prison population reflects differences in treatment through the criminal
justice system. Specifically, migrants along the border are more likely to be ar-
rested, detained prior to trial, and consequently, to be convicted and imprisoned.
Undocumented migrants also are less likely to be released from jail prior to trial.
Because Mexicans are disproportionately represented among migrants detained
along the border and among undocumented migrants, they are incarcerated at rates
from 2 to 4 times those of citizens (Hagan and Palloni, 1996). However, gross
differences in the incarceration rates of Mexican and U.S. citizens disappear once
differences in age structure (because Mexicans are younger and petty crime rates
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are higher among the young) and especially the differences in treatment in the
criminal justice system of Mexicans and Anglos are taken into account. Thus, Hagan
and Palloni (1996) conclude that for Mexicans the temporal association between
migration and crime is coincidental rather than causal.
That property crime rates (but not violent crime rates) along U.S.-Mexico bor-
der cities are relatively high has fueled perceptions that migrants, and Mexicans in
particular, are somehow responsible. There is some evidence that high crime rates
along the U.S.-Mexico border are related to the level of undocumented migration,
but not legal immigration (Hagan and Palloni, 1996; Smith and Edmonston, 1997).
However, crime rates have fallen in recent years even though migration from Mexico,
including unauthorized migration, has remained high. This situation affords an
opportunity to set the record straight about the lack of causal connection between
Mexican migration and crime rates along the U.S.-Mexico border. That is, crime
rates along the border are below those of comparable non-border cities (Smith and
Edmonston, 1997; Hagan and Palloni, 1996). Nevertheless, perceptions that crime
along the border is due largely, if not exclusively to Mexican immigration may be
more influential than facts in shaping policy responses to immigration. Therefore,
our final section discusses recent evidence about attitudes toward and perceptions
of Mexican migration to the United States.
Attitudes and Perceptions
Much of the current debate about immigration, and Mexican migration in
particular, is fueled by distorted perceptions about the costs and benefits of
migration rather than facts. This is significant because perceptions are crucial in
shaping reactions to immigration. Two general changes in attitudes toward
immigrants are germane for understanding the rising tide of anti-immigrant
sentiment, and anti-Mexican sentiment in particular (Espenshade and Belanger,
1997). First, several recent polls suggest that anti-immigrant sentiment is on the
rise. Nearly two of every three people surveyed in 1995 reported that U.S.
immigration should be reduced. A similar level of disapproval arose in the early
1980s, when unemployment reached 10 percent. However, when given a choice,
the majority of the U.S. population preferred immigrants from Europe and Asia
over those from Latin America. And, among Latin American immigrants, those
from Mexico were least preferred.
Second, the general public exaggerates the pervasiveness of undocumented
migration as a share of total immigration from Mexico (Espenshade and Belanger,
1997). Several polls conducted during the early 1990s revealed that two of every
three respondents surveyed believed that the majority of migrants were
undocumented. In fact, Mexico-U.S. relations are so confused in the public mind
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that nearly one in three respondents to a public poll indicated that illegal
immigration was the greatest worry about the future of Mexico. The negative
views about immigration, and Mexican migration in particular, reflect perceived
job competition of undocumented migrants with domestic workers. Finally, when
queried whether undocumented immigrants should be denied access to health and
education, more than half of respondents answered affirmatively. The rising tide
of anti-immigrant sentiment has been matched with legislation that attempts to
deny immigrants access to collective consumption services and benefits of all
kinds, except in the event of dire emergency. Restrictive policies of recent years,
especially the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
of 1996 (P.L. 104-193) appear to have deep foundations in perceptions and more
shallow foundations in fact.
Conclusions about Socio-political Impacts
Our general overview of social impacts points to several general conclusions,
some more tentative than others. Although Mexican migrants tend to concentrate
residentially, especially upon arrival, the available evidence points to residential
integration over time. The 1980s witnessed an increase in residential concentration
of Mexican migrants, but partly this reflects the intensity of the flow and the dis-
proportionate share destined for a few labor markets in the Southwest. Neverthe-
less, residential concentration patterns imply concentrated impacts and possibly a
slower pace of socio-cultural assimilation. This is evident in the high rates of Spanish
language retention, which in turn, has implications for educational attainment and
labor market integration of subsequent generations.
Social integration depends crucially on economic assimilation. Although there
remains some controversy about whether migrants from Mexico can be integrated
economically, recent econometric evidence suggests that second and third genera-
tion Mexican American men earn higher wages than their foreign-born counter-
parts of comparable human capital. In other words, the large wage gap between
Mexican and non-Hispanic white men, and between native and foreign-born Mexi-
can origin men, is largely attributable to group differences in levels of educational
attainment and English proficiency. This is not a trivial issue, however, because
Mexican migrants possess significantly lower human capital stocks than U.S. na-
tives (including blacks) and because the demand for unskilled workers has fallen,
thereby virtually ensuring low wages for those who do manage to get a foothold in
the labor market.
Political impacts of Mexican immigration hinge on rates of naturalization
and settlement patterns. The concentrated presence of Mexican immigrants
increases the size of communities and the likelihood of indigenous representatives.
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However, the low rates of naturalization coupled with the low voting rates weaken
the potential impact of Mexican immigration on the political system, at least in
the short run. Owing to poor data about immigrants and the criminal justice system,
it is difficult to draw conclusions about the impact of Mexican migration on crime.
Nevertheless, Mexicans do not appear to be more prone to crime than U.S. natives,
and the major trends in crime along the Mexico-U.S. border appear not to be
driven by migration. Finally, rising opposition to Mexican immigration appears
to be based on mis-perceptions about the prevalence of undocumented migration
in the total flow of Mexican migrants, and perceptions that Mexicans take jobs
away from domestic workers. Whether right or wrong, these perceptions are quite
profound in their consequences.
Conclusions and Recommendations
At the outset we postulated that migration from Mexico produces benefits
to the United States, and that these benefits come at a cost. Our assessment leads
us to conclude that the main beneficiaries are the workers themselves, both those
who remain in the United States and earn higher wages than they would in Mexico,
as well as those who return and reap higher returns on U.S. experience than they
would have on a comparable amount of work experience in Mexico (Zahniser
and Greenwood, 1997). U.S. workers who are complements in production to
Mexican immigrants benefit, but we find limited evidence of complementarity.
The major beneficiaries of Mexican labor are the owners of capital and land,
which in California and Texas includes the vast agricultural industry that
historically has employed large numbers of Mexican workers. U.S. consumers
also benefit from Mexican immigration through lower prices afforded by lower
unit costs for goods produced by industries where immigrants are concentrated
(this includes the vast labor-intensive segments of the agricultural industry).
Finally, the U.S. economy grows via Mexican immigration, although this is not
a major source of economic dynamism. However, it is unclear whether and how
the presence of Mexican migrants generate scale effects at the national level,
although local scale effects may be more substantial.
There are also costs associated with Mexican migration. The displacement of
workers who are substitutes in production is the most pronounced labor market
impact, which is disproportionately borne by earlier migrants from Mexico and
increasingly, by African Americans. Thus, continued immigration from Mexico
may dampen the economic prospects of earlier arrivals. State and local governments
that incur fiscal outlays for immigrants without adequate reimbursement from the
federal government also bear the costs of Mexican migration. Education costs are
particularly large, especially when they involve outlays for bilingual education
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and other special services. Because education costs are incurred mainly by the
young and represent an investment in future generations of workers, their present
value should be discounted by the future productivity of the workers.
Another important facet of Mexican migration is that the demographic,
economic and social impacts are concentrated spatially because the vast majority
of earlier and recent arrivals settle in just three states—California, Texas and
Illinois—and primarily in a few metropolitan centers within these states. Although
residential concentration can not be assigned to either the cost or benefit ledger,
this feature of Mexican migration has important social and cultural implications.
The residential patterns of recent arrivals have altered the ethnic landscape of these
states and in some locations, has visibly (and measurably) altered race and ethnic
segregation patterns. That Mexican immigration mainly involves young workers
also shifts the dependency ratio favorably, such that the burden of the elderly is
shouldered by a wider base than would be the case in the absence of immigration.
But, the average educational level of Mexicans is very low compared to the U.S.
population, including Mexican Americans, and the weight of large cohorts in recent
years have dragged down the average educational level of the Mexican origin
population overall.
Residential concentration is important because it increases the visibility of the
Mexican origin population and fuels anti-immigrant attitudes, particularly among
those groups most likely to compete with them. Residential concentration patterns
imply concentrated impacts and possibly a slower pace of socio-cultural assimila-
tion. This is evident in the high rates of Spanish language retention, which in turn,
has implications for educational attainment and labor market integration of subse-
quent generations.
Major Conclusions
Demographic Impacts
Although immigration has not been a major component of population growth
in the past, its influence on demographic change has been increasing in recent
decades. Consequently, future social and economic impacts of Mexican migration
are likely to be greater because they will be compounded by higher fertility and
mortality of Mexican-origin women, and the lower mortality at younger ages.
Labor Market Impacts
Analyses based on the 1990 census indicate that immigrants have little impact
on native workers, except in areas of high immigrant concentration, where some
job displacement and slight downward pressure on wages was evident. However,
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the largest negative impacts were on the migrants themselves. Case studies indicate
displacement of native workers in those sectors where that attract foreign workers.
The continued flow of new migrants and their location in the same areas as their
earlier counterparts, coupled with relatively low internal migration rates of persons
born in Mexico, suggest that migrants from Mexico will have some difficulty in
improving their economic status, at least relative to other foreign-born groups.
Impacts through Scale
Although relatively understudied in the literature on impacts of Mexican
immigration, economies of scale (generated by the emergence of dense Mexican
immigrant communities) can produce positive economic outcomes. The Little
Village study showed that scale effects associated with densely settled
neighborhoods appear to be conducive to enterprising activity even among low-
education Mexican immigrants.
Welfare Participation Impacts
Mexican migrants are less likely to receive means-tested welfare benefits than
their U.S. born counterparts of Mexican origin, but welfare participation rates dif-
fered by gender, headship and age. Household heads 65 and over who were born in
Mexico were more likely to receive SSI in 1989 than otherwise comparable native-
born heads, but this tendency may have been due to the failure of the Mexico-born
heads to qualify for Social Security relative to their native-born counterparts. Wel-
fare participation patterns and their consequences will change as a result of recent
changes in welfare legislation. The new eligibility requirements may discourage
the entry of some potential migrants from Mexico. The major effect of the new
legislation may be the perception that the U.S. is less receptive to migrants from
Mexico than previously, particularly undocumented migrants.
Fiscal Impacts
Fiscal impacts of Mexican immigration differ legal status; by state of residence;
by program; and by age groups, but also depending on whether a static or longitudinal
time frame is used to assess impacts; whether individuals or households are used
as analytic units in calculating revenues and expenditures; and the assumptions
about the size of the undocumented population. Nevertheless, because California
receives the largest share of Mexican—both legal and undocumented—and because
of its tax structure, it also incurs the largest fiscal impacts. Finally, the net fiscal
benefits associated with immigration generally accrue to the federal government
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(via federal taxes) while the net costs generally accrue to local entities, i.e., states
and counties (Smith and Edmonston, 1997). Short-term impacts of Mexican
immigrants depend crucially on age at arrival and schooling levels, which determine
labor market options. Longer term fiscal impacts depend on income and earnings
differences relative to native workers, fertility (which influences the educational
investments required by children of immigrants) and state of residence (which
determines the progressiveness of the tax structure).
Socio-Political Impacts
Social integration depends crucially on economic assimilation and vice versa.
Although there remains some controversy about the pace at which migrants from
Mexico can be integrated economically, recent econometric evidence suggests that
second and third generation Mexican American men earn higher wages than their
foreign-born counterparts of comparable human capital. In other words, the large
wage gap between Mexican and non-Hispanic white men, and between native and
foreign-born Mexican origin men, is largely attributable to group differences in
levels of educational attainment and English proficiency. This is not a trivial issue,
however, because Mexican migrants possess significantly lower human capital stocks
than U.S. natives (including blacks) and because the demand for unskilled workers
has fallen, thereby virtually ensuring low wages for those who do manage to get a
foothold in the labor market.
Political impacts of Mexican immigration hinge both on rates of naturalization
and settlement patterns. Low rates of naturalization coupled with the low voting
rates weaken the potential impact of Mexican immigration on the political system,
at least in the short run. Owing to poor data about immigrants and the criminal
justice system, it is difficult to draw conclusions about the impact of Mexican
migration on crime. Nevertheless, Mexicans do not appear to be more prone to
crime than U.S. natives, and the major trends in crime along the Mexico-U.S. border
appear not to be driven by migration. Finally, rising opposition to Mexican
immigration appears to be based on mis-perceptions about the prevalence of
undocumented migration in the total flow of Mexican migrants, and perceptions
that Mexicans take jobs away from domestic workers. Whether right or wrong,
these perceptions are quite profound in their consequences.
Research Agenda
Our study identified several areas requiring further research to better understand
the demographic, economic and social impacts of Mexican migration to the United
States. We conclude with a brief overview of priority questions for further research.
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Demographic Issues
Mexican origin women have the highest fertility of all immigrant groups, but
there is need to better understand:
• What are the causes and consequences of differential fertility of Mexi-
can origin women in the United States?
• How do Mexican-born women and subsequent generations of native-
born women of Mexican ancestry adjust their fertility behavior with
duration of residence in the United States?
• How will inter-marriage patterns accelerate the assimilation of the
Mexican-origin population?
• Why do internal migration patterns of the Mexican-born differ from
those of their U.S.-born counterparts, and what consequences (positive
and negative) follow from the low rates of internal migration?
Economic Issues
We identified several ways in which Mexican immigration differs from other
flows, but data limitations constrained our ability to draw firm conclusions about
various aspects of economic impacts. Further research is needed to address unan-
swered questions, such as:
• How do the earnings of Mexican-born individuals and those of subse-
quent generations of native-born persons of Mexican ancestry behave
relative to an appropriate control with duration of residence in the U.S.?
• How does welfare participation and levels of welfare use change with
duration of U.S. residence? What are the short and long-run fiscal im-
pacts of legal and undocumented migrants from Mexico at the local,
state and national levels?
• What is the level, nature and outcome of informal employment by legal
and undocumented migrants from Mexico?
• Why are the internal migration rates of Mexico-born persons so low
relative to other major immigrant groups? To what extent do these low
rates of internal migration impact various outcome measures, such as
earnings, employment, English language ability and other indicators of
economic and social integration?
• How does the limited internal migration of the Mexican-born and
Mexican-ancestry population affect residential segregation?
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• What factors slow linguistic assimilation of the Mexican-born
population? What are the implications of Spanish language maintenance
for subsequent generations of youth? Does Spanish language
maintenance retard social and economic assimilation?
• What processes undergird the negative impacts of recent migrants on
employment and earnings of earlier migrants from Mexico? Is it because
the earlier migrants do not respond (via migration) to labor market
opportunities in other locations, do not master English, do not acquire
additional education, and thus remain labor market substitutes for
subsequent arrivals?
• What types of scale effects result from concentrations of Mexican migrants?
Scale effects derive from the fact that Mexican immigrants consume goods
and services produced in the United States, thereby contributing to aggregate
income growth (although the net beneficiaries of immigrant consumption
are the owners of capital). Although there is relatively little study of the
consumption profiles of Mexican immigrants, such information is valuable
for appreciating how the scale effects of Mexican immigration operate
through demand for goods and services, including those produced within
and outside of ethnic labor market niches.
Social Issues
The economic future of the Mexican-origin population hinges crucially
on improving the educational profile of subsequent generations. Although the
education levels of the Mexican-origin population have been improving, the
rate of improvement is not fast enough to keep pace with either the gains
observed for other demographic groups, or the increased skill requirements
of employment.
• How do the Mexican-born and their offspring compare in this respect to
other historical and contemporary immigrant groups?
• What are the determinants of naturalization propensities among
immigrants from Mexico? Why are these propensities so low? Will
recent changes in U.S. policies change the naturalization rates of
Mexicans?
• How important is crime among the Mexican-born population, and is
this problem increasing? Are recent arrivals more prone to crime than
earlier migrants?
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Notes
1. With assistance from Paul Davies, John McDowell, Emilio Parrado, Michael Rosenfeld
and Steven Zahniser.
2. The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act of 1996 explic-
itly precludes undocumented migrants from receiving most major federal public benefit
programs. The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996,
more commonly known as the Welfare Reform Act, disqualifies lawful permanent residents
from receipt of food stamps and Supplemental Security Income, and prohibits immigrants
legally admitted after 22 August 1996 from receiving any federal means-tested program for
five years.
3. That IRCA altered the legal status of over a million Mexican migrants raises the
possibility that impacts by legal status have been changed over the period we analyze.
4. For evidence about the sensitivity of conclusions about labor market impacts of
migrants to level of aggregation, see Borjas, Freeman and Katz, 1996).
5. Migrant streams from Mexico are relatively small by historical standards, notably
the population losses sustained by European countries during the early nineteenth century
(see Massey, 1988).
6. There is some evidence that Mexican migrants are “preferred” to African American
and Puerto Rican workers, especially in jobs that become “immigrant-typed” (Krischenman
and Neckerman, 1991; Tienda, 1989). Some advantages of hiring Mexican migrant workers
derive from well-established network recruitment hiring that benefits employers via lower
search and replacement costs while also providing an informal screen on reliability.
7. For example, if the owners of capital in the United States enjoy a given gain at the
expense of low-income workers, society may not wish to equally weigh the gains and losses.
Such normative judgments presumably are one rationale for imposing entry quotas.
8. In the interest of brevity we focus on the three major destination states of Mexican
migrants, but have produced parallel tables for Florida, New York and the major regions
exclusive of these states. These results are reported in a separate appendix.
9. Another perspective of the dominance of Mexican workers in agriculture is provided
by Table 2A, which presents the race and ethnic composition of industries. Taking Califor-
nia as an example, Mexican migrants account for nearly half of all workers in the industry
compared to 36 percent of white natives and only 6 to 7 percent of Mexican natives and
other migrants. Among women, over one-third of those employed in agriculture are Mexico
born, compared to less than 7 percent of other migrant women.
10. Annual net demographic change stabilized around 1 percent by 1968, with modest
oscillations around this level in particular years. See 1996 Statistical Abstract of the United
States, Table 2.
11. These numbers are derived as follows: 12 percent of legal U.S. immigration from
Mexico times a 25- to 33-percent contribution of the foreign born to U.S. population growth
yields a 3- to 4-percent contribution of legal Mexican immigration to U.S. population growth
during non-IRCA years. During IRCA years the calculation is based on 40 percent of le-
gal U.S. immigration coming from Mexico, which yields between a 10- and 13-percent
contribution of legal Mexican migration to U.S. population growth. Of course, this crude
calculation ignores the fact that undocumented migrants were already present in the United
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States and ignores the secondary impact of undocumented migration on population growth
due to fertility. The latter consideration renders these estimates conservative, while the
former implies that the demographic impacts occurred in years prior to those observed.
12. Bachu (1991:35) reports that the average number of children ever born was higher
for women born in Mexico (2.1 births per woman) than for women born in any other country
or region. On average, foreign born women 18 to 44 years old in 1988 each had borne 1.6
births at the time of the survey compared with 1.3 births for native born women.
13. Of the remaining 14.6 percent, 5.4 percent resided in Arizona, Colorado and New
Mexico combined, 1.2 percent resided in Florida, 1 percent in New York, and 7 percent were
dispersed throughout the rest of the country.
14. The medium immigration assumption is 820,000 per year, which is approximately
the 700,000 reported by Fix and Passel (1994) plus an additional 120,000 undocumented
migrants or other unanticipated refugee stream. The Census Bureau’s (1996) rationale for
the 820,000 middle scenario assumes 1,042,000 immigrants and 222,000 emigrants, which
reflects the 1990 immigration law changes and current knowledge of emigration, undocu-
mented migration, and movement to and from Puerto Rico.
15. This section was drawn from Greenwood and McDowell (1993) and McDowell,
1997, but with the permission of Greenwood.
16. Greenwood and Lillydahl (1984) discuss these and related data in more detail.
Massey, et al. (1987, p. 173) report that among the households they surveyed, annual gross
income earned in the U.S. in 1982 ranged from 281,000 to 352,000 pesos, assuming the
average exchange rate that prevailed during the year. In the agricultural sector of Mexico the
prevailing wage translated into 52,000 pesos per year if a worker were employed 52 weeks,
which is highly improbable. Thus, by working in the United States, an individual from rural
Mexico would enjoy at least a five-fold increase in annual earnings. For a sample of pre-
dominately undocumented Mexican migrants, Jones and Murray (1986) report a ratio of
U.S. (i.e., average weekly earnings on latest U.S. job) to Mexican (i.e., average weekly
income in Mexico) earnings that ranges from 7 to 13.
17. As of January 1997, 1,585,418 visa applications were active for North American
countries. This figure represented 43.8 percent of applications worldwide.
18. The sophistication (and complexity) of the model can be increased by introducing
a second good, either produced for export or domestic consumption. This extension of the
model is important for understanding the elasticity of substitution of goods and laborers.
However, for our purposes here, it suffices to focus on two labor groups, as this is most
germane for the topic at hand.
19. This conclusion could conceivably be reversed by the presence of market distor-
tions that result in a wide divergence between an individual’s private remuneration and pri-
vate marginal product. This possibility is, however, unlikely (Johnson, 1965).
20. Referring to the impacts of population growth on inventive activity, Kelley (1972,
p. 20) concludes that “the scale effects of population have likely diminished significantly
over time; they could well be unimportant in the contemporary setting.” Kelley (p. 16) also
speculates that, while probably significant in the past, “it is plausible that the positive benefits
of population size through land and mineral development ... are relatively unimportant today.”
Spengler (1956, p. 287) makes essentially the same point as Kelley; that is, “possibly until
the outbreak of World War I, immigration contributed directly and indirectly to ...the growth
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of net national product and the amount produced per head. It is doubtful, however, whether
this proposition remains valid after World War I.”
21. For example, if immigrants are unskilled when they arrive, in the short run their
impact may widen differentials between the wage of low- and high-skilled domestic work-
ers. However, as immigrants acquire more experience, their earnings rise.
22. Skill groups are based on quartiles in a skill quantity index. Low skill refers to the
bottom two quartiles based on a representative national sample from the 1990 U.S. census.
High skill refers to the top two quartiles. Based on the national distribution of the skill
index, data for specific metropolitan areas were formed into the various skill groups. The
foreign born from Mexico tend to fall mainly in the low-skill group. More detail on the skill
groups is found in the Appendix to the Commission report (see Davies, Greenwood, Hunt,
Kohli, and Tienda, 1997).
23. Appendix A contains detail on all 122 metropolitan areas, whereas Table 6A and
6B report only selected areas.
24. The model upon which these conclusions are based consists of capital and the
following eight labor categories: (1) low-skill native black males; (2) low skill native black
females; (3) low-skill native non-black males; (4) low-skill native non-black females; (5)
low-skill foreign born; (6) high-skill native blacks; (7) high-skill native non-blacks; and
(8) high-skill foreign born. The skill categories are defined as discussed for the “Mexican
model,” and the estimates are based on 1990 census data for 225 MSAs. The simulation
results are derived for a 20-percent increase in category 5—low-skill foreign born. Note
that this group contains more than just low-skill persons born in Mexico because Los
Angeles receives foreign-born persons from numerous countries of birth (Waldinger and
Bozorgmehr, 1996).
25. Of course, the important question that no study has answered satisfactorily is whether
the economic mobility of African Americans would have been higher were it not for the
influx of immigrants. Unfortunately, we are not aware of any studies that can address this
question in a compelling way. Several recent papers to be presented at a workshop address
the question of whether and how immigration impacts African Americans specifically. This
information will be incorporated in a subsequent draft.
26. Card has shown that the Mariel Boatlift, which consisted of mostly low skilled
migrants, in the course of 6 months increased Miami’s work force by 7% (60,000 people),
yet had no perceptible impact on Miami’s labor market for either natives or for previous
Cuban migrants. This surprising result implies that the economic impacts of migrants are
not so easily isolated to their city of entry or residence as has been previously assumed.
Considering that the Mariel boat lift corresponded to a wave of migration that was a full
order of magnitude larger (relative to the work force of Miami) than most of the empirical
studies are able to contemplate, and that no impacts were found, Card’s study raises fun-
damental questions about the efficacy of the econometric literature on labor market im-
pacts of migration
27. A later study by Borjas appears to contradict that conclusion. See OECD report by
Greenwood, et al., 1997.
28. Imagine adding one additional child to a school system: if the child can be absorbed
into an already existing classroom, without any loss of quality in the education for the
classmates, then the marginal cost of educating one additional child may be less than the
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average cost. If a community received a wave of new immigrants and was forced to construct
a new school building to accommodate them, the marginal cost of educating the new students
might exceed the average cost per student throughout the district. Positive returns to scale
implies decreasing marginal costs of services (because larger enterprises will presumably
be more diversified, more efficient, and will have already made substantial capital expenditures
whose cost can be born by more people).
29. Little Village experienced profound demographic succession between 1970, when
Hispanics comprised only 30 percent of the community population, and 1990, when His-
panics comprised over 80 percent of all residents. In fact, by 1990, 17 of 20 census tracts
were over 84 percent Hispanic, predominantly Mexicans (born in the U.S. and in Mexico).
The household survey reported that over three-fourths of respondents were Mexico born.
During this period, the white population decreased from 53 to 6 percent of the total and the
total population of the community area rose from 62,848 to 81,155, representing a consider-
able increase in density (Raijman, 1996).
30. Data and models are not sufficiently refined to allow investigators to conclude that
no one from Mexico enters the United States with the intention of collecting welfare, but
general tendencies are clear.
31. Our discussion of demographic impacts underscored the point that California has
received an increasing share of all immigrants in recent years, including undocumented immi-
grants from countries other than Mexico. Therefore, impacts associated with undocumented
and legal migration from Mexico may in fact derive from other groups. Therefore, inferences
about the current fiscal impacts of Mexican immigration are therefore exaggerated.
32. Several limitations of this study were identified by NAS, 1996, but generally con-
clude that this study is one of the best of its genre.
33. In fact, she seems to have causality reversed when she argues that “economic re-
structuring drew the growing number of new immigrant arrivals into an ever-expanding
low-wage sector, where the increased immigrant concentration in a narrow tier of niches
drove wages down” (p. 260).
34. Although Mexicans have among the lowest naturalization rates of all immigrant
groups, recent years have witnessed a surge in naturalization applications, especially after
immigrants granted amnesty became eligible for citizenship.
35. DeSipio and Rocha (1992) argued that Dukakis’ successful courting of Mexican
American voters and organizations during the 1988 Democratic primaries was a key in-
gredient in his successful run for the nomination, especially in the Southwest. They also
note, however, that once the primaries were over Latino political interests were quickly
marginalized.
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Appendix C
Percentage Change in the Real Rental Price of Capital Due to a
20-Percent Increase in Foreign-Born, Low-Skilled
Mexican Labor—Selected Areas
Area Percentage Change
All areas (122) 0.27
California areas (23) 0.82
Texas areas (23) 0.33
Arizona, New Mexico, Colorado areas (11) 0.30
Areas in border states (52) 0.56
Areas of high concentration of foreign-born,
   low-skilled, Mexicans (13) 0.88
Areas of low concentration of foreign-born,
   low-skilled, Mexicans (43) 0.02
Santa Ana, CA 1.31
Bakersfield, CA 0.74
Chico-Paradise, CA 0.12
Fresno, CA 1.04
Los Angeles, CA 2.54
Merced, CA 1.66
Modesto, CA 0.74
Oakland, CA 0.27
Oxnard-Ventura, CA 0.89
Redding, CA 0.02
San Bernardino, CA 1.04
Sacramento, CA 0.15
Salinas, CA 1.68
San Diego, CA 0.80
San Francisco, CA 0.19
San Jose, CA 0.69
Santa Barbara, CA 0.45
Santa Cruz, CA 0.93
Santa Rosa, CA 0.29
Stockton-Lodi, CA 0.58
Vallejo, CA 0.31
Visalia-Tulare, CA 1.43
Yuba City, CA 0.42
Abilene, TX 0.10
Amarillo, TX 0.09
Austin, TX 0.16
Beaumont, TX 0.06
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Appendix C (Continued)
Area Percentage Change
Brazoria, TX 0.12
Brownsville, TX 1.44
Bryan-College Station, TX 0.14
Corpus Christi, TX 0.12
Dallas, TX 0.23
El Paso, TX 1.58
Ft. Worth-Arlington 0.17
Galveston, TX 0.08
Houston, TX 0.27
Killeen-Temple, TX 0.07
Longview-Marshall, TX 0.05
Lubbock, TX 0.06
McAllen-Edinburg-Mission, TX 1.75
Midland, TX 0.25
Odessa, TX 0.26
San Antonio, TX 0.48
Tyler, TX 0.16
Waco, TX 0.13
Wichita Falls, TX 0.07
Yakima, WA 0.81
Yuma, AZ 1.66
Las Cruces, NM 0.70
Richland-Kennwick-Pasco, WA 0.48
Greeley, CO 0.22
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Impacts of Migration in Mexico1
Gustavo Verduzco & Kurt Unger
Introduction
Migration impacts can be defined as the effects produced by the movementof people between two places, the sending or expulsion and the receivingplaces. For purposes of specificity it is convenient to restrict the analysis
to the effects closer to migration itself, even if in reality there are many other side
effects to the migration process. For our study, we are defining migration as an
essentially economic phenomenon, given the nature of Mexican migration during
the whole 20th Century as the movement of labor, a movement having little to do
with religious or political motives to migrate as in other parts of the world.
The literature usually treats these population movements as a positive adjust-
ment where labor supports and complements a better use and distribution of capital
in the receiving region. In modern times, labor migration invariably occurs to-
wards regions experiencing successful economic performance. The sending region
will also benefit from remittances and experiences associated with working in a
more advanced environment, plus the alleviation of unemployment at the point of
origin. Nevertheless, migration between countries usually faces higher constraints
not found in movements between regions within a country, due to the rigidities of
different legal and political frameworks. The contrast between countries such as
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the United States and Mexico brings additional frictions to international migration
between them.
The Nature of Migration
The first point to keep in mind are the contradictory characteristics of the
economic rationale to migration in contrast to the legal apparatus aimed to
refrain migration. The economic reasoning, for the most part, supports migration
both from the demand of labor as much as from the supply side. The legislation
within the recipient country, in this case the U.S., limits the movement of
foreigners. There are also, of course, many other social, cultural and demographic
tensions and implications to consider given the mobilization of people under
consideration, which involves the relation between two societies strongly
different in their backgrounds.
Our aim in this chapter is to determine the effects in Mexico, in general and
also specifically, resulting from being influenced by these labor movements. To
this end we have to review the many concerns expressed by analysts of migration
effects, both the positive and the negative impacts, but keeping at the center the
economic preeminence of the phenomenon with labor as an important factor of
production, and then the legal, cultural and demographic issues that may help us
reach a better understanding.
A Temporal Dimension
To address the effects or impacts of migration on each country, it is necessary
to consider several dimensions. One crucial dimension is time, given the very old
labor supply and demand interaction embedded in the operations of each country,
an interaction subjected to substantial variations along time.
Migration flows have varied in size, intensity and characteristics over the various
periods of this century. The effects have to be estimated in reference to the specific
period and context which corresponds to each country. However, these effects have
to be seen not only as concrete measures or estimates in a certain point of time, but
also pertaining to the dynamics of a very long labor interaction process.
International Economic Reorganization
It is well known that the economic pressures for restructuring have been
experienced in over recent decades by every economy, including the Mexican and
the United States economies. The U.S., as a wide and complex economy, has
experienced a variety of sectoral and regional strategies. One of these strategies
397
has involved the hiring of low skilled labor at very low wages in order to remain
competitive in certain agriculture activities (particularly evident in California) and
in some services (Escobar, A., F. Bean and S. Weintraub, June 1996).
For Mexico, on the other hand, the result of trade liberalization, adjustment
and privatization during the last decade or so has been a huge increase in the levels
of unemployment and the search for all kinds of complementary incomes to fi-
nance basic family survival (Cortés, F. and R. Rubalcava, 1995). Open trade has
also meant the successful recovery of certain agriculture activities, in particular
those for export, and it has also channelled substantial new investment into sub-
contracting (maquiladoras) and a few other industrial and services activities. These
trends will shortly show up in higher local demand for labor in Mexico, even if in
some cases (as in the first direct effect of maquiladoras) this is at the expense of
employment in other locations in the U.S. itself.
The North American scene has shown initiatives beyond the usual individual
country moves. Most noticeable has been the U.S. initiative to incorporate Canada
and then Mexico into NAFTA. This can be understood as a common strategy to
better compete against Europe and Asia. It is most evident in the immediate strength-
ening experienced in the economic ties of the three NAFTA countries, most clearly
shown in trade and investment statistics. And it is in the context of economic changes
and the recent evolution of migration, the “demand-pull supply-push” interaction,
where recent effects can be located.
Migration Flows: Temporary vs Permanent Migrations
The characteristics of migration flows add important considerations to esti-
mates of impacts. Among the total so-called “migrants,” there are two major groups,
those becoming permanent residents of the U.S. and many others that come and
go, some of them continuously along their productive lives. The latter group may
experience the journey only once or a limited number of times, while some others
may do it regularly. These patterns of migration impose obvious differences in the
estimates of impacts or effects, be these economic effects, labor, or demand for
public services. Though there are some preliminary estimates to distinguish the
two types of migrants, in practice it is extremely difficult to estimate separately the
effects due to each.
According to the survey EMIF (Encuesta de Migración a la Frontera Norte
de Mexico), the annual flow of labor migrants travelling to the U.S. in 1993 and
1994 was around 800,000 individuals (Corona, R. and R. Tuirán, 1996). This is to
say that any estimate of impacts would need to take into account the different
behavior of this group of labor migrants, different in many respects to those re-
siding permanently in the U.S.
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Another strand to differentiate impacts is the legal status of the migrating flows.
This is important in itself and also in respect to the workers’ own perception of
their labor competitiveness. In this respect, it is well known for instance that IRCA
transformed almost automatically an important proportion of migrant flow as legal
or documented migration, which then may have a different kind of effect accord-
ingly. In practice, however, it is difficult to distinguish the effects or impacts of one
group to the other due to information limitations, even when we may anticipate
large differences in many respects.
The Levels of Analysis
Impacts have to be referred to the level where they are materialized. Spatially,
there are three levels: national, regional and local. While at the national level im-
pacts may be small in many respects, at the regional and local levels the impacts of
migration may be extremely important. This can be as valid for certain regions in
the sending country as for some of the states and counties that concentrate the
flows in the recipient side.
It is well documented that there is a very large concentration of Mexican labor
migration to the U.S. in the southwest, as well as to certain areas or poles mainly
restricted to the states of Illinois, Oregon and Washington. Some other well dis-
persed places exist, but they account for minor proportions.
Another distinction has to do with the sector where migrant labor is employed.
Mexican labor in the U.S. is mostly concentrated in agriculture, in particular in the
production and packaging of fruits and vegetables, and some others are in the clothing
industry, construction and certain services for buildings, gardens, tourism and what
have been called the “ethnic industries.” Even if the evidence indicates that the
most recent Mexican migrants are predominantly in unskilled and low paid jobs in
these kinds of activities, it is necessary to account as well for other groups of Mexican
migrants in the past that followed more conventional employment trajectories given
better conditions in the demand side, both conditions of the labor market and of
economic prosperity in general, that were more favorable to that end.
On the Mexican side there is also a heavy concentration of not so many
localities (municipios) with large migration intensity. These are mostly located
in five states: Jalisco, Michoacán, Zacatecas, Durango and Oaxaca. These are
the places where Mexican impacts of migration to the U.S. are likely to be
apparent, at least in comparison with other non-migrating areas. Other
characteristics relevant to estimating effects in these municipios is that more
than one half of them (57% to be precise) are rural places (less than 20,000
inhabitants), and very few of them (only 1.7% to be precise) have more than
50,000 inhabitants.
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The predominantly rural origin of the Mexican migrants explains their
employment in the least skilled jobs in the United States. That is a very different
case for Mexicans that migrate within Mexico, who tend to be more urban in origin
and have better skills.
All the considerations above imply that we have to estimate carefully the im-
pacts for each country according to the level and sector of activity, as well as other
factors mentioned previously.
The Stylized Facts
First, we are dealing with two neighboring countries sharing a very long border
and where the presence of Mexicans was well established before the west ward
expansion of U.S. settlers in the previous century. This explains the important groups
of Mexican origin in the southwest of the U.S. well before the migration moves of
this century, a situation that has undoubtedly facilitated the assimilation between
the two types of populations.
Early in this century, closeness between the two countries also facilitated mi-
gration flows. During the decade between 1910 and 1920 an estimated 890,000
Mexicans moved to the U.S. due both to expulsion and attraction forces. The ex-
pulsion factor was mainly the Mexican Revolution that took preeminence in Northern
Mexico; but at the same time, Mexican labor was welcome to help in the extension
of the railroads and in agriculture in the U.S., given the shortage in U.S. labor due
to this country’s participation in World War I (Hall, Linda, 1990). Even taking into
account that few of those remained in the U.S.,2 the next decade of the 1920s reg-
istered the approval of legal residence for 459,287 Mexicans, a total 3.2% of the
Mexican population at the time.
As a counterflow, the economic difficulties of the 1930s generated the repa-
triation to Mexico of 345,000 Mexicans (47% of all those legalized since 1900).
This move created substantial problems in the absorption of labor in certain re-
gions of Mexico, something that quite likely accelerated the Cárdenas agrarian
reform of the 1930s as illustrated in some ethnographic studies.
Next, the U.S. entry into World War II demanded again the support of Mexi-
can labor of low cost (Fisher, 1953), giving raise to a total 4.6 million legal con-
tracts to Mexicans in the U.S., the so called Programa Bracero. In spite of the
relatively high number of contracts (equivalent to 209,000 a year), those opting to
reside permanently in the U.S. were only a 12% of the total number of contracts
granted. These are the very same years when Mexico enjoyed very successful rates
of growth, the period of the “Mexican miracle,” which translated into better living
standards for many in Mexico due to improvements in education, health and other
social benefits despite high rates of population growth.
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In latter years, particularly during the 1970s and 1980s, the number of Mexican
residents in the U.S. was increasing, at the same time that temporary migrants,
both legal and undocumented, were also increasing. These years represent both the
end of the “Mexican miracle” and the change in the direction of migration laws in
the U.S. to restrict earlier acceptance of migrants.
The most recent period in the 1980s has developed more critically certain con-
tradictions for the two countries, because the Mexican debt crisis of 1982 acted
together with the approval of IRCA in 1986 to push into the legalization and, quite
probably the settlement also, of a considerable number of Mexicans (2.24 million
between 1986 and 1992), on top of the flow of recurrent temporary migrants be-
tween the two countries.
Some Impacts at the National Level
in the Two Countries
The brief consideration above to the changing circumstances of labor migra-
tion during the 20th Century puts under perspective not only the magnitude of the
flows in different periods, but also underlines the changing conditions over time
affecting the interaction of supply-demand for labor, which in turn imposes differ-
ent effects for each country in the different periods of attention. There have been
periods in the past when migration was even more important than in recent years.2
For instance, from the Mexican perspective, the loss of 3.2% of total population
during the 1920s has probably been the most important demographic loss, not only
in relative numbers, but also in the sense that the migrants were mostly relatively
skilled middle class workers accounting for a very important share of the country’s
extremely scarce human capital (Verduzco, 1992). It is most unfortunate that we
do not have more detailed studies of this kind.
Some speculation can still prove helpful. The loss through migration in the
1920s, is most significant if one considers that during the 1910s the Mexican Revo-
lution resulted in the loss of 16% of the Mexican population, most of them part of
the work force (Ordorica and J. Lezama, 1993). By the same token it is likely that
the arrival effect of these Mexican migrants was not as important for the U.S. if
considered on a national scale, but it certainly was considerable at the regional and
local levels, especially in the southwest. And also the economic effects of the Mexi-
can migration flows will vary according to their countercyclical contribution to the
U.S. economy, say during the immediate post war 1920s and the very hard 1930s.
We know that estimates of this kind are scarce and hard to get but they can cer-
tainly be postulated at high probability rates.
The impact on the U.S. of Mexican migration is undoubtedly present today in
all spheres—cultural, economic, demographic and political. The contributions of
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many well settled and assimilated Mexican-American communities and individuals
are in evidence and well appreciated.
For Mexico, the Programa Bracero was most important between 1942 and
1964. It was particularly relevant for most of the rural communities on the center-
west coast and northern Mexico as it has been extensively documented on studies
of pueblos campesinos by both Mexican and U.S. scholars (Foster, 1948 and 1967;
Beals, 1946 and 1962; Belshaw, 1967; Acheson, 1964). However, the extent and
impact of migration flows during those years was very different from what seem to
be the characteristics of present migration. On the one hand, Mexican labor at that
time took essentially seasonal agricultural jobs, and few of those workers became
permanent residents of the U.S. On the other hand, the Mexican economy was
growing fast and did not show the kind of structural problems to create productive
employment that we face today. In sum, a plausible hypothesis is to assume that
migration in those years was due mostly to demand forces (the Programa Bracero),
even if remittances and other positive externalities were also important to support
the Mexican modernization in agriculture well in place during those same years.
The Challenge to Focus on Impacts
To properly estimate current effects or impacts of Mexican migrants, we need
to take into account the very complex sum of economic, social and cultural
interrelations that has amassed in both countries over the long experience of
migration. The challenge is most important because our interpretations will have
to remain consistent for future data comparisons.
Specific Criteria on the Impacts in Mexico
First, it is most important to consider both the number of persons who participate
in the phenomenon of migration and the manner in which they participate in it.
Earlier we saw that the volume of migratory flows has varied considerably
throughout the century, and therefore, for that reason alone, the impacts should
also be different in the regions of origin during different periods.
Furthermore, the types of migration, whether temporary, recurrent or permanent,
make the impacts stemming from each type equally different. It is not the same
when most heads of families in some community have gone to work for one or two
seasons in their lives to the U.S. as when a significant portion of the economically
active population migrates in a recurrent manner; or when, after a few years, entire
families in one locality move permanently to the United States. These are therefore
diverse circumstances that influence the types of impacts that may be seen in the
places of origin, and for that same reason it is important to be able to determine
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them clearly, since both the implications and interpretations of those facts could
vary enormously.
Other factors necessary to examine include the regions and localities of origin
of migrations and whether those places have gradually changed over time, since
the impacts would be different depending on the concentration or dispersion of
migration, as well as on the years of exposure to the phenomenon. The literature
shows varied effects along both dimensions.
It would not be the same if we found that migration came from all points in the
country, that is, following a pattern of geographical dispersion, as if it were con-
centrated in specific areas. In the first case the regional impacts would probably be
more difficult to discover than in the second. If various patterns coexisted, this
would also pose different analytical challenges.
For the time being, we know that migration from Mexico to the United States
has been taking place for many years. We also know that although the flows of
origin have continued to be concentrated in some states of the country, there are
now some new types, and that urban places of origin have increased, as have fe-
male and family migration.
We also have information showing that both the volume and the type of migra-
tory flows have varied throughout the century. The years of the bracero agreement
were the period when it was clearer that migratory flows had a merely seasonal
nature and were limited almost entirely to the rural sphere in both Mexico and the
United States.
In other pages we mentioned some of the overall impacts resulting from
migrations in both countries. Below we will present different types of information
that will enable us to situate more clearly both the circumstances that have a
bearing on the impacts of migration, and the advances in knowledge that exist
as a result of different research projects that have been carried out. We will begin
by stating some of the general characteristics of migratory flows based on the
differences observed in the municipalities of origin. This overview will give
occasion to talk later about the variation in the impacts of migration in the different
contexts of the country.
Municipalities of Origin of Migration
Of the 2,428 municipalities in the country, 62% show some degree of “migra-
tory activity” to the United States, although 18% have extremely low levels3 (see
Table 1).
But looking at the above distribution by regions we find that in the southeastern
states (Chiapas, Tabasco, Campeche, Yucatán and Quintana Roo), 66.5% of
municipalities do NOT participate in that flow of migrant working population to
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the United States. It should be recalled, however, that development levels in those
states are very varied, from very poor to very rich.
Furthermore, in the central states (Oaxaca, Veracruz, Guerrero, Puebla,
Tlaxcala, Hidalgo, Querétaro, State of Mexico and Morelos), 33.8% of the mu-
nicipalities do NOT participate. By contrast, in the border states only 10.2% do
NOT participate, and in the western and northern states practically all the munici-
palities have some participation.
In the country as a whole, the states with the least participation are Tabasco,
Chiapas, Veracruz, Yucatán4 and Quintana Roo. But in addition, in the state of Oaxaca,
65% of the municipalities do NOT have any migratory activity, and therefore we have
a contrasting situation there: in the last few years it has become a state of migration
to the United States, but nevertheless the majority of its municipalities are not con-
nected with that movement.5 Moreover, the municipalities in that state involved in
migration are dispersed throughout the different areas of Oaxaca’s territory and it is
only possible to speak of a relative concentration in the Mixtec region and slightly
less in the Central Valleys, where the capital is also situated.
Let us now see how the municipalities are distributed according to greater and
lesser intensity of “migratory activity.”
In the first place, of all the country’s municipalities, only 4.5% have “high” or
intense migratory activity, a circumstance that probably situates the phenomenon
of the country’s “recurrent” migration in those places, since the reference of the
indicator used for the Economically Active Population (EAP) of a municipality
tells us, in those cases, of a situation that implies a structuring of the migratory
Table 1
Migratory Activity in the Mexican Municipalities by Regions
(Porcientos)
% EAP Border North West Center Southeast Country
0 10.2 5.5 2.5 39.7 66.5 38.0
0.1-1 11.3 8.2 1.9 33.8 13.8 18.3
1.1-6.9 49.4 39.0 19.0 18.0 14.2 22.0
7-24.9 26.7 28.5 59.4 7.2 4.5 16.9
25.0 y más 2.2 18.7 17.0 1.1 0.8 4.5
(abs. 273) (abs. 182) (abs. 313) (abs. 815) (abs. 817) (abs. 2404)
*Migratory activity-=Percent of migrants per Economically Active Population in the municipality.
Source: National Survey of Demographic Dynamics (ENADID 1987–1992).
404
process that can only take place over many years.
Similarly, of the municipalities with “high” migratory activity, 80% are mu-
nicipalities with a population of less than 20,000 inhabitants, which means they
are very rural municipalities, and only one of them (Jerez, Zacatecas) has more
than 50,000 inhabitants.
By contrast, we find that of all the municipalities in the country, 43% have
“low” migratory activity and 17% medium. In these cases, 56% are municipalities
with less than 20,000 inhabitants and only 17% have more than 50,000 inhabitants,
which means that we can characterize the phenomenon of migratory activity as
being closer to rural than urban conditions.6
Of the municipalities with “high” or intense migratory activity (109
municipalities), a majority of 88% are found in 9 of the states with the most migration:
Jalisco, Michoacán, Guanajuato, Zacatecas, Durango, Chihuahua, San Luis Potosí,
Guerrero and Oaxaca; but 48% are found in only three states: Jalisco, Michoacán
and Zacatecas. This gives us a clear idea of the places where this type of
municipalities are concentrated.
In summary, we find that the phenomenon of intensity of migration does not
occur throughout the length of the republic, but is limited to only 4.5% of the
country’s municipalities, and of these, half (48%) are found in only three states:
Jalisco, Michoacán and Zacatecas. We therefore need to be very careful with inter-
pretations of the phenomenon of migration, especially when these are made on the
basis of community studies, as the above information shows us, on the one hand, a
dispersion of the phenomenon in general terms in the country, particularly from
the central states towards the northern and border states, but, on the other, we can
see a very strong concentration of the municipalities with the highest intensity of
migration in few states, mainly in the west.
Variations in the Impacts
In conclusion, from the point of view of the impacts of migration on the places
of origin, the above information shows us that since there is great variability in
the phenomenon of migration in the country, the analysis of the impacts should
take that consideration into account. We will talk about this further on.
Summarizing what has been analyzed so far, we find in the first place
that a significant increase in the phenomenon of migration to the United States
does seem to have occurred in the country, since there is migratory activity
in 62% of municipalities. It is concentrated in a few states and areas of those
states, mainly in the west and north (except the border states), as was pointed
out earlier.
In the west we also find the majority of the municipalities where migratory
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activity is highest of all. These include municipalities which for reasons of catego-
rization fall within the limits of what we have qualified as intense migration (more
than 25% of their Economically Active Population—EAP—involved in migration),
as well as the municipalities in which more than 50% of the EAP have migratory
activity to the United States. These municipalities have high migration since over
50% of their Economically Active Population went to work in the United States
between 1987 and 1992. They total 23 municipalities and 19 of them (83%) are in
Zacatecas, Michoacán and Jalisco. But of these 23 municipalities, only 3 have
more than 20,000 inhabitants and the 23 as a whole have an average of 11,155
inhabitants. This gives us an initial idea of the type of municipalities involved.
The information also shows very clearly that the majority of the more urban
municipalities, that is, those with more population, especially in the west and north,
also have migratory activity, although with low levels. This is a fact which, in
addition to coinciding with other information sources such as the Survey on Mi-
gration to the Northern Border (EMIF), makes it necessary to pose new research
questions, since in fact we still know very little about the meaning of migration to
the United States from these contexts, although further on we will try to point out
some of the better known features so far. But having put forward these consider-
ations, clearly the more rural municipalities with a population of less than 20,000
inhabitants predominate and for that reason they should be the prime object of our
analysis with regard to the impacts.
And if we recall what we have seen in relation to the municipalities where
there is intense migration, all of them, with the exception of Jerez, Zacatecas,
have less than 50,000 inhabitants and most do not exceed 20,000 population. Let
us also recall that only in a few cases do those municipalities form part of
microregions within the states.
These different characteristics of the municipalities of emigration make it nec-
essary for us to be cautious when speaking not only of the causal factors of migra-
tion, but also of the impacts on those places.
Municipalities with a Tradition
of Intense Migration
We should also differentiate between municipalities or communities with a “long
tradition of migration,” as well as those that have a “migratory tradition,” and those
that have been incorporated into the migratory flow recently or relatively recently.
In the first of these, that is, those with a “long tradition of migration,” the
factors that had a bearing on the start of the migratory flows occurred many years
ago and are unknown to us. Nevertheless, the effects of those successive migrations
have gradually accumulated in a different manner over time, in such a way that
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what we can observe now is a different situation from those that prevailed in different
periods and which gave rise to separate flows, probably also with different purposes
according to each period. In these cases, what we are surely observing at present,
if the flows have continued to be intense and uninterrupted, is their continuity, and
we should therefore consider them thus to observe the factors that continue to
Table 2
Michoacán Migratory Activity
Municipalities with Migratory Levels 6 and 7*
Coeneo* Alvaro Obregón
Cotija* Briseñas
Chavinda* Angamacutiro
Churintzio* Coahuayana
Ecuandureo* Copandaro
Huandacareo* Cojumatlan de Regules
Huaniqueo* Cuitzeo
Jiménez* Erongaricuaro
Jiquilpan* Ixtlan
Pajacuaran* Jacona
Panindicuaro* Juarez
Penjamillo* Lagunillas
Purepero* Marcos Castellanos
Puruandiro* Morelia
Tangancícuaro* Nuevo Parangaricutiro
Tinguindin* Numaran
Tlazazalca* Pátzcuaro
Tocumbo* Periban
Venustiano Carranza* Piedad, La
Villamar* Querendaro
Vista Hermosa* Quiroga
Zinaparo* Los Reyes
José Sixto Verduzco* Sahuayo
Santa Ana Maya
Tanhuato
Taretan
Tarimbaro
Uruapan
Yurecuaro
Zacapu
Zamora
Zinapecuaro
Zitacuaro
*Asterisk denotes communities with “intense” migratory activity.
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further the migrations, as well as if we had to observe and interpret different effects
of the migrations, since the recent impacts have changed on the basis of the
achievements or of meeting the needs of earlier years, partly as an effect of the
migrations themselves. For that very reason these types of places should be
differentiated from those with recent flows, since in some the purpose of the
migrations will be different from those where the migrations have been taking
place for many years.
By the best known studies, cases of this type would be those exemplified by
the studies carried out in the town of Jaripo (Fonseca, O. and Lilia Moreno, 1984);
in Gómez Farías (López, G., 1986) and the one called Chamitlán (Massey et al.,
1991), towns in Michoacán that have had continuity in the migratory process with-
out interruption for a long period of time.
According to what is reported, migration in those places (and its effects) has
not allowed appropriate or sufficient conditions to be met in order to end or reduce
the dependency on migration to the United States. One author therefore states:
“Migration is self-perpetuating because of the new consumption needs created by
expectations of life and by the permanence of the variables that condition migration”
(López, G., op. cit., p. 109). This is therefore a form of insertion, among others,
into the migratory process.
But another variable in this type of migration is the one presented in some of
the studies by Robert Kemper (1995 and 1981) for the town of Tzintzuntzan,
Michoacán. If we had looked at migration in this town at just two moments in time
(in 1960 and 1980), we would think that there had been a continuity of the process.
Figure 1. Density of Migratory Activity
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There, however, migration has been interrupted: during the bracero contract it
included practically all heads of families but it was suspended almost entirely during
the 1960s and 1970s and was then directed en masse to Mexico City and other
cities in the country. During the 1980s, migration to the “North” appeared again.
Something similar appears to have taken place in the other lakeside towns of
Pátzcuaro, as reported by Lise and Pietri (1976) until the 1960s, as well as Castile
(1974) and partially by Beals (1946 and 1962) in the Tarascan Meseta of Michoacán
for those same years.
By contrast to the first type of cases, here we find first a mass migration by
heads of families at the end of the bracero contract, together with the extensive
establishment of information and support networks. Then these flows ceased and
were oriented mainly to Mexico City, and began again later to the United States
during the 1980s.
As expressed by the same authors, the impacts of migration have been differ-
ent partly because conditions in each period have varied, but also because the oc-
cupational composition of the migratory flows has been partially transformed in
the different periods. The latter is important because although at times the flows
might not diminish in volume or proportion, what has been observed are differ-
ences in socioeconomic groups that act in accordance with a specific purpose; the
impacts may therefore also vary.
In these cases, as distinct from the previous ones for the state of Michoacán,
not only was there a rupture in the migratory process to the United States, but also
it was replaced by one of internal migration and then the orientation to the “North”
was resumed just a little over a decade ago.
In our municipal information, the municipalities of the first type mentioned
(Jaripo in the municipality of Villamar, Chamitlán in that of Chavinda and Gómez
Farías in that of Tangancícuaro) offer the most intense levels of migratory activity
in the entire country (above 50% of the EAP),7 while the municipalities of the
lakeside areas and the meseta appear in the “medium” and “low” levels. These are
some examples of the care we have to have both to talk of the causal factors of
migration, and if we have to analyze its impacts.
Municipalities with a Tradition
of Migration
Apart from the municipalities or states that have had an intense participation
in migration over time, we also have others in relation to the states that have had
some relatively significant degree of migratory participation, although to a lesser
extent than the previous ones. This is the case particularly with some of the border
and northern states.
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The low presence of migrants from these states according to information
sources of the past, leads us to think of the hypothesis that the expansion of the
agricultural frontier towards the north with the creation and expansion of important
irrigation districts constituted an attraction for internal rather than international
migrations. Let us recall the importance of the irrigation districts of Mexicali, of
Sonora, Chihuahua, Coahuila and Tamaulipas in relatively recent times for the
settling of the north of Mexico. It has been a process in which the opening up of
lands and the settling came first, followed by agricultural modernization as of
the 1950s.
However, perhaps because of the proximity of the border and fluctuations in
the changes that were taking place, those states have had international migration
for many years and therefore can be considered states with a “tradition of migra-
tion,” even though their participation in the overall flow has been low.
We thus have another variable introduced which, unfortunately, we only know
superficially. We do not know, for example, whether there is a corresponding
agricultural labor force to these irrigation districts on the other side of the border;
nor do we know whether the agricultural crises on this side were reflected in an
increase in migratory flows from those states. We know in general that the mi-
grants from those places have been relatively few, although we also know that
their participation in migrations is long-standing.
In the regionalization used here, it appears that the states of the “north” have a
proportion of municipalities with intense migratory activity that is very similar to
the situation of the western states. This is due mainly to the states of Durango and
especially Zacatecas, which contribute with 97% of the municipalities of the north
in that category.
In fact both in the north and in the border area there is and there always has
been migration but it appears to remain at medium and low levels and it would
therefore be important to know the purpose of these flows in the different areas of
those regions, as well as in rural and urban localities. That information would be
most useful to be able to situate the type of impacts on those regions whose char-
acteristic is having a tradition of migration which remains at low levels.
Municipalities of Recent Incorporation
into the Phenomenon
The best known states involved in migration are Oaxaca, Guerrero, Puebla
and Morelos, although there is still very little information on this phenomenon in
those places.
In Oaxaca, which is the best known state, seven municipalities (1.2%)8 have
intense migration, and in the rest of those that do have migration, “low” migratory
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activity predominates. Let us also recall that 65% of the municipalities in this state
do NOT participate in this type of migration.
We know from the work of anthropologist Abraham Iszaevich (1988) that in
one of these municipalities with intense migration (San Lucas Quiaviní), migra-
tory flows to the United States began to increase in the early 1960s and eventually
included 65% of adult males in the community. Moreover, in the seven communi-
ties he studied, there were different patterns of migration both to other places in
Mexico and to the United States. Unfortunately we know almost nothing about the
migratory situation in this state, which is particularly complex, not only because of
its size, but also because of its cultural heterogeneity, since more than 10 important
ethnic groups inhabit the state.
In other municipalities with recent migration, municipal information shows
that migration to the United States is partially extended to all the country’s states,
although with low levels of intensity and with very limited participation in the
majority of nontraditional states. In these cases, there is practically a total lack
of information, as it was not even suspected that the phenomenon existed in the
majority of those places.
In the three categories indicated above we have major differences that we should
consider in order to situate the details of the phenomenon of migration in a manner
appropriate to the conditions in which it occurs. This is also the path that will
enable us to better understand aspects related to their impact.
The Rural and the Urban
In the cases of most intense and semi-intense migration, rural municipalities
predominate over urban ones, although there is migration from practically all the
municipalities that have urban populations. Therefore, even from this perspective,
it would be observed that urban migration to the United States would probably
already have major importance.9 The Survey on Migration to the Northern Border
(EMIF) reported that 56% of the flow came from urban localities—of more than
15,000 inhabitants—(Corona, 1996). But, unless this movement of people can some
day be measured more accurately, it is clear migration of urban origin is more
important now than before, and it would therefore be necessary to study in depth
the implications of such a change.
Until now the most accurate study of migration to the United States has
been carried out almost entirely from the rural point of view because the
evidence was easier to analyze. In fact very few studies have analyzed this
phenomenon from an urban perspective, as we will see further on. For the time
being it is a limitation that does not allow us to understand the logic of labor
movements of an urban work force that goes to work abroad; and even less to
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think of specific impacts beyond a few general considerations following from
the few existing studies.
Migrations and Development: National
or Community Viewpoint
Earlier we saw that migratory flows to the United States have varied enor-
mously over the century due to diverse circumstances in each country. For Mexico
as a place of origin of migration, variations in the flow should be more or less in
keeping with the type of changes that have taken place in different periods. Some-
thing similar should occur with the impacts, since as has continually been repeated
in the studies, people do not simply leave to work as an end in itself, but with
specific projects and goals. Therefore, following this same logic, it would be con-
sistent to think that, depending on the specific contexts of migrants and according
to the community and regional circumstances of each period, the migrants estab-
lished their own goals in each period.
The above considerations point to various criteria that would be important to take
into account when talking of the impacts of migration on the places of origin in Mexico.
Similarly, we have presented an overview of the presence of recent migratory
flows in the country, as well as on the places where there is a greater presence of
the phenomenon. This will enable us to interpret more appropriately the informa-
tion that exists on the impacts based on the different studies that have been carried
out in different periods.
Different Priorities in Research
We should note, in the first place, that unlike many of the studies carried out in
the United States, in Mexico the topic of impacts has not been a priority—at least
not from the same viewpoint, nor with the same insistence. Secondly, the majority
of the studies deal with migrants and migrations from the rural sector, which al-
though consistent with the greater presence of the phenomenon in those places,
bypasses the view of the impacts on the diversity of urban localities where migra-
tion also exists. Thirdly, most of the studies, particularly the better known ones,
have been carried out in two of the states with the most migration in the country
(Michoacán and Jalisco) and several of them in communities in the municipalities
with the greatest intensity of migration in the entire country. And although it is
logical that it should happen, this implies certain limitations, at least from the point
of view of the suitability of having a more comprehensive and complete knowl-
edge of the phenomenon, especially when we know that recently it has become
dispersed to almost the entire country, although with a low presence.
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Among the studies carried out, the community studies of anthropologists or of
an anthropological nature stand out. In those types of studies, it has been more
common that the purpose of the work did not have the specific intention of study-
ing migration, but rather the community life of campesino villages. The encounter
with migration to the United States has been a finding that, owing to its magnitude
and importance in the communities, has had to be detailed more carefully. That is
why those studies are mainly geared to an ethnographic description of the life of
communities in accordance with the most conventional methods of anthropology.
These are followed in number by other studies of a sociodemographic nature whose
information comes mainly from surveys applied to the population, sometimes to a
single community or city, or to areas or groups of communities or cities, based on
a sample that in some cases has been statistically representative and in others not.
Another characteristic in all cases is that the studies were carried out during
different periods, a situation that also makes us be cautious with the interpreta-
tions, since we would have to situate the information according to the conditions of
the appropriate spatial and seasonal contexts.
In speaking of the impacts, the authors tend to favor those that are a conse-
quence of monetary remittances, that is, of the money sent or taken by migrants
themselves to their communities. Some researchers, however, have also focused on
the topic of the noneconomic effects of migration, although few have delved more
deeply into this point.
The authors’ intentions have frequently been to interpret the effects of both
monetary remittances and work experience in the overall process of change in the
communities studied. We should also be cautious, however, in this regard, since the
authors do not always give an account of socioeconomic processes in the commu-
nities they have studied.
Jorge Durand (1994) also states an important fact in presenting the best
known community studies. These include 25 authors and almost 37 communi-
ties, of which 30 are in Michoacán and Jalisco, 3 in Guanajuato, 3 in Oaxaca
and only 1 in Zacatecas.
Despite the above-mentioned limitations, we believe that the series of research
projects carried out in Mexico by both Mexicans and U.S. researchers can contrib-
ute important and useful knowledge on some of the effects or impacts of labor
migrations in Mexico.
Monetary Remittances
The topic of remittances is perhaps the one that has received the most attention
among the economic effects of migration. This is partly because it can be measured.
The justification is greater in this case since wages are considerably higher in the
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United States than in Mexico and there tends to be a differential between the peso
and the dollar in favor of the latter which leads to a special appraisal in this regard.
Although the importance of monetary remittances has been known since the
1920s (Gamio, 1930; Taylor, Paul, 1932 in Durand, J., 1994), it was not until re-
cently that researchers began to be concerned about the topic and to try to record
the amounts in some way. The estimates of remittances reported in the literature
generally allude to two levels: estimates of national coverage or estimates at the
level of very specific communities in which case studies have been made.
Frequently, based on specific research projects, researchers have attempted
to make more global calculations of the remittances sent by all Mexican migrants
(Díez-Canedo, 1984); García y Griego, M. and F. de los Ríos (1985); Massey and
Parrado (1994); Lozano, (1993). However, whether because of the community
orientation of many of those studies, or because of the broad suppositions on
which they had to be based, those calculations have been useful only as prelimi-
nary approximations during times when more accurate estimates were not avail-
able. Subsequently there have been other more complete estimates based on in-
formation from surveys with greater coverage, such as the survey carried out by
CENIET, and more recently the Survey on Migration to Mexico’s Northern Bor-
der (Corona, 1996).
In recent years Banco de México (the Central Bank) has designed a complex
methodology together with a strategy of very broad coverage in order to be able to
measure the inflow of dollars from Mexican migrants working in the United States.
Based on this methodology, and having reviewed the different measuring tests
carried out, Fernando Lozano has produced two measurement exercises, trying to
make up for the limitations of the different efforts, including the most recent ones,
such as those carried out by Massey and Parrado (1994) and Corona (1996). This
last work of Lozano’s was carried out at the request of the commission that pre-
pared the binational study (Lozano, 1997). His estimates are very close to the latest
ones from Banco de México: US$3.867 billion for 1995 compared to the bank’s
estimate of US$3.672 billion.
Viewed from a national standpoint, the importance of remittances may
seem moderate if we compare them with earnings from exports of goods, since
the remittances sent by migrants barely represented 5% of the total value of
exports in 1995. Nevertheless, they were equivalent to 57% of foreign
investment that year. It should be recalled, however, that during the last decade
remittances had a much greater relative importance when the economic context
was also different, and remittances were in fourth place in foreign-currency
inflows from abroad.
In view of the above and following the nature of geographic concentration of
the phenomenon of migration, it would seem more useful to evaluate it from a
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regional point of view. On this scale the importance of remittances is much greater,
particularly if we bear in mind that the majority of municipalities of origin are
predominantly rural.
Lozano’s estimates are perhaps more revealing from another perspective, that
which distinguishes between permanent and temporary migrants. The most important
implication of his estimates is the large proportion represented by remittances from
permanent migrants: 64.7% of total remittances. If the well-known tendency for
permanent migrants to reduce their remittances to their area of origin as time goes
by is proven, the importance of the remittances is destined to decline even more in
the future.
Now, as we have seen when reviewing the municipal figures, although mi-
gration is present with different levels of intensity throughout the country, it is
mainly concentrated in the states of the west and north, but especially in the former.
From the point of view of remittances this would mean, at least in theory, a greater
importance of same in those states and, within them, in the areas and communi-
ties in which the phenomenon of migration has intensified more, as we saw in
earlier pages.
Clearly, in those areas in particular, the economic benefits of migration are
most important, since the average income from remittances is equivalent to the
average income of households in a context in which only 40% of households reach
those levels of income (Papail and Arroyo, 1996). Also, remittances and other forms
of assistance from migrants have been channeled over the years into providing
support for certain agricultural activities, as well as for countless works such as
parks, schools, churches, roads, street paving, introduction of drainage, etc., in a
great many communities in those regions.
Similarly, the indirect effects of remittances should also be mentioned. These
can be calculated, although in a partial and limited manner, on the basis of
economic simulation exercises. Edward Taylor (1996) calculates that the greatest
multiplying effect of remittances takes place in rural households whose
consumption and spending patterns favor goods produced domestically with labor-
intensive technologies; by contrast, when remittances reach urban households,
the multiplying effects are less for Mexico because consumption patterns in those
places include a larger number of imported goods. Taylor calculates that each
dollar sent to Mexico by migrants could translate into an increase of between
US$0.30 (30 U.S. cents) and US$0.40 (40 U.S. cents) in the income of farmers
with small landholdings.
Nevertheless, as the United States economy becomes more integrated, the
multiplying effects of remittances are likely to become smaller, since production
in Mexico will respond more to demand in the overall North American market
and less to demand only in Mexico.
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Remittances and the Households
Strictly speaking, the most direct impact of remittances in dollars occurs in
the households where they are received, depending on the amounts sent and the
circumstances of each one. Secondly, the community can benefit more or less,
depending on the number of households with migrants and of members working
abroad, and there will also be greater benefit when the community can retain a
substantial part of the multiplying effects of the demands stemming from the first
outlay. Similarly, the impact will depend on whether the migratory pattern in the
community is occasional or recurrent, that is, whether households have members
migrating with a regular annual or biannual frequency, or whether migration takes
place only occasionally, once or twice throughout people’s entire life. Migration
that becomes permanent is also destined to reduce its contributions.
These different types of behavior in fact occur in the myriad communities
involved in the migratory process.
There follow some examples. Paul Taylor (in Durand, 1994) reported that dur-
ing the 1920s there was a mass migration from Arandas, Jalisco, which included
the young men of all social classes except landholders and wealthy merchants, but
without excluding their sons. In 1923 the income from the 200 “northerners” from
the town was $75,000 pesos, or the equivalent of US$375 per person (Martínez, T.,
1985), a figure which in those days was not negligible.
Robert V. Kemper for Tzintzuntzan (1981 and 1995) and Castile (1974) for
Cherán, both towns in Michoacán, affirm that almost all the young men in the
community enrolled at some point in the Bracero Program, although afterwards
they did not continue to go but changed their destination from the United States to
Mexico City, although as was mentioned before, during the 1980s the emigration
to the “north” began again. Currently, Kemper states (1995) that 200 families from
Tzintzuntzan are living in Mexico City and around 150 in the United States, aside
from the fact that 362 persons are living temporarily outside the community in
Mexico City, Morelia and the United States.
In four communities of Michoacán and Jalisco, D. Massey et al. (1987) point
out that of all migrants, between 15% and 25% had left to work in the United States
4 or more times. These would be the “recurrent” migrants.
Jorge Durand (1994) affirms that on average in the 11 communities in his study
(in Michoacán, Jalisco and Guanajuato), 54% of the migrants had only made one
journey in their entire life. Something similar is stated by Gustavo López (1986) for
the town of Tangancícuaro in Michoacán, when he says that approximately 60% of
the adult population had migratory experience, that is, that they had gone at least once.
In Los Altos (the highlands) of Jalisco, Juan Luis Orozco (1992:401-2) men-
tions three different profiles of migration in his communities. In Corralillos, 36%
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of the sons had gone to work in the United States, while in the village of Los
Dolores 21.4% had left and in El Refugio only 4.2%.
For Zamora, also in Michoacán, it is reported that 14% of the city’s working
population had migratory experience but only 19% of them were “recurrent” mi-
grants who had gone four or more times (Verduzco, 1992).
These data give us an idea of the variation in migratory profiles, even in states
and regions of high migration, and also during different periods.
Therefore, if our interest lies in the remittances, although we can talk of
overall quantities and average monthly or annual amounts, in fact they reach the
communities of origin in very individualized ways for each one, depending on
the migratory profiles at the time which sometimes or in some cases include many
people but can then drop or even increase more. Similarly, in some periods people
only go to the United States and in others that pattern coexists with internal
migration also.
It therefore follows that we find very variable quantities in the different stud-
ies. For example, Orozco (op. cit.) made a calculation based on data from his three
communities, and found that the income from remittances reached US$86,464,
which represents 13.9% of the total income of the communities or the equivalent of
US$371 a year per family. But he explains that this varies a great deal from com-
munity to community. Corralillos is where the most is received; there the annual
income is US$548 per family, equivalent to 28.4% of the income, whereas in El
Refugio it is only US$60 per family, equivalent to only 4.3% of the income. Obvi-
ously the differences between these quantities have much to do with each town’s
different migration patterns.
Massey and Parrado (1994) found similar behavior in their study of 22 com-
munities in the states of Michoacán, Jalisco, Guanajuato and Nayarit, since the
remittances calculated as a percentage of aggregate income obtained in Mexico
varied from insignificant quantities to considerable amounts.
Similarly, in Gómez Farías, Michoacán, López, G. (op. cit.), calculated that
remittances varied between US$80 and US$300 a month per family and that they
could be equivalent to 19% of the income.
In the village of Tepusco (municipality of Villa Hidalgo, Jalisco), almost 100%
of external family income comes from remittances, and these surpass the amount
of public spending of the municipality (Arroyo, De León and Valenzuela, 1991, p.
159). Moreover, in Colotlán, Jalisco, the same authors point out that remittances
are the economic base of that microregion, since they also amount to much more
than municipal spending. But by contrast, in the area of Ocotlán, also in Jalisco,
which is an industrialized region, there is less migration and those who do migrate
to the United States have the lowest levels of education, and hence the amount
received there from remittances is relatively insignificant.
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Owing to the above, and with good reason, they themselves affirm (1991:
p. 244) that the average estimates of remittances have limitations in their inter-
pretation because the majority of families in their study actually received small
quantities, a few received larger amounts, and more than a third did not obtain
anything. This study has the additional value of being representative of the “area
of rejection” of Jalisco and included 69 communities.10 Furthermore, J. Papail
and J. Arroyo (1996) mention that between 27% and 32% of the migrants from
the four medium-sized cities of Jalisco were unable to send money during their
last migratory experience.11
In this regard, in the communities studied by Orozco (op. cit.), 13% of the
migrants did not manage to return with savings from their last trip, while among
the migrants from the city of Zamora (Verduzco, op. cit.), 27% were also unable to
send money or bring it back with them, and of these, two-thirds never returned to
the United States.
Actually this is a point that has not been commented on much, since it is more
common to talk of the successes than the failures, but these data indicate a quarter
and even a third of returning migrants who were unable to send or bring back
money. It implies a difficult situation for many as a result of very resolute efforts.
In practice, the possibilities that individuals have of saving have to do with
diverse factors. In addition to merely circumstantial aspects, it also depends on the
situation of savings prior to the departure of each individual, since some travel
with what they have saved in different ways in Mexico, while others have to go into
debt and borrow and then have to pay back (in Mexico or in the United States),
usually with high interests. Fonseca and Moreno (op. cit.) illustrate this point very
well based on the accounts of various informants, although this is a recurrent theme
in almost all the studies and very well known by researchers of the topic. Similarly,
we know of the high costs of subsistence incurred by workers, particularly those
who work isolated in the fields, as well as undocumented migrants who have to
depend on intermediaries to obtain food, clothing and other types of goods in order
not to place themselves at risk (Fonseca, O. and L. Moreno, op. cit.). Moreover,
migrants have to face the costs of the journey itself, and especially payments to a
“coyote” to cross the border, as well as bribes to Mexican officials upon their re-
turn to the country. This is also something well known from experiences of field
work (see W. Cornelius, 1978; López, G., 1986; Massey, D. et al., 1987).
Ina Dinerman (1983) reported on the basis of the experiences of informants
from Ihuatzio and Huecorio in Michoacán, that between US$250 and US$300 was
spent on “coyotes” alone. At that time the money had to come from the activities of
the community itself.
On occasions, the monetary success of the trip to the United States will depend
partly on the economic situation in relation to the demand for workers in the period
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of the journey, since, for example, J. Papail and J. Arroyo (op. cit.) found in their
sample from medium-sized cities of Jalisco that 15% of returning migrants were
unemployed immediately before coming back to Mexico. They also mention having
found higher rates of unemployment among undocumented migrants that among
documented ones. It is likely that these two findings, as it is a recent study, reflect
to a certain extent the new situation that prevails in the United States labor market.
But the fact is, as can be seen from the above examples, that the income that
finally reaches families is not always high; on the contrary, many expenditures of
all types have to be made on the journeys there and back and during the stay, and it
is common for workers to have to face variable periods without work (Mines, R.
and S. Gabbard, 1993), and there are diverse losses connected with remittances. In
fact this is a point on which more research is needed, since the cost of migration
appears to be very high.
In another sense we know, for example, that in recent times wages have
dropped for migrants and we are aware that in addition there is greater labor
competition among Mexicans themselves; if this situation were to persist, faced
with high subsistence costs, to what extent would future migrations be inhibited
or change, and with them, the inflow of remittances? We believe it is possible to
put forward the hypothesis of a relative saturation of the labor market, which
together with the accompanying drop in wages could lead to a variable withdrawal
of the supply.
Another important aspect that has not been dealt with in depth in research
projects is a characteristics of remittances which, although known as a fact, has not
been thought about sufficiently. Arroyo, De León and Valenzuela (op. cit.) point
out that the remittances are: unstable and cyclical and therefore insecure.
These features have as much to do with the potential final benefits of
remittances as with the series of family strategies that households should plan
and execute.
It is true that these characteristics regarding the instability and insecurity of
remittances occur, although we do not know exactly under what circumstances or
to what extent.
In general terms the different studies show on the one hand, that there are
workers who, probably because of past experiences, as well as because of their
contacts through the networks and the more stable type of work they will carry
out, manage to engage quickly and without obstacles in some form of employment.
In such cases, the money they manage to save after deducting their expenses
could be channeled in a more stable manner to their families. On the other hand,
there are also the data of workers who did not manage to bring back or send any
savings to their families, as well as information showing that the expenses incurred
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by migrants in order to cross over to the other side and then maintain themselves,
especially if they are undocumented, are high and perhaps higher than for those
who are residents or those who already have papers. Furthermore, we also know
that there are activities, particularly agricultural ones, that do not make it possible
to have work continuously throughout the year. In fact this is a point on which
further research should be carried out in order to grasp the nuances of the costs
in this type of labor experience which is determined by the types of work
demanded, and by the clandestine forms of arrival and labor integration which
are so specific.
Remittances: Dependence
or Development?
Another common concern with the subject of remittances has to do with their
use. Therefore, in general the authors have made efforts to find out not only how
much reaches families, but also how it is used and what effects it promotes.
In general, but especially at the state and local levels, the generally shared
premise is that migrants’ contributions to their regions of origin help to improve
living conditions in said regions, even when the literature also tells of some coun-
terproductive effects in the form of conspicuous consumption, inflation and effects
of displays of consumption (see W. Cornelius, 1990, p. 98-9).
First of all, it has been found by researchers that the remittances are used
mainly for consumption, both for subsistence and for the acquisition of diverse
goods. Secondly, they are used to enlarge and embellish houses, as well as to im-
prove them with electricity, water and drainage services. Different debts incurred
are also paid for and the “northern” money is used to contribute to community
fiestas or to give parties themselves, as well as to support communities’ urban
infrastructure works.
In general terms, it tends to be evident that communities with more migration
look different, as described, for example, by Luis Rionda for Copándaro, Michoacán
(1986), or by Gustavo López for Gómez Farías (op. cit.). It is common for there to
be better houses in those places, as well as good urban services, or at least better
than in other neighboring communities.
However, at times a certain frustration can be perceived in the researcher
at not finding more productive investments in the communities (W. Cornelius,
1976 and 1990), as it would be wished that by taking advantage of migration,
the people of the villages could make progress. There is also the hypothesis
that migration could be an endless chain and only useful for consumption
(Russell, 1992).
420
The High Cost of the
Migratory Experience
As was mentioned earlier, it is more or less clear that there are some costs that do
not allow better tapping of migrants’ efforts. This is a point that for the time being
darkens the outlook for migration. For example, in the surveys carried out by Papail
and Arroyo it was seen that in the four medium-sized cities of Jalisco, the average
income from migration was equivalent, in 1993, to the average income in those cities.
In reading that information we would say that the comparison most commonly made
with the wage gap between the two countries, which is normally estimated at 1 to 10,
is actually unreal because the net amount that would be earned with the effort of
migration would not exceed what is finally obtained here. Nevertheless, if we con-
sider that in those same cities only 40% of the economically active population earns
on average that income, this would give us a more approximate dimension of the real
importance of remittances for those places, especially for those who emigrate from
there (op. cit., p. 119). But from another point of view, that fact shows that the real
possibilities for savings or productive investment are rather limited.
At any rate, having made these considerations, a review of the literature shows
us contrasting situations. But first it is necessary to make an observation. With
the exception of the research carried out by Papail and Arroyo (1996), Massey, D.
et al. (1987), González de la Rocha and A. Escobar (1990), Verduzco (1992) and
Durand (1994), all the projects that have some locality as a unit of analysis center
on the rural sector and are oriented, when they do so, to a study of agricultural
activities. Actually this is logical since, as we have seen, these migrations come
mainly from the rural sector. Nevertheless, a limitation tends to persist in the
works of researchers, and this is that owing to the complexities of the analysis,
the community is viewed as a sort of special world (which it is for the researcher),
where what counts is the community and its immediate surroundings and migra-
tion to the United States. At times the studies fail to observe that Mexican rural
communities have been following the tenor of the changes in the country. These
changes have signified, among other things, a sharp drop in the agricultural work
force which has gone hand in hand with a drop in the economic importance of
agricultural activity in comparison with the rest of economic activities. In an im-
portant sense for migrations it has implied that, since the late 1960s, the country’s
“rural” population, particularly campesinos, can no longer survive without the
support of their own people working in Mexican cities or in the United States
(Arizpe, 1980; Verduzco 1985; Arias 1992). In fact, if we analyze the extensive
literature on regional development and urbanization in the country, we find that
temporary and definitive migration to Mexican cities has predominated over mi-
grations of diverse types to the United States, but the fact is that rural inhabitants
have not lived from agriculture alone for several decades.
421
The above digression makes sense inasmuch as it has been common for some
researchers to want to see productive investments in rural settings which no longer
have the capacity for investments of that type.
But having stated these considerations, we can mention two types of communi-
ties in general that appear in the literature. In some there seem to be no productive
changes, or if there are, they are perceived as being of minor local or regional impor-
tance and migration appears rather as a process that establishes a dependence on
remittances and the exterior. This could be the case with places such as Huecorio
(Dinerman, 1982), Jaripo (Fonseca and Moreno, 1984), Gómez Farías (López, 1986),
Chamitlán (Massey et al., 1987) Las Animas (Goldring, 1990), Corralillos (Orozco,
1992), Tepusco and Colotlán (Arroyo, De León and Valenzuela, 1991).
On the other hand there are communities where remittances appear to have
supported processes of change, or where because processes of productive change
have taken place, remittances were viable as investments. Such a case is reported
by Acheson (1974) in Cuanajo, Michoacán, where the braceros’ remittances helped
to start furniture workshops. In Ihuatzio, also in Michoacán, Dinerman (op. cit.)
describes how with the support of remittances, crafts have provided a new alterna-
tive for some of the inhabitants, an activity that did not exist a few years earlier. In
Chilchota, Michoacán, something similar occurred with the different crafts that
emerged there (Ramírez, Luis, 1988).
In Copándaro, Michoacán, Rionda (1986) recounts how remittances have sup-
ported agricultural mechanization, as well as the development of lentil cultivation,
of which Michoacán has now become the country’s main producer. Furthermore,
activities of breeding and fattening cattle and hogs have been developed. Neverthe-
less, although there have been a number of changes in the town and some groups
that used to migrate no longer do so, there has now been an easement of migration
by other sectors of the population.
In Jalisco, moreover, Orozco (op. cit.) reports that in the town of Los Dolores
the productive changes and the improvement of living standards have been very
noticeable as compared with the other two communities he studied. In Los Dolores
remittances contributed to the changes and where in the past there was a pattern of
intense migration, now there is very little.
Arroyo, De León and Valenzuela (op. cit.) point out in their study of Jalisco’s
rural “area of rejection” that of the different areas they studied, that of Tepatitlán is
where there is the most productive investment from remittances. This goes particu-
larly to agriculture and other types of business.
In another study, but of the urban sector, Papail and Arroyo (op. cit.) also
report that the region of Tepatitlán, Jalisco, is where in comparative terms there
has been the greatest productive investment from migration. There the remittances
have been used to support poultry farming; but it should be noted that it is estimated
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that that city and its area of influence produce around 30% of the country’s eggs
and chicken.
In the city of Zamora, Michoacán, which is a subregional city in the north-
west part of the state, Verduzco (1992) studied the changes in the region’s rural
and urban sectors, as well as the characteristics of the diverse migratory flows,
including international ones. The study suggests that owing to the intense agri-
cultural development and the promotion of urban activities, migrations to the United
States had probably diminished over time. It was also suggested that the reduced
migrant sector of the present time was different from that of other periods.
Likewise, Papail and Arroyo suggest something similar for the medium-sized
cities of Jalisco studied by them.
But apart from these instances that refer to diverse achievements of certain
importance for communities and sometimes for regions, there are other accom-
plishments, perhaps more limited, but no less important.12
In the studies of Arandas (Taylor, Paul, 1932), Jaripo, Gómez Farías, Chavinda
(Alarcón, R. 1984), Huecorio (Belshaw, 1967), Alvaro Obregón (Trigueros, 1994),
Cherán (Beals, 1946) and a few others, it appears very clearly that during differ-
ent periods, but especially in the 1940s, when it was evident that there were ejido
lands together with a modernizing impetus but without capital or machinery, mi-
grations, through the bracero contract, helped to support those processes in vari-
ous ways. In this regard let us recall, as is stated repeatedly in the literature, that
migration takes place with very specific objectives, and this was indeed the case
during those years, since there were lands and conditions to cultivate them, but
official bank credits did not yet exist, as was to happen later.
From another perspective with comparative purposes, recent works by E. Taylor
(1996) and Yúnez (1997), based on building the social accountability matrixes of
various communities, offer preliminary conclusions, but no less convincing, that
emphasize the need to distinguish the effects, taking into account the differences
between localities. For example, the micro-multisectoral study in rural localities
with different characteristics, commissioned from Antonio Yúnez (1997), estab-
lishes the differentiated nature of the impacts of foreign-currency inflows, whether
from remittances or from exports, depending on the importance of the foreign
currency in the specific locality vis-a-vis other resources.13 The extreme cases in
his study illustrate the point: Napizaro (Mich.) is the locality that is most depen-
dent, in relative terms, on remittances and therefore the one that maximizes the
multiplying effects of a change in the inflow of foreign exchange (whether be-
cause of devaluation or increased hiring),14 while Concordia (Coahuila) has a more
balanced economy that depends to a lesser extent on remittances and that gathers
more limited multiplying effects of a change in foreign currency (see tables 4a
and 4b in Yúnez 1997). The implementation of this methodology presupposes a
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good dose of technical sophistication together with high costs in gathering the
information from each community, but it is undoubtedly a promising alternative
in the search for more precise conclusions.
In general terms, these diverse effects and changes at the community level are
also in harmony with findings reported in similar situations, together with migra-
tion, in other parts of the world (Taylor et al., 1995). The interpretation of many of
these cases coincides with that of other authors who, for other national contexts
view remittances as a vehicle for furthering the development of areas of migratory
expulsion, as long as the channeling of the remittances goes hand in hand with
other conditions. Unless there is better research on causality, as pointed out in
those studies, a generally accepted condition is being able to concentrate other
private and public resources, notably for infrastructure, in those same areas, other-
wise the effects of the remittances will be used on basic consumption with fleeting
distribution or multipliers (Massey, Arango, Hugo, Kouaouci, Pellegrino and Tay-
lor, 1993; Díaz-Briquets, 1991).
The result of these proposals contains clear implications of trade-off for the
public policy of both countries: it may be convenient for the United States for a
greater intensity of remittances to be concentrated in few areas in Mexico in or-
der to ensure the multiplying effects that would reduce dependence on said remit-
tances in the future; for Mexico it involves concentrating in the same regions of
origin, and mainly in those with the greatest development potential, to the detri-
ment of other regions that are also poor, a greater proportion of the effort for
investment in infrastructure.15
Migrations and Some Economic
Improvements
Along with the data and interpretations on the use of remittances, researchers
concur unanimously in reporting that migratory workers use part of their savings
from working in the United States to improve their homes, whether by decorating
them, extending them or introducing basic services such as electricity, water and
drainage. Similarly, it is common to find that localities with migrants benefit from
their contributions by receiving monetary support that helps them to improve diverse
services, whether urban infrastructure, health, religious, educational or
entertainment services. In towns with migrants it is common to find
acknowledgments from the residents to their fellow townsmen for having helped
them build a school or health clinic, or to introduce drinking water or build or
improve the church, etc.
It also has been common for researchers to report a certain channeling of
savings into productive activities, especially agricultural ones, mainly in aspects
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related to the acquisition of agricultural machinery or implements, as well as other
types of improvements or small technical innovations, etc.
Below we will try to analyze to what extent the situation as regards some of
these services or technological innovations characterize the municipalities with
the greatest migratory intensity, at least in the states that in relative terms have the
greatest presence of the phenomenon of migration.
These states are the following: Chihuahua, Durango, San Luis Potosí,
Zacatecas, Guanajuato, Jalisco, Michoacán, Guerrero and Oaxaca.
We proceeded to differentiate the municipalities according to the category of
“migratory activity,” into “low,” “medium,” “high,” and “nonexistent” in the way
this is presented initially in the first pages of this chapter. In accordance with
these categories we applied the analysis of variance to ascertain whether the null
hypothesis that there would be no differences between the four groups could or
could not be rejected.
Overall for the series of municipalities in the 9 states, the following variables
were statistically significant:
1) Percentage of housing with electric power;
2) Percentage of housing with piped water;
3) Percentage of housing with 2 to 5 rooms;
4) Percentage of livestock production units that use some kind of
technology;
5) Percentage of rural production units that use some kind of technology.
Furthermore, a number of differences appeared at the level of the diverse states.
In Chihuahua, for instance, the percentage of housing with drainage and the
percentage of housing with 2 to 4 bedrooms (size) were significant.
In Guanajuato, however, only the use of technology in agricultural units was
significant.
In Guerrero, the variables concerned with housing (drainage, water and
number of rooms and bedrooms), and the use of livestock technology were
significant.
In Jalisco, water in housing units and the variables referring to the use of tractors
and livestock technology appeared as significant.
In Michoacán the variables concerning housing (water, drainage, electricity
and size), as well as those relative to the use of tractors and livestock technology
were significant.
In Oaxaca, the same variables as those for Michoacán were significant.
In San Luis Potosí, only those concerning the size of housing units were
significant.
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Finally, in Zacatecas, the water in housing units, the use of tractors and the
use of agricultural and livestock technology were significant.
We thus have an initial statistical confirmation of the possible impact of mi-
gration on the states with the highest level of migratory activity in the country. And
furthermore, as we have seen, there are important variations between the different
states, a situation that suggests that the purpose of migrations can also vary a great
deal from one state to another, as was pointed out in the first few pages.
These are important clues that would be useful to take up in future research
in order to avoid generalizations on the variable conditions of municipalities of
origin, as well as of the impacts.
Another way, although limited, of observing the possible impact is to com-
pare the situation of municipalities in each state in accordance with a certain series
of characteristics, trying to differentiate between municipalities with intense mi-
gration and those with low migratory activity. Although this is a more descriptive
form, it may nevertheless be illustrative and therefore, by way of example we will
present only the case of the state of Michoacán, since it is the only one that ful-
fills various conditions that make it possible to make this observation by means
of this technique.16
For housing conditions, a few “strata” have been made with series of munici-
palities that present some similar characteristics within each stratum, but that show
differences between the “strata.” It is therefore a group of municipalities within
each state according to their similarities and differences with regard to a set of
variables that have to do with housing conditions.17 These “strata” were ranked
from lowest to highest in order to be able to observe which municipalities make
up each “stratum.”
In the lowest “stratum” are the municipalities with the worst housing condi-
tions, and in the highest stratum those that have the best.
In Michoacán, for example, of the 27 municipalities with intense migratory
activity, 23 (85%) are in the top 2 strata of a total of 7 strata, despite the fact that,
as will be recalled from earlier pages, the municipalities with intense migration
are rural. Of all the municipalities with the best housing conditions in the state
(56 municipalities), 41% are municipalities with intense migratory activity. (See
map attached at the end and observe how almost all the municipalities in strata 6
and 7 are in the northwestern section of the state. That is the section of the state
with the most migratory activity.)
In summary, the above information confirms, through the use of statistical
techniques, some possible impacts of remittances in specific conditions that have
to do with housing and agricultural productive activities. And, as was mentioned
earlier, these findings are in general harmony with what has repeatedly been re-
ported in community studies over time.
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Migrations and the Selectivity
of Migrants
The topic of the selectivity of migration has had special importance in stud-
ies on migration in general, because it allows us to situate the migrant population
in comparison with the nonmigrant population.
Until a few years ago the shared common knowledge was that those who
migrated to the United States were largely campesinos with low economic and
educational levels, but higher than their nonmigrant fellow countrymen. This is a
fact that was corroborated by different researchers over the years and also con-
firmed by the first major national survey on migration organized by CENIET in
the late 1970s (Zazueta, César, 1982).
We must accept, however, that this is a topic in which more research is also
needed, since what is known is rather general and not very detailed, and the infor-
mation available is really limited. It would be of particular interest to know more
about conditions of selectivity in more recent periods.
Massey et al. (1987) observed in four communities of Michoacán and Jalisco
that migrants to the United States did indeed have more schooling than nonmigrants,
but they saw that they had less than migrants to other parts of Mexico. Likewise
they saw that more rural workers went “North” and that those who were engaged
in nonrural activities tended more to go to Mexican cities.
The works of Arroyo, De León and Valenzuela point out that the selectivity
of migrants varies in different areas. In Ocotlán, for instance, which is an indus-
trial area, those who have less schooling cannot take part in those jobs and opt for
working in the United States. On the other hand in Colotlán the well-known pat-
tern of more schooling than nonmigrants is followed.
In Zamora (Verduzco, 1992), migrants are a negatively selected group com-
pared to those who do not migrate, although they have more schooling than the
rural migrants from the same region. Moreover, the “recurrent” migrants have
even greater negative selectivity.
Papail and Arroyo (op. cit. p. 63) found in their sample of the four medium-
sized cities of Jalisco that both current migrants and male ex-migrants had a slightly
lower level of schooling than nonmigrants in all age groups.
In the data from the survey on migration in Zacatecas (1991), we see that the
positive selectivity of migrants in terms of both schooling and occupation pre-
dominates. Let us recall that in that state migration from rural municipalities pre-
dominates and that intense migration is also important.
Finally, the Survey on Migration to the Northern Border (EMIF) points out
that the population between 15 and 44 years of age has a lower level of schooling
than the population of those same ages resident in Mexico (Corona, 1996).
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Although more research is needed on such an important and delicate topic,
there is room for the hypothesis that probably a significant portion of current
migratory flows is composed of persons with a low level of schooling and even
negatively selective in comparison with nonmigrants. It is also possible that the
findings in the United States with regard to this point are consistent with what is
observed from the Mexican side. If this tendency were true, it would be telling us
of a very specific labor demand at present.
The Demographic Impact
of Outmigration
It is estimated that between 3.5 million and 4.0 million Mexicans became United
States residents between 1980 and 1995. The majority of that population (85%) is
aged between 15 and 64 and only about 4% is older than 65.18 Therefore a majority
of that population is of working age and is penetrating the U.S. labor market.
Although overall the loss of this population may not be significant for Mexico
(it reaches 4.2%), it accounts for around 10% of the population in the states with
the highest levels of emigration. In this regard it should not be forgotten that the
majority of this loss includes persons of working age, and therefore from that per-
spective the exodus of population is bound to have more of an impact on those
places, particularly as regards the effects that may be expected in the future. Popu-
lation projections for the year 2010 in those states indicate a net reduction in the
population growth rate of between 0.8% and 1.0% a year. In those states the loss of
population due to earlier emigrations, coupled with present ones, could reduce the
expected population increase by up to 46% (Gómez de León and Tuirán, 1997).
The Costs of Migration
Despite the uncertainty in the tendencies of selectivity of migrants, it is a fact
that migration involves considerable costs for Mexico, although rarely has an at-
tempt been made to measure them. An estimate of the costs of migration may be
attempted by addressing the components of investment in human capital and rela-
tive quality of migrants.
We consider three types of costs associated with migration from Mexico: labor
opportunity costs; costs for selectivity and family and community costs. Thus far
these have received very little or no attention at all in the literature on migrations,
since, for example, labor opportunity costs have been estimated to be small by
assuming an excess of redundant labor in the country of origin. For Mexico this
assumption is questionable because of the condition of selectivity of its migrants,
which implies considerable costs.
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1) Labor Opportunity Costs: Costs of Education,
Health and Social Infrastructure.
These are the costs incurred throughout the life of individuals to achieve an
economically active person in good conditions of health and education.
The cost for Mexico is the opportunity cost represented by having invested in
preparing that person and not retaining the added value of all his activity for the
benefit of the country. The net returns of that person for the country are remittances
or savings, which hardly exceed 10% of the wages earned in the United States.
That wage is equivalent to the added value they contribute to the other economy.
There are relative costs or returns. By return we understand the quotient be-
tween what is obtained as a wage or added value and what is invested or spent in
exchange for that product. For Mexico the return is small if we consider the quo-
tient between the amount saved from the wage paid to migrants and the costs of
education, health, etc. incurred by Mexico. The return on migrants is only in re-
lation to the net amount in remittances or savings, as approximately 90% of what
they receive in the United States is consumed in that country. In this regard, it is
incorrect to associate the total U.S. wage with Mexican earnings. The literature
points out that the net amount of remittances is, on average, equivalent to the
amount provided by the average earnings in urban localities of origin in Jalisco
(Papail and Arroyo, 1996). The approximation of costs incurred by Mexico is
very high. This would include, for the education of Mexican workers resident in
the United States alone, between US$40 and 50 billion.19
From the viewpoint of the country of destination, the return on what is paid
to Mexican labor is very high, since there has been no need to incur costs of
education, health and social infrastructure. While that denominator is small and
sometimes close to zero for the host nation, we are talking about very high returns.
2) Comparative Costs for Migrants’ Selectivity
Two stages or periods must be recognized in appreciating selectivity. The first
is better known, when the population that migrates is compared with the population
that remains, using numerical indicators (usually years of schooling). In this
comparison the result tends to be positive selectivity in rural migration but negative
in more recent migration of urban origin. The second stage in perceiving selectivity
is by controlling the comparison for groups with the same schooling. In this case
the hypothesis that still dominates is positive selectivity, reflecting enterprising
qualities and the ability to face risks on the part of migrants. It is common for the
young people with the most initiative to leave, with the result that communities
lose their current and potential leaders, and their capacity for interaction with the
exterior is also weakened.
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3) Family and Community Costs
Migration is accompanied by significant changes in forms of family organiza-
tion, such as a necessary additional effort by families to facilitate the migration of
one or several of their members. Similarly, in the communities with the greatest
migration, major changes occur in those communities’ social and political organi-
zation (Zendejas, 1995), which frequently make themselves felt in diverse negative
situations for their inhabitants. It is also common for migration to be accompanied
by serious problems of family disintegration, as well as by the appearance of dif-
ferent psychological and social problems that were previously nonexistent in the
communities of origin.
Although such social costs are difficult to estimate accurately, observers have
realized their great importance in the communities of origin and it would be neces-
sary to carry out systematic studies so as to be able also to plan the establishment
of measures of support that could lessen their negative effects.
Migrations and the Social Organization
of Communities
Along with the existence of intense migratory flows to the United States, some
researchers, mainly anthropologists, have described types of behavior and specific
situations that have influenced the life of localities.
Reichert, J. (1982) called it the “migration syndrome” and then Alarcón, R.
(1988), broadening the view of the phenomenon, called it “northernization.” In short,
it is a question of the process that occurs particularly in communities with intense
migrations and where, owing to the effect of the large volume of people involved in
migration, important changes take place not only on a family but also on a community
scale. It implies changes in the family, in labor and economic organization, in percep-
tions and culture, and in community and political participation.
Dinerman (1983) carefully describes how within families, the roles and
economic functions of the different members have to be reassigned in accordance
with migration and cultivation cycles, faced with the real possibilities and the
expectations of migration. Besides, the relations of reciprocity that were previously
frequent, especially in indigenous communities, are upset by the need to use wage-
earning workers owing to the absence of male community members.
Recently, important changes have taken place with the increased presence of
women migrants, as pointed out by Donato (1996).
At the family level, the departure of the husband and father also leads to friction
and problems in the family that are not always easy to put right (Orozco, op. cit.).
Furthermore, Bohem, B. (1985) also mentions how because of migration,
reciprocal commitments are established between the migrant and the extended family,
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as well as between families when there are activities that should be covered in the
absence of the migrants. Over the years these small influences end up by changing
important aspects of communities’ social organization.
Alarcón, R. (op. cit.) also mentions how because of the fact that the young
people with the most initiative leave, the current and potential leaders in communi-
ties are lost. This leads to a weakening of communities in their relations with the
exterior, especially with government agencies in negotiations for services. Com-
munity participation is also weakened.
López (1986) and Alarcón (1988) mention how because some communities
are closely linked to international migration processes, there are perceptions and
expectations of another kind that have little to do with local living conditions in
the communities.
In summary, this type of migrations, because of specific characteristics as re-
gards the prolonged absence of one or various members of families, especially
when in addition there are many families in a community in this situation, produce
problems and frictions of different kinds which, although little known to us, con-
stitute a significant cost for families that find themselves in those circumstances.
It is a question, on the one hand, of emotional costs that weaken the different
members of migrants’ families, and on the other, of social and economic costs
because of the need to cover adequately the functions that the migrant leaves va-
cant both in his own family and in the community.
Finally, this study has shown the limited knowledge we still have as regards
some of the important impacts of migration: in the United States there are few
studies on the benefits that Mexican labor migration contributes to the country,
particularly in the sphere of economic production, whereas in Mexico, little is known
about the multiplying effects of migration in terms of development. As regards
costs, little is known in Mexico, especially in the sphere of social problems in the
communities of origin. Furthermore, there is still the need for an overall view of
the two countries in order to understand the logic of the social costs that migration
implies for the United States, together with another on the cost for Mexico of pre-
paring a labor force whose returns are in the United States.
Notes
1. We are grateful for the collaboration of Antonio Yúnez, Fernando Lozano, Christian
D. Muñoz, Luz Consuelo Saldaña, Virginia Levín and Fernando Cortés in different activi-
ties that made the preparation of this paper possible.
2. Hall and Coerver (1990) notice that according to the U.S. Department of Labor in
Washington between 1910 to 1920, only about 200,000 Mexicans intended to stay in the
U.S. as legal migrants; the rest were considered as “temporary visitors“ due both to the
internal war in Mexico and to labor demands in the U.S.
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3. The demographic loss to Mexico due to migration in recent years, from 1981-95, of
4.2% of total population, is now a little larger than what was in the 1920s.
4. “Migratory activity” is estimated from the data on the number of persons who re-
turned to the households of those interviewed between 1987 and 1992 in the National Sur-
vey on Population Dynamics (ENADID), the sample size being 800,000 cases. Based on
that information, Rodolfo Corona estimated the proportion of those persons in comparison
with the municipal EAP (Economically Active Population), and it has been on the basis of
that basic calculation that we have created three categories of “migratory activity”: “low”
(from 0.1% to 6.9% of the EAP); “medium” (from 7.0% to 24.9% of the EAP) and “high”
(from 25% to 100% of the EAP). We believe that levels between 0.1 and 1.0 may be consid-
ered extremely low.
5. In the 1960s it was said that the second city with the most Yucatecans was Los
Angeles, California. However, it would seem that those flows have diminished over the last
few decades, probably as a result of the major economic dynamism experienced in the Yucatán
Peninsula because of petroleum in Campeche, livestock-raising, especially in Quintana Roo,
and tourism in Cancún and the Maya areas. The positive migratory net balances of the last
few years indicate that that region has gone from being one of expulsion to become an area
of attraction of population.
6. It should be recalled that Oaxacans participate in various important migratory cir-
cuits within the country, among the most prominent being agricultural seasonal day labor-
ers. There are also significant contingents of Oaxacans in the Federal District, Tijuana, the
San Quintín Valley, Baja California, Sinaloa, and in the oil-producing areas of Veracruz and
Campeche.
7. Note that in different information sources, localities of more than 15,000 inhabitants
are commonly established as being of “urban” category, and therefore perhaps, in order to
avoid confusion in the scales of what is urban, it would be preferable to talk of the number
of inhabitants of those places, since ultimately what we want is to have an approximate
indicator of levels of socioeconomic differentiation in those places.
8. In four of these municipalities, studies have been carried out on one of their locali-
ties: in the community called La Yerbabuena in the municipality of Tlazazalca (Reichert,
1979); in Gómez Farías, in that of Tangancícuaro (López, Gustavo, 1986 and Goldring,
1990); in Chamitlán, the chief town of the municipality (Massey, D. et al., 1991); in “Jaripo”
in the municipality of Villamar (Fonseca, O. and Lilia Moreno, 1984).
9. It should be recalled that the state of Oaxaca has 570 municipalities.
10. In fact this is an approximation, since although there is migration from those places,
we do not know how many migrants come from the urban localities that may exist in the
municipality.
11. This was a very extensive study which was representative of a “rural area of
high rejection” of Jalisco. It comprised 26 municipalities, 69 localities, 576 families
and 3,739 persons.
12. This study was based on statistically representative samples for the four medium-
sized cities of Jalisco.
13. The perceptions of different authors tend to be contrasting. For some, the benefits
stemming from the establishment of new small businesses are considerable. See, for example,
the summary review of studies that record the capitalization of remittances into own
businesses, in Taylor et al., 1996, p.402. Others do not consider them significant. An account
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of the ambivalences may be seen in Cornelius 1990, p. 96-7. As obvious as it may seem, the
opinion will depend largely on the moment or phase in the development of the community
in which the observation is made.
14. These differences coincide with what has been reported by other authors on similar
topics. Durand and Massey, for example, find major differences between communities as
regards the percentages reached by productive expenditure as the purpose of migradollars
(reported in Taylor et al., 1996, p. 402).
15. Although, as can clearly be seen in the work of Lozano (1997), two-thirds of remit-
tances have come from Mexicans resident in the U.S., which leads one to suppose, given the
trends observed, that these will gradually diminish in the future. This drop at the community
level is also reported by Zendejas (1995) for the town of Erícuaro, Michoacán.
16. The dilemma is well expressed by Martin: “The neglect strategy makes emigration
areas even more dependent on an external labor market (Mexico’s central highlands); but
the subsidize-the-remittances strategy increases regional inequalities within emigration na-
tions.” (ibid., p. 658.) Certain isolated evidence shows the federal government’s indiffer-
ence towards states with migration. For Zacatecas, for example, it is estimated that federal
outlays are equivalent to less than one-third of the inflows from remittances (see Tamayo
and Lozano, 1990, p. 20)
17. In addition to the fact that Michoacán is a state with a considerable proportion of
municipalities with intense “migratory activity,” the use of the technique of analysis of vari-
ance already confirmed also that in that state, various of the variables referring to housing
were significant.
18. These variables were: Proportion of housing units with drainage; with piped water;
with electricity; with one room; number of occupants per room; and proportion of housing
units that use firewood or coal for cooking.
19. Data from the Current Population Survey, 1995.
20. But we must be cautious with these numbers since there is a great complexity in the
estimation of these numbers. The amount provided in the text is a preliminary estimation of
these type of costs.
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Responses to Migration Issues
Sidney Weintraub, Francisco Alba,
Rafael Fernández de Castro &
Manuel García y Griego*
Introduction
This chapter provides detailed background to the material on responses tomigration issues contained in the report Binational Study: Migration betweenMexico and the United States.
The time frame of this discussion of responses to migration issues begins es-
sentially with the termination of the Bracero Program in 1964 and goes to the
present. The pre-bracero period obviously had considerable influence in shaping
Mexican and U.S. responses to human movements, but brevity requires some point
of departure. Most emphasis in this discussion will be on more recent responses.
The organization of what follows is divided into nine section. See also Volume 3,
pages 1215 to 1250, for additional material, including four brief case studies illustrat-
ing the nature of the analytical model. These studies deal with the Bracero Program;
the migration ripple effects of the 1982 economic crisis in Mexico; the effort to
stimulate an economic-development response alongside the 1986 IRCA legislation;
and the Mexican reaction to the incidents in Riverside, California, in 1996.
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The nine sections in the body of this discussion are the following:
1. Analytical model. This is designed to set the framework from which deci-
sions are made to respond to what are seen as migration-engendered problems.
2. Differing perspectives. It is not necessary to elaborate on why the authori-
ties and public in Mexico, the sending country, view migration issues differently
from these groups in the United States, which receives the immigrants. Yet is im-
portant to keep these differences in mind when seeking the kind of cooperation
that this bilateral study implies. There is a predilection for Mexicans to see migra-
tion, undocumented or otherwise, as a relatively benign, really unavoidable, devel-
opment given the situation in that country, and for Americans to be less sanguine
about immigration in general and negative about illegal immigration. There really
is no completely consensual attitude.
3. Objectives of the two countries. This section flows logically from the previ-
ous comment on the different perspectives of the sending and receiving countries.
4. Societal attitudes. This section will draw heavily on polls and focus groups.
It also will examine the forces shaping these attitudes.
5. Legislative and judicial responses. The main U.S. responses take legislative
and judicial form. They do to some extent in Mexico as well, but also are reflected
in official statements and in reactions to U.S. responses.
6. Other actions. These relate either to non-legislative and non-judicial re-
sponses and to actions to enforce laws and judicial decisions.
7. Responses and reactions thereto. When one side acts, the other may re-
spond. The reaction may deplore the initial response, or it can reinforce its intent.
The typical sequence in the past was a one-sided response to a perceived problem,
reaction to that response by the other side, and then possibly a counter-reaction by
the original respondent. The one-sided nature of initial responses is increasingly
giving way to dialogue before action is taken. This study, for example, grows out
of a Mexican proposal for a binational examination of the migration issue and a
positive response by the United States.
8. The changing relationship. U.S.-Mexico relations have been altered by the
existence of NAFTA and the cooperation this demands on trade, investment, finan-
cial, and other economic issues. NAFTA has spawned considerable institutional-
ization of the economic relationship and the contacts being developed spill over to
the migration field. NAFTA does not provide complete insulation against bilateral
conflict, as the March 1997 U.S. debate over decertification of Mexico for insuffi-
cient cooperation to reduce drug trafficking illustrated. Mexico was eventually
certified.
9. Conclusions. The basis for these are set in the main body of the discussion.
The conclusions can also serve as the starting point for policy discussion.
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The Analytical Model
The normal pattern is that pressure calling for a response to a perceived migration
problem builds up in the United States, the receiving country in this bilateral
relationship. This means that the United States generally takes the initiative. Mexican
authorities and society at large may deplore the conditions that push migrants out
of the country, but the corrective in the Mexican system cannot be to act
independently to keep people from leaving. The solution to the emigration pressure
is seen in Mexico as being long term in nature, to alter the national economy and
societal conditions enough so that more Mexicans will stay at home voluntarily.
This means that most Mexican responses will be reactive. As in many other facets
of the bilateral relationship, there is an asymmetry in responses to migration matters.
The pressure that prompts a response can originate in either country, or in both
simultaneously. The most usual progression is for a series of developments to build
up over time and be brought to a head by a single event or series of events. The
passage of Proposition 187 in California in November 1994 can be seen as a re-
sponse to what was believed to be rising illegal immigration combined with an
economic downturn in the state. This legislation, in turn, triggered an instinctive
anti-California (anti-U.S.) reaction in Mexico. The high-speed chase and televised
beating of illegal immigrants by Riverside County police triggered a strong out-
burst in Mexico, but this had been preceded by long-standing Mexican concern
over the violation of the rights of its nationals in the United States.
One can cite any number of situations that led to significant responses. The
shortage of manpower during World War II stimulated the Bracero Program. The
sense that these Mexican workers were adversely affecting wages of a sensitive
U.S. group of workers led to the termination of the program. IRCA came to fruition
in the United States from a process of long study, including the use of commissions
established either by the executive or the Congress; the first of these commissions
was established earlier when the U.S. economy was performing poorly.
Recession and economic depression in the United States is often the under-
lying stimulus for a response of immigrant exclusion. This was true during the
Great Depression, just as it was in California in the first half of the 1990s. An
economic crisis in Mexico in 1982 added to the U.S. economic pressure leading
to the IRCA legislation.
Budgetary concerns, both state and national, have been a key stimulant of re-
cent U.S. responses to perceived immigration pressures. Proposition 187 was pre-
ceded by studies depicting (and often exaggerating) the high cost of providing
public services to aliens illegally in California. The 1996 immigration legislation
was substantially influenced by budgetary considerations. Those provisions of the
welfare-reform legislation of 1996 restricting benefits to legal immigrants were
prompted largely by federal budgetary considerations.
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The model set forth here argues that significant responses in the migration
field are not usually generated solely by immigration pressures, but only when
these come in combination with other events and developments. If the combina-
tion is not present, the immigration pressures by themselves are unlikely to lead to
meaningful responses. The U.S. Congress did not act to provide significant addi-
tional funding for the Border Patrol until the last few years, when the movement of
undocumented workers over the border combined with the declining California
economy and the increasing attention to the costs of providing services to these
immigrants at a time of constrained budgets.
The most important U.S. responses have a protracted gestation period, years
in the case of IRCA, decades really for providing adequate funding for the Immi-
gration and Naturalization Service. Debate on immigration responses is usually
emotional because immigration is central to the way Americans define themselves.
Debate is generally fierce because there are many competing interests. These in-
clude important employers of immigrants, including those who are present ille-
gally, who seek to limit effective control mechanisms or, failing this, to extract
some exceptions for their needs. The Special Agricultural Worker provisions of
IRCA and the ability to hire foreign mathematics professors and skilled computer
technicians are examples of the latter. The “half-open door” so familiar to students
of U.S. immigration practice, that immigration legislation either is riddled with
loopholes or inadequately enforced, is the result of these differing views.1
Because of this internal conflict, immigration legislation contains many com-
promises. This is self-evident, but taken one step further, it means that some issues
are resolved, while others are left pending for future debates. The ink is barely dry
on the 1996 immigration bill, and debate has already begun on the desirability of
new legislation to reduce the number of legal immigrants permitted to enter the
United States. The fact that each bill is the result of compromises is hardly an
earth-shaking observation, but what seems to be happening is that immigration
debates are coming with greater frequency. It took 13 years for the McCarran-
Walter Act to be amended substantially by the Immigration Act of 1965, 11 years
for the Eilberg bill to extend country ceilings to the Western Hemisphere in 1976,
four years to adopt the 1980 Refugee Act, and another six years until IRCA was
passed in 1986. Then, more recently, the United States added the Immigration Act
of 1990, then the most recent legislation in 1996, and a new debate is taking place
for possible legislation on legal immigration. Since 1980, the United States has
enacted significant new immigration legislation every few years, on average.
One final point needs to be added to this analytical model, namely, the extent
to which Mexican interests are factored into the shaping of U.S. policy. In the past,
this took place less through the openly stated opinions of the Mexican authorities
because these opinions were rarely given. The Mexican interest was included
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primarily through alliances, tacit or explicit, with U.S. interest groups seeking the
same outcomes as the Mexican authorities. For example, the legalization provisions
of IRCA favored Mexicans based largely on domestic U.S. concerns working in
tandem with Mexican hopes.
In more recent years, roughly the last 10, discussion between Mexican and
U.S. authorities on immigration matters has become quite common. Mexican view-
points, to some extent, are thus factored directly into U.S. policy, such as com-
mitments to protect the rights of Mexican nationals. Mexico, however, has not
reached the point where it lobbies directly with the U.S. Congress on immigra-
tion legislation.
The steps in the analytical model, to recapitulate, are roughly the following:
• An underlying context conducive to some U.S. immigration response,
one usually rooted in the U.S. economic situation;
• A triggering event or series of events, either in the United States or in
Mexico;
• A period of U.S. debate and political compromise that resolves some
differences but leaves other issues on the table;
• A Mexican reaction to the U.S. action, and perhaps a U.S. counter-
reaction;
• A new context for the next series of triggering events;
• And a speeding up of the process of additional immigration reforms.
Differing Perspectives
The perspectives of a country sending migrants necessarily differ from those
of the country receiving immigrants. The normal power relationship in this kind of
twosome favors the receiving country which, in principle, has the ability to decide
what immigrants it will accept and under what conditions. In reality, the U.S.-
Mexico migration relationship is more complex than this simple model. The bor-
der between the two countries is extensive and porous, notwithstanding the in-
creased resources now at the disposal of the U.S. Border Patrol. This gives indi-
vidual Mexicans considerable leeway to affect migration decisions and outcomes.
During most of the past two decades, the Mexican authorities remained aloof
from this decision-making contest. This is now undergoing a subtle transforma-
tion; the Mexican government is prepared to consult with U.S. authorities on mi-
gration issues. Nevertheless, the basic situation is largely unchanged in that the
contest is between migrants themselves and U.S. authorities. In the past, the U.S.
authorities refrained from entering this contest fully and a Swiss-cheese border
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full of holes was allowed to prevail. Internally, the employer-penalty program was
not vigorously enforced. It remains to be seen how far the change in the official
U.S. behavior will go, how long it will last, and what its effects will be.
The different perspectives of the two countries are shaped not only by the inher-
ent facts that dominate the supply push-demand pull reality, but also by a number of
other considerations. Many of these have changed in recent years and others are in
dynamic flux as this is written. In addition, the perceptions of the public and legisla-
tors in the two countries about the migration phenomenon, even when not completely
in conformity with the facts, have great weight in national responses.
Historical Background
Four Migration Waves
Mass migration from Mexico to the United States is about a hundred years
old. There have been four major waves of migration during this period: three north-
bound to the United States and one south-bound to Mexico. Beginning in the late
1890s and lasting until about 1930, the first major wave consisted mostly of sea-
sonal agricultural laborers, refugees from the Mexican Revolution, and family-
settler migrants moving north to the United States. The Mexican-born population
in the United States shot up from about 100,000 in 1900 to about a million in
1930—about two-thirds of these legal immigrants.2
The second major wave was a large flow of about 600,000 settlers who re-
turned south to Mexico during the Great Depression of the 1930s. The south-bound
net flow of migrants to Mexico during this decade was larger than the north-bound
net flow had been to the United States during the peak Mexican immigration de-
cade of the 1920s.3
The third major wave occurred in the context of the organized bilateral re-
cruitment of agricultural laborers during the Bracero Program (1942-1964) and
consisted of hundreds of thousands of Mexican workers who were employed un-
der 4.6 million contracts in the United States, and an additional number—probably
several hundred thousand workers—who entered illegally and worked without
contracts. Some settler migration also occurred during this period, but a significant
proportion of undocumented settlers was expelled during Operation Wetback (1954)
and the number of legal immigrants admitted from Mexico was relatively small.
Within this third wave, there were two distinct periods of unauthorized migration.
Although there are no reliable estimates of this population, the trend in the
apprehension of unauthorized Mexican migrants is suggestive: an explosive growth
from 64,000 in FY 1945 to 485,000 in FY 1950 and then to 1,075,000 in FY 1954; an
abrupt drop thereafter to 243,000 in FY 1955, 72,000 in FY 1956, and eventually to
30,000 in FY 1960. (Some authors have suggested erroneously that the one million
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apprehensions of 1954 correspond to Operation Wetback. Actually, Operation
Wetback generated about 175,000 apprehensions and expulsions during a two-month
period in the summer of 1954, most of which occurred during FY 1955.)
The fourth major wave began after the last bracero agreement expired in 1964
and has consisted of large flows of undocumented and legal immigrants, tempo-
rary and long-term residents in the United States. Again, the growth in the number
of apprehensions is suggestive of the growing flow of undocumented migrants:
Apprehensions rose from 44,000 during the last fiscal year of the Bracero Program
to 277,000 in 1970, 680,000 in FY 1975, 817,000 in FY 1980 and a peak of 1.7
million in FY 1986. The 1970 population stock of Mexican-born persons residing
in the United States regardless of immigration status was almost one million—
almost at the peak number estimated for 1930. It has grown by an annual average
of more than 160,000 since then, to about 5 million today.
Seven Junctures When Perspectives
and Responses Changed
During the past 10 decades, there have been about seven periods which can be
characterized as junctures when government responses and official perspectives
toward Mexican migration underwent significant change. In only one of these in-
stances were the responses of the two countries relatively harmonious (early World
War II, see below), and at two other junctures (1954 and 1964, see below) the
changes sought by the United States led to openly acknowledged policy differ-
ences. In the remaining four cases of change in perspective and responses, one
finds situations where the circumstances are mixed and include areas both of com-
mon ground and significant conflict.
The first juncture occurred in 1917. Several independent events of that year
combined in a new way to redefine the policy issues related to Mexican migration.
The 1917 Mexican Constitution adopted provisions for the protection of Mexican
emigrant workers and the regulation of labor recruiters offering employment abroad.
The United States adopted a new set of stringent requirements for the admission of
immigrants and then, after entering World War I, promptly suspended them for
Mexican and Canadian temporary workers. The recruitment of workers under these
exceptions has sometimes been referred to as the first Bracero Program. About
75,000 Mexican workers were admitted temporarily under the World War I excep-
tions; many of them were later admitted as legal immigrants.
It was the first time since the Civil War that U.S. immigration policy had shifted
to the admission of temporary foreign workers. Large numbers of workers also
were recruited illegally; these persons waded across the Rio Grande/Rio Bravo in
order to avoid paying the head tax at the port of entry. The Mexican government
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was too involved in the civil war to pay much attention to migration, but it did
express opposition to this recruitment and complained that labor recruiters were
evading Mexican laws and that migrants were not being protected.
The decade of the 1920s represents a second juncture with several major changes
in policy and perspective. On the U.S. side, the Border Patrol was established in
1924 and it began to deport thousands of Mexican workers who crossed illegally
and were mostly employed in agriculture. By 1929, legislation was adopted mak-
ing entry without inspection a crime punishable by a fine and imprisonment, not
just an administrative offense which could be remedied by deportation.
Also during the period, Mexican legal immigration grew substantially—aver-
aging more than 50,000 immigrants a year during 1924-1929—large enough to
generate national controversy and to spark a movement in Congress to eliminate
the exemption of Mexicans from the quotas imposed in the 1924 Act. Other gov-
ernments had criticized the national origins approach to restricting U.S. immigra-
tion, and the Mexican government also complained that the extension of this quota
would discriminate against its nationals.
Mindful of the bilateral conflicts that had arisen with China and Japan when
Congress enacted legislation to stop immigration from those countries, the State
Department actively opposed the proposal to restrict Mexican immigration.4 In
order to accomplish the same end in a manner less objectionable to Mexico, the
State Department, through its consulates, began to apply stringently the exclusion
against many Mexican visa seekers on the grounds that they were “likely to be-
come a public charge.” The number of immigrants admitted declined sharply from
67,000 in FY 1927 to 39,000 in 1929. The administrative restriction of Mexican
legal immigrants, and the subsequent decline to less than 3,000 immigrants admit-
ted annually during the depression years, made congressional action unnecessary.
Administrative restriction deflected the congressional thrust for an annual quota to
be applied to Mexican immigrants. However, it also had the unintended effect of
encouraging Mexicans who planned to obtain immigrant visas to enter the United
States illegally, seek employment, and later apply for a visa from within the coun-
try in order to get around the public-charge exclusion.
On the Mexican side, the government’s policy toward emigration also under-
went significant change during the decade. The most significant unilateral effort to
repatriate Mexican emigrants occurred in 1921, when the U.S. economy went into
sharp recession and tens of thousands of Mexicans were thrown out of work. The
Mexican government promoted an ambitious program which resulted in the repa-
triation of 150,000 Mexicans—about twice as many as the United States had ad-
mitted during the World War I first Bracero Program.
However, when the U.S. economy recovered smartly in 1922, many of the
workers brought home at Mexican government expense again emigrated to the
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United States. Mexican government policy gave less emphasis to repatriation
thereafter and a new emphasis was brought to bear on the protection of human
and labor rights of emigrants in the United States through the activities of the
Mexican consulates. The developments of the 1920s served both to define the
experience with consular protection in the United States and to accentuate the
Mexican view that, to some extent, emigration was virtually inevitable, and that
the most appropriate policy response would be U.S.-Mexican bilateral
management of contract labor migration. The Mexican government proposed such
an arrangement in 1929,5 but the major U.S. concern at that time was not how to
promote seasonal labor migration, but how to reduce drastically the admission
of long-term Mexican immigrants.
A third juncture took place immediately after the onset of the Great Depres-
sion. In 1931-32, the Bureau of Immigration conducted a much-publicized drive in
Los Angeles and elsewhere to locate foreigners who had entered illegally and to
expel them. The rationale for this deportation scare was that by encouraging immi-
grants to leave, jobs would be opened up for unemployed U.S. citizens. In addi-
tion, local governments, such as the County of Los Angeles, encouraged Mexican
immigrant families supported by local charities to leave by paying for their trans-
portation to the border and arranging for the Mexican government to cover the rest
of the transportation to points in the interior. The Mexican government at first
encouraged this repatriation, but it later viewed this as a situation created by U.S.
employers who had recruited Mexican workers during the 1920s boom and then
refused to assume any responsibility for them during the 1930s depression. The
Mexican government also criticized discriminatory actions taken against Mexi-
cans by local governments during the depression era.
A fourth juncture occurred at the outset of World War II, when perceived
labor shortages and the need for bilateral wartime cooperation led to a major
shift in U.S. policy: the negotiation of wartime bilateral agreements for the
temporary employment of Mexican workers in U.S. agriculture and railroads.
The protections adopted in the agreements reflected the requirements established
in previous Mexican legislation. The two governments assumed responsibility
for negotiating the terms of the employer-worker agreements, their enforcement,
and the administration of the program, including the selection and transportation
of Mexican workers, known as braceros. The efforts to jointly determine the
conditions of wartime bracero migration quickly led to efforts to focus on
undocumented migration, with the Mexican government pressuring the United
States to enforce its border controls and adopting its own modest efforts to
discourage illegal emigration. The Bracero Program was continued after the war
ended, and the bilateral agreement was renegotiated several times until the last
agreement expired in December 1964.
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A fifth juncture occurred in the middle of the Bracero Program. In 1954, the
negotiations for a new bracero agreement broke down, with the U.S. government
claiming that Mexican consulates had exercised their authority inappropriately to
withhold workers from growers in order to enforce Mexican interpretations of the
agreement. The U.S. government announced a program to recruit Mexican work-
ers unilaterally, a decision which incensed Mexican public opinion and led to a
disastrous decision by the Mexican government to use force to attempt to prevent
the unauthorized departure of Mexican workers. These efforts by the Mexican
government produced riots and confrontations between Mexican officers and
workers at the northern Mexican border. In the meantime, the U.S. Comptroller
General declared that the U.S. government had no authority to spend appropri-
ated funds for unilateral recruitment, and both governments returned to the nego-
tiating table and reached a new agreement much closer to the objectives of the
United States.
Subsequently, the U.S. government organized “Operation Wetback,” a depor-
tation campaign which removed many families of unauthorized immigrants living
in the United States and transported them with Mexican government cooperation
to points in the interior of Mexico. The campaign was accompanied by efforts to
facilitate the contracting of braceros to substitute for expelled workers. During
this juncture, the U.S. government was successful in pushing the Mexican govern-
ment about as far as it would go to accommodate growers’ interests in a new design
for a Bracero Program and also promoted the common objective of reducing sharply
illegal entries across the border.
A sixth juncture occurred during the period leading to and in the aftermath of
the termination of the Bracero Program. In the early 1960s, pressure against the
Bracero Program by labor and civil rights organizations mounted and opposition
grew within the U.S. administration. In 1963, the Mexican embassy in Washing-
ton, D.C. expressed its view in a diplomatic note that terminating the program
would not by itself bring Mexican labor migration to an end: unauthorized migra-
tion would grow in its place. The adverse effects on domestic farm labor working
conditions that opponents of the program attributed to it would, in the view of the
embassy, be exacerbated rather than eliminated by halting bracero recruitment.
The embassy’s note was published in the Congressional Record and the ensuing
debate led to a congressional vote to postpone the termination of the program to
December, 1964.
Although these differences were compensated by close cooperation in other
areas of the bilateral relationship, U.S. and Mexican government opinions about
the advisability of a Bracero Program remained in conflict for a decade. The Mexi-
can government gave up its unsuccessful attempts to put the negotiation of a new
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temporary worker program on the bilateral agenda in 1974 when it appeared that
migration and energy issues might be linked.
A seventh juncture occurred in 1986, with the passage of the Immigration
Reform and Control Act (IRCA). For more than a decade, a debate had been con-
ducted in the United States over what would be the best approach to reduce illegal
immigration. IRCA adopted a variation of the grand compromise which had been
advanced consistently since 1977: employer sanctions and mass legalization. Since
the largest national group in the unauthorized immigrant population was from
Mexico, both of these provisions were seen as having a major impact on Mexicans.
The perspectives held by the U.S. public and officials regarding Mexican migra-
tion shaped, and in turn were shaped by, the implementation of employer sanctions
and mass legalization.
The events leading to the passage of IRCA and then its aftermath point in
two different directions. On the one hand, they serve to underscore national dif-
ferences in perspective—especially when comparing the most prominent views
in both countries. U.S. public opinion showed a strong consensus against illegal
immigration even though the public was divided on how to respond. The consen-
sus of Mexican public opinion was that migration in one form or another was
virtually inevitable and that problems were created by U.S. measures to expel
millions of migrants who could not be absorbed by a weak Mexican economy.
The public debate in both countries in the decade prior to 1986 pulled them apart
rather than brought them together.
On the other hand, IRCA produced a convergence in the efforts to expand the
bilateral dialogue on migration. Mexican officials, in the aftermath of IRCA, ques-
tioned the wisdom of having refused to adopt a more open position regarding the
U.S. immigration legislative initiatives. Also, U.S. officials became concerned that,
because of migration and narcotics control issues, bilateral relations were in some
disarray. The immediate aftermath of IRCA seems to have marked a turning point
for both governments in their efforts to engage each other more substantively on
bilateral migration issues.
Changing Policy Stances
The bilateral interaction on migration issues has altered in recent years, most
notably from a lack of consultation to considerable discussion between the two
governments. At the margin, this has led to some actions that were missing before,
such as greater attention to the human rights of Mexicans illegally in the United
States, but the inherent differences between the two countries on the migration
issue remain.
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Mexico
Important and influential Mexican actors view migration as an outgrowth of
the social-economic situation that exists in the country. Consequently, the general
approach to the issue has found expression at a highly abstract level. Three such
expressions can be mentioned. The first is a straightforward supply-demand model,
that as long as the demand for the migrants exists in the United States, there is little
that the Mexican authorities can do about it. The second frames the issue in devel-
opment terms and concludes that as long as income disparities remain large, mi-
gration will continue. The third is that because of Mexico’s position as an exit
country from which emigration is inevitable, anything the government does has a
low probability of success.
These conceptions have had great influence on Mexican thinking about mi-
gration since the end of the Bracero Program in 1964. The perspective has been
summarized as follows: because the constitution guarantees Mexicans the right to
free transit within the country, it would therefore be wrong for the state to prevent
emigration; the Mexican government could not succeed in preventing emigration
even if it tried; Mexicans emigrate in response to U.S. demand, over which Mexico
has no control; and there is no reason for Mexico to try to control emigration be-
cause, through their actions (though not necessarily their rhetoric), the U.S. gov-
ernment and key political actors support undocumented immigration as beneficial
to the country.6
This way of thinking, in operational terms, translated into a policy to have no
policy on undocumented migration to the United States. In shorthand, Mexico had
a “no-policy” policy. Mexico, therefore, stayed aloof from the debate on changes
in U.S. immigration policy, and this political stance undoubtedly was optimal for
meeting Mexican interests over many years.7
The no-policy policy began to shift in the latter half of the 1980s when Mexico
started to liberalize its economy and to play a more active role in world economic
affairs (e.g., entry into the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) and closer
engagement with the United States, which led in due course to the conclusion of
NAFTA. The passage of IRCA in 1986 probably was the turning point in Mexico’s
position. The Commission for the Study of International Migration and Coopera-
tive Economic Development—the Asencio Commission named after its chairman,
Diego Asencio—that was mandated in the IRCA legislation called for bilateral
dialogue on positive ways to deter undocumented migration by promoting eco-
nomic development in Mexico and this led to extensive contacts and much bina-
tional research on migration issues. These discussions were relatively neutral, fo-
cused mainly on studying issues rather than changing policy—but there were con-
sultations where before there had been none.
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The grand bilateral policy of NAFTA which came later, even though it dealt with
economic issues, had its migration elements. One of the assumptions behind NAFTA
was that it would facilitate Mexican economic growth and thus indirectly deter
Mexican emigration. In the years since, the search for bilateral cooperation on migra-
tion issues has focused on practical, small steps rather than grand policies.
United States
The U.S. counterpart of the no-policy policy of Mexico was to act unilaterally
on migration matters. This suited the U.S. style, but had a practical logic if the
Mexican authorities preferred not to be involved. IRCA’s provisions setting up
the Asencio Commission enabled the United States to engage Mexico on the
related development-migration issues. Bilateral engagement has since become
the norm, with occasional lapses.
The degree of consultation is considerable and takes place at various levels.
The memorandum of understanding (MOU) of May 1996 dealing with the
protection of the rights of Mexican nationals in the United States was agreed at
the 13th meeting of the U.S.-Mexico Binational Commission, a cabinet-level
body.8 The decisions of the Working Group on Migration and Consular Affairs
include, in addition to carrying out this Binational Study of Migration, supporting
the participation of Mexican officials in the Citizen Advisory Committees along
the U.S.-Mexican border, and taking measures to assure safer and more orderly
repatriation of undocumented migrants.
During President Bill Clinton’s visit to Mexico, he and President Ernesto
Zedillo of Mexico issued a joint statement dated May 6, 1997, laying out measures
to “ensure a proper and respectful management” of the complex migration
phenomenon.
The Working Group on Migration and Consular Affairs of the Bilateral Com-
mission is the single most important body for consultation on migration matters.
The persons in charge of migration policy and their subordinates now meet regu-
larly. These meetings are facilitated by the presence of a migration attaché at the
Mexican embassy in Washington, something unthinkable during the no-policy policy
period. While there are sometimes glitches, the Mexican authorities are generally
notified of U.S. changes that the INS contemplates. Border Liaison Mechanisms
now exist to bring together local, state, and federal officials to discuss and, some-
times, resolve border problems, including migration matters. A Citizens’ Advisory
Panel has been established for dealing with abuses at the border and Mexican offi-
cials are sometimes invited to participate in its meetings.
The unknown in the current pattern of increased dialogue is whether this
will lead to harmony between the two countries on migration issues. At the
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extremes, there is little give in the official position of either country on the question
of illegal entry into the United States. The United States cannot overtly consent
to this, and Mexico cannot fortify its border to prevent exit. But there is room to
maneuver short of these polar positions, as discussed in the following section.
Potential Common Ground
Notwithstanding these partially differing perspectives, there is some common
ground, perhaps not in the “grand perspectives” but in the small and practical tasks
and operations, such as making the border a safer place and enacting and enforcing
actions against trafficking and smuggling of migrants. The Mexican authorities,
for example, could limit the gathering of persons whose evident purpose is to make
a run across the border.
Both governments would prefer migration to be orderly. There is also basic
agreement on some fundamental principles. Both governments recognize the sov-
ereign right and legitimate interest of each country to safeguard its own borders
and to enforce its own migration laws. Within this context, it is acceptable and
profitable to move toward the establishment of mechanisms for consultation on
migration issues at different levels of government, including law enforcement per-
sonnel and diplomatic and consular representatives, and procedures for the ex-
change of information, experiences, and resources in various aspects of migration
management.
To sum up, both countries now confront some similar challenges with regard
to migration flows; these would include instilling respect for the human rights of
migrants and assuring simultaneous facilitation and control of entry.
Changing Political-Economic Relations
While the grand policy of NAFTA does not include a migration element (save
for Chapter 16 on the temporary entry of business persons), the transformation of
respective attitudes that the agreement represents affects all elements of the bilat-
eral relationship.
From the Mexican side, NAFTA represented a shift from maintaining a distant
relationship to seizing the economic opportunity that a rich neighbor represents.
From the U.S. side, NAFTA represents a way to develop closer political and
economic ties with its neighbor. About 80 percent of Mexico’s merchandise exports
go to the United States. The industrial co-production that exists as a result of
substantial U.S. direct investment has been at the heart of Mexico’s recovery from
the economic debacle of 1995. From the U.S. side, the burgeoning market in
Mexico, despite the economic setback in 1995, represents a long-term opportunity.
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Two-way merchandise trade (using U.S. data) in 1996 amounted to $130 billion,
an increase of 20 percent over 1995.
Negotiating NAFTA also required a shift in bilateral political relations. Mexico’s
earlier reflexive opposition to U.S. international initiatives had to give way to a
more cooperative relationship. The United States had to give political relations
with Mexico a higher profile. NAFTA led to the creation of scores of new institu-
tions, mostly to deal with the technical aspects of the agreement (such as rules of
origin, customs procedures, and industrial and sanitary standards), but others with
considerable political content. These are the various dispute-settlement arrange-
ments, trilateral commissions for labor and the environment, and border institu-
tions for stimulating and financing infrastructure.
Economic-political contacts have been facilitated by embedding them in in-
stitutional arrangements. So, too, have migration consultations been institution-
alized. The migration issue is sensitive. In a recent poll involving 35,100 ballots,
the U.S. Foreign Policy Association found that 32 percent of respondents felt that
illegal immigration was the most important issue of U.S.-Mexican relations, more
than any other single matter.9 From the Mexican viewpoint, it is now important
that conflicts over migration issues not contaminate the growing bilateral eco-
nomic integration.
Administrative Structures
While Mexico and the United States both have presidential systems and fed-
eral structures, their governance differs substantially. The separation of powers is
a basic aspect of the U.S. political structure, whereas the Mexican executive has
been all powerful. This may change now that opposition parties control the Cham-
ber of Deputies while the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) controls the presi-
dency. From early in U.S. history, the Supreme Court has had the power to declare
laws unconstitutional, which has not been the case in Mexico. The use of the amparo
in Mexico protects individuals on an ad hoc basis against overdrawn laws. It is
much easier to amend the Mexican than the U.S. constitution; and the Mexican
constitution is far more detailed than its U.S. counterpart. The Mexican Congress
for many years was subordinated to the executive branch, compared with the peri-
odic shifts in dominance between the two branches in the United States. The Mexi-
can processes of government are now changing: the electoral system has been made
more transparent; the opposition power in the Congress has increased; and judicial
power is increasing. But the differences are still considerable. Except for a few
agencies (such as External Relations), there is no permanent civil service in Mexico
except at junior, non-policy levels. The turnover of personnel every six years, co-
inciding with each new president, is substantially greater than in the United States
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when a new president takes office. Consequently, there is little institutional memory
at senior levels in almost all Mexican government departments. The fact that the
same party, the PRI, has been in office for the last 67 years mitigates the effects of
the personnel turnover, but does not completely eliminate them because senior
people shift from agency to agency. Most decisions in Mexico are made at much
more senior levels than in the United States, and the lack of continuity at these
levels is therefore aggravated.
The power of the federal government in relation to that of states and localities
is significantly greater in Mexico than in the United States. This power is epito-
mized by the lesser ability of states and localities in Mexico to raise revenue than
in the United States. This, too, is changing, but the disparity with the United States
remains great; the differences may grow as even more power is going to state and
local levels in the United States.
Migration matters in both countries are under federal jurisdiction and it is at
this level where the consultation is most intense. Most initiatives, as noted earlier,
come from the United States. The most important of these take the form of legisla-
tion with attendant appropriations for such things as patrolling the border or veri-
fying the immigration status of job seekers.
There is thus something of a disconnect in both countries in that most bilateral
discussion takes place at the federal level, while most of the effects are at state and
local levels. It may be desirable to bring local authorities into more of the bilateral
give-and-take.
Because immigration issues are so conflictual, pitting interest groups against
each other and making it difficult to reach political compromises, the United States
has long relied on independent commissions to provide guidance to Congress in
anticipation of legislation. The Immigration Commission of 1907-1909 was cre-
ated to advise Congress on how to respond to the situation created by the “new
immigration”—nearly a million newcomers each year, mostly from southern and
eastern Europe. It commissioned studies and issued dozens of reports on the char-
acteristics of the new immigrant population.
These reports led to the adoption of a literacy test in 1917 as a screening de-
vice intended to reduce the number of illiterate and less desirable immigrants com-
ing to the United States from eastern and southern Europe. When the literacy test
did not produce the desired result, Congress abandoned it in favor of straightfor-
ward national origins quota laws (1921 and 1924) which essentially barred non-
white immigrants and provided few visas for immigrants from eastern and south-
ern Europe. Western Hemisphere countries were exempted from the quota and this
led to a large increase in Mexican legal immigration starting in 1924.
In 1950, Truman’s Presidential Commission on Migratory Labor was established
to study problems of migrant farm labor. The 1951 report was critical of the Bracero
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Program, but it stopped short of recommending its abolition. The Commission also
emphasized the adverse effects of illegal migration on domestic farm labor. It pre-
sented detailed recommendations for penalizing employers of unauthorized work-
ers—something the Mexican government had advocated before. In 1952, Congress
did adopt criminal penalties for the transportation and “harboring” of unauthorized
immigrants. However, it explicitly exempted their employment from the penalty
legislation. The congressional delegation from Texas was instrumental in securing the
passage of this loophole favored by farmers from that state, and it thus came to be
known as the “Texas Proviso.” The exception which legally permitted the employ-
ment of unauthorized workers was not repealed until the passage of IRCA in 1986.
In 1952, Congress passed omnibus immigration legislation but ignored Presi-
dent Truman’s urgings to repeal the quota restrictions which had been in place
since the 1920s. Truman appointed another commission whose 1953 report was
influential in leading to the eventual repeal of national origins quotas in 1965.
Starting in 1965, the Select Commission on Western Hemisphere Immigration
focused on the implementation of the 1965 Act and on “green card commuter”
migration, which had grown after the termination of the Bracero Program. Its work
influenced the 1976 amendment which extended the annual country ceiling of 20,000
visas to Western Hemisphere countries. All legal immigrants admitted in addition
to that number were “nonquota” immigrants, most of them immediate relatives of
U.S. citizens.
In 1978-81, the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy (SCIRP)
held hearings and commissioned studies to review immigration policy in light of
the growing unauthorized immigration, especially from Mexico, and the changing
patterns of refugee flows. Congress did not wait for its recommendations to adopt
the Refugee Act of 1980. The recommendations of the 1981 report were influen-
tial, however, in defining the range of acceptable proposals to respond to illegal
immigration. These proposals shaped the legislative initiatives presented by Sena-
tor Alan Simpson and Representatives Romano Mazzoli and Peter Rodino between
1982 and 1985, which eventually resulted in the Immigration Reform and Control
Act of 1986. The combination of employer sanctions and other control measures,
and legalization for both long-term residents and temporary farm workers, consti-
tuted the political compromise which made legislative success possible after a de-
cade and a half of unsuccessful attempts. SCIRP had envisioned the outlines of
that successful political compromise.
The current U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform (1993-1997) is the lat-
est iteration of this pattern. This Commission is charged with all aspects of immi-
gration reform.
In Mexico, the debate on the migration phenomenon also has been the object
of open and public participation sponsored both by legislative bodies and by the
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executive power. On the legislative side, on December 29, 1984, the Senate created
a commission to carry out a public national consultation on the situation of migrant
workers, including immigrants into Mexico as well as Mexican migrants into the
United States. This consultation was carried out in 16 hearings in central, south,
and northern Mexico during all of 1985. The commission’s report was presented to
the Senate in December 1985.10 One conclusion of this consultation was the proposal
for a Charter of Rights of Migrant Workers to be agreed between Mexico and the
United States.
In November 1990, the Mexican Senate again convened a hearing specifically
on human rights of migrant workers. This hearing, significantly enough, took place
at Mexico’s northern border, in Tijuana. There were 92 participants. One charac-
teristic of that hearing was the concern expressed by most participants of rising
anti-immigrant attitudes in the United States, the growing use of firearms by U.S.
border “vigilantes,” and the vulnerable situation of infants, women and Indian
migrants. There was a call for more stringent penalties against persons trafficking
migrants and for closer dialogue between authorities of the two countries.11
On the executive side, in the first half of 1995, there were public consulta-
tions, with numerous participants, on the migration phenomenon as part of the
process to prepare the national development program. The consultations covered
immigration and emigration issues and the opinions expressed were diverse.
Objectives of the Two Countries
This is a shifting target because objectives change with the times and the con-
text. Objectives sometimes must be defined as they relate to specific countries; for
example, Mexico’s objective to limit illegal immigration from Guatemala is quite
different from its desire not to rock the boat with respect to the movement of Mexi-
can migrants to the United States. Mexico, like the United States, has its own structure
of employer sanctions to deter the hire of illegal immigrants. For the United States,
because entry without documentation is predominantly from Mexico, the U.S. Border
Patrol is concentrated at that border.
U.S. immigration policy has placed priority on family reunification since 1965
and, in practice, this has benefited Mexico; but this priority is not immutable. What
follows focuses on objectives as articulated or practiced today.
Mexico
Migrant-sending countries rarely have explicit emigration policies. Few
countries deliberately encourage emigration on a permanent basis, although many
do so for temporary periods. Mexico did facilitate temporary emigration under the
455
Bracero Program and occasionally supports the idea of new programs to regularize
the current illegal immigration into the United States.
Migration is so prominent in Mexico’s domestic and foreign affairs that a pub-
lic stance is unavoidable. This need for going public has to be weighed against a
long-standing tradition of noninterference in the domestic affairs of other coun-
tries. The way out of this dilemma has been to pursue certain objectives related to
migration, but not to have a migration policy as such.
Three major objectives are being pursued by Mexico. The most salient and
openly stated is to protect the rights of migrants. This has more to do with migrants
than with migration. Because of the large numbers involved, the execution of this
objective requires the use of many resources, both outside the country and at home.
The protection of migrants’ rights abroad involves traditional consular and diplo-
matic efforts and a continuous monitoring of violations of these rights and the
circumstances under which they occur. This is accompanied by public denuncia-
tions from time to time. Much of Mexico’s consular activity in the United States
deals with migration issues.
There are important domestic and foreign implications of this emphasis on the
protection of migrant rights. On the domestic front, a special force has been cre-
ated—Grupo Beta—to prevent abuses against would-be migrants who concentrate
near the border to gain access to U.S. territory. Another recent initiative is a change
in the General Population Law and its regulatory apparatus to increase penalties
against those who traffic in migrant movements.
Achieving foreign migration objectives has led to substantial engagement with
U.S. authorities. In addition, Mexico has sponsored international efforts to adopt
rules regarding the rights of migrants and their families, irrespective of their legal
situation. Mexico was active in the efforts, first in the International Labor Organi-
zation and then in the U.N. General Assembly, to pass the 1990 U.N. International
Convention on the Protection of the Rights of all Migrant Workers and Members of
Their Families. Mexico took a leading role to develop a shared position on the
migration phenomenon within the North and Central American regions, as was
acknowledged in the Joint Communique of the Regional Conference on Migration
held on March 13 and 14, 1996, in Puebla, Mexico. This conference was attended
by the governments of 10 countries. Protection of the human rights of migrants and
others was the paramount issue at this conference.
A second Mexican objective is less openly stated, but of considerable impor-
tance. This is to avoid abrupt changes in U.S. immigration policy and in the flow of
migrants. Mexico wishes to maintain stability of migratory conditions as it consid-
ers changes in its migratory regime. One author has conceptualized this objective
as wanting “to keep the U.S. door open.”12 Recently this objective has taken the
form of wanting to regularize this flow. The current readiness to discuss some form
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of a guest-worker agreement can be seen in this light—to achieve steadiness in
migratory policy and stability in the flow. The most prevalent proposals since 1994,
set forth by diverse social groups, are to conclude a bracero-type agreement.13
The third objective that emerges from recent declarations of senior Mexican
officials is to get recognition of the contribution that Mexican migrants have made
to the U.S. economy and society.14 This objective can be seen as a reaction to the
recent negative U.S. climate against immigrants, and Mexican immigrants in par-
ticular. (This objective might be expanded to include the contribution that the mi-
grants have made to the Mexican economy and society.)
The Mexican government has developed two main activities in relation to its
citizens who are emigrating or have emigrated to U.S. territory: consular protection
and a program for supporting communities of resident Mexicans or Mexican-Ameri-
cans. Consular protection can be considered an immediate response to the wide va-
riety of problems arising from the large flow of Mexican migrants, undocumented
and documented, to the United States. The Program for the Mexican Communities
Living Abroad can be seen as a medium- and long-term strategy to improve the living
conditions of Mexicans and Mexican-Americans north of the Rio Grande.
Consular Protection
The main objectives of consular protection are to provide general assistance to
the individual traveling or working abroad to make his or her stay and manage-
ment of affairs easier in the receiving country, and to assure that the migrant has
access to a system of justice outside of the limits of jurisdiction of his native coun-
try. Consular protection implies a claim filed against the local or central authorities
located within the consular jurisdiction.
Traditionally, consular protection of co-nationals living in the United States
has been considered a priority activity of Mexican foreign policy. There are cur-
rently 41 consulates throughout the territory of the United States; 12 are consulates
general. This represents the largest network of consulates of any country in the
world. Since its inception, consular protection has assisted migrants in their repa-
triation, hospitalization, recovery of labor compensation, legal trials, and in offi-
cially protesting abuses against them.
Analysis of Mexican consular protection in the United States leads to five
main comments about this practice:
1. Protection is a traditional activity undertaken by the Mexican government.
Consular protection in the United States is more than a century old, dating back to
the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo of 1848. While the United States has focused in
Mexico on the protection of property, investments, and goods owned by its nationals,
Mexico, by contrast, has focused mostly on the protection of its labor force.
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2. Protection is often used as part of political rhetoric. Speeches on foreign
policy, and especially those regarding relations with the United States, usually
include a reference to these protective activities. This is clearly the case in the
yearly presidential State of the Union Address (Informe Presidencial). A review
of speeches since 1964 shows that most presidents have appealed to the strength-
ening of consular protection as the principal response to the perceived abuses and
violations of the human rights of Mexican legal and undocumented immigrants in
the United States.
3. Protection follows the same pattern of reactions and counter-reactions oc-
curring in the rest of the migration issue. The observed sequence is that Mexico
responds to a perceived problem, say the Riverside incident discussed elsewhere;
then comes a reaction to that response by the United States, which Mexico then
possibly follows with a counter-reaction.
4. Since the end of the Bracero Program, the Mexican government has periodi-
cally announced the strengthening of this system of protection. During the Zedillo
administration, there have been efforts to modernize the system by means of three
main activities: training and updating programs; harmonizing criteria of what con-
stitutes a case of protection; and improving technical infrastructure, such as the
development of databases.
5. During the 1990s, there has been a tendency to intensify the dialogue be-
tween the authorities of both nations, and to establish techniques of coordination
or consultation, such as the Border Liaison Mechanism, the Working Group on
Migration and Consular Affairs, the Consulting Mechanism for the Immigration
and Naturalization Services Activities and Consular Protection, and Mexico’s par-
ticipation in the Citizens’ Advisory Panel (CAP).
Program for the Mexican Communities
Living Abroad (PMCLA)
The Program was created in response to frequent demands from Mexican
Americans to the Mexican government for more support for their communities
living in the United States. The establishment of the PMCLA represents the Mexi-
can government’s recognition of the potential of Mexican Americans as a source of
political support within the United States, and also the potential of the community
to develop closer economic ties with Mexico. President Salinas created the Pro-
gram in 1990, the year in which the negotiation of NAFTA was launched.
The goals of the PMCLA can be summarized as follows:
• To strengthen the links with the Mexican community in the United States,
to defend the civil rights of its members, and to enhance Mexican culture
in the United States;
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• To contribute to the strengthening of Mexican citizens´ capacity to
respond to the anti-immigrant climate in various regions of the United
States; to institutionalize the relationship with Mexicans living abroad
and to increase their visibility in Mexico; and
• To promote business ties between Mexicans and Mexican Americans,
and to foster the latter’s participation in certain areas of U.S.-Mexico
relations.
The administration of Carlos Salinas made the program a priority in the bi-
lateral relationship. The yearly budget of the program has exceeded $1 million
since its creation. This, in terms of allocation of expenditures, makes it more sig-
nificant than the Consular Protection Program. The PMCLA has developed seven
main activities: community organization, sports, education and culture, informa-
tion and communication, health care, business, and fund raising. The main ac-
complishments are:
• It has strengthened and broadened Mexican ties with organizations of
Mexican Americans;
• It has created a network of cultural institutes all over the United States;
and
• It has established a Council for Business Promotion.
United States
The main official U.S. objective is to keep open the front door for legal immi-
gration but to close the back door of illegal immigration. While this objective can
be stated simply, it is complex in reality. The desire to limit illegal immigration has
long been official policy rhetorically, but not completely in practice. The implicit
policies have not always dovetailed with the explicit pronouncements. The immi-
gration legislation of 1996 contained some compromises on how open the front
door should be, but the issue was not really resolved. It is quite possible that the
issue of numbers will be revisited by the Congress in the near future. The priority
given to family reunification is established policy, but there is substantial senti-
ment for more skill-based selection.
Two articles in a recent issue of the Atlantic Monthly give a good synopsis of
the debate on U.S. immigration objectives. David Kennedy argues that the United
States can still afford to accept immigrants, largely because they augment the labor
supply and thus lead to higher economic growth. His main caveat is that immigrant
concentration in a few locations challenges the existing culture, a phenomenon not
present during earlier waves of immigration in the 19th century. The policy
459
implications of this analysis are ambiguous, but seem to point in the direction of
admitting fewer immigrants in that this may be the only way to limit concentration.15
George J. Borjas, following an analysis he has set forth frequently in recent
years, argues that because new immigrants are less educated than in the past, their
admission leads to a decline in the wages of less-skilled native and national U.S.
workers. His article focuses on the distributional effects of new immigrants whose
admission, he states, favors employers at the expense of national workers, with
only a modest net gain for the economy as a whole. The key policy implication of
this argument is to change the criteria for admission in favor of skills and away
from family unification.16
An analysis by the U.S. Department of Labor on how well the immigrant popu-
lation legalized under IRCA fared five years later tends to support the Borjas argu-
ment. Two findings of that study are that the legalized immigrants compete for
low-wage jobs, and that a disproportionate number of them are below the poverty
level.17 These are relatively short-term findings, over five years, and may or may
not hold over longer periods, say, a generation or more.
Another objective of the U.S. authorities is to seek greater cooperation from
the Mexican government than in the past. The earlier Mexican no-policy policy
meant that Mexico was a bystander as its nationals moved illegally across the bor-
der. The new policy of dialogue permits the United States to seek more official
engagement from Mexico. The Mexican legislation of October 1996 providing for
more severe punishment of Mexicans who engage in migrant trafficking is one
response to this new bilateral engagement.
The central U.S. objective—to put out the welcome mat to immigrants who
enter legally and reject those who enter without documents or illegally overstay
visas—requires a combination of facilitation and control. The control elements
involve fences at the border, more resources for the Border Patrol, stronger penal-
ties against employers who knowingly hire illegal aliens, a better system to help
employers determine who is illegal, and inspections that take place at work sites.
Control activities require the cooperation of agencies other than the INS, such as
the Labor Department for enforcement of work standards in activities that tend to
hire illegal aliens, such as the garment and construction industries, and service
establishments such as restaurants and hotels. Cooperation is also sought from
local jurisdictions, such as sheriffs.
The facilitation aspect was evident in the INS role in the IRCA legalizations
and the effort to speed up border crossings. While it became controversial in the
1996 presidential election campaign, the INS facilitated the naturalization of eli-
gible legal immigrants seeking citizenship and is working methodically to reduce
the backlog of eligible legal admissions. The 1996 immigration law contains a
number of facilitation measures: more full-time INS and Customs officials at the
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border to reduce delays at peak crossing hours; greater use of commuter lanes to
facilitate legal entry; more pre-inspection at foreign airports; and pre-clearance
authority for foreign officials.
The Bilateral Agenda
There is a bilateral agenda. These common interests include the following:
1. Making the border safer. This is manifested on the Mexican side by Grupo
Beta, on the U.S. side by the various facilitation efforts noted above, and jointly by
the Border Liaison Mechanism and Mexican participation in the Citizens’ Advi-
sory Panel.
2. Cooperative efforts to prevent smuggling of migrants.
3. Cross-border community programs to facilitate legal crossings.
The cooperation to achieve these and related objectives are the consequence
of the increased dialogue of recent years. The nature of the agreed objectives was
set forth in the joint statement of the two presidents of May 6, 1997.
At the same time, the porousness of the border in conjunction with U.S. efforts
to reduce illegal crossings at the most convenient points (such as Tijuana-San Di-
ego and Ciudad Juárez-El Paso) has resulted in some tragic consequences. Cross-
ings have been deflected to less hospitable terrains and a recorded 126 deaths re-
sulted in 1996, and the 1997 death toll is accumulating at a more rapid pace.
Societal Attitudes and How They are Shaped
The vast divide that exists in societal attitudes in the two countries on the
migration phenomenon is amply demonstrated in public opinion surveys, focus
group conclusions, treatment in the media, and positions of key actors. There is no
way to fully bridge the divide because it is rooted in the underlying situations of a
sending and a receiving country and, consequently, reflects national self-interest in
the current context. The best that can be expected is deeper understanding on each
side of the attitude of the other and why this outlook exists.
Public Opinion Polls and Focus Groups
These will be shown separately for the United States and Mexico.
United States
While there are variations in the percentages depending on the circumstances
when polls are conducted, the dominant U.S. attitude has been for restriction of
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immigration. The restrictionist viewpoint has grown in recent years, dominated
largely by attitudes in California. The restrictionist sentiment there exemplified by
the passage of Proposition 187 in November 1994 had reverberations throughout
the nation, but other states did not necessarily have the same reaction. The Gover-
nor of Texas, another important immigrant-receiving state, in August 1995 pub-
licly deplored the Mexico- and immigrant-bashing attitude that he felt was preva-
lent in California. A similar reaction came at roughly the same time from Rudolph
Giuliani, the mayor of New York City.
The ups and downs in the intensity of anti-immigrant sentiment seem to de-
pend significantly on the employment (unemployment) situation at the time a poll
is taken. It is therefore unwise to generalize about the depth of feeling on the immi-
gration issue other than as a reflection of attitudes at a given moment. The vote on
Proposition 187 came before California had recovered from an economic down-
turn. The contrary declaration of Governor George Bush, Jr., came when Texas had
recovered from its earlier recession. It is important to note, also, that Texas relies
much more than California on exports to Mexico and Texas is the main truck route
for U.S. trade with Mexico.18
Two aspects of the U.S. polling data merit emphasis:
1. The shifts in the proportion of the U.S. public that believes the level of
immigration should be decreased track reasonably well with the state of the economy
(i.e., there is a rise in restrictionist sentiment as the economy worsens). Using Gallup
Poll data, the proportion of persons favoring a decrease in immigration was 33
percent in June 1965, 42 percent in March 1977, 65 percent in 1981, 49 percent in
June 1986, 53 percent in 1988, and 65 percent in 1993, and roughly the same two
thirds in the summer of 1995.19 The economy was relatively healthy in 1965 (rela-
tively low restrictionist sentiment), depressed in 1982 (rising restrictionist senti-
ment), and growing in 1986 (and restrictionist sentiment declined). The concor-
dance between the state of the economy and restrictionist sentiment was less pro-
nounced in 1988, 1993, and 1995.
2. There is no evident correlation between public opinion as reflected in the
polls and legislation. The polls over the years show much support for penalizing
employers for knowingly hiring illegal aliens, but it took many years, until 1986,
to reflect this in federal legislation; and even then, the law was not rigorously
enforced. According to a Gallup poll in 1984, a majority of the public supported
the idea of an identification card, but this has been resisted by the U.S. Congress.
Despite the public sentiment over the past few decades for fewer immigrants, this
has not been reflected in legislation. The estimate of the number of legal immi-
grants who will be admitted in 1997 under the 1996 law is 850,000, about the same
as the previous year, despite the recent increase shown in the polling data of the
proportion of the public favoring a reduction.
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There are a number of reasons for the disparity between public opinion as
reflected in polls and congressional action. These include the lobbying of interest
groups, the logrolling that takes place to simultaneously satisfy many interests,
differences that exist between regions of the country, concern over civil liberties
with respect to identity cards, and the fact that polling percentages may not reflect
deeply held sentiments.
The best reflection of public opinion in California, at least in November 1994,
was the vote on Proposition 187, which was supported by a margin of 59 to 41
percent. Polls in California tend to show substantial divergences between Anglo
and Latino voters. Thus, in 1994, the California Opinion Index indicated that 56
percent of Anglos felt that the IRCA amnesty was a bad thing, while 68 percent of
Latinos thought it was a good thing to do. Again in 1994, 55 percent of Anglos
favored amending the Constitution to deny automatic citizenship to children of
illegal aliens born in the United States, while 76 percent of Latinos were against
such a constitutional amendment.
On some issues, however, positions were not what intuition would lead one to
believe. For example, on the use of ID cards for all persons living in the United States,
55 percent of Anglos thought it was a bad idea, while 56 percent of Latinos favored
this. On the issue of the number of immigrants who should be admitted for legal
residence, 55 percent of Californians thought this should be reduced, which was about
10 percentage points less than the Gallup Poll showed for the nation as a whole.
Recent developments in California, such as Proposition 187 and the incidents
in Riverside County affecting illegal immigrants, have stimulated the effort for
empowerment among Latinos. A poll commissioned by La Opinion, the nation’s
leading Spanish-language daily newspaper, and KVEA television, both in Los
Angeles, reported in May 1996 that 57 percent of Latinos felt the best response
was through political empowerment.20
Mexico
Data on Mexican public opinion regarding migration are either unsystematic
or nonexistent. Recent opinion polls, therefore, have to be treated with caution.
With this in mind, the high concentration of some poll results leads to the easy
interpretation that positions merely repeat “messages of the media.” However, this
is not always the case. For example, a poll of Mexico City residents taken immedi-
ately after the April 1996 Riverside incident found that three out of four respon-
dents consider that restricting the entrance of indocumentados is not in the interest
of the United States. Eighty-five percent of the same Mexico City respondents also
believe that Mexicans do little or nothing to help their nationals abroad. Only 15
percent declare to know that there are institutions which defend them.21
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The different perceptions that exist in the two countries on the migration
phenomenon manifest themselves quite vividly when it is possible to compare the
answers to identical questions in a Mexican and U.S. survey. Such a dual survey
was carried out in August 1996. The Mexican survey showed that only 2 percent of
the respondents believed that stricter border controls would be effective to diminish
migration, compared with 19 percent who believed so in the U.S. survey. The
perceptions on the effectiveness of employer sanctions work in the same direction:
the Mexican survey showed that only 4 percent believed that employer sanctions
would work, while 18 percent believed so in the U.S. survey.22
According to a January 1997 opinion poll by MORI de México, only one in
seven Mexicans believed that the measures taken by the government to protect its
nationals abroad are somewhat effective, and 42 percent believed governmental
efforts lack effectiveness. This same poll showed that 85 percent of Mexicans con-
sider that U.S. immigration policy is either unfair or racist.
When questioned about the costs and benefits of Mexicans working in the
United States, the respondents thought that migration was positive for both coun-
tries: 40 percent thought that the Mexican economy benefits, whereas 58 percent
believed the U.S. economy benefits.
In response to a question on the convenience of seeking a formal bilateral
temporary worker agreement, 76 percent thought that the Mexican government
should seek such a pact with the United States.23
A similar picture of Mexican perceptions emerges from another survey carried
out at the end of 1996. The survey was commissioned by Mexico’s National Popu-
lation Council (CONAPO) to evaluate family planning program in nine states in
Central and Southern Mexico. Respondents consider that although Mexico receives
some benefits from its migrants (42.6%), the United States benefits much more
(75.3%). Regarding perceptions of Mexican protection of migrants, the opinions
are almost equally divided between those who consider these efforts acceptable
(41.3%) and those who consider that deficient (46.2%). Finally, the proportion of
those who would like to see some sort of “temporary worker program” is over-
whelming (81.2%).24
Elites and Non-elites
There is little solid data on the views of elites and non-elites generally in the
United States. There is evidence that the views of Latino elites differ from those of
the rank and file. This statement may be more accurate if nuanced in the way Peter
Skerry has done: “Indeed, by defining the agenda for a poorly organized and largely
disenfranchised group, the leaders exert extraordinary influence over how it [the
rank and file, presumably] views the world.”25 Some examples given by Skerry are
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positions on immigration and abortion. De la Garza and De Sipio also stress the
importance of citizenship, or its lack, in shaping Latino views.26
Espenshade and Hempstead find in their analysis of survey data that the higher
the education and income of Latino respondents, the more favorable they generally
are to greater immigration.27 This is consistent with what the authors hypothesized.
The attitudinal differences between elites (defined in this example as the more
educated and wealthier) and non-elites reflect the disparities in their perceived
self-interest as much or more than in their ethnicity.
The significance of citizenship and disenfranchisement in determining mass
as opposed to leadership positions may be undergoing a transformation. The in-
crease in Latino (and other) naturalizations stimulated by the removal of benefits
from legal aliens in the immigration and welfare bills had considerable influence
in elections across the United States in 1996, especially in places where many
Latinos live.28 The rank and file Latinos, many more now enfranchised, turned out
in greater numbers than in the past and, for the most part, their votes reflected the
positions of the leadership. One unintended consequence of Proposition 187 and
other anti-immigrant measures elsewhere has been to weaken the Republican Party
in this and other states, at least for now, by antagonizing the fastest growing major
ethnic minority—Latinos—in the United States.29
In Mexico, similarly, there is little solid data on the differences, if any, be-
tween the views of elites and non-elites. An approximation, however, of the views
of the former can be obtained by looking at the way many enlightened employers
interpret the migration phenomenon. Employers generally take the view that labor
mobility is beneficial and rational. For them, there is no direct, or easy, solution to
stopping Mexican migration. The answer to migration is indirect—through a
healthier and more dynamic economy. Economic elites believe that if one wants to
stop the current exodus, it is important that Mexican families recoup their eco-
nomic security.
Employers see the migration phenomenon from the framework of the regional
asymmetries within North America, and its solution within this same regional frame-
work. Employers put forward two possible avenues to deal with the “migration
problem.” One is to legalize the phenomenon. The other (not in opposition to the
first) is to promote the idea that within the North American space, resources—
including labor—have to be shared among the three member countries.30
Public Positions of Influential Actors
Influential players can have a substantial impact on the public perception about
migration issues. The positions of these actors undoubtedly carry much weight
because their prominence attracts considerable media attention to their views. The
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resulting public perceptions, whether or not accurate, do have an effect on legislative
outcomes and on U.S.-Mexican relations.
In the United States, Governor Pete Wilson of California, by his advocacy of
Proposition 187, gave official sanction to the measure. Governor Wilson had ear-
lier made the issue of illegal immigration into California an important feature of
his re-election campaign. Pat Buchanan, when he was seeking the Republican nomi-
nation for president in 1996, surely influenced many voters to support his anti-
immigrant, especially anti-Mexican-immigrant, stance. In the end, Bob Dole, the
eventual Republican candidate, supported Proposition 187. The anti-Mexican-im-
migrant position was by no means limited to Republicans. Senator Diane Feinstein
of California opposed NAFTA largely on anti-immigrant grounds, and she has con-
tinued to take this position to this day. Her fellow Democrat from California, Sena-
tor Barbara Boxer, took a similar position.
Other key actors took opposite positions. As noted elsewhere, Governor George
Bush of Texas criticized the anti-Mexican tone of many of the key players in Cali-
fornia. President Clinton, on the opposite side of the position taken by his Repub-
lican rival, carried California in the presidential election.
Immigration from Mexico, and assertions about its fiscal burden for individual
states and its social consequences for the nation as a whole, raised the visibility of
Mexican relations in the United States, and not always in the most felicitous manner.
In Mexico, public statements and declarations of principles of key actors are
plentiful. The positions selected—only three—are considered particularly relevant
in framing the domestic debate and shaping the main public and private responses to
the migration phenomenon. In his Informe Presidencial, President José López Portillo
(1976-1982) synthesized in one short sentence what would later be repeated often as
the Mexican view on the migration reality: “Mexico wants to export goods, not
people.” For years, the bulwark of the Mexican migration policy position has been
the emphasis on the protection of migrant rights. During the debate on Proposition
187, this emphasis led Andrés Rozental, Undersecretary of Foreign Relations, to go
on record in California in August 1994, in a way that many consider aggressive, even
impolite and undiplomatic, in defense of Mexican migrants abroad. Finally, Jorge
Bustamante, a well known scholar of the migration phenomenon, for years has been
advocating the consideration of “a border perspective” in dealing with migration. His
argument is that realities and perceptions at the border are peculiar to that region.
Media
The media treatment of migration is well exemplified by the nature of the
coverage Proposition 187 received in Mexico and by the sober coverage in the
United States of immigration reform.
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Mexico — Proposition 187
The media in Mexico appeared to provide an accurate representation of the
positions of the executive branch of government, the political parties, firms, the
Catholic church, and the intelligentsia and academics about Proposition 187:
1. Executive branch of government: Both the Salinas and Zedillo governments
saw the initiative as a racist and xenophobic expression. The government con-
cluded that Proposition 187 affects the relationship between Mexico and the United
States and compels dealing with the migration issue from a holistic and not a par-
tial perspective.
2. Legislative branch of government and political parties: Both rejected the
initiative and rallied to defend the human rights of the migrants. Both groups feared
that Governor Pete Wilson’s “electoral demagogy” would spread to other places in
the United States. Their reaction had three elements: rejection of Proposition 187;
the need to defend the human rights of Mexican nationals; and improvement of
conditions in Mexico to obviate the need to emigrate.
3. Academic and intellectual communities: These groups characterized the
Mexican government’s response as unenthusiastic and felt that the rights of Mexi-
can migrants had been subordinated to NAFTA negotiations and then to Carlos
Salinas de Gortari’s ambition to lead the World Trade Organization. They argued
that failure to include the free mobility of labor between the signatory countries of
NAFTA led to the discriminatory treatment of illegal workers.
4. Catholic church: Demanded a prompt dialogue between authorities of both
countries and proposed the creation of a “Free Labor Agreement.” Church leaders
insisted that the Mexican government had to create conditions to avoid forcing
citizens to cross the border illegally.
5. Private sector: Considered immoral the use of the migration problem by the
U.S. politicians as a political device in the search for votes. Yet, they accepted that
there is a serious unemployment problem in Mexico. They favored a strong de-
fense of the rights of illegal workers in the United States.31
United States — Immigration Reform
In the period analyzed—from October to December 1995 and April 1996—
the American press published a series of articles on the migration problem, focus-
ing on the illegality aspect of the issue. In most reports, the dilemma was treated as
a fiscal, economic and social problem which had adverse effects on American
workers. There was also much stress on U.S. sovereignty loss because of lack of
control of the border. Most articles supported unilateral U.S. measures to control
illegal immigration.
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The U.S. media reporting also showed two other tendencies: that measures
like Proposition 187 were not a complete solution to migration problems; and the
need to respect the human rights of workers.32
Advocacy by Nongovernmental Organizations
The manner in which this is done differs in extent and intensity in the United
States and Mexico.
United States
Public interest groups are common in the United States and, in a sense, all
significant legislation is the outcome of contests between such groups with differ-
ing interests. It has ever been thus in the United States, even if not to the extent that
exists today; and, as Toqueville observed in a different setting, this capacity for
organization of the public at large is one of the strengths of U.S. democracy. The
immigration field lends itself to legislative and information contests because the
interests at stake touch simultaneously on family and kinship matters, the cultural
development of society, and the exercise of sovereignty over entry into national
territory. There are many U.S. NGOs whose work is devoted exclusively to immi-
gration issues (e.g., Federation for Immigration Reform, Center for Immigration
Studies, and Voice of Citizens Together in California), and many more for whom
immigration is one facet of their activities (such as the League of United Latin
American Citizens, Mexican American Legal Defense Fund, National Council of
La Raza, and, where issues of civil rights are involved, the American Civil Liber-
ties Union). Business and agricultural interests take public positions on elements
of legislation. The relative influence of these groups is significant in framing the
compromises that emerge in immigration legislation.
As one goes through the 1996 immigration and appropriation bills, the influ-
ence of NGOs—either direct or as a result of public-education efforts—on out-
comes becomes abundantly clear. Provisions to provide more funds to the Border
Patrol than the administration requested demonstrates the strength of the anti-ille-
gal immigrant sentiment. So do the pilot programs for confirmation of employ-
ment eligibility; but the fact that they are voluntary pilot programs also demon-
strates that opinions differ sharply on this issue. The facilitation of legal entry at
the border is in large part the result of a public-information campaign by NGOs.
The restriction of benefits to non-citizen legal immigrants in both the immigration
and welfare bills is partly the result of budgetary stringency and of pressure by
NGOs. The provision making mutilation of female genital organs a criminal of-
fense is the consequence of a public information effort by NGOs.
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The list could be extended to past legislation, such as the SAWs program of
IRCA and, before that, the Texas Proviso of 1952. The half-open door practice
reflected compromises between various NGO groups which led to formal opposi-
tion to illegal immigration but not excessively so in practice. The constitutional
case brought against implementation of major segments of Proposition 187 was
directed by the ACLU in California.
The removal of the Gallegly amendment, which would have denied public
education to alien children illegally in the United States, was largely a consequence
of an organized public campaign by a number of NGOs. This outcome was aided
considerably by the opposition to the amendment by the two Republican senators
from Texas, Phil Gramm and Kay Bailey Hutchison.33
Mexico
NGOs have helped Mexican migrants for years. With the influx of Central
American refugees into Mexico in the late 1970s and early 1980s, new NGOs arose
whose work was directed to these groups of immigrants. This division of labor on
migrants into and out of Mexico continues to the present, although there are NGOs
that deal with both groups. NGOs increasingly combine work on issues of emigra-
tion from Mexico and those dealing with immigration into Mexico.
Mexican NGOs are becoming increasingly active and visible in the public
debate. A group of at least two dozen NGOs, in combination with NGOs of other
countries, gathered in Puebla, Mexico just before the First Regional Migratory
Conference (March 1996) and presented a combined resolution. NGOs seek rec-
ognition by the government as interlocutors of the civic society.
These NGOs act as a pressure group for the migrants. The following two is-
sues seem to take priority in their agendas: to inform and sensitize the population
at large on the realities of the migration phenomenon; and to attempt to limit the
adverse effects of migration on individuals, families, and communities. Many NGOs
publicly denounce abuses and violations suffered by migrants during their journey
toward the North, be they Mexicans or other nationals.34
Although not an NGO, nor devoted particularly to migration issues, the
Comisión Nacional de Derechos Humanos (CNDH) has been monitoring the com-
pliance and violations of migrants’ human rights and, in so doing, has contributed
tremendously to the creation of a culture of respect for human rights, including
those of the migrants whatever their legal status. The CNDH in 1996 published its
Second Report on the violations of migrants human rights along the northern bor-
der.35 In 1995, it had published a report on the violations of the migrants’ rights
along the southern border.36
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Legislative and Judicial Responses
U.S. Federal Immigration Legislation
Nationality
The U.S. Constitution states that all persons born in the territory of the United
States are U.S. citizens and that Congress is empowered to establish a “uniform
rule of naturalization.” The terms by which nationality and citizenship are defined,
acquired, and lost are established by federal legislation and court decisions inter-
preting this broad Constitutional provision.
Birth in the United States confers citizenship regardless of the status of the
parents. Birth abroad of U.S. citizen parents confers derivative citizenship, according
to complex rules that have changed over time. Usually, naturalization is a process by
which a legally admitted immigrant who has resided in the United States for at least
five years submits a petition and passes an examination in English and civics.
Admission of Immigrants
The United States sees itself as a country of immigration, and sees immigrants
as potential U.S. (naturalized) citizens. U.S. immigration legislation has often arisen
as a response to a perceived immigration problem of the moment, but usually has not
focused specifically on Mexican immigrants. Early examples of policies that in some
way focused on Mexican immigrants include the suspension of certain requirements
of the 1917 Immigration Act to allow the temporary admission of Mexican workers
during World War I, the creation of the Border Patrol in 1924, and the administrative
restriction in 1927 which resulted in a decline in legal immigration from Mexico in
the absence of quotas fixed by statute. Another example of a policy focused on Mexico
was the recruitment of railroad and agricultural workers during World War II and the
institutionalization of the Bracero Program in 1951.
Family reunification emerged as an important feature of U.S. immigration
policy when numerical restrictions were first introduced in 1921, and it was
maintained when immigration law was reorganized into the Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952. In 1965 it became a central principle of U.S. immigra-
tion policy. Before and since then, immediate relatives—unmarried children,
spouses, and parents—of U.S. citizens have been admitted without statutory limit.
Immediate relatives of permanent resident aliens and other close relatives of U.S.
citizens and resident aliens have been admitted according to a complex set of
rules which changed between 1965 and 1990 within a worldwide annual numeri-
cal ceiling. Preference categories set aside about 80 percent of the numerically
limited visas for family-sponsored immigrants; employment-sponsored immigrants
comprised most of the remainder.
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In fiscal year 1995, the United States admitted over 720,000 immigrants, 12.5
percent, or nearly 90,000 of them born in Mexico (Table 1). The vast majority of
these were close relatives of U.S. citizens or legal permanent residents—460,000
or 64 percent of the total, 90 percent of the immigrants from Mexico. Mexican
immigrants comprised 26 percent of the total immigrants admitted under family-
sponsored preferences (first through fourth preferences), including the 2A prefer-
ence category of which 75 percent are admitted exempt from the per-country limit.
By contrast, they comprised only 2 percent of the employment-based immigrants
admitted and 3 percent of the categories not subject to numerical cap, which in-
cludes refugees and asylees.
Because the vast majority of Mexican immigrants over the years have been
family sponsored and more have applied under numerically limited categories than
visas have become available, backlogs have developed as applicants have waited
for an immigrant visa. This first became apparent in Mexico’s case shortly after
1976, when all countries were assigned an annual numerical limit of 20,000 immi-
grant visas for applicants other than immediate relatives of U.S. citizens. By 1982
271,582 active applications from Mexico were pending; by 1989 this had grown to
403,523. The 1986 Immigration reform and Control Act increased pressure on the
visa backlog system even as it allowed for the legalization of 2.3 million persons
from Mexico. This has led to a further increase in applications for permanent im-
migration status outside the numerical limitations of those legalized under IRCA.
Perhaps 800,000 visa applicants in the backlog for Mexico resulted from this sec-
ond stage of immigrant visa applications.
The 1990 Immigration Act increased the per-country annual limit for Mexico
and other countries to approximately 28,000.37 It also allowed for 55,000 extra
visas for each year during 1992-94 minus the amount by which immediate relative
immigrants exceeded 239,000 in the previous year for spouses and children of
aliens legalized under IRCA. This helped reduce the backlogs and, for a brief pe-
riod, nearly equalized the visa waiting period for applicants from all countries. By
January 1995, however, the immigrant waiting list had grown to a total of 3.7
million applications, one million, i.e., 28 percent, from Mexico (Table 2).
Mexican applications are oversubscribed in all of the family preference
categories—the shortest wait (first preference) is now about 41⁄2 years. In March
1997, visas were available for Mexican 2A applicants (spouses, children and
unmarried sons and daughters of permanent resident aliens) who had a priority
date before June 8, 1992. Third-preference applicants (married sons and daughters
of U.S. citizens) and fourth-preference (siblings of adult citizens) have waited for
about a decade for a visa. In March 1997, these applicants had February 1, 1988
and October 1, 1985 priority dates, respectively. It is not possible to predict how
long it will take any given set of applicants to obtain a visa since they may later
471
Table 1
Immigrants Admitted to the United States from All Countries
and Born in Mexico, by Legal Category, FY 1995
All
Immigrants Admitted Countries Mexico %
1. All immigrants admitted 720,461 89,932 12.5
(1)=(2)+(22)
2. Subject to numerical cap 593,234 86,079 14.5
3. Family-sponsored preferences 238,122 61,877 26.0
4. Unmarried adult children of U.S. citizens 15,182 1,979 13.0
5. Spouses and unmarried children of alien
residents, including exempt from limit 144,535 52,167 36.1
6. Married adult children of U.S. citizens 20,876 2,031 9.7
7. Siblings of U.S. citizens 57,529 5,700 9.9
8. Immediate relatives of U.S. citizens 220,360 22,016 10.0
9. Spouses 123,238 13,824 11.2
10. Parents 48,382 3,844 7.9
11. Children 48,740 4,348 8.9
12. Other family-sponsored subject to cap 2,171 454 20.9
13. Children born abroad to alien residents 1,894 369 19.5
14. Legalization dependents 277 85 30.7
15. Employments-Based immigrants 85,336 1,708 2.0
16. Priority workers 17,339 193 1.1
17. Professionals with advanced degrees of
exceptional ability 10,475 56 0.5
18. Skilled, professionals, unskilled 50,245 1,086 2.2
19. Special immigrants 6,737 372 5.5
20. Investors 540 1 0.2
21. Diversity Programs 47,245 24 0.1
22. Not subject to numerical cap 127,227 3,853 3.0
23. Refugees and asylees 114,664 37 0.0
24. Parolees 3,086 0 0.0
25. Suspension of deportation 3,168 581 18.3
26. IRCA legalization 4,267 2,972 69.7
27. Other* 2,042 263 12.9
Source: 1995 Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (Washington,
D.C.: GPO, 1997), tables 4, 5, 6,7, and 8, and unpublished data from Statistics Division, INS.
“From Mexico” refers to country of birth.
*This category consolidates a number of small admission categories listed in table 4. The
equivalent tabulations for Mexico are not published. The number listed (263) is inferred from
the 3,853 Mexicans admitted not subject to numerical cap.
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submit applications under a more advantageous category, a close relative may
naturalize and petition for their admission outside of the annual numerical ceiling,
or Congress may amend the law again.
Control of Unauthorized Immigration
IRCA contained important legislative changes in policy regarding the deterrence
of unauthorized immigration. Its principal provisions were (1) the adoption of
penalties for employers who knowingly hired unauthorized immigrants and who
did not review the documentation of all new hires; (2) the legalization of millions
of unauthorized migrants; and (3) additional resources for the apprehension and
removal of illegal entrants at the border with Mexico. The legalization provisions
Table 2
Immigrant Applicants Waiting for a Visa
January 1995*
Chargeable
Preference to Mexico All Countries
All preferences 1,039,706 3,692,506
All family preferences 1,032,695 3,554,986
1st Unmarried adult children 4,021 69,540
of U.S. citizens
2A Spouses & unmarried minor children 770,281 1,138,544
of permanent residents
2B Unmarried adult children 106,797 494,064
of permanent residents
3rd Married children of U.S. citizens 29,770 260,414
4th Siblings of adult U.S. citizens 121,826 1,592,424
All employment preferences 7,011 137,520
1st Priority workers 129 9,361
2nd Members of professions 35 9,097
3rd Skilled workers, professionals 6,351 111,506
and others
4th Certain special immigrants 494 7,393
5th Investors, other than targeted emp. areas 0 84
5th Investors, targeted emp. areas 2 79
Source: United States Department of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs, Report of
the Visa Office, 1995.
*Active immigrant visa applicants registered at consular offices in January, 1995.
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allowed migrants who had resided illegally in the United States since January 1982
and met other requirements, or who had been employed in perishable agriculture
for at least 90 days during the twelve months ending in May 1986 (Special
Agricultural Workers, SAWs) and met other requirements to obtain temporary and
later permanent resident status.
IRCA was the end product of a 15 year debate over how to respond to illegal
immigration, especially from Mexico, which had been marked by legislative pro-
posals considered but not enacted by Congress in 1971 and 1972, the Carter immi-
gration plan of 1977, the recommendations of the Select Commission on Immigra-
tion and Refugee Policy (SCIRP) in 1981, the Reagan immigration plan of 1981,
and successive bills introduced by Senator Alan Simpson and Representatives
Romano Mazzoli and Peter Rodino.
There is considerable debate regarding the consequences of employer sanc-
tions enforcement and the reasons for their perceived failure. As a policy response
to unauthorized immigration, especially from Mexico, four general observations
can be made. First, the response itself is a recognition that access to the labor
market accounts for much of the unauthorized immigration to the United States.
Second, 10 years of experience with the implementation of employer sanctions
underscores the difficulties involved in imposing a new employment standard and
in shifting to employers part of the burden of regulating immigrants in the labor
market. Third, employer sanction legislation has had some unintended but foresee-
able effects, such as the growth of an industry in fraudulent documents and the
expansion of the role of subcontractors and labor market middlemen who shield
employers from the penalties of the law. Finally, though it may be possible to argue
that unauthorized migration would have been higher in the absence of employer
sanctions, it is clear that these penalties in combination with other circumstances
since 1987 have not reduced the population of migrants illegally in the United
States or even reduced the rate of growth of this population.
There is much less debate over the immediate consequences of legalization
under IRCA. A total of 1.6 million pre-1982 residents and 1.1 million Special Ag-
ricultural Workers from all countries legalized their status and eventually were
admitted as permanent resident aliens outside of the numerical limitations. Mexi-
can nationals comprised 70 percent of the pre-1982 population and 81 percent of
the SAWs legalized under IRCA. Legalization made it possible for many of these
persons to stay and work in the United States without fear of deportation, travel
freely in and out of the country, to apply for immigrant visas for close relatives,
and to apply for naturalization, which many did, starting in the mid 1990s.
The increase in resources dedicated to border enforcement under IRCA was
further expanded and a new enforcement approach was adopted in 1993 with
Operation Hold-the-Line in El Paso and later with Operation Gatekeeper in San
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Diego. The new strategy combines a large growth in the number of Border Patrol
officers, an expansion in the kinds of devices and technology employed to detect
bordercrossers, and a forward and visible deployment of officers near the boundary.
In combination with an extensive metal fence constructed at the border, this approach
emphasizes deterring illegal entry whereas previous strategies emphasized
apprehension and removal after illegal entry.
Though it is early to evaluate the effect of this heightened border enforcement
effort on the size of the unauthorized immigrant population in the United States, it
has had the effect of changing the strategies employed by border crossing persons:
there is an increase in the number of illegal crossing attempts using fraudulent
documents at the ports of entry, of smugglers, and a growth in the flow through
difficult desert and mountainous terrain.
1996 Immigration Legislation
The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
(IIRIRA) goes beyond IRCA and constitutes an even more radical overhaul of
immigration law as regards the control of unauthorized immigration. IIRIRA au-
thorizes increased levels of appropriations for new resources and personnel related
to immigration enforcement. Depending on annual appropriations in each case, it
increases the number of Border Patrol agents by 1,000 per year and support per-
sonnel by 300 per year between FY 1997 and FY 2001 (sec. 101). It authorizes an
increase in the number of INS investigators and support personnel assigned to
investigate employer sanctions violations and document fraud (sec. 131). It autho-
rizes an increase of 300 new full-time investigators assigned to visa overstay cases
(sec 132). It mandates the Attorney General to increase detention space to 9,000
beds by the end of FY 1997 (sec. 386). It authorizes $150 million for costs associ-
ated with the removal of aliens, including investigations and detention (sec. 385).
It increases the number of asylum officers by 600 in FY 97 (sec. 605). It increases
the number of Assistant U.S. Attorneys by at least 25 to assist in the prosecution of
crimes relating to immigration and alien smuggling (sec. 204).
IIRIRA makes significant modifications designed to strengthen the effective-
ness of existing employer sanctions provisions. It removes the liability for technical
violations of paperwork requirements where employers demonstrate good faith (sec.
411). It reduces the number of acceptable employment verification documents and
requires the federal government to comply with the same paperwork requirements
(412). It requires the Social Security Administration to develop a prototype of a
counterfeit- resistant Social Security card (sec. 657). It provides for three types of
pilot programs designed to test the strengths and weaknesses and costs of various
approaches to verifying work authorization (sec. 401-403). Participation is voluntary
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for private employers (although certain employers who have violated immigration
laws may be required to participate) and mandatory for job applicants.
In addition to increasing substantially the number of Border Patrol personnel,
the IIRIRA mandates the construction of triple fencing along the San Diego border
(sec. 102) and calls for reports and studies to evaluate the deterrent effects of INS
border management (sec. 107). It also provides funds and establishes new
procedures to tighten the inspection of nonimmigrants (sec. 123, 124, 125, 110).
At the border it also provides for an improved border crossing card and an increase
in the number of border inspectors in order to reduce border crossing delays at
peak hours (121).
IIRIRA abolishes the doctrine of “entry,” and replaces it with the concept of
“admission,” eliminates the previous exclusion and deportation proceedings and
replaces them with a single hearing to effect removal (sec. 301, 304). The expe-
dited removal of inadmissible arriving aliens is authorized. Section 302 intro-
duces an important new condition for aliens which took effect on April 1, 1997:
the exclusion without a hearing for individuals with fraudulent documents or no
documents at all, unless the alien declares an intention to apply for asylum or
state a “credible fear of persecution.” If the alien cannot establish continuous
physical presence for the two years before notice or detention, the INS has the
discretion to deny a hearing to any alien who was not admitted or paroled—e.g.,
one who entered without inspection. The Attorney General has sole discretion
and this is unreviewable.
The authority of the INS to detain persons, moreover, is no longer subject to
judicial review. Nor may a court set aside a decision to detain or release an alien, or
to grant or deny bond or parole (sec. 303). Congress anticipated that there may not be
sufficient detention space for the INS to hold everyone under this section and therefore
authorized a transition period to delay its implementation if there is insufficient space
and personnel. Otherwise, this section became effective on April 1, 1997.
Section 301 introduces a set of new conditions which took effect on April 1,
1997, and which bar permanently or for several years the subsequent legal admission
of persons who remain unlawfully in the United States. An alien unlawfully present
in the United States for more than 180 days and less than one year, and who leaves
the United States voluntarily before removal proceedings, is inadmissible for three
years. An alien unlawfully present for one year or more and leaves voluntarily
before removal proceedings is inadmissible for 10 years. Certain aliens ordered
removed at the end of removal proceedings initiated at the time of arrival will be
inadmissible for five years. Otherwise, an alien who is ordered removed or who
has departed after a removal order was issued, is inadmissible for 10 years—20
years if subsequently removed, permanently if the alien committed an aggravated
felony. Aliens unlawfully present for an aggregate period of more than one year or
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who have been ordered removed and who subsequently enter or attempt to enter
the United States without lawful admission are barred permanently from admission.
The Attorney General is given discretion to give prior consent for reapplication
only after 10 years have lapsed.
Two previous forms of relief from deportation have been modified signifi-
cantly. The period of continuous presence required for “suspension of deportation”
is extended from seven years to 10, and the applicant must demonstrate that re-
moval would result in “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to the alien’s
U.S. citizen or permanent resident alien spouse, parent or child (sec. 304). Previ-
ously the applicant, a deportable alien, could demonstrate extreme hardship to himself
or herself.
The second form of relief from deportation—voluntary departure—is still avail-
able to many unlawful migrants. If sought before completion of removal proceed-
ings, it must be undertaken within 120 days of notice to appear. If sought at the
conclusion of removal proceedings, several specific conditions must be met: the
alien must have been physically present in the United States for at least one year
before the notice to appear, can demonstrate good moral character for five years
before application, is not deportable because of an aggravated felony or other seri-
ous grounds, and has established convincingly that he intends to depart. Failure to
depart in a timely fashion will result in civil fines between $1,000 and $5,000 (sec.
304). Other penalties include fines not to exceed $500 per day for aliens who will-
fully fail or refuse to depart after final orders of removal (sec. 380). The Attorney
General is given authority to limit eligibility for voluntary departure for any class
of aliens, and this authority is not subject to review by the courts (sec. 304).
The INS is required to detain any alien who is inadmissible on criminal-related
grounds or criminal grounds of deportation. The discretion is not subject to judicial
review (303).
IIRIRA seeks to facilitate the cooperation and communication between the
INS and state and local government agencies and the transfer of alien prisoners to
foreign countries. Section 133 authorizes the Attorney General to enter into agree-
ments with state and local authorities in order to authorize state and local law
enforcement officers to perform immigration enforcement functions, including
investigation, apprehension and detention. The IIRIRA prohibits federal, state, and
local officials from prohibiting any government entity from sending or receiving
information from the INS regarding the citizenship or immigration status of any
individual, or of maintaining such information (sec. 642). It also requires federal
regulations to tighten the design of birth certificates issued by the states, and to
consult with state agencies for this purpose (sec. 656). Section 330 recommends
the negotiation of additional prisoner transfer treaties which would allow for trans-
fers without the prisoner’s consent.
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Finally, IIRIRA levies new costs and criminal penalties on unlawful immigrants.
It precludes the payment of Social Security benefits to aliens not lawfully present
(sec. 503). It requires states to not provide in-state tuition and other college benefits
to an alien not lawfully present unless the state would also provide the same benefit
to citizens residing in another state (sec. 505). It increases either civil or criminal
penalties, or both, for individuals who are unlawfully in the country, who smuggle
or transport them, or who provide or utilize false documents. Section 105 provides
for civil penalties for illegal entry; sec. 108 for criminal penalties for high-speed
flights from immigration checkpoints. Certain criminal violations of the Immigration
and Nationality Act may be prosecuted as racketeering offenses (sec. 202). The
criminal penalties for alien smuggling are increased to 10 years’ imprisonment; 15
years for a third or subsequent offense (sec. 203). Section 211 allows for increased
criminal penalties for document fraud and sec. 215 for false claims to citizenship.
The family-sponsored immigration preferences were amended to require that
sponsors providing affidavits of support be able to support both the sponsor’s and
the immigrant families at 125 percent of the federal poverty guideline. This obliga-
tion does not end until the sponsored immigrant becomes a U.S. citizen or is em-
ployed for 40 quarters (i.e., accumulates ten years of employment). This is a strin-
gent new provision.
Many provisions of IIRIRA and its companion welfare reform legislation are
based on the assumption that unauthorized foreigners have abused the adjudicative
process and that immigrants take advantage of the welfare system. These two laws,
and the anti-terrorist act adopted in 1996, are mutually reinforcing. The hundreds
of pages of regulations required to carry out the IIRIRA that were issued by the
Justice Department in early 1997 reflect the extraordinarily detailed statute which
broadens the authority of the INS over aliens and reduces considerably the legal
means available to aliens to challenge administrative decisions which, if applied to
citizens, would be quashed by the courts. IIRIRA eliminated many of the proce-
dural due-process safeguards, including in many instances the right to a hearing
and the judicial review of administrative decisions. These provisions sharpen dif-
ferences between citizens and authorized aliens, and declare that unauthorized
immigrants cannot call on outside the protection of many of the safeguards avail-
able to citizens under the Constitution.
U.S. Supreme Court Decisions and
Immigration Law Enforcement
The authority of the law enforcement agents at an external border of the United
States or its equivalent (such as at an international port of entry) to conduct searches
and seizures and to detain is considerably broader than the authority of police officers
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in their normal conduct of criminal law enforcement within the country. The courts
have ruled that warrantless searches without probable cause at an external border
do not violate the Fourth Amendment prohibition of unreasonable searches and
seizures. The authority of immigration officers to stop vehicles, question persons,
and conduct searches and seizures at places other than the external border or its
equivalent, is broader than that of the police enforcing criminal law, but less broad
than at the external border.
Over the past three decades, the Supreme Court has defined different stan-
dards of constitutionally permissible searches and seizures depending on whether
the law enforcement activity was conducted by a roving patrol near the border, at
a traffic checkpoint, and in workplaces, whether the basis for the warrantless search
was individualized or not. In the early and mid 1970s, the Court tended to restrict
the search and seizure authority of the INS. Since then the trend has been toward
the expansion of that authority. This particular area of judicial review raises impor-
tant questions about the balance between the goals of immigration law enforce-
ment and protecting the privacy of individuals who face the possibility of warrant-
less searches, questioning, and detention by immigration officers.
Three Supreme Court cases—Almeida Sánchez v. U.S. (1973), U.S. v. Ortiz
(1975) and U.S. v. Brignoni Ponce (1975)—defined the initial standard by which
the courts sought to balance the strong governmental interest in controlling
unauthorized immigration and the constitutional right of individuals against
unreasonable searches and seizures. In its opinion in Brignoni, the Court
acknowledged the friction between the Fourth Amendment and the broad statutory
authority granted to the INS by section 287 of the Immigration and Nationality
Act to effect searches without a warrant.38 (Table 3 summarizes the cases discussed
in this section. A more extensive summary of Fourth Amendment cases appears
in Volume 3, pages 1241 to 1247.)
At issue in Brignoni was whether a roving patrol may stop a vehicle near the
border and question its occupants relying solely on the apparent Mexican ancestry
of those occupants. The Court held that a roving patrol need not base a stop on
probable cause if the officers are “aware of specific articulable facts, together with
rational inferences from those facts, that reasonably warrant suspicion” that the
vehicle was carrying unauthorized migrants, and that apparent Mexican ancestry
did constitute one of several factors that could be employed to determine whether
reasonable suspicion existed. However, the Court concluded that the apparent
Mexican ancestry of the occupants, alone and unsupported by other facts, was not
sufficient to believe the occupants were aliens and to justify a stop. An officer may
stop a car briefly and investigate the circumstances that provoke suspicion when
his or her observations lead him reasonably to suspect that a particular vehicle may
contain aliens who are illegally in the country.
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Table 3
Summary of selected Fourth Amendment Supreme Court cases,
1973-1990 (U.S. Supreme Court unless otherwise indicated)
Case Holding/significance
Almeida-Sánchez v. U.S. (1973) Limited the power of INS roving patrols to stop
and search vehicles not at border.
U.S. v. Ortiz (1975) Court applied probable cause standard to traf-
fic checkpoint searches.
U.S. v. Brignoni-Ponce (1975) Apparent Mexican ancestry of occupants of ve-
hicle near the Mexican border not sufficient un-
der Fourth Amendment to stop and question
re: citizenship and immigration status.
U.S. v. Martínez-Fuerte (1976) At a fixed checkpoint, individualized suspicion
is not necessary to stop a vehicle. Profile of
individuals, such as apparent Mexican ances-
try, is sufficient. Exception made for fixed check-
points.
U.S. v. Cortez (1981) Objective facts and circumstantial evidence
based on profile of individual are a legitimate
basis for suspicion of a particular person and
justifies investigative stop of vehicle. Dilutes
Brignoni-Ponce.
ILGWU v. Sureck (1982) Ninth Circuit held that the workforce in a build-
ing during a factory sweep by INS was seized
for the duration of the survey. Fourth Amend-
ment requires individual could be questioned
only on basis of reasonable suspicion that the
individual was an unauthorized alien.
INS v. Delgado (1984) Overturned ILGWU v. Sureck. INS practice of
closing factory exits not a detention but inter-
rogation device; systematic questioning not
based on individualized suspicion meets Fourth
Amendment standard.
INS v. López-Mendoza (1984) Exclusionary rule does not apply to deporta-
tion hearings.
U.S. v. Verdugo-Urquidez (1990) Fourth Amendment extends only to individuals
with substantial connections with U.S. and may
not extend to all unauthorized aliens present
in the United States.
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In Almeida-Sánchez and Ortiz, the Court held that a search of an auto away
from the border or at a traffic checkpoint requires a warrant or probable cause to
meet the reasonable searches and seizures standards of the Fourth Amendment.
In two subsequent decisions—U.S. v. Martínez-Fuerte (1976) and U.S. v. Cortez
(1981)—the Supreme Court backed away somewhat from the standards previously
enunciated. In Cortez, it diluted the holding in Brignoni by allowing for a stop
based solely on the profile of an individual. The Supreme Court found, examining
“the whole picture,” that the detaining officers had met the Brignoni-Ponce re-
quirement of founded suspicion. In Martínez, the Court carved out an important
exception for stopping vehicles at reasonably located traffic checkpoints. It held
that at such checkpoints, INS agents needed no individualized suspicion to stop a
vehicle and question its occupants.
The lower court decision in Martínez had followed Almeida, Ortiz, and Brignoni.
In reversing Martínez, the Supreme Court distinguished this case from previous
holdings by finding that traffic checkpoints conducted by the Border Patrol present
a minimal intrusion on the privacy of motorists and that the purpose of the stops
was legitimate and in the public interest. The Court also weighed in on the side of
practical considerations of law enforcement to justify the finding that traffic check-
points do not have to meet traditional Fourth Amendment standards. The opinion
observed that the need for this enforcement technique was demonstrated by the
records in the cases before the Court, and that on major routes the traffic is too
heavy to allow for a particularized study of vehicles.
The exception enunciated in Martínez applies only to traffic checkpoint stops.
Any intrusion beyond the original stop must be based on consent or probable cause.
Even so, in his dissent, Justice Brennan argued that in the instance of checkpoint
stops, the majority opinion had rendered the Brignoni requirement of minimum
reasonable suspicion meaningless. The exception created by Martínez-Fuerte,
Brennan argued, would “inescapably discriminate against citizens of Mexican an-
cestry and Mexican aliens lawfully in this country for no other reason than that
they unavoidably possess the same ‘suspicious’ physical and grooming character-
istics of illegal Mexican aliens.”
Martínez-Fuerte marked the beginning of a series of exceptions and a shift
away from the requirement of individualized suspicion and traditional interpreta-
tions of the Fourth Amendment in the enforcement of immigration law at places
away from an external border.
In 1982 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals issued a ruling in the case of
International Ladies’ Garment Workers’ Union v. Sureck which was consistent
with the earlier requirements. This case concerned a factory worksite survey in
which INS agents moved through the factory floor and inquired as to the citizenship
and immigration status of the workers while other agents were stationed at the
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exits. The Court admitted that section 287 of the INA authorized the INS to question
any alien or person believed to be an alien as to her right to be or remain in the
United States, pursuant to the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, the appeals court
found that an individual could be questioned only on the basis of a reasonable
suspicion or probable cause that that particular employee was an unauthorized
alien. In ILGWU v. Sureck the court found that the work force at the plant was
seized for the duration of the survey and that the agents had created a detentive
environment by their verbal authority, badges, use of the element of surprise, the
sustained disruption of the working environment, and the questioning of selected
individuals based upon their clothing, facial appearance, hair color and styling,
demeanor, language and accent.
In INS v. Delgado (1984), the Supreme Court overturned the Ninth Circuit
ruling. The majority opinion stated that the factory survey did not result in a sei-
zure of the entire work force, and that the individual questioning of the employees
did not amount to a detention or seizure under the Fourth Amendment. A concur-
ring opinion by Justice Powell reasoned that the surveys were permissible by ap-
plying the analogy of a permanent checkpoint away from the border. He found that
workers have no more expectation of privacy in a workplace than people in auto-
mobiles, and therefore the constitutional standard was met since both circumstances
posed minimal intrusiveness and maximum government interest. While federal courts
continue to refuse racial or national-origin appearance to justify warrantless stops,
the Supreme Court is apparently satisfied with the constitutionality of the system-
atic questioning (as opposed to questioning based on individualized suspicion) that
occurs during INS factory surveys.39
Another area where INS authority has been interpreted broadly involves the
exclusion of evidence obtained unlawfully. The issue in INS v. López-Mendoza
(1984) was whether an admission of unlawful presence in the United States made
after an allegedly unlawful arrest must be excluded as evidence in a deportation
hearing. The Court applied a balancing test which weighed the social benefits of
excluding unlawfully seized evidence against the likely costs. On the benefit side
was the goal of deterring future unlawful police conduct. On the cost side was the
loss of evidence and all of the secondary costs flowing from the less accurate or
more cumbersome adjudication that occurs as a result. The Court considered that
the costs did not justify the benefits. It also noted that deportation hearings require
fewer protections for the individual than do criminal proceedings.40 It concluded
that persons threatened with deportation could not exclude evidence obtained in
violation of the Fourth Amendment at civil deportation hearings.
In a later case not specifically about unauthorized aliens but that had important
implications for their rights, U.S. v. Verdugo-Urquidez (1990), the Supreme Court
suggested that unauthorized aliens have no Fourth Amendment rights at all. Before
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Verdugo reached the Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit considered the question
whether the Fourth Amendment applied to searches and seizures by U.S. agents of
property located in a foreign country and owned by a non-resident alien. The Ninth
Circuit reasoned that in its previous ruling in López-Mendoza, the Supreme Court
had recognized that unauthorized immigrants have Fourth Amendment rights and
therefore, that in Verdugo it was “difficult to conclude that Verdugo-Urquidez lack[ed]
these same protections” since Verdugo was legally present in the United States.
In its review of Verdugo, the Supreme Court disagreed. Justice Rehnquist stated
that the issue in López-Mendoza had been a narrow one—whether the exclusion-
ary rule applied in civil deportation hearings—and “did not encompass whether
the protections of the Fourth Amendment extend to [unauthorized immigrants] in
this country.”41 The Court noted that the Fourth Amendment extends only to “the
people,” which “refers to a class of persons who are part of a national community
or who have otherwise developed sufficient connection with this country to be
considered part of that community.” The Court reasoned that if the framers of the
Constitution had intended the Fourth Amendment to be more universal in its appli-
cation, they would have used the term “persons” as they did in the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments.42 The Court seemed to have concluded that Fourth Amendment pro-
tections extend only to those “people” who have “substantial connections” with
the United States.43
Between the Almeida-Sánchez, Ortiz, and Brignoni-Ponce at one end, and
Delgado and Verdugo-Urquidez at the other, the U.S. Supreme Court has shifted
away from the initial presumption that immigration officers are bound by tradi-
tional Fourth Amendment requirements. In so doing, it has made distinctions among
various classes of persons to determine whether the Fourth Amendment applies to
them. The Court has given considerable latitude to immigration law enforcement
officers, even as it has refused to abandon explicitly the requirement that searches
and seizures must be individualized under some circumstances.
Immigration Aspects of Other U.S. Legislation
Two important U.S. laws enacted in 1996, other than IIRIRA have significant
provisions relating to immigrants. The first of these is the welfare law (the Per-
sonal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996), and the
second the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). In
addition, the appropriations process has an important influence on immigration
matters. Most immigration matters are within the purview of the two judiciary
committees in the House of Representatives and the Senate, but the budget and
appropriation committees of the two houses have great influence. Related legisla-
tion, even if it contains immigration provisions, comes under the primary purview
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of the relevant committee for that subject, such as the House Ways and Means
Committee for welfare matters.
Under the welfare bill, illegal immigrants are ineligible for most public ben-
efits. For the most part, this was the case before the legislation. Illegal aliens re-
main eligible for emergency Medicaid, school breakfast and lunch programs, soup
kitchens, public health assistance for immunizations, disaster relief, and certain
housing benefits if receiving them on the date of enactment of the legislation.
More to the point, therefore, because the prohibitions are new, are those directed
against legal immigrants. They are barred from receiving Supplemental Security
Income (SSI), food stamps, and Medicaid until citizenship or until the immigrant
has worked 40 qualifying quarters and did not receive any Federal means-tested
program during any such quarter. There is an exception for refugees, asylees, and
individuals granted withholding of deportation during their first five years in the
country and for veterans and active duty service personnel. States have authority to
determine eligibility for Aid to Families with Dependent Children and state welfare
programs. The immigration legislation amended the welfare law to permit battered
women to receive public benefits under certain circumstances.
Legal immigrants will be subject to deeming rules in determining eligibility
for federal programs until citizenship or until the immigrant has worked 40 quali-
fying quarters and did not receive any Federal means-tested program during any
such quarter. This means that affidavits of support signed by those who sponsor
immigrants for admission are legally enforceable. States have the authority to limit
eligibility or to deem sponsor income and assets, with similar exceptions.
Governor Wilson, who had been prevented by the courts from implementing
many of the provisions of Proposition 187, used the provisions of the welfare leg-
islation to accomplish many of the same objectives. Less than a week after the
welfare bill became law, he issued an executive order to state agencies and state-
supported universities to cut off benefits to illegal aliens.
When he signed the welfare legislation, President Clinton stated he would try
subsequently to soften the impact on noncitizen legal residents. The Republican
chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, Bill Archer of Texas, was
quoted as saying that if the president wants to undermine and weaken the bill by
allowing noncitizens to receive welfare payments, “I will fight to protect the tax-
payer.”44 Nevertheless, some restitution of benefits was included in the 1997 legis-
lation to reduce taxes and balance the federal budget by the year 2002. Restoring
full benefits to noncitizen legal residents would require finding an estimated $20
billion elsewhere in the budget, either by reducing other programs or raising new
revenue, and this is therefore unlikely.
The AEDPA of 1996 was enacted to take effect in April 1997 and it provides
the basis for expedited deportation of persons considered criminal aliens. It
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prohibits the Attorney General from releasing from custody any criminal alien
deportable for having been convicted of either two crimes involving moral
turpitude within five years of entry, a firearms offense, a drug offense, and
aggravated felony, or a security-related crime. In earlier legislation, the Board
of Immigration Appeals could suspend forced removal of an alien who has become
acclimated to the United States on the grounds that this would inflict great
hardship, but under the AEDPA hardship will no longer be a criterion for
suspending forced removal. The definition of aggravated felony was expanded
in the AEDPA to include, among other offenses, theft or receipt of stolen property
for which the term of imprisonment is five years; and forgery, counterfeiting,
mutilating, or altering a passport in violation of the Immigration and Nationality
fraud provisions for which an 18-month sentence is imposed.
Like the IIRIRA discussed previously, AEDPA precludes judicial review of
administrative decisions, such as final orders of deportation of most criminal aliens
and places strict limits on issues to be considered in a habeas corpus review. This
removes many critical legal safeguards available to citizens.
When provisions on immigration and treatment of immigrants, those in the
United States legally and illegally, and on refugees and asylees, are scattered in
many bills, inconsistencies and anomalies are sure to arise. This is particularly
true when compromises on complex legislation are reached at the 11th hour, as
was the case for the immigration and welfare laws. This is why a bill to deal with
technical corrections was necessary in the new Congress. The more widely spread
across many laws are provisions dealing with immigration, the more complex it
becomes to make changes. The technical bill was vetted across the government in
the Departments of Agriculture, Education, Health and Human Services, Labor,
Justice, and the Social Security Administration. Such legislation often goes be-
yond technicalities.
Interplay between Federal and
State Actions in the United States
Control of borders is a federal responsibility, a fact that contributed to the
delay in implementing the legislation that grew out of Proposition 187. However,
once in the United States, the bulk of the impact of immigration falls on those
places where the immigrants live, the states and localities. Most public services
that are provided are done at the expense of the states and localities. Because the
impacts differ among the states, there is no single view on such issues as welfare,
education, health care, or even on attitudes toward welcoming or resisting immi-
grants. The differences among the states may become even more sharp in the fu-
ture now that many welfare decisions are being decentralized.
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The proposed Gallegly amendment on education brought out these differences
quite vividly. Representative Gallegly, a Republican, is from California and his
proposal to deny education to illegal alien children probably represented the
majority view in that state. Senators Gramm and Hutchison, both Republicans
from Texas, represented a different viewpoint, one shared by that state’s governor,
George W. Bush, also a Republican. The speaker of the House of Representatives,
Republican Newt Gingrich supported Gallegly. He phrased his position as follows:
“California decided by statewide referendum not to pay for these benefits; this
should be its right. Texas, on the other hand, has chosen to pay for these benefits;
this also should be its right.”45 The Texas position was not always thus, of course.
The leading U.S. Supreme Court decision requiring the education of illegal alien
children, Plyler v. Doe, grew out of a case brought against a Texas law of 1975
denying such education.
A number of states have brought suit to recover costs they must bear for
providing services to illegal aliens, all unsuccessful thus far. In their letter of
opposition to the Gallegly amendment, Senators Gramm and Hutchison stated their
support for federal funding of these education costs. A disproportionate share of
these education costs fall on seven states: California, New York, Florida, Illinois,
Texas, New Jersey and Arizona.
The Republican Mayor of New York City, Rudolph Giuliani, has argued against
welfare cuts for most legal aliens. He cited data showing that recent legal immi-
grants use public assistance less than native New Yorkers (11.2 versus 13.8 per-
cent), which is the reverse of the data cited by California. A proposal to deny pub-
lic services to illegal immigrants was killed in Florida in April 1995 based on op-
position from Cuban-American legislators. Instead, a commission was established
to study the issue.46
When Proposition 187 passed in California, there were predictions that the
sentiment embodied in this referendum would sweep across the country. There
were echoes of support in other states and at the federal level, but there also were
manifestations of opposition to this approach. The variety of state and locality
responses is a reflection of many distinct circumstances across the nation. Some of
these disparities are different economic situations among states and localities, unique
ethnic mixes, varying power relationships between Latinos and others, and non-
uniform perceptions of self-interest.
Nationals and Foreigners in Mexico
Immigration issues and immigration legislation have a radically different
significance in Mexico than they do in the United States. Mexico does not view
itself as a country of immigration. Immigrants in 20th century Mexico have been
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few in number and of marginal demographic significance. On a few occasions,
however, Mexico opened its doors to immigrants. This took place at the time of the
Spanish Civil War, before and during World War II, and in the 1970s and 1980s for
South and Central Americans. The 1990 census showed that less than 0.5 percent
of the national population is foreign-born, compared to 9 percent in the United
States (in 1995). Though few in number, foreigners traditionally have come with
capital and skills to Mexico, and therefore have had a salutory impact on the country’s
economy disproportionate to their number.
The Mexican Revolution of 1910 was in part a negative reaction to the enor-
mous concentration of land, industry and wealth in Mexico in the hands of a small
number of persons, many of them foreigners. The Constitution of 1917 and the
legislation adopted in later years reflected these concerns. The new legislation curbed
the property rights of foreigners. Mexico’s foreign policy at that time began to
promote the idea of noninterference in the domestic affairs of states and the doc-
trine that foreigners, as part of the condition of their admission, would have to
renounce the right to appeal to their home governments for support beyond the
rights already established under Mexican law.
Mexican legislation significantly curbed the right of foreigners to own real
property, especially along the coasts and near international boundaries; made it
difficult to naturalize; and established in the Constitution the right to deport for-
eigners for violations of Mexican law. Post-Revolution governments reversed the
pre-1910 policy of encouraging foreign immigration. These governments also were
disturbed by the growing emigration to the United States and the lack of popula-
tion of certain parts of Mexico and began to encourage the repatriation of Mexican
emigrants. The experiences of the late 19th and early 20th century turned Mexico
away from the promotion of immigration and toward coping with the growing flow
of nationals departing the country to the north.
Because Mexico is essentially a country of emigration of nationals rather than
of immigration of foreigners, much of what is important in migration laws and
policies relate to how nationality is defined and what are the rights of Mexican
nationals while traveling and in the border regions.
Under Mexico’s laws, all residents have freedom of movement within the ter-
ritory. Like many other countries, Mexico has formal requirements for the entrance
and departure of nationals and foreigners. (The United States, by contrast, does not
have formal departure requirements.) However, in practice, many of these formal
requirements are often ignored and are probably not enforceable, especially when
departures take place away from designated exit points. In any case, the constitu-
tional right to free transit has been interpreted to mean the right to leave the coun-
try, regardless of compliance with formal requirements. This interpretation has not
been tested in the Mexican courts. This interpretation was modified during the
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Bracero Program when the Mexican government made modest efforts to patrol its
side of the border to prevent unauthorized departures and again when it briefly
used armed force to prevent the unilateral recruitment of braceros by the United
States. The Mexican national consensus since the modest efforts during the Bracero
Program has been that the Constitution prevents the government from stopping the
departure of nationals from its territory.
In December 1996, Congress passed constitutional amendments often referred to
as “dual nationality,” whereby Mexicans who take another nationality at the time of
foreign naturalization do not automatically lose their Mexican nationality and citizen-
ship. As a result, once the amendments become effective, Mexican-born persons
naturalized as citizens of another country will no longer be treated as foreigners upon
their return to Mexico and their property rights and other rights will not suffer. (See
Volume 3, pages 1249 to 1250, on the unrenouncability of the Mexican nationality).
Immigration Law in Mexico
Mexico’s immigration law traditionally has been enacted within the frame-
work of what is termed “population law,” which includes policies designed to in-
fluence population dynamics, the promotion of settlement of sparsely populated
areas, and the distribution of Mexico’s resident population. Immigration is thus an
aspect of population policy and this approach underscores the view that Mexico is
more concerned with population growth and distribution than with the admission
of foreigners.
The current population law in Mexico dates from 1974, but this law has been
amended on several occasions, most recently in 1990, 1992 and 1996, to liberalize
the entry of certain categories of foreigners and to strengthen the penalties against
those who traffic in migrants.
A feature of Mexican immigration policy is that it gives priority to foreign
applicants who have needed skills from the standpoint of Mexico’s economic de-
velopment. Mexico is a country with a shortage of certain kinds of skilled workers,
and although immigration policy has not encouraged the recruitment of such workers,
it has given priority to their admission. In many instances, skilled immigrant work-
ers are required to certify that they will participate in the training of domestic
workers who wish to acquire these skills.
Another feature of Mexican immigration policy, and perhaps the most impor-
tant, is that the legislation indicates goals and priorities without specifying the
number or proportion of immigrants to be admitted under each category. Indeed,
Mexican immigration law gives great administrative discretion to the executive
branch to decide on a case-by-case basis whether particular decisions are consis-
tent with the overall policy goals.
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Like the United States, Mexico assigns a high priority to the admission of the
immediate relatives of Mexican nationals and resident immigrants. It appears that
the majority of the relatively small number of immigrants (inmigrantes e inmigrados)
admitted each year are essentially based on family reasons.
Immigration policy and practice has undergone subtle but important changes
since about 1980. The impetus for change came with the mass movement of Cen-
tral Americans into Mexico, especially near the southern border. Suddenly, Mexico
seemed to be not just a country of mass emigration, but also of substantial immi-
gration—at least of asylum seekers. Moreover, Mexico experienced the new situa-
tion of many foreigners entering illegally in order to proceed to the United States.
Mexico, therefore, modified its legislation and administrative procedures to deal
with these new circumstances by creating the category (calidad) of refugee (1990)
and increasing penalties for illegal trafficking in migrants in and out the country
(1990 and 1996).
Another event which provided stimulus for modifying immigration legislation
was the need to accommodate to the mobility of an open economy (and of NAFTA),
the influx of investment, and the provision of services. Mexican law was modified
(1992) to facilitate the entry of business visitors, investors, technicians, profes-
sionals, and others to conduct business in Mexico. Special facilities are given to
American and Canadian businesspersons to enter Mexico. In the year April 1994 to
April 1995, the number of U.S. and Canadian businesspersons entering the country
on a temporary basis (FMN) was a little more than 47,000, more than 95 percent
U.S. citizens.
Professionalization of Immigration
Administration in Mexico
The new circumstances of the past decade and a half, and the parallel decision
of the Mexican government to engage the United States more actively in migration
matters, have contributed to the increasing professionalization of the
administration of Mexican immigration policy. In 1993, the National Institute of
Migration was created. One of the main objectives of current migration policy is
to improve the services required by immigrants by simplifying regulations and
procedures, upgrading the quality of personnel, and strengthening the
administration, and the fostering a culture of service and probity.47 Thus, the
Secretaría de Gobernación, together with the National Commission for Human
Rights, has issued a brochure designed to prevent the violation of human rights
of migrants (Cartilla. Guía de Derechos Humanos para Migrantes). Indeed, it is
safe to assume that in shaping migratory behavior, Mexican authorities have in
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mind the probability of comparisons between what Mexico demands for its citizens
and the way Mexico treats its immigrants, be they authorized or unauthorized.
Other Actions to Encourage or Discourage Migration
Mexico
Discourage Migration: An Elusive Ambition
As a matter of principle, Mexico has not taken any action to encourage
migration. On the contrary, a traditional position is that emigration of nationals
is a loss to the country. Therefore, through the years, some actions can be listed
that had the purpose of discouraging migration. (Usually this is not the only, nor
the most important, purpose.) Most of these actions relate to the promotion of
economic development. It is commonly accepted that development is the best,
and only, long-term deterrent of mass emigration. All developmental actions are
obviously not related to migration. What it means is that since 1965 there have
been developmental measures whose goals included keeping would-be emigrants
within the national territory. This migratory consideration usually is a minor or
indirect one. Migration might play the role of safety valve, but not by design.
The Border Industrialization Program
This program, also known as the maquiladora program, encourages the es-
tablishment of in-bond plants to assemble imported components from the United
States to be then exported back. The program was established in 1965 precisely
after the termination of the Bracero Program with the intent of absorbing would-
be migrants. At the start, this program probably absorbed some local population.
The role of this program regarding the dynamics of Mexican migration to the
United States is a question that continues to be matter of debate. In any event, the
maquiladora program employed around three quarters of a million workers at the
end of 1996.
Economic Development in Origin Regions
After Mexico stopped seeking a renewal of a Bracero Program in the mid-
1970s, influential Mexican analysts proposed the establishment of special eco-
nomic development programs precisely in regions of origin of the migrants. The
purpose of these proposals was to keep people in their places of origin.48 The hope
was to obtain additional or special resources (from the outside) to be channeled to
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the emigration regions. These proposals never prospered. However, they show a
continuity in the Mexican attempts to discourage emigration.
NAFTA
One major action undertaken to discourage migration is NAFTA. Of course,
migration was not an overriding consideration to negotiate NAFTA. However, the
argument can be made that migratory considerations played a role in strengthening
the case for NAFTA. NAFTA is a development strategy that has a built-in, indirect
migratory effect—that price (wage) equalization would, eventually, discourage
emigration. This potential migratory effect—even if long term—was useful in “sell-
ing” NAFTA.49 NAFTA has provisions (chapter 16) to facilitate the mobility of
technical and business persons, but they are based on a different perspective. This
mobility is seen as associated or attached to the increased mobility of capital, ser-
vices and technology transfers.
United States
Worksite Verifications
The 1996 immigration legislation establishes three separate pilot programs to
confirm employment eligibility. Each has a duration of four years and is to be
conducted within a year of enactment of the law in at least five of the seven states
with the largest undocumented immigrant populations. Each program is voluntary
for most private employers (but not for the executive and legislative branches of
the federal government), but mandatory for job applicants.
The first, the basic pilot program, requires new employees to provide their Social
Security numbers and, for non-U.S. citizens, INS identifying information. Employ-
ers are required within three days of hire to use a toll-free confirmation system to
identify the employee’s work eligibility. The second, called the citizen attestation
pilot program, is permitted only in states where driver’s licenses and identification
cards have enhanced security features. This program is limited to 1,000 employers to
be chosen by the Attorney General. The third, the machine readable document pilot
program, is similar to the basic program except that the new employee presents a
machine-readable Social Security number and the employer’s inquiry is made through
a confirmation system using the machine-readable feature of the document. Nonciti-
zens must also provide their INS-issued numbers.
The ease with which documents could be forged was the Achilles’ heel of the
employer-penalty program under IRCA. The electronic verification pilots (or EVPs)
could be significant ultimately in deterring employment of illegal aliens, but not in
the short term. The new pilot programs are seen as an interim measure and depend
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on self-certification by the alien. Thus, an alien with a valid Social Security num-
ber who claims to be a U.S. citizen will not be detected. The joint electronic veri-
fication pilot (JEVP) with the Social Security Administration was put on hold in
the final immigration compromise.
The EVP is voluntary and, as of the end of February 1997, some 1,200 busi-
nesses were participating. They include meat packing in the midwest, poultry in
the Delaware-Maryland-Virginia area and Georgia, and about 75 hotels in South
Florida and San Diego. An interesting example among the volunteers is the North-
west Reforestation Contractors Association. Members of the Association claim that
many reforestation contractors working for either private timber companies or the
U.S. Forest Service and the Bureau of Land Management typically hire aliens ille-
gally in the United States to perform the work, permitting them to underbid those
contractors who do not, with no real danger of penalty even after IRCA. The group
stated that it tried to work out something with the U.S. government, including the
INS, in the years since IRCA, but with no concrete result. The problem was brought
to the attention of the Commission on Immigration Reform, and from there to the
INS, and the pilot program will include screening for unauthorized aliens on fed-
eral intensive-management contracts.
Nonimmigrant Visa Overstayers
The most recent INS estimate of the foreign population illegally in the United
States (released February 7, 1997) was five million as of October 1996, and grow-
ing by 275,000 people per year. Of the five million, the INS estimate was that 2.9
plus million (59 percent) entered the United States without inspection, and 2.1
million (41 percent) overstayed. The INS estimate was that 2.7 million of the five
million were Mexicans.
The INS response to reducing the population illegally in the United States
must thus have two separate components, prevention of entry at or near the border
and detection of people already in the United States either because they success-
fully evaded border deterrents or entered with valid visas and then abused the terms
of their permission. Extensive investigation to locate the latter is not considered
cost effective.
The INS makes a number of assumptions with respect to nonimmigrant visa
overstayers. Its February 1997 report states that of the 25 million persons admitted
as nonimmigrants in FY 1996, an estimated 98.5 percent will return home. The
INS believes that many of those who do not when the term of the visa expires have
a pattern of overstaying, returning home after a few years, and then repeating the
process. Many, the INS believes, return to work in particular activities in specific
locations, and increased inspections are to be conducted at these worksites.
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More important, under new procedures, a part of the I-94 form that
nonimmigrants must complete at entry will be stapled into the passport for surren-
der to the airline on departure. Depending on airline cooperation, this is intended
to facilitate discovery of overstayers. By means of an on-line system with U.S.
consulates, this information will be accessible when the person seeks a new visa.
About 60 percent of countries now have machine-readable passports that can be
checked at consulates. Armed with this information, the consular officer can than
take appropriate action, from a warning, to a fine, to visa refusal. This, as of now,
is the thinking about dealing with the visa overstayer problem.
The INS concern is not about overstays of a few days or a week, but rather a
pattern of overstaying for a year or more. The system of notifying the INS of over-
stays using the returned portion of the I-94 form will be tested at five busy airports,
with the cooperation of the airlines. This authority already exists in legislation.
Depending on the results, the program can be expanded later.
Labor Department
The Wage and Hour Division of the U.S. Department of Labor has responsi-
bility for enforcing a number of laws which establish standards for wages and
working conditions designed to protect low-wage workers. All these laws deal in-
directly with immigrant labor, and a number do so directly.
The Division’s major task is to insure compliance with the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act and this has implications for immigrant as well as national workers. The
Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act provides for registration
of farm labor contractors, proper maintenance and insurance for vehicles used to
transport migrant and seasonal farm workers, maintenance of healthful housing
and facilities for these workers, and prior disclosure to workers of employment
conditions and agreements. Under IRCA, the Wage and Hour Division was charged
with reviewing employer compliance with employment eligibility verification. The
Division has authority to inspect employer compliance with worker protections
under H-2A (temporary nonimmigrant agricultural workers), F-1 (foreign students),
H-1B (foreign specialty workers), and D (foreign crew members doing longshore
work) visa programs.
The Wage and Hour Division is working with the INS to coordinate enforce-
ment activities, including inspections, in specific industries that have been found
to violate immigration and labor laws (such as garment manufacture, janitorial
services and agriculture) in seven targeted deterrence zones (in California, Texas,
Arizona, New Jersey, New York, Florida and Illinois).
There are thus two lines of protection against hiring and/or exploiting workers
illegally in the United States, the employer-penalty program initiated by IRCA,
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and the enforcement efforts of the Labor Department which can uncover violations
of wage-and-hour laws that affect immigrants as well as nationals. The two can
work in tandem, as is now the practice in the targeted deterrence zones; but each
program has its limitations. Those of the worker-penalty program under the aegis
of the INS are discussed above.
The Wage and Hour Division is thinly staffed to carry out the tasks assigned
to it. Its budget authority permitted a staff of 1,289 full-time equivalents in FY
1996, which is lower than in any year of the last five. Enforcement actions com-
pleted were lower in FY 1996 than in any of the last 10 years. This means that the
Division cannot effectively carry out its responsibilities without substantial vol-
untary compliance. This need for voluntary compliance exists as well for the INS
in its enforcement of the employer-penalty program, including the new electronic
verification system pilot programs.
Reactions and Counter-Reactions
Cooperative Activities
The increased institutionalization of relations between Mexico and the United
States in the last few years has facilitated cooperation on migration matters. The
cooperation has dealt mainly with safety at the border, repatriation and education
of immigration officials.
Cooperation dealing with safety at the border consists mostly of sharing infor-
mation between various police and law enforcement agencies of the two countries,
strengthening the links between Mexican consular officers in the United States, and
prosecution of traffickers in migrants. The initiatives seek to achieve a safer border
and a more ordered repatriation process, including procedures to forewarn authori-
ties of the place and time of repatriation of undocumented immigrants at the border
and to carry out an internal repatriation program. The education activities include the
participation of Mexican officials in the Citizens Advisory Committees, mutual visits
between INS and INM personnel, including the teaching of courses on Mexican
culture by Mexican instructors to INS personnel and vice-versa.
Reactions to Unilateral Initiatives
Reactions to new initiatives can be quite important.
Increase in Naturalizations
A number of U.S. actions stimulated legal resident aliens from Mexico (and other
countries) to naturalize. These actions already have been discussed. They include
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Proposition 187, concern over what was seen as growing anti-immigrant sentiment
in the United States, and the removal of many benefits to noncitizens under the welfare
legislation. These measures led also to the conviction that the best way to combat
future actions of this nature was through empowerment at the ballot box, and a necessary
first step for this is U.S. citizenship. This reaction of Mexican Americans and other
Latinos had considerable impact on the 1996 elections and can have even more
profound implications for the direction of U.S. politics in the years to come.
More Mexicans were admitted as legal immigrants in the years 1970 through
1994 than any other nationality but, according to the INS, only 19 percent had
naturalized. This was one of the lowest percentages of naturalizations of any coun-
try. In U.S. fiscal year 1993, which antedates the passage of Proposition 187, the
number of Mexicans naturalized totaled 23,630. This figure jumped to 39,294 in
FY 1994, then to 67,277 in FY 1995, and a verified minimum of 232,702 in FY
1996. The impulse to naturalize has not been confined to Mexicans; the total num-
ber of application in FY 1995 was under one-half million, which jumped to 1.3
million in FY 1996, and is projected to exceed 1.8 million in FY 1997. The earlier
annual average was 300,000.50
INS Commissioner Doris Meissner has said she wished to activate the “N” in
the Immigration and Naturalization Service. The INS, consequently, set up a pro-
cedure to reduce the time to no more than six months from application to natural-
ization. This goal has since slipped to nine months or more. In any event, the INS
has been criticized for rushing naturalizations to influence the 1996 elections, a
charge vehemently denied.
English Language Usage
The use of Spanish in the United States grew as Latin Americans constituted
increasing proportions of legal immigration. During the 1980s, they represented
almost half the legal immigrants, followed in numbers by Asians. Affirmative ac-
tion programs, particularly under the stimulus of the Great Society in the 1960s,
led to bilingual education programs. The U.S. Supreme Court, in Lau v. Nichols,
ruled in 1974 that providing instruction only in English denied equal educational
access to children who do not speak English well.
There has been a reaction to this on two grounds—fear that the preeminence
of English in the United States would be diminished; and an opposite concern, that
the children themselves would be disadvantaged by an inadequate ability to speak,
read, and write English. Measures to designate English as the official language
have been passed in 23 states, and may arise at the federal level.51
On December 4, 1996, the U.S. Supreme Court heard a case that arose from a
constitutional amendment passed in Arizona in 1988 designating English as the official
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state language and requiring government workers to conduct state business only in
English. This was challenged by a state worker who often used Spanish in her job as
an insurance claims manager. As the case proceeded, the amendment was struck
down in the courts. Subsequently, the state employee who initiated the challenge left
her job and state officials decided not to defend the measure. However, the group that
had campaigned originally for the amendment, Arizonans for Official English, stepped
in to defend it. At the Supreme Court hearing, several justices raised questions as to
whether the case was moot, and in any event whether Arizonans for Official English
had any standing. Justice Anthony Kennedy told the attorney for the Arizona group:
“The voters didn’t give any authority to you.” The Supreme Court on March 3, 1997,
unanimously threw out earlier judgments on the grounds that the case was moot when
the employee left her job. The court also questioned whether Arizonans for Official
English could act as agents for people of Arizona.
Mexican Constitutional Change
Permitting Dual Nationality
As noted earlier, in December 1996, the Mexican Congress passed constitu-
tional changes that would allow Mexicans to keep their Mexican nationality even
though they opt for acquiring another. These changes took the form of making
Mexican nationality unrenounceable, except in specified circumstances. This Mexi-
can reaction complements earlier steps to provide information (although not en-
couragement) about the U.S. naturalization process.
The details of how dual nationality would work are still unclear. The key stated
motive was to permit Mexicans who naturalize in the United States to retain prop-
erty rights in Mexico. (See earlier discussion on the limits imposed on foreigners
to own property in Mexico under the 1917 Constitution.) It is unclear whether the
dual nationality would permit voting in Mexican elections. In practice, the deci-
sion on retaining Mexican nationality even as one naturalizes in another country is
for Mexico to make. Mexico is not unique among countries that do not require, or
do not recognize, renunciation of nationality; Great Britain, for example, does not
recognize the giving up of allegiance by its nationals.
The Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR) criticized the Mexi-
can action on the grounds that it would stimulate divided loyalties and undermine
assimilation of Mexican immigrants. FAIR said it would seek legislation to annul
U.S. citizenship of any person who exercises foreign citizenship.
Mexican Absentee Voting
The suggestion that Mexicans living outside the country be permitted to par-
ticipate in Mexican elections via absentee voting raises less emotional issues than
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those surrounding citizenship, but can lead to a negative reaction. The United States
cannot object in principle to absentee voting since it is practiced in U.S. states.
However, the sensitivity relates to the rallies and other campaign events at which
the Mexican flag is shown prominently. An issue was made of this type of display
by the group favoring Proposition 187 in California and this fact may have had
some influence in the final outcome.
Yet, it is hard to argue that Mexican nationals living in the United States should
be disenfranchised. The nub of this issue would seem to be the way absentee vot-
ing is handled, at least at the outset of the practice.
Mexican Use of Diplomatic Notes
In cases of incidents or specific actions, such as “Operation Hold the Line,” a
common Mexican reaction is the use of diplomatic notes, public protests or calls
for consultation. In many instances this is the end of the affair, without a reversal
of the triggering action. But in other instances, a process with cooperative ingredi-
ents follows.
The Changing Relationship
Relations between the Mexican and U.S. governments underwent a watershed
during the 1989-1993 period. This relationship evolved from a non-engagement
approach to a cooperative problem-solving problem attitude. For the first time in
the history of the bilateral relationship, both federal governments began to foster
and facilitate economic integration instead of repressing it. For Mexico, this repre-
sented a departure from the traditional defensive attitude, and the recognition of
economic interdependence; and for the United States it represented a less confron-
tational stance with its southern neighbor.
During the administrations of Carlos Salinas and George Bush, the two gov-
ernments devoted an extraordinary amount of attention to each other and sought to
institutionalize their inter-governmental affairs. The process of institutionalization
involved an increase in governmental contacts, the development of new rules gov-
erning U.S.-Mexico bilateral relations, and the creation of more effective consulta-
tive mechanisms. The empirical evidence that demonstrates this process of institu-
tionalization is indeed impressive. The number of officials involved in the bilateral
relationship increased dramatically. Almost every executive agency was drawn into
the relationship. The linkages between U.S. and Mexican governmental agencies
grew stronger and more direct; and contact between the agencies was increasingly
conducted independently of the State Department and the Foreign Affairs Ministry
in Mexico. Numerous cooperative and inter-institutional agreements were signed,
creating various official working groups and bilateral commissions, which were
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developed to support increased consultation. NAFTA alone has led to the creation
of 22 committees and working groups.
This formalization of the bilateral dialogue and consultation has also perme-
ated the migration agenda. During the last five years, there has been an upsurge of
mechanisms for dealing with the complicated immigration flow coming from
Mexico. The Working Group on Migration and Consular Affairs of the Binational
Commission exemplifies this tendency to formalize consultation. The Group was
created in 1987 as part of the Binational Commission. In 1992, it began to meet
independently of the Commission, and during the past two years has met eight
times. The highest level officials dealing with migration affairs participate in the
Group: the INS Commissioner, the Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs
at the State Department, and the Mexican Undersecretaries of Migration at the
Interior Ministry, and Bilateral Affairs at the Foreign Ministry, as well as more
than 20 officials from the two countries. The Group has become a useful mecha-
nism for bilateral dialogue and for coordinated efforts between the officials of both
countries. The proposal for this Binational Study was formalized at the first meet-
ing of the Working Group on Migration and Consular Affairs in Zacatecas, Mexico,
in February 1995.
Other examples of this trend toward the formalization of bilateral consultation
are the Border Liaison Mechanisms which, during the last three years, have in-
cluded Mexican participation in the Citizen’s Advisory Panel, and the Mechanism
of Consultation on the Activities of the INS and Consular Protection, created in
1996. In May, 1996, Secretary of Foreign Affairs José Angel Gurría, and Secretary
of State Warren Christopher signed a Memorandum of Understanding dealing with
the protection of the rights of Mexican nationals in the United States. The MOU
states seven principles and goals: First, to permanently include in the agenda of the
Bilateral Working Group on Migration and Consular Affairs of the Binational Com-
mission issues dealing with consular protection and human rights. Second, to no-
tify any individual detained by migration authorities of his/her rights and legal
alternatives, including the right to establish contact with his/her consular represen-
tative. Third, to facilitate communication between consular representatives and
detained individuals. Fourth, to facilitate the presence of consular officials in judi-
cial proceedings. Fifth, to bring to the attention of the Working Group on Migra-
tion and Consular Affairs reports on human rights written by the Border Liaison
Mechanism, and the Mechanism of Consultation on the Activities of the INS and
Consular Protection. Sixth, to promote transcultural understanding. Seventh, to
promote high-level cooperation to facilitate the investigation of violent incidents
related to consular protection.
Mexico has experienced profound changes in its economic and political structure
during the past 15 years and these have affected relations with the United States.
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These attitudinal changes in Mexico had a significant impact on U.S. thinking as
well, drawing the United States closer to Mexico in its policies. These changes are
also visible in the Joint Statement on Immigration signed by the two Presidents in
May 1997. All is not sweetness and light, as the March 1997 drug certification
conflict demonstrated, but even there a compromise acceptable to both nations was
worked out.
NAFTA and Institutional Building
The changes in the Mexico-U.S. relationship during the past decade and a half
have been breathtaking. The most important change is the entry into force of NAFTA
on January 1, 1994. Regardless of one’s opinion on the desirability of NAFTA, it is
clearly an important agreement, probably the most important between the two coun-
tries in this century. Its significance transcends economic integration as such, as
important as this is, because it forces greater cooperation than had existed earlier
on other matters as well.
Mexico and the United States, as the title of Alan Riding’s book put it, were
“distant neighbors” for many years.52 Mexican foreign policy emphasized inde-
pendence from the United States. This showed up in secondary ways, such as op-
posing U.S. initiatives in international organizations; Mexico voted consistently in
opposition to the United States in the United Nations General Assembly. On more
profound matters, such as limiting foreign direct investment, Mexican policy was
designed primarily to favor nationals over foreigners, but also to limit U.S. influ-
ence. The goods and services excluded under Mexico’s import-substitution policy,
to the extent that imports were less than they might otherwise have been, were
primarily from the United States.53 This also meant that Mexico exported less of its
goods to the United States than it later did under a policy that emphasized more
competitive industry.
Mexico, before the unilateral tariff reductions made prior to NAFTA, exported
few manufactured goods. Today, manufactures dominate Mexico’s exports. Mexico
looked within the country for its economic growth before the changes that began
in the 1980s. The domestic market is still more important than the export market,
but not as overwhelmingly as before. Mexico’s macroeconomic economic recov-
ery in 1996 was largely export-led. About 80 percent of Mexico’s exports now go
to the United States. Merchandise exports are now equal to about 30 percent of
GDP, which means that exports to the United States now represent some 25 per-
cent of GDP.
The majority of manufactured exports are intra-industry in nature, and much
of this is intra-firm. Increasing amounts of total trade are in intermediate products
which serve as inputs for further production in the other country. The intra-firm
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trade is evidence of much co-production, of parts produced in one country for
assembly or further processing in the other.
NAFTA represented a conscious policy by Mexico to take advantage of the
large U.S. market next door. It was predicated also on the desire to attract foreign
direct investment, and traditionally two-thirds of this came from the United States.
The cooperative economic relationship could not succeed unless the political rela-
tionship also became closer, and this has occurred. This does not mean that all
differences have been eliminated, but rather that differences are not sought out for
their own sake.
These changes in economic relations and political interactions are likely to
become more solid with the passage of time and the entrenchment of vested inter-
ests in production and trade in the two countries. Durability depends also on the
construction of institutions and these have flourished since NAFTA. As noted above,
the once formal intergovernmental relations have become more flexible. The Mexi-
can authorities now lobby in the United States, which they did not prior to the
NAFTA negotiating process. The Mexican government no longer operates solely
via its Secretariat for Foreign Relations (SRE) communicating with the State De-
partment, but rather across the spectrum of U.S. public and private agencies and
the Congress. On migration, it is worth noting the participation of the Secretariat
for Government Affairs (Gobernación). Counterparts from the two countries com-
municate directly by telephone, fax, and e-mail, when earlier everything went through
the SRE.
This greater intimacy permits easier communication on most subjects, from
drug trafficking to labor and environmental relations. Increased dialogue on immi-
gration matters also stems from a combination of this new institutional flourishing
and the Mexican concern over the anti-immigrant sentiment reflected in Proposi-
tion 187, and the expectation that the United States was becoming more serious in
preventing entry over the border without documents. The principal fruits of this
dialogue have been greater attention on protecting the rights of Mexicans, legal
and otherwise in the United States.
The increased closeness of the economic relationship and its salience for Mexi-
can economic recovery and growth also meant that it became important to handle
other problems in a way that avoids prejudice to economic cooperation. This was
one basis of the shift from political distancing to greater dialogue. It has also meant
that when migration incidents flare up, as they did in Riverside County in 1996,
the Mexican authorities prefer to handle these calmly. The Mexican media reacted—
overreacted—harshly to the two incidents in Riverside County, but the govern-
ment sought correctives. The language used domestically to calm the political fu-
ror was stronger than the action taken bilaterally with the United States, which was
designed to find satisfactory solutions looking to the future.
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The greater intimacy has not eliminated all conflict. Trade disputes still arise—
as one would expect from increased trade. The contentious issue of certifying Mexico
for cooperating with the United States to combat drug trafficking which President
Clinton did as of March 1, 1997, brought out long simmering differences and this
issue has the potential of limiting cooperation between the two countries on other
issues as well. There is still considerable opposition to NAFTA in both countries,
and this could lead to serious misunderstandings. History has not been erased by
recent bilateral interactions, but a cooperative layer has been superimposed on old
mistrusts.
Immigration Provisions of NAFTA
Immigration is not dealt with in NAFTA except for temporary business visi-
tors, but the relationships spawned by the agreement have their effects on the bilat-
eral immigration relationship. This binational report would not have been possible
in the pre-NAFTA period, but it is not remarkable today. The immigration relation-
ship is not a rose garden—the asymmetry makes this impossible for now—but the
dialogue is civilized.
Chapter 16 of NAFTA permits the entry into each of the three member countries
of business persons and technicians from the other two. For the United States,
this temporary entry extends to a number of categories of business visitors (B-1);
traders (E-1); investors (E-2); intracompany transferees (L-1); and professionals
(TN). The TN category (Trade NAFTA) is available only for citizens of Canada
and Mexico who meet certain educational and experience requirements. A TN
visa is issued for one year and there are no limits on the number of allowable
extensions.
A transitional annual limit of 5,500 was established for Mexican professionals
who can enter the United States under the TN category. There is no limit on Cana-
dian TN professionals. The limit can be increased by mutual agreement between
Mexico and the United States and will expire in 2003, unless the two countries
agree to eliminate it earlier. Canadian TN professionals remain exempt from the
TN visa requirement (that is, they can show up for admission and be admitted),
whereas Mexicans must first obtain a visa. The reason for the disparate treatment
of Mexicans and Canadians apparently was based on lesser experience with Mexi-
can TN professionals and the desire to let the number build up on a gradual basis.
If need be, Mexican professionals can still enter under the H-1B category, for which
there is a worldwide limit of 65,000, if this limit has not been breached. Mexico
has tried, without success thus far, to get a freer regime, including permits for
those accompanying the business persons admitted to the United States under
NAFTA chapter 16.
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Tension between Free Trade
and Immigration Restrictions
The current situation is that goods and services can pass more or less freely
across the Mexican-U.S. border, as can capital, but not labor. The reminder is
needed that NAFTA is a free-trade area and not a common market within which
all factors can move freely. Mexico, in the buildup to the NAFTA negotiations,
raised the issue of labor inclusion more broadly than in chapter 16, but this was
rejected by the United States on the grounds that this would not be accepted by
the Congress.
Does the disparate treatment of goods, services, and capital, as distinct from
labor, augment the tension that exists in any event on the immigration issue? The
argument that it does is made on the theoretical ground that if one factor (capital)
can move freely, then the other (labor) should be able to do so as well. This, how-
ever, may be more of a debating point than a solid argument. People are different
from capital, even if one can partially substitute for the other. Trade can also be a
partial substitute for the movement of people.
The argument that the tension on immigration is not heightened by NAFTA is
that free movement of goods, services, and capital can ease the pressure on labor
migration, at least over time.
In any event, the idea of completely free movement of people between the
two countries is moot, certainly for now. There are proposals from time to time
for a guest-worker program with Mexico for the admission of less-skilled work-
ers; a modest one exists between Canada and Mexico. Such proposals are moti-
vated not by the theoretical argument for equal treatment of all factors, but rather
the inability of Mexico to control emigration and of the United States to com-
pletely seal the border.
Conclusions
The basis for each conclusion is contained in the previous discussion.
Episodic Nature of U.S. Responses
Responses to curtail unauthorized immigration are episodic, most intense when
the U.S. economy, or the economy of California because of its importance as an
immigrant-receiving state, or the economy of Mexico, falters. Historically, the
intensity of the anti-immigrant effort has diminished as economic conditions im-
proved. This suggests that changes in immigration practices may be more fea-
sible when the two economies are prospering and tensions are minimal.
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Official Action and Effectiveness of
Immigration-Restriction in Practice
In the past, official U.S. responses to deal with the inflow of unauthorized
immigrants were consciously riddled with loopholes or not carried out with vigor.
The Texas Proviso was the classic example of this. More recently, the employer-
penalty provisions of IRCA were compromised at the outset by failure to have an
effective way to identify persons entitled to work in the United States, and then
further weakened by lax enforcement. It remains to be seen whether the current
efforts to deter illegal immigration will be more durable than in the past and if they
will be pursued more vigorously.
Mexican Engagement
One new element for dealing with the illegal-immigrant inflow into the United
States is the shift in the Mexican position from a “no-policy” policy, or deliberate
non-engagement, to a stance of increasing engagement with U.S. counterparts. The
ultimate effect of this engagement is hard to forecast because the Mexican priority
is to protect the rights of its nationals in the United States, while that of the United
States is for the Mexican authorities to actively deter the unauthorized movement
of persons. Each side has responded to some extent to the priorities of the other.
The U.S.-Mexico Memorandum of Understanding of May 1996 provides improved
assurance of humane treatment of Mexican migrants in the United States; and
Mexican legislation to more severely punish nationals who traffic in unauthorized
migrant movement has a direct deterrent motive. However, these actions, as useful
as they are symbolically, are unlikely to have much effect on unauthorized migrant
movement over the border.
Greater Role for State and Local Authorities
Because immigration is a federal responsibility in both countries, most bilat-
eral discussion takes place at this level. However, the impacts of migration are felt
primarily at state and local levels. In addition, many of the issues affected by mi-
gration, such as welfare in the United States and education in Mexico, are being
devolved increasingly to state and local levels. State border governors from the
two countries meet regularly. These considerations lead to the conclusion that it
may be useful to bring state and local authorities more actively into bilateral immi-
gration discussions.
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The Role of Nongovernmental Organizations
These groups have increased their activity. Proposition 187 was stimulated by
an NGO initiative, although it obviously received considerable official stimulus
from the support of Pete Wilson, the governor of California. The constitutional
case against Proposition 187 was led by the American Civil Liberties Union. Many
U.S. NGOs were involved in the debate on welfare and immigration legislation.
Mexican NGOs pressed their government to be more vigorous in protecting hu-
man rights of Mexican nationals in the United States.
Interplay between Economic Integration/
Political Cooperation and Immigration Control
The negotiations for and then the entry into effect of NAFTA changed the
context of Mexican-U.S. relations. What earlier had been a distant relationship,
with few institutionalized links, was transformed into a bilateral partnership re-
plete with public and private institutional contacts. NAFTA also forced a more
cooperative political relationship in order to avoid contamination of the increased
economic interaction by political disputes.
The recent trend towards the institutionalization of relations between the Mexi-
can and the U.S. governments has also permeated the migration issue area. In the
last five years, there has been an upsurge of initiatives to formalize the bilateral
dialogue and consultation on migration between Mexican and U.S. officials. It is
still early to assess the effectiveness of this bilateralism for preventing or solving
migration disputes. It is noteworthy, nevertheless, that this trend occurred in a pe-
riod of intense immigration debate in the United States, and when the mood of the
nation has apparently become less receptive to immigrants.
While the bilateral engagement on migration issues began before NAFTA went
into effect, cooperation on this issue also picked up after NAFTA. Mexico’s deci-
sion to engage in dialogue on migration matters is likely to increase the pressure
on its government to become more active in the day-to-day administration of these
issues.
Border Opening for Commerce and
Investment But Not People
Because of NAFTA, the importance of the U.S.-Mexican border is diminishing
for the flow of goods, services, and capital. In addition, measures have been taken
by the United States to facilitate legal human flows across the border. By contrast,
the United States simultaneously is increasing its efforts to control unauthorized
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entry across the border. This has the potential for increasing binational tensions, as
highly publicized incidents of the effects of this greater surveillance occur, such as
those in Riverside County, California, in 1996. This tension between opening for
commerce and investment and closing for unauthorized border crossing is unlikely
to disappear in the near future and the policy task is to minimize the inherent friction.
Human Rights Protection
The Mexican government continues to emphasize a traditional preoccupation
with violations of the human rights of its nationals in the United States, particu-
larly when instances of violence associated with the activities of U.S. law enforce-
ment bodies come to light. Successive Mexican administrations have strengthened
the network of consulates in the United States and have made these the forward
arm of policy to protect the human rights of Mexican nationals. At the federal
level, the U.S. government has been more sensitive to the Mexican demands for
human rights protection. Much of the increased binational dialogue on migration
issues deals with this theme.
Sensitivity Training
Violations of the human rights of Mexicans in the United States are likely to
receive much media attention in Mexico and damage the bilateral relationship.
Sensitivity training of U.S. immigration and police officials to minimize such inci-
dents is thus a good investment.
Immigrant Access to Social Services
Recent political trends in the United States have been running in the direction
of excluding immigrants, authorized or not, from receiving tax-supported social
services. Examples of this tendency include Proposition 187 and provisions of
both the welfare and immigration legislation of 1996. Proposition 187, because it
was seen in Mexico as being directed against Mexican nationals, led to consider-
able tension between federal officials in Mexico and state officials in California.
Internally, in the United States, what were seen as anti-immigrant actions and cur-
tailment of benefits to legal, noncitizen residents have led to increased naturaliza-
tions and political organizing among legal residents, Mexican and otherwise.
Unintended Consequences
Unintended consequences of legislation and other actions on immigration are
legion. Perhaps the best example of this was the 1965 immigration act, whose
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main purpose was to abolish the national-origins quotas and the Asia-Pacific Triangle,
but not to radically alter immigration volumes and patterns. The law, in fact, did
bring about a fundamental shift in immigration patterns in favor of family unification,
led to the dominance of Latin Americans and Asians in U.S. legal immigration,
and, because of the generous subsequent response to the post-1965 refugee crisis,
resulted in a substantial increase in immigrant numbers.54
Termination of the Bracero Program in 1964 stimulated Mexico’s border in-
dustrialization program and, over time, attracted many people to Mexico’s north-
ern border and, presumably, increased the ability to emigrate to the United States.
The legalization provisions of IRCA have led to many immigrant applications for
family reunification and have complicated dealing with the backlog of legal immi-
grant cases. Termination of many welfare benefits to legal immigrants stimulated
the pace of naturalizations and voter registrations, which altered the outcomes of a
number of political contests in 1996 in favor of Democratic candidates and may
determine the political alignment of many Mexican Americans in the future. Mak-
ing undocumented border crossing more difficult could lead many who succeed in
making it across to stay put in the United States rather than return to Mexico after
they complete seasonal jobs.
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QUANTIFICATION OF MIGRATION
Estimating Unauthorized Mexican
Migration to the United States:
Issues and Results
Jennifer Van Hook & Frank D. Bean
Issues in Estimating Unauthorized
Migration to the United States
Estimates of the size and the growth of the unauthorized migrant populationin the United Status have important and far-reaching public policyimplications. Such estimates influence assessments of the impact of
unauthorized migrants on local labor markets, public welfare resources, school
enrollments, and demand for health services. The size of this clandestine population
also affects evaluations of U.S. immigration laws, border enforcement policies and
the future impact of U.S. immigration and naturalization law. For instance, reliable
estimates made during the early 1980s of the unauthorized population helped to
predict the likely number of persons seeking legalization under the provisions of
the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) (GAO, 1993; Passel and Woodrow,
1987). Nevertheless, the unauthorized migrant population is difficult to measure
directly. Data obtained from survey items about legal status may be highly
questionable if not worthless because unauthorized migrants wishing to escape
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detection may be unlikely to reveal their status in interviews and/or questionnaires.
However, indirect demographic methods for estimating the unauthorized migrant
population have been developed and refined over the past twenty years. These
efforts have, for the most part, yielded increasingly reliable estimates.
Our purpose is to provide an overview of the best analytical approaches and
estimates of the stock and flow of the unauthorized Mexican migrant population
from the late 1970s to the present. In doing so, we describe the prevailing methods
used for estimating the unauthorized migrant population, including the unautho-
rized Mexican migrant population, during the late 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. We
thus show how the methodology and data used for making estimates of the stock
and flow of the unauthorized migrant population in the United States in general
and the unauthorized Mexican migrant population in particular have changed over
the past two decades. We highlight how these changes have led to improvements
and, in some cases, to increased inaccuracy associated with estimates of particular
components of the unauthorized population. We do not review every individual
estimate of the unauthorized Mexican migrant population because many studies
have already been summarized and evaluated competently in other reviews (Keely,
1977; Briggs, 1984; Siegel, et al., 1980; Hill, 1985; Bean, King, and Passel, 1986;
Bean, Telles, and Lowell, 1987; Edmonston, Passel, and Bean, 1990; Passel, Bean,
and Edmonston, 1990; Durand and Massey, 1992; GAO, 1993; Clark, et al., 1994).
Rather, we summarize and assess the conclusions of these reviews and describe
individual studies where appropriate.
This report is divided into five sections. First, we introduce concepts and de-
fine the terms that influence both the selection of approaches to estimation and the
interpretation of results that have emerged from various estimating procedures.
Second, in order to assess their methodologies and results, we review the approaches
to estimation of the stock of unauthorized Mexican migrants that have been used
since the late 1970s. Third, we conduct a similar assessment for estimates of flows.
Fourth, we introduce and discuss several issues whose lack of satisfactory resolu-
tion has plagued the conclusiveness and interpretation of the results of almost all
estimation approaches. Fifth, given the information and considerations introduced,
we briefly summarize the results of the estimates and present, based on the most
recent data available, what we think the most satisfactory figures are for the size of
the unauthorized Mexican population as of mid-1996.
Concepts and Definitions
An unauthorized migrant is a person who resides in the United States but is
not a U.S. citizen or permanent resident alien or authorized visitor. Various terms
have been used for identifying unauthorized migrants, including undocumented,
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illegal, or unauthorized immigrant, alien, or migrant, each of which has a slightly
different meaning and connotation. We use the term “unauthorized migrant” be-
cause it is most inclusive of the population we here attempt to describe. Not all
unauthorized migrants are undocumented; some arrive in the U.S. with legal docu-
ments but later either stay beyond the expiration date of their visa or otherwise fail
to comply with the terms of their entry (such as persons who legally cross the
border with border crossing cards but do so to work, which violates the terms of
the card). Also, not all unauthorized migrants are immigrants; many are temporary
migrants who intend to and do in fact return to their countries of origin within
reasonably short periods of time.
The types of data available and the methodology used to obtain estimates of
the unauthorized migrant population sometimes depend on the route through which
unauthorized status was attained. There are several ways to become an unautho-
rized migrant. These include entering without inspection, using fraudulent docu-
mentation, or violating the terms of border crossing cards. All violators of these
types end up in a category the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) calls
entrants without inspection (EWIs). Another way involves entering legally as a
nonimmigrant but subsequently violating the terms of the entrance visa or other
terms of entry (usually through failing to leave the U.S. by the time the visa ex-
pires). These are often called “visa overstayers.” Still another way involves enter-
ing as a legal resident alien but subsequently violating the terms of entry (e.g.,
through committing a criminal act or using a fraudulent marriage as a basis for
entry). Most studies that attempt to estimate unauthorized migrants separately by
type of entry focus on the two largest of these groups, EWIs and visa overstayers.
The data and methodology used to estimate the unauthorized Mexican migrant
population also depend on whether the estimate refers to the stock of the population
or the flow of the migratory stream. Stock refers to the size of the population at a
particular point in time. Flow refers to the number of entrances into (in-flow) and
exits from (out-flow) the population during a given time period. Most estimates of
the volume of the migratory flow have focused on in-flow. In-flow in turn may be
subdivided into gross in-flow and net in-flow. Gross in-flow is the total number of
entrances made during a given time period whereas net in-flow is the number of
persons entering during a given time period. Because an individual may enter the
country as an unauthorized migrant more than once in a single time period, net in-
flow is almost by definition smaller than gross in-flow. In contrast to in-flow,
relatively little attention has been paid to the size and components of the out-flow
of unauthorized migrants. Persons may exit unauthorized status through death,
emigration, deportation, or legalization. Out-flow is a critical component because
the majority of entrances are offset by exits, as indicated by estimates of net flow.
Observers who fail to account for out-flow risk highly exaggerated estimates of the
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rate of growth of the unauthorized migrant population. More attention has been
paid to estimating net flow (in-flow minus out-flow). Net flow has typically been
estimated as the change in stock as it is estimated at two or more points in time
(Passel and Woodrow, 1987; Woodrow, Passel, and Warren, 1987).
Another conceptualization which is related to the idea of stocks and flows but
is analytically distinct is the notion of temporary or permanent migrants, or so-
journers and settlers, to use the more sociological distinction (Bean, Vernez, and
Keely, 1989; Chavez, 1988). Here the reference is to the duration of stay in the
destination country, but especially to the migrant’s intended duration of stay (Rob-
erts, 1995). Such intentions have consequences because the kinds of immigration
and settlement policies that might be invoked in the cases of temporary and perma-
nent migrants are not necessarily the same (e.g., see Passel, 1986). Further compli-
cating the situation is that many temporary migrants undergo a transition to perma-
nent migrants over time. Apart from their sociological and policy significance,
temporary and permanent migrants may be thought to differ only in duration of
stay. At any point in time, estimates of the “stock” of Mexican migrants will in-
clude both permanent and temporary migrants, the latter of whom we would ex-
pect disproportionately to return to Mexico within short periods of time. From a
strictly temporal point of view, of course, the only distinction between these kinds
of migrants is their length of stay in the United States. One of the challenges facing
the estimation of stocks and flows of migrants, as we note below, is to develop
more complete information on the duration of stay distribution of migrants, espe-
cially by sex, age at migration, and mode of entry. If such information were avail-
able, it would be relatively straightforward to develop estimates of stocks and flows
of migrants. Of course, the sociological differences (and their attendant policy
implications) between migrants who intend short or long durations of stay would
nonetheless remain significant.
Based on the distinctions of mode-of-entry (EWI vs. overstayer) and of
intended duration of stay, we may construct a four-fold classification of
unauthorized entrants (see Figure 1). The groups represented by the boxes (bottom
row) in this classification are important because they have implications for policy.
Much of the historical and current debate in the United States about unauthorized
migration derives from differences in perceptions about which of these categories
dominates the flow of migrants, thus affecting growth in the stock of unauthorized
migrants. During the 1970s, for example, many observers confused the concepts
of stock and flow, mistaking evidence about large numbers of entrances for a
sizable stock of migrants. In effect, their error was to assume that permanent
EWIs substantially predominated over temporary EWIs, when at that point in
time just the opposite was true. Now immigration analysts debate the relative
importance of the EWI versus the overstayer flow, a debate that is not likely to
515
be resolved until we can ascertain the relative size of the temporary versus
permanent (or short-term versus long-term) component of each flow. Thus, if
virtually all visa overstayers were found to return to their countries of origin
within a couple of years of violating the terms of their visa, estimates of the
stock of overstayers would consist primarily of temporary migrants, however
numerous such persons might be at a given moment in time. This scenario would
have different policy implications than one in which visa overstayers were
generating large numbers of permanent migrants.
Approaches to the Estimation of the Stock
Speculative Estimates
Early efforts to determine the size of the total unauthorized migrant population
produced results that were highly speculative, ranged widely, and were usually
much higher than analytic estimates (Keely, 1977; Siegel, et al., 1980). Based on a
series of “educated guesses” in relation to the number of INS apprehensions of
unauthorized migrants, INS Commissioner Farrell (1972) testified that the total
unauthorized population exceeded one million in 1972. Three years later, INS
Commissioner Chapman (1975) raised Farrell’s estimate to 4 to 12 million largely
in an effort to create a public issue about unauthorized migrants and to increase
federal funding for the INS (Keely, 1977). Subsequent speculative estimates put
the unauthorized population at 8.2 million (Lesko Associates, 1975), 6 million
(Chapman, 1976), and 3 to 6 million (Castillo, 1978). Despite improvements in
methodology, which produced lower and increasingly reliable appraisals of the
size of the unauthorized population, speculative estimates continued to drive the
debate about unauthorized immigration as it was played out in the media as well as
in Congressional hearings during the 1980s (Bean, Telles, and Lowell, 1987). As
Unauthorized Entrants
EWIs Visa Overstayers
Permanent Temporary Permanent Temporary
EWIs EWIs Visa Overstayers Visa Overstayers
Figure 1. Analytic Typology of Kinds of Unauthorized Entrants
Based on Mode of Entry and Intended Duration of Stay
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recently as the mid-1980s, Corwin (1982) asserted, based primarily on conjecture,
that the Mexican unauthorized migrant population was as large as 8 to 10 million,
and Huddle, et al. (1985) selected the middle of Corwin’s range as their best estimate.
Early Analytic Estimates
Despite methodological difficulties and persistently large ranges, early ana-
lytic studies produced estimates of stock that failed to support the speculative as-
sertions that there were more than 6 million unauthorized migrants in the country.
One salient characteristic about the analytic studies of the size of the unauthorized
population conducted during the 1970s is that they developed a wide variety of
estimation techniques and often made creative use of available data. We list these
studies in Table 1. Early analytic estimates of the total unauthorized migrant popu-
lation were based on a variety of U.S. data sources. For example, Korns (1977)
compared CPS employment data with the Labor Department’s payroll survey mea-
sure of employment. By assuming that unauthorized migrants are not included in
the CPS data but are present in the payroll data, he concluded that the number of
unauthorized workers grew by 2 million between 1965 and 1969, but did not in-
crease substantially during the 1970s.
Using a more statistically sophisticated approach, Lancaster and Scheuren
(1977) matched CPS, IRS, and Social Security records of persons age 18-44 in
1973, and, using a log-linear technique, estimated the number of persons not rep-
resented in any of the three data sources. Finally, they compared the sum of the
those estimated to be both in and out of the three data sources with the total esti-
mated from the 1970 Census. On the assumption that no unauthorized migrants
were enumerated in the 1970 Census—an assumption that has been supported by
Census Bureau researchers (Fay, Passel, and Robinson, 1988)—they interpreted
the differential as the number of resident unauthorized migrants age 18 to 44. Due
to uncertainties associated with the data and the log-linear estimation technique,
their estimate ranged from 2.9 to 5.7 million. Robinson (1980) used U.S. death
statistics to estimate the male unauthorized population age 20-44 in 1975. Robinson
assumed that most deaths to unauthorized migrants are registered in U.S. vital
statistics, but that few or no unauthorized migrants are included in the 1970 cen-
sus. Then, in areas where large unauthorized migrant populations were assumed to
concentrate, death rates that were higher than other parts of the country were inter-
preted as due to “excess deaths” to unauthorized migrants. Robinson’s “compos-
ite” estimates ranged between 2.6 and 3.2 million, but his more conservative esti-
mates, which allowed for a broader range of underlying assumptions, ranged widely
from 0.6 to 4.7 million. The validity of estimates produced by this method was
severely weakened because death rates and patterns in cause of death among the
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unauthorized population were and remain unknown. Also, Robinson’s estimates
lacked precision because death records contained no information on place of birth
until 1983 (GAO, 1993).
Early estimates of the Mexican unauthorized population relied on Mexican
census or survey data. Goldberg (1974), using 1960 and 1970 Mexican census
data, projected forward the Mexican 1960 population to 1970 by adding births and
subtracting deaths and known legal emigration from Mexico to the United States.
The difference between the 1970 census population and the projected population—
about 1.6 million—was taken as an estimate of the size of the U.S. resident Mexi-
can unauthorized population in 1970. One problem with Goldberg’s estimate is
that its underlying assumption—that the coverage of the Mexican Census remained
the same from 1960 to 1970—cannot be substantiated. This is important because
small differences in coverage can lead to large differences in the final estimate
(Siegel, et al., 1980).
Another set of estimates were based on Mexican survey data collected by the
Mexican Government (CENIET). These surveys were more successful at describ-
ing the sojourner than the settler population among Mexican emigrants to the United
States. Garcia y Griego (1979; 1980) used migration histories collected from a
small sample of Mexican male migrants to estimate that 0.5 to 1.2 million unau-
thorized Mexican workers resided in the United States in 1977 and 1978. Zazueta
and Corona (1979) and Zazueta (1982) relied on data obtained from Mexico’s
National Survey of Emigration, which asked households about members age 15
and older who were either working or looking for work in the United Status. They
estimated that 400,000-500,000 Mexican workers lived in the U.S. around 1978
and 1979, 90 percent of whom were unauthorized. This estimate has been criti-
cized as being too low, not because it is implausible for the population it describes
(Durand and Massey, 1992), but because it does not include children, adult depen-
dents, or those who do not have household members living in Mexico (Siegel, et
al., 1980). Finally, Diez Canedo (1984) estimated that 481,000 Mexican workers
were living in the United States in 1975. This estimate was made by calculating the
total remittances sent from the U.S. to Mexico and dividing by the estimated aver-
age remittance made by migrant workers to their households in Mexico. This esti-
mate is similar to that produced by Zazueta and Corona (1979) and Zazueta (1982),
most likely because it describes a similar population, namely Mexican workers in
the United States who maintain linkages to households in Mexico.
Stock Estimates Based on Residual Methods
Estimates of the size and growth of the unauthorized migrant population in the
late 1980s and 1990s attempted to address some of the shortcomings of previous
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work. During the 1980s, the majority of these new studies employed a residual
method of one form or another. Residual methods provide an estimate and description
of the “enumerated” unauthorized migrant population, that is, the part of the
unauthorized population that is enumerated in the Census or represented in a sample
such as the Current Population Survey (CPS) (the unenumerated portion of the
population must be estimated by other means, as we discuss below). The enumerated
unauthorized population is estimated as the difference between the non-citizen
population enumerated in the Census or the CPS and the legally resident alien
population (enumerated non-citizens—legally resident aliens = enumerated
unauthorized resident migrants). This computation may be done separately by
national origin, period of entry, age, sex, and, depending on the level of detail
available in estimates of the legal population, by state and metropolitan area. Hence,
a substantial amount of information about the enumerated unauthorized migrant
population may be produced by residual methods. Studies that use a residual method
are listed in Table 2. Most of these studies were conducted by the Bureau of the
Census. Except in the case of Heer (1979) and Warren (1982), residual methods
were generally not employed with data collected prior to the 1980s because the
1980 Census was the first decennial census in which a sizable enumerated
unauthorized migrant population could be detected through demographic analysis
(Fay, Passel, and Robinson, 1988).
Residual estimates of the enumerated unauthorized population are highly sen-
sitive to estimates of their two components, the enumerated non-citizen and the
legally resident alien populations. In the series of residual estimates made by Cen-
sus Bureau researchers, the enumerated non-citizen component was routinely ad-
justed for errors associated with respondents not reporting country of birth,
misreporting citizenship status, and misreporting nativity. The task of approximat-
ing the number of legally resident non-citizens presented greater difficulties. Be-
cause respondents are not asked about legal status in the Census or the CPS, esti-
mates of the legally resident alien population must be obtained from external sources.
Due to changes in the external data sources available and changes in the legal
population brought about by the IRCA amnesty program, three different methods
have been developed to estimate the size and composition of the legal immigrant
population. We discuss each of these below.
The first relies on data obtained from the Alien Registration Program (form
I-53) by the INS. We refer to residual methods that uses the I-53 data as Residual
Method 1. Until 1981, the INS annually collected data on residence and other items
from legally resident non-citizens. Because of the discontinuation of the Alien
Registration Program after 1981, the only studies that have used Residual Method
1 include an analysis of the 1980 Census (Passel and Woodrow, 1984; Warren and
Passel, 1984, 1987; Passel, 1985b) or CPS data pertaining to a year prior to 1980
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(Heer, 1979; Warren, 1982). These studies found that about 2.057 million
unauthorized migrants and 1.131 million unauthorized Mexican migrants were
enumerated in the 1980 Census. The unauthorized population in the Census included
more women and children than indicated in apprehensions and Mexican migrant
history data. Because residual methods probably identify settlers better than
sojourners and commuters, this suggests that the settled part of the unauthorized
population includes a greater proportion of families and children than does the
commuter and sojourner portions of the unauthorized population (Warren and Passel,
1987, see also Muller and Espenshade, 1985).
One problem associated with Residual Method 1 is that about 11 percent of
legal immigrants were found to be missing from the I-53 data. Therefore, estimates
of the legal alien population had to be carefully adjusted for undercoverage (War-
ren and Passel, 1984; 1987). Another difficulty associated with Residual Method 1
is that it makes the assumption that all legal non-citizens are enumerated in the
census or CPS (Woodrow-Lafield, 1995; Woodrow, Passel, and Warren, 1987). If
legal non-citizen migrants had a undercount rate as high as five percent, for in-
stance, then the number of legal non-citizens enumerated in the 1980 Census would
be overstated by about 300,000, and the number of unauthorized migrants would
be underestimated by the same amount. Warren and Passel’s (1987) estimate of
2.057 million enumerated unauthorized migrants would then have to adjusted up-
ward to about 2.357 million.
The limitations associated with Residual Method 1 are small in comparison to
its advantages. The availability of Alien Registration data permitted researchers to
estimate directly the legally resident population rather than having to construct it
from INS immigration records and estimates of mortality and emigration. Also,
Alien Registration data allowed researchers to determine at the state and metro-
politan levels the size of local legal migrant populations. This level of geographic
detail thus permitted the generation of estimates of the unauthorized population by
state (Passel and Woodrow, 1984) and metropolitan area (Bean, Lowell and Taylor,
1988; Passel, 1985b). Such studies showed that unauthorized migrants concentrate
in areas that have large legal immigrant populations, namely metropolitan areas in
California, New York, Texas, Illinois, and Florida. The results also indicated that
among all states in 1980, California contained the largest share of unauthorized
immigrants, accommodating 49.8 percent of all unauthorized migrants and 67.5
percent of unauthorized migrants originating in Mexico.
After 1981, the Alien Registration Program was discontinued. As a result,
estimates of the legal alien population had to be constructed by projecting forward
the 1980 adjusted Alien Registration population to the appropriate year. For each
year of projection, numbers of new legal immigrants, refugees and other long-term
legal nonimmigrants were added and numbers of emigrants and deaths due to the
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legally resident foreign born were subtracted. Residual methods that use this
procedure are here referred to as Residual Method 2. The Census Bureau used
Residual Method 2 to estimate the unauthorized population enumerated in the CPS
during the 1980s up until the enactment of the IRCA legalization programs in 1988.
These studies include analyses of the April 1983 (Passel and Woodrow, 1987) and
the June 1986 CPSs (Woodrow, Passel, and Warren, 1987), which were the only
CPS data collected before 1988 that included information about nativity. These
studies concluded that by June 1986, about 3.158 unauthorized migrants, 2.196
million of whom were born in Mexico, were detected by the CPS. More importantly,
by this time the Census Bureau had compiled consistent estimates of the unauthorized
population enumerated in the CPS from 1979 to 1986. Assuming that the rate of
undercoverage was consistent across the CPS samples, reliable estimates of net
growth of the unauthorized population could be made. The studies indicate that the
unauthorized migrant population grew during the early 1980s by about 218,000
per year, and the Mexican-origin unauthorized population by about 115,000 per
year. Due to uncertainties associated with assumptions about emigration and
disproportionate undercoverage, however, the authors conceded that the annual
net growth of the unauthorized population could have been in the range of 100,000
to 300,000, with about half of the growth due to growth in the Mexican-origin
unauthorized population.
Most of the error associated with estimates that use Residual Method 2 is due
to uncertainties associated with emigration rather than immigration or mortality.
The INS keeps accurate records of the number and types of legal immigrants.
Also, the component due to mortality is small in comparison to the other two
components of change, so the proportion of total error due to error in the number
of deaths is small (Himes and Clogg, 1992). However, the INS has not collected
data about emigrants since 1957. During the 1980s, the Census Bureau routinely
used a mid-range estimate of 133,000 foreign-born emigrants per year. This
approximation was based on the results of research pertaining to the 1960s (Warren
and Peck, 1980) and the 1970s (Warren and Passel, 1987). During the 1980s,
attempts were made to update estimates of the emigration component by analyzing
special items included in the CPS during the late 1980s that asked respondents
about relatives who emigrated (Woodrow-Lafield, 1996). Although the results of
this work do not contradict the estimate of 133,000, it also indicates that other
estimates of the annual number of emigrants ranging from about 110,000 to 200,000
would be plausible. To the extent that the actual annual number of emigrants during
the 1980s were consistently higher than 133,000, the legal migrant population
would have been overstated and the enumerated unauthorized migrant population
would have been set too low. The opposite would be the case if the actual annual
number of emigrants had consistently been lower than 133,000. Because annual
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estimates of emigration are subtracted from the legal alien population for each
year the population is carried forward, the error associated with emigration increases
with each additional year. In other words, the longer the time data sources on the
legal migrant population or emigration are not available, the greater the uncertainty
associated with residual estimates.
Another source of error in estimates produced by Residual Method 2 relates to
assumptions about undercoverage of the legal immigrant population. As does Re-
sidual Method 1, Method 2 assumes that all the legal non-citizens are enumerated.
In addition, Residual Method 2 assumes that all immigrants who arrived since
1980—regardless of citizenship status—are represented in the CPS. The bias asso-
ciated with this additional assumption most likely increases over time as the pro-
portion of the immigrant population who arrived after 1980 grows. The error due
to this bias is increased even more for the above cited studies because they ana-
lyzed CPS rather than census data and the CPS has higher levels of undercoverage
than the census (Woodrow, 1991). That is, residual estimates of the enumerated
unauthorized population are understated the most when undercount rates of the
legal population are the highest. Of course, if the error associated with emigration
leads to an overestimate of the unauthorized population, then part or all of the
underestimation due to assumptions about undercount of the legal population may
be canceled out.
Starting in 1987, about 1.7 million long-term unauthorized migrants and an
additional 1.3 million unauthorized special agricultural workers (SAWs) applied
for legalization under the amnesty provisions of the 1986 Immigration Reform
and Control Act (IRCA). As a result, post-1987 residual estimates of the unautho-
rized migrant population have to be adjusted to account for this increase in the
legal population. In this variation of the residual method, which we refer to as
Residual Method 3, the legal population is constructed in the same way as in
Residual Method 2, only the number of IRCA legalized migrants are added to the
estimate of the legally resident foreign-born population. Studies that used this
method include analyses of the June 1988 (Woodrow and Passel, 1990) and the
November 1989 CPS files (Woodrow, 1990, 1991, 1992), and the 1990 Census
(Woodrow, 1991; GAO, 1993; Clark, et al., 1994). The results of these studies
show that about 2.3 million (ranging between 1.8 to 3.2 million) unauthorized
migrants were enumerated in the 1990 Census, about 80 percent of whom were
born in Mexico. This research also indicates that had IRCA not taken effect, the
unauthorized population would have grown by roughly 200,000 annually between
1986 and 1990, reaching a size 70 percent larger in 1990 than was observed. Most
of this difference was due to the large numbers of Mexicans who legalized under
IRCA; Mexicans comprised more than 70 percent of the IRCA legalized popula-
tion (Woodrow and Passel, 1990).
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The limitations associated with Residual Method 3 are the same as those
associated with Residual Method 2. In addition, estimates produced by Method 3
may be inaccurate because it is unclear what fraction of the SAW legalized population
remained resident in the United States after legalization. Many SAW applicants
presumably were seasonal migrant workers who spent a portion of each year in
Mexico. Whether to include the SAW population in estimates of the legally resident
population is important because each addition to the legal population results in a
one-to-one decrease in the estimated unauthorized population. Even though
researchers tend to focus on the number of SAWs who were resident in the United
States at the time of the Census, it is more important to focus on the number of
SAWs who were actually enumerated in the Census. The Census Bureau assumes
that an insignificant number of SAWs were enumerated in the Census or CPS.
Hence, they do not include the 1.3 million SAWs in estimates of the enumerated
legally resident alien population (although they do provide ranges of estimates that
result from varying assumptions about coverage of the SAW population).
Clark, et al. (1994) attempt to make estimates based on more plausible as-
sumptions. They assume that in the SAW legalized population, all pre-1984 en-
trants, all non-Mexicans, and about half of the remaining post-1984 entrants were
resident in the United States at the time of the 1990 Census. This amounts to 728,000
or about half of the SAW population. Clark, et al. (1994) include all 728,000 in
estimates of the legally resident population, resulting in an estimate of only 1.975
million enumerated unauthorized migrants in 1990 (in comparison, the Census
Bureau made a “preferred” estimate of 2.390 million)1. Although it does seem
implausible that no SAWs were resident nor enumerated in 1990, the Clark, et al.,
estimate of 728,000 could be too high. Even if half of the SAW population were
resident in the United States in 1990, it is doubtful that more than 40 to 50 percent
of this group were enumerated. Migrant agricultural workers have the highest rates
of undercount among all groups, reaching 60 to 70 percent (Gabbard, Kissam, and
Martin, 1993). However, there is evidence that a large number of SAW applicants
were not really farm workers, plus there is no guarantee that farm workers in 1988
continued to be farm workers in 1990. Hence, more SAWs may have been resident
in the United States in 1990 than many analysts have thought, and since many of
the SAWs may have been working outside agriculture, they may have had higher
coverage rates than has previously been assumed. We introduce below new evi-
dence about the residency patterns of the SAW population in the early 1990s.
In sum, residual methods provide reliable, consistent estimates of the size
and growth as well as detailed descriptions of the resident unauthorized migrant
population. In comparison with earlier analytic studies, the studies that used residual
methods during the 1980s and early 1990s were more successful at describing,
quantifying, and reducing the range of error associated with their estimates.
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Unfortunately, the range of error is likely to grow over time as information about
emigration and the size and geographical residence of the legal immigrant
population become increasingly out-of-date, and as other changes occur in the
legal population, such as those brought about by IRCA. Unless other methods for
obtaining accurate information about emigration or the legal immigrant population
are developed, residual methods will probably dominate the literature to a lesser
extent in the future than they did during 1980s. Another important limitation of
residual estimates is that they describe a selective part of the unauthorized
population, namely the portion that is probably least mobile and most permanently
established. As we describe in a separate technical appendix, other methods must
be used to estimate the total and unenumerated portions of the stock of the
unauthorized migrant population.
Other Approaches to Estimating Stocks
Other approaches to estimating the stock of unauthorized migrants used dur-
ing the 1980s and 1990s include a sex-ratio based method and a constructed com-
ponents method. Bean, King, and Passel (1983) developed a range of estimates by
examining sex ratios from the 1980 Mexican census. Given that Mexican emigra-
tion is age- and sex-selective, and that it occurs almost exclusively to the United
States, this research was able to estimate the number of persons “missing” from
the age and sex structure of the 1980 Mexican population expected in the absence
of emigration. Assumptions were made about differential census coverage by gen-
der, the proportion male among all emigrants aged 15-39, and the proportion of all
emigrants aged 15-39. After estimating numbers of Mexican emigrants for various
combinations of assumptions, estimates of unauthorized migrants were developed
by subtracting the number of I-53 reporting Mexican legal immigrants in the United
States, adjusted for underreporting. A major criticism is that the results obtained
are highly sensitive to the assumptions used, but a benefit is that the approach does
provide estimates of the total size of the unauthorized Mexican population, not just
the enumerated part of the population. The figures obtained ranged from 1.5 to 3.8
million, establishing an upper-bound estimate for 1980.
The most widely known and cited set of recent estimates of the stock of
unauthorized migrants has been constructed by the U.S. Immigration and
Naturalization Service (1997). Estimates are developed for each of the states in the
United States and for each of 99 countries of origin. The approach seeks to take
advantage of information obtained after IRCA about the numbers and characteristics
of unauthorized migrants legalizing their residence in the United States under the
provisions of IRCA. The INS estimate is not predominantly a residual estimate,
but rather involves starting with a 1982 estimate and then adding and subtracting
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components of change to bring the figure forward to October 1996. The approach
combines information about IRCA’s legalization applicants with results obtained
from using both the residual method to estimate net EWIs and the overstay method
(see below) to estimate overstayers. Applying these procedures to construct the
components of the unauthorized population results in an estimate of five million
unauthorized migrants resident in the United States by October 1996, of whom 2.7
million were estimated to be from Mexico and another 660,000 from El Salvador,
Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua. Fifty-nine percent of the total was estimated
to have “entered without inspection” and 41 percent to be “visa overstays.” Most
of the Mexicans were estimated to have entered the country as EWIs.
Approaches to the Estimation of Flows
Speculative and Early Estimates
In comparison of estimates to stock, few speculative estimates have been
made about the rate of growth of the unauthorized population. Chapman (1976)
guessed that the population grew by 500,000 per year, and Reubens (1980) esti-
mated an annual growth of 600,000 during the 1970s. Despite analytical evidence
that the annual growth of the unauthorized population was considerably less than
the speculative estimate of 500,000, the media and others continued to cite the
number. As Passel (1985: 6) chided, “The figure of 500,000 per year is widely
used even though there is no strong empirical support for selecting this figure
over any other. It seems to be popular because it is a nice ‘round’ figure that is
easy for the public to accept.”
Analytic estimates of the volume of in-flow and net flow of the unauthorized
population tended to refer to different parts of the unauthorized population and
ranged widely. These studies are listed in Table 3. Garcia y Griego (1980), using
Mexican survey data on migration histories, estimated that the annual in-flow from
Mexico of unauthorized migrants in 1975 ranged from 75,000 to 284,000. Others
used INS apprehensions data as a proxy for general patterns in the level of flow of
EWIs from Mexico (e.g., North, 1975; Frisbie, 1975). The difficulties associated
with using apprehensions data as a proxy for the flow of EWIs are (1) that appre-
hensions data do not include those who succeed in evading detection, and (2) that
apprehensions data count arrests, not individuals; arrest data are potentially mis-
leading because they include multiple arrests by the same person. The INS (1976)
attempted to estimate the component of fraudulent successful entries by conduct-
ing field studies at 15 Mexican border entry points and 10 major international
airports. Two teams of immigration inspectors were stationed at each entry point
and carried out careful inspections of entrants for fraudulent documents and intent
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to violate visa terms. Based on this work the INS concluded that there were 500,000
fraudulent entries into the United States in 1975, although these estimates have
been severely criticized because of small sample sizes and variable rates of detec-
tion depending on the day of the week, the immigration inspector, and point of
entry (Keely, 1977).
Chapman (1976) attempted to measure the visa overstay component of the in-
flow of unauthorized migrants by matching INS records of nonimmigrant visa en-
tries and departures. He estimated that from 1974 to 1976, 740,000 nonimmigrants
(about 250,000 annually) failed to leave the United States on time. These estimates
were almost certainly too high because they included nonimmigrants who left the
country but whose departure forms were never filed, were lost, or otherwise never
successfully matched with an arrival form. The size of this error was probably
large. At the time, the INS collected about six million entrance forms from
nonimmigrants per year, and departure forms were linked with arrival forms by
matching the name of the nonimmigrant (Siegel, et al., 1980).
Summed together, the estimates of in-flow of EWIs and visa overstayers eas-
ily matched and even exceeded the speculative estimate that the unauthorized popu-
lation grew at a rate of 500,000 per year. However, analytic estimates of net flow
showed that the out-flow component of the unauthorized migrant migration stream
offset much of the in-flow component. Based on an analysis of CPS data, Heer
(1979) estimated that the unauthorized Mexican population grew by about 116,000
annually from 1970 to 1975. Although Siegel, et al. (1980) criticized the estimate
because of its large sampling error, they concluded on the basis of the study and
other evidence that much of the unauthorized migration to the United States ap-
peared to be circular and was offset by return migration to Mexico.
Studies of flow conducted during the 1990s have exploited the availability of
new data and new estimation techniques. The INS has long matched arrivals with
departures (NIIS), terming arrivals that do not match with departures apparent
overstays. The latest research using this data goes one step further by attempting to
eliminate system error in the data (Warren, 1990). System error refers to false over-
stays. INS data for 12 countries which are assumed to have no overstays are used
to determine the extent of system error (Belgium, Netherlands Antilles, Norway,
Sweden, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Switzerland, Australia, New Zealand, Surinam,
Singapore and Finland). System error is computed separately by class of admis-
sion. First, overstays are estimated for each country using the Nonimmigrant In-
formation System (NIIS). Next, system error is subtracted from the rate of appar-
ent overstay. The remainder is multiplied by the number of expected departures to
equal the estimated number of overstays. For estimation by state of destination and
age, a calculation was made for each category by state or age. The rate of system
error was adjusted to match those of the countries.
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Nonimmigrant arrivals increased from 9.4 million in 1985 to about 14.3 million
in 1988. The annual number of overstays has fluctuated around 217,000-255,000
(increasing by 12% in 1986 and dropping 7% in 1987 (following IRCA) and
increasing 13% in 1988). The level of system error has dropped continually (10.3%
in 1985 to 8.1% in 1988). North America has been the primary region of origin for
overstayers (with the most growth occurring among those from Mexico). The top
five countries of origin (Mexico, Haiti, the Philippines, Poland and India) were
also among the leading countries for application for legal residence under IRCA.
Looking at the geographic distribution of those overstaying their visa time limits,
those states with the largest foreign-born population also attracted the most overstays.
Finally, Warren finds that most overstays were between ages 15 and 44.
Two primary assumptions are associated with this estimation procedure: (1)
that there are few actual overstays from the 12 benchmark countries selected so all
apparent overstays from these countries are assumed to represent system error and
(2) that a single point estimate of system error applies to every country within a
category of admission. In addition, the estimates exclude immigrant students who
overstay and all those who enter the United States without inspection (EWIs). In a
modification of the procedure undertaken as a result of a GAO (1995) scrutiny of
the approach, system error was re-estimated on a airline-by-airline instead of country
basis. While the revision resulted in somewhat higher or lower figures for a few
countries, the overall result was nearly identical to the figures obtained using the
previous method.
Another way to estimate the flow of unauthorized immigrants to the United
States is to use apprehensions data from the U.S. southern border. Apprehensions
data have been used as a proxy for unauthorized migration flows (Frisbie, 1975;
Jenkins, 1977; Fogel, 1982; Davila, 1986 and Borjas, Freeman and Lang, 1987).
Recent studies concentrating on apprehensions data from the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (Bean, et al., 1990 and Espenshade, 1990 and 1995a as well
as another study by Crane, et al., 1990) avoid many of the problems of previous
efforts by converting apprehensions into border crossings by assessing the prob-
ability of getting caught and the population at risk of getting caught, thereby con-
trolling for multiple apprehensions in the data (Passel, Bean and Edmonston, 1990).
In order to gauge the influence of factors that affect flows across the border, these
estimates rely on models with sets of demographic, economic, and behavioral vari-
ables (the size of young adult population in Mexico (15-34); the number of legal-
ized SAWs; relative wage and unemployment ratios; dummy variables for months
to capture seasonality; the number of officer hours and other measures of enforce-
ment on the border for apprehensions) (Bean, et al., 1990).
Apprehensions data are limited because many unauthorized migrants are never
apprehended, others may be apprehended many times, and the volume of
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apprehensions depends on the amount of effort expended by INS to apprehend.
Researchers compensate by using some measure of the amount of border patrol
effort (Bean, et al., 1990; Jenkins, 1977; Fogel, 1982; and Borjas, et al., 1987) and
include measures of the population at risk for apprehension (Bean, et al., 1990).
Espenshade (1990, 1995a) takes the analysis one step further by using a repeated
trials model that “captures the phenomenon that, once arrested by the U.S. Border
Patrol and taken back across the Mexican border, most unauthorized migrants are
likely to keep trying to enter the United States until they succeed” (Espenshade,
1990:175). Making use of INS data on the number of repeaters to estimate the
probability of apprehension, and then using this to convert apprehensions measures
to estimates of numbers of crossers, Espenshade constructs a time series on the
monthly flow of unauthorized migrants. He arrives at an estimate for the period
November 1986 to September 1988 of 175,000 per month, or a total of 4 million
unauthorized migrants. In another repeated trials study, Massey and Singer (1995)
utilize INS apprehensions data combined with data from a survey of migrants in
Mexico. They arrive at an estimate of the net flow by 1989 of 5.2 million.
There are several assumptions that must be made to use apprehensions data in
these models. The largest of these is that all individuals, even those apprehended
and sent back across the border, will succeed by the end of the month. If some
individuals do not attempt to cross again, this assumption will overstate the flow.
In addition they rely upon the assumption that the probability of being caught is
about 30 percent. A small change in this figure would change the size of the esti-
mated flow. These studies assume that data on previous apprehensions is accurate
and they assume that the probability of apprehension does not vary across groups
(Passel, Bean and Edmonston, 1990). The model on repeated trials also relies largely
on data on repeat crossers which depend on the facial recognition of the border
crosser by border patrol agents, a process highly subject to error.
Issues Affecting Estimates
Lack of sufficient data in a number of areas makes difficult the interpretation
of results of studies of the size and change of the unauthorized migrant population.
These include: (1) insufficient evidence about the extent of underenumeration in
official census and survey data of the unauthorized migrant population; (2)
insufficient data to develop more accurate estimates of the size of the legally resident
population to use in residual estimation approaches; (3) insufficient information
and data about duration of stay in the United States among unauthorized migrants;
(4) insufficient data to estimate emigration in the case of the legally resident
immigrant population; and (5) insufficient evidence on the residency patterns of
the SAWs population. In this section, we discuss the third of these issues and
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introduce new evidence on the fifth. The first is discussed in a separate accompanying
technical appendix entitled “Estimating Underenumeration among Unauthorized
Mexican Migrants to the United States: Applications of Mortality Analyses,” and
the second and fourth are discussed in a separate accompanying technical appendix
entitled “Issues in Estimating Legal Immigration.”
Duration of Stay Issues
The distribution of the length of duration of stay in the United States among
unauthorized migrants by mode of entry and the change in this distribution over
time are crucial factors in understanding the significance of various estimates of
the size of the unauthorized migrant population. If almost all EWIs were circular
migrants staying only a short time, and if almost all visa overstayers returned to
their countries of origin within a couple of years or so, the policy significance of
unauthorized migration would be greatly different than if either EWIs or visa
overstayers, or both, contained substantial fractions of long-duration migrants. Simi-
larly, long-duration migrants (say those who stay 10 to 20 years or more) but who
then return to their countries of origin are different yet again in their implications
for policy from migrants who stay permanently.
At present, very little is known about the distribution of duration of stay of
EWIs and visa overstayers (although data on this variable are now available for the
subgroup of EWIs who have returned to Mexico from the studies conducted by
Massey and his colleagues). Also, information on the duration of stay of visa
overstayers has reportedly been calculated but not released by the INS. One of the
reasons duration information is important is because different duration migrants
exert different demands on public benefits. At the extremes, if the flow of EWIs
and visa overstayers were each very large, the stock of unauthorized migrants in
the United States at any one point in time would be sizable even if all durations of
stay were relatively short (i.e., even if all migrants were temporary). If EWIs were
to exhibit typically longer durations than visa overstayers, they would contribute
more to the stock of unauthorized migrants on that count alone.
What does the available evidence suggest about the comparative distributions
of duration of stay among EWIs and visa overstayers? In the case of EWIs, almost
all of whom are from Mexico, several pieces of evidence point to increasing dura-
tions of stay over the past 15 to 20 years: (1) increasing proportions of entire fami-
lies, including women and children in the Mexican flow (Bean, et al., 1990; Woodrow
and Passel, 1990; Cornelius, 1992); (2) apparently decreasing rates of
underenumeration of the unauthorized Mexican-born population in official U.S.
Censuses and surveys, as noted above, a trend that could result from increasing
proportions of migrants with long durations of stay, especially given that census
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undercount rates in general have not been declining over the same period (Robinson,
et al., 1993); and (3) ethnographic studies whose results indicate that Mexican
migrants now embarking for the United States show longer intended durations of
stay than prior migrants (Cornelius, 1992). Unless a comparable shift has occurred
in the duration distribution among overstayers, this would have the effect of rais-
ing the proportion of the unauthorized stock attributable to EWIs. In the case of
visa overstayers, the only relevant evidence to our knowledge is Warren’s (1995)
finding that when overstayers were traced for a year or two longer than the one
year that is typically examined for purposes of defining an overstay, about 46 per-
cent had either converted their status or returned to their country of origin. This
suggests that if they were followed a bit longer, the vast majority would be found
to have converted their status or returned.
Even though durations of stay may be increasing among EWIs, many may
eventually return to Mexico (a pattern we might term long-term circular migra-
tion). Evidence of this pattern would also have significant policy implications.
Tables 4 to 6 present information on the extent of cohort succession among Mexi-
can-born persons based on results from the 1970, 1980, and 1990 U.S. Censuses
and the 1994/95 CPSs. Does the evidence in these tables indicate that Mexican
migrants tend to return to Mexico after having spent time in the United States, a
phenomenon we would expect to be more likely among unauthorized migrants?
Because there were hardly any unauthorized migrants enumerated in the 1970
Census, we would not anticipate evidence of cohort attrition beyond what we would
expect based on mortality in the 1980 data, and this is in fact what we observe. In
the cases of 1990 and 1994/95 data, however, evidence of substantial cohort attri-
tion emerges. Since there is no known reason to think this occurs because of mi-
gration to some country other than the United States, it is reasonable to think it
stems at least in part from return migrations to Mexico among persons in their late
forties and fifties. This phenomenon, of course, would reduce the stock of Mexi-
can EWIs compared to the case where long-term circular migration did not occur
and most migrants were permanent.
SAWs Residency Patterns
The number of SAWs resident in the United States or Mexico is a crucial
element in developing residual estimates, as noted above. To develop a rough estimate
of the number of SAWs living in Mexico at any single point in time during the
early 1990s, we used data from the Mexican Migration Project (1996) that collected
interviews on households in 39 communities in Mexico with a smaller sample of
households in the United States. The households in the Mexican sample were drawn
from simple random samples of households in the 39 communities. The households
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Table 4
Components of Change from 1970 to 1980 in the Mexican-born
Population Due to Immigration, Mortality, and Other Causes
Population Components of Change 1970 to 1980
Increase Decrease
Change  Due  Due Other
1970 1980 1980-1970 To Immig’n To Mortality (6) =
Sex, Age in 1980 (1) (2) (3) = (2)-(1) (4) (5) (3)-(4)-(5)
Both Sexes, Total 759,711 2,199,221 1,439,510 1,270,246 -90572 259,836
0-4 – 55,325 55,325 55,325 0 0
5-9 – 119,309 119,309 119,309 0 0
10-14 15,084 148,775 133,691 124,540 -62 9,213
15-19 31,459 214,195 182,736 162,857 -149 20,028
20-24 41,926 312,309 270,383 243,658 -376 27,101
25-34 116,503 547,228 430,725 350,977 -1,374 81,122
35-44 138,300 315,402 177,102 127,323 -2,142 51,921
45-54 118,238 191,476 73,238 50,734 -4,393 26,897
55-64 94,431 128,407 33,976 22,159 -8,582 20,399
65+ 203,770 166,795 -36,975 13,364 -73,495 23,156
Males, Total 371,463 1,158,765 787,302 695,567 -53,626 145,361
0-4 – 28,513 28,513 28,513 0 0
5-9 – 61,963 61,963 61,963 0 0
10-14 7,749 75,678 67,929 63,201 -37 4,765
15-19 15,962 117,785 101,823 90,773 -101 11,151
20-24 20,878 177,796 156,918 142,505 -275 14,688
25-34 57,458 300,934 243,476 199,159 -998 45,315
35-44 64,532 162,660 98,128 70,031 -1,340 29,437
45-54 57,683 93,961 36,278 24,478 -2,790 14,590
55-64 48,949 65,546 16,597 9,949 -5,768 12,416
65+ 98,252 73,929 -24,323 4,995 -42,316 12,998
Females, Total 388,248 1,040,456 652,208 574,679 -36,946 114,475
0-4 – 26,812 26,812 26,812 0 0
5-9 – 57,346 57,346 57,346 0 0
10-14 7,335 73,097 65,762 61,339 -25 4,448
15-19 15,497 96,410 80,913 72,084 -48 8,877
20-24 21,048 134,513 113,465 101,153 -100 12,412
25-34 59,045 246,294 187,249 151,818 -376 35,807
35-44 73,768 152,742 78,974 57,292 -802 22,484
45-54 60,555 97,515 36,960 26,256 -1,602 12,306
55-64 45,482 62,861 17,379 12,210 -2,814 7,983
65+ 105,518 92,866 -12,652 8,369 -31,179 10,158
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Table 5
Components of Change from 1980 to 1990 in the Mexican-born
Population Due to Immigration, Mortality, and Other Causes
Population Components of Change 1980 to 1990
Increase Decrease
Change  Due  Due Other
1980 1990 1990-1980 To Immig’n To Mortality (6) =
Sex, Age in 1990 (1) (2) (3) = (2)-(1) (4) (5) (3)-(4)-(5)
Both Sexes, Total 2,199,221 4,298,014 2,098,793 2,144,919 -146,551 100,425
0-4 – 102,388 102,388 102,388 0 0
5-9 – 155,561 155,561 155,561 0 0
10-14 55,325 203,705 148,380 155,913 -158 -7,375
15-19 119,309 381,253 261,944 255,960 -441 6,425
20-24 148,775 650,539 501,764 495,186 -1,097 7,675
25-34 214,195 1,239,616 1,025,421 657,455 -5,688 373,654
35-44 312,309 749,645 437,336 189,441 -7,594 255,489
45-54 547,228 393,338 -153,890 78,033 -9,267 -222,656
55-64 315,402 209,278 -106,124 33,412 -14,280 -125,256
65+ 486,678 212,691 -273,987 21,570 -108,027 -187,530
Males, Total 1,158,765 2,369,514 1,210,749 1,233,235 -83,211 60,725
0-4 – 52,447 52,447 52,447 0 0
5-9 – 78,906 78,906 78,906 0 0
10-14 28,513 105,632 77,119 81,144 -93 -3,932
15-19 61,963 216,179 154,216 151,736 -297 27,767
20-24 75,678 396,386 320,708 314,872 -796 6,632
25-34 117,785 720,819 603,034 387,207 -4,476 220,303
35-44 177,796 405,138 227,342 103,226 -5,548 129,664
45-54 300,934 200,583 -100,351 40,369 -6,109 -134,611
55-64 162,660 99,858 -62,802 14,804 -9,074 -68,532
65+ 233,436 93,566 -139,870 8,524 -56,818 -91,576
Females, Total 1,040,456 1,928,500 888,044 911,684 -63,340 39,700
0-4 – 49,941 49,941 49,941 0 0
5-9 – 76,655 76,655 76,655 0 0
10-14 26,812 98,073 71,261 74,769 -65 -3,443
15-19 57,346 165,074 107,728 104,224 -144 3,648
20-24 73,097 254,153 181,056 180,314 -301 10,423
25-34 96,410 518,797 422,387 270,248 -1,211 153,350
35-44 134,513 344,507 209,994 86,215 -2,046 125,825
45-54 246,294 192,755 -53,539 37,664 -3,158 -88,045
55-64 152,742 109,420 -43,322 18,608 -5,206 -56,724
65+ 253,242 119,125 -134,117 13,046 -51,209 -95,954
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Table 6
Components of Change from 1990 to 1995 in the Mexican-born
Population Due to Immigration, Mortality, and Other Causes
Population Components of Change 1990 to 1995
Increase Decrease
Change  Due  Due Other
1990 1995 1995-1990 To Immig’n To Mortality (6) =
Sex, Age in 1995 (1) (2) (3) = (2)-(1) (4) (5) (3)-(4)-(5)
Both Sexes, Total 4,766,014 6,669,468 1,903,454 1,707,618 -99,031 294,867
0-4 – 112,349 112,349 112,349 0 0
5-9 113,537 296,585 183,048 198,907 -151 -15,708
10-14 172,500 302,377 129,877 124,975 -129 5,031
15-19 225,886 447,095 221,209 219,920 -480 1,769
20-24 422,767 895,238 472,471 404,402 -1,676 69,745
25-34 1,463,595 2,022,661 559,067 411,641 -7,525 154,951
35-44 1,119,252 1,285,707 166,454 1,436,578 -8,693 31,490
45-54 600,093 655,699 55,606 552,367 -8,935 9,304
55-64 313,748 336,475 22,727 253,423 -11,354 8,739
65+ 334,637 315,282 -19,355 11,187 -60,089 29,547
Males, Total 2,627,524 3,720,895 1,093,371 9,721,378 -58,249 179,482
0-4 – 68,095 68,095 68,095 0 0
5-9 58,158 166,829 108,671 116,356 -88 -7,597
10-14 87,498 163,080 75,582 72,411 -76 3,247
15-19 117,134 259,654 142,520 134,184 -336 8,672
20-24 239,718 530,888 291,169 238,671 -1,313 53,811
25-34 879,166 1,164,056 284,890 210,175 -6,146 80,861
35-44 623,849 715,896 92,047 97,404 -6,581 1,224
45-54 318,102 346,287 28,186 18,442 -6,082 15,826
55-64 154,746 156,329 1,583 8,252 -7,122 453
65+ 149,154 149,781 627 8,148 -3,050 22,984
Females, Total 2,138,490 2,948,573 810,083 735,480 -40,782 115,385
0-4 – 44,254 44,254 44,254 0 0
5-9 55,379 129,756 74,377 82,551 -62 -8,112
10-14 85,002 139,297 5,425 52,564 -53 1,783
15-19 108,752 187,441 78,689 85,736 -144 -6,903
20-24 183,049 364,350 181,302 165,731 -363 15,934
25-34 584,428 858,605 274,177 201,466 -1,379 74,090
35-44 495,404 569,811 74,407 46,253 -2,112 30,266
45-54 281,991 309,412 27,421 36,795 -2,853 -6,521
55-64 159,002 180,146 21,144 17,091 -4,232 8,286
65+ 185,483 165,501 -19,983 3,039 -29,584 6,562
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in the United States were drawn from a non-random sample of 10-20 out-migrants
from the Mexican communities (none of the U.S. data was used for estimating
SAWs). We selected only those migrants in Mexico who reported that they came to
the United States under the Agricultural Workers Program (SAWs). The interviews
with this subsample of respondents were conducted between 1987 and 1995. Of
the 236 SAWs in the data, 191 were interviewed in Mexico. These 191 cases were
then classified by state of residence in Mexico. The number of households sampled
in the state and the number of household in the state from the 1990 Mexican census
(INEGI, 1990) were used to calculate the proportion of households in each state
that were included in the sample. The number of SAWs by state was divided by
this sampling fraction and summed across states to arrive at the total number of
SAWs living in the Mexican states. Finally, three estimates of the number of SAWs
living in Mexico were developed assuming different proportions of migrants from
Mexico coming from the seven sampled states. These estimates assume that 25%,
33% or 40% of all migrants from Mexico to the United States come from these
seven sending states. The results are presented in Table 7 and indicate that about
240,000 to 380,000 SAWs were resident in Mexico at a single point in time during
this time interval. Since 1,050,000 of the SAWs were from Mexico, 670,000 to
810,000 of the SAWs are estimated to have been resident in the United States at
any single point in time during the early 1990s.
Summary of Results from Estimating Procedures
As of 1980, stock and flow estimates of the unauthorized migrant population
tended to be unreliable due in part to lack of methodologies for correcting for
biases in the available data sources. For instance, better methods had to be devel-
oped in order to make more valid estimates of in-flow on the basis of INS appre-
hensions and nonimmigrant entrance/exit forms. Also, early analytic estimates tended
to be inconsistent in their assumptions, methodologies, and, consequently, in the
populations they described. Hence, the various estimates were difficult to compare
and evaluate (Bos, 1984). Finally, reviewers (Siegel, et al., 1980; Hill, 1985) found
that most early analytic estimates of stock and flow were highly sensitive to their
underlying assumptions. More complete data about the foreign-born and the unau-
thorized migrant population had to be obtained in order to better support underly-
ing assumptions, such as those made about undercount (Goldberg, 1974; Heer,
1979) and death rates (Robinson, 1980). As a result of these and other problems,
Siegel and his co-authors concluded in 1980 that “there are currently no reliable
estimates of the number of unauthorized residents in the country or of the net vol-
ume of unauthorized immigration to the United States in any past recent period”
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Table 7
Estimated Number of SAWs Living in Mexico
Number Hogares % of Number of Estimated
of in Hogares SAWs Total
Mexican State Hogares Sample in Sample in Sample SAWs
Jalisco 1,038,000 901 0.087 18 20,736
Guanajuato 703,000 800 0.114 17 14,938
Michoacan 668,000 1,250 0.187 59 31,529
San Luis Potosi 383,000 402 0.105 3 2,858
Zacatecas 241,000 940 0.390 86 22,048
Nayarit 169,000 400 0.237 7 2,957
Colima 88,000 200 0.227 1 440
Total 191 95,509
Estimated Number of SAWs Living in All of Mexico
If 25% of migrants come from above states 382,040
If 33% of migrants come from above states 286,530
If 40% of migrants come from above states 238,775
Sources:  1990 Mexican Census; Mexican Migration Project (1996).
(1980). Nevertheless, they conceded that the analytic studies supported the view
that by the end of the 1970s, 2.5 to 5 million unauthorized migrants and 1.5 to 2.5
million unauthorized Mexican migrants resided in the United States.
The residual studies conducted during the 1980s (see Table 8) obtained results
at the beginning of the 1980s that tended toward the lower end of this range, subject
of course to considerable uncertainty about the fraction of the unauthorized Mexican
migrant population not enumerated in the official U.S. Censuses and surveys on
which they were based. The results of these studies also showed the effects of
IRCA’s legalization programs, which removed substantial numbers of unauthorized
migrants from the estimates of stock. They also revealed that the unauthorized
migrant population (both overall and from Mexico) continued to grow annually
during the 1980s, diminished in total numbers only by the legalization programs of
IRCA. By 1992, the INS reported that 3.4 million unauthorized migrants overall
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Table 8
Residual Estimates of the Enumerated Legal and Unauthorized
Foreign-born Population, 1979-1990
(Populations in Thousands)
Total Foreign-born Mexican Foreign-born
Total Legally Unauthorized Total Legally Unauthorized
Enumerated Resident (Residual) Enumerated Resident (Residual)
(1) (2) (1) - (2) (1) (2) (1) - (2)
Nov. 1979 CPS 13,198 11,474 1,724 2,823 1387 1436
April 1980 Census 14,141 12084 2,057 2,531 1400 1131
April 1983 CPS,
age 14+ 13,633 11,540 2,093 2,850 1428 1422
April 1983 CPS,
all ages 15,808a 13,394a 2414a 3318a 1,577a 1,741a
June 1986 CPS 16,936 13,778 3,158 3,852 1656 2196
June 1988 CPS 17,835 15,929 1,906 4,085 2985 1100
Nov. 1989 CPS 18,508 16,441 2,067 4,642 2999 1643
April 1990 Census
(projected) 19,090 16,690 2,400 na na na
Sources: Warren and Passel, 1987; Passel and Woodrow, 1987; Woodrow, Passel and Warren,
1987; Woodrow and Passel, 1990; Woodrow, 1991; Woodrow-Lafield, 1995, 1996.
a1983 estimate for those age 14 and older adjusted to include all ages.
na = Estimate not available.
and 1.3 million from Mexico resided in the country, totals that have subsequently
been updated to 5.0 million and 2.7 million by October 1996 (U.S. Immigration
and Naturalization Service, 1997.
Two broad classes of considerations affect the significance of these (and in
fact any) estimates. One, of course, is their accuracy. To what degree can we be
confident that the figures reflect the sizes of the populations they are intended to
represent? While uncertainties remain (as noted in discussions above), there is no
question that the results of research on the magnitude of stocks and flows during
the 1980s has narrowed considerably the range of plausible estimates. However,
because of data gaps (e.g., the deletion of I-53 registration system, inadequate in-
formation on emigration, and the other issues noted above), estimates during the
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1990s that rely on residual approaches may be subject to increasing uncertainty,
and thus perhaps are increasingly likely to generate broad ranges of estimates
(Woodrow-Lafield, 1996).
A second factor that affects the significance of estimates is the context in which
they occur. Estimates are most appropriately viewed not in isolation, but in rela-
tion to other kinds of changes, including population changes. We discussed above
the policy significance of possibly shifting proportions of EWIs and visa overstayers.
More broadly, it is of interest to examine how the estimates of unauthorized Mexi-
can migration compare to population size generally in both the United States and
Mexico. The estimated enumerated unauthorized Mexican population (1.131 mil-
lion) in 1980 represented about 51 percent of the total Mexican-born population in
the United States, 8.0 percent of the U.S. foreign-born population, 12.9 percent of
the total Mexican-origin population, 0.4 percent of the total U.S. population, and
1.7 percent of the total Mexican population (see Table 9).
What evidence is there about the size of the unauthorized Mexican migrant
population during the 1990s? Estimates of Mexican unauthorized migrants should
readily square with evidence about (1) the overall size of the Mexican-born popu-
lation in the United States, (2) estimated rates of underenumeration in the legal
unauthorized populations, and (3) estimates of the size of the legal Mexican-born
Table 9
Relative Size of the Unauthorized Mexican Migrant Population
Expressed as a Percentage of the Mexican and the
United States Foreign-born, Mexican-origin, and
Mexican-born Populations, 1980–1996
Size of Unauthorized Mexican Migrant
Population As a Percentage of: 1980 1990 1996
U.S. Population 0.5 0.5 1.1
Mexican Foreign-born 51.4 30.7 49.9
Foreign-born 8.0 6.7 13.4
Mexican Origin 12.9 9.9 15.3
Mexican Population 1.7 1.6 3.1
Notes: Estimates of enumerated authorized Mexican migrant population are: 1980, 1,131,000
(Warren and Passel, 1987); 1990, 1,321,000 (Warren, 1995); 1996, 3,100,000
(constructed by the authors).
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population. A figure for unauthorized Mexican migrant stock may be constructed
by starting with the overall size of the enumerated Mexican-born population from
the March 1996 CPS of 6.68 million. Following the evidence from Hogan and
Robinson (1993) and Van Hook and Bean (1997), we set plausible underenumeration
rates for the legal and unauthorized Mexican populations at 4.0 and 12.0 percent
respectively. Consistent with the evidence that about 700,000 SAWs were in the
United States in the 1990s, we also adopt a mid-range estimate of 4.8 million legal
Mexican immigrants (Woodrow-Lafield, 1997). Given these values, the enumer-
ated number of legal immigrants is estimated as 4.608 million (4.8 x 0.96 = 4.608)
and the number of unauthorized immigrants as 2.35 million (6.679 – [4.8 x 0.96]/
0.88 = the number of unauthorized migrants = 2.35). Placing a 90 percent confi-
dence interval around the overall total of 7.15 million (obtained by adjusting for
undercount) adds and subtracts about 150,000 from each side of this value, giving
an estimated range of 7.0 to 7.3 million total Mexican-born persons in the United
States. In 1996, then, the figure of 2.35 million unauthorized Mexican-born mi-
grants represents 37.8 percent of the U.S. Mexican-born population, 10.2 percent
of the U.S. foreign-born population, 11.6 percent of the Mexican-origin popula-
tion, 0.8 percent of the total U.S. population, and 2.3 percent of the Mexican popu-
lation (see Table 9).
Note
1. The Census Bureau estimate is not 0.728 million larger than the Clark, et al., esti-
mate, but only 0.415 million larger because of differences in assumptions other than those
related to the residence of the SAW population.
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QUANTIFICATION OF MIGRATION
Estimating Underenumeration
among Unauthorized Mexican
Migrants to the United States:
Applications of Mortality Analyses
Jennifer Van Hook & Frank D. Bean
Because residual techniques generate estimates of the enumerated portionof the unauthorized Mexican population, they underestimate the true sizeof the unauthorized population at any point in time by an amount equal to
the size of the unenumerated portion of the population. In order to develop esti-
mates of the total size and growth of the unauthorized Mexican population, it is
thus important that methods be developed for assessing the size and growth of the
unenumerated portion of the population. A number of researchers have made and
continue to make assumptions about the underenumeration rate for the unautho-
rized migrant population that are not substantially empirically based. For instance,
some have argued that the undercount rate for unauthorized migrants must be at
least as high as the highest rate among native-born groups. On the basis of this
logic, some analysts argue that undercoverage must be as high as 20 percent, the
rate exhibited by native-born African-American males (e.g., Passel, Siegel, and
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Robinson, 1982). Others have argued that the undercount rate in the 1990 Census
may be at least as high as it was in the 1980 Census (Woodrow, 1991). However, if
the unauthorized migrant population were more settled and less concentrated in
agricultural occupations in 1990 than in 1980, then the undercount rate in 1990
might be lower than it was in 1980.
Evidence about the size of the unenumerated portion of the unauthorized popu-
lation for the census years 1980 and 1990 has been obtained by employing one of
two different approaches. The first involves direct attempts to estimate first the
undercount rate through comparisons of U.S. Census results with external data
about small or localized populations, such as school enrollment records, in-depth
survey results, and the findings from ethnographic field research. Estimates of the
rate of undercount are then applied to the estimates of the size of the unauthorized
population enumerated in the Census in order to approximate the size of the entire
unauthorized population. The second approach entails first making independent
assessments of the entire unauthorized migrant population or national origin groups
within the population based on data sources and methods that are thought to be less
sensitive to undercount, and then comparing these estimates with the enumerated
population in order to estimate the rate of undercount. The results of both of these
approaches are reviewed below, first with respect to the 1980 Census enumeration
and then the 1990 Census enumeration.
Direct examinations of the level of undercount indicate that between 20 and
50 percent of the stock of unauthorized residents appeared to be missing from the
1980 Census enumeration. One study compared Los Angeles public school enroll-
ments with estimates of families with school-aged children in the 1980 Census
(Muller and Espenshade, 1985) (see Table 1). The results indicated that nearly all
families in Los Angeles were enumerated, including families of unauthorized mi-
grants. These results are consistent with the observation that the census is better at
enumerating settled populations such as unauthorized migrant families than single
migrants. The results of the study also suggested that the undercount rate of the
entire unauthorized population was probably no greater than 50 percent. This view
was substantiated by the results of a survey of Mexican adults living in Los Angles
County (Heer and Passel, 1985, 1987). Foreign-born respondents were asked whether
they were legal residents and if so, to show the interviewer their “Green Card” or
equivalent evidence of legal status. Foreign-born respondents who indicated they
were undocumented or failed to show evidence of legal status were enumerated as
unauthorized migrants. Comparisons of the results of the survey with the number
of unauthorized Mexican migrants enumerated in the 1980 Census (Passel, 1985)
suggested that the undercount rate among Mexican unauthorized migrants was
probably no greater than about 44 percent (Passel, 1985; Passel and Robinson,
1988) (See Table 2).
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Table 2
Direct and Indirect Estimates of the Undercount for the Unauthorized
Migrant Population in 1980 and 1990 U.S. Censuses
Estimated Unauthorized Pop’n Undercount
(in millions) Percentage
Total Mexican-born Total Mexican-born
1980 Census
Direct Estimates of Undercount 3.4-3.7a 2.0a 40-45% 44%
Heer and Passel (1985, 1987);
Passel (1985); Passel and
Robinson (1988)
Indirect Estimates of Undercount
Bean, et. al. (1983) na 1.5-3.8 na 25-70%b
Revisions of Bean, et. al. (1983)
Passel (1985) na 1.9 na 40%b
Bean, et. al. (1986) na 1.5-2.8 na 25-60%b
Passel and Robinson (1991) 2.5-3.5 1.9 18-42% 40%b
Borjas, Freeman and Lang (1991) na 1.9 na 40%b
1990 Census
Direct Estimates of Undercount
GAO (1993) 3.2a 2.6a 25% 25%
Indirect Estimates of Undercount
GAO (1993) 3.4 2.7 29%b 30%b
Woodrow (1991) 3.3 27%b
Warren (1995) 1.0 2.6 -92%b 8%b
na: estimate not available.
aImplied population based on estimate of undercount (see note below).
bImplied undercount rate based on estimate of population (see note below).
Note: The implied population and undercount rates are based on the assumption that 2.1
million unauthorized migrants (1.1 million unauthorized Mexicans) were enumerated in
the 1980 Census, and that 2.4 million (1.9 million Mexicans) were enumerated in the
1990 Census.
Indirect evidence of undercoverage suggests a narrower range of undercount
for the unauthorized population, falling roughly between 30 and 40 percent. As
noted above, Bean, King, and Passel (1983) attempted to estimate the number of
Mexicans who had emigrated to the United States by analyzing the age and sex
composition of the population enumerated in the 1980 Mexican Census. Due to
uncertainties about the patterns of undercount in the Mexican Census and the
age-sex composition of the emigrant population, Bean, et al. (1983) concluded
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that the number of unauthorized Mexicans living in the United States could be as
low as 1.5 and as high as 3.8 million. Comparing this range with the number
enumerated in the 1980 U.S. Census—1.131 million (Warren and Passel, 1987)—
the Bean, et al. (1983) estimate implies an undercount between 25 and 70 percent.
However, residual estimates of the Mexican unauthorized population enabled
researchers to narrow the range of assumptions used in this analysis (Bean, King,
and Passel, 1986; Passel, 1985; Passel and Robinson, 1988). The results of these
revisions indicated that there were probably as few as 1.5 to 1.9 million
unauthorized Mexicans migrants in 1980. Assuming that Mexicans comprise about
60 percent of the unauthorized population, this suggests that between 2.5 and 3.2
million unauthorized migrants were living in the U.S. in 1980. A comparison of
these estimates with the approximation of the enumerated unauthorized population
suggests an undercount rate of 25 to 40 percent among Mexicans and 18 to 36
percent among all unauthorized migrants.
Using a different approach, Borjas, Freeman, and Lang (1991) analyzed vital
statistics data to determine the number of unauthorized immigrants missed in the
1980 Census. The method they used is similar to that used by Robinson (1980),
except that it yields more precise results because it employs data on the number
of deaths to Mexican-born persons residing in the United States (such data became
available in 1984 when vital statistics began to record place of birth on death
certificates). The methodology used by Borjas, Freeman, and Lang rests on the
assumption that (1) all deaths to unauthorized and legally resident Mexican-born
persons that take place in the United States are recorded in the U.S. vital statistics
and (2), that the Mexican-born population experiences age specific death rates
that are quite similar to those experienced by the U.S. native-born population. If
these assumptions hold, then the total Mexican-born population living in the United
States may be approximated by dividing the number of deaths to Mexican-born
persons by the death rate. By comparing this estimate with the number of Mexican-
born persons enumerated in the 1980 Census, the number of unenumerated
Mexican-born persons can then be estimated. Borjas, Freeman, and Lang’s results
indicate that the number of unenumerated unauthorized Mexicans in 1990 was
about 800,000. They add this to Warren and Passel’s estimate to yield a total of
1.9 million unauthorized migrants from Mexico, which implies a 40 percent
undercount rate. The results of this method tend to be highly sensitive to the
underlying assumptions. Nevertheless, if the effects of its limitations could be
minimized, the method has potential because it is empirically based, it can provide
national level results, and it can be used to obtain annual estimates of the
unauthorized population by age, sex, and country-of-origin, as we demonstrate
below in an application to the 1990 Census enumeration of unauthorized Mexican-
born male and female migrants.
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To summarize, the results of undercount studies as well as comparisons of
external estimates with estimates of the enumerated unauthorized population
suggest that at least 60 percent of unauthorized residents were enumerated in the
1980 Census. This implies that there were at most about 3.4 million unauthorized
migrants and 1.9 million unauthorized Mexican migrants living in the United States
in 1980.
In the case of the 1990 Census enumeration, both direct and indirect evidence
suggest that the undercount rate for the unauthorized migrant population was lower
than it was in 1980. The direct evidence comes from a series of ethnographic stud-
ies conducted by researchers working with the Census Bureau. The main purpose
for conducting these studies was to gain qualitative information about the causes
of undercount, although the results of the research can also be used to shed light on
undercoverage rates among various populations. The ethnographic evaluations were
conducted in 29 different neighborhoods across the United States and Puerto Rico,
each of which contained about 100 households. These 29 neighborhoods were se-
lected because they were thought to contain large concentrations of difficult-to-
enumerate populations. Experienced ethnographers made an effort to become fa-
miliar with the households and household members who lived within the sample
area by accessing informal networks and gaining information about the actual resi-
dences of people. Their assessments of the numbers of residents were compared
with the official Census counts for the sample areas. The results of the compari-
sons showed that, among those living in areas containing large concentrations of
unauthorized migrants,1 the undercount rate was at most 25 to 30 percent. One
area, Long Island, had an undercount rate as high as 72 percent, but this result was
not typical. The other areas showed undercount rates as low as or lower than 28
percent, and five areas had undercount rates less than 18 percent (U.S. GAO, 1993;
de la Puenta, 1993).
Indirect evidence of the undercoverage of the unauthorized population in 1990
comes from only a few studies. Although Warren (1995) produces estimates of
the entire unauthorized population in 1990, his estimates appear too low and can-
not be relied upon. For instance, he puts the total Mexican-born unauthorized
population at 1.0 million, which is 92 percent lower than the residual estimate for
1990 (U.S. GAO, 1993). Woodrow (1991) makes a “point estimate” of the unau-
thorized population in 1990 of about 3.3 million. Woodrow (1991) constructs this
estimate by projecting forward the estimated 1980 unauthorized population to
1990, adjusting for net growth during the 1980s and legalizations due to the amnesty
provisions of IRCA.
Another study showing indirect evidence of the undercount rate in 1990 was
conducted by U.S. GAO (1993) in consultation with Corona Vasquez (1991). By
comparing the Mexican population enumerated in the Mexican Census in 1980
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with those enumerated in the 1990 Mexican Census, Corona Vasquez (1991)
estimated that 1.5 to 3 million Mexicans emigrated during the decade. By adjusting
this estimate for differential undercount and legal migration to the United States,
GAO (1993) concluded that about that about 2.7 million unauthorized Mexicans
were present in the United States in 1990. Assuming that Mexicans comprise about
80 percent of the total unauthorized migrant population (based on the 1989 CPS
residual estimates), GAO puts the total unauthorized migrant population at 3.4
million. Like the results obtained from the ethnographic studies, the Woodrow (1991)
and GAO (1993) estimates imply an undercount rate of about 30 percent. This
level of undercoverage implies an unauthorized population of about 3.4 million
(2.7 million Mexican unauthorized migrants) in 1990.
In what follows, we apply the “death registration” method used by Borjas,
Freeman, and Lang (1991) to obtain another estimate of the total unauthorized
Mexican population and the underenumeration rate for 1990. One of the drawbacks
of the death registration method is that it is sensitive to its underlying assumptions.
Nevertheless, if the data used to produce the final estimates were more carefully
selected so that confidence in the underlying assumptions was greater, then the
method could be used to obtain annual estimates of the total size of the unenumerated
unauthorized population by country of origin. In the section below, we describe
the method in greater detail and evaluate its underlying assumptions. Then, using
a range of plausible initial assumptions, we estimate likely ranges for the undercount
rate for the 1990 unauthorized Mexican migrant population.
Methodology
On the assumption that all deaths to Mexican-born persons living in the United
States are recorded as such in the U.S. vital statistics and that an appropriate and
supportable assumption about the death rate experienced by the Mexican-born
population can be made, then the number of Mexican-born persons living in the
United States by age and sex (L
x
) can be estimated by dividing the number of
deaths to Mexican-born persons living in the United States (d
x
) by the death rate
experienced by the population (m
x
):
L
x
 = d
x
/m
x 
where x indexes age and sex groupings (Borjas et al., 1991). The population esti-
mate L
x
 is an estimate of the person-years lived during the year and only approxi-
mates the population at the time of the census enumeration. By subtracting the
number of Mexican-born persons enumerated in the census (C
x
) from the esti-
mated population (L
x
), we can then estimate the size of the unenumerated portion
of the Mexican-born population (U
x
):
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U
x
 = L
x
 - C
x
If most legally resident Mexican-born persons are enumerated in the Census, then
it can be assumed that most of the unenumerated population, U
x
, consists of unau-
thorized persons. Thus, the total unauthorized population, T, can be estimated as
the sum of the unenumerated population, U (that is, U
x
 summed across all x’s), and
the estimated enumerated unauthorized population, I; and the undercount rate can
be estimated as U/T.
Underlying Assumptions
Number of Deaths (d
x
)
First, the quality of the estimates depend on the extent to which deaths to
Mexican-born persons that take place in the United States are recorded in U.S.
vital statistics, and further, that the U.S. vital statistics correctly identify place of
birth. It is reasonable to assume that the vast majority of deaths to foreign-born
persons are recorded in U.S. death records. As others have argued, it would be very
difficult, and there would be little motivation, to “hide” the death of a foreign-born
person living in the United States (Borjas et al., 1991). Even among infants whose
mothers had illegally crossed the border to give birth, very few infant deaths would
go unrecorded because the vast majority of births to unauthorized migrants take
place in hospitals (Forbes and Frisbie, 1991).
However, even if all deaths to foreign-born persons are recorded in the U.S.
vital statistics, place of birth of some foreign-born persons may be misrecorded as
U.S.-born on their death certificates. Unfortunately, little is known about the qual-
ity of data about place of birth on death certificates. However, some evidence sug-
gests that Hispanic ethnicity is inaccurately recorded on about 20 percent of infant
(Hahn, Mulinare and Teutsch, 1992) and seven percent of adult death certificates
(Sorlie and Johnson, 1992). Place of birth is likely to be more accurately recorded
than ethnicity because place of birth is easier to define, is not complicated by mixed
parentage, and does not depend on perceptions of self-identity (for a discussion on
the difficulties in measuring race/ethnicity in death data, see Hahn and Stroup,
1994). Borjas, Freeman and Lang (1991: 81) similarly argue that the error associ-
ated with misreporting place of birth is likely to be small: “While there may be
some tendency for friends and relatives of unauthorized aliens to disguise country
of origin, the head of Registration of Methods of the Public Health Service in-
formed us that in his opinion these records are no less accurate for unauthorized
aliens than for other groups, leading us to discount this potential source of error.”
In making estimates of the unenumerated Mexican-born population, we
assume the error associated with inaccurate reporting of place of birth to be no
560
greater than five percent. Hence, we employ two alternative sets of estimates of
the number of deaths of Mexican-born persons. The first, labeled “D1” in Table
3, is the number of deaths to Mexican-born U.S. residents recorded in the U.S.
vital statistics. The second, labeled “D2,” is the recorded number of deaths inflated
by five percent.
Mortality Schedule (m
x
)
The validity of the estimate also depends on the extent to which the age- and
sex-specific death rates used in making the estimate (m
x
) conform to the actual
mortality schedule experienced by the Mexican-born population. Unfortunately,
there is a great deal of uncertainty about the mortality schedule of this population
because of uncertainty in estimates of the population at risk of dying. Borjas, Freeman
and Lang (1991) assume that the Mexican-born population experience the same or
higher age-specific death rates as the entire U.S. population, and therefore use its
mortality schedule for making their estimates. However, evidence exists that there
are significant differences between the mortality schedules of the total U.S.
(dominated by non-Hispanic whites) and Hispanic origin populations. Estimates
made in the United States and Healthy People 2000 Review (U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services, 1992) indicate that Hispanic males aged 15 to 44
have age-specific death rates that range from 15 to 24 percent higher than non-
Hispanic whites, and Hispanic females and Hispanic males older than 44 have
rates that range from 9 to 32 percent lower. These estimates are unlikely to be
strongly biased due to uncertainty in the size of the population at risk of dying
because they closely correspond with other estimates that are not affected by this
type of error. In an analysis of data obtained from the National Longitudinal Mortality
study, in which approximately 115,000 men and women age 15 to 24 were
interviewed and then followed up five years later, Singh and Yu (1996) found that
Hispanic men and women age 15 to 24 experience mortality levels that are nearly
identical to (about 96 percent of) those reported by the United States and Healthy
People 2000 Review.
One potential source of error in the estimates made in the United States and
Healthy People 2000 Review is that the number of deaths to persons of Hispanic
origin could be underestimated due to inaccurate recording of ethnicity on death
certificates. As discussed above, this error has been found to be as large as seven
percent. We use three different mortality schedules in making alternative estimates
of the number of unenumerated Mexican-born persons living in the United States
in 1990. The first mortality schedule, labeled “M1” in Table 3, is that experienced
by the white population. The second, labeled “M2,” is the mortality schedule of
Hispanics as it is reported in the United States and Healthy People 2000 Review.
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Finally, the third mortality schedule, labeled “B3,” is the Hispanic schedule in
which each of the age- and sex-specific death rates are inflated by seven percent in
order to account for possible underreporting of Hispanic deaths.
Enumerated Mexican-born Population (C
x
)
The estimates of the unenumerated population also depend on the extent to
which Mexican-born persons who are enumerated in the 1990 U.S. Census
correctly identify their place of birth. Warren and Passel (1987) calculate that
Table 3
Underlying Assumptions Used in Estimates of the
Mexican-born Unenumerated Population, 1990
Deaths to Mex. Born Death Rate, 1990 Enumerated Mex. Born
(D1) (D2) (M1) (M2) (M3) (C1) (C2)
Age Observed Adj. +5% White Hispanic Hisp. +7% Observed Adjusted
Males 0-4 77 81 .0021 .0021 .0022 52,447. 89,336
5-9 40 42 .0002 .0002 .0003 78,906 165,818
10-14 43 45 .0003 .0003 .0003 105,632 163,248
15-19 417 438 .0011 .0013 .0014 216,179 254,156
20-24 949 996 .0015 .0017 .0018 396,386 400,525
25-34 1,539  1,616 .0018 .0022 .0023 720,819 720,819
35-44 954 1002 .0027 .0033 .0036 405,138 416,813
45-54 803 843 .0056 .0044 .0047 200,583 207,819
55-64 911 957 .0146 .0114 .0122 99,858 99,858
65-74 1,275 1,339 .0345 .0242 .0258 55,017 112,505
75-84 1,917 2,013 .0800 .0557 .0596 28,657 28,657
85+ 1,537 1,6134 .1922 .1306 .1397 9,892 9,892
SUM 10,462 10,985 2,369,514 2,669,446
Females 0-4 93 98 .0016 .0017 .0018 49,941 59,301
5-9 38 40 .0002 .0002 .0002 76,655 138,957
10-14 22 23 .0002 .0002 .0002 98,073 127,960
15-19 66 69 .0005 .0004 .0004 165,074 178,244
20-24 107 112 .0005 .0004 .0004 254,153 254,153
25-34 234 246 .0006 .0006 .0006 518,797 518,797
35-44 293 308 .0012 .0011 .0012 344,507 369,850
45-54 419 440 .0032 .0023 .0024 192,755 211,313
55-64 674 708 .0082 .0059 .0063 109,420 127,744
65-74 1,122 1,178 .0195 .0146 .0156 63,470 144,398
75-84 1,951 2,049 .0494 .0352 .0376 40,698 52,452
85+ 2,098 2,203 .1554 .1082 .1158 14,957 15,623
SUM 7,117 7,473 1,928,500 2,198,792
Note:  Deaths include deaths to Mexican-born U.S. residents only
562
215,000 Mexican-born people misreported themselves as U.S. born in the 1980
Census. Woodrow (1991) estimates that by November, 1989, about 636,000
Mexican-born persons inaccurately reported as U.S. born in the CPS. To obtain
this figure, Woodrow (1991) first estimated the total U.S.-born Mexican-origin
population as 8,493,000 persons (a figure reached by projecting forward the
estimate from 1980), and then she subtracted this figure from the number
enumerated in the 1989 CPS.
In making our estimates, we employ two approximations of the total enumerated
Mexican-born population. The first, labeled “C1” in Table 3, is the Mexican-born
population as it is observed in the 1990 Census. The second, “C2,” is the observed
population adjusted upward for inaccurate reporting of place of birth. The “C2”
population was arrived at by adding to the observed Mexican-born population an
estimate of the number of people who reported themselves as U.S. born but who
are actually Mexican born. The number of misreporters, in turn, was estimated as
the difference between an independent estimate of the Mexican U.S.-born population
(Woodrow’s (1991) estimate projected forward from November, 1989 to April,
1990) and that observed in the U.S. Census.
Unenumerated Mexican-born Population (U)
Another assumption made by Borjas, Freeman, and Lang (1991) is that their
estimate of the unenumerated Mexican-born population, U, consists entirely of
unauthorized migrants. However, the legal Mexican-born population is likely to
have age- and sex-specific underenumeration rates that are at least as high as those
among non-Hispanic whites. Therefore, the unenumerated portion of the popula-
tion would consist of both legal and unauthorized Mexican-born persons. Accord-
ingly, we subtract from our estimate of U (i.e., the sum of U
x
) the approximate
number of unenumerated legal Mexican-born persons.
We approximate the unenumerated legal population in the following way.
Several researchers have put the 1990 enumerated unauthorized population at about
2.4 million (Woodrow, 1991; GAO, 1993; Clark, et al., 1994). We approximate
the Mexican component of the 1990 unauthorized population as proportional to
the relative sizes of the Mexican-born and total unauthorized population
enumerated in the 1989 CPS, such that the Mexican-born unauthorized population
in 1990 is estimated at 1.908 million. The remaining enumerated Mexican-born
population (including those who misreported as U.S.-born), numbering 2.960
million, is classified as legally resident. We then allocate the legal and unauthorized
Mexican-born populations into age- and sex-categories by assuming that the
unauthorized population has the same age and sex composition as Mexican-born,
non-citizen, post 1982 arrivals. Finally, we apply the age- and sex-specific
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undercount rates of the white population (Robinson et al., 1993) to our
approximation of the legal population. As a result of this procedure, we estimate
that about 34,160 legal Mexican-born males (2.1 percent) and 5,249 females (0.4
percent) are missing from the 1990 Census. Accordingly, we subtract 34,160 from
our estimates of the unenumerated male population, and 5,249 from the
unenumerated female population.
Correspondence Between Person-years (L
x
) and the
Number Eligible to be Enumerated
In estimating the number of unenumerated Mexican unauthorized migrants,
the death registration method compares an estimate of the person-years lived in the
United States by Mexican-born persons (L
x
) with the number of such persons
enumerated in the census (C
x
). This procedure relies on the assumption that L
x
closely approximates the number of Mexican-born persons who were eligible to be
enumerated in the census (that is, they were living in the United States on April 1,
1990). For this assumption to hold, all Mexican-born persons living in the United
States on April 1, 1990 who subsequently die in 1990, must have died in the United
States. If a significant number were to leave the United States after April 1, then
their deaths would not be recorded in the U.S. vital statistics, and the estimates of
L
x
 and U
x
 would be too low. U
x
 could even be negative if more people were counted
in the census than were estimated based on the number of deaths. We expect that
this would be most evident among older people because they are more likely to
return to Mexico mid-year because of an illness or retirement. To minimize this
type of error, we exclude estimates of U
x
 for the age-sex groups in which the estimate
of U
x
 is negative from the sum total of the unenumerated population estimates.
That is, when summing across all U
x
’s, only the positively valued estimates are
included in the sum.
In addition, for the above assumption to hold, all deaths that take place in the
United States to Mexican-born persons must be due to those who were living in
the United States on April 1. If a significant number were to migrate to the United
States after April 1 and subsequently die, then L
x
 and U
x
 would be overestimated.
We expect that this would occur more often among those who work seasonally in
the United States, such as working-aged men. Unlike the first type of error de-
scribed above, which can be detected in part by negatively-signed estimates of
U
x
, this type of error is difficult to identify. Hence, we do not attempt to adjust
our estimates to take into account this kind of discrepancy. Rather, we simply
note that this type of phenomenon is likely to lead to overestimates of the number
of unenumerated Mexican-born persons living in the United States at the time of
the U.S. Census.
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1990 Estimates
We produce a series of estimates of the number of unenumerated unauthorized
Mexican-born persons living in the United States in 1990. An estimate is made for
each combination of the assumptions regarding the numbers of deaths, different
mortality schedules, and sizes of the enumerated Mexican-born population. Since
we employ two alternative estimates of the number of deaths, three alternative
mortality schedules, and two alternative enumerated populations, we make a total
of twelve estimates (2 x 2 x 3 = 12).
Table 4 illustrates how one such estimate is constructed. In this example, the
unadjusted number of deaths to Mexican-born persons (D1), the mortality sched-
ule experienced by white men and women (M1), and the unadjusted enumerated
Mexican-born population (C1) are used to construct the approximation. The first
and second columns show the number of deaths (d
x
) and the age- and sex-specific
death rates (m
x
), respectively. Dividing the number of deaths by the death rate, we
obtain the third column, an estimate of the total Mexican-born population in 1990.
The fourth column displays the enumerated Mexican-born population (C
x
), and the
final column shows the difference between the total and enumerated population
estimates, that is, the unenumerated Mexican-born population (U
x
). As expected,
the estimates of U
x
 tend to be negative at the older ages, particularly among males.
Summing across the positive values, we obtain an approximation of 686,952
unenumerated males and 173,068 unenumerated females. When we subtract the
estimated number of unenumerated legal migrants from these figures, we obtain
estimates of approximately 653,000 unenumerated unauthorized males and 168,000
unenumerated unauthorized females. If we assume an enumerated unauthorized
migrant population of 1.9 million (1.1 million males, 0.8 million females), then
these estimates imply an underenumeration rate of about 37 percent among males,
17 percent among females, and 30 percent among both sexes combined.
Table 5 presents estimates of the unenumerated unauthorized Mexican-born
population, the total unauthorized population, and the implied undercount rate
for each of the twelve combinations of underlying assumptions. The estimates of
the total unauthorized Mexican migrant population range 2.1 to 2.9 million, with
the interquartile range spanning 2.2 to 2.6 million. The undercount rates
corresponding with the interquartile range of estimates ranges from only 14 to 26
percent. Even the highest estimate of 2.9 million unauthorized migrants implies
an undercount rate of only 34 percent. The estimates of the underenumeration
rate are higher for males, among whom as many as 40 percent may not have been
enumerated. Finally, we note that of the three underlying assumptions, those
pertaining to the mortality schedule and the enumerated population tend to exert
the greatest influence on the estimates.
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Table 4
Example of an Estimate of the Unenumerated
Mexican-born Population, 1990
(Using Underlying Assumptions D1, M1, and C1)
Total Pop’n Enumerated Unenum.
Deaths Death Rate (Person-Years) Population Population
Age (D1) (M1) (L) = D1/M1 (C1) (U) = L - C1
Males 0-4 77 .0021 36,858 52,447 -15,589
5-9 40 .0002 169,062 78,906 90,156
10-14 43 .0003 148,541 105,632 42,909
15-19 417 .0011 363,310 216,179 147,131
20-24 949 .0015 649,864 396,386 253,478
25-34 1,539 .0018 874,096 720,819 153,278
35-44 954 .0027 351,932 405,138 -53,206
45-54 803 .0056 143,729 200,583 -56,854
55-64 911 .0146 62,512 99,858 -37,346
65-74 1,275 .0345 37,005 55,017 -18,012
75-84 1,917 .0800 23,952 28,657 -4,705
85+ 1,537 .1922 7,999 9,892 -1,893
SUM (of Positive Values) 2,868,861 2,369,514 686,952
Females 0-4 93 .0016 57,642 49,941 7,701
5-9 38 .0002 221,636 76,655 144,981
10-14 22 .0002 118,459 98,073 20,386
15-19 66 .0005 145,726 165,074 -19,348
20-24 107 .0005 230,551 254,153 -23,602
25-34 234 .0006 380,792 518,797 -138,005
35-44 293 .0012 245,964 344,507 -98,543
45-54 419 .0032 132,979 192,755 -59,776
55-64 674 .0082 82,647 109,420 -26,773
65-74 1,122 .0195 57,580 63,470 -5,890
75-84 1,951 .0494 39,527 40,698 -1,171
85+ 2,098 .1554 13,504 14,957 -1,453
SUM (of Positive Values) 1,727,006 1,928,500 173,068
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In conclusion, the death registration method produces estimates of the
underenumeration rate that correspond with other evidence about undercount.
Namely, the underenumeration rate for unauthorized Mexican migrants in 1990
appears not to be as high as it was in 1980, most likely is no greater than 35
percent and may even be as low as 15 to 25 percent. In addition, the results
corroborate other evidence that the female unauthorized migrant population is
better represented in the U.S. Census enumeration than the corresponding male
population. Nevertheless, the results also show that the death registration method
produces estimates that are highly sensitive to their underlying assumptions.
Although the method has a great deal of potential for use in the future, the quality
of the estimates could be greatly improved if better information about the mortality
rates experienced by the foreign-born population and the enumerated population
were available.
Note
1. These were nine areas located in Long Island, rural Marion County, Oregon, Houston,
Bronx, San Diego, San Francisco, Miami, rural Santa Barbara County, and New Orleans.
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QUANTIFICATION OF MIGRATION
The Mexican-origin Population
of the United States in the
Twentieth Century
Jennifer E. Glick & Jennifer Van Hook
The Mexican-origin population in the United States has grown substantiallyover the last century. It consists of several different components and thecontribution of the Mexican-origin population to the size of the United
States population has increased and continues to increase as a result of growth in
each of these components. One part of this population consists of those individuals
born in the United States who can trace their ancestry to Mexico. Another component
consists of those individuals born in Mexico who have subsequently moved to the
United States. The latter group (the Mexican-born population in the United States)
can be broken down into three groups: naturalized citizens, legal immigrants and
unauthorized migrants from Mexico. Our goal is to provide a general picture of
both the past and present size, growth and distribution of the Mexican-origin
population within the United States. The following focuses on changes in each
group within this population. We begin by examining changes in the way this group
has been measured over time. Since the United States Census is the primary source
of this information, we focus on changes in these data. Next, we discuss the patterns
of growth in the Mexican-origin population over the past century. Finally, we turn
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to the potential for future growth and the geographic distribution of the Mexican-
origin population in the United States.
Measurement of the Mexican-origin Population
“Ethnicity denotes a social identity deriving from group membership based on
common race, religion, language, national origin, or some combination of these
factors (Bean and Tienda, 1987: 38).” In part because ethnicity is a multidimen-
sional concept, the way in which the Mexican-origin population has been defined
by the United States Census Bureau has changed over the years, during which time
Mexican ethnicity has been identified by a number of different indicators (see Table
1). Prior to 1970, Mexican ethnicity could be identified through the use of various
objective markers, including place of birth, parents’ place of birth, mother tongue,
and Spanish surname. While serving well to identify Mexican-origin persons who
were either foreign born or whose parents were born in Mexico, these identifiers
failed to adequately identify third or higher generation Mexican-origin persons,
especially those who no longer speak Spanish at home or who no longer have a
Spanish surname due to intermarriage. These limitations are especially problem-
atic for identifying the Mexican-origin population given the group’s long history
in the United States.
Table 1
Identifiers Available in the United States Census or Current Population
Survey for the Hispanic Population, 1950–1996
Home Spanish
 Language  Origin
Birth- Foreign Mother Other than Spanish1 or
Year place Parentage Tongue English Surname Descent Ancestry
1994-96 yes yes no no no yes no
1990 yes no no yes no yes yes
1980 yes no no yes yes yes yes
1970 yes yes yes no yes yes no
1960 yes yes  yes 2 no yes no no
1950 yes yes no no yes no no
Source (1950–1980) Bean and Tienda, 1987; (1990 Census and 1994-96 CPS) Constructed
by the authors.
1 Only available for five southwestern states.
2 Available for 25% of the foreign-born population
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In response to these concerns, a new measure of ethnicity was added to the
1970 Census in which Mexican ethnicity could be identified through the use of a
subjective item, ethnic origin. The census measure of ethnic origin allowed re-
spondents of any generation to identify themselves as having Mexican ethnicity.
This measure was included in the 1980 and 1990 Censuses as well. Thus, measures
of the size and distribution of the Mexican-origin population since 1970 depend on
the ethnic self identification of individuals whereas measures in previous years
rely upon the researchers’ ethnic classification based on several indicators.
Size of the Mexican-origin Population: 1900–Present
Despite the many changes in the measurement of the ethnic composition of
the United States, it is clear that the Mexican-origin population has grown steadily
from 385,000 in 1910 to over 18 million in 1996, as demonstrated in Table 2. This
Table 2
Total Mexican-origin Population in the United States: 1900–1996
Total Mexican-
origin Population Percent of
Year (in Thousands) Total U.S. Population
1996 18,039 1 6.8
1990 13,393 5.4
1980 8,740 3.9
1970 4,532 2.2
1960 1,736 2 1.0
1950 1,346 0.9
1940 1,077 0.8
1930 1,423 1.2
1920 740 0.7
1910 385 0.4
Source: U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service. Historical Statistics of the United
States, Part 1 (1975), U..S. Bureau of the Census, 1980 and 1990, and March Cur-
rent Population Survey, 1995 and 1996.
1 These figures are based on CPS data that are adjusted for undercount and thus
are not comparable to census figures.
2 Mexican-origin population calculated as a sum of the Mexican-born population and
natives of Mexican parentage.
574
population nearly doubled in size in every decade except for the period from 1930
to 1960. Some of this growth in the Mexican-origin population can be attributed to
natural increase of the U.S.-born population. Mexican American fertility rates are
approximately 35 to 40 percent higher than those of Anglos (Bean and Tienda,
1987), while each of these groups appear to experience comparable mortality rates.
Thus, even in the absence of migration, the Mexican-origin population would be
expected to increase relative to the Anglo population.
Despite its relatively high rate of natural increase, the present day size of the
Mexican-origin population in the United States is mostly attributable to immigra-
tion from Mexico during the twentieth century. Edmonston and Passel (1994)
estimate that the Mexican-origin population would only have been 14% of its
current size had there been no immigration from Mexico in the last 95 years.
Moreover, the number of immigrants from Mexico living in the United States has
been increasingly large both in terms of absolute numbers and in comparison to
other immigrant groups. Table 3 presents the size of the Mexican-born population
in the United States since 1900. The flow of immigrants from Mexico has fluctu-
ated throughout the twentieth century but it is clear that this population has be-
come an increasingly large component of the total foreign-born population in the
United States. By 1996, 27.2 percent of immigrants living in the U.S. originated
from Mexico.
Accompanying the growth in the stock of the Mexican foreign-born population
in this century, is growth in the flow of immigrants arriving from Mexico. While
the flow of immigrants has varied throughout the century, Mexican immigrants
have become an increasingly large proportion of the total immigrant stream. Table
4 presents the number of Mexican immigrants arriving in the United States in each
decade since 1900. Although the border between Mexico and the United States
obtained its modern definition in 1848, records on the Mexican immigration to the
United States were not kept until 1908. The accuracy of such data is dubious,
moreover, because the border region at that time was largely unsupervised and the
nature of immigration from Mexico at the very beginning of the twentieth century
is unknown. Two of the border states (Arizona and New Mexico) were only territories
under U.S. supervision until 1912.
Nevertheless, it can be seen that fluctuation in the growth of the Mexican-
born population in the United States has been due to the political climate in the
United States as well as economic demands for labor north of the border. The first
large-scale increase in immigration from Mexico onto U.S. territory can be seen
occurring between 1911 and 1920, during which time over 200,000 immigrants
arrived from Mexico. Increased demands for labor brought about by the exclusion
of Chinese workers in 1882, Japanese workers in 1907 and a shortage of European
immigrants during World War I encouraged Mexican migration. Numbers of
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Mexican immigrants continued to increase as the federal government exempted
the Western Hemisphere from the national quota laws of the 1920s and early 1930s
in the name of Pan Americanism which was also encouraged by many in the
southwest who looked towards Mexico for cheap labor (Reimers, 1992). During
the 1920s, over 450,000 Mexican immigrants entered the United States, comprising
11.2 percent of the total immigrant in-flow. However, when the demand for jobs
increased during the Great Depression of the 1930s, the United States repatriated
many Mexican-origin individuals and the once high levels of Mexican immigration
were greatly reduced.
Levels of immigration from Mexico once again increased to pre-1930s levels
with the introduction of the Bracero Program from 1943-1964. Starting in World
War II, non-Mexican farm workers in California sought higher paying jobs in the
defense industry, reducing the available labor supply for farmers. This prompted
growers to place pressure on Congress to admit temporary workers, or braceros,
Table 3
Total Mexican-born Population in the United States: 1900–1996
Mexican-born Percent of the
Population Percent of the  Total Mexican-
Year (in Thousands) Total Foreign-born  origin Population
1996 6,679 1 27.2 37.0
1990 4,298 21.7 32.1
1980 2,199 15.6 25.2
1970 759 7.9 16.7
1960 576 2 5.9 33.2
1950 454 4.4 33.7
1940 377 3.2 35.0
1930 617 4.3 43.4
1920 486 3.5 65.7
1910 222 1.6 57.7
1900 103 1.0
Source: U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service. Historical Statistics of the United States,
Part 1 1975), U.S. Bureau of the Census. 1980 and 1990, and March Current Population
Survey, 1995 and 1996.
1 These figures are based on CPS data that are adjusted for undercount and thus are not
comparable to census figures.
2 Mexican-origin population calculated as a sum of the Mexican-born population and natives of
Mexican parentage.
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from Mexico. During the peak of the program in 1956, 445,197 workers were
recruited (Reimers, 1992). Although these workers were expected to be temporary
residents in the United States, many stayed along with their family members. While
growers fought to retain the supply of cheap Mexican labor, Congress refused to
extend the program beyond 1964.
Despite the end of the Bracero Program, both unauthorized and legal
migration from Mexico has continued to grow during the past three decades. In
particular, the numbers of Mexican immigrants admitted to the United States have
recently increased dramatically, reaching 1.7 million or 22.6 percent of the flow
in the 1980s and 1.5 million or 28.5 percent of the flow in just the first half of
the 1990s. The size of the legal population increased dramatically during the late
Table 4
Immigration from Mexico to the United States: 1900–1995
Number Arriving Percent of All
from Mexico Immigrants Arriving
Years in the Decade in the Decade
A. Published Totals
1991-1995 1,490,040 28.5
1981-1990 1,655,843 22.6
1971-1980 640,294 14.2
1961-1970 453,937 13.7
1951-1960 299,811 11.9
1941-1950 60,589 5.9
1931-1940 22,319 4.2
1921-1930 459,287 11.2
1911-1920 219,004 3.8
1901-1910 49,642 0.6
B. Numbers of Mexican Arrivals Excluding IRCA legalizations1
1991-1995 440,662 11.3
1981-1990 693,213 11.6
Source: U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1995 Statistical Yearbook of
the Immigration and Naturalization Service. U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington, D.C., 1997.
1 Numbers of those legalizing their immigration status from the Statistical Yearbook
of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (1989–1995).
577
1980s and early 1990s due to the amnesty provisions of the 1986 Immigration
Reform and Control Act (IRCA). Under IRCA those unauthorized migrants who
had lived in the United States since 1982 or who had been working in the United
States in agriculture for at least six months were offered the opportunity to legalize
their migration status. Numbers of those entering the United States are inflated
because those legalizing their status under the IRCA provisions are included in
these counts. Between 1989 and 1994, IRCA offered legal status to approximately
2 million unauthorized Mexican agricultural workers and other migrants who
had been living illegally in the United States since 1982. Panel B of Table 4
illustrates the effect of the legalizations under IRCA on the size of the flow of
immigrants from Mexico. When those legalizing their status under the amnesty
provisions are removed from the official numbers of immigrants arriving in the
decade, the size of the Mexican immigrant population entering between 1981
and 1995 is greatly reduced and is more comparable to the size of the flow during
the 1970s.
The component of the Mexican-born population in the United States that
receives the most popular attention is the unauthorized migrant population. While
this segment of the Mexican-origin population in the United States is most visible
in the media, its size is often debated because it is difficult to accurately evaluate.
Table 5 presents the estimated size of the unauthorized Mexican migrant population
from 1980 to 1996. The methods used to arrive at these estimates are presented in
Table 5
Examples of Various Estimates of the Unauthorized
Mexican Migrant Population
Unauthorized Mexican Migrant Population as a Percentage of:
Est. Number
of Unauthorized Total Foreign- Mexican Foreign- Mexican-origin Total U.S.
Year Mexican Migrants born Pop’n born Pop’n Population Population
1996 2,700 11.0 40.4 15.0 1.0
1990 1,3211 6.7 30.7 9.9 0.5
1980 1,1311 8.0 51.4 12.9 0.5
Source: Estimates of enumerated unauthorized Mexican migrant Population from (1980)
Warren and Passel, 1987; (1990) Warren, 1995; Estimates of the total unauthorized Mexican
migrant popultion (1996) INS (1997).
1
 Estimate includes only the enumerated portion of the Mexican unauthorized population.
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the separate appendix, “Issues in Estimating Unauthorized Migration to the United
States.” The estimated enumerated unauthorized Mexican population in 1980 was
about 8 percent of the U.S. foreign-born population, 51 percent of the total Mexican-
born population in the United States and about 13 percent of the total Mexican-
origin population in the United States. By 1996, the unauthorized Mexican population
had increased to represent nearly 11 percent of the foreign-born population in the
United States, but was only 36 percent of the Mexican foreign-born population.
Although unauthorized migration from Mexico continues, legal immigrants
constitute by far the largest component of the Mexican-born population in the United
States despite the attention given to unauthorized migrants.
The last component of the Mexican-born population in the United States are
those immigrants who have become citizens of the United States. Table 6 presents
the numbers of Mexicans who naturalized for selected years going back to 1960.
Compared to other immigrant groups in the United States, Mexican immigrants
have been slow to naturalize (Grebler, 1966; Bean and Tienda, 1987). There may
be several factors influencing this comparatively low rate of naturalization but
English language ability is frequently cited as the largest barrier to citizenship
among Mexican immigrants (Reimers, 1992). It is clear from Table 6 that the
proportion of Mexicans who are becoming citizens is increasing over time.
Immigrants must reside in the United States for five years before becoming citizens
of the United States. The number of immigrants becoming citizens is likely to
increase substantially in the near future as those legalizing their status under IRCA
become eligible for naturalization (Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1992).
Table 6
Number of Naturalizations among Mexican-born Persons in the
United States: 1950–1996
Number of Number per 10,000
Naturalizations Mexican-born Persons
Year Among Mexicans In the United States
1995 67,238 110.9
1990 17,564 40.9
1980 9,341 4.2
1970 6,195 0.8
1960 5,913 1.0
Source: U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (1996).
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Projected Growth of the Mexican-origin Population
As the preceding discussion has illustrated, the Mexican-origin population in
the United States has grown substantially over the last century and this group
continues to make up an ever increasing proportion of the United States population.
The growth of the Mexican-origin population is expected continue into the next
century as well due to both natural increase and increased net immigration. According
to the population projections made by the Census Bureau, the Hispanic-origin
population will grow more in the next sixty years than all of the other racial and
ethnic groups combined (Day, 1995). Table 7 presents the projections of the size of
the Hispanic-origin population based on the U.S. Census projection from 1995.
This projection assumes that the Hispanic population will have the highest annual
number of immigrants entering the country than any other racial/ethnic group
(350,000 annually). The Census Bureau projections are based on the assumption
Table 7
Projected Size of the Mexican-origin Population
in the United States: 1995–2040
Projected Size (in Thousands) for the:
Mexican Mexican
Population Population
Year Hispanic Population (Estimate 1)1 (Estimate 2)2
1995 26,936 16,135 16,337
2000 31,366 18,788 19259
2010 41,139 24,642 25,876
2020 52,652 31,539 33,908
2030 65,570 39,276 43,211
2040 80,164 48,018 54,031
Source: Projection of the Hispanic Population from Day, Jennifer Cheeseman, Popu-
lation Projections of the United States by Age, Sex, Race and Hispanic Origin: 1995
to 2050. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, pp. 25-1130, U.S.
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1996.
Projection of the Mexican-origin population constructed by the authors.
1 Assuming that the proportion of the Hispanic population that is of Mexican origin
remains the same as observed in 1990 (59.9%).
2 Assuming the Mexican-origin population will continue to increase as a proportion
of the total Hispanic population by 1.5 percentage points per decade.
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that the Hispanic-origin population will continue to have higher fertility rates than
other racial/ethnic groups. Fertility among Hispanics is currently matched only by
Asians in the United States.
These projections indicate that the Hispanic-origin population will reach a
size of 80.1 million by 2040, or nearly one quarter of the total U.S. population
(Day, 1995). The last two columns of Table 7 present the population projection for
the Mexican-origin population alone. Unfortunately, the Census Bureau does not
make population projections for the Mexican-origin population separately from
the entire Hispanic-origin population. Therefore, we adjust the Census Bureau pro-
jection for the entire Hispanic-origin population to approximate the projections for
the Mexican-origin population. We make our projections by adjusting the Census
projections based on the proportion of the Hispanic-origin population that is of
Mexican origin. Two projections are presented each of which is based on slightly
different assumptions. The first projection assumes that the proportion of the His-
panic populations that is Mexican origin will stay the same. The Mexican-origin
population represented roughly sixty percent of the Hispanic-origin population in
1990. Our first projection for the Mexican-origin population, therefore, is made by
simply taking sixty percent of the estimate for the entire Hispanic-origin popula-
tion made by the Census Bureau. The second projection for the Mexican-origin
population presented in Table 7 assumes that the Mexican-origin population will
continue to increase as a proportion of the Hispanic-origin population over the
next several decades.1 Specifically, we assume that the Mexican-origin population
will increase from 60 percent of the total Hispanic-origin population in the United
States in 1990 to 67.4 percent of the Hispanic population in 2040. Based on either
set of assumptions, the Mexican-origin population in the United States will more
than double in size over the next sixty years. In fact, these projections indicate that
the Mexican-origin population alone will be larger than the projected size of the
Black population by the year 2040.
The projections presented in Table 7 make it clear that the Mexican-origin
population in the United States will continue to increase for some time. However,
there are other factors beyond natural increase that could alter the amount of growth
of the Mexican-origin population. Changes in immigration or ethnic identity could
affect future growth. For example, as those who legalized under IRCA become
eligible for citizenship in the United States, they will also be eligible to petition to
bring family members to this country (Immigration and Naturalization Service,
1992). Mexican immigrants have the largest pool of relatives who could become
migrants to the United States under the family reunification provisions than any
other foreign-born group in the United States (Schulte and Wolf, 1994). This factor
would result in an even more rapid growth of the Mexican-origin population than
was projected in Table 7.
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Another source of change that could affect the projected size of the Mexican-
origin population is changing rates of intermarriage and/or changing self
identification among the children of mixed-ethnicity parents. The projections in
Table 7 do not account for the possibility of changes in the patterns of exogamy.
Intermarriage between racial/ethnic groups may alter the way future generations
identify themselves given the present categories of race and ethnicity. Therefore,
differential patterns of exogamy may alter the projected size of these groups (Bean
et al., 1997). By 1990, 20.8 percent of Mexican-origin wives were married to non
Mexican-origin husbands (Bean et al., 1997).
Edmonston, Lee and Passel (1994) have presented population projections
adjusted for differential exogamy rates among Hispanics and other racial/ethnic
groups. Increases in exogamy are built into their projections. Their estimates,
presented in Table 8, show that the Hispanic-origin population in the United States
could vary from between 50.9 million and 77.4 million people by 2040 depending on
actual rates of exogamy. Table 8 also presents projections for the Mexican-origin
population based on the same patterns of exogamy built into the Edmonston, Lee and
Passel projections for the entire Hispanic-origin population. These projections
demonstrate that, if the Mexican-origin population remains approximately 60% of
the total Hispanic-origin population, individuals of Mexican origin will number
Table 8
Projected Size of the Mexican-origin Population in the United States
Adjusted for Potential Exogamy: 1995–2040
Hispanic-origin Pop’n (in millions) Mexican-origin Pop’n (in millions)
Single Ancestry Single and Single Ancestry Single and
Only1 Mixed Ancestry2 Only3 Mixed Ancestry4
1990 22.4 22.4 13.4 13.4
2000 28.6 31.9 17.1 19.1
2010 35.0 42.1 21.0 25.2
2020 41.1 53.0 24.6 31.7
2030 46.5 65.0 27.9 38.9
2040 50.9 77.5 30.5 46.4
Source: Bean, Cushing, Haynes and Van Hook (1997), Edmonston, Lee and Passel (1994).
Notes: 1 Both parents are of Hispanic origin.
2
 At least one parent is of Hispanic origin.
3
 Both parents are of Mexican origin.
4
 At least one parent is of Mexican origin.
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between 30 and 46 million by the year 2040 depending upon their rates of exogamy.
These projections for the Mexican-origin population range as low as 63 percent of
those Census Bureau projections that do not consider the affect of exogamy on the
size of the Hispanic-origin population. Thus, these adjusted projections indicate that
the Mexican-origin population may not grow as quickly as suggested by those
projections that are not adjusted for differential rates of exogamy.
The Geographic Distribution of the
Mexican-origin Population
In addition to its changing size and changing sources of growth, the Mexican-
origin population has also experienced changes in its geographic distribution within
the United States. Historically, the Mexican-origin population has been concen-
trated in the southwestern part of the country. Five states, Arizona, California,
Colorado, New Mexico and Texas, contain the majority of the Mexican-origin popu-
lation. The proximity of these states to Mexico made them a likely point of desti-
nation for immigrants. Mexican immigrants have been more geographically con-
centrated than their U.S.-born counterparts although both groups are more likely to
be found in the Western or Southern States than other Hispanic groups. Whereas
Mexican immigration prior to World War II was largely to rural southwestern areas
where jobs in agriculture, mining and the railroads were found, more recent mi-
grants have become increasingly urban although still concentrated in the south-
west (Bean and Tienda, 1987).
Table 9 presents the geographic distribution of the Mexican-origin population
from 1950 to 1990. By 1960 two states, California and Texas, contained the major-
ity of the Mexican-origin population. However, the distribution of the Mexican-
origin population within these states has changed significantly over time. For ex-
ample, in 1960, Texas and California each contained around 31 percent of the
Mexican-origin population. By 1990, California had 45 percent of this population
while Texas had less than 30 percent. Given that the size of the Mexican-origin
population was so similar in both states in 1960, the large increase in California
suggests that it has become an increasingly attractive destination for migrants. In
addition to a shifting a distribution of Mexican-origin individuals within the five
southwestern states, there has been a decrease in the proportion of this population
found only in these five states. In 1970, 87 percent of the Mexican-origin popula-
tion lived in one of the five southwestern states. By 1990, 84 percent of this popu-
lation did so. Other states such as Illinois, Michigan and Washington have attracted
increasingly large Mexican-origin populations as well (Bean and Tienda, 1987).
The decreasing geographic concentration of this group is likely to continue as the
Mexican-origin population continues to grow in the next century.
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Conclusion
While persons of Mexican ancestry have been part of the population of this
country since its beginnings, they have become an increasingly large component
of the population over the course of the twentieth century. This growth is a result of
both natural increase and immigration from Mexico with legal migration contrib-
uting the most to the overall growth. The flow of migrants from Mexico to the
United States has fluctuated with changes in the political and economic climates of
both countries but has increased overall. The proportion of the Mexican-origin
population in the United States made up of immigrants had been decreasing through-
out the beginning of the century but has increased since 1960. Because the recent
flow of immigrants from Mexico has been so large, the proportion of the Mexican-
origin population that is foreign born will continue to be high and may, in fact, be
larger than that of other ethnic groups in the United States.
The Mexican-origin population has and will continue to have an impact on the
ethnic makeup of the United States. Not only will the proportion of the Mexican-
origin population that is foreign born continue to be large but the Mexican-origin
population in the United States will become an increasingly important component
of the overall population, as the projections presented above indicate, probably
becoming the largest minority group early in the next century. This growth has
implications for the future social, economic and political conditions of the United
States. Its young age structure relative to non-Hispanic whites, for example, means
that the Mexican-origin population will contribute more to the working-age popu-
lation, will have a greater stake in the educational system and may, as a result,
become more politically active. In addition, since the Mexican-origin population
in the United States will continue to be made up of many foreign-born individuals,
both immigration policy in the United States and relations with Mexico will have
an increasing impact on this portion of the U.S. population.
Note
1. According to the results from the Current Population Surveys (March, 1986 and
1996), the Mexican-origin population has increased from 62 percent of the Hispanic-origin
population in 1986 to 63.4 percent in 1996.
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QUANTIFICATION OF MIGRATION
Emigration: Implications for U.S.
Immigration Policy Research
Ellen Percy Kraly
Introduction
Discussions of U.S. immigration trends and policy often rest on an implicitassumption that international migration to the United States is permanent.Research has revealed otherwise. Social demographic studies have shown
that immigration has been related to significant levels of emigration of aliens and
the foreign born throughout this century and continuing through the contemporary
era. Between 1900 and 1980 approximately 30 million immigrants came to the
United States, of which nearly 10 million returned or moved on to another country
(Warren and Kraly 1985). The U.S. Bureau of the Census estimates that 195,000
foreign born residents emigrate from the United States each year. Moreover, the
significance of emigration of immigrants appears to be characteristic of contemporary
immigrant receiving nations. Among every 100 immigrants to Canada, 30 to 45 are
estimated to eventually emigrate (Beaujot and Rappak 1986); of the settlers arriving
in Australia since the second world war, perhaps one quarter have permanently
departed (Lukomskyj and Richards 1986).
While emigration is increasingly identified by social scientists as an important
analytic issue in the study of immigration, the implications of emigration for the
formulation and implementation of U.S. immigration policy and programs remain
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remarkably unarticulated. This paper considers emigration as an immigration policy
issue for the United States. The general argument is that national immigration policy
would be more effectively conceptualized, crafted and implemented with a better
understanding of the dynamics of emigration among international migrants com-
ing to the United States.
To be sure, our statistical image of immigration to the United States is shaped
by a relatively small number of statutory and administrative concepts including
admission of permanent resident aliens and nonimmigrants, refugee migration and
asylum, and undocumented alien migration. Complementing trends in immigra-
tion with information about subsequent out-migration of aliens is likely to result in
shifting conclusions about both the demography of immigration as well as the na-
ture of social, economic and geographic effects. The statistical lens should be wid-
ened even further, moreover, to consider all sources of international migration to
and from the United States including native born and naturalized U.S. citizens.
Accordingly, a comprehensive appreciation of the dynamics of international mi-
gration will embed U.S. immigration trends, policy and issues within the broader
context of international population movements emerging regionally and globally.
Throughout the world international population movements are increasingly diverse
embodying a widening range of geographic origins and destinations, reasons for
migration, and social demographic characteristics (see Russell 1996; Martin 1994;
Castles and Miller 1993). The emphasis on movements to rather than from the
country blinds U.S. policy discussions to the connections between national policy
issues and wider regional and global processes.
The paper seeks to adjust the lens of U.S. immigration policy analysis by con-
sidering issues concerning population movements out of the United States.
 The analysis addresses four interrelated topics. First, I consider concepts of emi-
gration and temporary international migration, raising issues in analysis and inter-
pretation along the way. Second, I briefly and selectively review research on emi-
gration for the United States. Third, I reflect upon the need for better information
on emigration from United States for the design and implementation of U.S. immi-
gration policy. Fourth, recommendations are offered concerning priorities for the
collection of data and for research on international migration to and from the United
States. Strategies for the study of emigration and temporary international migra-
tion encompass regional and bilateral perspectives on migration processes.
Two further comments concerning the approach taken here should be added.
In several ways, this analysis builds upon a study prepared several years previ-
ously for the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, Office of Plans and
Analysis. That report, “Balancing the Equation: Federal Statistical Resources for
the Measurement of Alien Emigration from the United States,” represented an in-
ventory and assessment of federal data relevant for the measurement of emigration
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and offered recommendations for specific activities that might be pursued by the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to this end. Several of the findings
and recommendations of that study will be revisited for this analysis.
Second, discussions of the state of the art of emigration research often begin
with calling attention to both the dearth of statistical information on the departures
of immigrants from the United States and the consequent limitations of research
and analysis on the subject. While this concern is well justified for the United
States (hence, the current report!) it diverts our attention from what can be learned
from methodologies underlying currently available estimates and from survey re-
search concerning migration and immigrants, as well as from studies of emigra-
tion, return migration, and short-term migratory flows for other countries and re-
gions of the world. Perhaps we in the United States have not taken sufficient ad-
vantage of perspectives on international migration and national policy concerns
that have expressed in regions beyond the North American shores. Many countries
in the developing world which have traditionally been regions of origin for inter-
national migrants now find themselves experiencing both return migration as well
as other immigration and circular migration. These emerging trends are often un-
derstood as national and regional policy concerns regarding both migration as well
as social and economic integration among countries. In her discussion of interna-
tional migration data needs in Latin America, Maguid states,
The changes which have occurred in the international migratory movements in
Latin America and in the social, political and economic context in which they
occur, both international and regional, stress the urgency of having adequate,
reliable, up-to-date and continuous information for making or modifying mi-
gration policy (Maguid 1994, 39).
It is thus useful to consider approaches being pursued by other countries for gener-
ating information on international migration which is appropriate to process of
national and regional policy formation.
Concepts of Emigration and Temporary
International Migration
A variety of concepts concerning population movement from a country appear
in the literature. Accordingly, emigration, return migration and circulation are spe-
cial cases of international mobility (see Willekens 1994, 7-9; Gmelch 1980). Emi-
gration is generally considered as the permanent migration from one country to
another. The emigration of former international migrants includes return migration
to the country of origin, and re-migration to a third country or region. For refugees,
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return migration might considered repatriation. Obviously, nationals of a country
can also emigrate, a process sometimes called expatriation.
Certainly the largest numbers of moves out of a country are of temporary du-
ration in the form of travel for business or pleasure. Beyond travel and tourism,
moreover, temporary or short-term departures for work or training are increasingly
significant in population movements worldwide. The increasing diversity of forms
of international mobility is reflected in the long list of concepts seeking to capture
specific reasons for the moves: circulation, seasonal labor migration, border cross-
ers or commuters travelling daily or weekly to work in a different country, travel
for training and education, migration of professional transients. Each of these con-
cepts implies moves into and out of countries. Critically, the concept of interna-
tional circulation has been developed to refer to short-term labor mobility or mi-
gration that recurs at varying times and connects workers and perhaps their house-
holds to two or more places of work and residence (see Chapman and Prothero
1985; Conway 1988). Circulation may be considered an important dimension of
economic and social integration between and among countries (see Bailey and
Ellis 1993).
It is difficult to discuss these concepts without reference to specific national
contexts, policies and statistical practices. To be sure, the challenge to specifying
international migration concepts and terms reflects not so much demographic or
sociological issues but more the constraints imposed by national migration control
policies and statistical programs for measuring what are by definition bi- and multi-
lateral processes. Progress toward standard concepts and definitions of interna-
tional migration has involved international efforts throughout this century (see Kraly
and Gnanasekaran 1987); implementation of international statistical concepts in
national practices, however, has been uneven (see Simmons 1987; Kraly 1995).
Given our goal to connect emigration and circular migration patterns to U.S.
immigration policy it is important to identify population groups whose departures
are of interest. From a strictly demographic perspective, all residents of the United
States are “at risk” of emigrating. For immigration policy analysis, it is the emigra-
tion of alien and foreign born residents of the country that is relevant. Alien resi-
dents include a diverse of group of people depending on how residence is con-
ceived: aliens resident in the United States may be defined on the basis of legal
status such as legal permanent resident alien; or the resident alien population may
be considered as those non-U.S. citizens who fulfill residency rules of U.S. Census
Bureau operations, such as permanent resident aliens, foreign students and un-
documented migrants. By including naturalized U.S. citizens, the population of
foreign born residents represents an even broader demographic concept of lifetime
migrants to the United States and permits the analysis of relevant immigration
policy issues. For example, cross-classification of the foreign born population by
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citizenship status reveals the effect of naturalization on emigration behavior of
former immigrants.
Most often, however, it is the available data source that dictates the bound-
aries of emigration analysis. Thus, census-based estimates of emigration refer to
the foreign-born population and thus include both aliens and naturalized U.S. citi-
zens enumerated in the decennial census. Bratsberg and Terrell’s recent analysis of
‘Americans living abroad’ (1996) uses U.S. Department of State data on U.S. citi-
zens registering with consular posts in foreign countries. The population abroad
thus includes both native-born and naturalized U.S. citizens and as a result cap-
tures emigration, return migration and perhaps re-migration. Temporary migration
and circulation are processes very difficult to study using official data sources and
are more often considered in surveys and ethnographies investigating specific mi-
grant streams and ethnic communities.
The emphasis here is on what is known and needed to be known about emigra-
tion and short-term and circular migration of international migrants to the United
States. To best serve immigration policy analysis, moreover, the population of in-
ternational migrants should be broadly conceptualized to capture existing and
emerging trends in emigration and international mobility (see McNicoll 1992, 14).
We should thus consider groups of aliens migrating to the United States both within
and around U.S. immigration policies, specifically persons admitted for perma-
nent resident status (including refugees), nonimmigrants who reside in the United
States for significant periods of time such as students, workers and exchange visi-
tors, and resident undocumented migrants. Patterns of emigration and circulation
among the naturalized citizen population is also of interest given the connection of
this group to policies governing immigrant and refugee admissions and settlement
in the United States.
Research on Emigration from the United States
Suffice it to say that the emigration and temporary migration patterns of each
of the groups just identified have not been fully covered in the research literature.
Data for the study of emigration from the United States are limited. Federal sta-
tistical resources must be used creatively to produce estimates of emigration;
surveys and field research on particular immigrant groups have provided infor-
mation about short-term departures and patterns of circulation. Accordingly, this
discussion of what is known about emigration begins with a summary discussion
of U.S. data available for the study of emigration and population movements from
the United States. I will then consider several studies of emigration and short-
term mobility among immigrants with specific attention to recent estimates pre-
pared by the Population Division of the U.S. Bureau of the Census. The review
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by Karen Woodrow-Lafield (1997) provides a more comprehensive analysis of
the state of the art of emigration studies for the United States and should be con-
sidered in tandem to this report.
U.S. Data on Emigration
and Short-term Mobility
The need for federal data on emigration has been recognized for sometime
(see Keely and Kraly 1979; Levine, Hill and Warren 1985; Warren and Kraly
1985). As a result, federal statistical resources concerning emigration have been
documented and assessed in some detail (see for example, Kraly 1991; Woodrow-
Lafield 1994, 1996b; Borjas and Bratsberg 1996). The first observation that is
usually made concerning U.S. emigration data is that no comprehensive source of
statistical information on emigration exists for the United States (see U.S. Gen-
eral Accounting Office 1998, 4). Data on the permanent departure of aliens and
U.S. citizens were collected between 1908 and 1957 but the statistical program
was discontinued because of uncertainty about the quality of the data. Since that
time, alien emigration from the United States has been estimated using census
data, administrative data sources collected by several federal agencies, and re-
sults of surveys and other field studies.
In 1991 I identified four federal agencies that collected data most relevant for
the study of emigration among aliens and the foreign born population in the United
States: U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), U.S. Bureau of the
Census, U.S. Social Security Administration and the U.S. Travel and Tourism Ad-
ministration. Half a decade later the list remains essentially the same,1 although
some of these programs have been enhanced for purposes of emigration analysis.
For example, while INS no longer collects data it defines as emigration data, the
agency does in fact operate a program of statistical departure control for aliens
with nonimmigrant visas. The Nonimmigrant Information System (NIIS) records
the arrival and subsequent departure of nonimmigrants (excluding most Canadians
and Mexicans entering for business or pleasure). The system is the basis for infor-
mation on the legal entry of nonimmigrants and for the estimation of rates of visa
overstay among groups of nonimmigrant aliens. The system has been used to mea-
sure length of stay among groups of nonimmigrants. Kraly and Warren (1991, 1992)
used these data to estimate the number and characteristics of nonimmigrants who
remained (hence resided) in the United States for more than one year and thus
should be considered long-term immigrants according to United Nations standard
definitions. The INS Statistics Division now publishes a regular report on nonim-
migrant departures and patterns of length of stay among detailed visa categories.
Potentially, the NIIS program could be used to study international migration
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and mobility behavior and correspondingly circulation patterns among selected
groups of aliens by tracking the arrival-departure records of individuals over time.
The volume of information processed in this information system is, of course, im-
mense. INS has been encouraged in the past to consider sampling arrival-departure
record as a strategy for promoting more detailed research on trends and character-
istics of short-term international migration and mobility. Similarly, the existence
of departure control for nonimmigrant aliens travelling by air raises the possibility
or opportunity for collecting data (for statistical purposes) from permanent resi-
dent aliens departing the country as a means to study emigration and short-term
mobility among immigrants.
During the past two decades, demographers at the U.S. Bureau of Census have
made significant contributions to the study of emigration from the United States
primarily through efforts to estimate intercensal levels of emigration among the
foreign born. Warren and Peck’s (1980) analysis of foreign born emigration for the
1960-70 decade laid the foundation for the use of residual techniques applied to
international migration research. Warren and Passel (1987) produced estimates of
emigration that were a by-product of their method to construct the legally resident
alien population of the United States and ultimately the size of the undocumented
population enumerated in the 1980 census. Ahmed and Robinson (1994), whose
recent study will be discussed in some detail below, have used variations on this
analytic theme to produce estimates of emigration among foreign born residents
for the 1980-90 decade.
The Current Population Survey (CPS) has been explored as a basis for esti-
mating emigration using a multiplicity research design. The Census Bureau initi-
ated the collection of data on numbers and characteristics of relatives of U.S. resi-
dents living abroad in 1987 and continued data collection again in 1988 and 1989.
Briefly, the approach relies on identifying for U.S. residents those ‘consanquineal’
immediate relatives (parents, siblings and children) who are nonresidents of the
United States, and then determining whether any of these individuals are former
U.S. residents and are living abroad temporarily or permanently (longer-term). The
number of emigrants identified by this approach is biased by two broad sources of
error. First, emigration is underestimated to the degree that emigrants did not leave
relatives in the United States to report them; second, the number of emigrants will
be overstated by the number of immediate relatives eligible to report the relative.
According, the survey must weight the emigrant according to the probability of his
or her relative being in the sample, i.e., the “multiplicity” associated with the emi-
gration (see Woodrow 1996; Zaba 1987).
Two federal programs that continue to hold potential for the study of emigration
are the U.S. Social Security Administration (SSA) and the U.S. Travel and Tourism
Administration (USTTA). Each of these programs are considered in relative detail
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in the 1991 report and will only briefly discussed here. SSA collects direct, if not
comprehensive, data on the emigration of former U.S. immigrants as a by-product
of its records on earnings and benefits. For example, records on social security
beneficiaries residing abroad are maintained by SSA from which the number and
some characteristics of persons who had previously lived in the United States (both
foreign and native born) can be gleaned (see Kraly 1982).
The Continuous Work History Sample is a second social security data file
with a capacity to generate information on emigration. This microdata file is main-
tained for research purposes, although with strict constraints on public and federal
access, and permits the longitudinal analysis of changes in employment, earnings,
benefits, disability, and geographic location of employment. Country of birth is
also included in the data record. It may be feasible to estimate emigration among
foreign born workers given information about changes in earnings and benefits
claims. Finally, the USTTA has conducted air passenger surveys since 1983 for
purposes of monitoring trends in international tourism and markets. The survey
might be explored as an instrument for collecting data from different groups of
aliens on intentions about reasons for departure and length of stay abroad.
Selected Studies of Emigration
from the United States
Research on emigration from the United States is indeed limited, largely because
of data sources. We can look to studies of historical patterns of emigration from the
United States (for example, Axelrod 1972; Piore 1979; Warren and Kraly 1985)
which have relied on historical emigration statistics to trace patterns of emigration,
presumably return migration, among groups of immigrants to the United States.
Contemporary studies of emigration of U.S. immigrants have relied in large part on
census and administrative data sources to estimate levels and characteristics of emi-
gration. For example, Jasso and Rosenzweig (1982) matched individual data records
for immigrant admissions, naturalizations, and responses to the Alien Address Report
Program (which ceased operating in 1981) to yield estimates of the proportion of the
1971 cohort of permanent resident aliens who had emigrated by 1979.
Recent research by Borjas and Bratsberg has combined several administrative
and research data sources to estimate out-migration rates for the foreign born
population resident in the United States in 1980. Also using a residual estimation
approach Borjas and Bratsberg compare the enumerated foreign population with a
constructed estimate of the foreign population for 1980. In developing this expected
population, Borjas and Bratsberg wrestle with differences among statistical concepts
of U.S. international migration. For example, they must adjust the census data on
the foreign born for those international migrants which fulfill census residency
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rules but are not included in INS data on ‘immigrant’,’ that is, permanent resident
alien, admissions. These groups include undocumented resident migrants enumerated
in the census, and nonimmigrants such as many foreign students, temporary workers
and trainees, exchange visitors, etc. who have a de facto residence in the country.
In adjusting for these differences in data sources, the authors explore in the process
the sensitivity of estimates to alternative assumptions. Research findings reveal
out-migration rates which average 22 percent for the 1970-74 international migrant
cohort and 18 percent for the 1975-79 cohort. These out-migration rates vary widely
by region and country of origin. The out-migration rate for the 1975-80 cohort of
immigrants from Mexico is nearly double the overall level, 42 percent, and for the
Canadian cohort is much lower, 11 percent. The estimated rates provide a basis to
test models of the determinants of out-migration rates among legal international
migrants and patterns of selection of out-migrants among original immigrant cohorts
(Borjas and Bratsberg 1994).
Estimates of emigration have also been derived from survey research. As de-
scribed above, data on relatives living abroad of U.S. residents have been collected
in several rounds of the Current Population Survey (CPS). Karen Woodrow-Lafield
(1990, 1994) has analyzed these data to estimate numbers of surviving emigrants
under a range of assumptions about emigrants without immediate relatives in the
United States. Her findings have implications for both evidence about emigration
levels as well as analytic issues in predicting future trends:
The implied level of emigration in the 1980s appears similar to previous levels
based on intercensal research for 1960-1970 and analyses of legally registered
alien populations for 1965-80. ...Overall emigration levels are likely to be influ-
enced by changing heterogeneity of the foreign-born population on country of
origin, familial ties in the United States, and reasons for leaving their native
country. Characteristic of legal immigrant cohorts since 1965 are increasing
proportions from Latin American and Asia, from family preference categories
and exempt family reunification provisions, and from refugee status. All of these
characteristics would probably be associated with lower probability of return in
the short-run (1994, 27-28).
The use of multiplicity techniques for the estimation of emigration holds clear
potential for adding to our understanding of both levels of emigration as well as
relationships between international migration and family structure of foreign born
and native born persons in the United States. The approach thus deserves further
consideration within the context of federal statistical resources.
Census-based estimates of emigration among the foreign-born population pro-
vide important information of levels and characteristics of emigrations for recent
decades. As mentioned above, the first effort to estimate emigration for an intercensal
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period was that of Warren and Peck (1980). Demographers at the U.S. Census
Bureau, Population Division have continued to develop estimates of emigration
among the foreign-born using residual estimation techniques most recently repre-
sented in the work of Bashir Ahmed and Gregory Robinson (1994). It is useful to
consider closely the contribution of this analysis to research on emigration for at
least three reasons. First, the study provides measures of foreign born emigration
for the most current intercensal decade, 1980-90. Second, given the striking ab-
sence of empirically situated, comprehensive studies of emigration, the Ahmed-
Robinson estimates emerge as a significant contribution to both scientific and policy
discussions of the implications of U.S. emigration. Third, Ahmed and Robinson
emphasize the importance of modelling emigration in the form of emigration rates
rather than aggregate levels, and implicitly urge an appropriate break with the Census
Bureau tradition of modelling international migration.
Because of noteworthy contributions of the Ahmed-Robinson research, as well
as the prominence being given these estimates in current discussions, it is impor-
tant to appreciate several important analytic issues that should be considered in
interpreting the results of the analysis. An exploration of both the study’s strengths
and limitations will contribute to strengthening the argument for continued research
on emigration from the United States.
Ahmed and Robinson use a combination of approaches to produce detailed
estimates of emigration among the foreign born for the 1980-90 decade. A brief
summary of their data and methodology is warranted. Data collected in the 1980
and 1990 decennial censuses is basis for estimation. This contrasts to complemen-
tary census-based research on international migration which combines census data
with INS data on the admission of aliens who would likely be enumerated in the
census, i.e,. permanent resident aliens, refugees, students, etc. (cf. Warren and Peck
1980; Warren and Passel 1987; Borjas and Bratsberg 1994). The Ahmed-Robinson
analysis proceeds in two stages. First, the authors estimate the level and character-
istics of emigrants among the foreign born population enumerated in the 1980
census, that is, the 1980 foreign born stock. A residual technique is used to com-
pute the proportions of the foreign born population, by age, sex, year of entry and
country of birth, who emigrated between 1980 and 1990. Survival rates were de-
rived from comparison of life tables for different races developed by the Census
Bureau (Ahmed and Robinson 1994, 4-5).
The second stage of analysis is devoted to the estimation of emigration among
foreign born international migrants who entered the United States during the 1980-
90 decade and were enumerated in the 1990 census. Cohorts of these interna-
tional migrations are identified using the census question on year of entry. The
rates of emigration computed for the 1980 foreign born population for migration
cohorts prior to 1980 are applied to the 1980-90 international migration cohorts
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to produce estimates of levels of emigration and a profile of the composition of
emigration streams. The use of emigration rates results in a larger absolute an-
nual level of emigration for the recent decade, 195,000, in comparison to the level
of annual emigration assumed in national population estimates and projections
(133,000). This higher level of emigration reflects the higher levels of immigra-
tion during the decade.
The Ahmed-Robinson analysis is an important contribution to what unfortu-
nately is a relatively meager body of literature on overall levels and patterns of
emigration from the United States. This research provides estimates of emigration
for the recent stock and flow of lifetime international migrants and thus indicates
the degree of permanence of settlement and length of stay among foreign born
migrants to the United States. Second, these estimates seek to mine available U.S.
census data to yield not only the level of emigration for the most recent intercensal
decade but also characteristics of emigration streams among the foreign born. The
paper provides geographic and social demographic detail for foreign born emi-
grants that is both provocative and relevant for the design of subsequent studies of
emigration from the United States. Third, the results for both levels and patterns of
emigration derive from the application of emigration rates applied to the foreign
both stock in 1980 and international migrants arriving during the decade, disaggre-
gated by age, sex, year of arrival and country of birth. The estimates are a function
of a model or models of (e)migration behavior applied to shifting population com-
position. Thus, to a certain extent, the analysis shifts attention away from levels
estimated by residual analysis to the study of migration propensity and behavior.
The limitations of the study are also addressed by the authors. Issues raised
include assumptions about the level of population coverage in the successive cen-
suses, choice of life tables, and analysis and interpretation of results for countries
in which the estimation technique produced inconsistent levels of emigration. These
issues in data and method should be considered somewhat more closely. More-
over, additional issues in theory and population modelling, and data quality and
evaluation need to be critically entertained for an appropriate interpretation and
use of the findings. I would suggest that five general analytic issues should be
addressed in evaluating the Ahmed-Robinson estimates, all of which are interre-
lated: (1) the validity of their model of population change; (2) the assumptions
about the relationship between types or categories of international migrants and
migration behavior; (3) the relationship between model assumptions and migra-
tion theory and research; (4) issues concerning the quality and consistency of the
data; and (5) the need for more extensive exploratory and sensitivity analysis.
Of these five areas of concern I believe the first, the appropriateness of the
inherent model of population change for the foreign born population, is the most
important for evaluating the merits of the Ahmed-Robinson estimates of emigration.
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Estimation of levels and ultimately social demographic composition of emigration
among recent international migrants (1980-90) derives from the application of rates
of emigration computed for the foreign population who immigrated between 1970
and 1979 and were resident in the United States for the 1980 census enumeration.
In fact, rates of emigration for the 1980-90 cohort of international migrants are not
computed in this analysis, but current levels are computed on the basis of migration
behaviors from the 1970-80 decade, converted to annual emigration rates and
weighted by average length of stay estimated for the 1980-89 migrants.
Fundamentally, this model represents a conceptualization of population dy-
namics for recent international migrants that embodies a continuation or mainte-
nance of emigration behaviors of earlier international migrants. Because of the
shifting mix of legal/administrative categories of international migrants these emi-
gration rates may not be appropriate for the migrant cohorts of the 1980s (this
issue will also be considered below). The analytic approach and ultimately the
results deriving from this model of population change implies, it appears to me,
that we have access to more information about emigration behavior than in fact we
do. In short, there is no new information about emigration behavior, that is, age-
sex-country specific rates of emigration, for the international migration cohorts of
the 1980s. Ahmed and Robinson have estimated levels of recent emigration based
on a persistence of emigration rates estimated for the immigrants who entered dur-
ing the 1970s.
This line of argument can also be extended to the model’s assumptions about
the other components of population change. That is, one might contend with the
choice of the survival rates applied to the racial groupings of the foreign born
population as well as the essentially linear approach to estimating average age at
migration and average length of stay among international migration cohorts.
 A second general issue, mentioned briefly above, concerns assumptions in
the analysis and discussion about the relationship between types or categories of
international migrants and migration behavior. Within the discussion, the authors
recognize changing composition of international migration with regard to legal
and administrative categories such as permanent resident aliens, refugees, stu-
dents, and undocumented migrants (Ahmed and Robinson 1994, 10-11). They
also suggest in reasonable fashion that different categories of aliens coming to
the United States are likely to have different propensities to emigrate, either by
returning to the country of origin or emigrating to another country. The basis for
assumptions about rates of emigration for ‘nonselected’ countries, for example,
relies in large part on hypotheses concerning the likely emigration behavior of
aliens legalized under IRCA and refugees. In spite of this line of reasoning, how-
ever, the analysis does not model or incorporate alternative or diverse emigration
behaviors but, as emphasized above, adopts a model of migration that derives
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from an earlier decade and from what is certainly a different mix of categories
even within country of birth. There is thus a missed opportunity in the paper’s
discussion to underscore the need for basic research on patterns of return migra-
tion, re-migration, and international mobility and circulation among various legal
and administrative categories of international migrants to the United States as
well as among nationalities.
A third area of concern is the relationship between model assumptions and
existing migration theory and research. Again, this issue in connected to the previ-
ous concerns about the underlying population model and the relationship between
immigration categories and migration behaviors. Several components of the model
assume static conditions. For example, it is assumed that persons admitted as refu-
gees are less likely to return to their country of origin. A more dynamic perspective
on refugee migration and international migration generally might at least entertain
the possibility that conditions in both the sending and receiving countries may
change; thus migration behaviors may vary not only over the life course and by
length of stay but also in relation to the context of migration. Similarly, the model
assumes proportional levels of census coverage error that do not change for mi-
grant populations between 1980 and 1990. One might predict on the basis of the
sociology of immigrant settlement, however, that rates of population coverage would
be greater at the second census date rather than the earlier date, not necessarily
because of differences in census administration but because of greater knowledge
among earlier, more settled immigrant populations about civic participation and
the U.S. government in comparison to more recent immigrants. Moreover, the ba-
sis for establishing the assumed level of emigration among “unselected countries”
should be better grounded in theory and research on international migration per-
taining to the countries concerned. This is particularly necessary given that the
basic model of population change implies levels of emigration very much at odds
with the assumption that emigration rates for these countries are “50 percent of the
rates for selected countries” (Ahmed and Robinson 1994, 11).
A fourth set of issues concerns the quality and consistency of census data. The
Ahmed-Robinson estimates derive from both explicit and implicit assumptions about
the validity of several key census items. Evaluation of data on age and nativity
among the foreign born is necessary. Moreover, recent research by Ellis and Wright
(1996) cast doubt on the quality of data on length of stay in the United States by
estimating that perhaps one third of the foreign born population who indicated
they ‘came to stay in’ the United States between 1985 and 1990 had actually entered
before 1985. The heavy reliance on both year of entry and age to measure average
age at entry further necessitates the critical evaluation of these census items. Finally
and relatedly, there is a need in the analysis for more extensive exploratory and
sensitivity analysis. As mentioned above, the results of varying assumptions about
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changes in census coverage among immigrant populations should be presented.
Similarly, the sensitivity of emigration estimates to varying assumptions about
emigration rates for nonselected countries should be explored. In general, the analysis
does not lead one to be fully confident that the implications of either model
assumptions or data quality have been fully examined.
Both the strengths and limitations of the Ahmed and Robinson study serve to
fuel the argument for increased research on emigration. The findings point to the
demographic significant of emigration. The lack of adequate data to model the
propensity among former immigrants to emigrate for recent years reveals the weak-
nesses of the federal systems of international migration statistics.
These selected studies which have sought to develop comprehensive estimates
of levels of emigration from the United States often interpret their findings in rela-
tionship to dimensions of return migration of international migrants, in spite of the
fact that no information is available on the destination of the out-migrants, reasons
for departure, or intentions about permanence or length of stay of the move. More-
over, given the estimation methodology and data sources, these approaches are not
able to address either length of absence or short-term moves out of the United
States among groups of international migrants. Referring to the situation of Canada,
Beaujot and Rappak (nd) reflect on the problems in interpreting the results of emi-
gration studies which apply residual estimation techniques to a combination of
administrative data sources:
This discussion of definitions, data and methods makes it clear that immigration
and emigration are somewhat “fluid” terms whose statistical capture is far from
simple. For instance, some “landed immigrants” (permanent, by definition) may
have a very limited stay in Canada while other temporary workers may eventu-
ally stay for a long time. Some persons are defined as emigrants just because
they happened to be resident abroad on a census day, while other leave for long
periods between censuses and come back without being noticed (Beaujot and
Rappak nd, 26).
These issues are equally pertinent to the interpretation of emigration estimates for
the U.S. foreign born population.
As mentioned above, among official data sources, the Nonimmigrant
Information System (NIIS) holds some potential for the analysis of international
mobility, short-term migration, and circular migration among legal aliens in the
United States, specifically among nonimmigrants. Kraly and Warren (1991, 1992)
have used these data for identifying those (departing) nonimmigrants whose length
of stay was greater than one year. The information system could also be used to
monitor temporal and geographic patterns of international mobility among
categories of nonimmigrants and by the few social demographic characteristics
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available on the arrival-departure record (I-94 form). Moreover, the administration
of arrival-departure control might be modified (‘for statistical purposes’) to
document the international mobility of permanent resident aliens. In Australia,
Lukomskyj and Richards (1986) used this approach to study emigration among
‘visaed settlers’ who immigrated in 1980. Their analysis of records in the Movement
Data Base permitted not only the measurement of rate of out-migration (about 9
percent) among this immigrant cohort, but also of the characteristics of emigrants
relative to immigrants.
 Not captured in the Nonimmigrant Information System is the vast majority of
moves of aliens across the Mexican and Canadian borders of the United States. For
the most part, information on short-term international mobility and circular migra-
tion among U.S. international migrants has been generated through survey and
field studies of specific migrant streams and communities. The list of relevant schol-
arship is broad and draws from a long history in social science. Certainly the
ethnosurvey research conducted by Massey and his colleagues (see Massey, et al.,
1987) has been central in both revealing the dynamics and circularity of migration
of Mexicans between communities in Mexico and the United States as well as
demonstrating the value of longitudinal survey and ethnographic research for the
study of international migration. The Philippines Migration Study similarly re-
veals the relevance of surveys to reveal international mobility processes among
specific migrant streams (Fawcett and Arnold 1987). Research by Weiser (1988)
and Bailey and Ellis (1993) on return migration among Puerto Rican women illus-
trates the use of specialized surveys, in this case, the Puerto Rican Fertility and
Family Planning Assessment, to yield insight into the behavioral dynamics of cir-
cular migration.
Fawcett and Arnold make the most eloquent case for the use of surveys for the
study of international migration processes and emphasizing conceptual issues high-
lighted earlier:
“International migration” is not a unitary concept; rather, it is a broad category
encompassing population movements that differ in their timing, frequency, pur-
poses, and locational boundaries. Substantive and theoretical issues are greatly
influenced by how spatial mobility is conceptualized and measured. The advan-
tage of surveys in this respect is mainly in the amount of information collected.
A migration history can show frequency of moves, information about dates and
places can be obtained for long-term and short-term movements, and reasons
for moves and other motivational data can be collected. With such data in hand,
the researcher can devise different typologies and measures of movement, thus
ensuring that the key dependent or independent variable is measured in a way
that is congruent with the conceptual posture of the study (1529).
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The Need for Information on Emigration
from the United States
An early report of the U.S. General Accounting Office succinctly states the
policy rationale for the study of emigration of international migrants coming to the
United States: “[e]migration is a factor that underlies all immigrant impacts be-
cause the magnitude of those impacts depends upon the length of time that immi-
grants reside in the United States” (GAO 1989, 47; see also GAO 1988). More-
over, the size and composition of the international migrant populations resident
population which generates policy relevant impacts reflect the dynamics of change
in those populations.
For many countries, the argument that emigration and return migration is a
significant dimension of international migration policy analysis has already been
made. In Canada, the MacDonald Commission urged the consideration of the long-
term impacts of immigration on population change and economic growth (Beaujot
and Rappak nd, 3; see also Michalowski 1991). In Australia, official reports have
acknowledged the significance of return migration following the admission of per-
manent settlers (Lukomskyj and Richard 1986, 603). The need for continuous and
reliable information on mobility and migration among countries in Latin America
has been considered in discussions of national migration policies and also eco-
nomic integration within the region (see Maquid 1993).
There is a statutory rationale for considering emigration in light of U.S. im-
migration policy concerns. The Triennial Report to Congress mandated by the
1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act is to include an assessment of the
impacts of immigration on U.S. society, economic and population. Furthermore,
the 1990 amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act require that the
“social, demographic and natural resources impact of immigration...” be deter-
mined (see Sec.141(c)(1)(C)). To restate the obvious, the ‘impacts’ of immigra-
tion can only be examined with evidence about the international migrant popula-
tions in the United States and how those populations are changing in size, char-
acteristics and behaviors.
But the argument for better data on emigration and international mobility must
derive from more fundamental principles of public policy analysis than solely the
reporting requirements of the current law. If U.S. immigration policy is to serve
national and international interests, the policy should undergo ongoing critical
analysis informed by knowledge about patterns of change in causes, consequences
and characteristics of international migration to the United States. From this premise,
at least four general arguments can be offered for the necessity of improving national
statistical resources for the study of emigration and the international mobility of
U.S. immigrants. These include the benefits of information on U.S. population
dynamics, economic and human resource issues, social demographic accounting
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and the planning process, and issues of social and economic integration of the
United States with other countries and regions of the world.
Interpreting National Population
Dynamics and Regional Change
U.S. immigration policy does not exist to serve demographic ends. Concern
about the volume of immigration to the United States, however, is reflected in
annual ceilings, ‘pierceable’ or not, that are constructed to limit annual levels of
immigration for permanent residence. It is important that the image of immigra-
tion trends is connected to real migration processes. The reality is that while many
immigrants come to the United States intending to remain and do so permanently,
some aliens with permanent resident visas emigrate permanently and others depart
the country for temporary periods of time. Demographic research for the United
States, as well as other immigrant receiving countries, suggests that proportions of
immigrants emigrating are range upwards to 30 percent if not higher. Similarly,
aliens arriving on nonimmigrant visas may remain in the country permanently by
adjusting to permanent resident status. Kraly and Warren (1991) have shown that
perhaps 100,000 nonimmigrants will depart after lengthy stays; many of these are
likely to move into and out of the country on a recurring basis.
Policy makers and program managers are most certainly interested in the num-
bers, characteristics, and needs of international migrants, particularly permanent
resident aliens and undocumented migrants, in their constituencies and communi-
ties of operation at any point in time as well as changes over time. The picture of
international migrant populations painted through admissions and arrivals data is
incomplete without corresponding information on departures; the snapshots of
immigrant communities from census data are miss the dynamics of change in the
national population and local communities. Thus, if the public and policy makers
are to appreciate the relationship between international migration trends and im-
migration policy proposals, the evidence must be complete. When an annual level
of immigration is reported, for example, “...in 1994, 804,416 immigrants were
admitted to the United States... (U.S. Department of Justice 1996)” we should all
be enlightened enough to implicitly add, “...of which about one quarter or one third
are likely to emigrate....”
Without comprehensive data on emigration among groups of international mi-
grants, we are not able to effectively understand current demographic change or
project population growth in the near future. The lack of complete information on
components of population change is particularly problematic for analysis of the im-
pacts of international migration below the national level—for regions, states, metro-
politan areas, and local communities in the United States (see Greenwood and Ragland
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1991; Kraly 1995, 52-53) where migration is usually the most significant component
of population change. Furthermore, demographic analyses, for example, those taking
the form of population models and projections, require information on emigration in
order to construct realistic trends international migration under alternative policy
scenarios. (Kraly 1995, 1997; see also Michalowksi 1991).
Economic Consequences of Immigration
and Human Resource Issues
Debates about U.S. immigration continue to address issues concerning the
economic implications of immigration levels and composition. Changes in the struc-
ture of the visa preference system introduced in the 1990 amendments underscored
the heightened interest in Congress considering immigration as a route to enhance
job creation and economic growth. Increasingly, there is public concern about the
implications of U.S. immigration for social policy and entitlement programs. To
some observers, the Immigration Control and Financial Responsibility Act of 1996
represented a move to restrict legal immigration through reduced access to public
programs including health services, welfare programs and public education.
Information about return and re-migration of U.S. immigrants is fundamental
to the analysis of issues concerning immigration and economic growth in the United
States, labor force growth, and human resource needs. Oded Stark states that deter-
mining why and which international migrants return to countries of origin is the
“frontier of international migration research.” If the skill composition of migration
flows can be shown to be responsive to concrete policies, real-world concerns are
well served by the provision of clear answers to these questions. And real world-
concerns, in this context, are real indeed because the numbers of those who return
are, generally speaking, anything but trivial (Stark 1995: 55-56). Again, in the case
of both Canada and Australia there has been policy research devoted to the impli-
cations of return migration for the stock of landed immigrants and for the loss on
returns to investment in the settlement and adjustment process of immigrants.
Lukomskyj and Richards comment on the significance of return migration for
Australia because both
...the loss of skills and capital... and settler arrivals represent an initial cost to
Australia in terms of operating the migration programs and providing post-arrival
services and assistance. There is less return for the initial ‘investment’ in those
migrants who later depart... (1986, 604).
Borjas has consistently raised the issue of emigration in relationship the analysis
of the economic impacts of U.S. immigration and the skills and education levels of
immigrant workers (see Borjas 1987, 1990). Recent research by Borjas and Bratsberg
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(1994, 1996) considers how the human capital characteristics of groups of immigrants
are related to the process of return migration and concludes that
...return migration intensifies the type of selection that generated the immigrant
flow in the first place... if the immigrant flow is positively selected, so that
immigrants have above average skills, the return migrants will be the least skilled
immigrants... if the immigrant flow is negatively selected, the return migrants
will be the most skilled immigrants (1994, 25).
Information on migration intentions among immigrants, such those data collected
in the Legalized Alien Population Surveys may enhance the study of emigration
decision-making and emigrant selectivity (see Woodrow-Lafield 1996; cf.
Dustmann 1994).
Demographic Accounting and
Public Policy and Planning
As implied above, if national statistical accounts are to serve the process of
planning and analysis of public policy then the statistical systems must be able
both capture reality as well as anticipate emerging trends and phenomena. Philip
Martin emphasizes the importance for national migration policies of appreciating
the basic “facts” of international migration (Martin 1994, 102). National statistical
systems should facilitate the production of those facts and thus should not embody
only administrative or legal concepts deriving from policies and laws in currently
in place, but should also be conceptually flexible to permit the gazing at trends
through a different policy lens. Reflecting on patterns of migration between Aus-
tralia and New Zealand McNicoll wryly observes, “[a] demographic accounting
system is an arbitrary construct, usually chosen to overlay a distinct polity (14).”
U.S. international migration statistics are generated as products of the
administration of laws and programs concerning the admission and status of aliens
in the United States, hence the absence of emigration data. Furthermore, there is a
fundamental mismatch between official statistical concepts, which tend to divide
the international entry of aliens into three categories—permanent, temporary and
illegal, and the recurring patterns of international migration and mobility experienced
by large numbers of aliens entering the United States from Mexico and regions in
the Caribbean, in particular (Massey 1987; National Heritage Institute 1995, 7).
Improved information on current and evolving patterns of emigration and
international mobility would serve not only to evaluate current U.S. immigration
policy but also to anticipate the need for shifts in policy and redesign of programs.
Furthermore, flexibility in measuring both immigration and emigration within
statistical systems would enhance the capacity of demographic accounts to contribute
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to the broad enterprise of international migration policy analysis (Zlotnik 1987;
Fawcett and Arnold 1987).
Immigration Policy, International Relations
and Regional Integration
Morokvasic and De Tinguy have observed that since 1989 Central Europe has
experienced new forms of inter- and intra-regional population movements and note
that “[p]eople seem to go West in order to eventually remain in the East—where
they reside” (1993, 261). International population movements throughout the world
are embedded in widening economic and demographic regional differences as well
as in increasingly extensive social and economic linkages between and among coun-
tries and communities (Russell 1996; Martin 1994). Efforts to control or manage
international migration to the United States will depend in large part on the recog-
nition of the place of the United States in the global and regional economy and the
significance of social relations in shrinking the distance between sending and re-
ceiving communities across seemingly wide geographic space (see Papademetriou
1984, 267). Comprehensive study of current and emerging migration patterns is
critically needed for analysis of regional economic integration of Mexico and the
United States, as well as for the United States and other regions in Latin America
and the Caribbean.
These ideas are not new and have been articulated clearly through the re-
search program of the U.S. Commission for the Study of International Migration
and Cooperative Economic Development (see also Teitelbaum and Weiner 1995).
Emigration, particularly circulation, moreover, is a critical dimension of the in-
terdependence between and among countries. The study of emigration and inter-
national mobility among international migrants to the United States provides evi-
dence about trends in international relations and connections and the flows of
human and perhaps other forms of capital and investment, and thus can enhance
national understanding of the role of the United States in global change. This
statement is dramatic and presumptuous. Given the entrenched view that alien
immigration to the United States is permanent, however, some provocation would
seem warranted.
Priorities for Emigration Research
for the United States
The general conclusions of the previous (1991) report on emigration data noted
first, no comprehensive, ongoing source of statistical information on emigration
exists for the United States; second, in the near term, the analysis of emigration
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among U.S. immigrants would rely heavily on estimates of migration patterns among
the foreign born population and selected groups of aliens; and third, federal statis-
tical resources that have the potential for the measurement of emigration are rela-
tively inaccessible for research by analysts both in and outside the government
(Kraly 1991, 25-26). These conclusions remain essentially intact.
Several of the report’s specific recommendations to INS concerning emigra-
tion research, however, have been implemented. For example, INS has taken an
active role in the launching of a longitudinal survey of immigrants in the United
States which should yield indirect evidence about emigration among permanent
resident aliens. Analysis of data on length of stay among departing nonimmigrants
has been continued. There have been interagency discussions concerning the analysis
of administrative data sets, both SSA files and the USTTA air passenger survey, for
purposes of studying emigration and other dimensions of international migration
to and from the United States.
It will be important to continue build upon these initiatives. Specifically, three
broad research strategies concerning emigration and international mobility of U.S.
immigrants should be given priority in order to support national immigration policy
analysis. First, coordination and collaboration should be encouraged among policy
analysts and statisticians within those federal agencies which participate in immigra-
tion policy analysis. Continued exploration of administrative data files for the analy-
sis and estimation of emigration and international mobility should be pursued. For
example, the mission and scope of the Nonimmigrant Information System should be
expanded to include the study of international movements of both nonimmigrant and
permanent resident aliens. Analysts at INS and the Census Bureau’s Population Di-
vision should continue to work together to estimate emigration of the foreign born
using residual estimation techniques and to take more complete advantage of emigra-
tion data (generated through multiplicity survey design) and information on the for-
eign born population collected in previous and future Curre¡nt Population Surveys.
Further consideration of SSA data for the study of both emigration and immigration
should occur. It will be useful, moreover, for federal analysts to consider strategies
for generating data on emigration and international mobility used by statistical of-
fices of other countries notably Canada and Australia, throughout Europe (see
Willekens 1994), and Latin America (Maguid 1993).
Second, survey approaches to studying emigration, return and re-migration
as well as circular migration among international migrants should be pursued.
Particularly critical is collaboration among agencies to revisit the use of multi-
plicity research design in the Current Population Survey to generate direct esti-
mates of emigration and length of stay among immigrants to the United States.
Support for longitudinal survey research on U.S. immigrants, such as the New
Immigrant Survey currently underway, should continue. Analysis of the results of
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the Legalized Alien Population Surveys should be supported for purposes of
emigration research (see Woodrow-Lafield 1996). Again, the use of surveys by
other countries, for example, the Air Passenger Survey used in the United King-
dom and the German Socioeconomic Panel Survey (Dustmann 1994), and the
range of strategies pursued in many developing countries (see, for example, Altaf
1992; Apraku 1991; ESCWA Secretariat 1993) should provide valuable perspec-
tive on the use of survey research for the estimation of emigration and interna-
tional mobility using both direct and indirect techniques (see Zaba 1987; Larsen
and Sullivan 1987). Particular attention should be given to the development of
sampling methodology for surveys of alien departures from the United States at
both air and land border ports.
Third, the policy importance of information on emigration and international
mobility should be reflected in greater use of ethnosurveys for the longitudinal
study of specific immigrant streams between communities within countries of ori-
gin and the United States. A record of scholarship exists demonstrating the value
of combining sample survey methodology with ethnographic approaches for gen-
erating comprehensive information on the dynamics of international migration and
mobility for particular migration communities and locales in the United States.
Commitment to longitudinal research programs of this type would serve to provide
data tapping emerging patterns and forms of international population movement in
diverse regional contexts.
These three areas of research activity do not represent remarkably new ideas
for research on emigration and mobility among U.S. immigrants. At present, most
researchers interested in U.S. immigration and emigration have relatively clear
visions of both what might feasibly be accomplished within the current structure
of the federal statistical system, as well as what new research initiatives would be
most useful for increasing our reservoir of information about out-migration of U.S.
immigrants. What might be added to these visions, however, is attention to process.
The endeavor of U.S. immigration policy analysis would benefit from a structure
of human and statistical resources that results in focussed and coordinated attention
to issues concerning international migration as a dynamic process to and from the
United States. In an important paper, Frans Willekens (1994) considers both
approaches to “...bridging the gap between available data on international migration
flows and the information for policy making and research” (1994,1) in Europe.
While the construction of a coordinated data base among European countries is
emphasized, Willekens also notes the importance of ‘expert judgement’ in shaping
migration models and in interpreting results. This perspective is usefully considered
for the United States in the form a consortium of researchers focussing specifically
on issues of emigration, international mobility among groups of international
migrants to the United States.
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It may be worthwhile to ponder the creation of a “Program of Research on
Immigration, Emigration and Circulation among International Migrants to the
United States.” Such a program could provide a structure for coordinated efforts
to measure, estimate and monitor emigration and international mobility. Through
meetings and publications, an ongoing mechanism could be established for en-
couraging collaboration and exchange between and among analysts in the United
States as well as with researchers conducting relevant work in other countries.
Such an organizational framework would also have symbolic significance as for-
mal recognition that international migration both to and from the United States is
a dynamic and complex process which should be appropriately reflected in U.S.
immigration policy.
Note
1. The U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs, U.S. Internal Revenue
Service and the U.S. Department of Defense were also identified as potential sources of
statistical information on U.S. residents living abroad. While the scope and accessibility
for research of these statistical programs limits their usefulness for the study of alien emi-
gration, it may be useful to reconsider these programs for purposes of migration model-
ling and estimation.
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QUANTIFICATION OF MIGRATION
Estimating Authorized Immigration
Karen A. Woodrow-Lafield
Introduction
The linguistic tools of the demographer studying international migrationdescribe discrete events as biological events of birth and death. This is notso because someone who has migrated may easily return to the place of
origin, negating the migration event. Migration demographers must incorporate
the complexities of place and time. With a heightened awareness of the fluidity of
population movements, especially those across the southern border, there has also
emerged an awareness of the confluence of international population factors, world
systems, social networks, and modern technology for creating a continuum of
transnational migration.
The initial Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 retained several
provisions from earlier legislation and introduced important changes, continuing
the use of quotas (based on the 1920 population), restricting Eastern Hemisphere
to about 150,000 immigrants without any restriction on the Western Hemisphere,
and establishing a preference system based on family relationships and labor skills.
Subsequently, in 1965, the Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments
discontinued the use of quotas, changed the limit and distribution for immigration
visas for the Eastern Hemisphere, and established an annual ceiling of 120,000
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for the Western Hemisphere, otherwise without restriction. Per-country limits were
made applicable to the Western Hemisphere in 1976 and, two years later, a
combined ceiling of 290,000 with a single seven-category preference system was
established for both hemispheres. (See Levine, Hill, and Warren 1985 or U.S.
Immigration and Naturalization Service 1991.) This preference system remains
in effect with incremental changes over the decades and greater changes
implemented through the Immigration Act of 1990 (IA90). Considering recent
levels, Congress established a piercable cap on legal immigration. Apart from
authorized immigration, social scientists do not enthusiastically agree upon a
feasible role of policy in controlling illegal immigration (Cornelius, Martin, and
Hollifield 1994; Massey 1996).
This study takes the following course. First, a conceptual framework for ana-
lyzing migration by legal status is set forth, followed by an operational framework
with review of data on legal migration, statistical data systems, and official statis-
tics. The next section explicates the discontinuities in measuring legal migration to
the United States. These gaps derive in part from the fragmentation of statistical
functions within the federal government. After explicitly referring to the criteria
for measuring legal migration, prior estimates of legal migration are reviewed and
discussed as to methodological strength. At that point, an assessment of legal mi-
gration from all countries and from Mexico is made based on existing data, alter-
native assumptions, and carefully explained logic. Two major concerns about es-
tablishing consensus about unauthorized or undocumented migration levels are
accuracy in demographic accounting for the legally resident foreign-born and
Mexico-born populations and completeness, both absolutely and relative to the
legally resident populations, of total foreign-born and Mexican-born population
statistics for the United States. I have addressed the latter elsewhere (Woodrow-
Lafield 1991a, 1995a, Robinson et al. 1993). Finally, I address research priorities
for the U.S. and Mexican governments on the measurement of migration between
the two countries by legal status.
Conceptual Framework
For a substantial portion of the history of immigration in U.S. immigration
statistics reported since 1820, all migration was legal because there was no legislation
to prohibit entry of aliens until 1875 (Act of March 3, 1875, 18 Stat. 477). At that
time, the policy of direct federal regulation of immigration was established with
prohibitions for the first time on entry of undesirable migrants. The responsibility
of reporting immigration statistics was given to the Bureau of Immigration of the
U.S. Department of Labor in 1892, the forerunner of the U.S. Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS). Throughout the 20th century, apprehensions of illegal
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aliens have illustrated that migration to the United States consists of unauthorized
or undocumented as well as legal migrants.
For population and immigration policy making, certain other criteria emerge
as relevant, such as social capital, nature of consanguineal or affinal ties with le-
gally resident individuals, especially U.S. citizens, and human capital, as influenc-
ing opportunities to immigrate legally on the basis of skills. At first glance, these
might seem exogenous to an effort to quantify contemporary authorized immigra-
tion, but these criteria should be considered as endogenous. Migration between
Mexico and the United States is multi-dimensional, to say the least, and always has
been very complex.
The indexing criteria for conceptualizing migration are historical time, place,
intention, legal status, and duration. Historical time must be specified as a refer-
ent with remaining criteria. Place criteria refer to geographical location with ref-
erence to national boundaries. These are usually well established, especially for
the United States, but there may be international disputes about boundaries or
fluctuations over time. When an individual has changed places with respect to
crossing from the nation of origin into another, then a migration event has oc-
curred in historical time.
Two further criteria, intention with respect to length of stay and actual dura-
tion or length of stay, based on historical time based measures, characterize the
migration event as to whether long-term or short-term. Intentions may or may not
correspond with actual behavior, that is, there may be inconsistencies as individu-
als’ actual behavior deviates from intentions of long-term or short-term migration.
The differences between temporary and permanent migrations can appear at the
time of initial entry into the United States or may evolve during a migrant’s period
of presence. A migrant has intentions to either stay temporarily or settle for long
durations or a lifetime. Among those who intend to permanently migrate, some
will reverse their intentions and return migrate, re-migrate, emigrate or initiate a
series of intermittent residences. Among those who intend to be in the United States
for a few months or up to one year, this intention may evolve into an intention to
stay permanently. There will be varying intensities and successes of activities to
seek opportunities for settling in the United States.
Type of legal status at entry into the United States can signal whether the
migration is temporary or permanent, but the event may ultimately prove to be the
reverse of its initial appearance because the underlying intentions may differ from
the outset or may change. The presumption is that those entering with lawful
permanent residence are likely to live here unless they choose to emigrate, but
there is anecdotal evidence of dual residence lifestyles. Similarly, the general
presumption is that those entering with permission to stay for limited duration are
not lifetime migrants. If such a movement conforms to the legal structure in the
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new nation of residence, then the migration is authorized. Those entitled to remain
for their lifetimes are known as immigrants, or lawful permanent residents.
Otherwise, the migration would be described as illegal, undocumented, or
unauthorized. In addition, some authorized migrations are subject to temporal
constraints in that the legality of admission is conditional and may expire or be
revoked. Some individuals who entered legally may thus become unauthorized or
undocumented or of uncertain status. The reverse may also happen; i.e., some that
entered illegally may subsequently acquire legal status. Historical time and duration
are thus critical referents in regard to legal status.
Combining these indexing criteria, a set of mutually exclusive categories is
obtained for application to the migration events, into the United States as of a
specific date. These are:
• Lawfully permanent resident from date of arrival;
• Lawful entrant who remained in a temporarily lawful status for a short-
term stay;
• Lawful entrant who remained in a temporarily lawful status for a long-
term stay;
• Lawful entrant who subsequently became undocumented or unautho-
rized for a short-term stay;
• Lawful entrant who subsequently became undocumented or unautho-
rized for a long-term stay;
• Lawful entrant who subsequently became lawfully permanent resident;
• Unauthorized or undocumented entrant who subsequently became tem-
porarily lawful for a short-term stay;
• Unauthorized or undocumented entrant who subsequently became tem-
porarily lawful for a long-term stay;
• Unauthorized or undocumented entrant who subsequently became law-
fully permanent resident;
• Unauthorized or undocumented entrant who remained in that status.
The conceptual framework seeks to blend the dynamics of migration events
with the demographics of population composition by legal status and inter-regional
geography. The research problem merits adoption of multi-regional and multi-sta-
tus modeling as devised for demographic behaviors of status transitions. Such models
make rigorous data demands as to scope and detail, which are obviously improb-
able with respect to clandestine transitions.
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Operational Framework
Time-reference
A corresponding analytical or operational framework seeks to translate
these concepts to data realities. It is useful to consider the fundamental types
of temporal treatment by which migration and, specifically, authorized
migration might be studied.
Cross-Sectional or Historical
Cross-sectional studies generally use questions on place of birth, citizenship,
and period of entry or immigration and measure net immigration as of the survey
or census date. The decennial census in the United States is meant to encompass
the de facto population, according to criteria of “usual residence.” Migrants whose
stays are so temporary as to consist of only days or weeks would not be enumer-
ated if their stays occurred around the April 1 date. Self-identification “usual resi-
dent” would lead to inclusion of some migrants without permission to stay perma-
nently, even ones of unauthorized or undocumented status.
Because there is not usually a question about migration or residence status in
national surveys and the universe is the de facto population, the measure includes
authorized and unauthorized or undocumented migrants and this practice has been
upheld judicially (Passel and Woodrow 1984a).
Data for the more recent entrants are tainted with inclusion of temporary, es-
pecially unauthorized or undocumented, migrants so that cross-sectional data for
earlier entrants are more representative of the settler population. Curiously, when
there are both questions on period of entry and retrospective residence history,
there can be a lack of correspondence (Ellis and Wright 1996). If there were a
question about legal status, there might seem to be a higher incidence of unautho-
rized or undocumented status and temporary residence among more recent en-
trants than among earlier entrants.
Longitudinal
The simplest longitudinal approach, longitudinal studies with cross-sectional
data, would present detail about the foreign-born population, or a subgroup such
as unauthorized or authorized residents, at two or more dates. An example is
demographic comparison of data for legally resident aliens in the United States
according to an annual, administrative database to discern loss or departures (Levine,
Hill, and Warren 1985; Warren and Passel 1987a, b; Jasso and Rosenzweig 1990).
Another example, for more general migration, is comparison of the foreign-born
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population in two or more censuses, that is, net immigration as of two or more
dates, with indexing on period of entry or immigration so that an entry cohort may
be followed over time. Such longitudinally-oriented analyses might endeavor to
address demographic aspects of cohort change (Warren and Peck 1980) or cohort
change as to earnings assimilation, public assistance utilization, residential
overcrowding, and completion of naturalization (Borjas 1988; Myers and Lee 1996;
Smith 1992; Jensen 1988; Woodrow-Lafield 1996d). Ideally, the indexing criteria
would be sufficient to control for sources of heterogeneity, but dilution of the cohort
through return migration is a source of unobserved or uncontrolled heterogeneity.
An ideal study is to follow migrants’ experience over time to learn about their
transitions among immigration statuses and their socioeconomic experiences. A
pilot study is underway that follows immigrants and nonimmigrants over several
years. An alternative is a retrospective orientation, such as gathering life histories
within an ethnosurvey design such as for the Mexican Migration Project (Massey
1987). Building legal status histories is invasive, but these could be acquired more
easily with ethnographic methods than with official government surveys.
Two approaches blend cross-sectional and longitudinal orientations. First, an
example of cross-sectional analyses of longitudinal data is estimation of nonim-
migrant overstays or nonimmigrants becoming unauthorized based on ongoing data
collection of nonimmigrant arrival records and departure records (Warren 1986,
1990). Another example is presentation of net unauthorized or undocumented im-
migration based on apprehensions modeling derived from migration trip histories
(Massey and Singer 1995). Each of these approaches could be extended to the
incidence of authorized stays.
The units of analysis might involve individuals, families, households, family
networks, or cohorts, e.g., birth years. The individual level of analysis is the most
prevalent across substantive analyses, simply because it is most convenient for
data collection, but migration is based in family networks (Boyd 1989). A single
data collection effort can be flexible across multiple units of analysis, as the Legal-
ized Population Surveys (LPS and LPS2) (U.S. Immigration and Naturalization
Service 1992a; U.S. Department of Labor 1996) acquired individual-level data on
legalized immigrants, current residence status for household members, and reported
migration intentions for non-U.S. resident family members (Woodrow-Lafield 1994a,
1995b, 1996b). These studies showed that families and households of legalized
immigrants are mixed as to residence status, including some unauthorized resi-
dents. In addition, U.S. born children appear as do lawful permanent residents and
naturalized citizens.
One line of research on quantifying authorized migration seeks to cumulate
subsequent immigration within a family network with respect to the initial legal
immigrant, that is, the goal is to quantify the multiplier effect or the number of
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legal immigrants gaining admission subsequently through their family relationship
to an original immigrant (Jasso and Rosenzweig 1986, 1990). The magnitude of
this legal chain migration would depend not only on individuals’ interest, motivation,
and behavior but also on the opportunity structure for legally immigrating to the
United States. The present report does not explicitly address multiplier effects or
chain migration except in addressing the possible magnitude of compositional shifts
by authorization status in the near term as a consequence of the amnesty programs
in the late 1980s with new analyses pursuant to Woodrow-Lafield (1995b). The
major unit of analysis in this study is individuals, although amnesty-related family
effects are indirectly noted.
Event Categories
Previous work has reviewed administrative data sources, statistical systems,
and census and survey sources relevant for measuring or describing migration
generally or authorized immigration in particular for the U.S. context (Levine,
Hill, and Warren 1985; Kraly 1986; Jasso and Rosenzweig 1987). The discussion
here cannot be exhaustive and is intended as a cohesive presentation of data and
statistics for measuring and describing authorized immigration to the United States
as to either gross or net magnitude. Although seemingly superfluous after previous
sections on conceptualization and operationalization, explicitness as to terminology
or nomenclature is necessary due to the character of administrative data systems or
structures from which these statistics are derived.
First, individuals who have been lawfully accorded the privilege of residing
permanently in the United States, and are presumed as settling, are known as
immigrants in INS terminology. They may have been issued immigrant visas by
the Department of State overseas and appear in official statistics as arrivals.
Alternatively, they may already have legally entered the United States, usually
on a nonimmigrant visa, and have their status adjusted to permanent resident
status by the INS, filing an I-485 form. These individuals have experienced a
status transition without having experienced a migration event. The descriptive
“legal” is often used because the regular definition of “immigrant” does not
prescribe legal status.
Effective as of fiscal year 1995, Congress added Section 245(i) to the
Immigration and Nationality Act, which allows aliens who are living in the United
States without authorization, but who have become eligible to acquire immigrant
status, to apply directly with the INS rather than to return to the U.S. consulate
abroad through which their visa application had been filed. The largest impact of
this shift in application process may occur in the categories exempt from numerical
limitation, such as immediate relatives of U.S. citizens (U.S. Immigration and
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Naturalization Service 1996a; U.S. General Accounting Office, 1995a). This policy
will be short-lived, however.
Second, the category of temporary, authorized migrants is found in INS
statistics for nonimmigrants, aliens who seek temporary entry to the United States
for a specific purpose. To receive such entry, nonimmigrants must have a
permanent residence abroad and be approved formally for a nonimmigrant
classification such as foreign government official, visitor for business or for
pleasure, alien in transit throughout the United States, treaty trader or investor,
student, international representative, temporary worker or trainee, representative
of foreign information media, exchange visitor, fiancé(e) of U.S. citizen,
intracompany transferee, or NATO official. Purposes for nonimmigrants’ entries
are usually related to work, business, education, or recreation and their visits are
accordingly authorized for limited durations, usually with an explicitly stated
deadline for departure.
Third, there are special categories of temporary and legally resident
individuals given the nomenclature of nonimmigrant for which statistics are
handled separately from the official nonimmigrant statistical structure. These are
refugees, asylees, parolees, withdrawals, stowaways, and crewmen, of which
refugees number the largest. Refugee status is granted to “any person who is
outside his or her country of nationality who is unable or unwilling to return to
that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution, based
on the alien’s race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group,
or political opinion.” Their case is special in that refugees are permitted to adjust
to permanent residence after one year of continuous presence in the United States.
Asylee refers to “an alien in the United States or at a port of entry unable or
unwilling to return to his or her country of nationality, or to seek the protection
of that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution.”
The bases are similar to those for refugee status and asylees are also able to adjust
status after one year subject to numeric limitation (now 10,000 annually). Parolees
have not been admitted formally to the United States and may be required to
leave when the emergency (humanitarian) conditions supporting their parole into
the United States cease to exist.
Similarly, generally legalized aliens are a unique, historical group who hold or
held a temporary status before progressing to permanent residency (most in 1988-
1990. These individuals were certain aliens who had been unauthorized or
undocumented workers or were here as unauthorized or undocumented residents
and were eligible to apply under the legalization provisions of the Immigration
Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA). To be eligible under the general amnesty
provisions (filing I-687 application forms), aliens must have entered the United
States before January 1, 1982 either (1) illegally or (2) as temporary visitors with
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their authorized stay expiring, or with the Government’s knowledge of their unlawful
status, before that date, must have continuously resided in the United States in an
unlawful status since before January 1, 1982, and must qualify for admission as
nonexcludable. Another group of beneficiaries of amnesty under IRCA were
agriculturally legalized aliens gaining Special Agricultural Worker (SAW) status
(filing I-700 application forms) under an IRCA provision applicable for aliens who
had performed labor in perishable agricultural commodities for a specified period
of time during 1984-1986. The temporary and permanent statuses for agricultural
legalization applicants will be discussed later.
Immigrants
Demographic characteristics, nationality, country of birth, and country of last
residence encompass much of the heterogeneity of legal immigration over time.
For the post-1965 period dating from initiation of the seven-category preference
system for relatives of U.S. citizens and permanent resident aliens and for persons
with needed skills and training, legal immigrants can be detailed as to whether an
original immigrant or a non-original immigrant, that is, sponsored by a relative.
Beyond this classification, legal immigrants can be classified as to whether a prin-
cipal beneficiary immigrant or a derivative beneficiary, that is, a spouse, minor
child, or unmarried adult son or daughter of principal immigrants as well as by
preference category of admission or immediate relatives category.
The panorama of legal immigration to the United States is rich in descriptive
detail by country of last residence from 1820 and country of birth from 1925. The
availability of a consistent series of micro-data public-use immigrants files from
1972 to 1995 has enabled researchers to pursue studies of trends and contemporary
issues (Greenwood, McDowell and Trabka 1991; Houston, Kramer, and Barrett
1985). Mexican immigration became visibly greater around the turn of the century
during the great European migration over 1880-1920. By the time of passage of
the 1965 Amendments, immigration from Mexico (as the country of last residence)
already represented a substantial share of all legal immigration and has persisted
in relative importance to other source countries despite the imposition of per-
country limits under the preference system (Massey 1995, 1996). The European
countries’ share also diminished in recent decades, as there were large refugee
and family migration flows from Asian countries in the 1970s and 1980s. Mexican
immigration has long exceeded the preference per-country level due to admissions
levels under immediate relatives provisions. The prevalence of Asians, Mexicans
and other Latin Americans among legal immigrants is likely to persist unless the
legal system is changed or the sending countries become more attractive than the
United States.
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The legal immigration flows from Mexico have included large numbers of
women and children for decades (Houston, Kramer, and Barrett 1985), reflecting
that Mexican settlement in the United States is very family oriented, as is much of
immigration from the rest of the world, rather than for simply labor reasons. There
are some admissions of Mexicans under labor-based categories every year, but
most admissions under the preference system are family-based.
Nonimmigrants
The arrivals and departures of nonimmigrant aliens, except students, have been
processed through the Nonimmigrant Information System (NIIS) since 1984, a
data system based on the arrival-departure form (I-94) completed by most aliens
arriving by air or sea at ports of entry. INS collects the arrival portion at the time of
inspection with the alien retaining the departure portion, attached to the passport,
until collection by transportation carriers upon departure from the United States.
The Student/Schools Data System tracks admissions, enrollments, and departures
of students who are pursuing a full course of study in an approved program in an
academic, vocational, or other recognized nonacademic institution.
Arrivals statistics are published regularly that show admissions by country of
citizenship, port of entry, and nonimmigrant class of admission. Most nonimmigrants
are admitted for a period of six months or less, and depart accordingly, but many
other nonimmigrants live in the United States for several months or years on one or
Figure 1. Legal Immigrants Admitted from Mexico, Europe, and Total, 1821–1995
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more nonimmigrant classes. The INS has recently initiated publication of departures
statistics. Recent statistics on immigrants show that about 40 percent are adjustments
of nonimmigrants rather than new arrivals and two-thirds of immigrant adjustees
show durations of stay exceeding one year. About 4.3 percent of adjustments in
1994 were for Mexicans. Among Mexican nonimmigrants adjusting in 1994, the
majority were here with tourist visas.
Generally Legalized Aliens
A lengthy period of legislative debate culminated in IRCA’s major amnesty
program beginning May 1, 1987 for aliens who had been continuously resident in
an unauthorized or undocumented status since before January 1, 1982 (Greenwood
and McDowell 1985). The actual entry event was recorded on the I-687 applica-
tion form filed in 1987-1988. These individuals’ migration histories include the
unique set of administrative events: the I-687 application, legalization approval
for temporary residence status, and adjustment to lawful permanent resident. These
administrative events redefine the authorization status of this population subgroup
over time.
With some minor exceptions, the legalization program is regarded as a very
successful endeavor on the part of INS. The agency effectively mobilized
community groups, advocacy organizations, media resources, and its own staff
to inform aliens, process applications in a timely manner, and provide assistance
and decisions. Informal information networks played a significant role (Hagan
and Baker 1993). Furthermore, the approval rate was very high as INS broadly
interpreted documents as evidentiary of continuous U.S. residence. One empirical
indication of a continued unauthorized or undocumented presence was that at
least 700,000 were living within households of legalized aliens in 1988 (U.S.
Immigration and Naturalization Service 1992a), but that figure declined by 1992
(Woodrow-Lafield 1994a, 1995b).
The best gauge of the amnesty’s success would be a high rate of application
among the long-term unauthorized or undocumented residents who were eligible.
From evidence on the size and growth of the unauthorized or undocumented
population (Passel and Woodrow 1986, 1987), the upper limit on the size of the
amnesty-eligible population ranged between 2.5 and 4.0 million. INS used a
similar range and drew on geographic-based research (Passel and Woodrow 1984b)
to devise the geographic location of legalization offices. If the lower maximum
limit from Passel and Woodrow’s range were presumed, more than three-quarters
of eligible aliens may have applied. Mexico was the single largest country
represented among 1.8 million general legalization applicants as of May 1991;
1,229,016 were from Mexican aliens with 1,132,351 having entered without
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inspection. The legalization brought greater numbers in Texas than anticipated
but, on the other hand, the numbers of legalizations were somewhat disappointing
for New York officials.
Published immigrants statistics for 1989-1996 (U.S. Immigration and
Naturalization Service 1990, 1991, 1992b, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996a, 1997b, 1997c)
include legalized, generally and agriculturally, immigrants having adjusted status
to permanent residence after the requisite residency period. The application period
for the general program ended May 31, 1988, but INS continues to make decisions
on some applications every year in the course of litigation. Several hundred
thousand persons are participants in a class action case against INS to ask for the
right to apply for the amnesty program. Most were unable to do so in 1987—1988
because their unauthorized or undocumented status may have been unknown to
the INS. As some of these cases are resolved on an individual basis, additional
legalizations are occurring.
The micro data public-use immigrants files do not include the legalization
immigrants’ records in keeping with the confidentiality provisions of IRCA.1 How-
ever, the INS released administratively based micro data files including selected
application items (including demographic and origin characteristics) and adminis-
trative processing information about the generally legalized and agricultural worker
applicant pools (Borjas and Tienda 1994; Neuman and Tienda 1994). To meet
mandatory reporting requirements of IRCA, the INS was the primary sponsor of
the Legalized Population Survey (LPS) in 1989-1990 (U.S. Immigration and Natu-
ralization Service 1992a). Another wave in 1992 (LPS2), primarily sponsored by
the U.S. Department of Labor (1996), acquired post-legalization characteristics
for individuals, their household members, and their family networks abroad.
Special Agricultural Workers
Under IRCA’s provisions, aliens who had worked in seasonal U.S. agricultural
services for at least ninety days during May 1, 1985 to May 1, 1986 could apply for
temporary resident status during the application period June 1, 1987 until Novem-
ber 30, 1988. Applicants who had also worked at least ninety days during each of
the two previous years (May 1, 1983 to May 1, 1985) could qualify as “Group I”
applicants with entitlement to adjust to lawful permanent residence after one year
(sooner than for Group II applicants).
The demographic impact of this legalization has not always been well
considered. There were approximately 1.3 million applications under the SAW
provisions of IRCA as of November 30, 1988, greatly exceeding the expected
numbers. Nearly all were under the category of “Group II,” showing only evidence
of having worked for ninety days in U.S. agriculture. The flow of applications was
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at an escalating pace; about 700,000 SAW applications were filed in May 1988–
November 1988 (498,000 in the last two months). As given in the New York Times
(November 12, 1989), “estimates by Federal officials and immigration experts place
the number of fraudulent applications at somewhere between 250,000 and 650,000.”
The issue of fraudulence dims with the realization that working in U.S. agriculture
is an experience characterized by high turnover and extensive recruitment.
Consequently, the high number of agricultural legalization applicants may reflect a
tendency to underestimate the number of unauthorized or undocumented workers
involved in agriculture in addition to some fraud (Martin 1990; Commission on
Agricultural Workers 1992:67).
As of November 1989, INS had approved only 490,000 agricultural legaliza-
tion applications. Only 35,000 had been denied at that point. Nearly one million
agricultural legalization applicants received legal status on December 1, 1990. The
majority of these becoming agricultural legalization beneficiaries were “approved”
through INS’ failure to deny approval. Another indication of visa-seeking behavior
from aliens living here is that the high volume (more than 600,000) of registrations
for the Replenishment Agricultural Worker program included many (532,000 or 87
percent) with return U.S. addresses (Commission on Agricultural Workers 1992:66).
About 85,000 (or 14 percent of the overall number) claimed they were immediate
relatives of IRCA legalization applicants or beneficiaries. None were admitted during
the authorization period for the RAW program because agricultural labor short-
ages did not materialize.
Published tabulations describe the agricultural legalization applicant popula-
tion and statistics for adjustment to lawful permanent resident status in 1990 and
1991 reflect agricultural legalization beneficiaries (U.S. Immigration and Natural-
ization Service 1991). As for generally legalized immigrants, the agriculturally
legalized cases are excluded from the public-use micro-data immigrants files and
administratively-based public-use micro data files are the single source for their
demographic characteristics, application information, and processing history.2 There
have been no survey efforts focusing on agricultural legalization applicants or ben-
eficiaries, although the LPS identified some agricultural legalization beneficiaries
living with generally legalized respondents (78,000) (U.S. Department of Labor
1996; Woodrow-Lafield 1995b, 1996b).
Refugees, Parolees, and Asylees
The U.S. Bureau of the Census includes some refugees in official accounts at
the time of their arrival on the basis of data from the Office of Refugee Resettlement
in the Department of Health and Human Services. Others, generally from countries
sending few, are not added routinely at arrival, but they (and other nonimmigrants
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living here including asylees) eventually appear in official INS statistics upon
adjustment to permanent residence. Over recent years, several hundred thousand
persons sought asylum in the United States, but the INS could not process their
applications on a timely basis. Until very recently, this applicant pool constituted a
significant population of indeterminate status.
Other Nonspecific
There are several additional special categories of foreign-born persons who
are either legally present or of indeterminate status. Although several of the migra-
tion events discussed earlier are quite clearly to be considered as contributory to
the permanently resident population, others may also be associated with perma-
nent migration in more diffused ways.
Temporary Protected Status (TPS) was extended under the Immigration Act of
1990 to 194,000 Salvadorans here in January 1, 1991–June 30,1992, with later
extension to additional aliens from Kuwait, Lebanon, Liberia, and Somalia, re-
ceiving this status due to country conditions deemed to prevent safe returns. A
related program granted de novo affirmative asylum interviews to as many as one-
half million Salvadorans here as of September 19, 1990 and Guatemalans here as
of October 1, 1990 under the settlement of American Baptist Churches vs.
Thornburgh. The initially specified date of departure has been deferred recurrently
by request of the Salvadoran government and others (U.S. Commission on Immi-
gration Reform 1994:162-173). They may wish to seek lawful permanent resi-
dence now that they have lived here for so long. Extended Voluntary Departure
(EVD) status is granted to designated nationals in the United States because the
U.S. State Department judged conditions in the countries “unstable” or “uncer-
tain” or to have shown a pattern of “denial of rights.”3 Nearly all aliens from the
People’s Republic of China here at the time of the Tiananmen Square protests were
eligible for deferred enforced departure upon visa expiration4 and many later ad-
justed status (e.g., under the Chinese Student Protection Act).
Spouses and children of legalization beneficiaries are potentially resident
without having lawful status. Under application guidelines, family members could
submit all of their I-687 applications with a single fee of $475 rather than individually
with fees of $150. About two-thirds of all primary applications were filed on this
basis. Yet only about 451,000 (21.4 percent) of a total 2,111,000 nuclear family
members of generally legalized persons had also attained amnesty (Woodrow-Lafield
1995b). Some were otherwise legally entitled to remain in the United States
permanently with lawful permanent residence (135,000 or 6.4 percent), U.S.
citizenship (1,133,000 or 53.6 percent), or SAW status (32,000 or 1.5 percent).
However, approximately 107,000 or 5.1 percent gave “family fairness” or “family
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unity” as their status, a reference to INS’ policy that emerged to avoid family
disintegration if some members were ineligible to apply under IRCA legalization
provisions. The Immigration Act of 1990 remedied this “family unity” problem by
allocating visas for dependents of IRCA legalization beneficiaries.
Populations
The “Standard”—Legally Resident
Foreign-Born Population in 1980
Warren and Passel approached the task of estimating unauthorized or undocu-
mented aliens as a function of nativity and citizenship. That is, they constructed an
estimate for legally resident aliens and an estimate for aliens counted in the census,
which involved an increase for aliens misreporting as naturalized citizens based on
an independently constructed estimate for the naturalized citizen population.
Resident Aliens
For several decades, the INS maintained the Alien Address Registration System,
on the basis of aliens’ voluntary registration through the U.S. Postal Service annually
in the entire month of January. The I-53 form contained only a few demographic
and immigration items, including current address, category and date of admission,
age, sex, and country of birth. The data were intended for INS resource allocation
and statistical purposes and provided a periodic description of the origin, geographic,
demographic, and status characteristics of the alien presence in the United States.
As an economy measure, the Congress discontinued funding the program after
1981. Warren and Passel (1983, 1987a, b; Passel and Robinson (1988) first
formulated a baseline estimate for the alien component using the Annual Alien
Address Registration Program for January 1980. This initial estimate included or
excluded categories of aliens according to self-reported resident status. Those
categories considered “usually” resident by census residence rules are permanent
resident aliens, students, refugees, and “other” aliens. Excluded categories included
commuter workers, visitors, crewmen, and exchange aliens. Since registration was
voluntary, an assessment of country-specific coverage was made by analyzing
permanent resident alien admissions and the numbers of registered aliens for 1965-
1980. The 1980 alien data were adjusted for estimated underregistration of 11.1
percent, resulting in an overall increase of 12.5 percent. For Mexico, Warren and
Passel estimated that 7.3 percent of legally resident aliens had failed to register
(Passel 1991). Underregistration or undercoverage may not have been a serious
obstacle for statistical research as believed (Levine, Hill, and Warren 1985:65;
Jasso and Rosenzweig 1990; Warren and Passel 1983, 1987a, b).
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Naturalized Citizens
Naturalization statistics represent those among legally resident foreign-born
persons who are not as likely as those who have not naturalized to return migrate
or otherwise leave the United States to reside elsewhere. For immigrants of many
origins, U.S. naturalization necessitates relinquishing citizenship in one’s origin
country and any nationality rights. Parents may list their minor children on their
naturalization form, and request a copy of the child’s (ren’s) certificate of deriva-
tive citizenship from the INS. Unfortunately, from a statistical perspective, many
do not do so and even when such certificates are requested, INS data system cap-
ture may be incomplete. Thus, INS naturalization statistics do not completely cover
the population deriving citizenship automatically upon naturalization of a parent.
An estimate of naturalized citizens in the 1980 census was based on both cen-
sus reporting as naturalized citizens and a demographic estimate constructed by
surviving naturalizing immigrants over time, as identified with INS administrative
naturalizations statistics. Substantial overstatement of naturalized citizen status
(843,000) was found and shifted into the “alien” category, including about 375,000
for Mexico-born. Criticism of this work on the basis of INS recorded naturaliza-
tions over 1960-1980 (Hill 1985) is separate from the undocumented results be-
cause classification by citizenship is unnecessary for derivation of undocumented
estimates.
Gauging Quality of 1980 Estimates
The initial Warren-Passel estimate for 1980 of 12,084,000 legally resident for-
eign-born persons, including 7,816,000 aliens and 6,118,000 naturalized citizens
was meant to represent the complete population of legally resident foreign-born
persons as of January 1980. Included were 1,400,000 persons of Mexican birth,
with 1,195,000 aliens and 205,000 naturalized citizens. An obvious weakness is an
insufficiency of 1980 census data for the earliest entry period (before 1960) for all
countries or regions other than Mexico. Because there would be negligible amounts
of non-Mexican unauthorized or undocumented immigration prior to 1960, this
research has emphasized the “Entered After 1960” population, with inclusion of
Mexicans who entered pre-1960.
Other limitations of that estimate may derive from country-level adjustment
for underregistration of legally resident aliens. First, there was no direct information
with which to estimate underregistration levels by age, sex, or period of immigration.
Second, underregistration levels for the permanent resident alien category were
assumed to apply to temporary resident alien categories, such as students, refugees,
and other aliens. The proportions of permanent resident aliens of the registered
population considered resident for census purposes varied by country from 12.3
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percent (Saudi Arabia) to 98.8 percent (Portugal). (For Mexico, the percentage was
98.3 percent.) Consequently, there could be error in the estimates by country if this
assumption were flawed.
The nature of the data collection period, based on a one month-period, also
raises concerns about the utility because the population estimate would probably
overrepresent shorter durations and overestimate the population entered for the
most recent time period. Hill (1985) raised questions about overreporting for Mexico,
among other countries, possibly as a result of misreporting by temporary residents
in the category for permanent resident.5 Subsequently, Passel (1991) allowed for
greater variability in the legally resident alien component for the Mexican popula-
tion (±10 percent) than for the non-Mexican population (±3 percent), noting that
unauthorized or undocumented migrants might have erroneously registered.
Legally Resident Foreign-Born
Populations Post-1980
Demographic Accounting
As described earlier, the estimate of legally resident foreign-born persons as
of 1980 by Warren and Passel can be considered a “standard,” in several senses,
and it became a foundation for using a components-of-change method to derive
post-1980 estimates for legally resident foreign-born populations in the United
States. The major components of change are estimated mortality, assumed
emigration, admissions of lawful permanent residents and certain groups of arriving
refugees, and other transitions to lawful permanent residence by persons already
living in the United States (including adjustments and legalizations). This
methodology was designed for consistency with the Census Bureau’s methodologies
for demographic analysis and postcensal population estimates.
An accounting for components of change for the legally resident population
had previously been implicit in accounting for change to the total resident population
before 1980 because an unauthorized or undocumented presence had not been
measurable for the 1970 census. The demographic analysis program for measuring
U.S. census coverage relies on comparison of the enumerated population by age,
sex, and race with an independently constructed estimate of the total resident
population as of Census Day. However, the 1980 census apportionment counts
delivered to the President January 1, 1981 exceeded the independent estimate, and
Census Bureau demographers noted the possible effects for net undercount of one
to six million unauthorized or undocumented residents (Passel, Siegel, and Robinson
1982). The ASA Technical Panel on the Census Undercount recommended in the
fall of 1982 that the Census Bureau continue strong efforts to improve estimates of
the number of illegal aliens and that the Census Bureau make public a sufficient
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number of undercount estimates to illustrate the uncertainties in the methods (ASA
Technical Panel, 1984). Plans for demographic analysis of 1990 census coverage
recognized that demographic accounting for the total resident population must be
legal status-specific. (See Himes and Clogg 1992.) To this end, a systematic research
program at the Census Bureau monitored net authorized immigration in the 1980s
and indirectly monitored net unauthorized or undocumented migration by
partitioning foreign-born estimates into authorized and unauthorized or
undocumented components (Passel and Woodrow 1987; Woodrow, Passel, and
Warren 1987; Woodrow and Passel 1990; Woodrow 1992c).
Table 1 summarizes the 1970-1990 time series of estimates of foreign-born
population, legally resident foreign-born estimates, and estimates of unauthorized
or undocumented residents in surveys or censuses.6 The measured number of
unauthorized or undocumented residents in censuses or surveys has been around 2
million with the single exception of 1986 when the estimate was 3.2 million. The
landmark amnesty of IRCA for aliens proving continuous residence in an
unauthorized or undocumented status since January 1, 1982 generally confirmed
the various studies (Warren and Passel 1983, 1987a; Passel and Woodrow 1984b;
Meissner and Papademetriou 1988). Post-1986 estimates required accounting for
IRCA-legalized aliens’ transitions from unauthorized or undocumented resident to
authorized `or legal resident. Those legalizing on the basis of having lived here
continuously in an undocumented status since before 1982 are prima facie permanent
residents. These figures in Table 1 incorporate most of the general legalizations,
but alternative estimates based on allowing for agricultural legalizations are discussed
below (Woodrow and Passel 1990; Woodrow 1992c). IRCA’s amnesty appeared to
result in a marked decline in the “enumerated” unauthorized or undocumented
resident population between 1986 and 1989, but levels of net unauthorized or
undocumented migration were undiminished (Woodrow and Passel 1990; Woodrow
1992c; Donato, Durand, and Massey 1992).
Because the U.S. Bureau of the Census does not officially measure
undercoverage of the foreign-born population in total or by legal status, a potpourri
of rationales have been discussed for a range on the total number of unauthorized
or undocumented residents over 1980-1990. Despite the passage of time, these
ranges are not really very different. The most consensual is the range for 1980 that
relies on several studies suggesting that the probable upper bound of the unauthorized
or undocumented population was 3.5-4.0 million (Bean, King, and Passel 1983;
Levine, Hill, and Warren 1985; Passel and Robinson 1988; Heer and Passel 1987).
Following some internal wrangling between demographers and statisticians about
the quality of residual estimates for unauthorized or undocumented residents, the
Census Bureau used 3.0 million as the preferred estimate for total net unauthorized
or undocumented migration as of 1980 (Fay, Passel, and Robinson 1988), of which
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2.3 million represented net unauthorized or undocumented migration for the 1970s
(Passel and Robinson 1988).7
These studies were the foundation for the net unauthorized or undocumented
migration component for evaluating the 1990 census (Woodrow 1991a) discussed
below. For this evaluation of 1990 census coverage (Robinson et al. 1991, 1993),
an estimate for legally resident foreign-born population was implicit rather than
explicit and the net “unauthorized or undocumented” migration component possi-
bly included agriculturally legalized residents. Interpretation of the transition of
agriculturally-legalized (SAW) applicants has never been clear whether the time-
referent were 1988, 1989, 1990, or today. Throughout discussions of post-1980
analyses, application of the components-of-change method is complicated by, first,
the legal precariousness of agricultural legalization applicants and, second, by at-
tribution of U.S. residence for agricultural legalization-approved beneficiaries. The
last two studies mentioned in this table (Woodrow-Lafield 1995a; Clark et al. 1994)
make allowances for nonspecific authorized immigration, including agriculturally
legalized residents, and we return to these results following discussion of unknown
factors in measuring net authorized immigration and a closer examination of stud-
ies for the 1979-1989 period.
Mexican population estimates for national surveys, including the 1970-1990
censuses, are shown in Table 2, as available on a comparative basis using similar
residual methodologies. The legally resident Mexico-born population in the United
States increased from about 1.4 million in 1980 to perhaps 3.0-3.5 million for 1990,
depending on particular assumptions. This increase mirrors the overall increase
over recent decades in the size of the Mexico-born population living in the United
States. The unauthorized or undocumented population of Mexican birth appears to
have fluctuated and to have declined slightly for 1990 relative to 1980, but this
appearance may be merely artifactual due to the unauthorized or undocumented
estimate as a residual using the survey or census estimate subject to undercoverage.
Prior to IRCA, extrapolation of studies of average population change due to net
unauthorized or undocumented migration from Mexico implied there were as many
as 2.5 to 3.5 million unauthorized or undocumented Mexican residents (Passel and
Woodrow 1987).
These estimates for legally resident foreign-born populations are only as accurate
as they are unbiased from data gaps on emigration or return migration and unknown
long-term immigration associated with nonimmigrants or agriculturally legalized
persons. Exercising expert judgment is inescapable, but guiding strategies are
nonexistent. The number of unauthorized or undocumented residents in 1990 was
certainly below six million (Woodrow-Lafield Forthcoming). The next section
addresses the more “known” components of change. The following sub-sections
address the major uncertainties about the authorized foreign-born estimate stemming
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from “temporary” migration, emigration after authorized immigration, incorporation
of the agriculturally-legalized population, and the ultimate immigration
consequences of the IRCA legalizations.
Knowns: Administrative Statistics
Admissions for lawful permanent residence, legalization approvals, adjust-
ments to lawful permanent residence, and nonimmigrant arrivals are easily acces-
sible administrative statistics. These would be considered “knowns” in the sense
that the data sets are regarded as highly complete within the domain. Interpretive
cautions must be noted for using these administrative statistics for social science
research. First, those immigrants arriving as permanent residents may have had
prior U.S. residence experience or may anticipate short or long stays abroad. Sur-
vey responses to questions about the timing of immigration may differ from re-
corded date of lawful permanent residence. Second, generally-legalized immigrants
are usually presumed as having settled here for their lifetimes and at minimal risk
of return migration as a consequence of their sustained presence. Third, those ad-
justing to lawful permanent residence from a nonimmigrant class may have sub-
stantial U.S. residence histories, either continuous or on an intermittent basis. Fourth,
arriving nonimmigrants are presumed to be temporary residents, and the majority
of nonimmigrant departures occur following short durations of stay.
Figure 2. Legally Resident Foreign-born by Mexican Birth: 1970–1990
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Unknowns: ”Temporary” Migrants
A one-year entry cohort of nonimmigrant arrivals8 is comprised of (1) aliens
who ever depart and (2) aliens who stay or are lifetime migrants. Among those
who depart, most do so after a brief visit, as is the experience for the majority of
arriving nonimmigrants, and others depart after stays of one year or more. Among
those who stay, some adjust to permanent resident status and others stay as unau-
thorized or undocumented, but either may have changed among nonimmigrant
classes. Those nonimmigrant arrivals followed quickly by departure are not con-
sidered as counting toward population change and such individuals would not meet
residence rules for either census enumeration or inclusion in national surveys. Those
eventually departing after longer residence periods and those ultimately becoming
lawful permanent residents present difficulties for accounting for population by
authorization status. The magnitude of the accumulated number of present stayers
across various nonimmigrant arrival cohorts is needed to estimate the legally resi-
dent foreign-born populations for dates falling within the transition between non-
immigrant status and departure or adjustment to permanent status. Ultimately, a
stayer’s presence is recorded in immigrants statistics for adjustees and the rest
depart. If the population were constant over time, there would not be a problem.
This problem is difficult conceptually, analytically, and empirically. The ap-
propriately detailed arrivals and departures statistics are not yet published for moni-
toring the nonimmigrant population, although considerable improvements have
been made. Departures statistics have not been published regularly and are incom-
plete because the departure portion of the I-94 form may not be collected at exit or
INS may receive it much later. In reviewing relevant studies, four questions are
posed: (1) As of a specific date, how many nonimmigrants have stayed in the United
States for at least one year or are likely to do so? (2) How many nonimmigrants
have stayed in the United States for at least one year as of a specific date? (3) How
many nonimmigrants among those arriving within a year stay for at least one year
before their departure? (4) How many nonimmigrants would stay for at least one
year for a hypothetical arrival year? The net difference of 2.3 million for 1994
(22.1 million arrivals less 18.8 million departures) cannot be interpreted as an-
swering any of these questions. The first two questions could be phrased with re-
spect to 1990 and 1995 or 1996 dates for the overall purpose. The latter two ques-
tions are more flow-oriented. Modeling nonimmigrant processes of arrival, depar-
ture, and adjustment over time with modification for departures’ undercoverage
could address these questions.
The first question is relevant for gauging how many nonimmigrants may be
included in a census or national survey of the resident population. The residence
rules for the census stipulate that individuals should be living here on a permanent
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basis or should have lived here for at least six months. Even when migration may
not be for permanent residence, six months of residence might be considered a
threshold for considering nonimmigrants as usual residents. The 1980 estimate of
Warren and Passel included about 612,000 nonimmigrants whose class of admis-
sion was taken to imply “usual” residence—243,000 refugees, 192,000 students,
and 177,000 other aliens (Woodrow 1990). Throughout the 1980s, official postcensal
population estimates did not allow for population change due to temporary migra-
tion, i.e., depending on the presumption that newly arriving nonimmigrants be-
coming “usual” residents for several months or years would be offset by depar-
tures, including adjustments of status of similarly usually resident nonimmigrants.
From several indications, the size of the nonimmigrant population stock is
likely to have increased. One set of consequences for the “black box” of
nonimmigrant stayer is the volume of adjustments to lawful permanent residence.
A total of 1,150,000 long-term nonimmigrant residents, excluding IRCA adjustees,
adjusted to lawful permanent residence during 1990-1994 or about 230,000
annually. This is considerably greater than for 1980-1984. Without knowing the
size of the nonimmigrant stock now, one could retroactively impute its value on
the basis of those giving the designated date or an earlier date of entry upon
adjusting in subsequent years. The volume of nonimmigrant arrivals nearly doubled
for 1981-1990 (123.1 million) relative to 1971-1980 (64.3 million). Over 1985
and 1994, the numbers of nonimmigrant arrivals increased from 9.5 to 22.1 million.
Having established that contemporary measures for the nonimmigrant stock are
necessary, there are none in the absence of the alien registration program. Such
an accounting could have been accomplished in the course of another statistical
program to measure visa overstay levels. Several studies (Warren 1986, 1990,
1993, 1994a) have focused on inferring the contributions of nonimmigrant visa
overstays to net unauthorized or undocumented migration. The same analytic
strategy could emphasize measurement of contributions of nonimmigrant visa stays
to net authorized immigration.
The empirical evidence as to the third question is limited to a single case study
of nonimmigrant arrivals during calendar 1983 that resulted in a departure before
1988. Kraly and Warren (1991, 1992) estimated long-term immigration including
not only lawful permanent resident statistics but also allowances for nonimmigrant
arrivals with eventual departures after a one year stay as of 1987 and for nonimmi-
grant arrivals with eventual adjustment to lawful permanent residence during 1984-
1986. These studies by Kraly and Warren (1991, 1992) rely on ex post facto defi-
nition of nonimmigrants as long-term immigrants. Among all nonimmigrant arriv-
als (9,849,000), the majority departed within the first year, but about 113,000, or
1.2 percent, departed after at least a one-year stay (Kraly and Warren 1991). Among
those from Mexico (627,000), about 7,000, or 1.1 percent, departed after one year
643
or more. Nonimmigrant arrivals under classes of foreign officials, temporary workers,
exchange visitors, refugees, and students, showed higher percentages of long-term
stays leading to departures than for visitor classes. Another 79,000 persons who
initially arrived as nonimmigrants in 1983, of whom 5,000 were from Mexico,
adjusted to permanent resident status. These statistics are right-censored as to de-
partures after 1987 and permanent residence adjustments after 1986 (or the extent
that all departure forms may not have been collected) (Kraly and Warren 1992).
With more complete data for 1987, Kraly and Warren (1992) reported that long-
term immigration reached 120,000 (including 8,000 from Mexico) and adjustments
reached 96,000 (including 6,000 from Mexico). According to my own examina-
tion of 1988-1994 statistics, adjustments to nonimmigrants arriving in calendar
19839 were 9,093, 14,905, 29,683, 41,516, 7,553, and 2,683 for Fiscal Years 1988-
1993 (including 561, 556, 8,226, 21,152, 26,839, and 3,092 from Mexico).10 Longer
observation for this transition would minimize right-censoring biases on long-term
immigration measures.
The fourth question concerns nonimmigrants living in the United States in a
hypothetical sense. To illustrate a technique for projecting the amount of long-term
immigration associated with more recent nonimmigrant arrival cohorts, Kraly and
Warren (1992) showed duration-specific proportions departing or adjusting to per-
manent residence for nonimmigrant arrival cohorts of 1983-1987.11 Such a set of
rates could be used to generate synthetic estimates for this additional components
of long-term immigration for any year subject to applicability for other nonimmi-
grant arrival cohorts. The duration-of-stay statistics in U.S. Immigration and Natu-
ralization Service (1996b) can be used to generate a hypothetical distribution of
person-years in the United States for any departure cohort, but these statistics are
not necessarily descriptive of any particular arrival cohort.
Unknowns: Emigration after Permanent
Authorized Immigration
Following the post-war period of low immigration and low emigration, the
volume of authorized immigration rose over the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. The
magnitude of emigration after authorized immigration, also known as return mi-
gration or re-migration, began to shift upward. Absent official counts for departing
immigrants, several studies using indirect approaches have described possible
emigration levels for the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s decades (Warren and Peck 1980;
Warren and Kraly 1985; Warren and Passel 1987b; Woodrow-Lafield 1996a; Ahmed
and Robinson 1994; Borjas and Bratsberg 1996).
The crucial question is whether emigration has perpetually increased in the
latter half of the 20th century as the foreign-born population increased dramatically.
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Emigration levels for 1960-1990 and 1960-1999 might be similar to levels over
1960-1980 if the propensity to emigrate may be lower among contemporary residents
than among prior cohorts or because origin or other characteristics associated with
lower propensity to emigrate may be more highly represented among the foreign-
born recently residing in the United States. The compositional mix of the foreign-
born population has shifted to include greater proportions of (1) Latin Americans
and Asians for whom emigration has seemed lower than for Europeans (Jasso and
Rosenzweig 1990; Warren and Kraly 1985) and (2) immigrants who entered under
visa categories logically associated with lesser likelihood of return migrating, such
as refugees, asylees, adjustees from nonimmigrant statuses, and formerly
unauthorized or undocumented or temporarily resident individuals.
The empirical evidence is mixed as reviewed in Kraly (1997) and Woodrow-
Lafield (1997). First, Borjas and Bratsberg (1996:169) found emigration for immi-
grants entering in the 1970s of about 900,000 by 1980, which equaled three-quar-
ters of that for all period of entry groups found by Warren and Passel (1987b). This
level for recent entrants’ emigration may be overestimated by not allowing for
1980 census undercoverage. The range of total emigration for 1980 census cover-
age research was about .9 to 1.9 million foreign-born emigrants. Second, multi-
plicity sampling-based surveys of U.S. residents about nonresident relatives were
fielded to measure emigration occurring over 1980-1989 (Woodrow-Lafield 1996a).
Because the emigrant population is relatively small, the survey estimates are sub-
ject to considerable sampling variance. Based on these results and sensitivity analyses
using emigration rates by age, sex, period of entry, and country or region of origin,
the preliminary 1990 census coverage evaluation employed an estimate of 1.33
million for net emigration of legally resident foreign-born for the 1980s and al-
lowed a range of .8 million to 2.2 million (Woodrow 1991b). An intercensal ap-
proach (as in Warren and Peck 1980) yielded a result toward the upper end of this
range (Ahmed and Robinson 1994) suggesting higher emigration in the 1980s than
in the 1970s. A higher emigration allowance was adopted for population programs
in the 1990s, but the effect was offset by an increased allowance for net population
change due to net unauthorized or undocumented migration. Two methodological
questions concern comparability of coverage in the context of rising nonimmi-
grant arrivals and continuing unauthorized or undocumented immigration and the
validity of assuming similar propensities to emigrate for pre-1980 immigrants and
post-1980 immigrants within age, sex, and country of birth subgroups. These points
are considered at length in Woodrow-Lafield (1997) and Kraly (1997).
The preponderance of evidence about emigration is more adequate for posit-
ing a broad range than for stating that emigration levels are higher in the 1980s or
1990s than in the 1970s. For the purposes of estimating net authorized immigra-
tion as of the 1980s and 1990s, assumptions about the level and composition of
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emigration flows are generally consistent with prior research for the 1960s and
1970s. For post-1989 analyses, alternative series show the effects of varying an-
nual emigration among 95,000, 133,000, or 195,000. Compositional detail by age,
sex, and period of entry would be tenuous. The studies by Woodrow and others
(Woodrow, Passel and Warren 1987; Woodrow and Passel 1990; Woodrow 1992c)
using independently constructed estimates for the legally resident foreign-born
population in the 1980s did not produce age and sex detail with the exception of
Passel and Woodrow (1987). Legal foreign-born emigrants will be distributed to
Mexico as country of origin and to all other countries of origin on the basis of
Warren and Kraly (1985) as for unauthorized or undocumented research (Woodrow
and Passel 1990; Woodrow 1992c).
The Mexico-born population has increased dramatically since 1950, but that
increase has been dominated by authorized immigration—primarily family-based
and legalization-based. The current magnitude of the Mexico-born population poses
conflicting expectations about return migration levels. In one sense, there might
seem to be lesser propensity for return migration given a greater density on autho-
rized status, greater demographic diversity, and possibly greater representation of
sending communities at migration maturity. Alternatively, the Mexico-born popu-
lation accumulated over entry cohorts of the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s could be
approaching a “critical mass” for return migration when Mexican return migration
could become more easily discernible, despite limitations of methodologies. Such
a shift would be detectable by comparing multiplicity sampling-based estimates of
Mexican emigrants as Woodrow-Lafield (1996a) found for the post-IRCA period
(e.g., 1988-1998 or 1988-2003).
Unknowns: U.S. Residence of Agricultural
Legalization Beneficiaries
Meaningful distinctions exist among agricultural legalization applicants, agri-
cultural legalization-approved beneficiaries, agricultural legalization-default ben-
eficiaries, and residents becoming agricultural legalization-approved beneficiaries.
The agricultural legalization beneficiaries may not be presumed automatically as
living in the United States because their “proof” of agricultural work experience
did not establish usual residence in the United States. As well known from studies
based on the Mexican Migration Project, Mexican migration is a complex process.
Within that data base, settlers abroad are defined on the basis of having a U.S. stay
of at least three years. Because about 700,000 agricultural legalization applica-
tions were filed in May 1988-November 1988 (498,000 in the last two months), the
agricultural legalization program may have been a magnet for aliens seeking U.S.
residence status and may have ultimately promoted migration to and settlement in
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the United States. (Also, see Martin 1990, 1994, 1996.) Further confusing the issue
of whether agricultural legalization beneficiaries live in the United States, the INS
automatically granted lawful permanent resident status to all agricultural legaliza-
tion beneficiaries. That benefit was extended to both approved beneficiaries and
default beneficiaries, whose applications INS simply failed to deny, with about
900,000 receiving approval and becoming “lawful permanent residents” by the
default deadline of December 1, 1990.
Three sources offer some insights to the behavior of agricultural legalization
beneficiaries following legalization. First, the National Agricultural Workers Survey
(NAWS) acquired individual migrant workers’ legal status; almost one-half of
the migrant workforce in 1989—1991 had legalized under IRCA (Gabbard, Mines,
and Boccalandro 1994).12 Samardick (1995) reported that about 32 percent of
Mexico-born migrant workers in 1993-1994 had SAW status and another 7 per-
cent were general legalization beneficiaries. Many of the agricultural legalization
beneficiaries appear to have continued working in seasonal agricultural services.
Second, the numbers awaiting second preference visas for spouses and children
of legalization beneficiaries as of January 1993, 1994, 1995, and 1996 exceeds
the likely level for the generally legalized population (Woodrow-Lafield 1995b),
suggesting that as many as one-half million are dependents of agricultural legal-
ization beneficiaries. The third indicator of agricultural legalization beneficia-
ries’ residence in the U.S. rather than their origin country will be their behavior
in seeking to naturalize. All were eligible to begin to apply for naturalization on
or before December 1, 1995. Naturalization applications for fiscal year 1996 were
markedly higher for 1996 (1.2 million) over the previous year, but INS has not
updated information about applications for naturalization among eligible gener-
ally legalized immigrants or agricultural legalization beneficiaries. As of May
1994, only 7.7 percent of eligible generally legalized immigrants (233,000) had
applied to naturalize (U.S. Department of Labor (1996:107). Current levels of
completed naturalization levels would help in inferring U.S. residence for agri-
cultural legalization beneficiaries.
Unknowns: Immigrant Flow Effects from IRCA
The U.S. presence of family members of IRCA beneficiaries must be viewed
carefully in building an accounting model for the legally resident foreign-born
population. The consequences of the general legalization program under IRCA
will be considerable with as many as three million future immigrants related to
these legalization beneficiaries, including at least one million Mexican relatives
(Woodrow-Lafield 1994a). As noted above, many relatives were here with authorized
permanent status. Approximately 136,000 spouses, 223,000 children, 30,000 parents,
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130,000 siblings, and 102,000 other relatives were living in IRCA beneficiaries’
households in 1992 and had nonresident statuses (family fairness, temporary visa,
other, or missing). Within households of legalized Mexican immigrants, there were
91,000 spouses, 159,000 children, 19,000 parents, 99,000 siblings, and 69,000 other
relatives in nonpermanent statuses, totaling 436,000 (unpublished analyses by
Woodrow-Lafield). The problem of family disruption became apparent in 1987
with cases of families with members ineligible to apply for amnesty, leading to
INS’ policy known as “family unity” or “family fairness.” The IA90 was an attempt
to resolve these situations with up to 55,000 visas for spouses and children of
legalization beneficiaries. A lesser amount resulted (140,000 and the second
preference visa waiting list counts associated with legalization beneficiaries grew
to 739,774 in January 1993 and remained high (853,382, and 824,000 in 1994 and
1995), including many spouses and children of agricultural beneficiaries (U.S.
Department of State 1993, 1994, 1995; U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform
1995). Empirical evidence exists for the immigrant flow consequences from the
general amnesty, but none exists for those from the agricultural legalization. Given
the high level of uncertainty surrounding the agricultural legalization beneficiaries
as possible U.S. residents, this additional data gap is very serious.
Waiting times for new applicants are growing progressively longer and ap-
proaching ten years’ duration (U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform 1995).
Resident dependents of IRCA beneficiaries will eventually be incorporated into
future estimates for the legally resident foreign-born population as they become
lawful permanent residents with allocated visas for 1992-1994, with second pref-
erence (or first, third, or fourth preference) visas in some year, or under provisions
for immediate relatives (parents, spouses, or minor children) of U.S. citizens. To
date, those from the first category and some of the second will be incorporated.
Omission of others from the authorized estimate causes overestimation of an unau-
thorized or undocumented residual.
A more expedient way for the IRCA beneficiary to bring close family mem-
bers as legal immigrants to the United States will be the two-tier processes of
naturalization and sponsorship under numerically exempt immediate relatives pro-
visions. Many of those who were minor children (100,000-200,000) at the time of
visa petition filing may have aged into adulthood by the time of visa issuance and
therefore be ineligible (U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform 1995). Among
Mexican respondents in the 1992 LPS, nearly three-quarters indicated they would
either “definitely” or “probably” apply for naturalization upon becoming eligible
(Woodrow-Lafield 1995c). This study is consistent with microeconomic theory
about naturalization decisionmaking in that having a coresident sibling without
permanent status and having a parent or sibling intending to immigrate are signifi-
cantly associated with intending to apply for naturalization.
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If IRCA-legalized immigrants were able to complete the naturalization process
easily and quickly, then the numbers of spouses and children who would become
lawful permanent residents under immediate relatives’ provisions during 1995-
1998 would be approximately 300,000, considering Woodrow-Lafield’s (1994a,
1995b) work, and if SAW-legalization immigrants were equally able to naturalize,
the entire backlog of 824,000 might be converted into legal immigrants (if there
were no aging of minor children). These figures could even be conservative because
some naturalizing legalized immigrants may not have petitioned for their spouses’
and minor children’s admission under second preference, fearing that might
jeopardize their chances of securing nonimmigrant visas for short-term visits.
Probably some three-quarters of these various figures would represent Mexican
origins. Two other plausible explanations for arguing that these figures may be
conservative is that the empirical evidence omits future family unification to
agricultural legalization beneficiaries and migration and U.S. settlement of
agricultural legalization beneficiaries may be as lengthy as described in the work
of Massey and others. It is conceivable that the visa waiting list under second
preference could double or triple over the next few years.
Net Authorized Immigration for 1979-1989
The construction of the 1979, 1983, 1986, 1988, and 1989 estimates for legally
resident foreign-born populations uses the 1980 base population and authorized
immigrants by age group, sex, period of entry, and country of birth, with all
survival calculations preserving this specificity. The decrements for emigration
and increments for legalizations are made in the last stage by country of origin
and period of entry. Illustrative increments for agriculturally legalized residents
are by sex for Mexico and all other countries. The increment for generally
legalized immigrants could more easily be made by age and sex than the
increments for agriculturally legalized immigrants or immigrant flows from IRCA
beneficiaries’ sponsorship.
Published detail by estimated authorized status has always been restricted,
whether to age groups, sex, country, and period of entry (Warren and Passel 1987a),
broader age groups, country, period of entry, and state of residence (Passel and
Woodrow 1984b), or period of entry and region of birth (Passel and Woodrow
1987; Woodrow, Passel, and Warren 1987; Woodrow and Passel 1990; Woodrow
1992c). The census-based studies carried risks of various estimation errors, which
might be either independent or cumulative. The survey-based studies have the added
limitations of sampling errors to prohibit highly detailed analyses of demographic
and origin characteristics; therefore, demographic detail in studies after the 1980
census was incorporated for instrumental purposes rather than for its intrinsic value.
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Without Accounting for IRCA Legalizations
Prior studies showed post-1986 estimates for the legally resident foreign-born
population without any amnestied aliens pursuant to IRCA for estimating net popu-
lation change due to unauthorized or undocumented immigration. Without allowing
for legalizations pursuant to the amnesty provisions of IRCA, the foreign-born popu-
lation legally resident would have grown from 7.0 million to 11.4 million over 1979-
1989 (second tier, Table 3). This increase is only from post-1981 immigration. Re-
cently admitted authorized Mexico-born immigrants accounted for slightly more
than one-tenth of net authorized immigration for the post-1981 entry period.
With Accounting for Generally
Legalized Immigrants
The featured or preferred estimates (first tier) for the legally resident foreign-
born population showed an increasing trend over 1979-1989 from 7.0 million to
13.1 million. The rate of increase was greater for the legally resident Mexico-born
population as the number more than doubled over that decade from 1,388,000 to
2,522,000. Without considering origin, most of the increase is attributable to post-
1981 immigration. With closer examination, most of the increase for the Mexico-
born population is almost wholly from the IRCA legalization of aliens proving
continuous unauthorized or undocumented residence since before January 1, 1982.
As a reminder, these estimates of the legally resident foreign-born population were
produced under the auspices of the Census Bureau’s 1980 and 1990 census cover-
age evaluation programs and, accordingly, are intended to represent those indi-
viduals meeting the Census Bureau’s criteria for living in the United States on a
usual basis.
With Incorporation Of Agriculturally
Legalized Beneficiaries As Residents,
Alternative Series
The issue of agricultural legalization applicants’ inclusion in the legally resi-
dent estimate, in national surveys or the census, and in survey-based unauthorized
or undocumented estimates was complicated during 1988-1990. For example, the
review of the illegal immigration component by Himes and Clogg (1992) men-
tioned only the generally legalized immigrants. Until the deadline of December 1,
1990, the INS might have refused many of the applicants on the basis of having
shown insufficient grounds. Making any allowance for agricultural legalization
beneficiaries’ residence affects primarily the overall legally resident foreign-born
and legally resident Mexico-born populations.
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Table 3
Estimates of Net Legal Immigration with Legalizations,
1979–1989, Total and Mexican-born
Total (in thousands) Mexico-born (in thousands)
Entered Entered Entered Entered
Before After Before After
Data and Source Total 1982 1981 Total 1982 1981
Preferred
1979, Passel and Woodrow (1987) 7,036 7,036 – 1,388 1,388 –
1980, Passel and Woodrow (1984) 7,173 7,173 – 1,400 1,400 –
1986, Woodrow, Passel and Warren (1987) 9,911 7,595 2,316 1,657 1,397 260
1988, Woodrow and Passel (1990) 12,473 9,114 3,359 2,985 2,597 389
1989, Woodrow (1991a, 1992c) 13,104 8,887 4,217 2,999 2,522 477
Without any IRCA legalizations
1979, Passel and Woodrow (1987) 7,036 7,036 – 1,388 1,388 –
1980, Passel and Woodrow (1984) 7,173 7,173 – 1,400 1,400 –
1986, Woodrow, Passel and Warren (1987) 9,911 7,595 2,316 1,657 1,397 260
1988, Woodrow and Passel (1990) 10,728 7,369 3,359 1,766 1,378 389
1989, Woodrow (1991a, 1992c) 11,440 7,223 4,217 1,837 1,360 477
With general legalizations and low
number of SAW beneficiaries as residents
1979, Passel and Woodrow (1987) 7,036 7,036 – 1,388 1,388 –
1980, Passel and Woodrow (1984) 7,173 7,173 – 1,400 1,400 –
1986, Woodrow, Passel and Warren (1987) 9,911 7,595 2,316 1,657 1,397 260
1988, Woodrow and Passel (1990) 12,473 9,114 3,359 2,985 2,597 389
1989, Woodrow (1991a, 1992c) 13,354 8,887 4,467 3,211 2,522 689
With  general legalizations and moderate
number of SAW beneficiaries as residents
1979, Passel and Woodrow (1987) 7,036 7,036 – 1,388 1,388 –
1980, Passel and Woodrow (1984) 7,173 7,173 – 1,400 1,400 –
1986, Woodrow, Passel and Warren (1987) 9,911 7,595 2,316 1,657 1,397 260
1988, Woodrow and Passel (1990) 12,473 9,114 3,359 2,985 2,597 389
1989, Woodrow (1991a, 1992c) 13,604 8,887 4,717 3,449 2,522 927
With general legalizations and high number
of SAW beneficiaries as residents
1979, Passel and Woodrow (1987) 7,036 7,036 – 1,388 1,388 –
1980, Passel and Woodrow (1984) 7,173 7,173 2,316 1,400 1,400 260
1986, Woodrow, Passel and Warrent (1987) 9,911 7,595 3,359 1,657 1,397 389
1988, Woodrow and Passel (1990) 12,473 9,114 4,217 2,985 2,597 477
1989, Woodrow (1991a, 1992c) 13,879 9,662 4,992 3,774 3,297 1,252
651
Post-1986 analyses included illustrative estimates based on alternative
assumptions about inclusion of agricultural legalization applicants as legally resident
for November 1989. The scenarios, similar to those presented in Woodrow and
Passel (1990) and Woodrow (1992c), are:
• Low assumption of agricultural legalization beneficiaries as residents,
for which each is assumed to have resided in the United States, on aver-
age, for three months, implying that 250,000 would be included;
• Moderate assumption of agricultural legalization beneficiaries as resi-
dents, for which each is assumed to have resided in the United States,
on average, for six months, implying that 500,000 would be included;
• High assumption of agricultural legalization beneficiaries as residents,
for which 550,000 beneficiaries (including 100,000 Group I and 450,000
Group II) are assumed as continuously resident in the United States and
for which 450,000 beneficiaries are assumed to have resided in the United
States, on average, for six months, implying that a total of 775,000 would
be included;
• All assumption of agricultural legalization beneficiaries as residents,
for which nearly all beneficiaries are assumed to have resided in the
United States permanently, for inclusion of 1,000,000.
The effect of incorporating agricultural legalization beneficiaries as residents
increases the post-1981 portion of net authorized immigration with especially marked
increase for the Mexico-born population. The 1988 and 1989 studies also considered
composition by sex with illustrative scenarios (Figure 3). Given implications for
derivation of unauthorized or undocumented estimates, it appeared in the late 1980s
Table 3 (Continued)
Total (in thousands) Mexico-born (in thousands)
Entered Entered Entered Entered
Before After Before After
Data and Source Total 1982 1981 Total 1982 1981
With general legalizations and nearly all
SAW beneficiaries as residents
1979, Passel and Woodrow (1987) 7,036 7,036 – 1,388 1,388 –
1980, Passel and Woodrow (1984) 7,173 7,173 – 1,400 1,400 –
1986, Woodrow, Passel and Warren (1987) 9,911 7,595 2,316 1,657 1,397 260
1988, Woodrow and Passel (1990) 12,473 9,114 3,359 2,985 2,597 389
1989, Woodrow (1991a, 1992c) 14,104 8,887 5,217 3,799 2,522 1,277
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as if the demographic and origin characteristics of the agricultural legalization
applicant pool constrained the feasible assumptions at that time to low and moderate
ones. Allowing for inclusion of more than 500,000 agricultural legalization applicants
(perhaps 425,000 from Mexico) in the legally resident estimate led to unbalanced
sex ratios and implausible unauthorized or undocumented estimates based on the
1988 and 1989 CPS (Woodrow and Passel 1990; Woodrow 1991a, 1992c). Some
or many SAWs may certainly have been living in the United States prior to final
INS processing and simply have been omitted from the CPS estimates of the foreign-
born population. The likelihood of high census and CPS undercoverage for
agricultural legalization beneficiary residents is obvious, particularly if they resemble
agricultural migrant workers (Kissam 1993; La Cooperativa Campesina de California
1991; Gabbard, Kissam, and Martin 1993).
On an average annual basis, the combined unauthorized or undocumented and
IRCA-legalizing population increased by about the same amounts among nearly all
the time periods for all countries combined—approximately 200,000. For the various
time intervals 1979 to 1989, 1979 to 1986, and 1986 to 1989, average annual change
ranged between 163,000 and 218,000 (with confidence intervals bounded by 57,000
and 288,000). As apparent from Figure 4, if one abides by this range of variability, the
amount of net population-level change due to unauthorized or undocumented immi-
gration over the 1980s has considerable uncertainty. The decade’s amount might
have been about one-half million, or greater by a factor of five.
Figure 3. Legally Resident Mexico- and Other Foreign-born for 1989
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Some authors have incorrectly given a range of 100,000 to 200,000 yearly as
based on the Census Bureau’s studies of population growth from unauthorized or
undocumented migration for the 1980s (Simcox 1994; Warren 1994b). However,
the range of 100,000 to 300,000 was consistently quoted for population-level change
beginning with Passel and Woodrow’s analysis (1987) for 1979-1983 corresponding
with confidence intervals on estimates for annual change (Passel and Woodrow
1986; Woodrow 1992c:134). One explanation is that some readers may interpret
the survey-based estimates too literally without heeding sampling errors.
Alternatively, the misinterpretation may have happened when the population
projections methodology (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1989) anticipated a post-
IRCA decline as, apparently, even Congress believed there had been “significant
progress” in closing Athe back door to illegal immigration@ (Day 1996:69). One
must also be careful to recall that population estimates and projections, and the
200,000 allowed annually for change due to unauthorized or undocumented
migration, are only census-level.13
Caveats
When considered independently of any survey evidence on immigrants,
interpretation of net authorized immigration estimates require cognizance of only
possible estimation errors with cumulative, rather than merely offsetting, effects.
Figure 4. Net Population Change Due to Estimated Undocumented Immigration
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Because these estimates were prepared for the purpose of monitoring unauthorized
or undocumented immigration during the 1980s, other implications of
measurement errors are relevant. Although drawn from non-survey sources, the
methodology for deriving undocumented populations as a residual requires
statistical significance testing as if legally resident estimates were included within
the survey. The presence of sampling or nonsampling errors for certain
subpopulations can be signaled by negative unauthorized or undocumented
estimates as was the case for non-Latin American populations with the November
1989 analysis.
Net Authorized Immigration: 1990 and Beyond
For Census Day, 1990
Demographic analysis of 1990 census coverage estimated the total resident
population at 253.4 million, including the unauthorized or undocumented popu-
lation residing in the United States on April 1, 1990 by May 1991, prior to the
Secretary of Commerce’s decision on whether to adjust the 1990 census appor-
tionment counts for undercoverage. However, demographers could not replicate
previous analyses, that is, compare the legally resident foreign-born population
estimate as of Census Day 1990 with the 1990 census count of the foreign-born
population which was unknown until early February of 1992 and officially tabu-
lated by 1993 (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1993a, b). Three research memoranda
undertaken in the demographic analysis program over 1990-1991 are relevant:
Project D2: Preliminary Estimates of Undocumented Residents in 1990 (Woodrow
1991a); Project D5: Preliminary Estimates of Emigration Component (Woodrow
1991b), Project D7: Uncertainty Measures for Other Components (Robinson,
Woodrow, and Ahmed 1991). For the census evaluation, the emphasis was on
measuring overall undercoverage of all residents by age, sex, and race. Partition-
ing of legally resident and unauthorized or undocumented populations was not
necessary and Woodrow (1991a) noted that the unauthorized or undocumented
component might include some legally resident immigrants.14
Net Immigration by Authorization Status
Authorized Residents
In Robinson et al.’s (1993) analysis of 1990 census coverage, the implicit
estimate for legal foreign-born residents as of Census Day 1990 would be 16.7
million as a minimum after incrementing the November 1989 estimate of
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Woodrow (1991a, 1992c) with 250,000 additional legal immigrants over
December 1989-March 1990 as described in Woodrow (1992b) and Woodrow-
Lafield (1995a). That figure would have included at least 3 million Mexico-born
authorized residents. For the “entered since 1960” population, the overall figure
would be at least 13.4 million.
A prime source of uncertainty about the legally resident foreign-born popula-
tion for 1990 is the size of the resident population having benefited from the agri-
cultural legalization provisions of IRCA. With assumptions about resident agricul-
tural legalization beneficiaries, the overall estimate could increase to 17.6 million
and the Mexico estimate would increase rather markedly to 3.8 million. The com-
ponent for authorized immigration over the 1980s was bounded by 5.9 and 8.3
million for modeling uncertainty in the total resident estimate (Robinson et al.
1991, 1993; Robinson, Woodrow, and Ahmed 1991), to account for uncertainties
as to agricultural legalization and emigration.
The two published estimates for legally resident foreign-born persons in 1990
shown in Table 1 and for the Mexico-born portion shown in Table 2 are similar in
methodological divergence from pre-1990 census studies. Citing nonspecific au-
thorized immigration, including agricultural legalization beneficiaries,
nonimmigrants becoming permanent residents in the 1990s, special EVD and TPF
statuses, and dependents of IRCA-legalized beneficiaries,15 Woodrow-Lafield
(1995a) used estimates of 14.354 million and 17.690 million for the legally resi-
dent foreign-born population entered since 1960 and entered in all time periods.
Clark et al. (1994) similarly allowed explicit amounts for agricultural legalization
beneficiaries’ presence, foreign students, and other nonimmigrants for overall esti-
mates of 17.749 million, including 3.469 million Mexicans for 1990.
Unauthorized or Undocumented Residents
The Census Bureau’s estimate is there were 3.3 million unauthorized or
undocumented residents on April 1, 1990 as of a 1991 report. This figure was
initially presented as a preliminary estimate (Woodrow 1991a) and underwent
extensive review by internal committees, external demographers (Himes and Clogg
1992), and the Special Advisory Committee on Adjustment. Two approaches were
used. The first one explored effects of differential coverage between the estimate
of the unauthorized or undocumented population as of November 1989 based on
Current Population Survey (CPS) data and the 1990 census. The second presented
assumptions about total unauthorized or undocumented residents as of 1980 (2 to
4 million), total net unauthorized or undocumented immigration for 1980-1990
(2 to 3 million or 200,000 to 300,000 annually), and total IRCA legalizations for
1980-1990 (2 to 3 million). The assumption about net population change due to
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unauthorized or undocumented immigration is grounded in studies of unauthorized
or undocumented migration through the 1980s (e.g., Woodrow 1992c).
These direct and implicit estimates of the total number of unauthorized or
undocumented residents as of April 1, 1990 converged on a “point” estimate of
3.3 million as the best “working” estimate as of a 1991 report. The “likely” range
associated with this point” estimate was given as 1.9 million to 4.5 million, espe-
cially to account for the agricultural legalization. To account for the broad band of
uncertainty of the unauthorized or undocumented component, the preliminary es-
timates of 1990 census coverage from demographic analysis assumed that the true
number of unauthorized or undocumented residents in 1990 was between 1.7 mil-
lion and 5.5 million as a worst case scenario of census undercoverage (Woodrow
1991a, Robinson et al. 1991, 1993). These “bet the house” limits (Das Gupta and
Robinson 1991) represent the 99.9% limits and the 95% limits for the unautho-
rized or undocumented component are 2.4 million to 4.7 million. In its review, the
U.S. General Accounting Office (1993) did not recognize this difference and im-
plied the Census Bureau had an unrealistically high upper limit on the number of
unauthorized or undocumented residents in 1990.
This preliminary point estimate for net unauthorized or undocumented immi-
gration for the 1980s and associated ranges gained legitimability as the Census
Bureau’s official work on the component. A subsequent report (Fernandez and
Robinson 1994) extrapolated the point estimate of 3.3 million simplistically to
October 1992 and April 1994 as a conservative upper limit with INS estimates for
unauthorized residents as a lower limit (Warren 1993).16
Coverage and Components Errors
Census Coverage of Resident and
Legally Resident Foreign Born
A comparison of the legally resident foreign-born population estimate with a
census or survey estimate of foreign-born persons yields only a minimum for un-
authorized or undocumented residents included in the census or survey, because
there may be undercoverage of legal residents. Undercoverage of unauthorized or
undocumented residents contributes to underestimation of unauthorized or undocu-
mented residents in the United States (Woodrow-Lafield 1995a).
Demographic analysis estimates for the total 1990 resident population were
detailed by age, sex, and race. This demographic detail for the net unauthorized or
undocumented immigration component was synthetically estimated on the basis of
the age-sex-country compositions of the generally legalized and agriculturally
legalized populations. Census coverage research focuses on selected demographic
and social characteristics (age, sex, race, Hispanic origin, area of residence, et al.)
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without considering nativity status. The demographic analysis program offers limited
view of Hispanic undercoverage so one might wonder whether the postenumeration
survey estimates of Hispanic undercoverage might be representative of the absolute
upper limit on undercoverage of Hispanic unauthorized residents. The key problem
is that the postenumeration survey suffers from correlation biases, in a tendency to
miss many of the same difficult-to-enumerate subgroups as the census. The
composition of Hispanic undercoverage is unknown as to the reference groups of
natives, lawful foreign-born residents, and unauthorized residents. Woodrow-Lafield
(Forthcoming) allowed for up to 14 percent undercoverage of the foreign-born
population, or as much as three million, which would mean that nearly two of
every missed three persons could be foreign-born.
Plausibility Ranges for Total, Mexico-born
Based on detailed review (Woodrow-Lafield, Forthcoming) of possible errors
in estimating unauthorized or undocumented residents for 1990, the greatest pos-
sible estimate would be about 8 million. That improbable extreme could hold only
if all of the errors were in the direction of underestimating unauthorized or un-
documented residents. A range of 2 to 6 million is defensible as reasonably repre-
senting the unauthorized or undocumented population in 1990 corresponding with
a 95-percent level of certainty and liberal or broad assumptions of the ranges of
possible errors. The broader the range given for a particular estimated unautho-
rized or undocumented or legally resident population, the more conservative the
statement about the population. A more narrowly specified range requires stronger
support for the associated assumptions.
Similarly looking at the evidence of total and authorized immigration from
Mexico, the number of unauthorized or undocumented Mexican residents as of
1990 is slightly under 1 million to slightly more than 2 million (at 95-percent cer-
tainty) (Woodrow-Lafield 1996e). The likely range around a point estimate of 3.2
million for the legally resident Mexico-born population is 3 million to 3.9 million.
The greatest possible unauthorized or undocumented estimate would be 2.7 mil-
lion if all of the errors accumulated in the direction to minimize the legally resident
estimate and maximize the unauthorized or undocumented residual.
Statistical significance testing and derived confidence intervals on point esti-
mates can only be approximate with these types of authorized status population
estimates. It is very critical to remember the underlying rationale of statistical in-
ference, that as one broadens the confidence interval or raises the level of certainty
associated with the interval, one decreases the chances of not including the true
population parameter in the sample. If one were willing to accept only a 65% level
of certainty, one could draw from Woodrow-Lafield’s study (1996e) to state that
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the total number of unauthorized or undocumented Mexican residents for 1990
ranged between 1.2 and 1.9 million, a substantially narrower range. However,
there is considerable risk that the true population size lies beyond this range.
Beyond 1990
Authorized Immigration
Lawful Permanent Resident Alien Admissions
Since the 1990 census, there have been over 5 million admissions of lawful
permanent residents, net of IRCA legalizations. That figure includes about one-
half million from Mexico. Nearly two-thirds of the lawful permanent resident ad-
missions in Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991 were legalization adjustments. The fiscal
year 1991 was the peak year for agricultural legalization adjustments, primarily of
the agricultural legalization-default beneficiaries. Many of the aliens, who applied
for adjustment in fiscal year 1995, the first year of implementation of the new on-
soil policy, did not gain permanent resident status until fiscal year 1996.17
Net Authorized Immigration
Alternative Series, Varying Emigrants, Agricultural
Legalization Beneficiaries as Residents,
or other Nonspecific
Alternative series of estimates for net authorized immigration18 as of 1990
and beyond 1990 are presented in Table 5 that consider uncertainties as to
emigration of authorized immigrants, incorporation of agricultural legalization
beneficiaries as U.S. resident, and nonspecific sources of net authorized
immigration. The range for the low (95,000), moderate (133,000), and extreme
(195,000) assumptions about annual levels of emigration is narrow, although those
differences would accumulate over the number of years. For the Mexico-born,
these assumed amounts of emigration are slight given the emphasis on emigration
of lawful permanent residents—9,000, 13,000, or 20,000 in accordance with
Warren and Passel (1987b). The range for incorporation of agricultural legalization
beneficiaries as residents is difficult to say and so to be viewed as tentative. The
assumed amounts for incorporation of agricultural legalization beneficiaries as
residents is 300,000 (250,000 for Mexico), 550,000 (400,000 for Mexico), or
850,000 (700,000 for Mexico). The range for nonspecific sources of legal
immigration may be conservatively stated for all countries and yet may be well
designed for Mexico. The assumed amounts for other nonspecific sources of
authorized immigration are zero, 700,000 (250,000 for Mexico), or 1,000,000
659
Ta
bl
e 
4
La
w
fu
l P
e
rm
a
n
e
n
t R
es
id
en
ts
 A
dm
itt
ed
 to
 th
e 
Un
ite
d 
St
at
es
, F
is
ca
l Y
e
a
rs
 1
99
0–
19
96
Al
l I
R
CA
 L
eg
al
iza
tio
ns
(F
rom
 19
82
IR
CA
 S
AW
To
ta
l A
dm
itt
ed
a
n
d 
Ag
ric
ul
tu
ra
l)
Le
ga
liz
at
io
ns
IR
CA
 d
ep
en
de
nt
s
Fi
sc
al
 Y
e
a
r
To
ta
l
M
ex
ic
o-
bo
rn
To
ta
l
M
ex
ic
o-
bo
rn
To
ta
l
M
ex
ic
o-
bo
rn
To
ta
l
M
ex
ic
o-
bo
rn
19
90
1,
53
6,
48
3
67
9,
06
8
88
0,
37
2
62
2,
51
9
56
,6
68
51
,1
87
(X
)
(X
)
19
91
1,
82
7,
16
7
94
6,
16
7
1,
12
3,
16
2
89
3,
30
1
90
9,
15
9
74
0,
76
1
(X
)
(X
)
19
92
97
3,
97
7
21
3,
80
2
16
3,
34
2
12
2,
47
0
11
6,
38
0
89
,0
86
52
,2
72
28
,4
49
19
93
90
4,
29
2
12
6,
56
1
24
,2
78
17
,5
34
5,
56
1
4,
02
2
55
,3
44
39
,2
43
19
94
80
4,
41
6
11
1,
39
8
6,
02
2
4,
40
3
1,
58
6
1,
36
2
*
34
,0
74
33
,1
36
19
95
72
0,
46
1
89
,9
32
4,
26
7
2,
97
2
1,
14
3
98
2
27
7
22
2
19
96
91
5,
90
0
16
3,
57
2
4,
63
5
3,
60
5
1,
34
9
1,
15
8
18
4
14
7
19
90
-1
99
6
7,
68
2,
69
6
2,
33
0,
50
0
2,
20
6,
07
8
1,
66
6,
80
4
1,
09
1,
84
6
88
8,
55
8
14
2,
15
1
10
1,
19
7
19
91
-1
99
6
6,
14
6,
21
3
1,
65
1,
43
2
1,
32
5,
70
6
1,
04
4,
28
5
1,
03
5,
17
8
83
7,
37
1
14
2,
15
1
10
1,
19
7
*
 
N
ot
 a
pp
lic
ab
le
So
m
e 
fig
ur
es
 a
re
 fo
r 
N
or
th
 A
m
er
ic
an
 c
ou
nt
rie
s.
So
ur
ce
: 1
99
0-
19
95
 S
ta
tis
tic
al
 Ye
a
rb
oo
ks
.
 
M
at
er
ia
ls
 p
re
pa
re
d 
fo
r 
Bi
na
tio
na
l S
tu
dy
 (J
u
n
e
 1
99
5),
 Ta
bl
e 
6.
 
Im
m
ig
ra
n
ts
 A
dm
itt
ed
 b
y 
M
a
jor
 C
ate
go
ry 
of
Ad
m
is
si
on
 a
nd
 R
eg
io
n 
an
d 
Se
le
ct
ed
 C
ou
nt
ry
 o
f B
irt
h:
 
Fi
sc
al
 Y
e
a
r 
19
96
, (
htt
p:/
/w
ww
.
in
s.
u
sd
oj.
go
v/
pu
bl
ic
/s
ta
ts
/1
00
7.
ht
m
l). 
U.
S.
 
Im
m
ig
ra
tio
n 
an
d
N
at
ur
al
iz
at
io
n 
Se
rv
ice
.
660
(800,000 for Mexico). The latter set of assumptions is intended to encompass
those residents whose status might be considered as neither authorized nor
unauthorized or undocumented at the present time who might be sponsored by a
naturalizing relative who is an IRCA legalization beneficiary. In a sense, this
nonspecific component is an effort to make the accounting less atomistic or
individualistic and to account for clustering or family patterns of migration
resulting from IRCA. An expert’s assumptions are only that subject to review of
prior studies and possibilities for errors. The assumptions shown involve a certain
degree of arbitrariness as to magnitude and composition.
The columns for net authorized immigration for entry 1960-1990 are based on
carrying forward the estimated legally resident foreign-born population of Woodrow
(1991a, 1992c) from December 1, 1989 to April 1, 1990 primarily with additional
legal admissions and additional general legalizations for most tiers. Figures for net
authorized immigration for 1960-1996 are constructed by surviving the 1989 base
estimate until 1996, adding surviving numbers of admissions of lawful permanent
residents 1990-1996 (net of legalization adjustments), adding generally legalized
immigrants, subtracting estimated emigrants, adding agriculturally legalized im-
migrants, and adding other nonspecific amounts as indicated.
The first tier of estimates ((1) through (3)) for the legally resident foreign-
born population or net authorized immigration as of 1990 or 1996 is most consis-
tent with official procedures for counting individuals as contributing to the resi-
dent population as immigrants or settlers. This set is the lowest representation of
net authorized immigration. The second tier of estimates ((4) through (6)) is slightly
higher to reflect a low allowance for agriculturally legalized residents. With set
(5), the estimate is about the same as for Clark et al. (1994). Among all the esti-
mates, including the other tiers, sets (7) through (30), the amount of net authorized
immigration as of 1990 ranged between 13,092,000 (3) and 15,854,000 (28). The
amount of net authorized immigration from Mexico as of 1990 ranged between
3,199,000 (3) and 4,807,000 (28).
Net authorized immigration from all countries over 1960-1996 shows an
increase of at least three million relative to the period 1960-1990, when holding
assumptions constant. The low estimate appears in set (3)—16,105,000—and the
high estimate in set (28) is 19,415,000. Net authorized immigration of Mexicans as
of 1996 ranged from 3,870,000 (3) to 5,543,000 (28). The extreme allowance for
nonspecific sources of authorized immigration may be beyond the range of reality,
so that these upper limits might be shifted downward to set (20)—18,534,000 for
all countries and 4,924,000 for Mexico. Dramatically higher figures are also
conceivable as borne out by the earlier discussions. Depending upon the degree to
which one of the alternative series might be more accurate than set (17), the
divergence from prior estimation strategies would be greater or lesser. Fiscal years
661
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1996 and 1997 have been years of significant naturalization activities, especially
among legalization beneficiaries, portending a “hump” in legal immigration. That
echo of the amnesty could easily make estimates for legal status populations as of
1995 obsolete to experts, though highly visible among the outer circle.
Discussion, Policy, and Conclusions
Summary of Findings
To summarize, the upward trend in authorized immigration to the United States
and, for Mexico, the focused impact of IRCA’s amnesty programs, account for a
gradually increasing presence of legally resident immigrants since 1980. The precise
magnitude is difficult to pinpoint because the extent of U.S. residence among
agriculturally legalized individuals, the volume of transitions from unauthorized
or undocumented status into lawful permanent residence among family members
of legalized immigrants, and timely accounting of nonimmigrants in the United
States are not yet known. Ways of improving estimation for legally resident foreign-
born populations are obvious, but few of the statistical improvements recommended
by the National Academy of Sciences in 1985 (Levine, Hill, and Warren 1985)
have been accomplished. The quantity of net authorized migration is more
conservatively estimated with traditional definitions of permanent migration, tending
toward overestimation of the quantity of unauthorized or undocumented migration,
than with less restrictive definitions with inferences from multiple data sources.
This study has taken the direction of organizing the task of estimating legal
status populations in a fashion more or less like production of official postcensal
population estimates and projections (Keyfitz 1985). The uncertainties surrounding
authorized and unauthorized estimates are great enough and the policy contingencies
of sufficient merit that modeling strategies with multidimensionality are warranted.
Point estimates tell a story about balance of authorized and unauthorized immigration
over 1980-1996, but scholars should be careful in assigning credibility. The aim of
presenting alternative series is not to obscure understanding of the demographic
phenomena of net immigration by authorization status but, rather, to present coherent
bases for long overdue statistical improvements in the monitoring of international
migration to the United States.
A comparison of the 1990 census count for the foreign-born population with
net authorized immigration series that allow for sources of uncertainty would yield
unauthorized or undocumented residuals generally below the 3.3 million estimate
for total unauthorized or undocumented residents. Series (2), (3), and (6) were
close to it. It is conceivable the census data underrepresent the size of the foreign-
born population in the United States, possibly by as many as one million persons
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or more. Allowing for this unknown undercoverage would commensurately increase
the unauthorized or undocumented residual. Even allowance for undercoverage of
two percent would increase the unauthorized or undocumented estimate for 1990
by 400,000, but the increase might easily be one million or more.
A similar comparison of net authorized immigration estimates as of 1996
with foreign-born survey estimates suggests the unauthorized or undocumented
resident population in mid-decade may be scarcely higher than the estimates for
1990. At first, this seems remarkable because the post-1990 CPS estimates are
based on weighting strategies intended to compensate for undercoverage error
in the 1990 census. Given post-1990 lawful admissions of 5 million to 6 million,
the estimates for the foreign-born population from the CPS’s in March 1994 (22.6
million), March 1995 (23.0 million), and March 1996 (24.6 million) seem scarcely
higher than the 1990 census count of 19.8 million within which only about 615,000
had been incorporated for undercoverage (one-sixth of the estimated net
undercoverage from postenumeration studies or one-eighth of that estimated from
demographic analysis) (Robinson and Hansen 1996; Robinson et al. 1991, 1993).
(Also see Waite 1995.) Depending upon which alternative series is most suited
to realities in 1990 and 1996, there may not have been any increase in net
unauthorized or undocumented migration between 1990 and 1996. Additional
allowance of undercoverage of the foreign-born would commensurately increase
the unauthorized or undocumented estimate. The amount of net unauthorized
immigration could be the same for mid-decade as in 1990, but a marked decline
pertains for most scenarios. To the extent that one tends to agree with the
hypothesis that all or most agricultural legalization beneficiaries have changed
residence to the United States, even if not here initially, or to expect that substantial
numbers of legalization dependents will obtain immigrant visas, unauthorized
or undocumented estimate would be lower. The case of Mexico is very remarkable,
because an apparent increase in net unauthorized or undocumented immigration
over 1990-1996 would prove to be temporal or spurious under reasonable
assumptions for agricultural worker settlement, family settlement, and sponsorship
of dependents for IRCA legalization beneficiaries. That timetable will depend
on bureaucratic processes and continuity of preference categories and immediate
relatives provisions as well as individuals’ decisionmaking.
Census Programs: Estimates and Projections
Estimates
Official postcensal population estimates use an allowance for net immigration
that draws on INS official statistics for lawful immigration and incorporates an
allowance for net population change due to undocumented immigration. The amount
666
for the 1980s was based on net undocumented migration for 1975-1980 as of 1980
(Warren and Passel 1987a; Passel 1985). Period-of-entry data are more suspect for
the 1980s and 1990s with fluctuating flows due to period factors (oil boom and
recession, amnesty, and peso devaluation), suggesting that stock to stock compari-
son is a better approach. Various studies monitored net population change from
undocumented migration throughout the 1980s by comparisons, but demonstrable
deviation was unlikely given the range of sampling variability. Even sizable differ-
ences between estimates, e.g., fairly high numeric shifts in the population living
below the poverty threshold (greater than the foreign-born), may not be statisti-
cally significant and be interpretable only as indicating continuation of prior levels
of poverty.
Measuring differences between population estimates based on different
sources or changes in population subgroups with national surveys, whether the
long-form sample survey in the decennial census or the Current Population Survey,
relies on comparability of measurements with similar questions, sampling,
weighting procedures, and nonsampling errors. Post-1992 CPS estimates for the
foreign-born population are not entirely comparable with earlier foreign-born
estimates from various CPS’s for three reasons. First, the 1993 CPS estimates
are the first ones based on the 1990 census population rather than the 1980 census
population. Second, revisions to the methodology for production of independent
population controls included adjustment for 1990 census undercoverage by age,
sex, race, and Hispanic origin (Woodrow-Lafield and Short 1995). This might
insufficiently allow for undercoverage of the foreign-born population because
differential nativity risks of omission were neither measured nor adjusted.
Demographic analysis estimated 1990 census undercoverage at 4.8 million, but
the PES undercoverage adjustment of 4.0 million was incorporated into the CPS
weighting procedures. Third, CPS coverage may be better for the Mexico-born
population in the 1990s than previously due to greater trade and business
opportunities and inclusion in the CPS of working, sojourning Mexicans not in
the legally resident estimate.
Projections
The Census Bureau population projections program makes low, medium, and
high level assumptions about net migration, for which international migration
dominates native migration. These assumptions have changed greatly over the past
ten years to become more commensurate with changing immigration levels (Ahlburg
and Vaupel 1990). The current series assume that net immigration ranges between
300,000 and 1,370,000 annually (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1993c). That range
allows for a range of about 280,000 to 1,020,000 for net authorized immigration
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and a range of 100,000 to 300,000 for net unauthorized or undocumented
immigration. (See Woodrow 1992a and Day 1992.) A very relevant point is that the
allowances for population change are incorporated irrespective of nativity or
authorization status.
INS Programs: Multiple Missions
Unauthorized Immigration Estimates
The major methodology for deriving legal status estimates is one that first
aggregates an estimate of the legally resident foreign-born population from a myriad
of INS data sources and demographic techniques. A second step uses this to
disaggregate an estimate of the whole foreign-born population from the census or
Current Population Surveys of the U.S. Bureau of the Census to find the
unauthorized or undocumented portion. Net error affects the unauthorized or
undocumented estimate.
INS official estimates for unauthorized residents are derived with another
methodology without deriving the counterpart of legally resident foreign-born
population. These estimates for October 1992, October 1994, and October 1996
are constructed with various components for unauthorized or undocumented
population subgroups: those resident since before January 1, 1982 who did not
legalize under IRCA by 1988, net nonimmigrant overstays after 1988, and net
unauthorized or undocumented migration by border-crossers after 1988. The
technical discussion of the underlying methodology is detailed in one report
(Warren 1994a), but the most recent report includes only a sketchy description
of the methodology and assumptions (U.S. Immigration and Naturalization
Service 1997a). The first of these components is rather small. The second
component is based on failures to depart among nonimmigrant arrivals within
specified periods. A major problem with this component’s estimation is the right-
censoring of nonimmigrant cohorts currently present in the United States. The
third component is predicated in part on the Census Bureau’s allowance for net
population change due to unauthorized or undocumented migration, residual
studies of Mexican unauthorized or undocumented migration before IRCA,
presumed efficacy of IRCA border controls, and unmeasured Mexican
unauthorized or undocumented migration.
One of the reports from INS (Warren 1994a) includes a table reference to a
total resident undocumented population in 1990 of 2.6 million. The figure is not
based on empirical examination for 1990, but, on the contrary, this figure stems
from simple extrapolation of the October 1992 estimate (3.4 million) (Warren
1993, 1994a) by assuming net unauthorized immigration of 300,000 annually
668
for 2.5 years. If the total number of foreign-born persons in 1990 had been 20.4
million (as in Robinson and Hansen 1996), then this INS figure would imply
17.8 million legally resident foreign-born persons, about the same as argued by
Woodrow-Lafield (1995a). This scenario would mean that foreign-born residents
would have to have had equal coverage to the overall population which seems
very unlikely (Woodrow-Lafield 1995a: 200). If undercoverage greater than .6
million were allowed, such as 1.0 million, then the estimated number of authorized
residents would be constrained to increase to 18.2 million to maintain the
unauthorized or undocumented figure of 2.6 million. Having performed this
exercise, the latest release (U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service 1997a)
showed an increased figure, 3.9 million, for October 1992. Working backward,
the extrapolated figure for 30 months previously would be 3.3 million! Both the
U.S. Bureau of the Census and the Immigration and Naturalization Service have
“authenticated” the point estimate.
Taking Robinson and Hansen’s (1996) figure of 20.4 million for foreign-
born in 1990,19 and Fernandez and Robinson’s (1994) continued acceptance
of the estimate of 3.3 million unauthorized or undocumented residents for
1990, the implied figure for the legally resident foreign-born population for
1990 would be 17.1 million. The Fernandez and Robinson (1994) extrapolated
range for 1994—3.5 to 4.0 million unauthorized or undocumented residents—
implies a legally resident foreign-born population of 18.6 million to 19.1
million in March 1994.
Enforcement Evaluation
Methodological work would be helpful for evaluating the efficacy of INS
border enforcement strategies in the 1990s. Official INS estimates for unauthorized
residents do not fulfill that purpose because net annual entries without inspection
are assumed. Distinguishing between measures for net population change due to
undocumented immigration and net undocumented immigration is essential for
evaluating border enforcement, interior detection, and work site enforcement
strategies. The Census Bureau has an established orientation toward the former
type of measure, as appropriate for its mission of statistically describing the
population without regard to legal status characteristics. Therefore, post-arrival
transitions from unauthorized to authorized status, as possible through either a
wide-scale amnesty program or individual eligibility, is of no consequence for
measuring overall population change. The time frame is generally long as well,
such as a decade. The INS enforcement evaluation requires more immediate and
focused measures of net undocumented immigration in a highly politicized
budgetary process.
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Methodological work is also needed for nonimmigrant overstay research and
to assess relative priorities of the agency for border enforcement and interior detection
strategies. The sheer volume of nonimmigrant arrivals in the United States mandates
a closer look by demographers. In 1986 the Visa Waiver Pilot Program was
established to permit certain nonimmigrant visitors (for stays not to exceed 90
days) from specified countries to enter on a temporary basis without nonimmigrant
visas. As of fiscal year 1994 there were 22 countries whose citizens were eligible
under the program after expansion and extension of the initial pilot program
(including countries with reciprocal waivers to U.S. citizens and other countries
assumed unlikely to contribute visa overstays). Since the advent of the program,
the integrity of the NIIS for monitoring nonimmigrant visa patterns, e.g., stays and
overstays, has deteriorated which is regrettable given great promise of the NIIS
(U.S. General Accounting Office 1988; Woodrow 1987).
Benefits Provision
Naturalization is regarded as a benefit among the various INS activities and
processing services. In the past, the agency burden from applications for natural-
ization was small, but the process was still beset with bureaucratic delays and pit-
falls (North 1987). Efforts reduced these difficulties in the early 1990s, but the
transition to eligibility of IRCA-legalized population with an anticipated burden
upon the naturalization benefits arm of the agency. As of April 1996, nearly 6
million immigrants may have been eligible to apply for U.S. citizenship, according
to one estimate (U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service 1996c). Young im-
migrants, maybe another 10-15 percent, would perhaps be eligible to derive citi-
zenship upon a parent’s naturalization. A total of 10.5 million would be eligible to
apply over 1996-2000.
Naturalization levels in the late 1990s appear likely to exceed or equal admis-
sions of legal permanent residents. If INS (and other federal agencies) manages to
resolve the problems that have created the naturalizations backlog, then both the
lawful permanent resident population and aliens eligible to apply for naturaliza-
tion could decline from the 1996 levels.
Systematic Research Program
Systematic collection of national survey data on the population by nativity,
country of birth, parents’ country of birth, citizenship, and period of entry is a
major step toward systematically monitoring net immigration to the United States
by authorized status. Allied programs for insuring accuracy of these survey results
should be sustained and nourished within the federal statistical community. This
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task is pervasive across the decennial census adjustment issue, 2000 census design,
inter-censal population estimates, and measuring net population change due to
unknown or unauthorized immigration.
The essential companion effort is systematic utilization of INS data sources
on authorized immigration and temporary authorization for entry to the United
States. This effort must incorporate procedures for tracking those who have come
into the United States to ascertain return migration levels and produce population
measures. Finally, any proposed legislation affecting individuals’ legal status may
have far reaching consequences for which consultation with immigration demog-
raphers is critical.
Data Recommendations
This study has organized the task of estimating legal status populations in a
fashion more or less like the production of official postcensal population estimates
and projections. The aims of presenting alternative series are to cover plausible
scenarios in recognition of uncertainty, identify scenarios as proximal to the true
scenario through iterative logic, and present coherent bases for statistical improve-
ments in monitoring international migration by legal status to the United States.
Consensus about net authorized immigration is critical for consensus about net
unauthorized or undocumented migration for which social scientists and
policymakers continually renew discussions. The estimated quantity of authorized
migration is more conservative with traditional definitions of long-term migration,
tending toward overestimation of the quantity of unauthorized or undocumented
migration, which would be provocative for national and foreign policy.
Statistical monitoring of international migration to the United States has
problems intrinsic to the data sources and the phenomena (Willekens 1994).
Expert judgment is at the core of this field of demographic research and might
play a bigger role than technical demographic expertise. Yet the modeling
prospects are excellent for those capable of merging expert judgment with
sophisticated modeling of error distributions for various components of
authorized and unauthorized or undocumented immigration. As discussed above,
even the worst case scenarios have rather delimited ranges as to numbers of net
authorized immigrants and net unauthorized or undocumented immigrants
(Woodrow-Lafield Forthcoming).
The preeminent recommendation is the establishment of a comprehensive
infrastructure with the mission of measuring all aspects of international migration.
Six data collection and analysis programs are vital for the statistical foundations of
understanding U.S. immigration: (1) studies of demographic impacts of the
agricultural legalization; (2) continued surveys of generally legalized immigrants,
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(3) innovative surveys on composition of the foreign-born population by type of
status; (4) transition-oriented modeling in measuring net immigration by legal status;
(5) special surveys of relatives living abroad who emigrated from the United States;
and (6) studies of survey and census coverage of the foreign-born.
First, the significance of the agricultural legalization for immigration policy
warrants social science research on its consequences. To address net change from
undocumented migration, demographers need to know the settlement and family
migration consequences stemming from those IRCA provisions. The proportion of
unauthorized workers within the agricultural workforce is increasing in the 1990s,
as the proportion legalized under IRCA declined. Agricultural workers may have
moved into other labor force sectors or may have returned to their native countries.
Second, continued surveys of the generally legalized immigrants would track
their experiences of naturalization, family unification, and assimilation into American
society. These surveys were discontinued after the 1992 wave, but the data effort is
unique as a longitudinal undertaking.
Third, a special survey to measure the foreign-born population’s composition
on legal status may be propitious to identify the heterogeneity of the lawfully present
population of foreign birth. Without a legislative mandate, such a survey would be
unlikely under data collection programs.
Fourth, better ways of modeling transitions among legal statuses for migrants
must be devised in studying migration in the modern world. Existing administra-
tive records databases are a gold mine of information about individuals but the
focus is blurred by incompatibilities of data systems and insufficient resources.
Cross-sectional perspectives risk biased perceptions of a dynamic phenomenon.
The statistical emphasis is on discrete events of arrival and departure as opposed to
durations of stay, leaving a considerable gap in knowledge of the convergence of
temporary residence with permanent residence.
Fifth, multiplicity surveys of relatives living abroad are recommended to monitor
levels of return migration by comparison with earlier surveys over 1987-1988.
That slight upturn in return migration to Mexico might have been the beginning of
a new trend. Such a survey has added value in its measures, albeit crude, of the
magnitude of family unification since IRCA.
Sixth, studies of survey and census coverage of the foreign-born population
are relevant for measuring unauthorized immigration whether or not there are
comparable survey data on individuals’ legal status, as suggested above. Indirect
estimation methodologies are biased by undercoverage of the foreign-born
population. Consequently, benchmarks for authorized and unauthorized
immigration confound coverage and classification errors. As the Hispanic
population becomes the largest minority population, accuracy in population figures
merits emphasis.
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Notes
1. Nor does the INS include these records in the micro data files provided to the Census
Bureau for its population programs.
2. That file has not been regularly updated and does not completely cover “approval” processing.
3. Certain aliens holding EVD status from Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Poland, and Uganda,
who had resided here since July 1, 1984, were eligible to adjust to temporary and then to
permanent residence status under the legalization program.
4. Figures cited were as high as 73,000 students and 250,000 visiting nationals (Inter-
preter Releases 55,645-7, June 19, 1989).
5. An indirect indication of this possibility is that the estimate for the legally resident
foreign-born population in Texas in 1980 (Passel and Woodrow 1984b) yielded an unautho-
rized or undocumented residual that was much lower than the population legalized after
long-term residence.
6. Research on residual measures for net unauthorized or undocumented migration has
not kept pace with collection of nativity data in Current Population Surveys in June 1991,
March 1994, March 1995, and March 1996.
7. This is largely based on reported date of last entry to stay in the United States.
8. The size of this cohort may exceed the actual number of persons arriving as
nonimmigrants because an individual may enter and exit more than one time.
9. The datum is date of current nonimmigrant class admission. Therefore these statis-
tics and, presumably those of Kraly and Warren, may actually include earlier entrants.
10. These adjustments are as published in INS yearbooks.
11. The proportions were calculated on the basis of calculations for 90 individual countries.
12. Although the response categories were very detailed, these were years during which
individual SAW applicants’ statuses changed from applicant to temporary residence, to per-
manent residence, or to denied applicant.
13. Espenshade (1995) apparently did not reconsider this difference, but he may have
been misled by Fernandez and Robinson’s (1994) failure to distinguish the multiple as-
sumptions for making the initial estimate of 3.3 million.
14. As mentioned previously, postcensal population estimates and projections require
only measures of population change rather than time-specific designations of legal and un-
authorized or undocumented status. This research may not be useful for evaluating enforce-
ment efficacy.
15. Woodrow-Lafield (1994b, Forthcoming) also incorporated amounts for more non-
specific legal immigration.
16. The discussion discusses the 3.3 figure in the context of INS official estimates.
17. In a sense, this new policy may have contributed to the appearance of a downward
shift in legal immigration for 1995 relative to earlier years that some interpreted as real.
18. These tables were developed with published tabulations (U.S. Immigration and
Naturalization Service 1991, 1992b, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996a, 1997b). The technical de-
mography of estimating the population by legal status depends more critically on coverage
issues and classification issues than on these simple tasks. These results might differ slightly
from official counting of immigrants in official postcensal population estimates.
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19. This figure is based on illustrative calculations but the authors did not explain
whether the calculations were done using an adjustment matrix used for the CPS weighting
scheme (Cohany, Polivka and Rothgeb 1994) or with findings from demographic analysis
of 1990 census coverage. The CPS still has undercoverage relative to the independent popu-
lation controls (Waite 1995).
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QUANTIFICATION OF MIGRATION
Viewing Emigration
at Century’s End
Karen A. Woodrow-Lafield
Introduction
For most of U.S. history, net immigration, the “residue” of immigration, hasrepresented an important source of population growth, accounting for 30percent or more over three decades and possibly for a fourth as well (Gibson
1975, 1992). In the broadest sense accounting for generational impacts, fully 31.8
percent of the population in 1990 would be attributable to net immigration that
occurred during the period 1790-1900. Only 19.3 percent of the current population
would be attributable to the more recent net immigration since 1900. This is par-
ticularly notable as 1900-1910 is often considered the historically high decade
(Gibson 1992).
Emigration1 has had a substantial role in offsetting immigration flows in both
the short-run and long-run, from “high” immigration decades such as 1900-10 to
“low” ones such as 1930-40. “Immigration” and “net immigration” are not equivalent
as, historically, about one-third of legal immigrants for 1900-1980 had emigrated
as of 1980 (Warren and Kraly 1985). That ratio is based on several studies reviewed
below. Pointing to its significance, Keely and Kraly (1978) noted that population
modelers would conventionally assume emigration as either equaling “10 percent
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of alien immigration” (Zero Population Growth 1977) or implicitly set to zero
(U.S. Bureau of the Census 1975).
There has been a lesser administrative focus on emigrants than on immigrants for
the United States. INS collected partial information from departing alien emigrants
only from 1907 to 1957. Direct measures are generally not possible or feasible as the
nature of the U.S. border and magnitude of population movements would preclude
comprehensive collection of statistics. Other countries’ data on immigrant admis-
sions or enumerated populations by birthplace are generally inadequate for measuring
emigration because non U.S.-born persons have dominated the emigration flows.
From Nil to Noticeable: Trends in Emigration
Estimates of emigration are important for the Census Bureau’s programs of
population estimates and projections, including coverage evaluation of the decen-
nial census and national surveys (Fay, Passel, and Robinson 1988; Himes and Clogg
1992). Indirect measurements of emigration have been devised according to the
changing nature of immigration and official statistics. In assessing future levels of
legal immigration, the U.S. General Accounting Office (1988:4) noted there is “no
comprehensive approach to counting emigrants.” For the 1960s and 1970s decades,
emigration levels were assessed with two main analytic approaches that decom-
posed changes over time, either in the foreign-born population or in the legally
resident foreign-born populations to legal immigration, mortality, and variation in
coverage, yielding emigration as a residual. Each found higher emigration levels
than for the 1940s and 1950s, suggesting that return migration was rising as legal
immigration levels rose.
Emigration over 1960-1970
The first approach, by Warren and Peck (1980), derived an estimate of 1.1
million for foreign- born emigration between the 1960 and 1970 censuses by look-
ing at change in the foreign-born population due to legal immigration, estimated
mortality, and census coverage. This useful method of intercensal comparison was
recognized as inappropriate for subsequent periods, as noted in Himes and Clogg
(1992), when inclusion of a substantial number of undocumented residents creates
another major unknown—net undocumented migration.
Emigration over 1970-1980
The second approach is best described as iterative, to first estimate emigration
for the 1970s, and second, to estimate net undocumented migration as of 1980.
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Warren and Passel’s (1987a) efforts focussed on specifying components of change
to the legally resident alien population, with modeling based on the time series of
INS Alien Address Registration data for 1965-1980. Relative to more than 3.9
million legal immigrants during the 1970s, an estimated 1.2 million emigrated.
Among 614,000 from Mexico, some 120,000 emigrated (Warren and Passel 1987b).
Jasso and Rosenzweig (1990:125-138) carried out a similar analysis finding higher
“emigration losses,” but differential coverage and mortality losses were included
with emigration losses.2 Indeed, their average annual loss of 157,000 exceeded
Warren and Passel’s estimate by one-third. This time series modeling could not be
extended to measure emigration during the 1980s and 1990s, because the INS no
longer registered legally resident aliens annually.
The level of emigration during the 1960s and 1970s was certainly higher than
allowed in official population estimates for the 1970s and early 1980s—only 9,000
foreign-born emigrants annually. To the extent that actual emigration was higher,
as evident from these analyses, the discrepancy served to offset the omission of net
undocumented migration. Upon completion of Warren and Passel’s (1987a, b) dual
analyses of emigration and net undocumented migration, annual allowances of
133,000 foreign-born emigrants and 200,000 as population change due to net un-
documented migration were established for constructing census-level postcensal
population estimates (Passel 1985, 1986).
Some of these studies adopted entry cohorts, defined broadly as entered in the
most recent ten years or earlier, as reference populations, given the analytic value
of tracking over adjacent censuses. Others adopted broad time intervals for analy-
sis. There is a substantive interpretation also, because immigrants settled here for
ten years or more seem more likely to remain than immigrants of lesser durations
or, to rephrase, more recent entrants are more likely to include short-term stayers.
The Immigration and Nationality Act recognizes five years of residence as denot-
ing commitment necessary to become a naturalized citizen. Attrition through emi-
gration is probably occurring throughout time and the life cycle so that emigration
measures suffer from right-censoring.
Over 1940-1980, emigration levels seemed to be increasing as immigration
levels were also increasing, following the decline of mid-20th century. Further
corroboration of this is found with Borjas and Bratsberg’s study showing that emi-
gration for immigrants entering in the 1970s as of 1980 may have amounted to
900,000, which equaled three-quarters of that for all period of entry groups in
Warren and Passel (1987b). The crucial question is whether the level found for
1960-1980 is sufficiently descriptive of emigration levels for 1960-1990 and 1960-
1999 or whether emigration has perpetually increased in the latter half of the 20th
century as the foreign-born population increased dramatically.
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Recent Emigration
Emigration levels for 1960-1990 and 1960-1999 might be similar to levels
over 1960-1980. This might be so if either the propensity to emigrate is lower
among contemporary residents than among prior cohorts or origin or other charac-
teristics associated with lower propensity to emigrate are more highly represented
among the foreign-born recently residing in the United States. The compositional
mix of the foreign-born population has shifted. First, the population includes greater
proportions of (1) Latin Americans and Asians for whom emigration has seemed
lower than for Europeans (Jasso and Rosenzweig 1990; Warren and Kraly 1985).
Second, many immigrants entered under visa categories logically associated with
lesser likelihood of return migrating, such as refugees, asylees, adjustees from
nonimmigrant statuses, and formerly undocumented or temporarily resident indi-
viduals. Three studies are relevant for considering emigration levels for the 1980s—
new empirical evidence, sensitivity analyses, and a resurrection of the intercensal
approach.
Empirical Evidence of Emigration
in the 1980s
First, superseding methods invalidated by data inadequacies or changing legal
status of immigrants, the Census Bureau pioneered another data collection method
to measure emigration in the 1980s (Woodrow-Lafield, 1996a and Woodrow, 1991c).
These special questions on Current Population Surveys (CPS) (in 1987,1988, and
1989) about emigrant parents, children, and siblings of U.S. residents yielded baseline
estimates for emigration lower than estimated historical levels.
However, the emigrant population represents a small population relative to the
U.S. resident population. Multiplicity survey estimates of emigrants and Ameri-
cans living abroad are subject to as many, or more, limitations as are other CPS
estimates. Results based on a relatively small number of cases should be cautiously
interpreted and small differences between estimates may not be significant after
examining standard errors or considering nonsampling error (Waite 1995). Esti-
mating emigration with surveys of residents has two limitations leading to under-
estimation— measuring recent emigrants in greater numbers than and, presum-
ably, better than earlier emigrants and measuring only emigrants having U.S. rela-
tives. A third limitation could involve overestimation—measuring emigrants with-
out specificity as to former status (whether undocumented, nonresident aliens, or
lawfully permanent resident). Given possible biases, Woodrow-Lafield (1996a)
demonstrated that current emigration levels could equal or exceed emigration of
the 1960s and 1970s (Warren and Peck 1980; Warren and Passel 1987b).
687
Emigration Component in
1990 Census Coverage
The 1990 census coverage evaluation (Robinson, Ahmed, Das Gupta, and
Woodrow 1993) incorporated a preliminary estimate of emigration of legal resi-
dents during 1980-1990 (Woodrow 1991b) in combination with a preliminary net
undocumented immigration component for 1980-1990 (Woodrow 1991a). Because
emigration assumptions are involved in estimating legally resident immigrants,
underestimation of emigration would lead to underestimation of undocumented
residents. Overestimation of emigration would result in overestimation of undocu-
mented residents.
In recognition of this confounding of emigration and net undocumented mi-
gration and the dearth of evidence that emigration levels had changed over 1980—
1990 relative to previous decades, a conservative stance was adopted. The amount
of the net emigration component for the legally resident foreign-born population
for 1980—1990 was set at 1.3 million (for a total of 1.6 million including native-
born).3 Woodrow (1991b) stipulated that net emigration of foreign-born for the
1980s could vary between .8 million and 2.2 million (1.0 and 2.6 million in total).
These limits were based on the multiplicity-based ranges from Woodrow-Lafield
(1996a) and sensitivity analyses in Woodrow (1991c).
Some simulation results were based on using emigration rates by age, sex, and
period of entry (Warren and Peck 1980), with multipliers of .5 and 1.5, and showed
possible emigration of 1.3 million to 2.3 million for the 1980s. An alternative simu-
lation using crude emigration rates for recent entrants by region of origin (Warren
and Passel 1987b) showed an amount of 1.9 million. These amounts are not sur-
prising, given the simplistic synthetic calculations and greater immigrants denomi-
nators for the 1980s relative to the 1960s. Immigration had nearly doubled.
Intercensal Analysis
After release of 1990 census data on the population by nativity, origin, and
period of immigration, Ahmed and Robinson (1994) presented emigration esti-
mates for 1980—1990 based on an intercensal analysis similar to Warren and Peck’s
(1980) for the 1960s. This methodology had been deemed less useful than Warren
and Passel’s (1987b) for analyzing foreign-born emigration in the 1970s due to the
simultaneity of unknown legal emigration and net undocumented immigration and
the necessity of measuring legally resident foreign-born emigration. In their re-
vival of the intercensal approach, Ahmed and Robinson (1994) do not treat the
problem of net undocumented immigration, i.e., of inclusion or coverage of un-
documented residents.
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Fortunately, the Ahmed-Robinson result falls within the range described
previously.4 One may be skeptical about heeding their assertion of higher emigration
in the 1980s than in the 1970s. Apart from fundamental questions about applying
the intercensal methodology in the context of continuing undocumented immigration,
the findings are merely the consequence of an assumption that emigration in the
1980s occurs at about the same propensity for pre-1980 immigrants and post-1980
immigrants within age, sex, and country of birth subgroups. This amounts to
“averaging” the propensity to emigrate across a great expanse of heterogeneity—
social capital, human capital, socioeconomic assimilation, social networks, and
favorability of origin communities. To quote from Vaupel and Goodwin (1987:728),
“Populations are heterogeneous. Averages hide that heterogeneity.”
A similar, simplistic application of crude emigration rates for legally regis-
tered aliens in 1980 who had entered in 1975-1980 with estimated authorized im-
migration for the 1980s and the 1980 population would scarcely be credible. As
described above, Woodrow-Lafield (1991c) prepared such an emigration estimate
for 1980—1990 drawing on Warren and Passel’s work with detail for region of
origin and period of entry. The overall result of 1.9 million emigrants may be use-
ful for setting an upper boundary on emigration, but the assumptions create an
anomaly. This simplistic model forces North America as the dominant region sending
emigrants abroad, but it seems implausible that nearly 40 percent of lawful perma-
nent residents admitted recently would emigrate or return to their origins.
Assumptions on Emigration for 1980-1990?
The preponderance of evidence about emigration is more adequate for posit-
ing a broad range than for stating that emigration levels are higher in the 1980s or
1990s than in the 1970s. Is holding this opinion an example of a tendency among
demographers whom Preston (1993:595) has described as “unusually reluctant to
commit Type II errors—saying that something is true when it isn’t . . . and unusu-
ally prone to committing Type I errors-failing to say that something is true when it
is?” In general, the Census Bureau’s confidence in emigration estimates has been
gauged by the commensurability of the allowance for net population change due to
net undocumented migration. This is certainly indicative of the same caution while
at the same time adapting to a layman’s perception that rising immigration would
be necessary and sufficient for higher emigration.
In positing estimates for net authorized immigration of the 1980s and 1990s,
prior research is a guide for assumptions about the level and composition of emi-
gration flows. Composition by age, sex, and period of entry can be based on War-
ren and Peck (1980), as used at the Census Bureau throughout the 1970s and 1980s
for population estimates and projections and by census coverage researchers (Fay,
689
Passel, and Robinson 1988). Legal foreign-born emigrants can be distributed to
country or region of origin based on the historical pattern of levels and rates of
emigration described in the research literature (Warren and Kraly 1985), as also
employed in undocumented estimation (Woodrow and Passel 1990; Woodrow 1992).
The Tide of Net Immigration from Mexico
Mexican migration to the United States is well known to consist of a huge
volume of temporary migration relative to a lesser volume of permanent migra-
tion (Massey and Singer 1995; Espenshade 1990; Lowell 1992). In past and present
cross-sectional analyses, the probable inclusion in the census of Mexican tempo-
rary migrants may complicate interpretations of losses due to emigration. Setting
this problem aside, the Mexican population residing permanently in the United
States, of both authorized and unauthorized or undocumented statuses, is the out-
come of progressive levels of permanent immigration over the past four decades.
The initial migration levels soared in the late 1970s, and that initial trip was likely
to have led to additional trips and eventual settlement for a segment of those ever
migrating (Donato, 1993, 1994; Donato, Durand, and Massey, 1992). The un-
documented presence was partially legitimated with the legalization provisions
of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986. The Mexico-born popula-
tion has increased dramatically over 1950 to mid-1990’s, but that increase has
been dominated by authorized immigration—primarily family-based and legal-
ization-based.5
The current magnitude of the Mexico-born population poses conflicting ex-
pectations about return migration levels. In one sense, there might seem to be lesser
propensity for return migration given a greater density on authorized status, greater
demographic diversity, and possibly greater representation of sending communi-
ties at migration maturity. Alternatively, the Mexico-born population could be ap-
proaching a “critical mass” for return migration. That is, at some time, return mi-
gration could become more easily measurable or discernible, despite limitations of
methodologies, simply because of its volume as a function of the larger size of
immigrant cohorts over the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s.
Allusions to the waves and tides of undocumented migration portray the
variation in flows, as variation from one wave to another in magnitude. If one were
to describe Mexican immigration in 1930-1950 as at low tide, then the 1980s and
1990s are ones of high tide. Most of the content in the volume returns, but some
remains. The simile falls apart when considering the residue, because wave upon
wave of immigration leads to an accumulation. This accumulated Mexican-born
population is, however, subject to returning just as portions of preceding waves. To
take an extraordinary scenario, would a notable fraction of Mexicans leave California,
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Texas, Illinois, and Florida to return if there were to be a sustained boom of economic
prosperity in Mexico?
Those with legal status may be less likely to emigrate (Lindstrom and Massey
1994). Legal status is often obtained after a lengthy time during which the sending
community becomes more oriented to having members in the United States, the
migrant becomes more assimilated, and the social network within the United States
grows (Massey, Goldring, and Durand 1995). The stay becomes defined as perma-
nent (Roberts 1995). Conditions in Mexico may be more favorable toward Mexi-
cans deciding to stay in the United States, as remittances are recognized as valu-
able (Massey and Parrado 1994), the Mexican economy is struggling, and nation-
ality rights for non-residents are now preserved. Among immigrants legalized after
long-term undocumented residence, primarily from Mexico, socioeconomic mea-
sures correspond with strong sentiments toward naturalization, family unification,
and remaining in the United States (Woodrow-Lafield 1995, 1996b).
Prospects for Measuring Emigration
in the 21st Century
Emigration is conceptually dense and the task of measuring emigration from
the United States has been and will continue to be challenging. This brief review
and Kraly (1997) have demonstrated these points while reviewing prior research
and the possible insights from forthcoming research. Whether such empirical analy-
ses will be realized will depend on data creation and researchers’ ingenuity. The
long-awaited multiplicity surveys of emigration received funding primarily through
1990 census coverage evaluation programs, and prospects for a renewal of these
surveys are unknown. The last data set in the series, in June 1991, has neither been
analyzed nor released.6
Yet the greatest strength of these multiplicity surveys may be monitoring emi-
gration levels for detecting gradual or sudden shifts. For example, Woodrow-Lafield
(1996a) reported a significant increase in Mexico-born emigrants over the July
1987-June 1988 period. Border control and employer sanctions provisions of IRCA
may have forced some undocumented aliens to return to Mexico, although a com-
peting explanation is that newly legalized aliens may have chosen to visit their
origin communities.
The statistical infrastructure within Mexico has the potential of yielding valu-
able data for the monitoring of population movements (Garcia y Griego 1985).
U.S. sources are not at all pertinent to the inclusion of temporary migrants or their
patterns of returning to Mexico (U.S. General Accounting Office 1993). Ethno-
graphic surveys have given important indications of these flows through migration
histories (Massey et al., 1987). The prospects for measuring flows from Mexico
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into the United States may be poorer than the prospects for measuring the reverse
flows, but the latter has considerable portent for interpreting the highly visible
signs of border crossing and INS enforcement activities.
Notes
1. Throughout this discussion, emigration refers to only emigration of foreign-born
persons. Some cited sources are relevant for native emigration. Foreign-born emigrants have
consistently outnumbered native-born emigrants, for which estimates have been based on
similar intercensal cohort analyses, analyses of Canadian census data for Americans (Finifter,
1973), and foreign census data for Americans (Fernandez, 1987).
2. Another study by Jasso and Rosenzweig (1982) traced the representation of legally
admitted immigrants in 1971 in subsequent cross-sectional data to portray demographic
characteristics of emigrants.
3. The age-sex-race distribution conformed with those for previous coverage evalua-
tions that used work of (Warren and Peck 1980) for demographic characteristics of emi-
grants in the 1960s.
4. The population estimates methodology uses this allowance for foreign-born emigra-
tion, but this shift is almost wholly countered by an increase in the allowance for population
change due to net undocumented immigration.
5. Woodrow (1992) shows this quite clearly, disaggregating the Mexico-born popula-
tion to its legal and undocumented components.
6. The U.S. researchers, Frank D. Bean and Karen A. Woodrow-Lafield, sought access
to these data without success.
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CHARACTERISTICS OF MIGRANTS
The Process of Acquiring
Citizenship at Birth in
Mexico and the United States
Jorge A. Bustamante, Guillermina Jasso,
J. Edward Taylor & Paz Trigueros Legarreta
Citizenship at Birth—United States
At birth, according to U.S. nationality law, a person is either a national ofthe United States—a person owing permanent allegiance to the UnitedStates—or an alien. Most, but not all, nationals of the United States are
also citizens of the United States. In general, citizenship may be acquired at birth
or through naturalization. There are two main principles that nations use to confer
citizenship at birth, jus soli—that is, citizenship based on place of birth, and jus
sanguinis—that is, citizenship based on kinship. While some nations use one or
the other principle, the United States follows both principles.
The principle of jus soli, a guiding principle of feudalism and of English com-
mon law, was codified in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution (1868),
which reads:
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All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside.
As the Fourteenth Amendment makes clear, there are two requirements for
acquisition of citizenship via jus soli: physical birth in the United States and
birth subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. Thus, persons born in the
United States to diplomatic personnel representing foreign countries do not
acquire U.S. citizenship at birth, because diplomatic personnel are not subject
to U.S. jurisdiction; and persons born on board foreign-flag ships in U.S.
territorial waters do not acquire U.S. citizenship via jus soli. Federal legislation
has extended citizenship at birth to persons born in most territories and
possessions of the United States. For example, the Act of 1952 (66 Stat. 163)
grants citizenship to persons born in the Virgin Islands after January 17, 1917,
a date one week before the United States purchased the Virgin Islands from
Denmark; on the other hand, persons born in the Philippines during the period
when it was a Commonwealth of the United States (1898-1946) were nationals
but not citizens of the United States.
Under the principle of jus sanguinis, the United States grants citizenship at
birth to persons born abroad to two U.S. citizen parents and also to persons born
abroad to one U.S. citizen parent (and an alien parent), provided that the U.S.
citizen parent meets the requirements to transmit citizenship. These requirements—
notably physical residence in the United States for a specified number of years
during specified periods of the life course—have changed over the years, so that
date of birth is a key factor in ascertaining the rules governing acquisition of
citizenship at birth for particular individuals. For example, persons born between
January 13,1941, and December 23,1952, are covered by provisions of the Na-
tionality Act of 1940 (54 Stat. 1137), which stipulates that, in order to transmit
citizenship, the U.S. citizen parent must have previously resided in the United
States or its outlying possessions for 10 years, at least five of which were after
attaining the age of 16.1,2
In the study of migration, citizenship at birth is a fundamental variable of
interest. Table 1 reports, in the rightmost column, the actual citizenship at birth of
the major categories of persons, by birthplace and parental citizenship. As discussed
above, information on birthplace and parental citizenship is not always sufficient
for ascertaining citizenship at birth; there are two cases—(i) individual born in the
United States to two alien parents, and (ii) individual born abroad to one U.S.
citizen parent—in which additional information is needed in order to ascertain
citizenship at birth.
697
Nationality at Birth and Citizenship—Mexico
Mexico’s law of the land distinguishes between nationality and citizenship. It
includes both criteria, jus soli and jus sanguinis to establish that Mexican nationality
is acquired either by birth within the Mexican territory or, regardless of birth place,
by being the child of a Mexican father or a Mexican mother or both. Mexican
nationality can also be acquired by naturalization. Mexican nationality however, is
a neccesary but not a sufficient condition to become a Mexican citizen. A Mexican
national by birth needs, a) to be 18 years of age or older or, b) in the case of being
born in other country of Mexican parents, or being born in Mexico of both parents
being citizens of other country, to have expressly and formally resigned being a
citizen of any other country, after being 18 years of age. Such a distinction between
nationality and citizenship in Mexico has important implications for patrimonial
and job-related rights. The basic assumption behind it is that nationality is part of
a heritage that an individual cannot erase even if he or she wants to. In this sense it
is like the parents one had, the color of one’s skin, language first spoken, religion,
Table 1
Citizenship at Birth, by Place of Birth and Parental Citizenship
Place of Number of
Birth U.S. Citizen Parents Citizenship at Birth
United States Two U.S. citizen
United States One U.S. citizen
United States Zero—Born subject to U.S. citizen
U.S. jurisdiction
United States Zero—Born not subject to Alien
U.S. jurisdiction
Abroad Two U.S. citizen
Abroad One—Requirements to U.S. citizen
transmit citizenship met
Abroad One—Requirements to Alien
transmit citizenship not met
Abroad Zero Alien
NOTES: United States = 50 states, plus outlying territories and possessions to which the
United States has extended jus soli.
Abroad = Outside the United States.
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etc. Citizenship, in contrast, derives from fundamental rights of any individual to
willfuly select one’s allegiance to a nation and government in association to the
residence one wants to have on a permanent basis.
Recent (1996) Mexican legislation reforms have introduced unprecedented
modalities to the constitutional definition of nationality. Mexican nationality in the
past was considered lost when a Mexican national had acquired another nationality.
With the new legislation, not yet formaly enacted, Mexican nationality is considered
indelible within the Mexican territory, regardless of any other nationalities an
individual has acquired. This is the case of a Mexican national who acquires the
U.S. nationality/citizenship, who returns to Mexico. As far as the recent reform,
such an individual will be considered by the Mexican laws to be as Mexican as
when he or she left Mexico. Mexican laws about citizenship however, remain the
same. A Mexican national by birth might acquire dual or multiple nationalities
without losing his or her original Mexican nationality obtained by either jus soli or
jus sanguinis, when in Mexican territory. However, such an individual cannot have
more than one country of citizenship. If such a Mexican national, who has acquired
U.S. citizenship, wants to excersize electoral rights in Mexico, he or she has to
formaly resign the U.S. citinzenship before being elegible to exercise any electoral
right in Mexico.
Notes
1. Note that citizenship acquired via jus sanguinis must be maintained through resi-
dence requirements, and these have also changed over the years. For example, under the
1940 Act, the child lost his/her citizenship unless he/she resided in the United States for five
consecutive years between the ages of 13 and 21.
2. An interesting sidelight concerns the gender requirement for transmitting citizen-
ship. Until 1934, only U.S. citizen men could transmit citizenship to children born to them
and an alien parent. The Act of May 24, 1934 (48 Stat. 797) extended the privilege of trans-
mitting citizenship to U.S. citizen women.
699
CHARACTERISTICS OF MIGRANTS
The Selectivity of International
Labor Migration and Characteristics
of Mexico-to-U.S. Migrants:
Theoretical Considerations
Jorge A. Bustamante, Guillermina Jasso,
J. Edward Taylor & Paz Trigueros Legarreta
Neoclassical Economic Theories of Migration
Neoclassical economic theories of labor migration posit that individualssituate themselves in the labor market and jobs where their expectedearnings (net of migration costs) are highest. Earnings are the product of
wages and time worked, both of which depend on education and other “human
capital” characteristics of individuals. For example, neoclassical theory predicts
that either of the following three events would increase Mexico-to-U.S. migration:
(1) an increase in wages or employment for Mexican migrants in the United States;
(2) a decrease in employment or wages in rural or urban Mexico; or (3) a decline in
migration costs or risks, as when relatives or friends assist villagers with entering
and finding work in the U.S. It also predicts that the people who migrate to the
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U.S. are those with the set of characteristics that bring them higher expected earnings
in the U.S. than in Mexico. Other considerations affecting individuals’ satisfaction
or “utility” at different locales (e.g., proximity to family members, relative
deprivation, family income risk) also affect migration propensities in neoclassical
models. The association between characteristics of individuals and their likelihood
of migrating is frequently referred to as the “selectivity” of migration.
Four variables are key to explaining the selectivity of Mexico-to-U.S. migra-
tion from a neoclassical economic perspective. They are: (1) the economic returns
to individuals’ characteristics (education, sex, age, etc.) at home (e.g., in the Mexi-
can village); (2) the returns to these characteristics in the United States; (3) the
returns to these characteristics in competing migrant labor markets in (e.g., urban)
Mexico; and (4) the effects of these characteristics on migration costs. Some theo-
ries add to this list the variables of risk (and willingness to take risks) and the
utility or disutility of migration for family members besides the migrant (i.e., those
who remain behind).
For example, consider a young man with little schooling and few assets in
rural Mexico. If the returns to his labor are higher in the U.S. than in his home
village or other labor markets in Mexico, there will be an incentive for the man to
migrate, other things being the same. If the young man lacks family contacts in the
U.S. to help finance the trip northward (including the border crossing) and provide
job information, however, higher economic returns in the U.S. may not be suffi-
cient to justify the costs and risks of migrating. In this way, migration selects not
only on personal characteristics associated with earnings, including schooling, age,
sex, and work experience, but also on household and other contextual variables,
including family assets affecting individuals’ productivity at home and “migration
networks,” or family contacts at migrant destinations.
Social science research on the determinants of migration using household-
level data generally find that human capital (e.g., education) is positively related to
the likelihood of out-migration (see Yap, 1977). The selectivity of migration on
individual and household characteristics varies across migrant destinations, how-
ever. It depends critically on the returns to these characteristics in different migrant
labor markets.
For example, in most cases, average schooling levels for immigrants in the
U.S. are substantially above those of their countries of origin (Borjas, 1991 and
1994; Demery, 1986). This finding reflects higher economic returns to schooling
in the U.S. compared to places of origin as well as other potential migrant
destinations (e.g., urban areas in migrants’ countries of origin). It also has
implications for development. If migrants take (human) capital with them when
they migrate, this may have detrimental effects on the productivity of workers
left behind.
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Mexico-to-U.S. migration appears to be the exception, however. In the 1980
census, Argentine immigrants to the U.S. report an average of more than 13 years
of schooling, compared to less than nine years at home. For Brazil, the differential
is even greater: more than 15 years of education for immigrants in the U.S. but less
than nine at home. Average education in Guatemala is only around three years, but
Guatemalan immigrants in the U.S. average around nine years of schooling. Only
in Mexico does the average education of immigrants approach that of the country
of origin: roughly 6.5 years of schooling for Mexican immigrants in the U.S. com-
pared with an average of around 6.1 years in Mexico (Borjas, 1991).
The negative selectivity of Mexico-to-U.S. migration with respect to school-
ing stands in contrast not only to other immigrant groups but also to rural-to-urban
migrants within Mexico. Household surveys conducted in Mexico in the 1980s
revealed that internal migrants had significantly more schooling than nonmigrants,
and that Mexico-to-U.S. migrants had significantly lower levels of schooling than
individuals who did not migrate to the United States, including both rural-to-urban
migrants and village stayers (Taylor, 1986; Massey, 1987; Massey and García España,
1987; Stark and Taylor, 1991). A typical finding is that average schooling of rural-
Mexico-to-U.S. migrants is between 4 and 4.5 years. This pattern appears to be
due to high economic returns to schooling for migrants within Mexico, but low
returns to schooling both in rural Mexico and in the jobs available to most Mexican
immigrants in the United States (Taylor, 1987). In rural Mexico, which has exten-
sive migration networks leading to low-skilled U.S. jobs but where the economic
returns to schooling in these jobs are low or nil, the selectivity of international
migration strongly favors low-skilled persons. Barriers to legal entry make it diffi-
cult for migrants with intermediate levels of schooling to reap high returns in U.S.
labor markets.1
U.S. Census data generally reveal a continuum of skills for emigrants from
Latin American countries, with average schooling lowest for Mexican immigrants,
higher for Central American immigrants, and highest for immigrants from the
Southern Cone. For example, in 1980, immigrants from Argentina, Brazil, and
Canada averaged between 1.2 and 2.7 years more schooling than native U.S. men
ages 25 to 64. Immigrants from Guatemala averaged 3.6 fewer years of schooling
than native-born U.S. men. Mexican immigrants averaged 6 fewer years of school-
ing than native-born U.S. men. Of 41 countries of origin in Borjas’ (1991) study,
Mexican immigrants had less schooling than any other country-of-origin group.
In countries other than Mexico, which do not share a long and porous border with
the U.S. and do not have extensive networks leading to low-skilled U.S. jobs,
international migration is more costly and risky. This precludes much emigration
from the low end of the skill distribution, leaving a predominance of brain-drain
migrants at the top.
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Despite the predominance of low-skilled migrants, there appears to be a
significant brain drain at the upper end of Mexico’s skill distribution, indicating
that the economic benefits from migrating to the United States are sizeable for
highly skilled individuals. This outcome is encouraged by U.S. immigration law,
which selects migrants on the basis of skills when issuing employment-related
visas. As a result, even though most Mexicans, particularly those who enter the
U.S. illegally, have low levels of human capital, international migration absorbs
a relatively large share of Mexico’s educated workforce. In 1994, 843 legal Mexican
imigrants reported professional-technical occupations, and 428 described
themselves as executives or managers; another 15,290 entered as temporary workers
in skilled occupational categories, and 14,773 Mexicans were admitted as students
(U.S. INS, 1996). These people constitute a relatively small share of the total
flow of Mexicans into the United States and a small share of the skilled U.S.
workforce. However, they represent a significant fraction of Mexico’s educated
workforce. It appears that, although rural-Mexico-to-U.S. migrants have below-
average schooling, urban-Mexico-to-U.S. migrants average slightly higher levels
of schooling than the national average.2
Neoclassical economic theory would predict that migration selects individuals
on a wide array of characteristics besides schooling. Traditionally, most of the
demand for low-skilled immigrant labor in the United States was in industries with
overwhelmingly male workforces (e.g., agriculture). In the past two decades, the
demand for female labor in light manufacturing and service (e.g., domestic maid
and child care) services in the United States appears to have grown significantly,
increasing the economic returns to migration for Mexican women. Village surveys
generally find that Mexico-to-U.S. migrants are significantly more likely to be
male than non-Mexico-to-U.S. migrants (typically, more than 60-70 percent of
Mexico-to-U.S. migrants are males, compared to 30-40 percent of individuals who
stay in Mexico, either as nonmigrants or as internal migrants), but that the
participation of women in migration is increasing. On average, migrants are also
young (first-time migrants usually in their teens, and average age of migrants
typically in the late 20s). With few exceptions, Mexico-to-U.S. migrants originate
from households in Mexico that are above-average in size—that is, with other family
members who can fill in for migrants in household and farm production activities
at home. Some studies find that Mexico-to-U.S. migrant households have more
physical-capital assets, including landholdings, than non-Mexico-to-U.S.-migrant
households, and U.S. migrant households in Mexico almost always average higher
income, with or without counting remittances, than nonmigrant households. This
suggests that families in Mexico have to reach some minimum wealth or income
threshold before they are willing or able to assume the costs and/or risks of sending
migrants to the U.S. It also undoubtedly reflects positive effects of past migration
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on family assets and incomes. Econometric studies that control for the “feedback”
of migration on household incomes reveal that, initially at least, Mexico-to-U.S.
migrants tend to originate neither from the very top nor from the very bottom of
Mexico’s rural income distribution.
Migration Selectivity and
Changing Characteristics
of Mexico-to-U.S. Migrants
Although socioeconomic differences between migrants and nonmigrants are
significant initially, migration network theories (Massey; Stark, Taylor, and Yitzhaki,
1986) predict that these differences narrow as networks of family contacts at mi-
grant destinations expand and the psychological and economic costs and risks of
migration progressively decline. This finding helps resolve discrepancies among
community studies with respect to some key variables. For example, in contrast to
findings reported on pages 748 to 750 (Table 1; also, see Lopez, 1986 and Mines,
1981), some studies have found that migrants are primarily landless workers
(Cornelius, 1976; Stuart and Kearney, 1981). Married men dominate the migrant
workforce in some towns (Weist, 1973; Cornelius, 1976; Dinerman, 1982), but in
others the participation of women and children more closely resembles that of men
(Reichert, 1979; Fernandez, 1988; Cornelius, 1990). Without a nationally repre-
sentative data set, a theory of how average migrant characteristics vary through
space and over time is essential for situating and making sense of findings from
these community studies.
Massey and Durand (1992), in the sociological literature, and Taylor (1992b)
and Stark, Taylor, and Yitzhaki (1988, 1986), in the economics literature, have
attempted to incorporate findings from surveys of places into general theories about
the process of migration. They emphasize “migration networks” and the diffusion
of these networks across sending-area households and individuals as the key vari-
ables shaping and reshaping characteristics of migrants over time.3
Findings from several community studies in Mexico suggest that migration
becomes less selective and more representative of migrant-sending areas over time.
This appears to be due to the spread of migrant network connections, which provide
information to prospective migrants and offer direct assistance that lowers the
material and psychic costs and risks associated with (especially unauthorized)
migration across borders. Characteristics of Mexican immigrants increasingly
resemble those of the general population as the spread of migration networks within
and across communities makes migration less selective. It also makes the origins
of Mexican immigrants increasingly diverse, as new networks, fortified in some
cases by direct recruitment, materialize in communities that have not traditionally
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been major suppliers of migrants to the United States. Because of this, differences
in characteristics between migrants and nonmigrants fade over time.
A consensus is beginning to emerge that estimates of migrant characteristics
are sensitive to the stage of the migration process at which surveys are conducted.
The socioeconomic and demographic profile of migrants from individual villages
evolves over time, as does the participation of villages and regions in U.S. migrant
streams, in ways that reflect changes in the way individuals are selected into (and
out of) migration. The migration selection process shapes the characteristics of
migrant flows into U.S. labor markets. This means that estimates of migrant
characteristics are a function of the place and time at which surveys are carried out.
A survey of migrants from an “old” migrant-sending area generally yields different
findings than a survey of migrants from a “new” sending area, and surveys of the
same migrant-sending areas produce different findings at different points in time.
A statistical portrait of Mexico-to-U.S. migrants cannot be constructed from existing
household survey data in isolation of the process that selects people into and out of
migration, nor in isolation of the ways in which this process evolves over time.
The ideal way to test for changes in migrant characteristics at different stages of
the migration process is to utilize matched longitudinal data, as in the Michoacan
Migration Project. Alternatively, Massey, Goldring, and Durand (1994) propose an
index of community “migration prevalence” as a basis for comparing communities
that are apparently at different stages of the migration process. For a given community
at a given point in time, international “migration prevalence” is defined simply as the
number of people with international migratory experience divided by the total number
of people alive. The disadvantage of the Massey et al. approach is that it imposes a
temporal interpretation when explaining differences in communities at given points
in time, by assuming that communities have different migration-prevalence levels
because they are at different points in a migration process. It is possible for two
communities with long histories of migration to have significantly different levels of
migration prevalence. The strength of the Massey et al. approach is that it makes it
possible to compipare characteristics of migrants and nonmigrants in communities
with different migration-prevalence levels using cross-sectional data. This is impor-
tant, in light of the paucity of matched longitudinal data on migrant households.
Massey et al. uncover definite patterns of convergence in characteristics between
migrants and nonmigrants at different levels of community migration prevalence.
The “New Economics” of Labor Migration
Recent theoretical work on the economics of migration offers additional
clues about why characteristics of Mexico-to-U.S. migrants differ from those
of nonmigrants and why both change over time. The new economics of labor
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migration (NELM; see Massey, Arango, Hugo, Kaouaci, Pellegrino, and
Taylor, 1994 and Stark, 1981), suggests four categories of economic motives
for migration:
(1) Expected Income. Migration (and migrant remittances) are a means to
increase incomes of migrants and of their households of origin in Mexico.
(2) Risk. Allocating some family members’ time to migration provides a way
to spread household income risk, by securing access to a new income source that
is not highly correlated with local (e.g., crop) incomes. That is, migrants repre-
sent an insurance policy for their households in Mexico. The same holds for in-
dividuals who are able to spread their work time during the year or across years
between Mexico and the United States.
(3) Market Imperfections. In the absence of well-functioning capital markets
in migrant-sending areas, migrants represent financial intermediaries who enable
their households of origin to invest in new activities or technologies.
(4) Relative Income. “Investing” in migration is a means for households
to improve their relative income position within the reference group (e.g.,
the village).
These motives for migration are important for explaining changes in
immigrant characteristics over time. Motive (1) suggests that migrants originate
from poor households with few assets and low productivity (although there are
limits to this; see Motive 3, below), and that U.S. migrants tend to be individuals
with human capital (skills, schooling) or “migration capital” (e.g., family contacts)
for which there is a high economic return in the U.S. (and not human capital for
which there is a large economic return in Mexico). Motive (2) suggests that
migrants originate from areas where local incomes are risky, or (as emphasized
by the NELM) from households that are experiencing economic changes (e.g,.
adopting new technologies, changing production activities) that increase
(subjective) income risks. However, because migration itself is inherently risky,
it also suggests that migrants and their families are able to insure against migration
risks, and/or that they have access to “migration networks” that provide migration
insurance to them. Motive (3) suggests that migrants have little access to local
capital or else that their households of origin have large capital needs relative to
capital availability (e.g., if they are investing in new production activities or
technologies). However, because migration is costly, it also suggests that families
who send migrants abroad have sufficient capital to finance what generally is a
costly migration venture, or else have networks of relatives or friends who can
finance migration costs from the U.S. side of the border. Motive (4) suggests
that migrants originate from households that are relatively deprived within their
reference groups (e.g., villages).
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The interplay of (1)-(4) suggests that, initially at least, migrants:
• Are individuals with characteristics that make them relatively more
productive in the U.S. labor markets to which they have access and less
productive in Mexico (i.e., less able to generate income at home.
• Come neither from the poorest households (which cannot afford the
costs of international migration) nor the richest households (which lack
the expected income and relative income incentives to migrate) in their
places of origin.
• Come neither from the least secure households (which would not be
willing to take on the risks of migration) nor from the most secure house-
holds (which would not depend on migrants for income security).
In the medium- to long-run, the expansion of migration capital, or networks,
reshapes the selectivity of migration by influencing the economic returns, costs,
and risks of migration. If access to networks becomes diffused across households
at different income levels, lower income households may begin sending migrants
abroad. Successful migration investments by some families affect the relative in-
come position of others in the local reference group. And, if migrants represent
financial intermediaries facilitating investments in new economic activities at home,
the absolute and relative income positions of migrant families will tend to rise over
time. Finally, catastrophic events in Mexico, such as the economic crisis of the
1980s and 1990s, create incentives for new groups of individuals, with new char-
acteristics, to enter the migration stream. This probably accounts for the rising
schooling levels of Mexico-to-U.S. migrants from the Michoacan households de-
picted in Table 1 on pages 748 to 750.
The Theory of Circular Migration and
Imperfect Migrant Labor Markets
It is well known that many of the workers involved in immigration flows into
the United States return to their country of origin. In the case of migration from
Mexico to the United States, which has persisted for over a hundred years, not only
has there been a return flow but it has included the majority of migrants. These
workers return to Mexico after a migratory “career” that involves alternating stays
in the receiving areas in the United States and in their home communities in Mexico.
Such a migratory “career” can continue for several years, but it generally ends
with an aging worker’s definitive return to Mexico. Obviously this is not true in
every case. A growing proportion of migrants is choosing to remain permanently
in the United States. Perhaps the decision to remain in the United States or to
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return definitively to the home community is a function of the intensity of the
interaction between the sending community and the receiving community, reflected
in the number of family members that the first-time migrant has in the United
States. That is, the fewer family members a migrant has in the United States, the
more likely it is that he will return definitively to Mexico.
 Data obtained from the Cañón Zapata project support these hypotheses. They
reveal a process of circular migration from Mexico to the United States which is
clearly related to the geographical proximity of these two countries. By circular
migration it is understood here, the process by which an individual alternates stays
in Mexico and the United States, for more than six months, between his or her
family residence and job residence, until either age, success or failure, makes him
or her to permanently establish his family residence at some point of his or her
circulatory route, either in Mexico or in the United States.
The notion of circular migration holds methodological and theoretical impli-
cations. Methodological, because of at least two reasons, a)length of stays in the
United States might be increasingly long, returns to Mexico become increasingly
short and job residence becomes permanent as a result of family reunification.
Then, new entries to the United States from Mexico might increase the volume of
the migratory flow giving to the observer the impression of an increase in immi-
gration to the United States, when in fact he or she is observing an increase in the
intensity of a circulatory movement, including Mexican citizens who might have
moved on a permanent basis to the United States. On the other hand, b)when mea-
sured properly, circulatory migration might become an indicator of the intensity of
the interactions between structural conditions and factors located at the two sides
of the border, which are associated to the phenomenon of international migration
between the two countries. Theoretical, because of at least two reasons. First, the
definition of a migrant should no longer depend on his or her position in the map
but on his or her engagement in an international labor market. Traditional defini-
tions of a migrant require his or her crossing of a geographical boundary for cer-
tain period of time. The notion of a circulatory migration should be made opera-
tional from the theoretical assumption that a migrant is a person who is no longer
a permanent resident of his or her home town because of a decision that implies to
join an international labor market by responding to a perceived labor demand in
another country. This means that a migrant is a migrant from the moment he or she
has left home with the intention of looking for a job in another country.
The other reason is, that as a consequence of the above, for the purpose of an
estimate of the number of international migrants, their numeration should begin
when they join the migratory circle, regardless of whether that person has crossed
an international border or not. The migratory circle includes the geographical space
between the last permanent residence and the place of migratory destiny. The
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latter could be of various types—from an attempted destiny to an actually reached
one. The analyst’s selection of the type of migratory destiny might depend on the
scope of the analysis. The important implication here is to include all persons
who are in the international migratory circle in the enumeration of international
migrants, whether or not they have left the country of origin or reached the country
of destination.
Notes
1. One exception to the negative selectivity of international migration with respect to
schooling comes from an analysis of one of the newest Mexico-to-U.S. migrant groups, the
Mixtecs from Oaxaca (Zabin and Hughes, 1995). It found that, of those who migrated inter-
nally to farm jobs in the Mexican states of Baja and Sinaloa, those who went on to migrate
to the United States were significantly more likely to be males (84 percent), single (38
percent), and better educated than those who remained as internal migrants in Mexico. (55
percent of the latter were males, 21 percent were single, and average schooling was 2.7
years.) The low mean education of both migrant groups in this sample probably reflects low
average schooling levels at these migrants’ place of origin in Oaxaca.
2. This conclusion is deduced from (1) the finding from rural household surveys that
Mexico-to-U.S. migrants have less schooling than individuals who do not migrate to the
United States, and (2) Borjas’ (1994) finding that average schooling levels of Mexican-born
immigrants in the U.S. (taken from the U.S. Census) are slightly higher than average schooling
in Mexico.
3. Taylor (1992) and Stark, Taylor, and Yitzhaki (1986, 1988) emphasize the spread of
family migrant contacts, or migration networks, in their theory of changing effects of mi-
gration on rural income inequalities. Durand and Massey (1992) emphasize the importance
of “social capital,” or networks of contacts with family and friends in the United States, in
their “cumulative theory of migration.”
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CHARACTERISTICS OF MIGRANTS
Data Sources
Jorge A. Bustamante, Guillermina Jasso,
J. Edward Taylor & Paz Trigueros Legarreta
This report has two parts. The first part describes data collected in
Mexico. The second part describes data gathered in the United States.
Data Collected in Mexico
This section contains a comparative overview of the ENADID and EMIFsurveys; detailed descriptions of each of these two surveys and data sets;and descriptions of Mexican community survey data sets (the Michoacán
Survey and the Mexican Migration Project surveys).
ENADID and EMIF Surveys—Introducción
En el presente documento se busca presentar una descripción detallada de las
principales fuentes de datos sobre características demográficas y laborales de los
migrantes, así como su participación en la práctica migratoria, basadas en muestras
de personas o hogares tomadas en México. Las encuestas implementadas en México
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que serán revisadas aquí son: (1) La Encuesta Nacional de Indicadores Demográficos
(ENADID); (2) La Encuesta sobre Migración en la Frontera Norte (EMIF), (3) Las
encuestas llevadas a cabo en el Estudio de Migración de Michoacán de la Universidad
de California, Davis, y El Colegio de México; y (4) Las encuestas del Proyecto
sobre la Migración Mexicana (el estudio Durand-Massey).
Cada una de las cuatro fuentes de datos tiene características metodológicas
diferentes; la ENADID estudia al individuo en su lugar de residencia habitual, ya
sea porque está de regreso de su práctica migratoria, o porque su familia señala que
se encuentra en Estados Unidos La EMIF se enfoca a los flujos de migrantes, esto
es, a aquellas personas en tránsito hacia Estados Unidos o de regreso de ese país,
motivo por el cual la información recabada en cada caso es diferente, aún cuando
puede ser complementaria. Las encuestas UC Davis-COLEF se enfocan en las
características socioeconómicas de migrantes y sus hogares de origín y los impactos
económicos de la migración en México. Las encuestas Durand-Massey detallan
las características socio-demográficas de la migración y de los migrantes.
Encuesta nacional de la dinámica
demográfica, 1992 (ENADID)
(Resumen de la descripción presentada en el
CD Rom elaborado por el Instituto Nacional
de Economía, Geografía e Informática (INEGI)
Observaciones generales
La Encuesta Nacional de Indicadores Demográficos (ENADID), levantada en
1992,1 ofrece las siguientes ventajas:
• Se realizó en todo el territorio nacional y tiene representatividad a nivel
de entidad federativa, gracias a lo cual se puede conocer el peso de la
migración internacional en cada estado de la república y comparar las
características de los migrantes con la población no migrante.
• Abarcó tanto a los migrantes de retorno que respondieron a las preguntas
sobre su actividad migratoria, como a los que se encontraban en ese
país, pero su familia aportaba información sobre algunas de sus
características sociodemográficas.
En el caso de los de retorno, se pudo saber algo sobre su historia migratoria, lo
que permite conocer los cambios que se han venido presentando a través del tiempo.
Con ella se puede estimar la cantidad de migrantes en el período de 1987 a
1992, conocer datos sobre: fecha de la migración, residencia actual, fecha de retorno,
entre otros; y establecer relaciones con la migración interna.
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Analizar, además, características educativas, económicas y laborales, de los
migrantes, parentesco, sexo, edad, entidad de origen.
Al realizarse en la unidad doméstica de donde provienen los migrantes, también
proporciona datos de sus viviendas y grupos domésticos.
Hay que hacer notar que mientras la ENADID incluye a todo tipo de migrantes,
—independientemente de la época en que hayan vivido en Estados Unidos y si su
permanencia en ese país se debiera a sus actividades laborales o a otro fin— la
EMIF, sólo contempló a aquéllos que habían trabajado en Estados Unidos o bien
manifestaron su interés por entrar con ese objetivo. Para los fines de este trabajo se
excluyó a los entrevistados que declararon no haber nacido en el territorio mexicano,
debido a que no había información sobre su nacionalidad.
Para la ENADID utilizamos dos bases de datos del disco compacto elaborado
por el Instituto Nacional de Economía, Geografía e Informática (INEGI), la de
migración internacional y la de características generales de la población. Analizamos
dos bases de datos de la EMIF, proporcionadas por el Consejo Nacional de Población
(CONAPO): la de migrantes mexicanos que retornan voluntariamente a México y
la de migrantes deportados.
Aunque los migrantes laborales que se dirigen a Estados Unidos provienen
de todo el país, a lo largo del tiempo han destacado algunas áreas de origen donde
se concentra una alta proporción, en tanto que los demás se dispersan en el resto
del territorio mexicano. Tomando en cuenta esta peculiaridad de la práctica
migratoria y con la finalidad de tener una visión del conjunto nacional, a partir de
las especificidades, dividimos el territorio mexicano en seis regiones, utilizando
como criterios:
• La presencia de los oriundos de cada entidad federativa en los flujos
migratorios a través del tiempo;
• La intensidad en su participación, de acuerdo a los datos recientes;
considerando su peso en el conjunto de migrantes, y, al interior de cada
entidad, en relación con su población;
• Su cercanía geográfica.
Complementariamente, se trató de que todas las regiones tuvieran
representatividad estadística en la EMIF, ya que, la muestra de varios estados es
muy reducida.
Tomando en cuenta estas observaciones se establecieron las siguientes regiones:2
I. La región de mayor salida, con 36.7% de los migrantes (de acuerdo a la
ENADID), compuesta por los cuatro estados de mayor tradición en esta
práctica: Guanajuato, Michoacán, Jalisco y Colima.3
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II. Las entidades de la frontera norte —Baja California, Sonora, Chihuahua,
Coahuila, Nuevo León y Tamaulipas, incluyendo también Baja California
Sur4— que aportan el 18.3% de los migrantes.
III. Los seis estados ubicados entre las dos regiones anteriores —Sinaloa,
Durango, Nayarit, Zacatecas, San Luis Potosí5 y Aguascalientes— con
18.2% de los migrantes.
IV. Los cinco estados del interior que rodean al Valle de México —Distrito
Federal, Estado de México, Querétaro, Hidalgo y Tlaxcala— con 12.9%
de los migrantes.
V. Oaxaca, Guerrero, Puebla6 y Morelos con una participación conjunta de
11.7% de los migrantes.
VI. Las seis entidades del sureste —Veracruz, Tabasco, Chiapas, Campeche,
Yucatán y Quintana Roo— que únicamente aportan el 2.2% de los migrantes.7
Se utilizó como criterio para clasificar a los migrantes su región de nacimiento,
con la finalidad de tener idea sobre algún posible desplazamiento interno antes de
migrar a Estados Unidos.8
Por otro lado, tomando en cuenta las características de cada encuesta, la
información de la ENADID se dividirá, cuando sea pertinente, entre migrantes de
retorno y emigrantes (que son los que se encontraban en Estados Unidos cuando se
levantó la encuesta). La información de la EMIF se analiza considerando los dos
tipos de flujos mencionados:
1. Los que regresaban voluntariamente a México, provenientes de Estados
Unidos y que estuvieron en ese país con el fin de trabajar.
2. Los migrantes de origen mexicano entrevistados después de haber sido
deportados de Estados Unidos.
Las variables que se analizaron son:
• Edad del migrante,
• Sexo,
• Estado civil,
• Tipo de localidad de nacimiento (urbana o rural),
• Escolaridad,
• Residencia actual,
• Situación laboral del migrante en México, antes o después de migrar,
según la información disponible,
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• Oficio o profesión desempeñada en caso de haber estado laborando,
• Sector económico,
• Período en que entraron a Estados Unidos por primera y última vez,
• Duración de la última estancia,
• Número de entradas al vecino país,
• Condición laboral y sector económico en el que trabajaron en Estados
Unidos, durante su última estancia,
• Estado y ciudad en los que permanecieron más tiempo durante su
última estancia.
Metodología
La Encuesta Nacional de la Dinámica Demográfica representa el acercamiento
macrosocial más importante y completo al comportamiento demográfico en México.
Integra los tres aspectos de la dinámica demográfica (la fecundidad, la mortalidad
y la migración), desde el momento mismo del diseño muestral. Es el primer estudio
de carácter nacional, que cubre prácticamente todas las zonas del país.
Por su especial cuidado en la metodología utilizada y en los mecanismos de
retroalimentación y control, resulta ser una investigación con los más altos estándares
de rigurosidad. Su diseño muestral permite cubrir la totalidad del país, generando
información a los niveles federal, estatal y municipal.
Comprende catorce temas generales, dentro de tres bloques de aspectos:
niveles y composición de la población (características generales de la
población, nivel de mortalidad, fecundidad, registro de nacimientos y
defunciones y prácticas anticonceptivas); características socioeconómicas de
la población (Características de la vivienda, hogares, condiciones económicas
y características educativas) y todo lo relacionado con la migración nacional
e internacional.
Permite generar datos a nivel nacional, área de residencia urbana-rural, cuatro
tamaños de localidad, regiones y entidades federativas.
El diseño de la muestra se realizó de manera estratificada y bietápica. Por un
lado se seleccionaron las unidades de acuerdo a condiciones geográficas y
características de similitud. Por el otro, las unidades de análisis de acuerdo a dos
etapas de selección.
El tamaño de la muestra se calculó atendiendo a dos indicadores: la tasa de
mortalidad a nivel nacional y el promedio de hijos nacidos vivos por mujer en edad
fértil, a nivel entidad federativa. Para calcularlo se realizó la función en cada uno
de los dos conceptos y después se procedió a obtener un tamaño derivado de la
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combinación entre los dos factores, calculándose finalmente los niveles de error
para los demás temas de interés considerados en la encuesta.
Con respecto a las unidades de análisis, la encuesta comprende las siguientes:
las viviendas, los miembros nacionales y extranjeros de esas viviendas, los
residentes habituales de las viviendas, las mujeres entre 15 a 54 años de edad,
miembros del hogar y residentes habituales, personas que se fueron a vivir a otro
país, desde 1987 hasta la fecha de la encuesta y, finalmente, personas que siendo
miembros del hogar y residentes habituales murieron de enero de 1987 a la fecha
de la encuesta.
El procedimiento de estratificación, pone en primer lugar los municipios o
delegaciones de cada entidad federativa. Luego, cada estado se estratifica por Zona
Rural, Zona Urbana Certeza (ZUC) y Zona Urbana Resto (ZUR). Finalmente, cada
localidad se subdivide en grupos de manzanas.
La estratificación geográfica se realizó de la siguiente manera: se clasificaron
localidades de acuerdo al total de habitantes en marzo de 1990, teniendo como
resultado cuatro tipos de unidades, las de menos de 2,500 habitantes, las de 2,500
a 19,999 habitantes, las de 20,000 a 99,999 habitantes y las de 100,000 o más.
La importancia de este estudio para conocer la dinámica migratoria, tanto
nacional como internacional, aumenta no sólo por la extensión geográfica que
cubre, sino también por la amplitud de los temas que están interrelacionados.
Permite conocer:
• Las características de los flujos de migración.
• Los perfiles de los migrantes internos e internacionales utilizando la
información sobre las características socioeconómicas de los individuos,
de los grupos domésticos y de las viviendas.
• Comparar los niveles de migración interna e internacional, con lo que
es posible establecer algunas hipótesis de relación entre ambos
fenómenos.
• En lo que se refiere a la migración interna, toma en cuenta los aspectos
de: la condición de migración (estatal y municipal), el tiempo de
residencia en la entidad; el lugar de residencia anterior; tiempo de
residencia anterior y el lugar de residencia en 1987.
• En cuanto a la migración internacional, estimar la cantidad de migrantes
en el período de 1987 a 1992, conocer datos sobre la condición de
residencia al momento de migrar, parentesco de los migrantes, sexo,
edad, entidad de origen, fecha de la migración, lugar de destino,
residencia actual, fecha de retorno y condición de residencia al retorno.
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• Además de este tipo de información, la investigación permitió relacionar
la información obtenida sobre las características de la vivienda, las de
la población, educativas, económicas y laborales.
Con esta información se agruparon los datos en tres bases distintas: la primera,
compuesta por las características generales de las viviendas de los migrantes; la
segunda, las características de los flujos de migración interna e internacional y la
tercera se compone de las características educativas de los migrantes.
Informe trimestral de la encuesta
sobre migración en la frontera
norte de México (EMIF)
Introducción
Una de las preocupaciones sobre el estudio del fenómeno migratorio es conocer
las características de los individuos que han decidido desplazarse de su lugar ha-
bitual de residencia con el objeto de modificar sus condiciones de vida y trabajo.
Durante los últimos años este hecho ha llamado la atención de instituciones
académicos y por supuesto de las entidades gubernamentales que de alguna manera
están relacionadas con la problemática que este fenómeno tiene a su alrededor.
A lo anterior se agrega la necesidad de contar con información oportuna y
confiable sobre las condiciones y modificaciones asociadas con los
desplazamientos y sobre todo si éstos están orientados a cruzar las fronteras
nacionales. En este sentido, la importancia que ha cobrado la migración laboral
de origen mexicano a la frontera norte y hacia los Estados Unidos requiere un
conocimiento más cercano de sus componentes para que, en la medida de lo
posible, se ejecuten acciones de Política Pública encaminadas a modificar o
atenuar las causas que originan tales movimientos.
En este contexto, la Encuesta sobre Migración a la Frontera Norte de México
(EMIF) proporciona información que permite evaluar los posibles cambios en el
comportamiento de la población migrante, así como para la realización de estudios
comparativos. El objecto de La Encuesta sobre Migración en la Frontera Norte
(EMIF), es captar la dimensión y características de los distintos flujos de migrantes
laborales mexicanos, a partir de la elaboración teórico-metodológica desarrollada
por el equipo encabezado por Jorge Bustamante, con Jorge Santibáñez y Rodolfo
Corona, todos ellos de El Colegio de la Frontera Norte. Su finalidad es estudiar la
circularidad migratoria basada en el método de muestreo de poblaciones móviles.
En ella, se utiliza el concepto de migrante laboral a partir de su conducta de migrar,
esto es, de desplazarse de su ciudad o comunidad de residencia de origen a otra
ciudad o comunidad con propósitos laborales. El flujo migratorio se concibe así
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como un desplazamiento o más que un “migrante” realiza a través de una ruta
recurrente de su lugar de origen a otra ciudad, estado o país y viceversa, con
propósitos laborales o para regresar de manera temporal o definitiva. Se trata de
una encuesta continua, por lo que permite captar las variaciones durante el año,
tanto en el número de migrantes como en la participación de los distintos subgrupos.
La encuesta tuvo dos etapas, la primera, de 1993 a 1994, y la segunda, de 1994 a
1995. Sólo se trabajó la información del primer año, pues es la única disponible.9
Dada la metodología de la EMIF, los levantamientos anuales pueden dividirse
en cortes trimestrales. El presente documento informa, sobre los resultados obtenidos
durante el trimestre comprendido entre el 14 de diciembre de 1993 al 13 de marzo
de 1994, correspondiente al primer levantamiento.
En el primer apartado se exponen consideraciones en torno a la metodología
que sustenta a la encuesta y la información relevante sobre el trabajo de campo.
En un segundo apartado se presentan los elementos que permiten contar con
una definición de población de trabajo, que en adelante se denominará población
de análisis.
Con base en lo anterior el tercer apartado contiene la descripción de algunos
resultados de la encuesta. El orden de presentación de los mismos tiene por objetivo
ofrecer un panorama general de las características de la llamada población migrante
y de cada una de las particularidades asociadas a ella. En este sentido conviene
señalar que la encuesta capta migrantes que se desplazan por diversos motivos, sin
embargo en el presente documento la atención se centrará en los migrantes laborales
captados por la encuesta.
De igual manera el documento considera, en primer lugar, una caracterización
general por flujos y subpoblaciones de análisis para el leventamiento trimestral.
Finalmente se presentan un anexo estadístico. El cual tiene un formato que
responde a distintas necesidades, El Anexo I está conformado por la serie de
tabulados básicos de los migrantes laborales durante el trimestre considerado
del primer levantamiento por flujo y subpoblación. La caracterización general
de los migrantes que dan origen a cada subpoblación de análisis, se basa en
esta información.
Descripción general de la EMIF
Consideraciones generales
La Encuesta sobre Migración en la Frontera Norte de México (EMIF) es una
fuente de medición y caracterización directa de los flujos migratorios de trabajadores
mexicanos en dos direcciones: a) entre México y Estados Unidos y b) hacia o
desde las localidades fronterizas del norte de México. La base metodológica de la
EMIF, aplica técnicas de muestreo probabilístico de poblaciones móviles y supone
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una observación directa que cubre un amplio espectro de posibilidades tipológicas
de desplazamientos migratorios.
Por esta razón la EMIF incorpora dos dimensiones en la medición del fenómeno
migratorio, la geográfica y la temporal, lo cual representa la posibilidad de una
observación continua de los desplazamientos en ambas direcciones y en consecuencia
un tratamiento especial de las mediciones que se vayan registrando.
Los elementos que la metodología de la EMIF conjuga son:
I. La captura y estudio de los desplazamientos migratorios, en ambas
direcciones.
II. La analogía con el tipo de desplazamientos estudiados por otras
disciplinas como la oceanología o la biología que miden los
desplazamientos periódicos, estacionales o cíclicos de individuos de un
lugar a otro.
El flujo de personas se presenta en ambas direcciones10 (Sur-Norte), lo cual
hace compleja y poco operativa la agrupación en un solo conjunto a las personas
que comprende dicho flujo, además que las características pueden variar para quien
se incorpora a éste o sale del mismo11. Esta doble dirección del flujo migratorio,
requiere una clasificación que permita una observación y caracterización adecuada
del mismo.
Los migrantes cuya dirección es de sur a norte llegan a una localidad fronteriza
ya sea para permanecer en ella o para cruzar (documentado o indocumentado) hacia
Estados Unidos. Los migrantes en dirección norte-sur, llegan a las localidades
fronterizas procedentes de Estados Unidos (de manera voluntaria o devueltos por
la patrulla fronteriza) o de las mismas localidades fronterizas, utilizándolas como
punto de salida hacia el sur, o como destino o inicio para un nuevo cruce hacia
Estados Unidos. Esta dinámica es la que se conoce como flujo migratorio.
La división del flujo migratorio propuesta por la metodología de la EMIF,
segmenta a los migrantes dependiendo de su dirección y destino, definiendo la
población objetivo y la población sujeta a observación captada en cada una de las
encuestas de la manera descrita por el cuadro no. 1.
Es importante resaltar que para cada una de las subdivisiones propuestas en el
diseño de la EMIF, se aplican cuestionarios diferentes toda vez que se realizan los
filtros para identificar la población objetivo a la que pertenecen los sujetos
encuestados (ver diagrama de la cédula filtro de la EMIF).
La EMIF consta de cuatro cuestionarios diseñados para captar a migrantes en
ambos sentidos. A los deportados se les identifica como un flujo en sí mismo, ya
que en el cuestionario para estos migrantes se excluyen preguntas que permitan
subdividirlos, pues la característica para identificarlos es que su regreso se califica
como forzado.
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Por lo anterior, en adelante se ha determinado utilizar la siguiente clasificación
de flujos y subpoblaciones de análisis,12 misma que será utilizada para referirse y
presentar los resultados de la encuesta.
Para el flujo sur-norte se presentan como subpoblaciones aquellos cuyo destino
es la frontera norte y/o los Estados Unidos.
En el caso del flujo norte-sur, se consideraron como subpoblaciones tanto a
quienes proceden de Estados Unidos como a los que proceden de la frontera norte
de México. A los migrantes devueltos por la patrulla fronteriza se les denominará
flujo de Deportados.
Cuadro 1
Flujo Migratorio
Procedente del Sur
y con Destino Procedente del Norte
Estados La Frontera Estados La Frontera
Población Unidos Norte Unidos Norte Deportados
1. Si manifiestan la decisión de ir a los Estados Unidos con o sin experiencia migratoria
internacional o de permanencia en la ciudad fronteriza pero con alguna experiencia en migración
internacional, se considera migración internacional; al complemento de éste conjunto, se le
considera migración a la frontera norte.
2. Si la mayor parte del tiempo permaneció en alguna ciudad de Estados Unidos, se
considera como un desplazamiento procedentes de dicho país. En caso contrario, si la mayor
parte del tiempo permaneció en alguna localidad fronteriza del norte de México, se juzga
como desplazamiento procedente de la frontera norte.
Población
Sujeta a
Observación
Todas las unidades sujetas a muestreo, es decir, toda persona que pasa
por los puntos de muestreo, independientemente que pertenezcan o no
a la población objetivo.
Población
Objetivo:
Individuos
que
participan
en el flujo
migratorio
Internacional
o a la
frontera
norte de
México
Individuos no nacidos en
Estados Unidos, mayores
de 12 años que llegan a
una de las ciudades por
las zonas y puntos de
muestreo considerados,
no residentes en esa
ciudad y cuya estancia en
la zona fronteriza es para
trabajar o buscar trabajo,
para visitar familiares o
amigos, o por negocios,
sin fecha comprometida
para el regreso. (1)
Individuos mayores de 12
años, no nacidos en
Estados Unidos, que no
viven en la ciudad de
aplicación de la
entrevista, cuya estancia,
mayor de un mes, en la
zona fronteriza se debió a
una visita a familiares,
amigos, o bien a
negocios; o para buscar
trabajo o trabajar,
independientemente de la
duración de su visita. (2)
ndividuos que son
entregados a las
autoridades
migratorias
mexicanas por
agentes de la
patrulla fronteriza
de Estados
Unidos, en los
puertos de
entrada al país,
ubicados a lo
largo de la línea
fronteriza.
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1. Flujo Sur-Norte
— Con destino a la frontera norte (SFN)
— Con destino a los Estados Unidos (SEU)
2. Flujo Norte-Sur
—Procedentes de Estados Unidos (EUS)
— Procedentes de la frontera norte (FNS)
3. Flujo Deportados
— Deportados (DEP)13
En relación con la clasificación propuesta concierne anotar las siguientes
precisiones.
Flujo Sur-Norte. Capta sujetos cuya estancia en la zona fronteriza se debe a
visita a familiares o amigos y negocios, sin fecha comprometida de regreso y por
eso es mayor que el flujo migratorio laboral. La razón por la que se incluyó es que,
si bien al momento de la entrevista no es migrante por motivos laborales, con el
paso del tiempo puede convertirse en uno.
Dentro de este flujo no se consideran aquellos sujetos que declaren como lugar
de residencia alguna localidad en los Estados Unidos, toda vez que son excluidos
de la encuesta a partir de la cédula filtro.
Flujo Norte-Sur. Capta sujetos nacidos en México que residen actualmente en
los Estados Unidos. Sin embargo no puede ser considerada representativa de la
población nacida en México y residente en Estados Unidos, puesto que se desconoce
el porcentaje de esa población que se desplaza a México en forma temporal; tampoco
se conoce si el sujeto de esa población que se desplaza temporalmente tiene un
perfil similar a quien no lo hace.
De igual modo, capta flujos migratorios no necesariamente laborales, ya que
se aplica un cuestionario a aquellos sujetos cuya estancia en Estados Unidos fue
para visitar a familiares o amigos o para negocios, con tiempo de estancia superior
a un mes.
Flujo Deportados. Incluye ciudadanos de otras nacionalidades, residentes de
la zona fronteriza y aquellos sujetos cuyo desplazamiento se efectúa por motivos
no laborales (compradores, personas que visitan familiares o amigos, etcétera).
Subestima a los menores de edad, ya que éstos son frecuentemente entregados a
los consulados de México en Estados Unidos para su repatriación.
Otro aspecto importante es que de las unidades en flujo, aquí es donde la
probabilidad de que se presente una enumeración múltiple es más alta, pues los
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migrantes realizan varios intentos consecutivos hasta lograr internarse en Estados
Unidos o desistan de su intento.
Por las características del diseño metodológico de la EMIF, existen algunos
tipos de migrantes laborales que no son captados por la encuesta, estos son los
que se desplazan en transportes marítimos desde México hacia los Estados Unidos,
en transportes de carga, en vehículos particulares, en transportes aéreos que llegan
directamente a ciudades del interior de los Estados Unidos de América y los
residentes en la frontera que deciden migrar a los Estados Unidos. Asimismo los
llamados commuters y los visa abusers.14
Dado que la EMIF realiza una ponderación con base en dos dimensiones (espacio
y tiempo) para expandir las características del migrante, conviene señalar que los
eventos presentan variación de representatividad que depende en primera instancia
del tiempo y el espacio donde se detecta el desplazamiento, así como de la dinámica
del flujo en el punto donde se aplica el cuestionario.
Avances en el desarrollo del
levantamiento de la EMIF
La EMIF consta de levantamientos anuales continuos divididos en períodos
trimestrales. Hasta el momento se cuenta con la información de los cuatro trimestres
para el primer año de levantamiento.
Las fechas de estos levantamientos son como se presenta en el cuadro no.2.
Uno de los aspectos que interesa destacar es el relacionado con el procedimiento
del levantamiento de la EMIF.
Primer año de levantamiento
En el primer año de operación de la encuesta, se establecieron tres regiones
de muestreo;15 la región Este que comprende las localidades fronterizas situadas
al este de Ciudad Acuña, Coahuila; la región Centro con las localidades ubicadas
Cuadro 2
Períodos trimestrales
Primer levantamiento
1er. Trimestre 2o. Trimestre 3er. Trimestre 4o. Trimestre
1er. Levantamiento
28 de Marzo 1993
27 de Marzo 1994
28/Mar/1993
27/Jun/1993
28/Jun/1993
27/Sep/1993
28/Sep/1993
27/Dic/1993
28/Dic/1993
27/Mar/1994
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entre Ciudad Acuña y Nogales y la región Oeste que comprende las localidades
situadas al oeste de Nogales. Tales regiones se organizaron a partir de siete
ciudades de la frontera norte que fueron elegidas como los puntos de coordinación
de la encuesta.16
En este el primer año de operación (28 de marzo de 1993 al 27 de marzo de
1994), la distribución de las localidades donde se aplicó la encuesta se detalla en
el cuadro no. 3. La dinámica del movimiento de los diferentes flujos captados
obligó la modificación de las localidades de muestreo debido al cierre de
operaciones en ellas, ésta situación se refleja en la variación del número de
localidades reportado.
Durante el segundo trimestre de operación, se eliminaron definitivamente cinco
localidades: Cd. Guerrero, Agua Prieta, Naco, Ojinaga y Sonoyta, por lo que el
trabajo de campo se realizó en 18 localidades.17
Cuadro 3
Distribución de localidades de muestreo por region y coordinacion
regional: Primer levantamiento anual
( 28/Mar/93 al 27/Mar/94)
Region Coordinacion Regional Localidad
Este Matamoros Matamoros
R. Bravo/Nvo. Progreso
Reynosa
Camargo
Miguel Alemán
Nuevo Laredo Nuevo Laredo
Piedras Negras Piedras Negras
Ciudad Acuña
Centro Juárez Cd. Juárez
Porfirio Parra
Rodrigo M. Quevedo
Porvenir
Nogales Nogales
Oeste Mexicali Mexicali
San Luis Río Colorado
Tijuana Tijuana
Tecate
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Dentro de las localidades se establecieron zonas de muestreo (central de
autobuses, aeropuertos, estaciones de ferrocarril, garitas), y dentro de las zonas
puntos de muestreo. Estos puntos de muestreo son los lugares donde se aplica la
encuesta dado que las personas que utilizan los servicios de transporte público
pasan obligadamente por ellos.
Los puntos de muestreo son las puertas de entrada o salida a los andenes, salas
para recoger equipaje, etc. En el caso de los deportados éstos puntos son las puertas
por donde la patrulla fronteriza devuelve a territorio mexicano a las personas que
se internan ilegalmente a los Estados Unidos.
Durante el primer año de aplicación de la EMIF, la distribución de los puntos
de muestreo establecidos se presenta en el cuadro no.4.
Durante el primer trimestre de operación la distribución de los puntos de
muestreo se detalla en el cuadro no. 5.
En lo que se refiere al número de cuestionarios aplicados, EL COLEF reportó
la siguiente distribución en el primer año, según los flujos identificados en el
cuadro no. 6.
Durante este año de aplicación de la EMIF, la evolución en el levantamiento
de los datos para el primer trimestre de acuerdo al sentido del flujo, se presenta en
el cuadro no. 7.
Durante el segundo trimestre, la aplicación de cuestionarios observó la
distribución que aparece en los cuadros 8 y 9.
Cuadro 4
Distribucion de puntos de muestreo por trimestre según flujo
Primer levantamiento anual
(28/Mar/93 al 27/Mar/94)
Flujo Flujo Flujo
Trimestre Sur-Norte  Norte-Sur Deportados
1 28/Mar/93-27/Jun/93 46 62 21
2 28/Jun/93-27/Sep/93 31 38 12
3 28/Sep/93-27/Dic/93 42 48 14
4 26/Dic/93-27/Mar/94 42 50 14
Total 161 198 61
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Cuadro 6
Distribución de cuestionarios aplicados
por trimestre según tipo de flujo
Primer levantamiento anual
(28/Mar/93 al 27/Mar/94)
Flujo Flujo Flujo
Trimestre Sur-Norte Norte-Sur Deportados Total
1º 1,687 1,755 1,990 5,432
2º 1,653 1,880 2,787 6,320
3º 1,330 2,093 1,814 5,237
4º 1,598 1,487 2,323 5,408
Total 6,268 7,215 8,914 22,397
Cuadro 5
Distribución de puntos de muestreo por región según tipo de flujo
Primer trimestre
(22/Mar/93 al 28/Jun/93
Coordinación Flujo Flujo Flujo
Región Regional Sur-Norte Norte-Sur Deportados
Este Matamoros 11 16 5
Nuevo Laredo 3 3 1
Piedras Negras 3 3 2
Centro Juárez 9 14 4
Nogales 7 10 4
Oeste Mexicali 9 10 2
Tijuana 4 6 3
Total 46 62 21
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Cuadro 7
Distribución de cuestionarios aplicados por tipo de flujo
Primer trimestre
(28/Mar/93 al 28/Jun/93)
Número de Número de
Cuestionarios Cuestionarios
Flujo Completos Parciales* Total
Sur-Norte 1,602 84 1,687
Norte-Sur 1,682 73 1,755
Deportados 1,935 55 1,990
Total 5,219 212 5,432
* Cuestionarios parciales son aquellos que no fueron concluidos porque la unidad de transporte
que utilizaba el migrante estaba a punto de partir y se suspendía la entrevista, o bien porque
el migrante se negaba a continuarla.
Cuadro 8
Distribución de cuestionarios aplicados por
coordinación regional según tipo de flujo
Segundo trimestre
(28/Jun/93 al 27/Sep/93)
Coordinación Flujo Flujo Flujo
Regional Sur-Norte Norte-Sur Deportados
C P Total C P Total C P Total
Matamoros 276 26 302 316 17 333 640 6 646
Nuevo Laredo 206 1 207 210 2 212 327 0 327
Piedras Negras 151 0 151 246 0 246 298 0 298
Cd. Juárez 277 1 278 381 0 381 452 0 452
Nogales 94 7 101 130 8 138 167 7 174
Mexicali 102 1 103 171 1 172 172 8 180
Tijuana 510 1 511 392 6 398 702 8 710
Total 1,616 37 1,653 1,846 34 1,880 2,758 29 2,787
Nota: C= Número de cuestionarios completos
P= Número de cuestionarios parciales
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Cuadro 9
Distribución de cuestionarios aplicados por tipo de flujo
Segundo trimestre
(28/Jun/93 al 27/Sep/93)
Número de Número de
Cuestionarios Cuestionarios
Flujo Completos Parciales Total
Sur-Norte 1,616 37 1,653
Norte-Sur 1,846 34 1,880
Deportados 2,758 29 2,787
Total 6,220 100 6,320
Definición de población objetivo
Dentro de la corriente migratoria confluyen personas cuyos desplazamientos
hacia o desde la frontera norte o los Estados Unidos responden a diversas razones.
Dado que uno de los objetivos centrales de la EMIF es la captación de los
desplazamientos de carácter laboral, conviene considerar las principales
características se presenta en el cuadro no. 10.
De acuerdo con el cuadro anterior se puede clasificar a la población migrante
en dos grupos diferenciados entre sí: uno conformado por individuos nacidos
y residentes en México que declararon como razón del desplazamiento trabajar
Cuadro 10
Población migrante
Individuos que participan en el flujo migratorio
internacional o a la frontera norte
Migrantes Laborales
Individuos nacidos y residentes en
México que declararon como razón
del desplazamiento trabajar o buscar
trabajo
* En este flujo están considerados extranjeros residentes en México y que declararon como
razón de desplazamiento trabajar o buscar trabajo.
Migrantes No Laborales*
Individuos que declararon como
razón de desplazamiento una
actividad ajena a trabajar o buscar
trabajo.
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o buscar trabajo, y el otro integrado por quienes declaran que lo hacen por
razones diferentes.
El objetivo es captar a los mexicanos nacidos en México, que vivían y que
residían en México pero en lugares diferentes a las localidades fronterizas,
especialmente a quienes declararon como razón de desplazamiento trabajar o
buscar trabajo.
Con base en lo anterior se sugiere como definición de migrante laboral al
conjunto de individuos captados por la EMIF, que siendo parte de la población
migrante han nacido y residen en México y que declararon como razón del
desplazamiento trabajar o buscar trabajo. En adelante nos referiremos a los grupos
por la denominación de migrante laboral y de migrante no laboral.
De acuerdo con esta definición no se incluye como migrante laboral hacia
Estados Unidos a quien:
a. Declara que se desplaza a los Estados Unidos por actividades no
relacionadas con trabajar o buscar trabajo, aunque cuenten con
experiencia migratoria hacia ese país.
b. Declara que se desplaza a la frontera norte y declara no ir a buscar trabajo,
pero tiene experiencia migratoria en los Estados Unidos.
c. Declara que se desplaza a la frontera norte y no contestó o no especificó
si va a trabajar o buscar trabajo a la frontera norte aunque tenga
experiencia migratoria hacia los Estados Unidos.
d. Declara que se desplaza a los Estados Unidos por actividades no
relacionadas con trabajar o buscar trabajo y que además no tiene fecha
comprometida de regreso.
También se excluye como migrante laboral hacia la frontera norte a quien
declara que se desplaza a la frontera norte por actividades no relacionadas con
trabajar o buscar trabajo, pero no tiene fecha comprometida de regreso.
Con objeto de caracterizar a los migrantes laborales se han considerado las
siguientes variables:
• Sexo
• Edad
• Escolaridad
• Estado civil
• Jefe de hogar
• Localidad de residencia
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• Estado de residencia
• Ciudad de cruce
• Estado de mayor permanencia en Estados Unidos
• Localidad de destino
• Estado de destino
• Documentación para cruzar a Estados Unidos
• Documentación para trabajar en Estados Unidos
• Empleo-desempleo en Estados Unidos
• Empleo-desempleo en México 30 días antes de iniciar el viaje
Finalmente conviene hacer una aclaracion en relación con la forma en que se
presenta la información.
La primera se refiere a la dificultad para presentar una división a partir de la
variable sexo y utilizarla como base de comparación debido a que la muestra tiene
una proporción pequeña de mujeres. Por tal razón se optó por realizar la comparación
por tipo de localidad de residencia (urbana-no urbana).
El papel de la frontera norte en el fenómeno
migratorio
Una de las preocupaciones básicas del fenómeno se relaciona con las variaciones
en el tiempo que presenta la corriente migratoria hacia y desde la frontera norte de
México y los Estados Unidos. Si bien es cierto que a lo largo del año los movimientos
de personas están presentes, es durante algunas épocas donde dicha corriente tiende
a ser más intensa en cualquiera de las dos direcciones.
En este sentido, diversos especialistas afirman que durante los meses de enero
y febrero, aumenta la corriente migratoria hacia el norte a causa del regreso de
connacionales hacia los Estados Unidos y por la presencia en las ciudades
fronterizas de aquellos que intentan cruzar hacia ese país, generalmente de manera
indocumentada. De acuerdo con los datos presentados para este período, es el
flujo sur-norte el de mayor importancia ya que concentra un mayor porcentaje
respecto a los flujos norte-sur y deportados (45.9%, 33.7% y 20.3%
respectivamente).
Tamayo y Fernández (1983), sostienen que la heterogeneidad interna de la
frontera norte complica identificarla como una “región”; el único elemento de
homogeneidad fronteriza es su desigualdad manifiesta respecto a los niveles de
desarrollo estadounidense.
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Las desigualdades en el desarrollo económico entre las zonas de la región
fronteriza, repercuten en la dinámica de los mercados de trabajo locales. Esta
dinámica es uno de los principales elementos de atracción de la migración laboral.
La distancia geográfica entre la región de origen y destino también repercute en las
actividades que los migrantes desarrollan en sus localidades de origen así como las
que están en posibilidades de desarrollar en las de destino.
La frontera norte se ha caracterizado por ser una de las regiones de atracción
de las migraciones internas de este país. Dentro de ésta, existen algunas zonas
urbanizadas más significativas como destino de migrantes, como el caso de Tijuana
que presenta un importante crecimiento demográfico y un fuerte desarrollo
económico; donde los sectores comercial y servicios son básicos para la economía,
sin olvidar que el sector industrial presenta un gran dinamismo a partir de la
instalación de la industria maquiladora.
Por su parte, Nuevo Laredo conjuga ser la puerta de entrada más cercana hacia
los Estados Unidos desde la Ciudad de México, amén de encontrar en esta ruta a la
ciudad industrial de Monterrey. Ambos elementos hacen de Nuevo Laredo un
importante centro de tráfico comercial entre México y los Estados Unidos
Ciudad Juárez y Nogales, desarrollaron su dinámica económica a partir de la
década de los setentas, principalmente por el establecimiento de la industria
maquiladora que atrajo una importante corriente de migración laboral.
Matamoros, Piedras Negras y Mexicali, se consolidan a partir del auge que
tuvieron sus valles agrícolas y el efecto que tuvo la reactivación económica en
las ciudades fronterizas al término de la Segunda Guerra Mundial, junto con el
impulso que recibieron sus economías a partir de la implementación de la
industria maquiladora.
Muestras de la población migrante
Primer levantamiento18
Consideraciones generales. Durante el trimestre comprendido entre el 14 de
diciembre de 1993 y el 13 de marzo de 1994, la EMIF captó para la población
migrante los siguientes totales en cuadro no. 11.
Del total registrado para la población migrante captada por la EMIF, la
distribución de acuerdo a los grupos y flujos asociados se detalla en los cuadros
12 y 13.
Tomando el total estimado para la población migrante, los definidos como
laborales, es decir aquellos nacidos y residentes en México que declararon como
razón del desplazamiento trabajar o buscar trabajo, representan el 61.03% del total
captado en este período, mientras que los identificados como no laborales representan
el 38.97%.
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Cuadro 11
Población migrante
Distribución por grupo según flujo y subpoblación de análisis
(14/Dic/93 al 13/Mar/94)
Migrantes
Población Migrante Migrantes Laborales  no Laborales
Flujo Subpoblación Muestra Ponderados Muestra Ponderados Muestra Ponderados
Sur-Norte SFN 762 239,348 500 145,261 262 94,087
SEU 692 174,414 514 120,150 178 54,265
1,454 413,762 1,014 265,411 440 148,352
Norte-Sur EUS 669 204,326 323 75,661 346 128,666
FNS 862 174,015 673 119,228 189 54,787
1,531 378,340 996 194,889 535 183,453
Deportados DEP 2,207 155,059 1,720 117,720 487 37 339
Total* 5,192 947,162 3,730 578,020 1,462 369,144
* La diferencia entre el total de la población migrante y el total de migrantes laborales y
   migrantes no laborales, corresponde estrictamente al redondeo de las cifras ponderadas
SFN: Procedentes del Sur con destino frontera norte
SEU: Procedentes del Sur con destino Estados Unidos
EUS: Procedentes de los Estados Unidos con destino al Sur
FNS: Procedentes de la frontera norte con destino al Sur
DEP: Migrantes deportados
Si consideramos que la frontera norte ha experimentado un crecimiento
demográfico que destaca en comparación con el resto del país (Ham, 1993), no es
de extrañar que para ambos grupos (laborales y no laborales), mayor número de
ellos se dirige a localidades de la frontera norte en contraste con aquellos que se
dirigen a los Estados Unidos. Aquí se destaca que el 54.73% de los migrantes
laborales participantes en el flujo sur-norte se dirigían a alguna localidad de la
frontera norte y el 63.42% de los migrantes no laborales tenían este mismo destino.
Tal hecho se explica en parte, por el atractivo para la migración de las
condiciones laborales que se han desarrollado en la frontera, y del importante papel
que han desempeñado estas ciudades en el marco de la crisis económica de los
ochenta.19 La importancia económica de la región parece confirmarse también en
el caso del flujo norte-sur ya que la proporción de migrantes laborales que proceden
de la frontera norte significó el 61.18% del total del flujo.
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Cuadro 12
Población migrante
Distribución porcentual por grupo, flujo y subpoblación de análisis
(14/Dic/93 al 13/Mar/94)
(Muestra expandida)
Poblacion Migrante
947,162
Migrantes Laborales Migrantes No Laborales
61.03 38.97
Sur-Norte Norte-Sur Dep. Sur-Norte Norte-Sur Dep.
45.92 33.72 20.36 40.19 49.70 10.11
SFN SEU EUS FNS DEP SFN SEU EUS FNS DEP
54.73 45.27 38.82 61.18 100.00 63.42 36.58 70.13 29.87 100.00
SFN: Procedentes del Sur con destino frontera norte
SEU: Procedentes del Sur con destino Estados Unidos
EUS: Procedentes de los Estados Unidos con destino al Sur
FNS: Procedentes de la frontera norte con destino al Sur
DEP: Migrantes deportados
Considerando el total de migrantes no laborales con dirección norte-sur destaca
que el 70.13% provenía de alguna ciudad de los Estados Unidos.
La EMIF reporta que del total de migrantes laborales, el 20.36% son deportados.
Como primera observación, se destaca que la mayor proporción de migrantes
participa en el flujo sur-norte (43.69%), en el flujo norte-sur participaron el 39.94%
y los deportados representan el 16.37% restante. La mayor proporción (25.27%)
son migrantes que tienen como destino la frontera norte, seguidos en orden de
importancia por aquellos que provenían de Estados Unidos (21.57%).
Del total de los migrantes laborales captados durante este período el 25.13%
se dirigió hacia la frontera norte y el 20.78% a los Estados Unidos. El 20.63%
provenía de la frontera norte y un 20.37% fueron captados como deportados.
De los migrantes no laborales la subpoblación más representativa es aquella
que proviene de los Estados Unidos (34.86%).
Perfil básico de los migrantes laborales. A partir de las variables consideradas
en este documento como básicas20 y del conjunto de datos de la EMIF para el
período, se pueden identificar los rasgos más distintivos de la población laboral
que capta la encuesta. Los migrantes nacidos y residentes en México, que se
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Cuadro 13
Población migrante
Porcentaje estimado por grupo según flujo y subpoblación
(14/Dic/93 al 13/Mar/94)
Flujo/Subpoblacion
Sur-Norte Norte-Sur Deportados
Grupo SFN SEU EUS FNS DEP
Laborales 25.13 20.78 13.09 20.63 20.37
No Laborales 25.48 14.70 34.86 14.84 10.12
Total 25.27 18.42 21.57 18.37 16.37
Total Flujo 43.69 39.94 16.37
SFN: Procedentes del Sur con destino frontera norte
SEU: Procedentes del Sur con destino Estados Unidos
EUS: Procedentes de los Estados Unidos con destino al Sur
FNS: Procedentes de la frontera norte con destino al Sur
DEP: Migrantes deportados
desplazaron para trabajar o buscar trabajo entre el 14 de diciembre de 1993 al 13
de marzo de 1994 tienen las siguientes características: El flujo sur-norte muestra
un peso relativo mayor (45.92%) que el del flujo norte-sur (33.72%) en el total de
los desplazamientos por motivos laborales. Al observar las subpoblaciones se tienen
que el movimiento más significativo del flujo sur-norte es aquel que se dirige a la
frontera norte (54.73%), en el flujo norte-sur los que provienen de la frontera
representan el 61.18% (Cuadro no. 13).
The Michoacán Project Surveys of
1983, 1989, and 1993 (Taylor,
Fletcher, Orlove, and Yúnez)
The Michoacán household-farm surveys were carried out in three villages and
a town in the Pátzcuaro region in spring/summer of 1983, 1989 and 1993. This
region is located in central Mexico, approximately 1,500 miles south of the Mexico-
California border. It is on the fringes of the Tarascan highlands. Like most of cen-
tral Mexico, it is at an altitude of more than 6,000 feet. The villages and town are
situated on the shore of Lake Pátzcuaro. At the time of the 1983 survey, two of the
villages were connected to the nearest town, Erongarícuaro, by a dirt road which
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became impassible to all but off-road vehicles during much of the rainy summer
season. The 1983 survey gathered data on 540 individuals in 61 randomly selected
households located in two villages. In the 1989 and 1993 surveys, we re-inter-
viewed these original households, and in 1993 added 20 new households to the
sample in each village and expanded the survey to a third village and nearby town,
with a sample size of 50 households in each.
This region has a long history of sending migrants to the United States, pre-
dating the bracero program. Migration accelerated during the bracero program. In
many villages, well over one half of all men who were in their prime working years
during the 1950s and early 1960s participated at some time in the bracero program.
Most of these also entered the United States illegally to work during this period. A
typical pattern was for young men to first work in U.S. agricultural jobs as braceros,
returning to their villages each year and using U.S. earnings to invest in their farms
and raise their families in Mexico; then to regularly enter the United States ille-
gally to work each year. The termination of the bracero program did not reduce
Mexico-to-U.S. migration from the villages in this study. Instead, ex-bracero workers
continued to cross the border frequently in the 1960s to work in the fields as unau-
thorized immigrants. Their treks northward became less frequent in the 1970s and
especially in the 1980s, as the ex-braceros became older and as their children took
their place in U.S. labor markets.
With very few exceptions, at least one son or daughter of ex-braceros, and
typically several children, were residing in the United States at the time of our first
survey. However, few held agricultural jobs; most (around 90 percent) worked in
light manufacturing and service jobs in and around Southern California’s San
Fernando Valley. By the early 1990s, the numbers of U.S. migrants increased dra-
matically, as older siblings helped younger ones to migrate and as many children
of non-ex-braceros joined U.S. migrant streams.
One of the villages, a Purépecha (Tarascan)-speaking community, was
almost entirely bypassed by the bracero program. Its households did not
participate heavily in Mexico-to-U.S. migration at the time of the 1983 survey;
only a handful of individuals from this village worked in the United States in
the early 1980s, almost all as H-2 workers harvesting tobacco in Virginia. By
1993, many households in this village had family members working in the
United States, mostly in manufacturing and service jobs in Southern California,
a few harvesting apples in Washington and Oregon, but no H-2(A) workers in
the Eastern United States.
The villages boast several tienditas, or small stores, in which goods brought
in from the outside are sold through windows cut into the facades of adobe houses.
These goods range from flour, lard and sugar to Coca Cola, toilet paper and
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chewing gum. Typically, a local butcher slaughters an animal and sells meat on
the main cobbled road in the village once every one or two weeks. The rest of
the time, villagers must travel the one to two kilometers to town to purchase
meat. Stores in the town also sell a limited variety of consumer durables, and a
weekly market dramatically expands the town’s inventory. There is no central
market within the villages. Apart from the tienditas, an active trade in staples,
dairy products and some fruits and vegetables is carried out on doorsteps of village
houses. Villagers have excellent information about which families have maize
surpluses, milk cows, chickens and eggs, firewood and other local commodities
for sale in the village. Local prices for these commodities are held in check by
the villages’ proximity to the town. The interaction of village supply and demand
determines the prices of other goods, including labor and tractor services, which
are supplied locally.
High transaction costs insulate the villages and town from much of the influ-
ence of government corn-price policy. Despite a high government-guaranteed price
for maize, the cost of transporting harvests to the nearest CONASUPO purchase
point prevented all but a few individuals from selling to the government. Rela-
tively marginal agro-ecological conditions limited maize output in this area to around
one metric ton per hectare, restricting the local maize supply. As a result, local corn
prices were lower than the guaranteed price but nevertheless well above the world
price during this period.
The household-farm survey gathered complete sociodemographic data on ev-
ery living family member, regardless of whether he or she was residing in the
village at the time of the surveys. These data include sex, age, education, marital
status, migration experience for both internal and international migration, relation-
ship to the household head, current residence and years at current residence, En-
glish language proficiency, and U.S. immigration status. We also constructed a
complete work time-use profile on every family member residing in Mexico, and
we gathered data on all income contributions to the household from migrants in
Mexico or in the United States, including in-kind contributions.
The surveys included a module on household assets (land, physical capital,
contacts with relatives and friends elsewhere in Mexico or in the United States).
Complete data were also gathered to permit estimation of production, incomes and
expenditures each household in the sample. On the production side, village market
prices (where available) and quantities of all intermediate and factor inputs and
outputs were recorded for each activity. For subsistence households, production
was valued at the going village price.
On the factor side, wages for hired labor and, except in the case of a few
tractor owners, actual costs of tractor services were observed and used to calculate
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hired-labor and capital value-added. Ox-and-plow services were valued at their
opportunity costs, that is, the village price for these inputs. The ejido, or agrarian
reform, prohibited sale or renting of ejido lands, which made up nearly all of the
land base controlled by villagers. Because of this, land rents had to be estimated
econometrically. (See Taylor and Wyatt, 1994). Family labor value-added was
calculated as a residual, from the imputed value of production minus the observed
or imputed costs of all intermediate and factor inputs, including imputed land rents.
(Land rents were not separated out from family and other capital in the 1982 SAM.)
All purchases of inputs and sales of output were recorded by origín and destination,
respectively. Inputs purchased from outside the village represent “village imports,”
while output sold to outside markets represents “village exports.” The difference
between exports and imports yields village marketed surplus, which is a village
analogue to the marketed-surplus concept in the household-farm literature (e.g.,
Singh, Squire and Strauss, 1986).
The expenditure side of the survey gathered data, based on recall and a
reconstruction of typical weekly food menus, on consumption expenditures,
savings and investments. Expenditures on lumpy goods like furniture, plows,
and house construction were relatively easy to obtain, as was information on
daily or weekly menus, e.g., the corn input into a family’s nixtamal (dough)
for tortillas. In the case of subsistence production, consumption, like output,
was valued at village market prices. Expenditures on livestock, machinery and
tools made up the majority of investments. These expenditures, together with
limited reported savings in bank accounts, were counted as savings (payments
by households into the capital account) and as investments (expenditures by
the capital account on investment goods or savings sent to banks outside the
village) in the village SAM. No formal savings were reported in the 1988 survey,
which was for a period of high inflation and negative real interest rates.
Schooling expenditures were counted both as human-capital savings (from
households to the human capital account) and as human-capital expenditures
(from the human capital account to the rest of Mexico). Children normally
complete six years in a government school within the village. Because primary
education is free and secondary schools are located outside the village, human
capital investment represents a village import. Schooling costs include fees,
supplies, lodging for live-away students (e.g., in the state capital of Morelia),
and daily transportation for students commuting from the village to the
government secondary school in the nearby municipio (county) seat of
Erongarícuaro or to a post-secondary school in the city of Pátzcuaro. All
consumption and investment expenditures were recorded by place of origín to
indicate whether they represent local goods or village imports.
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Mexican Migration Project
(Durand-Massey) Surveys
The Mexican Migration Project provides cross-sectional data from random
samples of households surveyed in 1982-83 and 1987-91 in 19 communities in the
Mexican states of Jalisco, Michoacán, Guanajuato, and Nayarit, areas that have
traditionally sent large numbers of migrants to the United States. Within each com-
munity, 100-200 households were randomly selected and interviewed, resulting in
a total sample size of 3,400 households across 19 communities. Detailed socio-
demographic data were gathered, together with migration life histories.
Data Collected in the United States (Census, Current
Population Survey, INS, and Farmworker Surveys)
United States Census and Current
Population Survey
The U.S. decennial censuses and the Current Population Surveys (CPS) are
among the major sources of data used by researchers to study the characteristics of
migrants. Public-use microdata files are available for the censuses of 1900, 1910,
and 1940 through 1990.
Strengths of the U.S. Decennial Censuses
The decennial Census of Population enables rich description of the enumerated
foreign-born. Information on country of birth, year of entry, naturalization, and, in
some censuses, on use of English or other languages and on parental nativity can
be combined with data on age, sex, marital and employment behavior, and earnings
and income to yield a composite picture of the foreign-born at the time of the
census. The censuses also have the advantage of broad coverage and ample sample
size, facilitating examination of groups whose size is very small, such as age/sex/
nationality-specific cohorts.
Shortcomings of the U.S. Decennial Censuses
Unfortunately, the inferences about the migration process that can be drawn
from census data are limited, due to three serious shortcomings: (a) the lack of
information on characteristics particularly relevant to the study of migration, (b)
the census data’s cross-sectional nature, and (c) lack of firm knowledge concern-
ing the rate and stability of coverage.
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Missing Migration-Relevant Information
As is well known, the decennial censuses do not contain information on the
legal status of the foreign-born.21 It is thus impossible to distinguish among true
immigrants (legal permanent resident aliens and those among them who have be-
come naturalized citizens) and visitors of a wide variety. Some of the visitors are
nonimmigrants, i.e., persons holding temporary visas from among the broad set
discussed above; such visitors include employees of foreign concerns (such as for-
eign correspondents and automobile plant managers), members of foreign trade
delegations, employees of international organizations (such as the World Bank),
and foreign students. Others of the visitors are deportable aliens. Obviously, lack
of information on legal status is more serious for some origín countries than for
others. The problem would appear to be severe for Mexico, as Mexico probably
has substantial contingents of all three main legal types—permanent resident aliens,
nonimmigrants, undocumented migrants—and estimated characteristics do not
accurately describe any of them.
The lack of information on legal status makes it impossible to estimate natu-
ralization rates or to interpret unambiguously shifts in migrant characteristics. An
increase or decrease in average age or schooling or earnings might merely be the
result of changes in the legal-status composition of the migrants. For example,
even if the schooling and earnings of newly-admitted permanent resident aliens
remained the same, a shift upward in intracompany transferees would produce an
increase in average earnings while a shift upward in undocumented migrants would
produce the opposite.
It should also be noted that citizenship, too, is not unambiguous in most
data sets and in the decennial censuses. The rightmost column of Table 14 reports
the imputed citizenship at birth for the same combinations of birthplace and
parental citizenship for which actual citizenship at birth is reported. As shown,
there are two classes of persons whose imputed birth-citizenship differs from
actual birth-citizenship: (i) persons born in the United States who are not subject
to U.S. jurisdiction and hence are not birth-citizens; and (ii) persons born abroad
to one U.S. citizen parent who does not meet the requirements for transmitting
U.S. citizenship.
Moreover, the 1970 and 1980 censuses followed a practice that may have
resulted in the citizenship misclassification of persons born in the United States to
mothers living abroad. Mexicans and Canadians living in border areas would be
most affected by this misclassification. Briefly, the census question on nativity
instructed, “Print the state where this person’s mother was living when this person
was born. Do not give the location of the hospital unless the mother’s home and the
hospital were in the same state.” If the instruction was followed, then it was
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impossible to correctly answer the next question, on citizenship. Thus, the 1970
and 1980 censuses contain subsets of Mexico-raised U.S. birth-citizens who are
misclassified as naturalized U.S. citizens.
Cross-Sectional Nature of Census Data
Because the census data are cross-sectional, studies based on them are subject
to two important sets of biases: those arising from emigration selectivity and those
arising from the confounding of cohort and experience effects.22
With respect to the confounding of cohort and experience effects, it is well-
known that studies based on cross-sectional data cannot reveal the patterns of dy-
namic processes and cannot disentangle age, period, and cohort effects.23 Thus,
when cross-sectional data are used to study migrant behavior, it is impossible to
distinguish between the effects of experience in the United States and the effects of
factors associated with the immigrant’s vintage—that is, with conditions in both
the origín country and the United States at the time of entry (including the rules for
the selection of immigrants in effect at the time of admission to permanent resident
status). For example, as Borjas (1985) notes, in studies of the earnings of immi-
grants based on cross-sectional data, it is impossible to distinguish between two
potential facts: (i) that immigrants improve their earnings as their time in the United
States increases, as hypothesized by Chiswick (1978); and (ii) that each successive
entry cohort of immigrants has possessed lower earnings potential (possibly as a
consequence of the law for the selection of immigrants).
Cross-sectional data have an additional weakness when used to study migra-
tion processes. The respondents enumerated in the decennial censuses represent
the survivors of entry cohorts, cohorts which may be selectively and differentially
trimmed by emigration decisions (Jasso and Rosenzweig 1982). For example, if
immigrants who subsequently emigrate from the United States are non-randomly
self-selected and if the selection mechanisms operate differentially across entry
cohort and/or country of origín—if, to illustrate, the low achievers from the 1955
entry cohort leave while the high achievers from the 1965 entry cohort leave—
then the true adjustment effect cannot be identified. Tracking the progress of an
aggregate cohort across successive cross-sectional data bases may thus confound,
because of selective emigration, the life-course mobility of an individual with shifts
over time in the mixture of sub-sets in the individual’s entry cohort. For example,
if the high earners in a cohort emigrate, it may appear that the cohort has made no
progress when in fact the survivors (initially low earners) have substantially in-
creased their earnings. Biases associated with emigration selectivity may be espe-
cially acute for Mexico-born persons, as their emigration may be both high and
fluctuating over time.
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Coverage and Coverage Change
The validity of inferences concerning changes over time both within and
between cohorts of foreign-born persons hinges on changes in coverage. In particular,
coverage of undocumented migrants is problematic.
Legal Immigrant Samples Based on
Administrative Records of the
Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS)
Samples based on administrative records of the INS constitute the major source
of information about legal immigrants. These data are of two main types: (i) ad-
ministrative records covering new legal immigrants and new naturalized citizens;
and (ii) surveys of samples drawn from INS records.
INS Administrative Data
Precise information on persons granted permanent resident alien status and on
those among them who subsequently naturalize is collected by the U.S. Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service. Public-Use tapes of the New-Immigrant File for
the years 1972-1994 are now available (see INS 1994 Statistical Yearbook, p. 177).
Additionally, INS has undertaken to match immigrant and naturalization records
for the FY 1977 and 1982 immigrant cohorts; these microdata are also available as
public-use tapes. Selected cross-tabulations of data from the New-Immigrant and
Naturalization Files are published in the INS Annual Report and its successor, the
Statistical Yearbook.24
Strengths of INS Data
The principal advantage of INS data lies in the detailed information on legal
status, visa classification, and country-of-origín variables. It is thus possible to
study the determinants of naturalization rates, since normally eligibility to natural-
ize depends on both legal status and length of residence. It is also possible, though
with considerably less ease, to study the effects of duration in the United States on
employment status and occupation.
The information available in the New-Immigrant File and the Naturalization
File includes: (i) personal characteristics, including age, sex, marital status, state
of residence (or intended residence, for persons entering to become permanent
residents), occupation; (ii) origín-country information, including country of birth,
country of last permanent residence, country of chargeability (for numerically limited
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Table 14
Actual and Imputed Citizenship at Birth, by Place of
Birth and Parental Citizenship
Citizenship at Birth
Place of Birth No. of U.S. Citizen Parents Actual Imputed
United States Two U.S. citizen U.S. citizen
United States One U.S. citizen U.S. citizen
United States Zero—Born subject to U.S. citizen U.S. citizen
U.S. jurisdiction
United States Zero—Born not subject to Alien U.S. citizen
U.S. jurisdiction
Abroad Two U.S. citizen U.S. citizen
Abroad One—Requirements to U.S. citizen U.S. citizen
transmit citizenship met
Abroad One—Requirements to Alien U.S. citizen
transmit citizenship not met
Abroad Zero Alien Alien
Notes: United States = 50 states, plus outlying territories and possessions to which the United
States has extended jus soli.
Abroad = Outside the United States.
visas), country of former nationality (for those who naturalize); and (iii) statutory
classifications, including the provision of law under which the person became an
immigrant, the provision of law under which the person was admitted for
nonimmigrant temporary residence prior to immigration (if the person was adjusting
from nonimmigrant to immigrant while in the United States), and the category of
law under which the person became naturalized, as well as all the relevant dates—
of admission to permanent residence, of admission to the prior nonimmigrant
residence (if an adjustment of status), and of naturalization.
These data thus provide considerable detail on the circumstances of a given
person’s becoming an immigrant and acquiring U.S. citizenship. The 1977
Immigrant-Naturalization Cohort and the 1982 Immigrant-Naturalization Cohort,
by merging the New-Immigrant and Naturalization Files, make it possible to
distinguish important features of a foreign-born person’s migration-relevant
biography. An examples of such a biographies would be: a person who entered the
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United States as a nonimmigrant with a foreign-student visa in 1972, married a
U.S. citizen, becoming an immigrant as the spouse of a U.S. citizen in 1977,
naturalized in 1987, reporting marital status as divorced.
Deficiencies of INS Data
The INS data have two important shortcomings—missing relevant informa-
tion and limited longitudinality.
Missing Relevant Information. Important information relevant to the migra-
tion process is missing from the INS data. These data do not contain information
on earnings, education, family and household structure, or language; in addition,
information on occupation obtained from the New-Immigrant file is problematic,
at least for persons who are (i) entering to become permanent residents (as op-
posed to persons adjusting status in the United States), and (ii) entering without
labor certification.
The missing information may be regarded as being of three types. The first
type consists of relevant attributes and characteristics of individual immigrants;
this category might comprise information on language, schooling, earnings, and
the like. The second type consists of information that would identify family groups
of individual immigrants; for example, in the existing New-Immigrant File it is
impossible to link the record of a person admitted as the spouse of an employment-
fourth-preference immigrant with the record of the corresponding employment-
fourth-preference principal. The third type of missing information is information
on the sponsor.
Limited Longitudinality. Even when the New-Immigrant and the Naturaliza-
tion Files are merged, they provide longitudinal information for each entire cohort
on only one variable, naturalization. Longitudinal information on other character-
istics, such as occupation, marital status, and state of residence, is available only
for the sub-set of the cohort who naturalize. Thus, with the exception of naturaliza-
tion, information is longitudinal only for a self-selected portion of each New-Im-
migrant cohort.
Surveys of Samples Based on
INS Administrative Data
The principal weakness of INS administrative data—the lack of information
on schooling, earnings, and other variables—can be overcome by collecting that
information from individuals randomly selected from the administrative data. Such
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a design loses none of the strengths of designs based on INS administrative record,
overcomes the deficiencies, and, when embedded in a longitudinal data collection
framework, overcomes as well the problems associated with cross-sectional data,
such as emigration selectivity and confounding of cohort and experience effects.
In this report we draw on a special study carried out by the GAO on the imme-
diate-relative immigrants of FY 1985 and on two main INS-based sample surveys.
These are the special two-wave survey of the IRCA legalized population, LPS-1 and
LPS-2, and the baseline interview data from the New Immigrant Survey Pilot Study.
The GAO Study
As was noted above, INS data do not include information on an immigrant’s
sponsor. The General Accounting Office assembled a microdata set containing in-
formation on the U.S. citizen sponsors of a probability sample of immediate rela-
tives who became permanent resident aliens in FY 1985. The GAO data include
information on whether the sponsor was himself/herself an immigrant and on his/
her country of birth. If the sponsor was an immigrant, then information is also
provided on the date of admission to immigrant status and the date of naturaliza-
tion. The data thus make it possible to distinguish not only between birth-citizens
and naturalized citizens but also, within birth-citizens, between those born in the
United States and those born abroad to U.S. citizen parents.
Legalized Population Surveys
The Legalized Population Surveys, LPS-1 and LPS-2, represent two rounds of
a longitudinal survey of a sample of persons legalized under Section 245A of the
1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act. These are persons who had lived in the
United States continuously since January 1, 1982, had applied to the INS for
legalization, and had been granted legalization in the first phase of the IRCA program
(i.e., had been granted legal temporary resident status). During the first round,
carried out in February-June of 1989, a total of 6,193 persons were interviewed.
The second round selected for interview a subset of the initial interviewees; a
requirement for participation in the second round was successful admission to legal
permanent resident status. Thus, the population covered by LPS data represent a
subset of unauthorized migrants who were in the United States in 1989. It is not
necessarily representative of the entire unauthorized migrant population either before
or after 1982. Nevertheless, the Mexican subset of the LPS sample provides an
important complement to other data sources to estimate characteristics of Mexican
migrants, and it includes some variables (e.g., on remittance behavior) not available
in other data sets.
742
NIS Pilot Study
To improve the data base on immigrants, a program of comprehensive,
multicohort, longitudinal surveys of new legal immigrants to the United States
based on probability samples of INS records was recently developed. This pro-
gram—the New Immigrant Survey—is designed to monitor changes across co-
horts, with new samples drawn periodically, and to monitor adaptation over time,
interviewing sample members at regular intervals over the life cycle and also ob-
taining information about and from their children. To test the design, and in par-
ticular to assess the cost-effectiveness of alternative methods of locating and track-
ing immigrants—with the aim of maximizing both initial and longitudinal response
rates—a pilot study is being carried out. The pilot study includes a baseline inter-
view and follow-up interviews over the course of a year. The sample is a probabil-
ity sample drawn from among the set of persons who became new permanent resi-
dent aliens during July and August of 1996. In this report we draw on preliminary
results from the baseline interview of the pilot study, which collected information
on schooling, English language skill, labor force participation, and earnings both
in the United States and abroad.
Farmworker Surveys
UC-EDD Farmworker Survey (1985)
The UC-EDD Survey of California Farm Workers was carried out by the
University of California, Davis (UC) and the California Employment Development
Department in Sacramento (EDD) in August 1983. The sample includes 554 male
farm workers in 37 counties; workers in all crops and production-related activities
were interviewed in each survey area. The survey was designed to obtain as
representative a statewide sample of farm workers as possible, given the well-
documented difficulties inherent in studying this population. The data provide
information on farm worker human capital and other sociodemographic
characteristics, including immigration status and country of origín; on the type of
work and commodity in which farm workers were employed at the time of the
interview; and on farm worker earnings. Just over 80 percent of all farm workers in
the survey were Mexican-born, and 29 percent were undocumented.
National Agricultural Worker Survey (NAWS)
The National Agricultural Workers Survey (NAWS) was carried out in response
to the legislative requirement under IRCA that the Secretaries of Agriculture and
Labor determine annually if there is a shortage of Seasonal Agricultural Service
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(SAS) workers. The NAWS collects comprehensive job history information on
SAS workers to estimate fluctuations in the labor supply. It also gathers
sociodemographic and earnings data, similar in most respects to the UC-EDD sur-
vey. Only farm workers employed in SAS labor are interviewed for the NAWS.
More than 2,000 such workers were interviewed in fiscal year 1990. Unfortunately,
the NAWS data have not been made available to us for analysis; only tabulations
already carried out and published by DOL may be used.
Notes
1. La Encuesta Nacional de la Dinámica Demográfica (ENADID) representa el
acercamiento macrosocial más importante y completo al comportamiento demográfico en
México. Integra los tres aspectos de la dinámica demográfica (la fecundidad, la mortalidad
y la migración). Es el primer estudio de carácter nacional, que cubre prácticamente todas las
zonas del país. Para el tema que nos ocupa, comprende las siguientes unidades de análisis :
viviendas, miembros nacionales y extranjeros de esas viviendas, residentes habituales de las
viviendas y personas que se fueron a vivir a otro país, de 1987 hasta la fecha de la encuesta.
2. Hicimos algunos cambios a la regionalización presentada en San Diego, con la
finalidad de tomar en cuenta las características de las zonas expulsoras y la historia de la
participación de cada entidad en la migración.
3. Consideramos que era más adecuado situar a Colima en esta región por su ubicación
geográfica y porque aunque en relación al conjunto de migrantes el peso de este estado es
muy pequeño, esto se debe a su reducida dimensión, ya que sólo representa el 0.53% de la
población nacional, según el conteo poblacional de 1995. Sin embargo, los migrantes
constituían el (5.68%) de su población residente, según la ENADID; lo que significa que
ocupaba el cuarto lugar, después de Michoacán, Zacatecas, y Durango.
4. La participación de Baja California Sur es mínima, ya que únicamente aporta el
0.2% de los migrantes (que representan, al interior de la entidad, el 0.95% de su población
residente), sin embargo, consideramos que ésa era la mejor forma de ubicarla.
5. De acuerdo al documento presentado en San Diego, Zacatecas y San Luis Potosí
formaban parte de la región I. Sin embargo, decidimos cambiarlos para dejar únicamente los
estados donde la recurrencia de la migración era más constante.
6. Anteriormente, Puebla formaba parte de la región del Valle de México, sin embargo,
tomando en cuenta los estudios en la zona se decidió que resultaba más adecuado incorporarlo
a la región V debido a que una parte importante de sus migrantes proviene de la región
colindante con los estados de Guerrero y Oaxaca, conocida como la Mixteca.
7. Dado el escaso número de migrantes provenientes de esta región, en este documento
se omitirá el análisis de su comportamiento.
8. Aunque la información obtenida por este medio es limitada, principalmente en la EMIF.
9. Ver el apéndice metodológico elaborado por el Consejo Nacional de Migración.
10. La medición de los flujos migratorios no puede limitarse a una sola dirección, ello
sería equivalente a considerar que los mexicanos al ingresar a los Estados Unidos cambian
en forma definitiva su lugar de residencia y rompen con los vínculos familiares y sociales
que los hacen regresar periódicamente.
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11. Una unidad en tránsito, puede pasar de un flujo a otro.
12. Flujo Sur-Norte: designa al desplazamiento proveniente de cualquier parte de la
República y que se concentra en las ciudades de la zona fronteriza del norte de México, ya
sea para permanecer en ellas o internarse en los Estados Unidos.
Flujo Norte-Sur: designa a desplazamientos que se dirigen hacia el sur de la frontera norte
de México, ya sea porque provienen de los Estados Unidos o de alguna localidad fronteriza.
Será considerado como un tercer flujo al conjunto de deportados por las autoridades
migratorias norteamericanas.
Cada uno de los flujos se divide en uno o más subconjuntos, mismos que identificamos
como subpoblaciones de análisis.
13. En adelante, para realizar comparaciones entre las subpoblaciones se tomarán las
características que presentan en conjunto los deportados.
14. En el diseño metodológico de la EMIF, por cuestiones operativas que fueron
probadas a escala en la ciudad de Tijuana y porque algunos movimientos migratorios son
demasiado lentos, esporádicos o no tienen puntos específicos de paso-observación, algunas
unidades que participan en el flujo migratorio internacional quedan fuera de la metodología
propuesta. Tal es el caso de los migrantes locales, transmigrantes o conmuters, visa abusers
o la migración legal.
15. Algunos de los criterios considerados en el establecimiento de estas regiones fueron:
a) la infraestructura de vías de comunicación, toda vez que las rutas que siguen los migrantes
no se alejan de la infraestructura existente y b) las localidades o regiones de origen y destino
de los migrantes porque se estima que las rutas de los migrantes siguen una lógica que se
establece gracias al mercado laboral y a la existencia de redes sociales y familiares, tanto en
las zonas de salida como en las de llegada.
16. El criterio principal fue que en ellas se ubican las direcciones regionales de El
COLEF que cuentan con la infraestructura necesaria para la operación del proyecto. Por
otra parte se evaluó la facilidad de establecer enlaces con las localidades aledañas a la
zona fronteriza y se capitalizó la ventaja de contar con personal adecuado para facilitar el
contacto con las autoridades oficiales y el sector privado así como el acceso a las diferentes
zonas de muestreo.
17. Los criterios considerados para excluir tales localidades fueron:
a) baja densidad en el flujo migratorio
b) localidades que contaban con flujos de carácter local
c) ubicación inadecuada de algunas localidades para la captación de los flujos
d) excesiva distancia entre las localidades y las coordinaciones regionales
18. En esta sección del documento se considera la información de un trimestre del
primer levantamiento, que cubre el período del 14 de diciembre de 1993 al 13 de marzo
de 1994.
19. Cruz Piñeiro (1992), afirma que muy ligados a la dinámica de la fuerza de trabajo,
se encuentran los procesos migratorios; de hecho, gran parte de las tendencias características
de la fuerza de trabajo y su inserción laboral en la frontera norte explican y son explicadas
a la vez, en función de las características y magnitudes de los flujos migratorios hacia la
región. En concreto, una primera aproximación señala que los migrantes constituyen el 70%
de la PEA en Tijuana, el 50% en Nuevo Laredo y el 34% en Ciudad Juárez.
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20. Si bien es cierto que en la sección del documento destinada a la descripción de las
variables a ser consideradas se aclaró la pertinencia de utilizar el tipo de localidad de residencia
para llevar a cabo los tabulados básicos, la información obtenida para la variable sexo se
incorpora como una característica general.
21. See Shryock and Siegel (1975, pp. 578-580), Keely and Kraly (1978, pp. 270-271),
Warren and Peck (1980, pp. 79-80), and Jasso and Rosenzweig (1982; 1986a; 1986b).
22. For fuller discussion of the biases associated with the use of cross-sectional data
to study migration phenomena, see Greenwood and McDowell (1986) and the references
cited therein.
23. For recent examination of this large literature, see Hobcraft et al. (1982) and
Jasso (1985).
24. The Annual Report of the Immigration and Naturalization Service published an-
nual data for many of the series of interest from 1943 through 1977 and the Statistical
Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Service since 1978. Both have included
several historical time series.  Additional historical time series are collected in U.S. Bureau
of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United States:  Colonial Times to 1970.
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CHARACTERISTICS OF MIGRANTS
Immigrant Characteristics
from U.S. Data Sources
Jorge A. Bustamante, Guillermina Jasso,
J. Edward Taylor & Paz Trigueros Legarreta
United States Census (1990)
Table 1
Current Population Survey—CPS (1996)
Table 2
Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS) and INS-Based Samples
Tables 3–14 and Figures 1-3
Farmworker Surveys—UC/EDD (1985)
Table 15
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Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS) and INS-based Samples
Table 3
Top Five States of Residence at Admission, with Percent Distributions
at Admission and at Naturalization: FY 1977 and 1982 Cohorts
FY 1977 FY 1982
State Men Women Men Women
A. Intended State of Residence at Admission, All Immigrants
Arizona 3.70 3.48 3.46 4.10
California 48.13 49.76 34.96 38.07
Illinois 10.41 9.84 8.63 6.28
New Mexico 1.91 1.76 2.26 1.96
Texas 24.91 27.50 37.00 40.82
B. Intended State of Residence at Admission, Immigrants
    Who Later Naturalized
Arizona 3.42 4.82 2.95 4.86
California 42.38 42.53 35.14 37.02
Illinois 14.35 13.25 17.20 8.87
New Mexico 1.42 2.10 1.80 2.12
Texas 22.71 26.20 27.04 32.70
C. Naturalized Immigrants
Arizona 3.52 5.56 3.20 5.21
California 41.25 40.71 34.28 36.29
Illinois 12.72 11.51 16.30 9.06
New Mexico 1.08 2.13 1.43 1.62
Texas 24.05 28.10 25.92 31.12
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Table 4
Age Distribution, Legal Immigrants: Fiscal Years 1971, 1977, 1982, 1994
Summary Characteristics
Maxi-
Subset Mean S.D. Q(.25) Q(.5) Q(.75) mum
A. FY 1971 Legal Immigrants (N = 370,478)
Men born in Mexico 20.97 14.06 13 18 27 69
Men born elsewhere 26.32 15.44 15 27 34 95
Women born in Mexico 21.05 16.39 9 18 29 74
Women born elsewhere 26.59 15.82 17 25 35 90
B. FY 1977 Legal Immigrants (N = 462,315)
Men born in Mexico 22.58 13.19 14 23 29 98
Men born elsewhere 28.86 17.76 16 27 39 99
Women born in Mexico 23.26 14.94 13 23 31 95
Women born elsewhere 30.55 18.53 18 27 41 99
C. FY 1982 Legal Immigrants (N = 594,131)
Men born in Mexico 23.74 12.26 17 24 29 98
Men born elsewhere 26.75 16.27 15 25 35 98
Women born in Mexico 24.56 15.12 14 23 32 95
Women born elsewhere 28.37 17.48 16 26 37 98
D. FY 1994 Legal Immigrants (N = 804,416)
Men born in Mexico 20.59 14.06 11 18 25 95
excl. legalization dep. 23.38 15.19 13 20 28 95
Men born elsewhere 30.10 17.66 17 29 40 99
Women born in Mexico 25.82 15.49 14 24 34 98
excl. legalization dep. 27.32 16.22 16 25 36 98
Women born elsewhere 31.58 18.01 19 29 42 99
Notes: Figures for 1977, 1982, and 1994 are calculated from the INS microdata public use
files; 1971 figures are calculated from a one-in-one-hundred sample of the immigrant cohort.
Cohort sizes refer to the complete cohorts; missing data on sex or age may slightly reduce the
size of the populations/sample on which calculations are based. Data for 1982 include 2,300
Silva case adjustments. Data for 1994 exclude 6,022 IRCA-legalized persons but includes
34,074 legalization dependents. The minimum age observed in all groups in all years is zero,
which represents infants less than one year old. Q denotes the quantile function; thus, Q(.25)
denotes the 25th percentile and Q(.5) denotes the median.
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Table 5
Age Distribution, FY 1994 Legal Immigrants, by Visa Category
Summary Characteristics
Maxi-
Subset Mean S.D. Q(.25) Q(.5) Q(.75) mum N
A. Employment Visas, Except Third Preference “Other Workers” and
    Fourth Preference: Principals
Men born in Mexico 32.62 8.47 27 31 38 68 641
Men born elsewhere 36.97 8.45 31 35 42 86 21,940
Women born in Mexico 33.29 6.89 29 33 37 57 100
Women born elsewhere 34.67 7.71 29 33 39 77 10,183
B. Employment Visas, Except Third Preference “Other Workers”  and
    Fourth Preference: Spouses
Men born in Mexico 34.05 8.41 27 34 37 61 41
Men born elsewhere 38.43 8.83 32 37 43 92 5,345
Women born in Mexico 32.00 7.58 27 31 37 57 465
Women born elsewhere 35.27 8.16 29 34 40 76 18,768
C. Employment Visas, Third Preference “Other Workers”: Principals
Men born in Mexico 32.32 6.98 27 30 36 55 194
Men born elsewhere 36.38 8.70 30 34 41 69 1,438
Women born in Mexico 34.03 8.70 29 32 37 66 73
Women born elsewhere 39.61 9.36 32 38 45 82 2,431
D. Employment Visas, Third Preference “Other Workers”: Spouses
Men born in Mexico 32.76 5.05 29 32 38 40 21
Men born elsewhere 41.66 10.59 33 40 49 85 938
Women born in Mexico 31.44 7.32 26 30 36 58 117
Women born elsewhere 35.48 8.41 29 34 40 73 876
E. Sibling Visas: Principals
Men born in Mexico 43.06 11.50 34 43 51 76 1,026
Men born elsewhere 46.08 9.56 39 46 53 83 9,502
Women born in Mexico 42.19 11.66 34 42 51 80 1,071
Women born elsewhere 46.13 9.82 39 45 53 84 9,362
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Table 5 (Continued)
Summary Characteristics
Maxi-
Subset Mean S.D. Q(.25) Q(.5) Q(.75) mum N
E. Sibling Visas: Spouses
Men born in Mexico 45.02 11.48 36 45 53 77 525
Men born elsewhere 48.64 9.62 42 48 55 87 5,656
Women born in Mexico 40.76 10.19 33 40 48 70 702
Women born elsewhere 42.50 8.76 37 42 48 77 7,026
F. Spouses of U.S. Citizens
Men born in Mexico 27.04 7.14 23 25 29 84 9,786
Men born elsewhere 32.04 8.56 26 30 36 91 48,943
Women born in Mexico 29.26 9.05 23 27 33 85 10,041
Women born elsewhere 31.31 10.00 25 29 35 96 76,470
G. Parents of U.S. Citizens
Men born in Mexico 63.09 10.14 56 63 70 95 1,742
Men born elsewhere 64.45 8.49 59 64 70 99 18,112
Women born in Mexico 60.17 10.41 53 60 67 98 3,199
Women born elsewhere 61.97 9.17 56 62 68 99 33,313
H. Minor Children of U.S. Citizens
Boys born in Mexico 12.06 5.36 8 13 17 20 2,732
Boys born elsewhere 12.29 5.24 8 13 17 20 17,364
Girls born in Mexico 11.57 5.28 7 12 16 20 2,550
Girls born elsewhere 12.06 5.20 8 13 16 20 17,299
I. Adopted Children of U.S. Citizens
Boys born in Mexico 4.46 5.45 0 2 7 19 48
Boys born elsewhere 1.94 3.27 0 0 3 19 3,492
Girls born in Mexico 3.66 4.48 0 2 6 17 47
Girls born elsewhere 1.93 3.30 0 0 2 19 4,613
Notes: Figures are calculated from the INS microdata public use files. Q denotes the quantile
function; thus, Q(.25) denotes the 25th percentile and Q(.5) denotes the median.
758
Table 6
Schooling Distributions and School Enrollment Rates,
Persons Born in Mexico: NIS 1996 Cohort and 1990
Census Recent Entrants (Entered 1987–90)
NIS 1996 U.S. 1990
Schooling Characteristic Cohort  Census
A. Years of Schooling Completed,
    Persons Aged 25 and Over
Less than 5 years 21.2 28.1
5-8 years 29.5 28.6
9-11 years 14.6 17.6
12 years 11.0 11.1
13-15 years 9.1 8.3
16 years 5.7 3.3
17-18 years 5.3 1.1
19+ years 3.8 1.9
Mean years 8.9 –
Median 7.0 –
B. School Enrollment, Persons
    Aged 18 to 24 Years 25.4 15.7
Note: 1990 Census figures for foreign-born are drawn from published tabulations (1990
CP-3-1).
Source: Jasso, Massey, Rosenzweig, and Smith (1997).
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Table 7
Schooling Distributions and School Enrollment Rates: NIS 1996
Cohort, 1990 Census Foreign-born (Entered 1987–90),
and 1990 Census Native-born
NIS 1996 Foreign-Born Native-Born
Schooling Characteristic Cohort 1990 Census 1990 Census
A. Years of Schooling Completed, Persons
    Aged 25 and Over
 Less than 5 years 6.8 12.1 1.8
5-8 years 12.7 11.9 6.9
9-11 years 14.1 12.9 14.3
12 years 12.4 17.6 31.1
13-16 years 32.9 32.8 38.8
17-18 years 12.1 7.5 4.7
19+ years 9.0 5.2 2.4
Mean years 12.7 – –
Median years 13.0 12.0 12.0
B. School Enrollment,
Persons Aged 18 to 24 Years 38.2 37.8 42.9
Note: 1990 Census figures are drawn from published tabulations (1990 CP-3-1 for the foreign-
born, 1990 CP-3-2 for the native-born).
Source: Jasso, Massey, Rosenzweig, and Smith (1997).
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Table 8
Years of Schooling Completed Among Mexico-born
and All Immigrants Aged 25 Years and Over at
Admission, by Visa Class: NIS 1996 Cohort
All Immigrants Born in Mexico
Visa Class Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Spouse of U.S. citizen 13.6 4.6 12.7 4.9
Parent of (adult) U.S. citizen 7.5 5.1 4.5 4.3
Sibling, principal and spouse 13.4 5.4 7.5 2.1
Employment, principal and spouse 16.1 4.3 16.0 6.1
Refugee/asylee, principal and spouse 13.1 4 – –
Diversity, principal and spouse 14.5 3.3 – –
Other 11.1 4.7 7.3 3.9
All Immigrants 25 and over 12.7 5.1 8.9 5.5
Note: Figures are for all immigrants in the NIS 1996 cohort (July and August 1996)
who were aged 25 years and over at admission to permanent residence.
Table 9
English Language Skill Among Immigrants Born in Mexico Aged 18
Years and Over at Admission, by Whether They Ever Entered the United
States Without Inspection (EWI): NIS 1996 Cohort
No EWI Some EWI
English Language Proficiency All Experience Experience
Speaks English “very well” 9.1 12.9 5.6
Speaks English “fairly well” 9.7 16.7 5.6
Speaks English “average or so-so” 32.9 26.2 38.1
Speaks English “not very well” 17.9 13.2 21.4
Speaks English “not well at all” 30.3 30.9 29.3
Note: Respondents classified as having EWI experience met at least one of two criteria:
(i) their first trip to the United States was without legal documents, or (ii) adjustment to
permanent residence was from an EWI status.
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Table 10
Sex and Citizenship Type of the U.S. Citizen Sponsors of
Immediate Relatives, for All Immediate Relatives and
Those Born in Mexico: Evidence from the GAO FY 1985
Immediate-relative Immigrants File
Own Adopted
Sponsor's Citizenship Type Spouses Children Children Parents
A. All Immediate-Relative Immigrants
Birth-Citizen, Born in U.S. 76.28 52.57 97.89 2.91
Birth-Citizen, Born Abroad to
    U.S. Parent(s) 4.02 12.64 0 1.65
Birth-Citizen, Place of Birth Not Known 0.18 0 0 0
Naturalized Immigrant 19.52 34.79 2.92 95.44
Total Sponsored Immigrants 124,093 25,778 9,286 38,986
B. Immediate-Relative Immigrants Born in Mexico
Birth-Citizen, Born in U.S. 74.26 48.48 0 6.67
Birth-Citizen, Born Abroad to
    U.S. Parent(s) 2.94 24.24 0 6.67
Birth-Citizen, Place of Birth Not Known 0.74 0 0 0
Naturalized Immigrant 22.06 27.27 0 86.67
Total Sponsored Immigrants 28,957 6,425 137 2,464
C. Immediate-Relative Immigrants Born in Mexico, Sponsored by U.S. Men
Birth-Citizen, Born in U.S. 73.17 48.00 0 11.11
Birth-Citizen, Born Abroad to
    U.S. Parent(s) 4.88 20.00 0 0
Birth-Citizen, Place of Birth Not Known 2.44 0 0 0
Naturalized Immigrant 19.51 32.00 0 88.89
Total Sponsored Immigrants 8,730 4,868 NA 1,479
D. Immediate-Relative Immigrants Born in Mexico, Sponsored by U.S. Women
Birth-Citizen, Born in U.S. 74.74 50.00 0 0
Birth-Citizen, Born Abroad to
    U.S. Parent(s) 2.11 37.50 0 16.67
Naturalized Immigrant 23.16 12.50 0 83.33
Total Sponsored Immigrants 20,227 1,557 NA 985
Note: All figures are sample estimates except the total numbers of immigrants in
Panels A and B. All naturalized-citizen sponsors of Mexico-born immediate relatives
were themselves born in Mexico except for 13.64 percent of the women sponsors
of spouses, of whom two-thirds were born in Germany and the remaining one-third
in Cuba. Of the birth-citizens born abroad who sponsored Mexico-born immediate
relatives, all were themselves born in Mexico.
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Table 12
Occupation of Legal Immigrants Born in Mexico Aged 21–55 Years
at Admission, with Percent Distributions at Admission and at
Naturalization, by Sex: FY 1977 and 1982 Cohorts
FY 1977 FY 1982
Summary Occupation Group Men Women Men Women
A. Occupation at Admission, All Immigrants
Managerial/Professional 6.4 1.7 7.2 4.3
Technical/Sales/AdminSupport 3.9 2.5 3.0 4.9
Service Occupations 11.9 4.1 9.6 8.1
Farming/Forestry/Fishing 7.9 0.7 9.5 1.4
PrecisionProduction/Craft/Repair 15.0 0.7 16.2 3.3
Operators/Fabricators/Laborers 53.2 13.1 51.7 12.9
B. Occupation at Admission, Immigrants Who Later Naturalized
Managerial/Professional 9.5 3.5 10.7 6.2
Technical/Sales/AdminSupport 6.2 5.1 5.4 8.9
Service Occupations 13.2 5.4 11.4 9.6
Farming/Forestry/Fishing 4.6 0.3 4.8 0.8
PrecisionProduction/Craft/Repair 14.6 0.9 16.3 5.5
Operators/Fabricators/Laborers 49.3 13.7 46.9 12.3
C. Occupation at Naturalization, Naturalized Immigrants
Managerial/Professional 12.7 6.3 11.8 7.5
Technical/Sales/AdminSupport 8.0 12.8 8.1 16.7
Service Occupations 19.1 15.7 15.0 16.6
PrecisionProduction/Craft/Repair 14.7 3.8 10.9 3.0
Operators/Fabricators/Laborers 29.6 13.5 25.4 10.3
Note: Percentages shown are based on all persons in the age group.
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Table 13
Characteristics of the Mexican Legalized Population in 1987
Social and Demographic Characteristics
Age (Median, April 30, 1987) 30
Sex (% Males) 59%
Marital Status (% Married) 53%
Household Family Size (Persons) 3.8
Education (Median Years) 6.0
English Language Proficiency (% Speaking English Well) 10%
Work Characteristics
Labor Force Participation (and Unemployment) Rate
Males 96% (2.3%)
Females 65% (6.6%)
Total 83% (3.6%)
Industry of Employment
Agriculture 9%
Construction 10%
Manufacturing 34%
Sales 24%
Services 23%
Hours Worked/Wk. Among Those Working
Males 44
Females 40
Total 43
Mean Hourly Wage $7.14
Median Earnings $8,435
Family Income
Mean $17,551
Median $14,875
Family Remittances
Mean $1,304
Median $500
Share of...
Income Remitted 7%
Families Remitting 66%
Source: INS Legalized Population Survey (INS 1990)
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Table 14
Comparison of Selected Characteristics of the Mexican Legalized
Population in 1987 and 1992
Average 1987 Average 1991
Social and Demographic Characteristics
Age (Median, April 30, 1987) 30
Sex (% Males) 59% 57%
Marital Status (% Married) 53%
Household Family Size (Persons) 3.8
Education
Median Years 6.0
6 or Fewer Years (%) 57
12 or More Years (%) 17
English Language Proficiency (% Speaking English Well)10% 27%
Work Characteristics
Labor Force Participation (and Unemployment) Rate
Males 96% (2.3%) 93%
Females 65% (6.6%) 62%
Total 83% (3.6%) 80% (7%)
Industry of Employment
Agriculture 9% 7%
Construction 10% 10%
Manufacturing 34% 27%
Sales 24% 27%
Services 23% 24%
Hours Worked/Wk. Among Those Working
Males 44 41
Females 40 37
Total 43 40
Mean Hourly Wage $7.14 $8.11
Median Earnings $8,435 $12,091
Family Income
Mean $17,551
Median $14,875 $19,112
Family Remittances
Mean $1,304 $783
Median $500
Share of...
Income Remitted 7%
Families Remitting 66% 51%
Source: INS Legalized Population Survey, INS (1992)
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Figure 1. Proportion Male, Legal Immigrants 1960–1995
Figure 2. Proportion Male, Spouse Immigrants 1970–1979
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Figure 3. Annual Naturalizations of Mexico-born Persons
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Farm Worker Surveys—UC/EDD (1985)
Table 15
Characteristics of U.S.-born Immigrant and Unauthorized Immigrant
Farm Workers (1985) UC-ESS Survey Data
Sample Mean
Full Mexican Unauthorized
Variable Sample U.S.-Born Immigrants Immigrants
Skill (1=Skilled Job) 0.10 0.17 0.10 0.04
Sex (1=Male) 0.75 0.83 0.75 0.83
Foreign Born (1=Foreign Born) 0.98 0.00 1.00 0.99
Illegal Immigrant (1=Illegal) 0.26 0.17 0.27 1.00
Education (Yrs.) 4.86 6.11 4.83 4.22
U.S. Farm Experience (Yrs.) 12.58 11.06 12.62 8.22
Years Since Immigration 14.67 12.89 14.71 9.86
U.S. Citizen (1=Yes) 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.10
Commodity:
Tree Fruit 0.13 0.00 0.13 0.15
Nuts 0.04 0.11 0.04 0.05
Fldveg 0.01 0.06 0.01 0.01
Ffruit 0.43 0.28 0.43 0.33
Other 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.07
Characteristics Of County In Which Worker Was Interviewed:
Share Illegal 0.29 0.36 0.29 0.33
Per Capita Income 7,418.10 7,010.40 7,427.80 7,254.40
Average Rent (Monthly) 218.93 204.85 219.26 211.86
Share In:
So. San Joaquin Valley 0.21 0.56 0.21 0.33
No. San Joaquin Valley 0.32 0.17 0.32 0.33
Sacramento Valley 0.10 0.06 0.11 0.10
Central Coast 0.12 0.06 0.12 0.10
North Coast 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06
Inland So. Calif. 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.39
Average Weekly Earnings 189.82 225.61 225.61 190.20
Average Hourly Wage 5.23 4.57 5.25 5.10
Share Hired By Farm Labor
    Contractor 0.26 0.26 0.27
Sample Size 770 18 752 203
Source: Analysis of UC-EDD Survey Data. The survey is described in detail in Mines and
Martin (1986).
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CHARACTERISTICS OF MIGRANTS
Mexico-to-U.S. Migrant
Characteristics from Surveys
Involving Samples Drawn in Mexico
Jorge A. Bustamante, Guillermina Jasso,
J. Edward Taylor & Paz Trigueros Legarreta
Características sociodemográficas
Sexo
El 91.82% del total de los migrantes laborales son hombres, lo que representaun índice de masculinidad de 1,122 hombres por cada 100 mujeres. Delflujo sur-norte, la proporción de hombres fue del 96.88%. De éstos el 54.71%
se dirigieron a la frontera norte y el 45.29% hacia los Estados Unidos. Las mujeres
representan sólo el 3.12%, teniendo el 55.43% como destino la frontera norte.
En el flujo norte-sur, destaca que aproximadamente nueve de cada 10 mujeres
procedìan de la frontera norte.
Del total de varones, la mayoría se concentra en el flujo sur-norte (48.44%).
Sin embargo si consideramos a las subpoblaciones destaca el hecho de que quienes
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tienen como destino alguna ciudad de la frontera norte, agrupan el mayor número
del total del flujo migratorio laboral, seguidos por los deportados y los procedentes
de Estados Unidos.
Destaca que en términos relativos, existe una mayor proporción de mujeres
deportadas que hombres.
En el caso de las mujeres, el 57.04% de las que participan en la corriente
migratoria se encuentra en el flujo norte-sur, en donde la mitad proviene de la zona
fronteriza. Si tomamos el total de mujeres captadas para la población laboral (47,255),
el 50.74% procede de alguna ciudad de la frontera.
Grupos de edad
La estructura por edad es característica de las migraciones temporales, y se
concentra en aquellas donde se desarrollan las actividades económicas, ya que del
flujo sur-norte el 74.48% de los migrantes laborales tienen entre 15 y 34 años y un
73.46% para el flujo norte-sur. Cabe destacar que para los deportados aquellos que
se encuentran en estos grupos de edad representan el 86.86%.
Si consideramos los grupos de edad por subpoblación de análisis los más jóvenes
(entre 15 y 19 años) se dirigen a la frontera norte y aquellos que se agrupan entre
los 25 y 34 años lo hacen hacia los Estados Unidos. Presumiblemente podemos
pensar que aquellos que se dirigen a las localidades fronterizas inician su carrera
migratoria y aquellos que declaran que se dirigen a los Estados Unidos cuentan
con experiencia migratoria de al menos un cruce a la frontera, sobre todo si
detectamos que para el flujo norte-sur la mayoría de los que regresan de alguna
ciudad de los Estados Unidos tienen entre 25 y 34 años; para el caso de los deportados
también la mayor proporción se encuentra entre estas edades.
Cuadro 1
Migrantes Laborales
Porcentaje Estimado Según Sexo y Subpoblación
(14/Dic/93 al 13/Mar/94)
Flujo
Sur-Norte Norte-Sur Deportados
Masculino 48.44 31.64 19.92
Femenino 17.55 57.04 25.40
Indice De Masc. 31.01  6.23 8.81
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Escolaridad
En lo que se refiere a la escolaridad1 de los migrantes laborales los resultados
de la encuesta permiten apuntar que la gran mayoría de los entrevistados se
concentran en los niveles de primaria y secundaria, estos dos niveles significan el
77.35% del total, siendo más importante el primer nivel ya que reúne casi el cincuenta
por ciento de los captados por la EMIF (49.54%).
Se puede destacar que si bien la instrucción formal básica y media es notoria,
también lo son los porcentajes de participación de aquellos que declararon niveles
medio superior (9.75%) y superior (2.91%) y aún más alta la presencia de los que
declararon no contar con algún nivel de escolaridad (9.99%).
Estado civil
Una de las características importantes de los migrantes se asocia con el estado
civil y los llamados jefes de hogar. En la discusión de redes familiares y remesas,
por mencionar algunos temas relacionados con el fenómeno migratorio, comunmente
se asocia el comportamiento de los migrantes con la existencia de una serie de
vínculos familiares y extrafamiliares para sustentar la posibilidad de migrar, el
envío de parte del ingreso obtenido, la misma decisión de migrar, etc.
De acuerdo con la EMIF, del total del grupo de migrantes laborales la proporción
entre solteros y casados es similar (46.27% y 48.45% respectivamente). Es, sin
embargo, al interior de los flujos y subpoblaciones donde se apuntan importantes
diferencias en la distribución. El grupo de casados es mayoritario en los flujos sur-
norte y norte-sur, sólo en el flujo de deportados los solteros son mayoría (62.45%)
y probablemente esté asociado con el hecho de que el 51.03% de éstos tienen entre
15 y 24 años de edad.
Considerando las subpoblaciones, la proporción entre solteros y casados de
quienes se dirigen a alguna ciudad de la frontera norte, es prácticamente la misma.
Sin embargo entre los que regresan de alguna de estas ciudades o quienes son
devueltos por la patrulla fronteriza predominan los solteros.
Jefes de hogar
Respecto a la posición al interior del hogar, en el período bajo consideración
se encuentra que la mayoría de los migrantes laborales eran jefes de familia (55.05%).
En la distribución por subpoblación es notable el caso de los que tienen como
destino los Estados Unidos (SEU) en que además declararon ser cabezas de familia
(70.99%). Entre los procedentes de la frontera norte (FNS) y deportados (DEP)
quienes no son jefes de familia, es decir que pueden ser hijos, esposos(as), otros
familiares o amistades son más numerosos (54.25 y 56.43% respectivamente).
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Localidad de residencia
El patrón de origen-destino es uno de los que más cuidado merecen, pues los
efectos de los movimientos migratorios sobre los referentes geográficos son de
notable trascendencia. A partir de los resultados de la encuesta es posible determinar
las características generales de los lugares de origen2 de los migrantes laborales.
En primer lugar se puede apuntar que la encuesta ha captado en su mayoría migrantes
cuyo origen es urbano (58.49% frente a un 41.51% que declaró provenir de
localidades no urbanas). Considerando los flujos se tiene una mayor proporción de
migrantes laborales que residen en localidades urbanas, para el flujo sur-norte la
proporción es de 53.32%, para el norte-sur 60.35% y para deportados 67.63%.
Estado de residencia
Para referirnos a la distribución de las entidades de origen de los migrantes
laborales han sido identificados los estados más importantes para cada flujo y
subpoblación. De acuerdo al cuadro resumen, para el flujo con dirección sur-norte,
es decir aquellos que declararon dirigirse hacia alguna ciudad en la frontera norte
o bien hacia alguna ciudad en los Estados Unidos, los migrantes provenían de alguna
de las siguientes entidades por orden de importancia: Michoacán (10.14%),
Guanajuato (9.65%), Sinaloa (8.97%), Coahuila (7.63%) y Jalisco (7.22%).
Cabe destacar a los migrantes de los estados de Guanajuato y Michoacán en la
población que se dirige hacia los Estados Unidos pues ellos aportan el 16.64% y el
16.49% respectivamente de esta subpoblación.
En el caso de las subpoblaciones que conforman el flujo norte-sur, los estados
de mayor importancia son: Coahuila (10.7%), Guanajuato (9.79%), San Luis Potosí
(7.21%), Durango (6.52%), Oaxaca (5.90%), Veracruz (5.73%), Sonora (5.47%),
Nuevo León (5.08%), Chihuahua (4.80%) y Michoacán (4.72%).
Para el caso de los deportados, los migrantes de Baja California (10.86%),
Michoacán (10.08%) y Tamaulipas (8.08%) son los que tienen una mayor importancia.
Características socioeconómicas
Condición laboral y sector de actividad
en el lugar de residencia
En el flujo migratorio sur- norte el 75.21% manifestó haber trabajado en
su lugar de residencia. De los que se dirigieron a la frontera norte y a los
Estados Unidos, el 79.59% y el 69.91%, respectivamente, declararon que tenían
trabajo en su lugar de residencia. La proporción es similar en los flujos norte-
sur y deportados.
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De los migrantes laborales que participaron en el flujo sur-norte el 22.50%
manifestó no haber trabajado en su lugar de residencia, el 31.91% declaró haber
trabajado en actividades agrícolas, el 22.68% en actividades industriales y el 21.74%
en comercio y servicios.
De aquellos que declararon no haber trabajado y los que lo hicieron en el
sector agrícola, más del cincuenta por ciento (53.25 y 54.43%, respectivamente)
tuvo como destino los Estados Unidos.
La frontera norte se constituyó en el destino de la mayor proporción de los
migrantes laborales que, en su lugar de residencia, trabajaron en los sectores in-
dustrial y comercio y servicios (60.19 y 72.87%, respectivamente).
Haciendo referencia a los migrantes procedentes del norte, se observa que
aquellos que trabajaron en su lugar de residencia antes de su ingreso a los Estados
Unidos presentan un patrón por sector de actividad similar al de los que se desplazan
en sentido sur-norte; es decir, la mayor proporción trabajó en actividades agrícolas
(30.05%), seguido por el sector industrial (24.13%) y en una menor proporción en
el sector servicios y comercio (23.99%).
Cabe señalar que la proporción de migrantes que no trabajó en su lugar de
residencia es mayor a la proporción de aquellos que trabajaron en la industria o el
comercio, dado que el 27.95% del total de migrantes manifestó no haber trabajado
antes de iniciar su desplazamiento hacia el norte.
De los migrantes procedentes de los Estados Unidos, el 38.99% manifestó
haber trabajado en el sector agrícola , el 22.02% en la industria y el 11.04% en
comercio y servicios. El restante 27.95% declaró no haber trabajado en su lugar de
residencia antes de su ingreso a ese país.
Para el flujo de deportados, el sector industrial concentra una mayor proporción,
ya que del total del flujo el 30.89% trabajó en ese sector. Por otra parte, los que no
trabajaron en su lugar de residencia tienen una menor proporción relativa, puesto
que sólo el 18.64% de ellos declaró no haber trabajado 30 días antes de iniciar su
viaje hacia los Estados Unidos.
Estado de residencia y localidad
de destino en la Frontera Norte
Al analizar la distribución de porcentajes de migrantes laborales que se
desplazaron del sur hacia la frontera norte, la zona3 de Tijuana concentró el 44.93%,
Cd. Juárez el 25.43%, Piedras Negras el 8.73%, Matamoros el 7.52%, Nogales el
6.80%, Mexicali el 3.97% y Nuevo Laredo el 2.62%.
El mayor número de migrantes que llegaron a la zona de Tijuana procedía de
los estados de Sinaloa (25.10%), Oaxaca (14.85%) y Michoacán (9.55%). Cabe
hacer la aclaración que a excepción del estado de Sonora que aporta el 4.15%,
774
ningún otro estado fronterizo contribuye con migración laboral hacia dicha zona.
Nogales, también presenta una alta dispersión en los estados de procedencia, sin
embargo, son las mismas localidades de Sonora las que contribuyen con la mayor
proporción (35.30%). Esta zona atrae en mayor medida migrantes procedentes de
Sinaloa (19.10%), el Distrito Federal (7.64%) y Michoacán (6.38%). A diferencia
de la zona de Tijuana, la zona de Nogales concentra población migrante de otros
estados fronterizos.
Los estados que participan en mayor medida con migración laboral hacia la
zona de Cd. Juárez son: las localidades no fronterizas del estado de Chihuahua4
con el 27.74%, Durango con el 24.75%, Zacatecas con el 13.27% y Aguascalientes
con el 7.46%.
El estado de Sonora contribuye con el 46.0% del total de los migrantes que
tuvieron como destino la zona de Mexicali, seguido por los estados de Guanajuato
(15.89%), Sinaloa (14.28%) y Oaxaca (13.18%), es decir, cuatro estados
concentraron el 89.35% del total de los migrantes laborales que se desplazaron en
este período a la zona de Mexicali.
La zona de Piedras Negras capta la mayor parte de migrantes de las
localidades no fronterizas de Coahuila5 (73.90%), y en una menor proporción de
Nuevo León (13.16%).
De los migrantes que se desplazaron a la zona de Matamoros, el 36.35% proviene
de localidades no fronterizas del estado de Tamaulipas, el 18.32% del estado de
México, el 14.35% de Veracruz, el 13.56% de San Luis Potosí y el 10.31% de
Nuevo León.
A la zona de Nuevo Laredo, llegan migrantes procedentes, en orden de
importancia, de los estados de Jalisco (20.17%), Nuevo León (17.55%), Guerrero
(9.46%), Guanajuato (8.93%), Veracruz (8.56%), Coahuila (8.46%) y Oaxaca con
el 7.85%.
Localidad fronteriza de mayor estancia
y estado al que se dirigen
En el flujo norte-sur, la distribución porcentual de los migrantes laborales
procedentes de la frontera norte con destino al sur6, se presenta de la siguiente
manera: el 23.50% provenía de Matamoros, el 16.92% de Tijuana, el 16.18% de
Juárez, el 12.51% de Piedras Negras, el 10.60% de Nogales, el 10.57% de Mexicali
y el 7.92% de la zona de Nuevo Laredo.
De los migrantes procedentes de Matamoros, un 26.11% se dirigía a las
localidades no fronterizas del estado de Tamaulipas, 21.53% a San Luis Potosí,
20.09% a Veracruz, 9.39% a Nuevo León y el 8.91% a Guanajuato y en menor
proporción al estado de México (5.78%) y Guerrero (2.86%).
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El 66.61% del total de migrantes procedentes de Piedras Negras se dirigía
hacia localidades no fronterizas del estado de Chiuhahua, el 11.63% a Nuevo León,
el 7.95% al estado de México. Tres estados concentran el 86.19% del total de
migrantes procedentes de la zona fronteriza de Piedras Negras.
Los migrantes que proceden de Tijuana presentan una mayor dispersión hacia
los estados de destino en el interior de la república, siendo los más significativos el
estado de Sonora (11.09%), Oaxaca (10.60%), Sinaloa (8.90%), Puebla (8.84%),
Nayarit (8.54%) y Coahuila con el 7.36%.
De manera similar, los procedentes de Nogales presentan una dispersión hacia
los lugares de destino con la diferencia que, el 55.90% se dirigía hacia las localidades
no fronterizas de Sonora y el 18.96% hacia Sinaloa, es decir, el 74.86% del total de
migrantes que provenían de la zona de Nogales se dirigía hacia las mismas
localidades de Sonora y al estado de Sinaloa.
Los provenientes de la zona Juárez se dirigían en mayor proporción hacia las
localidades no fronterizas de Chiuhahua (37.35%), seguidos, en orden de
importancia, por los que se desplazaban hacia Coahuila (21.33%), Durango (18.02%)
y Zacatecas (7.46%).
Del total de migrantes que proceden de la zona de Mexicali, el 42.09% se
dirigía hacia Oaxaca, el 13.61% a Sonora, el 12.92% a Sinaloa y en menor
proporción hacia Nayarit (5.70%), Jalisco (3.67%), el Distrito Federal (3.57%) y
Guanajuato (3.23%).
Los estados de San Luis Potosí, Durango, Jalisco, Tamaulipas, Coahuila y
Veracruz concentran las mayores proporciones de los migrantes procedentes de la
zona de Nuevo Laredo, ya que a ellos se dirigían el 14.89, 12.84, 11.76 , 10.34,
9.51 y 9.35%, respectivamente.
Ciudad fronteriza de cruce
Las ciudades de preferencia para cruzar hacia los Estados Unidos son Tijuana
(19.01%), Cd. Juárez (14.59%) y Nuevo Laredo (11.88%). Tomando relevancia
otras ciudades de Tamaulipas ya que concentran el 24.25%. Cabe resaltar que es
Tijuana la que concentra un mayor número de deportaciones, puesto que el 50.63%
de devoluciones se realiza por esta ciudad.
Posesión de documentos para cruzar
y/o trabajar en los Estados Unidos
En el flujo norte-sur, el 54.63% manifestó tener documentos para cruzar hacia
los Estados Unidos. Esto deja ver la alta proporción de migrantes laborales
indocumentados, toda vez que el 98.38% de los migrantes deportados no poseen
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ese documento. Si examinamos la posesión de documentos para trabajar, el 54.93%
de los migrantes procedentes del norte si cuenta con él.
Texas y California son los estados donde la población migrante declara un
mayor tiempo de estancia. El 80.60% de los migrantes laborales procedentes de los
Estados Unidos declaró haber trabajado en ese país, es decir, de 75,661 migrantes,
60.980 trabajaron.
Table 2
Mexico-to-U.S. Migrant and Nonmigrant Characteristics,
Michoacán Surveys, 1983 and 1993
1983 Mean 1993 Mean
Mexico- Non-Mexico- Mexico- Non-Mexico-
to-U.S. to-U.S. to-U.S. to-U.S.
Variable Migrants Migrants Migrants Migrants
Sex (% Male) 63 44 57 42
Age 29 32 32 20
Education (Years) 4.1 4.5 5.8 4.3
Migration Network
   (% with Contacts)
U.S. 89 49 99 74
Within Mexico 57 73 58 73
Migration Experience (Years)
U.S. 4.9 0.8 6.8 3.5
Within Mexico 0.8 1.3 1.9 2.5
Adult Family Size 9.11 7.98 11.7 11.0
Landholdings (Hectares) 7.1 5.14 3.2 2.1
Sample Size 70 353 128 432
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Table 3
Changing Characteristics of Mexico-to-U.S. Migrants
on their First Trip with Migration Prevalence
(Massey-Durand Survey of 19 Mexican Communities)
Prevalence of Migration in Community
40% or
Characteristic 0%-9% 10%-19% 20%-29% 30%-39% Greater
Sex (% Female) 6.7 25.6 32.6 27.5 44.3
Age: Males
15-19 Years 20.7 23.2 29.8 33.7 39.8
35 or Older 11.4 9.2 6.6 8.0 4.0
Diversity 57 74 83 83 78
Age: Females
15-19 years 2.9 13.0 16.5 14.5 24.9
35 or Older 14.8 10.9 13.8 13.6 17.1
Diversity 20 69 83 81 87
Household Head (%) 86.0 59.7 43.3 41.5 19.2
Education
None (%) 23.2 23.5 16.4 21.6 6.4
Mean Years 2.7 3.7 5.2 2.9 4.3
Diversity 36 53 55 51 63
Landowners* (%) 6.1 8.1 4.9 5.1 .5
Not in Work Force* (%) 9.4 12.6 15.1 14.5 31.7
Mexican Occupation, Diversity* 32 50 59 47 41
U.S. Destination Diversity 46 57 56 63 63
Legal Status
Undocumented (%) 45.7 55.8 63.6 61.8 36.0
Diversity 43 57 56 47 54
U.S. Occupation
Agriculture (%) 83.3 52.1 41.5 71.1 84.1
Diversity 15 34 45 27 33
Males 24 30 39 39 41
Females 16 37 50 34 48
No. of Migrants 227 1,148 1,480 635 343
No. of Migrant Household
    Heads 172 670 674 190 57
* Sample includes household heads only.
Source: Table Assembled from Massey, Goldring, and Durand (1994)
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Notes
1. En la EMIF para la variable escolaridad se propone una agrupación para los niveles
de secundaria, preparatoria y profesional en la que están incluidos otros niveles de instrucción.
Cuando se hace referencia al nivel de escolaridad para secundaria estarán incluidos los que
declararon haber terminado ese nivel y aquellos que concluyeron estudios técnicos con
primaria; para el caso de preparatoria se hace referencia a los técnicos con secundaria y en
el nivel profesional también se incluyó la Normal.
2. Como lugar de origen nos referimos en este momento al estado o tipo de localidad
de residencia.
3. Se ha incorporado la utilización del término zona para hacer referencia a las localidades
que están agrupadas en cada coordinación regional, por lo que no se hace referencia a una
agrupación distinta a la utilizada a lo largo del texto, amén de evitar que el tamaño de
muestra no sea representativo. Cada una de estas zonas está conformada por las siguientes
localidades:
a) La zona de Tijuana comprende las localidades de Tijuana y Tecate.
b) La zona de Juárez comprende las localidades de Cd. Juárez, Porfirio Parra,
Rodrigo M. Quevedo y El Porvenir.
c) La zona de Piedras Negras comprende las localidades de Piedras Negras y Cd.
Acuña.
d) La zona de Matamoros comprende las localidades de Matamoros, Reynosa,
Camargo y Miguel Alemán.
e) La zona de Nogales comprende la localidad de Nogales.
f) La zona de Mexicali comprende las localidades de Mexicali y San Luis Río
Colorado.
g) La zona de Nuevo Laredo comprende la localidad de Nuevo Laredo.
4. Se sabe que son localidades no fronterizas toda vez que el migrante ha declarado no
residir en la localidad donde se realiza la entrevista.
5. Aplica la razón expresada en la nota anterior.
6. El destino pueden ser las localidades no fronterizas de los estados del norte o cualquier
estado del interior de la república mexicana
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CHARACTERISTICS OF MIGRANTS
Mexico-To-U.S. Migrant
Characteristics from Mexican
Data Sources
Jorge A. Bustamante, Guillermina Jasso,
J. Edward Taylor & Paz Trigueros Legarreta
Revisión de la bibliografía escrita por autores mexicanos
antes de la aprobación de IRCA; sobre las características
demográficas, sociales y económicas de los migrantes
mexicanos a Estados Unidos
Características metodológicas
Los materiales revisados son de dos tipos: los que estudian el fenómenomigratorio desde una perspectiva macrosocial, tratando de conocer lascaracterísticas generales de los migrantes mexicanos, y aquéllas que
prefieren analizar la problemática a partir de estudios de caso, ya sea en alguna o
algunas comunidades expulsoras o en una región.
Desde una perspectiva histórica, los primeros trabajos sobre el tema son los de
Manuel Gamio (1930 y 1969), Alfonso Fabila (1932) y Enrique Santibáñez (1930),
fueron excepciones en esos tiempos.
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Es probable que el interés de estos autores por el tema esté vinculado a la ola
antimexicana que se desató en el vecino país del norte debido a la crisis económica
de 1929. El más importante de ellos, es el de Manuel Gamio (1930 y 1969), ya que
hizo un concienzudo estudio sobre el fenómeno migratorio, de 1926 a 1929,
utilizando una gran variedad de fuentes como son los censos de Estados Unidos y
de México, la información de la Secretaría de Gobernación respecto a las entradas
y salidas de mexicanos, y la del gobierno norteamericano sobre las “money or-
ders” destinadas a México, entrevistas en profundidad, etc.
Los trabajos de los otros dos autores, aunque de menor valor científico, aportan
importante información para una época en la que poco se investigó al respecto. Fabila,
etnólogo mexicano, escribió sobre sus observaciones en Estados Unidos con la finalidad
de prevenir a los mexicanos que se interesaban en ir a trabajar a ese país, motivo por el
cual sus textos describen las pésimas condiciones de vida de sus connacionales residentes
en Estados Unidos y los malos tratos a los que estaban sujetos.
Santibáñez, periodista y funcionario consular, publicó una serie de artículos
en el diario Excélsior, que fueron reunidos posteriormente en un libro. Utilizó como
técnicas: observaciones personales, encuestas efectuadas por él y sus colaboradores
“con una gran cantidad de inmigrantes mexicanos”, noticias periodísticas,
estadísticas, disposiciones oficiales y datos históricos.
En los años siguientes, sobre todo en la década de los 1950s se publicaron
varios libros, de carácter más bien descriptivo, enfocados, principalmente, al
importante fenómeno del bracerismo, que atrajo a tantos mexicanos, a partir del
convenio firmado por los gobiernos de México y Estados Unidos en 1942. Moisés
González Navarro (1954) lo estudia desde una perspectiva histórica y otros como
Luis Fernández del Campo (1942), Miguel Calderón (1952), Ignacio García Téllez
(1955), José Lázaro Salinas (1955) y Jesús Topete (1961),1 enfocan de manera un
tanto descriptiva distintos aspectos de la problemática económica y social de los
braceros mexicanos.
A fines de los1960s, a raíz de la terminación del Programa Barcero en 1964,
que dio lugar al auge de la migración indocumentada, se inicia otra etapa en la que
participa como figura principal Jorge Bustamante. Desde sus primeros estudios
con Julián Samora y Cárdenas, comienza a plantear la necesidad de estudiar el
problema de una manera más científica. En el libro Los Mojados (The Wetback
Story (1971)), los autores mencionados, refieren los resultados de su investigación,
realizada en tres centros de detención norteamericanos en 1968-1970, donde
aplicaron cuestionarios a 493 hombres de aproximadamente mil que había en esos
momentos; y realizaron varias entrevistas en profundidad (Samora, 1971: 67-68;
Bustamante, 1976 y Bustamante 1979).
En una siguiente etapa, Bustamante, con un importante equipo de investigadores
entre los que estaban Manuel García y Griego, Rodolfo Corona y Carlos y César
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Zazueta, emprenden una investigación en el el Centro Nacional de Información y
Estadísticas del Trabajo de la Secretaría del Trabajo y Previsión Social (CENIET);
que culmina con la Encuesta Nacional de Emigración a la Frontera Norte del País
y a los Estados Unidos (ENEFNEU), aplicada entre diciembre de 1978 y enero de
1979. Uno de sus principales méritos fue el de tratar de conocer la dimensión y las
principales características de los migrantes, de manera directa, a nivel nacional, a
partir de una muestra seleccionada probabilísticamente, que abarcaba a todo el
país (CENIET, 1982: 57). Abarcó 62,500 viviendas en 115 localidades, seleccionadas
probabilísticamente, lo que permitió captar información de aproximadamente
300,000 individuos.
La encuesta proporcionó una amplia información que permitió tener un mayor
conocimiento de las características socio-económicas del fenómeno, estimar su
dimensión y determinar las principales áreas de expulsión.
Sin embargo, la necesidad de abarcar un universo tan amplio, restringía
la posibilidad de profundizar sobre aspectos importantes de la migración. Uno
de ellos, que además estaba adquiriendo auge entre los investigadores sociales,
era el de la unidad doméstica de donde procedía el migrante y su papel en
este fenómeno.
Así surgieron una serie de investigaciones en comunidades expulsoras de
migrantes internacionales, con un enfoque de tipo antropológico, e inspiradas en el
análisis estructural. Podemos señalar entre ellas, la del equipo de la UAM
Azcapotzalco, coordinado por James Cockcroft, la de López Castro, la de Alarcón
y la de Fonseca y Moreno. Los estudios se realizaron en el estado de Michoacán,
tanto en cabeceras municipales, como poblados y ejidos; en zonas de agricultura
tradicional y modernizada, donde se aplicaron, encuestas, complementadas con
historias de vida. En todas se habla de la poca actividad económica no agrícola en
la comunidad o el pueblo, muchas veces debido a la centralización que ha tenido
lugar en ciudades como: Zamora, Morelia y Guadalajara. Entre las investigaciones
en otras entidades federativas están la de Diez Canedo (1984), quien utilizó la
información que recabó trabajando con Wayne Cornelius, en la región de Los Al-
tos de Jalisco; y las de Ortiz (1980), Ornelas (s/f) y Rionda (1983) en Oaxaca. Se
trata, en todos los casos, de estudios llevados a cabo a fines de los 1970s o principios
de los 1980s.
En general, todos ellos tratan de entender la migración internacional como un
proceso histórico, en el que influyen elementos de diversa índole, que propician
comportamientos específicos en cada etapa y en cada grupo social, así como
transformaciones a través del tiempo (Trigueros; 1994).
Fonseca y Moreno estudiaron el fenómeno migratorio en Jaripo, Michoacán,
entre febrero y junio de 1981. Su principal fuente fueron entrevistas abiertas a
informantes clave (Barjau; 1982; Fonseca; 1986, y Fonseca y Moreno; 1988).
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Alarcón (1988), se basó en una encuesta levantada en la cabecera municipal
de Chavinda, Michoacán, que abarcó 200 viviendas e incluyó a todos los individuos
varones mayores de 18 años.2
López Castro (1986), por su parte estudió la migración desde un poblado llamado
Gómez Farías en Tangancícuaro, Michoacán. Su investigación se basó, para el
período de 1900 a 1919 en historias orales recogidas en junio y julio de 1983 en
Gómez Farías, Francisco J. Múgica y Tierras Blancas, así como en información
documental. Para la historia más reciente, utilizó, además, dos encuestas que aplicó
entre marzo y octubre de 1983. La primera, a 110 familias con base en un muestreo
aleatorio, encabezadas por: 88 de jornaleros, 11 de poseedores, 2 de comerciantes,
9 dedicados a otras actividades.3 La segunda, a 48 productores seleccionados con
una muestra estratificada y que tenía como finalidad obtener datos sobre su unidad
productiva, la historia migratoria del productor y su familia y su relación con la
introducción a la tecnología.
Cockcroft, et al. (1981) y Trigueros y Rodríguez (1988) con todo el equipo de
la UAM, estudiaron una comunidad de ejidatarios cercana a Morelia, llamada La
Purísima. Utilizaron censos levantados en las décadas de los 1930s y 1940s; una
encuesta aplicada por el grupo en 1981, que abarcó a gran parte de las familias de
la comunidad, e historias de vida y entrevistas en profundidad, recogidas también
en 1981.
Por otro lado, en 1984 se emprendió un nuevo esfuerzo para estudiar la forma
como había evolucionado el fenómeno migratorio a nivel nacional. El Consejo
Nacional de Población realizó la Encuesta en la Frontera Norte a Trabajadores
Indocumentados devueltos por las autoridades de los Estados Unidos de América
(ETIDEU), que se basó en 9,631 entrevistas a migrantes deportados. Incluye a las
personas de nacionalidad mexicana de 15 años o más que fueron devueltas entre el
5 y el 16 de diciembre de 1984 en distintos puestos fronterizos. A diferencia de la
ENEFNEU, el carácter casual o fortuito, no probabilístico de esta encuesta impide
inferir valores cuantitativos de la población objetivo (CONAPO;1986).
A diferencia de las investigaciones anteriores, la de Verduzco (1992), se enfocó
al estudio de la migración internacional de origen urbano, en la ciudad de Zamora,
donde encuestó a una muestra de 801 trabajadores.
Periodización de la migración
internacional mexicana
Primera etapa
Santibáñez (1930: 77) señala que fue a partir de los 1850so cuando tuvieron
lugar los primeros desplazamientos de mexicanos a Estados Unidos, y concretamente
a Texas, ya incorporada a la Unión Americana. Lentamente surgían y se desarrollaban
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poblaciones a lo largo de la margen del Río Bravo o cercanas a él. Pasaban el río
sin ninguna dificultad y se instalaban, superando con mucho el número de los
pobladores de raza sajona. Más adelante, la construcción de los ferrocarriles facilitó
la movilización de los mexicanos del centro del país; aunque, según el autor, no
llegaban a introducirse más allá de San Antonio.
Entre los fenómenos que propiciaron la gran movilización de mexicanos a
Estados Unidos están la Revolución de 1910 y la 1a. Guerra Mundial. La expansión
de la industria de guerra y la salida de ciudadanos norteamamericanos (incluyendo
mexico-americanos) creó una escasez de fuerza de trabajo. En una amplia gama de
actividades los trabajadores en Estados Unidos fueron remplazados por mexicanos.
Cuando en 1924 la “National Origins Act” disminuyó considerablemente la
immigración de Europa y de otras partes del mundo, México, otra vez fue el gran
proveedor de trabajo. (Samora;1971:18).
En muchas de las comunidades analizadas se hace mención a estos primeros
desplazamientos. Ochoa (1986) señala que ya en 1872 había michoacanos en Estados
Unidos. Desde la fiebre del oro californiano, algunos arrieros de Cotija lograron
llegar hasta allá. Sin embargo, parece ser que los primeros migrantes del Bajío
Zamorano salieron hasta principios de este siglo (Alarcón y de la Peña, 1989).
Algo semejante ocurrió en Jaripo (Mich.), cuyos vecinos comenzaron a ir a
Estados Unidos en la década de los 1920s, aunque hubo quienes fueron desde fines
del siglo pasado. Fonseca atribuye el arraigo de esta práctica al éxito que tuvieron
los primeros que se aventuraron.
En Chavinda, la migración internacional se inició a principios de siglo, al igual
que en Gómez Farías (antes Puentecillas). Aunque no se trataba de una movilización
masiva, los hacendados se quejaban de la falta de mano de obra disponible. Aumentó
en 1918 debido a la sequía y a las bandas de asaltantes que proliferaron con la
Revolución de 1910. López Castro señala que en otros poblados del distrito de
Zamora aumentaba esta práctica año tras año: Purépero, Tlazazalca, Chilchota y
Tangancícuaro (López Castro, 1986: 36-38; también hace referencia a esta situación
Alarcón, 1988).
En la ciudad de Zamora, también hubo quienes migraron durante los primeros
años de este siglo, al igual que en los casos señalados, se trataba de un fenómeno
marginal, que se extendió durante el período revolucionario y los años que le
siguieron, como respuesta a la violencia militar y a la desarticulación económica
(Verduzco, 1992).
En Los Altos de Jalisco la situación es semejante. De acuerdo a Alarcón y de la
Peña (1989) su historia social en el presente siglo “no puede comprenderse sin hacer
referencia a la migración a Estados Unidos.” Recuerda que en varias novelas sobre
la vida de esa zona a principios de siglo participan “norteños”, quienes “juegan un
papel de ruptura social y prefiguran la revolución mexicana por su desprecio a las
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tradiciones, su rechazo a los trabajos mal remunerados y su altivez ante los patrones
y ricos”. Diez Canedo (1984), encontró en las comunidades donde hizo su estudio,
que la migración tuvo su origen en la época del conflicto cristero (1925-1928).
Resultaba muy caro ir hasta Estados Unidos por las deficientes comunicaciones
y porque los ingresos de la mayoría eran muy bajos. Es por eso que algunos autores
señalan que entonces viajaban los que pertenecían a familias más acomodadas
(Trigueros, 1994). Sin embargo, en el caso de Jaripo, parece ser que los que
contaban con más recursos prestaban dinero a otros compañeros para realizar el
viaje en grupo.
Por último, López Castro (1986:75-76) habla de la repatriación debida a la
crisis de 1929 y señala que, debido a ella y a los temores de los posibles migrantes,
la población de Puentecillas tuvo una tasa de crecimiento de 4.8% de 1920 a 1930.
El Programa Bracero, 1942-1965
Todos los autores que estudiaron comunidades del occidente, encontraron que
es precisamente en esta época cuando la migración se convierte en una práctica
generalizada. Las facilidades dadas por los dos gobiernos posibilitaron que
participaran miembros de los distintos grupos sociales. En algunas investigaciones
se señala que eran principalmente los ejidatarios recién dotados, los que se integraban
en mayor proporción, puesto que lo reducido de la estancia (entre 45 días y 6 meses)
permitía que trabajaran por temporadas en Estados Unidos y regresaran para realizar
los trabajos necesarios en su parcela. También se hace referencia a que esta estrategia
era favorecida por la incapacidad de satisfacer sus necesidades únicamente con la
parcela, debido tanto a su reducida dimensión, como a la falta de apoyo técnico y
crediticio (Trigueros, 1994).
Lo mismo sucedió en Zamora, donde la corriente migratoria aumentó
impulsada por la carencia de dinero para hacer producir la tierra entre los
campesinos. Sin embargo, en este caso, el flujo se redujo a partir de la segunda
mitad de los 1950s debido al auge económico en la zona, cuyo eje fue la agricultura
beneficiada con riego y la introducción de cultivos más rentables. Este boom generó
empleos, no sólo en el sector primario, sino también en el comercio y los servicios
(Verduzco, 1992).
La migración indocumentada (1965-1986)
También hay coincidencia en las investigaciones analizadas, en el hecho que,
a pesar de la terminación del Programa Bracero, la práctica migratoria continuó,
aunque surgieron distintas modalidades en los desplazamientos. En algunas
comunidades varios habían legalizado su situación laboral en Estados Unidos, por
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lo que podían viajar cuando y a donde quisieran; así como ir legalizando el status
de los demás miembros de sus familias. Pero en la mayoría de los casos se vieron
obligados a migrar como indocumentados, lo que se facilitaba por la experiencia
adquirida en la práctica y por la existencia de redes más o menos establecidas en
distintas regiones de la Unión Americana, principalmente, en California.
Como ejemplos de las formas que adoptó la migración en este período, podemos
mencionar el caso de Gómez Farías, donde prevalecieron los desplazamientos
temporales, por objetivos. En los primeros meses del año partían a California, para
regresar en los meses finales. A principios de los 1980s comenzaba a extenderse la
tendencia a “invernar” en Estados Unidos, ya que los costos económicos de los
viajes eran muy altos (López Castro;1986:76-77). Antes de 1982 muchos “gomeños”
llevaban a sus familias con ellos, pero, debido al enorme aumento de los precios
del transporte, la vigilancia del SIN y los mayores riesgos que implicaba el paso
como indocumentado, esa tendencia se redujo. Sólo quienes tenían visa continuaban
llevando a la familia (López Castro; 1986: 85-87).
En Los Altos de Jalisco, también fue creciendo la práctica migratoria, sobre
todo en los municipios del centro de la región. En algunas zonas, el desarrollo
económico, debido en gran medida al auge lechero, fue capaz de retener a muchos
migrantes potenciales gracias a la oferta de atractivos empleos y a la posibilidad de
éxito de pequeños negocios en el área de los servicios, financiados, muchas veces,
con los dólares obtenidos de la migración (Alarcón y de la Peña, 1989).
A diferencia de lo que ocurría en las zonas rurales, en Zamora se mantuvo la
tendencia a la baja, en términos relativos, de la práctica migratoria; aunque sí creció
en números absolutos, lo que no es de extrañar dado el gran aumento de la población.
Sin embargo, la mayoría de los zamoranos no dependía económicamente de la
migración, y más bien recurrían a ella con un fin específico. Por este motivo,
Verduzco (1992) sólo encontró que 19% de los migrantes entrevistados eran los
que habían ido cuatro veces o más.
Areas de origen en México
Tradicionales
Tres entidades han sido clasificadas consistentemente en los primeros lugares
como proveedoras de migrantes: Jalisco, Michoacán y Guanajuato. A ellas se
agregaron Chihuahua, Durango y Zacatecas.
Gamio señalaba en 1930 que el 54.3% de los migrantes mexicanos provenía
de esos tres estados del centro-occidente de México (Michoacán, Guanajuato y
Jalisco), siguiéndolos en importancia Nuevo León, Durango y el D.F. (Gamio, 1930)
(ver Cuadro 1).
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Areas nuevas
En 1969, el equipo de Julián Samora encontró que el porcentaje que ocupaban
los primeros tres estados era de sólo 24.1%, pero que, con Chihuahua y Durango
—que superaban a los tres primeros— ascendía a 52.5% (Zamora, 1970).
En la ENEFNEU (1978-79) Michoacán pierde peso, quedando en quinto lugar,
después de Guanajuato, Jalisco, Chihuahua y Zacatecas; alcanzando el conjunto,
64.9%. En la ETIDEU (1984), Michoacán vuelve a encabezar el grupo y los cinco
estados mencionados reducen su peso a únicamente 39.7%; lo que nos hace pensar
que la práctica migratoria se va extendiendo en el país. Estados que antes no
destacaban presentan porcentajes más o menos altos, por ejemplo, Zacatecas, Baja
California, Guerrero y Oaxaca.
Por otro lado, en la investigación del grupo de Zamora, 84% de los encuestados
provenía de áreas rurales, en la ENEFNEU4 el porcentaje se había reducido a 69.8%;
no obstante lo cual, resultaba ser mayor que el observado para el conjunto de la
población mexicana en 1978 y que era de 53%.
Cuadro 1
Estados de origen de los migrantes por orden de importancia,
según diversos autores
Gamio Samora ENEFNEU* ETIDEU**
(1926-28) (1968-70) (1978-79) (1984)
Michoacán  20.0  8.3 8.4 13.1
Guanajuato 19.6 8.3 17.9 8.9
Jalisco 14.7  7.5 13.9 11.8
Nuevo León 8.0 6.1 1.5
Durango 5.9 9.9 5.0 5.9
DF 5.0 1.0 1.7 3.1
Chihuahua 4.4 18.5 12.6 11.9
Zacatecas 6.9 11.8 5.7
S. Luis Potosí 7.3 4.4 2.6
Baja Calif. 0.5 1.6 5.0 3.6
Total 78.1 75.4 80.7 68.1
* Sólo se utilizó la información de la población que en el momento de la encuesta se
encontraba en Estados Unidos.
** Lugar de nacimiento
Fuentes: Gamio (1930); Samora, 1971: 92; Zazueta y Corona, 1979: 129, y CONAPO, 1986
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Si en lugar de considerar el lugar de nacimiento en la ETIDEU, tomamos el de
residencia, aumenta el peso de los estados fronterizos, especialmente de Chihua-
hua, al que corresponde el 15.7%; Baja California, el 10.2%; y Sonora, el 5.2%.
Mientras pierden importancia los estados del centro de la república, lo que muestra
cómo muchos de los migrantes cambian su residencia a la zona fronteriza, antes de
migrar a Estados Unidos.
Areas de recepción en Estados Unidos
Areas tradicionales
1900-1942
De acuerdo a la información del Censo Norteamericano presentada por Gamio
(1930); a principios de siglo Texas superaba con mucho a los demás estados de
la unión en cuanto a la atracción de migrantes, ya que ahí se encontraba más de
la mitad (68.7%) de la población de origen mexicano. Lo seguía Arizona con
13.7%, mientras California incluía únicamente 7.8% y Nuevo México, 6.4%. Sin
embargo, la situación fue cambiando, en el censo de 1920, el peso de la población
mexicana en Texas se había reducido un poco (52.5%), mientras el de California
se había más que duplicado (18.8%), superando con ello a Arizona (12.8%). Nuevo
México también bajó su participación (4.2%), y Colorado adquirió cierta presencia
(2.3%). El orden se modifica cuando se consideran las money orders de 1926-
1927, ya que entonces California presenta el primer lugar (36.2%), mientras de
Texas sólo proviene el 15.7%; de Arizona 4.8% y de Nuevo México, 1.4%. En
cambio, el estado de Illinois que en los censos presentaba un porcentaje muy
bajo, alcanza una proporción de 12.2%; Indiana, de 5.1%; Michigan, de 3.4% y
Pennsylvania de 1.8%. Es probable que, además de la creciente demanda de
trabajadores mexicanos en los estados norteños del este y medioeste, influyan
los salarios más altos en esas regiones alejadas, así como el hecho de que en los
estados fronterizos, muchos de los mexicanos censados ya no mantuvieran relación
económica con familiares en México.
Por otro lado, los migrantes que se ocupaban en la agricultura se desplazaban
continuamente durante el verano y el otoño siguiendo el calendario de las cosechas
a través de varios estados de la unión americana. Muchos de ellos regresaban,
en invierno a México (Gamio, 1930: 43).
Las estrategias también cambian en cada región. Por ejemplo, los alteños de
Jalisco se organizaban en pequeños grupos y se dirigían a El Paso, Texas, y desde
ahí se internaban a los estados del centro y este, en donde se empleaban como
trabajadores no calificados en la construcción y mantenimiento de la vía del
ferrocarril y en fundiciones (Alarcón y de la Peña, 1989).
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En general, y como se observa en las distintas investigaciones, había una gran
dispersión de los migrantes en esta primera etapa. En el caso de Jaripo, iban a
Chicago, Indiana y Michigan, principalmente; aunque hubo quienes fueran a
Colorado, Wyoming, Nebraska, Pennsylvania, Texas, Kansas y California. La
mayoría de ellos regresaron cuando las crisis, algunos de la de 1921–1922 y otros,
de la de 1929 (Fonseca: 1986).
Programa Bracero
Durante el Programa Bracero, el abanico de estados también fue amplio, Texas,
California, Arizona, Indiana, Delaware, Michigan, Arkansas, Montana y Washing-
ton, entre otros. Sin embargo, comenzaba a concentrarse la migración en los estados
del suroeste, principalmente, en California (Fonseca, 1986; Trigueros, 1994; Alarcón
y de la Peña, 1989).
Cuadro 2
Distribucion de los migrantes mexicanos en los estados de la
union americana, en 1900, 1920, 1926–1927, 1978–1979 y 1984
Estado de GAMIO ENEFNEU ETIDEU
Residencia 1900 1920 (1926-1927) (1978-1979) (1984)
California 7.8 18.8 36.2 47.3 54.1
Texas 68.7 52.5 15.7 27.4 34.2
Illinois 0.2 0.8 12.2 7.4 0.2
Indiana 0.0 0.1 5.1
Arizona 13.7 12.8 4.8 2.0 7.3
Michigan 0.1 0.3 3.4
Pennsylvania 0.1 0.0 3.1
New Mexico 6.4 4.2 1.4 2.7 1.0
Colorado 0.3 2.3 2.3 1.8 0.2
Total 91.3  91.8 84.2 88.6 97.0
Gamio se basó para 1900 y 1920 en el Censo Norteamericano; para 1926-1927, en la
proveniencia de money orders depositadas en Estados Unidos y destinadas a México, en
los periodos de julio- agosto, 1926 y enero-febrero, 1927.
La información de la ENEFNEU y de la ETIDEU se refiere a migrantes, en la primera se
incluyen documentados e indocumentados, mientras que en la segunda únicamente
indocumentados.
Fuentes: Gamio, 1930; CENIET, 1982, y CONAPO, 1986
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Areas nuevas
En la ENEFNEU se encontró que los estados con porcentajes más altos de
migrantes mexicanos eran, por orden de importancia, California con 47.3%; Texas
con 27.4%; Illinois con 7.4%; Nuevo México con 2.7% y Arizona con 2%.
Como se ve en el cuadro anterior, en la ETIDEU adquieren mucho mayor peso
los estados fronterizos de California, Texas y Arizona; en tanto que se reduce la
importancia de los más lejanos, como Illinois y Colorado. Es muy probable que
influya el hecho de que el INS, opera mucho más activamente en la zona fronteriza;
de manera que, para los que logran alejarse más, aumentan las probabilidades de
permanecer en Estados Unidos y regresar cuando lo decidan y no expulsados, motivo
por el que no fueron captados por esta encuesta.
Como sucedía en los períodos anteriores, la práctica migratoria difiere en cuanto
a los lugares de destino en las distintas regiones. Aunque en todas las investigaciones
revisadas se destaca el predominio de California, varía el peso de otros estados
como Texas, Illinois y Arizona. También dentro de California se han señalado zo-
nas diversas. Alarcón (1986:345) menciona que los chavindeños (Mich.) se dirigían
a cuatro regiones de California y que eran, por orden de importancia: el Valle de
San Joaquín, el Valle de Salinas, la bahía de San Francisco y un barrio del centro de
Los Angeles. Para los jaripeños los polos de mayor atracción eran Los Angeles,
Oxnard, San José y, sobre todo, el condado de San Joaquín (Fonseca y Moreno;1988).
López Castro (1986) encontró en Gómez Farías que la mayoría se dirigía a
Watsonville o a lugares cercanos a San Francisco.
Perfil demográfico de los migrantes
Edad
Gamio (1969), basándose en la información de sus 61 entrevistas señalaba
que la edad de los migrantes fluctuaba entre los 20 y los 60 años, con alta proporción
de gente de edad madura, las mujeres eran, en los pocos casos que analizó, de
edad avanzada.
De acuerdo al equipo de Samora, 70.8% tenían en el momento de la entrevista
30 años o menos. Si consideramos su primera participación, 85.8% lo hizo en esas
edades (Samora, 1971: 90).
En 1978-79, según la ENEFNEU, el porcentaje de menores de 30 años se
había reducido a 54.7%. Pero en 1984, de acuerdo a la ETIDEU, era de 74.2%,
siendo el promedio de edad de 26.2. Es probable que la diferencia se deba a
que la ENEFNEU incluía migrantes con documentos, y según varios de los
trabajos en microrregiones, los mayores únicamente migraban cuando disponían
de los mismos.
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Si consideramos la diferencia de edades por sexos, en esta última encuesta,
se encontró que entre los hombres el porcentaje de menores de 30 años era de
75.3% y el de las mujeres, de 65.4%; lo que nos muestra que las mujeres tienden
a migrar mayores.
Sexo
La gran predominancia masculina en esta práctica ha sido destacada en todas
las investigaciones. En las entrevistas hechas por Gamio (1969), en la década de
los 1920s, incluyó a muy pocas mujeres. Todas viajaron para acompañar al marido
o a la familia.
En la ENEFNEU (1978-79) se encontró que 83.9% de los migrantes a Estados
Unidos eran hombres; en la ETIDEU (1984), el 89.1%. Es probable que, otra
vez, la diferencia se deba a que es más alto el porcentaje de mujeres que migran
con documentos.
Aun cuando en todas las investigaciones se ha resaltado la poca participación
de las mujeres (Diez Canedo, 1983; Alarcón, 1986, etc.), muchos autores notaron
un mayor involucramiento en los 80s, por la abundancia de oportunidades de
empleos en los que se prefiere mano de obra femenina. Sin embargo, varía la
situación, al igual que sucede con la migración familiar. Ambos aspectos están
muy relacionados con el acceso a los documentos para legalizar su situación, la
existencia de redes en Estados Unidos y las pautas culturales de cada comunidad.
Alarcón (1986:345) encontró que a los hombres de Chavinda (Michoacán)
no les gustaba casarse en Estados Unidos ni llevar a sus familias con ellos pues
consideraban que no había condiciones para un desarrollo sano. En cambio, en
Jaripo se había extendido la migración familiar, lo que es entendible dada la
cantidad de vecinos de la localidad que contaban con documentos. Esto resultaba
de suma importancia para poder incorporar, poco a poco a los otros integrantes,
quienes iban legalizando su situación, hasta que finalmente se podía desplazar
todo el grupo completo (Fonseca, 1986). Esta estrategia muestra la importancia
que ha tenido la legalización de los migrantes en el incremento de la migración
femenina y familiar. En Gómez Farías se abandonó esta práctica en los primeros
años de la década de los 1980s debido a la carestía del viaje y a los peligros que
implicaba, ya que en este caso la mayoría no contaba con documentos. Sin em-
bargo, 20.2% de los migrantes eran mujeres, la mayoría de las cuales iban desde
1976, explícitamente a trabajar. Además, únicamente el 27.11% de ellas viajaba
acompañando a los hombres de la familia y para realizar los trabajos domésticos
(López Castro, 1986). En cambio, Verduzco (1992) señala que en Zamora, la
migración era casi totalmente masculina.
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Estado civil
Gamio (1930, 44) señalaba que, como regla general, los trabajadores agrícolas
eran hombres, solteros, o bien, casados que dejaban sus familias en México o en
las ciudades americanas. Pero que los empleadores preferían hombres con familia
por dos razones: permanecían en el trabajo y sus familias ayudaban al jefe del
grupo, con lo que el empleador disponía de más mano de obra.
En la investigación de Samora se observó que 48% eran solteros (Bustamante,
1976: 31).
En general, se ha encontrado que migran en proporciones semejantes los casados
y los solteros, aun cuando puede cambiar la duración de la estancia, de acuerdo al
estado civil, y la utilización de los ingresos devengados.
Escolaridad
Entre los entrevistados por Gamio (1969), la escolaridad era sumamente baja,
de menos de 5 años, con una fuerte proporción de analfabetas, lo que no es de
extrañar dadas las condiciones de la mayor parte de la población mexicana en las
primeras décadas de este siglo.
El equipo de Zamora establecía que 28% nunca había asistido a la escuela y
90% no había terminado la primaria (Zamora, 1971: 90). La proporción había bajado
a la mitad en 1984, aunque todavía era muy elevado el porcentaje de analfabetas
detectado por la ETIDEU, 14% (17.6%, de las mujeres).
De acuerdo a la ENEFNEU, el promedio general de años cursados y aprobados
por los migrantes era de 4.9, nivel que se mantuvo en la ETIDEU (en el caso de las
mujeres, 4.6) (CONAPO, 1986). En la ENEFNEU 34.3% había estudiado menos
de 4 años y sólo el 24.6% completaron 7 años o más. Esta proporción era muy
inferior al nivel que existía en Estados Unidos, donde de las personas mayores de
17 años, únicamente el 3.4% tenía entre 0 y 4 años de instrucción; el 14.1% tenía
cursados entre 5 y 8 años y el 82.5% más de 8 años (CENIET, 1982).
En algunos estudios de caso se encontró que el grado de escolaridad alcanzado
se relacionaba positivamente con una mayor probabilidad de emigrar, lo que daba
lugar a que se fuera la población más joven, más productiva y mejor educada. Sin
embargo, no se trata de una situación generalizada.
En la ciudad de Zamora participaban en la migración los trabajadores con
bajo nivel educativo (de 0 a 3 años de escolaridad), siendo todavía menor el nivel
entre los migrantes recurrentes. Verduzco señala que es probable que este grupo
enfrentara serias limitaciones para insertarse de forma ventajosa en el mercado
laboral que abrió el dinamismo económico y comercial zamorano, lo que los
obligaba a integrarse en la migración laboral como una estrategia para valorizar
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mejor su fuerza de trabajo. En este orden de ideas propone que, a diferencia de la
migración de origen rural, que recluta fundamentalmente a los sectores medios
del campesinado, la migración urbana se nutre de los contingentes de trabajadores
menos favorecidos (Verduzco, 1992).
Nivel social
Se ha señalado que, en general, migran más aquellos cuya actividad, agrícola
o de otro tipo, les permite situarse por encima del nivel de subsistencia, pero no los
que cuentan con granjas capitalistas eficientes, ya que sus ingresos en la localidad
donde viven son suficientes para vivir bien (Diez Canedo, 1984). Al respecto, López
Castro (1986: 88-96) sugiere que para poder migrar se requiere de una fuerte
inversión (entre 300 y 350 dólares). Sin embargo, hace referencia a que hay otro
elemento que favorece la migración, independientemente de la posición económica:
las redes sociales. Por otro lado, plantea que los ricos viajan poco porque tienen
posibilidad de rentar o comprar parcelas e invertir en la agricultura comercial. Un
aspecto importante que menciona es que, en igualdad de condiciones la gente prefiere
no moverse geográficamente.
Perfil ocupacional de los migrantes
Sectores económicos de ocupación en México
Tradicionales
Aunque la mayoría de los entrevistados por Gamio (1969) en los 1920s se
dedicaba a labores agropecuarias, como peón, mediero o minifundista, era
significativa la presencia de pequeños comerciantes, obreros, empleados y artesanos.
El autor lo atribuía a su elevada movilidad geográfica y ocupacional desde antes de
su viaje al norte, ya que muchos residían en una gran ciudad antes de migrar.
Durante el Programa Bracero en la mayoría de las comunidades michoacanas
migraban tanto ejidatarios, como arrendatarios ecuareros y jornaleros (Fonseca,
1988; López Castro, 1986; Trigueros, 1994).
Nuevos
En 1971, de los entrevistados por el equipo de Zamora, 57% habían estado
trabajando en México en el sector agrícola y únicamente 12% laboraron en trabajos
calificados (Samora, 1971: 91).
En la encuesta del CENIET (1982), se señala que el 58.5% de la población
migrante se ocupaba en el sector primario, 15.1% en el secundario y 23.5% en el
terciario.5 Estas proporciones son diferentes a las que presentaba entonces la
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población mexicana en su conjunto, ya que únicamente el 39.3% se ocupaba en el
sector primario; 21.4% en el secundario y 38.7% en el terciario.
En la ETIDEU, el 39.4% laboraba en el sector primario, 33.1% en el secundario
y 26.5% en el terciario.
En cuanto a la ocupación desempeñada, el 59.6% de la muestra de la ENEFNEU
desempeñaba labores agropecuarias; el 17.3% eran trabajadores no agrícolas y el
9.4% trabajadores en servicios y transportes (CENIET, 1982).
En la ETIDEU, el 39.8% desempeñaba labores agropecuarias; 39.3% eran
trabajadores no agrícolas, 8.5%, trabajadores en servicios y transportes y 7.6% se
ocupaban en el comercio. Al analizar la información por sexos, sobresale el hecho
de que sólo 5.6% de las mujeres trabajaba en el sector primario; 30.6% en el
secundario y 60.2% en el terciario, de las cuales el 21.4% correspondía a actividades
en unidades domésticas no productivas (CONAPO, 1986).
De acuerdo a las investigaciones revisadas, la migración a Estados Unidos se
presenta tanto en comunidades con agricultura tradicional, afectada por las malas
condiciones de la tierra y lo reducido de las parcelas; como en las que se han
implementado técnicas modernas con la consiguiente orientación de la producción
al mercado (Trigueros; 1994).
Otro aspecto interesante de mencionar es que, entre los migrantes que se
encontraban en Estados Unidos había 27.2% (110,719) que no estaban trabajando
antes de su viaje. De ellos, el 15.2% estaba desempleado, 14.1% era trabajador no
remunerado y 40.3% se ocupaba en quehaceres domésticos (Ibid.).
Llama la atención el hecho, señalado por Alarcón, de que fueran los que se
ocupaban en actividades agrícolas los que optaban por la migración internacional,
lo que se podría atribuir a que los que tenían cierta calificación, podían acomodarse
en el mercado laboral mexicano —y que coincide con la observación de Verduzco
sobre el nivel educativo de los migrantes—. Por ese motivo, los que tenían mayor
preparación preferían migrar al interior del país, la mayoría de los cuales lo hacía
en forma definitiva.
Un aspecto en el que existen diferencias de una investigación a otra es el que
se refiere al peso que tenían los poseedores de tierra en el conjunto de migrantes.
Algunos autores encontraron que eran ellos los que preferentemente participaban
en esta actividad; otros, que eran aquellos que no tenían los que más viajaban y
más a menudo.
López Castro (1986: 92-96), por su parte, encontró que 60% de las familias de
ejidatarios enviaban migrantes continuamente y que 37.7% de los jefes ejidatarios
migraban.6 Sin embargo, los que tenían más viajes en promedio eran los que
disponían de parcelas medianas (entre 4 y 6 hectáreas); siguiéndolos los de 7 a 10
hectáreas y, al último, los de 1 a 3 hectáreas. Plantea que existe un límite arriba del
cual dejan de viajar, y lo fija, para el caso de Gómez Farías, en 10 hectáreas de
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riego. También señala que migraban más los poseedores de tierras de riego y sus
hijos, en relación a los que disponían de tierras de temporal. El autor supone que
esto se debía a que en estas últimas se necesitaba la mano de obra familiar para el
trabajo en la parcela, o bien, a la falta de recursos para financiar el viaje. Sin em-
bargo, en Chavinda, un poco más de la mitad del flujo migratorio (57.2%) estaba
formado por jornaleros.
Alarcón encontró que migraban más los jornaleros, y de los poseedores, los
que tenían tierras de riego.
Según Fonseca (1988), aunque en Jaripo, la actividad principal era la agricultura,
a partir de los 1970s se notaba un creciente abandono de la agricultura de subsistencia,
debido a que un número importante de familias vivía exclusivamente de la migración
a Estados Unidos.
Sectores económicos de ocupación
en Estados Unidos
Tradicionales
Santibáñez (1930) señala que a fines del siglo pasado, los mexicanos que
llegaban a las poblaciones fronterizas del estado de Texas se empleaban en la
agricultura y las industrias de la construcción, ferrocarrilera y automotriz.
En 1920, los mexicanos continuaban trabajando en la agricultura, la ganadería,
la industria ferrocarrilera, y la de la construcción, urbana y caminera, pero además
lo hacían en la petrolera, la extractiva y la ladrillera. También laboraban como
empleados de restaurantes y estibadores. Menciona que existían algunos casos de
trabajadores calificados como artesanos, sastres, impresores, peluqueros,
comerciantes y médicos. Por último, los trabajos en la industria y los calificados se
realizaban en el norte, ya que, según el autor, en el sur, ese tipo de trabajos estaban
cerrados para los mexicanos (Ibid., 88-89).
 La información de Gamio (1930) coincide, en términos generales con la de
Santibáñez, y se refiere a que en la primera década del siglo, los trabajadores
mexicanos se empleaban principalmente en el cultivo y la cosecha de algodón,
maíz, caña de azúcar y frutas; pero también en los ferrocarriles, en los ranchos
ganaderos y en la minería. Para la década siguiente (1910-1920) la demanda de
fuerza de trabajo mexicana se había intensificado y se ocupaban en el cultivo de la
remolacha y en industrias tales como la acerera, la cementera, la automotriz y las
empacadoras de alimentos del este y el medioeste (Gamio, 1930: 25-27). Señala
que la demanda de trabajadores mexicanos en la industria era pequeña, pero
constante, y, generalmente, el trabajador mantenía su posición durante todo el año.
El motivo por el que ellos se desplazaban al sur era por lo riguroso del invierno;
siendo probable que al año siguiente regresaran a su mismo trabajo. En cambio, la
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demanda para las labores agrícolas era muy grande, pero variable, y se limitaba a
ciertas estaciones del año y a ciertas labores. De tal manera que para diciembre la
demanda se acababa enteramente, y muchos trabajadores se veían obligados a
regresar (Ibid., 43).
Plantea que la distribución geográfica de los migrantes parecía comprobabar
que una alta proporción de ellos estaba empleada en el trabajo rural, en pequeños
pueblos y ciudades, mientras un grupo reducido laboraba en empresas industriales
en ciudades como Chicago, Los Angeles, San Antonio y los alrededores de Pitts-
burgh (Ibid., 29).
Sin embargo, entre sus entrevistados la agricultura no era la actividad princi-
pal. La mayoría de sus informantes se ocupaban en trabajos poco calificados, como
peones del ferrocarril, jornaleros agrícolas, en la construcción de vías de
comunicación y de casas. También obtuvo información de obreros de las industrias
minera, cementera, fundidora y empacadora. Algunos laboraban como trabajadores
en servicios y otros pocos eran artesanos o comerciantes en pequeño. Encontró que
tenían una extrema movilidad ocupacional, lo que, desde su punto de vista, reflejaba
la precariedad de los empleos y la sobreexplotación y discriminación que sufrían
(Gamio, 1969).
Fabila (1932) también resalta la importancia de empleos como la construcción
de carreteras, la minería, la industria manufacturera y la ferrocarrilera y añade la
pizca del limón —que consideraba era uno de los menos pesados y, quizá el mejor
retribuido— y la pizca del algodón.
Las investigaciones en comunidades coinciden con las observaciones de los
autores mencionados en el sentido de que en esta primera etapa la migración se
dirigía a sectores económicos no agrícolas.
En cambio, durante el Programa Bracero, la mayoría laboró en la agricultura;
aunque hubo casos aislados que se ocupaban en la industria ferrocarrilera, la
maderera, el cuidado de bosques y hasta como cocineros (Fonseca, 1986).
Modernos
De acuerdo a la investigación del equipo de Samora (1971), de los
entrevistados que lograron trabajar (43%) la mayoría estaba empleada en la
agricultura. Aun cuando sabían que la mejor manera de evitar ser aprehendidos
era alejándose de la frontera, los primerizos, sin contactos en Estados Unidos
buscaban empleo en la agricultura de los estados fronterizos debido a que, siendo
que la mayoría provenían de áreas rurales, eso era lo que sabían hacer. De acuerdo
a sus observaciones, era en esa zona donde obtenían un cierto grado de
socialización, y aprendían acerca del código no escrito del comportamiento del
“mojado” (Samora, 1971: 74-75).
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La información de la ENEFNEU nos permite tener un acercamiento a los
sectores de actividad de los migrantes de toda la república, aunque únicamente se
trata de aquellos que estaban en su vivienda y podían informar sobre su experiencia
en el último viaje. De ellos, el 37.1% laboraba en el sector primario; 24.8% en el
secundario y 37.6% en el terciario (CENIET, 1982, 144).
Según la ETIDEU, los porcentajes eran de 45% en el sector primario; de 21.5%
en el secundario y de 33.1% en el terciario. En cuanto a la ocupación, el 45.9%
eran trabajadores agropecuarios; 33.9% laboraban en el proceso industrial; 17.4%
en servicios y transportes y 1.8% en el comercio. Por otro lado, existen
comportamientos diferentes entre las mujeres migrantes. Unicamente el 12.7% de
ellas se desempeñaban en el sector primario; 7.8% en el secundario y 78.7% en el
terciario; de las cuales, 61.6% laboraba en unidades domésticas no productivas
(CONAPO, 1986).
A pesar de que la agricultura seguía siendo la actividad en la que se ocupaba la
mayor proporción de migrantes, el peso de esta actividad variaba entre los migrantes
de cada comunidad, aspecto que está muy relacionado con el estado norteamericano
al que se dirigían.
En la investigación de Alarcón en Chavinda (1988), el 66.9% se ocupaba en
actividades agrícolas, 15.8% en actividades manuales y 12.6% en servicios no
calificados. En cambio, un elevado porcentaje de jaripeños se incorporaba en
grupos familiares al trabajo agrícola en California (a pesar de contar con papeles
para entrar legalmente) (Fonseca, 1988). Lo mismo sucedía entre los migrantes
de Los Altos de Jalisco, quienes se ocupaban en el sector primario tanto en
California como en Texas. Los que se ocupaban en la industria se iban a Chicago
o a Los Angeles.
De los migrantes provenientes de Chavinda, aunque el trabajo agrícola era el
más favorecido, cada vez encontraban más posibilidades de ocuparse en actividades
no agrícolas, lo que además se debía a que en el campo cada vez había menos
oportunidades de empleo por la mecanización de los cultivos. Esto daba lugar a
que las estancias fueran más largas (López Castro, 1986).
Niveles de ingreso
En México
Gamio señalaba, basándose en fuentes oficiales mexicanas, que en 1926, el
promedio de salario diario para los trabajadores agrícolas en México era de 0.91
pesos, y el de los trabajadores industriales, de 1.40; o sea, en promedio 1.15 pesos,
lo que significaba 0.57 dólares. Pero que en las regiones de las cuales provenían la
mayor parte de los migrantes, el salario diario era todavía más bajo. Decía que, de
acuerdo a sus cálculos, el salario mínimo para que el trabajador con una familia de
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cinco miembros, pudiera sobrevivir, aun sin educación y recreación, o sea sólo con
su urgente necesidad de vivir, debía ser de 247.48 pesos al mes (123.74 dólares).
En estados como Aguascalientes y Tamaulipas, debía ser más alto, puesto que el
costo de la vida era mayor. Sin embargo, con el salario promedio de 1.15 pesos al
mes únicamente sería 35.65 pesos; lo que significaba que se debería incrementar
aproximadamente ocho veces para que pudiera cubrir el costo de las necesidades
de vida normales (Gamio, 1930: 35-37).
En Estados Unidos
Santibáñez (1930: 93), encontró que en Texas los jornaleros trabajaban de 10
a 12 horas diarias y recibían a cambio 1.25 o 2 dólares, según la época del año y la
disponibilidad de migrantes. Pero en el norte, el salario era doble o triple ya que no
había tanta competencia como en los estados fronterizos.
Gamio (1930: 38) señalaba que era muy difícil establecer los salarios de los
migrantes mexicanos puesto que eran mucho más bajos que los registrados en
las estadísticas oficiales y su nivel fluctuaba cuando cambiaba la demanda. Por
estos motivos prefirió utilizar datos obtenidos de su trabajo de campo, de la
información consular y de algunos empleadores de trabajadores mexicanos. De
acuerdo a esta información el pago mínimo era de 1.50 dólares al día y, un poco
más bajo en algunas partes de Texas; mientras que en otras regiones la
remuneración llegaba hasta 6 dólares diarios. Al establecer un promedio con esta
información obtenía un salario de 3.38 dólares diarios o 104.78 al mes de treinta
y un días. Este pago era seis veces mayor que el de 17.67 dólares al mes que el
trabajador ganaba en México.
Según sus cálculos, el salario en México constituía la octava parte del costo de
la vida, en tanto que en Estados Unidos se mantenía en relación con el pago que
recibían. En general, en México el costo de la vida era muy alto y el pago muy
bajo, mientras que en Estados Unidos el pago era mucho más alto y el costo de la
vida, menor (Ibid., 38-40).
En Estados Unidos el trabajador mexicano no sólo ganaba lo suficiente para
satisfacer sus requerimientos elementales para un mínimo de bienestar; sino que
también gastaba dinero para educación, recreación, etc. Los trabajadores mexicanos
en Estados Unidos poseían propiedades que nunca lograrían con los ingresos en
México: automóviles, fonógrafos y refrigeradores (Ibid., 41).
Fabila (1932: 55) señalaba que aunque el salario mínimo en Estados Unidos se
había establecido en 5 dólares por ocho horas diarias de labor, y 3 para las mujeres;
el mexicano se quedaba satisfecho con 15 o 16 dólares semanales.
En la encuesta de Samora (1971), de los que lograron trabajar antes de ser
aprehendidos, 26% ganaban menos de un dólar por hora; 56%, entre 1.00 y 2.00
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Dólares; 14%, entre 2.0 y 3.00, y 3% ganaba arriba de 3.0 dólares por hora. También
realizaron un estudio en El Paso en 1969 y ahí encontraron que los salarios para
indocumentados en la agricultura eran de entre 0.75 y 1.10 dólares. No se podían
quejar porque los denunciaban y había suficiente repuesto. Las mujeres que
trabajaban en unidades domésticas no productivas conmutaban diario de México y
ganaban 2.00 dólares diarios (Samora, 1971: 98-99).
De acuerdo a las observaciones del Senador Ralph Yarborough (1968:188-
190), citado por Samora (1971: 24) Texas era uno de los estados con más bajas
remuneraciones; era uno de los 13 que no tenían salario mínimo. Pero que los otros
12 eran predominantemente rurales, en tanto que Texas era un rico estado indus-
trial, y su agricultura se encontraba entre los tres principales productores.
Entre los encuestados en la ETIDEU en 1984, el ingreso diario más usual era
en 1984 de 21 a 30 dólares, ya que el 39.7% ganaba dentro de ese rango; sin em-
bargo había 27.9% que ganaban menos y un 8.6% que ganaba 41 dólares o más.
Entre los migrantes de La Purísima entrevistados en 1981, el ingreso semanal
más usual era de 100 a 199 dólares (72% de los entrevistados), y aunque variaba
según la rama de actividad, en todas era predominante.7
En Gómez Farías el sueldo mensual promedio en 1982, de acuerdo a López
Castro (1986) era de 624 dólares, del cual gastan aproximadamente el 32.1% en casa
y comida; 16% en otros gastos, envían a sus casas 32.1% y todavía ahorran 19.9%.
Migración interna
Es común encontrar en los poblados donde se practica la migración
internacional, que ésta se combina con la migración interna, aunque los destinos
y el peso de cada modalidad varía de una comunidad a otra. Sin embargo, a pesar
de las diferencias, todos los autores coinciden en que la que se dirige a Estados
Unidos es mucho más importante. Esta última es casi siempre es temporal, mientras
que la que se dirige al interior de la República Mexicana es en muchos casos
permanente. Llama la atención que los dos tipos de desplazamientos se pueden
encontrar en una misma familia y aún en un mismo individuo; en estos casos se
trata de migraciones temporales.
En Chavinda, el 25.4% de los entrevistados por Alarcón habían estado
trabajando en Estados Unidos pero sólo 6.4% lo había hecho en algún otro lugar
de México. Por otro lado, como ya vimos, mientras los trabajadores agrícolas
optan en gran proporción por Estados Unidos, entre los trabajadores manuales y
no manuales la incidencia en la migración interna es un poco más alta, aunque,
también inferior a la que se dirige a Estados Unidos. En La Purísima, la migración
al Distrito Federal era usual, pero también muy inferior a la que se dirigía al
vecino país.
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Características socio-demográficas de los flujos de
migrantes laborales mexicanos hacia Estados
Unidos, por regiones de procedencia
(ENADID and EMIF Surveys)
Características generales
Los datos muestran que las zonas de expulsión tradicionales mantienen los
primeros lugares, aunque su peso en el conjunto se ha reducido. En 1930 Gamio
señalaba que el 54.3% de los migrantes mexicanos provenía de tres estados del
centro-occidente de México (Michoacán, Guanajuato y Jalisco). En la ENADID
(1992), esos tres estados aportaban el 35.2%, y en la EMIF (1993-1994), el 30.4%
de los que se dirigen a Estados Unidos y 36.5% de los que vienen de regreso.
También, según las investigaciones revisadas, a lo largo del tiempo se incorporaron
otros estados como Zacatecas, Durango y Chihuahua, a los que se han agregado
algunas entidades fronterizas, del centro de México, y los de la zona Pacífico Sur.
De acuerdo a la ENADID, después de los tres estados tradicionales se ubicaron:
México, en cuarto lugar, Zacatecas, Durango, Guerrero, Chihuahua, el Distrito
Federal, Nuevo León y Tamaulipas, en ese orden de importancia.8
De acuerdo a la ENADID, las personas que migraron entre 1987 y 1992
constituyen el 2.34% de la población, 1.09% habían retornado y 1.24% permanecían
en Estados Unidos. Si consideramos la participación por entidades, destacan
Michoacán, donde representan el 7.78%; Zacatecas (7.74%), Durango (6.42%) y
Colima (5.68%); mientras para los estados del sureste sólo constituyen el 0.1% en
Tabasco, 0.2% en Chiapas y 0.3% en Tabasco y Campeche. De los michoacanos
habían regresado 4.39% y 3.98% de los zacatecanos, seguidos por los colimeños
(3.35%) y los nayaritas (3.11%). Sin embargo, con la información disponible es
difícil interpretar qué elementos podrían influir en estas diferencias.
Si consideramos a la población de 12 años o más, el 3.9% de ella ha ido a
buscar trabajo en Estados Unidos, pero, en el caso de los hombres, el porcentaje es
de 6.7%. Sobresalen los hombres mayores de 50 años, entre quienes el 11.4% ha
estado en esa situación.
Tomando en cuenta la regionalización propuesta, y como ya habíamos
señalado, el 36.5% de los migrantes registrados por la ENADID nació en la región
I (mayor salida de la emigración). En el flujo de los migrantes que regresan de
Estados Unidos (EMIF) el porcentaje es algo mayor, 37.4%; pero mucho menor
en los deportados, 27.7%. La siguen, con un margen de diferencia muy grande,
los de la región de las seis entidades (III) y la de la frontera norte (II) con el
18.4% y 18%, respectivamente. En la EMIF, en el flujo de los que vienen de
Estados Unidos los porcentajes son: superior, el de la III, 24.5%, pero inferior el
de la zona fronteriza, 18.1% (en los deportados, los de la frontera presentan un
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porcentaje superior, 22%, frente a 20.4% de la III). Las regiones IV y V se
encuentran a una distancia bastante amplia de las anteriores, ya que proporcionan
el 13.1% y el 11.8%, de acuerdo a los datos de la ENADID y 11.2% y sólo 6.7%,
respectivamente en el flujo de los que regresan de Estados Unidos. En el caso de
los deportados existen diferencias importantes entre estas dos regiones, ya que la
región V supera a la región IV con un amplio margen : 16.3% frente a 10.2%. Así,
resulta más alto en el caso de la región V con relación a la ENADID y más bajo
en la IV. Por último, la región VI (entidades del sureste) presenta una participación
sumamente limitada en las dos encuestas, en la ENADID, 2.1%; en la EMIF, flujo
norte-sur 2.0% y algo más alta, 3.5% entre los deportados.
Al considerar la región de residencia —que supone en algunos casos una
migración previa— encontramos que en la ENADID, los cambios resultan
insignificantes. Sin embargo, en la EMIF, en el flujo de los que vienen de Estados
Unidos, pierden peso las regiones tradicionales I y III, así como la de Oaxaca-
Guerrero, mientras ganan la del valle de México y la de la frontera, lo que no es de
extrañar, dado que esas zonas constituyen polo de atracción, especialmente, algunos
estados de la región II. En el flujo de los deportados, sólo la región fronteriza
incrementa su porcentaje, que alcanza 32.1%. La región I que es la que le sigue,
sólo constituye el 24.5%, la región III el 16.7% y la región  IV y la región V, 9.7%
y 14.3%, respectivamente. Esto nos lleva a constatar que, como se señala en
investigaciones microrregionales, varios migrantes internacionales cambian su
residencia, principalmente, hacia el norte, antes de ir a Estados Unidos.
Características sociodemográficas
Distribución por sexo
La población masculina sigue siendo preponderante, aún cuando el índice
de masculinidad es muy diferente en cada una de las encuestas. En la ENADID
el 26.2% de la población son mujeres, mientras que en la EMIF únicamente el
1.88% de los que provienen de Estados Unidos, y 5.6% de los migrantes que
vienen del sur. La presencia femenina es mayor entre los deportados: 10.7%. Es
probable que esto se deba a la mayor participación de jóvenes. La diferencia en
cada una de las encuestas podría ser atribuible a que, según se ha detectado en
los estudios microrregionales, muchas mujeres sólo migran cuando tienen papeles,
y, cuando esto sucede, pueden viajar directamente desde su lugar de origen y
regresar de la misma manera, sin necesidad de dirigirse a la frontera, por lo que
no pueden ser captadas por la EMIF.
Si consideramos la distribución por regiones, volvemos a encontrar diferencias
entre las encuestas. Así, por ejemplo, en el caso de los que vienen de Estados
Unidos de la EMIF, la región V no cuenta con mujeres, y la región I y la región IV,
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sólo con 1.2% y 1.5%, respectivamente. El porcentaje más alto es el de la zona
fronteriza con únicamente 3.2%. Entre los deportados las diferencias por regiones
son mínimas ya que el porcentaje de hombres fluctúa entre 82.3% en la región III
y 86.2% en la región I.
En cambio, en la ENADID la región con más bajo porcentaje de mujeres es la
del Valle de México, con 18.4%; y, al igual que en la EMIF, la que cuenta con
mayor participación femenina es la de la frontera (32.5%).9
Distribución por edades
Se ha señalado, también, que en la migración laboral a Estados Unidos
predominan los jóvenes, lo que se confirma en nuestras encuestas, aunque con
diferencias entre ellas y en los distintos tipos de flujos. En la ENADID, el promedio
de edad es de 25.8% ; muy semejante al de los deportados, 25.4. En el flujo de los
que vienen de Estados Unidos el promedio es mucho mayor, 31.68, quizá debido
a que algunos de ellos ya regresan de manera definitiva. De cualquier forma, si
consideramos que se trata únicamente de población trabajadora, este promedio
no resulta demasiado alto.
Tomando en cuenta el comportamiento por sexo, encontramos diferencias
importantes en cada encuesta. En la ENADID, el promedio de edad de las mujeres
es más bajo que el de los hombres (23.8% frente a 26.6% de los hombres) ; en
la EMIF sucede lo contrario: el promedio es superior en las mujeres, aunque la
diferencia es poco pronunciada. En el caso de los que regresan de Estados Unidos,
32.58 frente a 31.67 en los hombres; en el de los deportados, 27 frente a 25,7 en
los hombres.
Si analizamos esta variable según el tipo de localidad de nacimiento vemos
que en la EMIF las diferencias son muy pequeñas, tanto en el caso de los que
vienen de Estados Unidos, como en el de los deportados, siendo mayor el promedio
en los que nacieron en comunidades rurales (en los que vienen del norte, 32.8 en
los de origen rural y 30.25 en los provenientes de ciudades; en los deportados, la
relación es de 26.8 y 25.1, respectivamente). En la ENADID, la diferencia es
todavía menor, 26 años en los de origen rural y 25.6 años en los que provienen de
localidades urbanas.
También las diferencias por regiones de procedencia son pequeñas. En la
ENADID los más jóvenes son los de las región Oaxaca-Guerrero (25.1 años), los
mayores, los de las norteñas (26.9 años en la región II y 26.1 años en la región III).
Esto podría deberse a la facilidad de los desplazamientos, sobre todo en el caso de
las entidades fronterizas; y quizá podría influir la antigüedad de la tradición, ya
que, como ya hemos visto, los estados sureños se integraron a esta práctica mucho
más tardíamente. En los que vienen de Estados Unidos de la EMIF sucede algo
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parecido, los promedios menores corresponden a las regiones más nuevas en la
práctica migratoria, la región IV y la región V (28.5 años y 28.06 años
respectivamente); siendo los mayores los de las regiones más tradicionales, la región
I y la región III, con 33.4 años y 32.5 años, respectivamente. En los deportados la
situación es contrastante, ya que el promedio más bajo es el de la región III, 24.6
años; y, el más alto, el de la región V, 27.7 años.
Según la ENADID, el 47.5% de los hombres migrantes está en los grupos de
edad comprendidos entre los 15 y 24 años; ubicándose el 73.2% entre los 15 y los
34 años. La situación es semejante en el caso de las mujeres, aunque algo más
concentradas en el grupo de 15 a 24 años, 49.1%, y menos entre los 15 y los 34
años (71.7%). Los deportados (EMIF) son mucho más jóvenes, el 72.9% se
encuentra entre los 15 y los 29 años; alcanzando una proporción de 85.6% los que
están comprendidos entre los 15 y los 34 años. En tanto que, de los que vienen de
Estados Unidos, únicamente 31% está entre los 15 y los 24 años, y 65.7% entre
los 15 y los 34 años. Como ya habíamos visto cuando analizamos los promedios,
este tipo de flujo incluye un porcentaje más alto de migrantes mayores. Esta
situación se hace más evidente en el caso de las mujeres, ya que entre los 15 y los
34 años sólo se encuentra el 52.5% de ellas.
Estado civil de los migrantes
En cuanto al estado civil de los migrantes, de acuerdo a la información de la
ENADID, predominan los casados o unidos (unidos), aunque existen diferencias
importantes entre sexos, ya que mientras en los hombres constituyen el 72.2%, en
el caso de las mujeres, sólo el 58.3%. En cambio, en éstas es bastante elevado el
peso de las separadas, viudas o divorciadas (desunidas), ya que es de 18.5% frente
a únicamente 2.6% en los hombres. Quizá esto se deba a que un número importante
de mujeres recurren a esta práctica cuando requieren recursos para sostener a su
familia. En los solteros el porcentaje es semejante en ambos sexos (25.2% en los
hombres y 23.2% en las mujeres). Esto parece demostrar que, a diferencia de lo
que muchos suponen, la migración es más una estrategia para sostener al grupo
doméstico, que una simple aventura.
En los que regresan de Estados Unidos de la EMIF, también los unidos superan
a los solteros, aunque los márgenes son menores, 64.7% en los hombres y 57.3%
en las mujeres. En este caso, la proporción de desunidos es muy reducida en los
dos sexos, 1.5% en los hombres y 2.7% en las mujeres. También es más alto el
porcentaje de mujeres solteras 40% (frente a 33% de los hombres). Llama la atención
el caso de la región IV, pues en ella los solteros superan a los unidos (53% frente a
46.9%); en tanto que en las demás regiones se observan patrones semejantes al que
presenta el conjunto de la población.
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En cambio, entre los deportados, el 60.41% son solteros y 37.4% casados.
Llama la atención que entre las mujeres, el porcentaje sea muy semejante 47.4% y
45.3%, respectivamente. La relación se invierte cuando se toma en cuenta el lugar
de residencia de las mujeres deportadas (47.3% casadas y 44.8% solteras).
Distribución por tipo de localidad
Se ha señalado que aunque tradicionalmente los migrantes provenían de áreas
rurales, esta tendencia se ha ido reduciendo, de tal manera que actualmente es
mayor la proporción de aquellos que nacieron en localidades urbanas (de 15,000
habitantes o más). Sin embargo, de acuerdo a las dos encuestas, los migrantes de
origen rural presentan porcentajes ligeramente superiores. En la ENADID, los de
origen rural constituyen el 55.3% y entre los que proceden de Estados Unidos y
viven en México, de la EMIF, 61.4%. Unicamente entre los deportados, los de
origen urbano presentan un porcentaje mayor, 58.7%. Es posible que esta
predominancia esté relacionada con la edad y la región de residencia, pues, como
vimos, los migrantes deportados son más jóvenes y tienen mayor peso en los estados
fronterizos, donde predomina la población urbana. También podría influir el hecho
de que las redes que favorecen la migración son más fuertes en las comunidades
rurales; por lo que serían los migrantes urbanos los que se encontrarían
“desprotegidos” en el territorio americano. Sin embargo, únicamente se trata de
hipótesis que podrían ser exploradas.
Por otro lado, si consideramos la localidad de residencia, la proporción de
migrantes urbanos se incrementa ligeramente, debido a la migración previa de
localidades rurales a urbanas que ya se ha señalado. En la ENADID aumenta a
44.7%, aún cuando continúa siendo mayor el peso de los que vienen de zonas
rurales. En la EMIF, la población urbana que regresa de Estados Unidos (53.6%) sí
llega a superar a la de residencia rural. Entre los deportados constituye el 68.4%.
Al considerar las regiones, en la ENADID, se notan diferencias muy marcadas,
ya que mientras la regiones del Valle de México y de la Frontera tienen porcentajes
bajos de migrantes rurales (32.1% y 34.2%, respectivamente) en las otras la proporción
es mayor de 60%, especialmente en la de las Seis Entidades que alcanza 70%.
Escolaridad de los migrantes
Igual que sucedía en los aspectos antes mencionados, y siguiendo la tendencia
de la población mexicana en su conjunto, ha aumentado el nivel de escolaridad de
los migrantes. Sin embargo, y seguramente relacionado con el peso de la población
rural, el porcentaje de analfabetismo continúa siendo bastante elevado y el promedio
de escolaridad bajo.
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Los datos de la ENADID nos muestran que únicamente el 4% de los migrantes
no lee ni escribe; sin embargo, de los que asistieron a la escuela, más de la mitad
(57.8%) no pasó más allá de la primaria y sólo 3.8% llegó a cursar estudios de nivel
profesional. Según los datos de la EMIF, entre los que vienen de Estados Unidos, el
porcentaje de los que no aprobaron ningún año de escuela es bastante alto, 11.7%,
siendo bastante inferior en los deportados, 8.2%. De este mismo flujo, 53.6% no llegó
al nivel de secundaria y sólo 1.1% llegó a aprobar grados de formación profesional.
Llama la atención que, en términos generales, las mujeres presentan niveles
ligeramente superiores de escolaridad, ya que de las que no llegaron más allá de
la primaria el porcentaje es de 57.8% (frente a 58.7% de los hombres), en tanto
que en el nivel profesional presenta un 5.5% frente a un 3.4% en los hombres).
En el flujo de los que regresan de Estados Unidos (EMIF) sucede algo semejante,
ya que 11.8% de los hombres no llegó a aprobar ningún grado de escuela, frente
a 4% de las mujeres. Unicamente 32% de los hombres pasaron más allá de la
primaria, de las mujeres, 41.4%.
Sorprende el bajísimo nivel de escolaridad de la región I ya que 19.1% de los
que nacieron ahí no terminó ningún grado escolar (de los nacidos en la región de la
frontera, sólo 3.8%), y únicamente 17.3% llegaron a un nivel superior a la primaria
(52.3% de la región II). Las diferencias son mucho menos pronunciadas entre la
población rural y la urbana pues, por ejemplo, el porcentaje de los que no aprobó
ningún grado fue de 13.1% en la población rural y de 11.2% en la urbana.
Si consideramos el promedio de años de escolaridad tenemos que en el flujo
de los que vienen del sur de la EMIF10, es de 5.96 en la población rural, y de 7.02,
en la de origen urbano. En el caso de los que regresan de Estados Unidos, es de
5.41 y de 6.47, respectivamente. Entre los deportados es de 6.87 en los de origen
urbano y de 6.16 en los de origen rural.
En cuanto a la escolaridad por sexo, observamos también que el de las mujeres
es superior, 7.61, frente a 6.26 en los hombres en el flujo procedente del sur; de
7.09, frente a 5.9, en el que proviene de Estados Unidos y de 6.88, frente a 6.53 en
los deportados. Así, parece comprobarse que las mujeres que migran son más
preparadas, a pesar que, en el conjunto de la población ellas se encuentran en gran
desventaja educativa frente a los varones.
Actividad laboral de los
migrantes en México11
Actividad laboral por sexos
De acuerdo a la información de la ENADID, 78.6% de los hombres entrevistados
trabajaron durante los 30 días anteriores al levantamiento de la encuesta. De los
que no laboraron, fueron los que tenían empleo y no trabajaron, quienes alcanzaron
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el porcentaje más alto (34.2%); sin embargo, la proporción de los que buscaban
empleo era bastante elevada, 27.3%.
De los que venían voluntariamente de regreso de Estados Unidos (EMIF), e
informaron al respecto, 83.9% trabajó los treinta días anteriores a su viaje a
Estados Unidos y de los deportados, 78.7%. Así vemos que, como se ha señalado
en muchas ocasiones, la migración no puede ser atribuida a la falta de empleo,
sino a las diferencias en las remuneraciones.
De los que sí estuvieron ocupados, según la ENADID, el porcentaje más alto
es el de los empleados u obreros con 44.7%; siguiéndolos en importancia los
trabajadores por cuenta propia (30.9%) y los jornaleros (15.5%). Como se ve, aún
cuando muchos de los migrantes siguen residiendo en áreas rurales, son muy pocos
los que todavía laboran en actividades agrícolas. Aunque hay que tomar en cuenta
que muchos de los trabajadores no remunerados (6.3%) y varios de los que señalaron
ser trabajadores por cuenta propia podrían también laborar en el campo, en el predio
familiar, los primeros y como ejidatarios o minifundistas agrícolas, los segundos.
Sin embargo esta información no nos la proporciona la encuesta. Es de señalar que
únicamente un 2.4% se ocupa como patrón o empresario, lo que resulta congruente
con lo que se conoce de la práctica migratoria y del tipo de trabajos que realizan los
mexicanos en Estados Unidos.
En lo que se refiere a los que venían voluntariamente de Estados Unidos
(EMIF), más de la mitad (54.9%) se ocupó en el sector agropecuario; en los
deportados el porcentaje es más bajo, pero superaba, de todos modos, a los demás
(35.5%). Los otros sectores tenían mucho menor importancia en los retornantes
voluntarios, 25.4%, el industrial (de los cuales el 17.3% correspondía a la indus-
tria de la construcción); y 19.6%, el terciario (0.2% correspondía al servicio
doméstico). Entre los deportados, el sector industrial se acercaba más al
agropecuario con 33.9% (20.5% en la construcción), muy cercano, también, al
sector servicios, con 30.5% (1.1% en el servicio doméstico). Así vemos que,
mientras el sector agropecuario tenía un importante peso entre los que regresaban
voluntariamente, entre los deportados las actividades que se pueden considerar
“urbanas” en conjunto superaban al sector primario.
Es de subrayarse la elevada proporción de migrantes ocupados en la construcción
—en los de retorno voluntario alcanza 16%— frente a las demás subramas de la
actividad industrial que sólo representan 8.6%. Esta situación nos hace pensar que la
mayor parte de los que cuentan con empleos en el sector manufacturero no migran,
mientras que, para los trabajadores de la industria de la construcción, la migración
resulta una estrategia atractiva, sobre todo si tomamos en cuenta la inestabilidad del
empleo en esa rama y las malas condiciones laborales y salariales que privan en ella.
De las mujeres, según la ENADID, la proporción de aquéllas que trabajaban
en México es muy baja 32.5%. Cuando revisamos las causas nos damos cuenta que
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se debe, en el 85% de los casos, a que se ocupaban en quehaceres del hogar. Sin
embargo, hay que recalcar que todas ellas migraron a Estados Unidos con la finalidad
de trabajar o buscar trabajo.
De las que sí estuvieron ocupadas, el porcentaje más alto es el de las empleadas
u obreras con 68.8%. Les siguen las trabajadoras por cuenta propia (21.4%) y, con
mucha distancia, las trabajadoras no remuneradas (7.2%). En cambio, el peso de
las jornaleras es mínimo (2.2%).
Entre las que retornaron voluntariamente (EMIF), el porcentaje de las que
trabajaban antes de ir a Estados Unidos12 (38.9%), es ligeramente más alto que
el de la ENADID, pero inferior al que presentan aquéllas que fueron deportadas
(45.9%). Una proporción importante se ocupaba en el sector servicios, de las
primeras, 68.2%; de las deportadas, 63.9% (16.7% y 19.8%, respectivamente,
en el servicio doméstico). El sector industrial es el que presenta el peso más bajo
en las de retorno voluntario, 7.6% ; en tanto que en las deportadas, el sector
agrícola (14.9%).
Actividad por región de residencia
Naturalmente la situación cambia cuando consideramos la localidad de
residencia, aunque en el caso de la actividad agropecuaria no resulta tan marcado
como podría esperarse, ya que, en los de retorno de Estados Unidos, en las áreas
rurales es de 61.4% y en las zonas no rurales, de 43.3%. En cambio, el sector
industrial, sí muestra una diferencia considerable: 33.9% en las localidades
urbanas frente a 20.6% en las rurales. En el sector terciario, aunque sí hay
diferencias, éstas son menos notables (18% en las áreas rurales frente a 22.8%
en las urbanas).
En la ENADID, observando únicamente el comportamiento masculino, los
porcentajes más altos de obreros o empleados se encuentran en las regiones más
urbanizadas, la región II y la región IV (53.1% y 51.6%, respectivamente), en tanto
que en las regiones de mayor tradición migratoria (la región I y la región III), la
proporción de jornaleros o peones es relativamente más alta (19,6% y 16%,
respectivamente; frente a 7.2% en la región IV%). Llama la atención la elevada
proporción de trabajadores no remunerados en las regiones III y V, ya que son de
13.2% y 10.4%, respectivamente, proporciones muy cercanas a las que ocupan los
jornaleros. Quizá esto se deba a que en esas regiones es donde tiene mayor
importancia la agricultura campesina de autoconsumo. Estos planteamientos se
comprueban cuando analizamos el tipo de localidad en donde viven los migrantes,
puesto que, en el caso de las ciudades de más de 100,000 habitantes, el porcentaje
de empleados u obreros es de 64.5% (en las de 20,000 a 99,000, de 55.3%); en
tanto que el de jornaleros es de 30.1% en las localidades de menos de 2,500 habitantes
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frente a 2.3% y 6.2% en las de 20,000 a 99,000 y en las de 100,000 o más,
respectivamente. Los trabajadores sin remuneración destacan en las localidades
más pequeñas (14.9%); bajando su importancia a medida que se trata de
asentamientos mayores. Por último, la proporción de trabajadores por cuenta propia
es muy semejante en todos los tipos de localidades, aunque es un poco menor en
las de 100,000 habitantes (28.7%).
En los deportados, el nivel de ocupación es alto en todas las regiones, su-
perior a 70% ; especialmente elevado en la región del Valle de México (IV)
donde alcanzó 87.6% y en la de Oaxaca-Guerrero (81.1%). Contrariamente a lo
que se sabe con relación a la ocupación en la República Mexicana, fue la región
fronteriza la que alcanzó el nivel más bajo de empleo (74.4%). Esto podría
atribuirse a que muchos de los migrantes que viven ahí, lo hacen con la finalidad
de pasar al otro lado, y no les interesa conseguir empleo. Un porcentaje
relativamente alto de ellos, señaló que buscó trabajo y no encontró o que no
trabajó por diversas razones.
De los ocupados, sobresalen, en el sector primario, la región I (49.3%), la
región III (47%) y la región V (45%); en tanto que en el sector servicios destacan
la región IV (38.9%) y la región III (36%). Por último, el trabajo en el sector indus-
trial tiene el mayor peso en la región III (47.5%) y en la región IV (39.6%).
En el flujo de los que retornan voluntariamente, los porcentajes más altos en el
sector agropecuario corresponden a las mismas regiones (I, III y V), pero en este
caso las proporciones son superiores (61.3%, 62.4% y 68.1%). También, al igual
que en los deportados, el sector servicios tiene un peso importante en la región IV,
42%, con lo que supera a los demás sectores económicos. En todas ellas el sector
de la construcción supera al industrial (que presenta porcentajes bajísimos en todas
las regiones) y es especialmente elevado en las regiones II y III.
En el caso de las mujeres (ENADID), en todas las regiones encontramos el
alto nivel de desocupación, especialmente en la de las seis entidades donde alcanzó
un porcentaje de 73.1% (la proporción más baja fue en la de Oaxaca-Guerrero
con 63.7%). La proporción más elevada en cuanto a motivos de no laborar es la
que corresponde a los llamados quehaceres del hogar, estando en los extremos la
región III con 64% y la región IV con 49.7%. Esta última destaca por presentar
un porcentaje muy superior de mujeres que buscaron trabajo (8.8%) y de estudiantes
(6.9%). Por último, las que buscan trabajo se concentran en las ciudades de más
de 100,000 habitantes, habiendo porcentajes mínimos en las menores de 20,000.
En lo que se refiere a su participación en la actividad agrícola, quedan en los
extremos la región de las seis entidades (III) donde sólo participan 26.9% y la de
Oaxaca-Guerrero (V) con 36.3%. Estos datos llaman la atención, puesto que, las
dos regiones presentan elevados porcentajes de población rural, lo que haría suponer
un comportamiento semejante.
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Se sabe, gracias a las investigaciones en microrregiones, que en esas zonas
existen pocas posibilidades de empleo fuera del hogar, lo que se confirma en esta
encuesta. Son las mujeres de las áreas urbanas las que más realizan trabajos fuera
de su hogar, 38% de las que viven en localidades de más de 100,000 habitantes y
33.5% de las de ciudades pequeñas. En tanto que de las que viven en localidades
de menos de 20,000, sólo lo hacen 26.3% y en las menores, 27.2%.
Como ya decíamos el peso más importante en la ocupación es el de empleadas
u obreras, y sorprende que estén en los extremos las de la región fronteriza y la
del Valle de México (74.6% y 52.9%, respectivamente), puesto que se trata de
las regiones más urbanizadas. Es muy probable que la diferencia se deba a la
existencia de las empresas maquiladoras de la frontera que ocupan a un elevado
número de mujeres. Prácticamente no hay jornaleras (con excepción de la región
fronteriza en la que se registró un 6.3%, lo que es atribuible a la agricultura
comercial que emplea un elevado número de trabajadores agrícolas, aunque
muchos de ellos son estacionales). Por último, la región donde predominan las
mujeres trabajadoras sin pago, no es una de predominancia rural, sino la del valle
de México donde el porcentaje alcanza el 38.6%.
Características de la actividad migratoria
Tradición migratoria
Los entrevistados de las dos encuestas reportan haber participado en la migración
desde antes del Programa Bracero, aunque resulta difícil conocer su peso real, ya
que gran parte de los que vivieron esa experiencia han muerto o, en menor medida,
se han ido a vivir a Estados Unidos y, en el caso de la EMIF, pasaron la edad en la
que es usual migrar. Es por ello que las proporciones de entrevistados en esas
condiciones son muy bajas y únicamente nos ofrecen indicios de la importancia de
esa actividad en las distintas regiones. Así podemos observar, como también se
mencionó antes, que el peso de cada una de ellas ha ido variando.
A diferencia de lo que las investigaciones revisadas señalaban sobre la
participación en la práctica migratoria de las distintas entidades federativas, según
la información de la ENADID, antes de la firma del convenio para la contratación
temporal de braceros (1942) los estados que tuvieron mayor participación son
Tamaulipas y Durango, el primero contaba con 41.5%13 de los que viajaron en ese
período. De la región tradicional, sólo Michoacán destaca, aunque se ubicaba en
tercer lugar seguido de San Luis Potosí y Nuevo León. Sin embargo, se trata de
pocos casos —dada la antigüedad del evento— aunque no deja de llamar la atención.
Durante el período del Programa Bracero, los estados fronterizos pierden peso y se
colocan en los primeros lugares Michoacán y Guanajuato, seguidos por Nuevo
León y Durango. Jalisco comienza a destacar en los 1970s, cuando se ubica en
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primer lugar seguido por Michoacán, San Luis Potosí y Zacatecas. Es sólo en los
1980s cuando Jalisco adquiere importancia, ya que de los que migraron por última
vez, los provenientes de ese estado constituyen el 16% en 1980-85 y el 19.2% en
1986. Sin embargo, no llega a superar a Michoacán que aporta el 22.6%. La región
I tuvo su mayor predominio entre 1965 y 1986, ya que aportó el 46.8% de los
migrantes. Si la unimos con la región III tenemos que el 70% de los que estuvieron
por última vez en ese período provenía de esa zona; en tanto que las regiones IV y
V sólo aportaron el 4.6% y el 4.5%, respectivamente.
En los que retornan voluntariamente (EMIF), al revés de lo que ocurría entre
los informantes de la ENADID, la región I supera a las otras desde el primer período
(con excepción al quinquenio de 1965-69) período en el que la región III le duplica
en cuanto a presencia. Después de entonces su importancia resulta indiscutible
hasta los 1990s donde su margen de ventaja se reduce notablemente, otra vez frente
a la región III. Esta última es la que le sigue en todos los períodos, en tanto que en
el tercer lugar se ubica la región de la frontera, excepto en el período 1965-69,
cuando la del Valle de México se ubica en el tercer lugar.
Entre los deportados, la participación de las cuatro primeras regiones es muy
semejante en el período anterior a 1941, destacando la de la zona fronteriza y la del
Valle de México. En cambio, durante la época del Programa Bracero, sobresalen la
de las seis entidades y la de Oaxaca-Guerrero. Así, según estos datos, la región I
tampoco sobresale, lo que sólo ocurre a partir del período 1965-69, con 52.9%,
justo al revés de lo que se observaba en el otro flujo. En los 1970s aporta 40% y su
predominio se mantiene hasta 1986 con 35.6%. Después de entonces, vuelve a
perder peso, con sólo un 27.7% de los migrantes; proporción ligeramente inferior
a la de la región de la frontera (que cuenta con el 27.8%). Con los datos presentados,
nos damos cuenta que es difícil saber a tantos años de distancia cuales eran las
regiones preponderantes, aún cuando queda claro que son las tres primeras las que,
en casi todos los casos, se ubican en los primeros lugares.
Por otro lado, según la información tanto de los que regresan de Estados Unidos,
como de los deportados, la participación de la población rural fue muy importante
durante los 1940s, 1950s y 1960s de más de 75%, bajando a partir de entonces, de
manera que para la década de los noventas únicamente aportó el 50.6% en los de
retorno voluntario.
Lugares de destino
De acuerdo a la EMIF, en el flujo de los de retorno voluntario, destacan, como
era de esperarse, Texas con 39.6% y California con 30.1%. Les siguen en importancia,
con una diferencia notable, Arizona con 5.1%, Florida con 3.3% y Carolina del
Norte con 2.3%.
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En cuanto a las ciudades, sobresalen, San Antonio y el Valle de Texas, con
6.9% cada una, Los Angeles, California con 6.2%, Houston y Dallas-Fort Worth en
Texas con 4.4% y 4.2%, respectivamente y Fresno, California, y Phoenix, Arizona,
con 3% y 2.9%, respectivamente.
Entre los deportados, el 81.9% sólo estuvo unas cuantas horas, por lo que
únicamente tenemos información del lugar de destino en 18.1% de los casos (88,498,
ya que, además, hubo 1,051 individuos que no informaron). Sin embargo, coinciden
en la mayoría de los estados de destino, aún cuando no en las proporciones, lo que
está relacionado, quizá, con su situación más inestable, la importancia de las zonas
por donde entran, y la falta de tiempo para adentrarse más en el país. En lo que
respecta a los estados, California ocupa el primer lugar con 44% de los migrantes;
Texas, el segundo, con 31.9% y Arizona, el tercero, con 12.7%. El cambio de orden
coincide también con lo que encontramos en la primacía de las ciudades, ya que,
aunque la ciudad que tiene mayor peso es Los Angeles (7.9%), las ciudades que la
siguen muy de cerca son las fronterizas de Phoenix (7.3%) y San Diego (7.2%).
Después vienen el Valle de Texas (5.1%) y otra fronteriza, El Paso, Texas (4.7%).
Es probable que esta información resulte sesgada —sobre todo en el caso de
los deportados— hacia las ciudades y los estados fronterizos, ya que los que logran
interiorizarse en el país, tienen mayores posibilidades de no ser expulsados y de
regresar por avión directamente al interior de México. Y es que parece ser que los
que llegan a los estados del centro o del norte de Estados Unidos obtienen mejores
remuneraciones y permanecen por períodos de tiempo mayores, por lo que cuentan
con más recursos para viajar en avión y así evitarse el problema de dirigirse a la
frontera y de ahí a sus lugares de origen.
Como ya ha sido señalado en otras investigaciones, la preferencia por cada
estado varía por regiones y por entidades de origen de los migrantes, situación que
se encuentra muy relacionada con la existencia de una tradición migratoria y de
redes familiares de los dos lados de la frontera.
Aunque en todas las regiones predominan California y Texas, la proporción
y el orden varían en cada caso. En el caso de los que retornan de manera voluntaria
(EMIF), en la región I y la región V sobresale California, con 37.8% en la primera
y 63.5% en la segunda; seguidos por Texas con 30.5% y 10.1%, respectivamente.
En las otras tres, Texas atrae una mayor población, especialmente en la región IV
y la región II, con 60.7% y 60.6% de sus migrantes, respectivamente, en tanto
que California sólo atrae a 16.1% y 11.6%, respectivamente. En la región III,
aunque Texas supera a California, el margen entre ellos es mucho menor (37.8%
en el primero frente a 27.5%, en el segundo). Los demás estados, presentan mucho
menor concentración.
En las regiones de mayor tradición, los migrantes se encuentran más repartidos
en las ciudades. En la región I, principalmente en San Antonio, Texas (7.5%);
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Fresno, California (5.6%) y el Valle de Texas (4%). En la de la frontera,
únicamente poblaciones texanas: el Valle de Texas en primer lugar con 8.7%,
seguido por Houston (6.5%), El Paso (5.8%), Dallas-Fort Worth (5.5%) y San
Antonio (4.8%). En la de las seis entidades existe más concentración en el Valle
de Texas (12.7%) y Los Angeles (12.1%), que superan con mucho a ciudades
como Dallas-Fort Worth (4.6%), Phoenix, Arizona, (4.5%) y San Antonio (4%).
Los procedentes de la región IV y la región V presentan mayor concentración:
los del Valle de México, en San Antonio (18.4%) y, en menor medida, en Houston
(8.7%) y, los de Oaxaca-Guerrero, en Los Angeles (18.5%) seguido, con mucha
distancia, por Fresno, California (7.1%).
En el caso de los deportados, no se logra apreciar suficientemente este
fenómeno por los motivos relacionados con su expulsión, señalados
anteriormente. Para los de la región de mayor tradición migrante, California
destaca con una alta proporción (61.6%) seguido con un amplio margen de
diferencia por Texas (24.2%). En la región III, también es California el estado
preferido (32.8%), pero seguido muy de cerca por Arizona (27.6%) y Texas
(27.3%). Como sucedía con los del flujo de migrantes voluntarios, en la región
fronteriza, Texas es la principal fuente de atracción (53.5%). En las regiones IV
y V, California es el polo principal, especialmente en la región V, ya que el
76.2% de sus migrantes, se dirigió a ese estado.
Número de viajes y duración de las estancias
De acuerdo a la ENADID, de los migrantes de retorno, 68.1% permanecieron
en Estados Unidos menos de un año durante su última estancia. Sin embargo, hubo
12.6% que habían estado dos o más años. En cambio, y como era de esperarse, de
los que estaban en Estados Unidos cuando se levantó la encuesta, 42.5% llevaban
en ese país 2 años o más, aún cuando seguían manteniendo nexos con su familia de
México, que los reconocía como parte del grupo.
En cuanto al número de viajes a Estados Unidos para trabajar, en los migrantes
que retornaron voluntariamente, captados por la EMIF, el 34.3% sólo lo había hecho
una o dos veces y 18.4%, de 3 a 5; pero un porcentaje relativamente alto (34.2%)
señaló que lo había hecho más de diez veces. La situación es muy diferente en el
caso de las mujeres, ya que únicamente 13.6% de ellas había ido a trabajar 11
veces o más, en tanto que casi 80% viajaron menos de seis veces.14
De los deportados, para el 53.6% de los casos era la primera vez que lo habían
hecho; y, de los restantes, 23.8% sólo había cruzado entre una y dos veces más,
sólo un 5.8% que fue 11 o más. Así pues se aprecia que, en términos generales, los
deportados tienen menos experiencia en la práctica, aún cuando hay quienes a pesar
de haber estado en Estados Unidos varias veces, resultan ser deportados.
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Períodos de entrada a Estados Unidos y de salida
Como es bien sabido, el flujo migratorio varía a lo largo del año, siendo los
primeros meses, aquéllos en que se concentran más emigrantes, en tanto que los
que regresan lo hacen preferentemente en los últimos meses. Esta situación tiene
su explicación, tanto en los requerimientos de la agricultura comercial
norteamericana y las inclemencias del tiempo, como en la tradición que se ha
impuesto en las comunidades de migrantes, de reunirse y hacer sus celebraciones
locales (principalmente las fiestas de Navidad y de los santos patronos de los pueblos)
y familiares (bodas, sobre todo) en los meses de diciembre y enero. Esto se comprobó
en las encuestas revisadas, aún cuando todos los meses del año se presentan salidas
y regresos. De acuerdo a la ENADID, los porcentajes de emigrantes se van
reduciendo en cada trimestre, según la información aportada sobre la fecha del
último viaje. 29.7% en el primero (enero-marzo); 28.4% en el segundo (abril-junio),
27.1% en el tercero (julio-septiembre) y 14.9% en el cuarto (octubre-diciembre).
En cuanto al retorno, sucede exactamente lo contrario, 14% en el primero; 21.1%
en el segundo; 29.6% en el tercero y 35.3%, respectivamente.
Actividad laboral en Estados Unidos
Un elevado porcentaje de los que regresaron voluntariamente, sin contar a los
que permanecieron horas (3.5%) consiguió trabajo en Estados Unidos, 88.8% (88.9%
de los hombres y 87.1% de las mujeres).
A pesar de que mucho se ha comentado, y se ha detectado en investigaciones
microrregionales que la agricultura ha perdido importancia en la actividad
económica de los migrantes, en el flujo de los que vienen de regreso, el sector
agropecuario seguía siendo el que ocupaba a más de la mitad (52.7%). Asimismo,
notamos que, a pesar de que se ha señalado al sector servicios como el
predominante; en la encuesta es el sector industrial el que sigue en importancia
con 24.6%. Llama la atención, que, al igual que sucedía en la actividad laboral en
México, en Estados Unidos también tiene un importante peso la industria de la
construcción, ya que casi dos terceras partes (16%), de las personas ocupadas en
la industria, se emplean en esta actividad. Al último se encuentran los servicios
con 22.7% (5.8% en el servicio doméstico).
Conviene señalar la especificidad de la actividad laboral de las mujeres, aunque
se trata de un grupo reducido —8768, que constituyen el 1.9% de los migrantes
que trabajaron e informaron sobre su actividad laboral en Estados Unidos)— ya
que resulta muy diferente a la de los hombres. El porcentaje más alto de ellas
laboró en los servicios, 62.6%, de las cuales, más de la mitad lo hizo en el servicio
doméstico (33.9%). Seguía en importancia el sector industrial con 28.7%
(únicamente 1.8% en la construcción) y, sólo 8.7% se empleaba en actividades
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agropecuarias. El hecho, ya señalado en otras investigaciones, de la importancia
que tiene el servicio doméstico en la población femenina, aquí queda sobradamente
demostrado. Además, un porcentaje mucho más alto que el de los hombres, se
ocupa en la industria, lo que también hace pensar en que varias de ellas se ocupan
en establecimientos dedicados a la confección de ropa o al ensamblado, aunque no
es posible saberlo con exactitud.
Como ya se dijo, los deportados, muy pocos deportados lograron trabajar e
informaron al respecto (46,204); sin embargo, observamos en ellos una distribución
muy diferente: el sector en el que más se ocuparon fue el de los servicios, con
47.6%, de los cuales 12.4% trabajaba en servicios domésticos. La agricultura sólo
alcanzó 32.1%; mostrando en el porcentaje más bajo los que laboraban en el sector
industrial (20.2%, de los cuales el 14.7% se ocupaba en la industria de la
construcción). La gran mayoría de ellos estaba empleado a sueldo fijo, especialmente
los que se ocupaban en el sector industrial (85.9%), en tanto que de los que trabajaban
en la construcción y el servicio doméstico, alrededor de una tercera parte trabajaba
a destajo o por obra determinada.
Si consideramos el tipo de localidad de residencia en México de los migrantes
que regresan de Estados Unidos, tenemos que, aunque en todos ellos sobresale la
actividad agrícola, presenta un porcentaje mayor en los que provienen del medio
rural (58%, frente a 46.6% en los urbanos), en tanto que en la industria manufacturera
y en los servicios el peso de los de localidades urbanas es mayor.15 En la industria
de la construcción, presentan proporciones semejantes, aunque ligeramente
superiores en los de origen rural (16.4% frente a 14.2%).
Hay que señalar que los porcentajes por ramas de actividad en Estados Unidos
son muy semejantes a los que presentan esas mismas ramas en México, especialmente
en lo que se refiere a los sectores primario y secundario; ya que en el caso de los
servicios, es menor el porcentaje de los que se ocupan en esa rama en Estados
Unidos (14.9% frente a 18.6%, en México) y, especialmente en el servicio doméstico
(5.8% en Estados Unidos, frente a sólo 0.3% en México.
Por último, aunque existe cierta relación entre la actividad desempeñada en
México y la que se realiza en Estados Unidos, ésta no es tan determinante, ya que
únicamente 48.2% de ellos coinciden en la misma actividad en los dos mercados
laborales. Sin embargo, son los que en su país de origen se ocupan en la rama
agropecuaria los que en un porcentaje mayor laboran en esa rama, 67.1%; pero
también presentan una proporción elevada los que en México laboran en el sector
industrial (61.1%). En los servicios no sucede lo mismo, de los que provienen de
esa rama en México, únicamente el 26.6% se ubica en el sector primario en Estados
Unidos (y 20.4% de los que provienen del servicio doméstico).
En el sector industrial como actividad en Estados Unidos, el porcentaje más
elevado lo tienen los que trabajaron en esa misma rama en México (13.8%), seguidos
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por los que estuvieron en el sector servicios (12.1%). En cambio, de los que provienen
del sector agropecuario, sólo 6.3% labora en esa rama de actividad. También en los
servicios tienen mayor presencia los que realizan actividades de esa rama en México,
22.8%. Y, por último, donde existe una relación mayor es en el caso de los que en
México se ocupan en el servicio doméstico, ya que el 79.6% de ellos también
trabaja en esa actividad en Estados Unidos. La proporción de los que provienen de
las otras ramas es sumamente baja.
Notes
1. Todos ellos citados por Ernesto Galarza (1958, 1964 y 1977).
2. La limitación del trabajo de Alarcón es que poco explica sobre migración documentada
e indocumentada, número de viajes, duración de los mismos, tipos de trabajos, etc. Mucho
menos trata de relacionar estas variables entre sí o con otras demográficas o económicas.
3. De ellos, había 18 migrantes en Estados Unidos, 17 jornaleros y uno con actividad
no definida.
4. Incluye a las personas que tenían como mínimo 15 años, residentes habituales de
la vivienda y que en el momento de la entrevista se encontraban en Estados Unidos
trabajando o buscando trabajo y que tenían familiares que pudieran informar sobre ellas,
y a aquellas que habían trabajado o buscado trabajo en Estados Unidos en los últimos
cinco años (desde el 1o. de enero de 1974) y que se encontraban viviendo en México en el
momento de la entrevista (CENIET, 1982).
5. Conviene aclarar que la información es diferente para los dos conjuntos de migrantes.
Para aquellos que se encontraban en Estados Unidos, se refiere al trabajo que tenían antes de
migrar, en tanto que para los que ya estaban en México, al momento de la entrevista: diciembre
de 1978 o enero de 1979.
6. No explica sobre la edad de estos ejidatarios migrantes, ni cuando migraron por
última vez.
7. En el caso de la agricultura, el 75% percibía ese salario, en la industria 62.5% y en
los servicios, el 78.6% (Trigueros, 1994).
8. En el flujo de los migrantes que regresan a México de la EMIF, encontramos otro
orden. Después de Guanajuato y Michoacán se ubican Chihuahua y Zacatecas. Jalisco queda
hasta el quinto lugar. El estado de México y Guerrero presentan poca participación, en tanto
que Coahuila ocupa el sexto lugar.
9. Llaman la atención por el gran peso de la población masculina, los estados del centro
como Tlaxcala (86.3%), Querétaro (85.2%), de la región IV y Aguascalientes (86.6%), de la
región III. Los estados de Sinaloa y Tabasco presentan la menor proporción, 63%.
10. La información sobre los promedios de escolaridad para el caso de la EMIF, fueron
proporcionados por el Dr. Jorge Santibáñez del Colegio de la Frontera Norte.
11. En el caso de la ENADID, la información sobre la actividad laboral se refiere a los
treinta últimos días antes del levantamiento de la encuesta y no a la situación que tenía el
informante antes de viajar a Estados Unidos.
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12. Hay que señalar que se trata de muy pocos casos, 3972.
13. Es probable que esto se deba a la situación fronteriza.
14. Hubo un 1% de los migrantes que señaló no haber ido nunca (la vez que cruzaron
sólo estuvieron algunas horas).
15. En la industria (sin incluir a los de la construcción) los porcentajes son 10.1%
en los de localidades urbanas y 6.6%, en los de origen rural. En los servicios, 29.1%
(7.9% en servicio doméstico) en los primeros y 19% (3.5% en servicio doméstico)
en los segundos.
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CHARACTERISTICS OF MIGRANTS
Some Thoughts on Perceptions and
Policies Mexico-United States
Labor Migration Flows:
Some Theoretical and Methodological
Innovations and Research Findings
Jorge A. Bustamante
Introduction
Migrations between Mexico and the United States are associated primarilyto the geographical vicinity of the two countries. There was a time whenthe concern for undocumented immigrants was in Mexico City in refer-
ence to the increasing number of U.S. citizens who were crossing the unprotected
borders of Mexico to enter the states of Texas, California, Colorado and New Mexico
without authorization of the Mexican government. A war resulted from that illegal
flow and Mexico lost lands representing half of its territory. The ink of the Treaty of
Guadalupe-Hidalgo (1848) had not dried out when migrations on the opposite direc-
tion began to increase. Labor migrations in massive numbers from Mexico to the
United States were sought after by aggressive recruiters funded by the U.S. Congress
in the first decades of the 20th century, in order to allow the economic expansion of
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the United States southwest. U.S. recruiters of Mexican labor were restless at the
beginning of the century in the states of Guanajuato, Jalisco and Michoacán, attract-
ing Mexican workers for the expansion of railroads, the exploitation of mines and the
opening of new lands for agriculture in the states of California, New Mexico, Colo-
rado and Texas. These recruiting efforts funded by U.S. Congress at the beginning of
the century gave birth to networks of Mexican migrants which even today explain the
predominance of a small number of Mexican states in the totals of migrants who have
interacted with continuous U.S. demands for Mexican labor shaping a de facto inter-
national labor markets between the two countries.
This labor market is not recognized as such by the two countries. International
migration from Mexico to the United States is viewed very differently depending on
the side of the border from which this phenomenon is observed and evaluated. It is
difficult to demystify migration between Mexico and the United States, and to ex-
plain what it represents for each country. This is particularly the case with undocu-
mented migration. Because of the contradictory visions of undocumented migration
that permeate values and perceptions of the people of these two countries, an effort
of demystification is indispensable if both nations really seek economic integration
as it is assumed in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
The view that predominates in Mexico is that outmigration toward the United
States is basically an economic phenomenon, a labor issue, from which the United
States reaps the benefits since Mexican migrants fill jobs that U.S. workers are
unwilling to take. Thus, the migrant workers are carrying out an activity which is
as legitimate as the profits made by their U.S. employers.
In the United States, in contrast, the predominant view of these same migrants is
that they are in the majority criminals, who transport drugs from Mexico and enter the
United States to subsist on public assistance programs or to take jobs which rightly
belong to U.S. citizens. Supposedly these U.S. workers are forced into unemploy-
ment by the influx of Mexican migrants who come to steal their jobs.
In Mexico these individuals are called “migrant workers” and they are viewed
in such a positive light that their family members are openly proud of their
achievements. In the United States, they are called “illegal aliens”; they are viewed
in a very negative light, almost like a plague invading from outside and where the
citizens of the United States are made the victims. Given the respective acceptance
of these contrasting visions in the two countries, the migratory phenomenon also
evokes contrasting perceptions in terms of how the set of migration problems
interjects into the relations between the two countries. Mexico’s view of the problems
associated with migrant workers encompasses things such as the violation of their
human and workers’ rights abroad; this being the case, the Mexican government
seeks a bilateral agreement that would eliminate such abuses. The United States’
view is that the primary problem associated with “illegal aliens” is their violation
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of U.S. immigration law; this being the case, the U.S. government seeks a solution
in anti-crime legislation, part of domestic legislation to govern domestic problems.
It is virtually impossible for these two visions, sustained respectively by the
civil societies of the two countries, to be both correct. One of these two visions
must not correspond to the reality of migration. One of these two visions contains
more myth than truth, although it is very possible that neither of them captures the
full range of cases. This fact makes it imperative to begin a process of de-mythifying
migration as a necessary and sufficient condition that would allow both countries
to come together within the context of bilateral relations and find ways to act jointly
to address the impacts of the issue in both countries.
Such a de-mythifying effort must begin with scientific research which can
help us develop a diagnosis of the costs and benefits that labor migration from
Mexico to the United States brings to the two countries. The results of this diag-
nosis should stimulate a raising of consciousness on the reality of migration and
stimulate a consensus in both countries regarding the need to eliminate undocu-
mented migration through a bilaterally negotiated process that would have to be
concomitant to a formal agreement on labor migration between Mexico and the
United States.
For the de-mythification of migration to succeed in both countries, it is essen-
tial that efforts should be undertaken bilaterally by research institutions in both
Mexico and the United States, institutions of such repute in the international scien-
tific community that their conclusions would be credited even if they diverged
from the visions predominating within the two countries’ respective governments
and civil societies.
This paper will attempt to lead the scientific communities of both Mexico and
the United States to the conviction that a bilateral effort to de-mythify undocu-
mented Mexico-U.S. migration is a first and necessary step, and that this first step
may suffice to initiate a rationalization process that eliminates migration as an
obstacle in the relations between these two countries. The complexity of the task
involved in addressing and resolving the issue of migration within a context of
bilateral relations is as great as it is the gap between the actual characteristics of
migration and these characteristics as they are popularly perceived.
If our objective is to build a broad and shared understanding of migration, we
must explain why the gap referred to above is so wide. Toward this purpose this
paper is divided in three parts. The first part consists of a historical approach to the
cultural and economic meaning of the Mexican migration to the United States. The
second part consists of some recent findings from a research project designed to
monitor the undocumented migratory flows from Mexico to the United States.1
The third part consist of a policy proposal derived from the theoretical approach
discussed in the first two parts.
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The first two parts correspond to a conceptual dichotomy derived from Max
Weber theory of Verstehende soziologie2 (Interpretative Sociology). The first chapter
of the posthumously published work of the German sociologist and, research findings
reported elsewhere,3 led to a methodological distinction between two dimensions
of the phenomenon of Mexican immigration to the United States. One called here
“cultural” and, the other called “interactional.” This distinction is derived from
empirical findings which show a relative independence of changes in U.S. public
perceptions of Mexican undocumented immigrants on one hand; and, hiring practices
by their U.S. employers as well as some economic consequences of the insertion of
these migrants into the U.S. labor market, on the other.
It will be argued in this paper that, in periods of economic recessions, U.S.
public opinion has gone to extremes of negative views about the presence of Mexi-
can immigrants, whereas in periods of economic expansion public opinion has
swung to less negative and even positive views praising Mexican labor.4 These
changes in U.S. public opinion have not impacted significantly the persistent growth
of U.S. demands for Mexican immigrant labor over the century, as one could infer
from data presented by Paul Taylor (1928, 1929a, 1929b, 1930, 1931a, 1931b,
1968, 1971); Manuel Gamio (1926, 1930a, 1930b); Ernesto Galarza (1956, 1958,
1964); Julian Samora (1970, 1971a, 1971b) and Bustamante (1975, 1977, 1978,
1979a, 1979b, 1979c, 1979d, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1988, 1989a, 1989b, 1990, 1992).
The importance of such a distinction is, that these two dimensions not only
behave differently over economic cycles, but, they can not be approached for sci-
entific purposes by the same research methods. What is called here the “cultural
dimension,” corresponds to an epistemological approach which draws from Max
Weber’s notion of “erklarendes Verstehen,”5 one which datum is to be found in the
cultural or intersubjective dimension of social relations. What it is called here the
“interactional dimension” corresponds to a different epistemological approach which
draws also from Weber’s conceptualization of “direct understanding” (aktuelle
Verstehen).6 In this dimension of the phenomenon of undocumented immigration
from Mexico, the more directly observable nature of its datum, allows for more
complex levels of quantitative analysis. This is the level of statistical analysis that
could be made out of actual identification and countings of migrants crossing the
international border without inspection. The fact that there is an observable behav-
ior that occurs under certain objective circumstances,7 allows for a more complex
quantitative analysis than the values or motivations based on which such a person
makes some sense out of such a behavior.
The nature of the datum for an analysis of such values or motivations is less
ready for a direct observation with the instruments currently available for the
scientific observer of such an individual’s behavior. In other words, the difference
between the “aktuelle Verstehen” and, the “erklarendes Verstehen” of the
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undocumented immigration from Mexico can be illustrated by the difference between
asking ourselves how many are crossing the border and, why they are crossing it.
This difference does not allude to the scientific quality of the datum in one, versus
the other dimension of reality. It alludes to the method of scientific analysis pertaining
to one in contrast to the most appropriate for the other. Both basic datum are
respectively, equally grounded in the empirical reality. They differ however, in its
respective susceptibility of quantitative measurability and statistical analysis. Not
because of difference in its empirical nature but because of the available scientific
tools for the analysis of one in contrast to the other dimension.
This “cultural-interactional” dichotomy suggested here, is meant to be opera-
tional of the weberian concept of “verstehende Soziologie.”8 Such an
operationalization is meant to emphasize a crucial epistemological distinction made
by Weber between, a)the world of values, ideas, beliefs or myths, susceptible of a
scientific understanding through a systematic procedure of “Verstehen” or inter-
pretation rendered “adequate at the level of meaning” (Sinnhaft adaquat);9 and, b)
the world of directly observable behavior, more susceptible of being counted and
thus, subjected to statistical analysis rendered adequate (Kausal adequate)10 at the
level of causal associations.11
The basic premise of the theoretical framework proposed here for the study of
migration from Mexico to the United States is that this migration occurs within a
context of interaction processes between people of two different countries and within
a space which encompasses the two sides of the international border. This is espe-
cially true for undocumented migration. In general terms, Mexican migration to
the United States can be conceptualized as the outcome of the interaction between
U.S. employers and Mexican workers. This social interaction occurs within a labor
market which is by nature international, because the actors who personify demand
constitute a demand from within the United States, actualizing this demand when
they hire undocumented migrants and; because the actors who personify supply do
this from Mexico when they make a decision to migrate to the United States in
search of jobs.
For this conceptual frame I continue drawing from the basic sociological
concepts introduced by the sociologist of Erfurt. Beginning with the cultural
dimension implied in the concept of “Gemeinter Sinn,” it could be suggested that
the social relations of migration between Mexico and the United States sprung out
from the conceptualization of a certain option by the would-be migrant, that is, to
migrate to the United States in search for a job. That option was taken because it
was part of his or her culture. As such, it is learned in a process of socialization
which is both a necessary and sufficient condition for the behavior that involves
migration to the United States from some point in Mexico. That option and the
corresponding behavior of migration would not be rational from the part of the
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migrant if it were not for a corresponding behavior of a stranger in all cultural
senses except one. That of the “Gemeinter Sinn” of a labor related interaction,
which is shared by the would-be migrant from a distant place in one country, with
a would-be-employer from another country. That would-be employer is some body
with a different background and from a different country than the migrant who has
also conceptualized an option: to hire a Mexican migrant. Such an option is also an
element of his culture as it is shown below reflected in the quotations from Vice
President Nance Garner and Senator McCarran respectively. The would-be U.S.
employer has learned the socially constructed meaning of hiring a Mexican migrant
as a part of a socialization process without which the social relations of migration
between Mexico and the United States as we know them would not take place.
That shared “Gemeinter Sinn” of a labor interaction is the necessary condition for
the social relation of undocumented migration in which the Mexican actor and the
American actors recognize their respective behaviors as mutually addressed to each
other, as they become engaged in a social relation of labor giving birth to the micro
dimensional instance of what we know as Mexican undocumented immigration to
the United States. In the sharing of a “Gemeinter Sinn” of labor it is implied a
complex dimension of history. A history of how such a meaning became an element
in the respective cultures of the Mexican migrant and U.S. employer.
That historical dimension requires a special method of scientific inquiry which
is different than the one it is required for the study of the interactional dimension
implied in the actual experience of hiring and been hired implied in the phenom-
enon of the undocumented immigration from Mexico. In such an experience is
where one finds the objective dimension of migration as a social relation. In this
structural context the Mexican migrant embodies a labor supply that interacts and
corresponds in a rational way to the behavior of the U.S. employer who embodies
a labor demand. In the understanding of what this conceptual formulation implies,
lies the theoretical understanding of undocumented migration from Mexico to the
United States as a social relationship.
Theoretical Foundations for the “Interactional
Dimension of a Labor Market”
The concept of “interaction” is understood here as it was used by Weber. The
importance of this concept lies in how it relates to the concept of an “international
labor market.” I am not speaking here about the concept of “market” as it is used in
classical and neoclassical economics, but in the sense that it is used by sociologists,
and developed out of Max Weber’s theory of social interaction.
In this theoretical context, Weber distinguishes between the idea of a “perfect
market,” which would resemble that understood by classical economic theory, and
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the idea of an “imperfect market,” which diverges from the assumptions of a perfect
market. Weber’s vision of an “imperfect market”12 can be applied to structural
conditions in which processes of interaction based on money exchanges occur
between actors who tend to occupy differential or asymmetric power positions.
The primary difference between these two types of “market” lies in the fact
that the “perfect market” assumes a relationship between actors that is sufficiently
symmetrical to foster a dynamic that tends toward equilibrium between the ele-
ments in the relationship. I do not propose to determine whether this idea does or
does not apply to the international labor market from which the phenomenon of
undocumented migration from Mexico to the United States emerged. Rather, my
objective is to use the concept of an “imperfect market” as developed from Max
Weber’s formulations for two reasons: First, this concept permits the introduction
of the element of “power asymmetry” into the relationship between the principal
actors of the “labor market,” and second, it allows a virtual dissection of the inter-
action processes that make up this relationship. These processes range from the
cultural elements that shape intentions in a reflective motion. Those elements which
go, from what George Herbert Mead found in his notion of “mind” as a social
construct at a microdimensional level of analysis, to the macrodimensional levels
of the interactions between the economies of the United States and Mexico through
the process of labor migration, including the objective elements that characterize
international migration, such as an exchanged labor relationship for money.
Levels of Analysis
Within this theoretical context, undocumented migration from Mexico to the
United States is understood as a phenomenon that occurs within a) the respective
cultures of the actors involved which implies a historical dimension of the migratory
phenomenon and, b) the structure of an international labor market that spatially ex-
tends to cover both sides of the border. Interactions occur at various levels within this
structure. The most important is the interaction that takes place between a labor
demand, personified by U.S. employers, and a labor supply, personified by Mexican
migrant workers. We speak of the personification of supply and demand because both
supply and demand include “structural conditions” that go beyond the behavioral
interaction between an individual employer and the worker he employs.
Another level at which these processes of interaction occur involves the
interaction between the “structural conditions” of demand and the “structural
conditions” of supply in the country where the migration flows originate and the
country that receives them. The term “structural conditions” refers here to somewhat
abstract notions, such as the state of the respective national or regional economies
or, the respective national states, as either of them become imposed on the
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international labor market outcomes. That labor market is where the Mexican
migrants and their U.S. employers interact. These “structural conditions” are
operationalized respectively as “factors.” These are the set of elements (“factors”)
that comprise everything causally related to labor demand or labor supply, including
migratory behaviors. Hence, the term “factors” refers to the elements that make up
labor demand and labor supply in the international market in which migrants
participate. It is the “factors” that allow or make possible or necessary the presence
of a labor supply or a labor demand. The set of “factors” that makes up the “structural
conditions” of labor supply may be partially or totally independent from the “factors”
that make up the “structural conditions” of labor demand.
An Operationalization of
the Levels of Analysis
Although we can envision other levels of interaction—to explain cultural in-
fluences or changes, for example—for the research that I propose here, only three
levels of analysis need to be used; these are outlined below:
A) The level of interaction between specific actors, where we seek to explain
their observed and inferred behavior and behavioral change. Each of
these actors directs or orients his behavior toward the other in a
relationship that exists because both actors share or understand in the
same way the meaning of the other’s behavior. In the case of the migrants
of one country and the employers of another country, the interaction is a
labor relation, that is, a relation in which both actors understand that
one will provide labor and the other will pay money in exchange.
This theoretical context assumes that there may be power
asymmetry between the actors in the interaction, and that this power
differential determines asymmetric positions for the actors within the
structure of market relations. Given this assumption, we can design the
research to empirically identify what are the defining characteristics of
the power asymmetry between actors, and what are the implications of
this asymmetry for the nature of the relationship.
At this level, the interaction between actors can be extended to
include interactions between migrants and other actors who are on the
demand side but are not strictly employers. These are called “significant
others.” An illustration of these are the agents of the United States Border
Patrol or representatives of other organizations or institutions on the
demand side, who interact so frequently with the migrants that enable
the observer to empirically identify patterns of interaction.
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One important methodological characteristic of this level of
analysis is that it can be carried from the macrodimentional levels to the
most microdimensional ones that the research demands. This was
probably one important reason why Weber placed the definition of basic
concepts for the study of social relations in the first chapter dedicated to
spell out the methodology that would correspond to his theoretical
approach. More important for the purposes of this paper is to underline
the theoretical difference between the notion of market in classical
economics and the notion of market in the sociological theory of Max
Weber. This is especially important when the object of our study is a
labor market. We sociologists object to equating labor with the purchase
or the bartering of a barrel of oil or a ton of corn, as if all can be equated
as market commodities. To the extent that the labor force as a commodity
is linked with the destiny of its producer in terms of universally accepted
human and labor rights, it is significantly differentiated from any other
type of commodity. Because these other commodities have no inherent
rights associated with their producer, they can have, and in fact do have,
a destiny that can be totally independent of that of their buyers or sellers.
Because of their independent destiny, these commodities are generally
subject to markets in which price, theoretically is the result of a tendency
toward an equilibrium between the forces of supply and the forces of
demand. This tendency could not be assumed without some minimum
degree of power symmetry between the actors representing supply and
demand respectively. When we turn to look at a labor market from a
sociological perspective, it is virtually impossible to find such symmetry
and equilibrium, particularly as we look at the lowest wage levels. This
is why Weber diverges from the notion of market proposed in classical
economics in order to introduce the variable of power as an element in
the interactions of an “imperfect market,” a concept particularly
applicable to labor markets. Here power is taken to mean the number
and merit of the options that each partner in the labor relationship has to
impose its conditions on the other partner.13
According to adherents of Weber’s theory of social relations, the
idea of labor market stems from the premise that it is a social structure
shaped by interactions between actors who can hold differential power
positions; thus, the exchange of labor for money need not necessarily tend
toward equilibrium for us to be able to view it validly as a market
relationship. Weber introduces the element of power differential between
actors in an “imperfect market,” and we can use his sociological construct
in modeling a labor relationship as asymmetric, such as the one that exists
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between Mexican migrant workers and U.S. employers. Weber’s concept
of market permits us to logically organize not only the specific elements
that personify supply and demand, but also the contexts that condition the
existence of supply and demand, respectively, as components of this market.
Thus, this is how this concept allows us to speak of the “structural
conditions” on the “demand side” and on the “supply side.” These conditions
include “factors” such as the domestic market of each country, allowing us
to envision the interactions of each domestic labor market with that of the
neighboring country through the link of international migration. This means
that each domestic labor market is a part of the respective conditions of
supply and demand in the context of an international labor market. This is
the theoretical notion that it is used here in order to understand the processes
of interaction between factors located on both sides of the frontier between
the two countries interconnected by this migration. These factors produce
impacts on a phenomenon whose empirical reality can be defined by the
fact that migrants sell their labor in exchange for money in a country other
than their homeland.
B) The level of interaction between the “structural conditions” that
correspond to supply and demand, respectively. This is a level of analysis
that permits a more macrodimensional focus, through which it is possible
to analyze, for example, the interactions between a state of economic
recession on the demand side and a drop in the amount of remittances
that migrants make to their home economies. Another example might
be the interaction between changes in the age structure of the population
on the demand side, when these changes yield a labor shortage that
interacts with conditions on the supply side to produce a migration flow
that has different conditions than it would have had if there were no
changes in the age structure on the demand side.
C) The level of interaction between the “factors” that comprise the “condi-
tions” of supply or of demand in such an international labor market. By
focusing the analysis at this level, it is possible to move from the macro
to the micro level in order to examine the relationship that could exist,
for example, when drought affects a region in the migrants’ country of
origin, increasing their need to depend on work in the United States.
The resulting increase in the migrant labor force, in turn, lowers the
“market value” in the United States of those migrants who were the
victims of the drought in their home region.
In the scenario proposed above, we could say that drought in the region of
origin entered into interaction with the demand conditions in the destination country
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through the phenomenon of migration, even though this drought would have been
an independent factor with respect to the demand conditions if migration did not
exist as a mediating link between the two countries. This same concept of migration
as a mediator, enabling conditions of supply in one country to interact with conditions
of demand in the other, allows us to identify and measure the costs and benefits of
undocumented migration for the sending country and for the receiving country, as
well as the association between them. This is something that would be very difficult
to do without this concept. It explains, for example, the inflation that occurs on the
supply side when the migrants make seasonal returns to their homes in Mexico;
and, on the demand side the social mobility of some Hispanics as a result of the
savings that the hiring of undocumented Mexican migrants represents.
The theoretical schema presented above refers to a relatively static view of the
structure of relations in an international labor market. Therefore there must be
other concepts that can contribute toward explaining the dynamism that actually
characterizes the migration phenomenon. Along this line of thinking the concepts
of “circular migration,” “migration flows,” and “migration stocks” will be intro-
duced after the following section.
The main objective of this paper is to make clear, through scientific methods,
the elements that turn the reality of migration between Mexico and the United
States into a myth, and the elements that hinder our understanding of this reality.
Only with a clear understanding can the people and the governments of these two
countries act in concert to address the migration issue in a way that takes their
respective interests into account.
With this aim in mind, a central definition of undocumented immigration is
proposed. One that could be used to lead scientific research as well as serving as a
common ground for bilateral negotiations.
A Central Definition of Undocumented
Immigration from Mexico
Undocumented immigration from Mexico to the United States is understood
here as a process of social interactions between people from the two countries as
they move across the U.S.-Mexico border or are located in a country different than
that of his or her counterpart in a labor relation. The basic meaning of these
interactions corresponds to an international labor market where the demand from
the United States is as real as the supply from Mexico.
The basic elements of this definition are the concepts of a) a context of processes
of social interactions across the international border and, b) the asymmetry of power.
These two concepts have the analytical advantage of being able to apply from one
end to the other of the continuum that goes from the micro to the macro levels of
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analysis. That is, from the micro level of the social interaction between a migrant
worker and his or her employer, to the macro level of the interaction between the
national economies or governments or cultures, as long as they are relevant for the
shaping of conditions for the international labor market where the undocumented
migrant worker is inserted.
These basic concepts allow the analysis to follow different axes of the patterns
of social interactions of the undocumented immigrant such as: a) the geographical
location of actors or factors at each side of the border or; b) the structural location
of actors or factors pertaining to the international labor market between the two
countries or, c) the identification of the external processes of interaction character-
izing either the demand side or the supply side of the respective country, within
which there are interplays of internal labor market shaping conditions connected to
those external processes of interaction as suggested in the diagram.
This definition of undocumented immigration from Mexico is not shared by
the governments nor by the majority of the people of the two countries. The pres-
ence of undocumented immigrants from Mexico in the United States is predomi-
nantly viewed as an exogenous calamity. As a crime-related phenomenon thus, as
a law enforcement problem which requires a police type of solution.
The same people doing the same thing are viewed in Mexico as people who go
to theUnited States in search of a job to do things that American citizens are not
interested in doing for a living. In a nutshell, Mexican undocumented migrants do
something as legitimate as the benefits received by those who hire them in the
United States.
The marked contrast between the perceptions or visions of undocumented
Mexico-U.S. migration held respectively in the two countries concerned is not
due to a lack of adequate information as much as it is due to a contrast between
the respective national interests of these two countries, in turn associated with
the asymmetry of power that characterizes relations between Mexico and the
United States.
With the above definition we move to an empirical analysis of the two
dimensions suggested above. This analysis results from different methodological
approaches required by the difference explained above between the cultural and
the interactional dimensions. Both pertain to the same phenomenon to the extent
that values which shape perceptions leading to immigration policies belong to the
immigration issue as much as the actual number of undocumented immigrants
working in the agricultural production of a particular region of the United States.
One dimension might not be directly related to the same facts than the other.
Furthermore, one dimension could be in contradiction to the other or follow different
dynamics. The theoretical assumptions followed in this analysis are, a) that the
interplay between the two dimensions has to be understood before the undocumented
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immigration phenomenon is under control and, b) that the same method of research
can not be applied to the two dimensions.
There are in fact two “cultural” dimensions of this bilateral phenomenon. One
corresponding to the conditions of the supply side in Mexico and another correspond-
ing to the conditions of the demand in the United States. For the purpose of discussion
of the theoretical frame of reference proposed in this paper, focus will be placed on
the cultural dimension corresponding to the demand side of the international labor
market, as it is shaped in the United States. For the “Verstehen” at the level of mean-
ing of the “cultural” dimension of the undocumented immigration in the United
States, an historical approach will be taken, led by the following hypothesis.
The public morality of those in the United States who believe that Mexican
immigration is a threat or something exogenous and harmful includes an ideologi-
cal construct that justifies in moral terms the sanctions or punishments levied against
those identified or labeled as “illegal aliens.” This ideological construct is a social
construct in a similar sense in which Max Weber understood that element of the
social relations to which he called the “Gemeinter Sinn.”14 as the intersubjective
meaning commonly attached to a behavior or a symbol by the members of a com-
munity in a context of a social interaction.
What it makes the meaning attached to the presence of undocumented immi-
grants from Mexico stick in the social context of the United States is an act of
power. Its exercise corresponds to an asymmetry of power between those who
label15 them “illegal aliens” and those who are so labeled. The common meaning of
such a label is about some one (an alien) who has entered the United States braking
the U.S. laws with the main purpose of doing something which will represent a
cost or a burden to the American people.16
“Illegal aliens” are viewed today in the United States both, as a cause of some
of the worst calamities that afflict the country, such as drug traffic, and as source of
cheap labor. That is, both, as a problem and as a solution. The intensity of these
views varies over time respectively. The contradiction between them however,
becomes more acute in times of economic crisis.17
If we look at the history of migration from one country to the other, what
stands out is the United States’ interest in gaining access to cheap Mexican labor.
The following quotation, drawn from the congressional hearings on migration held
in 1926, is particularly eloquent:
Mr. Chairman, here is the problem in a nutshell. Farming is not a profitable
industry in this country, and, in order to make money out of this, you have to
have cheap labor... in order to allow land owners now to make a profit on their
farms, they want to get the cheapest labor they can find, and if they can get the
Mexican labor it enables them to make a profit. That is the way it is along the
border and I imagine that is the way it is anywhere else.18
832
For the purpose of the methodology suggested here, this quotation becomes
even more significant when we learn that its author was John Nance Garner, who
built his fortune on agricultural lands adjacent to Mexico, just north of Piedras
Negras, Coahuila, and who became Vice-president of the United States a few years
after making this statement in a congressional hearings.
A few years later we find the same clear “Gemeinter Sinn” of a national inter-
est underlying the immigration policies of the United States. In 1953 Senator Walter
McCarran declared the following before a Senate Committee:
Senator [Elender], I think you will agree with me that on this side of the border
there is a desire for these wetbacks... Last year when we had the Appropriations
Bill up, the item that might have prevented them from coming over to some
extent, was stricken from the Bill... we might as well face this thing realistically.
The agricultural people, the farmer along the Mexican side of the border in
California, in Arizona, in Texas... want this help. They want this farm labor.
They just can not get along with out it.19
It is intriguing how these references to the cheapness of Mexican labor in
congressional hearings testimony in the United States over several decades seem
to assume that the Mexican labor force is a sort of a natural resource, something
inexpensive by its very nature. What it is more relevant for the purpose of the
theoretical framework used here, is the way this two statements reflect very
eloquently the cultural understanding of Mexican immigrant labor among United
States employers in a historical perspective. These statements allude to two levels
of power asymmetry, one, between the U.S. employers and the migrant workers
and; two, between the United States and Mexico. Here you have U.S. Senators
talking about Mexican citizens as if there was no international law or as if Mexico
did not exist as a sovereign nation to be dealt with about her own citizens. Here we
have a power asymmetry reflected at both end levels; from the macro to the
microdimensional. The latter reflected in the capacity of U.S. employers to exercise
their power by imposing low wages upon the socially constructed vulnerability of
the Mexican migrant. It suffices to compare the salaries compiled in the meticulous
research conducted by Manuel Gamio. Gamio noted that the average salary paid to
migrant workers in southeast Texas in 1926 was between $1.50 and $2.00 per day.20
Twenty-four years later, Saunders and Leonard recorded average salaries in this
same region at $2.50 an hour for a twelve-hour workday.21 If we factor in inflation
in the interim, we find that salaries have risen hardly at all in nearly 25 years, while
the profit returns to agriculture in this region rose 1,000 percent in the same period,
according to these same authors.22
Then followed the years of the Bracero Program, from 1942 to 1965. No
one has described more knowledgeably or more eloquently the conditions of
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extreme exploitation that migrant workers suffered during these years than
Dr. Ernesto Galarza in his classic work, Merchants of Labor: The Mexican
Bracero Story.23
During my years as a graduate student, when I posed as an undocumented
migrant as part of an exercise in participant observation which I reported in my
doctoral dissertation,24 I had occasion to witness an event that reflected very
eloquently the way in which the power asymmetry between Mexicans and U.S.
citizens was brought into play to drive salaries down. It was the summer of 1969.
I was in Weslaco, Texas, and had joined a group waiting on a street corner to be
hired by a farmer. A truck drew up and stopped near the group. The driver gestured
that we could climb aboard. About 20 of us did so, almost everyone who had been
waiting. They took us to a ranch about 15 kilometers away. The driver of the truck
got out, and we all got down. His first words to us were: “There’s lots of you....” As
if he had not expected us. Then he said: “Let’s see... raise your hand if you want to
work for a dollar an hour.” Nearly everyone in the group raised his hand. “No...
there are still too many of you,” he said. Then he added: “Let’s see, raise your hand
if you want 75 cents an hour.” The number of us who raised our hands dropped to
half. As his voice rose in impatience he said: “No... there’s still too many. Let’s see,
who wants the job for 50 cents an hour.” The group of us raising our hands dropped
to seven. Talking like someone who had repeated the same speech many times
before, the foreman told those who had not raised their hands: “Ok, boys, you’ll
get a chance another time. Get on your way fast so I don’t have to call the police
and have you cited for trespassing.”
As the big group of unhired workers moved away, they began to yell at us,
clearly angered, as if in persisting at trying to get a job, even at low salaries,
we had failed to show the hoped-for solidarity. Their mildest words for us were,
“You hungry bastards.” The foreman turned around toward the seven who had
survived this “reverse auction,” where those who won employment were those
who offered the lowest price. The foreman gestured, and all the workers
responded with a palms up gesture. I did the same as the others. When the
foreman came around and saw my hands, he told me laconically: “Not you...
you go with the others.”
As I walked slowly toward the ranch gate I asked myself if this was the ultimate
measure of power asymmetry between U.S. employers and Mexican workers, and
how long it had taken to transform it into a shared code of communication, into a
“Gemeinter Sinn,” well understood and well accepted despite its clear disadvantage
for the migrant workers. I asked myself at what point this disadvantage in hiring
conditions had been transformed into an element in the culture of the labor market
of migrants and their employers in a foreign country. Posterior reflection on this
experience made clearer to me that this is some sort of a last degree of “freedom”
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before reaching the point where work stops being a social relation between an
employer and a “free” worker to become slave labor. Taking the theoretical
perspective in which international labor migration is viewed as a social relation
that takes place in the structural framework of an international labor market, this
notion of a scale of “freedom” within which the worker acts in response to conditions
that the employer sets, is relevant because it leads to the point where the worker’s
level of freedom disappears, and with it the nature of the social relationship. When
this happens, as it does with slavery, we are no longer talking about a social
relationship of labor but about a unilateral act of power.
Over more than 20 years of conducting research on undocumented migration,25
I have seen very few improvements in the working conditions of the migrants. I
thought I had seen everything until I visited the so-called spider holes that migrant
workers are constructing today, at the end of the 20th Century, in the northern
part of San Diego County. The migrants spend their nights in these holes. By day
they work in the few crops that have not yet been edged out by changing land use
patterns which convert agricultural land into the proliferation of residential
developments that is taking over this area that formerly grew the most beautiful
flowers in southern California, cultivated since the first plantings in the 1940s by
Mexican hands.
To summarize: For decades, the United States has demonstrated an insatiable
appetite for Mexican labor. This appetite is not constant. It has decreased in times
of high unemployment, as during the economic crises of 1907, 1921, 1929-34,
1954, 1974, 1981 and 1992. Nevertheless, in none of these crises has the appetite
for cheap labor fallen to zero. In the three most recent crises, I have been able to
document a paradoxical situation: the crisis itself encourages some businessmen,
who under normal conditions would not hire undocumented migrant workers, to
turn to this labor force in order to lower their production costs as a way of dealing
with the impacts of the crisis.
In all of these crises, measures have been proposed that would expel Mexican
migrant workers en masse, offering ideological justifications that I will discuss in
the following section. In many of these crises, there were broad expulsions of fully
documented Mexican immigrants. Instances include the crises of 1907,26 1921,27
1929-34,28 and 1954.29
What is important to note here in terms of the proposed hypothesis is, that
the United States has demonstrated a long-standing and intense demand for Mexican
migrant labor. But the United States wants to satisfy this demand for a resource
which comes from abroad according to its own unilateral terms. In this way the
United States is exercising the power asymmetry it holds over the country from
which it extracts de facto the cheap labor force it seeks. Even when bilateral
agreements have been signed that would regulate this demand, as was the case
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with several of the bracero agreements, these were flagrantly violated, as
documented by Craig,30 Galarza,31 Gamboa,32 García,33 Montejano,34 Sobek,35 and
Taylor,36 again testifying with each violation to the power asymmetry in U.S.
relations with Mexico, even when the U.S. government has put its signature on a
bilateral agreement with Mexico.
One could argue that the U.S. interest in Mexican labor has not been so much
national as regional, although, as Gamboa has ascertained,37 demand in the United
States has geographic roots as far away as Washington State, on the border with
Canada. What is clearly beyond question is that the U.S. government, when deal-
ing with Mexico, has put all its might behind its interest in Mexican labor. The
most recent expression of this government support is the United States’ unilateral
decision from the outset, to exclude labor migration from the agenda in the nego-
tiations of NAFTA.
This degree of national support, by which the United States has historically
guaranteed U.S. employers unrestricted access to Mexican labor, has led to a per-
sisting official definition of undocumented immigration as a problem of criminal-
ity and law enforcement.
When public opinion reaches a high level of consensus around this official
definition, it becomes equated with “national interest.” At this level, the
predominance of such a public definition makes politically impossible any alteration
of the official position that equates “illegal aliens” with criminals, particularly
because this definition has the function of producing savings to the U.S. economy.
These savings are equal to the difference between the salary and benefits that an
undocumented migrant receives as a function of being undocumented, and the
salary that a U.S. citizen actually receives for the same work, particularly in regions
and economic sectors where the hiring of undocumented workers is widespread.
The implied equation for this function would lead to a result that could well total
several billion dollars per year. This is equal to the costs the U.S. economy would
be likely to incur in salary differentials if bilateral negotiations produced a
legalization program that would regulate hiring practices, wages, working
conditions, as well as the number of Mexican migrant workers which would
correspond to the real size of a U.S. labor needs. When one imagines the economic,
social and political meaning of such a notion of dealing with the undocumented
immigrants from Mexico as a bilateral phenomenon related to a de facto
international labor market, one can imagine the analogy of such changes with
what implied in the 19th Century the rising cost of the black labor force in the
United States once slavery was abolished. In this analogy lies one part of the
explanation of why there is such a resistance from the part of the U.S. government
to officially recognize the labor market nature and the bilateral causality that
characterize and drive the phenomenon of undocumented Mexican migration. In
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refusing to give this recognition, the United States is exercising an act of power
which is essentially no different in nature than the act of power involved in
justifying the enslavement of blacks in the 19th Century.
Although as yet little research has been done in this area, the profile of an
hypothesis emerges from history. This is one which goes to the root of the problem
addressed in this paper. That is, that the current and widespread economic interest
in keeping the U.S. border with Mexico relatively open to the entry of undocumented
migrants exists, not because there is a real need for labor or because the labor
demand cannot be satisfied domestically, but because this is a strategy that can
lower, or slow the rise of, salary levels in U.S. regions that draw Mexican migrants.
In other words, the conditions of power asymmetry between these two countries
make undocumented migrants vulnerable in terms of their human and worker rights
in the United States. This allows U.S. employers to pay salaries and impose labor
conditions that are inferior to those that would be acceptable to local workers. This
decreases the salaries of undocumented migrants, but it also produces a wider impact
on salaries since it drives down the salaries for other jobs that are near the bottom
of the wage scale. In summary, this hypothesis could be stated as follows:
undocumented migration from Mexico to the United States is maintained because
it depresses wage levels, thus, the greater the oversupply of migrant labor, the most
marked is the decrease in wage levels in the region. If this hypothesis can be
confirmed, it would explain why the United States does not use its might to close
the border to undocumented migrants, and why it took the decision not to include
labor migration in the negotiations of NAFTA.
The attempt has been in the previous sections to reach a sociological Verstehen,
“adequate at the level of meaning” of the “cultural” dimension of undocumented
immigration in the United States. We turn now to the other dimension that it was
called “interactional” where some basic socioeconomic characteristics of the
undocumented immigrants from Mexico will be presented in a route toward an
“Erklarendes Verstehen” of this phenomenon, for which methodological approach
the concept of “circulatory migration” becomes crucial.
Circular Migration between Mexico
and the United States
It is well known that many of the workers involved in immigration flows into
the United States return to their country of origin. In the case of migration from
Mexico to the United States, which has persisted for over a hundred years, not only
has there been a return flow but it has included the majority of migrants. These
workers return to Mexico after a migratory “career” that involves alternating stays
in the receiving areas in the United States and in their home communities in Mexico.
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Such a migratory “career” can continue for several years, but it generally ends
with an aging worker’s definitive return to Mexico. Obviously this is not true in
every case. A growing proportion of migrants is choosing to remain permanently
in the United States. Perhaps the decision to remain in the United States or to
return definitively to the home community is a function of the intensity of the
interaction between the sending community and the receiving community, reflected
in the number of family members that the first-time migrant has in the United
States. That is, the fewer family members a migrant has in the United States, the
more likely it is that he will return definitively to Mexico.
Data obtained from the Zapata Canyon project support these hypotheses. They
reveal a process of circular migration from Mexico to the United States which is
clearly related to the geographical proximity of these two countries. By circular
migration it is understood here, the process by which an individual alternates stays
in Mexico and the United States, for more than six months, between his or her
family residence and job residence, until either age, success or failure, makes him
or her to permanently establish his family residence at some point of his or her
circulatory route, either in Mexico or in the United States.
The notion of circular migration holds methodological and theoretical impli-
cations. Methodological, because of at least two reasons, a) length of stays in the
United States might be increasingly long, returns to Mexico become increasingly
short and job residence becomes permanent as a result of family reunification.
Then, new entries to the United States from Mexico might increase the volume of
the migratory flow giving the observer the impression of an increase in immigra-
tion to the United States, when in fact he or she is observing an increase in the
intensity of a circulatory movement, including Mexican citizens who might have
moved on a permanent basis to the United States. On the other hand, b) when
measured properly, circulatory migration might become an indicator of the inten-
sity of the interactions between “structural conditions” and “factors” located at the
two sides of the border, which are associated to the phenomenon of international
migration between the two countries.
The notion of circular migration holds theoretical implications because the
definition of a migrant should no longer depend on his or her position on the map
but on his or her engagement in an international labor market. Traditional definitions
of a migrant require his or her crossing of a geographical boundary for certain
period of time. The notion of a circulatory migration should be operationalized
from the theoretical assumption that a migrant is a person who is no longer a
permanent resident of his or her home town because of a decision that implies
joining an international labor market by responding to a perceived labor demand in
another country. This means that a migrant is a migrant from the moment he or she
has left home with the intention of looking for a job in another country.
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For the purpose of estimating of the number of international migrants, the
count should begin when they join the migratory circle, regardless of whether that
person has crossed an international border or not. The migratory circle includes the
geographical space between the last permanent residence and the place of migratory
destination. The latter could be of various types—from an attempted destination to
an actually reached one. The analyst’s selection of the type of migratory destination
might depend on the scope of the analysis. The important implication here is to
include all persons who are in the international migratory circle in the enumeration
of international migrants, whether or not they have left the country of origin or
reached the country of destination.
There is need is for the concept of “circulatory migration” because to know
the actual cost and benefit of international migration for the countries of origin and
destination respectively one needs to know how many there are in the “migratory
circle.” The operationalization of this concept should allow a better understanding
of the relationships between the costs and benefits of international migration for
the two countries by taking into account where and how the costs are borne for the
reproduction of the migrant labor force. In other words, in the theoretical context
of international circular migration, one could say: a) that circularity exists between
an economy of origin and an economy of destination which are brought into inter-
action through migration; b) if the migrant is understood as “human capital”38 needing
to be reproduced, the reproduction of this “capital” involves a cost to the economy
of origin and a net benefit for the economy of destiny, where this human capital is
generating wealth with its labor; therefore c) the economy of origin is subsidizing
the economy of destiny where this subsidy is equal to the savings that the receiving
economy realizes when it takes advantage of human capital for which it did not
pay the costs of reproduction.
Both the methodological and the theoretical implications of the concept of cir-
culatory migration should be analytically viewed from a Weberian perspective as an
“ideal type”39 of an international labor market. This is to say, a social and economic
construct. The social sense, in its microdimensional level derives from the nature of
a social relation between its most significant actors, namely the U.S. employer and
the Mexican migrant. In its macrodimensional level it involves the social, political,
economic and cultural relations between Mexico and the U.S. as nations.
The operationalization of the concept of “human capital” corresponds to the
operationalization of the concept of “structural conditions” as one of the “factors”
both, on the supply side, in terms of its production and, on the demand side, in
terms of its use. It is hoped that this conceptual framework will suggest the means
to measure the dimension of costs and benefits of international migration,
something not attempted to date, perhaps because no adequate theoretical
framework existed.
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Migratory Flows
The circular nature of international migration between Mexico and the United
States can best be measured when we are able to identify migratory flows in spatial,
temporal and numerical terms. The fact that most undocumented migrants cross at
some point along Mexico’s northern border, where they can be interviewed, has
enabled the Zapata Canyon Project to identify principal flows in terms of their
origin and destination. The measurement of migration flows has been the surest
means devised thus far for calculating variations in the volume of undocumented
migration; this is the case because efforts to measure undocumented migrant stocks
are hindered by the fact that the undocumented status of these individuals forces
them into a covert existence in the United States. Measurements of migration flows
are even more valuable when we can determine the socioeconomic characteristics
of the migrants, even though this technique has not allowed us to determine the
number of undocumented immigrants there are in the United States. The ongoing
research of the Zapata Canyon Project has illustrated the importance of focusing
on flows as the key element in the analysis of international migration between
Mexico and the United States.
The following maps depict empirical findings of two independent research
projects. One is the above mentioned Zapata Canyon Project. The other
corresponds to the Survey on Migration in the Northern Border of Mexico which
acronym in Spanish is EMIF.40 In contrast to the Zapata Canyon Project, EMIF
measures migratory flows from south to north and from north to south. Its
methodology derives from the theoretical concept of “circulating migration.” It
is based on an adaptation of what biology statisticians call “sampling of mobile
populations.” This sampling technique is used for the estimate of numbers of
migratory species. From whales to dolphins to salmon or migratory birds or blood
cells. As it is the case with some migratory species, the circular nature of the
migratory phenomenon between countries, in a theoretical frame, involves
dimensions of time and space. The conceptualization of these dimensions allowed
for the operationalization necessary for the design of the sample of continuous
migratory flows. These were developed and administered by a team of scientists
of El Colegio de la Frontera Norte, headed by the author, by means of the EMIF.
The empirical definition of “space” through which “migratory circulation” occurs,
is associated with the concept of “migratory routes.” These are like rivers that
flow with two-way currents, connecting places of origin with places of destination
of a circulating migration.
In the case of the observation of migratory flows, after the route of these virtual
rivers has been empirically established , we define the place of empirical observation
for the smallest unit of sample space, as if resorting to the narrowest part of the
river in order to better view what passes through the current. To this end, we find
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the narrow sections of these “rivers” in bus stations, airports, railroad stations, and
customs and immigration inspection places along the freeways.
All of these points are identified as corresponding to all the points of entry to
Mexico, from or to the United States, which represent levels susceptible to
conforming even more when “doors” or other units of space that are smaller, are
systematically identified in airports or bus stations through which displacements
occur through the “migratory rivers.” Once that, say, a bus station is identified as
the narrowest sampling unit, we complete a systematic count of all the persons
who pass through this “door” in units of time. Periods of three months are the most
amount of time used. During this time, we make a complete census of people who
cross. This occurs with the end of taking sample units of the smallest amounts of
time which are then selected at random in accordance with conventional sampling
techniques for designs of multistage samples.
Maps 1 to 6 indicate with arrows the set of Mexican states which consist of the place
of origin of migrants, both documented and undocumented, who were found to have the
place of destination indicated with the arrow in the map. The arrow starts in the Mexican
state with the largest number of migrants in terms of their state of origin. Data used for
the maps compiles the whole region defined by the shadowed area in the map. Arrows
point at the state of destination of the migratory flow in the United States.
The estimated number of migrants is based on conventional sampling proce-
dures applied to the sample frame of the “mobile populations” following the same
principles used by biology statisticians for their sampling technique mentioned above.
Maps 7 to 12, are based on the Zapata Canyon Project’s data. The reference to
the number of cases corresponds to actual individuals who were personally inter-
viewed based on the questionnaire that has been administered three days per week,
ever since September of 1987 to the present.
Maps 13 and 14 indicate flows of returned migration from the United States to
Mexico. In accordance to the notion of “circulating migration,” “returned migration”
does not necessarily mean a return for good. Numbers of this flow indicated in the
map correspond to individuals who, in the period during which the survey was
conducted, were found to be returning to Mexico after being identified as migrants,
coming from the United States. Data shown in the maps correspond to the first
time ever that the actual flows of returned migration is estimated directly from a
systematic random sample of actual migrants.
Map 1
This map shows the state of Guanajuato as the place of origin of the highest
number of migrants, who were found to come from the region defined by the
shadowed area, on their way to the U.S. southwest region, with the state of
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Map 1. Destination in the United States of the Flow of Migrants
Whose Stated Permanent Residence Is in One of the
Following States: Guanajuato, Michoacán, Jalisco,
Zacatecas and San Luis Potosí
Total estimated flow from Mexico to the United States = 455,695
Estimated flow from shadowed area = 209,009
Source: Survey on Migration in the Northern Border of Mexico. COLEF-CONAPO-STyPS,
from March 1993 to March 1994.
California as the place of destination for the highest number of migrants com-
ing from the shadowed area in the map. This area represents historically the
place of origin of the oldest and largest source of out labor migration from Mexico
to the United States. This was the targeted region for the first recruiting efforts
by U.S. Congress-funded recruitment programs during the second decade of
this century.
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Map 2
This map shows the origin and destination of U.S.-Mexico border migrants. The arrow
indicates the highest numbers corresponding to this short distance flow as it originates in the
state of Coahuila and as it ends in the state of Texas. Data from this and other COLEF
surveys indicate a northward tendency in the place of origin of the majority of migrants.
This is to suggest that there seems to be a tendency to shorten the distance between place of
origin and place of destination of the international migratory phenomenon under study.
Map 2. Destination in the United States of the Flow of
Migrants Living in Mexico’s Northern Border States
Total estimated flow from Mexico to the United States = 455,695
Estimated flow from shadowed area = 113,407
Source: Survey on Migration in the Northern Border of Mexico. COLEF-CONAPO-STyPS,
from March 1993 to March 1994.
NEW MEXICO 12.5%
TEXAS 57%
BETWEEN 8.5 AND 3%
LESS THAN 1.5%
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Map 3
 In a descending order, this map depicts the flow from a Western region of
Mexico in which the state of Sinaloa is the place of origin of the highest numbers
of migrants going to the state of California from the shadowed area in the map.
Map 3. Destination in the United States of the Flow of Migrants
Whose Stated Permanent Residence Is in One of the
Following States: Sinaloa, Durango, Nayarit,
Colima and Aguascalientes
Total estimated flow from Mexico to the United States = 455,695.
Estimated flow from shadowed area = 54,387.
Source: Survey on Migration in the Northern Border of Mexico. COLEF-CONAPO-STyPS.
From March 1993 to March 1994.
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Map 4
This map depicts the migration from the southern part of Mexico, with the
state of Oaxaca as the place of the highest number of labor migrants from the
region to the United States. The states of Oaxaca and Guerrero, shown in the
shadowed area in the map, are the place of origin of migrants who are mostly
Indians, some of them monolingual in their native language, and certainly the poorest
Map 4. Destination in the United States of the Flow of Migrants
Whose Stated Permanent Residence Is in One of the
Following States: Oaxaca, Guerrero and Morelos
Total estimated flow from Mexico to the United States = 455,695
Estimated flow from shadowed area = 28,831
Source: Survey on Migration in the Northern Border of Mexico. COLEF-CONAPO-STyPS,
from March 1993 to March 1994.
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among the majority of the labor migrants going to the United States. The ethnic
group in the majority of migrants coming from the states of Oaxaca and Guerrero
are the Mixtecos. They are atypical migrants in more than one sense because they
tend to fund their respective cost of migration in U.S. dollars. This is to suggest a
factor of solidarity of migrants already in the United States whose savings are the
main source of funding for the migration of others from the same ethnic group. The
majority of the rest of migrants tend to finance their journey to the United States
with Mexican pesos, meaning the migrant’s own resources. As in the majority of
Mexican migrant’s place of destination, the state of California appears as a virtual
mecca for Mexican migrant laborers. Both the Zapata Canyon and the EMIF projects
show the state of origin of more than 50% of the Mexican migrants both documented
and undocumented, with the metropolitan area of Los Angeles as the place of
destination of 75% of the total found in the state of California.
Map 5
This map depicts the flow from Central Mexico with the Federal District
(Mexico City) as the place of origin of the highest number of migrant workers
going to the United States with the predominance indicated by the arrow and the
shadowed area. Migrants from Mexico City, both documented and undocumented,
are newcomers in the statistics of out migration from Mexico to the United States.
They appeared within the 10 states with the largest numbers of international migrants,
only 15 years ago. Today, they seem to compete for the first place as a place of
origin of undocumented migration from Mexico. This is particularly the case of
the flow that passes through the city of Tijuana.
Map 6
This map shows the region of origin of the lowest proportion within the totals
of migrant workers from Mexico to the United States, with the state of Veracruz as
the place of origin of the highest numbers and the state of Chiapas with close to nil
migration to the United States. As the arrow in this map suggests, these migrants
tend to cross the border at the closest distance to the United States.
Maps 7 to 12
These maps represent accumulated figures corresponding to an eight-year
period, as opposed to the EMIF’s data, which correspond only to the twelve-month
period between 1993 and 1994. These differences in the time span of these two
sources of data are the main reason for the differences in the direction of the migratory
flow depicted in the respective series of maps. Another important difference is the
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Map 5. Destination in the United States of the Flow of Migrants
Whose Stated Permanent Residence Is in One of the
Following States:  D.F., México, Querétaro,
Puebla, Hidalgo and Tlaxcala
Total estimated flow from Mexico to the United States = 455,695
Estimated flow from shadowed area = 39,891
Source: Survey on Migration in the Northern Border of Mexico. COLEF-CONAPO-STyPS,
from March 1993 to March 1994.
sample base. Zapata Canyon Project’s data correspond to actual number of cases
with no statistical bases for a stochastic generalization of the universe of
undocumented immigrants. In contrast, the maps based on EMIF’s data, complies
with all the assumptions required for the statistical estimates indicated in the
respective maps.
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Map 6. Destination in the United States of the Flow of Migrants
Whose Stated Permanent Residence Is in One of the
Following States: Veracruz, Tabasco, Chiapas,
Campeche, Yucatán and Quintana Roo
Total estimated flow from Mexico to the United States = 455,695
Estimated flow from shadowed area = 10,128
Source: Survey on Migration in the Northern Border of Mexico. COLEF-CONAPO-STyPS,
from March 1993 to March 1994.
848
Map 7. Destination in the United States of the Flow of Migrants
Whose Stated Permanent Residence Is in One of the
Following States: Guanajuato, Michoacán,
Jalisco, Zacatecas and San Luis Potosí
Total number of cases = 107,313
Number of cases from shadowed area = 21,919
Source: Zapata Canyon Project. COLEF. From September 1987 to June 1996.
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Map 8. Destination in the United States of the Flow of
Migrants Living in Mexico’s Northern Border States
Total number of cases = 107,313
Number of cases from shadowed area = 13,122
Source: Zapata Canyon Project. COLEF. From September 1987 to June 1996.
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Map 9. Destination in the United States of the Flow of Migrants
Whose Stated Permanent Residence Is in One of the
Following States: Sinaloa, Durango, Nayarit,
Colima and Aguascalientes
Total number of cases = 107,313
Number of cases from shadowed area = 8,244
Source: Zapata Canyon Project. COLEF. From September 1987 to June 1996.
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Map 10. Destination in the United States of the Flow of Migrants
Whose Stated Permanent Residence Is in One of the
Following States: Oaxaca, Guerrero and Morelos
Total number of cases = 107,313
Number of cases from shadowed area = 5,866
Source: Zapata Canyon Project. COLEF. From September 1987 to June 1996.
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Map 11. Destination in the United States of the Flow of Migrants
Whose Stated Permanent Residenceis in One of the Following
States: D.F., México, Querétaro, Puebla, Hidalgo and Tlaxcala
Total number of cases = 107,313
Number of cases from shadowed area = 11,261
Source: Zapata Canyon Project. COLEF. From September 1987 to June 1996.
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Map 12. Destination in the United States of the Flow of Migrants
Whose Stated Permanent Residence Is One of the Following
States: Veracruz, Tabasco, Chiapas, Campeche,
Yucatán and Quintana Roo
Total number of cases = 107,313
Number of cases from shadowed area = 2,641
Source: Zapata Canyon Project. COLEF. From September 1987 to June 1996.
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Map 13. Destination in Mexico of the Flow
of Migrants from the State of California
Total estimated flow from California to Mexico = 38,758
Estimated flow from shadowed area = 15,501
Source: Survey on Migration in the Northern Border of Mexico. COLEF-CONAPO-STyPS.
from March 1993 to March 1994.
Maps 13 and 14
These maps show the volumes of the returned migration from the United States
to Mexico which took place between 1993 and 1994. Map 13 shows the flow of
return with the state of California as the place of origin and the states of Jalisco
and Michoacán as the states of destination of the majority of migrants within this
flow of return migration. When this map is compared to map 14, the importance
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of regional distinctions becomes more apparent in the empirical estimation of the
migratory flows. Map 13 shows the western states of the two countries connected
by migratory flows. Map 14 shows a similar connection between the state of Texas
and the eastern and northern central regions of Mexico.
The circulant process of migration suggested in this paper does not mean that
the migratory flows indicated in the maps presented here necessarily correspond
to different individuals with different socioeconomic characteristics. Actually, one
Map 14. Destination in Mexico of the Flow
of Migrants from the State of Texas
Total estimated flow from Texas to Mexico = 38,758
Estimated flow from shadowed area = 13,603
Source: Survey on Migration in the Northern Border of Mexico. COLEF-CONAPO-STyPS.
From March 1993 to March 1994.
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individual could appear in different flows within a short period of time. The
importance of the empirical notion of migratory flows has to do with differences in
the conditions of U.S. labor demands in interaction with conditions of Mexican
labor supply. We have found that it is the changing conditions of the international
labor market studied here where the notion of migratory flows make a difference.
This is to suggest that joining the migratory flow to California might represent a
different outcome than joining the migratory flow to Texas for a Mexican migrant
worker either documented or undocumented.
International Migration as a Process of Interaction
Recent Findings From The Zapata Canyon Project41
Some interesting data sources have been drawn regarding basic socioeconomic
characteristics of undocumented immigrants from Mexico over the last 6 years. In
regard to gender, there is a relative stability in the proportion of women. It should
be noted however, that there are significant variations when data is broken down
by state of origin. Then, migrants from the metropolitan area of Mexico City show
the highest proportion of women (24%) whereas in states more rural in the origin
of migrants such as Guerrero that proportion drops to less than 10 percent. An
important methodological finding could be stated. The more urban in origin, male
and female migrants’ data should be analyzed separately in order to account for
significant differences by gender in migratory behavior.
In regard to age, data from the Zapata Canyon Project suggest there is a tendency
toward a higher concentration in the most productive age cohorts (between 20 and
30). This could indicate an increasing competition in the labor market in the United
States and/or a shorter “migratory career,” meaning the time through which an
individual keeps himself or herself in the circulatory process of migration between
the two countries.
In regard to education (years of school attended), it is interesting to note a
decrease in the percentages of the least educated, which suggests an increase in the
“human capital” value of the undocumented immigrants.
One of the most important findings of the Zapata Canyon Project is the rela-
tively rapid increase of the urban origin of undocumented immigrants from Mexico
(13% in less than 6 years). A hypothesis could be drawn from this finding in the
sense that there is a higher cost for the economies of origin of these migrants asso-
ciated to an outmigration of a labor force that appears to be of an increasingly
higher “human capital” value.
Data resulting from the question, “Have you ever had a job in the United
States?”  provide some empirical foundation to the notion of a “circulatory
migration” put forward here. The increasing pattern of the affirmative responses
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suggest an increasingly intensive circulatory movement of these migrants between
the two countries.
Data from the Zapata Canyon Project show some patterns of destination choice
among undocumented immigrants from Mexico. They confirm previous findings
about the increasing preference for California in general and Los Angeles in par-
ticular, among undocumented immigrants from Mexico. The high degree of con-
centrated migrant flow through the city of Tijuana is congruent with the preference
for California. Almost two-thirds of the total number of Mexican undocumented
immigrants in route to the whole United States is heading toward California. This
pattern of concentration seems to be enhanced by the relative decline in the prefer-
ence for other regions of the United States or Canada in addition to the decline in
the percentages of migrants who responded not to know where they were heading
at the time when they were interviewed.
Finally, data from the Zapata Canyon Project yield empirical support for con-
tentions made above about of the persistence of a United States labor demand for
Mexican undocumented immigrants. There is an increase in the reported previous
job experience in the United States of individuals getting ready to enter the United
States again, except in farm working where a clear decline seems to be taking
place. This seems to be congruent with the patterns of increase in education levels
among undocumented immigrants.
Toward a Pragmatic Approach to Manage
Labor Migration from Mexico
In a manner of a symbolic synthesis of the two parts discussed above, an idea
for the initiation of a bilateral process of rationalization of the labor migration
phenomenon between the two countries is advanced here.
In early 1992 there was an important meeting in Washington, D.C.,  at which
representatives of the Mexican and U.S. federal governments discussed the problems
of violence on their common border. On the eve of that meeting, a high-level
functionary in the U.S. federal government, who asked not to be identified, told
me, “there are no official proposals from the Mexican side on what to do about
undocumented immigration; they only have proposals to talk about the problem,
but not about how to resolve it.” Meanwhile, of course, it is painfully clear that the
U.S. government does have proposals. These proposals all share a common
characteristic: all adopt the law enforcement focus that the U.S. government
consistently places on undocumented migration. The U.S. government never wavers
from defining this phenomenon as a crime problem requiring police-type solutions.
The persistence of this view of migration from Mexico has led the U.S. government
to categorically reject on principal the idea of considering labor migration within
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the negotiations of NAFTA. The U.S. government will only agree to deal bilaterally
with the problem of undocumented migration if it is in relation to law enforcement
policies. Its refusal to view the issue as a labor issue has been inflexible. However,
this inflexibility has not been expressed openly and hence it has not appeared in
the mass media. In my view, it is a political miscalculation on the part of the Mexican
government to allow the U.S. government to acknowledge its inflexibility only
within internal diplomatic circles. I had the opportunity to attend an ANUIES-
PROFMEX conference in Mazatlán in 1990, to hear the opening of the free trade
negotiations.
A high-level functionary from the office of Ambassador Carla Hills presented
the United States’ official position on refusing to include the migration issue as
part of the negotiations of this accord. The rationale put forward since that time
is that labor migration would only be included in the negotiation of a “common
market,” not of a “free trade agreement.” This rationale masks the fact that the
United States prefers to continue addressing the migration issue unilaterally as a
crime issue, since undocumented migration provides an inexhaustible source of
cheap labor that the United States can regulate and has regulated according to its
economic needs. It also has an additional advantage: these migrants serve politically
as scapegoats every time the U.S. government wants to hide from the U.S. public
the true causes of some hardship such as high rates of unemployment, drug
trafficking, or social unrest such as the recent disturbances in Los Angeles. To
address the migration issue as a labor phenomenon would mean bringing it to the
bilateral negotiating table, and that, in turn, would increase the costs of this labor
force that is kept cheap by virtue of the fact that it is kept undocumented, and
hence criminal. The United States’ refusal to focus on undocumented migration
as a labor issue saves the U.S. economy several billions of dollars every year.
This is the chief reason for the current U.S. position, and it is what lies behind
U.S. inflexibility on dealing with the migration issue as anything other than a law
enforcement issue.
This inflexibility is nothing other than a flagrant expression of the power
asymmetry characterizing the U.S.-Mexico relationship across all dimensions, from
the macro to the micro. In this light, the United States is unjustified in saying that
“there are no official proposals from the Mexican side.” This is asking to blame
the victim.
This situation suggests that the Mexican government should formulate a proposal
detailing what has been voiced by a series of Mexican presidents, government
ministers, and high-ranking members of Congress: a) that Mexico wants to export
products, not people; b) that undocumented migration is a labor issue and a human
rights issue; c) that these issues should be negotiated bilaterally in depth and over
the long term. This has been the position of the Mexican government during the
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last four administrations, ever since President Echeverría decided over 20 years
ago not to seek renewal of the Bracero Program agreements which had lapsed in
1965. The U.S. government has never officially accepted points b) and c) since the
U.S. view does not accept that migration is a trans-border issue demanding
“international cooperation.” It continues to hold that migration is a domestic national
security issue or a law enforcement issue. In order to correct this lack of a precise
definition of Mexico’s national interests in the issue of undocumented workers, I
propose a strategy that includes the following steps:
Step A is agreement by the two national governments to form a Bilateral Com-
mission with three objectives:
A1) to produce a bilateral report that defines and describes legal and
undocumented migration, both of Mexican citizens to the United
States and U.S. citizens to Mexico;
A2) to discuss and defend this report before representatives of the
respective legislatures and before representatives of the major
media networks, of key associations from the private sector, and
of organized labor from each country;
A3) to act as consultants to the official negotiators of a Migration Treaty
between the two countries, with commission members filling this
role in their respective countries.
Negotiating such a treaty would be step B, which could only be attempted
once the set of objectives outlined above—A1, A2, and A3—had been accomplished.
The irrationality that permeates the mythology of Mexico-U.S. migration leads
us to assume that a necessary precondition for reaching agreement on a Labor
Migration Treaty would be to de-mythify undocumented immigration. This could
be accomplished through a scientific analysis that would be produced and supported
bilaterally, making it acceptable and credible on both sides of the border. Under
current conditions, it is impossible to reach any agreement that would be acceptable
to the respective political institutions and civil societies of Mexico and the United
States. It is imperative that these conditions change. This would be the primary
objective of the proposed Bilateral Commission. This commission would be made
up of one member from each country’s respective government sector, and two
members each per country from the business sector, organized labor, and academic
institutions. It would have a budget with which to finance independent studies on
the condition that they be bilaterally directed. Its secretariat or permanent staff
would include members from both countries; these individuals would be charged
with implementing the decisions of the commission. Once the research efforts had
produced their results and the negotiations of the Migration Treaty had begun,
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commission members would act as consultants to their respective country’s team
of negotiators, except in the case of government representatives on the commission,
who could serve as members of their country’s negotiating team. The complexity
of the issue of migration between these two countries is so great that we should not
expected its negotiation to be any less intricate than the negotiation of NAFTA.
What the United States has to gain from a Labor Migration Agreement is not of a
different nature than what is expected to be gained with NAFTA; namely, a
neighboring country economically capable to buy more U.S.A.- made products
and politically stable to institutionalize similar rules of the game than those of the
neighbors to the north, joining strategies on a regional basis in order to compete
successfully with the European Community and the Asian countries.
Notes
1. This is the Zapata Canyon Project which basically consists of a survey technique
where personal interviews are systematically conducted at the main crossings sites of the
Mexican-U.S. border in the cities of Tijuana, Mexicali, Ciudad Juarez, Nuevo Laredo and
Matamoros, to a randomly selected sample of individuals on the Fridays, Saturdays and
Sundays of every week, ever since September of 1987 to the present. This project has pro-
duced the only time series data base on the flows of undocumented migration from Mexico,
other than the statistics on apprehensions produced by the U.S. Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service. Previous findings from this project have been reported, among others, in the
following publications by the author of this paper: “Undocumented Immigration: Research
Findings and Policy Options,” in R. Roett, Mexico and the United States: Managing the
Relation, Boulder, Co.: Westview Press. 1988; “Measuring the Flow of Undocumented
Immigrants,” in W. Cornelius and J. A. Bustamante eds., Mexican Migration to the United
States: Origins, Consequences and Policy Options, San Diego-La Jolla, CA: Center for
U.S.-Mexico Studies-University of California. 1989; “Undocumented Migration to the United
States: Preliminary Findings of the Zapata Canyon Project,” in: F. Bean et al. eds., Undocu-
mented Migration to the United States, Washington, D.C.: The Rand Corporation and the
Urban Institute Press. 1990.
2. Max Weber, Grundriss der Sozialokonomic; III Abteilung, Wirtschaft und
Gesellschaft, Tubingen: Verlag von J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). 1925. In the first sec-
tion entitled “Methodische Grundlagen” (Basic Methodological Premises), section 5, pp.
3-4, Weber makes a dual distinction between two kinds of “understandings,” after his fa-
mous dictum that “Verstehen” is what sociology is all about. This dual distinction is be-
tween a)”aktuelle Verstehen,” which refers to the understanding of culturally meaningful
behavior directly observable and, b)”erklarendes Verstehen,” which refers to the under-
standing that is reached for explanatory purposes, through the cultural interpretation of
social actions. This dichotomy inspired the basic distinction made in this paper where the
“cultural dimension” corresponds to an attempt toward b and the interactional dimension
corresponds to an attempt toward a.
3. J. A. Bustamante, “Structural and Ideological Conditions of the Undocumented
Immigration to the United states.” American Behavioral Scientist, Vol. 19, No. 3. New York,
N.Y.: 1976; “Commodity Migrants: Structural Analysis of Mexican Immigration,” in : S. R.
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Ross ed., Views Across the Border: The United States and Mexico. Albuquerque, N.M.:
University of New Mexico Press. 1978; “Mexican Migration; Political Dynamics of
Perceptions” in: C. Reynolds and C. Tello eds. Stanford, Ca.: University of Stanford Press.
1983; “Interdependence, Undocumented Migration and National Security” in: Jorge A.
Bustamante et al. eds. Labor Market Interdependence. Stanford, Ca.: University of Stanford
Press. 1992.
4. Documentation in support of this assertion appears in, J. A. Bustamante, “El debate
sobre la ‘invasion silenciosa’,” Foro Internacional, Vol. 17, No. 3, El Colegio de México.
México, D.F. 1977. pp. 403-417.
5. See note 2.
6. See note 2
7. Such as an individual who is actually crossing the U.S.-Mexico border at a place
where there is no inspection by the U.S. authorities. Individual whose behavior can be em-
pirically accounted for in terms of socioeconomic characteristics and statistical categories.
8. Here, the specific reference corresponds to Weber’s discussion of this concept in
sections 6, 7 and 8 of the first chapter of Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft.
9. It is argued here that one of the most serious distortions of Max Weber epistemological
approach to the study of social relations comes from Talcott Parsons’ translation of “Sinnhaft
adaquat” and “Gemeinter Sinn” as “subjectively adequate” and “subjective meaning”
respectively. There are few concepts as crucial for the understanding of Weber’s sociological
theory as the concept of “Sinn” (meaning). My reading of the original writings leads me to
interpret this concept as “a cultural sense that is commonly attached to a behavior or a
symbol which meaning is intersubjectively shared by the members of a community.” That is
an interpretation of “Sinn” as a social construct, distinctively independent in origin from the
subjective individuality. Parsons’ rendition of “Sinn” results closer to his own epistemological
approach to the social action which is anchored in the subjective individuality of attitudes.
Weber’s explicit preoccupation for a legitimate identity of sociology as a field of knowledge,
places the datum of “Sinn” in the social nature of the community, whereas Parsons places
the datum of “subjective meaning” in the psychological nature of the individual.
10. The second paragraph of section 7 of the first chapter of Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft,
leaves no doubt of Weber’s emphasis on the overt behavior as a datum required for the
“Kausal adequat” level of scientific understanding of social actions, which is to be understood
in contrast to the cultural nature of the datum required for the “Sinnhaft adequate” level.
11. This methodological distinction does not mean that cultural elements cannot be
counted or that they are not susceptible of statistical analysis. The difference is one of epis-
temological nature. It has to do more with a still weak scientific development of social
sciences where no analytical instruments have been developed yet to grasp and render di-
rectly measurable some intersubjective elements of culture, than with a positivistic distinc-
tion between “hard” and “soft” data.
12. Wolfang J. Mommsen, Max Weber und die deutsche Politik 1890-1920, pp. 23-
54, quoted by Dirk Käsler in Max Weber: An Introduction to His Life and Work (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1988). In this quote Mommsen refers to the detailed studies
that Weber made of agriculture in the region of the Elbe River, in which he analyzed in
over 12 publications appearing between 1892 and 1894 (still untranslated from the Ger-
man) the conditions of the agricultural workers, including Polish migrant workers. Many
of Weber’s ideas that are particularly relevant to labor sociologists appear in this series of
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works, commissioned by the Verein fur Sozialpolitik in 1890 to be conducted by Weber,
along with Thiel, Conrad, and Sering. My understanding of this part of social and eco-
nomic theory where Weber most thoroughly develops his sociological notion of a labor
market came from a reading of the book by Dirk Käsler, cited above, and Wolfang J.
Mommsen’s later work, The Political and Social Theory of Max Weber (Chicago: Univer-
sity of Chicago Press, 1989).
13. For a thorough analysis of the treatment that Weber gives to the topic of power
asymmetry in certain labor relations, see chapter 3, on agricultural workers, in Dirk Käsler’s
book on Weber, cited in the previous footnote.
14. See note 8. The understanding of this concept was not enhanced by the translation
into Spanish done in Mexico by a team headed by José Medina Echavarría at El Colegio de
México, first published in 1944, which rendered “Gemeinter Sinn” as “sentido mentado.” In
a work by the author entitled “The Parsonization of Weber in American Sociology,” presented
at the annual congress of the American Sociological Association held in Washington, D.C.,
in 1970, I propose that this concept should be understood as “the cultural sense that a
community attach to a behavior or a symbol” which is used or expressed in the interactional
process of constructing a social relationship. Only thus is the concept compatible with the
epistemological principle on which Weber based his insistence in differentiating psychology
from sociology; that is, “Gemeinter Sinn” is not located in, nor does it stem from, the individual
psyche but rather from the social surroundings where we find the social constructions that
shape the culture of a community.
15. This concept should be understood as used in “labeling theory.” See: Bustamante
Jorge A., “The Wetback as Deviant, An Application of Labeling Theory,” American Journal
of Sociology, Vol. 7, No.4. University of Chicago. Chicago, Ill.: U. of Chicago Press. 1972.
Pp. 706-718.
16. Both the intensity and the extension of the labeling in the way used here, becomes
exacerbated in periods of economic recession in the United States when “illegal aliens”
become the scape goats of the calamities that afflict American communities, such as unem-
ployment tax burdens, government budget deficit, health problems (from AID’s to TV), air
pollution in the city of Los Angeles etc., as it has been documented in: Bustamante, J. A.
“The Mexicans are Coming: From Ideology to Labor Relations,” International Migration
Review Vol. XVII, No.2 (summer) 1992.
17. This contradiction appears documented in, Bustamante J. A., “The Mexicans are
Coming: From Ideology to Labor Relations,” cited in footnote 12. A more current evidence
of this contradiction can be found in the contrast between the verses distributed in May of
1993 by Mr. William J. Knight, Assemblyman representing the 36th California district and
former mayor of the City of Palmdale, and the table that appear in the following page,
showing the persistence of undocumented immigrant labor demands in the last 6 years in
spite of the economic recession in the United States.
18. U.S. Congress, Hearings before the Committee on Immigration and Naturalization,
1926. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office. 1926. Pp. 20-24
19. U.S. Senate. Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, S.1917.
Appropriations Hearings. 1953. P. 123 (Senator McCarran).
20. Manuel Gamio, Mexican Immigration to the United States. New York: Dover
Publications, 1971.
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21. Lyle Saunders and Olen F. Leonard, The Wetback in the Lower Rio Grande Valley
of Texas. Inter-American Occasional Papers, No. 7 Austin: University of Texas Press, 1951,
pp. 16-17.
22. Ibid., p . 18.
23. Here are the final paragraphs of Galarza’s book, which support the first hypothesis
presented in this paper:
“The picture of the ideal worker drawn by the managers of migration for trade-unionists
to contemplate, was that of the man of the barracks, the main in a camp who spent all of his
time under supervision if not under surveillance. Occasionally some of these total communities
were surrounded by barbed wire, though this was in any event only symbolic. Though invisible,
a more effective barrier surrounded them—the social distance created by differences in
language, customs and unfamiliar patterns of character and behavior. Outside the barracks
the limits of freedom were prescribed, and they were also the limits of the job. Liberty had
found its economic determinant.
“No doubt efficiency lay in this direction and not in that of the man of the family; of the
spontaneous relationships of the free life after work; of the street corner, back yard and
meeting hall talk to discover interests commonly held and perhaps to devise ways in com-
mon to protect them, to discover the vital connections between work and citizenship.”
The image of the perfect farm laborer that was thus in the making under administered
migration was not, unfortunately, one that could be seen only at home. Each time that
California’s industrial farmers drew heavily on some alien reservoir of cheap labor they
called it to the attention of foreign lands.
“It could hardly be avoided. Commercial agriculture, bidding in a world stirred by
agrarian revolt, invited inspection. What it had to show, behind its dazzling efficiency, was
the managed, not the autonomous, man.
“The trumpet calls of the New Frontier were still echoing when Senator Harrison A.
Williams, Jr., chairman of the Senate subcommittee on migratory labor, posed the question:
“If a man in an underdeveloped country can point to our migratory farm workers and ask
why we have not set our house in order, what answer shall we give him?”
“The answer seemed to come in the words of four patricians of industrial agriculture
testifying at a congressional hearing, the Messis. William H. Tolbert, Bruce Sanbom, Jr.,
George Lyons and Leland J. Yost: ‘The same thing was true even in the Roman Empire.
When they reached a stage of civilization they had to reach out to other areas where there
was a lesser standard of living to bring in those people to do the menial tasks.’
24. Jorge A. Bustamante, “Mexican inmigration to the United States; the Social Rela-
tions of Capitalism,” Ph.D. dissertation. Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Uni-
versity of Notre Dame. January 10, 1975.
25. I refer to the following works where I developed ana analytical distinction between
the economic or “structural” dimension and the ideological or political dimension of un-
documented immigration from Mexico to the United States: J. A. Bustamante, “Commodity
migrants: Structural Analysis of Mexican Immigration,” in: Views Across the Border: The
United States and Mexico, Stanley Ross (ed.). University of New Mexico Press. 1978. Pp.
183-203; J. A. B. “Condiciones estructurales e ideológicas de la emigración mexicana
indocumentada a los Estados Unidos,” in: El Economista Mexicano, Vol. 12, No. 2, March-
April, 1979. Pp. 24-38; J. A. B. “La migración indocumentada México-Estados Unidos:
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Relación entre dinámica política y estructuras económicas,” in: Primer encuentro sobre
impactos regionales de las relaciones económicas México-Estados Unidos, vol. 3, Eliseo
Mendoza Berrueto (ed.) 1992. Pp. 241-310; J. A. B. “Mexican Migration: Political Dynam-
ics of Perceptions” in: United States-Mexico Relations: Economic and Social Aspects, C.
Reynolds and C. Tello (eds.) Stanford University Press. 1983. Pp. 259-276; J. A. B. “La
migración de los indocumentados,” in: El Cotidiano, (special issue 1) 1987. Pp. 13-29; J. A.
B. “La política de inmigración de Estados Unidos; Un análisis de sus contradicciones,” in:
Migracion en el Occidente de México, El Colegio de Michoacán. 1988. Pp. 19-40.
26. We learn of these conditions through the criticisms and denunciations that writers
from the Liberal Party were able to publish in opposition newspapers during the era of
Porfirio Díaz. The following paragraph is an eloquent example. It is drawn from one of
these publications, “El Colmillo Ilustrado,” and was published on March 8, 1905.
“On previous occasions we have referred to the mistreatment suffered by Mexicans
who migrate to the United States. The representatives of our government in that country are
not in the least concerned about this suffering which is so evident among our fellow
countrymen who are in that Republic. Because of their lack of interest, we find that many of
our compatriots are wandering, unable to find work, half naked, and dying of hunger. The
government of Mexico is to blame when Mexicans abroad are made victims of mistreatment
and abuse. This blame accrues because of their lack of vigor in defending these people’s
rights. Our government must insist that the fundamental rights of our citizens in the United
States be respected. The dignity of our nation demands it” (p. 30).
27. See J. A. Bustamante, “El debate sobre la ` invasión silenciosa’. Foro Internacional,
vol. 17, no. 3 (El Colegio de México), 1977. Pp. 403-417.
28. The two best works on the expulsions of Mexicans during the years of the Great
Depression are by Mercedes Carreras de Velazco, Los Mexicanos que devolvió la crisis 1929-
1932 (Dirección General de Archivo, México, D.F.: Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores), and,
by Abraham Hoffman, Unwanted Mexican-Americans in the Great Depression: Repatriation
Pressures, 1929-1939 (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1974).
29. See Juan Ramón García, Operation Wetback: The Mass Deportation of Mexican
Undocumented Workers in 1954 (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1980); and, Julián Samora,
Los mojados: The Wetback Story (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1971).
30. Richard B. Craig, The Bracero Program: Interest Groups and Foreign Policy (Austin:
University of Texas Press, 1971).
31. Op. cit.
32. Erasmo Gamboa, Mexican Labor and World War II: Braceros in the Pacific North-
west, 1943-1947 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1990).
33. Op. cit.
34. David Montejano, Anglos and Mexicans in the Making of Texas, 1836-1986 (Austin:
University of Texas Press, 1990).
35. María Herrera Sobek, The Bracero Experience: Elitelore versus Folklore (Berke-
ley: University of California Press, 1979).
36. If we had to rely on the research of a single author to prove our first hypothesis, the
research conducted by this conscientious scholar from the 1920s through the 1980s would
suffice. See Paul S. Taylor, Labor on the Land: Collected Writings, 1930-1970 (New York:
Arno Press, 1981).
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37. Op. cit.
38. This concept is used as understood by G. S. Becker in Human Capital; a Theoretical
and Empirical Analysis. New York, N.Y.: National Bureau of Economic Research. 1975.
39. At least three sources should be consulted for a basic understanding of what Weber
meant by an “ideal type”: M. Weber, an “ideal type”: Economy and Society, (edited by
Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich) New York, N.Y.: 1968. Pp. 20-22; M. Weber, “The Mean-
ing of Discipline,” in: From Max Weber (H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (eds.) New York,
N.Y.: Oxford University Press. 1958. P. 42 and; M. Weber, “Objectivity in Social Science
and Social Policy” in: The Methodology of Social Sciences, E. A. Shils and H. A. Finch
(eds.). New York, N.Y.: Free Press. 1949. P. 104.
40. This research project was originally submitted to a competition for research projects
to be funded by the World Bank and under the conditions of competition established by the
World Bank, organized by Mexico’s Secretary of Labor and the National Council of Popu-
lation. The maps are drawn from data corresponding to the first year of this survey 1993-94.
41. For a description of this project see note 1.
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FACTORS THAT INFLUENCE MIGRATION
U.S.-Mexican Migration
Philip Martin
Mexico hosts a significant foreign population—some 440,000 foreignerswere registered with the National Migration Institute as permanentresidents of Mexico in 1995, including 150,000 U.S. citizens.1
There is a significant migration between the U.S. and Mexico. Most U.S.-
Mexican migration involves Mexican citizens who are returning after seasonal
employment in the U.S. In addition, it is believed that many legal Mexican immi-
grants return to settle in Mexico—return migration may be equivalent to 20 to 30
percent of annual Mexican immigration. Finally, some U.S. citizens—many of
Mexican origin—move to Mexico each year, especially after they retire from their
U.S. jobs. There were reportedly 150,000 U.S. citizens registered with Mexico’s
National Migration Institute as permanent residents of Mexico in 1995.
There are also temporary foreign workers in Mexico grouped, as in the U.S.,
at the extremes of the job ladder. According to press accounts, Mexico issues about
125,000 work permits to foreign workers each year, mostly seasonal permits for
Guatemalan farm workers, and there are reportedly “thousands” more unautho-
rized foreign workers in Mexico (Migration News, January, 1995), including many
unskilled Central Americans employed at the bottom of the Mexican labor market
picking coffee beans, doing unskilled construction work, or employed in Mexican
households as maids and gardeners.
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Many of the factors that sustain Mexico-U.S. migration also sustain Central
American-Mexican migration, viz, Mexican labor markets that have become de-
pendent on Guatemalan and other foreign workers, workers pushed across the bor-
der by significant wage and unemployment gaps, and networks of friends, rela-
tives, and labor contractors who can bridge the border. Early in 1996, it was re-
ported that Mexico was apprehending an average 300 Central Americans and Asians
per day, double the number in 1995 (Migration News, January 1996).
There were in 1994 reportedly thousands of professional foreign workers in
Mexico, including both legal and illegal “dryback” Americans. Unlike most other
Western Hemisphere visitors, who get 30 day tourist visas, Mexico issued 2 mil-
lion Americans 6 month tourist visas in 1993.2 Americans who live in Mexico can
then simply cross into the United States every 6 months, and get a new tourist visa
on their return to Mexico.3
The U.S. Department of State estimated that, as of May 1, 1993, some 2.6
million U.S. citizens lived abroad, including 522,000 in Mexico, 335,000 in Canada,
215,000 in the United Kingdom, 160,000 in Germany, 131,000 in the Philippines,
125,000 in Israel, and 103,000 in Italy (Bratsberg and Terrell, 1996, 791).
Notes
1. In the 1990 Mexican Census, some 300,000 residents of Mexico were reportedly
born in another country, and 600,000 did not specify a country of birth.
2. In 1994, an estimated 17 million U.S. residents visited Mexico, and they accounted
for about three-fourths of Mexico’s $7.5 billion tourism revenues.
3. Some U.S. residents of Mexico report that it is easier to live and work “illegally” in
Mexico by manipulating tourist visas than it is to obtain the proper residence visa. Ameri-
cans doing business in Mexico are granted 30-day business visas, and they must prove that
they are affiliated with an established U.S. or Mexican company, and that they are not dis-
placing equally-qualified Mexicans, to obtain a longer business visa. American retirees who
want to register as Mexican residents must have an income of at least $2,000 a month.
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FACTORS THAT INFLUENCE MIGRATION
Mexican Immigrant Workers and
U.S. Food Expenditures
Philip Martin
U.S. Food Expenditures
There were about 100 million “consumer units” in the U.S. in 1993, andthey spent an average $30,700, up from $29,800 in 1992. The U.S. popu-lation in 1993 was 258 million, so the average consumer unit contained
about 2.6 persons.
The five largest expenditure items in 1993 were housing, $9600, transporta-
tion, $5500, food, $4400, personal taxes, $3000, and personal insurance and pen-
sions, $2900.1
Food expenditures included $2700 for food eaten at home, 9 percent of total
expenditures, or about $52 per week. The major items consumed at home were meat
and poultry, on which spending averaged $735, fruits and vegetables, $445, cereals
and bread, $435, and dairy products, $295. In addition, consumer units spent an
average $225 on non-alcoholic beverages, and $270 on alcoholic beverages.
About 60 percent or $270 of the fruit and vegetable expenditures were for
fresh fruits and vegetables—about $135 for fresh fruits, and $135 for fresh
vegetables, the commodities most likely to use immigrant farm labor. Over 52
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weeks, this means that the average consumer unit spent $5.20 per week on
fresh produce.
Farmers obtained an average 24 percent of the retail price of food consumed at
home in 1993—or about $650. The farmer’s share of the retail food dollar ranged
from a low of about 7 percent for grains used in cereal and bakery products, to 40
to 48 percent for poultry, eggs, and beef.
Farmers received about 19 percent of the average retail price for fresh fruits
($26 of $135), and 23 percent of the retail price of fresh vegetables ($31 of $135),
so that farmers get $57 or 21 percent of the $270 average retail expenditures on
fresh fruits and vegetables. Farm labor, including supervisory labor, typically rep-
resents about one-third of farmers’ costs of production for fresh fruits and veg-
etables, or farm labor represents about $8.60 of the $26 that the average U.S. con-
sumer unit spends on fresh fruit, and $10.20 of spending on fresh vegetables, or a
total $19 per consumer unit per year.
Suppose that current levels of immigration hold farm wages 50 percent below
the level they would otherwise be, so that current farm worker wages of $5 to $6
per hour would be $7.50 to $9 per hour without additional immigrant workers. And
suppose that the entire cost of higher farm wages is passed through to consumers,
so that the annual cost of the farm labor used to produce the fresh fruit consumed
by the average American household rises from $8.60 to $13, and the cost of farm
labor to produce fresh vegetables rises from $10.20 to $15.
If these increased farm labor costs were completely passed through to con-
sumers, spending on fresh fruits and vegetables eaten at home for a typical 2.6
person consumer unit would rise by almost $10, from $270 to $280.
In addition to food eaten at home, the average consumer unit in 1993 spent
$1700 on food eaten away from home. It is difficult to calculate the food cost of
meals eaten away from home—some of the total cost of restaurant, cafeteria, and
airline meals reflects services and atmosphere. If 10 percent of away from home
food is for fresh fruits and vegetables, another $170 is spent on them, and if the
farm share of fresh produce eaten away from home is 21 percent or $36, and if
farm labor represents 33 percent or $12 of this farm share, then a 50 percent in-
crease in farm labor costs would raise spending on fresh fruits and vegetables eaten
away from home by $6, from $170 to $176.
The total increase in average consumer unit spending on food if farm wages
were to rise by 50 percent as a result of immigration changes, and if all of the
increased costs were passed through to consumers, would be about $16 per year.
For 2.6 persons, 50 percent higher farm wages would increase individual produce
expenditures by $6.
In 1995, the average American ate 712 pounds of fruits and vegetables. About
40 percent or 285 pounds are consumed as fresh produce—including almost 50
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pounds of potatoes per person. Consumer units in the Northeast and Midwest spend
more on average for fresh fruits and vegetables, as do larger consumer units and
those with higher incomes.
Mexican immigrants play important roles throughout the U.S. food and fiber
system, so that focusing on fresh fruits and vegetables understates their impor-
tance. However, the combination of a small farm share of retail food prices, and
a relatively small share of hired labor in farm production costs—in 1992, 98 per-
cent of the 1.9 million U.S. farm operators were non-Hispanic whites—means
that farm wages lowered by immigration do not make food and fiber much cheaper
for consumers.
For example, in 1993, U.S. farmers paid wages and benefits of $12 billion to
farm workers that they hired directly, and an additional $3 billion to contractors to
cover the cost of worker wages and benefits as well as contractor profits. The value
of farm commodities sold in 1993 was $175 billion—$90 billion in livestock sales,
and $85 billion in crop sales.
This means that total labor expenditures were about 8.6 percent of farm sales
and, since farmers, on average, obtain about 25 percent of retail expenditures, a
$1 purchase at the grocery store includes $0.25 for the farmer, and $0.02 for
farm workers.
The Tomato and Raisin Cases
Much of the debate over whether a new guest worker program is needed for
U.S. agriculture is a debate over how the farm labor market would adjust if the 20
to 40 percent of the work force that is believed to be unauthorized were prevented
from working by stepped up border and interior controls.
According to U.S. farmers, if there are currently 100 workers employed, and
30 are unauthorized, then effective immigration controls would require the grow-
ers to find 30 new workers. Since, growers assert, these new workers are not avail-
able within the U.S., even at higher wages, growers should have easy access to
foreign workers.
Worker advocates counter that the supply of U.S. workers is elastic—at higher
wages, more U.S. workers would seek farm jobs, or remain farm workers.
But the history of the U.S. suggests that the key factor in adjusting to fewer
workers is the demand for labor, not the supply. When wages rise, growers typi-
cally find ways to get work done with fewer workers, so that the labor force in
agriculture shrinks.
This section reviews two cases: the actual adjustment of processing tomatoes
to the end of the Bracero Program, and the likely adjustment of the raisin grape
industry to fewer migrant workers.
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Tomatoes
In 1979, The California Agrarian Action Project filed suit against UC on behalf
of 19 farm workers, charging that university research used public funds to, inter
alia, displace farm workers and eliminate small farmers (Superior Court of California,
Case 516427-5, September 4, 1979). The federal and state governments were, in
the mid-1980s, spending $1 billion per year of public monies on agricultural research,
and the suit asked that UC mechanization research be halted until the university
created a fund to assist farm workers equal in size to what UC earns from royalties
(Martin and Olmstead, 1985, 601).
This “mechanization lawsuit” turned the spotlight on the major U.S. employer
of Bracero workers in the early 1960s, and illustrates how the one case of adjust-
ment to fewer Mexican workers in fact occurred. In 1960, a peak 45,000 work-
ers—80 percent of whom were braceros—hand-picked 2.5 million tons of the pro-
cessing tomatoes used to make catsup in California. In 1990, about 5,500 mostly
female farm workers were employed to sort 4 times more tomatoes2 (Mamer and
Wilke, 1990). In this case, mechanization reduced the number of jobs for farm
workers, and changed the harvesting task from hand-picking tomatoes into field
boxes to riding on a machine and sorting machine-picked tomatoes.
In 1960, all processing tomatoes were picked by hand. In 1970, none were.
How reliable were the mechanization forecasts of those in the tomato industry? A
1963 report by the Giannini Foundation of Agricultural Economics concluded that,
if Bracero tomato pickers were not available, the CA industry would shrink, and
that many growers may follow their pickers to Mexico, which would lead to job
losses in associated canning and processing. Senator Kuchel (R-CA), representing
CA growers, asserted that mechanizing the tomato harvest was “feasible, but 8 to
10 years away” (Congressional Record, August 15, 1963, 15205).
Raisins
The single most labor-intensive activity in North America in the mid-1990s is
harvesting raisin grapes. Some 40,000 to 50,000 workers are involved in a four to
six-week effort to cut bunches of grapes from 200,000 acres of vines—owned by
5500 small farmers—and lay them on paper trays to dry in the sun (Alvarado,
Mason, and Riley, 1995, 379). Many of the workers are recently-arrived and thus
unauthorized, and the presumption is that the centuries-old process of paying workers
$0.15 to $0.18 per 25-pound tray of grapes picked and laid on paper trays to dry in
the sun—in 1995—cannot be changed.
A case study of the raisin industry in the early 1990s noted that the interaction
of a “continued and unabated influx” of immigrant workers to replace SAWs, non-
enforcement of employer sanctions, and the use of labor contractors to match workers
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and jobs left the 94 percent Mexican-born labor force working under some of the
“most marginal conditions” in California agriculture sun (Alvarado, Mason, and
Riley, 1995, 379-80). Virtually all of the labor contractor-grower arrangements are
verbal agreements to have the labor contractor take responsibility for finding and
supervising a crew of workers in exchange for a flat fee, a median $0.21 per tray in
1991, or to pay the contractor the agreed upon piecerate to harvest workers—$0.15
to $0.18 per tray—plus 31 percent for payroll taxes and the contractor’s expenses
and profits (Alvarado, Mason, and Riley, 1995, 383).
There are methods to harvest raisins and other commodities with machines, or
to use machines to save much of the labor currently employed in the raisin harvest.
One grower, for example, planted twice the number of raisin vines per acre, cut the
canes by hand to let the raisins dry on the vine, and then harvested the dried-on-
the-vine raisins mechanically—with a machine developed to pick wine grapes at
night and thus improve grape quality—by shaking the raisins off the vines.3 A
variety of machines to eliminate most of the hand-harvest labor in raisins are avail-
able, at costs ranging from $20,000 to $100,000.
The conventional raisin harvesting system requires an ample supply of work-
ers without other U.S. job options—many of the raisin growers interviewed in
1991 said that they would switch to mechanical raisin grape harvesting if there
were a labor shortage. This suggests that, in the raisin case, improving wages and
benefits would reduce the demand for labor. The mechanical system, according to
the grower who uses it, relies on a handful of well-paid workers (Dan Bryant,
“Grower finds the benefits outweigh drawbacks with dried-on-vine raisins,” Ag
Alert, December 20, 1995).
Notes
1. These food expenditure data are from the Statistical Abstract of the U.S., 1994, 465.
2. There are no consistent data on farm worker employment by commodity. One way to
estimate employment by commodity is to ask farm advisors to estimate the hours of regular
and seasonal labor required per acre to produce a commodity. This approach was used to
generate these employment estimates, but they include often unexplained differences for
the same commodity that is produced similarly in 2 counties.
Mamer and Wilke (1990), for example, report that the 40,000 acres of processing toma-
toes in Yolo county required 6 regular and 38 temporary hours of labor per acre in 1989, while
the 63,000 acres in Fresno county required 22 regular and 31 seasonal hours. These numbers
were combined to generate a statewide average 16 regular and 34 seasonal hours per acre.
The major reason for the difference in hours is that in Yolo county, irrigation hours
were reported to be 0, while in Fresno, they were 7 hours per acre. The Fresno report also
included 5 hours of regular supervisory labor per acre, while the Yolo report had none.
Both county reports estimated that harvesting required 11 to 13 hours per acre, or that
harvesting required fewer hours per acre than thinning and weeding (14 hours). At 12 hours
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per acre, sorting the tomatoes from California’s 330,000 acres in 1990 required 4 million
hours of labor. Sorters sometimes work 12 hours per day and 6 day weeks; if they average
72 hours weekly for 10 weeks, they average 720 hours per season. These calculations sug-
gest that a total 5500 sorters would be required; at the usual wage hourly wage of $4.50 in
1993, sorters average $3240 each.
3. Drying raisins on the vine raises yields—high density plantings are expected to be
five to six tons of raisins per acre, versus two to 2.5 tons per acre for conventional raisins.
877
FACTORS THAT INFLUENCE MIGRATION
Guest Workers: Past and Present
Philip Martin
The Bracero Program
There were three major phases of U.S. government-authorized recruitmentof Mexican workers, and each was associated with a wartime emergency.However, “the Bracero Program” usually refers to the agreements between
the U.S. and Mexico that permitted 4.6 million Mexican farm workers to enter the
United States on a temporary basis to do farm work between 1942 and 1964. Some
workers returned year after year; an estimated one to two million Mexicans worked
seasonally in the U.S. over these 22 years.
World War I Programs
Between 1885 and 1952, there was no U.S. law that permitted the admission
of temporary foreign workers—immigrants had the right to work where they pleased,
so that they could not be confined e.g., to a particular employer or to seasonal
agriculture. Indeed, the Immigration Act of 1917 went even further, explicitly
denying admission to “persons... who have been induced... to migrate to this country
by offers or promises of employment,” thus preventing the entry of immigrant
workers who were recruited to work for particular employers. The 1917 Immigration
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Act also imposed a head tax on immigrants and excluded immigrants over 16 who
could not read in any language.
The first U.S. government-approved recruitment of Mexican workers occurred
in 1917, when the U.S. Department of Labor suspended the contract worker bar,
head tax, and the literacy test for Mexican workers coming to work for U.S. farm-
ers for up to one year. Many Mexicans had left the U.S. in the spring of 1917, in
part because of rumors that Mexicans would be drafted into the U.S. army, and to
replace them, as well as to replace U.S. residents who were drafted, Mexicans
were legally admitted.
Mexicans coming to the U.S. under this first Bracero Program had to provide
two photos, one for the INS and one for a card that the Mexican worker carried
with him, and pay their own transportation to the U.S. Housing and meal arrange-
ments were left to the discretion of employer-worker arrangements and, as a result,
some Mexican workers wound up owing money at the end of the season.
Between May 23, 1917 and June 1920, some 51,000 Mexicans entered the
United States legally under these exemptions, and 80 percent were farm workers
(Fuller, 1942, 19853). Another source reports that 80,000 Mexican workers were
admitted between 1917 and 1921, mostly to work “in the sugar beet fields of
CA, CO, UT, and ID, and in the cotton fields of TX, Arkansas, and CA” (Scuggs,
1960, 322).
The Mexican workers had to pay for their own round-trip transportation to the
U.S., and many lived in farmer-owned housing and bought food from their farmer-
employers. Wages were set by farmers, and there was no U.S. government enforce-
ment of farmer wage promise. In some cases, Mexican workers wound up owing
their farmer-employers money, and the Mexican government, forced to deal with
the repatriation of “stranded” workers, amended its labor law in 1931 to require
that foreign employers must pay the round-trip transportation expenses of Mexi-
can workers.
Farmers during World War I did not necessarily want Mexicans: California
fruit growers in 1917 approved a resolution that requested, “as a war measure, to
permit the introduction of sufficient Chinese or other farm labor... to feed our
Allies and prevent them from being starved into surrender” (California Farmer,
December 8, 1917). The Los Angeles Times in 1920 was quoted as calling for
Chinese farm workers; “who would be injured if 1,000,000 Chinamen were brought
to this country to work on the farms or where needed...?” (quoted in California
Cultivator, January 17, 1920). An influential survey of farm labor problems in
1918 noted that “Chinese or Orientals” were preferred to Mexicans (Adams and
Kelly, 1918, 9).
Many Mexicans were eager to migrate. During the Mexican Revolution (1913-
1920), the seven west central states of Mexico—Nuevo Leon, Tamaulipas,
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Zacatecas, San Luis Potosi, Guanajuato, Jalisco, and Michoacán—were a
battleground between the central government in Mexico City and revolutionaries
from Mexican states near the U.S. border. The fighting led most haciendas to
reduce their employment. Between 1910 and 1930, by one estimate, 20 percent
of the population of the west central states left, including 1.5 million, or 10 percent
of Mexico’s entire population, who migrated to the United States (Cross and
Sandos, 1981, 9-10).
During the 1920s, when the U.S. Border Patrol was established and immigra-
tion from the Eastern Hemisphere was limited by national origin quotas, farmers
persuaded Congress not to limit immigration from Mexico. Studies and testimony
during the 1920s is cited frequently as examples of how farmers thought about
labor; “fluid casual labor is [the] farmer’s only salvation... the prime necessity of
his success... Until Thomas Edison or Henry Ford develop machinery... The Mexi-
can immigrant fills the requirements of farm labor in California and the Southwest
as no other laborer could” (Survey, 1928, 8-10). Most U.S. observers agreed with
the statement of one Texas Congressman in 1926—“80 percent of the Mexicans
that come over for temporary work go back” (Survey, 1928, 13). Farmers asserted
that Mexicans have “neither desire nor ambition to become permanent fixture(s) or
citizen(s)” (Survey, 1928, 17).
World War II Programs
Repatriations and depression practically stopped Mexico-U.S. migration in
the 1930s. During the 1930s, there was an outpouring of literature about the misery
caused by a surplus of farm workers, especially in California.
The Depression brought approximately 1.3 million people from other states to
California, and at least 150,000 of these new Californians became farm workers.
U.S. citizens had been part of California’s seasonal farm work force since the 1850s,
but it was only in the 1930s that they played the usual role of immigrants—the
newest and most desperate additions to the farm work force. Both California farm
employers and farm workers complained that too many workers were trying to
find farm work, and researchers began to use the term “open-air food factories” to
describe large CA farms that hired gangs of farm workers for short harvest periods
(Taylor and Vasey, 1936, 419).
The year 1939 was the high water mark of publicity and concern about farm
labor problems in California. John Steinbeck asked in The Grapes of Wrath how
one group of Americans could take such undue advantage of other Americans
who were temporarily down-on-their-luck. Carey McWilliams wrote Factories
in the Fields, and Varden Fuller's thesis, The Supply of Agricultural Labor as a
Factor in the Evolution of Farm Organization in California, demonstrated that
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California farms had more in common with the non-farm factories that were being
subjected to federal labor laws than the family farms described in Congressional
debates to demonstrate that hired farm workers did not want or need the protections
of labor laws.
These reports convinced most Americans that California agriculture was dif-
ferent, and that the labor law protections that had been made available to non-farm
workers should be extended to workers on at least the largest farms. However, this
reform zeal never took root. War intervened, and some of the young men who may
have been active union organizers joined the armed forces, and other men and
women found factory jobs. Instead of reforming farm labor markets to make farm
jobs acceptable to American workers, the wartime emergency was used to justify
the importation of Mexican Bracero farm workers.
In the spring of 1942, California farmers predicted that there would be labor
shortages, and they called for the importation of between 40,000 and 100,000
Mexican farm workers for the September harvest. On July 23, 1942, the U.S. and
Mexican governments concluded a “farm labor supply agreement” that permitted
Mexican workers (braceros) to enter the U.S. do farm work on emergency basis
when U.S. workers were not available. On September 27, 1942, the first braceros
entered the U.S. in El Paso, en route to California sugar beet fields.
Reformers complained bitterly that there was no shortage of farm workers.
Growers’ cries of labor shortages were, they argued, “a mere repetition of the
age-old obsession of all farmers for a surplus labor supply” (Craig,1971, 38-39).
And many farmers had reservations about the Bracero Program, since it required
that a minimum wage of $0.30 per hour be paid, and that Bracero workers be
guaranteed work for three-fourths of the period that the farmer promised them
work. Farmers feared that such minimum wages and work guarantees would
spread from foreign to domestic workers, and so no Texas farmers requested
braceros in 1942.
The Mexican government, sensitive about the conditions under which some of
its nationals had previously worked in the U.S.1 and, according to Craig, doubtful
that there was a real labor shortage in U.S. agriculture, insisted that the U.S.
government guarantee the contracts that farmers provided to Mexican workers,
including round-trip transportation and the payment of wages equal to those of
similar American workers (Craig, 1971, 41). The U.S. government agreed, and
Mexican workers were admitted to the United States by establishing an exception
to immigration laws for “native-born residents of North America, South America,
and Central America, and the islands adjacent thereto, desiring to perform agricultural
labor in the United States.”
The 1942 agreement allowed braceros to bring their families to the U.S., a
provision that U.S. employers wanted so that fewer braceros would desert their
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contracts, and so that spouses and children 14 and older could work. However,
no family members of braceros were admitted (Congressional Research Service,
1980, 24).
The Bracero Program was small during the war years; admissions peaked at
62,000 in 1944, less than 2 percent of nation’s 4 million hired workers. However,
braceros were concentrated on a few farms in a few states, where their impacts
were significant. Braceros were employed primarily in the southwestern states,
with the majority employed in California, and then only on the largest farms—
fewer than 50,000, or 2 percent of the nation’s commercial farms, ever employed
Braceros. Although the major crop changed during the life of the program, most
Braceros picked cotton during the program’s first years.
Both the U.S. and Mexican governments hoped that the opportunity to mi-
grate legally would reduce the illegal flow of Mexican workers to the U.S. How-
ever, Scruggs concluded that, “the Bracero Program, instead of diverting the flow
of wetbacks into legal channels... actually stimulated unlawful emigration” (1961,
151). But Mexico did not send Braceros legally to Texas, and so many Mexicans
went illegally to Texas and other states. The Mexican foreign minister on August 8,
1946 suggested that, if the U.S. were to impose “sanctions on American employers
who employ illegal entrants, the result would promptly come about that Mexican
workers would not in the future” migrate illegally (Congressional Research Ser-
vice, 1980, 26).
The Bracero Program with the U.S. government as the contractor of Mexican
workers lapsed on December 31, 1947, and there followed several years of a con-
stantly revised agreement, but the flow of Mexican workers northward was mostly
informal and unlawful. Beginning in 1948, the U.S. employer, not the U.S. govern-
ment, was the legal contractor of Mexican workers, and the U.S. employer was
responsible for paying the Mexican worker’s round trip transportation, and the
U.S. Employment Service became responsible for certifying that U.S. workers were
not available.
Illegal immigration increased in the late 1940 as Braceros learned they did not
have to pay bribes to local Mexican officials to get on recruitment lists, and then
pay additional bribes at recruitment centers. U.S. farmers were pleased because
they could employ Mexican workers without government “red tape,” such as hav-
ing their housing for Braceros inspected and being required to offer them the mini-
mum or government-calculated prevailing wage, whichever was higher. American
workers protested that Braceros were being used to break their strikes, as occurred
during the 1947 strike of table grape harvesters at DiGiorgio farms in 1947 (Pollit,
1971, 67).2
The number of aliens who were legalized after arriving and finding employ-
ment illegally far exceeded the number of Mexican workers that U.S. employers
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contracted legally in the interior of Mexico. Between 1947 and 1949, for example,
74,600 Mexicans received contracts from U.S. employers at recruitment centers
inside Mexico. By contrast, 142,000 “wetbacks” who were illegally in the U.S.
were legalized by granting them contracts, a process termed, even in official U.S.
government publications, as “drying out the wetbacks” (President’s Commission,
1951, p. 53).
The President’s Commission on Migratory Labor, established in 1951, was
asked to investigate whether Braceros were adversely affecting U.S. workers, and
whether additional Mexican workers were needed because of the Korean War emer-
gency. The President’s Commission concluded that:
• Bracero labor “depressed farm wages and, therefore, has been detri-
mental to domestic labor”
• Mexico rather than the U.S. “secured reasonable limitation of numbers
and some protection to labor standards”
• “foreign labor importation... should be under the terms of intergovern-
mental agreements which clearly state the conditions and standards of
employment” (President’s Commission, 1951, 64-66).
Furthermore, the Commission concluded that “no special measures be adopted
to increase the number of alien contract workers beyond the number admitted in
1950,” which was 67,500, and that “legislation be enacted making it unlawful to
employ aliens illegally in the United States” (President’s Commission, 1951, 178).
Korean War Programs
The President’s Commission recommendations were not adopted. On July 12,
1951, PL-78, the Mexican Farm Labor Program, became law (Craig, 1971). PL-78
amended the Agricultural Act of 1949 to authorize the U.S. government to negoti-
ate an agreement with Mexico to admit Mexican workers to work seasonally in
“essential” U.S. crops until December 31, 1953.
The U.S. Department of Labor administered the program from the U.S. side,
by notifying Mexico at least 30 days before Braceros were needed, and then oper-
ating reception centers on the border, arranging transportation from the reception
centers to U.S. farms, helping Mexican workers and U.S. farmers to negotiate con-
tracts covering wages and working conditions, and enforcing these contracts. Farmers
had to reimburse the U.S. government for its costs, up to $15 per worker, and pay
an additional fee if the Bracero was not returned to the reception center at the end
of the contract. Farmers were expected to pay all the costs associated with PL-78
Braceros except for enforcement costs.
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The U.S. Secretary of Labor was prohibited from supplying Mexican workers
to U.S. employers unless DOL certified that there were not sufficient domestic
workers who were “able, willing, and qualified” to do the work after “reasonable”
recruitment efforts, and that the presence of Mexican workers would not
“adversely affect the wages and working conditions of domestic agricultural
workers similarly employed.”
The program operated with the U.S. Department of Labor notifying Mexico
30 days in advance of the number of Mexican workers likely to be needed. The
Mexican Interior ministry contacted governors of Mexican states “where Braceros
are available”—each Mexican state had a Bracero quota that was to be based on
unemployment rates.3 The governor, in turn, contacted mayors, who “select Braceros
from a waiting list on a first-come, first-served basis” (Taylor, 1963, 42).
The Braceros selected had provided their own transportation to one of three
reception centers in Mexico—in Ciudad Chihuahua, Empalme, Sonora, and
Monterrey, Nuevo Leon—these Mexican reception centers were an average 280
miles from the U.S. border.4 At these reception centers, Braceros were interviewed
to determine if they had farm work experience, examined by Mexican doctors
under contract to the U.S. Public Health service for their ability to do farm work,
and then checked by the INS for their admissibility as non-immigrants. Mexican
workers then received conditional entry permits that permitted them to report to
one of several U.S. reception centers on the border, in El Centro, Nogales, El
Paso, and Hildalgo.
At these U.S. reception centers, farmers and associations “contracted” Mexi-
can workers, usually by having an association representative sign the contract on
their behalf, and then the Bracero, and representatives of the U.S. and Mexican
governments, signed as witnesses. Most Braceros were “repeaters”—a survey of
309,000 Braceros in the second half of 1957 found that 78 percent had worked as
Braceros at least one year before, and 22 percent were first-time Braceros.
DOL noted that, because of the “volume of workers,” it is “impractical to
select individuals in response to employer requests” (U.S. Department of Labor,
1953, 7). Braceros were not subject to Social Security or income taxes.
Farmers in most cases offered first-time Braceros minimum six-week con-
tracts, and then offered renewals to Braceros deemed satisfactory (Anderson, 1961).
Maximum contracts were for six months, with extensions of at least six week inter-
vals possible. Bracero workers could be “furloughed” without pay for up to 15
days during the life of the contract.
Each worker-employer contract had to include provisions that DOL and the
Mexican government required, including the promise to pay the higher of the pre-
vailing or adverse effect wage at least every two weeks, a guarantee of work for at
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least three-fourths of the work days in the contract period, free housing that was to
be inspected by DOL, either meals provided at cost by the employer or cooking
facilities, and workers’ compensation insurance to cover expenses if the Bracero
was injured at work. At the end of the contract, Braceros were to be given money
to cover their transportation and subsistence back to the reception center—they
were expected to check in within 5 days of the end of the contract. However, if the
Bracero abandoned his job, or did not “give his employer reasonable opportunity
to provide transportation,” the employer was not required to pay return transporta-
tion and subsistence.
Some of the proponents of the Bracero Program argued that the possibility of
legal entry would reduce illegal immigration. President Truman, in reluctantly sign-
ing PL-78 into law, sent a note to Mexican President Aleman suggesting that the
Bracero Program be only six months long to keep up the pressure on Congress to
approve an employer sanctions bill.
President Aleman agreed that the U.S. and Mexico should combine “our ef-
forts, in putting a definite stop to the illegal movement of agricultural workers”
(quoted in Kiser and Kiser, 1979, 157). In 1951, Mexico’s interior ministry an-
nounced that it was “adopting new measures to have our border authorities keep a
strict vigilance over the departure of our compatriots and prevent the departure of
those who are not properly documented,” and cooperating with defense and other
ministries to “prevent the illegal departure of our compatriots from Mexican Terri-
tory” (Kiser and Kiser, 1979, 159-160).
However, in Congressional debate over what became the Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952, an amendment in the Senate to penalize U.S. employers
found to employ illegal aliens when the employer had “reasonable grounds to be-
lieve a worker was not legally in the U.S.” was defeated by a vote of 69-12. In-
stead, the so-called Texas proviso was included in the INA—the willful importa-
tion, transportation, or harboring of illegal aliens became a felony punishable by
fines of up to $2000 or five years imprisonment, but “employment of an illegal
alien” was specifically exempted from the definition of harboring.
Illegal immigration continued after PL-78 was signed: a Life magazine story
entitled “Wetbacks Swarm In” was typical of the era. The Border Patrol had been
reduced to 1,000 agents by 1953 and, the U.S. Attorney General pronounced him-
self “shocked” by the extent of illegal immigration in August 1953. A former Gen-
eral of the Sixth Army was appointed INS Commissioner in the spring of 1954,
with orders to “halt the influx.”
“Operation Wetback” was launched by the INS in 1954, and resulted in 1.1
million apprehensions during what was then a July 1953-June 1954 fiscal year.
Most of these apprehensions occurred at the border in May and June 1954—there
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were only 80,000 apprehensions during the height of the June-August 1954 interior
sweeps, and most of these apprehensions were recorded in FY55.
The Bracero Program expanded to accommodate more legal Mexican work-
ers, so that the ratio of apprehensions to Braceros was reversed; in 1951-52, there
were 5 apprehensions per Bracero admission; by 1956-57, there were 5 Bracero
admissions per apprehension.
There was no explicit provision that Braceros be only temporary U.S. residents,
so that, by 1959, it was reported that 20,000 “specials” were employed in year-round
jobs. Most of these specials received six-month contracts that were renewed, and
most were employed in Texas and New Mexico (U.S. Department of Labor, 1959, 5).
The availability of Braceros permitted the southwestern states to become the
garden states of the United States. In California, fruit and nut production rose 15
percent during the 1950s, and vegetable production rose 50 percent. New irriga-
tion facilities expanded the acreage available to grow fruits and vegetables, the
interstate highway system allowed produce to be shipped cheaply to eastern mar-
kets, and new plant varieties and packing technologies made California produce
preferred to locally-grown fruits and vegetables in the eastern United States where
most Americans lived.
This expansion of farm production in California was not accompanied by higher
farm wages. The U.S. Department of Agriculture’s estimate of average hourly farm
earnings rose 41 percent—slightly more than the 35 percent increase in consumer
prices—from $0.85 in 1950 to $1.20 in 1960. In contrast, average factory wages in
California rose 63 percent, from $1.60 per hour in 1950 to $2.60 in 1960. Slowly
rising farm wages and faster-rising factory wages drew American workers to fac-
tory jobs where there were no Braceros.
In addition to Mexican workers, California farmers also imported workers from
Japan and the Philippines. Under a program established with Japan in 1956, some
1730 Japanese were employed in December 1960, mostly in Ventura county, and
28 Filipinos were imported, both under provisions of the H-2 program. Asian workers
paid their own transportation to California, and the farmer paid their transportation
from Los Angeles or San Francisco to the work site. Asian workers got 6-month
renewable contracts, and most remained in California for three years (California
Assembly, 1965, 9-10).
By the early 1960s, Braceros were essential to harvest only a few crops. As
cotton and other geographically dispersed crops were mechanized, the Bracero
Program became a non-immigrant program for a handful of farmers, and political
support in the U.S. for its continuation weakened. As unions and ethnic groups
called for the end of the Bracero Program, growers made familiar arguments to
maintain the program: American workers were not available; without the immigrants
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crops would rot and food prices would rise; and the admission of Braceros has no
adverse effects on U.S. workers (California Senate, 1961).
An influential study in Los Angeles and found that almost half of the unem-
ployed would do farm work if wages and conditions were improved (Schmidt,
1964, 27-28). According to the study, there were no “cultural barriers” to Ameri-
cans doing farm work, only economic barriers.
The Kennedy Administration, which took office in January 1961, was
determined to revise the Bracero Program to better protect U.S. workers by preventing
Mexican workers from depressing U.S. farm wages. In October 1961, President
Kennedy, “reluctantly” signing a bill to extend the Bracero Program through
December 31, 1963, asserted that “the adverse effect of the Mexican farm labor
program as it has operated in recent years on the wage and employment conditions
of domestic workers is clear and cumulative in its impact” (Congressional Research
Service, 1980, 52). Kennedy ordered the U.S. Department of Labor to “prescribe
standards and to make the determinations essential for the protection of the wages
and working conditions” of U.S. workers (quoted in Congressional Record, August
15, 1963, 15215).
Governor Pat Brown (D-CA) and most Congressional leaders opposed an ex-
tension of the Bracero Program. In May 1963, the House of Representatives re-
jected a two-year extension of the Bracero Program on a 174-158 vote, and then
the Senate and House approved simple one-year extensions of the program, until
December 31, 1964.
Mexico favored a two-year extension of the Bracero Program, pointing out that
Braceros sent about $35 million annually in money orders through the Bank of Mexico,
and that total remittances might top $100 million per year (Taylor, 1963, 42). In a
June 21, 1963 note, the Mexican government asserted that the Bracero Program was
“a result of the migration phenomenon... the absence of an agreement... would give
rise to... the illegal introduction of Mexican workers into the United States.” Craig
credits this Mexican note with tipping the balance in Congress in favor of extending
the Bracero Program one more year, until the end of 1964 (1971, 195-6).
Bracero Program Effects
Greencard Commuters
After the Bracero Program ended in 1964, foreign workers could still be im-
ported under the H-2 section of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952,
which allowed the Attorney General “after consultation with appropriate agen-
cies of the Government” to import needed workers. Employers seeking H-2 workers
to fill vacant jobs had to satisfy a double temporary provision—(1) the alien worker
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was coming temporarily to the United States to perform temporary services or
labor and (2) unemployed persons capable of performing such services cannot be
found in this country. Thirdly, the employment of temporary foreign workers was
to have no “adverse effects on U.S. workers” (Congressional Research Service,
1980, p. 59).
Many farmers expected to import Mexican workers under the H-2 provisions
of the INA. However, the Secretary of Labor published regulations in December
1964 that had the effect of making it much more expensive and difficult to import
Mexican farm workers under the H-2 program than it had been to import Braceros.5
Many U.S. senators were outraged, and an effort to transfer the authority to certify
the need for H-2 alien farm workers from the Department of Labor to the Depart-
ment of Agriculture failed in the Senate only because the Vice-President cast the
deciding vote (Congressional Research Service, 1979, p 42).
The U.S. launched efforts in the mid-1960s to find U.S. workers to replace
Braceros. For example, in September 1964, Los Angeles county supervisors said
that persons able to work and getting food and assistance from the county would be
cut off if they refused to do farm work for $1.25 per hour, the adverse effect wage
rate that had to be offered to Braceros (U.S. Senate, 1965, 19-20).
The number of migrant farm workers—most of whom were U.S. citizens—
reached a postwar peak of 466,000 in 1965, and grower interest in mechanization
increased so much that a major study predicted that, by 1975, if a fruit or vegetable
could not be harvested mechanically, it would not be grown in the United States
(Cargill and Rossmiller, 1970).
Most of the 50,000 to 60,000 Mexican immigrants admitted each year in the
mid-1960s were believed to be ex-Braceros who got immigrant status as a result of
a U.S. employer offering them jobs. An estimated 80 percent of the 55,000 Mexi-
can immigrants admitted in 1962 were ex-Braceros, and most were admitted at the
behest of California farmers (U.S. Senate, 1965, 22).
A 1963 article noted that, since immigrants bound for the U.S. had to prove
that they would not become public charges in the U.S., most Mexican immigrants
cleared the “public charge” hurdle by providing a letter from a U.S. employer offering
the Mexican immigrant a year-round job. Some U.S. employers issued 25 or more
letters and, in such cases, the practice was for the U.S. Department of Labor to
certify that the employer could not obtain U.S. workers (Gallardo, 1963, 26).
California farmers pointed out that it was simpler to get a greencard issued than it
was to obtain a Bracero, since there was no housing inspection or requirement that
a greencard worker be paid a government-set wage. Many farmers turned to
greencard workers as a result of the activities of “consultants,” who advised them
not to issue more than 25 letters.
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According to one report, there were 122,000 Mexican immigrants who provided
occupational information between 1949 and 1961—Mexican immigration during
the 1950s was 300,000. About 50,000 of these Mexican immigrants with occupations
were farm workers, and 30,000 were domestic servants, mostly in California and
Texas (Gallardo, 1963, 27). The Mexican ambassador in 1963 estimated that 32,000
farm workers became greencarders in 1961, and another 40,000 in 1962
(Congressional Record, August 15, 1963, 15204). A 1963 California Farmer article
reported that 80 percent of the 222,000 immigrants from Mexico between 1957
and 1962 were ex-Braceros (Taylor, 1963, 43).
The Mexican government opposed the greencard program—the Alien Regis-
tration Card I-151 was green—pointing out that, while the greencarder was free to
leave the farmer who got him immigrant status, greencard workers did not have the
protection of wage, housing, and other protections that were included in Bracero
contracts. The U.S. Department of Labor similarly testified in 1963 that greencard
Mexicans could be used to break strikes, while Braceros could not (Congressional
Record, August 15, 1963, 15187).
In 1967, the INS issued regulations that barred the use of a greencard to enter
the U.S. to take up employment where a labor dispute was in progress, a response
to UFW and other union complaints that greencard workers were being used to
break U.S. strikes. In 1968, Senator Edward Kennedy (D-MA) introduced a bill,
S2790, that would have required the U.S. Secretary of Labor to determine whether
immigrants returning from temporary stays in Mexico or Canada would have an
adverse effect on the wages and working conditions of U.S. workers.
Illegal immigration after the Bracero Program ended in 1964: some 110,000
deportable aliens were located in FY65, and almost twice as many, 212,000, in
FY68. The number of aliens apprehended almost doubled again, to 420,000, in
FY71, and then rose to 788,000 in FY74. In FY68, it was reported that 41,425
illegal Mexican aliens were apprehended while employed in U.S. agriculture (U.S.
Senate, 1969, 64).
Economic Effects
There were a number of mid-1960s studies of the effects of ending the Bracero
Program on U.S. agriculture and U.S. farm workers, and most came to conclusions
similar to those reached by Martin in 1966, viz, that “U.S. agriculture is perfectly
able to adjust to a situation without foreign labor without any major production
decreases” (1966, 1137). There were $44 billion worth of farm commodities sold
in 1965, and losses due to lack of labor for harvesting were estimated to total $17
million, or less than one half of one percent, with most of the losses in California
strawberries (1966, 1141).
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The 1996 Gallegly-Pombo Guest Worker Proposal
The House on March 21, 1996 rejected by a 242-180 vote an effort by growers
to launch a new guest worker program. On March 5, 1996 the House Agriculture
Committee approved 25 to 14 an amendment by Rep. Richard Pombo (R-CA) to
the House immigration bill that would grant temporary work visas to 250,000 foreign
farm workers, with the ceiling to be reduced by 25,000 each year.
The existing temporary farm worker program admitted about 11,400 H-2A
farm workers in FY95, including 6100 Mexicans and 4200 Jamaicans, down from
13,200 in FY94, when 6100 Mexicans and 5900 Jamaicans were admitted. The
largest group of Mexican H-2As is employed in North Carolina-Virginia tobacco.
The Jamaicans were concentrated in the East Coast apple harvest and the Florida
sugarcane harvest—U.S. Sugar, the nation’s largest employer of H-2A temporary
foreign workers for the past 50 years, announced in June, 1995 that it would har-
vest all of its sugar cane by machine in 1996. U.S. Sugar employed 1,300 Jamaican
cane cutters in 1995.
Background
In February 1995, the National Council of Agricultural Employers released a
proposal for a supplementary foreign worker program to fill temporary or seasonal
U.S. jobs. One year later, Rep Elton Gallegly (R-CA) unveiled the NCAE proposal
as the “Alternative Agricultural Temporary Worker Program” or “Temporary Agri-
cultural Worker Amendments of 1995... to provide a less bureaucratic alternative
for the admission of temporary agricultural workers.”
There are about two million workers employed at some time during a typical
year on the nation’s crop farms, and the DOL National Agricultural Workers Sur-
vey estimates that 25 percent may be unauthorized.
Under the Gallegly-Pombo proposal, growers, labor contractors, or associa-
tions wanting to employ foreign farm workers would have had to file at least 25
days before the job was to begin a labor condition attestation (LCA) with their
state Employment Service office listing the number of foreigners requested and
when work was to begin. Local ES offices would review these LCAs “only for
completeness and obvious inaccuracies” within seven days after they were filed.
Employers violating their attestations or program rules could be assessed civil money
penalties, and be barred from the program.
If the foreign workers the employer wanted to hire were outside the U.S., grow-
ers would submit their names to INS and consulates abroad, and these named workers
would have been given H-2B visas to enter the U.S. at the consulates or at a port of
entry. Growers could recruit foreign workers anywhere and in whatever manner they
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wished. Foreign workers would have to leave the U.S. when their jobs end or be
subject to deportation, unless another employer promises to hire them within 14 days.
Under the rejected plan, 25 percent of the foreign workers’ wages would have
been placed into a federal trust fund managed by the INS, which foreign workers
would have reclaimed with interest in their country of origin. Foreign workers
would have been limited to a maximum two years in the U.S. [Greg Schell of
Migrant Farmworker Justice Project in Belle Glade, Florida asserted in early 1996
that 25 percent of the H-2A workers do not return to their countries of origin.]
Program costs would have been financed by employer contributions equiva-
lent to the Social Security and unemployment insurance taxes that would not be
paid by growers. Most predictions were that farmers would request the maximum
250,000 guest workers because there was no incentive not to make requests for
foreign workers.
The guest worker program would sunset after three years if Congress failed to
re-authorize the pilot five-state telephone verification system that the Smith bill
establishes to make it easier for employers to determine whether workers are pre-
senting false documents.
The Gallegly-Pombo proposal was essentially an effort to extend the proce-
dure used to admit H-1B temporary foreign professionals to agriculture. Under the
current H-1B program, nonfarm U.S. employers “attest” that they are paying pre-
vailing wages and satisfying other conditions so as to have no adverse effects on
similar U.S. workers—workers with at least a BA or equivalent—and then the U.S.
Department of Labor relies on complaints from U.S. workers and other employers
to investigate charges that employers are violating their attestations. H-1B foreign
workers can remain in the U.S. for up to six years.
The current H-2A program, by contrast, requires farm employers wishing to
employ H-2A temporary foreign workers to take a series of steps to prove that U.S.
workers are not available, and then to offer U.S. and foreign workers housing at no
cost, contracts that guarantee work for at least three-fourths of the period that the
employer asserts workers are needed, and other benefits and protections.
Rep. Lamar Smith (R-Texas), chair of the House Immigration Subcommittee,
argued against the growers’ guest worker proposal: “once you admit hundreds of
thousands of people like this, why not just pull the Border Patrol off the border and
let people in?” The Clinton administration opposed the program for fear that it
would increase illegal immigration, reduce job opportunities for U.S. workers, and
depress wage and work standards for U.S. workers. The Clinton administration
also opposed the Gallegly-Pombo, arguing that the current H-2A program is suffi-
ciently flexible to cope with any farm labor shortages.
About 60 farm organizations, from the American Farm Bureau Federation to
the Wisconsin Christmas Tree Producers sent a letter to senators and representatives
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on February 12,1996 to urge the inclusion of the Gallegly proposal in immigration
reform legislation.
Fourteen organizations, from the American Friends Service Committee to the
United Methodist Church sent a letter to House Speaker Gingrich on February 14,
1996 opposing the Gallegly proposal, and the effort to include it in the immigration
bill without hearings on its features.
On the same day, March 21, 1996, that the House rejected the Gallegly-Pombo
proposal, it also voted 357-59 to reject an alternative offered by Rep Robert Goodlatte
(R-VA) as a way to defeat Gallegly-Pombo. Goodlatte’s proposal would have modi-
fied the H-2A program by transferring it from the Labor Department to the Immi-
gration and Naturalization Service, reducing the required period of grower recruit-
ment to 20 days, and capping H-2A admissions at 100,000 per year.
Congressional Hearings: 1995-96
In September and December 1995, the Senate and House, respectively, held
hearings on farmers’ requests for an alternative non-H-2A guest worker program.
None of these hearings focused on bills or concrete proposals, since the Gallegly-
Pombo proposal was not yet available. Instead, the hearings typically featured farm-
ers making three arguments, and worker, government, and academic representa-
tives responding.
The three major grower arguments were:
1. That illegal aliens comprise a significant share of the current farm labor
force. Growers testified that illegal aliens are 50 to 70 percent of some
harvest crews, and they implied that this percentage is typical of the
entire hired farm work force despite the legalization of over one million
unauthorized workers in the SAW program in 1987-88 (The U.S. De-
partment of Labor estimates that 25 percent of the labor force on U.S.
crop farms was unauthorized in 1993-94.)
2. That new control measures under consideration in Congress—more
border controls, more interior enforcement, and a more secure work
authorization document—would prevent them from continuing to hire
unauthorized workers who present fraudulent documents. Effective con-
trols on hiring illegal aliens would leave them with a labor shortage,
they asserted.
3. That the current H-2A program is too inflexible to provide them with
foreign workers if labor shortages appear—the U.S. workers recruited
for employers allegedly do not show up, work hard, or remain with the
employer; growers must pay U.S. and H-2A workers the higher of three
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wages—prevailing, minimum, or adverse effect wage rate—and provide
housing at no charge to the U.S. and temporary foreign workers. In the
words of one grower, the H-2A program is “too structured for a labor
market that is relatively unstructured.”
Worker representatives attacked these grower arguments by asserting that
there is no shortage of workers, only a shortage of decent wages, benefits, and
working conditions.
Second, worker advocates argued that employers prefer vulnerable foreign work-
ers to U.S. workers. In North Carolina, for example, it was asserted that U.S. citizen-
Puerto Rican workers were sent to employers where they would not have work for
two weeks, and told that they would have to live at their own expense until the harvest
began, while H-2A workers were sent to work immediately. It is no wonder, they
assert, that U.S. workers under such circumstances abandoned these farm jobs, while
H-2A workers stay with their employers as required by their visas.
Most government representatives opposed the growers proposal. The INS and
DOL dislike the lack of control over entries under the growers’ proposal, and even
the USDA acknowledges that a free agent-attestation guest worker program may
not provide workers to isolated areas most in need of migrant farm workers.
Academics generally argued that the U.S. farm labor market could adjust to
the absence of immigrant workers—legal, illegal, or guest workers—with very
little effects on the average American. Academics testified that:
First, it is unlikely that currently unauthorized workers will be removed quickly
from the farm work force.
Second, even if the 20 to 30 percent of the current work force that is illegal
were removed from the farm work force, U.S. consumers may not notice their
removal in food costs because farm worker wages are, on average, only about 11
cents of a $1 produce item. Farmers receive about one-third of the retail price of
most fruits and vegetables, and farm workers receive one-third of the farmer’s
price. This means, that for a $1 head of lettuce, farmers get an average $0.33, and
farm workers $0.11.
Removing 20 to 30 percent of the farm labor force might raise farm wages. If
done quickly, as at the end of the Bracero Program, farm wages might rise by 30 to
50 percent—the UFW was able to negotiate a 40 percent one-year wage increase in
1966 because farm wages had been held down by Braceros, and Braceros were no
longer available. If farm wages rose 50 percent, from today’s $4 to $6 range to $6
to $9 per hour, and if all of the wage increases were passed on to consumers, the
head of lettuce would cost consumers $1.05, i.e., a doubling of farm wages leads to
a five percent retail price increase.
Retail produce prices may fall rather than rise, as occurred when the end of the
Bracero Program encouraged farmers and processors to change the way that tomatoes
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were handled. In the tomato case, the end of immigrant labor caused production to
rise, and retail prices to fall.
The tomato example illustrates that it is very hard to predict what will happen
when the labor supply changes. Many growers in 1963 testified that the tomato
industry had no choice but to follow its pickers to Mexico, shifting production
there. Instead, the harvest was mechanized, and today almost five times more to-
matoes are produced in California. Those closest to the adjustment issue may not
have the clearest picture of likely adjustments.
Most of the adjustments to fewer and more expensive workers in agriculture
occur on the DEMAND, not the supply side, of the labor market. In other words, in
the face of immigration reforms, lasting adjustments are more likely to be found
by accelerating labor-saving mechanization, or changing the way farm work is
done, or letting production of the commodity shift overseas, not in launching new
efforts to recruit U.S. workers, to build housing for migrant workers, or to provide
government services to farm workers that raise their effective incomes.
The notion that most adjustments to fewer and more expensive farm workers
reduce the demand for farm labor, not increase the supply, reflects experience in
the U.S. and elsewhere. This is why, in most societies, development is associated
with a smaller percentage of the work force producing food.
Growers and their supporters typically frame the argument in a manner that
looks for SUPPLY adjustments. For example, if there are currently 100 workers
employed and 30 are unauthorized, effective immigration controls would require
the government to find 30 new workers.
The removal of unauthorized or guest workers from the farm work force rarely
prompts U.S. workers to replace them. The more common response is for growers
to demand fewer workers, often by mechanizing hand-harvest tasks.
Engineers point out that there are alternatives to hand work in agriculture,
even to harvest raisin grapes, the crop often associated with recently arrived and
illegal workers. One California grower planted twice the number of raisin vines
per acre, cut the canes by hand to let the raisins dry on the vine, and then harvested
the dried-on-the-vine raisins mechanically by shaking the raisins off the vines.
Machines to eliminate most of the 50,000 four-to-eight week hand harvesters are
available at a cost of $18,000 to $55,000 each.
In evaluating future agricultural guest worker proposals, three questions might
be borne in mind:
First, are there any indications of labor shortages that are putting upward pres-
sure on farm wages?
Second, if farm wages rise, how does the supply of labor respond, e.g., do
rising wages encourage more workers to seek farm jobs, or current workers to
work more hours?
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Third, do rising wages set in motion technological, trade, or other changes that
reduce the demand for farm workers?
The rationale for guest workers is that the labor market is not responding
properly to market signals such as rising wages, or that government intervention is
needed to prevent market adjustments that would have negative effects, such as
rising food prices. If a new guest worker program begins before any of these
adjustments can be observed, it will never be known how easily the farm labor
market can adjust to changes in its labor supply.
Mid-1980s versus Mid-1990s
In the mid-1980s, despite opposition from the Reagan administration and the
major sponsors of immigration reform legislation, farmers successfully included
in the Simpson-Mazzoli legislation guest worker proposals.
In June 1984, Congress adopted the Panetta-Morrison amendment that would
have established a free agent guest worker program for agriculture—what the New
York Times termed one of the top ten political stories of 1984 (Leon Panetta, D-
CA, who led the fight for the growers in the House, is President Clinton’s chief of
staff).6 Then-senator Pete Wilson (R-CA) persuaded the Senate to approve a simi-
lar free agent program in 1985.
Mexico-Canada Guest Worker Program
Since 1974, Mexicans have been traveling to Canada to work seasonally in
agriculture under a program that is very similar to the Bracero Program. Canadian
farm employers—three-fourths in Ontario—get certified by their Department of
Labor to have Mexican farm workers admitted, and then the Mexican Department
of Labor recruits workers to travel to Canada. In the early 1990s, about 5000 Mexi-
can workers were employed on Canadian farms each year, almost double the 2700
in 1988.
Under the program, Canadian employers offer Mexican workers contracts
approved by both governments that, inter alia, guarantee wages of at least $C5 to
$C6 per hour, at least 240 hours of work in six weeks, for seasonal earnings of up
to $C2000, and free housing and either meals or cooking facilities. Mexican work-
ers, two-thirds of whom are requested by name, pay about $C160 for a Mexican
passport and Canadian visa.
When this program was described in October 1995, it was noted that almost
20 percent of the Mexican workers headed to Canada were from Tlaxcala, a
Mexican state not noted for significant emigration. Indeed, some Mexican studies
suggest that this guest worker program may be leading to a trickle of illegal
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immigration—a 1988 survey found at least 13 workers who returned to Canada
as illegal workers.
Notes
1. The Mexican government did not permit Braceros to be employed legally in Texas
during the war years, 1942-47, because of past abuses and state discrimination against Mexi-
cans. Many Mexicans entered Texas illegally to work on farms.
2. Despite explicit regulations prohibiting Braceros from being used to break strikes,
DiGiorgio was able to use them for six weeks of the strike, until the federal government
stopped their employment.
3. In some states, including Sonora, Braceros had to pick a certain amount of cotton
locally before they were permitted to depart for the U.S. (Taylor, 1963, 43).
4. By the early 1960s, an estimated 85 percent of Braceros sent north had been in the
U.S. before.
5. Secretary of Labor Wirtz interpreted the decision to terminate the Bracero Program
as signifying congressional intent to reduce or eliminate the presence of temporary foreign
workers in U.S. agriculture. Under December 19, 1964 DOL regulations, U.S. employers
wishing to receive DOL certification to import H-2 workers had to attempt to recruit U.S.
workers at a DOL-established Adverse Effect Wage Rate (AEWR), and to offer such work-
ers free housing, round-trip transportation, and then receive e certification to employ H-2
workers for a maximum of 120 days, because “the only justification for bringing in labor is
to meet the peak conditions the highly seasonal agricultural industry” (Congressional Re-
search Service, 1980, p. 65).
6. John Norton, Undersecretary of Agriculture in the mid-1980s and a major lettuce
grower, said that “Leon Panetta carried the ball for California on the Panetta-Morrison amend-
ment... He did a superb job of trying to represent California’s labor needs... he’s been a real
champion of the industry.” California Farmer, June 21, 1986, 7.
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FACTORS THAT INFLUENCE MIGRATION
Proposition 187 in California
Philip Martin
California voters on November 8, 1994 voted 59 to 41 percent to approveProposition 187, the “Save Our State” Initiative. Proposition 187, ifimplemented, would create a state-run system to verify the legal status of
all persons seeking public education, health care, and other public benefits. The
only sections of Prop 187 currently in effect are those that make the manufacture,
distribution, or use of false documents to obtain employment or public benefits a
state felony.
Proposition 187 primarily creates a state-mandated screening system to pre-
vent unauthorized persons from obtaining public services. In the words of the ini-
tiative—no person “shall receive any public social services to which he or she may
otherwise be entitled until the legal status of that person has been verified.”
A majority of voters in 50 of California’s 58 counties supported Prop 187—
the exceptions were eight San Francisco Bay Area counties. According to exit polls,
64 percent of whites, 57 percent of Asian-Americans, 56 percent of African-Ameri-
cans, and 31 percent of Latinos voted in favor of Prop. 187. Some 78 percent of
those voting in favor of Prop. 187 agreed that “it sends a message that needs to be
sent” and 51 percent agreed that “it will force the federal government to face the
issue.” Some 40 percent of voters in one exit poll said that they voted primarily
because Prop. 187 was on the ballot.
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Of those voting against the measure, 60 percent agreed with the statement that
it “doesn’t solve the problem” and about 40 percent agreed that “it would throw
children out of school” and that “it is racist/anti-Latino.”
California’s population is 57 percent white, 25 percent Latino, nine percent
Asian-American, and seven percent African American. However, voters on No-
vember 8, 1994 were 75 to 80 percent white, eight to 10 percent Latino, four to five
percent Asian-American, and 10 percent African-American.
Proposition 187 may mark the beginning of national efforts to reduce legal
and illegal immigration, much as Proposition 13 in 1978 arguably laid the basis for
the Reagan-era tax cuts of the early 1980s. On the other hand, Proposition 187 may
be turn out to be a largely symbolic expression of frustration with illegal immigra-
tion, much as Proposition 63, which made English the state’s “official language” in
1986, proved to be.
Provisions
Proposition 187 has five major sections. First, it bars illegal aliens from the
state’s public education systems from kindergarten through university, and requires
public educational institutions to begin verifying the legal status of both students
(effective January 1, 1995) and their parents (effective January 1, 1996).
California educational institutions today verify the residence but not the legal
status of elementary school pupils and university students. There are no tuition
charges for K-12 education. One of California’s three higher education systems—
the state university system—charges resident illegal aliens lower in-state tuition,
while community colleges and UC charge them higher out-of state tuition. Almost
1 in 7 college and university students in the U.S. attends a public institution in CA.
Second, Proposition 187 requires all providers of publicly-paid, non-emer-
gency health care services to verify the legal status of persons seeking services in
order to be reimbursed by the state of CA. Persons seeking emergency care must
also establish their legal status, but unauthorized persons must be provided emer-
gency health services.
Third, Proposition 187 requires that all persons seeking cash assistance and
other benefits verify their legal status before receiving benefits. Unauthorized aliens
are generally not eligible for such benefits, so this provision establishes a state-run
eligibility system to screen applicants for benefits.
Fourth, all service providers are required to report suspected illegal aliens to
California’s Attorney General and to the INS. This means that those enrolling chil-
dren in school, or those determining eligibility for public benefits, are required to
report persons they suspect of being unauthorized. State and local police must de-
termine the legal status of persons arrested, and report unauthorized aliens.
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Fifth, the making, distribution, and use of false documents to obtain public
benefits or employment by concealing one’s legal status is now a state felony,
punishable by fines and prison terms. Prop 187 does not affect e.g., teenagers who
buy or use false documents to obtain alcohol.
Proposition 187 is an initiative statute whose provisions remain state law un-
less disapproved by a two-thirds vote of the California Legislature or by another
initiative. Sections of Prop 187 can be implemented individually. On November 9,
1994, Governor Wilson ordered that state-reimbursed health services for prenatal
care be stopped as soon as possible, and that no more unauthorized aliens be en-
rolled in state-reimbursed long-term health care programs (nursing home care).
Campaign
Proposition 187 initiative began with a huge lead in opinion polls—it had a
37-point lead in July, 1994, and led among likely voters by 62 to 29 percent in mid-
September, 1994. However, by early November, polls indicated that as many likely
voters opposed as supported SOS. Most politicians and opinion leaders argued that
voters should reject Proposition 187 because it was too blunt an instrument to deal
with the complex issue of illegal immigration. No major newspaper endorsed Propo-
sition 187.
In the week before the election, Governor Wilson, who was re-elected with 55
percent of the vote, asserted that if Proposition 187 became law, he would require
state and local government employees to report suspected illegal aliens as required
by the initiative. California Attorney General Dan Lungren, who was also re-elected,
promised to develop emergency regulations to implement the initiative immedi-
ately, but noted that there was no penalty for persons who do not report suspected
illegal aliens.
Wilson’s campaign bought the only pro-Proposition 187 TV ads that were aired,
while the anti-187 campaign used contributions from doctors and teachers to run
anti-Proposition 187 TV ads. Democratic gubernatorial challenger Kathleen Brown
ran out of money for TV ads at the end of her campaign, and toured high school
and college campuses, urging students to work to defeat Proposition 187.
President Clinton argued against Proposition 187. According to Clinton, “it is
not wrong for you [Californians] to want to reduce illegal immigration. And it is
not wrong for you to say it is a national responsibility.” Clinton said that “the
federal government should do more to help to stop illegal immigration and to help
California bear the costs of the illegal immigrants who are there,” but urged California
voters to reject Proposition 187 and allow the federal government to “keep working
on what we’re doing—stiffening the border patrol, stiffening the sanctions on
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employers who knowingly hire illegal immigrants, stiffening our ability to get illegal
immigrants out of the work force, increasing our ability to deport people who have
committed crimes who are illegal immigrants.”
The campaign’s final days were marked by large numbers of Hispanic stu-
dents walking out of high school to protest Proposition 187, and by charges of
hypocrisy between U.S. Senate candidates Feinstein and Huffington. Both took
tough stands against illegal immigration, and both charged that the other employed
an illegal alien maid. Feinstein hired an illegal housekeeper in the early 1980s—
before it was unlawful for a U.S. employer to knowingly hire illegal alien work-
ers—and Huffington hired an illegal alien nanny in the late 1980s and early 1990s,
when such hiring was unlawful. Feinstein was narrowly re-elected.
The Mexican government actively opposed Proposition 187. In his final state-
of-the-nation address, former Mexican President Carlos Salinas de Gortari as-
serted that “Mexico affirms rejection of this xenophobic campaign, and will con-
tinue to act in defense of the labor and human rights of our migrant workers.”
Ernesto Zedillo, who became Mexico’s President on December 1, 1994 asserted
during a November, 1994 trip to Washington, DC that Mexico “cannot object to
legitimate enforcement of U.S. laws,” but Mexico objects to “enforcement [that]
might lead to deprivation or violation of basic human rights... [including] educa-
tion and health care.”
Status
On November 20, 1995, a federal judge, in a 72-page opinion (League of
United Latin American Citizens v. Wilson, Case No. CV 94-7569 MRP, declared
most parts of Prop. 187 unconstitutional. The judge held that “Proposition 187’s
verification, notification and cooperation/reporting requirements directly regu-
late immigration [which only the federal government can do] by creating a com-
prehensive scheme to detect and report the presence and effect the removal of
illegal aliens.”
The key distinction in most of the ruling is the source of funds for programs. If
a program is funded with both federal and state funds, the judge ruled that California
could not unilaterally make illegal aliens ineligible for benefits. But if the program is
funded with state funds only, then California can make illegal aliens ineligible for
benefits. Only in K-12 education is the source of funds irrelevant—in this case, a
1982 U.S. Supreme Court decision requires states to educate illegal alien children.
The judge ruled, however, that under federal law California can deny entry and in-
state tuition status to illegal aliens seeking entry to colleges and universities.
Attorneys representing California argued that the state has a right and duty
to conserve scarce state funds, and to spend them as voters wish. The federal
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judge, by contrast, emphasized that only the federal government has the power
to regulate immigration.
The California State Attorney General on January 31, 1996 asked the court’s
permission to exclude illegal aliens from 23 state programs, ranging from state-
funded abortion to child abuse prevention programs—wholly state-funded programs.
Reactions
Proposition 187 was based on the theory that changes in immigrant policy can
affect immigration flows. According to Governor Wilson, denying public services
to unauthorized aliens would discourage them from coming to the U.S., and en-
courage some who are here to leave.
In March 1996, the U.S. House of Representatives approved, on a 257-163
vote with Speaker Gingrich’s support, a so-called “Proposition 187 or Gallegly”
amendment to immigration reform legislation that would permit states to deny
public education to illegal alien children, and to prohibit states from offering fed-
erally financed welfare benefits to illegal aliens. Many experts believe that, if Con-
gress approves the denial of free public education to unauthorized children, the
U.S. Supreme Court will reverse the 5 to 4 Plyler vs Doe decision in 1982 that
found unconstitutional a 1975 Texas law that kept unauthorized children out of
school. In the Plyler decision, the Supreme Court acknowledged that education
was not a “fundamental right,” but the majority decision emphasized that Texas
provided no evidence “suggesting that illegal entrants impose any significant bur-
den on the state’s economy.”
Bob Dole supported the Gallegly amendment; President Clinton opposed it.
There are an estimated 700,000 illegal alien children in K-12 U.S. schools, includ-
ing 355,000 in California
There was an attempt to put a Save Our State II initiative on the November
1996 ballot, but it failed to secure enough signatures. Save Our State II would
have required all applicants for welfare payments or other government benefits in
California to present state-issued identification cards proving their U.S. citizen-
ship or legal residency, all persons born in California to be fingerprinted at birth,
and all birth certificates to contain information regarding the residency status of
the baby’s mother.
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FACTORS THAT INFLUENCE MIGRATION
Mexican Migration Project Data
Katharine Donato
In this section, we present findings from an analysis of data from the MexicanMigration Project (MMP). Its purpose is to examine the extent to which Mexican men and women migrate legally and illegally to the United States, trends
in the chances of migrating over time, and whether and how migration patterns
differ by community of origin. The MMP data were collected in the 1980s and
early 1990s from about 200 households in each of 39 communities in western cen-
tral Mexico, a region of Mexico surrounding the city of Guadalajara from which
most U.S. migrants were born (MMP, 1995). The communities range in size from
1000-person ranchos to a section of Guadalajara, which had a 1990 population of
2.9 million (see Table 1).
In each of the 39 communities, households were randomly selected and inter-
views were conducted in December-January when sojourner U.S. migrants often
return to Mexico. Individual migration histories were compiled for all members of
the household, including those absent when the interview was conducted.
Interviewers spoke with household heads and obtained information on all
children, whether they were present or not, and if absent, whether they were in
Mexico or the United States (Massey and Espinosa, 1995, 4). For the household
heads, migration histories were compiled for each year after age 15, and they
included questions such as did the person migrate to the United States and if so,
904
Table 1
Characteristics of 39 Mexican Communities
Sampled for Study of U.S. Migration
Mexico
Type of Community 1990 1940 Survey Sample U.S.
and Name State Populationa Population Year Size* Sample*
Metropolitan Areas
Community 24 Jalisco 2,870,000b 229,235 1982 200 16
Community 2 Guanajuato 868,000b 74,155 1987 200 0
Community 32 S.L.P. 526,000b 97,762 1993 200 0
Community 19 Michoacán 493,000b 44,304 1991 200 20
Community 15 Guanajuato 363,000b 32,377 1991 200 20
Community 29 Michoacán 217,000b 20,583 1992 200 13
Community 35 Zacatecas 109,000b 26,673 1994 239 10
Community 31 Guerrero 101,000b 21,882 1993 100 0
Community 28 Jalisco 74,000b 22,170 1992 201 20
Smaller Urban Areas
Community 1 Guanajuato 52,000 12,015 1987 201 20
Community 38 S.L.P. 42,000 29,556 1994 200 0
Community 26 Guanajuato 34,000 8,341 1992 200 15
Community 9 Michoacán 32,000 5,452 1989 200 20
Community 17 Jalisco 31,000 13,003 1991 200 20
Community 27 Guanajuato 24,000 5,698 1992 200 15
Community 13 Guanajuato 21,000 5,635 1990 200 20
Community 11 Nayarit 20,000 4,720 1990 200 20
Community 4 Guanajuato 17,000 6,159 1988 200 22
Towns
Community 36 S.L.P. 13,000 13,923 1995 201 0
Community 23 Jalisco 12,000 5,531 1982 200 20
Community 12 Nayarit 12,000 551 1990 200 20
Community 18 Zacatecas 8,000 2,821 1991 365 20
Community 33 Colima 7,000 6,641 1995 200 20
Community 22 Michoacán 7,000 5,131 1982 200 20
Community 14 Michoacán 7,000 3,046 1990 200 20
Community 8 Michoacán 6,000 2,304 1989 200 20
Community 6 Jalisco 5,000 2,167 1988 200 20
Community 3 Jalisco 4,000 1,257 1988 200 22
Ranchos
Community 7 Jalisco 3,000 615 1988 200 15
Community 20 Jalisco 3,000 1,900 1982 106 14
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with or without documents. In addition, interviewers collected data from about
20 migration households who had moved to the U.S. in the summer following
data collection in Mexico.
Migrating on a First and Subsequent U.S. Trip
To examine the chances of making a first U.S. trip, the key variables are birth
dates and when and how each household member took a first trip to the United
States by the time of the interview. For each year of life, a household member had
three possible choices: (1) not to make a trip, coded as zero; (2) to make an unau-
thorized trip (either w/o docs or with tourist visas, border crossing cards, or bor-
rowed/false docs, who also had U.S. work experience), coded as one; or (3) to
migrate legally, coded two. Once a person migrated, he or she was excluded from
subsequent analysis.
Individual life-histories were used to estimate age-period models of migration.
For men and women, two types of probabilities are estimated:
(1) the probability that a man/woman aged 20-24 would migrate, legally or
illegally, to the United States for the first time in a given year, and
Table 1 (Continued)
Mexico
Type of Community 1990 1940 Survey Sample U.S.
and Name State Populationa Population Year Size* Sample*
Community 21 Jalisco 2,000 1,128 1982 94 6
Community 10 Michoacán 2,000 808 1989 150 20
Community 5 Guanajuato 2,000 1,630 1988 150 10
Community 34 Zacatecas 2,000 30,894 1995 149 0
Community 30 Zacatecas 1,000 384 1991 187 0
Community 16 Guanajuato 1,000 303 1991 100 10
Community 39 S.L.P. 1,000 29,556 1995 100 0
Community 25 Jalisco 1,000 275 1992 100 7
Community 37 S.L.P. 1,000 13,933 1995 102 0
*Sample size refers to number of households in the sample.
aRounded to nearest thousand
bPopulation of metropolitan area
Source: Mexican Migration Project (1995)
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(2) the cumulative probability that men/women by age 40 would have made
a first legal or illegal trip to the United States.1
We then extended these models to measure recurrent migration, and therefore,
estimated two sets of probabilities:
(1) the probability that a young man would migrate, legally or illegally, on
a subsequent trip (after making a first trip), and
(2) the cumulative probability that men by age 40 would migrate on a sec-
ond legal or illegal U.S. trip.2
For example, in Community 2, a large metro area in the state of Guanajuato,
the chance that a young man aged 20-24 would migrate illegally to the United
States was just 1 percent in 1994. Based on the model and year-by-year migration
probabilities for all men in the sample, we would expect about 16 percent of men
to migrate to the U.S. at least once illegally by age 40.
To better understand trends over time, consider a typical community, say
community 11, which in 1990 was a small urban area with a population of 20,000.
Table 2 shows that 12 percent of men aged 20-24 in this community took a first
illegal trip in 1980. Ten years later, despite high rates of legal migration associated
with IRCA’s amnesty program, 11 percent of the young men made a first
unauthorized trip. However, in 1991, the chance of making an illegal first trip
dropped to 5 percent, then rose to 7 percent in 1994, meaning that 7 of 100 young
men in community 11 made a first illegal trip to the United States in 1994.
Probabilities for communities 3 and 10, which are much smaller and more typi-
cal of the villages that depend on emigration and remittances to supplement earnings
from a mostly agricultural economy, illustrate similar patterns. In general, young
men were more likely to make a first illegal than legal U.S. trip until 1986. In 1986,
the chance of making a first illegal trip from community 10 was 45 percent, twice as
high as making a first legal trip. In community 3, the chance of making an unautho-
rized trip was 38 percent, more than 10 times higher than making a legal trip.
By 1987, the pattern had changed. In community 3, young men still faced
higher chances of migrating illegally than legally, but the difference between the
two narrowed considerably after 1986. For men in community 10, however, the
pattern reversed—beginning in 1987, the chance that a young man would migrate
legally was higher than migrating illegally. In 1992, 60 of 100 young men in com-
munity 10 made a first authorized trip, representing the highest migration prob-
ability recorded since 1980.
The second panel of Table 2 presents cumulative probabilities which answer
the question, what is the probability that a young man would have taken at least
907
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one unauthorized or legal trip to the United States by age 40? The probabilities for
each community are based on the rates of out migration that were estimated for
each community between 1940 and 1992. Young men enter the pool of potential
migrants at birth, and leave at age 39 or by death. The pool of those who could
migrate—the denominator—is all men in the community under age 40 who have
so far not migrated legally or illegally.
Once again, beginning with community 2, men by age 40 had a 29 percent
chance of migrating illegally on a first trip in 1980, or about one in three men
under 40 in this section of Guadalarja were predicted to have made at least one
illegal trip to the U.S. by 1980. By the mid 1980s, the chance that a man would
make at least one illegal trip rose to 36 percent but then fell, dropping to 20 percent
and in 1988 to just 8 percent. The decline continued through 1992, when the life-
time chance of making a first unauthorized trip was just 5 percent. However, two
years later, it had risen to 16 percent.
So far, our results suggest three key findings. First, from some communities,
virtually all young men will make an initial U.S. trip by age 40. Second, the chances
of migrating illegally and legally vary considerably by origin community—they
are lower than in larger metropolitan areas than in smaller rural communities. Third,
despite declines immediately after 1986, the probability of making an initial unau-
thorized U.S. trip by age 40 began to rise again by the 1990s, based on a model that
uses migration experience through 1992.
Table 3 presents the same probabilities of migration calculated for women in
the four communities. Like those for men, they reveal that: (1) by age 40, most
women will migrate to the United States on a first trip; and (2) the incentives to
migrate have changed since 1980. However, despite the similarities, year-by-year
probabilities show that shifts in the chances of migrating legally and illegally were
more gradual than those for men. For example, declines in the chances that a woman
would migrate illegally occurred in the 1990s rather than immediately after 1986.
Finally, the probabilities presented in Table 4 suggest that more recent repeat
trips to the United States were made with legal documents rather than without
them. In communities 2, 11, and 10, the lifetime chance of making a second trip
(after making a first) with legal documents was much higher than making an ille-
gal trip in the mid 1990s. Before 1987, however, the chance of making a second
unauthorized trip was much higher than migrating legally.
Community Similarities and Differences
To better understand migration trends over a longer period of time for all 39
communities, we estimated the probabilities of migration separately for each year
beginning in 1943. From these probabilities (see Appendices 1-3), we derive
909
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Figures 1-15. Figures 1-5 illustrates trends in the chances that a male household
head migrates on a first U.S. trip, Figures 6-10 document shifts in the chances
that a woman migrates on a first U.S. trip, and Figures 11-15 describe trends in
the chances that a male household head makes a second U.S. trip. In each set of
figures, the first figure summarizes the probabilities of migrating across all 39
communities in 1943-94, and the next four figures describe the probabilities for
communities 2, 11, 3 and 10 in 1971-94.
On the whole, the figures reveal the same difference that we observed earlier
between the predicted and cumulative probabilities. The predicted chances that
young men migrate on a first illegal or legal trip at age 20-24 was quite low
throughout the period, but magnified over 40 years, the chances of migrating were
considerably higher.
Figure 1 illustrates how, in the beginning of the Bracero period, the chance
that young men would migrate on a first U.S. trip with documents was higher
than the probability of migrating illegally. In 1947, young men were more likely
to migrate illegally but, after Operation Wetback in 1954, the probabilities reversed
again, and legal migration became the norm until the end of the Bracero Program.
After 1964, however, the cumulative probability that young men migrated le-
gally trended downward, while the cumulative probability of a first illegal trip
moved up, peaking at 80 percent in these emigration communities in 1983. Since
then, the lifetime probability that a young man would migrate on a first legal trip to
the United States by age 40 has fluctuated, with legal and illegal probabilities fol-
lowing similar year-by-year patterns, reaching an all-time low of approximately
20 percent in 1990, and then doubling to at least 40 percent by 1994.
These trends are consistent with evidence that stepped up enforcement and the
increased legalization of Braceros in the mid-1950s helped lower the chances of
illegal first-time entry. As the number of Braceros was reduced in the late 1950s,
and reduced to zero after 1964, the chances of illegal entry grew. This upward
pattern continued until the mid 1980s, when IRCA produced both a legalization
program and a series of incentives explicitly designed to reduce illegal entry to the
United States. As a consequence, the probability of first-time illegal migration dra-
matically declined in the late 1980s, intersected with that for legal migration, and
in recent years the chances of legal and illegal migration converged.
Figures 2 through 5 illustrate how the pressures to migrate have changed over
time in the four typical communities. Unlike Figure 1 that described the average
probabilities across all 39 communities, trends in Figures 2 through 5 document
striking differences among the villages in the chances of migrating on a first U.S.
trip. For example, the figures show clearly that, in community 2, a less established
migrant sending community, the chance of illegal migration was much lower, and
less symmetric, than in other communities. In addition, although the chance of
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Figure 2. Chances That a Male Household Head Migrates
on a First U.S. Trip, for Community 2, 1971–94
Figure 1. Chances That a Male Household Head Migrates on a
First U.S. Trip, for 39 Mexican Communities, 1943–94
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Figure 4. Chances That a Male Household Head Migrates
On a First U.S. Trip, for Community 3, 1971–94
Figure 3. Chances That a Male Household Head Migrates
On a First U.S. Trip, for Community 11, 1971–94
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making a first illegal trip was higher than a first legal trip from 1971 to 1987 for all
communities, since then, differences across communities have emerged. Commu-
nity 2 is noteworthy in this regard because young men remain more likely to mi-
grate illegally than legally since 1986.
In communities 3 and 10, the most established migrant sending origins from
which virtually everyone migrates on a first trip with or without documents, overall
trends reveal remarkably high levels of migration and almost perfect symmetry
between the two types of cumulative probabilities (see Figures 4 and 5). In 1971,
from community 3, the lifetime chance of migrating illegally was close to 90 percent,
whereas the chance of illegal migration dropped to roughly 10 percent. In that
same year, the cumulative chance of migrating on a first U.S. trip from community
10 was 65 percent for men without documents and 35 percent for those making
legal trips.
The chances of migrating continued at the same high levels through 1986,
but with an important distinction—migrating legally replaced migrating illegally
in these two villages. During the post-IRCA period, the chance of making a legal
trip by age 40 grew to a high of 40 percent in community 3, and 80 percent in
community 10. In both communities, upward or downward shifts in the chances
Figure 5. Chances That a Male Household Head Migrates
On a First U.S. Trip, for Community 10, 1971–94
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of legal and illegal migration essentially mirror each other—a drop in the chance
of illegal migration occurred in the same year that the chance of legal migration
increased. Despite the shifts, however, the combined chances of migration suggest
that virtually everyone will migrate on a first trip by age 40.
Community 10 illustrates Massey et al.’s (1994) view of how migration has
become a self-feeding process. Of the 39 communities in the data set, this
community has the longest history of U.S. migration. Many residents were
legalized in 1987-88, so that the probability of migrating on a first legal trip
rose in 1988 and surpassed the chance of making a first unauthorized trip. Later,
in the 1990s, with documents themselves, these migrants sponsored the legal
migration of their dependents, thus facilitating very high levels of legal migration
from this community.
In contrast to the patterns for men, women’s chances of migrating on a first
legal trip are higher than for a first unauthorized trip throughout the 1943-94 period
(see Figure 6). Dramatic increases occurred in two periods. The mid 1960s witnessed
the legalization of many Braceros, who in turn sponsored their immediate family
Figure 6. Chances That a Woman Migrates on a First U.S. Trip,
for 39 Mexican Communities, 1943–94
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Figure 7. Chances That a Woman Migrates on a
First U.S. Trip, for Community 2, 1971–94
Figure 8. Chances That a Woman Migrates on a
First U.S. Trip, for Community 11, 1971–94
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Figure 9. Chances That a Woman Migrates on a
First U.S. Trip, for Community 3, 1971–94
Figure 10. Chances That a Woman Migrates on a
First U.S. Trip, for Community 10, 1971–94
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members (many of them women) for purposes of family unification (Donato, 1993).
In the early 1990s, there was a second peak in a woman’s chance to migrate legally
as many began to enter as relatives of IRCA’s amnesty recipients.
Interestingly, however, Figures 7-10 show that trends in individual communities
may differ from Figure 6. For example, community 3 was unusual because here a
woman’s chance of migrating illegally was higher than migrating legally until 199,
when legal migration became the norm. In community 10, the gap in the lifetime
chances of legal versus illegal migration was much larger than that observed for all
39 communities.
Finally, Figures 11-15 reveal trends in the chances that men migrate on a sec-
ond U.S. trip. Across all 39 communities, the cumulative probability of migrating
legally was higher than illegal migration during the 1942-64 Bracero period. The
crossover year was 1963, when the chances of migrating illegally exceeded those
for legal migration. This state of affairs continued until the late 1980s, when the
chances of making a second legal trip were higher than making illegal trips. By the
early 1990s, however, the two probabilities converged so that roughly 50 percent
of men migrated on an illegal or legal second trip.
Figure 11. Chances That a Male Household Head Migrates on a
Subsequent U.S. Trip, for 39 Mexican Communities, 1943–94
919
Figure 12. Chances That a Male Household Head Migrates on a
Subsequent U.S. Trip, for Community 2, 1971–94
Figure 13. CHances That a Male Household Head Migrates on a
Subsequent U.S. Trip, for Community 11, 1971–94
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Figure 14. Chances That a Male Household Head Migrates on a
Subsequent U.S. Trip, for Community 3, 1971–94
Figure 15. Chances That a Male Household Head Migrates on a
Subsequent U.S. Trip, for Community 10, 1971–94
921
Assessment
These data suggest that the majority of men and women will leave traditional
emigration communities west central Mexico on a first U.S. trip by age 40, and
that most men will make a subsequent trip. On a year-by-year basis, the major
difference was whether Mexicans made their first trips legally or illegally, not
whether or not they migrate. Legal status differences were also related to community
of origin. From traditional emigration communities, prior high levels of illegal
migration have fed on themselves, changing the legal status of newly arriving
Mexican migrants without shifting the overall pressures to migrate over the long
term. In fact, the present analysis reveals that the chance of migrating on a first trip
has begun to rise in the 1990s.
Together with findings from prior community studies, these data suggest that
the pressures to migrate are now as high as ever. Although the legalization program
appears related to a rapid rise in probabilities of legal migration, it is clear that the
overall pressures to migrate in many communities in west central Mexico remain
is strong and may be on the rise. So the question is how to get over the current
migration peak or hump.3
Examination of migration trends suggests that stepped up enforcement and a
legalization program for Braceros combined to lower the chances of illegal migra-
tion in the mid-1950s. By the early 1990s, a similar two-pronged control policy
existed in the United States. Although the legalization program implemented as
part of IRCA and several stepped-up border enforcement programs, especially in
San Diego and El Paso, also lowered the chances of illegal first-time migration
from Mexico, the pressures to migrate have remained high.
Therefore, our re-analysis of these data suggests that recent migration from
communities with long trajectories of migration has become a self-feeding pro-
cess. After 1986, with amnesty and the ability to sponsor their relatives, many
more migrants have been entering legally. But at the same time that the incentives
to migrate legally and illegally have changed, high levels of migration prevail.
Notes
1. Note that both probabilities derive from weighted models to correct for differences
between the U.S. and Mexican samples. Within Mexico, weights are the number of households
in the community divided by the number of households in the sample. Within the United
States, weights are the number of out migrant households from each community living in
the United States divided by the number of households in each community surveyed in the
United States. By pooling and weighing the U.S. and Mexican samples, these data provide
a representative profile of the total binational population of all communities in the data set.
2. Unfortunately, data are not yet available to estimate probabilities of recurrent migra-
tion for women.
922
3. This conclusion contrasts with that made by Reyes (1997), who analyzed the MMP
data and reported that approximately 50 percent of Mexican migrants return to Mexico.
Although many do return home, her figure derives from an analysis that is biased in favor of
high emigration rates. By including all MMP observations, of which many refer to the 1942-
64 period when Mexican workers were recruited by the U.S. government to work in agricul-
ture and then return home, her estimate of return migration is likely to overestimate the
extent to which recent migrants (in the last 10-15 years or so) return to Mexico
923
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Technical Appendix: MMP Analysis
The MMP data permit us to separately distinguish between the chances of
making an initial (first) or subsequent (two or more) trip to the United States.
Together these events determine the overall flow of legal and illegal migrants across
the border (see Donato et al., 1992).  In this report, we examined the chances that
male household heads and women migrate on an initial U.S. trip, and for men, the
chances that they migrate on a subsequent trip.
For the analysis, we drew on two basic sources of information: the birth date
and the date of the first trip to the United States (compiled for all household mem-
bers) and the history of border crossing (gathered from household heads). Given
each subject’s date of birth and year of first trip, we first constructed separate year-
by-year life histories up to the date of the first U.S. trip for both men and women.
That is, we built discrete-time person-year files that followed each subject from
birth to the date of the survey or to the first U.S. trip, whichever came first. For the
recurrent trip analysis, we built a similar discrete-time person year file but con-
structed it from year-by-year files that began with the year migrants returned from
their first trip up to the year of their next trip.
Because the outcome measure was trichotomous (migrated illegally, legally,
or did not migrate), we used multinomial logistic regression to estimate the chance
of migrating with and without legal papers versus not migrating at all (the refer-
ence category) (Hosmer and Lemeshow, 1989).  The multinomial logit equation is
given below:
          
= + + +β β β βj j j jx x x0 1 1 2 2 3 3
where j represents legal status of migration on a first (or subsequent) trip and 0
indicates no migration, and where P (Y =  j| x) is the probability of migration with
legal status j given a set of characteristics represented by the vector x. The effects
of the explanatory variables in time t on the log-odds ( gj  (x) ) of migrating with
legal status j in t + 1 are;  age given by β j1,  period given by β j2 ,  and community
given by β j3
 
. Note that period and age are time varying, whereas community is a
fixed variable.
We began by estimating age-period models and age-period-community models
(see Technical Appendix Tables 1A-3B). From them, we calculated the conditional
chances that male household heads (or women) of a given age migrate, legally or
illegally, on an initial U.S. trip using the equation below:
g x
P Y j x
P Y xj
( ) = =( )
=( )ln
|
|     0
948
P Y j x e
e
g x
g x
k
j
k
=( ) =
−
∑
|
( )
( )
0
2
where β0  = 0 and hence g 0 (x) = 0 .
Using these probabilities as a baseline, we built life tables that produced the
cumulative chances that men by age 40 would make a legal, illegal trip, or not
migrate, in a certain year (Shyrock et al., 1976). Technical Appendix Table 5 de-
picts the lifetime migration experience in community 10 in 1994 by age, assuming
the probabilities of Mexican out-migration that prevailed up to 1994. These fig-
ures show what would happen if a male household head born into this community
were to go through life subject to the probabilities of out-migration prevailing in
different years. The hypothetical probabilities begin with the assumption that at
birth (age intervalx=0), the chance of not migrating, P(NM), equals 1 and the prob-
abilities of migrating legally, P(ML), or illegally, P(MIL) equal 0.
At age interval (x+1),
(1) the chance of not migrating is
P(NM)
x+1 = P(NM)0 - [P(NM)0*(P (Y = legal | x given age ≤ 14) +  P(Y =
illegal | x given age ≤ 14)];
(2) the chance of migrating legally is
P(ML)
x+1 = [P(ML)0 + (P(NM)0* P (Y = legal | x given age ≤ 14)]; and
(3) the chance of migrating illegally is
P(MIL)
x+1 = [P(MIL)0 +  (P(NM)0* P (Y = illegal | x given age ≤ 14)].
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Technical Appendix Table 1A
Multinomial Age-Period Analysis of the Probability that Male Household
Heads from 39 Mexican Communities Will Migrate Illegally or Legally
(vs. Not Migrating) on a First U.S. Trip
Illegal vs Not Mig Legal vs Not Mig
Age and Period B SE B SE
Age
< 15 – – – –
15-19 2.908 0.113 3.142 0.156
20-24 3.405 0.111 3.832 0.152
25-29 3.202 0.111 3.834 0.152
30-34 2.926 0.113 3.806 0.153
35-39 2.563 0.115 3.837 0.154
40-44 2.438 0.117 3.806 0.156
45-49 2.434 0.119 3.947 0.157
50-54 1.898 0.130 3.621 0.163
55+ 0.946 0.140 3.327 0.160
Period
Before 1943   – – – –
1943 1.328 0.296 2.222 0.228
1944 1.140 0.302 2.137 0.225
1945 1.133 0.289 2.048 0.222
1946 0.980 0.293 1.388 0.254
1947 1.737 0.229 1.560 0.237
1948 1.667 0.229 1.470 0.236
1949 1.774 0.219 1.201 0.248
1950 1.539 0.226 1.639 0.217
1951 1.159 0.244 1.537 0.218
1952 1.534 0.219 1.643 0.210
1953 1.283 0.229 1.642 0.207
1954 1.075 0.237 1.588 0.206
1955 1.031 0.236 2.029 0.191
1956 0.962 0.238 1.868 0.193
1957 0.696 0.255 2.326 0.183
1958 0.925 0.235 1.936 0.189
1959 0.943 0.231 1.976 0.187
1960 1.167 0.217 2.095 0.183
1961 O.845 0.231 1.771 0.188
1962 0.712 0.238 1.681 0.189
1963 1.187 0.210 1.442 0.194
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Illegal vs Not Mig Legal vs Not Mig
Age and Period B SE B SE
1964 1.415 0.200 1.664 0.188
1965 1.673 0.190 0.366*  0.233
1966 1.168 0.206 0.812 0.209
1967 1.793 0.186 0.735 0.211
1968 1.885 0.183 0.816 0.206
1969 1.833 0.184 0.871 0.203
1970 2.093 0.179 1.007 0.197
1971 2.216 0.176 0.878  0.200
1972 2.005 0.179 0.750 0.202
1973 2.422 0.173 0.683 0.204
1974 2.413 0.173 0.666 0.203
1975 2.360 0.173 0.668 0.203
1976 2.411 0.173 0.805 0.196
1977 2.350 0.172 0.833 0.194
1978 2.412 0.172 0.807 0.194
1979 2.566 0.170 0.901 0.191
1980 2.443 0.171 0.793 0.192
1981 2.389 0.171 0.857 0.190
1982 2.175 0.173 0.638 0.194
1983 2.129 0.174 0.667 0.194
1984 2.480 0.171 0.808 0.190
1985 2.574 0.170 0.706 0.193
1986 2.635 0.169 0.749 0.191
1987 1.992 0.176 1.218  0.181
1988 2.152 0.175 1.849 0.174
1989 1.532 0.186 1.851 0.175
1990 2.263 0.176 1.740 0.177
1991 1.051 0.214 1.195 0.190
1992 0.941 0.237 1.226 0.197
1993 0.118*  0.335 -0.362*  0.311
1994 1.573 0.346 1.302 0.291
Intercept -7.893*  0.186  -8.365*  0.212
Chi-Square 11,183
Person-Years 218,012
* Not significant, p > .05
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Technical Appendix Table 1B
Multinomial Age-Period-Community Analysis of the Probability that
Male Household Heads from 39 Mexican Communities Will Migrate
Illegally or Legally (vs. Not Migrating) on a First U.S. Trip: 1971–94
Age, Period, Illegal vs Not Mig Legal vs Not Mig
and Community B SE B SE
Age
< 15 – – – –
15-19 2.912 0.114 3.177 0.156
20-24 3.306 0.111 3.760 0.151
25-29 3.045 0.112 3.625 0.152
30-34 2.769 0.113 3.503 0.153
35-39 2.445 0.116 3.518 0.154
40-44 2.328 0.118 3.447 0.156
45-49 2.323 0.120 3.586 0.157
50-54 1.744 0.131 3.229 0.163
55+ 0.617 0.140 2.759 0.160
Period
Before 1971 – – – –
1971 0.921 0.079 -0.546 0.119
1972 0.687 0.085 -0.697 0.124
1973 1.100 0.071 -0.764 0.126
1974 1.071 0.071 -0.789 0.124
1975 0.996 0.072 -0.848 0.124
1976 1.030 0.070 -0.671 0.112
1977 0.956 0.070 -0.649 0.109
1978 1.022 0.068 -0.671 0.108
1979 1.183 0.064 -0.562 0.102
1980 1.054 0.066 -0.667 0.105
1981 0.999 0.067 -0.597 0.101
1982 0.781 0.071 -0.824 0.109
1983 0.757 0.073 -0.787 0.108
1984 1.137 0.065 -0.609 0.102
1985 1.238 0.063 -0.698 0.106
1986 1.316 0.061 -0.639 0.102
1987 0.661 0.077 -0.168 0.082
1988 0.838 0.075 0.502 0.066
1989 0.194 0.099 0.460 0.067
1990 1.085 0.078 0.595 0.074
1991 0.177*  0.146 0.298 0.102
1992 0.370 0.179 0.667 0.118
1993 -0.310*  0.298 -0.560 0.217
1994 0.474*  0.316 0.333*  0.254
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Age, Period, Illegal vs Not Mig Legal vs Not Mig
and Community B SE B SE
Community
1 –  – – –
2  -1.999 0.336 -0.904 0.367
3 1.557 0.151 1.477 0.244
4  -1.068 0.168 -0.728 0.254
5  -1.244 0.439 -2.749 1.488
6 0.475 0.170 0.941 0.247
7 0.232*  0.188 0.284*  0.302
8 1.223 0.133 1.713 0.216
9 0.893 0.124 1.934 0.204
10  2.251 0.159 3.916 0.215
11  0.275 0.133 1.070 0.209
12  0.505 0.135 -0.128*  0.233
13  1.276 0.130 0.949 0.212
14 -0.614 0.178 -0.168*  0.257
15 -1.052 0.187 0.044*  0.238
16 -0.031 0.349 0.846 0.385
17  0.533 0.142 1.908 0.210
18  0.471 0.139 1.688 0.208
19 -0.270*  0.143 -0.217*  0.229
20  0.500 0.225 0.626*  0.326
21 -0.044*  0.264 -0.268*  0.409
22  1.682 0.147 1.549 0.232
23 -0.253*  0.195 0.371*  0.271
24  0.286*  0.328 0.829 0.408
25 -0.956 0.394 -1.214 0.744
26 -0.209*  0.143 1.096 0.210
27  0.222*  0.151 1.004 0.221
28 -0.147*  0.154 0.137*  0.236
29 -0.101*  0.169 -0.416*  0.295
30  1.926 0.161 2.025 0.240
31 -1.200 0.134 -1.033 0.215
32 -1.824 0.224 -1.874 0.350
33 -0.213*  0.151 -0.354*  0.245
34  1.804 0.177 2.488 0.243
35 -1.496 0.208 -1.099 0.300
36  0.194*  0.237 1.046 0.282
37  1.067 0.283 1.581 0.334
38 -0.277*  0.198 -0.702*  0.360
39  0.687 0.198 -0.147*  0.380
Intercept -6.608 0.164 -7.512 0.249
Chi-Square 20,611
Person-Years 218,012
* Not significant, p > .05
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Technical Appendix Table 2A
Multinomial Age-Period Analysis of the Probability that Women
from 39 Mexican Communities Will Migrate Illegally
or Legally (vs. Not Migrating) on a First U.S. Trip
Illegal vs Not Mig Legal vs Not Mig
Age and Period B SE B SE
Age
< 15 – – – –
15-19 1.500 0.031 -0.084 0.017
20-24 2.242 0.028 -0.017*  0.018
25-29 2.382 0.028 0.050 0.019
30-34 2.213 0.030 0.001*  0.021
35-39 2.075 0.032 -0.066 0.024
40-44 1.916 0.036 -0.097 0.027
45-49 1.611 0.042 -0.151 0.031
50-54 1.407 0.050 -0.245 0.038
55+ 1.143 0.043 -0.562 0.032
Period
Before 1943 – – – –
1943 -1.791 0.906 -0.418 0.180
1944 -1.859 0.906 -0.446 0.177
1945 -1.956 0.906 -0.508 0.177
1946 -1.850 0.822 -0.398 0.162
1947 -0.206*  0.364 -0.443 0.162
1948 0.136*  0.306 -0.166*  0.139
1949 0.301*  0.279 -0.193*  0.138
1950 0.407*  0.258 -0.083*  0.128
1951 0.396*  0.252 -0.047*  0.122
1952 0.437*  0.241 -0.067*  0.121
1953 0.430*  0.236 0.040*  0.112
1954 0.422*  0.232 0.078*  0.108
1955 0.450 0.222 0.138*  0.102
1956 0.494 0.214 0.226 0.097
1957 0.457 0.212 0.323 0.091
1958 0.432 0.210 0.357 0.088
1959 0.476 0.203 0.489 0.083
1960 0.451 0.200 0.583 0.078
1961 0.384*  0.200 0.585 0.077
1962 0.406 0.196 0.649 0.074
1963 0.425 0.191 0.719 0.071
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Illegal vs Not Mig Legal vs Not Mig
Age and Period B SE B SE
1964 0.740 0.172 0.949 0.065
1965 0.798 0.168 0.948 0.064
1966 0.870 0.162 1.178 0.060
1967 0.940 0.158 1.252 0.058
1968 1.139 0.150 1.255 0.058
1969 1.337 0.144 1.290 0.057
1970 1.475 0.140 1.317 0.056
1971 1.603 0.137 1.372 0.055
1972 1.729 0.134 1.414 0.054
1973 1.890 0.131 1.446 0.053
1974 2.107 0.128 1.534 0.052
1975 2.256 0.127 1.577 0.052
1976 2.354 0.126 1.606 0.051
1977 2.452 0.125 1.632 0.051
1978 2.560 0.124 1.656 0.050
1979 2.622 0.124 1.661 0.050
1980 2.758 0.123 1.698 0.050
1981 2.784 0.122 1.736 0.049
1982 2.815 0.122 1.768 0.049
1983 2.856 0.122 1.842 0.049
1984 2.859 0.122 1.694 0.050
1985 2.936 0.122 1.731 0.050
1986 2.986 0.122 1.748 0.049
1987 3.020 0.121 1.785 0.049
1988 3.092 0.121 1.850 0.049
1989 3.237 0.121 1.954 0.049
1990 3.271 0.121 2.099 0.049
1991 3.222 0.122 2.186 0.050
1992 3.065 0.124 2.032 0.053
1993 3.094 0.125 2.067 0.056
1994 3.183 0.143 2.988 0.068
Intercept -7.164 0.120 -4.132 0.042
Chi-Square 44,913
Person-Years 680,574
* Not significant, p > .05
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Technical Appendix Table 2B
Multinomial Age-Period-Community Analysis of the Probability that
Women from 39 Mexican Communities Will Migrate Illegally or Legally
(vs. Not Migrating) on a First U.S. Trip: 1971–94
Age, Period, Illegal vs Not Mig Legal vs Not Mig
and Community B SE B SE
Age
< 15 – – – –
15-19 1.559 0.031 -0.116 0.019
20-24 2.332 0.028 -0.046 0.019
25-29 2.460 0.028 -0.011*  0.021
30-34 2.281 0.030 -0.084 0.023
35-39 2.124 0.033 -0.195 0.026
40-44 1.991 0.036 -0.242 0.030
45-49 1.683 0.042 -0.326 0.035
50-54 1.484 0.051 -0.445 0.042
55+ 1.119 0.044 -0.911 0.036
Period
Before 1971 – – – –
1971 0.970 0.074 0.816 0.041
1972 1.094 0.069 0.868 0.039
1973 1.251 0.063 0.910 0.038
1974 1.467 0.058 1.011 0.036
1975 1.625 0.054 1.060 0.036
1976 1.723 0.052 1.097 0.034
1977 1.814 0.049 1.124 0.034
1978 1.924 0.047 1.158 0.033
1979 1.984 0.046 1.174 0.033
1980 2.135 0.043 1.230 0.032
1981 2.158 0.043 1.276 0.031
1982 2.186 0.042 1.310 0.031
1983 2.271 0.042 1.492 0.031
1984 2.285 0.042 1.371 0.033
1985 2.365 0.041 1.418 0.032
1986 2.415 0.040 1.438 0.032
1987 2.449 0.040 1.486 0.031
1988 2.504 0.039 1.548 0.031
1989 2.601 0.039 1.615 0.030
1990 2.852 0.040 1.818 0.031
1991 3.106 0.043 2.049 0.035
1992 3.075 0.048 2.198 0.040
1993 3.403 0.052 2.668 0.047
1994 3.026 0.091 2.820 0.075
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Age, Period, Illegal vs Not Mig Legal vs Not Mig
and Community B SE B SE
Community
1 – – – –
2  -2.507 0.306 -2.076 0.160
3 0.715 0.113 -0.210 0.094
4  -0.917 0.110 -1.270 0.079
5  -1.344 0.309 -2.185 0.308
6  -0.761 0.150 -1.190 0.116
7  -0.067*  0.134 -0.435 0.100
8 1.729 0.089 0.057*  0.069
9 1.290 0.085 0.165 0.058
10  1.118 0.111 1.409 0.072
11  1.387 0.086 0.853 0.057
12  1.440 0.087 0.492 0.061
13  0.120*  0.091 -0.283 0.062
14 -1.988 0.175 -6.772 1.163
15 -1.647 0.134 -2.298 0.119
16 -1.892 0.423 -0.730 0.175
17  0.674 0.092 0.842 0.060
18  1.140 0.091 3.009 0.056
19 -0.629 0.097 -1.629 0.079
20  1.179 0.118 0.630 0.083
21  0.090*  0.162 0.243 0.094
22  1.454 0.091 1.751 0.058
23 -0.129*  0.118 -0.498 0.081
24  0.461 0.120 -0.214 0.089
25 -0.217*  0.189 -1.683 0.242
26  0.812 0.088 1.118 0.058
27 -0.448 0.102 -0.594 0.071
28  1.033 0.090 0.373 0.063
29  0.712 0.098 -1.206 0.100
30  1.579 0.105 0.332 0.095
31  -0.675 0.086 -1.585 0.060
32  -1.601 0.123 -1.147 0.078
33 0.546 0.091 -0.338 0.067
34  -1.091 0.196 -3.236 0.357
35  -0.931 0.107 -1.461 0.082
36 0.344 0.123 -0.189*  0.098
37 0.444 0.180 -0.421 0.178
38  -0.583 0.126 -3.280 0.246
39 0.503 0.129 -3.410 0.447
Intercept -7.104 0.090 -3.861 0.056
Chi-Square  124,004
Person-Years 680,574
* Not significant, p > .05
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Technical Appendix Table 3A
Multinomial Age-Period Analysis of the Probability that Male Household
Heads from 39 Mexican Communities Will Migrate Illegally or Legally
(vs. Not Migrating) on a Subsequent U.S. Trip
Illegal vs Not Mig Legal vs Not Mig
Age and Period B SE B SE
Age
< 15 – – – –
15-19 1.937 0.418 2.442 0.445
20-24 1.998 0.411 2.591 0.437
25-29 1.583 0.411 2.030 0.437
30-34 1.301 0.411 1.955 0.437
35-39 1.052 0.412 1.977 0.437
40-44 0.619*  0.413 1.810 0.438
45-49 0.283*  0.415 1.688 0.439
50-54  -0.177*  0.420 1.100 0.443
55+ -1.321 0.427 0.670*  0.442
Period
Before 1943 – – – –
1943 1.633 0.752 1.811 0.659
1944 0.990*  0.678 2.268 0.472
1945 0.858*  0.614 2.289 0.437
1946 1.271 0.507 2.007 0.428
1947 0.661*  0.556 1.880 0.424
1948 0.471*  0.545 1.402 0.432
1949 1.601 0.444 1.542 0.422
1950 0.868*  0.493 1.671 0.416
1951 1.125 0.458 1.517 0.413
1952 1.273 0.443 1.910 0.397
1953 0.990 0.451 1.784 0.396
1954 0.967 0.450 1.587 0.400
1955 1.225 0.440 2.192 0.387
1956 1.289 0.430 2.010 0.387
1957 0.903 0.447 2.190 0.384
1958 1.183 0.431 2.461 0.379
1959 1.050 0.436 2.300 0.381
1960 1.174 0.428 2.258 0.380
1961 0.771*  0.442 2.169 0.380
1962 0.734*  0.441 1.936 0.382
1963 0.925 0.434 1.890 0.383
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Illegal vs Not Mig Legal vs Not Mig
Age and Period B SE B SE
1964 0.941 0.434 2.139 0.380
1965 1.956 0.403 1.052 0.400
1966 1.422 0.414 0.966 0.401
1967 1.803 0.407 1.209 0.396
1968 1.525 0.412 1.265 0.393
1969 1.978 0.403 1.141 0.397
1970 1.868 0.406 1.345 0.392
1971 2.216 0.400 1.045 0.399
1972 2.351 0.398 0.983 0.399
1973 2.415 0.397 1.006 0.399
1974 2.411 0.396 0.948 0.399
1975 2.309 0.397 1.078 0.393
1976 2.181 0.397 1.120 0.390
1977 2.255 0.395 1.077 0.390
1978 2.411 0.393 1.092 0.388
1979 2.265 0.394 1.262 0.384
1980 2.267 0.394 1.219 0.384
1981 2.193 0.394 1.091 0.385
1982  2.126 0.394 1.187 0.383
1983 2.175 0.394 1.040 0.385
1984 2.198 0.393 1.121 0.384
1985 2.220 0.393 1.077 0.384
1986 2.450 0.392 1.139 0.383
1987 1.968 0.395 1.554 0.377
1988 2.116 0.394 1.866 0.375
1989 1.404 0.404 1.988 0.374
1990 1.955 0.401 2.302 0.374
1991 1.488 0.420 1.900 0.382
1992 1.077 0.463 1.900 0.391
1993 0.837*  0.520 0.776*  0.455
1994 2.088 0.519 2.442 0.436
Intercept -5.388 0.540 -5.853 0.555
Chi-Square 4,134
Person-Years 48,759
* Not significant, p > .05
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Technical Appendix Table 3B
Multinomial Age-Period-Community Analysis of the Probability that Male
Household Heads from 39 Mexican Communities Will Migrate Illegally
or Legally (vs. Not Migrating) on a Subsequent U.S. Trip: 1971–94
Age, Period, Illegal vs Not Mig Legal vs Not Mig
and Community B SE B SE
Age
≤ 19 – – – –
20-24 0.494 0.100 0.579 0.108
25-29 0.154*  0.100 -0.005*  0.108
30-34  -0.107*  0.100 -0.093*  0.109
35-39  -0.341 0.102 -0.121*  0.109
40-44  -0.789 0.108 -0.360 0.113
45-49  -1.135 0.116 -0.466 0.117
50-54  -1.566 0.131 -1.061 0.132
55+ -2.836 0.152 -1.639 0.127
Period
Before 1971 – – – –
1971 0.918 0.124 -0.790 0.171
1972 1.070 0.115 -0.843 0.170
1973 1.116 0.113 -0.780 0.168
1974 1.107 0.111 -0.825 0.169
1975 0.994 0.112 -0.668 0.152
1976 0.836 0.114 -0.658 0.145
1977 0.937 0.107 -0.702 0.142
1978 1.115 0.100 -0.693 0.139
1979 0.977 0.101 -0.531 0.126
1980 0.954 0.100 -0.556 0.126
1981 0.900 0.100 -0.670 0.128
1982 0.787 0.102 -0.565 0.122
1983 0.868 0.100 -0.711 0.128
1984 0.924 0.100 -0.595 0.123
1985 0.925 0.100 -0.630 0.124
1986 1.170 0.091 -0.560 0.122
1987 0.671 0.103 -0.126*  0.098
1988 0.858 0.101 0.217 0.090
1989 0.091*  0.136 0.299 0.088
1990 0.693 0.127 0.804 0.091
1991 0.518 0.180 0.510 0.121
1992 0.482*  0.264 0.861 0.152
1993 0.524*  0.336 -0.074*  0.282
1994 0.890 0.365 1.015 0.261
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Age, Period, Illegal vs Not Mig Legal vs Not Mig
and Community B SE B SE
Community
1 – – – –
2** -0.013*  0.579 0.334*  0.671
3 2.306 0.332 1.828 0.421
4  -0.602*  0.448 0.789*  0.451
5 0.976*  0.773 -0.873*  2.333
6 1.162 0.371 2.033 0.418
7 1.345 0.358 1.449 0.452
8 1.917 0.326 1.678 0.408
9 1.774 0.318 2.792 0.389
10  3.145 0.331 4.477 0.395
11  1.068 0.327 2.069 0.394
12  1.243 0.330 0.565*  0.428
13  2.617 0.317 1.830 0.394
14  0.442*  0.396 1.053 0.437
15  1.993 0.352 2.491 0.411
16  1.088 0.594 1.921 0.532
17  1.857 0.325 2.910 0.393
18  1.840 0.323 2.633 0.392
19  1.568 0.327 1.241 0.406
20** 2.684 0.408 2.084 0.509
23  2.629 0.600 3.019 0.592
25  0.541*  0.681 -0.653*  1.421
26  1.202 0.334 2.208 0.397
27  1.066 0.339 1.689 0.403
28  1.606 0.343 1.530 0.425
29  1.685 0.350 0.952 0.460
30  2.813 0.341 2.586 0.421
31 -0.511*  0.347 0.774*  0.400
32 -0.130*  0.494 -1.736*  1.003
33 -0.223*  0.406 1.189 0.420
34  3.005 0.343 3.396 0.411
35  1.367 0.380 0.570*  0.515
36  1.318 0.356 1.704 0.417
37  1.334 0.470 1.911 0.488
38  1.803 0.367 1.021 0.508
39  1.970 0.369 1.143 0.508
Intercept  -4.308 0.508 -4.170 0.398
Chi-Square 7,496
Person-Years 48,791
  * Not significant, p > .05
** Community 2 represents communities 2 and 24. Community 20 represents communities
    20, 21, and 22.
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Descriptive Statistics
Person Years Referring to:
Men,
Men, 1st Trip Women, 1st Trip  Subsequent Trip
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Age < 15 .23 .42 .46 .50 .01 .08
15-19 .09 .28 .12 .32 .02 .13
20-24 .11 .31 .10 .30 .08 .27
25-29 .11 .31 .08 .28 .13 .33
30-34 .10 .30 .07 .25 .14 .35
35-39 .09 .28 .05 .22 .13 .34
40-44 .07 .26 .04 .19 .12 .33
45-49 .06 .24 .03 .16 .10 .31
50-54 .05 .21 .02 .14 .09 .28
55+ .09 .30 .04 .19 .18 .39
Period
Before 1943 .07 .08 .04 .07 .00 .03
1943 .01 .08 .01 .07 .01 .03
1944 .01 .09 .01 .07 .00 .04
1945 .01 .09 .01 .08 .00 .05
1946 .01 .09 .01 .08 .00 .06
1947 .01 .10 .01 .08 .00 .07
1948 .01 .10 .01 .08 .00 .07
1949 .01 .10 .01 .09 .01 .07
1950 .01 .10 .01 .09 .01 .08
1951 .01 .11 .01 .09 .01 .08
1952 .01 .11 .01 .09 .01 .09
1953 .01 .11 .01 .10 .01 .10
1954 .01 .11 .01 .10 .01 .10
1955 .01 .12 .01 .10 .01 .10
1956 .01 .12 .01 .10 .01 .11
1957 .01 .12 .01 .10 .01 .11
1958 .02 .12 .01 .10 .01 .11
1959 .02 .13 .01 .11 .01 .12
1960 .02 .13 .01 .12 .01 .12
1961 .02 .13 .01 .12 .02 .12
1962 .02 .13 .01 .12 .02 .12
1963 .02 .13 .02 .12 .02 .13
1964 .02 .13 .02 .13 .02 .13
1965 .02 .14 .02 .13 .02 .13
1966 .02 .14 .02 .13 .02 .13
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Person Years Referring to:
Men,
Men, 1st Trip Women, 1st Trip  Subsequent Trip
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
1967 .02 .14 .02 .14 .02 .13
1968 .02 .14 .02 .14 .02 .13
1969 .02 .14 .02 .14 .02 .14
1970 .02 .14 .02 .14 .02 .14
1971 .02 .14 .02 .15 .02 .14
1972 .02 .14 .02 .15 .02 .14
1973 .02 .15 .02 .15 .02 .15
1974 .02 .15 .02 .16 .02 .15
1975 .02 .15 .03 .16 .02 .15
1976 .02 .15 .03 .16 .03 .16
1977 .02 .15 .03 .17 .03 .16
1978 .02 .15 .03 .17 .03 .17
1979 .02 .16 .03 .17 .03 .17
1980 .03 .16 .03 .17 .03 .18
1981 .03 .16 .03 .17 .03 .18
1982 .03 .16 .03 .18 .04 .18
1983 .02 .16 .03 .17 .04 .19
1984 .03 .16 .03 .17 .04 .19
1985 .03 .16 .03 .17 .04 .19
1986 .03 .16 .03 .17 .04 .20
1987 .03 .16 .03 .17 .04 .20
1988 .02 .16 .03 .17 .04 .20
1989 .02 .14 .03 .16 .03 .18
1990 .02 .14 .02 .15 .03 .17
1991 .02 .12 .02 .14 .02 .15
1992 .01 .10 .01 .11 .01 .12
1993 .01 .08 .01 .09 .01 .09
1994 .01 .07 .01 .08 .01 .09
Community
1 .03 .18 .03 .18 .03 .18
2 .04 .18 .03 .16 .01 .11
3 .02 .16 .03 .17 .06 .23
4 .04 .18 .03 .17 .02 .12
5 .02 .15 .02 .14 .01 .08
6 .03 .17 .03 .17 .03 .18
7 .03 .17 .03 .17 .03 .16
8 .02 .15 .03 .16 .04 .20
9 .03 .16 .03 .16 .03 .18
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Technical Appendix Table 4 (Continued)
Person Years Referring to:
Men,
Men, 1st Trip Women, 1st Trip  Subsequent Trip
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
10 .02 .14 .02 .14 .06 .24
11 .03 .16 .03 .16 .02 .15
12 .03 .16 .02 .15 .02 .14
13 .03 .16 .03 .17 .04 .19
14 .03 .18 .03 .17 .03 .16
15 .03 .18 .03 .17 .01 .11
16 .01 .12 .02 .13 .02 .14
17 .03 .16 .03 .17 .04 .20
18 .05 .22 .05 .22 .10 .29
19 .03 .17 .03 .16 .02 .15
20 .01 .10 .02 .12 .00 .04
21 .01 .11 .01 .12 – –
22 .01 .11 .03 .17 – –
23 .15 .12 .02 .15 .00 .03
24 .01 .07 .03 .16 – –
25 .02 .12 .01 .11 .01 .09
26 .03 .18 .03 .17 .02 .15
27 .03 .16 .03 .17 .04 .19
28 .03 .18 .03 .17 .01 .12
29 .03 .17 .02 .15 .02 .13
Community
30 .02 .15 .03 .16 .07 .26
31 .01 .12 .01 .11 .00 .06
32 .04 .19 .03 .17 .01 .12
33 .03 .18 .03 .16 .02 .14
34 .02 .13 .02 .14 .04 .19
35 .04 .20 .04 .18 .01 .11
36 .03 .20 .03 .17 .04 .19
37 .01 .12 .02 .12 .04 .20
38 .03 .17 .03 .16 .02 .13
39 .02 .13 .01 .10 .02 .13
% Migrating:
legally 2.8 3.5 8.2
illegally 3.8 2.9 8.2
% Not migrating 93.4 93.6 83.5
Total Number
of Person Years 218,012 680,574 48,791
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Technical Appendix Table 5
Life Table of the Cumulative Probability of Making a First Trip Legally or
Illegally (vs. Not Migrating) by Age 40, Given the Probabilities of Legal
and Illegal Migration Prevailing in Community 10, 1994
Probability of:
Age Not Migrating Migrate Legally Migrate Illegally
0 1.000000 0.000000 0.000000
1 0.944453 0.036120 0.019427
2 0.891991 0.070234 0.037775
3 0.842444 0.102452 0.055104
4 0.795649 0.132881 0.071470
5 0.751453 0.161620 0.086927
6 0.709712 0.188763 0.101526
7 0.670290 0.214397 0.115313
8 0.633057 0.238608 0.128335
9 0.597892 0.261474 0.140633
10 0.564681 0.283070 0.152249
11 0.533315 0.303466 0.163219
12 0.503691 0.322730 0.173579
13 0.475712 0.340923 0.183365
14 0.449288 0.358106 0.192606
15 0.195786 0.537532 0.266682
16 0.085318 0.615721 0.298962
17 0.037179 0.649793 0.313028
18 0.016202 0.664640 0.319158
19 0.007060 0.671111 0.321829
20 0.002204 0.674731 0.323065
21 0.000688 0.675861 0.323451
22 0.000215 0.676213 0.323572
23 0.000067 0.676324 0.323609
24 0.000021 0.676358 0.323621
25 0.729892E-006 0.676368 0.323624
26 0.254462E-006 0.676372 0.323625
27 0.887133E-007 0.676373 0.323626
28 0.309281E-007 0.676374 0.323626
29 0.107825E-007 0.676374 0.323626
30 0.415001E-008 0.676374 0.323626
31 0.159727E-008 0.676374 0.323626
32 0.614766E-009 0.676374 0.323626
33 0.236614E-009 0.676374 0.323626
34 0.910691E-010 0.676374 0.323626
35 0.360454E-010 0.676374 0.323626
36 0.142669E-010 0.676374 0.323626
37 0.564689E-011 0.676374 0.323626
38 0.223506E-011 0.676374 0.323626
39 0.884643E-012 0.676374 0.323626
40 0.366722E-012 0.676374 0.323626
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FACTORS THAT INFLUENCE MIGRATION
Coyotes and Alien Smuggling
Gustavo López Castro
Coyotes or polleros or pateros are persons who, for a fee, assist individualswishing to enter the U.S. without legal authorization to do so. There havealways been coyotes along the Mexico-U.S. border, but their activities
became significant only after 1964, when the Bracero Program ended.
The number and range of services provided by coyotes have expanded. We
surveyed 6 coyotes in Guanajuato, 2 in Michoacán, and 3 in Tijuana, as well as 3
INS investigators dealing with alien smuggling in California, and one 1 in El Paso.
We also interviewed migrants seeking unauthorized entry into the U.S.
Since 1983, we found that most migrants attempting unauthorized entry
into the U.S. used coyotes, although even in 1996, there were about one in four
migrants who attempted to cross the border with the help of only friends or rela-
tives or on their own.1 We distinguish between three major types of coyotes: local
agents, local and border smugglers, and border-only smuggling businesses, each
with a menu of prices and services. The type of coyote used depends on migrant
access to networks of friends and family—migrants without access to networks are
most likely to arrive at the border by bus, and find a border-area business smuggler
to help them to attempt entry into the U.S.
966
A local coyote normally operates with at most two helpers from the same town
or region, and specializes in telling potential migrants who to contact at the border
to cross, and where to go once in the U.S. Some migrants go with family members
or friends to the border, and make contact with a coyote from their town or region;
such a local and border coyote may guide migrants across, have them picked up on
the other side, and transport and deliver them to their destination. Such local-bor-
der coyotes often involve five to ten people and work with migrants from a particu-
lar town or area; many are loosely-structured groups.
The Bracero Program offered legal entry options and reduced coyote activi-
ties, but coyotes offered a means of entry for workers with no U.S. job contacts and
thus little possibility of entering legally. In the late 1960s, when an offer of em-
ployment from a U.S. employer could be used to secure a green card and perma-
nent residence, some workers used coyotes to find U.S. employers who would
sponsor them. However, some of the workers who were eligible for green cards
never completed the process, and instead continued to migrate seasonally and ille-
gally to the U.S.
Local-Interior Coyotes
In Michoacán and Guanajuato, “everyone knows” where to find coyotes. These
coyotes have one or two assistants (usually family members) to help them to organize
groups of 5 or 6 migrants, take them to the border, help them cross into the United
States, and then transport them to their final destination, which is often the where the
coyotes themselves are going. The coyotes may then work in the U.S. for several
months before returning to their hometown to organize another group of migrants.
Their level of operational sophistication is minimal, and they normally use the same
method to smuggle people across the border: crossing the Rio Bravo (in the case of
Table 1
Migrant Use of Coyotes
Migrants— Migrants—
Type of Coyote No Network with Network
Local 9% 16%
Local and Border-Informal 18% 40%
Border-Business 53% 17%
No coyote 20% 27%
Source: questionnaires from the “International Migration in the Bajío project, CER/
ColMich
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people from the north of Guanajuato state), or across the mountains of Tijuana and the
Arizona desert (in the case of people from Michoacán state).
Once in the U.S., these coyotes use public transportation, including trains,
buses and planes. Their failure rate is high—some report four attempts before suc-
cessful entry, versus a claimed one attempt and your in by border business coy-
otes—but their commitment to the group means that they make as many attempts
as necessary until they succeed in getting across. Paradoxically, when the local
coyote himself is captured, he is rarely processed as a smuggler, because he ap-
pears to be just another migrant. Those with him are not inclined to denounce him
as a smuggler, since they are acquaintances and friends; local coyotes are often
considered paisanos or countrymen.2
Until the INS launched the IDENT and ENCATS systems in 1994, local coyotes
had certain advantages over other coyotes because of their relationship with the
people they tried to take across. Things have started to change, however, because
at some border crossing points all undocumented workers captured are fingerprinted
and photographed, enabling INS to detect local coyotes because of their more
frequent apprehensions.
Although the fees charged by the local coyotes are generally lower than those
of the other types of coyotes, the new INS identification systems have increased
their risks and raised their fees Price differences have narrowed, and made price a
less important factor in which type of coyote to use to enter the U.S.
Safety is one of the major reasons to use the services of a local coyote; mi-
grants assume that they will have fewer physical risks if they go with someone
they know from their area, someone whose family resides in the region, and some-
one who can bring news back to the town. This means that the prestige of the local
coyote depends not so much on his rate of success in getting people across the
border in as few attempts as possible, but upon the safety of the people who travel
under his guidance and responsibility.
Economic factors also come into play. It is by not unusual for the family that
stays behind to pay the coyote for his services once they are notified that their family
member has arrived safely at his/her destination. In this situation, both the reputation
and social position of the coyote are important; these will be determining factors in
terms of the number of clients that he will be able to attract in the future.
Some local coyotes are part-time operators, taking people across the border
only occasionally, or restricting their activities to friends and relatives. Some of
these occasional coyotes have legal permission to enter the U.S., so they do not
cross the border with migrants. Instead, they travel to the border with the migrants,
and help to find a smuggler who will guide the migrants across, and then wait for
the migrants inside the U.S. These occasional coyotes do not play a substantive
role in the migratory flow.
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Local and Border Coyotes
Some coyotes originally from the migrants’ area of origin live in border areas,
and get referrals from local coyotes or friends and family of past migrants. In many
cases, migrants seek border area coyotes using a telephone number, an alias, or the
name of a specific restaurant or hotel. With such a border contact, and someone
who will take responsibility for the person once they make it into the U.S., mi-
grants from Michoacán, Guanajuato, Zacatecas and Jalisco set out for the U.S.
Local and border coyotes set up loosely-structured groups characterized by a
low level of technological sophistication. Most have two or three vehicles (usually
vans) and use hotels as “safe rooms.” They rarely use cellular telephones, citizen
band radios or “beepers,” and usually cross the border over the mountains, through
ravines or by swimming and wading across the river; they rely on evading the INS
rather than understanding its activities and attempting to outwit INS with decoys etc.
Membership in these groups is flexible. There is a leader, but the group is only
brought together when there are migrants to be smuggled. Furthermore, the leader
generally calls only those members whom he considers ideal for the job, thus mini-
mizing losses and guaranteeing the continuity of his services.
Border Business Coyotes
Business coyotes have a long history in the border area, but smuggling mi-
grants into the U.S. has evolved from a supplementary business to a full-time oc-
cupation. However, as the number of Mexicans entering the U.S. increased, and as
U.S. employers sent their supervisors to the border area to recruit workers, some
coyotes began to specialize in the movement of workers across the border.
Business coyotes developed after the Bracero Program ended in 1964. Some
were unauthorized workers who had experience crossing the border, while others
developed relatively sophisticated organizations that could recruit migrants as they
arrived in the border area and provide a variety of services to them.
All business coyotes have three major elements; recruiters, guides, and U.S.
agents or delivery persons. The recruiters linger around the bus and train stations—
every day, 125 buses arrive from the interior of Mexico in Tijuana, and two trains
arrive in Mexicali—or hotels that provide shelter to the migrants, or hang out in
the bars and restaurants frequented by migrants, and make deals with potential
migrants. As smuggling has evolved, there has been a shift from the “cash-in-
advance” payment system and to the “payment-on-delivery” system—when the
migrant reaches his U.S. destination, the migrant tells a family member or friend
within the United States to pay the coyote.
The process of the crossing is straightforward: wait until dark, get the group
together at a hotel or some other safe place, lead it to the border, cross through
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some gap or hole or tunnel under the fence, or jump over the fence. The coyote
then guides the group over the countryside on foot, walking, running, and hiding,
until it arrives at a prearranged place where a delivery person with a vehicle is
waiting to pick up the migrants and take them to a U.S. destination. Once the
pollos have been dropped off, payment is made, and the coyote returns to Mexico
to share the proceeds with his confederates. There are many variations; the dis-
tance to be walked is variable, depending on whether the vehicle meets the mi-
grants in a rural or urban area, and affects the price paid by the migrant—more
walking means lower prices.
Migrants do not need to use a coyote to attempt such entries, and some do not.
Some know the border area so well that they use public transportation inside the
U.S., such as the suburban trolleys in San Diego and then Amtrack to reach Los
Angeles, or they take planes away from San Diego, El Paso or Laredo.
Smuggling women is more complicated. Business coyotes began to add women
to their organizations, and to offer women and children one contact person from
recruitment to guide to delivery. In some cases, the wife of the coyote helps to
negotiate the agreement—virtually all are verbal—and then travels with family
members to the border to watch the guide take women across. The coyote’s wife
remains with the family members until the women reached their destination in the
U.S. as a form of security and a guarantee of delivery.
Most migrants attempt to elude the border patrol. But stepped up border con-
trols and more women migrants have led more migrants to attempt to enter the
U.S. using false documents. Especially during peak traffic periods, inspectors re-
portedly spend more time looking at the document than the person, so that it is
relatively easy to borrow genuine documents and cross, a method preferred by
many women. Some coyotes obtain green cards (known as “micas”) and distribute
them to migrants, taking into consideration physical similarity and ensuring that
the migrant using them is older than the person shown on the card. Many coyotes
also offer migrants Social Security cards and identification cards like those issued
by the Department of Motor Vehicles. In some cases, valid Mexican passports with
temporary U.S. visas are used. Children and babies are simpler to smuggle with
false documents, because they typically do not require identification or photographs.
In some cases, U.S. birth certificates can be used to enter the U.S. at border entry
ports until children are 18.
False documents are used to attempt to enter the U.S. on foot or in autos, with
the on-foot method preferred because of the risk that the vehicle will be confis-
cated, and the migrants’ fellow passengers accused of smuggling. In most cases,
coyotes send migrants, one at a time, and separated by 50 or 100 other crossers, to
the port of entry. Once inside the U.S., the migrants report to a telephone booth or
some other easily visible spot for further instructions. Walking through the port of
970
entry is one of the simplest and most expensive smuggling methods, costing as
much as $800. Fewer coyotes attempt to conceal migrants inside vehicles, inside
cargo containers, or in cars with double trunks; these methods often lead to trag-
edies, and are used less and less frequently.
Coyotes who have been in business since the 1970s report that there was rela-
tively little demand for their services in the 1970s, because there were too many
coyotes for the number of migrants who wanted to be smuggled—it was also easy
to enter the U.S. without the help of a smuggler. Most migrants who turned to
coyotes in the 1970s had special needs—women, children, the elderly, Central
Americans, Asians. IRCA stimulated interest in coming to the U.S., and the possi-
bility of obtaining a green card via the legalization programs led to a huge increase
in the demand for coyote services, especially for the service of getting from the
border area further inside the U.S. Smuggling people into the U.S., and moving
them around within the U.S., proved to be enormously profitable, and made previ-
ous training and investments in safe houses and vehicles pay off.
After 1994, the coyote business changed once again. Business coyotes with a
network of safe houses and vehicles have an advantage in evading stepped up bor-
der controls, and they have been able to charge migrants premium prices of $500 to
$1500 because of their superior ability to smuggle them into the U.S.
Business coyotes remain centered in the border area, but they tend to recruit
only the most profitable migrants, such as Central Americans and Asians. The
smuggling system resembles a series of semi- autonomous links in a chain which
extends from Chiapas to Chihuahua, in which the agents decide which transporta-
tion systems to use, which links to follow, and when it is most advantageous to
“sell” their human cargo to the next agent. A large number of people participate as
service providers, and none of them are surprised when 20 Salvadorans or 5 Chi-
nese suddenly show up on their doorstep to eat or to spend the night. The principal
objective is to get these (doubly undocumented) migrants into the United States;
Central Americans and Asians are especially highly-valued since they pay the most
to be smuggled into the U.S.
Conclusions
It is best to think of coyotes as business operators who are breaking both Mexican
and U.S. law. Within Mexico, coyotes are considered somewhat shady characters,
but they are perceived to be engaged in a business that harms no one. Indeed, many
people think that the coyotes are providing a service to Mexico (by alleviating the
poverty of thousands of families), and to the United States (providing needed work-
ers). Migrants consider the coyotes to be a “necessary evil”—but one which could
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Table 2
Coyotes: Principal Characteristics by Sphere of Operation
Target Price System of Advantages/
Type Population Logistics Range Payment Disadvantages
Local Relatives; Access to a 250-600 Variable: Personal
only friends; word- social network USD -by family mem- safety; worry-
of-mouth network in depend- ber or friend in in hometown;
recommend- hometown; ing on U.S. upon safe modest price
ation; limited takes migrant arrange- delivery; range; suitable
geographical to border; ment -by family in for the cautious
area arranges for hometown upon person;
crossing; crossing confirmation of possibility to
meets migrant safe delivery; get a job
on U.S. side -installments arranged by the
and delivers by the migrant coyote himself.
to destination him/herself High rate of
from coyote- failure
related
employment
Local- Word-of- Informal 400-900 In almost all Personal safety
Border mouth organization; USD cases by family suitable for
recommend- contact  made depend- member or women and
ation; wide in places ing on friend in U.S. children.
geographical frequented by arrange- upon safe Higher prices.
area; con- migrants ment of delivery
tacts in both (hotels, restau- crossing
hometown rants), use of
and border fake documents
Border Contacted at Formal, struc- 600- Generally by High probability
only bus station, tured organiza- 1500 family member of success.
train, hotel, tion; use of USD or friend in US Expensive, vul-
restaurant, cellular phones, depend- upon safe nerabiity during
near the beepers; cont- ing on delivery wait at border;
border and tact on both arrange- lack of social
other places sides of border; ment for support
frequented pick-ups, fake crossing network
by documents, U.S.
migrants airports
Source: Fieldwork, Gustavo López Castro, CER/Colmich, 1997
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be much worse than it actually is. The local coyotes rank higher than the border
coyotes for the obvious reasons of familiarity; but not even the border coyotes are
perceived as being particularly nasty. Much more to be feared are nocturnal en-
counters with bandits or with one of the many groups of police that patrol the
border area.
We found no evidence of collaboration between coyotes and drug traffickers
in the towns; not even in the drug-producing areas of Michoacán. Interviews car-
ried out with Border Patrol agents towards the end of 1996 also suggested few
connections. We were told of cases in which migrants were urged to pay for part of
the cost of being smuggled by also taking a small package along, but it is not clear
how common this practice is, and it does not seem to be common for migrants to
take packages from producing areas to the border.
The local coyotes and local-border groups appear to keep their distance from
drug smuggling. Some of those associated with business coyotes may also be in-
volved in drug smuggling, but there appears to be a firm line between the two
activities due to the high risks involved in drug smuggling.3
Quotes from Smugglers/Migrants
Costs
People come to us from, say, Leon, Guanajuato and when they get here they
say; “Hey, I heard you take people across in airplanes. How much do you charge?”
Then, “how much do I need to make it?” Then we say “look, from here to the
border its 362 pesos right now, plus another $100 the jump, between $100 and
$120 for the airplane ticket and you’d better have fifty or sixty dollars more for
your expenses on the other side, like, I mean, for taxis, meals or whatever you
need to spend; so we’re talking about a total of around $300.”
Contacts
Back in San Felipe a lot of folks say that in Ocampo there are real good
coyotes, real quiet, you know, good people. Here and anywhere you look there’s
lots of them, especially if you have friends or relatives, they’ll set you up with
one in a flash. Over in San Felipe it looks like they’re charging about $500. It’s
a lot, but if you have good luck, and work hard, cause sometimes you can get
caught, but if you work hard, in about three weeks, or at the outside a month,
you pay it off; and from there on it’s gravy.
I used to make it as a wetback walking across country. It’s all a question of
finding contacts. The first three times I went I couldn’t get any contacts, not
even with the people that crossed with me. It’d take me eight or nine days to get
to San Antonio, walking day and night; but then I started making contacts about
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a three days’ walk from here. I’d go to this farmer’s place and ask for a chance
to call San Antonio by phone. That’s right, I’d get there at night and sit on the
fence, the dogs would start to bark and the old man, an “old gringo,” would
come running over and I’d ask him “... gimme a chance to call my boss in San
Antonio?” “How many guys are with you?” I’d say “three or four,” “ok, bring
’em over, that’s all right,” and then he’d call and the boss would send someone
over to pick us up. That’s what I mean by contacts.
Guarantees
Up there at the border there’s lots of coyotes, but there’s no safer way than
going with one right from here, like one’s got more guarantee, more safety, it’s
somebody you know and you’re with a group and they take better care of you,
cause you never know what it’s gonna be like up there. I mean, you always hope
things will go well for you, but the way things are right now it’s a bitch, and this
way you’re safe.
Up there, you could find yourself with a bunch of people who are just start-
ing and... that’s tough. But these guys from Mezquite come and go and if you
don’t get across but get caught, they take you back across again. Ya, they’ve got
good contacts. If you got contacts that’ll answer for you, you give them the
telephone number and they call and then they take you to your house and they
pay him there, but you’re safe.
People come from all over to use this coyote; from Leon, and other places,
they’re finding out that these guys are doing well and so they come to look for
them and they get comfort and they protect them. They’ve got their trucks to
bring the folks this far; they’ve got a good setup. They take care of you here, and
things are safe, you even go like friends with all the others; the other way you
just gotta take your chances alone up there at the border. But here, here they take
responsibility. They’re good guys, once they take you on as a client, you go
under their responsibility; the other way, up there at the border, who’ll take
you?, who knows?, who guarantees you anything?, who knows?.But these guys
give you a guarantee.
My Way
I always like going across by way of Juarez, on a plane, for this reason: that
way I don’t run any risks, none, cause it’s real hard for them to catch me among
all the people; with all the people around they’ll never grab me; if they get
some, they’re gonna get some of them, but not me. And if they do get me, they’ll
just take me like any other illegal migrant.
And when they get caught you just tell them “Know what, if they grab you
I’ll see it when they get you. Where they send you—there’s three bridges or
four—and you just stay there around the bridge where they send you back, don’t
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move, cause I’ll go there to pick you up and send you back across again.” That
is, whoever wants to, right?; cause some say “know what, I’m not going again.”
So what do you do?, you say “gimme your ticket,” you go and change it and
then you got your money. But as long as the folks say they want to keep trying
to get across, you gotta keep at it.
Papers
You get the cards in El Paso, Texas. They’re lost or stolen. The thing is
that they gotta look something like the migrant who wants to get across. You
get a lot of these things by telephone. Then, when you make a connection you
take things as they come... and you take your time cause you don’t want to get
in with just anybody. I mean, in these cases there are straight people and
crooked ones, but with time you come to learn who you can work with and
who you can’t.
Ethics
Ok, so let’s say... it’s a crime, right?... but at the same time the person, the
illegal migrant, the folks who want to get across, don’t see it as a crime, but still
they’re grateful, they don’t say... I mean... the fact is the people are never satis-
fied, they always say... one thing or another, look you didn’t give us anything to
eat, like what do I know, right?, but you know you gotta economize as much as
you can cause you never know if they’re gonna get across or if they’re gonna
get sent back from the airport.
Notes
1. We have included questions concerning the method chosen to cross the border in
various questionnaires used in community studies. Among these we can mention the survey
carried out by a group from the Colegio de Michoacán in 1983, 1986, 1988, and 1992 as
well as 390 questionnaires which were applied in three towns in Michoacán and two towns
in Jalisco in 1996.
2. The village connections explain how some families of migrants can pay off the cost
of smuggling with dollar remittances to the family of the local coyote. Such a payment
method would not be acceptable to border area coyotes.
3. A coyote in Guanajuato said that he cannot afford to take the risk of sending drugs
along with migrants, who would be too nervous during the numerous police stops in Mexico.
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FACTORS THAT INFLUENCE MIGRATION
Factores de la Migración y Redes
Migratorias
Jean Papail
El análisis de las corrientes de emigración anuales de algunas ciudades mediasde Jalisco (Lagos de Moreno, Ciudad Guzmán, San Juan de los Lagos,Tepatitlán de Morelos) hacia Estados Unidos entre 1976 y 1993, sugiere la
existencia de fluctuaciones importantes en la magnitud de estos flujos, estrechamente
ligadas a la coyuntura económica. Los periodos de fuerte crecimiento económico
en México (1978-81, 1984-85, 1989-92) se caracterizan por flujos de primera
migración orientados a la baja o más o menos estables en sus volúmenes, mientras
los periodos recesivos (1982-83, 1986-88) que acompañan las crisis monetarias,
producen olas migratorias hacia el país fronterizo.
Según este modelo, el periodo actual debería caracterizarse por una nueva
ola migratoria, producida por la devaluación de la moneda mexicana en diciembre
de 1994, y el contexto recesivo en el cual se desarrolla la actividad en México.
En efecto, varios factores inciden en la movilidad geográfica de la mano de obra:
tasa de desempleo, diferencial de salarios entre los dos países, evolución del
ingreso real.
Por otra parte, las economías norteamericana y mexicana evolucionan muy a
menudo de manera desfasada en sus ciclos cortos durante los 20 últimos años, lo
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que tiende a regular de cierta manera la magnitud de los flujos migratorios, aun si
la tendencia de fondo a largo plazo de estos flujos está orientada a la alza.
En este trabajo nos concentraremos en las modalidades y condiciones de los
desplazamientos, y la inserción de los migrantes en Estados Unidos, temas sobre
los cuales la literatura disponible es menos abundante. Nuestra principal fuente de
datos está constituida por una encuesta aleatoria realizada en diciembre de 1995 en
una población de 801 migrantes y ex-migrantes masculinos de 2 ciudades del Estado
de Jalisco, escogidas por sus fuertes tasas de emigración.
Para circunscribir mejor el cambio de contexto económico después de la
devaluación de diciembre de 1994, hemos agregado a la muestra alrededor de
400 hogares en los cuales ningún miembro es migrante o ex-migrante a Estados
Unidos. La elección de migrantes masculinos exclusivamente se debe al hecho
de constituir una población homogénea, ya que se considera además que es la
componente motriz del conjunto de los flujos, y que se trata esencialmente de
migraciones de trabajo.
Ciertos datos de esta encuesta permiten comparaciones útiles con informaciones
procedentes de una encuesta realizada a mediados de 1993 sobre las migraciones
internacionales en las cuatro ciudades jaliscienses mencionadas anteriormente. Así,
nos referiremos a veces a resultados de la encuesta de 1993, particularmente cuando
se detectan cambios significativos en diversos aspectos de la migración.
Por fin hay que subrayar que la población estudiada aquí no pretende representar
al conjunto de los flujos mexicanos. En varias regiones proveedoras de migrantes
existen ciertas especificidades en cuanto a la relación rural/urbano, a la participación
femenina en la composición de los flujos, a los lugares de destino en el país fronterizo
(determinados en gran parte por la historia de sus redes migratorias), a las actividades
desempeñadas por los migrantes del otro lado de la frontera, etc. Sin embargo
pensamos que ciertos cambios importantes en los últimos años en la emigración
urbana jalisciense pueden contribuir a aclarar transformaciones más globales que
están apareciendo en ciertos aspectos en los flujos mexicanos.
El contexto socioeconómico actual (1994-95)
Los dos indicadores más importantes (actividad e ingreso) en materia de
movilización de la mano de obra mexicana hacia Estados Unidos sufrieron fuertes
cambios con la crisis económica que estalló con la devaluación de la moneda
mexicana en diciembre de 1994.
Después de un corto periodo de relativa estabilidad del ingreso real (1991-
1994), la devaluación crea una nueva ruptura en la evolución de este indicador. El
índice de salario mínimo real nacional que se ubicaba en 44.1 en febrero de 1989
(base 100 en 1980), 40.0 en noviembre de 1991 y 38.7 en noviembre de 1994, se
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reduce al 31.2 en noviembre de 1995.1 Por otra parte, la tasa de desempleo abierto
a nivel nacional, que oscilaba entre 2.5 y 3.5% durante los primeros años de la
década, alcanza 7.3% en septiembre de 1995.
Los datos de la encuesta sobre migraciones que levantó el INSER-U de G/
ORSTOM en diciembre de 1995 ilustran el cambio del contexto socioeconómico
entre 1994 y 1995:
• Se observa un estancamiento del ingreso promedio mensual por hogar
entre estos dos años (mil 791 pesos en 1994 y mil 837 pesos en 1995),
lo que corresponde en términos reales a un fuerte deterioro del nivel de
vida de estos hogares (cuadro 1). Más de la mitad de los hogares
consideran que sus ingresos se quedaron al mismo nivel o disminuyeron
entre estos dos años (cuadro 2). En este contexto, el nivel del monto de
las remesas enviadas por los migrantes internacionales se vuelve un
elemento cada vez más importante en la estructura de los ingresos de
los hogares (cuadro 3).
Cuadro 1
Ingresos promedios mensuales por hogar (pesos)
1994 1995
Hogares de no migrantes 1423 1478
Hogares de migrantes y de ex-migrantes 1791 1837
1659 1708
(N) (1082) (1080)
Cuadro 2
Percepción de los ingresos del hogar en 1995 respecto a 1994
Tipo de hogar bajaron estables aumentaron total (N)
sin migrantes 24.8 27.7 47.5 100 (383)
con migrantes actuales 13.2 39.6 47.1 100 (280)
con ex-migrantes 25.9 32.2 41.9 100 (401)
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• Se observa igualmente un nivel elevado de desempleo que se manifiesta
por el hecho de que en cada hogar se perdió en promedio cerca de 0.5
empleos durante el año 1995. El porcentaje de hogares afectados por el
desempleo de uno o más miembros del grupo familiar se avecina al
30%; lo que explica en gran parte la evolución observada del ingreso
hogareño.
Unicamente alrededor del 30% de los desempleados pudieron encontrar un
nuevo empleo durante el año de 1995 en su ciudad de residencia. Un reflejo de
esta situación se encuentra en la proporción de desempleados entre los migrantes
internacionales en el momento del primer desplazamiento a Estados Unidos. Este
indicador se ubicaba en 11.1% durante el periodo 1985-1989; 12.9% durante los
años 1990-1993 y subió al 17.5% durante los dos últimos años (1994-1995).
Se puede presentar esta situación de manera sintetizada. La relación del tamaño
promedio del hogar respecto a sus miembros económicamente ocupados; la relación
que fluctuaba entre 3.1 y 3.4 miembros por ocupado durante el periodo 1985-
1993 se deterioró fuertemente durante los dos últimos años cuando alcanzó el
valor de 4 miembros por ocupado (cuadro 4).
El crecimiento del desempleo y el estancamiento de los ingresos hubieran podido
ser agravados por eventuales situaciones de endeudamiento respecto al sistema
bancario u otras instituciones por la fuerte alza de las tasas de interés que produjo
la devaluación y el fuerte incremento de la inflación que la siguió. Sin embargo se
observa que apenas 10% de los hogares están endeudados a fines del 95, de los
Cuadro 3
Monto de las remesas promedios mensuales de los migrantes
1994 1995
En pesos 1414 2010 (335 dólares cambio = 6P/1USD)
(N) (196) (220)
1985-1989 1990-1991 1992-1993 1994-1995
3.4 3.1 3.4 4.0
Cuadro 4
Relación promedio entre el tamaño del hogar y el
número de activos ocupado por periodo
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cuales un tercio renegoció sus deudas o lo están haciendo, y cerca del 10% no
considera que este nuevo contexto empeoró su situación en este aspecto.
Esta situación de estancamiento de los ingresos nominales y de incremento
del desempleo fue en parte compensada por la incorporación de nuevos miembros
de los hogares a los mercados de trabajo locales (adolescentes, mujeres dedicadas
anteriormente a los quehaceres domésticos, etc.)
En 1995, en un tercio de los hogares de no migrantes que sufrieron pérdidas de
empleos se incorporó por lo menos un miembro suplementario al mercado de trabajo
respecto al 23% de los hogares que no sufrieron desempleo de sus miembros (en
los hogares de migrantes actuales y de ex-migrantes estos porcentajes se ubican
respectivamente en 22 y 18.5%). Esta incorporación de miembros suplementarios
al mercado de trabajo representa 0.16 hombres y 0.16 mujeres en los hogares donde
no hubo desempleo, y 0.28 hombres y 0.22 mujeres en los hogares donde por lo
menos uno de sus miembros sufrió desempleo. Como se puede observar, los
miembros femeninos de los hogares fueron muy solicitados para superar el deterioro
de la situación económica en 1995 (cuadro 5). Según estos datos el saldo global de
las salidas (por desempleo) del mercado de trabajo y de las nuevas incorporaciones
a éste, fue ligeramente positivo, gracias sobre todo al componente femenino. Sin
embargo, es probable que buena parte de estos nuevos empleos corresponda a trabajos
de tiempo parcial y/o mal remunerados
Otra respuesta de las familias al deterioro del contexto económico fue la creación
de un negocio familiar que se dio en alrededor de 15% de los hogares. Las pérdidas
de empleo no parecen tener mucha influencia en este aspecto. Por otra parte, se
observa que solamente alrededor de 8% de los desempleados que lograron emplearse
en 1995 lo hicieron bajo el estatuto de “auto-empleo” (por cuenta propia).
Cuadro 5
Promedio de miembros de los hogares recién incorporados al
marcado de trabajo por sexo y pérdidas de empleos en 1995
Hombres Mujeres
SIN PÉRDIDAS DE EMPLEOS
hogares de ex-migrantes ctuales 0.13 0.16
hogares de ex-migrantes 0.14 0.13
hogares de no migrantes 0.20 0.19
CON PÉRDIDAS DE EMPLEOS
hogares de ex-migrantes 0.24 0.19
hogares de migrantes actuales 0.32 0.17
hogares de no migrantes 0.27 0.29
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Cuadro 6
Ramas de actividades en las cuales se reinsertaron los
desempleados y opiniones sobre las ramas que ofrecen
las mejores oportunidades de empleo y/o ingresos
Ramas de actividad
Agricultura Industria Construcción Comercio Servicios Otras Total
Reinserción 5.6 20.9 24.5 11.2 35.6 2.1 100
(N) (143)
Opiniones 7.6 26.2 7.8 36.6 17.5 4.2 100
(N) (904)
Finalmente una de las consecuencias más importantes del brusco cambio del
contexto económico se refleja en la movilización geográfica de la mano de obra,
como suele ocurrir en estas situaciones. En 16% de los hogares que no sufrieron
desempleo durante el año 1995, se observó emigraciones de las ciudades en las
cuales se ubican estos hogares. Esta proporción sube al 27% cuando los hogares
tuvieron al menos un miembro desempleado durante 1995.
Se puede comparar la distribución por ramas de los empleos que encontraron
los desempleados cuando lograron reinsertarse en los mercados locales de trabajo
con las aspiraciones, reflejo de las opiniones sobre las ramas que ofrece las mejores
oportunidades de trabajo y/o ingresos (cuadro 6).
Como se puede constatar, las opiniones (o aspiraciones) difieren notablemente
de la situación real en 1995. Esta brecha se debe en gran parte a las aspiraciones
al auto-empleo (alrededor de 50% de las opiniones respecto al 8% en los casos de
reinserción) que se concentra fuertemente en la rama comercio (cerca del 66% de
las aspiraciones a establecerse por cuenta propia). Como se demostró en trabajos
anteriores, esta aspiración al auto-empleo es un factor relativamente importante
de la movilidad territorial en la medida que necesita un cierto periodo de
acumulación de capitales que casi exclusivamente se puede realizar en una
economía como la de Estados Unidos que ofrece salarios netamente superiores a
los de las economías locales. Como lo veremos mas adelante, el diferencial de
salarios promedio entre Jalisco y Estados Unidos se ubica en alrededor de 8 a
fines de 1995, respecto a 4.5 en 1993 (el salario promedio percibido por los
migrantes en Estados Unidos en 1993 equivalía a 4.5 salarios promedios percibidos
en los lugares de origen).
Por otra parte, alrededor del 30% de los ex-migrantes —reinstalados para 90%
de ellos con más de un año en sus lugares de origen— consideran, en este contexto
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recesivo de la economía mexicana, volver a irse a Estados Unidos. Esta proposición
alcanza 39% ente los migrantes de retorno de menos de 4 años.
Del otro lado de la frontera, la recuperación de la economía norteamericana
durante los tres últimos años después de la recesión del inicio de la década, que se
manifiesta por tasas de crecimiento del orden de 3% anual y tasa de desempleo
abierto alrededor del 5.5% reactivó la demanda de trabajo, lo que concurre a estimular
la movilización de mano de obra mexicana.
Para concluir, la fuerte recesión de la economía mexicana en 1995 y 1996
produjo un contexto muy propicio al desencadenamiento de una nueva ola migratoria
de mano de obra (como ocurrió en 1983-84), a pesar del endurecimiento de la
política migratoria por parte de Estados Unidos. No existen señales al inicio de
1996 que se alcanzaron los puntos de inflexión en la evolución de los principales
indicadores que utilizamos aquí, que podrían predecir una inversión de tendencia
en la evolución de la magnitud de los flujos.
Las modalidades de la migración
y las redes migratorias
Las características de los migrantes al
momento de la primera migración
La edad promedio a la primera migración osciló alrededor de los 23 años en
todos los periodos considerados. Sin embargo parece haber subido fuertemente
(27.8 años) durante los dos últimos años, debido a una modificación de la
composición de estos flujos. En 1994 y 1995, la proporción de jefes de hogares en
los flujos alcanzó 46% mientras se ubicaba alrededor del 35% durante los periodos
anteriores. Con una edad al desplazamiento netamente más elevada (30.2 años)
que la de los individuos con estatuto de hijos en los hogares de salida (20.1 años),
este componente, cuyo peso relativo se refuerza en los flujos, hace subir la edad
promedio del conjunto. Esto se refleja en la proporción de casados en los
movimientos, que pasa del 32% antes de 1990 al 38% durante los últimos años.
Durante este último periodo se observa un fuerte aumento de la proporción de
casados entre los jóvenes adultos migrantes (20-24 años). Representan actualmente
36% del grupo de edades contra 11% durante los periodos anteriores.
Por otra parte, se observa también un aumento del tamaño (número de personas)
de los hogares cuyos jefes son migrantes desde el inicio de la presente década. El
tamaño de estos hogares sube de 4.4 miembros durante el periodo 1985-1989 a 5.5 en
1994-1995, lo que incide, como se mencionó anteriormente en la evolución de la
carga consumidores/activos ocupados.
Se puede considerar que la migración retrasa la realización de matrimonios
como se observó en otros estudios (R. Pimienta Lastra, 1995). Según nuestros datos
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Cuadro 7
Ramas de origen de los migrantes según el periodo de migración
Periodo Agricultura Industria Construcción Comercio Servicios Otras Total
Antes 80 49.8 9.6 10.5 9.1 15.5 5.4 100
80-84 22.7 25.3 13.3 10.7 21.3 6.6 100
85-89 16.9 27.3 16.3 11.0 23.8 4.6 100
90-93 11.6 27.5 14.5 15.2 23.2 7.9 100
94-95 16.9 32.3 7.7 13.8 20.0 9.2 100
la edad promedio al matrimonio en la población masculina se ubica en 22.3 años
cuando estos matrimonios se realizan antes de la primera migración; pero sube al
25.2 años cuando este evento está precedido por el desplazamiento a Estados Unidos.
El nivel educativo de la población migrante subió de manera constante a lo
largo de los años pero parece haber retrocedido durante los años 1994-95, lo que se
puede asociar en parte a la alza de la proporción de migrantes que provienen de la
rama agrícola en los flujos recientes. De manera general este nivel educativo es
ligeramente inferior al de la población mexicana en general como lo señalan
diferentes estudios (R. Corona, 1995). Es posible que la crisis económica incrementó
el nivel de deserción escolar de los adolescentes que participan en los flujos
migratorios. La elevación de la edad promedio a la migración influye también en
este deterioro del nivel promedio de escolaridad.
Como se mencionó anteriormente, se observa un incremento de la proporción
de desempleados en los flujos de salida durante los dos últimos años sobre todo en
la población de no jefes de hogares. Entre estos últimos migrantes, la proporción
de desempleados se ubicó en 19.4% en 1994-1995 respecto al 12.1% durante los 4
primeros años de la década.
La distribución de las ramas de actividad de los migrantes ocupados según el
periodo de salida (cuadro 7) confirma lo que habían revelado estudios anteriores
(Papail y Arroyo, 1995): una diversificación progresiva de las actividades de origen
de los migrantes, en detrimento de la agricultura que proveía alrededor de la mitad
de los flujos migratorios antes de 1980.
La evolución de la estructura de los ingresos percibidos por los activos antes
de migrar hace aparecer un mejoramiento sensible: en 1994-1995, 73% de los
migrantes percibían ingresos iguales o inferiores a 2 salarios mínimos respecto al
85% entre los migrantes del periodo 1985-1989. Sin embargo se pueden comparar
estos datos con los de 1993 (Papail y Arroyo, 1995) concernientes a las mismas
ciudades. En esta fecha, alrededor del 60% de los activos ocupados de Ciudad
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Guzmán y Lagos de Moreno percibían a lo más 2 salarios mínimos. Los migrantes
parecen pues conformar una sub-población con ingresos ligeramente inferiores al
promedio de la población de sus ciudades de origen, particularmente los que
provienen de la rama agrícola donde se encuentra la fracción más importantes de
ingresos inferiores o iguales a 2 salarios mínimos.
Los proyectos que formulan los migrantes al desplazarse a Estados Unidos
son relativamente constantes en su distribución entre las diferentes épocas de
migración. Alrededor del 20% no tienen proyectos bien definidos. Entre los que
tienen un proyecto principal (o prioritario) elaborado, la compra de una casa o de
un terreno representa la perspectiva que aparece con más frecuencia (entre 25 y
30%). Entre 8 y 15% según los periodos de migración, manifiestan el deseo de
establecerse por cuenta propia a su futuro regreso a su ciudad de origen después de
trabajar varios años en el país fronterizo, y 10 a 15% formulan como proyecto
prioritario un futuro matrimonio.
Una proporción relativamente importante (20 a 25%) considera el
desplazamiento a Estados Unidos como la mejor opción para “progresar“, mejorar
su situación económica”, etc. Naturalmente, los migrantes casados antes de migrar
formulan generalmente proyectos mejor definidos que los solteros. El objetivo de
comprar una casa o un terreno aparece mucho más frecuentemente en este grupo
que entre los solteros. La realización de este objetivo es muy frecuente si se considera
que 87% de los jefes de hogares al migrar antes de 1980, que no tenían casa propia
antes de desplazarse, son actualmente, después de su regreso, dueños de su vivienda
(esta proporción alcanza 61% entre los migrantes de 1980-1984; 56% entre los
migrantes de 1985-1989 y 35% entre los que salieron en 1990-1993).
Las condiciones del primer desplazamiento
a Estados Unidos
La elaboración del proceso de decisión de migrar a Estados Unidos parecer ser
mayoritariamente un proceso personal: alrededor del 75% de los migrantes afirman
haber elaborado este proyecto personalmente, tanto entre los jefes de hogares como
entre los individuos que tenían el estatuto de “hijo” en el momento del
desplazamiento.
La influencia del grupo familiar en la generación del proyecto migratorio aparece
en alrededor del 15% de los casos en todos los periodos anteriores a 1993. Su
importancia relativa creció considerablemente durante los dos últimos años,
representando 24% de los casos en la población de “hijos” en detrimento de la
influencia de los amigos. Un aspecto interesante a señalar es que cuando la
generación del proyecto migratorio no proviene del migrante mismo, la persona
que originó el proyecto reside con mayor frecuencia en Estados Unidos en el
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transcurso del tiempo (53% de estas personas residían en el país fronterizo en 1980-
1984; 75% en 1990-1993 y 85% en 1994-1995).
Esta intervención externa está frecuentemente asociada a la existencia de un
empleo asegurado para el migrante a su llegada a Estados Unidos, generalmente en
la agricultura o en la construcción. La seguridad de tener un empleo al llegar del
otro lado de la frontera creció fuertemente desde el inicio de la década de los ochenta:
15% de los que salieron en los años1980-1984 se encontraban en esta situación, y
respectivamente 20%, 26% y 32% en los periodos 1985-1989, 1990-1993 y 1994-
1995, gracias a la fuerte presencia de familiares o amigos en este país. Este aspecto
deja entrever igualmente el papel relativamente importante de la demanda de trabajo
en la generación de los flujos migratorios.
Desde mediados de los ochenta, la proporción de indocumentados en los flujos
de primera migración parece haberse reducido. Del 87% durante los años 1980-1984,
esta proporción bajo al 84% en 1985-1989 y 78% y 80% respectivamente en 1990-
1993 y 1994-1995. Sin embargo, la distribución de los tipos de documentos con los
cuales los migrantes cruzan la frontera muestra el peso preponderante y en progresión
constante de las visas turísticas en el transcurso del tiempo. Este tipo de documentación
representaban 43% de los documentos requeridos para ingresar legalmente a Estados
Unidos en 1980-1984, 66% en 1985-1989, 72% en 1990-1993 y 86% durante los dos
últimos años. Esto indica que la migración “legal” de mano de obra es sensiblemente
más baja que lo que aparece en los datos brutos de la encuesta.
El endurecimiento de la política migratoria de Estados Unidos, que se manifiesta
en particular por la intensificación de la vigilancia de la frontera californiana desde
hace unos años parece haber producido una redistribución de los lugares de ingreso
a este país. Además de un uso más importante del transporte aéreo por parte de los
poseedores de visas turísticas desde 1993, existe una diversificación creciente de
los lugares de cruce terrestre de la frontera durante los años 1994-1995. Tijuana,
por donde cruzaban 78% de los migrantes indocumentados durante los años 1980-
1984, y 95% durante el periodo 1985-1993, no representa más de 56% de los lugares
de cruce de los indocumentados que se desplazaron en 1994-1995. Esta
diversificación se produce en provecho de Nogales (13% de los cruces de
indocumetados en 1994-1995 contra 4 a 6% en los periodos anteriores) y otras
ciudades fronterizas no californianas.
Esta diversificación se refleja igualmente en los destinos de los migrantes
indocumentados. Mientras California representaba entre 80 y 85% de los destinos
de los indocumentados durante la década de los ochenta, su peso relativo en la
distribución de los destinos de estos migrantes bajo al 76% en 1990-1993 y 67%
durante los dos últimos años.
Son esencialmente otros Estados, Illinois y Texas (que representan con
California los destinos tradicionales de la migración jalisciense), los que se
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beneficiaron de esta redistribución geográfica. Se observa el mismo fenómeno
en el territorio californiano: Los Angeles, San Francisco y San Diego que
absorbían generalmente alrededor de 50% de los flujos dirigidos hacia ese Estado,
no representan más que un tercio de los destinos de los migrantes mas recientes
(1994-1995).
La proporción de indocumentados en la migración dirigida hacia California
fue siempre netamente superior a las de los flujos que se dirigen hacia otros
Estados, y no parece haber cambios significativos en este aspecto durante los
últimos años.
Alrededor de 77% de los migrantes indocumentados usaron los servicios de
un pollero para cruzar la frontera durante los años 1980-1993. Parece haberse
intensificado este uso desde 1993, si se considera que 86% lo hicieron durante los
dos últimos años, a pesar del fuerte aumento de este costo (de 310 dólares en
promedio en 1994 a 380 dólares en 1995).
Paradójicamente, el reforzamiento de la vigilancia en la frontera no parece
haber producido mayores dificultades para los indocumentados: entre 55% y 60%
de estos migrantes lograron cruzar la frontera en su primer intento en 1994 y 1995,
proporción ligeramente superior a lo que ocurría en los periodos anteriores (alrededor
del 53%).
Los dos últimos años se señalan igualmente por el cambio ocurrido en la
estructura del financiamiento del desplazamiento. Hasta 1993, más de la mitad
(entre 53% y 58% en todos los periodos) de los costos asociados al desplazamiento
estaban financiados por los ahorros del propio migrante. Esta proporción bajó al
38% durante los dos últimos años cuando se usaron más préstamos (29%) otorgados
sobre todo por el grupo familiar residiendo en México y otras fuentes de
financiamiento (incluyendo regalos). Esta mayor necesidad de financiamiento
externo refleja los cambios reciente ocurridos en los destinos (peso relativo más
importante de los Estados no fronterizos en el territorio norteamericano) que
aumentan los costos del desplazamiento, como el aumento de estos costos después
de la devaluación del peso.
Las modalidades de inserción en estados unidos
Cerca del 95% de los migrantes que salieron por primera vez a Estados Unidos
en1994-1995 tenían un pariente y/o un amigo en su lugar de destino (76% tenían a
un pariente y 55% a un amigo). Esta proporción es constante entre los migrantes
desde mediados de los ochenta y era ya relativamente alta al inicio de esta misma
década (82%).
Se observa la misma redistribución de los lugares de residencia de los
conocidos de los migrantes en el transcurso del tiempo: California que absorbió
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alrededor del 75% de los flujos durante la década de los ochenta, no representa
más que 65% de los destinos de los familiares y amigos que migraron entre 1990
y 1995; mientras los destinos no tradicionales (otros Estados como Texas e Illi-
nois) captaron 18% de los flujos más recientes respecto al 8-10% durante la década
de los ochenta.
Esta presencia de parientes o amigos en el lugar de destino tiene gran importancia
porque facilita la inserción del migrante recién llegado en este nuevo contexto.
Una de las formas más frecuentes de ayuda que se le proporciona al recién
llegado está representada por el hospedaje. Desde hace una decena de años, la casi
totalidad (95%) de los nuevos migrantes se benefician de esta ayuda que les brindan
los parientes o amigos que residen en el lugar de destino. Esta facilidad alcanza
cerca del 100% de los migrantes que se dirigen a Illinois desde el inicio de la
década de los ochenta, expresión de la antigüedad de las redes migratorias en este
Estado. En los Estados de destino no tradicional, esta ayuda beneficia actualmente
a cerca del 90% de los migrantes.
La mayor parte de los migrantes hospedados a su llegada a Estados Unidos
(50 a 60% según los periodos) lo están por una duración superior a un mes, sobre
todo entre los documentados. Generalmente el hospedaje proporcionado por los
conocidos es gratuito (55% de los casos), pero la participación financiera por parte
del migrante se vuelve mayoritaria a partir de los dos meses de hospedaje.
Al hospedaje está estrechamente asociada la alimentación para el recién llegado,
y las mismas observaciones (duración, forma) anteriores pueden hacerse respecto
a esta otra forma de ayuda.
Alrededor del 75% de los empleos encontrados por los recién llegados lo son
por mediación de los parientes o amigos que residen en el lugar de destino. Desde
1985, solamente 10 a 15% de los empleos fueron encontrados por los migrantes sin
intervención externa.
Fuera de California y Texas, esta búsqueda personal es muy poco frecuente
(sobre todo en Illinois), lo que denota proyectos migratorios mejor preparados (o
menos aleatorios) en el aspecto de la inserción profesional por parte de los migrantes
que se dirigen hacia estos Estados. Este aspecto se refleja igualmente en la proporción
de migrantes que estaban seguros de tener un empleo determinado a su llegada a
Estados Unidos. En los dos últimos años por ejemplo, 14% de los migrantes que
llegaron a California tenían un empleo asegurado respecto al 57% entre los que se
fueron a Illinois y otros Estados (excepto Texas).
La proporción de migrantes documentados que tenían un trabajo asegurado al
desplazarse se ubica entre 25 y 30% en todos los periodos. Esta asociación “migrante
documentado” “trabajo asegurado” que estaba muy fuerte antes de 1980, sobre
todo en la agricultura, se debilitó mucho en el transcurso del tiempo, aun si presenta
todavía una relativa importancia en la rama de la construcción.
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Por otra parte, se observa una fuerte reducción de la precariedad en este grupo
de migrantes en la medida que antes de 1980, por el peso de la agricultura (y la
estacionalidad de sus empleos) en la absorción de estos flujos, más de la mitad
(60%) de los que tenían un trabajo asegurado al migrar, lo tenían por una duración
inferior o igual a 6 meses, mientras son apenas 10% en esta situación los que migraron
entre 1990 y 1995.
El tiempo requerido para encontrar un empleo estuvo alargándose desde el
inicio de la década de los ochenta hasta 1993: 24% de los recién llegados necesitaban
4 semanas o más para insertarse en el mercado laboral en 1980-1984, respecto al
31% en 1985-1989 y el 35% durante el periodo 1990-1993. Durante los dos últimos
años (1994-1995) esta tendencia se invirtió y la inserción profesional se realiza
mucho más rápidamente: solamente 25% de estos nuevos migrantes necesitan un
mes o más para encontrar un empleo.
Generalmente se puede considerar que la inserción en los mercados locales de
trabajo se realizan más rápidamente en Texas y en otros Estados de destino no
tradicional. De igual manera los migrantes documentados encuentran más
rápidamente un empleo que los indocumentados. Casi 2/3 del primer grupo están
trabajando a más tardar 2 semanas después de su ingreso en Estados Unidos respecto
al 53% en el segundo grupo durante los dos últimos años.
En términos de ramas de actividad, esta inserción ocurre generalmente mucho
más rápidamente en la agricultura y en la construcción aunque en los años recientes
únicamente esta última ofrece posibilidades de encontrar un empleo con rapidez,
probablemente porque es ahí donde se cuenta la más alta proporción de trabajadores
documentados entre todas las ramas que absorben los flujos de mano de obra. Si
antes de la década de los ochenta, era en la rama agrícola donde se encontraba la
más alta proporción de trabajadores documentados entre su mano de obra, esta
rama fue desplazada en este aspecto por la industria durante el periodo 1985-1993,
y por la construcción actualmente.
Hubo una diversificación progresiva en la estructura de las ramas de actividad en
las cuales se insertan los migrantes en Estados Unidos a partir de la segunda mitad de
los años setenta. Antes de esta fecha más de la mitad de los migrantes originarios de
las ciudades medias de Jalisco se empleaban en la agricultura a su llegada en el país
fronterizo (Papail y Arroyo, 1995). Esta proporción bajó al 16% durante el periodo
1990-1993, pero parece tener un ligero repunte (21%) actualmente (1994-1995). La
diversificación se produjo en provecho de la industria, de la construcción, de los
restaurantes-hoteles y de los servicios (cuadro 8). Globalmente California destaca
por la importancia de sus ramas construcción y servicios en la absorción de sus
inmigrantes, Illinois por su industria, y Texas y los otros Estados por su agricultura.
El desplazamiento a Estados Unidos se acompaña generalmente de cambios de
actividades entre el lugar de origen y el lugar de destino. Tomando el grupo de ramas
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constituido por la agricultura, la industria y la construcción, se observa que desde el
inicio de los ochenta, solamente entre 26 y 32% de los migrantes provenientes de
estas ramas siguen trabajando en las mismas actividades al llegar a Estados Unidos.
Es sobre todo en la agricultura donde se observó la retención más importante de mano
de obra a través de la migración y en menos medida en la construcción, aún si desde
el inicio de los noventa, los migrantes provenientes de la agricultura mexicana tienen
una movilidad parecida a los migrantes provenientes de las otras ramas.
Los empleados (o contratistas) de los migrantes son en su mayoría anglo-sajones
(alrededor del 42%) o de origen mexicano (mexicanos o chicanos: 43%). El primer
grupo es mayoritario en la agricultura y la industria, pero esta sub-representado en
los servicios y restaurantes-hoteles. Al contrario se observa una sobre-representación
de los contratistas y empleadores de origen mexicano en las ramas de la construcción
y de los restaurantes-hoteles. El tercer grupo de empleadores o contratistas en el
cual predominan los norteamericanos de origen asiático están muy concentrados
en la rama restaurantes-hoteles.
En cuanto a las relaciones de trabajo, los migrantes desempeñan sus actividades
en un contexto mayoritariamente latino desde hace mucho tiempo, pues casi 2/3
(64%) de sus superiores directos, y alrededor del 90% de sus colegas de trabajo
son de origen mexicano. La presencia de la jerarquía anglosajón aparece
esencialmente en la industria. Al contrario, la jerarquía de origen mexicano esta
sobre-representada en la agricultura y sobre todo en la construcción y los servicios.
Geográficamente, se observa que los empleadores o contratistas anglosajones
son netamente mayoritarios fuera de California, mientras los empleadores de origen
mexicano son sub-representados en Texas y en los Estados de destino no tradicional.
Comparando los datos de diciembre de 1995 con los datos concernientes al
periodo1991-19932 , parece haber ocurrido un aumento sensible de los ingresos
Cuadro 8
Ramas de actividad de los inmigrantes a su llegada a Estados Unidos
por periodo de migración
Ramas de actividad
Periodo Agricultura Industria Construcción Comercio Servicios Otras Total
1980 52.3 17.0 9.5 7.1 11.6 2.5 100
80-84 31.1 14.2 19.8 17.0 14.2 3.8 100
85-89 13.8 11.0 24.8 24.3 22.5 3.7 100
90-93 16.0 14.1 25.0 19.9 19.2 5.8 100
94-95 20.6 17.6 30.9 13.2 14.7 2.9 100
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percibidos por los migrantes en Estados Unidos entre las dos fechas. El salario
promedio percibido según estas fuentes sube de 5.6 dólares/hora (alrededor de 250
dólares/semana) en 1991-1993 a 8.3 dólares/hora (alrededor de 350 dólares/semana)
a fines de 1995. Aparte de posibles diferenciaciones producidas por la técnica de
muestreo entre las dos fuentes, varios factores concurren para explicar esta fuerte
alza de los ingresos:
• El aumento sensible de la demanda de trabajo a partir de 1993, después
de la recesión económica del inicio de la década, sobre todo en Califor-
nia, lo que favorece el incremento de los salarios.
• La modificación de la estructura de las ramas de actividades en las cuales
se emplean los migrantes, como beneficio de actividades generalmente
mejor remuneradas como en la rama de la construcción.
• El aumento reciente de la edad promedio a la migración, que moviliza
mano de obra más experimentada.
• Una posible modificación de la relación documentados/indocumentados
en favor del primer grupo (se considera que los indocumentados perciben
en general un salario inferior del 20% al salario de un documentado,
Papail y Arroyo 1995).
Esta evolución del nivel de los salarios es coherente con la evolución del nivel
de las remesas mensuales (alrededor de 260 dólares en 1991-1993 a cerca de 330
dólares en 1995).
En todos los periodos de migración, alrededor del 40% de los migrantes
proyectaban quedarse menos de un año en Estados Unidos. La misma proporción
(40%) consideraba una estancia de duración indeterminada, mientras una muy débil
fracción (3 a 4%) pensaba establecerse definitivamente en el país fronterizo. No se
observan variaciones significativas en este aspecto en el transcurso del tiempo. Sin
embargo los flujos dirigidos hacia Illinois parecen de más larga duración de estancia
o con mayor frecuencia (7%) como de establecimiento definitivo.
El factor que parece tener la influencia más importante en la duración de estancia
proyectada en Estados Unidos se refiere a los proyectos elaborados al momento de
migrar. Cuando se trata de proyectos bien definidos (casarse, comprar una casa o
un terreno, establecerse por cuenta propia al regreso), las duraciones de estancia
son relativamente cortas, lo que es paradójico en varios casos. Al contrario el proyecto
general (“mejorar”, “progresar”... etc.) está netamente con mayor frecuencia asociado
a la duración “indeterminada”, Por otra parte, se observa que los migrantes
documentados tienen generalmente proyectos de estancia más cortos. Esto se debe
en buena parte a su peso relativo en la rama agrícola donde los requerimientos de
mano de obra son a menudo estacionales.
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En todos los periodos considerados, alrededor del 60% de los migrantes
indocumentados pensaban tramitar la regularización de su presencia en el territorio
norteamericano; cualquiera que sea el Estado de residencia, excepto en Texas donde
menos del 50% de los migrantes formularon este proyecto.
El hecho de planear la regularización de su situación parece estar relacionado
con el proyecto de traer más tarde a parientes o a veces a amigos. En efecto, 46%
de los indocumentados que pensaban regularizarse formulaban este proyecto con-
tra 22% entre los que no proyectaban regularizarse. Globalmente, cerca del 40%
de los migrantes documentados tenían este proyecto de traer más tarde a parientes
a Estado Unidos. Esta proporción no alcanza el 30% entre los indocumentados
generalmente, pero parece estar en aumento desde mediados de los ochenta (33%)
con la implementación de la ley IRCA.
El proyecto de traer parientes es más frecuente entre los migrantes que residen
en Illinois (41%) y en California (37%) que entre los que residen en otros Estados
(32%), y aumenta generalmente con el tiempo de estancia proyectado. Los migrantes
documentados que piensan traer a parientes se refieren en alrededor del 70% a
esposas e hijos, y para los 30% restantes a hermanos (15%) y amigos (15%), mientras
los indocumentados distribuyen sus prioridades de manera diferente (55% de esposas
e hijos, 28% de hermanos y 17% de amigos).
Los motivos enunciados por los migrantes que quieren traer a sus parientes o
amigos se refieren generalmente a la reunificación familiar (“estar juntos”) cuando
se trata de esposas e hijos (84% de estos casos) o al tema general del mejoramiento
de la situación personal (“mejor vida en Estados Unidos”, “más oportunidades de
trabajo”, “ayudar”) cuando se trata de hermanos, otros parientes o amigos.
Entre los migrantes que no pensaron traer a parientes o amigos al país fronterizo
(64% de los migrantes), los motivos más frecuentes se refieren a condiciones de
vida muy difíciles (“sufrimientos”, “ambiente peligroso”, etc. 37% de los casos), o
porque el migrante no pensaba quedarse mucho tiempo en este país (11%) o, a
veces porque el migrante atrasaba la formulación de ese proyecto hasta estabilizar
su situación allá (acomodarse mejor, empleo menos precario...).
Entre los migrantes actuales (que residen en Estados Unidos en diciembre
de 1995), 61% son casados. En este grupo, 41% de las esposas residen igualmente
en el país fronterizo. Esta frecuencia es de 23% cuando el matrimonio ocurrió
antes de la migración (y apenas 28% cuando el migrante salió por primera vez
antes de 1991); pero alcanza la mitad (49.7%) cuando la primera migración
precedió el matrimonio3 , lo que refleja la diversidad de los proyectos según el
orden cronológico de estos eventos. La presencia de esposas en Estados Unidos
es mucho más frecuente entre los migrantes casados documentados (54%) que
entre los indocumentados (38%).
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Las perspectivas
Entre los migrantes de retorno a sus lugares de origen, la duración de estancia
promedio en Estados Unidos se ubica alrededor de 7.5 años en todos los periodos
de regreso. Esta estancia en el país fronterizo es mucho más larga (alrededor de 10
años) cuando los migrantes estaban en situación legal que cuando se trata de
migrantes indocumentados (alrededor de 6 años). La edad promedio al regreso
oscila alrededor de los 30 años en todos los periodos. Generalmente, cerca del 60%
de los migrantes se reincorporaron a su regreso en las ramas de actividad en las
cuales desempeñaban sus actividades antes de migrar.
Los datos de la encuesta confirman lo que se mencionó en trabajos anteriores
(Papail y Arroyo, 1995) sobre el deslizamiento de la distribución de las actividades
del sector primario hacia el sector terciario a través del ciclo migratorio (cuadro 9).
La agricultura y la industria que proveyeron el 51% de la mano de obra migrante
(antes del desplazamiento), no absorben más que el 29% de esos migrantes a su
regreso a México. Al contrario el comercio y los servicios que proveyeron 31% de
la mano de obra integran 50% de los migrantes de retorno.
Entre los ex-migrantes, alrededor del 30% consideran regresar de nuevo a
Estados Unidos debido al contexto recesivo actual de la economía mexicana,
proporción que sube a casi 50% entre los migrantes de retorno de menos de 2
años, pero que apenas alcanza el 16% entre los que regresaron hace 6 años o
Cuadro 9
Distribución de las ramas de actividad de los migrantes de retorno
según su rama de actividad antes del inicio del ciclo migratorio
Rama de actividad actual
Rama antes
 de migrar Agricultura Industria Construcción Comercio Servicios Otras Total
Agricultura 40.4 7.7 6.7 27.9 10.6 6.7 100
Industria 3.8 44.9 7.7 15.4 19.2 9.0 100
Construcción 4.7 7.0 82.8 11.6 14.0 0.0 100
Comercio 2.9 11.4 5.7 68.6 8.6 2.9 100
Servicio 1.3 5.2 2.6 11.7 76.6 2.6 100
Otros 0.0 4.3 4.3 17.4 8.7 65.2 100
(N) 13.6 15.3 12.5 23.1 26.7 8.9 100
(360)
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más. Este proyecto es más frecuente entre los solteros (34%) que entre los
casados (27%).
La reinserción de los migrantes en las economías locales se produce más o
menos fácilmente según el periodo de regreso. Los individuos que regresaron
alrededor del año de 1990 se beneficiaron con un contexto más favorable en su
reinserción en los mercados de trabajo locales, durante una época de crecimiento
sostenido de la economía mexicana y una demanda de trabajo en expansión. Muchos
pudieron realizar sus proyectos de establecerse por cuenta propia gracias a la
subvaluación de la moneda mexicana durante estos años (Papail y Arroyo, 1995).
Este regreso fue ocasionado en muchos casos por la constitución de nuevos
hogares, misma que se había aplazado a causa de la migración laboral; por la compra
de casas, y de manera general, por un cierto arraigo que reduce la propensión de
“irse a volver” a Estados Unidos.
Las condiciones de reinserción se volvieron mas difíciles, sobre todo a partir
de 1993 cuando empezó a contraerse el mercado de empleo con la sobrevaluación
del Peso. Hay que subrayar la proporción todavía no despreciable (10 a 16%) entre
los que regresaron hace más de 1 año, de los que consideran auto-emplearse o
comprarse una casa (cuadro 10). Se observa que los jefes de hogares que tienen
casa propia, son individuos que pasaron generalmente 9 o 10 años en promedio en
Estados Unidos, duración netamente superior a los jefes de hogares regresados sin
tener casa propia actualmente (alrededor de 6 años de estancia), lo que deja entrever
que la realización de este tipo de proyecto (tener casa propia) necesita una cierta
duración de trabajo en el país fronterizo.
Se puede pues considerar que actualmente existen probabilidades relativamente
elevadas de re-emigración entre los ex-migrantes regresados durante los últimos 5
años. Hay que recordar que los primeros años de la década de los noventa se señalaron
por una importante ola de regresos a México, lo que sugiere la existencia de un
potencial de re-migrantes importantes en esta población.
En la población de migrantes actuales (que residen en 1995 en Estados
Unidos), cerca del 80% piensan seguir trabajando en el país fronterizo. La
situación migratoria (indocumentados o no) no parece influir mucho en los
proyectos de residencia: 83% de los indocumentados manifiestan su interés en
seguir trabajando cierto tiempo en Estados Unidos respecto al 76% de los
individuos en situación regular.
Los proyectos derivados y asociados al regreso al lugar de origen
(establecerse por cuenta propia o comprar una casa) son poco frecuentes y
pueden entenderse tal vez como cambios coyunturales de prioridades, ligados
a la situación crítica de la economía mexicana que privilegia las solidaridades
familiares (uso más importante de las remesas para el sostenimiento de las
familia en el lugar de origen) en detrimento de proyectos personales, a pesar
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del contexto más favorable para la elaboración de estos últimos proyectos
(subvaluación del Peso durante 1995).
Se observa en efecto, una brecha muy importante entre los proyectos definidos
en el momento de la migración a Estados Unidos entre los que salieron durante los
3 últimos años (alrededor del 20% formulaban la compra futura de una casa como
proyecto prioritario, y cerca del 8% proyectaban crear un negocio propio a su regreso
a México), y los proyectos que desarrollan actualmente los migrantes que residen
en el país vecino.
Actualmente, la duración de estancia en Estados Unidos no parece tener mucha
influencia en la propensión a regresar al lugar de origen, contrariamente a lo que se
podría pensar (cuadro 11). Si examinamos los proyectos actuales de los migrantes
que residen desde hace 8 años y más en el otro país (la estancia promedio entre los
ex-migrantes es de 7-8 años), observamos que más de la mitad de ellos (55%)
piensan seguir trabajando en Estados Unidos por un tiempo indeterminado; cerca
del 10% proyectan instalarse definitivamente allá, y 7% esperan jubilarse para
volver a residir en México.
Los proyectos derivados de un eventual regreso a México (establecerse por
cuenta propia, compra de casa), toman cierta importancia entre los migrantes que
residen desde hace 4 o 7 años en Estados Unidos, es decir entre individuos que
teóricamente, programarían actualmente su regreso definitivo a México durante
los 2 o 3 próximos años. Sin embargo, se observa también en este grupo una débil
propensión a elaborar un proyecto de regreso.
Cuadro 10
Proyectos actuales de los ex-migrantes según la duración de
residencia en México (en años) desde su regreso y el Estado Civil
Tiempo transcurrido desde el regreso Estado Civil
Proyectos 0-1 2-3 4-5 6 y más Total Casados Solteros
Regresar a E.U. 47.3 39.4 32.0 16.4 28.3 27.1 34.0
Quedarse aquí 4.2 5.7 9.0 6.8 6.5 6.2 7.0
Poner un negocio aquí 8.3 11.3 10.7 5.8 8.0 8.0 8.0
Comprar una casa aquí 0.0 2.8 5.4 4.3 3.4 3.5 3.0
Mantener a la familia 31.9 31.0 41.0 51.4 42.6 45.5 33.0
Otro 8.3 9.9 1.8 15.3 11.1 9.7 15.9
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
(N) (72) (71) (56) (190) (389) (288) (100)
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El factor más importante en la elaboración de los proyectos actuales está
relacionado con la situación familiar del migrante: su Estado Civil y sobre todo el
lugar de residencia de la esposa cuando es casado.
Entre los migrantes casados cuyas esposas residen en Estados Unidos, cerca
del 20% manifiestan el deseo de quedarse definitivamente a residir en este país.
Esta proporción no pasa del 4% entre los solteros y los migrantes casados cuyas
esposas residen en México. Es muy probable que la presencia de hijos nacidos en
el país fronterizo en estas familias juega un papel importante en estas distribuciones.
De la misma manera, cerca del 10% de los migrantes cuyas esposas residen en
Estados Unidos esperan la jubilación para regresar definitivamente en sus lugares
de origen, respecto al 3% máximo en los otros grupos (cuadro 12).
Todo parece indicar que una gran parte de los migrantes actuales están en
situación de espera respecto a la evolución de la situación económica en México
para definir un proyecto preciso y muchos de ellos están atrasando su regreso
definitivo a sus lugares de origen.
Conclusiones
Aunque esta encuesta, en la cual se sustenta este trabajo, no fue diseñada para
evaluar la evolución de la magnitud de los flujos anuales hacia Estados Unidos, se
CUADRO 11
Proyectos actuales de los migrantes actuales por duración de estancia
en Estados Unidos
Duración de residencia en Estados Unidos
(años)
Proyectos 0-3 4-7 8 y más Total
Seguir trabajando en E U 77.8 74.8 55.2 65.1
Instalación definitiva en EU 6.2 5.7 9.5 7.8
Nacionalizarse, llevar a la familia a EU 6.1 0.0 4.8 3.9
Jubilarse para volver a México 1.2 1.1 7.4 4.5
Regresar definitivamente a México 3.7 2.3 5.3 4.2
Poner un negocio en México 3.7 6.9 4.2 4.7
Comprar una casa en México 0.0 3.4 1.6 1.7
Otros proyectos 1.2 5.7 12.1 8.1
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
(N) (81) (87) (190) (358)
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puede conjeturar —con fuerte probabilidad— un incremento importante del flujo
de emigración desde hace un año. Los principales indicadores (tasa de desempleo,
índice de salario mínimo, relación tamaño de hogar/activos ocupados) de la economía
mexicana que usamos aquí se deterioraron mucho desde 1994. Por otra parte, la
economía norteamericana se encuentra desde hace 3 o 4 años en una fase de
crecimiento relativamente sostenido que reactivó la demanda de trabajo y
particularmente de mano de obra mexicana en muchas ramas de actividad. Esta
reactivación —en desfase con la situación de la economía mexicana en 1995 y
1996— tuvo entre otras consecuencias, una casi duplicación desde 1993, de la
relación de salarios promedios percibidos por los trabajadores mexicanos entre sus
lugares de origen y los Estados Unidos, lo que volvió mucho más atractivo el
desplazamiento hacia el país fronterizo desde el año pasado, a pesar de las dificultades
crecientes que encuentran los migrantes al ingresar en ese país.
Esta situación de desfase en la evolución de las 2 economías creó pues un contexto
muy favorable al desencadenamiento actual de una nueva ola migratoria, como ocurrió
en los años 1983-1984 después del estallido de la crisis mexicana en 1982.
Los desplazamientos actuales movilizan migrantes primerizos (entre los cuales
más y más jefes de familias al parecer), y también re-migrantes (componente de
fuerte crecimiento en los flujos de salida desde fines de la década de los ochenta),
Cuadro 12
Proyectos actuales de los migrantes que residen en Estados Unidos
según la situación matrimonial
Situación matrimonial
Casados
Esposa en Esposa en Estados
Proyectos México Unidos Solteros
Seguir trabajando en E U 68.5 48.3 73.8
Instalación definitiva en EU 3.1 19.3 3.7
Nacionalizarse, llevar a la familia a EU 5.8 3.3 2.7
Jubilarse para volver a México 3.1 9.7 2.2
Regresar definitivamente a México 6.3 3.2 2.9
Poner un negocio en México 3.1 6.5 5.1
Comprar una casa en México 0.8 2.2 2.2
Otros proyectos 9.4 7.6 7.4
100.0 100.0 100.0
(N) (127) (93) (137)
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procedentes de la ola de regresos en México durante los primeros años de los noventa,
y entre los cuales existe un fuerte potencial —como lo vimos— de nuevos
desplazamientos en este contexto.
Además de la diversificación de las ramas de actividades de origen de los
migrantes y de las ramas en las cuales se insertan en Estados Unidos, que tomó
consistencia desde los años ochenta, se observa actualmente una diversificación de
los Estados de destino de los flujos de salida hacia el país vecino. Esta redistribución
geográfica es, en buena parte, una consecuencia del endurecimiento de la política
que practican Estados como California respecto al fenómeno migratorio, y del
deterioro del clima social (desarrollo de actitudes xenofóbicas por parte de varios
sectores de la población norteamericana), pero se debe igualmente a la expansión
tradicional de la migración jalisciense. Esto se manifiesta por una fuerte reducción
de la parte de los flujos dirigidos hacia California, en provecho de otros Estados en
el interior de la Unión Americana.
Por otra parte, los desplazamientos actuales parecen mucho más preparados, o
menos aleatorios en cuanto a las condiciones de cruce de la frontera y a la inserción
profesional en los lugares de destino. Esta inserción se produce más rápidamente
no solamente gracias a una coyuntura económica favorable, sino también por la
extensión y el buen funcionamiento de las redes de parientes y amigos que permiten
asegurar a los migrantes la consecución rápida de un empleo al llegar a su destino.
Es probable igualmente que la diversificación de los lugares de destino, cuando
se apoya en redes establecidas de conocidos, facilita la inserción de la población
migrante en regiones y ramas de actividades menos concurridas o menos saturadas.
El fuerte incremento de los costos de desplazamiento (transporte, “pollero”)
no parece representar un freno al crecimiento del volumen de los flujos en la medida
que los migrantes pueden solicitar con mayor frecuencia préstamos familiares en
sus lugares de origen, que sustituyen en parte ahorros insuficientes, para financiar
estos costos.
El incremento aparente de los salarios promedios percibidos por los migrantes
en Estados Unidos desde hace unos años debería teóricamente favorecer los
proyectos personales asociados a los regresos definitivos en México (creación de
micro empresas o auto-empleo, compra de casa...) en la medida que los migrantes
pueden asignar una fracción más importante de sus ahorros a estos proyectos. Sin
embargo, a través de los proyectos actuales que planean los migrantes, no se perciben
cambios significativos en este aspecto, tal vez porque la crisis económica en México
se traduce por una mayor solicitud de recursos a los migrantes, y también porque
muchos migrantes, al atrasar su regreso definitivo, esperan una estabilización de la
situación económica o un mayor deslizamiento de la moneda mexicana frente al
dólar. En este caso se “inflaría” momentáneamente el volumen de migrantes que
residen en Estados Unidos actualmente.
997
Es probable que la paridad del Peso mexicano a mediados de 1996 (7.40 pesos/
dólar) se ubica en su zona de equilibrio, pero el fuerte diferencial de inflación entre
los dos países, que seguirá por lo menos durante los dos próximos años, puede
dejar esperar para muchos, una nueva pérdida de valor de la moneda nacional que
seguirá volviendo muy atractiva la migración hacia Estados Unidos.
Sin embargo, a mediano plazo (3-5 años), se puede considerar con cierto
realismo una relativa estabilización de la paridad cambiaria, y la eliminación del
desfase en la evolución de las dos economías, que borrará sensiblemente los altibajos
coyunturales en la magnitud de los flujos migratorios anuales, y “desinflará” el
volumen de la población migrante en Estados Unidos.
Notes
1. Indicadores INSER, Carta Económica Regional, INESER, Universidad de Guadalajara,
varios números.
2. Encuesta migraciones a Estados Unidos, INSER/ORSTOM, 1993
3. Según datos anteriores (encuesta migraciones a Estados Unidos. INSER-U DE G/
ORSTOM, 1993) alrededor del 10% de las esposas de los migrantes en Estados Unidos.
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Anexo 1
Características generales de la muestra, encuesta migraciones
internacionales en 2 ciudades de Jalisco
Edad actual
- 15 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40 + N.S. Total
0.1 3.6 15.6 21.1 15.0 12.9 31.3 0.4 100.0
Estado Civil
Soltero Casado Otro Total
28.4 68.1 3.5 100.0
Hogares de migrantes
Hogares encuestados Hogares de no migrantes y ex-migrantes
Ciudad Guzmán 201 401
Lagos de Moreno 200 400
401 801
Tipo de migrantes
Migrantes actuales 364
Ex-migrantes 437
801
Parentesco
Jefe del hogar 68.3
Hijos 29.5
Otros 2.3
100.0
999
Mexicali-
Tijuana Nogales (a)
% de éxito al primero intento en 85-89 52.2 60.0 8.6
% de éxito al primer intento en 90-95 52.7 68.8 10.7
(a): % de cruce por Mexicali+Nogales/total 3 ciudades (sube al 23% en 94-95)
Anexo 2
Cuadro 1
Encuesta migración 1995
INESER/ORSTOM
Número de intentos antes del cruce de la frontera con
resultados exitosos, por periodo (indocumentados)
Elementos de explicación para entender el aumento del éxito al primer intento en
94-95:
• Uso más frecuente de los polleros en 94-95
• Modificación de la distribución de los lugares de cruce en detrimento
de Tijuana donde el cruce es más arriesgado:
80-84 85-89 90-93 94-95 Total
Primer intento 48.1 52.9 52.8 59.0 52.5
Segundo intento 26.6 29.9 35.4 25.6 30.3
Tercer intento 10.2 9.2 3.6 7.7 7.7
Cuatro intentos o más 15.1 8.0 8.2 7.7 9.5
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
(79) (174) (110) (39) (402)
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Cuadro 2
País de residencia en 1995 de los indocumentados que emigraron en
1987 y 1988 según su intención de regularizar su situación en EU al
momento de la migración (indocumentados=cruces
terrestres+turistas+estudiantes...)
Intención de regularización
Si No
Residía en Estados Unidos durante 1995 66.7 41.4
Residía en México durante 1995 33.3 58.6
100.0 100.0
(39) (29)
Anexo 3
Porcentaje de migrantes indocumentados que utilizaron un coyote
según el periodo de migración
antes del 80 80-84 85-89 90-93 94-95 Total Absolutos
72.2 76.1 78.7 76.4 85.5 76.8 628
Fuente: Encuesta sobre migración internacional, INESER/UdeG-ORSTOM, 1995
Número de intentos antes del éxito
1er éxito 2do éxito 3er éxito 4to éxito Total Absolutos
Intentos 0 1 2 3 y más
Porcentaje 60.7 23.6 6.0 9.7 100 801
Fuente: Encuesta sobre migración internacional, INESER/UdeG-ORSTOM, 1995
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IMPACTS OF MIGRATION
The Participation of Mexican-born
Households in Means-tested U.S.
Welfare Programs
Paul S. Davies & Michael J. Greenwood
Introduction
Participation by the foreign born in welfare programs is the focus ofconsiderable scrutiny in the United States. Presumably motivated by thenotion that legal and unauthorized immigrants participate in some sense
“too much” in such programs, Congress passed the Personal Responsibility and
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996. This Act restricts the access of
even legal immigrants to welfare utilization. In spite of the passage of this
legislation, many questions regarding immigrant utilization of public assistance
programs remain only partially answered or unanswered. Precisely which public
assistance programs are used relatively much by which entry cohort of which
foreign-born group relative to which native-born group? The answers remain
obscure. In this paper, we provide an unusually detailed analysis of public
assistance utilization by Mexican-born households relative to various control
groups of native-born households.
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Dramatic changes in the number of immigrants entering the United States, in
the source country composition, and in the age composition over the past 25 years
have rekindled research interest and policy debate regarding the impact of immi-
grants on the U.S. economy. For example, what effects do immigrants have on
U.S. factor markets, on the education system, and on the health care system? The
research conducted here is focused in that it attempts to answer one specific ques-
tion that stems from this recent immigration policy debate: Do Mexican immi-
grants use means-tested public programs more intensively than otherwise similar
natives? The means-tested programs studied here are Aid to Families with Depen-
dent Children (AFDC) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI). Social insurance
programs constitute another type of public program. They refer to programs funded
by payroll taxes on working individuals, primarily Social Security.1 We account
for Social Security income in this study, but we do not specifically study participa-
tion in the Social Security system.
Significant growth has occurred in immigrant welfare participation since 1970.
As reported in Borjas and Trejo (1993), the percentage of households receiving
welfare increased substantially for both native and immigrant households between
1970 and 1980. However, as shown in Table 1, the increase in the participation rate
for immigrant households (5.9% in 1970 to 8.8% in 1980) was greater than that for
native households (6.1% in 1970 to 7.9% in 1980). Table 1 also shows that the
participation rate for immigrant households increased again to 9.1% in 1990, whereas
that for native households actually decreased to 7.4%. Furthermore, female-headed
households, whether native or immigrant, are more likely to receive welfare than
male-headed households (Table 1).
Table 1
Percentage of Native and Foreign Born
Households Receiving Welfare, 1970-1990
Male-headed Female-headed
All Households Households Households
Year Natives Foreign Born Natives Foreign Born Natives Foreign Born
1970 6.1 5.9 3.7 4.5 14.8 10.4
1980 7.9 8.8 4.8 6.5 16.2 14.5
1990 7.4 9.1 N/A N/A N/A N/A
Source: Borjas and Trejo (1993) and Borjas (1994)
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This paper makes two important advances in the analysis of participation
in means-tested welfare programs by native-born and Mexican-born households.
First, although several previous studies have empirically examined welfare
participation by immigrants (e.g., Blau, 1984; Borjas and Trejo, 1991, 1993;
Jensen, 1988; Tienda and Jensen, 1986; and Trejo, 1992), only Borjas and Trejo
(1993) is based on an explicit, underlying theoretical model. In the section titled
“Theoretical Model,” a household utility maximization model is developed for
the decision to participate in welfare (and social insurance) programs. Drawing
from Moffitt (1981, 1983), welfare stigma is incorporated into the utility
function and is allowed to vary across immigrant and native households. In
the context of the theoretical model, private transfer income also is separated
from other non-labor income because households receiving private transfers
are likely to display different program participation patterns than households
not receiving such transfers.
Second, a seven-equation simultaneous system is developed for empirical analy-
sis that allows for explicit links between head and spouse hours worked, head and
spouse wages, household consumption, and household welfare and social insur-
ance participation. This model is more detailed than the models used in previous
research and more accurately depicts the household decision-making process.
In the empirical work reported below we not only distinguish female-headed
households and male-headed households, but we also separately identify single
female-headed households. Single female-headed households have especially high
AFDC participation rates. Moreover, within each type of household, we distin-
guish the age of the head (29 and under, 30-49, 50-64, and 65 and over). This last
distinction allows for a better understanding of AFDC users, who tend to be rela-
tively young, and SSI users, who tend to be somewhat older (primarily 65 and
over). Finally, the types of models developed here study the foreign born relative
to a control group of native-born persons. We consider four different native-born
control groups (Mexican ancestry natives, all natives, white natives, and black
natives). The various distinctions in the data in combination with the various con-
trol groups used in the analysis allow for a more complete understanding of wel-
fare utilization of the foreign born.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows: the following section, titled “Previ-
ous Findings,” discusses the previous literature relating to welfare and social in-
surance participation by the foreign born. The next section lays out the theoretical
model. The data set is discussed in the section titled “Data.” The empirical model
and estimation techniques are described in the section titled “The Model and Esti-
mation Techniques.” The next section presents the empirical results, and the final
section provides a summary and conclusions.
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Previous Findings
Several studies over the past 20 years examine the probability of social program
participation by immigrants versus natives in the United States. However, none of
these studies include all of the relevant explanatory variables (many times due to
data availability problems), nor do they explore the link between hours worked
and public program participation, as is done here. In general, previous studies show
that immigrant households are less likely than otherwise comparable native
households to participate in welfare programs, although the raw data indicate that
immigrant households are more likely to participate than natives (Table 1). These
studies typically focus on two variables: foreign-born status and year of entry. The
foreign-born status variable is generally a simple dummy variable coded as one if
the household head or spouse is foreign born and zero if native born. The year of
entry variable is usually a series of dummy variables indicating when the head of
the foreign-born household entered the U.S.; for example, head entered 0-5 years
ago, 6-10 years ago, or head entered between 1975 and 1979 or between 1970 and
1974. These year of entry variables are usually interacted with the foreign-born
status variable to examine immigrant participation differences across various entry
cohorts. Certain studies, such as Borjas and Trejo (1991) and Jensen (1988), pool
data from two U.S. Censuses. This procedure allows for the identification of cohort
effects (by examining participation by different entry cohorts), assimilation effects
(by examining the relationship between program participation and years since
migration), and period effects (by examining participation differences due to being
observed in the 1970 vs. 1980 Census), but not all three at once.2
A third variable, age at arrival, has rarely been included in empirical analyses
of immigrant program participation, although its effect on program participation
may be important. If immigrants arrive at younger ages, the majority of their human
capital (education, experience, etc.) is accumulated in the U.S. Immigrants arriving
at older ages, on the other hand, have little incentive to accumulate U.S.-specific
human capital due to the shortness of their remaining work careers. Those
immigrating at older ages may therefore place a greater burden on the SSI program,
whereas those arriving at younger ages are more probable AFDC participants.
Blau (1984) is the only previous study that examines participation in both
welfare and social insurance programs. Using the 1976 Survey of Income and
Education, Blau conducts her analysis separately for male-and female-headed
households. Focusing on six year of entry groups interacted with foreign-born status
and controlling for various personal characteristics, Blau finds that foreign-born
male-and female-headed families are initially significantly less likely to participate
in both types of programs than are otherwise similar natives. Although length of
time in the U.S. and probability of welfare recipiency do not display any consistent
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pattern, Blau finds that the probability of immigrant participation in social insurance
programs increases with time in the U.S. After residing in the U.S. for 16 (26)
years, male (female) immigrants become significantly more likely to participate in
social insurance programs than natives.
Borjas and Trejo (1991) pool the 1970 and 1980 Public Use Microdata Sample
(PUMS) of the U.S. Census to examine immigrant welfare participation rates, al-
lowing them to identify the cohort and assimilation effects on immigrant welfare
usage. Among their findings, Borjas and Trejo (1991) report that more recent im-
migrant cohorts are more likely to enter the welfare system than are earlier cohorts
(cohort effect) and that immigrant households are more likely to use welfare the
longer they have been in the U.S. (assimilation effect). Borjas and Trejo also con-
clude that immigrant welfare participation rates have risen between 1970 and 1980,
which is largely attributable to the shift in national origin mix of immigrants from
European countries to Asian and Latin American countries. Finally, they calculate
that the increased welfare participation of immigrants between the 1950-59 cohort
and the 1975-80 cohort has increased welfare costs by over $5 billion.
Most studies account for the effect of Hispanic origin on the probability of
program participation by including a dummy variable equal to one if the head is of
Hispanic origin. Using such a strategy, Blau (1984), for example, finds that male-
headed and female-headed Hispanic households are more likely to receive wel-
fare, but less likely to receive social insurance, than are their otherwise similar
non-Hispanic counterparts.3
Borjas and Trejo (1993) use the 1980 PUMS to compute unadjusted and ad-
justed welfare participation rates for 62 source countries for both male-and fe-
male-headed households.4 For immigrants from Mexico, the male-headed partici-
pation rates are 8.7% (unadjusted) and 9.6% (adjusted) whereas the female-headed
participation rates are 29.3% (unadjusted) and 22.2% (adjusted). By way of com-
parison, the mean participation rates for immigrants from all 62 countries are 5.1%
(unadjusted) and 7.6% (adjusted) for male-headed households and 13.0% (unad-
justed) and 16.6% (adjusted) for female-headed households. In all cases, immi-
grant households from Mexico are more likely welfare participants than are immi-
grants from all other countries on average.
Tienda and Jensen (1986) and Jensen (1988) analyze welfare participation
differences between Hispanic immigrant households and native Hispanic
households.5 Both studies split the Hispanic group into Mexican, Puerto Rican,
and other Hispanic households. Tienda and Jensen (1986) use the 1980 PUMS.
Whereas the raw data indicate that immigrant Hispanic households are more likely
to receive public assistance than native Hispanic households, the estimated model
shows otherwise. Hispanic immigrant families are 9% less likely than otherwise
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comparable natives to have received public assistance income in 1979. Within the
Hispanic group, Mexicans are less likely, and Puerto Ricans more likely, to receive
welfare payments than other Hispanics. Furthermore, recent Hispanic immigrants
(those entering between 1975 and 1979) are 9% less likely to participate than
otherwise similar Hispanic natives. Mexican families that immigrated between 1970
and 1980 are also less likely to participate in public assistance than are other Hispanic
immigrant families or native families.
Jensen (1988) conducts essentially the same analysis as Tienda and Jensen
(1986); however, he combines 1970 and 1980 Census (PUMS) data to examine
differences in participation for each immigrant group both for different entry co-
horts (e.g., 0-5 years ago, 6-10 years ago) and across the two time periods. Multi-
variate logistic regression analyses show that immigrants are generally less likely
to use welfare than their native counterparts. Focusing on changes across the two
time periods, he concludes that the lower likelihood of Hispanic immigrants using
public assistance is specific to 1979. When Jensen (1988) beaks down immigrants
by entry cohort, he further concludes that recent Hispanic immigrants in 1970 are
more likely to participate, but Hispanic immigrants who entered 0 to 5 and 6 to 10
years ago in 1980 are significantly less likely to participate. Furthermore, recent
Mexican immigrants are less likely to receive public assistance income.
Three important shortcomings are evident in nearly all of the studies discussed
above. First, with the exception of Borjas and Trejo (1993), none of the studies base
their empirical work on an underlying theoretical model. The Borjas-Trejo model,
however, is significantly different than that developed in the following section titled
“Theoretical Model.” The authors model both the decision to immigrate to the U.S.
and the decision to participate in a welfare program given immigration. As such,
welfare participation becomes a function of source-country characteristics including
income, income inequality, and distance from the U.S. (representing the cost of im-
migration). Participation in social insurance programs is not addressed, nor does the
model allow for comparisons between otherwise similar immigrants and natives.
In the present paper, a utility maximization model is constructed following
Moffitt (1983), which allows the family to explicitly choose participation or non-
participation. Whereas the Moffitt model deals only with welfare program partici-
pation, the model employed here allows the family to separately choose to partici-
pate in welfare and social insurance programs. The model yields a system of equa-
tions for welfare program participation, social insurance participation, consump-
tion, and labor supply.
Second, welfare stigma may play an important role in the participation deci-
sion, yet this issue is not covered in any previous studies. Moffitt (1981) incorpo-
rates stigma into a model of welfare participation by assuming that an individual
receives disutility from participation in the AFDC program. Moffitt (1983) takes a
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slightly different approach by allowing for a flat component of stigma, resulting
from participation in and of itself, as well as for variable stigma, which is related to
the size of the welfare benefit received. Given Moffitt’s finding that stigma arises
from participation and does not vary with the amount of the benefit given partici-
pation, the model employed in this paper incorporates only a flat component of
stigma. Furthermore, stigma is associated with participation in welfare programs
and not with participation in social insurance programs.
Third, private intra-family transfers may provide an important safety-net for
families and may therefore influence both participation in and benefit levels re-
ceived from welfare and social insurance programs. Although several studies (e.g.,
Cox and Jakubson, 1995; Schoeni, 1991) have examined the extent to which pri-
vate transfers within families are crowded out by public transfer programs, none
has addressed the reverse of this issue: To what extent, and in which direction,
does the presence of private intra-family transfers influence the probability of par-
ticipation in, and the level of payments received from, public transfer programs?
For welfare programs, the effect is expected to be negative; however, the effect of
private transfers on social insurance participation is more ambiguous.
Some descriptive statistics are illustrative of the importance of private trans-
fers and the differences in private transfer behavior across countries of origin. Cox
and Jakubson (1995) use 1979 survey data from the President’s Commission on
Pension Policy (PCPP). They find that private transfers make up about 10.3% of
family income for those families receiving such transfers, while mean public transfers
received for these families account for about 19.2% of family income (Cox and
Jakubson, 1995, Table 1). In the PCPP survey, 25.9% of the families reported re-
ceiving private transfers within the sample time interval. Unfortunately, this sample
relates to a very small number of families (4,232 family units were included) and
does not make any distinction as to the foreign-born or native-born status of the
families surveyed.
In a review article, Cox and Jimenez (1990) present descriptive statistics relat-
ing to private transfers in other countries. Private transfers are more prevalent and
make up a larger share of total family income in other countries than in the U.S.
For example, in rural India, 93% of households reported receiving some form of
private transfer, with the average transfer amount accounting for 11% of house-
hold income. In Malaysia, between 19% and 30% of households received a private
transfer. Here the average transfer amount accounted for 11% of household in-
come. The comparable figures reported for the United States are 15% of house-
holds receiving private transfers, making up 1% of household income on average
(Cox and Jimenez, 1990, Table 1).
Although the statistics presented above are quite general, they support two
claims. First, private intra-family transfers are received by a significant number of
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households in both the United States and other countries. If the hypothesis that
private transfers affect the propensity to use public transfer programs is correct,
then excluding private transfers from the model would be a serious omission. Sec-
ond, the observed differences in private transfer patterns across countries lend sup-
port to the argument that immigrants from various countries may behave differ-
ently than natives with respect to public program participation. These differences
may stem from cultural differences and therefore would not be detected by simply
holding constant such characteristics as age and education.
Only two previous studies, Tienda and Jensen (1986) and Jensen (1988), at-
tempt to control for private transfers. Both do so by including a dummy variable
for extended family status as an explanatory variable in the welfare program par-
ticipation equations. The hypothesis is that extended families are more likely to
provide informal support within the family and should therefore exhibit lower pro-
pensities to participate in welfare programs, all else equal. Indeed, Wolpin (1980)
demonstrates that immigrant families, especially Mexicans and Asians, are more
likely to reside in non-nuclear households. However, Tienda and Jensen (1986)
and Jensen (1988) both find that extended family status increases the probability
of welfare participation. This proxy for the actual presence and amount of private
intra-family transfers is clearly not satisfactory, but more satisfactory measures are
rarely available in the data.
In this study, private transfers directly enter the utility maximization model as
a form of non-labor income in the budget constraint and carry through to become
an argument in the demand equations for welfare and social insurance participa-
tion. Private transfers should therefore enter the empirical model, although data
availability presents a significant constraint here. This issue is discussed further in
the section titled “Data.”
The results obtained in a number of previous studies are sensitive to the con-
trol group of native-born persons that is chosen as the comparison group for the
foreign born (Greenwood and McDowell, 1986). For example, a common control
group is otherwise comparable native-born persons of the same ancestry as the
foreign-born group (e.g., Davies, 1996). However, other control groups also are
meaningful to study, such as all native-born persons, white native-born persons,
black native-born persons, and even other foreign-born groups. In this study, we
examine persons born in Mexico relative to a number of alternative control groups.
Census data on welfare participation do not distinguish the precise program in
which the individual or household participated. Thus, Aid to Families with Depen-
dent Children (AFDC) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) are bundled to-
gether in “welfare income.” This aggregation is problematic because the two types
of programs mainly are used by different types of individuals. For example, AFDC
utilization is oriented toward single-parent, female-headed households, whereas
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SSI is oriented toward aged persons and the disabled. During 1990 and 1991, of
SSI recipients who were lawful resident aliens, almost 65 percent were aged whereas
about 35 percent were blind or disabled. A better understanding of participation in
means-tested welfare programs by the foreign born thus requires considerable dis-
aggregation of the population. In this study, we distinguish various age groups, and
we also specifically identify single-parent households.
Theoretical Model
The model presented below examines the separate decisions of households to
participate in welfare programs and social insurance programs. This is a micro-
oriented approach to the problem, as opposed to the more macro-oriented model of
Borjas and Trejo (1993), and appropriately places the participation decision at the
household level, rather than at the individual level. Allowing the household to sepa-
rately choose welfare and social insurance participation within a single utility
maximizing framework represents a significant advance over previous theoretical
work in this area.
Furthermore, drawing from Moffitt (1981, 1983), the model incorporates wel-
fare stigma into the utility function and includes a parameter that allows stigma to
vary across immigrant and native groups. The foreign-born and native-born may
respond differently to the stigma of welfare participation, due to unobservable cul-
tural differences.
Moreover, the model developed here separates private transfer income from
other non-labor income, because households receiving such private transfers are
presumably less likely to participate in welfare and social insurance programs than
otherwise similar households not receiving private transfers. As with welfare stigma,
this response is expected to differ between natives and the foreign born. Several
papers (e.g., Cox and Jakubson, 1995; Schoeni, 1991) have examined the relation-
ship between private and public transfers. However, these papers are primarily
concerned with the crowding out effects of public transfers on private transfers.
The effect of private transfers on the propensity to participate in public transfer
programs is not examined, nor are differences in such relationships between immi-
grants and natives explored. Our model remedies these shortcomings.
Our model presented is based on a model developed by Moffitt (1983). However,
several modifications make it more amenable to foreign born-native born
comparisons of program participation. In Moffitt (1983), the unit of analysis is the
individual and the decision of interest is participation or non-participation in a
welfare program (namely, AFDC). Because the model presented in this paper is
applied to participation in both welfare and social insurance programs, it is more
appropriate that the household be the unit of analysis. Specifically, household utility
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is specified as a function of consumption by each member of the household, ci, and
labor supply of each member, hi, where I=1,...,n. The household head is assumed to
be the decision maker. The general form of this utility function is
(1) U u c c h h An n= −( ,..., , ,..., ) .1 1 2λφ
Each member’s consumption ci can be thought of as a vector of goods with
associated price vectors pi. Alternatively, each ci may be considered an individual
specific composite commodity with price pi. The utility function is assumed to
be concave.
A distinguishing feature of this utility function is the (-φA2 ) term representing
welfare stigma. A2 is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if the household partici-
pates in a welfare program and equal to 0 if the household does not participate. The
stigma parameterφ  indicates the reduction of utility due to participation in a wel-
fare program. Moffitt (1983) also includes such a term, defined as the flat compo-
nent of stigma. A variable component of stigma is included by Moffitt (1983) as
well, allowing stigma to change with the level of welfare benefits received. How-
ever, Moffitt finds this variable component to be insignificant; hence, it is not in-
cluded in the model developed here.
No stigma is associated with participation in a social insurance program. Par-
ticipation in such programs is in some sense a right (entitlement) people acquire as
a result of tax contributions throughout their working years, whereas welfare pro-
gram participation many times signifies the inability of a person or family to pro-
vide for themselves. The λ  parameter attached to (- λφA2 ) is an adjustment pa-
rameter allowing the effects of stigma from welfare participation to vary across
immigrant and native households. Here, λ  will be greater than, equal to, or less
than one depending upon whether immigrants attach more, the same, or less stigma,
respectively, to participation than natives. For native households, λ  is equal to
one.
The budget constraint facing the household simply equates expenditures on
consumption goods by each member of the household to full household income
(2) p c w h N X A T A Bi i i i
i
n
i
n
= + + + +
==
∑∑ 1 2
11
,
where wi is member I’s wage, N is total household non-labor income, and X is total
household private transfer income. Household income from social insurance pro-
grams is taken into account by the A1T term where A1 is a dichotomous variable
equal to 1 if the household receives social insurance benefits and equal to 0 if the
household does not receive such benefits. T is the household’s benefit from social
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insurance programs. Household welfare income enters the budget constraint as
A2B, where A2 is the dichotomous welfare participation variable and B is the
household’s welfare benefit.
As noted above, private transfer income is included in the model because house-
holds receiving private transfers presumably are less likely to participate in wel-
fare and perhaps social insurance programs. Total private transfers may be defined
as X = X1 + X2, where X1 denotes private transfers within the household and X2 is
private transfers from other households. A household’s participation in a welfare
or social insurance program may be influenced more by private transfers from
other households than by those within the household. Private transfers within the
household do not alter the total resources available to the household, but simply
redistribute these resources. Therefore, within-household private transfers should
have little effect, if any, on a household’s participation in welfare and social insur-
ance programs.
Given that welfare programs are means-tested, providing an income
guarantee G  and taxing earned income at rate t, an additional constraint, defining
the welfare program benefit level, must accompany the budget constraint
(3) B G t w hi i
i
n
= −
=
∑ .
1
The income guarantee, G , and the program tax rate, t, are expected to be impor-
tant variables for the empirical analysis because they can vary greatly by state for
welfare programs such as AFDC. For example, state AFDC benefit guarantee lev-
els for a family of two (one adult and one child) in 1989 ranged from a low of $88
per month in Alabama to a high of $752 per month in Alaska, with a mean of $313.
The nominal program tax rate is currently set by federal statute at 100%. In other
words, AFDC benefits are reduced by $1 for every $1 of earned income (beyond
some minimal excludable amount for work-related transportation expenses). How-
ever, the effective AFDC program tax rate is much lower and varies greatly by
state. Fraker, Moffitt, and Wolf (1985) estimate these effective tax rates over the
period 1967 to 1982. In 1979, for example, the effective AFDC tax rate ranged
from a low of 13% in Georgia, Mississippi, and South Carolina, to a high of 55%
in Illinois, with a mean of 29%. The effective tax rate is the more relevant measure
for the empirical analysis because it accounts for income and asset exclusions al-
lowed for under AFDC rules. However, measures of the effective tax rate for 1989
may not be available and may be difficult to estimate due to data limitations. This
issue is discussed further in the section titled “Data.”
The household’s problem is then to maximize (1) subject to (2) and (3). Given
that A1 and A2 are dichotomous variables (i.e., participate or do not participate), the
household can be thought of as first maximizing utility (1) by choosing ci and hi for
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all I=1,...,n holding A1 and A2 constant. A1 and A2 are then chosen to maximize
(indirect) utility through some combination of participation and non-participation.
Solution of the first-order conditions yields a consumption demand equation and a
labor supply equation for each household member I. These are standard Marshallian
demands with arguments including individual specific prices, (net) wages and family
income from sources other than labor:
(4a)
h h p p w A t w A t N X A T A G ii i n n= − − + + + ∀*( ,..., , ( ),..., ( ), )   ,1 1 2 2 1 21 1
and
(4b)
c c p p w A t w A t N X A T A G ii i n n= − − + + + ∀*( ,..., , ( ),..., ( ), )   .1 1 2 2 1 21 1
A feature of these demand equations is that the price and wage facing each indi-
vidual household member is an argument in member I’s consumption demand and
labor supply functions, which adds some notion of interdependence between house-
hold members in making consumption and labor supply decisions.
Substituting (4a) and (4b) into the utility function (1) produces the indirect
utility function, given A1 and A2
(5)
      = −u c c h h An n( ,..., , ,..., ) .* * * *1 1 2λφ
The stigma term (- λφA2 ), which is allowed to vary across immigrant and native
groups, is incorporated into the indirect utility function, although it does not ap-
pear in the demand equations (4a) and (4b). The object is now for the household
head to simultaneously determine social insurance participation (A1) and welfare
participation (A2) in order to “maximize” household indirect utility.
An important issue to be considered here is that of eligibility for the welfare
and social insurance programs under consideration. As discussed by Moffitt (1983),
eligibility for the means-tested welfare programs is included in the model by virtue
of the benefit level equation (3) and the welfare stigma term (- λφA2 ). Some house-
holds may not participate because income is too high to generate a positive benefit
level. Others may be eligible based on income, but may choose not to participate
due to the reduction of utility through welfare stigma. Eligibility for social insur-
ance programs is a bit more difficult to deal with. In the case of Social Security, for
V p p w A t w A t N X A T A G A An n( ,..., , ( ),..., ( ), ; , )1 1 2 2 1 2 1 21 1− − + + +
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example, quarters of covered employment and age are the primary determinants of
a household’s eligibility. Those households not meeting the minimum eligibility
requirements may be thought of as facing an additional constraint, eliminating the
choice of A1 = 1.
The household head maximizes indirect utility by choosing the combination
of A1 and A2 that yields the greatest indirect utility. More formally, two threshold
functions, A1
*
 and A2
*
, are created to represent the demand for participation in each
type of program:
(6a)
A V p p w A t w A t N X T A G An n1 1 1 2 2 2 21 1 1
* ( ,..., , ( ),..., ( ), ; , )= − − + + +
and
(6b) A V p p w t w t N X A T G An n2 1 1 1 11 1 1* ( ,..., , ( ),..., ( ), ; , )= − − + + +
          − + + +V p p w w N X A T An n( ,..., , ,..., , ; ).1 1 1 10
If the household head compares indirect utility with participation to indirect utility
without participation, the decision rule for each program becomes:
1 if A1
*
 > 0 (participate)
(7a) A1 =
0 if A1
*
 ≤ 0 (do not participate);
1 if A2
*
 > 0 (participate)
7b) A2 =
0 if A2
*
 ≤ 0 (do not participate).
The choice of participation or non-participation essentially comes down to the
question of whether the additional utility received from additional income given
participation outweighs the stigma associated with participation. If the utility gain
from participation is greater than the utility loss from stigma, then the household
participates. If not, it does not participate. The participation decision is a single
decision made by the household head on behalf of the entire household. This for-
mulation of the stigma term allows for differing participation behavior across im-
migrant and native households.
− − − + +V p p w A t w A t N X A G An n( ,..., , ( ),..., ( ), ; , );1 1 2 2 2 21 1 0
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Equations (4a), (4b), (7a), and (7b) can all be combined to form a system of
demand equations for estimation purposes.
Demand for social insurance program participation:
1 if A1
*
 > 0
A1 = where A1
*
 is given by (6a)
0 if A1
*
 ≤ 0
Demand for welfare program participation:
1 if A2
*
 > 0
(8) A2 = where A2
*
 is given by (6b)
0 if A2
*
 ≤ 0
Demand for consumption:
Labor supply:
The system (8) is used as the basis of the empirical model of the section titled “The
Model and Estimation Techniques.”
Data
The data set employed for the empirical analysis is the 5% sample of the
1990 Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS) of the United States Census (Bureau
of the Census, 1992a). This data set contains both household records and person
records for the individuals comprising each household. For the entire country,
several million observations are available on over 200 different variables. Of
particular interest for this study are the geographic identifier variables on the
household record and the relationship, place of birth, year of immigration, and
income variables on the person records. The geographic identifier variables are
important in that they allow identification of the state and the metropolitan
statistical area (MSA) in which each household resides. Thus, differences in
welfare eligibility rules and benefit payments across states can be taken into
account, as can differences in participation behavior in metropolitan and
nonmetropolitan areas.
c c p p w A t w A t N X A T A G ii i= − − + + + ∀*( ,..., , ( ),..., ( ), )   1 1 2 2 1 21 1Ι Ι
h h p p w A t w A t N X A T A G ii i= − − + + + ∀*( ,..., , ( ),..., ( ), )   .1 1 2 2 1 21 1Ι Ι
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The place of birth and year of immigration variables are clearly of central
importance to this study. The sample is designed to include foreign-born house-
holds from Mexico and native-born households of Mexican ancestry, as well as
various other native-born households. The year of entry variable allows for the
identification of eight different year of entry categories for the foreign-born popu-
lation. These categories are as follows: 1985-90, 1980-84, 1975-79, 1970-74, 1965-
69, 1960-64, 1950-59, and before 1950. Use of these year of entry variables is
important for several aspects of this study.
Most previous studies have counted as foreign born only those households
with a foreign-born head, ignoring the place of birth of the spouse. In this study,
we classify as foreign born all households in which either the head or the spouse (if
present) was born in another country. This classification method results in more
complete coverage of the foreign-born population.
Finally, the income variables are of great importance. For each individual,
eight sources of income are identified in the PUMS: wage and salary income; non-
farm self-employment income; farm self-employment income; interest, dividends,
and net rental income; social security income; public assistance income; retire-
ment income; and all other income. Each income measure refers to income of that
type received in 1989. Public assistance income is the key measure for this study.
As noted above, public assistance income includes income from both Aid to Fami-
lies with Dependent Children (AFDC) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI). A
household is classified as a public assistance program participant if it had positive
income from the public assistance programs. Because separate measures of AFDC
and SSI are not available, we distinguish the groups most likely to receive each by
age and other characteristics.
The analysis conducted in this study is a household-level analysis. Individual
income measures are combined to yield, at the household level, measures of earned
income, nonearned income, social security income, and public assistance income.
Several of the individual-level characteristics are preserved, however. Education
levels and head and spouse income measures are maintained at the person level for
use in estimated wage and hours worked equations.
With aggregation of individual characteristics to the household level, an issue
arises concerning which member’s characteristics to use for such household char-
acteristics as ancestry, place of birth, and year of entry. The procedure adopted
here is to use the characteristics of the head. For example, household ancestry for
native-born households is determined by the ancestry of the household head. The
foreign-born characteristics such as place of birth and year of entry are determined
by the relevant characteristics of the individual conferring foreign-born status on
the household. If the head is the foreign-born member, the household’s place of
birth and year of entry are those of the head. If the household head is native-born,
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but the spouse is foreign-born , then the spouse confers foreign-born status on the
household and the household’s place of birth and year of entry are those of the
spouse. Individual-level ancestry, place of birth, and year-of-entry variables also
are maintained for the head and the spouse. These are important variables for the
estimated wage and hours worked equations. No attempt is made to create a house-
hold education-level variable, because this and other characteristics like it are spe-
cific to individuals and are maintained as such in the data.
Households with no persons residing in them (presumably vacant households)
and households with negative values for any of the income measures are trimmed
from the sample, as are institutional units such as prisons, nursing homes, retire-
ment homes, and mental institutions. Households with either the head or the spouse
on active military duty also are deleted from the sample because active duty mili-
tary personnel participate in a different human capital accumulation process than
does the non-military population, and are therefore likely to behave differently
with respect to program participation. A variable does, however, identify military
veterans. This dummy variable is included as an independent variable in all esti-
mated equations to control for any potential behavioral and/or human capital dif-
ferences of those who have served in the military.
Another important data-related issue has to do with the use of sample weights.
Data from the 1980 PUMS are self-weighted, which implies that the sample was a
random sample of the entire population. However, the 1990 PUMS contains two
different types of weights, a household weight and a person weight. Each house-
hold is assigned a unique household weight and each person within each house-
hold is also assigned a unique person weight. According to the PUMS documenta-
tion, these weights are to be applied when analyzing the data so that estimates can
be taken to be nationally representative. In other words, the 1990 PUMS is not a
random sample. The weights are designed to correct for over-sampling of certain
groups and under-sampling of other groups.
If the analysis utilized only household records, the household weight would
be the appropriate choice. Likewise, the person weight would be appropriate if
only person records were being analyzed. However, this analysis makes use of
both household variables and person variables, some of which have been combined
to create household-level characteristics. Given this information, neither the person
weights nor the household weights are used in any part of the analysis. This is done
for two primary reasons. First, no aggregating is done beyond the household level,
so weighting does not seem appropriate. Second, and perhaps more important, the
sample properties upon which the household and person weights were derived are
in some sense destroyed in the process of eliminating households as described
above. Because, for example, individuals on active military duty were deleted,
person-weighted estimates will be no more “nationally representative” than the
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unweighted estimates. All regression results and descriptive statistics presented
below are based on the raw, unweighted data and therefore represent the actual
contents of the PUMS data set created and used here.6
Several variables necessary for the analysis are constructed from the raw Cen-
sus data, including years of education, potential labor market experience, the log
of head and spouse wages, and head and spouse hours worked. Each of these is
briefly discussed in the following paragraphs. For years of education, the 1990
PUMS provides a variable called YEARSCH which has 17 education categories
ranging from no completed years of school to doctorate degree. However, the cod-
ing of this variable does not allow it to be used as a continuous measure of educa-
tional attainment. We therefore assigned a number to each category to represent
the number of years of education necessary to reach that level. For example, the
category “Bachelor’s degree” was assigned 16 years of education. In this way, we
created a continuous educational attainment variable called EDUC that is used in
several of the estimated equations.7 The variable EDUC is then used to create a
measure of potential labor market experience, EXPER, as typically used in Mincer
earnings equations. EXPER is computed as age less education less six.8 The expe-
rience variable also is used in the estimated wage equations.
Head and spouse hours worked and the logarithm of head and spouse wages
also are created. Hours worked are defined as the product of number of weeks
worked in 1989 and average hours worked per week in 1989, which results in the
variables HHOURS for household heads and SHOURS for spouses. Although this
is a somewhat imperfect measure of hours worked, it is the best that is available in
the 1990 PUMS. The wage is created by dividing wage and salary income in 1989
by HHOURS for household heads and by SHOURS for spouses. The logarithm of
the wage is then taken to create head’s log wage, LHWAGE, and spouse’s log
wage, LSWAGE. Various descriptive statistics are reported in Appendix 2.
One final issue to discuss here is that of private transfer income. Private trans-
fer income is referred to in the section titled “Previous Findings” as an important
explanatory variable that has been excluded from all previous studies and is in-
cluded in the theoretical model of the section titled “Theoretical Model.” Due to
the limitations of the Census data, we are unable to compute a reasonable measure
for this variable. Therefore, household private transfer income is excluded from
the empirical work of this study.9
The Model and Estimation Techniques
The empirical model is derived based on the demand equations from the
theoretical model presented above. However, a number of changes were made due
to shortcomings of the data set. First, private transfers are not separated from
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nonearned income as is done in the theoretical model since no measure of private
transfers is available in the 1990 PUMS. Presumably, private transfers received
from other family members are included in the “All Other Income” component of
nonearned income.
Two other compromises from the theoretical equations are made for the pur-
pose of empirical tractability. Whereas the theoretical model calls for the estima-
tion of a labor supply equation and a consumption equation for each member of the
household, the empirical model estimates a labor supply equation only for the house-
hold head and spouse (if present) and a single household-level consumption equa-
tion. The closest measure of consumption available is gross rent (for renters) and
selected monthly owner costs (for owner-occupied homes, condominiums, and
mobile homes). These cover primarily rent, mortgage payments, utilities, and in-
surance (Bureau of the Census, 1992b). These measures are transformed into a
measure of annual spending for each household. Admittedly, several problems arise
in measuring consumption in this way, perhaps the most important of which is the
investment-like features of housing and housing services expenditures. Unfortu-
nately, it is the best measure available in the 1990 PUMS.
The empirical model consists of seven equations for each household: head
hours worked, spouse hours worked, head wage, spouse wage, social security
participation, public assistance participation, and household consumption. The
complete empirical model is as follows:
(9) hhours sspart pastpart shours= + + +β β β β0 1 2 3
+ + +β ψ ε4 1 1 1lhwage x
(10) shours sspart pastpart hhours= + + +γ γ γ γ0 1 2 3
+ + +γ ψ ε4 2 2 2lswage x
(11) lhwage hhours x hmills| ( )> = + + +0 0 3 3 1 3δ ψ δ ε
(12) lswage shours x smills| ( )> = + + +0 0 4 4 1 4η ψ η ε
(13) sspart lhwage lswage pastpart x= + + + + +θ θ θ θ ψ ε0 1 2 3 5 5 5
(14) pastpart lhwage lswage sspart x= + + + + +pi pi pi pi ψ ε0 1 2 3 6 6 6
(15) yspend lhwage lswage sspart= + + +µ µ µ µ0 1 2 3
+ + +µ ψ ε4 7 7 7pastpart x
1019
where the variables are defined in Appendix 1. The vectors x1  through x7  are vectors
of exogenous explanatory variables which may contain common elements. These
explanatory variables include household head characteristics, other household
characteristics, area characteristics, and foreign-born characteristics in order to ensure
the comparison of “otherwise similar households.”
The model is simultaneous due to the appearance of endogenous explanatory
variables in the labor supply, program participation, and consumption equations.
Given this simultaneity, the system must be identified so that meaningful estimates
of the coefficients may be obtained. In order to ensure identification, the rank and
order conditions are checked (Kmenta, 1986). The system passes both conditions
for identification and can therefore be estimated by any appropriate systems esti-
mation technique.
The estimation technique adopted here is a two-stage procedure. In the first
stage, reduced-form equations are estimated for all right-hand-side endogenous
variables (i.e., hhours, shours, sspart, and pastpart). These reduced-form equations
cannot be estimated by ordinary least squares due to the nature of the dependent
variables. Head and spouse hours, for example, are left censored at zero due to the
presence of non-working heads and spouses in the sample. Tobit is the appropriate
estimation method for the head and spouse hours worked equations. The program
participation variables, on the other hand, are dichotomous variables equal to one
if the household participates and zero otherwise. With this type of dependent vari-
able, probit is the appropriate estimation technique. The fitted values from these
reduced-form equations are retained and renamed by adding the extension “ht” to
the variable name.
As part of the first stage, the log-wage equations are estimated for the
subsamples of working heads and spouses. The estimated wage equations are run
separately for the household head and spouse (if present). Those who did not
work in 1989 are initially assigned a wage of zero. However, this cannot be used
as their wage in estimating equations (9) through (15) above. As described in the
labor supply literature, a wage of zero does not imply that the individual has no
market earnings. It means that the wage that individual could command in the
labor market, given his or her skills and ability, is less than that individual’s res-
ervation wage. This being the case, the individual chooses not to work. For pur-
poses of estimating the model above, a predicted wage must be derived for the
subsample of non-working heads and spouses based on his or her human capital
and socioeconomic characteristics.
The estimated wage equations take a standard form, including sex, potential
market experience and its square, education, work limitation status, ability to speak
English, and a vector of foreign-born status indicators as independent variables.10
The wage equation is run for the subsample of working heads or spouses, including
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the inverse Mill’s ratio as a correction for sample selection bias. The inverse Mill’s
ratio is derived from Tobit estimates of the parameters from the head (spouse)
hours worked equation. Inserting this inverse Mill’s ratio (sometimes called
Heckman’s lambda) into the estimated wage equation has become a standard method
of correcting for sample selection bias.11 The estimated parameters are applied to
the characteristics of the full sample of heads (spouses), both working and not
working, to arrive at a predicted or estimated wage for each head (spouse) in the
sample. When no spouse is present in the household, the spouse’s estimated wage
is set equal to zero. The variables LHWAGEHT and LSWAGEHT refer to predicted
head and spouse log wages, respectively.
The second stage involves estimating the structural equations of the model
(equations 9, 10, 13, 14, and 15) using the first stage fitted values in place of the
right-hand-side endogenous variables. The structural equations for head and spouse
hours are estimated by Tobit while those for social security and public assistance
participation are estimated by Probit. Household consumption is estimated by or-
dinary least squares (OLS).
A variable is included in the analysis to control for age at entry into the U.S.
This variable is constructed as current age less the midpoint of the year group in
which entry occurred. For natives, age at entry is set equal to zero. Friedberg (1993),
in the context of immigrant labor market assimilation, shows that age at arrival is
an important explanatory variable, though it has been excluded from nearly all
previous studies. She finds that immigrants arriving at older ages earn less at every
stage of assimilation than otherwise similar immigrants arriving at younger ages.
Furthermore, controlling for age at arrival reduces the rate at which immigrants
close the earnings gap with otherwise similar natives.
In the case of welfare participation, age at arrival may play a similarly im-
portant role. For example, foreign-born persons arriving while young may gain
greater knowledge of the U.S. welfare system and may therefore be more likely
participants than otherwise similar foreign-born persons arriving at older ages.
Furthermore, those arriving earlier in their lives may lose the feelings of stigma
attached to welfare participation in their home country as they grow up more like
Americans. If this is the case, welfare participation and age at arrival will be
negatively related. On the other hand, foreign-born persons arriving at younger
ages may have made greater earnings progress through the assimilation process
than otherwise similar foreign-born persons arriving later in life and may there-
fore be less likely to participate in welfare programs. These hypotheses are em-
pirically tested below.
Friedberg (1993) also points out an important identification issue when
including age at arrival as an explanatory variable. For the foreign born, current
age is equal to years since arrival plus age at entry. Including all three explanatory
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variables in the same equation leads to perfect colinearity and the parameters are
not identified. However, by including both foreign born and natives in the sample,
identification of these three parameters is possible because the relation “current
age equals years since arrival plus age at entry” does not hold for natives. Friedberg
(1993) correctly argues that if one imposes the restriction that the effects of current
age on participation are the same for the foreign born and natives, then the
parameters on current age, years since arrival, and age at entry can all be identified.
This identification method is employed here, although it imposes no true restriction
on the model since foreign-born and native households are to be pooled, and a
single coefficient is estimated for the current age variable, regardless of the
inclusion of the age at entry variable. A simple addition, including the age at
entry variable represents an important advance over previous studies of welfare
program participation by the foreign born.
Empirical Results
In the results reported below, several types of households are studied: (1) all
households; (2) all households, by age (49 or less, 50-64, 65 or over); (3) all
female-headed households; (4) all female-headed households, by age (29 or less,
30-49, 50-64, 65 and over); (5) single female-headed households; (6) single fe-
male-headed households, by age (29 or less, 30-49, 50-64, 65 and over); (7) male-
headed households; (8) male-headed households, by age (29 or less, 30-49, 50-
64, 65 and over). For all households, two sorts of models are reported. The first
is a “country model” that contains a dummy variable distinguishing household
heads (or spouses) born in Mexico. The second is a “country/entry cohort model”
that contains a set of dummy variables for Mexican-born household heads indi-
cating the period of their U.S. entry (1985-90, 1980-84, etc.). For other house-
hold types, only the country/entry cohort model is reported. The country/entry
cohort model provides more detail about the participation behavior of Mexican-
born households relative to native-born households. Moreover, four different control
groups of native-born households are used: (1) Mexican ancestry natives; (2) all
natives12; (3) black-headed natives; (4) white-headed natives. The various control
groups are used selectively.
The sample splits we have made are motivated by drastic differences in welfare
participation rates across the groups as presented in Table 2. For example, female-
headed households display participation rates that are more than double those for
male-headed households. This difference is even more pronounced for single female-
headed households. Although male-headed households tend to have relatively low
participation rates, these households are examined due to their large sample sizes
relative to female-headed households. Participation rates for the Mexican born and
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Table 2
1990 Welfare Participation Rates by Headship
Configuration, Foreign-born Status, and Age
Single
All Female- Female- All Male-
Headed Headed Headed All
Group Households Households Households Households
Mexican-Born 24.2% 28.0% 8.7% 11.8%
Households (15,445) (10,524) (62,126) (77,571)
29 and under 20.0% 25.5% 5.6%
(3,409) (1,574) (15,305)
30-49 22.5% 26.5% 6.7% 9.1%*
(7,092) (4,668) (32,988) (58,794)
50-64 22.5% 23.0% 12.2% 14.5%
(2,565) (2,059) (9,074) (11,639)
65 and over 37.0% 37.5% 26.1% 29.8%
(2,379) (2,223) (4,759) (7,138)
Mexican Ancestry 27.4% 29.5% 8.3% 14.2%
Native Households (20,739) (17,378) (46,244) (66,983)
29 and under 30.1% 33.6% 6.9%
(4,953) (3,727) (9,447)
30-49 23.6% 26.0% 5.8% 12.0%*
(8,795) (7,176) (23,353) (46,548)
50-64 23.9% 24.7% 10.4% 14.4%
(3,858) (3,472) (9,292) (13,150)
65 and over 38.1% 38.2% 20.6% 28.1%
(3,133) (3,003) (4,152) (7,285)
All Native 13.5% 14.3% 4.6% 7.4%
Households (130,135) (109,360) (275,788) (405,923)
29 and under 17.7% 19.8% 4.0%
(18,859) (13,913) (36,244)
30-49 13.0% 14.6% 3.3% 6.5%*
(43,237) (33,045) (124,225) (222,555)
50-64 13.2% 14.0% 5.0% 7.3%
(23,561) (20,081) (62,519) (86,080)
65 and over 12.3% 12.5% 7.5% 9.7%
(44,488) (42,321) (52,800) (97,288)
* Indicates that figures are for 49 and under age group.
Source: Authors’ computations from 1990 PUMS. Number of households in each group in
parentheses.
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for Mexican ancestry natives typically increase from the young to the old, suggesting
that SSI usage is quite high among these groups. This pattern is not as strong for
the group of all native households.
In the discussion below, we focus primarily on the dummy variable for Mexico
(country model) and the set of dummy variables indicating entry cohort (country/
entry cohort model). Other variables are discussed selectively. All Probit coeffi-
cients reported below have been transformed following Green (1997) so that they
may be interpreted as marginal effects.
All Households
Table 3 indicates that households headed by Mexican-born persons are only
slightly more likely to participate in welfare than otherwise comparable house-
holds headed by native-born persons of Mexican ancestry. Furthermore, they are
no more likely to participate than households headed by native-born persons in
general. However, they are more likely to participate than native white households,
but are less likely to participate than native black households.
Several variables in the models are included to control for eligibility to re-
ceive welfare. Among these are the number of household members 17 years old
or younger (SHHLE17), the number 65 years old or older (SHHGE65), and the
number disabled (SHHDISAB). Each of these variables has been interacted with
the MEXICO dummy variable. Relative to each control group, Mexican-born
households are more likely to receive welfare, presumably SSI, if they contain
persons 65 and over, but they are less likely to receive it (presumably AFDC) if
they contain persons 17 or younger. Moreover, they are less likely to receive welfare
if the household has a disabled person or persons in it.
The models also include three variables that reflect characteristics of the place
of residence: the state’s average monthly AFDC payment (AFDCAVG), the state’s
average SSI payment (SSIAVG), and residence in a metropolitan area (INMA).
Relative to all native households and to white-headed native households, Mexi-
can-born households are more likely to receive SSI in states that provide supple-
ments to this national program. Relative to native households of Mexican ancestry
and to white-headed native households, they are also more likely to receive AFDC
if they reside in states with relatively generous AFDC benefits.
The country/entry cohort models reported in Table 4 provide a more precise
depiction of welfare usage by Mexican-born households. Relative to each control
group, Mexican-born households are significantly less likely to participate in wel-
fare if they entered the United States more or less recently, which is to say between
1970 and 1990. Because persons are most likely to migrate during their child-
bearing years, this empirical result suggests that Mexican-born households are less
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Table 3
1990 Welfare Participation by All Households, Country Model:
Marginal Effects Based on Probit Estimates
Mexican
Ancestry All Black White
Variable Control Native Control Native Control Native Control
intercept -0.187*** -0.129*** -0.219*** -0.120***
lhwageht -0.047*** 0.006*** -0.027*** 0.003*
lswageht -0.002 0.029*** 0.027*** 0.024***
sspartht -0.019*** -0.015*** -0.024*** -0.011***
sothinc2 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
sextfam -0.001 0.003*** 0.001 0.000
mexico 0.006* 0.000 -0.015** 0.006***
entage -0.001*** 0.000 -0.001*** 0.000
hsex 0.052*** 0.033*** 0.060*** 0.027***
heduc -0.001*** -0.005*** -0.003*** -0.004***
hage 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.000***
hwrklim -0.046*** -0.032*** -0.055*** -0.027***
hwrkprev 0.021*** 0.008*** 0.022*** 0.008***
hunemply 0.118*** 0.074*** 0.143*** 0.061***
hwidowed -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.021*** -0.021***
spouse -0.037*** -0.059*** -0.100*** -0.044***
seduc -0.001** -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.003***
sage 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
sunemply 0.046*** 0.026*** 0.052*** 0.022***
engonly -0.007*** -0.006*** -0.008* -0.007***
shhle17 0.034*** 0.023*** 0.044*** 0.018***
shhge65 0.054*** 0.013*** 0.021*** 0.010***
shhdisab 0.082*** 0.058*** 0.096*** 0.051***
mex65 0.019*** 0.036*** 0.063*** 0.034***
mex17 -0.015*** -0.014*** -0.022*** -0.010***
mexdisab -0.007*** -0.006*** -0.007** -0.005***
mexwid 0.008 0.026*** 0.017*** 0.029***
afdcavg 0.000*** -0.000 0.000 0.000***
ssiavg -0.000 0.000*** -0.000 0.000***
inma -0.003 -0.011*** -0.012*** -0.014***
N 144,554 483,494 116,722 435,000
log L -42,722.554 -105,081.311 -38,157.308 -85,919.187
Note: *** indicates significance at the .01 level; ** indicates significance at the .05 level; and
* indicates significance at the .10 level.
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Table 4
1990 Welfare Participation by All Households, Country/Entry
Cohort Model: Marginal Effects Based on Probit Estimates
Mexican
Ancestry All Black White
Variable Control Native Control Native Control Native Control
intercept -0.160*** -0.124*** -0.196*** -0.115***
lhwageht -0.047*** 0.007*** -0.024*** 0.004**
lswageht 0.004 0.028*** 0.024** 0.025***
sspartht -0.012*** -0.015*** -0.017*** -0.010***
sothinc2 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
sextfam 0.000 0.004*** 0.002 0.001**
img8590 -0.040*** -0.024*** -0.064*** -0.016***
img8084 -0.023*** -0.017*** -0.047*** -0.010***
img7579 -0.020*** -0.019*** -0.046*** -0.012***
img7074 -0.008* -0.013*** -0.033*** -0.006***
img6569 0.002 -0.006** -0.021*** 0.000
img6064 0.020*** 0.007** -0.000 0.011***
img5059 0.019*** 0.009*** -0.001 0.012***
imgle49 -0.003 0.007*** -0.018*** 0.010***
entage -0.000 0.000*** 0.000** 0.000***
hsex 0.051*** 0.034*** 0.060*** 0.027***
heduc -0.001*** -0.005*** -0.003*** -0.004***
hage 0.000 -0.000*** -0.000* 0.000***
hwrklim -0.045*** -0.031*** -0.054*** -0.027***
hwrkprev 0.020*** 0.008*** 0.022*** 0.008***
hunemply 0.118*** 0.074*** 0.143*** 0.061***
hwidowed -0.016*** -0.018*** -0.013*** -0.019***
spouse -0.039*** -0.055*** -0.085*** -0.041***
seduc -0.001*** -0.003*** -0.001*** -0.003***
sage -0.001*** -0.000*** -0.001*** 0.000***
sunemply 0.046*** 0.026*** 0.052*** 0.023***
engonly -0.009*** -0.006*** -0.002 -0.008***
shhle17 0.033*** 0.022*** 0.042*** 0.017***
shhge65 0.056*** 0.015*** 0.029*** 0.012***
shhdisab 0.084*** 0.058*** 0.099*** 0.051***
mex65 0.012*** 0.027*** 0.051*** 0.026***
mex17 -0.014*** -0.012*** -0.020*** -0.008***
mexdisab -0.012*** -0.010*** -0.013*** -0.008***
mexwid 0.000 0.014*** -0.002 0.019***
afdcavg 0.000*** -0.000 0.000* 0.000***
ssiavg -0.000* 0.000*** -0.000 0.000***
inma -0.003 -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.014***
N 144,554 483,494 116,722 435,000
log L -42,659.366 -104,910.437 -38,097.006 -85,766.813
Note: *** indicates significance at the .01 level; ** indicates significance at the .05 level; and
* indicates significance at the .10 level.
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likely to participate in AFDC than the various native-born households, which is a
finding further supported by evidence reported below.
More distant Mexican-born cohorts are more likely to receive welfare than
most of their native-born counterparts, except blacks. For example, those who
migrated between 1950 and 1964 are significantly more likely to participate than
otherwise comparable native-born households of Mexican ancestry. Relative to
white-headed native households, the same is true for those who entered the United
States in 1964 or earlier. The participation of these very distant entry cohorts is
almost certainly in the SSI program.
Certain other results are also of some importance. For example, in both the
country model and the country/entry cohort model, and relative to all four native
control groups, household heads with higher education levels are significantly less
likely to participate. The same effect is evident for spouse education. Furthermore,
household heads who are widows or widowers are significantly less likely to par-
ticipate in all cases. Finally, households with an unemployed head or spouse are
significantly more likely to receive welfare payments.
For all households, Tables 5 and 6 distinguish three age groups (49 or less, 50-
64, 65 or over). The idea behind this distinction is to better identify those groups
that are most likely to participate in AFDC (49 or less) and those that are most
likely to participate in SSI (65 or over). The tables contain only the country/entry
cohort models, and they report findings for two control groups—Mexican ancestry
natives (Table 5) and all natives (Table 6).
For the group less than 50 years old, only the most recent entry cohort from
Mexico (entered 1985-90) is significantly less likely to participate in welfare than
native-born households of Mexican ancestry. Those who entered before 1970 are
more likely to participate. The results are similar when all natives form the control
group. Mexican-born households in this age class with persons 65 or over are less
likely to use welfare than Mexican ancestry natives but more likely to use it than
native whites. Relative to both control groups, Mexican-born households with per-
sons 17 or under and with disabled persons are less likely to participate.
For the group 50 to 64 years of age, no statistically significant differences are
evident for any entry cohort relative to Mexican ancestry natives. However, rela-
tive to all natives, more distant entry cohorts (especially those before 1970) are
more likely to participate. Results for the 65 or over age class are similar for recent
entry cohorts, except that the foreign-born group is marginally more likely to use
welfare than each control group. For more distant entry cohorts, the Mexican-born
group is no more likely to participate than all natives.
Where AFDC payments are relatively high, the youngest age group is more
likely to participate in welfare, and where SSI payments are generous the oldest
group is more likely to participate. This pattern is consistent with the eligibility
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Table 5
1990 Welfare Participation by All Households by Age Group Mexican
Ancestry Control: Marginal Effects Based on Probit Estimates
Variable 49 and under 50–64 65 and over
intercept -0.136*** -0.399*** -0.676***
lhwageht -0.040*** 0.076*** 0.119***
lswageht -0.054*** 0.016 0.186***
sspartht -0.052*** -0.021*** 0.070**
sothinc2 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
sextfam -0.002* -0.004 0.003
img8590 -0.019*** -0.019 0.035
img8084 -0.007 0.019 0.158**
img7579 -0.006 0.022 0.114**
img7074 0.003 0.010 0.100**
img6569 0.009** 0.021 0.079*
img6064 0.023*** 0.019 0.088**
img5059 0.020*** 0.014 0.033
imgle49 0.024** 0.020 -0.011
entage -0.000*** -0.000 -0.001
hsex 0.054*** 0.076*** 0.107***
heduc -0.001** -0.007*** -0.018***
hwrklim -0.037*** -0.039*** -0.115***
hwrkprev 0.022*** 0.055*** 0.068***
hunemply 0.103*** 0.092*** 0.138***
hwidowed 0.004 -0.025*** -0.036***
spouse 0.026** -0.070* -0.416***
seduc 0.002*** -0.003** -0.009***
sunemply 0.043*** 0.032*** 0.049***
engonly -0.004* -0.019** -0.010
shhle17 0.027*** 0.044*** 0.064***
shhge65 0.108*** 0.088*** 0.021
shhdisab 0.078*** 0.098*** 0.128***
mex65 -0.002*** 0.012 0.013
mex17 -0.010*** -0.020*** -0.027***
mexdisab -0.022*** -0.007 0.006
mexwid -0.008 0.017 -0.028
afdcavg 0.000*** 0.000* -0.000***
ssiavg -0.000*** -0.000 0.000***
inma 0.005** -0.023*** -0.070***
N 105,342 24,789 14,423
log L -26,542.232 -8,098.710 -7,443.915
Note: *** Indicates significance at the .01 level; ** Indicates significance at the .05 level; *
Indicates significance at the .10 level.
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Table 6
1990 Welfare Participation by All Households by Age Group, All
Native Control: Marginal Effects Based on Probit Estimates
Variable 49 and under 50–64 65 and over
intercept -0.085*** -0.108*** -0.254***
lhwageht -0.024*** -0.016 0.027***
lswageht -0.035*** 0.032*** 0.091***
sspartht -0.016*** -0.014*** 0.055***
sothinc2 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
sextfam 0.001** 0.004** 0.017***
img8590 0.004 0.002 0.003
img8084 0.002 0.022* 0.052*
img7579 0.003 0.021* 0.038*
img7074 0.008*** 0.017* 0.033*
img6569 0.012*** 0.021** 0.028
img6064 0.020*** 0.024*** 0.032*
img5059 0.019*** 0.022*** 0.014
imgle49 0.022*** 0.022*** -0.004
entage -0.000*** -0.001*** 0.000
hsex 0.030*** 0.010* 0.033***
heduc -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.010***
hwrklim -0.024*** -0.041*** -0.064***
hwrkprev 0.013*** 0.034*** 0.030***
hunemply 0.065*** 0.045*** 0.025***
hwidowed 0.006*** -0.008*** -0.036***
spouse 0.017*** -0.068*** -0.181***
seduc 0.002*** -0.003*** -0.005***
sunemply 0.024*** 0.012*** 0.009**
engonly -0.001 -0.003 -0.017***
shhle17 0.017*** 0.026*** 0.047***
shhge65 0.038*** 0.018*** 0.003
shhdisab 0.047*** 0.061*** 0.069***
mex65 0.009*** 0.029*** 0.007
mex17 -0.008*** -0.014*** -0.035***
mexdisab -0.017*** -0.008*** 0.004
mexwid -0.011** 0.002 0.012*
afdcavg 0.000*** 0.000* -0.000***
ssiavg -0.000 0.000** 0.000***
inma 0.004*** 0.001 -0.031***
N 281,349 97,719 104,426
log L -51,161.317 -20,633.389 -31,145.791
Note: *** indicates significance at the .01 level; ** indicates significance at the .05 level; and
* indicates significance at the .10 level.
1029
requirements for participation in each program. As for the results presented above
for all households, higher educational attainment by the household head reduces
the probability of participation for households in all three age groups. Head and
spouse unemployment status are positively related to participation in welfare
programs, and this result also is consistent across age groups.
Female-headed Households
The incidence of AFDC usage is far higher among female-headed households
than among male-headed households. This is clearly evident in Table 2, which
indicates that the 1990 welfare participation rate for native female-headed
households is 13.5%. That for native, single female-headed households is 14.3%,
and for native male-headed households is 4.6%. Comparable figures for Mexican-
born households are 24.2% (female-headed), 28.0% (single female-headed), and
8.7% (male-headed). For two control groups (Mexican ancestry natives and all
natives), Table 7 reports the welfare participation results for female-headed
households. Moreover, this table includes both the country model and the country/
entry cohort model.
Mexican-born, female-headed households are more likely to participate in
welfare than otherwise comparable Mexican ancestry natives, but the relationship
is only marginally significant. When Mexican-born households are compared to
all natives, no statistically significant differences are evident. The country/entry
cohort model suggests that these results are due to offsetting tendencies for recent
and more distant entry cohorts. Relative to each control group, more recent entry
cohorts are less likely to use welfare but more distant cohorts are more likely to use
it. These results provide further evidence that Mexican foreign-born households
tend to use less AFDC but more SSI than their comparison groups. Again, these
findings are reinforced by coefficients on the interaction terms that entail house-
hold members 65 or over (MEX65) and 17 or younger (MEX17). When more house-
hold members 65 and over are present, the Mexican-born households participate
more than the native control group. The opposite is true when more household
members 17 and under are present.
Specifically focusing on single, female-headed households narrows the
population of welfare users to the broad group with the highest incidence of usage
(Table 2). However, the empirical results for single, female-headed households
presented in Table 8 are almost identical to those for all female-headed households,
which suggests that the former group drives the results of the latter. The only
substantive difference is in the country/entry cohort model with all natives as
the control group. For all female-headed households, entry cohorts before 1960
participate significantly more than natives, but for single, female-headed
1030
Table 7
1990 Welfare Participation by Female-headed Households Born
in Mexico: Marginal Effects Based on Probit Estimates
Mexican
Mexican Ancestry All Native
Ancestry Control, All Native Control,
Control, Country/Entry Control, Country/Entry
Variable Country Model Cohort Model Country Model Cohort Model
intercept -0.108*** -0.127*** -0.151*** -0.148***
lhwageht -0.226*** -0.150*** 0.025*** 0.036***
lswageht -0.029 -0.094** 0.026** 0.012
sspartht -0.010 -0.002 -0.029*** -0.028***
sothinc2 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
sextfam -0.020*** -0.018*** 0.001 0.003**
mexico 0.020* – 0.007 –
img8590 – -0.116*** – -0.060***
img8084 – -0.065*** – -0.041***
img7579 – -0.052*** – -0.039***
img7074 – -0.015 – -0.016**
img6569 – 0.002 – -0.009
img6064 – 0.027* – 0.006
img5059 – 0.032** – 0.020***
imgle49 – 0.001 – 0.021***
entage -0.003*** -0.001** -0.001*** 0.000
heduc 0.005** 0.000 -0.012*** -0.013***
hage 0.001*** 0.000 -0.001*** -0.001***
hwrklim -0.062*** -0.054*** -0.048*** -0.046***
hwrkprev -0.006 0.005 0.021*** 0.020***
hunemply 0.278*** 0.279*** 0.152*** 0.152***
hwidowed -0.068*** -0.057*** -0.034*** -0.029***
spouse -0.050 0.068 -0.072*** -0.042***
seduc -0.002 -0.000 -0.003*** -0.002**
sage -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.002***
sunemply 0.142*** 0.139*** 0.079*** 0.078***
engonly -0.012 -0.020*** -0.009*** -0.010***
shhle17 0.079*** 0.076*** 0.051*** 0.050***
shhge65 0.125*** 0.122*** 0.034*** 0.035***
shhdisab 0.143*** 0.144*** 0.102*** 0.101***
mex65 0.016 0.009 0.035*** 0.027***
mex17 -0.032*** -0.027*** -0.033*** -0.026***
mexdisab -0.014* -0.024*** -0.017*** -0.025***
mexwid 0.045*** 0.018 0.044*** 0.015***
afdcavg 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000 0.000*
ssiavg -0.000*** -0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
inma 0.014 -0.002 -0.025*** -0.027***
N 36,184 36,184 145,580 145,580
log L -15,926.659 -15,903.916 -45,271.396 -45,187.061
Note: *** indicates significance at the .01 level; ** indicates significance at the .05 level; and
* indicates significance at the .10 level.
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Table 8
1990 Welfare Participation by Single Female-headed Households Born
in Mexico: Marginal Effects Based on Probit Estimates
Mexican
Mexican Ancestry All Native
Ancestry Control, All Native Control,
Control, Country/Entry Control, Country/Entry
Variable Country Model Cohort Model Country Model Cohort Model
intercept -0.030 0.022 -0.184*** -0.174***
lhwageht -0.403*** -0.381*** 0.035*** 0.039***
sspartht -0.015 -0.011 -0.034*** -0.033***
sothinc2 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
sextfam -0.022*** -0.019*** 0.003 0.005**
mexico 0.022 – 0.007 –
img8590 – -0.192*** – -0.083***
img8084 – -0.127*** – -0.067***
img7579 – -0.086*** – -0.056***
img7074 – -0.040** – -0.031***
img6569 – 0.008 – -0.018*
img6064 – 0.028 – -0.001
img5059 – 0.038** – 0.014
imgle49 – -0.004 – 0.016*
entage -0.004*** -0.001** -0.001*** 0.000
heduc 0.014*** 0.012*** -0.014*** -0.014***
hage 0.003*** 0.001** -0.001*** -0.001***
hwrklim -0.100*** -0.098*** -0.058*** -0.057***
hwrkprev -0.024 -0.021 0.021*** 0.021***
hunemply 0.329*** 0.329*** 0.176*** 0.176***
hwidowed -0.081*** -0.067*** -0.040*** -0.035***
engonly -0.003 -0.010 -0.007** -0.008***
shhle17 0.088*** 0.085*** 0.058*** 0.057***
shhge65 0.154*** 0.150*** 0.037*** 0.036***
shhdisab 0.164*** 0.168*** 0.115*** 0.116***
mex65 -0.002 -0.004 0.026*** 0.023**
mex17 -0.031*** -0.023*** -0.037*** -0.027***
mexdisab -0.023** -0.036*** -0.024*** -0.034***
mexwid 0.047*** 0.012 0.045*** 0.013*
afdcavg 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000 0.000
ssiavg -0.000 -0.000 0.000*** 0.000***
inma 0.065*** 0.059*** -0.027*** -0.029***
N 27,902 27,902 119,884 119,884
log L -12,881.819 -12,850.738 -38,199.308 -38,118.723
Note: *** indicates significance at the .01 level; ** indicates significance at the .05 level; and
* indicates significance at the .10 level.
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households this is not the case. The probable reason for this difference is that
cohorts that entered before 1960 are somewhat older, and older single-female
headed households are not likely to have young dependent children present as
required for AFDC eligibility.
Tables 9 and 10 provide age-specific welfare participation results for all
female-headed households where the respective control groups are Mexican
ancestry natives and all natives. Relative to both control groups, recent entry
cohorts (since 1975) of Mexican-born females less than 30 years of age are less
likely to participate in welfare (AFDC). Relative to all natives, those who entered
during the 1960s are more likely to participate. Moreover, those aged 30 to 49
who entered between 1950 and 1969 are more likely to participate than either
control group.
Other factors held constant, including entry cohort, age at entry makes a dif-
ference in welfare participation. Relative to each control group, Mexican-born fe-
males between the ages 30 and 64 are less likely to use welfare if they entered at an
older age. However, relative to all natives, those aged 65 and over who entered at
older ages are more likely to participate (almost certainly in SSI), suggesting that
SSI is being used in place of Social Security by the elderly foreign born who do not
qualify for the latter.
Previously, we observed that Mexican-born households are more likely to re-
ceive welfare if they contain persons 65 or over, but are less likely to receive it if
they have persons 17 or younger or who are disabled. Tables 9 and 10 provide
more details. If their households include persons 17 or younger, Mexican-born,
female-headed households under the age of 50 are less likely to use welfare than
otherwise comparable households of Mexican ancestry natives and of all natives.
If their households include persons 65 or older, they are less likely to participate
than otherwise comparable households of Mexican ancestry natives and no more
likely to participate than the households of all natives. The higher welfare usage of
the Mexican-born, female-headed households arises from the group aged 50-64,
and this finding holds for each control group.
The availability of AFDC plays an important role in the welfare usage of
Mexican-born females below 50 years of age. Moreover, state supplements to SSI
exert a significant influence on the welfare usage of those 65 and over.
The age-specific results for single, female-headed households show few
significant differences between the Mexican-born population and the native-
born control groups in terms of entry cohort (Tables 11 and 12). The only
noteworthy coefficients suggest that single, female-headed households from
Mexico under the age of 30 are less likely to participate in welfare than their
Mexican-ancestry native counterparts if they entered the United States between
1975 and 1990.
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Table 9
1990 Welfare Participation by Female-headed Households Born in
Mexico by Age Group, Mexican Ancestry Native Control:
Marginal Effects Based on Probit Estimates
Variable 29 and under 30-49 50-64 65 and over
intercept -0.153*** -0.243*** -0.317*** -0.623***
lhwageht -0.146*** -0.020 0.003 0.059
lswageht -0.189*** -0.079* -0.131** 0.013
sspartht -0.051 -0.069*** -0.024 0.027
sothinc2 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
sextfam -0.017*** -0.020*** -0.015 -0.008
img8590 -0.197*** 0.003 0.058 -0.289*
img8084 -0.108** 0.011 0.078 -0.139
img7579 -0.103*** 0.023 0.075 -0.113
img7074 -0.035 0.037 0.096 -0.103
img6569 0.026 0.039* 0.079 -0.075
img6064 0.057 0.074*** 0.063 -0.055
img5059 -0.082 0.044** 0.089** -0.069
imgle49 -0.879 0.027 0.055 -0.130*
entage 0.003 -0.002*** -0.004** 0.001
heduc 0.001 -0.004 -0.007** -0.021***
hwrklim -0.066* -0.019 -0.064** -0.113***
hwrkprev -0.023 0.006 0.111*** 0.080*
hunemply 0.280*** 0.269*** 0.162*** 0.240***
hwidowed -0.012 -0.017 -0.071*** -0.095***
spouse 0.157* -0.025 0.084 -0.122
seduc 0.002 0.000 0.007** -0.008
sunemply 0.161*** 0.125*** 0.093*** -0.015
engonly 0.013 -0.046*** -0.066*** -0.038
shhle17 0.091*** 0.065*** 0.077*** 0.069***
shhge65 0.202*** 0.218*** 0.096*** 0.050
shhdisab 0.171*** 0.139*** 0.155*** 0.152***
mex65 -0.136** -0.084*** 0.101*** 0.055
mex17 -0.037*** -0.020*** -0.028*** -0.063***
mexdisab -0.055** -0.033** -0.035** 0.021
mexwid 0.029 -0.005 0.061*** 0.010
afdcavg 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000 -0.001***
ssiavg -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000 0.000***
inma -0.006 -0.023* -0.015 -0.067***
N 8,362 15,887 6,423 5,512
log L -3,386.361 -6,266.820 -2,759.176 -3,199.684
Note: *** indicates significance at the .01 level; ** indicates significance at the .05 level; and
* indicates significance at the .10 level.
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Table 10
1990 Welfare Participation by Female-headed Households
Born in Mexico by Age Group, All Native Control:
Marginal Effects Based on Probit Estimates
Variable 29 and under 30-49 50-64 65 and over
intercept -0.142*** -0.044** -0.080** -0.233***
lhwageht -0.031** -0.133*** -0.095*** -0.018
lswageht -0.190*** -0.026* -0.021 0.092***
sspartht -0.012 -0.029*** -0.034*** 0.125***
sothinc2 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
sextfam -0.005 -0.001 0.008** 0.018
img8590 -0.099*** -0.023 0.015 -0.058
img8084 -0.049* -0.014 0.055 0.015
img7579 -0.045** 0.004 0.042 0.027
img7074 0.006 0.024* 0.059 -0.057
img6569 0.042** 0.027** 0.049 -0.038
img6064 0.041* 0.049*** 0.037 -0.030
img5059 0.002 0.043*** 0.057** -0.029
imgle49 -0.505 0.016 0.047** -0.057*
entage 0.002 -0.001** -0.002*** 0.002**
heduc -0.009*** 0.003* -0.002 -0.011***
hwrklim -0.031** -0.055*** -0.069*** -0.085***
hwrkprev 0.015 0.004 0.076*** 0.038***
hunemply 0.173*** 0.152*** 0.096*** 0.050***
hwidowed -0.089*** 0.016*** -0.022*** -0.056***
spouse 0.195*** -0.037 -0.060 -0.219***
seduc 0.008*** -0.001 0.003 -0.003
sunemply 0.087*** 0.082*** 0.033*** 0.001
engonly 0.001 -0.004 -0.007 -0.020***
shhle17 0.073*** 0.041*** 0.052*** 0.056***
shhge65 0.055* 0.065*** 0.036*** -0.003
shhdisab 0.095*** 0.090*** 0.103*** 0.104***
mex65 -0.026 -0.004 0.068*** 0.010
mex17 -0.041*** -0.018*** -0.029*** -0.061***
mexdisab -0.037*** -0.028*** -0.030*** -0.005
mexwid 0.096** -0.030*** 0.015 0.016
afdcavg 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000 -0.000***
ssiavg -0.000** -0.000 0.000 0.000***
inma -0.009 0.024*** 0.024*** -0.026***
N 22,268 50,319 26,126 46,867
log L -7,025.651 -14,233.100 -7,695.962 -15,469.302
Note: *** indicates significance at the .01 level; ** indicates significance at the .05 level; and
* indicates significance at the .10 level.
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Table 11
1990 Welfare Participation by Single Female-headed Households
Born in Mexico by Age Group, Mexican Ancestry Native Control:
Marginal Effects Based on Probit Estimates
Variable 29 and under 30-49 50-64 65 and over
intercept -0.129* -0.117 -0.179 -0.552***
lhwageht -0.253*** -0.171** -0.114 0.032
sspartht -0.021 -0.079** 0.003 -0.038
sothinc2 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
sextfam -0.010 -0.018*** -0.021*** -0.012
img8590 -0.295*** -0.110* -0.177 -0.416**
img8084 -0.197*** -0.087* -0.117 -0.282
img7579 -0.155*** -0.052 -0.104 -0.237
img7074 -0.069 -0.027 -0.042 -0.159
img6569 0.020 0.022 -0.053 -0.117
img6064 0.072 0.060** -0.053 -0.086
img5059 – 0.035 0.004 -0.098
imgle49 – 0.033 -0.007 -0.168**
entage 0.005 -0.001 -0.001 0.003
heduc 0.003 0.004 -0.002 -0.020***
hwrklim -0.173*** -0.052* -0.067** -0.145***
hwrkprev 0.020 -0.005 0.073 0.094**
hunemply 0.368*** 0.334*** 0.171*** 0.246***
hwidowed -0.083 -0.018 -0.086*** -0.090***
engonly 0.024 -0.038*** -0.064*** -0.027
shhle17 0.110*** 0.072*** 0.085*** 0.063***
shhge65 0.215*** 0.250*** 0.090*** 0.063
shhdisab 0.268*** 0.151*** 0.157*** 0.173***
mex65 -0.221** -0.104*** 0.109*** 0.063
mex17 -0.037*** -0.014*** -0.026*** -0.057***
mexdisab -0.102** -0.045** -0.052*** 0.020
mexwid 0.010 -0.023 0.061** 0.003
afdcavg 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.000 -0.001***
ssiavg -0.000 -0.000*** -0.000 0.000***
inma 0.019 0.012 0.014 -0.063***
N 5,301 11,844 5,531 5,226
log L -2,243.164 -4,921.863 -2,397.253 -3,038.578
Note: *** indicates significance at the .01 level; ** indicates significance at the .05 level; and
* indicates significance at the .10 level.
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Table 12
1990 Welfare Participation by Single Female-headed Households
Born in Mexico by Age Group, All Native Control
 Marginal Effects Based on Probit Estimates
Variable 29 and under 30-49 50-64 65 and over
intercept -0.170*** -0.056* -0.060 -0.244***
lhwageht 0.001 -0.165*** -0.126*** -0.023
sspartht -0.096** -0.044*** -0.037*** 0.139***
sothinc2 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
sextfam 0.000 -0.000 0.003 0.017***
img8590 -0.051 -0.087*** -0.165** -0.054
img8084 -0.038 -0.067** -0.096 0.024
img7579 -0.031 -0.038 -0.098 0.042
img7074 0.024 -0.011 -0.048 -0.075
img6569 0.040 0.022 -0.048 -0.046
img6064 0.011 0.041** -0.049 -0.037
img5059 – 0.041*** -0.005 -0.034
imgle49 – 0.033 -0.004 -0.066**
entage -0.001 -0.000 0.001 0.002**
heduc -0.015*** 0.004* 0.000 -0.010***
hwrklim -0.059*** -0.066*** -0.082*** -0.096***
hwrkprev 0.026 -0.009 0.079*** 0.040***
hunemply 0.214*** 0.195*** 0.110*** 0.052***
hwidowed -0.111*** 0.012* -0.026*** -0.058***
engonly 0.006 -0.003 0.000 -0.021***
shhle17 0.083*** 0.052*** 0.057*** 0.056***
shhge65 0.103*** 0.082*** 0.049*** -0.004
shhdisab 0.132*** 0.107*** 0.118*** 0.112***
mex65 -0.106* -0.012 0.061*** 0.011
mex17 -0.041*** -0.020*** -0.025*** -0.060***
mexdisab -0.052** -0.040*** -0.049*** -0.006
mexwid 0.062 -0.040*** 0.015 0.019*
afdcavg 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000* -0.000***
ssiavg -0.000* -0.000* 0.000 0.000***
inma -0.019*** 0.032*** 0.032*** -0.023***
N 15,487 37,713 22,140 44,544
log L -4,975.052 -11,118.921 -6,612.380 -14,724.546
Note: *** indicates significance at the .01 level; ** indicates significance at the .05 level; and
* indicates significance at the .10 level.
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Male-Headed Households
Male-headed households are the final group analyzed. Both the country and
country/entry cohort models are estimated using both Mexican ancestry native house-
holds and all native households as the control group. The country/entry cohort
model is then estimated by age group against both control group. The results gen-
erally indicate that the more recent Mexican-born, male-headed entry cohorts are
less likely to participate than either native control group (Table 13). The more
distant entry cohorts are more likely to participate than the control of male-headed
Mexican ancestry natives, but are not statistically different from the control of all
native male-headed households. Male-headed Mexican-born households with mem-
bers 17 years old and younger are less likely to participate than either native con-
trol group, whereas those with members 65 years old and older tend to be more
likely to participate.
The age-specific results presented in Table 14 (Mexican ancestry native con-
trol) and Table 15 (all native control) indicate that male-headed, Mexican-born
households in the older three age groups are somewhat more likely to participate in
welfare programs than otherwise comparable natives from each control group. For
example, all eight entry groups in the 30 to 49 year old group are significantly
more likely to participate than Mexican ancestry native households. Seven of the
eight in this age group are more likely to participate than households in the all
native control. Several of the entry cohorts in the 65 and over age group are signifi-
cantly more likely to participate than male-headed households in each control group.
Mexican-born, male-headed households with members 17 and younger are signifi-
cantly less likely to participate than otherwise comparable natives. This result is
consistent across both control groups and all age groups.
Summary and Conclusions
This paper presents an econometric analysis of participation in means-tested
programs by Mexican-born households in the United States. Household-level
records are created from the 1990 Public Use Microdata Sample of the U.S.
Census. Several control groups are explored, as are several subsamples of the
data, in order to provide a more complete analysis of welfare participation
differences between Mexican-born and native-born households. Two models are
run for most of the subsamples. The country model simply uses a dummy variable
to distinguish between Mexican-born and native households. The country/entry
cohort model is more detailed, replacing the country dummy with a series of
eight entry cohort dummies. Furthermore, the data are separated into age groups
for some of the subsamples in order to examine differences in participation
behavior between the young and the old. This allows us to examine those
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Table 13
1990 Welfare Participation by Male-headed Households Bor
 in Mexico: Marginal Effects Based on Probit Estimates
Mexican
Mexican Ancestry All Native
Ancestry Control, All Native Control,
Control, Country/Entry Control, Country/Entry
Variable Country Model Cohort Model Country Model Cohort Model
intercept -0.189*** -0.158*** -0.124*** -0.118***
lhwageht -0.023*** -0.032*** 0.002 0.002
lswageht 0.030*** 0.046*** 0.040*** 0.044***
sspartht -0.017*** -0.013*** -0.009*** -0.008***
sothinc2 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
sextfam 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.005***
mexico -0.002 – -0.005** –
img8590 – -0.025*** – -0.015***
img8084 – -0.017*** – -0.013***
img7579 – -0.018*** – -0.017***
img7074 – -0.011*** – -0.014***
img6569 – -0.004 – -0.008***
img6064 – 0.011** – 0.002
img5059 – 0.010** – 0.003
imgle49 – -0.006 – 0.002
entage -0.000 0.000** 0.000** 0.000***
heduc -0.001*** -0.001** -0.003*** -0.003***
hage 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000***
hwrklim -0.038*** -0.039*** -0.027*** -0.027***
hwrkprev 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.006*** 0.006***
hunemply 0.069*** 0.069*** 0.045*** 0.045***
hwidowed 0.017*** 0.019*** -0.005*** -0.004**
spouse -0.023* -0.040*** -0.021*** -0.023***
seduc -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.005***
sage -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***
sunemply 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.018*** 0.019***
engonly -0.006** -0.007*** -0.005*** -0.005***
shhle17 0.019*** 0.018*** 0.011*** 0.011***
shhge65 0.044*** 0.048*** 0.010*** 0.012***
shhdisab 0.067*** 0.069*** 0.045*** 0.046***
mex65 0.013*** 0.007 0.029*** 0.022***
mex17 -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.006*** -0.005***
mexdisab -0.006*** -0.010*** -0.002** -0.005***
mexwid 0.009 0.002 0.028*** 0.020***
afdcavg 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000
ssiavg 0.000 0.000 0.000*** 0.000***
inma -0.008*** -0.009*** -0.012*** -0.012***
N 108,370 108,370 337,914 337,914
log L -26,242.388 -26,194.498 -58,186.156 -58,084.246
Note: *** indicates significance at the .01 level; ** indicates significance at the .05 level; and
* indicates significance at the .10 level.
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Table 14
1990 Welfare Participation by Male-headed Households Born in
Mexico by Age Group, Mexican Ancestry Native Control:
Marginal Effects Based on Probit Estimates
Variable 29 and under 30-49 50-64 65 and over
intercept -0.027 -0.208*** -0.354*** -0.455***
lhwageht -0.076*** 0.030** 0.069** 0.038
lswageht 0.010 0.046*** 0.097*** 0.178***
sspartht -0.058*** -0.050*** -0.015** 0.027
sothinc2 -0.000 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
sextfam 0.002 0.003*** -0.001 0.008
img8590 -0.036** 0.033*** -0.018 0.051
img8084 -0.026** 0.029*** 0.021 0.117*
img7579 -0.013 0.013** 0.022 0.114**
img7074 -0.006 0.012** -0.001 0.121***
img6569 -0.007 0.010** 0.014 0.099**
img6064 0.018 0.015*** 0.013 0.100***
img5059 0.070* 0.009* 0.003 0.051*
imgle49 – 0.017* 0.018 0.015
entage 0.001 -0.001*** 0.000 -0.000
heduc 0.000 -0.003*** -0.006*** -0.011***
hwrklim -0.041*** -0.022*** -0.038*** -0.114***
hwrkprev 0.029** 0.036*** 0.027*** 0.060***
hunemply 0.047*** 0.057*** 0.074*** 0.107***
hwidowed 0.075** 0.037** -0.009 0.023
spouse -0.035** -0.082*** -0.160*** -0.355***
seduc 0.000 -0.003*** -0.006*** -0.009***
sunemply 0.038*** 0.028*** 0.025*** 0.045***
engonly -0.000 -0.011*** -0.010 0.001
shhle17 0.022**** 0.013*** 0.034*** 0.060***
shhge65 0.054*** 0.095*** 0.088*** 0.030**
shhdisab 0.079*** 0.063*** 0.086*** 0.118***
mex65 0.013 -0.029*** -0.016 -0.004
mex17 -0.008*** -0.004*** -0.017*** -0.020**
mexdisab -0.042*** -0.014*** 0.000 0.002
mexwid -0.086 -0.009 0.055** -0.013
afdcavg 0.000*** 0.000 0.000 -0.000**
ssiavg -0.000** -0.000 -0.000 0.000***
inma 0.005 -0.020*** -0.035*** -0.056***
N 24,752 56,341 18,366 8,911
log L -5,023.768 -11,229.854 -5,266.798 -4,193.281
Note: *** indicates significance at the .01 level; ** indicates significance at the .05 level; and
* indicates significance at the .10 level.
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Table 15
1990 Welfare Participation by Male-headed Households Bor
 in Mexico by Age Group, All Native Control:
Marginal Effects Based on Probit Estimates
Variable 29 and under 30-49 50-64 65 and over
intercept -0.054*** -0.080*** -0.093*** -0.225***
lhwageht -0.036*** -0.004 -0.010 0.029**
lswageht -0.011* -0.001 0.091*** 0.060***
sspartht -0.034*** -0.011*** -0.010*** 0.022
sothinc2 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
sextfam 0.002** 0.003*** 0.001 0.014***
img8590 -0.012 0.009* 0.009 0.005
img8084 -0.007 0.008** 0.024* 0.035
img7579 0.000 0.003 0.021** 0.038*
img7074 0.004 0.005* 0.010 0.045**
img6569 0.004 0.007** 0.015* 0.032*
img6064 0.020*** 0.011*** 0.018** 0.037**
img5059 0.056** 0.009*** 0.013** 0.017
imgle49 – 0.015*** 0.019*** 0.004
entage 0.000 -0.000*** -0.000** 0.000
heduc -0.001** -0.001*** -0.002** -0.006***
hwrklim -0.020*** -0.016*** -0.043*** -0.063***
hwrkprev 0.021*** 0.015*** 0.021*** 0.024***
hunemply 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.033*** 0.017***
hwidowed 0.020 0.024*** 0.002 -0.016***
spouse 0.003 -0.005 -0.117*** -0.100***
seduc 0.001 -0.001*** -0.008*** -0.005***
sunemply 0.024*** 0.015*** 0.010*** 0.006*
engonly 0.000 -0.002* -0.001 -0.012***
shhle17 0.017*** 0.007*** 0.018*** 0.039***
shhge65 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.013*** 0.004
shhdisab 0.049*** 0.036*** 0.056*** 0.055***
mex65 0.015 0.005 0.018*** 0.007
mex17 -0.009*** -0.002*** -0.009*** -0.023***
mexdisab -0.027*** -0.010*** -0.003 0.010***
mexwid -0.030 -0.009 0.022** 0.020*
afdcavg 0.000*** 0.000 0.000 -0.000***
ssiavg -0.000*** 0.000 0.000* 0.000***
inma 0.002 -0.003** -0.014*** -0.025***
N 51,549 15,7213 71,593 57,559
log L -7,917.711 -20,887.892 -12,670.314 -15,281.022
Note: *** indicates significance at the .01 level; ** indicates significance at the .05 level; and
* indicates significance at the .10 level.
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households more prone to AFDC usage separately from those households more
prone to SSI usage.
The empirical results of this study indicate that Mexican-born households are no
more likely to use welfare than either otherwise comparable native-born households
of Mexican ancestry or otherwise comparable native-born households in general.
However, they are more likely to participate than native whites, but less likely than
native blacks. Moreover, recent cohorts from Mexico are less likely to use welfare
than any control group, whereas more distant cohorts are more likely users.
Essentially the same basic results hold when households are partitioned into
those headed by females and those headed by males. The highest incidence of
welfare usage is among single female-headed households, but Mexican-born fe-
males in this group are significantly less likely to participate in welfare (AFDC) if
they entered the United States in recent cohorts. This finding holds relative to dif-
ferent control groups, and it holds as well for young female household heads (less
than 30 years old) born in Mexico.
The same general finding holds for male-headed households from Mexico, as
well as for young male-headed households from Mexico. Recent entry cohorts
participate less in welfare (AFDC) than otherwise comparable households both of
Mexican ancestry and of all natives. However, Mexican-born male-headed house-
holds 65 years old and over who entered the U.S. in more distant cohorts show
some tendency to use welfare (SSI) significantly more than otherwise comparable
native-born households of Mexican ancestry. Although a similar relationship holds
relative to all native households 65 and over, it is less strong.
Borjas and Trejo (1993) conclude that immigrants assimilate into welfare. Find-
ings of the present study do not directly address the assimilation issue because we
do not employ two Censuses to form synthetic cohorts that are followed through
time. However, the present results suggest some caution in drawing conclusions
regarding the assimilation of Mexican immigrants into welfare. When they are
young, recent entrants in the U.S., the Mexican-born population is less likely to
use welfare, which is almost certainly AFDC. When they grow older, or enter at
older ages, they are more likely to use SSI.
In studies of this type, in which the foreign born are analyzed relative to a
control group of native-born households, investigators may impute behavior to the
foreign born when the native-born control is in some sense more responsible for a
finding. The apparently higher use of SSI by the Mexican-born population is al-
most certainly due to their not qualifying for Social Security during their retire-
ment years. The control group of natives has Social Security income available to it,
which in turn lessens its reliance on SSI. Indeed, it is not clear whether the results
of the present study are due to the lesser use of SSI by older natives or the higher
use of SSI by older persons born in Mexico.
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Notes
1. Although several other public programs could be analyzed, such as public schooling,
and while one could also include Food Stamps and Unemployment Insurance in the welfare
program group and Medicaid in the social insurance group, the analysis here is limited to
the welfare programs AFDC and SSI and the social insurance program Social Security. This
restriction is a direct result of the data set used, the 1990 Public Use Microdata Sample of
the U.S. Census. See the section titled "Data" for more details.
2. Assimilation effects are only analyzed in Borjas and Trejo (1991).
3. Blau (1984) also analyzes the level of benefits received given participation. For male-
headed Hispanic households, she finds that the level of welfare benefits received is signifi-
cantly higher, and the level of social insurance benefits received is not significantly different,
than that of male-headed non-Hispanic households. For female-headed Hispanic households,
the level of welfare benefits received is significantly higher, and the level of social insurance
benefits received is significantly lower, than for female-headed non-Hispanic households.
4. The adjusted rates are predicted from OLS welfare participation regressions in which
age, education, marital status, year of immigration, and English language proficiency of the
head, as well as the number of disabled household members, the age composition of the
household, and household size are included as independent variables.
5. Tienda and Jensen (1986) and Jensen (1988) also examine welfare participation for
Asian, black, and white immigrant and native households. These results are not discussed
here.
6. To test the validity of our choice not to use the sample weights, some regressions
have been run both with and without the sample weights. The results from the weighted and
unweighted regressions are essentially the same.
7. The EDUC variable actually appears as HEDUC, for head’s education, and SEDUC,
for spouse’s education, in the empirical work.
8. As with the educational attainment variable, in the empirical work below, EXPER
appears as HEXPER, for head’s experience, and SEXPER, for spouse’s experience.
9. Since no explicit measure of private transfer income is available in the 1990 PUMS,
we consider the 1990 Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) in an effort to
impute private transfer income into the 1990 PUMS. The SIPP is the only data set available
that identifies private transfer income and provides detailed variables on foreign-born sta-
tus. The core records from the 1990 SIPP are combined with the migration history variables
from the 1990 Wave 2 Topical Module. Records are excluded and variables are created to as
closely as possible match the format of the 1990 PUMS data set created earlier. The primary
variable of interest in the 1990 SIPP is “money received from family or friends.” This source
of income can be identified by households as one of ten income sources from a list of 36
possible sources. If so identified, the dollar amount received in each month of the panel is
also reported. These monthly amounts are converted to annual amounts to match the private
transfer income definition that is needed in the 1990 PUMS. Descriptive statistics indicate
that 404 of the 8663 households analyzed, or 4.7%, report receiving private transfers. Mean
private transfer income among these 404 households is $2,177.77 with a standard deviation
of $4,034.65 and a range from $3.75 to $30,375.00. By way of comparison, mean household
earned income for this same group is $26,538.57.
Following Cox and Jakubson (1995), Cox and Rank (1992), and Cox (1987), a model
is developed to explain private transfer receipt and the level of private transfers received.
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The following independent variables are included in the model: age of the household head,
age squared, education level of the household head, age interacted with education, sex of
the household head, a dummy variable indicating the presence of a married spouse, house-
hold earned income, dummy variables for the race of the household head (Black, Asian, and
Hispanic), a foreign-born dummy variable, and a dummy variable indicating the presence of
foreign-born household members other than the head.
The model is estimated by each of two methods. First, a tobit model is fit to explain the
amount of private transfers received by all households. The tobit model is appropriate here
because it accounts for left censoring of private transfer income at zero dollars. Second, a
two-stage model is estimated in which the first stage consists of a probit explaining receipt
or non-receipt of private transfers. From this probit, the Mill’s ratio is computed. The sec-
ond stage then involves fitting a least squares equation to the level of private transfers re-
ceived, with the sample restricted to only those households with positive private transfer
income. The Mill’s ratio is included as an independent variable in this regression to correct
for sample selection bias.
Although both models produce generally significant coefficients of the expected signs,
imputing private transfers into the 1990 PUMS based on these estimated coefficients pro-
duced negative values for all households. Given this result, private transfer income is not
added to the 1990 PUMS data set, nor is it included in the empirical model reported below.
However, the estimated coefficients on the foreign-born dummy variables are large, posi-
tive, and highly statistically significant. In fact, the foreign-born coefficient from the tobit
model indicates that foreign born households receive nearly $1,800 more per year in private
transfers than do otherwise similar native-born households. Notwithstanding these findings,
private transfer income may be captured in the 1990 PUMS as part of the “all other income”
measure included in non-labor income. However, even if this is the case, the effects of
private transfer income on welfare participation cannot be separately examined.
10. Killingsworth (1983) discussed wage equations in the labor supply context. Friedberg
(1993) analyzes wage and earnings equations including foreign-born characteristics.
11. Killingsworth (1983), Heckman (1979), and Maddala (1983), among others, pro-
vide very detailed discussions of this procedure.
12. The all native control represents a 10% random sample of all native-born house-
holds in the 1990 PUMS.
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Appendix 1
Variable Definitions
Variable Name Variable Definition
Household Characteristics
PASTPART Public assistance participation dummy (equal to 1 if household
participates)
SSPART Social security participation dummy (equal to 1 if household
participates)
SOTHINC2 Sum of household’s dividend, interest, and net rental income,
retirement income, and all other income
SEXTFAM Number of extended family members living in the household
SPOUSE Equal to 1 if a married spouse or unmarried partner is present
ENGONLY Equal to 1 if English is the only language spoken in the household
SHHLE17 Number of household members less than or equal to 17 years old
SHHGE65 Number of household members greater than or equal to 65
years old
SHHDISAB Number of household members who are disabled
INMA Equal to 1 if household is located in a metropolitan area
Head Characteristics
LHWAGE Head’s log-wage
HSEX Sex of household head (equal to zero if male, 1 if female)
HAGE Age of household head
HEDUC Head’s years of completed education
HUNEMPLY Equal to 1 if head is unemployed or not in the labor force
HWRKLIM Equal to 1 if head has work limiting disability
HWIDOWED Equal to 1 if head is a widow or widower
Spouse Characteristics
LSWAGE Spouse’s log-wage
SAGE Age of spouse
SEDUC Spouse’s years of completed education
SUNEMPLY Equal to 1 if spouse is unemployed or not in the labor force
SWRKLIM Equal to 1 if spouse has work limiting disability
SWRKPREV Equal to 1 if spouse has work preventing disability
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Appendix 1 (Continued)
Variable Name Variable Definition
Foreign Born Characteristics
MEXICO Equal to 1 if household is of Mexican birth
MEX65 MEXICO interacted with SHHGE65
MEX17 MEXICO interacted with SHHLE17
MEXDISAB MEXICO interacted with SHHDISAB
MEXWID MEXICO interacted with HWIDOWED
MEXENG MEXICO interacted with ENGONLY
MEXAFDC MEXICO interacted with AFDCAVG
MEXSSI MEXICO interacted with SSIAVG
ENTAGE “Household’s” age at entry into the U.S.
IMG8590 Equal to 1 if household immigrated between 1985 and 1990
IMG8084 Equal to 1 if household immigrated between 1980 and 1984
IMG7579 Equal to 1 if household immigrated between 1975 and 1979
IMG7074 Equal to 1 if household immigrated between 1970 and 1974
IMG6569 Equal to 1 if household immigrated between 1965 and 1969
IMG6064 Equal to 1 if household immigrated between 1960 and 1964
IMG5059 Equal to 1 if household immigrated between 1950 and 1959
IMGLE49 Equal to 1 if household immigrated before 1949
Area Characteristics
AFDCAVG State’s average monthly AFDC payment
SSIAVG State’s average SSI payment
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Appendix 2
Descriptive Statistics
Mexican
Ancestry
Variable All All Natives Natives Mexican-Born
n 483,494 405,923 66,983 77,571
hsex 0.30 0.32 0.31 0.20
hage 48.00 49.34 42.74 40.97
(17.45) (17.57) (15.19) (14.97)
hwrklim 0.15 0.16 0.13 0.09
hwrkprev 0.10 0.11 0.08 0.06
lhwage 1.74 1.75 1.76 1.66
(1.24) (1.27) (1.13) (1.03)
heduc 11.79 12.51 10.98 8.03
(3.80) (3.13) (3.75) (4.65)
hunemply 0.33 0.34 0.28 0.25
spouse 0.62 0.60 0.61 0.75
sage 27.29 27.13 24.24 28.15
(24.36) (25.16) (22.08) (19.64)
lswage 0.79 0.81 0.80 0.73
(1.10) (1.12) (1.08) (0.99)
seduc 7.36 7.57 6.85 6.25
(6.32) (6.49) (6.03) (5.20)
sunemply 0.28 0.26 0.26 0.43
mexico 0.16 – – 1.00
img8590 0.02 – – 0.12
img8084 0.03 – – 0.17
img7579 0.03 – – 0.19
img7074 0.03 – – 0.17
img6569 0.02 – – 0.10
img6064 0.01 – – 0.07
img5059 0.02 – – 0.09
imgle49 0.01 – – 0.08
entage 3.68 – – 22.62
(9.44) (10.98)
sothinc2 3,928.40 4,470.49 1,633.42 1,091.64
(9971.79) (10634.07) (5171.11) (4294.14)
sextfam 0.12 0.06 0.14 0.40
(0.46) (0.29) (0.46) (0.89)
shhdisab 0.25 0.26 0.23 0.19
(0.53) (0.53) (0.52) (0.49)
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Appendix 2 (Continued)
Mexican
Ancestry
Variable All All Natives Natives Mexican-Born
shhle17 0.81 0.64 1.13 1.70
(1.21) (1.04) (1.32) (1.59)
shhge65 0.10 0.11 0.06 0.07
(0.32) (0.32) (0.26) (0.27)
sspart 0.26 0.29 0.17 0.13
pastpart 0.08 0.07 0.14 0.12
engonly 0.78 0.92 0.26 0.03
inma 0.66 0.63 0.78 0.86
afdcavg 365.67 352.50 359.93 434.58
(156.66) (142.62) (199.68) (202.19)
ssiavg 3,060.62 2,951.54 3,236.93 3,631.40
(785.46) (666.87) (1026.95) (1063.11)
Note: For dichotomous variables, the figures presented are sample proportions. For continuous
variables, the figures presented are sample means. Standard deviation appears in parentheses.
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IMPACTS OF MIGRATION
Labor Market Implications of Scale,
Innovation, and Entrepreneurship
Michael J. Rosenfeld & Marta Tienda*
This paper addresses what is known about the impacts of immigrants onthe U.S. economy, with special focus on Mexican immigrants. Tostimulate critical thinking about whether Mexican migration warrants
special policy consideration, it is necessary to first identify what is unique or
distinctive about U.S.-bound Mexican migration. This a fair question because
historically U.S. immigration policy has considered national origins in setting
admission guidelines. Sometimes administrative policies for immigrants from
different countries have been used to reinforce controversial international
policies, as in the case of immigrants and asylum seekers from Central America
during the 1980s, when refugees from El Salvador and Guatemala were
systematically turned away, while refugees from Nicaragua were welcomed (see
Teitelbaum and Weiner, 1995). The different treatment of unauthorized migrants
from Haiti and Cuba during the 1990s offer another stark example of the
intersection of foreign policy and immigration policy.
Our discussion of U.S. immigration begins by recognizing that migrant
characteristics differ according to source regions and countries, and that these
characteristics directly influence migrants’ integration prospects and labor market
1050
impacts in the host society. Most studies about migration make the simplifying
assumption that the U.S. is a single, or perhaps divided (high wage and low wage)
labor market. Frequently ignored are the reception factors, especially community-
level circumstances, that facilitate the integration of new arrivals and organize
links between immigrant enterprises and the mainstream economy. Most Mexican
immigrants come not to an alien anglo environment, but rather to Mexican American
communities within the United States where Spanish is spoken and where the
customs and consumer tastes of the neighbors are well understood. This is relevant
for understanding the labor market impacts of Mexican along with several additional
factors that distinguish Mexican migrants from those who come to the U.S. from
other source countries.
Size of the flow. Among the 18 million foreign born people living in the U.S. in
1990, more than 4 million, or 24% came from Mexico (see Table 1). Mexico con-
tributes a larger share to the foreign born population of the U.S. than any other
country, and roughly as much as the entire continents of Asia and Europe.
Duration of the flow. In the decade 1911-1920, 219,000 Mexicans legally im-
migrated to the U.S (Bean and Tienda, 1987). In the 1920s, this flow more than
doubled. The 1930s and 1940s were slow times for all kinds of international mi-
gration except for war refugees. Migration from Mexico picked up again in the
1950s (299,000), and the flow has steadily increased to more than a million legal
Mexican immigrants in the 1980s. The Mexican share of legal migration is lower
than the Mexican proportion of foreign-born in the U.S. because the foreign born
population also includes undocumented (i.e., illegal) immigrants.
Residential Concentration and “Sister” Communities. For historical reasons,
the Mexican origin population is residentially concentrated in the five Southwest-
ern states and Illinois. Within these locations, Mexican immigrants tend to reside
in the largest metropolitan areas. Moreover, there are sizable established Mexican
American communities in cities such as Los Angeles, Chicago, San Antonio and
Houston. In 1990 there are just under 9 million U.S. natives of Mexican descent
(see Table 1).
Motives for Migration. The Mexican immigrant flow includes negligible num-
bers of refugees or political asylum seekers. Virtually all Mexican immigrants seek
better economic opportunities in the United States. However, social and familial
ties to established Mexican American communities in the U.S. also draw immi-
grants across the U.S.-Mexico border.
Undocumented Immigration: Mexicans represent the bulk of undocumented
migrant flows. Data on undocumented migrants is necessarily sketchy. However,
studies of legalization authorized by the Immigration Reform and Control Act
(IRCA) of 1986 indicate that 70% of those who were legalized under the amnesty
program were of Mexican origin (see Tienda, et al., 1991; Singer, 1994).
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Educational Attainment. The Mexican immigrant population comes to the
U.S. with low levels of formal education. Male Mexican immigrants average nine
years of education (see Table 2), which is substantially less than most other na-
tive and immigrant groups, who average a high school education. Because Mexico
has been the single largest source of migrants to the U.S. for 30 years, and be-
cause migrants from Mexico have low levels of formal education, there has been
much concern in recent years about declining skills of recent immigrants, and
Mexican streams in particular.
Low Wage Workers. As a corollary to the low educational attainment of Mexi-
can immigrants, Table 2 shows that male Mexican immigrant workers (excluding
farm workers) averaged an hourly wage rate of only $8 in 1993, which is consider-
ably lower than most other native and immigrant groups. The annual average wage
and salary income of male Mexican immigrant workers hovered around $15,000 in
1993, almost 50% below that earned by non Hispanic white immigrants and 24%
below that earned by U.S.-born Mexicans.
Labor Force Participation. Adult male immigrants from Mexico participate
in the labor force at a rate of about 80% (see Table 2), which is higher than the
average rate of both native and immigrant men of comparable ages. One reason for
Mexican immigrants’ higher labor force participation than other immigrants is age
structure. Mexican immigrants are relatively young: only 1.4% of all Mexican
immigrant male adults are retired, as compared with 7.8% for all immigrant male
adults, and 12.9% for all native born adult males. Mexican immigrants may also
work more in their older years or perhaps may not live long enough to enjoy a
lengthy retirement (or may retire back to Mexico); the sample size of the Current
Population Survey (on which Table 2 is based) is not large enough to allow for
deeper study of this question.
All of these features of U.S.-bound Mexican migration—its volume; history;
socioeconomic and demographic composition—would appear both to justify and
warrant bilateral policy considerations. This is all the more so because the 2,000
mile shared border facilitates unregulated entry and poses special challenges for
both the Mexican and U.S. governments. Because Mexican immigration does not
include many refugees (whose entry into the U.S. satisfies humanitarian or global
political criteria), it is reasonable, as a first step, to address the policy issues of
Mexican immigration as a simple cost and benefit problem for the U.S. economy:
if Mexican migrants are beneficial for the U.S. economy, then less restrictive im-
migration policies would be appropriate. If Mexican immigration is harmful to the
U.S. economy, then restrictive policies are justified.
Before turning to a discussion of the different ways that international migration,
and Mexican immigration in particular, may effect the U.S. economy, we offer two
comments. Our reading of the recent literature about the economic impacts of
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immigration, and our own research (including a survey of households and businesses
in the mostly Mexican Chicago neighborhood called Little Village) leads us to
believe that immigrants in general, and Mexican immigrants in particular are
probably beneficial to the U.S. economy. We will endeavor to justify this assertion
in the remainder of this paper.
The second comment relates to the efficacy of restrictive policies toward
Mexican immigration. Rather than discuss specific policies in this paper, we
simply note that the duration of U.S.-bound Mexican migration and the resultant
size and vibrancy of the established Mexican American communities in the U.S.
makes control very difficult because migrants can tap into social and familial
contacts in the established Mexican American communities (which lowers the
cost of migration). Massey, Donato and Liang (1990) have expressed informed
skepticism about the deterrent effects of IRCA. Massey’s work on immigration
has emphasized the strength of social and familial ties as factors that draw Mexican
immigrants to the U.S., and the impotence of governmental policies that attempt
to restrict immigration after sister communities are established in the United States.
Zolberg (1995) has called attention to the perverse effects and unintended
consequences of U.S. immigration policies. We raise this point simply as a
cautionary note for policy discussions; the complexity of the real world is
humbling for those of us who work on policy issues, particularly when framed
in narrowly economic terms.
The Economic Impacts of Immigration
Academic studies about the economic impacts of immigration are concerned
with various different types of impacts. Accordingly, we adopt Greenwood’s (1994)
language in which he refers to separate and distinct channels of influence through
which immigration impacts the economy of the host society. In this paper we discuss
a few these channels of influence, paying special attention to labor market impacts.
We will treat only briefly the most commonly studied channel of influence, that is,
the direct effect of immigrants on the wages of natives. One common view of
immigration sometimes found in the mass media is that immigrants take jobs away
from native workers, or exert a downward force on wages by accepting lower wages
than comparably skilled native workers. Immigrants, however, also create jobs by
their own demand for goods and services, and immigrant workers can be
complements as well as substitutes for native workers. The net effects of immigrants
on the wages of natives is therefore difficult to measure, although many have tried.
The second most frequently studied channel of influence focuses on the direct
fiscal impact of immigrants, and we will again be brief with this topic. Fiscal impacts
concern the current account balance between what immigrants pay in taxes and
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fees with what they consume in tax-supported amenities and services. Mexican
immigrants earn low wages, and therefore pay lower than average income tax.
Mexicans also have larger than average family size, so they may consume more in
public education services than they pay in local taxes. The issue is complicated, as
we note below, by the fact that Mexican (and other) immigrants pay their share of
Social Security taxes, a regressive tax, and many immigrants are ineligible for
Social Security benefits. We will take up the issue of fiscal channel of influence
with a brief literature review below.
Instead of focusing on the labor market channel of influence, or the fiscal chan-
nel of influence, both of which have been extensively analyzed, albeit inconclusively,
we focus instead on the channels of influence that derive from economies of scale,
and the special contributions that immigrants may make through their inventiveness,
motivation, and self-selection for willingness to work hard in order to improve their
lot in life. The former consideration is important for Mexican immigration because
of the sheer volume of the flow, while the later is relevant because the low educational
attainment of Mexicans relative to other immigrants and U.S. natives leads to the
partly inaccurate inference that Mexican immigrants are unlikely to be entrepreneur-
ial. To make our case on these two points, we draw on a recent survey of entrepreneur-
ship in the Mexican neighborhood of Little Village, Chicago.
The Labor Market “Channel of Influence”:
A Brief Comment
Borjas and Tienda (1987) summarize many of the empirical studies of wage
and labor market impacts of immigration, with the general finding that immigrants’
impact on the wages of natives are barely significant, while impacts on the wages
of earlier cohorts of immigrants are discernible, albeit small. Greenwood and
McDowell (1993) also provide an extensive survey of this literature, therefore we
provide only a few comments. The first point is that, as Borjas (1994) notes, there
are some methodological and empirical shortcomings of this line of work. Most of
the labor market studies use the number of immigrants in a city as a measure of the
immigrants’ influence in a particular labor market. One problem is that natives
may migrate internally in response to immigration (for instance, to avoid immi-
grants) so that the correlation of immigrant presence with low native wages may
simply represent the effect of selective internal migration by natives.
A second problem has been highlighted by Card’s (1990) empirical study of
the massive and sudden wave of Cuban migration to Miami in 1980, known as the
Mariel boat lift. Card has shown that this sudden wave of mostly low skilled
migrants, which in the course of 6 months increased Miami’s work force by 7%
(60,000 people), had no perceptible impact on Miami’s labor market for either
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natives or for previous Cuban migrants. This surprising result implies that the
economic impacts of migrants are not so easily isolated to their city of entry or
residence as has been previously assumed. Considering that the Mariel boat lift
corresponded to a wave of migration that was a full order of magnitude larger
(relative to the work force of Miami) than most of the empirical studies are able
to contemplate, and that no impacts were found, Card’s study raises fundamental
questions about the efficacy of the econometric literature on labor market impacts
of migration.
The Fiscal Channel of Influence
Empirical studies about fiscal channels of influence has been weighted down
by studies that examine only part of the fiscal picture (i.e., welfare) and studies
that examine only local impacts. Simon (1984, 1989, and 1996) has presented a
series of analyses based on the most comprehensive data source available, the 1976
Study of Income and Expenditures. He showed that immigrants are net fiscal con-
tributors to the U.S. economy mainly because they contribute to, but do not receive
benefits from the Social Security program. This is because immigrants have a high
worker to dependent ratio, and because immigrants of retirement age are generally
not eligible for benefits. Social Security is a federal program, and Simon points
out, as do Greenwood and McDowell (1993), that much of the fiscal burden of
immigration is felt by states and localities.
The peculiarities of the distribution of the fiscal effects of immigration im-
plies that local and state governments probably are burdened by immigration, but
that this burden is more than balanced by immigrants’ support of Social Security.
The fiscal burden felt by states and localities in regard to immigration is, there-
fore, not a real “cost” of immigration, but rather a problem in the fiscal balance
between the federal government and the states, and more specifically between the
states with few immigrants (whose retirees are partly subsidized by immigrants)
and the immigrant receiving states. Precisely because they ignore federal pro-
grams like Social Security, studies that focus on local fiscal impacts, such as Mines
and Martin (1986), Muller and Espenshade (1985) and McCarthy and Valdez
(1986), have left the possibly mistaken impression that immigrants are a fiscal
drain on the U.S. economy.
Rothman and Espenshade (1992) were rather critical of Simon’s analysis for
two reasons. One reason is that Simon aggregated immigrants of all national origins,
and the second is that he applied national average figures for taxation and per pupil
school expenditure to populations that are not evenly distributed across the country.
Neither criticism invalidates Simon’s inference that Social Security payments by
immigrants make them net fiscal assets to the U.S. economy (although the lack of
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national disaggregation does pose some problems for applying Simon’s findings to
the case of Mexican immigrants only).
In the particular case of Mexican immigrants, the issue of fiscal impacts is
complicated by the fact that there are legal and illegal immigrants, who use ser-
vices and transfers at very different rates, and whose contributions to Social Secu-
rity and to federal taxes differ depending on whether they are formally or infor-
mally employed, and depending on their legal status in the United States.
Heer (1990) and Weintraub and Cardenas (1984) claimed that undocumented
Mexicans use fewer services or transfers (because they are either not eligible for
them, or are wary of any contact with officials). This implies that undocumented
workers are essentially a fiscal windfall for employers and also for state and na-
tional coffers (because they do pay taxes). Weintraub and Cardenas (1984) esti-
mated that the state of Texas received a fiscal benefit of at least $120 million per
year from undocumented aliens (mostly Mexicans), although Rothman and
Espenshade (1992) point out that Weintraub and Cardenas’ data is based on a non-
random interview sample. Undocumented workers occupy a peculiar space in the
rhetoric about immigration. Undocumented workers, or illegal immigrants. are the
object of much political backlash against migration, yet (if Heer and Weintraub
and Cardenas are correct) they may be the most fiscally beneficial of migrants.
Economies of Scale and Innovation
The first modern essay on population growth and the economy is credited to
Malthus, who assumed that natural resources were fixed and that therefore a larger
population would necessarily mean a lower standard of living for everyone. Simon
(1993) notes that Malthus wrote five different editions of his famous essay, and
each subsequent edition was less alarmist about the consequences of larger
populations. Adam Smith and the other early innovators of modern economic theory
took a different view. For Smith, a greater population meant a greater division of
labor, which implied greater efficiency and product per person, and therefore
increasing returns to scale; twice as many workers would create more than twice
as much product. One of Smith’s famous examples is the pin factory, where the
manufacture of pins is divided into eighteen different tasks, each performed by
one person. The assumption is that such specialization (for which a substantial
population is a necessary ingredient) leads to greater efficiency, and greater per
capita production.
Simon (1993) cites a number of 19th century economists who directly confronted
Malthus’ initial supposition that natural resources are fixed; he quotes Henry George
who wrote “Both the jayhawk and the man eat chickens, but the more jayhawks the
fewer chickens, while the more men the more chickens.” This same anti- Malthusian
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view is developed at some length in Simon (1989). The basic premise is the classical
economic notion that the price mechanism ensures that as demand for a given natural
resource rises while supply falls, technology and innovation will be applied to find
more or to create substitutes for the important resource. Simply put, the greater the
human demand for chickens, the more farmers will devote themselves to new and
more efficient ways to produce chickens. Technology, in other words, overcomes
some of, if not all, the apparent limits of natural resources. Not all resources are as
easy to replenish as chickens, of course, and Simon takes his argument considerably
further. He argues that, despite the claims of the environmentalists, natural resources
from fresh water to forests to oil reserves have never been more plentiful (at least
in terms of the resources that are directly accessible by society).
Since the past two centuries of history in the developed world has proven that
Malthus’ alarmist view of population growth is insufficient, Preston (1989) and
Simon (1989) and others have reemphasized the positive economic potential of
population growth. Some public goods, such as national defense, do not depend
directly on the size of the population. An increase in population ought not to in-
crease the need for national defense, but would increase the number of people
paying for defense, thus lowering the cost per capita and lessening the burden on
the native residents; this would be experienced as a direct increasing return to
scale. Most services are not like national defense in that an increase in population
would ordinarily require an increase in services provided (education, police pro-
tection, health care, electricity and sewer service to name a few). If the marginal
cost of providing a service decreases as the populations grows (holding the quality
of the service constant, which is easier to do in theory than in practice), then popu-
lation growth will lower the per capita cost of that service and everyone will ben-
efit from increasing returns to scale.
In theory (and usually in practice), an increasing population leads to higher
population density, and higher density areas receive most services at a lower cost
per person. For example, rural electrification costs much more per person served
than urban electrification. Some rural schools may be less costly per pupil than
urban schools, but unlike the provision of electricity the quality of education services
is not easily comparable. Preston (1989) points out that in the United States, which
has a relatively low average population density, the majority of the population is
crowded around large metropolitan areas, leaving many rural counties almost vacant.
Workers in the city earn more than rural workers, and city residents have access to
many goods and services that are unavailable in rural areas. The residential settlement
patterns of U.S. residents seems to be evidence that economies of scale are a real
force drawing people to settle in areas of higher concentration. Both Preston and
Simon cite the powerful Japanese economy, with high population density and few
natural resources, as an example of the continuing relevance of economies of scale.
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The Japanese enjoy minimal transportation and communication costs because their
population density is so high.
On the question of returns to scale and economic history, the central figure is
Simon Kuznets. Kuznets (1960, [1967] 1973, [1972] 1973) argued that not only
are there increasing returns to scale in industry because of greater specialization
and because of technological innovation, but that technological innovation itself is
subject to a scale economy. The reasoning is as follows: there are a fixed propor-
tion of innovators and geniuses in any population. Because different branches of
knowledge are interrelated, and because engineering and technical innovations rest
on an established base of knowledge (the cumulative effects of earlier innova-
tions), it stands to reason that larger societies will have a greater number of innova-
tors and geniuses (because of sheer numbers). Furthermore, this larger number of
innovators and geniuses will feed off each other’s work to create an economy of
scale for innovation, which will in turn make the entire society more efficient. As
Kuznets writes (1960: 328), “The greatest factor in growth of output per capita is,
of course, the increasing stock of tested, useful knowledge.”
If there are in fact increasing returns to scale as Kuznets and Simon and the
classical economists claimed, the implication for immigration is fairly clear: more
people make the whole society more efficient, and immigration, on balance, should
be beneficial to the host society. The issue is, of course, more complex because
there can also be diseconomies of scale, and because the extent of increasing or
decreasing returns to scale is the subject of substantial disagreement in the empiri-
cal literature. The question of returns to scale is central, however. The pro-immi-
gration studies generally assume, as Simon (1989) does, a positive return to scale
for population growth. And most anti-immigrant work emphasizes over crowding,
over use of limited resources, and other implicit decreasing returns to scale for
population growth.
The economic literature that employs explicit models for the impacts of immi-
gration, such as Borjas (1995), almost invariably assumes constant returns to scale
in the production functions. Despite the fact that the measurement of real returns to
scale presents many empirical problems, and therefore the assumption of constant
returns to scale is a defensible assumption, we believe that this common assump-
tion builds an inherent bias against possible economic benefits immigration. Kuznets’
economic history of the U.S. makes a strong case for the importance of returns to
scale over time, and Simon has pointed out that there is little reason to believe
these historical arguments are any less relevant today.
The returns to scale issue is further complicated for the case of Mexican
immigrants because Mexicans are, on average, the immigrant group with the fewest
years of formal education (see Table 2 and also Chiswick, 1986; Borjas 1992; Borjas
and Freeman 1992). This means that arguments about the innovative capacity of
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Mexican migrants may be a bit harder to make. On the other hand, the size and
duration of the flow of migrants from Mexico (and the resultant size, development,
and division of labor within the established Mexican American communities)
provides many possibilities for scale economies internal to the Mexican American
neighborhoods themselves.
As we will see in the vignettes from our Little Village (Chicago) survey, this
immigrant Chicago neighborhood has enough Mexicans to support a fully differ-
entiated economy of goods and services. Because the Little Village community is
growing, and because the consumer tastes and language of the Little Village resi-
dents is best understood by other co-ethnic residents, there are ample opportunities
for business, entrepreneurship, and economic innovation in Little Village and in
other Mexican American communities. Little Village, in other words, is conducive
to a myriad of formal and informal economic activities which are largely invisible
to formal accounting systems and surveys. Moreover, there is more economic in-
novation in these communities than the low level of formal education of the Mexi-
can migrants might lead one to believe.
Arguments about national level diseconomies of scale generally rest on the
inefficiency of large enterprises due to inertia and the inability to change and adapt.
Robinson (1960) presents multinational data on the cost of national administration
(health, education, services and defense), and argues that the large countries (which
in most of his samples, means the U.S.) are not necessarily more efficient in pro-
viding services than the smaller countries (Great Britain, France, Italy, Jamaica).
Robinson’s data shows that U.S. spends less per capita on national administration,
except for defense where the U.S. spends far more. The problem with this kind of
data is that there is no way to account for differences in the quality of the services
provided, so one does not know whether India is either a tremendously efficient
provider of national services, or a provider of very sparse administrative services
(the latter is probably closer to the truth). Robinson (1960: xvii) makes the rather
bold claim that ‘it seemed to be our general impression that most of the major
industrial economies of scale could be achieved by a relatively high- income na-
tion of 50 million,’ which would imply, of course, that the U.S. is far too big to
enjoy any further advantages from scale economies. The problem, however, is that
the 50 million person limit is arbitrary, and no empirical data or sound reasoning is
cited to support it.
Jewkes (1960) makes an argument about the diseconomies of scale that seems
to contradict Kuznets directly on the issue of economies of scale for innovation.
Jewkes argues that although there are some examples of large corporate research
and development making technological breakthroughs that would have been im-
possible for individual inventors to make (he cites the DuPont corporation’s inven-
tion of Nylon), most inventions are made by individuals working alone. Jewkes
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points out that the aircraft jet engine was invented simultaneously by a British air
force cadet and a German undergraduate, working by themselves. In terms of
Kuznets’ theory, what is relevant for our argument is that the inventors of the jet
engine lived in the well populated developed countries, and were therefore able to
take advantage of a stock of knowledge, and had access to other innovators and
ideas that would not have been available to an equally talented inventor living in
Costa Rica or Belize. The invention of the jet engine by two separate individuals
does not, therefore, undermine the idea of scale economies in knowledge.
When Kuznets refers to innovation and technology as the engines for economic
growth (see Kuznets [1972] 1973), he mainly refers to technologies like the steam
engine, the light bulb, the telephone, the internal combustion gasoline engine, or the
more recent advent of atomic energy. These technological advances have had pro-
found and lasting effects on the economy, without doubt (although the legacy of
atomic energy may not be as clear as Kuznets imagined). But Kuznets’ emphasis on
the highest levels of technological input leave open the question of whether working
class immigrants can be considered as advantages in a scale economy of knowledge,
which according to Kuznets’ examples, would seem to favor mainly the immigration
of physicists, engineers, doctors and other highly trained people.
Simon (1989: 175) offers one answer to this question. In his words:
It cannot be emphasized too strongly that ‘technological advance’ does not
mean only ‘science’ and scientific geniuses are just one part of the knowledge
process. Many technological advances come from people who are neither well
educated nor well paid: the dispatcher who develops a slightly better way of
deploying the taxis in his ten-taxi fleet; the shipper who discovers that garbage
cans make excellent cheap containers; the supermarket manager who finds a
way to display more merchandise in a given space; the supermarket clerk who
finds a quicker way to stamp prices on cans; the market researcher in the super-
market chain who experiments and finds more efficient and cheaper means of
advertising the store’s prices and sale items and so on.
Simon appropriately acknowledges that it is not only the Enrico Fermis and
Albert Einsteins who contribute to knowledge and hence economic efficiency, but
also motivated, entrepreneurial and innovative immigrants who, despite a lack of
formal education, may contribute to a society’s economic well being. It is well to
remember that much of the economic literature assumes that years of schooling is
a direct measurement of skill and hence of worker productivity. Simon (1989) argues
that immigrants bring with them knowledge based on the experience of how things
are done in other places, and may therefore be highly productive in their host society
despite a limited formal education. The burgeoning literature on ethnic enterprise
in America would appear to support this view.
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Supplementary to Simon’s argument about working class innovation and
entrepreneurship are studies that consider how immigrants may be self-selected
for entrepreneurial spirit and work ethic. Chiswick (1978: 901) argues that the
good performance (in excess of what their moderate schooling levels would lead
one to expect) of immigrants in the U.S. economy is evidence that the immigration
process self selects migrants for ‘motivation’ and ‘innate ability.’ Chiswick’s
empirical findings have been repeatedly questioned by Borjas (1992, 1994) who
argues that Chiswick confused an assimilation effect with a cohort effect; Borjas’
point is that there has been a decline in immigrant skills rather than an assimilation
of immigrants over time.
Borjas (1992) refers to the declining skills of recent immigrant cohorts, but his
own tables show that overall immigrant educational attainment has risen steadily
over time (from 9.5 years in 1940 to 12 years in 1980); U.S. native educational
attainment has simply risen faster, so that it is not immigrant skills that are declin-
ing but rather U.S. native skills (measured by years of education) that are outpac-
ing the skills of the immigrants, and precisely at a time when the returns to skill
have been rising markedly. The educational attainment of Mexican male immi-
grants to the U.S. has crept up from about 7 years in the 1950s to a bit less than 9
years today (in our Table 2, their educational attainment is reported as 9.4 years,
but this is for only non agricultural workers; the full sample of Mexican male im-
migrants has 8.7 years of education). As such, the “skills” of Mexican immigrants
(as measured by education) have not declined over time. The education gap be-
tween Mexican immigrants and natives may have increased over time, but Chiswick’s
analysis still rests on the advantage that immigrants have due to their self-selection
for determination and creativity, if not formal schooling. Since both Chiswick and
Borjas rely mainly on cross sectional data from the decennial census, it is not en-
tirely possible to adjudicate between their competing conclusions interpretations
because neither can adequately model period effects which have greatly altered
opportunities for earning a living.
Kao and Tienda (1995) have recently demonstrated a result which bolsters
Chiswick’s idea that immigrants are self selected for innate skill and motivation.
Using the National Education Longitudinal Survey (NELS:88), they showed that
the children of first generation immigrants have higher scholastic aspirations and
test scores than their native-born counterparts of similar socioeconomic standing.
Although the effect that Kao and Tienda measure is strongest for the children of
Asian immigrants, the children of Hispanic immigrants also seemed to benefit from
this optimism and strong immigrant work ethic.
If Mexican immigrants are self selected for innate skill and motivation, it is
partly due to the fact that Mexican immigrants come to the U.S. for economic
opportunity rather than fleeing Mexico for political reasons. Political refugees, as
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Chiswick (1978) notes, migrate for noneconomic reasons, and therefore would not
necessarily represent the most fit, able, or motivated citizens. Economic migrants
(like the Mexican migrants), who assume the costs and risks of migration would
naturally be most likely to migrate if they considered their own abilities and deter-
mination would produce higher returns in the destination country. This, at any rate,
is the rationale for believing that economic immigrants might be self selected for
innate ability. There is, of course, no direct way to measure innate skills. What we
offer, instead, is a glimpse into the Little Village neighborhood of Chicago which
shows substantial levels of economic activity and entrepreneurship.
Mexican Immigrants’ Entrepreneurship
and Innovation
The Little Village Household Survey, hereafter LVHS, consists of in depth
interviews from 330 households in Chicago’s mostly Mexican Little Village
community (see Tienda and Raijman, 1996 for a more detailed description). The
survey uncovered considerably higher rates of self employment and informal
employment for Mexicans (especially Mexican immigrants) than had been
previously found. According to 1980 U.S. Census figures (Fratoe, 1986), 4.9% of
all Americans were self employed. Some ethnic groups, such as Russians and
Lebanese, were self-employed at rates approaching 10%, while for Mexicans the
self-employment rate hovered around 2%. According to the LVHS, self employment
rates for Mexicans in Little Village were about 10%. While the higher rate of self
employment may be partly due to the urban setting of the Little Village community
(which excludes the farm worker population, almost none of whom would be self-
employed), the LVHS in-depth interviews also uncovered that much self employment
occurs in the informal economy, which is a kind of economic activity that standard
surveys seldom detect.
Following Portes and Sassen-Koob (1987), we note that the level of self
employment, and especially self employment via informal activities, can be viewed
as a source of economic innovation at the margins of a developed economy (there
is considerable debate about the value of the informal sector in both developing
and developed countries; see Portes and Schauffler 1993 for a review). In fact,
according to preliminary analysis of the LVHS, many Mexican migrants have
charted a labor market history that starts with low wage employment, proceeds
to a mixture of low wage jobs with informal self employment to smooth income
levels, and sometimes proceeds to full-time informal self employment. A sizable
proportion of the formally self employed Mexican immigrants in Little Village
started those businesses in the informal sector, so that the informal economy can
also be seen as a pipeline into the formal economy. By definition, informal
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businesses do not pay taxes and license fees, which is seldom examined by
analyses who estimate the fiscal balance between immigrants and natives. Before
going further into the possible benefits and drawbacks that immigrant
entrepreneurship entails for the wider economy, we turn to a LVHS interviews
themselves for examples. Consider the case of Yolanda (now age 40) who
immigrated from the Mexican state of Jalisco to Chicago in 1975. She has a second
grade education, and is married with 8 children. The following is a verbatim
excerpt from her interview.
She came to the U.S. with economic necessity and she had always like the
fruit business. She went to Maxwell Street where there was a man who sold
fruit. She started selling fruit (tomatoes) for the man without him telling her to
do so. He like the way she sold fruit and within 3 weeks, he looked for her to
ask her to help him sell in the flea market. He paid her $25 per day. One day, he
made her cry in front of everyone. He accused her of stealing $25. She held in
her anger and stayed there, but she started thinking that maybe she, too, could
sell fruit and that way nobody would humiliate her. She told the man she was
going to steal whatever she could. Within 3 weeks she stole $100. She returned
the money to him to show him that she was no thief. But because he had hu-
miliated her, he gave her the money. Then she began to study the way he sold,
where he got his merchandise, how much he sold it for, etc. Then she asked
him to pay her with vegetables instead of with money so that she could sell
them. She got a grocery cart (she said she found it in the street—she stressed
that she didn’t steal the cart). She sold the merchandise that he gave her and
made almost twice the amount she earned by working with the man. She saved
a little and bought whatever she could from the man so that she could sell it.
With $250 she set up a stand at Maxwell Street (a flea market in Chicago). In
three years she saved $1000, plus $10,000 for a down payment on a house.
When she found out that Maxwell Street would be closing, she decided to open
up a store. With $1000 she started the store 2 years ago and until now, she has
invested $30,000 in it. She has no debts; she didn’t ask for loans because she
doesn’t like debt. She started the business on her own and she continues to
develop it on her own.
The first point to be made about Yolanda’s story is that, as Simon (1989) has
pointed out, economic innovation can originate among persons of all social classes.
Yolanda’s second grade education and modest income did not keep her from finding
a better way to sell tomatoes. The second point concerns how much immigrants
“take” from the host society in their endeavors to find a better life for themselves.
For this question, we take Yolanda’s shopping cart as a metaphor. If, as Yolanda
claims, her shopping cart (with which she started her fruit selling business) was
indeed simply “found in the street,” we see the immigrant taking resources that are
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essentially wasted and returning them into the economy by dint of their own hard
work and innovative use.
If, for a moment, we imagine that Yolanda (perhaps a different Yolanda) had
stolen the cart, we get the other side of the economic argument. If the cart had been
stolen, then Yolanda was not contributing to efficiency but simply cutting in on an
already existing market for retail fruit, and perhaps undercutting the sales of a
legitimate retail fruit store by selling fruit from a stolen cart without paying any
sales tax to the state.
The question of fiscal contributions is a bit more complex, but it seems that
Yolanda eventually is also contributing through this economic channel of influ-
ence. At first, Yolanda works for the other fruit merchant, and we can assume that
no income taxes are being paid from Yolanda’s $25 a day salary, and no sales taxes
are paid from sales in the Maxwell Street flea market. In the second stage, Yolanda
is selling fruit from her own cart, and again we can assume that no sales taxes are
being paid. In the third and final stage, Yolanda is reinvesting her money into a
house and her own fruit store, which denotes a shift from the informal to the formal
economy. In the final stage, Yolanda is presumably paying taxes on a business and
a property that were capitalized out of her own effort and creativity. Sassen-Koob
(1989) describes the tension between immigrant informal economies that inno-
vate, create and incubate entrepreneurial ideas (and are presumably an asset to the
overall economy) versus informal sectors that simply represent tax and regulation
avoidance by subcontractors tied to larger, formal firms (this kind of informal busi-
ness is presumably a drain on the overall economy). Both kinds of informal busi-
nesses exist in Little Village.
As Yolanda’s story is a bit unusual, we offer a few other representative stories
taken from the Little Village survey. Hugo, age 48 was born in Mexico and has a
U.S. born wife, two children, and a Mexican high school education. His father
worked on the railroads in Mexico. Hugo started his own business because he did
not want to work for others.
I started this business in 1985 after working for the Lawndale Bank as a vice
president. There I discovered that many people wanted to send documents and
letters to Mexico and since no one offered this kind of service I decided to estab-
lish this business. It took me a year to acquire sufficient understanding of this
area. I decided to start this business because of the demand by the people for the
service; in this area there are many people that come to make deposits and I
think that if they had more education it would work better but none the less we
are growing.
Jesus was born in Mexico, immigrated to Chicago in 1965, and now lives with
his wife, one child and his mother in law. Jesus had a third grade education in
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Mexico. He had been part owner of a restaurant in Nuevo Laredo, Mexico and sold
it to come to the U.S.; he says he thinks about business all the time.
In 1968, there was no latinos here, I was one of the first. The neighborhood
was Polish. I rented a garage in which I sold tortas and food. I began to let them
taste my food- tacos and everything and I began to do better and better. It was a
small place- a garage. I formed it into a restaurant. I paid rent to a Polish man,
when he saw me working hard, he promised to sell it to me. In 1972, the owner
of the building financed and sold it to me. It’s been 25 years.
José and Efigenia are from Tamaulipas, Mexico and are both over 50 years old.
José reports zero formal education. He says he went into business to be independent.
I came illegally to the U.S. from Mexico where I was a barber. I started
working as a barber in my house, and when I had sufficient clientele I rented a
small place which was completely equipped, and that’s how I got to the first
level. After a long time, I got my savings together and started my own business
with my own equipment, although I still rent the space.
The modest stories of Hugo, Jesus, José and Efigenia illustrate a few important
points about Mexican migration to the U.S. Despite a lack of formal education,
both Jesus and José exhibit the traits of entrepreneurship. Both abandoned
businesses in Mexico in order to come to the U.S. where, presumably, they
expected to receive better returns for their skills. Admittedly, this is circumstantial
evidence for the theoretical proposition that immigrants from Mexico, and other
non- refugee countries are self selected for innate skill, or entrepreneurial spirit.
But absent direct empirical evidence, many have concluded that low education
levels are inconsistent with innovation and entrepreneurial activity.
A second point relates to the size of Chicago’s Mexican American community,
and the differentiated economy that is implied by residential concentration within
the city limits. Because Little Village was (or became) populous and diversified,
there were ample opportunities for new and innovative kinds of businesses, like
Hugo’s document and currency transmission service. The information that Hugo
needed in order to start his business was an experiential knowledge based on
having lived in Mexico and the U.S., and having contact with the consumer needs
of households in Little Village, rather than formal education.
Conclusion
The literature on the effects of population growth on economic development
is justifiably modest in its claims and predictions. Kuznets himself ([1967] 1973)
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readily admitted that increased population could have different impacts on an
economy, depending on many factors, and that therefore there is no single
“population effect.” Mexican migrants to the U.S. are almost always viewed in
the recent literature as low wage labor market drones- people who are willing to
work picking lettuce or sewing pants in a factory for just a few dollars a day. The
bulk of the literature then turns on whether this low wage labor is more beneficial
to the U.S., or detrimental because the migrants exert a downward pressure on
wages and also use state services. Our point in this paper is that Mexican migrants,
despite their low average formal education, may contribute significantly to the
U.S. economy through economic and cultural innovations, and returns to scale
for a larger population.
Direct national returns to scale may be due to a greater national division of
labor, or to a larger number of persons to share fixed costs, such as defense (since
the cost of defense does not depend directly on the number of residents, a larger
population would presumably lower per capita defense costs). The country as a
whole may also benefit from a larger population due to an increased number of
technical and practical innovations; this is Kuznets’ theory and Simon has reminded
us that beneficial innovations can come from people of any class or educational
background. While the flow of immigrants from Mexico may provide a somewhat
lower yield of scientific innovations (because of the low proportion of Mexican
immigrants who have postgraduate education), the Mexican migrants are able to
take advantage of a different, local kind of scale economy. Because of the size and
duration of the flow of migration from Mexico, Mexican migrants are integrated
into the U.S. economy through Mexican American communities that are them-
selves large enough and diverse enough (especially the urban neighborhoods like
Little Village in Chicago) to support innovative new businesses.
Mexican immigrants are workers; their labor force participation is high be-
cause they come to the U.S. in their prime working years. Because the flow of
Mexican migrants is so heavily weighted toward young workers and contains so
few retirees, Mexican immigrants make an especially positive fiscal contribution
to the national Social Security program. Mexican migrants may also be self se-
lected for talent, motivation and innate skill, as Chiswick would argue, which would
imply that the low educational attainment of Mexican immigrants underestimates
their real skill and productivity. We cannot deny, however, that the low educational
attainment of Mexican migrants also correlates with low annual and hourly wages,
so that the economic returns to this (supposed) high level of innate skill and moti-
vation is not easily detected in the Current Population Survey. Chiswick would
argue that the respondents in the CPS (especially the Mexican immigrants) are
weighted to the most recent immigrants (because the flow of immigration from
Mexico has been increasing over time—see Table 3), and that it takes time for the
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innate skills of immigrants to lift their earnings to the level of native workers.
Chiswick (1986) reports that the earnings of Mexican immigrants exceeds the earn-
ings of native workers when the Mexican immigrants have been in the U.S. labor
market for 15 years.
We have not considered migrants’ possible effect on the U.S. economy through
their consumer purchases. Migrants not only increase the size of the U.S. consumer
market but they also have particular tastes and needs that may affect the tastes of
natives. Immigrants, as Simon (1989) points out, have throughout history been
viewed as the bearers of new ideas, new ideas that have been tested in other societies
and contexts. Despite the fact that the effect of population growth on economic
Table 3
Historical Trends in Legal Mexican Migration to the U.S.
Number of Total Mexican
legal Mexican (all countries) immigration
Period Immigrants legal immigrants as % of Total
1901-1910 49,642 8,273,667 0.60%
1911-1920 219,004 5,763,263 3.80%
1921-1930 459,287 4,100,777 11.20%
1931-1940 22,319 531,405 4.20%
1941-1950 60,589 1,044,638 5.80%
1951-1960 299,811 2,519,420 11.90%
1961-1970 453,934 3,313,387 13.70%
1971-1980 640,294 4,509,113 14.20%
1981-1989 974,200 5,801,600 16.79%
1990 680,186 1,536,483 44.27%
1991 947,923 1,827,167 51.88%
1992 214,128 973,977 21.98%
1993 126,642 904,292 14.00%
1994 111,415 804,416 13.85%
1990-1994 2,080,294 6,046,335 34.41%
Source: 1994 Statistical Yearbook of the INS.
Note: From 1989–1994, 2.67 million persons, most of them of Mexican origin, received amnesty
due to provisions or IRCA (1986) and were counted as new immigrants for those years.
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growth is quite resistant to formal quantification because of the myriad ways that
population increase can trigger economic effects, we believe that questions about
economies of scale ought be considered more systematically. There is no sound
reason to think that the U.S. has passed some magic population density that makes
it immune to any further benefits from economies of scale. The implications of
increasing returns to scale are simply that, other things being equal, a larger
population will tend to increase the economic efficiency of the entire society.
Note
* Paper prepared for the June, 1996 meeting “Mexican Migration and U.S. Policy”
Washington, D.C.   This research has been supported by the U.S.- Mexico Binational Com-
mission on Immigration.  The Little Village Household Survey on which we draw is part
of a project,  “Entrepreneurship in Chicago’s Ethnic Neighborhoods,” (Marta Tienda, Ri-
chard Taub and Robert Townsend, Principal Investigators) funded a grant to the Center
for the Study of Urban Inequality from the Rockefeller, the Ford and the MacArthur Foun-
dations.  We acknowledge institutional support from the Ogburn-Stouffer Center of NORC
and the University of Chicago, and the technical assistance Fay Booker.  The usual dis-
claimers apply.
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Impacts of Migration
The U.S. Labor Market Impacts of
Low-skill Migration from Mexico
Paul S. Davies, Michael J. Greenwood,
Gary L. Hunt, Ulrich Kohli & Marta Tienda*
Introduction
Although in recent years a growing literature has focused on the economiceffects of U.S. immigration (Borjas, 1994; Greenwood and McDowell,1986; LaLonde and Topel, 1997; and Smith and Edmonston, 1997), little
research has dealt directly with the migrant group from Mexico. An example of
this gap is a recent study of the economic consequences of U.S. immigration by the
National Academy of Sciences (Smith and Edmonston, 1997) that makes only
passing reference to the Mexico-born population. By estimating the U.S. employment
and wage effects of this population, the present study takes a step toward filling
this research gap.
Four distinctive characteristics of Mexican migrants to the United States have
implications for the nature and magnitude of their labor market impacts. First, the
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sheer volume of the migration flow and the size of the Mexico-born population in
the United States set this foreign-born group apart. Second, a large share of the
undocumented population is of Mexican origin. Third, the Mexico-born population
in the United States has low education levels, which although improving have not
kept pace with those of the U.S. population. Fourth, the Mexico-born population is
highly concentrated in the Southwest and in several large cities.
Mexico contributes a larger share to the U.S. foreign born population than any
other country—roughly as much as the entire continents of Asia and Europe. Dur-
ing 1994 alone the United States admitted as legal resident aliens 111,398 persons
born in Mexico. Between 1989 and 1993, boosted by legalizations under terms of
the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), 2.4 million persons of
Mexican birth were legally admitted to the United States. The size of the migrant
flow is important for understanding impacts because arguments about scale econo-
mies and about magnitudes of impacts derive directly or indirectly from the vol-
ume of migration, depending, of course, on residential patterns, return migration
rates, and other social and demographic characteristics we discuss below.
Not only is Mexico the single most important source of legal immigrants, it is
also the primary source of unauthorized migrants. Data on undocumented migrants
are necessarily sketchy. However, studies of legalization authorized by IRCA indi-
cate that 70 percent of those who were legalized under the amnesty program were
of Mexican origin (see Tienda, et al., 1991; Singer, 1994). Between 1989 and 1994,
the U.S. Border Patrol located 6.4 million entries from Mexico who were deemed
deportable. Legal status of migrants is important for understanding the impacts of
Mexican migration because public attitudes and behavior toward migrants from
Mexico are often driven by images, accurate or not, of undocumented migrants.
Employers who fear sanctions for hiring migrants who entered the United States
unlawfully may deliberately avoid hiring all workers who look and sound like
foreigners. Such behavior could directly affect the employment and wage opportu-
nities of earlier arrivals who entered legally, as well as some native residents who
speak English with an accent or “look Mexican.” Although these effects are diffi-
cult to quantify, there is little disagreement that the presence of a large share of
undocumented migrants among the Mexican migrant population shapes the policy
and social climate surrounding Mexican migration to the United States.
The Mexican migrant population comes to the United States with low levels
of formal education. Male Mexican migrants average nine years of education, which
is substantially less than most other native and migrant groups, who average a high
school education. Because Mexico has been the single largest source of migrants
to the U.S. for 30 years, and because migrants from Mexico have low levels of
formal education, recent concerns about admitting immigrants with low skills have
focused on migrant streams from Mexico. The skill composition of Mexican migrants
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has important implications for a study of impacts because it is central for addressing
questions about labor market impacts, and in particular, whether Mexicans compete
mainly with other low wage workers (e.g., native-born teens, unskilled women,
blacks, Mexican Americans, and migrants who arrived earlier), or whether Mexican
migrants fill labor market niches that domestic and other foreign-born workers do
not want. In light of recent trends in U.S. wage inequality between skilled and
unskilled labor groups, the question of whether large numbers of unskilled Mexican
migrants can be absorbed in the labor market remains a central source of controversy
about the economic impact of Mexican migrants.
In 1990, of 13.5 million Mexican-origin persons enumerated in the census,
45.3 percent resided in California and 28.8 percent resided in Texas.1 California’s
share of national population was 12.0 percent in 1990 and Texas’s was 6.8 percent.
Such concentrations of Mexican-origin population suggest highly regionalized
immediate impacts of the migrants, although several studies suggest that the ef-
fects of immigrants are quickly arbitraged across the nation (Borjas, 1994). A ma-
jor advantage of the approach adopted here is that for simulation purposes we are
able to distinguish areas with differing concentrations of Mexico-born persons rather
than relying only on nation-wide estimates of the impacts.
The wage and employment impacts of the foreign born on native workers may
differ according to race and national origin, but the findings of prior studies are
highly variable. The empirical evidence generally indicates that immigrant groups
tend to be substitutes for some domestic labor market groups and complements for
other domestic workers (Borjas, 1987a). Specifically, Hispanic immigrants appear
to be substitutes for white domestic male workers, but complements with native
Hispanic workers. Mexican immigrants have a small negative impact on the earn-
ings of both white and black native-born men. However, all immigrants have a
sizable negative impact on their own wage levels (Borjas, 1986a, and 1986b). One
important implication of earlier studies is that in attempting to assess substitution
and complementarity relationships among the foreign born and the native born,
investigators should disaggregate the study population as much as possible. The
functional form of the production function used in this study allows for the speci-
fication of considerably more labor types than is found in the typical production-
theory approach (Greenwood, Hunt, and Kohli, 1996; 1997).
This study employs cross-sectional 1990 Census data on metropolitan areas in
the context of a production-theory approach that uses the Symmetric Normalized
Quadratic functional form and that incorporates eight labor inputs and a measure
of capital. The eight labor inputs, whose estimation is allowed by the functional
form employed here, permit us to account not only for low-skill Mexico-origin
labor, but also for certain skill groups with whom this group is likely to compete in
U.S. labor markets (including native, low-skill labor distinguished by sex, as well
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as foreign-born, low-skill labor from parts of the world other than Mexico). The
incorporation of capital into the empirical model avoids the assumption of
separability of labor and capital that has been problematic in several earlier empirical
studies. An advantage of cross-section data is that the model can be calibrated and
simulated for specific metropolitan areas that differ in terms of their concentration
of Mexico-born persons. Moreover, following the work of Greenwood and Hunt
(1995), we incorporate into the model certain channels of influence in addition to
the production channel. These other channels include labor force participation and
aggregate demand.
Workers born in Mexico increase the supply of labor available in the United
States. This increased labor supply clearly is not spread evenly across the United
States, but rather is concentrated in proximity to the U.S.-Mexico border and in
areas that offer those types of employment opportunities that are attractive to mi-
grants from Mexico. Previous studies typically have shown that the wage and
employment effects of increased immigration on native-born groups are not great
(see Greenwood and Hunt, 1995; Greenwood, Hunt, and Kohli, 1996 and 1997).
The largest impacts are on other foreign-born workers (like the immigrants them-
selves). The results of earlier studies, however, have been based on 1980 census
data and on other data sources that are sufficiently old to throw into question their
contemporary relevance. Moreover, the various studies that adopt a production
function approach usually have not focused specifically on areas of high immi-
grant concentration.
In this paper, we disaggregate native workers by skill, gender, ethnicity, and
nativity, and estimate the impacts of migrants from Mexico at the metropolitan
area level in different regions of the U.S. including, especially, areas in the South-
west that are near to Mexico. We consider employment and wage effects stemming
from both supply-side and demand-side effects of low-skill Mexican migration.
Effects on the rental price of capital services also are explored.
Model Structure—An Overview
The model incorporates one aggregate output and nine inputs.2 The relatively
large disaggregation of inputs reflects the interest of this study in the effects of
immigration by origin and skill level on native U.S. workers by skill level, gender,
and ethnicity. Eight groups of labor are identified in the model: (1) native, low-
skill, Mexican males; (2) native, low-skill Mexican females; (3) native, low-skill
non-Mexican males; (4) native, low-skill, non-Mexican females; (5) native, high-
skill males and females; (6) foreign-born, low-skill Mexican males and females;
(7) foreign-born, low-skill non-Mexican males and females; and (8) foreign-born,
high-skill males and females. The ninth input is capital. The methodology is the
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same as that reported in Greenwood, Hunt, and Kohli (1997), but the labor inputs
are different. In this part of the model substitution and complementarity relationships
between the various inputs are estimated.
The model contains 18 endogenous variables. For each of the nine inputs, a
factor price equation is specified by setting the factor price of the input equal to the
input’s value marginal product (VMP). The VMP for each input is derived from
production theory as described below. Eight more behavioral equations are speci-
fied for the labor force participation rates of the eight groups of labor. These equa-
tions also are treated in more detail below, but their basic purpose is to measure the
degree to which own-wage changes influence the labor force participation of the
various labor groups. Finally, a behavioral equation for aggregate absorption of
area output (i.e., area aggregate demand) is specified.
In addition to the 18 equations for the corresponding 18 endogenous vari-
ables, the model contains several technical relations, such as an aggregate value
added production function and numerous identities. Some of these identities trans-
late variables from their indexed forms used in theoretical specification (e.g., nor-
malized employment), to their more policy-relevant forms (e.g., employment). The
model contains 46 such technical relations and identities. Altogether the model
contains 64 behavioral equations, technical relations, and identities.
Data
Because it facilitates our later presentation of empirical results, the next sec-
tion discusses the 1990 data used in this study. This section is followed by a discus-
sion of the model structure. The various components of the model’s structure are
followed by a discussion of issues relating to econometric estimation, as well as
the presentation of the estimates obtained for model parameters.
Factor Inputs and Prices
The 1990 Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS) of the U.S. Census (U.S.
Bureau of the Census, 1992a) is used in the estimation of labor inputs and prices.
The five percent (state) sample is used because it contains more observations
than the one percent (metropolitan area) sample, while still containing metropolitan
area of residence. A number of steps were taken in preparing these data. First, a
random sample was drawn from the PUMS for the estimation of Mincerian-style
earnings equations. Second, a skill-quantity variable was computed from the
earnings equations for all individual observations in the five percent PUMS. This
skill-quantity variable is important in making the demographic disaggregations
described below. The third step involved aggregating the individual observations
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to the Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) level to form aggregate area labor
inputs and prices. Altogether 273 MSAs are identified from the 1990 PUMS five
percent sample. As part of this third step, individual observations were grouped
into eight demographic groups based on male/female, Mexican/non-Mexican,
native-born/foreign-born, and high skill/low skill status. The criteria for assigning
skill level are discussed below.
Earnings Equations
In preparing the data for estimation of earnings equations, a 10 percent ran-
dom subsample of the five percent PUMS was taken. This was done following the
subsampling procedures described in the PUMS Technical Documentation (U.S.
Bureau of the Census, 1992b). Only those observations satisfying the following
criteria were used: age between 16 and 65, not currently in school, not currently in
the military, not self-employed, and 1989 earnings greater than zero. This process
yields a national subsample of 456,202 observations.
Using this national subsample, Mincerian-style earnings equations were
econometrically estimated separately for males (235,069 observations) and females
(221,133 observations). For these earnings equations, an hourly wage variable was
created by dividing 1989 earnings by hours worked in 1989 (computed as hours
worked per week times weeks worked in 1989). The natural logarithm of the 1989
hourly wage served as the dependent variable.
The independent variables included: educational attainment, potential labor
market experience (constructed as age less education less six) and its square, a
dummy for metropolitan area residence, race and ethnicity dummies, a foreign-
born dummy and its interaction with year of entry dummies, a set of census divi-
sion dummies, a set of world region of origin dummies, a set of occupation dum-
mies, and a set of industry dummies.
The OLS estimates produce reasonable results. For both males and females,
the log of hourly earnings increases with education. It also increases with potential
labor market experience, but at a decreasing rate. Foreign-born individuals have
log-wages below those of natives, although this effect is not statistically significant.
The adjusted-R2 in the male earnings equation is 0.365 and that in the female equation
is 0.252. The equation F-value for males is 2759.75 and for females is 1524.22.
Skill Quantity
Based on the results of the earnings equations, we predicted a “skill-quantity”
variable or skill index for all individuals in the subsample. This skill index was
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predicted using the estimated coefficients on educational attainment, potential labor
market experience and its square, the foreign-born dummy and the interactions
between foreign-born and year of entry, and the world region of origin dummies,
along with the actual values of each of these variables for each individual in the
subsample. This predicted skill-index variable is designed to reflect skill quantity
(a proxy for human capital) rather than various aspects of “skill price” such as
racial or ethnic discrimination or compensating differentials due to industry,
occupation, region of residence, or MSA residence. The skill-quantity estimates
are made separately for males and females using the estimated coefficients from
the appropriate regression equation.
Each individual in the subsample was coded as being in one of four skill quartiles
by ranking all observations by predicted skill quantity and splitting them into four
groups of equal size. Each individual was then designated as low skill or high skill
depending on how the skill quartiles are grouped. In the analysis conducted in this
paper, the lower two skill quartiles are designated as “low skill” whereas the upper
two skill quartiles are designated as “high skill.” This low skill/high skill segmen-
tation is discussed further below.
Aggregation
Having created the skill quartiles from the earnings equations, we next aggre-
gated the data to the MSA level. To do so, we used the complete five percent 1990
PUMS rather than the subsample used for the earnings equations. Observations
were excluded from the data if they did not meet our “selection criteria.” The skill-
quantity variable was computed for all individuals as described above. The indi-
viduals were then coded as belonging to one of the four skill quartiles based on the
value of this skill quantity variable and the quartile “break-points” determined from
the 10 percent national subsample.
As indicated above, eight demographic groups were created for the Mexican
model. Individuals were coded as native-born if they were born in the U.S. or in
U.S. outlying areas (e.g., Guam, American Samoa, Puerto Rico). Otherwise, indi-
viduals were coded as foreign- born. Individuals were considered to be low-skill if
they were in the lower two skill quartiles. The upper two skill quartiles accounted
for high-skill individuals. Mexican status is conferred by birth in Mexico for the
foreign-born and by Mexican origin (as reported on the PUMS Hispanic origin
question) for the native born.
For each demographic group, several variables were created at the MSA level.
These include total group population, number employed in the group, group labor
force participation rates, total group earned income, total group non-labor income,
total group welfare income, total group social insurance income, and total group
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hours worked. Furthermore, aggregate MSA population, employment, earnings,
and non-labor income were created by summing across all eight demographic groups.
The eight demographic groups exhaustively include area population, and therefore
employment, earnings, and non-labor income.
This aggregation process was conducted MSA-by-MSA, in all states plus the
District of Colombia, yielding 273 MSAs. Ten of these 273 cross state boundaries,
and therefore represent the combination of data from multiple states. After deleting
those MSAs in which one or more of the eight demographic groups have small or zero
populations, we are left with 122 useable MSAs for the analysis conducted below.
Model Structure
Production Function and Factor Prices
We assume that in each metropolitan area, the technology can be represented
by an aggregate production function. Let y be the quantity of output and assume J
inputs,3 the quantities of which are denoted by xj. The production function is writ-
ten as follows:
(1)  y = f (x1, . . . , xJ).
This function is assumed to be twice continuously differentiable, increasing, quasi-
concave, and linearly homogeneous. Under profit maximization, we get the mar-
ginal product conditions (also known as the inverse input demand equations, or the
wage equations) by differentiation:
(2)  
w
p
f
x
j Jj
j
=
⋅
=
δ
δ
( )
,   ,...,  ,1
where p is the price of output and wj is the price of the jth input.
To describe the substitution and complementarity relationships between the J
inputs, we can use the Hicksian elasticities of complementarity4:
(3)  ψ j k
j k
j k
f f
f f j k J,
,
,   , ,...,  ,≡ = 1
where f f x f f x xj j j k j k≡ ⋅ ≡ ⋅δ δ δ δ δ( ) / , ( ) /( ), 2 , and f f≡ ⋅( ).
Quasiconcavity of the production function implies that ψ j j, ≤ 0 . Furthermore
ψ j k, > 0  if inputs j and k are Hicksian q-complements, andψ j k, < 0  if inputs
j and k are Hicksian q-substitutes.
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The Hicksian elasticities of complementarity may seem to be somewhat difficult
to assess, and it is sometimes more convenient to use quantity elasticities of inverse
demands. These are defined as follows:
(4) η
δ
δj k
j
k
w
x
,
ln
ln
≡
Making use of Equations (2) and (3), one can easily show that:
(5) η ψj k j k ks, , ,= ⋅
where sk is the cost share of the kth input: s x w pyk k k≡ /( ).
To describe the production function, we use the Symmetric Normalized Qua-
dratic functional form introduced by Diewert and Wales (1987). It is as follows:
(6) f a x
x
j j
j
j k jk j k
j j j
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∑ ∑1
2 β
where bjk = bkj,  ∑ = ∑ = =b j k Jjk j0 1 1,      ( , ,..., ).β  As shown by Diewert
and Wales (1987), this functional form is flexible, and it is globally concave as
long as B bjk≡ [ ]  is negative semidefinite and ∑ >β j jw 0.  The negative
semidefiniteness of B can be imposed by using the reparameterization of Wiley,
Schmidt, and Bramble (1973). That is, we set B = -TT where T jk≡ [ ]τ  is a lower
triangular matrix. As to ∑ β j jx ,  this term can be interpreted as a Laspeyres input
quantity index.
Assuming cost minimization, the inverse input demand functions are obtained
by differentiation:
(7)
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One difficulty with flexible functional forms is that their number of parameters
increases very rapidly with the number of inputs. Even if one assumes linear
homogeneity, the number of parameters in a N-input model is equal to
N + (N - 1) N / 2. Thus, if N = 2, the number of parameters is 3; if N = 4, there are
10 parameters, and if N = 16, the number of parameters jumps to 136. This may
lead to serious problems of multicollinearity, and it may lead to inefficient estimates.
One way around this problem has been suggested by Diewert and Wales (1988),
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who introduce the concept of K-flexibility, or semiflexibility. A functional form
g(z) is said to be semiflexible at some point z* if it has enough free parameters
for g(z*), its gradient ∇g z( *),  and its Hessian ∇2g z( *)
 
to attain arbitrary
values, provided that ∇2g z( *)  is restricted to have rank K < N. A semiflexible
functional form therefore has less parameters than a flexible one, and, although
it is not flexible, it does not impose any obvious a priori restrictions on the size
or the signs of the elasticities of substitution or complementarity.
The concept of semiflexibility rests on some new results obtained by Diewert
and Wales (1988). They show that any semi-definite N N×  matrix of rank K,
where K is less than the maximal possible rank N, has a K-column triangular de-
composition. This means that T mn≡ [ ]τ  is now such that τ mn = 0  for
1 ≤ < ≤m n N  and for n = K + 1, . . . , N. Thus, T now is defined as a lower
triangular N N×  matrix which has zeros in its last N - K columns. Note that T
now has only N (N + 1)/2 - (N - K) (N - K + 1)/2 free parameters. This may mean a
substantial reduction in the number of parameters to be estimated. Thus, if N = 8
and K = 3, the number of free parameters is 21, as opposed to 36 in the unrestricted
case. This reparameterization applied to B in (6) yields the K-flexible—or
semiflexible—version of the Symmetric Normalized Quadratic production func-
tion. In what follows, we will set K = 3; indeed, there is ample evidence that there
is little to be gained in considering larger values of K.5
For empirical implementation the factor price equations have to be imbedded
within a stochastic framework along with the other behavioral equations. We assume
that the inverse input demand equations are stochastic due to errors in optimization.
We define the optimization errors in the input demand equations at time t as
vj (t) (j = 1, . . . , J). We assume that the vector of disturbances is identically and
independently, joint normally distributed with mean zero and non-singular covariance
matrix Ω :
(8) E v t v s
s t if s t
if s t[ ( ) ( )]
 ,   
  ,
=
∀ =
≠

Ω
0
where Ω  is a J J×  positive definite matrix.
The model is estimated by the algorithm of Berndt, Hall, Hall, and Hausman
(1974) which is essentially a nonlinear version of the iterative Zellner (1962) method.
All estimations were done on a Digital AXP 3000-800S computer, using SHAZAM,6
version 7.0. The nine inputs of the model are identified above.
Parameter estimates are shown in Table 1. Concavity is imposed globally, and
it is therefore satisfied for all observations. Monotonicity is satisfied for all
observations but one. Table 2 reports estimates of the Hicksian elasticities of
complementarity (ψ jk ) at the sample mean, whereas Table 3 gives the sample-
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Table 1
Mexican Model
Parameter Estimates (asymptotic t-values in parentheses)
τ11 0.00312 (2.57) τ33 -0.00492 (-0.42)
τ21 0.01077 (4.01) τ43 0.11402 (1.85)
τ31 0.02289 (5.05) τ53 0.04357 (1.95)
τ41 -0.01224 (-0.26) τ63 -0.00474 (-0.18)
τ51 0.16173 (5.75) τ73 0.00116 (0.11)
τ61 -0.00376 (-0.48) τ83 -0.05538 (-2.66)
τ71 0.00155 (0.29) a1 0.00182 (30.21)
τ81 0.00359 (0.21) a2 0.00475 (32.85)
τ22 0.00400 (0.82) a3 0.02457 (114.88)
τ32 -0.00513 (-0.66) a4 0.12130 (167.04)
τ42 0.05863 (0.52) a5 0.36144 (222.94)
τ52 0.04651 (0.54) a6 0.00739 (24.73)
τ62 0.02403 (4.15) a7 0.01433 (76.91)
τ72 0.01084 (2.86) a8 0.04335 (66.08)
τ82 0.02055 (0.36) a9 0.41485 (178.14)
The subscripts refer to the inputs which are defined as follows:
(1) Native, low-skill, Mexican, male labor; (2) Native, low-skill, Mexican, female labor; (3) Native,
low-skill, non-Mexican, male labor; (4) Native, low-skill, non-Mexican, female labor; (5) Na-
tive, high-skill labor; (6) Foreign-born, low-skill, Mexican labor; (7) Foreign-born, low-skill,
non-Mexican labor; (8) Foreign-born, high-skill labor; (9) Capital.
mean values of the quantity elasticities of inverse input demands (η jk ). Capital is
a Hicksian complement for all categories of labor, except foreign-born high-skill
labor. Overall, however, and this is rather surprising, there appears to be far more
substitution than complementarity relationships.
Most labor categories seem to be competing with each other. The strongest
complementarity links are between native, low-skill men and low-skill migrants,
as well as between native, low-skill, non-Mexican women and high-skill migrants.
Judging from the elasticities shown in Table 3, an increase in the number of low-
skill Mexican migrants would tend to benefit capital and low-skill native males,
and hurt all other categories of labor; however, except for low-skill Mexican mi-
grants themselves, these effects are very small.
Labor Force Participation
The modeling of labor force participation rates begins with a reservation wage
equation and a market wage equation:
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Table 2
Mexican Model
Elasticities of Complementarity (values at the sample mean)
      
ψ j k j k
j k
f f
f f,
,
=
•
•
k=1 k=2 k=3 k=4 k=5 k=6 k=7 k=8 k=9
j=1 -2.910 -3.858 -1.585 0.172 -0.761 0.866 -0.184 -0.141 0.769
j=2 -5.820 -1.926 -0.177 -1.117 -1.573 -0.878 -0.584 1.342
j=3 -0.946 0.381 -0.364 1.018 0.073 -0.233 0.294
j=4 -1.121 -0.130 -1.013 -0.428 0.974 0.350
j=5 -0.230 -0.112 -0.155 0.056 0.277
j=6 -11.171 -2.339 -2.304 0.869
j=7 -0.587 -0.263 0.356
j=8 -1.852 -0.068
j=9 -0.401
The subscripts are as defined at the bottom of Table 1.
Table 3
Mexican Model
Quantity Elasticities of Inverse Demand (values at the sample mean)
      η δδj k
j
k
w
x
,
ln
ln
≡
k=1 k=2 k=3 k=4 k=5 k=6 k=7 k=8 k=9
j=1 -0.005 -0.018 -0.039 0.021 -0.277 0.006 -0.003 -0.006 0.321
j=2 -0.007 -0.028 -0.048 -0.022 -0.406 -0.012 -0.013 -0.025 0.560
j=3 -0.003 -0.009 -0.023 0.046 -0.132 0.008 0.001 -0.010 0.123
j=4 0.000 -0.001 0.009 -0.137 -0.047 -0.008 -0.006 0.042 0.146
j=5 -0.001 -0.005 -0.009 -0.016 -0.084 -0.001 -0.002 0.002 0.116
j=6 0.002 -0.008 0.025 -0.124 -0.041 -0.083 -0.034 -0.101 0.363
j=7 -0.000 -0.004 0.002 -0.052 -0.056 -0.017 -0.008 -0.011 0.149
j=8 -0.000 -0.003 -0.006 0.119 0.020 -0.017 -0.004 -0.081 -0.029
j=9 0.001 0.006 0.007 0.043 0.101 0.006 0.005 -0.003 -0.167
The subscripts are defined at the bottom of Table 1.
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(9) S H Z u= + + +γ γ γ0 1 2 1
(10) W X u= + +β β0 1 2
where S is the reservation wage (or shadow wage), H is hours worked, Z is a vector
of other factors that influence the reservation wage, W is the market wage, and X
is a vector of factors that influence the market wage. The gammas and betas are
parameters. The u1 and u2 terms are zero mean, spherical, normally distributed
stochastic errors. Equations (9) and (10) apply to individuals.
Let W X= +β β0 1 ,  where a bar over variables denotes a mean. Therefore,
(11) W X W W u= + + − +β β0 1 2 ,
which implies
(12) W X X W u= − + +β1 2( ) .
Assuming that W=S, Equations (9) and (10) can be equated and the following
equation for hours can be derived:
(13) H X X W Z= − + − −{[ ( ) ]/ }.β γ γ γ1 0 2 1
If H>0, then the individual participates. If H≤0, then the individual does not
participate.
For participating individuals, H>0 implies that Eq.(13) becomes
(14) {[ ( ) ]/ } {[ ]/ } .β γ γ γ1 0 2 1 2 1 1 0X X W Z u u y− + − − + − >
Equation (14) in turn implies the following:
(15) {[ ]/ } {[ ( ) ]/ }.u u X X W z2 1 1 1 0 2 1− < − + − −γ β γ γ γ
Therefore, for participants, H>0, we have
(16) u u X X W z2 1 1 0 2− < − + − −β γ γ( ) .
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This implies that the probability of participating is
(17) Pr ( ) {[ ( ) ]/ }ob H X X W z> = − + − −0 1 0 2Φ β γ γ σ
where sigma is the standard deviation of u u2 1− . Each of the eight labor groups
has a corresponding Equation (17) structure to represent its labor force participa-
tion rate behavior.
The sources of data used to estimate the participation rate equations for each
of the eight labor groups are those described above for the labor quantity and price
variables and the aggregate area output price variable. Specific variables utilized
from the five percent PUMS include a labor force participation dummy variable as
the dependent variable; and the following independent variables in the vector X
(see Eq. (17)): white, black, years of schooling completed, potential experience
and its square (as defined above), foreign-born dummy variable, and immigration
cohort 1980-90. The vector Z (see Eq. (17)) contains the following independent
variables: family income, black, white, number of children under six years of age
present in the household, and number of children six to seventeen years of age
present in the household. All income variables, including the average area wage
for the labor group, are expressed in real terms by deflating by the aggregate area
output price variable described above.
The stochastic assumptions made for the labor force participation rate equations
flow from the theoretical discussion presented above. Each of the eight labor group’s
participation is modeled as a binary probit process. The maximum likelihood
estimates of the probit equations for the eight labor groups are presented in Appendix
Tables A1 through A8. It is notable that the estimated coefficients on the area average
real wage for seven of the eight labor groups are positive and significant. The
estimated effect of higher real wages on average is negative and significant only
for the group of native, high skill persons.
Each estimated equation contains both area average variables and variables
that represent deviations of individual observations from the area averages. The
theoretical motivation for this structure is presented above. The deviations are rep-
resented by variable names beginning with the letter “D.” The variable names in
Appendix Tables A1 through A8 are associated with the following variables:
AREARW, area real wage of group; RFAMINC, real household income of group;
KIDLT6 and KID617, children less than six years of age in household and those
between 6 and 17 years of age in household, respectively; BLACK and WHITE,
dummy variables representing broad race of individuals; ED, years of schooling
completed; X and XSQ, years of potential experience and its square, respectively;
IMG8090, immigrant dummy variable interacted with entry cohort of 1980-90. In
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each of the eight corresponding tables of estimates, the marginal effects of each
independent variable on the probability of participating (=1) or not participating
(=0) is presented.
Aggregate Output Quantity and Price
Our methodology requires an index of real output (real value added). Let xjh
and wjh be the quantity and the price of input j in region h. We first define w˜ j   as the
mean price of input j across all regions:
(18) w˜
w x
x
j
h j
h
j
h
h j
h≡
∑
∑
We next define sj
h
 as the value-added share of input j in region h:
(19) s
w x
w x
j
h j
h
j
h
j j
h
j
h≡ ∑
We also define s˜ j  as the mean value added share of input j, that is the share of
input j in the total of the value added by all regions:
(20) ˜ .s
w x
w x
j
h j
h
j
h
h j j
h
j
h≡
∑
∑ ∑
The price of output in region h (ph) is then calculated as a Tornqvist price index,
where the prices in region h are compared to the corresponding mean prices:
(21) p s s
w
w
h
j
j
h
j
j
h
j
= +



∑exp ( ˜ ) ln ˜
1
2
.
Finally, the quantity of real value added in region h is obtained implicitly as:
(22) y
w x
p
h j j
h
j
h
h=
∑
.
The data used for the labor input quantities and prices are those discussed
above. The data used to compute the quantity and price of capital services are a
combination of the labor data and gross state product data obtained from the
Bureau of Economic Analysis’ Regional Economic Information System (REIS)
and a Jorgensonian measure of the cost of capital. The gross state product data
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for each state were scaled to corresponding MSA-level data using one-digit SIC
labor earnings at the state and MSA levels. The computation of the rental income
for capital then was computed as the difference between MSA value added (i.e.,
gross product) and labor earnings. The rental price of capital services was
estimated as the Jorgensonian user cost of capital services. Division of the rental
income by the user cost yielded the estimate of the quantity of capital services
used in this study.
The approach taken in Greenwood and Hunt (1995) is taken in specifying the
absorption equation. The aggregate demand for real value-added output produced
in area h is:
(23) ln( ) ln( ) ln[ /( )]y p Y N ph h h h h= + +α α α0 1 2
where yh  is aggregate demand for real value-added output produced in area hh ,
ph  is the corresponding aggregate price index, N h  is area population, Y h  is
area household income, “ln” is the natural logarithm operator, and the alphas are
parameters. Equation (23) can be expressed in inverse form by solving for
ln( )ph .
The aggregate area output price and quantity variables are those defined above.
Aggregate area household income and population are computed from the summation
of the corresponding area aggregate group variables across the eight demographic
groups delineated above.
In this study, instrumental variables estimation is not entertained. Based on
the work of Greenwood and Hunt (1995), the estimation of the aggregate absorption
equation requires instrumental variables to obtain the correct sign on the price
coefficient. Therefore, the estimates from Greenwood and Hunt (1995) are used in
this study with appropriate scaling.
Model Simulations
The model is organized into six blocks of equations: (1) production; (2) labor
force; (3) input value shares; (4) income; (5) absorption; and (6) add factors.
Block 1 consists of 11 equations. Nine represent the value marginal product
equations for each of nine inputs: five categories of native labor, three categories
of immigrant labor, and capital. The skill levels are defined as quartiles of the
U.S. distribution of skills. The value marginal products are set equal to wage
rates (i.e., skill prices). The value added production function is the tenth equation
in the first block. The eleventh equation is for aggregate value added output in
nominal terms. All of these variables are index numbers. The indexing procedure
is discussed below.
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Block 2 consists of 33 equations. There are eight labor force identities, one for
each of the eight labor groups. These specify labor force size as the product of
labor force participation rate and population of labor force age. Eight employment
identities define a normalized (i.e., indexed) employment measure, described below,
for each of the eight labor groups, and eight additional employment identities for
the employment of each of the eight groups of labor. Each of the eight labor groups
also has a labor force participation equation specified for it. Finally, there is an
identity for aggregated population of labor force age, the sum of the corresponding
variable across the eight groups.
Block 3 consists of nine input value share equations, one for each of the
eight labor inputs and capital. Block 4 includes an aggregate income identity:
the sum of labor earnings and nonlabor income; and it includes eight wage rate
equations (actual wage rates and not index numbers). Block 5 consists of an
absorption equation written in inverse form so that the area price index is on the
lefthand side.
Block 6 consists of 18 equations, one for each of the model’s add factors. The
add factors are variables that are computed endogenously during the baseline
simulation of the model to ensure that the baseline simulation solution values equal
the observed sample values. There is an add factor for each structural/behavioral
equation in the model. Add factors are not required for identities since the computed
values for the corresponding variables will equal the observed sample values if the
structural/behavioral variable values are forced (by add factoring) to equal the
observed sample values. There are eight add factor equations for the eight labor
force participation rate equations. There are nine add factor equations for the value
marginal product conditions. Finally, there is an add factor equation for absorption.
The model simulations were accomplished in two steps. The first step was to
generate an add-factored baseline simulation. The second step was to increase the
“foreign-born, low-skilled, Mexican” labor group by 20 percent in each of the 122
metropolitan areas. Our basic assumption here is that Mexico-born migrants in the
United States tend to have relatively low skill levels because, as noted above, they
tend to have relatively low levels of education. The difference in the solution val-
ues of each of these two steps, in each area, represents our simulated impacts of a
20 percent increase in low-skilled, Mexican migrants.
All blocks of the model are “turned on” in the simulations. Consequently, both
supply and demand-side effects on employment and real factor prices are captured.
In order to understand the economics of the simulations, it is useful to disaggregate
conceptually the simulations into three parts. In the first part, only the effects of
immigration on the value marginal products of each input and on output are
considered. Consequently, increased immigration results only in factor price effects
and an output effect. Only the production block of the model is therefore “turned
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on.” Consequently, impacts are limited to those operating through the production
structure channel of influence.
In the second part, employment effects in addition to factor price effects are
considered. This is accomplished by “turning on” the production, labor force, in-
put value shares, and income blocks of the model structure. Impacts are therefore
limited to those operating through the production structure and labor force partici-
pation channels of influence.
Additional effects are “turned on” in the third part by considering aggregate
demand in addition to the effects occurring through the production structure and
labor force participation channels. The aggregate demand effects have two aspects.
First, the impacts of changes in local wage and nonlabor income on local demand
are incorporated. If the sum of changes in local wage and nonlabor income is posi-
tive due to immigration, then local demand will rise and the local price level will
be supported. Second, the effects of changes in output on the local price level are
incorporated. An increase in migration directly results in an increase in labor input
locally and therefore to the production of more local output. If the labor force
participation effects across all labor groups do not offset this positive direct output
effect of increased migration, the level of locally produced output will rise. In parts
one and two, such an output increase would be absorbed without a change in the
price of locally produced output. In this way, the other two parts represent, by
assumption, the operation of a small open economy. In this third part, local price is
endogenized and a lower price of local output will be required to get the extra
output absorbed, ceteris paribus.
Aggregate demand effects operate in two opposing directions on the local price
level and therefore on value marginal products. If the local demand effect bolsters the
local price level, then this will support value marginal products and factor prices.
However, this positive effect could be offset to some extent, or outweighed, by the
downward pressure on local price by any extra local output produced with increased
immigration. In the simulation of the model, of course, both effects are computed,
and the result for factor prices is incorporated. The simulation results presented be-
low incorporate all three of these parts: the production structure channel of influence,
the labor force participation channel, and the aggregate demand channel.7
In Table 4, the simulated effects on the real wages of the eight groups of
labor are presented. For all 122 areas, the average real wage of the migrant group
itself falls by 3.0 percent. As shown in Table 5, due to this lower wage rate, workers
in this category withdraw from the labor force, so that ultimately employment of
this group increases by 19.39 percent and not by 20 percent, which reflects a
displacement effect of about 0.6 percent (20.0 percent - 19.4 percent). The wage
rates of other labor categories are almost unchanged. For example, native, low-
skill females of Mexican ancestry suffer a wage loss of only about 0.3 percent
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and their employment falls by about 0.2 percent. Thus, for the average U.S. region,
even relatively large increases in Mexican-born labor do not appear to have large
impacts on native workers.
Metropolitan areas in California and Texas have relatively heavy concentrations
both of Mexican-born persons and of native-born persons of Mexican ancestry. Each of
these states contains 23 metropolitan areas in the sample. The major impact of a 20-
percent increase in foreign born, low-skill Mexican labor in California is on this group,
whose wages fall by 6.9 percent (Table 4) and whose employment declines by 1.3
percentage points (20 percent less 18.7 percent) (Table 5). The largest wage impacts on
other groups occur to foreign-born, low-skill, non-Mexicans and to foreign-born, high-
skill persons, but in each case the effects amount only to about one percent. The labor
displacement effect is never more than 0.5 percent for any group (Table 5).
The results for Texas are similar to those for California, but for the most part
are slightly more moderate. For example, when their employment is increased by
20 percent, foreign-born, low-skill Mexican workers in Texas suffer a 5.0 percent
wage decline (Table 4) and about 1.1 percentage point job displacement (Table 5).
Comparable effects for Arizona, New Mexico, and Colorado (11 areas) are a 3.7
percent wage reduction and approximately 0.8 percent displacement. Areas of high
concentration of foreign-born, low-skill Mexican workers clearly experience the
largest impacts of a 20-percent increase in this labor category. For 13 areas for
which this labor group constitutes 60 percent or more of the foreign-born popula-
tion, the wage effect for a 20-percent increase in this group represents a decline of
11.4 percent. Employment of the group is reduced by 2.4 percentage points. Na-
tive, low-skill females of Mexican ancestry suffer a 1.3 percent wage decline and
a 0.4 percent job displacement effect. Even these last effects are not large.
Three possibilities have been suggested for the repeated empirical finding that
the effects of even relatively large increases in foreign-born labor do not appear to
have great impacts on native workers. First, the foreign-born population is a rela-
tively small fraction of the population and the labor force, and thus the effects may
not be detectable. The results presented above suggest that even in areas with heavy
concentrations of foreign-born, low- skill, Mexican labor, the wage and employ-
ment displacement effects of relatively large increases in this labor group are not
great either for the native-born groups or for other foreign-born groups. The only
noteworthy impact is on the own-wage rate because the members of the group are
very good labor market substitutes for one another. A second possible explanation
for the relatively small impacts of the foreign born on wages and employment is
that offsetting increases occur in labor demand and supply relationships with the
effect that the wage changes tend to cancel. A third explanation is that efficient
U.S. markets result in the effects quickly arbitraging themselves across the nation,
with the result that the effects are difficult to detect.
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A closer examination of specific metropolitan areas in California and Texas
and of other areas of high foreign-born, low-skilled Mexican concentration, indicate
that the simulated wage and employment effects vary substantially. For example,
among metropolitan areas in California, the own-wage reduction resulting from
the 20-percent increase in foreign-born, low-skilled Mexican workers reaches as
high as 15.2 percent in Visalia-Tulare and as low as 0.24 percent in Redding (Table
4). Employment of foreign-born, low-skilled Mexicans is reduced by as much as
3.1 percent in Los Angeles and as little as 0.04 percent in Redding (Table 5).
Similar variation in the magnitude of wage and employment effects is apparent
among metropolitan areas in Texas. The wage reduction experienced by foreign-
born, low-skilled Mexicans varies between 25.4 percent for McAllen-Edinberg-
Mission and 0.5 percent for Beaumont (Table 4). The group experiences employment
reductions of between 6.1 percent in McAllen-Edinberg-Mission and 0.1 percent
in Beaumont (Table 4). Also of note, wages of foreign-born, low-skilled Mexicans
fall by 15.9 percent in Yuma, Arizona, while employment falls by 3.4 percent.
Greeley, Colorado, also has a high concentration of foreign-born, low-skilled
Mexicans, although the own-wage reduction there is only 3.2 percent and the
employment reduction is just 0.6 percent.
The range of the wage and employment effects on other groups resulting from a
20-percent increase in foreign-born, low-skilled Mexican workers is much smaller.
Among metropolitan areas in California, the wages of native, low-skilled males (both
Mexican and non-Mexican) increase, though this increase is relatively small and
varies between 0.0 percent in Redding and 2.3 percent in Los Angeles (Table 4). The
wage effect is similar for metropolitan areas in Texas, reaching a high of 4.3 percent
in McAllen-Edinberg-Mission. The employment effect on this group varies little
across metropolitan areas in California and Texas and is nearly zero in most cases.
To the extent that wages and job opportunities of the native born are influ-
enced by low-skill migrants from Mexico, females and especially Mexican ances-
try females bear the impacts. However, these effects are not great even in areas
with high concentrations of foreign-born, low-skill Mexicans. For example, in ar-
eas where at least 60 percent of the foreign-born population consists of low-skill
migrants from Mexico, a 20 percent increase in this population reduces the real
wage of native-born Mexican ancestry females by 1.3 percent and their employ-
ment by 0.4 percent (Tables 4 and 5).
As discussed above, native, low-skilled females (both Mexican and non-
Mexican) and other foreign-born groups tend to suffer wage and employment
decreases as a result of the 20-percent increase in foreign-born, low-skilled Mexican
workers. Although the effects are quite small on average for metropolitan areas in
California and Texas (around 1 percent or less), some areas of high foreign-born,
low-skilled Mexican concentration display relatively large effects. For example, in
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Los Angeles, California, the wages of foreign-born, high-skilled workers fall by
3.4 percent while employment falls by 0.8 percent. In McAllen-Edinberg-Mission,
Texas, the wages of native, low-skilled, Mexican females fall by 4.0 percent,
accompanied by a 1.3 percent reduction in employment.
A general presumption is that the two groups most likely to enjoy benefits due
to migration from Mexico to the United States are the migrants themselves and
their U.S. employers. However, because most models that focus on the U.S. impacts
of immigration assume separability of labor and capital, as well as not incorporating
capital explicitly in the empirical framework, empirical models typically do not
allow any assessment of the returns to capital. In the model described above, we
explicitly introduce capital and therefore we are able to perform simulation exercises
that relate to the return to capital.
Table 6 reports the percentage change in the real rental price of capital due to
a 20-percent increase in foreign-born, low-skilled Mexican labor. Among all of the
inputs, capital is the clearest winner. In California areas in general the real rental
price of capital increases by 0.82 percent, but the increases are somewhat larger in
agricultural areas like Merced (1.7 percent), Salinas (1.7 percent), and Visalia-
Tulare (1.4 percent). However, the largest increase (2.5 percent) occurs in Los
Angeles. The average increase in the real rate of return to capital in Texas is 0.3,
but for many areas close to the border the return is considerably higher
(Brownsville—1.4 percent; El Paso—1.6 percent; McAllen-Edinberg-Mission—
1.8 percent). Another border area that experiences a large increase in the rate of
return to capital is Yuma, Arizona (1.7 percent). These results provide confirma-
tion that the U.S. owners of capital benefit due to low-skill migration from Mexico.
Conclusions
In summary, labor market impacts are the most intensively studied effects of
the foreign born in the United States. Although these effects may be mitigated or
reinforced through less-highly studied channels of influence, the following con-
clusions have the strongest support. First, in both 1980 and 1990 the foreign born
had a tendency to put downward pressure on the wage rates of the native born and
a tendency to displace them from their jobs, but the effects were not large at the
national level. The Mexican-born had similarly small impacts at the national level.
Second, the foreign born are highly concentrated regionally, and although internal
migration and trade tend to distribute the consequences over broader regions, the
economic consequences also are concentrated. The largest impacts of low-skilled
migration from Mexico are on other low-skilled migrants from Mexico, because
the two groups are good labor market substitutes. In areas of high concentration of
new migrants from Mexico, such as El Paso, other migrants from Mexico suffer
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Table 6
Percentage Change in the Real Rental Price of Capital
Due to a 20-Percent Increase in Foreign-born,
Low-skilled Mexican Labor—Selected Areas
Area Percentage Change
All areas (122) 0.27
California areas (23) 0.82
Texas areas (23) 0.33
Arizona, New Mexico, Colorado areas (11) 0.30
Areas in border states (52) 0.56
Areas of high concentration of foreign-born,
  low-skilled, Mexicans (13) 0.88
Areas of low concentration of foreign-born,
  low-skilled, Mexicans (43) 0.02
Santa Ana, CA 1.31 Beaumont, TX 0.06
Bakersfield, CA 0.74 Brazoria, TX 0.12
Chico-Paradise, CA 0.12 Brownsville, TX 1.44
Fresno, CA 1.04 Bryan-College Station, TX 0.14
Los Angeles, CA 2.54 Corpus Christi, TX 0.12
Merced, CA 1.66 Dallas, TX 0.23
Modesto, CA 0.74 El Paso, TX 1.58
Oakland, CA 0.27 Ft. Worth-Arlington, TX 0.17
Oxnard-Ventura, CA 0.89 Galveston, TX 0.08
Redding, CA 0.02 Houston, TX 0.27
San Bernardino, CA 1.04 Killeen-Temple, TX 0.07
Sacramento, CA 0.15 Longview-Marshall, TX 0.05
Salinas, CA 1.68 Lubbock, TX 0.06
San Diego, CA 0.80 McAllen-Edinberg-Mission, TX 1.75
San Francisco, CA 0.19 Midland, TX 0.25
San Jose, CA 0.69 Odessa, TX 0.26
Santa Barbara, CA 0.45 San Antonio, TX 0.48
Santa Cruz, CA 0.93 Tyler, TX 0.16
Santa Rosa, CA 0.29 Waco, TX 0.13
Stockton-Lodi, CA 0.58 Wichita Falls, TX 0.07
Vallejo, CA 0.31 Yakima, WA 0.81
Visalia-Tulare, CA 1.43 Yuma, AZ 1.66
Yuba City, CA 0.42 Las Cruces, NM 0.70
Abilene, TX 0.10 Richland-Kennwick-Pasco, WA 0.48
Amarillo, TX 0.09 Greeley, CO 0.22
Austin, TX 0.16
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job displacement and significant downward pressure on their wage rates. Such
effects impede the upward economic mobility of less-skilled migrants themselves.
Finally, owners of capital and land are the primary U.S. beneficiaries from the
presence of less-skilled migrants from Mexico.
Based on our econometric results the most surprising finding is probably that
Hicksian complementarity relationships are much fewer than one might have ex-
pected. One tends to think that an increase in the supply of one factor increases the
marginal products of the other factors. Indeed, one common argument in favor of
immigration often is that more low-skill immigrants would make most other factors
more productive, even if previous low-skill immigrants unavoidably get hurt. On
average, Hicksian cross-elasticities of complementarity tend to be positive. Actually,
they must be positive in the two-input case. They will also be positive, even if there
are many inputs, if the functional form is Cobb-Douglas or CES, for instance. Yet, our
results indicate that, even though capital is definitely a Hicksian complement for
labor, Hicksian substitution relationships by far dominate among the different cat-
egories of labor. In the model, some complementarity relationships between various
labor categories are evident, but they tend to be scarce and weak. These often involve
low-skill native males and females, high-skill native females, and low- and high-skill
migrants. As far as an increase in low-skill immigration is concerned, the clear win-
ner is capital, but low-skill males and high-skill females are also likely to benefit.
The simulation results indicate that the largest adverse impacts of additional
low-skilled, Mexican migrants falls on low-skilled, Mexican migrants themselves.
Although small relative declines and advances are observed in the real wages and
employment of other labor groups, the size of these effects is usually small. Capital’s
real rental price rises in the simulations, with the magnitude varying directly with
the concentration of low-skilled, Mexican migrants in the various areas, as does
the absolute value of the negative real wage effects on the migrants themselves and
the various impacts on the labor market outcomes of other labor groups. These
findings highlight the importance of demographic and geographic disaggregation
in immigrant impact analyses.
Relative to other foreign-born groups and relative to the native born, persons
born in Mexico have relatively low rates of U.S. internal migration (Greenwood,
Henning and McDowell, 1997). Indeed, the native born of Mexican ancestry have
low rates of internal migration in general. For example, among those household
heads born in Mexico who entered the United States between 1970 and 1974, only
4.1 percent made an interstate move between 1985 and 1990. During the same
period 5.2 percent of native-born heads of Mexican ancestry made such a move. In
contrast, the same entry cohort from other countries of origin had much higher
rates of internal migration over the 1985-1990 period. Representative rates of internal
migration for these other groups are as follows: Philippines—12.3 percent;
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Germany—18.0 percent; United Kingdom—19.7 percent; India—21.7 percent;
Korea—15.8 percent; and Vietnam—15.2 percent. Among these countries, only
for Mexico do the foreign born have lower rates of internal migration than the
native born of each respective ancestry.
Neuman and Tienda (1994) also confirmed that undocumented migrants from
Mexico are less likely to move across state lines than undocumented migrants from
other regions. An analysis of administrative records (Legalization Application Pro-
cessing System, or LAPS) revealed that just over one-quarter of amnestied immi-
grants changed residence at least once between the time of most recent entry and
application for amnesty, but the likelihood of inter-state moves as undocumented
migrants varied by place of birth. Mexicans were least likely to move subsequent
to their initial entry, whereas Asians and Africans were most likely to do so. Spe-
cifically, only 19 percent of undocumented Mexicans who applied for legal status
had moved across state lines before soliciting amnesty compared to over two-thirds
of undocumented migrants from Asia and Africa, and over half of undocumented
migrants from other Latin American countries (except Salvadorans, whose inter-
state migratory behavior was similar to that of Mexicans).
If secondary migration leads to greater residential dispersion throughout the
country, the social impacts of undocumented migration ultimately will be less se-
vere in the states that serve as gateways for initial entry. Overall, unauthorized
Mexican migrants who moved across state lines were less residentially concen-
trated at the time of application for amnesty than were nonmovers. For Mexicans,
California and Texas were the main gateways for unauthorized entry. However,
limited evidence suggests dispersal of impacts through inter-state moves of unau-
thorized Mexican migrants; nonmovers were more than twice as likely as movers
to have entered through California (three out of four nonmovers from Mexico en-
tered through California compared to just over one-third of movers). Mexicans
who entered without inspection through Texas were more likely to have changed
their state of residence by the time of application for amnesty, thereby attenuating
impacts in this state. Specifically, just over half of Mexican movers entered through
Texas compared to more than one-fifth of nonmovers.
These low rates of internal migration among persons born in Mexico are due
to many factors, such as relatively low levels of education, lack of English language
skills, and strong ties to areas with high concentrations of persons born in Mexico.
Like education, migration is a form of investment in human capital and as such
migration presumably yields higher future returns. Historically, internal migration
has been a mechanism through which Americans have taken advantage of
employment and wage opportunities elsewhere to improve their economic status.
Thus, the low internal migration rates of both those born in Mexico and those born
in the United States of Mexican ancestry may restrict their access to areas that
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provide favorable economic opportunities. Lack of internal mobility also perpetuates
high concentrations of the Mexican-born population. The continued entry of migrants
from Mexico who are good labor market substitutes for earlier migrants results in
continued job competition between the groups, which in turn restricts wage growth
for them.
Notes
* This paper was prepared with support from the United States Commission on
Immigration Reform—Mexico-United States Binational Migration Study. We gratefully
acknowledge this support.
1. Other foreign-born groups also are highly concentrated. For example, 64.6 percent
of the Cuban-origin population resided in Florida in 1990. However, these groups have
absolute numbers that are low in comparison to the Mexican-origin population. The Cuban
group, for example, numbered 1.0 million in 1990, or 7.7 percent of the Mexican group.
2. We are presently unable to estimate the model with more than nine inputs, but this is
five more inputs than is found in the typical production-theory approach.
3. J = 9 in all models.
4. See Hicks (1970), Sato and Koizumi (1972), and Syrquin and Hollender (1982).
5. See Diewert and Wales (1988), Kohli (1994), and Greenwood, Hunt and Kohli (1996).
6. See White (1988).
7. Separate results associated with the opening of each channel are available from the
authors on request.
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Appendix Table A1
Mexican Model Labor Force Participation ML Probit Estimates
Native, Lower-skilled, Mexican Males
Standard
Parameter Estimate Error t-statistic
AREARW 376.176 258.669 1.45427
RFAMINC 61.3785 13.6618 4.49271
KIDLT6 .265769 .055806 4.76241
KID617 .076358 .054201 1.40879
BLACK 1.01195 1.03761 .975270
WHITE -.242839 .151583 -1.60202
DBLACK -.942278 1.07299 -.878178
DWHITE .327015 .162248 2.01552
DED .097896 .012121 8.07632
DX .061153 .980902E-02 6.23438
DXSQ -.124580E-02 .163513E-03 -7.61896
DIMG8090 1.40544 1.22085 1.15120
C .631353 .267986 2.35592
Standard Errors computed from analytic second derivatives (Newton)
dP/dX
0 1
AREARW -80.45346 80.45346
RFAMINC -13.12714 13.12714
KIDLT6 -0.056841 0.056841
KID617 -0.016331 0.016331
BLACK -0.21643 0.21643
WHITE 0.051936 -0.051936
DWHITE  -0.069939 0.069939
DED  -0.020937    0.020937
DX  -0.013079    0.013079
DXSQ 0.00026644 -0.00026644
DIMG8090 -0.30058 0.30058
C -0.13503 0.13503
Log of Likelihood Function = -1480.12
Number of Observations = 3808
Number of Positive Observations = 3198
Fraction of Positive Observations = 0.839811
Sum of Squared Residuals = 453.344
R-squared = 0.115128
Fraction of Correct Predictions = 0.839548
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Appendix Table A2
Mexican Model Labor Force Participation ML Probit Estimates
Native, Lower-skilled, Mexican Females
Standard
Parameter Estimate Error t-statistic
AREARW 157.074 111.311 1.41112
RFAMINC 107.314  6.66555 16.0999
KIDLT6 -.370276 .018081 -20.4792
KID617  -.070952 .013506 -5.25354
BLACK  1.13268  .612932  1.84796
WHITE  -.141244 .085478  -1.65239
DBLACK -1.20283 .635434 -1.89293
DWHITE .120051  .089450 1.34210
DED .085264  .558204E-02 15.2746
DX .024808  .355593E-02 6.97662
DXSQ -.866736E-03 .740739E-04  -11.7010
DIMG8090 -1.16845 .510514 -2.28878
C .192903 .118596 1.62655
Standard Errors computed from analytic second derivatives (Newton)
dP/dX
0 1
AREARW -51.34042 51.34042
RFAMINC -35.07622 35.07622
KIDLT6 0.12103 0.12103
KID617 0.023191 -0.023191
BLACK -0.37022 0.37022
WHITE 0.046166 -0.046166
DBLACK 0.39315 -0.39315
DWHITE -0.039239 0.039239
DED -0.027869 0.027869
DX -0.0081087 0.0081087
DXSQ 0.00028330 -0.00028330
DIMG8090 0.38191 -0.38191
C -0.063051 0.063051
Log of Likelihood Function = -6993.56
Number of Observations = 12182
Number of Positive Observations = 7708
Fraction of Positive Observations = 0.632737
Sum of Squared Residuals = 2359.90
R-squared = 0.166572
Fraction of Correct Predictions = 0.707273
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Appendix Table A3
Mexican Model Labor Force Participation ML Probit Estimates
Native, Lower-skilled, Non-Mexican Males
Standard
Parameter Estimate Error t-statistic
AREARW 229.311 99.3298 2.30858
RFAMINC 63.4894 3.83384 16.5603
KIDLT6 .157440 .019434 8.10124
KID617 .079847 .025122 3.17833
BLACK .202275 .129982 1.55617
WHITE 1.05712 .113347 9.32637
DBLACK -.361712 .138173 -2.61783
DWHITE -.795073 .121111 -6.56481
DED .146418 .396335E-02 36.9430
DX .068899 .339693E-02 20.2826
DXSQ -.136488E-02 .589171E-04 -23.1661
DIMG8090 .865882E-02 .088712 .097606
C -.079648 .162948 -.488793
Standard Errors computed from analytic second derivatives (Newton)
dP/dX
0 1
AREARW -41.73207 41.73207
RFAMINC -11.55438 11.55438
KIDLT6 -0.028652 0.028652
KID617 -0.014531 0.014531
BLACK -0.036812 0.036812
WHITE -0.19238 0.19238
DBLACK 0.065828 -0.065828
DWHITE  0.14469 -0.14469
DED -0.026646 0.026646
DX -0.012539 0.012539
DXSQ 0.00024839 -0.00024839
DIMG8090 -0.0015758 0.0015758
C 0.014495 -0.014495
Log of Likelihood Function = -14934.2
Number of Observations = 4472
Number of Positive Observations = 38642
Fraction of Positive Observations = 0.863914
Sum of Squared Residuals = 4440.56
R-squared = 0.155589
Fraction of Correct Predictions = 0.867446
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Appendix Table A4
Mexican Model Labor Force Participation ML Probit Estimates
Native, Lower-Skilled, Non-Mexican Females
Standard
Parameter Estimate Error t-statistic
AREARW 304.171 24.8732 12.2289
RFAMINC 23.8142 1.14345 20.8266
KIDLT6 -.530727 .474732E-02 -111.795
KID617 -.149499 .351399E-02 -42.5440
BLACK .578658 .061099 9.47082
WHITE .670588 .058886 11.3880
DBLACK -.468357 .064083 -7.30856
DWHITE -.655242 .061658 -10.6270
DED .104957 .169158E-02 62.0469
DX .020743 .878380E-03 23.6151
DXSQ -.104941E-02 .179880E-04 -58.3393
DIMG8090 -.461973 .049749 -9.28605
C -.305222 .072614 -4.20337
Standard Errors computed from analytic second derivatives (Newton)
dP/dX
0 1
AREARW -93.11224 93.11224
RFAMINC -7.28994 7.28994
KIDLT6 0.16247 -0.16247
KID617 0.045764 -0.045764
BLACK -0.17714 0.17714
WHITE -0.20528 0.20528
DBLACK 0.14337 -0.14337
DWHITE 0.20058 -0.20058
DED -0.032129 0.032129
DX -0.0063498 0.0063498
DXSQ 0.00032124 -0.00032124
DIMG8090 0.14142 -0.14142
C 0.093434 -0.093434
Log of Likelihood Function = -134647.
Number of Observations = 248369
Number of Positive Observations = 170964
Fraction of Positive Observations = 0.688347
Sum of Squared Residuals = 45110.8
R-squared = 0.153350
Fraction of Correct Predictions = 0.730216
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Appendix Table A5
Mexican Model Labor Force Participation ML Probit Estimates
Native, Higher-skilled
Standard
Parameter Estimate Error t-statistic
AREARW -46.0643 20.2122 -2.27903
RFAMINC 19.9034 1.14656 17.3592
KIDLT6 -.194098 .596017E-02 -32.5658
KID617 -.025811 .413460E-02 -6.24266
BLACK .134839 .070952 1.90042
WHITE .355892 .062215 5.72038
DBLACK -.328959 .074482 -4.41660
DWHITE -.301183 .065311 -4.61152
DED -.025589 .146034E-02 -17.5228
DX .019869 .146036E-02 13.6055
DXSQ -.107197E-02 .278087E-04 -38.5480
DIMG8090 -.322939 .074837 -4.31526
C 1.12338 .084711 13.2614
Standard Errors computed from analytic second derivatives (Newton)
dP/dX
0 1
AREARW 7.57394 -7.57394
RFAMINC -3.27253 3.27253
KIDLT6 0.031914 -0.031914
KID617 0.0042438 -0.0042438
BLACK -0.022170 0.022170
WHITE -0.058516 0.058516
DBLACK 0.054088 -0.054088
DWHITE 0.049521 -0.049521
DED 0.0042074 -0.0042074
DX -0.0032669 0.0032669
DXSQ 0.00017625 -0.00017625
DIMG8090 0.053098 -0.053098
C -0.18471 0.18471
Log of Likelihood Function = -83604.3
Number of Observations = 275623
Number of Positive Observations = 247762
Fraction of Positive Observations = 0.898916
Sum of Squared Residuals = 23336.4
R-squared = 0.684925E-01
Fraction of Correct Predictions = 0.899257
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Appendix Table A6
Mexican Model Labor Force Participation ML Probit Estimates
Foreign-born, Lower-skilled, Mexicans
Standard
Parameter Estimate Error t-statistic
AREARW 326.612 188.085 1.73651
RFAMINC 45.8073 5.53054 8.28261
KIDLT6 -.280559 .016288 -17.2252
KID617 -.049781 .010875 -4.57762
BLACK .201741 .783226 .257577
WHITE -.450715 .081139 -5.55482
DBLACK .125994 .807753 .155981
DWHITE .428945 .084985 5.04731
DED .018887 .354467E-02 5.32841
DX .024408 .373495E-02 6.53513
DXSQ -.782044E-03 .683280E-04 -11.4454
DIMG8090 -.259368 .027825 -9.32129
C .090804 .156783 .579172
Standard Errors computed from analytic second derivatives (Newton)
dP/dX
0 1
AREARW -121.91581 121.91581
RFAMINC -17.09870 17.09870
KIDLT6 0.1047 -0.10473
KID617 0.018582 -0.018582
BLACK -0.075305 0.075305
WHITE 0.16824 -0.16824
DBLACK -0.047030 0.047030
DWHITE -0.16011 0.16011
DED -0.0070502 0.0070502
DX -0.0091110 0.0091110
DXSQ 0.00029192 -0.00029192
DIMG8090 0.096815 -0.096815
C -0.033895 0.033895
Log of Likelihood Function = -7487.86
Number of Observations = 11498
Number of Positive Observations = 6045
Fraction of Positive Observations = 0.525744
Sum of Squared Residuals = 2638.10
R-squared = 0.798307E-01
Fraction of Correct Predictions = 0.621673
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Appendix Table A7
Mexican Model Labor Force Participation ML Probit Estimates
Foreign-born, Lower-skilled, Non-Mexicans
Standard
Parameter Estimate Error t-statistic
AREARW 513.323 99.4405 5.16212
RFAMINC 18.8780 2.33006 8.10194
KIDLT6 -.415248 .011742 -35.3655
KID617 -.104216 .795639E-02 -13.0983
BLACK .272277 .084406 3.22580
WHITE -.238858 .045165 -5.28853
DBLACK .025034 .088216 .283778
DWHITE .053862 .047700 1.12920
DED .016021 .201185E-02 7.96320
DX .017073 .209490E-02 8.14958
DXSQ -.824776E-03 .399819E-04 -20.6288
DIMG8090 -.338545 .015629 -21.6615
C .103879 .102992 1.00861
Standard Errors computed from analytic second derivatives (Newton)
dP/dX
0 1
AREARW -171.81270 171.81270
RFAMINC -6.31858 6.31858
KIDLT6 0.13899 0.034882
BLACK -0.091133 0.091133
WHITE 0.079947 -0.079947
DBLACK -0.0083790 0.0083790
DWHITE -0.018028 0.018028
DED -0.0053623 0.0053623
DX -0.0057143 0.0057143
DXSQ 0.00027606 -0.00027606
DIMG8090 0.11331 -0.11331
C -0.034769 0.034769
Log of Likelihood Function = -23111.0
Number of Observations = 39239
Number of Positive Observations = 25519
Fraction of Positive Observations = 0.650348
Sum of Squared Residuals = 7897.68
R-squared = 0.114888
Fraction of Correct Predictions = 0.692219
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Appendix Table A8
Mexican Model Labor Force Participation ML Probit Estimates
Foreign-born, Higher-skilled
Standard
Parameter Estimate Error t-statistic
AREARW 286.908 44.3974 6.46226
RFAMINC 97.4366 4.44469 21.9220
KIDLT6 .100829 .015647 6.44418
KID617 .051002 .999703E-02 5.10176
BLACK -.206484 .111559 -1.85089
WHITE -.027063 .066818 -.405023
DBLACK .151424 .118472 1.27815
DWHITE .063638 .069625 .914010
DED .237935E-02 .206830E-02 1.15039
DX .036828 .236676E-02 15.5603
DXSQ -.109184E-02 .441550E-04 -24.7274
DIMG8090 -.147804 .019277 -7.66733
C .505518 .090778 5.56875
Standard Errors computed from analytic second derivatives (Newton)
dP/dX
0 1
AREARW -42.39572 42.39572
RFAMINC -14.39800 14.39800
KIDLT6 -0.014899 0.014899
KID617 -0.0075365 0.0075365
BLACK 0.030512 -0.030512
WHITE 0.0039990 -0.0039990
DBLACK -0.022376 0.022376
DWHITE -0.0094036 0.0094036
DED -0.00035159 0.00035159
DX -0.0054419 0.0054419
DXSQ 0.00016134 -0.00016134
DIMG8090 0.021841 -0.021841
C -0.074699 0.074699
Log of Likelihood Function = -12770.3
Number of Observations = 46536
Number of Positive Observations = 42335
Fraction of Positive Observations = 0.909726
Sum of Squared Residuals = 3536.00
R-squared = 0.747712E-01
Fraction of Correct Predictions = 0.910327
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IMPACTS OF MIGRATION
Mexican Immigrants and Mexican
American Political Assimilation
Michael Rosenfeld*
There are many political dimensions of Mexican immigration and MexicanAmerican life in the U.S. Political life in the U.S., as elsewhere, includesthe realms of routine electoral politics where candidates seek votes, symbolic
politics where images of immigrants may be put to a variety of uses, legislative
politics where rights and privileges of different groups may be gained or lost, and
so on. The political relationship between Mexican immigrants and Mexican
Americans (a term which I will use in this paper to refer to U.S. born persons of
Mexican descent) is a multidimensional one that has evolved over time as the
Mexican American community has evolved politically, and as U.S. immigration
law has changed.
While at first it may seem that immigrants have little direct effect on routine
electoral politics in the U.S., because they cannot vote, there are in fact a number
of links between immigrants and electoral politics. Immigrants effect electoral
politics directly through census enumerations and decennial redistricting. U.S.
congressional districts, and all state legislative districts are apportioned on the ba-
sis of persons, rather than on the basis of citizens or adult citizens because of the
wording of article 1, section 2 of the U.S. constitution (the U.S. is quite unusual in
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this regard). In the aftermath of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and subsequent
court interpretations (see Guinier, 1991), some legislative districts have been de-
signed to be minority dominated, in order to insure greater minority representation
in the various legislative bodies. Because these districts are designed to contain a
certain number of people, rather than a certain number of adult citizens, Mexican
immigrants contribute to the electoral power of Mexican Americans by the weight
of their sheer numbers. Because of the presence of so many Mexican immigrants,
Mexican American districts have many fewer potential (and actual) voters than
other districts. Table 1 shows that in the 1992 U.S. elections, people of Mexican
descent (Mexican immigrants and Mexican Americans) cast only about 16 votes
per hundred persons, while non-Hispanic Whites cast about 50 votes per hundred
persons. The low number votes by persons of Mexican origin (Mexican immi-
grants and Mexican Americans) is due to a number of factors: younger population,
lower citizenship rates, along with relatively low registration and voting rates, but
the most important is the low adult citizenship rate of 54% as compared with 95%
for non-Hispanic Whites and 92% for non-Hispanic blacks.
Mexican immigrants also may represent a cost to Mexican Americans if the
presence of immigrants induces an anti-immigrant backlash in the non-Hispanic
native population. Political organizations that serve the Mexican American com-
munity fought against IRCA in 1986 because they feared that a policy of employer
sanctions that was intended to deter the employment of illegal Mexican immi-
grants might lead to wholesale discrimination against Mexican Americans and other
Hispanic groups as well. IRCA also included an amnesty provision for long term
undocumented residents, a provision which allowed more than 1.5 million Mexi-
can immigrants to legalize their residence in the U.S., so the opposition of the
Hispanic political organizations to IRCA ought to be viewed as evidence that im-
migrants are not the primary constituents of these U.S. based Hispanic organiza-
tions. Generally, if the anti-immigrant backlash takes on racial, ethnic, or discrimi-
natory overtones, then such a backlash will necessarily make life more difficult for
the non-immigrant coethnics (in this case Mexican Americans). Weintraub (1996)
and Espenshade and Belanger (1996) take up such issues as California’s Proposi-
tion 187, and other well known uses or abuses of the image of immigrants in U.S.
popular politics.
Mexican immigrants are incorporated into life in the U.S. through communi-
ties or barrios that are already densely settled by Mexican Americans and other
Mexican immigrants. In these barrios the Mexican American political organiza-
tions, civic organizations and elected officials constitute the local elites. As the
Mexican American community has evolved politically over the last 30 years, and
in particular as the Mexican Americans have become assimilated into routine elec-
toral politics in the U.S., the nature of the barrios has changed. As the nature of the
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barrios has changed, the political dynamics between the Mexican immigrants and
the Mexican Americans has necessarily changed. In this paper I examine the tra-
jectory of Mexican American politics, especially the growth of electoralism, and
discuss how these changes may have effected the political dynamics between Mexi-
can immigrants and Mexican Americans.
It is crucial to keep Mexican immigrants and Mexican Americans separate
empirically and analytically, especially when studying political issues. Mexican
immigrants have long been known to have the lowest levels of naturalization, and
the most tenacious maintenance of their native language among all major immi-
grant groups in the U.S. The attachment of Mexican immigrants to American poli-
tics is, therefore relatively low. Surveys of political opinion have revealed that
Mexican Americans have a surprisingly low level of political solidarity for immi-
gration issues (see De la Garza et al, 1992). One cannot assume, therefore, that
Mexican immigrants and Mexican Americans share a common political perspec-
tive, although some processes such as naturalization have undergone tremendous
changes since 1994 such that the future political statuses of Mexican immigrants
and Mexican Americans are hardly certain (see concluding sections).
Most studies that deal with the political assimilation of Mexican Americans,
such as J. Garcia (1987), are methodologically individualistic, that is they address
the assimilation of individual persons. In this paper, political assimilation is used
the way it is used by Dahl (1961) to mean the political assimilation of minority
groups, rather than the assimilation of individuals. The relevant part of Dahl’s famous
study of New Haven is the section that details the political incorporation of Irish
immigrants in the 19th century. Dahl argues that ethnic identity politics and
nationalistic politics are a transitional phase for minority groups; in the case of the
Irish in New Haven these former immigrants and working class citizens came to
hold a share of mainstream political power in the course of three or four generations.
Alvarez (1973) proposed, and M. T. García (1989) explored in greater depth a
generational interpretation of recent Mexican American history that has proved to
be quite influential. García refers to 1930-1950 generation as the Mexican American
generation, and the 1960s as the Chicano generation. The Mexican American
generation was typified mainly by assimilationist, legalistic organizations like
LULAC (League of United Latin American Citizens), founded in 1929, which held
its meetings in English and excluded Mexican nationals from membership. The
Mexican American generation was succeeded by the radical Chicano generation of
the 1960s.
M. T. García’s analysis does not go past the Chicano generation. I. M. García
(1996) attempts to fill the void in M. T. García’s analysis by suggesting that the
recent, post 1975 generation of Mexican Americans is the ‘Hispanic generation.’
Acuña (1988) refers to the current period as the ‘age of the brokers,’ by which he
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means that since the mid 1970s Mexican American politics have been dominated
by elites (businessmen, politicians, bankers) who mediate between the wider Ameri-
can power structure and the Mexican American community. One of the salient
changes in Mexican American politics since the Chicano generation has been the
growth of Mexican American electoral participation, especially the new presence
of Mexican Americans at many levels of elected office. Using data on Hispanic
surnamed officials in state legislatures, state executive offices, and the U.S. Con-
gress, I show how Mexican Americans have undergone a quantum leap in electoral
politics since 1970.
The emergence of Hispanics as an electoral force has been treated for the case
of California (Browning, Marshall and Tabb, 1984; Guerra 1989; Guerra 1991). I
extend the analysis to include the rest of the Southwestern U.S., and also offer
some new ideas about how electoral representation ought to be measured. De la
Garza et al (1982) notes that prior to 1965, there were hardly any Mexican Ameri-
can elected officials in all of the southwestern U.S, and further notes that at the
time of publication Mexican Americans were still greatly underrepresented. This
paper takes a somewhat different approach, by focusing on a transition from elec-
toral insignificance to electoral significance. For the Mexican Americans in the
southwestern U.S., this transition takes place in the 1970s (except in New Mexico,
where it took place much earlier). The transition from electoral insignificance to
electoral significance has important implications for how immigrant minority groups
are assimilated into U.S. culture.
Methodology
The standard measure of electoral representation is the parity score (Robinson
and Dye, 1978; Browning, Marshall and Tabb, 1984), which goes by a variety of
different names in the literature, but consists simply of this: specific group per-
centage of total elected officials divided by the same specific group’s percentage of
total population. A group that makes up 12% of a state’s population, but only 6% of
that state’s elected officials would have a parity score of 0.5.
1.a Parity Score =
 (#of Hispanic elected officials/Total # of elected officials)
(#of Hispanic persons/Total# of persons)
Or
1.b Parity Score =
 (#of Hispanic elected officials/Total # of elected officials)
(#of Hispanic adult citizens/Total# of adult citizens)
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Because of the winner take all election format in the U.S., and because of the
established preference of majority white voters for majority white candidates
(Guinier, 1991), minority groups are almost always underrepresented (i.e., have
parity scores of less than 1). Some authors, most notably Guinier (1991) have
questioned the significance of increased numbers of minority elected officials, on
the grounds that electoral representation does not guarantee real political gains
for the minority group. Browning, Marshall, and Tabb (1984) have made the
argument that minority groups may only enjoy the fruits of increased political
power if their representatives are part of a governing coalition; clearly electoral
representation is a necessary, but not by itself a sufficient condition for minority
political empowerment.
Figure 1 shows the parity scores for Hispanic surnamed elected officials for
the 5 states with the largest percentage of Mexican Americans (Arizona, Califor-
nia, Colorado, New Mexico, and Texas) from 1960 to 1995. The 1960 starting
point is far enough back to capture the entire trajectory of Hispanic electoralism in
every state except New Mexico. The universe of elected officials in each state is
the following: state wide elected offices (governor, comptroller, lieutenant gover-
nor, etc.),´ state legislature (house and senate), U.S. congress and U.S. senate. His-
panic ethnicity of elected officials is determined by surname. Using surname to
determine ethnicity is less efficient than individual self identification, but the U.S.
census did not fully rely on self identification for Hispanic ethnicity until 1980
(Bean and Tienda, 1987), and national lists of Hispanic elected officials are only
available after 1984 (NALEO, 1994 and Brimhall-Vargas, NALEO educational fund,
personal communication). Surname identification is therefore the only consistent
way to address Hispanic political representation over time, as pre 1984 studies
have done (see Lemus, 1974). For the sake of consistency, the official U.S. census
lists of Spanish surnames (U.S. Census 1960, U.S. Census 1970, see also Bean and
Tienda 1987) were used to determine the Hispanic ethnicity of elected officials, so
that whatever biases are built into the list of surnames essentially vanishes as a
result of being in both the numerator and the denominator of the parity score1. The
random error aspect of using Hispanic surname as a marker for Hispanic ethnicity
is somewhat controlled by the use of large sample sizes in the political universe—
the states average more than 15 Hispanic surnamed officials each by 1995, so the
random misidentification of one or two officials does not does not alter the long
term trends. Since the long term trends are precisely what are of interest here, the
use of larger political universes2 (larger, for instance, than Browning, Marshall and
Tabb, 1984) serves to minimize the influence of the stochastic nature of individual
election results.
The second element in the parity scores is the population denominator. In
this case I take a different approach from the previous studies by using only adult
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citizen population instead of total population. Only adult (over 18 years of age)
citizens have the right to vote in the U.S. In a representative democracy, those
who do not have the right to vote are not, strictly speaking, represented. Pachon
(1991) describes the lack of rights that non-citizens face, and the problem that
non-citizenship presents for Hispanic (especially Mexican American) political
empowerment. Because the Mexican origin population includes so many
immigrant non citizens (although this seems to be changing—see below), previous
studies of political representation have overstated the under representation of
Mexican Americans by including non-citizens among the minority population.
In the studies of Black political representation (like Robinson and Dye, 1978),
Figure 1. Hispanic Surnamed Elected Officials
in the Southwestern U.S., 1960–1995
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very little bias is introduced by using total population instead of adult citizen
population because whites and blacks have citizenship rates and age profiles that
are very similar (see Table 1). The studies that have measured Hispanic political
participation (Browning, Marshall and Tabb, 1984; Guerra 1989; Guerra 1991)
have adopted this same strategy of using total population figures, without taking
into account the large problem of non-citizenship, and the smaller problem of an
Hispanic population that is younger, and therefore has more non voters than the
wider society. The data for adult citizen populations comes from the Public Use
Micro Samples of the 1960 and 1970 census, and the November Current
Population Surveys of 1978-1992.3
Findings
California, Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, and Colorado form the dominantly
Mexican Southwest4. Among these five states, all but New Mexico show a pattern
of electoral emergence in the early to mid 1970s5. The timing of the emergence of
Mexican American electoralism is consistent with de la Garza et al. (1982), as well
as with the authors who have reported findings only on California (Browning,
Marshall and Tabb, 1984; Guerra 1991). Crucial here is the identification of a gen-
eral Mexican American entrance into electoral politics, what I will call the Mexi-
can American electoral generation, starting in the early 1970s.6
What I endeavor to measure, in Figure 1, is the emergence of Hispanic
electoralism, and more specifically Mexican American electoralism in the 5
Southwestern states. This emergence is judged by achievement of a steady level of
electoral representation of at least 0.5 on the parity scale. This level corresponds
roughly to Robinson and Dye’s (1978) findings for the equilibrium level achieved
by blacks in city politics in the U.S. Prior to 1970 there were a trickle of Hispanic
elected officials. Early pioneers include Raymond Tellez, mayor of El Paso (elected
in 1957—see M. Garcia 1989); Henry Gonzalez, congressman from Texas (elected
1960); Edward Roybal, congressman from California (elected 1962), and ‘Los Cinco’
who were elected to power in Crystal City, Texas in 1963 (see Shockley, 1974).
The early pioneers are important historically, but what is more important
sociologically is the achievement by a minority group of a steady and significant
level of representation throughout the political system. This steady and significant
level of electoral representation is both a marker of, and an engine for future political
assimilation by the minority group.7
It is important to note from the parity scores of Arizona, California, Texas, and
Colorado that the gains in Mexican American elected representation that occurred
during the 1970s reached a new stable level by 1980. The idea of a new threshold
is important: the parity levels (roughly 0.5 to 0.8) reached in Arizona, Colorado,
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California and Texas by the end of the 1970s have declined somewhat since 1980
but remained greater than 0.5 for 15 years, and this is what justifies the identifica-
tion of a distinct phase of Mexican American electoralism.
Discussion
Where are the historical antecedents and causes of the electoral generation?
The 1975 extension of special protection under the Voting Rights Act to Hispanics
(especially Mexican Americans in Texas—see Thernstrom, 1987) did not have
important effects until the next period of decennial legislative redistricting, after
1980. Since Figure 1 shows that the crucial transition in Mexican American
electoralism occurred before 1980, the transition cannot be due to the direct effects
of the Voting Rights Act. In fact, both Thernstrom (1987) and Skerry (1993) point
to the already developed state of Mexican electoralism in 1975 as evidence for
their argument that Mexican Americans did not need the Voting Rights Act’s
substantial special protections. The comparison between the relatively developed
state of Mexican American electoralism in 1975, and the abject exclusion of blacks
from the electoral process in the American South in 1965 (the specific situation
whose amelioration was the original goal of the Voting Rights Act in 1965) is
instructive in this regard.
In order to address the origins of the electoral generation (and, by extension,
its implications) I turn now to a more historical treatment of Mexican American
politics. The starting point for this analysis is the generational view of Mexican
American history introduced by Alvarez (1973), explored by García (1989), and
implied by Acuña (1988), in which a Mexican American generation dominated by
assimilationist organizations (like LULAC) in the 1950s is succeeded by a radical
generation in the 1960s, and early 1970s which is in turn succeeded by a more
assimilated, moderate period I call the electoral generation.
In its heyday (1968-1974) the Raza Unida Party (RUP) produced a stream
of dedicated political cadres who helped to extend the reach of Mexican
Americans into the electoral system in the U.S. These early forays into electoral
politics included local elections in Crystal City, Texas and three races for governor
of Texas. The first Mexican American political candidates in Illinois were both
Chicano activists: John Chico in 1969 (see Acuña, 1988) and Rudy Lozano, a
leader in the radical Chicano nationalist group CASA8 (Centro de Acción Social
Autónomo—see Taller de Estudios Comunitarios, n.d.) who was narrowly
defeated in the Democratic primary for alderman in Chicago’s 22nd ward in
1983. Other authors, including Guinier (1991) and Browning, Marshall and Tabb
(1984) have noted that many of the first minority politicians have come from
activist backgrounds.
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Although the radicals played a crucial role in breaching electoral barriers,
ironically the new electoral political strength proved to be a counter balance to the
influence of the radicals, and groups like the RUP receded from prominence in the
1970s9. Ramsey Muñiz, the RUP candidate for governor of Texas got about 200,000
votes in 1972 and again in 1974. In 1978, with the RUP in disarray, their Texas
gubernatorial candidate Mario Campean got only 15,000 votes (I. M. García, 1989).
As the RUP lost influence, more moderate and mainstream political organizations,
like Mexican American Democrats (MAD) stepped in to take their place.
In a classic account, Dahl (1961: 34) describes the emergence in 19th century
New Haven of an ethnically based (mostly Irish) immigrant politics that challenged
the patrician status quo in that city: “The very success of politicians who use the
ethnic approach leads to the obsolescence of their strategy. As assimilation
progresses, new unities and cleavages supersede the old....” Portes and Stepick
(1993: 215) cite Dahl, and have made the same point with regards to Cuban poli-
tics in Miami: “... ethnic politics provides an effective vehicle for convergence
because the achievement of political power socializes immigrants into the func-
tioning of mainstream institutions and gives them the necessary ‘voice’ to feel that
they are part of those institutions.” Politically assimilationist organizations such as
NALEO (National Association of Latino Elected and appointed Officials) and
SWVRP (South West Voter Registration Project) were founded in the 1970s, around
the time when Mexican American electoralism became entrenched, to register
Mexican American citizens, and to promote the idea of civic and electoral partici-
pation to Mexican Americans. SWVRP was founded by Willie Velasquez, a former
RUP activist (I. M. García, 1989).
The new Mexican American electoral elite face a number of structural barriers
in their quest to further integrate their constituents into routine American electoral
politics. One barrier is, of course, the continuing stream of new Mexican immigrants.
As I noted earlier, Mexican American legislative districts have many fewer potential
and actual voters than other districts. The presence of so many electorally non
viable adults tends to dilute the community’s interest in electoral politics, and limits
the strength of the bond between the elected officials and their constituents. This
situation, referred to by Skerry (1993: 249) somewhat hyperbolically as the problem
of ‘rotten boroughs’ may increase Mexican Americans’ cynicism about electoral
politics, but I think it would be hard to demonstrate that Mexican American politicians
are any more out of touch with their constituents than other politicians. A second
argument that has sometimes been proposed is that Mexican Americans are passive
and cynical about electoral politics because of lessons learned from decades of
experience with bureaucratic authoritarianism in Mexico. There are, however,
millions of immigrants in the U.S. from countries considerably less democratic
than Mexico, so this argument may be less than convincing.
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The transition to the electoral generation has produced gains, but it has also
left gaps in the political avenues open to Mexican Americans. The radical Chicano
organizations were much more inclusive of immigrants, both legal and undocu-
mented, in their rhetoric and in their political organizing than is the current spec-
trum of electorally oriented Mexican American civic organizations. The transition
to electoral politics has meant a change from politics based on ethnicity to politics
based on U.S. citizenship. The absence of an effective, powerful Chicano national-
ist organization (an absence which is a direct legacy of the electoral generation’s
success) has left the Mexican American community with weakened defenses against
attacks, such as California’s Proposition 187 which explicitly targeted undocu-
mented Mexican immigrants and also raised the level of xenophobia high enough
to represent a threat to Mexican Americans in California.
The enormous flow of immigrants from Mexico represents political benefits
as well as costs to the Mexican American community. Since the immigrants of
today are often the parents of the Mexican Americans of tomorrow, the current
wave of immigration will be the driving force behind a dramatic expansion of the
Mexican American electoral base early in the next century. This electoral expan-
sion may have important consequences in the electoral balance of power between
whites, blacks and other ethnic groups. Skerry (1993) argues that while Mexican
American political organizations tend to identify themselves with a coalition of
minority interests, Mexican Americans themselves are deeply ambivalent about
their minority status. While Mexican American politicians in the U.S. congress
tend to find much common ground with black congressional leaders (both groups
are predominantly Democratic, mostly urban, and largely progressive on fiscal is-
sues), on the local level such black-Mexican coalitions have proven much harder to
create or sustain. It is by no means certain, therefore, that the explosive growth of
the Mexican American population will lead to political empowerment of other
minority groups, such as blacks.
In presidential politics, the concentration of Mexican Americans in three
important states (California, Texas, and Illinois) could potentially give Mexican
American voters an important amount of leverage, but this leverage would depend
on the state in question being very closely contested, and on Mexican American
voters turning out at a high rate and voting as a block. While Mexican American
voters have generally favored Democratic candidates over Republican in
presidential elections in proportions almost high enough to qualify as ‘block
voting,’ the low turnout of Mexican Americans, and the lower fund raising potential
of the Mexican American community compared to other groups means that
national candidates are likely to continue (at least in the short term) to view the
Mexican American electorate as a marginal, rather than a central player. DeSipio
and Rocha (1992) argued that Dukakis’ successful courting of Mexican American
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voters and organizations during the 1988 Democratic primaries was a key
ingredient in his successful run for the nomination, especially in the Southwest.
They also note, however, that once the primaries were over Latino political
interests were quickly marginalized.
Finally, the political status of Mexican immigrants both in the U.S. and back
home in Mexico has undergone rapid changes in the 1990s with eventual outcomes
that are far from certain. There is substantial evidence that the long-standing trend
of low naturalization rates for Mexican immigrants is being reversed. Naturaliza-
tion applications received by the INS had been steadily below 300,000 for many
years but rose to more than 500,000 in fiscal year 1995, 1.3 million in fiscal year
1996, and are expected to be even higher in 1997 (Migration News, 4 /97). Three
factors seem to be motivating this unprecedented increase. First, the Democratic
party in the U.S. applied pressure to speed up the naturalization process prior to the
elections of 1996, because immigrants (especially Hispanic immigrants) were viewed
as potential supporters of the Democratic party. The deluge of naturalization appli-
cations, and the reported pressure by the Clinton administration on the INS to speed
the process up led to some embarrassing errors, including the failure to properly
screen some applicants for prior criminal records (Migration News, 4 /97). The
second factor has been changes in Mexican law which allow Mexicans who natu-
ralize as U.S. citizens to retain their Mexican citizenship (which includes the right
to own certain kinds of land in Mexico), and the law will also allow Mexican citi-
zens in the U.S. to vote in Mexican elections as early as the year 2,000 (Migration
News, 6 /97). These changes in Mexican law have removed important barriers that
previously kept many Mexican immigrants from naturalizing. The third set of fac-
tors include the 1996 welfare reform and the general political climate which has
targeted immigrants (even legal immigrants) and limited the social services and
benefits for which they are eligible. In an anti-immigrant political environment,
U.S. citizenship carries more benefits. If the new trend toward naturalization con-
tinues, the political power of Mexican Americans will undoubtedly grow because
the number of potential voters will grow, and Mexican Americans will move closer
towards fulfillment of their potential in electoral politics.
Notes
*The author would like to thank Marta Tienda for helpful comments and Fay Booker
for research assistance. This research has been supported by the U.S.-Mexico Binational
Commission on Immigration.
1. Bean and Tienda (1987) discuss the fact that the official U.S. census list of Hispanic
surnames changed from one census to the next, so that census counts of Hispanics are not
strictly comparable.
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2. By far the largest survey of Hispanic political representation is NALEO (1994),
whose data includes officials down to the school board level, but their data only goes back
to 1984 and is therefore of only limited use in studying the long term trends.
3. The Hispanic share of the adult citizen population is much more stable than
the Hispanic share of total population, because the latter reflects highly variable and
difficult to measure levels of legal and especially illegal immigration.  The 1960
census did not ask about citizenship, so citizenship rates for 1960-1970 have been
determined by linear extrapolation from the rest of the data set.  Hispanic share of
adult citizen population in 1993-1995 is set to be equal to the Hispanic adult citizen
share in 1992.
4. Among the other in my sample that I do not present here, Illinois has the smallest
Hispanic population (just over 4% of total adult citizens in 1992) of the states in our sample
and does not cross the 0.5 parity level until 1993.  New York, with its heavily Puerto Rican
Hispanic population (Hispanics make up about 6.5% of the adult citizen population of
New York in 1992), also does not cross the 0.5 parity level until 1993.  Both New York
and Illinois show signs of a breakthrough into significant electoral representation, but the
signs are too recent to allow for any conclusions at this time.  Florida, with its mainly
Cuban Hispanic population crosses the 0.5 parity level in the late 1980s.  There is enough
of a pattern in the data to conclude that the Cuban American population, which is located
mainly in Florida, has made a transition into the realm of electoral politics.  Given this
evidence, I can identify a Cuban American electoral generation, beginning in the early to
mid 1980s.
5. New Mexican exceptionalism has frequently been commented upon in the lit-
erature (Sierra, 1992; Pachon 1991; Padilla and Ramírez, 1974).  The New Mexican
population consists of Hispanics of Mexican extraction and also of the descendants
of the Spanish conquistadors, called Hispanos (see Bean and Tienda, 1987).  The
citizenship rate of the Spanish surnamed population of New Mexico has fluctuated
between 85% and 95% between 1970 and 1992.  By comparison, less than 50% of
California’s Hispanic population are citizens (based on the CPS figures for 1988-
1992).  Among the other states, only Colorado has citizenship rates equal to those of
New Mexico, and these high citizenship rates are also partly due to a centuries old
population of Hispanos.
6. Because the data in this study consist of elected officials, the contours of Figure 1 do
not describe the years of grassroots political mobilization that may precede the eventual
electoral breakthrough.
7. It is assumed that the first electoral gains are probably made at the level of school
boards and local offices, which are not captured in this data set.  The achievement of sizable
elective representation in state legislatures, state executive positions, and the U.S. congress
generally represents a subsequent threshold.
8. CASA competed with the RUP for influence in the 1970s, and absorbed some of the
RUPs activists when the RUP faded from the scene in the late 1970s.
9. This is not to suggest, of course, that radicalism has disappeared from the Mexi-
can American political spectrum.  The tradition of radicalism is far too rich to have
disappeared, but it has certainly ceded its central position to the assimilationism of
electoral politics.
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IMPACTS OF MIGRATION
Transferability of Skills and the
Economic Rewards to U.S.
Employment for Return
Migrants in Mexico
Steven S. Zahniser & Michael J. Greenwood*
Introduction
Migration from Mexico to the United States is substantial. Mexico is thesingle most important source of legal immigration to the United Statesand the primary source of unauthorized migrants. Between 1989 and
1995, the United States admitted more than 2.5 million persons of Mexican birth
as legal resident aliens. Over two million of these immigrants utilized provisions
of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), which gave certain
unauthorized entrants to the United States the opportunity to become legal residents.
In 1995, the United States admitted as legal resident aliens 89,932 persons born in
Mexico, of whom 2,972 were IRCA legalizations.1 Moreover, between 1989 and
1994, the U.S. Border Patrol located 6.4 million persons from Mexico who were
deemed deportable.2
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Employment and earnings opportunities in the United States relative to Mexico
are clearly a primary factor driving the flow of migrants. Massey et al., (1987)
document how the costs of later Mexico-U.S. migration are reduced by earlier
flows. These cost reductions perpetuate and even increase the flows over time
(Massey, 1988). Although large numbers of additional migrants remain more or
less permanently in the United States each year, the flow long has been character-
ized by return migration to Mexico (Massey et al., 1987; Mines, 1984; Ranney and
Kossoudji, 1983; and Bustamante, 1977).3
Migration is an investment in human capital. As such, migrants themselves may
anticipate a differentially higher return to their labor services in the United States
than in Mexico. During their residence in the United States, migrants presumably
learn new skills and may obtain additional education. For example, an agricultural
laborer in Mexico may become an agricultural laborer in the United States, where
new and different agricultural skills are acquired. In time, the individual may move
to an urban area and work in endeavors that have little direct connection to agricul-
ture, such as in restaurants or factories. If such persons subsequently return to Mexico,
they bring with them knowledge and skills not acquired in Mexico. If this newly
acquired human capital earns a reward in Mexico, then returning migrants will enjoy
higher earnings than otherwise comparable individuals who never have migrated to
the United States. Moreover, the anticipation of higher future returns in Mexico
resulting from a period of U.S. employment may enter into the decisions of Mexicans
regarding whether to migrate to the United States.
For various Mexican communities of origin, a number of case studies have
attempted to assess the economic consequences of remittances sent home by mi-
grants in the United States or U.S. savings brought back by returning migrants.4
For the most part, these studies do not acknowledge that new and different skills
are accumulated when the migrant works in the United States, that these skills are
more or less transferable back to Mexico, and that U.S.-acquired skills may have a
payoff in Mexico. The probable reason for this prior lack of attention to this poten-
tially important channel of influence on source communities is that until fairly
recently comprehensive data relating to the income or earnings of Mexican mi-
grants and nonmigrants have been unavailable.
In this paper, we utilize a unique data set collected by the Mexican Migration
Project to explore the relationship between U.S. migration experience and the
Mexican earnings of return migrants. We present evidence that return migrants
reap substantial returns to their U.S. work experience in the Mexican labor market.
Moreover, we advance a theoretical argument to explain why this finding is not
altogether unexpected. Specifically, if a migrant’s reservation wage in the United
States is an increasing function of his or her U.S. experience, then the expected
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wage in Mexico necessary to induce returning to Mexico is also an increasing
function of that experience.
The paper is organized as follows. The following section, “Data,” describes
the data used in the paper and identifies their source. The section titled “Theoreti-
cal Model and Econometrics” lays out the theoretical model that guides our think-
ing regarding the reservation wage argument and describes the econometric tech-
niques that we employ. The section titled “Empirical Results” discusses our em-
pirical results, and the final section provides a summary and conclusions.
Data
The data for this paper are drawn from the Mexican Migration Project, an
ongoing study of the migration experiences of households throughout western and
central Mexico. The project, which is headed by Jorge Durand and Douglas Massey,
has its roots in a 1982 study of four communities in the states of Jalisco and
Michoacán (Massey et al., 1987) which have been the origin of much migration to
the United States. Since 1987, the project has visited one or more new communi-
ties on an almost annual basis. Although the communities are not chosen at ran-
dom, an effort is made to examine communities of varied sizes and economic bases
in each state of the region. At this time, data are available for 43 communities in
eight Mexican states. Table 1 provides an overview of these communities and their
prominent features.
Typically the project interviews 200 household heads selected at random in
each community. However, some household heads were in the United States at the
time that interviews were conducted in their hometowns in Mexico. For this rea-
son, the project traces and interviews about 20 such individuals from each Mexi-
can community in the United States. Thus the overall sample contains persons who
have never migrated to the United States, migrants who have returned to Mexico,
and migrants who had not returned to Mexico by the time that the Mexican Migra-
tion Project visited their respective communities of origin.
Respondents are asked a variety of questions concerning their current demo-
graphic characteristics, the monthly income of the household head, and their fami-
lies’ migration experiences. The head of household is also asked to reconstruct his
or her employment and migration history, which is used to calculate total U.S.
migration experience. The interviews utilized in this paper occurred between 1982
and 1996, and all monthly income figures are converted to 1994 new pesos.
For the purposes of our analysis, we have excluded observations on household
heads over 65 years of age. The resulting data set contains 5,273 observations,
4,884 drawn from the 43 communities in Mexico and 389 conducted in the United
1136
Table 1
Sample Information
Observa-
tions
in Basic
State/ Survey 1990 Political Sample Size Earnings
Community Type Year Population Category Mexico U.S. Model
Colima
Town 1994 7,000 Municipal seat 200 20 149
Guanajuato
Smaller urban area 1987 52,000 Municipal seat 201 20 56
Metropolitan area 1987 868,000 Municipal seat 200 0 149
Smaller urban area 1988 17,000 Municipal seat 200 22 139
Village 1988 2,000 Tenencia 150 10 119
Smaller urban area 1990 21,000 Municipal seat 200 20 137
Metropolitan area 1991 363,000 Municipal seat 200 20 133
Village 1991 1,000 Tenencia 100 10 56
Smaller urban area 1992 34,000 Municipal seat 200 15 127
Smaller urban area 1992 24,000 Municipal seat 200 15 152
Guerrero
Metropolitan area 1993 101,000 Municipal seat 100 0 86
Town 1995 7,000 Municipal seat 153 0 99
Town (1) 1995 35,000 Tenencia 100 0 25
Jalisco
Village 1982 3,000 Municipal seat 106 14 57
Village 1982 2,000 Tenencia 94 6 34
Town 1982 12,000 Municipal seat 200 20 100
Metropolitan area 1982 2,870,000 State capital 200 16 84
Town 1988 4,000 Municipal seat 200 22 62
Town 1988 5,000 Municipal seat 200 20 99
Village 1988 3,000 Tenencia 200 15 117
Smaller urban area 1,991 31,000 Municipal seat 200 20 115
Village 1992 1,000 Tenencia 100 7 60
Metropolitan area 1992 74,000 Municipal seat 201 20 116
Michoacán
Town 1982 7,000 Municipal seat 200 20 98
Town 1989 6,000 Tenencia 200 20 125
Smaller urban area 1989 32,000 Municipal seat 200 20 126
Village 1989 2,000 Tenencia 150 20 57
Town 1990 7,000 Municipal seat 200 20 123
Metropolitan area 1991 493,000 State capital 200 20 165
Metropolitan area 1992 217,000 Municipal seat 200 13 134
Nayarit
Smaller urban area 1990 20,000 Municipal seat 200 20 106
Town 1990 12,000 Tenencia 200 20 119
San Luís Potosí
Metropolitan area 1993 526,000 State capital 200 0 92
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Table 1 (Continued)
Observa-
tions
in Basic
State/ Survey 1990 Political Sample Size Earnings
Community Type Year Population Category Mexico U.S. Model
Smaller urban area 1994 42,000 Municipal seat 200 0 112
Town 1995 13,000 Municipal seat 201 0 117
Village 1995 1,000 Tenencia 102 0 55
Village 1995 1,000 Tenencia 100 0 41
Zacatecas
Town 1991 8,000 Municipal seat 365 20 176
Village 1991 1,000 Tenencia 187 0 39
Metropolitan area 1994 109,000 State capital 239 10 197
Village 1995 2,000 Tenencia 149 0 54
Smaller urban area 1995 34,000 Municipal seat 201 0 134
Village 1995 1,000 Tenencia 111 0 26
(1) Population figure for this community reflects the population of the entire municipality (simi-
lar to a county in the United States) and not just the population of the town. Population figures
are rounded to nearest non-zero thousand.
A tenencia is a community that is not the seat of government of the municipality to which it
belongs.
Sources: Mexican Migration Project, Table 1: Sample Information, web page (http://
lexis.pop.upenn.edu/mexmig/sampletable.html), 1997; and INEGI (1993).
States. Of the 4,884 heads of household who were interviewed in Mexico, 4,367
were employed at the time of the interview. These 4,367 individuals are the focus
of our investigation, but the information provided by those interviewed in the United
States and those not working in Mexico is also used in the analysis.
Sample statistics are reported in Table 2. Of the 4,367 Mexican household
heads in the sample who were employed at the time of the interview, 1,341 (30.7
percent) reported U.S. migration experience. This experience ranges from one month
to over 45 years, but 72.4 percent of those with migration experience resided in the
United States for five years or less. Migration experience also varies considerably
by community, since certain communities have had considerable involvement for
many years in what is widely seen as a cumulative phenomenon, whereas others
have had little or no experience (Massey, 1994). The models described below
therefore contain 42 community dummy variables that control for community
differences as well as unobserved community characteristics that could influence
income or earnings.
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Table 2
Means and Standard Deviations for Observations
Used in Earnings Regression
Standard
Variable Mean Deviation
Monthly income (in 1994 new pesos) 1,309.85 2,632.13
Return migrants 1,652.94 4,131.42
Non-migrants 1,229.91 1,156.99
Age (in years) 41.5661 11.6666
Mexican experience (in years) 28.2442 14.1155
U.S. experience (in years) 1.5119 4.0673
Female 0.0753 0.2640
Education (in years) 5.8099 4.7279
College educated 0.1049 0.3064
Married 0.9020 0.2974
U.S. migration experience of father
precedes that of individual 0.1800 0.3842
U.S. migration experience of sibling
precedes that of individual 0.3151 0.4646
Has relatives in the United States 0.6648 0.4721
Legal U.S. resident 0.0985 0.2980
Agricultural land owned (in hectares) 1.6375 18.1035
Owned agricultural land 0.1044 0.3058
Number of workers in household 1.8425 1.2406
Number of nonworkers in household 3.6011 2.1080
Spouse works 0.1523 0.3593
Business owner 0.2574 0.4372
Street vendor of food 0.0307 0.1725
Street vendor of goods 0.0181 0.1333
Grocery store 0.0369 0.1885
Cattle trader 0.0048 0.0692
Agricultural goods trader 0.0064 0.0798
Manufactured goods trader 0.0121 0.1095
Tortilla mill 0.0050 0.0708
Butcher shop 0.0046 0.0675
Restaurant 0.0073 0.0853
Workshop 0.0348 0.1833
Repair shop or garage 0.0080 0.0892
Small assembly shop 0.0039 0.0623
Other type of business 0.0584 0.2345
Occupational match 0.2214 0.4153
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Theoretical Model and Econometrics
Individual i’s decision to return to Mexico from the United States involves a
comparison of expected utility in the two countries. Let i’s expected utility in the
United States be
(1)     ui = ui[wius(usexpi), oyius , ei],
and that in Mexico be
(2)     ui* = ui*[wimx , oyimx - ci, ei],
where wius(usexpi) is the wage rate in the United States, which is an increasing
function of U.S. experience; wimx is the expected wage rate in Mexico; oyius (oyimx)
is income from sources other than labor in the United States (Mexico); ci is the
fixed cost of moving from the United States to Mexico; and ei measures unobserv-
able taste factors. The individual returns to Mexico if and only if
(3)     ui* > ui.
The probability of returning to Mexico is given by
(4)     P[i returns] = P[ui*(wimx ,oyimx - ci, ei) > ui(wius{usexpi}, oyius , ei)].
Table 2 (Continued)
Standard
Variable Mean Deviation
Irregularly employed 0.0426 0.2020
Professional 0.0939 0.2917
Technician or manual laborer 0.0121 0.1095
Office worker 0.0360 0.1712
Salesperson 0.1216 0.3269
Industrial owner or supervisor 0.0048 0.0692
Skilled manual worker 0.2114 0.4083
Unskilled manual worker 0.1161 0.3204
Agricultural worker 0.2386 0.4263
Service worker 0.1287 0.3349
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If explicit functions are specified for ui and ui* and if these are solved for ei, the
probability of returning to Mexico is given by
(5)     P[i returns]=P[ei > z(wimx , wius{usexpi}, oyius , oyimx , ci)].
Now
(6a)   Mi = 1 iff ei > z(.), and
(6b)   Mi = 0 otherwise,
where Mi = 1 indicates that individual i returned to Mexico and Mi = 0 indicates that
the individual did not return.
The reservation wage wimx=imx0 is the value of wimx for which
(7)     ui*[wimx , oyimx - ci , ei] = ui[wius(usexpi), oyius , ei].
Thus the reservation wage is an increasing function of U.S. experience:
(8)     wimx=imx0 = f [wius(usexpi), oyius , oyimx , ci)].
Consequently, the more U.S. experience an individual has, the higher the ex-
pected wage in the United States, and thus the greater the expected wage in Mexico
that is required to induce his or her return. More nonlabor income in the United
States, such as from transfer payments, and higher costs of migrating back to Mexico
also increase the reservation wage.
The econometric model estimated here is a standard human-capital, log-earn-
ings function that includes variables for education, Mexican experience and its
square, and U.S. experience and its square. Education is measured as the number
of years of schooling completed. A dummy variable also is included for those who
have education beyond the preparatoria (12 years of education), which corresponds
to a high school education in the United States. In the types of communities in-
cluded in the sample, individuals with any higher education are fairly rare and may
thus earn a differential return due to their possible status as community leaders or,
in general, community resources.
The variable for Mexican labor market experience is defined as age less six
less years of schooling (less U.S. experience when relevant). U.S. experience is the
number of years spent in the United States, which is defined as total months of
U.S. experience divided by 12. Unfortunately, the survey instrument does not indi-
cate the number of months that the individual actually worked in the United States,
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so we assume that all months spent in the United States entailed work, which clearly
overstates actual U.S. labor market experience. Moreover, the number of U.S. mi-
gration spells and their pattern of duration could influence the nature of human
capital accumulation, but we employ a measure of cumulative months. Finally, if
the primary occupation in the United States matches the primary occupation of
subsequent employment in Mexico, a higher probability exists that occupation-
specific human capital was transferred back to Mexico. The regressions contain a
dummy variable that equals one if such a match exists and otherwise equals zero.
U.S. experience may have differential returns to various occupations in Mexico,
depending in part on the relevance of the experience to Mexican employment op-
portunities, which in turn is likely to reflect the general versus specific form of
human capital accumulated in the United States. The model therefore contains a
vector of dummy variables that indicate the head of household’s occupation. To
identify specific Mexican occupations that reflect returns to U.S. experience, we
interact these dummy variables with predicted U.S. experience.5 The model also
contains demographic characteristics of the household head, including gender (equals
one if female and zero if male) and marital status (equals one if married and zero
otherwise). Moreover, it contains several household characteristics: a dummy vari-
able that equals one if the household head’s spouse works outside the home and
otherwise equals zero; the total number of workers in the household; and the total
number of nonworkers in the household.
A period of work in the United States may allow an individual to send remit-
tances back to Mexico, or the migrant may return to Mexico with “pocket” sav-
ings. Such funds may be used in Mexico to invest in a business or agricultural land,
in which instances reported income may include a return to the individual’s busi-
ness endeavors or land holdings. Thus for some observations the measure of re-
ported income may include more than a return to human capital per se, since the
Mexican Migration Project collects information only on income and not specifi-
cally on earnings. As a partial correction, the model includes a set of dummy vari-
ables for business ownership, which indicate the specific type of business owned
by the household head.6 It also contains a measure of the amount of agricultural
land owned. A cleaner way to examine the relationship between U.S. experience
and the return to human capital in Mexico is to estimate the earnings regression
only for those household heads with no business or land holdings. These results are
reported below. Finally, as noted above, the model contains a set of occupational
control variables.
The third control vector is a set of 42 community dummies that identify the
various communities in which the Mexican interviews took place. The population
size of the survey communities varies greatly, from less than a thousand to almost
2.9 million (based on 1990 census data). Observations from larger communities
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may have greater variance and consequently cause heteroskedastic errors. A
chi-squared test [c2(42) = 864.09, p < 0.0001, in the most basic earnings model]
easily rejects the null hypothesis of a homoskedastic error structure. Thus each
earnings model contains a set of community dummy variables (whose results are
not listed), as well as a correction for community-wise heteroskedasticity.
Mexican income is not observed for those household heads who were in the
United States at the time of the interview, nor for those who were in Mexico at the
time of the interview but were not working. Table 3 reports the results from two
probit models, one for the probability of being interviewed in Mexico and one for
the probability of working. Inverse Mills ratios are derived from these probits. The
various equations of the model are identified. Unlike the income regressions re-
ported below, neither probit contains the detailed business or occupation controls,
but all regressions include community controls. Moreover, the probits contain two
dummy variables that closely relate to the propensity of migrating to the United
States. The first indicates the presence of any family member in the United States,
and the second equals one if the individual is a legal U.S. resident and otherwise
equals zero. Moreover, age and its square are included in the probit for the prob-
ability of being interviewed in the United States in place of Mexican experience,
U.S. experience, and their squares.
Higher expected wages in the United States are clearly a major force in the
flow of migration from Mexico. Moreover, expected wages in Mexico not only
enter into decisions to migrate from Mexico to the United States, but they also
influence return migration. Indeed, a major hypothesis of this paper is that experi-
ence gained in the United States influences the earnings of return migrants to Mexico.
In this way, time spent working in the United States may influence the expected
wage differential and thus affect the decision to return. Consequently, expected
Mexican wages influence time spent working in the United States. For this reason,
we treat the U.S. experience variable (and its square) as endogenous. Table 4 dis-
plays the results of a first-stage tobit regression from which the predicted values of
U.S. experience are derived. All predicted values of U.S. experience less than zero
are set to zero in the second-stage earnings regression.
Empirical Results
U.S. experience has a significant payoff in the Mexican labor market. An ad-
ditional year of U.S. experience yields about an 8.9-percent return in Mexico in
terms of monthly income (Table 5). Estimated at the mean income of those who
never migrated, this amounts to 109 new pesos per month at 1994 prices, or about
28 U.S. dollars.7 Given the argument presented above that the reservation wage is
an increasing function of U.S. experience, we are not entirely surprised at this
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Table 3
Results of Probit Models of Location of
Interview and Employment Status
Location Employment
of Interview Status
Variable (Y1) (Y2)
Intercept 1.0563* 1.4580***
Age (in years) 0.0304
Age squared -0.0002
Mexican experience 0.0180*
Mexican experience squared -0.0006***
U.S. experience -0.0456**
U.S. experience squared 0.0012*
Female 0.6608*** -1.2141***
Education (in years) -0.0377*** 0.0144
College educated 0.7898*** 0.3254
Married 0.6505*** 0.2657
Has relatives in the United States -1.4398*** -0.0573
Legal U.S. Resident -1.7006*** -0.1416
Agricultural land owned (in hectares) -0.0016 -0.0009
Number of workers in household 0.0332 0.2245***
Number of nonworkers in household 0.0805*** -0.0655***
Spouse works -0.6410*** -0.2494*
Business owner 0.3285*** 0.0589
N 5,273 5,273
Interviewed in United States (Y1 = 0) 389 389
Interviewed in Mexico (Y1 = 1) 4,884 4,884
Not employed (Y2 = 0) 523 523
Employed (Y2 = 1) 4,750 4,750
Log Likelihood -727.47 -934.50
Results for dummy variables denoting communities of origin are not reported.
Results of chi-squared test:*** passes at 99-percent level;** passes at 95-percent level;* passes
at 90-percent level.
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Table 4
Results from First-Stage Tobit Model Used to Generate
Fitted Values for U.S. Migration Experience
Parameter
Vector/Variable Estimate
Intercept -2.1430
Individual characteristics
Mexican experience (in years) -0.1633***
Mexican experience squared -0.0008
Female -6.0484***
Education (in years) -0.4951***
College educated 0.5413
Married 1.5676**
Migration networks
U.S. migration experience of father
precedes that of individual 1.8814***
U.S. migration experience of mother
precedes that of individual -1.0431***
Household characteristics
Agricultural land owned (in hectares) 0.0047
Number of workers in household 0.9829***
Number of nonworkers in household -0.0494
Spouse works -3.0323***
Business ownership
Street vendor of food 2.1945***
Street vendor of goods 1.5294*
Grocery store 3.8777***
Cattle trader 0.8394
Agricultural goods trader -0.6807
Manufactured goods trader 2.6642***
Tortilla mill 0.5505
Butcher shop 2.5389*
Restaurant 0.5692
Workshop 2.1226***
Repair shop or garage -2.6355
Small assembly shop 4.1532**
Other type of business 2.1819***
Occupation
Irregularly employed 4.7324***
Technician or nonmanual laborer -3.4277**
Office worker -0.7933
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large return. In contrast, an additional year of Mexican experience yields a return
of about 1.1 percent, and the square term for Mexican experience has the typical
negative sign and is also significant. Thus an additional year of U.S. experience
yields a monthly return that is at least eight times higher than that of an additional
year of Mexican experience.
An additional year of Mexican education below the preparatoria level yields
a monthly return in Mexico of 3.6 percent, or less than half the return to an addi-
tional year of U.S. experience. However, an additional year of education beyond
the preparatoria yields a return of about twice that of U.S. experience. For those
who do not plan to continue their education beyond the preparatoria, the former
results suggest a strong incentive to migrate to the United States at the earliest
possible age, return to Mexico with U.S. experience, and enjoy the higher returns
in Mexico that are discounted less. This observation also may indicate one reason
for the young ages at which many Mexican migrants make their first trip to the
United States.8
Table 4 (Continued)
Parameter
Vector/Variable Estimate
Salesperson 0.6303
Industrial owner or supervisor 1.1224
Skilled manual worker 0.2427
Unskilled manual worker 0.6816
Agricultural worker 1.7832***
Service worker 0.4894
Mills ratios
Interview location 10.6165***
Employment status 10.3724***
Scale factor 6.0631
N 4,367
Has U.S. migration experience 1,600
Lacks U.S. migration experience 2,767
Log likelihood -6218.76
Results for dummy variables denoting community of origin are not reported.
Results of chi-squared test: ***passes at 99-percent level;** passes at 95-percent
level; *passes at 90-percent level.
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Table 5
Results from Earnings Regressions
All All Business
Vector/Variable Individuals Individuals Owners “Workers”
Intercept 7.0180*** 7.0326*** 6.9250*** 7.2432***
Individual characteristics
Mexican experience (in years) 0.0106*** 0.0100*** 0.0092 0.0115***
Mexican experience squared -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001 -0.0001**
U.S. experience (fitted, in years) 0.0887*** 0.0898** 0.0542* 0.1001***
U.S. experience squared -0.0002 0.0001 0.0002 0.0010
Female -0.1944*** -0.2038*** -0.3527*** -0.2553***
Education (in years) 0.0364*** 0.0360*** 0.0380*** 0.0398***
College educated 0.1654*** 0.1665*** 0.1799* 0.0744
Married 0.1413** 0.1342** 0.1664 0.0134
Household characteristics
Agricultural land owned (in hectares) 0.0017*** 0.0016*** 0.0014** n.a.
Number of workers in household 0.0004 0.0001 (b) -0.0101
Number of nonworkers in household 0.0082 0.0082 (b) 0.0116*
Spouse works 0.0224 0.0278 (b) 0.0378
Business ownership
Street vendor of food -0.0784 -0.0743 -0.0806 n.a.
Street vendor of goods 0.0456 0.0301 0.0740 n.a.
Grocery store -0.0608 -0.0412 -0.0379 n.a.
Cattle trader 0.6025*** 0.6074*** 0.4581*** n.a.
Agricultural goods trader 0.1762 0.1637 0.2389* n.a.
Manufactured goods trader 0.2046** 0.2211*** 0.1747* n.a.
Tortilla mill 0.3246*** 0.3212** 0.3642*** n.a.
Butcher shop 0.1658 0.1983 0.0602 n.a.
Restaurant 0.1941 0.1891 0.1559 n.a.
Workshop 0.0633 0.0708 0.1011 n.a.
Repair shop or garage 0.4058*** 0.4031*** 0.3792*** n.a.
Small assembly shop -0.3988*** -0.3953*** -0.1953 n.a.
Other type of business 0.1290*** 0.1285*** n.a. n.a.
Occupational match 0.1769*** 0.1677*** 0.1311* 0.2170***
Occupation interaction terms (a)
Irregularly employed n.a. 0.0098 n.a. n.a.
Technician or nonmanual laborer n.a. 6.2852 n.a. n.a.
Office worker n.a. -0.0157 n.a. n.a.
Salesperson n.a. -0.0614* n.a. n.a.
Skilled manual worker n.a. -0.0387 n.a. n.a.
Unskilled manual worker n.a. 0.0481 n.a. n.a.
Agricultural worker n.a. 0.0057 n.a. n.a.
Service worker n.a. 0.0333 n.a. n.a.
Occupation
Irregularly employed -0.4515*** -0.4622*** -0.5662*** -0.5101***
Technician or nonmanual laborer -0.2079** -0.2129** -0.4344** -0.1462
Office worker -0.2944*** -0.2887*** -0.7649*** -0.2899***
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Table 5 (Continued)
All All Business
Vector/Variable Individuals Individuals Owners “Workers”
Salesperson -0.2758*** -0.2394*** -0.3721*** -0.4256***
Industrial owner or supervisor 0.5225*** 0.5259*** 0.1197 0.0182
Skilled manual worker -0.2822*** -0.2673*** -0.4217*** -0.2957***
Unskilled manual worker -0.3116*** -0.3416*** -0.5498*** -0.3438***
Agricultural worker -0.5419*** -0.5444*** -0.5681*** -0.5770***
Service worker -0.4162*** -0.4197*** -0.5240*** -0.4702***
Mills ratios
Interview Location -0.0919 -0.1011 0.1040 -0.2630***
Employment Status -0.4202*** -0.4224*** -0.2873 -0.4997***
N 4,367 4,367 1,124 2,919
Log likelihood -4,650.84 -4,632.90 -1,154.42 -2,883.59
n.a. = not applicable.
(a) No industrial owner or supervisor was estimated to possess U.S. migration experience,
thus the interaction term for this occupational class was omitted from the model containing
occupational interaction terms.
(b) To ensure convergence of the model for business owners only, these three variables were
omitted.
Results for dummy variables denoting community of origin are not reported.
*** indicates |t| >= 1.96; ** indicates 1.67 <= |t| < 1.96; * indicates 1.29 <= |t| < 1.67.
The regressions for “all individuals” contains business and land owners as
well as “workers.” The control variables for certain types of businesses (cattle
trader, manufactured goods trader, tortilla mill, repair shop or garage, and small
assembly shop) are statistically significant, as is the control for the amount of
agricultural land owned. Because the dependent variable entails a measure of
income and not just earnings, it may reflect returns to factors of production other
than labor. Remittances sent from the United States to Mexico and savings accu-
mulated in the United States and brought back to Mexico could be invested in a
business or a farm and thereby yield a return to capital and land. Thus the regres-
sion for “workers” may yield a more accurate assessment of the returns to human
capital investments. This regression suggests an annual return to an additional
year of U.S. experience of 10.0 percent, about nine times the return to the first
year of Mexican experience.9
Business owners with U.S. migration experience earn more than their
counterparts who lack such experience, as is evidenced by the model for business
owners only. This model indicates that each year of U.S. experience increases the
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income of business owners by 5.4 percent, but the coefficient is only marginally
significant. Interestingly, additional experience in Mexico does not appear to raise
the income of business owners, as the coefficients for this variable and its square
are not statistically significant.10
The occupational match variable identifies return migrants who have the same
occupation in Mexico as they had in the United States. These individuals enjoy a
particularly high return of 17.7 percent. The life histories of these persons reveal
that practically all of them also had experience in their present occupation prior to
their first U.S. migration experience. These individuals therefore possess the distinct
advantage of accumulating skills and knowledge in the same occupation over an
extended period of time, uninterrupted by their spells as migrants. This characteristic
may explain the strikingly high returns to the occupational-match variable.
When the U.S. experience variable is interacted in the regressions for all indi-
viduals with the various occupational dummies, the resulting coefficients are not
statistically significant, except for the salesperson interaction term. A similar re-
gression for “workers” only, whose results are not reported, does not generate any
significant parameter estimates for these terms.
We also implement two alternative econometric specifications, although we
do not report their results for want of substantially different results from our basic
model. The first of these replaces the Mills ratio pertaining to interview location
with a “spliced” Mills ratio vector. Specifically, we estimate two separate probit
models to generate an alternative Mills ratio for the interview location in order to
distinguish return migrants from non-migrants. One probit model contains the re-
turn migrants and the U.S. respondents, and the other contains the non-migrants
and the U.S. respondents. We then “splice” together the two vectors of Mills ratios
generated by these models to form a single vector and substitute this new vector
into the first-stage tobit and second-stage earnings regressions. The motive for this
innovation is our concern that the nested, two-tiered selection process experienced
by return migrants may influence the results of the income regression, as return
migrants first decide to migrate to the United States and then later elect to return to
Mexico. However, the substitution of the “spliced” vector causes no noteworthy
changes in the results of the earnings regression.
The second alternative incorporates several additional variables related to U.S.
immigration status. Mexicans who are legal U.S. residents may possess certain
advantages and disadvantages relative to Mexicans without documents. For ex-
ample, U.S. employers may be more certain of the continuing presence of workers
with documents and therefore may be more likely to give them jobs that entail
added responsibility. In general, the U.S. employers of workers who are legally
entitled to work in the United States have more incentive to train and otherwise
invest in these workers than in workers whose continued employment is uncertain.
1149
Similarly, Mexican employers may be less likely to employ and less likely to train
workers with legal U.S. residency out of concern that these persons may soon de-
part for the United States. For these reasons, we estimate an earnings equation that
includes a dummy variable equal to one if the individual is predicted to possess
legal residency in the United States and zero otherwise. Interaction terms between
this variable and U.S. experience and its square are also included. Because the
probability of obtaining legal residence in the United States increases with U.S.
experience, we treat the documents variable as endogenous and estimate a first-
stage probit for this variable. Predicted values of the variable less than or equal to
0.5 are set equal to zero in the corresponding earnings regression, and values greater
than 0.5 are set equal to one. However, none of these variables generate statisti-
cally significant parameters in the earnings regression.
Summary and Conclusions
Migration from Mexico to the United States may affect the Mexican economy
in numerous ways through several potential channels of influence. As a substitute
for trade in goods, the flow of labor may reduce exports from Mexico to the United
States. Migrant remittances that flow from the United States back to Mexico may
affect both consumption patterns and capital accumulation in Mexico. By reducing
excess labor supply in Mexico, migration may lessen not only employment and
underemployment, but also social tension.
Due to the volume of migration from Mexico to the United States and the
circularity of the flow, human capital acquired during a period of employment in
the United States and returned to Mexico may be one of the strongest channels
through which migration affects the Mexican economy. However, data limitations
on the Mexican side of the border have prevented a detailed analysis of this chan-
nel of influence. In this study we employ a unique set of survey data to study the
impact of migration on the wages of returning migrants relative to a control group
of individuals who have never participated in migration to the United States.
Presumably, those Mexicans who migrate to the United States expect to earn a
higher return on their labor services in the United States than in Mexico, given
their costs of migrating. If they had not participated in U.S. migration, these same
individuals also may have earned higher returns in Mexico than their non-migrating
counterparts. To control for the possibility that the resulting parameter estimates
are tainted by selectivity bias, we perform a Heckman selectivity correction by
estimating a probit model for the probability of participating in U.S. migration.
This regression is distinguished from the earnings equation by the inclusion of a
set of variables relating to possible migration networks that facilitate movement to
the United States. The equation yields an inverse Mills ratio that is employed in the
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earnings equation. The model also contains a second selectivity correction for
participation in the Mexican labor market.
The higher an individual’s expected earnings in Mexico, the less time he or
she will wish to devote to work in the United States, ceteris paribus. Thus potential
Mexican earnings and time spent working in the United States are endogenous.
To account for this endogeneity, we estimate a first-stage tobit model for total
U.S. migration experience. Finally, because observations are drawn at different
times from communities of varying size and economic circumstances, we include
a set of community dummy variables and provide a correction of community-
wise heteroskedasticity.
Empirical results indicate a high return to U.S. experience that is at least eight
times as great as the return to Mexican experience. Moreover, for those persons
who transfer accumulated occupational skills from the United States to Mexico in
the sense of having the same broad occupation in each country, monthly income
increases an additional 17 percent. These results suggest that Mexican migration to
the United States, in addition to being encouraged by the expectation of higher
wages in the United States, may be spurred by the expectation of higher wages in
Mexico for those who return. The returns to U.S. experience are about twice as
high as the returns to less than 12 years of Mexican education, which gives persons
who do not plan to continue their education beyond the preparatoria a powerful
incentive to migrate at the youngest possible age.
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1. U.S. Department of Justice, various issues. Immigration statistics are for fiscal years,
not calendar years.
2. U.S. Department of Justice (1996), Table 74.
3. Census data place the Mexican-born population in the United States at 759,711
in 1970, 2,199,221 in 1980, and 4,298,014 in 1990 (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1973,
1984, 1994).
4. Durand and Massey (1992) survey many of these case studies.
5. The occupational dummy variables are listed in Table 5. The excluded comparison
group is professionals and administrators.
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6. The business dummy variables are listed in Table 5. The excluded comparison group
is household heads who do not own a business.
7. The figure in U.S. dollars was calculated using the period-average exchange rate for
1994 in International Monetary Fund (1997).
8. When one considers all members of the households surveyed by the Mexican Migra-
tion Project (including the grown offspring of the household heads) who were born between
1961 and 1970, half of those with U.S. experience made their first trip to the United States
by the age of 19.
9. As Table 1 indicates, five communities in the sample were surveyed in 1982, and the
other 38 between 1987 and 1996. When these first five communities are removed from the
sample and the series of models is re-estimated, the results change very little, although the
estimated return to U.S. experience is somewhat larger. The coefficient for predicted U.S.
experience (0.0963) remains highly significant, as do the coefficients for Mexican experi-
ence and its square (0.0121 and -0.0002). In contrast, when two outlying observations with
monthly income in excess of 35,000 new pesos are dropped from the sample, the estimated
return to U.S. experience is slightly smaller. The coefficients from this re-estimation of the
model are also statistically significant: 0.0875 for the fitted value of U.S. experience and
0.0115 and -0.0002 for Mexican experience and its square.
10. A separate model for landowners only failed to converge, presumably due to the
small number of observations. An ordinary least-squares regression for this group produced
statistically insignificant parameter estimates for U.S. experience and its square.
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IMPACTS OF MIGRATION
Impactos de los cambios económicos
en el agro mexicano y en la
migración: un análisis
micro-multisectorial
Antonio Yúnez Naude1
Introducción
El propósito del reporte es estudiar los posibles efectos en la economía ruraly en la emigración del campo a las ciudades y a los E.U.A. de algunas delas modificaciones en el contexto macroeconómico de México. Los
resultados presentados han sido obtenidos de un proyecto de investigación, cuya
base de datos se elaboró a partir de trabajo de campo efectuado entre 1993 y 1996
y de modelos cuantitativos micro- multisecotriales.2
Nuestro enfoque trata de superar las limitaciones de los estudios nacionales de
impactos mediante una metodología distinta, cuyo sujeto de análisis son las
poblaciones rurales y sus hogares. Hace uso de los modelos multisectoriales, pero,
en vez de ser aplicados a una economía en conjunto y a su agro, tiene un carácter
local y específico. Esto es así porque los estudios macroeconómicos no logran
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capturar aspectos fundamentales de sectores rurales caracterizados por la presencia
de unidades familiares de producción y consumo. (Taylor y Yúnez-Naude: 1995).
La ausencia de información oficial y las exigencias de datos para capturar las
especificidades y heterogeneidad de la economía agropecuaria de países como
México hacen necesaria la elaboración de bases de datos construidas a partir de
información primaria y directa en base a trabajo de campo. Esto lo hemos hecho a
partir de encuestas socioeconómicas detalladas a una muestra representativa de
hogares de las poblaciones que hemos estudiado. Las encuestas capturan tanto los
flujos monetarios en las economías de los pueblos, como los no monetarios (por
ejemplo, el uso de trabajo familiar, no remunerado, en las actividades productivas).
La información obtenida en el trabajo de campo se usa para elaborar una matriz de
contabilidad social (MCS en adelante) de cada población, que es la base de datos
con la que se alimenta el modelo multisectorial para cada una de ellas.
En este documento se presentan los resultados obtenidos al poner en práctica
nuestra propuesta a cuatro poblaciones del México rural: Concordia, localizada en
el estado de Coahuila, El Chante en el de Jalisco, Napízaro en Michoacán y San
Quintín en Baja California. Los pueblos no sólo tienen características
socioeconómicas distintas. Además, su diversidad se dá en cuanto a la emigración
nacional e internacional de sus habitantes: Napízaro es una comunidad típica de
emigrantes a los E.U.A.; aunque El Chante también cuenta con una gran cantidad
de personas que trabajan en el país vecino, las remesas que el pueblo recibe son de
menor peso para su economia respecto a Napízaro; en contraste, tal tipo de
emigración es marginal en Concordia y prácticamente nula en San Quintín (de
hecho, el pueblo bajacaliforniano demanda trabajo de emigrantes del resto de
México).3
Incorporar al estudio del agro y de sus procesos de emigración tal diversidad
es de suma relevancia (abajo veremos que el papel que en cada pueblo juega la
migración, trae consigo consecuencias importantes en cuanto a los impactos que
sobre cada uno de ellos tienen cambios en el contexto macroeconómico de México
y en la política agrícola). Además contrasta con los estudios existentes al respecto,
que se enfocan casi exclusivamente al análisis de comunidades de alta migración a
los E.U.A..
A partir de modelos de multiplicadores calculamos los impactos que sobre los
ingresos de cada uno de los cuatro poblados tendrían cambios recientes en el contexto
económico del país (reducción del salario real y devaluación del peso), así como
en materia de política agrícola (PROCAMPO y dos esquemas alternativos a este
programa) y la aplicación del Federalismo a una de las poblaciones estudiadas.
En la sección que sigue se hace una breve descripción de la estructura
socieconómica de las cuatro poblaciones. En la tercera se discuten las simulaciones
realizadas y en la cuarta los resultados. El texto concluye con una serie de reflexiones
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sobre las implicaciones de los hallazgos en cuanto a los fenómenos migratorios y
en materia de política económica.
Las características de los pueblos
Concordia es una población ejidal del municipio de San Pedro de las Colonias,
localizado en la comarca de La Laguna. El clima predominante de la región —con
temperaturas extremas y bajo índice de lluvias— impide el desarrollo de una
agricultura de temporal y hace indispensable el sistema de riego.
Hasta los inicios de la década de los noventa el algodón representó el principal
producto agropecuario de La Laguna. Esto cambió radicalmente a partir de 1992,
ya que la fibra dejó de ser una alternativa rentable para los agricultores. Frente a
ello se inició un proceso de sutitución que culminó con la producción casi exclusiva
de maíz y frijol. En la actualidad, la producción de básicos en La Laguna (incluyendo
a Concordia) es comercial, con elevados rendimientos (de 3.1 ton. por Ha.) y uso
de paquetes tecnológicos sofisticados.
El cambio en el contexto agrícola regional también ha llevado a modificaciones
en el mercado laboral. En efecto, frente a la reducción de la demanda de trabajo
por parte del complejo algodonero y al carácter estacional y breve del ciclo agrícola
para el cultivo del maíz y frijol, los habitantes de Concordia se han visto forzados
a buscar empleo, agrícola y no agrícola, en las ciudades de la región e incluso en
otras zonas del país y en los E.U.A.
El Chante es una población agrícola del Valle de Autlán. Es productora de
caña de azúcar y, en menor medida de maíz y ganado. La estructura de la propiedad
de su tierra es mixta, con ejidos y propiedad privada. Los ejidatarios se dedican
principalmente a la producción de maíz en tierras de buen temporal para el consumo
propio o la venta y los productores privados al cultivo de la caña irrigada. La caña
es vendida a un ingenio localizado en el Valle, que también es el que provee a los
cañeros de insumos y otros recursos para la producción.
Aunque muchos de los habitantes de El Chante tienen parientes que han migrado
a los E.U.A. (sobre todo en el período “bracero”), la economía local no depende
mucho de sus remesas.
Napízaro es una población ejidal a orillas del lago de Pátzcuaro del Municipio
de Erongarícuaro que en los últimos quince años ha pasado de ser de agrícola a
ganadera. No obstante, el maíz y el frijol siguen siendo importantes dentro de las
actividades locales. La orientación de la economía de Napízaro es mixta, ya que su
producción la obtiene en base al trabajo familiar y parte la orienta para el consumo
propio (y ahorro familiar) y parte para la venta.
La economía de San Quintín (localizada en el Valle con el mismo nombre,
que forma parte del extenso Municipio de Ensenada) es de corte capitalista y
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comercial: está dominada por las actividades comerciales, por los servicios de
hotelería y restaurantes y por el empaque de productos hortícolas para la
exportación a los E.U.A. llevado a cabo por una empresa ubicada en la localidad.
Esta última actividad tiene elevadas exigencias de trabajo en la época de cosecha
del Valle, por lo que recurre a los servicios de emigrantes de los estados de Oaxaca
y Guerrero.
Produccción local
En términos del valor de la producción generada (valor agregado, producto
interno bruto o PIB), el tamaño de los pueblos estudiados es disímil: Concordia es
1.15 veces más grande que Napízaro, El Chante es más de 6 veces mayor que
Concordia y San Quintín 2.7 más grande que El Chante (ver los totales de los
cuadros 1a, 1b, 1c y 1d).
Las tres poblaciones más pequeñas se dedican, básicamente, a la actividad
agropecuaria. Sin embargo, difieren en su composición (cuadros 1a, 1b y 1c): la
más importante de Napízaro es la ganadera (explica el 61% de su PIB), mientras
que la agricultura es la de mayor peso en la oferta local de El Chante y Concordia
(49% y 66%, respectivamente). No obstante, su composición difiere entre las dos
poblaciones agrícolas: el cultivo más importante de El Chante es la caña y el maíz
y el frijol en Concordia. En contraste, San Quintín se dedica a la provisión de
servicios (cuyo peso en el PIB local es del 65%) y al procesamiento de hortalizas
(35%, cuadro 1d).
Conviene añadir que el comercio —cuyas ventas están compuestas,
principalmente, de bienes procesados— es una actividad importante en los cuatro
pueblos. Debido a la ausencia de producción manufacturera en ellas, los productos
comerciados tienen que ser importados, lo cual indica la dependencia de las
economías locales con su exterior (es decir con el resto de México).4
La contribución del trabajo familiar en el valor agregado es muy importante
en Concordia y El Chante (explica, respectivamente, el 43% y el 50% de su PIB,
cuadros 1b y 1c), relativamente importante en Napízaro (21%, cuadro 1a) y no
importante en San Quintín (14%, cuadro 1d).5 No obstante el gran peso del trabajo
familiar en las actividades económicas de Concordia y El Chante, ambas también
hacen uso de trabajo asalariado (su peso en el valor agregado de la primera
población es del 28% y del 23% en la segunda). Esto es así en Concordia por las
exigencias de mano de obra en las épocas agrícolas pico y, como veremos, porque
muchos de sus habitantes trabajan durante todo el año en otras actividades en la
región, pero fuera del pueblo. Por su parte, la producción de caña de El Chante
requiere de mano de obra adicional para la cosecha, al grado que utiliza los
servicios laborales de emigrantes de Guerrero (los últimos explican casi la mitad
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del valor agregado proveniente del trabajo asalariado, cuadro 1c). La situación
de Napízaro es muy distinta, pues el trabajo asalariado sólo representa el 3% de
su valor agregado (la actividad más importante del poblado, la ganadera, se hace
a partir del pastoreo en base al trabajo familiar).
Relaciones con el exterior
Un fenómeno de suma importancia en el agro mexicano es la enorme
dependencia que las comunidades que lo forman tienen respecto a su exterior (re-
gional, nacional o internacional). Como veremos a continuación, las poblaciones
que hemos estudiado no son la excepción, lo cual significa que serán de peso los
impactos que sobre ellos tienen cambios en la situación económica y de la política
pública de México, así como en las relaciones del país con el resto del mundo (con
los E.U.A. en especial).
Fuentes del ingreso de los hogares
Los pueblos tienen fuertes vínculos con mercados de trabajo más allá de la
comunidad: Napízaro con los de E.U.A., Concordia y El Chante con los regionales
y San Quintín por la demanda que hace de los servicios laborales de trabajadores
provenientes de otros estados de la República mexicana. Esto se refleja en los
datos sobre el origen del ingreso de los hogares (cuadros 2).
No obstante lo anterior, el peso y las características de tal dependencia varían
de poblado a poblado. En efecto, la proporción de los ingresos provenientes del
exterior en el total del ingreso de los hogares es mucho mayor en Concordia que en
El Chante y Napízaro: 74%, 23% y 23%, respectivamente (cuadros 2a, 2b y 2c).6
Otra diferencia importante es que la mayor parte del ingreso externo que fluye a
los hogares de Concordia proviene de los servicios laborales proporcionados por
sus habitantes en la Comarca Lagunera y ciudades aledañas, mientras que para
Napízaro éste se compone, principalmente, de las remesas enviadas por los miembros
de sus hogares ubicados en los E.U.A. Por su parte, la mitad de los ingresos del
exterior recibidos por los hogares de El Chante tienen su origen en el resto de
México (la gran mayoría en la región, es decir, en el resto del Valle de Autlán) y la
otra mitad proviene de los emigrantes a E.U.A. Como la situación de San Quintín
es muy distinta a la de los otros tres pueblos (la empacadora requiere de servicios
laborales extraregionales), la vinculación del poblado con el mercado laboral
mexicano se refleja en el peso de los ingresos de los hogares de inmigrantes en el
total de los ingresos locales de los hogares de San Quintín, que es del 12% (cuadro
2d, séptima fila, segunda columna).
1162
Cu
ad
ro
 2
a
N
ap
íz
ar
o:
 O
rig
en
 y
 p
es
o 
de
l i
ng
re
so
 d
e 
lo
s 
ho
ga
re
s
(p
es
os
)
Lo
ca
l
Ex
te
rn
o
(en
dó
ge
no
)
(%
)
de
l r
es
to
 M
éx
ico
de
l r
es
to
 d
el
 m
un
do
Su
bt
ot
al
(%
)
To
ta
l
Pe
so
D
e 
su
bs
ite
nc
ia
82
,0
62
5%
11
,4
90
17
,2
68
28
,7
58
6%
11
0,
82
0
5%
(%
)
74
%
26
%
10
0%
Pe
so
 e
n 
to
ta
l e
xó
ge
no
40
%
60
%
M
ed
ia
no
s
76
7,
40
0
48
%
10
2
22
1,
70
0
22
1,
80
2
46
%
98
9,
20
2
47
%
(%
)
78
%
22
%
10
0%
Pe
so
 e
n 
to
ta
l e
xó
ge
no
0%
10
0%
G
ra
nd
es
76
1,
37
0
47
%
75
,1
20
15
5,
89
8
23
1,
01
8
48
%
99
2,
38
8
47
%
(%
)
77
%
23
%
10
0%
Pe
so
 e
n 
to
ta
l e
xó
ge
no
33
%
67
%
To
ta
l
1,
61
0,
83
2
10
0%
86
,7
12
39
4,
86
6
48
1,
57
8
10
0%
2,
09
2,
41
0
10
0%
D
is
tri
bu
ci
ón
 p
or
 o
rig
en
77
%
23
%
10
0%
Pe
so
 e
n 
to
ta
l e
xó
ge
no
33
%
67
%
Fu
en
te
: T
a
yl
or
,
 
J.
 E
. e
 I.
 A
de
lm
an
: 1
99
6
1163
Cu
ad
ro
 2
b
Co
nc
or
di
a:
 O
rig
en
 y
 p
es
o 
de
l i
ng
re
so
 d
e 
lo
s 
ho
ga
re
s
(p
es
os
)
Ex
te
rn
o
Lo
ca
l
de
l
de
l r
es
to
de
l r
es
to
(en
dó
ge
no
)
(%
)
go
bi
er
no
de
 la
 re
gi
ón
de
l m
un
do
Su
bt
ot
al
(%
)
To
ta
l
Pe
so
Ag
ríc
ol
as
1,
07
4,
90
3.
0
55
%
21
,9
07
.3
3,
33
3,
14
9.
6
55
,7
62
3,
41
0,
81
9
62
%
4,
48
5,
72
12
61
%
(%
)
24
%
76
%
10
0%
Pe
so
 e
n 
to
ta
l
 
 
 
e
xó
ge
no
1%
98
%
2%
N
o 
Ag
ríc
ol
as
86
4,
52
6.
2
45
%
58
,1
45
.8
1,
88
4,
06
5.
0
10
6,
56
7
2,
04
8,
77
8
38
%
2,
91
3,
30
4
39
%
(%
)
30
%
70
%
10
0%
Pe
so
 e
n 
to
ta
l
 
 
 
e
xó
ge
no
3%
92
%
5%
To
ta
l
1,
93
9,
42
9.
2
10
0%
5,
45
9,
59
7
10
0%
7,
39
9,
02
6
10
0%
D
is
tri
bu
ci
ón
 
 
 
po
r o
rig
en
26
%
0
74
%
10
0%
Pe
so
 e
n 
to
ta
l
 
 
 
e
xó
ge
no
1%
98
%
3%
Fu
en
te
: R
od
ríg
ue
z 
G
., 
M
ar
ía
 d
el
 R
ef
ug
io
: 1
99
5
1164
Cu
ad
ro
 2
c
El
 C
ha
nt
e:
 O
rig
en
 y
 p
es
o 
de
l i
ng
re
so
 d
e 
lo
s 
ho
ga
re
s
(p
es
os
)
Ex
te
no
Lo
ca
l
de
l
de
l r
es
to
de
l r
es
to
Pe
so
Pe
so
(en
dó
ge
no
)
0%
Va
lle
 
M
éx
ico
 
de
l m
un
do
Su
bt
ot
al
0%
To
ta
l
0%
Ag
ríc
ol
as
8,
37
7,
74
0
80
%
1,
82
3,
31
2
13
0,
04
0
35
2,
28
5
2,
30
5,
63
7
74
%
10
,6
83
,3
77
78
%
(%
)
78
%
22
%
Pe
so
 e
n 
to
ta
l e
xó
ge
no
79
%
6%
15
%
m
a
ic
er
os
2,
48
7,
29
0
0.
30
88
8,
82
6
67
,5
19
10
2,
03
1
1,
05
8,
37
6
0.
46
3,
54
5,
66
6
0.
33
(%
)
70
%
30
%
Pe
so
 e
n 
to
ta
l e
xó
ge
no
84
%
6%
10
%
ca
ñe
ro
s
3,
59
1,
76
0
0.
43
65
7,
43
4
48
,8
33
22
,8
13
72
9,
08
0
0.
32
4,
32
0,
84
0
0.
40
(%
)
83
%
17
%
Pe
so
 e
n 
to
ta
l e
xó
ge
no
90
%
7%
3%
m
ix
to
s
2,
29
8,
69
0
0.
27
27
7,
05
2
13
,6
88
22
7,
44
1
51
8,
18
1
0.
22
2,
81
6,
87
1
0.
26
(%
)
82
%
18
%
Pe
so
 e
n 
to
ta
l e
xó
ge
no
53
%
3%
44
%
N
o 
Ag
ríc
ol
as
2,
13
5,
81
7
20
%
39
0,
20
5
7,
35
9
39
8,
49
7
79
6,
06
1
26
%
2,
93
1,
87
8
22
%
(%
)
73
%
27
%
Pe
so
 e
n 
to
ta
l e
xó
ge
no
49
%
1%
50
%
To
ta
l
10
,5
13
,5
57
2,
21
3,
51
7
13
7,
39
9
75
0,
78
2
3,
10
1,
69
8
13
,6
15
,2
55
D
is
tri
bu
ci
ón
 p
or
 o
rig
en
77
%
23
%
10
0%
Pe
so
 e
n 
to
ta
l e
xó
ge
no
71
%
4%
24
%
Fu
en
te
: B
ec
er
ril
, J
., 
et
 a
l.:
 1
99
6
1165
Cu
ad
ro
 2
d
Sa
n 
Qu
in
tín
: O
rig
en
 y
 p
es
o 
de
l i
ng
re
so
 d
e 
lo
s 
ho
ga
re
s
(m
ile
s d
e p
es
os
)
Ex
te
rn
o
Lo
ca
l
Pa
rti
ci
-
de
l
de
l r
es
to
de
l r
es
to
To
ta
l
Pa
rti
ci
-
(en
dó
ge
no
)
pa
ció
n
go
bi
er
no
de
 M
éx
ico
de
l m
un
do
e
xó
ge
no
pa
ció
n
To
ta
l
Pe
so
M
ig
ra
nt
es
 a
 E
.U
.
1,
74
3
17
%
0
0
28
2
28
2
36
%
2,
02
5
18
%
Pa
rti
ci
pa
ció
n
86
%
0%
0%
14
%
10
0%
M
ig
ra
nt
es
 a
l R
es
to
 M
éx
.
31
2
3%
28
23
7
0
26
5
34
%
57
7
5%
Pa
rti
ci
pa
ció
n
54
%
5%
41
%
0%
10
0%
N
o 
m
ig
ra
nt
es
6,
96
2
68
%
22
7
0
0
22
7
29
%
7,
18
9
65
%
Pa
rti
ci
pa
ció
n
97
%
3%
0%
0%
10
0%
In
m
ig
ra
nt
es
1,
19
0
12
%
5
0
0
5
1%
1,
19
5
11
%
Pa
rti
ci
pa
ció
n
10
0%
0%
0%
0%
10
0%
To
ta
l
10
,2
07
10
0%
26
0
23
7
28
2
77
9
10
0%
10
,9
86
10
0%
D
is
tri
bu
ci
ón
 p
or
 o
rig
en
93
%
8%
10
0%
N
ot
a:
 S
e 
in
clu
ye
n 
la
s 
re
m
es
as
 (q
ue
 M
art
íne
z a
sie
nta
 en
 la
 M
CS
 co
mo
 in
gre
so
 de
 la
s a
cti
vid
ad
es
 em
igr
ato
ria
s).
Fu
en
te
: M
ar
tín
ez
 G
, A
: 1
99
6
1166
Origen de los insumos
Sin excepción, las actividades de los cuatro poblados dependen marcadamente
de los insumos externos: su peso en el total de insumos productivos es del 79%
para Napízaro, del 77% para Concordia,7 del 87% para El Chante y del 98% para
San Quintín (cuadros 3). Sin embargo, hay variaciones respecto a su origen: todos
los insumos “importados” por Napízaro y Concordia provienen del resto de México,
mientras que el 96% de las compras de insumos al exterior de El Chante tienen el
mismo origen y el peso de ellas para San Quintín es del 51% (el 4% y 49% restantes,
respectivamente, provienen de los E.U.A.).
Las simulaciones
La gran dependencia de las poblaciones del México rural con el exterior es
incorporada sistemáticamente en los modelos multisectoriales de multiplicadores.
El enfoque es, pues, valioso porque permite cuantificar los posibles impactos en
las comunidades de cambios en el contexto económico y en la política pública
(es, decir, en las variables exógenas a los pueblos).8 Al respecto, se han diseñado
tres grupos de simulaciones para estimar los efectos que sobre las comunidades
estudiadas (y en el agro mexicano en general) tendrían modificaciones en la
economía del país. El primero se refiere a la situación macroeconómica de México
y consiste en dos experimentos: la reducción del salario real y la devaluación del
peso (en general, provocadas por las reformas económicas y por la crisis de fina-
les de 1994). El segundo grupo está relacionado a cambios en materia de política
económica y está compuesto por tres ejercicios de simulación: PROCAMPO (uno
de los pilares de la política de eliminación de subsidios a la producción de cultivos
básicos), el uso alternativo de los recursos de ese programa para la promoción de
las actividades productivas y la aplicación del federalismo presupuestal. Por último,
se aplicó una simulación a Napízaro, Concordia y El Chante en la que se unen los
cambios en el contexto macroeconómico de México (reducción del salario y
devaluación) y PROCAMPO.
El conocimiento preciso de la economía de cada uno de los cuatro pueblos
y el marcado contraste entre la de Napízaro, Concordia y El Chante frente a la
de San Quintín. permite que ello se tome en cuenta en el diseño de las
simulaciones. Como la reducción del salario real y PROCAMPO han afectado
solamente a las tres primeras comunidades, sólo se le aplicaron tales cambios
exógenos a ellas. Es decir, los habitantes de San Quintín no han sufrido tanto de
la reducción del salario como los de las otras tres comunidades que trabajan en
el resto de México, y el pueblo bajacaliforniano no produce cultivos básicos.
Sin embargo, San Quintín aporta más recursos al gobierno de los que recibe de
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él y los otros tres pueblos tienen un presupuesto más o menos equilibrado con la
federación. Por tal motivo sólo se le aplicó al primer poblado la simulación de la
aplicación del federalismo, que equivaldría a PROCAMPO en los tres pueblos
restantes. El experimento del federalismo consiste en regresar a los agentes de
San Quintín los recursos que aportan al gobierno central, y el de PROCAMPO
se basa en la canalización de los pagos por hectárea gubernamentales a los hogares
de Napízaro, Concordia y El Chante según la cantidad de tierra que dedican a
los cultivos básicos. Se hacen dos ejercicios adicionales para los últimos tres
pueblos con el propósito de estimar los impactos de esquemas alternativos a
PROCAMPO en las comunidades que reciben estos recursos. Consisten en usar
los mismos recursos de PROCAMPO a la promoción de la actividad agrícola o
ganadera en vez de usarlos para apoyar directamente el ingreso de los hogares
que cultivan básicos.
La forma en que se hizo el experimento de devaluación para Napízaro,
Concordia y El Chante también difiere de la aplicada a San Quintín: en los tres
primeros pueblos ésta se simula a partir de un aumento en las remesas que los
hogares reciben de sus miembros que trabajan en los E.U.A., mientras que para
San Quintín consiste en el aumento del valor en pesos de las exportaciones de la
principal empresa del pueblo, dedicada a la venta a los E.U.A. de los productos
hortícolas que empaca.
Por último, con el fin de evaluar los efectos combinados de la crisis y de la
política de apoyo a los productores de cultivos básicos, se hizo una simulación
para Napízaro, Concordia y El Chante en la que se unen los cambios exógenos
provocados por la reducción del salario real, la devaluación y por la aplicación de
PROCAMPO.
En síntesis, los ejercicios de simulación son los siguientes.
1. Cambios en la situación macroeconómica de México
1.1. Reducción del 20% de los salarios pagados a los miembros de los
hogares de Napízaro, Concordia y El Chante que trabajan en el resto
de México
1.2. Aumento en el valor en pesos de las remesas que los hogares de
Napízaro, Concordia y El Chante reciben de los miembros que
trabajan en los E.U.A. (el aumento equivale al 113% del valor de
las remesas, que es la tasa a la que el peso se devaluó entre 1994 y
1996)
1.3. Aumento del 16% en las exportaciones hortícolas de San Quintín a
los E.U.A. (el incremento porcentual es conforme al dato recabado
en la encuesta directa y recoje tanto el efecto positivo de la
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devaluación del peso en las ventas a los E.U.A. de la empacadora
como el negativo por el crecimiento de los costos de los insumos
productivos que importa al mismo país)
2. Cambios en materia de política económica
2.1. PROCAMPO y esquemas alternativos
a. Pagos directos a los hogares productores de básicos o
PROCAMPO (Napízaro, Concordia y El Chante)
b. Canalización alternativa de los recursos de PROCAMPO: a las
actividades agrícolas de Napízaro, Concordia y El Chante y no
a sus hogares
c. Recanalización de los recursos de PROCAMPO a las actividades
ganaderas de Napízaro, Concordia y El Chante
2.2. Aplicación del federalismo a los agentes de San Quintín (el ejercicio
consiste en retornar al pueblo los pagos que sus distintos agentes
económicos hacen al gobierno federal)
3. Combinación de reducción de los salarios, la devaluación y PROCAMPO
en Napízaro, Concordia y El Chante.
Resultados
Los impactos de las modificaciones en el contexto y políticas económicas
simulados se encuentran en los cuadros 4, que muestran los efectos relativos de
tales cambios en las variables de la base (es decir, de la MCS o del año base) de
Napízaro (cuadro 4a), Concordia (cuadro 4b), El Chante (cuadro 4c) y San Quintín
(cuadro 4d).
Las primeras líneas de los cuadros 4 (bajo el subtítulo “Ingreso exógeno”)
muestran los efectos directos de los cambios exógenos en las cuentas de ingresos
de cada una de las poblaciones. Por ejemplo: la reducción del 20% del salario real
de México significa una disminución directa del 7.99% de los ingresos que los
hogares de subsistencia de Napízaro reciben del exterior; la devaluación tiene el
efecto contrario pues aumenta directamente los ingresos exógenos de tales hogares
en un 66.81%; las transferencias de PROCAMPO los hace crecer en un 36.45% y
el efecto combinado de estos tres cambios es el de subir el ingreso exógeno de los
hogares mencionados en un 95.26% (cuadro 4a, cuarta fila y segunda, tercera,
cuarta y séptima columnas). Las filas restantes (bajo el subtítulo “Ingreso endógeno”)
reportan los efectos multiplicativos de los cambios exógenos en las cuentas
endógenas de cada una de las cuatro poblaciones.
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Cuadro 4a
Napízaro: Resultados de los experimentos
(cambios porcentuales respecto a la base)
Combinación
de los tres
Reducción Alternativa A Alternativa B primeros
salarios Devaluación PROCAMPO a PROCAMPO a PROCAMPO experimentos
Ingreso exógeno
Hogares
Subsistencia -7.99 66.81 36.45 95.26
Medianos -0.01 111.22 37.81 48.93
Grandes -6.50 75.09 34.79 103.37
Actividades
Granos básicos 567.09
Ganadería 19.55
Ingreso endógeno
PIB -0.81 15.78 6.55 13.09 14.06 15.33
Actividades
Granos básicos -0.97 18.94 7.88 56.67 12.66 18.20
Ganadería -0.64 11.01 4.68 3.63 16.44 11.57
Recursos naturales -1.20 24.00 9.94 7.57 8.00 22.87
Artesanias -0.38 19.14 7.06 5.35 5.71 12.32
Comercio -1.27 32.94 13.05 11.54 10.75 27.72
Factores
Trabajo familiar -0.97 20.48 8.39 19.61 12.29 19.01
Trabajo asalariado -0.97 21.31 8.68 24.74  9.25  19.28
Capital -0.85 17.14 7.08 10.80 13.23 16.34
Tierra -0.70 12.45 5.26 10.86 15.69 12.79
Hogares
Subsistencia -2.66 28.54 14.12 9.17 10.57 35.70
Medianos -0.63 37.14 13.55 10.25 10.97 22.84
Grandes -2.14 29.72 13.18 10.47 10.72 35.93
Exógeno total
Gobierno -1.39 33.45 13.38 10.33 10.85 29.31
Resto de México -1.20 29.84 11.90 11.80 11.49 25.71
Fuente: estimaciones propias
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Cuadro 4b
Concordia: Resultados de los experimentos
(cambios porcentuales respecto a la base)
Combinación
de los tres
Reducción Alternativa A Alternativa B primeros
salarios Devaluación PROCAMPO a PROCAMPO a PROCAMPO experimentos
Ingreso exógeno
Hogares
Agropecuarios -19.67 1.82 5.24 -12.61
No agropecuarios -18.96 5.79 -13.17
Actividades
Granos básicos 15.80
Ganadería 1,973.58
Ingreso endógeno
PIB -7.24 1.22 1.24 7.99 8.08 -4.78
Actividades
Granos básicos -1.38 0.21 0.26 14.56 1.65 -0.91
Ganadería -15.70 2.69 2.63 2.01 62.71 -10.37
No agropecuarias -3.99 0.72 0.62 0.50 0.52 -2.65
Comercio -14.29 2.42 2.43 1.88 2.27 -9.44
Factores
Familiar -7.65 1.30 1.30 7.44 16.42 -5.05
Asalariado -10.27 1.74 1.75 4.51 1.93 -6.79
Capital -4.89 0.81 0.85 10.93 1.91 -3.23
Tierra -1.38 0.21 0.26 14.56 1.65 -0.91
Hogares
Agropecuarios -16.36 1.62 4.23 2.30 2.16 -10.51
No agropecuarios -16.06 4.52 0.47 1.74 2.03 -11.06
Exógeno total
Gobierno -15.83 2.96 2.35 2.05 2.06 -10.53
Resto de México -13.79 2.33 2.35 2.38 2.37 -9.10
Fuente: estimaciones propias
1175
Efectos de los cambios en la situación
macroeconómica de México
Las modificaciones sufridas por la economía mexicana afectan a todos los
pueblos. Sin embargo, el peso y tipo de relaciones con ella hacen que los impactos
de la crisis difieran de comunidad a comunidad.
Reducción del salario real
Concordia es, por mucho, el pueblo más afectado por la caída en el salario real
de los trabajadores, pues el impacto directo del fenómeno es la reducción de casi el
20% de los ingresos exógenos totales recibidos por sus hogares. Lo anterior ocasiona
que el producto interno bruto (PIB) de la comunidad se reduzca en más del 7%
(segunda columna del cuadro 4b). En contraste, el impacto de la crisis salarial no
es considerable para Napízaro y El Chante: hace que su PIB disminuya,
respectivamente, en sólo un 0.8% y un 1.4% segunda columna de los cuadros 4a y
4c). El efecto es mayor para la economía de El Chante respecto a la de Napízaro
por el impacto de la reducción salarial en el ingreso de los trabajadores del pueblo
jaliciense que prestan sus servicios en las escuelas públicas de la región.
La reducción de los salarios no afecta en gran medida a los ingresos de las
actividades y factores productivos de Napízaro (el que más decrece es el comercio,
cuya depresión no sobrepasa el 1.3%). Sus hogares resienten un poco más, aunque la
depresión de sus ingresos no sobrepasa el 2.7% (segunda columna del cuadro 4a).
La crisis salarial afecta a todos los componentes de la economía de Concordia,
pero algunos la resienten más. Son los casos de las actividades ganadera y comercial
(cuya producción cae en 16% y 14%, respectivamente); de las retribuciones al
trabajo (familiar y asalariado) y del ingreso de los dos tipos de hogar (segunda
columna del cuadro 4b).
La economía de El Chante es menos golpeada que la de Concordia por la
reducción de los salarios. La excepción son los maestros de las escuelas públicas,
afectados por la dismunición del salario real que les paga el gobierno. Esto hace
que el ingreso de los asalariados locales disminuya en más del 10.5% y que el de
los hogares no agrícolas lo haga en 3.4% (lo último debido a que la mayoría de los
maestros son miembros de los hogares no dedicados a las actividades agrícolas,
segunda columna del cuadro 4c).
La crisis salarial también repercute negativamente en los ingresos que el
gobierno recibe por las contribuciones de los tres pueblos (primera línea de la
segunda columna bajo el encabezado “exógeno total” de los cuadros 4a, 4b y 4c).
Lo mismo sucede con la demanda que las comunidades hacen a productos del resto
de la región y de México.
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Cuadro 4c
El Chante: Resultados de los experimentos
(cambios porcentuales respecto a la base)
Combinación
de los tres
Reducción Alternativa A Alternativa B primeros
salarios Devaluación PROCAMPO a PROCAMPO a PROCAMPO experimentos
Ingreso exógeno
Trabajo asalariado* -20.00 -20.00
Hogares
Maizeros -1.28 10.73 11.67 21.12
Cañeros -1.34 3.48 2.14
Mixtos -0.53 48.84 6.87 55.18
Suma Hogares Agric. -1.13 17.00 7.83 22.77
No agrícolas -0.18 55.70 55.52
Actividades
Maíz 25.89
Ganadería 11.40
Ingreso endógeno
PIB -1.42 1.73 0.24 1.02 1.21 0.55
Actividades
Maíz -0.41 1.92 0.30 19.33 0.86 1.81
Caña -0.01 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.06
Otros agrícolas -1.91 9.14 0.60 0.58 2.53 7.83
Total Agricultura -0.06 0.27 0.03 1.32 0.13 0.25
Ganadería -0.89 4.66 0.76 0.48 5.47 4.52
No agropecuaria 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Comercio -1.40 6.97 0.88 1.68 2.74 6.44
Factores
Familiar -0.57 2.90 0.40 0.30 2.02 2.73
Asalariado local -10.52 0.31 0.04 0.92 0.14 -10.16
Asalariado de fuera -0.21 1.10 0.17 0.81 1.19 1.06
Total Asalariados -5.82 0.67 0.10 0.87 0.62 -5.05
Capital local -0.62 2.99 0.41 15.81 1.22 2.77
Capital de fuera -0.01 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.06
Total Capital -0.20 0.95 0.13 4.80 0.42 0.88
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Cuadro 4c (Continued)
Combinación
de los tres
Reducción Alternativa A Alternativa B primeros
salarios Devaluación PROCAMPO a PROCAMPO a PROCAMPO experimentos
Tierra local -0.36 1.74 0.24 8.75 1.05 1.62
Tierra de fuera -0.01 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.06
Total Tierra -0.07 0.33 0.05 1.41 0.23 0.31
Hogares
Maizeros -1.80 4.86 3.71 1.99 1.06 6.76
Cañeros -0.48 1.89 0.18 0.31 0.91 1.59
Mixtos -0.54 10.60 1.49 0.55 1.12 11.55
Total Hogares Agric. -0.94 5.17 1.70 0.93 1.02 5.93
No agrícolas -3.36 16.48 0.19 0.57 0.91 13.31
Exógeno total
Gobierno -1.08 4.99 0.70 0.59 0.74 4.62
Resto del Valle -1.00 5.41 1.08 1.08 1.03 5.50
Resto de México -1.76 7.98 1.14 1.24 1.66 7.37
* Maestros de escuelas públicas
Fuente: elaboración propia
Devaluación
Los resultados de la investigación constatan el fenómeno ampliamente
documentado en la literatura sobre el desarrollo económico; a saber: que la
depreciación de la moneda local tiene efectos positivos en la economía rural. En
efecto, la devaluación del peso frente al dólar estadounidense impulsa el PIB de las
cuatro comunidades estudiadas (tercera columna de los cuadros 4a a 4c y segunda
del cuadro 4d). En el caso de Napízaro, Concordia y El Chante el efecto positivo
de la depreciación se dá a través de la migración (ya que aumenta el valor en pesos
de las remesas y, en consecuencia, el ingreso de sus hogares), mientras que en el
caso de San Quintín tal impacto surge del mayor ingreso en pesos proveniente de
la exportación de hortalizas de la empacadora.
No obstante, el enfoque adoptado permite hacer las siguientes precisiones.
Entre mayores ingresos netos del exterior (de los E.U.A.), el impacto positivo
para la economía local de la devaluación es mayor. Así entonces, Napízaro es la
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Cuadro 4d
San Quintín: Resultados de los experimentos
(cambios porcentuales respecto a la base)
Aumento en las (Distribución de los
exportaciones Federalismo recursos federales)
Ingreso exógeno
Empacadora 16.00
Hogares
Migrantes a E.U. 46.00 3.46
Migrantes a México 0.21 0.01
No migrantes 285.53 17.19
Inmigrantes 3,057.83 3.94
Actividades
Negocios grandes 1.16 11.93
Negocios pequeños 6.66 15.00
Empacadora 7.60 48.38
(Suma) 100.00
Ingreso endógeno
PIB 2.40 2.97
Actividades
Negocios
Grandes 0.49 1.57
Pequeños 0.75 1.98
Tianguis 1.18 4.41
Empacadora 0.74 0.36
Factores
Trabajo familiar o ganancia 3.79 5.59
Asalariado 6.07 5.19
Capital 12.70 7.25
Tierra 15.69 7.40
Hogares
Migrantes a E.U. 5.04 5.21
Migrantes a México 3.58 4.32
No migrantes 3.14 3.80
Inmigrantes 5.89 4.46
Fuente: Anabel Martínez: 1996
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población en la que los ingresos del exterior son más importantes y es,
precisamente, la que más crece a raíz de la devaluación del peso (en casi un 16%,
tercera columna del cuadro 4a); le sigue San Quintín, en la que parte importante
de su ingreso proviene de los E.U.A., y cuyo PIB crece en 2.4% (tercera columna
del cuadro 4d).9 Por su parte, la devaluación afecta menos a El Chante (su PIB
aumenta en sólo un 1.73%, tercera columna del cuadro 4c) y es aún menos
significativa para Concordia (el crecimiento de su PIB no pasa el 1.3%, tercera
columna del cuadro 4b).
La depreciación del peso provoca un crecimiento en el ingreso de todos los
componentes de la economía de Napízaro, destacándose el de los hogares (sobre
todo el de los medianos) y el del comercio (tercera columna del cuadro 4a). Los
hogares no agropecuarios y el comercio de Concordia son los que más se
benefician con la depreciación del peso (tercera columna del cuadro 4b). También
es el ingresos de los hogares no agrícolas de El Chante el que más crece, seguido
por el de los hogares mixtos y el de las actividades agrícolas distintas a la
producción de caña y maíz, del comercio, de los hogares maizeros y de la
ganadería (tercera columna del cuadro 4c). Por su parte, aunque el ingreso de
todos los componentes de la economía de San Quintín crece por la devaluación,
los más beneficiados son los factores y los hogares y, dentro de ellos, los
vinculados directamente con las actividades de la empacadora, es decir: la tierra,
el capital, el trabajo de los inmigrantes que laboran en ella y las ganancias de la
misma (cuadro 4d, columna dos).
Cabe notar que los pequeños impactos de la depreciación del peso en El
Chante y, sobre todo, en Concordia se deben al reducido peso de las remesas en
los ingresos totales de sus hogares. Sin embargo, el impacto marginal de un
aumento absoluto en las remesas es importante en todas las comunidades. Así
por ejemplo, no obstante que el peso de las remesas en el ingreso total de los
hogares de El Chante es de sólo el 5.5% (cuadro 2c), por cada dólar de inyección
a sus hogares, su ingreso total aumenta en 20%; para Concordia el peso es aún
menor (del 2.2%, cuadro 2b), pero el ingreso total de sus familias aumenta en
10% por cada dólar que se le inyecta. Otro aspecto importante a notar respecto
a los impactos marginales de la devaluación es que, en términos absolutos, son
los ingresos totales de los hogares no agrícolas de El Chante los que más crecen,
pero en términos marginales los que más se ven afectados positivamente son los
de los hogares cañeros.10
Por último, los efectos que la devaluación tiene sobre las tres poblaciones
hace que sus contribuciones al gobierno aumenten y que su demanda de productos
del reso de México también lo haga. Estos resultados muestran cómo la migración
—en concreto, el impacto positivo de la devaluación del peso en las remesas—
hace que se abran más las comunidades rurales a su exterior, en este caso al nacional.
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Efectos de los cambios en materia
de política pública
Las inyecciones gubernamentales de recursos benefician a las economías de
los cuatro pueblos, sea mediante PROCAMPO, la utilización de los recursos de
éste programa para promover a las actividades productivas agropecuarias o a partir
de la aplicación del federalismo fiscal. No obstante y al igual que en el caso de las
simulaciones anteriores, el peso, la distribución y la magnitud de los efectos varían
de pueblo a pueblo y dependen del tipo de política seguida.
PROCAMPO y políticas alternativas de
apoyo a la producción agropecuaria
La comunidad más beneficiada por el esquema de apoyo directo a los
productores de básicos es Napízaro: el impacto en su PIB es de aumentarlo en un
6.6% (cuadro 4a, cuarta columna). Por su parte, el PIB de las otras dos que producen
cultivos básicos (Concordia y El Chante) crece muy levemente (en 1.24% y 0.24%,
respectivamente, cuarta columna de los cuadros 4b y 4c). Esto se debe al peso
relativo de las inyecciones de recursos gubernamentales a sus hogares agrícolas:
en Napízaro sobrepasa el 35% de los ingresos exógenos de sus hogares, en El
Chante es de alrededor del 8% y en Concordia es de sólo el 5% (cuadros 4a, 4c y
4b, respectivamente, cuarta columna, líneas bajo el encabezado “ingresos
exógenos”).11 En los tres pueblos, los componentes más beneficiados por
PROCAMPO son los hogares productores de cultivos básicos (los tres tipos de
hogares en Napízaro, los agropecuarios de Concordia y los maizeros y mixtos de
El Chante, cuarta columna de los cuadros 4a, b y c, filas que componen el encabezado
“ingresos exógenos”).
Conviene detenerse un poco para hacer comparaciones entre los efectos
diferenciados de la devaluación y de la aplicación de PROCAMPO. Los resultados
discutidos indican que la depreciación del peso tiene mayores impactos positivos
que el esquema gubernamental de apoyo al agro en la gran mayoría de los
componentes de las economías de Napízaro y El Chante, y que lo contrario sucede
con los de Concordia. No obstante, y como ya se mencionó, estas conclusiones
dependen del peso de la migración y de la producción de básicos en la economía de
los pueblos.
El análisis de multiplicadores permite hacer otro tipo de comparaciones al
poderse estimar con él los efectos de aumentos equivalentes en el valor en pesos de
las remesas y en las transferencias directas de PROCAMPO. Es decir, estos ejercicios
de simulación suponen que la devaluación significa un aumento en las remesas a
los hogares con migrantes de, digamos 100 Dls u 800 pesos al tipo de cambio
vigente, y que PROCAMPO se traduce en un aumento igual en el ingreso (800
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pesos), pero de los hogares productores de básicos. Aunque con diferencias relativas
pequeñas, en términos generales PROCAMPO tiene efectos más positivos en los
PIBs locales que la devaluación en Napízaro y en Concordia, y lo contrario sucede
en el caso de El Chante.12 Los resultados se deben a las diferencias en cuanto al
tipo de hogar más beneficiado con los cambios simulados y a las vinculaciones de
tales hogares con la economía local. Por ejemplo, es el caso de las familias de
subsistencia y grandes de Napízaro, cuyo ingreso aumenta más con PROCAMPO
que con una devaluación de un igual monto; como ellos son los que más vinculación
tienen con la economía local frente a los hogares medianos (que son los perjudicados
al aplicarse PROCAMPO y no la devaluación), el impacto del esquema
gubernamental en el PIB de Napízaro es mayor.
Regresando a las simulaciones sobre los cambios exógenos que, de hecho, han
sucedido, los resultados de las simulaciones alternativas a PROCAMPO muestran
que hay políticas nacionales distintas y mejores. Estas se ilustran en el cuarto y
quinto experimentos para Napízaro, Concordia y El Chante (bajo el título de
“alternativa A” y “alternativa B” en los cuadros 4a, 4b y 4c), que consisten en
canalizar los mismos montos de recursos que usa PROCAMPO a las actividades
productivas agrícolas (alternativa A) o pecuarias (alternativa B) y no a los ingresos
de los hogares.13
La superioridad de los apoyos a la producción es evidente en los resultados
para los tres pueblos: con la alternativa A el crecimiento del PIB de Napízaro se
duplica respecto al efecto que sobre éste tiene PROCAMPO (13.1% vrs. 6.55%,
cuadro 4a, quinta y cuarta columnas, respectivamente) y con la B el PIB del pueblo
crece aún más; el aumento del PIB de Concordia se multiplica por más de seis con
cualquiera de las dos aternativas (cuadro 4b) y el factor de expansión del PIB de El
Chante es de más de cuatro y de cinco con la alternativa A y B, respectivamente
(cuadro 4c).
Conviene notar que con los esquemas alternativos a PROCAMPO son las
actividades productivas agropecuarias las que más se benefician (y no el ingreso
de los hogares), que el ingreso factorial crece más y que, con la excepción de El
Chante, las actividades comerciales aumentan menos que con PROCAMPO.
En lo que respecta a las relaciones de los pueblos con el exterior, los resultados
indican que las transferencias que Napízaro y Concordia le hacen al gobierno
crecen menos con las dos alternativas a PROCAMPO y se reducen con la alternativa
A para El Chante. Por su parte, el aumento en la demanda de productos del exte-
rior se mantiene prácticamente inalterada en Napízaro y Concordia con las
alternativas A y B respecto a PROCAMPO, mientras que para El Chante su
crecimiento es mayor.
Debido a que los comercios locales de los tres pueblos se dedican básicamente
a la venta de productos “importados”, las comparaciones anteriores indican que, al
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menos para Napízaro y Concordia, las alternativas a PROCAMPO tienen un mayor
sesgo a favor del agro que el programa puesto en práctica a partir de la Administración
del Presidente Salinas.
Federalismo
La aplicación del federalismo fiscal a San Quintín14 —el único pueblo de los
estudiados que aporta más recursos al gobierno de los que recibe— tendría impactos
positivos en su economía, ya que crecería en casi un 3% (cuadro 4d, tercera co-
lumna). Todos los componentes de la comunidad se verían beneficiados, los
inmigrantes, inclusive. Los beneficios de la aplicación del Federalismo en
pobalciones exportadoras como San Quintín no sólo serían mayores que los efectos
de la devaluación, sino que, de distribuirse entre sus principlaes agentes (cuarta
columna del cuadro 4d), beneficiarían a todos sus componentes y de manera más
equitativa que con la depreciación del peso (comparar la segunda y tercera columnas
del cuadro 4d).
Los efectos de la crisis y de PROCAMPO
en Napízaro, Concordia y El Chante
Hay un marcado contraste en las repercusiones que, en los pueblos agropecuarios
estudiados, tienen la combinación de la reducción en los salarios reales, la
devaluación y la aplicación de PROCAMPO. El fuerte vínculo de Napízaro con el
mercado de trabajo estadounidense, su reducida dependencia en los mercados
laborales de México y los beneficios de PROCAMPO hacen que los impactos
positivos de la devaluación dominen los efectos de l a crisis salarial, por lo que su
PIB crece considerablemente (última columna del cuadro 4a). Concordia enfrenta
la situación opuesta y su PIB reciente las adversidades de la reducción de los salarios
en México al grado que los recursos de PROCAMPO son insuficientes para lograr
que su economía no se deprima (cuadro 4b, última columna). La situación de El
Chante es intermedia al sufrir parcialmente los embates de la crisis salarial pero, al
recibir los apoyos de PROCAMPO y los beneficios de la devaluación, su PIB logra
mantenerse más o menos estable.
Reflexiones finales
Los modelos de multiplicadores aplicados a poblaciones del México rural
permiten estudiar los impactos que, sobre el agro tienen y podrían tener cambios
en la eonomía y en la política gubernamental de desarrollo.
Si se toman por separado, los efectos de las modificaciones del contexto en el
que se ubican los pueblos estudiados tienen el mismo signo: la depresión del salario
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real los afecta negativamente y la devaluación y políticas de apoyo al agro impulsan
su producción o ingresos. No obstante, el detalle de la información usada y las
características del enfoque adoptado permiten obtener resultados precisos, con los
cuales es posible conocer las diferencias que tales cambios tienen de pueblo a
pueblo y, con ello, hacer un esbozo de tipología al respecto y presentar reflexiones
en materia de política.
En principio, aquellas poblaciones pequeñas en las que las remesas de los
E.U.A. son fuente importante del ingreso de sus hogares saldrían beneficiadas con
la devaluación del peso y con la política gubernamental de apoyo a ellos: es el caso
de Napízaro. La crisis salarial no afecta mucho a este tipo de comunidades debido
a que la fuerte emigración a los E.U.A. de los miembros de sus hogares las aisla de
ella: el efecto de la reducción en el salario real de México es más que compensado
por el crecimiento en el valor en pesos de las remesas que reciben. Sin embargo, tal
aumento no sólo es función de la depreciación del peso, sino de los recursos que
les puedan remitir a sus familias los miembros que trabajan en los E.U.A., y los
importantes cambios de actitud y políticas hacia los inmigrantes sucedidos en lo
reciente en aquel país no ofrecen perspectivas halagüeñas.
Los pueblos más golpeados por la crisis son los que tienen una importante
proporción de hogares que dependen de los ingresos obtenidos por la prestación de
los servicios laborales de sus miembros fuera de la localidad, en la región o en el
resto de México. Es el caso de Concordia, a la que se le unen otras muchas
poblaciones rurales. Frente a las escazas o nulas alternativas de ingreso que en la
actualidad ofrece la economía del país, la situación está impulsando la emigración
de los habitantes del campo a los E.U.A. o conduciendo a la presión de los recursos
naturales rurales. 15
Por su parte, algunos pueblos con fuentes de ingreso muy diversificadas (como
El Chante) estarían logrando sortear los embates de la crisis. Sin embargo, una de
éstas fuentes son las remesas, por lo que la prolongación de la crisis puede aumentar
las presiones a que sus habitantes busquen trabajo en los E.U.A.
A lo último habría que añadir que son muy fuertes los impulsos de la crisis
hacia la emigración al país vecino del norte de los habitantes del agro mexicano.
Investigaciones que estiman los impactos de la devaluación en tales flujos indican
que ésta podría crecer hasta en más de un 20% (Taylor, J. E. et al: 1997). Aunque
no es posible hacer este tipo de estimaciones con los modelos de multiplicadores,
16
 los resultados de los efectos marginales de la devaluación en el ingreso de los
hogares indican que las presiones a migrar pueden ser muy fuertes (por ejemplo,
en términos absolutos, serían mayores para El Chante respecto a Napízaro los efectos
en los ingresos de sus hogares de un aumento equivalente en las remesas que reciben).
Por su parte, la devaluación (y el Tratado de Libre Comercio Norteamericano
o TLCN) tienen consecuencias positivas en poblaciones dedicadas a la exportación
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de productos agrícolas intesivos en el uso de mano de obra. Es el caso de San
Quintín, cuyos ingresos y demanda de trabajadores del resto de México han crecido
a raíz de la devaluación del peso o del TLCN.
Nuestro estudio también permite hacer una consideración, frecuentemente
olvidada en los estudios del agro mexicano: ésta se refiere a los efectos que los
cambios en la economía rural tienen sobre el resto del país. Los resultados expuestos
indican que una de las consecuencias de la crisis es la disminución de los ingresos
que el gobierno recibe del agro y de la demanda que el sector hace a los productos
manufacturados que produce el sector industrial de México.17
Además de contribuir a proporcionar las bases para elaborar una tipología del
medio rural y su contexto, nuestro enfoque permite hacer consideraciones en ma-
teria de políticas de apoyo al agro. Así pues, PROCAMPO puede ser una medida
para reducir la emigración del agro a los E.U.A., pero los resultados de nuestras
indagaciones también indican que hay medidas distintas (igual de neutrales y que
usan los mismos montos de recursos gubernamentales), cuyos efectos positivos
serían aún mayores. Según ellos, un programa como PRODUCE (el esquema de
apoyo a la producción agropecuaria de la Adminsitración del Presidente Zedillo)
podría ser más eficáz que PROCAMPO para reducir la emigración e impulsar el
desarrollo rural.
Hay un último aspecto importante en materia de política que recoje nuestro
estudio. Este tiene que ver con la importancia de tomar en cuenta las prioridades y
condiciones locales en el diseño de la política de desarrollo rural. Por ejemplo, los
resultados expuestos indican que, para Napízaro, la política más eficáz para promover
su PIB (o, lo que es lo mismo, su oferta local) sería la de canalizar los recursos de
PROCAMPO a la actividad ganadera. Sin embargo, si fuera más prioritario el
impulso del ingreso de los factores laborales (trabajo familiar y asalariado) y la
reducción de la emigración, la medida más adecuada podría ser aquella que canalizara
los recursos de apoyo gubernamental a la producción de cultivos básicos (ver
columnas 5 y 6 del cuadro 4a). En contraste, el apoyo estatal a la ganadería de
Concordia provocaría el más alto crecimeitno de la economía del pueblo, así como
el más elevado aumento de los ingresos al trabajo familiar (columnas 5 y 6 del
cuadro 4b).
La importancia de las diferencias que existen en el funcionamiento de la
economía de los pueblos remite al federalismo, una cuestión de suma relevancia
para el desarrollo político y socioeconómico de México. En efecto, los resultados
del estudio (ejemplificados en el párrafo anterior) fundamentan el argumento de
que, en parte, la política económica debe de descentralizarse, ya que sería más
eficáz en el cumplimiento de sus objetivos si tomara en cuenta las condiciones
y prioridades locales. Una conclusión similar se aplicaría a San Quintín, pues en
su caso, la puesta en práctica del federalismo fiscal sería muy conveniente a la
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economía local. Lo anterior es especialmente válido cuando se toman en cuenta
las condiciones de vida de los inmigrantes y el hecho de que el gobierno las
puede mejorar al retornar a ellos parte de los ingresos que recibe de la comunidad
en donde trabajan.
En síntesis, lo expuesto refleja la importancia de combinar la política nacional
de desarrollo rural con las locales y, en especial, de tomar en cuenta la heterogeneidad
en las condiciones de funcionamiento de los componentes del medio rural. Una
estrategia de tal naturaleza sería más eficaz para impulsar al agro mexicano, para
promover la economía nacional y, en consecuencia, para aligerar las necesidades
de emigración que tienen los habitamtes del campo mexicano.
Notes
1. Agradezco el apoyo de los Profesores Richard Sexton y J. Edward Taylor para pasar
mi año sabático como profesor visitante de la Universidad de California en Davis, así como
los comentarios de E. Taylor.
2. El texto contiene resultados de investigaciones dirigidas por el Prof. Taylor y el
autor, que han involucrado el esfuerzo de un numeroso grupo de estudiantes y asistentes.
Dentro de ellos, los que han contribuido mayormente están mencionados en las referencias
como autores o coautores de artículos o tesis. La investigación ha recibido apoyos económicos
de CONACYT, de la Fundación Hewlett, del Pacific Rim Research Program, del proyecto
sobre la Reforma Ejidal y de UC-Mexus (las tres últimos programas de la Universida de
California).
3. Descripciones detalladas se encuentran, respectivamente, en: Rodríguez González,
María del Refugio: 1995, Becerril García, J.: 1995, Taylor, J. E. e I. Adelman: 1996 y Martíbez
Guzmán, A.: 1996.
4. En la subsección “Relaciones con el exterior” veremos que el fenómeno se hace más
agudo al considerar la recurrencia de los hogares y de las actividades productivas de los
pueblos al exterior como fuente de ingreso y de insumos.
5. De hecho, la cifra de 14% para San Quintín es menor, pues el dato tiene un sesgo
hacia arriba ya que incluye las ganancias de los negocios grandes y de la empacadora (es
decir, de las empresas de corte capitalista) . Es este pueblo, el uso de trabajo familiar está
concentrado en los negocios pequeños y en los tianguis o globeros (nombre local que se les
da a los comercios ambulantes). Aunque en menor medida, el dato es también algo exagerado
para El Chante, pues incluye las ganacias que de hecho tienen los productores de caña. En
Napízaro la tierra es un componente importante de su valor agregado debido a la importancia
que tiene para el pastoreo del ganado.
6. Es conveniente hacer notar que, aunque el peso del ingreso externo en El Chante y
Napízaro es menor que en Concordia, también es muy importante, lo cual se refleja en los
ejercicios de simulación abajo presentados.
7. El 77% incluye a las actividades comerciales de Concordia (cuadro 3b). Se precedió
de ésta manera porque la mayor parte de las ventas de los comercios del pueblo son de
insumos producidos en el resto de México y por la manera en que se constryó su matriz de
contabilidad social.
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8. El enfoque de multiplicadores tiene sus limitaciones (por ejemplo, con él sólo pueden
estudiarse impactos en el ingreso de cambios exógenos y supone que los agentes económicos
no reaccionan a cambios en los precios relativos, ver Rodríguez, María del Refugio, et.al.:
1996 ). Sin embargo, a diferencia de los modelos de equilibrio general aplicados —otro
enfoque de análisis multisectorial— incorpora situaciones de desempleo, que son realistas
en el contexto de la presente crisis de la economía mexicana.
9. En realidad, el efecto de la devaluación en éste poblado sería mayor. Esto debido a
que provocaría un aumento en la competitividad de la empresa empacadora, aspecto no
captado en el modelo de multiplicadores ya que supone que es constante el volumen físico
de sus exportaciones (es decir, en el modelo, lo único que crece con la devaluación son los
ingresos en pesos de la empresa).
10. Por razones de espacio no se incluyeron cuadros con los resultados de los efectos
marginales de los impactos exógenos. Sin embargo se hará referencia a ellos a lo largo
del texto.
11. El resultado coincide con el hecho de que, al basar sus transferencias en las hectáreas
cultivadas con básicos y no en la productividad, PROCAMPO beneficia más a los agricultores
con tierras menos productivas.
12. Los resultados no se presentan en cuadros por las razones expuestas en la nota 9.
13. Los ejercicios pueden tomarse como representativos de medidas gubernamentales
que promuevan la producción agropecuaria mediante la inversión en obras de infraestructura
que mejoren las vías de transporte y las comunicaciones de las comunidades.
14. El ejercicio consiste en retornar a la población el excedente que hay entre sus
aportaciones al gobierno y los gastos que el último hace en la economía local. Tales
desembolsos se distribuyeron entre sus agentes de acuerdo a los pagos que le hacen a las
entidades públicas, pero dejando un remanente para transferir algún monto a aquellos
que no lo hacen o montos mayores a los que pagan pocos impuestos (hogares de no
migrantes y de inmigrantes, respectivamente, ver las dos últimas columnas del cuadro
4d). La base de datos de San Quintín (es decir, su MCS) es preliminar, por lo que los
resultados expuestos —tomados de Martínez, A.: 1996— para éste pueblo también lo
son. Lo anterior hace que el estudio cuantitativo para San Quintín sea menos completo
que el de las otras tres poblaciones.
15. Encuestas que estamos realizando en otras poblaciones confirman lo anterior.
Por ejemplo,la crisis en la cosntrucción ha provoado el retorno a su comunidades de los
miembros de hogares en pueblos de la Sierra Norte del Estado de Puebla que trabajan
como albañles en ciudades cercanas. Como ya hay una enorme presión en los recursos
productivos naturales de la Sierra, ésto ha significado la pérdida de una importante fuente
de ingreso de muchos de sus hogares y su pauperización, así como el deteriro de su
medio ambiente.
16. En ellos la migración se trata como una variable exógena.
17. El descuido contrasta con la insistencia que se hace en la literatura internacional
sobre la importancia de los efectos que tiene la situación de la agrícultura sobre el componente
industrial de los países en desarrollo. Esto se debe a que en ella se enfatiza la fuerte demanda
que el agro tiene de productos manufactureros de origen nacional.
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IMPACTS OF MIGRATION
Las remesas de los migrantes
mexicanos en Estados Unidos:
Estimaciones para 1995
Fernando Lozano Ascencio*
Introducción
Los cambios en el patrón migratorio entre México y Estados Unidos y lastransformaciones en el sistema de envío de remesas durante la primeramitad de los noventa, generaron un incremento considerable en el monto
de dinero transferido por los migrantes mexicanos. Según fuentes norteamericanas
durante el período comprendido entre 1990 y 1995, el volumen de personas nacidas
en México con residencia habitual en Estados Unidos creció en 2.4 millones, al
pasar de 4.3 a 6.7 millones de personas (Hansen 1996). Esto significa un crecimiento
promedio anual de alrededor de 480 mil personas. De corroborarse estas cifras este
incremento constituye una verdadera revolución en la historia de la migración entre
México y Estados Unidos.
Por cuanto a las modificaciones en el sistema de envío de remesas entre Estados
Unidos y México, el principal cambio ha consistido en el aumento del dinero
transferido por vías electrónicas. De acuerdo con el Banco de México, en 1995
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casi 1,000 millones de dólares ingresaron al país a través de medios electrónicos.
Como un ejemplo de ello, tan sólo el Grupo Elektra en su asociación con Western
Union, movilizó 100 millones de dólares en 1994, 440 millones en 1995 y tienen
programado transferir 700 millones de dólares durante 19961.
El debate en torno a la magnitud de estos recursos también se ha intensificado.
En medios académicos se discute no sólo la magnitud de las remesas (Massey y
Parrado 1994, Corona 1995), sino también los determinantes económicos y sociales
en el envío de dólares, y el impacto de este flujo de divisas en las comunidades
expulsoras de migrantes (Massey y Basem 1992, De la Cruz 1995, Durand et.al.
1996a, Durand et.al. 1996b). En medios gubernamentales mexicanos,
particularmente en el Banco de México, continuamente se revisan y afinan los
procedimientos para la estimación de las remesas familiares, sobre todo ampliando
la cobertura de captación de estos fondos en el territorio nacional (Carriles et.al.
1991, Banco de México 1994:177-178).
En medios gubernamentales de Estados Unidos, también se han desarrollado
iniciativas para determinar la magnitud del flujo de divisas generado por los
inmigrantes internacionales. Al respecto se han levantado dos grandes encuestas a
migrantes que lograron su legalización en 1986, una en 1989 y otra en 1992, en
donde, entre otras muchas características sociodemográficas, se puede estimar el
monto de las remesas enviadas por los migrantes, al menos del grupo que ha logrado
su legalización en ese país (U.S. Department of Justice 1992 y U.S. Department of
Labor 1996).
El objetivo de este trabajo es elaborar una estimación del monto de las remesas
transferidas por los migrantes mexicanos en Estados Unidos durante el año de 1995,
según características de los migrantes y mecanismos de envío. Se pretende actualizar
un trabajo previo elaborado por el autor, utilizando fuentes de información y
procedimientos similares (Lozano 1993). El trabajo está dividido en tres partes: En
la primera se hace una breve revisión de trabajos recientes que estiman el monto de
las remesas de los migrantes mexicanos. En la segunda parte se presentan los
procedimientos y fuentes empleados en la estimación de remesas para 1995. Y en
la última parte se presentan los resultados de este ejercicio, los que se confrontan
con estimaciones recientes sobre remesas internacionales captadas en México.
Estimaciones recientes sobre el monto de las
transferencias de los migrantes mexicanos
Esta sección está dedicada a la revisión de trabajos recientes que contienen
estimaciones sobre el monto de las remesas de  los migrantes mexicanos en Estados
Unidos2. Se comentarán aquí las estimaciones elaboradas por de Massey y Parrado
(1994), Rodolfo Corona (1995), por el Banco de México y las contenidas en la
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Encuesta a la Población Legalizada (Legalized Population Survey-LPS, [U.S.
Department of Justice 1992 y U.S. Department of Labor 1996]). La revisión de
estos trabajos es central, dado que de ellos proviene en buena medida la información
que aquí  se emplea para elaborar las estimaciones sobre el monto de las remesas
de los migrantes.
Massey y Parrado (1994)
Este trabajo ofrece una estimación del flujo anual de remesas enviado por los
migrantes mexicanos, fijando como año de referencia 1990. La información
empleada por los autores, proviene de una encuesta levantada entre 1982 y 1992,
en 22 comunidades del centro occidente de México. La encuesta ha sido aplicada
también a los migrantes de estas comunidades en los lugares de destino de los
Estados Unidos. Las estimaciones de remesas incluyen el flujo monetario enviado
desde Estados Unidos, así como el monto de dinero que los trabajadores llevaron
consigo en sus viajes de retorno a México. Asimismo, la estimación incluye las
remesas enviadas por migrantes temporales y migrantes permanentes, ya sean
documentados o indocumentados. Los autores estimaron que un total de 24 millones
de dólares fue enviado a las comunidades incluidas en la muestra, durante el año
del levantamiento. En algunos lugares, este flujo de dinero iguala y aun rebasa el
valor del ingreso local. Al generalizar esta cifra para la región del occidente de
México los autores estimaron que el flujo regional de “migradólares” ascendió a
1.5 mil millones de dólares. Sin embargo, cuando los autores insertan los datos de
su encuesta en el modelo desarrollado por Lozano (1993), el flujo total de remesas
estimado es de 2,012.5 millones de dólares, de los cuales 1,167.3 millones (58%)
es enviado por migrantes temporales y 845.2 millones de dólares (42%) por
migrantes permanentes.
Rodolfo Corona (1995)
Este autor presenta una estimación del monto total de remesas enviado a México
por los migrantes en Estados Unidos, tomando como base el año de 1993. La fuente
de información empleada es la Encuesta sobre Migración en la Frontera Norte de
México (EMIF), levantada entre el 28 de marzo de 1993 y el 27 de marzo de 1994.
La EMIF es un conjunto de cuatro encuestas continuas, levantadas en diversos
puntos de la frontera norte de México, a poblaciones en movimiento. Estas cuatro
poblaciones son: los migrantes que llegan desde el sur a la frontera norte, los
migrantes que retornan voluntariamente de Estados Unidos, los migrantes que
regresan al sur después de trabajar en la frontera norte de México, y los
indocumentados devueltos por la patrulla fronteriza de Estados Unidos.
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De acuerdo con Corona la EMIF permite una medición directa del monto de
las remesas de dos poblaciones del grupo de migrantes procedentes de Estados
Unidos: 1) los migrantes laborales, población de residentes habituales en México,
que trabajaron una cierta temporada en Estados Unidos y que retornaron a sus
hogares en el interior de la república mexicana, en el año de referencia de la encuesta;
y 2) los individuos nacidos en México que residen habitualmente en Estados Unidos
y que, durante el año de la encuesta, viajaron temporalmente a México para reunirse
con familiares o de paseo.
El monto total de remesas estimado por Corona para 1993 es de 2,055 millones
de dólares, de los cuales 1,470 millones fueron transferidos por migrantes temporales
(71.5%) y 585 millones (28.5%) por migrantes permanentes. Corona argumenta
que su cálculo de remesas está subestimada debido a que la EMIF excluyó dos
componentes: por un lado, el dinero que los migrantes llevan consigo, cuya
indagación se omitió para evitar rechazos, respuestas incorrectas y no alterar otras
partes del cuestionario. De otro lado, no se contempló las remesas de los grupos de
migrantes que no son captados por la EMIF. Estos grupos son: 1) los emigrantes
permanentes que no retornan de visita a México, 2) los emigrantes permanentes
que cuando retornan a México sólo cruzan a las ciudades fronterizas mexicanas, 3)
los migrantes laborales que viven en las ciudades fronterizas, y 4) el grupo de
migrantes temporales y permanentes no indocumentados que regresan directamente
al interior de México por vía aérea.
Banco de México
Antes de 1989, el renglón de remesas familiares de la balanza de pagos de
México sólo registraba el dinero captado vía giros postales y telegráficos, de acuerdo
con los reportes de la Secretaría de Comunicaciones y Transportes. A partir de
1989, el Banco de México amplió el radio de captación de remesas y consideró
también los fondos transferidos vía money orders y cheques personales, recibidos
en instituciones bancarias y casas de cambio. El instrumento de estimación del
monto de money orders y cheques personales es la Encuesta Mensual de Remesas
Familiares, complementada por el Censo de Remesas Familiares que se llevó a
cabo, por primera vez, en agosto de 1990 (Carriles et.al. 1991). La Encuesta Men-
sual se basa en la información proporcionada por dos instituciones bancarias
(Bancomer y Banamex), y el Censo contiene información de todos los
establecimientos bancarios y casas de bolsa de México. Para estimar el monto total
de los envíos, se conjunta la información muestral con los datos del censo, y se
suman las transferencias realizadas vía telégrafo (Banco de México 1991:23 y 264).
Estos dos instrumentos de medición (la encuesta y el censo) tuvieron buenos
resultados entre 1989 y 1992. El monto anual de remesas estimado durante ese
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período fue el siguiente: 1,682 millones de dólares en 1989, 1,980 millones en
1990, 1,852 millones en 1991 y 1,927 millones de dólares en 1992. Sin embargo,
en 1993 el marco muestral empezó a presentar problemas, debido entre otras cosas
a que las casas de cambio redujeron considerablemente la compra de remesas, a
que se amplió la participación de muchas otras instituciones bancarias y comerciales
(especialmente en zonas rurales), pero sobre todo, al aumento del monto de remesas
vía transferencias electrónicas y al incremento de transferencias en efectivo y en
especie (Banco de México 1995).
A partir de 1994 el Banco de México incorporó en la balanza de pagos el
monto de las transferencias electrónicas y una estimación de las “transferencias de
bolsillo”, tanto de efectivo como en especie. La información sobre las transferencias
electrónicas es reportada directamente al Banco de México por las compañías
dedicadas a esta actividad, por lo que no hay necesidad de hacer algún tipo de
muestreo. La información sobre las remesas en efectivo y en especie proviene de
una sección especial que se añadió a la Encuesta de Turismo, levantada también
por el Banco de México.
Con la incorporación de estos dos rubros, la estimación del monto de las remesas
aumentó a casi el doble de lo que se venía reportando: 3,694 millones para 1994 y
3,672 millones de dólares para 1995. Considerando los canales a través de los
cuales se efectuaron los envíos durante 1995, el 39.7% se remitió vía money or-
ders, 27.1% vía transferencias electrónicas, 24.4% vía giros telegráficos, 8.1% lo
constituyen las remesas en efectivo y en especie, y el 0.7% corresponde al envío de
cheques personales (cuadro 1). Es significativo el hecho de que pese al incremento
del dinero enviado vía transferencias electrónicas, los money orders continúen siendo
el mecanismo de envío más utilizado por los migrantes mexicanos en Estados Unidos.
Cuadro 1
Remesas familiares estimadas por el Banco de México, según
modalidad de envío, 1990-1995 (Millones de dólares)
Modalidad de envío 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Total 2,493.6 2,658.0 3,070.1 3,333.2 3,694.3 3,672.7
Money orders 1,375.4 1,215.4 1,026.4 602.8 1,622.4 1,456.3
Giros telegráficos 464.6 524.7 679.7 784.0 888.5 894.5
Cheques 140.2 112.0 221.0 145.6 49.9 26.2
T. Electrónicas  504.2 996.7
Efectivo y especie 629.3 299.0
Ajuste 1990-1993  513.4 806.0 1,143.0 1,800.8
Fuente: Dirección de Investigación Económica, Banco de México
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Una vez que los encargados de elaborar estas estimaciones revisaron y afinaron
el marco muestral e incorporaron los dos “nuevos rubros” a las estimaciones de
1994 y 1995, se elaboró un ajuste retrospectivo del monto total de remesas,
considerando el comportamiento del flujo de remesas durante estos dos últimos
años. Las cantidades ajustadas se presentan en el último renglón del cuadro 1.
Llama la atención que el total de los montos “ajustados” son considerablemente
más altos que los estimados por Massey y Parrado, para el año de 1990 y por
Rodolfo Corona, para el año de 1993.
Legalized Population Survey (LPS)
Esta es una encuesta que ha sido levantada en dos etapas, una en 1989 y otra
en 1992. La encuesta se aplicó entre la población que logró la residencia legal en
Estados Unidos, como resultado de las Reformas a la Ley de Inmigración (Immi-
gration Reform and Control Act, IRCA) de 1986. La primera etapa de la encuesta
fue administrada entre 6,193 personas, y la segunda entre 4,012 individuos que a
su vez respondieron la encuesta en su primera etapa. De esta forma es posible tener
un seguimiento de las características de esta población en un período de tres años.
Seleccionando a la población nacida en México que respondió las dos encuestas,
se encontró que un total de 1,940 individuos (la cifra ponderada representarían a
una población de 596,131 personas) enviaron 733 millones de dólares, de acuerdo
con la encuesta de 1989, y 621.5 millones, según la encuesta de 1992. Esta última
cifra incluye 109 millones de dólares transferidos en efectivo y en especie (cuadro
2). La disminución en el monto total de remesas enviadas a México corrobora lo
que diversos autores han planteado, en el sentido de que a medida que aumenta la
permanencia del migrante en el país receptor, disminuye la cantidad y la periodicidad
de los envíos de dinero a su país de origen (véase Menjívar et.al. 1996).
Cuadro 2
Estimación del flujo de remesas de la población mexicana
que logró su legalización con la IRCA, 1989 y 1992
Muestra Muestra Remesas
Encuesta Año (individuos) Ponderada (millones)
LPS1 1989 1,940 596,476 733.0
LPS2 1992 1,940 596,476 510.7
  Fuente: Legalized Population Survey, 1989 y 1992.
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Esta encuesta es muy importante pues contiene información del grupo de
migrantes radicados permanentemente en Estados Unidos, respecto de los cuales
generalmente se tiene poca información. Además, pese a que el universo de esta
encuesta identifica sólo a un grupo específico de migrantes documentados (los
legalizados bajo la IRCA), confirma un hecho no muy aceptado por algunos autores,
en el sentido de que los envíos de los migrantes permanentes son considerablemente
altos. Más adelante se retomará la discusión sobre este aspecto.
Procedimientos y fuentes
El procedimiento empleado para la estimación de monto total de remesas
captado en México consiste en la construcción de un algoritmo que incorpora
diverso tipo de indicadores demográficos y económicos (Lozano 1993). La
estimación de remesas se elabora para dos grupos fundamentales de migrantes:
los migrantes temporales y los migrantes permanentes. En este trabajo se
considera a la población de migrantes temporales, aquella que reside en México
y que emigra temporalmente a los Estados Unidos en busca de trabajo, para
después regresar nuevamente a México. El grupo de migrantes permanentes se
refiere a la población de mexicanos que ha decidido radicar definitivamente en
los Estados Unidos.
El conjunto de indicadores demográficos y económicos que se requieren para
la estimación del monto total de remesas son los siguientes. Para la población de
migrantes temporales, se necesita conocer su volumen, la duración promedio de su
estancia en Estados Unidos, la proporción de migrantes que envía dinero a México,
el promedio mensual de envíos, la proporción de migrantes que hacen “transferencias
de bolsillo” y los montos promedios de esas transferencias. Para la población de
migrantes permanentes se requiere información sobre su volumen, tasa de
participación dentro de la población mexicana de quince años y más, proporción
de migrantes que envía dinero a México, promedios mensuales de envíos, así como
información relacionada con sus “transferencias de bolsillo”.
La información utilizada en este trabajo proviene de las siguientes bases de
datos: Encuesta Nacional de la Dinámica Demográfica 1992 (ENADID), Encuesta
de Migración en la Frontera Norte 1993-1994 (EMIF), Mexican Migration Project
1995, Legalized Population Survey 1989 y 1992, y Current Population Survey, 1994
y 1995. Además se emplea información de los censos mexicano y norteamericano
de 1990, así como del Conteo Mexicano de Población y Vivienda 1995.
En lo que sigue se hará una exposición detallada del procedimiento que se
siguió para la selección de cada uno de los indicadores demográficos y
económicos. En virtud de que la estimación de remesas es para el año de 1995,
algunos de los indicadores fueron ajustados a ese año.
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Indicadores para la población de migrantes
temporales
Dos son las cifras fundamentales que se requieren para la estimación de las
remesas de los migrantes temporales: una se refiere al número de trabajadores que
laboraron o buscaron trabajo en Estados Unidos en un año determinado, y la otra
se refiere al flujo de retorno de migrantes temporales, es decir, el número de
trabajadores que regresó a México durante ese mismo año. Las fuentes de
información exploradas fueron la Encuesta Nacional de la Dinámica Demográfica
(ENADID) y la Encuesta sobre Migración en la Frontera Norte (EMIF).
En el archivo de Datos Generales de la ENADID, existe una pregunta dirigida a
las personas de doce años y más que habitan en el hogar “... ¿alguna vez ha ido
[NOMBRE] a los Estados Unidos a trabajar o en busca de trabajo?” (INEGI 1994:365).
Si la persona respondía afirmativamente, se le pedía información sobre el mes y el año
de su última salida a Estados Unidos, así como del mes y año de regreso (para aquellos
que habían regresado). Trabajando la información de este archivo, se encontró que un
total de 2’449,045 individuos declararon haber ido a Estados Unidos a trabajar o en
busca de trabajo. Dado que el objetivo es determinar el monto de dinero que ingresa
a México anualmente, es preciso conocer el volumen de trabajadores temporales que
estuvieron en Estados Unidos en un año determinado. La ENADID fue levantada
entre el 31 de agosto y el 30 de noviembre de 1992. Para los fines de este trabajo se
estableció como período anual de referencia el comprendido entre los meses de
noviembre de 1991 y octubre de 1992. Ello permite “aislar” a la población que declaró
haber estado en Estados Unidos en algún momento de ese período. En el cuadro 3 se
Cuadro 3
Migrantes temporales residentes en México, según período de entrada
y salida de Estados Unidos, noviembre 1991—octubre 1992
Período de entrada y salida de E.U. Población
1) Migrantes que entraron y salieron de E.U.
entre noviembre 91 y octubre 92 191,263
2) Migrantes que entraron a E.U. antes de nov. 91
y regresaron a México entre nov. 91 y oct. 92 177,647
3) Migrantes que entraron a E.U. entre nov. 91
y oct. 92 y no han regresado a México 123,237
4) Migrantes que entraron a E.U. antes de nov. 91
y no han regresado a México 24,188
Total 516,335
 Fuente: Encuesta Nacional de la Dinámica Demográfica, 1992
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observa que 516,335 migrantes temporales estuvieron en Estados Unidos entre
noviembre de 1991 y octubre de 1992. Del total de migrantes temporales, 368,910
(71%) regresó a México en algún momento del período de referencia, y los 147,425
migrantes restantes (29%) continuaban en Estados Unidos en el momento del
levantamiento de la encuesta.
Por su parte la EMIF estableció que 657,326 individuos, nacidos en México, y
que declararon vivir en México, regresaron de Estados Unidos entre el 28 de marzo
de 1993 y el 27 de marzo de 1994 (entre abril de 1993 y marzo de 1994 para
nuestros fines). De ellos 373,646 migrantes (56.8%), declararon haber entrado y
salido de Estados Unidos entre abril de 1993 y marzo de 1994, mientras que 274,163
personas (41.7%) entraron a Estados Unidos antes de abril de 1993 (cuadro 4).
Trabajando con la base de datos de esta encuesta se determinó que la duración
promedio de estos migrantes en Estados Unidos fue de 9.04 meses. Cabe señalar
que esta población no incluye, como en el caso de la ENADID, a los migrantes que
habían estado en Estados Unidos en el período de referencia y que no habían
regresado a México. Pese a que la EMIF subestima el volumen de migrantes
temporales, pues como se señaló, no incorpora a la población que aún se encuentra
en Estados Unidos, presenta varias ventajas en comparación con la ENADID3.
La primer ventaja de la EMIF respecto de la ENADID es que recoge información
directamente del migrante, lo que implica una mayor calidad en la información. En
cambio la ENADID recoge la información de algún miembro del hogar encuestado, no
necesariamente del migrante. Una segunda ventaja de la EMIF es que el cuestionario
se aplica justo en el momento en que el migrante está regresando de Estados Unidos
(por algun punto de la frontera norte mexicana), en cambio, la ENADID recoge
información sobre migraciones que ocurrieron en el pasado, lo cual también representa
una desventaja, respecto a la calidad de la información.
Cuadro 4
Migrantes temporales residentes en México, según período de
entrada y salida de Estados Unidos, abril 1993—marzo 1994
Período de entrada y salida de E.U. Población
1) Migrantes que entraron a E.U. entre abril 93 y
marzo 94 y regresaron a México en el mismo período 373,646
2) Migrantes que entraron a E.U. antes de abril 93
y regresaron a México entre abril 93 y marzo 94 274,163
3) No declararon mes y/o año de entrada a E.U. 9,517
Total 657,326
Fuente: Encuesta de Migración en la Frontera Norte, 1993-1994
1198
En una eventual situación en la que se intentara algún tipo de proyección de la
población de migrantes temporales para el año de 1995, utilizando la información
de ambas encuestas (ENADID y EMIF), se incurriría en diversos problemas y
errores. Por ejemplo, si se asumiera que la población de migrantes temporales
presentó un crecimiento constante, entre la mitad de período del año de referencia
considerado para la ENADID (1º de mayo de 1992), y la mitad del período
considerado para la EMIF (1º de octubre de 1993), ello implicaría un incremento
de esta población en alrededor de 25%, hacia la mitad del año de 1995. El problema
con este supuesto de crecimiento constante, es que no existe evidencia de que la
migración temporal mexicana esté aumentando, y mucho menos al ritmo que esta
proyección supondría.
De otro lado, las poblaciones que cada encuesta considera no son estrictamente
comparables, pues la ENADID incorpora información de migrantes que se
encontraban en Estados Unidos en el momento del levantamiento de la encuesta,
y la EMIF no los toma en cuenta. Es por estas razones que se considerará a la
población de migrantes temporales reportada por la EMIF, para la estimación del
monto de las remesas, bajo el supuesto de que este flujo se mantuvo constante
hasta el año de 1995.
Ahora bien, como se intenta establecer el promedio de trabajadores que
laboraron o buscaron trabajo en Estados Unidos durante 1995, se considerará el
promedio de estancia de 9 meses, reportado por la EMIF, como un indicador clave
para calcular el promedio anual de migrantes temporales. El algoritmo sería el
siguiente. Al multiplicar la población de migrantes temporales (657,326) por 0.75,
factor que expresa que los migrantes permanecieron en Estados Unidos tres cuartas
partes del año, es decir, nueve meses, se obtiene un promedio estimado de
trabajadores-año en Estados Unidos de 492,995 individuos.
Esta estimación del promedio anual de migrantes, implica un supuesto adicional:
que todos los migrantes temporales entraron y salieron de Estados Unidos en un
lapso de doce meses. El cuadro 4 destaca que no todos los migrantes entraron a
Estados Unidos en el año de referencia de la encuesta. Sin embargo, dada la
continuidad de la migración temporal, las estancias de los que estuvieron más tiempo
se compensan con las de aquellos que estuvieron lapsos más cortos. Es por ello que
para estimar el promedio de trabajadores-año para 1995, no es riesgoso trabajar
con el anterior supuesto.
La población estimada en 492,995 trabajadores-año es un insumo básico para
estimar el envío de fondos de los migrantes temporales durante sus estancias en
Estados Unidos, a lo largo del año de 1995. Sin embargo, en diversas trabajos se ha
documentado que los migrantes temporales llevan dinero en su viaje de regreso a
México, operación conocida como “transferencia de bolsillo”. Para ello se requiere
conocer el flujo de retorno de estos migrantes temporales durante 1995.
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Para los fines de este ejercicio, se considerará a la población de 657,326
individuos reportada por la EMIF, para el período comprendido entre abril de 1993
y marzo de 1994, como el flujo de retorno de migrantes temporales. Es probable
que el volumen de este flujo haya aumentado en los 21 meses que van del 1º de
octubre de 1993 (mitad de período del año de referencia de la EMIF) y el 1º de
julio de 1995, mitad del año de 1995. Sin embargo, no se cuenta con ningún otro
referente para establecer alguna hipótesis de crecimiento de esa población, situación
que podría redundar en una subestimación del monto de las “transferencias de
bolsillo” de los migrantes temporales.
Otros indicadores centrales, para la estimación de las  remesas de los migrantes
temporales, son la proporción de migrantes que realiza envíos de fondos durante su
estancia en Estados Unidos, el promedio de dólares enviados al mes, la proporción
de migrantes que realizan “transferencias de bolsillo” y el monto de éstas últimas.
El cuadro 5 resume la información que al respecto ofrecen las encuestas reportadas
en los trabajos de Massey y Parrado (1994) y Rodolfo Corona (1995).
La información del trabajo de Massey y Parrado proviene de encuestas
levantadas entre migrantes de 22 comunidades de los estados de Jalisco, Guanajuato,
Michoacán y Nayarit, durante 1982 y 1992. Las encuestas fueron administradas
tanto en la comunidad de origen, como en los lugares de destino en Estados Unidos.
Por esta razón la encuesta considera dos tipos de poblaciones: una, la de migrantes
presentes en México que declararon haber trabajado o buscado trabajo en Estados
Unidos, y otra, la de migrantes presentes en Estados Unidos. Estas dos poblaciones
se ajustan perfectamente a los dos grupos que se han establecido en este trabajo,
para la estimación del monto total de remesas. En virtud de que las encuestas se
administraron en diferentes años, las cifras en dólares fueron ajustadas por los
autores al año 1990. Respecto a la información de los migrantes presentes en México,
Massey y Parrado señalan que las dos terceras partes de la población contenida en
su muestra, enviaron un promedio de 185 dólares mensualmente. Esta cantidad, a
precios de 1995, equivale a 199 dólares (cuadro 5).
Por su parte Corona (1995) trabajando la base de datos de la EMIF estableció
que 335,242 personas, o sea el 51% del total de migrantes procedentes de Estados
Unidos, envió dinero a México durante los últimos 30 días de actividad económica.
Por lo que se refiere al monto de los envíos mensuales, el promedio de dólares
enviados durante el último mes de trabajo en Estados Unidos fue de 474. Asimismo,
la duración promedio en su lugar de trabajo fue de 8.1 meses. Por tanto la cifra de
320 dólares reportada en el cuadro 5, constituye el promedio de envíos mensuales
a lo largo un año. Esta cantidad, a precios de 1995, equivale a 328 dólares.
Para la estimación del monto de las remesas de los migrantes temporales, se
consideró el promedio entre las dos encuestas reseñadas en el cuadro 5, tanto para
definir la proporción de migrantes que envió dinero a México, como para el monto
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mensual de los envíos. Las cifras resultantes, 0.58 como la proporción de migrantes
que envía dinero, y 264 como el promedio de envíos mensuales a México, están en
un rango bastante aceptable, considerando los resultados a los que han llegado diversos
estudios sobre este campo (véase Lozano 1993:50-51). Por cuanto a la información
referida a las transferencias de bolsillo, solamente el trabajo de Massey y Parrado
recoge datos al respecto. En el mismo cuadro 5 se observa que del total de los migrantes
captados en 18 de las 22 comunidades encuestadas, 58% llevó un promedio de 1,087
dólares en su regreso a México (1,166 dólares a precios de 1995). En virtud de que
no se cuentan con otras estimaciones, se considerarán estos indicadores para la
estimación de las “transferencias de bolsillo” de los migrantes temporales.
Indicadores para la población
de migrantes permanentes
Al inicio de esta sección se había definido a la población de migrantes
permanentes como aquella compuesta por personas nacidas en México, que radican
habitualmente en Estados Unidos, ya sea de manera documentada o indocumentada.
Cuadro 5
Migrantes temporales que envían dinero a México y
monto de los envíos, según dos encuestas
Concepto Massey y Parrado EMIF
Año de la encuesta 1982-92 1993-94
Año base de la estimación de remesas* 1990 1993
Número de migrantes 1,012 657,326**
Proporción que envía dinero 0.66 0.51
Promedio de dólares enviados al mes 185 320
Promedio de dólares enviados al mes
    a precios de 1995 199 328
Proporción de migrantes que hicieron
    “transferencias de bolsillo” 0.58*** —
Promedio de las “transferencias de bolsillo” 1,087 —
Promedio de las “transferencias de
    bolsillo” a precios de 1995 1,166 —
Fuente: Massey y Parrado 1994, Corona 1995.
* Este dato es necesario para “inflar” o deflactar la información de dólares a un año
base, en este caso 1995.
** Valor ponderado. La cifra no ponderada es de 1,991 casos.
*** Esta cifra fue estimada considerando únicamente 18 de las 22 comunidades
encuestadas. El total de migrantes es de 876.
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Al igual que con los migrantes temporales, sobre esta población interesa conocer
su volumen total, la población susceptible de enviar fondos a México, la proporción
que hace envíos, así como el monto de los mismos.
De acuerdo con cifras del Buró de Censos de Estados Unidos, entre 1990 y
1995 el número de personas nacidas en México radicadas en ese país, aumentó de
4.298 millones a 6.721 millones. Nunca, en la historia reciente de la migración
entre México y Estados Unidos se había presentado un crecimiento tan espectacular
como este. Sin embargo, existen autores que sugieren, que la cifra de 1995, que
proviene de la Encuesta Continua de Población (Current Population Survey CPS,
marzo de 1995), pudiera estar sobreestimada.
Robinson y Hansen (1996) encontraron que la diferencia de 457 mil individuos
en la población de mexicanos en Estados Unidos entre 1994 y 1995, al pasar de
6.264 a 6.721 millones entre esos años, no es estadísticamente significativa. De
ahí que concluyan que un error de muestreo pudiera estar sobreestimando el
volumen de la población de mexicanos en Estados Unidos, y que la diferencia
entre 1994 y 1995 no represente el incremento real de esta población. La sugerencia
de estos autores es usar con precaución estas cifras, y emplearlas sólo para hacer
comparaciones del tamaño relativo de las poblaciones de inmigrantes y no
cuantificar diferencias absolutas. Sin embargo, tanto el Buró de Censos, como
algunos autores que laboran en esa institución (Hansen 1996), han hecho públicas
las cifras de la población nacida fuera de los Estados Unidos, considerándolas
como válidas (cuadro 6).
Por su parte Corona y Tuirán (1996) desarrollaron un ejercicio de estimación
del saldo migratorio internacional de México entre 1990 y 1995, tomando como
base el Censo de 1990 y el Conteo de Población y Vivienda 1995. Con la información
sobre el crecimiento natural (nacimientos y defunciones) y la migración interestatal
durante el quinquenio 1990-95, y con la información sobre residentes en México
del Censo de 1990 y del Conteo de 1995, los autores aplicaron el método residual
para estimar el saldo neto de la migración permanente internacional de mexicanos
entre 1990 y 1995 por sexo y entidad federativa.
Con base en una serie de ajustes realizados a la población de 1990 (debido a
problemas de subcobertura presentes en el censo de 1990), y ajustando la población
del Conteo al 30 de junio de 1995, los autores concluyen que el saldo migratorio
internacional total ascendió a 1 millón 387 mil personas entre 1990 y 1995 (cuadro
7). Dado que la absoluta mayoría de la emigración internacional mexicana se dirige
a los Estados Unidos, Corona y Tuirán sugieren considerar esta cifra como el total
de emigrantes permanentes de México a Estados Unidos en esos cinco años. La
distribución por sexo es casi equitativa (694 mil hombres y 693 mil mujeres), y los
lugares de residencia de esta población en México antes de emigrar definitivamente
a los Estados Unidos, corresponden al patrón migratorio conocido: 47.9% residía
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Cuadro 6
Población total de mexicanos radicados en los
Estados Unidos según grupos de edad, 1995
Grupos de edad Hombres Mujeres Total
0-4 73,307 45,163 118,470
5-9 163,052 130,234 293,286
10-14 156,506 137,276 293,782
15-19 270,003 189,664 459,667
20-24 559,420 366,077 925,497
25-29 633,509 479,442 1,112,951
30-34 567,062 387,612 954,674
35-39 407,996 316,662 724,658
40-44 284,139 255,464 539,603
45-49 198,584 164,283 362,867
50-54 146,511 145,682 292,193
55-59 81,942 99,987 181,929
60-64 69,052 82,132 151,184
65-69 56,466 54,104 110,570
70-74 45,280 29,626 74,906
75 y más 43,069 81,742 124,811
Total 3,755,898 2,965,080 6,720,978
Fuente: Current Population Survey, Marzo 1995
Cuadro 7
Estimación del saldo migratorio internacional de
México entre 1990 y 1995 por sexo
Concepto Hombres Mujeres Total
Población censal
    corregida 1990 40’630,378 41’862,065  82’492,443
Población estimada
30 de junio 1995 sin
    migración externa 45’241,864 46’613,540 91’855,404
Saldo migratorio
    externo 1990-95 -694,070 -693,411 -1’387,481
Fuente: Corona y Tuirán 1996.
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en la zona de tradición migratoria, 24.4% en los estados norteños y 27.7% en las
entidades del centro de México4.
El promedio anual de mexicanos que se fueron a vivir a Estados Unidos,
entre el 30 de junio de 1990 y el 30 de junio de 1995, fue de 277 mil personas.
Este volumen de emigrantes “... equivale a una tasa anual de migración
internacional negativa de 0.31%, que, como pérdida neta de habitantes, disminuyó
la tasa anual de crecimiento natural del país (2.17% en este quinquenio), fijando
así en 1.87% la tasa anual de crecimiento poblacional total de México” (Corona
y Tuirán 1996:18).
Con base en la información ofrecida por las dos fuentes anteriores (la CPS
muestra un crecimiento de la población mexicana en Estados Unidos de 2.423
millones de personas entre 1990 y 1995, mientras que Corona y Tuirán sugieren un
crecimiento de 1.387 millones de individuos), en este trabajo se tomará en cuenta
la información de la segunda fuente, para la estimación del monto de las remesas
de los migrantes permanentes. La elección obedece principalmente a que los errores
de muestreo que presenta la CPS podrían estar sobreestimando a esta población, y
debido a las advertencias de algunos autores a no usar las cifras absolutas de los
inmigrantes internacionales de la CPS.
La población de migrantes permanentes en Estados Unidos en 1995 quedaría
entonces en 5.685 millones, que sería el resultado de sumar la población mexicana
residente en Estados Unidos (que de acuerdo con el censo norteamericano fue de
4.298 millones), más la estimación de 1.387 millones de individuos elaborada por
Corona y Tuirán. Ahora bien, para la estimación del monto de remesas enviadas
por los migrantes permanentes es preciso restar a la población menor de 15 años.
Para ello sí fue necesario recurrir a la estructura por edad que ofrece la CPS de
1995. De acuerdo con el cuadro 6, el 10.5% del total de la población mexicana
radicada en Estados Unidos son menores de 15 años. Al substraer este último
porcentaje a la población total estimada de 5.685 millones, la población de 15 años
y más quedaría en 5.088 millones de personas. Adicionalmente, a esta población
habría que restarle la población económicamente inactiva y a los desempleados,
con el objeto de “aislar” a la población en riesgo de enviar dinero a México. De
acuerdo con la CPS de 1994, el 58.98% de la población mayor de 15 años es
población ocupada.
En cuanto a las visitas que los migrantes permanentes realizan a México a lo
largo del año, información necesaria para establecer el monto de sus “transferencias
de bolsillo”, la EMIF estableció que un total de 499,664 individuos, que declararon
vivir en Estados Unidos, y que habían nacido en México, ingresaron a México
entre abril de 1993 y marzo de 1994 (COLEF, CONAPO y STPS 1994). Rodolfo
Corona (1995:9) los divide de la siguiente manera: 87% declararon haber trabajado
en Estados Unidos y el 13% restante no trabajó o no especificó su condición laboral
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(cuadro 8). En este ejercicio de estimación del monto de remesas, se considerará a
esta población de migrantes permanentes reportada por la EMIF para estimar sus
“transferencias de bolsillo”.
Respecto a los indicadores económicos de la población de migrantes
permanentes, en el cuadro 9 se recoge información de cuatro encuestas: Legalized
Population Suvey (LPS1 y LPS2), Mexican Migration Project (MMP) y la EMIF.
Por lo que se refiere a la proporción de migrantes ocupados que envió dinero a
México, de acuerdo con la LPS1 y la LPS2, dicha proporción disminuyó de 0.73 a
0.60 entre 1987 y 1991, que son los años base de las respectivas encuesta. Massey
y Parrado encontraron que la proporción de migrantes permanentes que envió dinero
a México fue de 0.18, mientras que la EMIF reportó que de los 434,378 residentes
en Estados Unidos que visitaron México entre abril de 1993 y marzo de 1994, y
que declararon haber trabajado en aquel país, el 36% (156,193 personas) realizó
envíos durante su estancia en Estados Unidos. Como se puede observar, el rango
de variación de la proporción de migrantes que envía remesas es muy grande (0.73
el valor más alto y 0.18 el más bajo). Sin embargo, dado que la EMIF estaría
representando a un universo más amplio de migrantes, pues la LPS sólo considera
a la población recién legalizada y la encuesta del Mexican Migration Project a
comunidades de migrantes del centro de México, se consideró pertinente trabajar
con la proporción de 0.36 que ofrece la EMIF, para la estimación de las remesas
enviadas por los migrantes permanentes (cuadro 9).
Respecto al promedio de dólares enviados al mes, en la LPS1 la población que
envió remesas, transfirió un promedio de 162 dólares al mes, que a precios de 1995
equivaldría a 197 dólares. En la LPS2, los mexicanos que sí enviaron remesas,
Cuadro 8
Migrantes mexicanos radicados en E.U. que entraron a México
entre abril 1993 y marzo 1994, según condición de trabajo
Condición de trabajo en E.U. Migrantes %
No trabajaron en Estados Unidos 64,976 13.0
Trabajaron en E.U. no enviaron 278,185 55.6
Si trabajó y si envió 156,193 31.3
No especificado 310 0.1
Total 499,664 100.0
Fuente: Corona 1995, con base en información de la Encuesta Sobre Migración en la Frontera
Norte 1993- 1994
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transfirieron un promedio de 140 dólares al mes, 147 dólares a precios de 1995.
Massey y Parrado estimaron el promedio mensual de envíos de esta población en
152 dólares para 1990, 163 dólares a precios de 1995. Corona, por su parte, señala
que el promedio enviado por individuo al mes fue de 476 dólares. Sin embargo,
esta cantidad fue trasferida a México en un promedio de 1.66 envíos al mes, es
decir hubo gente que realizó más de un envío durante el último mes de trabajo. Por
tanto “... el monto de cada remesa enviada durante el último mes de trabajo, [...] en
promedio ascendió a 334 dólares” (Corona 1995:16).
En el caso del dinero promedio enviado mensualmente por los migrantes
permanentes, también se advierte un rango de variación muy grande; además, una
de las cifras se “dispara” sensiblemente, la de 488 dólares, reportada por la EMIF.
Cuadro 9
Migrantes permanentes que envían dinero a México y
monto de los envíos, según cuatro encuestas
Encuestas
Concepto LPS1 LPS2 MMP EMIF
Año de la encuesta 1989 1992 1982-92 1993-94
Año base de los estudios 1987 1991 1990 1993
Número total de migrantes
    captados en las encuestas 596,131 596,131 1,933*  499,354
Número de migrantes ocupados
    según las cuatro encuestas 453,122 419,838 n.d. 434,378
Proporción de migrantes ocupados
    que envía dinero a México 0.73 0.60 0.18 0.36
Promedio de dólares enviados
    mensualmente 162 140 152 476
Promedio de dólares enviados
   al mes a precios de 1995 197 147 163 488
Proporción de migrantes que hicieron
    “transferencias de bolsillo” – 0.33 0.03 –
Promedio de las “transferencias de
    bolsillo” – 597 789 –
Promedio de las “transferencias de
    bolsillo” a precios de 1995 – 627 847 –
Fuente: U.S. Dept. of Justice 1992, U.S. Dept. of Labor 1996, Massey y Parrado 1994,
Corona 1995.
* Cifra no ponderada
1206
Independientemente de que las tres encuestas consideran subpoblaciones distintas,
del grupo de migrantes permanentes (la LPS1 y la LPS2 recogen información de la
misma población), las diferencias en las cifras promedio de dinero enviado, pudieran
obedecer a la manera como es formulada la pregunta en los cuestionarios. Por
ejemplo, la pregunta de la LPS1 y LPS2 es: “¿Cuánto del dinero que ganó usted en
[1987 ó 1991] mandó a familiares o amigos en otros países? En caso de que el
entrevistado tuviera dificultades para responder con una cantidad específica, tenía
la posibilidad señalar el porcentaje que mandó a familiares o amigos, respecto del
dinero que ganó durante el año. En este caso, la forma de calcular el monto promedio
de envíos por mes, es simplemente dividiendo la cifra reportada por el entrevistado
entre doce.
En el caso de la encuesta del Mexican Migration Project la pregunta sobre
el envío de remesas (referida al empleo más reciente en Estados Unidos), es
¿cuánto mandaba al mes a su familia en México? A diferencia de la LPS que
indaga sobre el dinero enviado al año, la encuesta del MMP formula la pregunta
respecto al promedio mensual de envíos. Aunque por la estructura de las preguntas
pudieran existir variaciones en las respuestas, las preguntas son esencialmente
las mismas.
La EMIF tiene dos preguntas ligadas para determinar el monto de los envíos
mensuales. Una es ¿durante el último mes de trabajo, cuántos dólares ganó? y la
siguiente es ¿de esa cantidad, cuántos dólares envió usted a su país de origen? Por
la forma en que está formulada la pregunta, la calidad de la respuesta puede ser
muy alta para el mes específico al que se hace referencia. Sin embargo, sería riesgoso
suponer que ese nivel de envíos se mantiene, con la misma intensidad, a lo largo de
todos los meses del año. De ahí que se haya omitido, en este caso específico, la
información de la EMIF. La cifra final que se sugiere como el promedio de dinero
enviado a México por los migrantes permanentes, es de 169 dólares, cantidad que
es la media de los promedios mensuales reportados por las tres encuestas restantes.
Finalmente, para la estimación de las “transferencias de bolsillo” de los
migrantes mexicanos residentes en Estados Unidos, la encuesta LPS2 y el Mexican
Migration Project ofrecen información al respecto. De acuerdo con la LPS2, uno
de cada tres individuos encuestados envió regalos y/o llevó consigo dólares en
efectivo a México por un monto promedio de 597 dólares en 1991, 627 dólares a
precios de 1995.  Para el Mexican Migration Project sólo una pequeña cantidad de
migrantes permanentes (0.03%) llevó dinero consigo a México. La cantidad
promedio fue de 789 dólares en 1990, que a precios de 1995 equivaldría a 847
dólares (cuadro 9). En virtud de que la LPS es una encuesta diseñada específicamente
para conocer las características de la población con residencia habitual en Estados
Unidos, se juzgó conveniente emplear la información de esta última fuente para la
estimación de las “transferencias de bolsillo” de los migrantes permanentes.
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Resultados
Con base en los indicadores económicos y demográficos expuestos en la sección
anterior, tanto para la población de migrantes temporales como permanentes, se
elaboraron las estimaciones del monto total de remesas transferido por los migrantes
mexicanos para el año de 1995. Los resultados se presentan en los cuadros 10 al
12. Por lo que se refiere al monto de las remesas de los migrantes temporales, en
el cuadro 10 se observa que este grupo transfirió un total de 1,366 millones de
dólares, de los cuales 921.5 millones (67.5%) fueron enviados durante su estancia
en Estados Unidos, y el resto, 444.5 millones de dólares (32.5%), lo constituye el
monto de sus “transferencias de bolsillo”.
El cuadro 11 presenta la estimación de las remesas transferidas por los migrantes
permanentes. Los resultados muestran que los fondos enviados por este grupo
Cuadro 10
Estimación de las remesas transferidas por los migrantes
temporales según forma de envío, 1995
Envíos desde Estados Unidos
a) Promedio anual de migrantes
    temporales (miles) 493.0
b) Proporción de migrantes que envía dinero 0.59
c) Dólares enviados por trabajador al mes 264
Remesas recibidas en México
    (Millones de dólares) 921.5*
Transferencias de bolsillo
a) Trabajadores que regresaron a México
    (miles) 657.3
b) Proporción de trabajadores que realizaron
    “transferencias de bolsillo” 0.58
c) Monto promedio de las “transferencias
    de bolsillo” (dólares) 1,166
Monto total de las “transferencias de bolsillo”
    (Millones de dólares) 444.5**
Remesas totales de los migrantes temporales
   (Millones de dólares) 1,366.0
* El cálculo fue [(a*b*c*12)/1,000]
** El cálculo fue [(a*b*c)/1,000]
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ascendieron a 2,281.5 millones de dólares, cantidad que se descompone como sigue:
2,191.6 millones de dólares (96.1%) fueron enviados por estos migrantes desde
Estados Unidos, y los 89.9  millones restantes (3.9%) corresponden a sus
“transferencias de bolsillo”.
El cuadro 12 presenta el resultado global de este ejercicio. De acuerdo con
este cuadro, México recibió en 1995 la cantidad de 3,647.5 millones de dólares por
concepto de transferencias de fondos de los migrantes mexicanos en Estados Unidos.
De este total, el 37.5% fue transferido por  el grupo de migrantes temporales y el
62.5% por el de migrantes permanentes. Asimismo, al desagregar los resultados de
Cuadro 11
Estimación de las remesas transferidas por los migrantes
permanentes según forma de envío, 1995
Envíos desde Estados Unidos
a) Población mayor de 15 años 5,088.0
    (miles)
b) Proporción de migrantes ocupados 0.59
c) Proporción de migrantes que
    envía dinero 0.36
d) Dólares enviados por trabajador
    al mes 169
Remesas recibidas en México
   (Millones de dólares 2,191.6*
Transferencias de bolsillo
a) Población que regresó a México y que
    trabajó en Estados Unidos (miles) 434.4
b) Proporción de trabajadores que realizaron
    “transferencias de bolsillo” 0.33
c) Monto promedio de las “transferencias
    de bolsillo” (dólares) 627
Monto total de “transferencias de bolsillo”
    (Millones de dólares) 89.9**
Remesas totales de los migrantes permanentes
    (Millones de dólares) 2,281.5
* El cálculo fue [(a*b*c*12)/1,000]
** El cálculo fue [(a*b*c)/1,000]
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esta estimación, de acuerdo con la forma de envío, se observa que el 85.3% fue
transferido durante las estancias de los migrantes en Estados Unidos, y el 14.7%, o
sea 534.4 millones de dólares, corresponde a las “transferencias de bolsillo”.
Discusión y conclusiones
Con el propósito de tener una mejor idea del monto total de remesas estimado
en este trabajo, en el cuadro 13 se presentan los resultados de los otros autores aquí
reseñados, así como nuestros resultados. Un primer aspecto a comentar se refiere
al volumen total de remesas. El cálculo de 3,647.5 millones de dólares es ligeramente
inferior al monto estimado por el Banco de México para el año de 1995 (3,672.7
millones de dólares). La diferencia absoluta es de 25 millones de dólares.
Por cuanto al monto transferido por los migrantes temporales, el orden de
magnitud es más o menos cercano a las estimaciones de Massey-Parrado y Corona.
Los primeros autores ubican el monto del dinero enviado por este grupo en 1,167.3
millones de dólares, 199 millones menos que nuestra estimación, mientras que el
cálculo de Corona de 1,470 millones, es superior a la estimación aquí elaborada en
104 millones de dólares. Sin embargo, donde las cifras son completamente distintas,
tanto en términos absolutos como relativos, es en lo referido al monto enviado por
los migrantes permanentes. Siguiendo la comparación con los dos trabajos
mencionados, Massey y Parrado encontraron que las transferencias de los migrantes
Cuadro 12
Estimación del monto total de remesas transferidas
según tipo de remitente y forma de envío, 1995
Remesas totales
Tipo de remitente (Millones de dólares) %
Migrantes temporales 1,366.0 37.5
Migrantes permanentes 2,281.5 62.5
Total 3,647.5 100.0
Remesas Totales
Forma de envio (Millones de dólares) %
Envíos desde Estados Unidos 3,113.1 85.3
“Transferencias de bolsillo” 534.4 14.7
Total 3,647.5 100.0
Fuente: Cuadros 10 y 11
1210
permanentes ascendieron a 845.2 millones de dólares, que equivale al 42% del
total de su estimación para 1990, mientras que Corona fijó ese monto en 585 millones,
que corresponde al 28.5% de su estimación total. El cálculo de este trabajo del
monto enviado por los migrantes permanentes es de 2,281.5 millones, que representa
el 62.5% del total de fondos transferidos a México.
Un aspecto que ha influido de manera decisiva en el incremento del monto
de remesas de los migrantes permanentes, es el considerable aumento de la
población mexicana que ha emigrado definitivamente a Estados Unidos en los
últimos cinco años. Entre 1990 y 1995 la población de mexicanos en Estados
Unidos creció en 1.387 millones de personas, según Corona y Tuirán (1996) y en
2.423 millones, según el Buró de Censos de Estados Unidos. Sin embargo, pese
a que esta población tiende a reducir la magnitud y la periodicidad de sus envíos
a México, conforme pasa el tiempo —tal y como lo expresan los resultados de las
Cuadro 13
Estimación del monto total de remesas transferidas
según diversos autores, 1995
Autor y año base Remesas totales
de la estimación (Millones de dólares) %
1. Massey y Parrado (1990)
Total 2,012.5 100.0
Migrantes temporales 1,167.3 58.0
Migrantes permanentes 845.2 42.0
2. Corona (1993)
Total 2,055.0 100.0
Migrantes temporales 1,470.0 71.5
Migrantes permanentes 585.0 28.5
3. Banco de México
1990 2,493.6 100.0
1991 2,658.0 100.0
1992 3,070.1 100.0
1993 3.333.2 100.0
1994 3,694.3 100.0
1995 3,672.7 100.0
4. Lozano (1995)
Total 3,647.5 100.0
Migrantes temporales 1,366.0  37.5
Migrantes permanentes 2,281.5 62.5
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encuestas a la población legalizada (LPS)— el monto transferido por estos
migrantes continúan siendo muy significativo.
Por último, respecto al impacto económico de las remesas de los migrantes
mexicanos se puede decir que, pese a su incremento durante los últimos cinco
años, su importancia como fuente de divisas ha declinado. Ello ha sido resultado
del crecimiento de las exportaciones mexicanas en los últimos cinco años. En 1990
el valor total de las exportaciones mexicanas fue de 26,773 millones de dólares.
Para 1995 esa cifra casi se triplica al ubicarse en 79,541.6 millones de dólares. Por
tanto, en 1990, las remesas de los migrantes representaron el 9.3% de las
exportaciones totales, mientras que para 1995 su participación se redujo a 4.6%
(cuadro 14).
No obstante esta reducción relativa, el monto total de las remesas continúa
estando muy cercano al valor de las exportaciones agropecuarias. Pero sin duda el
impacto de las remesas de los migrantes debe evaluarse más en términos regionales,
ya que sus efectos económicos y sociales son más importantes en aquellos lugares
donde la concentración de migrantes es mayor.
Apéndice metodológico
La metodología empleada en este trabajo para la estimación de monto total de
remesas captado en México, consiste en la construcción de un algoritmo que
incorpora diverso tipo de indicadores demográficos y económicos. Para la población
definida como migrantes temporales, es decir aquella compuesta por individuos
que residen en México y que emigran temporalmente a Estados Unidos en busca
de trabajo, la información demográfica y económica que se requiere es la siguiente:
volumen, duración promedio de su estancia en Estados Unidos, proporción de
migrantes que envía dinero a México, promedio mensual de envíos,  proporción de
Cuadro 14
Indicadores seleccionados de la balanza de pagos de México, 1995
Concepto Millones de dólares %
Exportaciones de mercancías 1995 79,541.6 100.0
Exportación de Maquiladoras 31,103.3 39.1
Exportaciones petroleras 8,422.6 10.6
Turismo exterior 6,164.1 7.7
Exportaciones agropecuarias 4,016.2 5.1
Remesas 3,647.5 4.6
Fuente: Banco de México, Indicadores del Sector Externo y Cuadro 12
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migrantes que hacen “transferencias de bolsillo” y monto promedio de esas
transferencias. Para la población de migrantes permanentes, o sea la aquella
compuesta por mexicanos que han decidido radicar definitivamente en los Estados
Unidos, se requiere información sobre su volumen, tasa de participación dentro de
la población mexicana de quince años y más, proporción de migrantes que envía
dinero a México, promedios mensuales de envíos, así como información relacionada
con sus “transferencias de bolsillo”.
La información demográfica y económica utilizada en este trabajo proviene
de las siguientes bases de datos: Encuesta Nacional de la Dinámica Demográfica
1992 (ENADID), Encuesta de Migración en la Frontera Norte 1993-1994 (EMIF),
Mexican Migration Project 1995, Legalized Population Survey 1989 y 1992, y
Current Population Survey, 1994 y 1995. Adicionalmente se emplea información
de los censos mexicano y norteamericano de 1990, del Conteo Mexicano de
Población y Vivienda 1995, así como de la Dirección de Investigación Económica
del Banco de México. En virtud de que la estimación de remesas que se presenta en
este trabajo considera como año base el de 1995, las cifras sobre el monto promedio
de los remesas se ajustaron a ese año, con base en la información de Council of
Economic Advisers (1996).
La estimación de remesas considera la trasferencia de fondos de los dos grupos
de migrates mencionados, y toma en cuenta dos formas de envío de dinero: (1)
Envíos realizados cuando el migrante se encuentra en Estados Unidos (vía money
orders, giros telegráficos, transferencias electrónicas o por encargo a terceras per-
sonas que viajan a México), y (2) “transferencias de bolsillo”, es decir, dinero que
es llevado por el migrante en su viaje de visita o de regreso a México. Cabe mencionar
que en esta estimación de remesas sólo se consideran las transferencias de fondos
de la población nacida en México, y no toma en cuenta los posibles montos enviados
por la población México-Americana, omisión que puede contribuir a subestimar el
monto total de remesas captado en México.
Notes
*Este artículo es un versión corregida del documento entregado en Septiembre de 1996
a la Comisión para el Estudio Binacional México-Estados Unidos sobre Migración. El autor
agradece los comentarios y sugerencias de Gustavo Verduzco, Rodolfo Corona y Jennifer
Van Hook durante el desarrollo de este trabajo.
1. El Grupo Elektra tiene establecidas asociaciones comerciales con Woolworth
Mexicana, Banca Promex y Banco Internacional para la transferencia de fondos a México.
INFOSEL, 11 de enero 1995, 20 de marzo 1995, 2 de mayo 1995 y 27 de febrero 1996.
2. Se trata de estimaciones elaboradas entre 1992 y 1996. Una revisión exhaustiva de
trabajos previos que estiman el monto de las remesas de los migrantes mexicanos se puede
encontar en el trabajo del autor de 1993.
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3. Aunque la EMIF también ofrece información sobre el flujo de migrantes que declaró
tener intenciones de internarse en Estados Unidos, población estimada en 797,931 individuos,
no hay manera de saber si efectivamente todos entraron a Estados Unidos, ni cuántos de
ellos regresaron a México y cuántos permanecieron en E.U.
4. En la EMIF deliberadamente se suprimieron las preguntas sobre las “transferencias
de bolsillo” ya que los migrantes hubieran tenido que declarar el supuesto monto de dinero
que llevaban consigo en el momento de la encuesta, situación que no se juszgó pertinente
(Corona 1995:17).
5. Las entidades consideradas en cada zona son las siguientes. Tradicional:
Aguascalientes, Colima, Durango, Guanajuato, Jalisco, Michoacán, Nayarit, San Luis Potosí
y Zacatecas. Norte: Las dos Bajas, Coahuila, Chihuahua, Nuevo León, Sinaloa, Sonora y
Tamaulipas. Centro: Distrito Federal, Guerrero, Hidalgo, Estado de México, Morelos, Oaxaca,
Puebla, Querétaro y Tlaxcala. Sureste: Campeche, Chiapas, Quintana Roo, Tabasco, Veracruz
y Yucatán. El saldo neto migratorio internacional de la zona Sureste es ínfimo (281 individuos,
0.02% del total).
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RESPONSES TO MIGRATION
The Bracero Program
Manuel García y Griego
Background
Between 1942 and 1964, the United States and Mexico negotiated severalexecutive agreements which made possible the recruitment of 4.6 millionMexican agricultural workers known as braceros.1 The two governments
arranged for the recruitment of railroad workers between 1943 and 1945. They
also cooperated extensively in the return of unauthorized migrants to Mexico. During
the early 1950s, the Mexican government made modest efforts at patrolling its side
of the border and, at Mexico’s request, the White House pressed Congress to adopt
employer sanctions. The effort backfired and instead Congress adopted the “Texas
proviso” in 1952, which exempted employers of unauthorized workers from any
sanctions. This exemption was eliminated in 1986. The years between 1942 and
1964 mark the only period during which the two governments jointly managed
labor migration between their countries.
The actual operation of the program evolved over time, though certain general
features did not change. One or both governments operated migration stations in
Mexico where rural farmworkers were selected as bracero candidates. From there
they were transported to migration reception centers at the border, where grower
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representatives hired them for relatively short periods—six weeks in many instances.
Their employment and living conditions were regulated by the terms of an agreement
negotiated by government representatives, with the U.S. officials representing the
interests of farm employers and Mexican officials representing the interests of the
braceros. Contracts for individual workers occasionally were renewed and extended.
Otherwise, at the end of the contract period, workers were returned at employer
expense to Mexico.
The recruitment of contract workers through the Bracero Program was
accompanied by a parallel flow of unauthorized workers from Mexico. Most of
these migrants entered without inspection and sometimes worked for growers
that also employed braceros. Some also were braceros who “skipped” their
contracts, thus becoming nonimmigrant overstayers. For a few years after World
War II, some illegal entrants working for agricultural employers were legalized
and given contracts under the bracero agreement. In the years before 1954 the
flow of unauthorized migrants was larger—though it is not known by how much—
than the movement of contract workers. In the 10 years after 1955, unauthorized
migration from Mexico virtually disappeared. The manner in which the Bracero
Program was run before 1954 stimulated unauthorized migration; after 1954 it
substituted for it.
The Bracero Program offers numerous examples of the pattern of U.S. and
Mexican responses to migration issues described in this report. This pattern con-
sists of a triggering event or set of events that provoked debate and led to reac-
tions in one country and counterreactions in the other. Indeed, this pattern repeats
itself with small incidents themselves constituting “triggers” that also can be
considered part of a broader process of debate, reactions, and counterreactions.
Three examples are chosen here that illustrate this pattern: creating the Bracero
Program (1941-43), changing the terms of bilateral cooperation (1953-54), and
terminating the program (1961-63).
Creating the Program, 1941-43
The events associated with the entry of the United States into World War II
constitute the context in which the program came into existence. The United States
sought Mexican government cooperation in the use of its neighbor’s airspace, the
acquisition of critical raw materials, and the establishment of jointly operated listen-
ing posts in Mexican territory. To this end the U.S. government agreed to settle
pending disputes regarding Mexico’s foreign debt and 1938 oil nationalization claims.
Entry into World War II led to a rapid expansion of the U.S. economy, ending
the 1930s depression. In 1940 average annual unemployment was still high (14.6
percent). It dropped to 4.7 percent in 1942 and 1.9 percent in 1943. As early as
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1941 California growers complained of shortages of harvest labor and petitioned
the Immigration and Naturalization Service to admit Mexican temporary workers
on an emergency basis, as had been done during World War I.
Triggering Events
Shortly after declaring war on Japan and Germany, the U.S. government
created an interagency committee to explore the possibilities of recruiting Mexican
agricultural workers. The Mexican government opposed unilateral recruitment
on the grounds that the World War I program had not provided sufficient
guarantees for migratory workers. Mexican government attitudes toward Mexican
migration also had been shaped by unfortunate anti-Mexican incidents during
the 1930s. The U.S. government perceived its potential domestic labor shortages
as an obstacle in achieving desired levels of production in agriculture and in
industries associated with the war effort. It did not want to complicate the wartime
alliance with Mexico, however, by recruiting workers unilaterally. Neither did it
want to alienate labor organizations, who opposed recruitment just as post-
depression wages were starting to rise. The executive branch forged a compromise
by reaching a migrant labor agreement with Mexico that met all key Mexican
requirements and would be closer to the position of labor organizations. The
agreement specified that the U.S. government was the legal employer (growers
were subcontractors) and established labor protections in the contract that were
consistent with Mexican law and far beyond any U.S. requirements. Because the
Mexican government had observed frequent incidents of discrimination against
Mexicans in Texas, it prohibited the employment of contract workers in that state
for the duration of the war.
Debate, Mexican Reaction,
and Counterreactions
Many growers were unsatisfied with the agreement when they discovered that,
at least formally, it required certain labor benefits such as the payment of
transportation to and from Mexico and living expenses while employed, which
they would not have to provide for domestic workers. They lobbied Washington,
and in 1943 Congress enacted legislation to provide for an alternative recruitment
mechanism, used also for agricultural workers from the Caribbean. This legislation
threatened the bilateral agreement, which had been created as the exclusive
mechanism for the regulation of Mexican labor migration to the United States. To
prevent Mexico’s abrogation of the agreement, the State Department decided against
the growers and determined that workers could not be recruited from Mexico under
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the new legislation. Growers unhappy with the bracero agreement had only two
other alternatives—to raise wages and make other adjustments that might attract
domestic workers, or hire unauthorized workers. For the most part, they chose the
latter. The growth of unauthorized migration from Mexico during World War II
and afterwards created a new context of public debate and government negotiations
in the early 1950s.
Changing the Terms of Bilateral
Cooperation, 1953-54
In the early 1950s, the U.S. public and the federal government perceived un-
authorized migration from Mexico to have reached crisis proportions. INS appre-
hensions of Mexican migrants shot up from 64,000 in FY 1945 to 865,000 in FY
1953. The 1951 Presidential Commission on Migratory Labor reported that unau-
thorized workers took away jobs from domestic farmworkers and caused social
problems. Criticism was directed at the U.S. government for not preventing the
massive inflow of unauthorized workers at the same time that it expended money
to recruit braceros in Mexico. U.S. officials blamed the Mexican government for
setting unrealistic standards for the administration of the program, for interpreting
the agreement unilaterally, and for undermining grower confidence in the program.
Mexican government officials blamed the continued flow of unauthorized migrants
on the failure of the U.S. Congress to enact employer sanctions. They blamed the
growers for hiring and exploiting unauthorized workers. And they defended the
bilateral agreement as the most appropriate way to regulate migration and set hu-
mane standards for Mexican workers in the United States.
Triggering Events
In 1953 the U.S. embassy in Mexico City sought to persuade the Mexican
government to interdict would-be unauthorized migrants at travel embarkation
points in the interior of Mexico before they got to the border. The Mexican gov-
ernment refused on the grounds that this would violate constitutional guarantees.
The U.S. government also explored briefly the option of stationing troops at the
border to prevent illegal entries. The attorney general made a widely publicized
“fact-finding” trip to the California border, where he issued statements designed
to build public support for later action to stop this migration. Late in 1953 the
United States pressed the Mexican government to modify the labor agreement in
ways that would make the program more attractive to growers. Mexico refused.
The agreement expired, and early in 1954 the United States recruited Mexican
workers unilaterally.
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Mexican Reaction, Debate,
and Counterreactions
The Mexican government issued a public appeal for workers not to go to
the United States. It also announced plans to prevent their departure through
the use of force. Mexican soldiers patrolled segments of the border with
California, and Mexican police and migration officers tried to prevent workers
from going through the ports of entry to the United States. This effort ended in
spectacular failure. Subsequently the Mexican government relinquished attempts
at control, and workers rioted at the border as U.S. authorities were unable to
handle all of the people trying to get in. The U.S. comptroller general issued a
finding that government expenditures for unilateral recruitment were not
authorized by existing law and the recruitment was stopped. Both governments
received considerable domestic criticism for their handling of this crisis and
returned to the bargaining table.
A new agreement was reached subsequently where almost all U.S. demands
were met. Congress passed legislation to authorize the unilateral recruitment of
Mexican workers if need be. The two governments also created a commission to
settle other pending migration matters, which concluded its work in six months.
Later in 1954, the U.S. government planned and launched the mass deporta-
tion campaign known as “Operation Wetback.” The Mexican government partici-
pated in its implementation by transporting migrants, close to 2,000 per day, from
the border to points in the interior. User fees were dropped for employers who
hired braceros. The United States obtained Mexican government acquiescence to
an additional key grower demand: bracero contracts for four weeks. Many grow-
ers faced with the prospect of interrupted access to unauthorized workers were
persuaded to hire braceros under new contracts. During “Operation Wetback” large
numbers of agricultural employers dropped their previous opposition to hiring con-
tract workers. The Bracero Program was expanded to accommodate much of the
previous unauthorized flow. In 1951-52, “there were five apprehensions per bracero
admission; by 1956-57, there were five bracero admissions per apprehension.”2
The new program was attractive to growers in large part because labor guarantees
were not enforced.
Terminating the Program, 1961-63
In 1959 a study was conducted for the Department of Labor that persuaded
U.S. officials that domestic farmworkers were adversely affected by the bilateral
program. That same year the Department tightened the administration of the program
significantly, leading to grower protests and starting a steady decline in the number
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of workers contracted. In 1960 congressional opponents succeeded in preventing
amendments to the program by pro-agribusiness legislators who wanted to curb
the secretary of labor’s authority over the program. In 1961 the Kennedy
administration extended the agreement, though reluctantly, citing adverse effects
on the wages and working conditions of domestic farmworkers and the “serious
impact in Mexico if many thousands of workers employed in this country were
summarily deprived of this much-needed employment.”3 As the Bracero Program
was winding down, some growers became less dependent on Mexican contract
labor by increasing their use of mechanical harvesters, reorganizing labor activities,
and sponsoring the adjustment of some braceros into permanent legal immigrants
(also referred to as green card workers). U.S. labor unions and public interest groups
lobbied for the termination of the program.
Triggering Events
Congressional opposition to the Bracero Program mounted. To the surprise of
many observers, in March 1963 the House of Representatives voted to terminate
the program.
Mexican Reaction, Debate, and
Counterreactions
In response to congressional action, the Mexican government expressed its
objections in a diplomatic note. It argued that the agreement did not cause the
migration of workers; rather, the agreement was the result of an existing tendency
for migration to occur. Eliminating the program would not stop migration. Instead
it would produce “a de facto situation” of the “illegal introduction of Mexican
workers into the United States.” Unauthorized migration “would be extremely preju-
dicial to the illegal workers and, as experience has shown, would also unfavorably
affect American workers, which is precisely what the legislators of the United States
are trying to prevent.”4
In response to these and other concerns, the U.S. Congress postponed the ter-
mination of the program by one year, and the last bracero agreement expired in
December 1964. The Mexican government responded to the anticipated job loss
by enacting rules which made it possible for U.S. companies to establish assembly
plants (maquiladoras) along the northern border. The reluctance of Mexican au-
thorities to accept the U.S. decision to terminate the program was manifested in the
decade after the U.S. congressional action of 1963. Shortly before the expiration of
the Bracero Program, President-elect Gustavo Díaz Ordaz met with President Lyndon
Johnson and raised the possibility of a new migrant labor agreement. Johnson pointed
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toward labor union opposition but expressed doubts that U.S. workers would be
found to perform the labor of Mexican braceros.
“[O]nce the policy that the American labor leaders want was proved a failure,
[the U.S. government] could work out a satisfactory agreement with Mexico.”5
This did not occur, however, during Díaz Ordaz’s administration. His successor,
Luis Echeverría, also attempted unsuccessfully to interest the United States gov-
ernment in negotiating a neo-Bracero Program agreement. He gave up at his sum-
mit meeting with Gerald Ford in 1974, arguing that a new assessment of the history
of the Bracero Program had shown that such an agreement would not protect the
labor rights of Mexican workers.
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RESPONSES TO MIGRATION
Mexico’s 1982 Economic Crisis
Francisco Alba
The Eruption of a Protracted Crisis
The Mexican economy suffered a severe breakdown in 1982, which hadlong-lasting consequences. Before that, from the early 1930s, economicgrowth was constant (although in 1953, the economy was stagnant at current
prices). The GDP in 1982 declined by 0.6 percent and in 1983, the GDP lost an
additional 4.2 percent.1 This deterioration came immediately after a period of
economic boom; growth averaged 8.4 percent between 1978 and 1981, a rate of
growth that had been achieved only sporadically in the long period of economic
growth that prevailed during and following World War II, when annual GDP growth
averaged between 6 and 7 percent.2
Many observers did not view the 1982 events as the traditional kind of slow-
down of the sexennial change of administration. Indeed, the conclusion was that
development strategy followed since World War II had run its course. The devel-
opment strategy, based on import-substituting industrialization (ISI), protection,
and government direction, was no longer sustainable. In the 1978-1991 period, the
ratio of manufactured imports to exports was roughly 4 to 1. Fundamental disequi-
libria were present in public finances (the “traditional” or financial deficit in 1982
was 17.7% of the GDP) and in the current account of the balance of payments (in
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1981 this deficit amounted to US$ 12.6 billion). Foreign debt had grown to high
proportions (more than US$ 90 billion in 1982, equivalent to more than 50% of the
GDP) and one devaluation was followed by another in 1982. Foreign debt service
in 1982 represented almost half the value of total exports and the debt could not be
readily serviced. A deep financial crisis exploded in August. On September 1, 1982,
the government took control of the banks. By the end of the 1982, inflation was in
the three-digit range (December to December). The 1982 crisis certainly turned
out to be more than a debt crisis.
Just as the 1982 crisis was exceptional, so were the measures taken to over-
come it. The priority was to achieve basic macroeconomic equilibrium. This ad-
justment meant: a reduction of economic activity in 1983; a substantial decrease in
imports (42%); reduction of domestic private consumption (7.5%), which together
translated into a net trade surplus to help service the foreign debt (the current ac-
count in 1983 was positive by US$ 5.4 billion). Especially relevant for its potential
implications for migration, there was a reduction of domestic wages (depending
on the indicator used, wages in 1983 lost between a quarter and a third of their
1982 purchasing power). There was thus an increase in the binational wage differ-
ential; the international wage equivalent based on changes in minimum wages us-
ing the official exchange rate suffered a depreciation of more than 40 percent in
1982 compared with its 1981 value, and a further depreciation in 1983. Unemploy-
ment and underemployment rose in 1982 and 1983. Total employment contracted
by 0.3 percent in 1982 and by 2.3 percent in 1983.3 In summary, GDP per capita in
1983 was about 10 percent below its 1981 level.
Reactions: U.S. Immigration Reform Is Strengthened
U.S. reactions to the Mexican economic events in 1982-1983 took a number
of forms. One was that the events in Mexico stimulated U.S. anti-illegal immigra-
tion initiatives.4 Carlos Rico has summarized this point as follows: “During the
final stages of the legislative reform process [leading to IRCA], Mexican [migrant]
flows once again became an important component in the discussion. This was re-
lated to the deepening Mexican economic crisis, which seemed to give credence to
those who warned about a veritable flood of people coming into the United States
unless something was done to prevent it.”5 The U.S. Executive Branch also reacted
and apparently Border Patrol agents were quietly moved from the U.S.-Canada
border to the U.S.-Mexico border.
The economic crisis took place amidst a very intense U.S. legislative process
with a series of initiatives to control unauthorized immigration. In March 1982,
U.S. Senator Simpson and Representative Mazzoli introduced an immigration bill
that was passed in the Senate, but was not discussed in the House of Representatives.
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The process started again in 1983 and this time the final outcome was close; at the
end of 1984, a conference committee could not reach agreement on the Senate and
House versions. Data show that in 1983, compared with 1982, apprehensions jumped
by 32 percent, from 887,481 to 1,172,306.6 Line-watch apprehensions also jumped
sharply (by almost 46 percent in FY 1983). Line-watch hours also increased, but
modestly (by 5.6 percent). Interestingly enough, line-watch apprehensions per hour
climbed substantially (by 38 percent), reflecting an increase in attempts to cross
the border and, probably, an increase in illegal flows that appear to have resulted
from the 1982 decline in the Mexican economy.7 Apprehensions remained at or
above the 1983 level in 1984 and 1985.
In addition to the possibility of new legislative measures subsequent to the
Simpson-Mazzoli proposal of 1982 and 1983-1984, there was fear in Mexico that
massive expulsions of nationals would take place, and a widespread debate fol-
lowed on the appropriate countermeasures to deal with this possibility. The extent
of this reaction was so important that serious scholars thought it appropriate to
calm down the reactions about Mexico’s readiness to receive potential expellees.8
Toward a Resolution: New Economic Policies and Irca
The resolution of the economic episode that arose in 1982 was achieved through
a “new equilibrium” based on measures taken in Mexico and the United States.
Although not directly related to the above migratory concerns, the adoption by
Mexico of a new development strategy promised to bring an end to the causes of
the 1982 economic crisis— the triggering event. The new strategy of opening and
liberalizing the economy promised to deliver jobs and wages at least in line with
previous patterns and thereby bring migration pressures to more traditional patterns.
The economic adjustment measures of the new Mexican administration (1982-
1988) were favorably received by the international financial community. Second,
a gradual change of the economic paradigm took hold. Important changes in com-
mercial policy were implemented starting in mid-1985 and were reinforced insti-
tutionally by Mexican adherence to GATT in 1986. The change in paradigm was
not designed per se to overcome the 1982 economic crisis, but rather to substitute
for the old ISI model and to provide high rates of economic growth, making the
economy internationally competitive and facilitating a fuller and better allocation
of resources, including labor. The promise of the new path was that it would even-
tually translate into a less unequal structure of rewards and wages, with the obvi-
ous migratory implications.
On the U.S. side, the passage of IRCA (also known as Simpson-Rodino law)
in 1986 seemed to offer an answer to the phenomenon of unauthorized migration,
particularly from Mexico. As a matter of fact, IRCA was not an answer to the
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events triggered by the 1982 economic crisis, but it seemed to close a chapter in
the U.S. migratory debate initiated in 1971 with the first proposal by Representa-
tive Peter W. Rodino. Indeed, IRCA struck a deal between different interests incor-
porating employer sanctions and a regularization program, but was accompanied
by increased resources and personnel for the INS and the Border Patrol to secure
better control of the border.
Having reached this resolution to the migratory phenomenon, the situation
moved to a different context. The stage was set for a strengthened Border Patrol, a
hardening of the official U.S. position, and a modified public debate.9
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RESPONSES TO MIGRATION
IRCA and the Facilitation
of U.S.-Mexico Migration Dialogue
Sidney Weintraub
Context
The Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) was enacted in 1986 afteran extended period of study and national debate in the United States on thecontrollability of the border. The Carter administration had proposed com-
prehensive immigration legislation in 1977, but the Congress showed no disposi-
tion to act. Instead, the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy
(SCIRP) was established in 1978, which made its report in early 1981. By then,
Ronald Reagan was president and his administration submitted its own legislation,
drawing on the Carter proposals and the SCIRP report. There was still consider-
able reluctance to act.
The members of SCIRP addressed some highly conflictual issues that later
became central to the IRCA debate. These dealt with amnesty for persons illegally
resident in the United States and a penalty provision for employers who knowingly
hired persons illegally in the United States. SCIRP recommended an employer-
penalty program, but then voted narrowly (eight to seven, with one abstention) in
favor of some form of more secure identification document or documents to
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determine the right of persons to be present and work in the United States. The
subsequent legislation submitted by the Reagan administration did include an
employer-penalty program, but this did not include the adoption of a means of
identification that would be difficult to forge. The amnesty provision in the Reagan
submission had a January 1, 1980 date for continuous residence of persons illegally
in the United States, plus some additional criteria, for eligibility for receiving
temporary resident status. The Reagan legislation also proposed a modest temporary
worker program.
In the year following this proposal, in August 1982, the Mexican debt crisis
erupted and this led to four years of economic decline and stagnation in Mexico.
During those four years, the real minimum wage in Mexico declined by some 40
percent as a consequence of the stabilization program in the country. It is hard to
precisely determine cause (the Mexican economic decline and reduction in real
incomes of Mexican workers) and effect (the impact on Mexican emigration to
the United States), but apprehensions did increase from about 900,000 to one
million in the years immediately preceding 1982 to 1.2 to 1.3 million a year be-
tween 1983 and 1985. Apprehensions soared to 1.7 million in 1986, and then
dropped again in the years after IRCA. Whatever reality these apprehensions sig-
nified—more border-crossing attempts, more attention to apprehensions by the
U.S. Border Patrol, or both—they did revive the issue of loss of control over
immigration by the U.S. authorities.
Triggering Events
The SCIRP report, followed by the legislative submission of 1981, laid much
substantive groundwork for the discussion that followed on the content of legislation
dealing with illegal immigration. The triggering events for IRCA included the
economic slowdown in the early years of the Reagan administration prompted by
the anti-inflation effort of the Federal Reserve, and the concern raised by the extended
economic troubles of Mexico after 1982. The triggering events in this case occurred
in the two countries and it was significant that they came after considerable debate
within the United States on possible remedial action to curtail illegal immigration.
IRCA dealt only with this subject, not with immigration generally.
Debate and Compromise
The grand bargain in IRCA was the adoption of an employer-penalty
program advocated by those who wished to curtail future illegal immigration,
and the legalization provisions supported by groups who wished to regularize
the situation of persons who, while not legally in the United States, had
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established their roots there over an extended period. The debate on both parts
of the bargain was fierce.
Regularization was seen by its opponents as rewarding lawlessness and inviting
more of the same in the future. Penalizing employers for knowingly hiring persons
illegally in the United States was seen by its opponents as requiring a form of
documentation of Americans that would inevitably lead to human rights violations
and discrimination in hiring against Latinos and Latino-looking persons.
The compromises in IRCA around this grand bargain were significant. Em-
ployer identification of those persons with a right to work in the United States was
based on existing and easily forged documents, like a social security card and driver’s
permit. As was widely predicted at the time, a thriving business emerged in pro-
ducing these forged documents. In addition, the INS was less than zealous in imple-
menting the program. The experiment has not been a rousing success in deterring
illegal immigration. The outcome might have been the same even if identification
of persons had been made more secure and if penalties had been more severe, but
this is speculation. The legalization program turned out to be quite substantial.
Legalization applications exceeded three million, overwhelmingly of Mexicans
(70 percent Mexican of the pre-1982 applicants and 81 percent Mexican under the
Special Agricultural Workers program). Around 2.7 million people were actually
legalized under the program.
The SAWs program, under which applicants had to demonstrate only three
months of qualifying work in the United States during the previous year, was a
special concession extracted by agricultural interests. Roughly 1.3 million of the
legalization applications came under this program. The pre-1982 program, which
based legalization on continuous residence from no later than January 1, 1982, had
1.7 million applicants.
Mexican Reaction
The Mexican authorities reacted to IRCA’s passage much as they had to previ-
ous U.S. legislative and other U.S. responses to migration matters. They remained
largely silent, treating the legislation as an internal matter of the United States
about which it would be inappropriate to comment. As described in Volume 1,
pages 437 to 509, Mexico for many years consciously adopted a “no-policy” policy
toward U.S. migration actions, deliberately refraining from commenting or react-
ing, other than to protect the human rights of its nationals in the United States.
One other provision of IRCA turned out to have significant consequences in
bringing some alteration of this policy, namely, that establishing the Commission for
the Study of International Migration and Cooperative Economic Development (often
referred to as the Asencio Commission, after its chairman, Diego Asencio). This
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Commission was instructed, “in consultation with the governments of Mexico and
other sending countries in the Western Hemisphere,” to examine the conditions which
contribute to unauthorized migration to the United States and to explore “mutually
beneficial reciprocal trade and investment programs to alleviate such conditions.”
The final report of the Commission, Unauthorized Migration: An Economic Devel-
opment Response, was issued in July 1990 and, among other proposals, recommended
the establishment of a free-trade area between Mexico and the United States. This
was not the only such recommendation, but it was the main one developed with a
migration as contrasted with a primarily economic motivation.
The Commission and its staff engaged in an extensive consultation and re-
search program with Mexico and other important migrant-sending countries in the
Western Hemisphere. In Mexico, it obtained the collaboration of the Consejo
Nacional de Población (CONAPO), the Mexican government’s demographic agency,
and many universities throughout the country. This cooperation facilitated submis-
sions from Mexican researchers. At the end of the day, in addition to including the
research products in appendices to the final Commission report, six volumes, many
dealing with the Mexican-U.S. situation, were published commercially by Westview
Press in 1991 under the overall title of “Series on Development and International
Migration in Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean Basin.”
For a number of reasons, the Commission was able to open a dialogue on
migration issues with Mexico that had not been possible before. Some explana-
tions for this accomplishment are that the context was not threatening, but rather
developmental in nature; the Commission was a creation of the U.S. Congress, not
the executive branch; the interaction was based on joint and parallel studies by
Mexicans and Americans; and IRCA itself had established a new reality in U.S.
policy toward unauthorized migration. In addition to its discussions with academ-
ics, the Commission’s consultations included meetings with senior officials of the
Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores (the Mexican Foreign Ministry), Gobernación
(the Interior or Government ministry, to which CONAPO reported), the Mexican
Senate, and individual members of the Chamber of Deputies, Mexico’s lower house.
CONAPO had been designated as the main point of liaison for the Commission’s
research by President Miguel de la Madrid.
New Context
The failure to resolve the identification problem in connection with employer
sanctions in IRCA has meant that this issue returned to the table in the 1996
immigration legislation. The main innovation on this issue in the 1996 legislation
is the establishment of voluntary pilot programs to verify employment eligibility.
The basic program (there are two others) requires new employees to provide their
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prospective employers with their social security numbers and, in the case of non-
U.S. citizens, their INS identifying information. The employers have three days
before hiring to verify the work eligibility of the new employee using a toll-free,
electronic confirmation system under which the two numbers will be cross-checked.
The pilot programs are voluntary for employers to join, have a duration of four
years, and are to be conducted in at least five of the seven states with the largest
populations of undocumented immigrants. As is evident from the description, the
new pilot programs themselves represent a compromise. They are voluntary and
have a time-limited test life.
The legalization program set in motion an inevitable second step for family
reunification that will affect legal immigration numbers for 15 to 20 years, or more.
The backlogs that will develop are substantial, ranging up to one million and more
in FY 1995, and their future progression and reduction will depend on behavior of
the legalized residents, particularly the number that naturalize and the nature of
their families, and the speed with which visas are issued in the future.
IRCA in retrospect, has had three major consequences: (1) it led to the legal-
ization of status of 2.7 million people, mostly of Mexican origin; (2) it helped open
a migration dialogue between Mexico and the United States, but (3) it changed the
content of the dialogue as a result of the many family unification visa applications
that were made in its wake.
The Never-ending Reform Process
It took ten years between the grand bargain of IRCA to the significant new
bargains on illegal immigration in the 1996 legislation. It is evident that the 1996
legislation, because of its own compromises, coupled with the dynamic situation
in the U.S.-Mexican relationship, will require revisiting in the relatively near future.
IRCA and the Asencio Commission helped set in play a consultative process
between Mexico and the United States that had not existed earlier. The active en-
gagement of the two countries was abetted by the entry into effect of NAFTA on
January 1, 1994, and this affected engagement on migration issues as well. One
end result of this combination—the contacts made possible by the Asencio Com-
mission and the institutional development under NAFTA—are the proximate par-
ents of the bilateral migration examination of which this case study is a part.
1234
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RESPONSES TO MIGRATION
The Riverside Incident
Rafael Fernández de Castro
Facts
The incident occurred on April 1, 1996, at the end of a high- speed chase inSouth El Monte, Riverside County, California. A pickup truck carryingtwenty Mexican immigrants who had entered illegally was chased for over
an hour by members of the Riverside County Sheriff’s Department; when the truck
stopped, 18 of them tried to flee. The remaining two, a man and a woman from the
state of Michoacán, Enrique Funes Flores and Alicia Sotero Vásquez, although
they offered no resistance, were forced out of the truck and clubbed by sheriff’s
deputies Kurt Franklin and Tracy Watson. Neither of them could understand the
commands given to them in English. Funes was beaten half a dozen times, resulting
in a fractured arm and other injuries. Alicia was clubbed, pulled by the hair and
shoved violently against the truck, but sustained no major injuries.
The chase and the beatings were recorded by KCAL-TV Channel 9 of Los
Angeles, and the video was shown to the public in and out of the United States in
the immediate aftermath. Both deputies and some alleged eye-witnesses attempted
to justify the violence with the argument that the immigrants were hurling pieces
of metal and other projectiles at them; this was denied by the immigrants who
said that the top of the pickup truck was falling apart. The driver of the truck, the
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smuggler or pollero, managed to elude the authorities but was apprehended two
months later after he tried to bring another group of immigrants illegally into the
United States.
Immediate Actions Taken by the U.S.
The two deputies involved were suspended from active duty while the inci-
dent was being investigated by the FBI, the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Depart-
ment, and the Riverside County Sheriff’s Department. The investigations focused
on the possibility of assault, excessive use of force and civil rights violations. The
main witnesses in the incident were law enforcement officers, California Highway
Patrol officer Marco DeGennaro (who saw the beatings unfold and audiotaped the
deputies shouting at the immigrants), the 18 passengers who were riding in the
truck; and motorists who saw the chase on the highway.
On April 4, civil rights attorneys Mark Rosenbaum, David Ross, and Dan
Stormer filed a $10 million claim against the Riverside County Sheriff’s Depart-
ment on behalf of Sotero and Funes, alleging that the deputies “recklessly, inten-
tionally and wantonly” beat and kicked them, violating U.S. law, the Vienna Con-
vention on the Law of Treaties and United Nations’ conventions against torture.
John Barnett1 will defend Riverside County deputies arguing that they acted
properly, according to the circumstances and based on the premise that the illegal
immigrants were putting innocent people’s and the deputies’ lives in danger by
hurling objects at them.
Tracy Watson who said he was coerced by his superiors to write a potentially
self-incriminating report following the incident, filed suit against the Riverside
Police Department for violating his constitutional rights of due process and legal
representation and protection from unlawful detention and self-incrimination.
On April 4, the Immigration and Naturalization Service authorities released
the other 18 illegal immigrants who were captured after the freeway chase to the
custody of the Mexican Consulate and gave them a special permit to remain in the
United States for six months so they could assist in the investigations.
Social Protests
After the incident, several marches and demonstrations were organized in bor-
der towns as well as in Washington D.C. by immigrant-rights activists, civil rights
organizations, labor unions and liberal political groups. They attributed the actions
of the Sheriff’s deputies to an anti-Mexican, anti-immigration fervor sweeping the
country, and protested the use of unnecessary violence against minority groups in
the United States.
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Reactions and Consequences
Mexico
Government Secretaria de Relaciones
Exteriores (S.R.E.)
The incident caused indignation in both the government and the society as a
whole. On April 2, the Mexican government delivered a diplomatic note to the
U.S. Department of State, protesting the use of violence and demanding investi-
gation of the incident. The White House responded by asking the Department of
Justice to follow the case closely. The same day, the Mexican Ambassador in
Washington, Jesús Silva Herzog, and the Consul in Los Angeles, José A. Pescador,
sent letters to the Governor of California and to the Riverside County Sheriff
demanding a detailed explanation of the incident and that those responsible for
the beatings be punished.
The Mexican Consulate in Los Angeles established contact with organizations
such as the National Council of la Raza (NCLR), South Western Voters
Registration (SWVR), the United States Hispanic Chamber of Commerce
(USHCC), and the League of United Latin-American Citizens (LULAC). They
in turn sent letters to the President of the United States, to Congress and to Janet
Reno, the U.S. Attorney General, condemning the incident and demanding that
justice be done.
On April 10, the Mexican Under Secretary for Bilateral Affairs of the Foreign
Ministry, Juan Rebolledo, met with U.S. Department of Justice officials in Wash-
ington D.C. Rebolledo acknowledged the Mexican authorities’ acceptance of Presi-
dent Clinton’s program to tighten security at the border to stem the flow of illegal
immigrants and asked for:
a) a review of the methods and procedures for applying migration laws in
the United States; and
b) intensification of Border Patrol agents’ training in human rights.
Again Secretary José Angel Gurría declared that California Governor Pete
Wilson’s support of Proposition 187 and proposals to extend its ideas to other states,
plus anti-migration statements during the presidential and congressional contests,
had generated a climate of intolerance in the United States against immigrants. He
also declared that the Mexican government has committed itself to increase its
efforts to protect the rights of Mexicans, whether legally admitted or not, living in
the United States, through Mexico’s 40 consulates. He said that the presence of
Mexican consular authorities will be augmented at detention centers where immi-
grants who entered illegally are held, and will open a center in California and other
border states where human rights violations claims could be filed.
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On April 16, Mexico, through the Foreign Ministry, appealed to the Human
Rights Commission of the United Nations for a special conference on the rights of
migratory workers and their families, and proposed a resolution to condemn the
violation of human rights of migrants.
Congress
On April 9, the incident was debated in the Mexican Congress by deputies and
senators from major parties, the PRI, PAN, PRD, and PT.2
(a) Main agreements. A joint congressional resolution was issued3 which de-
manded that President Zedillo make public the list of human rights violations com-
mitted against Mexicans in the United States in the past five years. These had been
recorded by the 40 consulates, and had been kept secret to avoid damaging the
bilateral relationship. The executive responded on April 11 by publishing the list
of human rights violations against co-nationals in a document titled: “Protection of
Mexican Citizens Living in the United States,” The list intended to demonstrate
that the United States had fallen into a systematic pattern of human rights viola-
tions against Mexicans.
(b) Criticism of the Executive. The opposition argues that the Mexican gov-
ernment is responsible for the migration problem because of its inability to create
enough jobs in Mexico. It criticized President Zedillo and Secretary Gurría for
what they consider to be a lack of consistency in defending the rights of illegal
workers in the U.S. and for their weak response to the Riverside incident. The
opposition demanded that President Zedillo make migration a priority of the
country’s foreign policy. An independent representative declared that the United
States is carrying out a low-intensity war against Mexican citizens living in the
United States, as well as creating a hostile anti-immigrant climate along the bor-
der. He accused the Clinton administration of militarizing the border.
Social Reactions
Human Rights organizations in Mexico demanded that President Zedillo
suspend all migration agreements with the United States and create in their place
a bilateral agreement to reduce migratory movements. The then Director of the
National Commission of Human Rights in Mexico, Jorge Madrazo, agreed to help
the Mexican consulates in the United States in the defense of the rights of illegal
immigrants.
The incident had significant effects on the domestic scene. The human rights
issue was sensitive because of recent violations committed against peasants com-
memorating Emiliano Zapata’s death in Tlaltizapan, Morelos. An earlier serious
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violation had occurred in Guerrero. Mexicans have been sensitized to human rights
violations committed against immigrants from Central and South America caught
trying to enter Mexico illegally or to cross the country en route to the United States.
Such incidents of repression weakened President Zedillo’s position that he is turn-
ing Mexico into a law-based country.
The United States
In the United States, two facts made the Riverside incident particularly
significant. On the one hand, the incident bore many similarities to the 1991 beating
of the African-American Rodney King, which had raised important social issues
such as the growing intolerance of white police toward minority groups. On the
other hand, the Riverside incident occurred at the outset of a national electoral
campaign and with important migration bills pending in Congress. During 1996,
legislators discussed at length the social and economic costs of migration. The
1996 immigration legislation focused primarily on limiting illegal immigration.
The incident coincided with the end of the primary elections. Senator Robert
Dole used the migration issue to gain votes in states like California. Dole supported
the proposal to deny public education to children illegally in the United States
because of what he said was the “most expensive mandate of all times” under
which the federal government forces the states to assume these education costs.
The incident made evident, once again, a problem of legal jurisdiction. Local law
enforcement agencies are frustrated because there is nothing that a state or local law
enforcement agency can do about a violation of immigration other than calling the
local Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) officer to report the case, and
local and state officers can merely accompany the INS on patrols of the US-Mexican
border. By contrast, INS officials have powers not given to local police. For instance,
they can interrogate any person believed to be an alien, board ships in US waters to
search for immigrants seeking to enter illegally, and can patrol private lands within
2.5 miles of the border to search for undocumented people.
Counteractions by the U.S. Government
The U.S. Department of Justice agreed:
a) with Mexico’s request to conduct the review of the methods and pro-
cedures for applying migration laws with local police along the U.S.-
Mexico border;
b) to give the Mexican authorities a full report on federal actions in the
Riverside and Temecula4 cases.
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Congress
On April 10, Chicano members of Congress met and supported an agreement
on migration between the two countries that would deal with the protection of
immigrants. Among them, Lucille Roybal, Esteban Torres, and Javier Becerra de-
clared that one of their roles in Congress is to work vigorously in order to counter-
balance the anti-immigration climate.
Civic Reactions
On April 17, the President of the U.S.-Canada Human Rights International As-
sociation, M. Hale, urged the United States to sign the International Convention of
Human Rights. The Director of the Los Angeles Coalition for the Rights of Immi-
grants, Susan Alva, demanded the creation of an independent commission to inves-
tigate police abuses against Latinos in all the counties of Southern California.5
For Bilateral Relations
On May 8, at the 13th Meeting of the Binational Commission, a Memorandum
of Understanding (MOU) dealing with the protection of the rights of Mexican nation-
als in the United States was signed by Secretaries Angel Gurría and Warren Christo-
pher. It can be claimed that this MOU represents a new binational understanding
reached as the result of the sequence of reaction and counter-reaction produced by the
Riverside incident. This case study also shows the high sensitivity in Mexico—the
executive, congress, the opposition parties, and the media—towards the violation of
human rights of co-nationals in the United States. Similarly, many Americans were
annoyed with the hate messages and columns against Mexico in the media, especially
given the numbers that cross the border. It is evident that there exist some highly
sensitive areas in bilateral affairs, such as immigration, where the traditionally an-
tagonistic and mutually recriminating attitudes still prevail.
Notes
1. The lawyer who defended the officials charged with beating Rodney King in Los
Angeles in 1991.
2. Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), Partido Acción Nacional (PAN), Partido
de la Revolución Democrática (PRD) and Partido del Trabajo (PT).
3. This was the first joint resolution ever achieved by the leading party with the opposition.
4. On April 6, a truck full of illegal immigrants rolled over in Temecula, in the River-
side County, killing seven and injuring 18 people.
5. Similar to the Christopher Commission created in 1992 to investigate the Rodney
King case.
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Immigration Enforcement
Sidney Weintraub, Francisco Alba,
Rafael Fernández de Castro
& Manuel Garcia y Griego
Supreme Court decisions
unless otherwise indicated
(including case, year,
holding, and significance).
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RESPONSES TO MIGRATION
On the Unrenounceability
of Mexican Nationality
Sidney Weintraub
In December 1996, three articles (30, 32, and 37) of the Mexican Constitutionwere modified to open the possibility to all Mexicans to keep their Mexicannationality, even though they choose to take another one. The aim of the leg-
islation is twofold. One is to permit Mexicans to reside in another country and still
maintain roots in their country of birth. The second is to remove any obstacle—
real or perceived—that might limit their full advancement and legal protection in
their country of adoption.
According to the constitutional changes, no Mexican by birth can be deprived
of Mexican nationality, except in a few specific instances; and acquiring another
nationality is not one of these. These changes have yet to become law because
Mexican States are in the process of ratifying them.
These constitutional changes create a status or norm that will provide new
obligations and rights. Mexican secondary laws will regulate or determine the
specific rights of those who possess another nationality. The aim here is to avoid
conflicts derived from possessing double, or multiple, nationality. These conflicts
might arise in such fields as taxation and property rights, and extradition and
political rights. On this point, it is worth mentioning that in the interim—until the
1250
corresponding secondary laws are changed—the current Nationality Law (Ley de
Nacionalidad) continues to be the law of the land in matters not contradicting the
above-mentioned changes.
Mexican legislators believe that as many as two million Mexicans lost their
Mexican nationality by voluntarily adopting another one. To Mexicans in such
conditions, the Mexican Congress offers remedial actions. If these Mexicans are in
full legal standing (se encuentran en pleno goce de sus derechos), they can regain
their Mexican nationality just by asking (previa solicitud) the Ministry of Foreign
Relations (SRE) within the next five years, after these changes become law. The
number of Mexicans who meet these conditions could be rather small, however,
because, according to some experts, just a few people actually have explicitly
renounced their Mexican nationality.
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Testimony of Barbara Jordan, Chair, 
U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform
Before the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary
Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee Affairs
August 3, 1994
Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, thank you for providing this opportunity to report on the work of the U.S.
Commission on Immigration Reform.
The Commission was created to assess and make recommendations regarding the implementation and impact of U.S.
immigration policy. Mandated in the Immigration Act of 1990 to submit an interim report in 1994 and a final report in
1997, the Commission has undertaken public hearings, fact-finding missions, and expert consultations to identify the
major immigration-related issues facing the United States today. I am pleased to share our preliminary findings and
recommendations with you today. Our report, which will be submitted on September 30, will provide fuller details on
these recommendations and the reasons we are making them.
The process undertaken by the Commission has been a complex one. Distinguishing fact from fiction has been difficult,
in some cases, because of what has become a highly emotional debate on immigration. We have heard contradictory
testimony, shaky statistics, and a great deal of honest confusion regarding the impacts of immigration. Nevertheless, we
have tried throughout to engage in what we believe is a systematic, nonpartisan effort to reach conclusions drawn from
analysis of the best data available. The recommendations that I present today have been adopted unanimously.
Principles Underlying Work of the Commission
Certain basic principles underlie the Commission's work. We decry hostility and discrimination towards immigrants as
antithetical to the traditions and interests of the country. At the same time, we disagree with those who would label
efforts to control immigration as being inherently anti-immigrant. Rather, it is both a right and a responsibility of a
democratic society to manage immigration so that it serves the national interest.
The Commission believes that legal immigration has been and can continue to be a strength of this country. Most legal
immigrants are the spouses, children, parents, or siblings of a U.S. citizen or long-term permanent resident. A smaller
number are sponsored by U.S. businesses that need their skills and talents. While there may be disagreements among us
as to the total number of immigrants that the United States can absorb or the categories to whom the U.S. should give
priority for admission, the Commission agrees that legal immigration presents many opportunities for this nation.
That is not to say that the Commission is unmindful of the problems that may also emanate from immigration. Too
many have abused the very hospitality that we grant so freely. Unlawful immigration is unacceptable. Enforcement
measures have not sufficiently stemmed these movements. Failure to develop more effective strategies to curb unlawful
immigration has blurred distinctions between legal and illegal immigrants. Many communities legitimately fear that
they have lost the ability to integrate the diverse range of individuals and families who enter heir communities. The
Commission is particularly concerned about the impact of immigration on the most disadvantaged within our already
resident society--inner city youth, racial and ethnic minorities, and recent immigrants who have not yet adjusted to life
in the U.S.
For the Commission, the principal issue at present is how to manage immigration so it continues to be in the national
interest. Managing immigration presents a number of challenges:
How do we ensure that immigration is based on and supports broad U.S. economic, social, and humanitarian
interests rather than the interests of those who would abuse our immigration laws?
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How do we manage our borders while still encouraging international trade, investment, and tourism?
How do we maintain a civic culture based on shared values while accommodating the diverse population admitted
through immigration policy?
It will be impossible to reach answers to these questions unless our policies and their implementation are more credible.
As far as immigration policy is concerned, credibility can be measured by a simple yardstick: people who should get in,
get in; people who should not enter are kept out; and people who are deportable should be required to leave.
The Commission is convinced that immigration can be managed more effectively and in a manner that is consistent with
our traditions, civil rights, and civil liberties. As a nation of immigrants committed to the rule of law,
this country must set limits on who can enter and back up these limits with effective enforcement of our immigration
law.
Recommendations
The problem of unlawful immigration will not be solved by quick fixes. There are no panaceas. Nor will this problem be
solved cheaply. If the nation is serious about controlling illegal immigration, it must commit substantially more
resources than are currently available to accomplishing the measures required. The U.S. must also more effectively
target existing resources on strategies that are most likely to prevent unlawful immigration from occurring. In sum,
curbing unlawful immigration requires:
Better border management;
A more effective method of deterring the employment of unauthorized workers;
A consistent policy regarding eligibility for public benefits;
A willingness and ability to remove those who have no right to remain in the country, with particular focus on
criminal aliens;
An enhanced capacity to respond to immigration emergencies;
An effective strategy to reduce the pressures for migration in sending countries; and
Better data for making and implementing policy.
No one approach will be sufficient to address unlawful migration.
Let me touch on the highlights of this comprehensive strategy that the Commission will be recommending in its
September report.
I. Preventing Unlawful Entry and Facilitating Legal Entry Across U.S.
Borders
The Commission believes that significant progress has been made during the past year in identifying and remedying
some of the weaknesses in U.S. border management. Nevertheless, we believe that far more can and should be done to
meet what we consider to be the twin goals of border management: preventing illegal entries while facilitating legal
ones.
Land Borders
The Commission supports enforcement strategies aimed at prevention of illegal entry at the border rather than
Testimony of Barbara Jordan, August 3, 1994
080394.html[6/13/17, 3:07:43 PM]
apprehension following illegal entry.
The Commission was favorably impressed with the pilot program in El Paso, Operation Hold the Line. Prevention holds
many advantages: it is more cost-effective than apprehension and removal, it eliminates the cycle of voluntary return
and reentry that has characterized unlawful border crossings, and it reduces potentially violent confrontations between
Border Patrol officers and those believed to be seeking illegal entry.
Prevention strategies require a combination of additional personnel, improved technology and communications, data
systems that permit quick identification of repeat offenders, additional equipment including vehicles, and a political
commitment to this approach. Prevention also requires a capacity to anticipate changes in smuggling patterns. The
Commission recommends development of contingency plans to handle smuggling at new locations along the border as
well as increased sea smuggling that may arise as land border controls are improved. The Commission also recommends
formation of a mobile, rapid response team that can be deployed when new avenues of illegal entry are identified. The
Commission supports use of unscalable physical barriers only as a last resort in border control, if they are needed to
reduce violence at the border.
The Commission supports efforts to increase training for Border Patrol officers, improve procedures for adjudicating
complaints of Border Patrol abuses, and provide redress or relief to those subjected to improper actions. And,
recognizing the fundamental shift in Border Patrol policy that a prevention approach requires, the Commission
recommends systematic evaluation of the effectiveness of the new border strategies adopted by INS.
The Commission recommends additional resources for inspections at land border ports of entry in order to facilitate
legal entry.
Legal entry should be facilitated in order for the country to benefit from trade and tourism. The Commission also
believes that an intregal part of controlling illegal entry is facilitating legal entries. When Operation Hold the Line was
instituted, it became apparent that a portion of those crossing the river illegally had or were eligible for legitimate
Border Crossing Cards [BCCs] but found it was slower and more difficult to cross through the port of entry. In
particular, high priority should be given to easing traffic through inspections posts and expediting issuance of BCCs.
The Commission is giving consideration to a user fee to be imposed on crossers of the U.S. border as a possible way to
provide additional funds to facilitate land border management. Consideration also is being given to a fee for issuance of
the BCC, now precluded by U.S.-Mexico treaty. Also, further steps need to be taken better to ensure that the BCC is not
misused by legal crossers who are engaged in unauthorized employment. The Commission's recommendations
regarding employer sanctions should help in this regard.
The Commission supports increased coordination between the governments of the U.S. and Mexico on border issues.
The Commission views favorably the discussions underway between the U.S. and Mexican federal governments and
border state and local governments. These discussions provide forums to promote greater cooperation between the two
governments in solving problems of such mutual concern as border violence, violations of Mexican exit laws and U.S.
entry laws, movements of third-country nationals through Mexico to the United States, smuggling of people and goods,
and similar issues.
Airports
As with land borders, the Commission supports a combined facilitation and enforcement strategy that would prevent
the entry of unauthorized aliens while facilitating legal admissions at U.S. airports.
The Commission supports the use of new technologies to expedite the inspections process and improve law
enforcement. We also commend and urge continuance of the government-airline industry discussions and
recommendations for preflight inspections and more efficient processing of travelers with Machine Readable
Documents. The Commission supports efforts to devise programs that enhance the capacity of airline carriers to identify
and refuse travel to aliens seeking to enter the U.S. on fraudulent documents. We encourage the INS and the airlines to
continue the Carrier Consultant Program and other coordinated efforts to maintain complete, accurate and reliable
Advance Passenger Information System [APIS] data and improved lookout data systems.
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The Commission heard testimony from the airline industry on what they consider to be undue fines and penalties
imposed for transport of unauthorized aliens. The Commission recommends development of a system for mitigation of
penalties or fines for those carriers that cooperate with the INS and show actual reductions in the number of
unauthorized aliens they carry. The Commission further believes that carriers should not be responsible for the actual
physical custody of inadmissible air passengers.
Coordination of Border Management
The Commission urges careful monitoring of coordination among agencies with responsibility for
border management.
In a June 1993 report, GAO outlined efficiency and other management problems with the INS-Customs dual inspection
structure on primary inspection at land border stations. Among them: poor coordination; lack of updated cross-
designation training; lack of joint performance studies; no coordinated approach for addressing staffing imbalances and
traffic backups; a substantial interagency rivalry; and weakened operational accountability due to the dual structure.
Even though the report focused on land border ports-of-entry, the same problems occur at air ports-of-entry as well.
More recently, the National Performance Review noted, in reference to previously voiced suggestions, that a
reorganization of the agencies at this time was too extreme and that the agencies should continue to work in the existing
structure, with the assistance of present interagency work groups. In two years, the existing structure is to be
reevaluated. The Commission plans to monitor whether the coordination mechanisms recommended
by the NPR help address the recurrent management problems experienced in land and airport immigration inspections
and border control. If they do not make the needed improvements, the Commission will recommend further actions.
Antismuggling Efforts
The Commission believes an effective prevention strategy requires enhanced capacities to combat organized
smuggling for commercial gain.
The Clinton Administration introduced legislation in July 1993 that enhances penalties for smuggling or harboring
aliens for commercial advantage or financial gain and includes organized smuggling under the provisions of RICO. The
legislation also provides expanded authority for seizure and forfeiture of property related to smuggling activities and
enhanced authority for wiretaps. The Commission supports the basic approach taken in this legislation, and we
recommend, as well, enhancement of intelligence gathering and diplomatic pressures to prevent smuggling rings from
operating.
II. Deterring the Employment of Unauthorized Aliens
Employment continues to be the principal magnet attracting illegal aliens to this country. As long as U.S. businesses
benefit from the hiring of unauthorized workers, control of unlawful immigration will be impossible. The Commission
believes that both employer sanctions and enhanced labor standards enforcement are essential components of a strategy
to reduce the job magnet.
Verification of Employment Authorization
At the heart of many of the problems in current application of employer sanctions is the verification process used to
determine work authorization. Widespread counterfeiting of documents that can be used for verification of identity and
employment authorization has been reported since IRCA's implementation. It is also relatively easy to obtain genuine
documents, such as birth certificates or drivers licenses, by fraudulent means. Moreover, confusion about the
verification procedures and wariness about the validity of the documents has led to great potential for discrimination
against foreign-looking and -sounding citizens and legal immigrants.
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The Commission recommends development and implementation of a simpler, more fraud-resistant system for
verifying authorization to work.
In examining the options for improving verification, the Commission believes that the most promising option for more
secure, nondiscriminatory verification is a computerized registry, using data provided by the Social Security
Administration and the Immigration and Naturalization Service.
The key to this process is the social security number. All workers must already provide a social security number upon
taking employment. The verification process that the Commission is looking at adds a step to this existing requirement:
checking that the social security number is valid and has been issued to someone authorized to work in the United
States.
This verification system will reduce the time, resources, and paperwork spent by employers in abiding by the
requirements of immigration law. It also should reduce any potential for discrimination. Employers would no longer
have any reason to ask if a worker is a citizen or an immigrant--the only relevant question is: "What is your social
security number?"
The Commission further recommends that the President immediately initiate a program to implement this new
verification process in the five states with the highest levels of immigration. The President already has the authority to
do this in the Immigration and Nationality Act. The initiative should incorporate a number of features.
First, employers will need a way to determine that the individual about to be hired is actually the person with that social
security number. We have received conflicting testimony about the best way to check the applicant's identity. We have
heard proposals for a more secure social security card, counterfeit-resistant drivers license, and telephone verification
system. The pilot program presents an opportunity to determine what is the most cost-effective, fraud-resistant and
nondiscriminatory method.
Second, the pilot and any resulting legislation to establish the system on a permanent basis must provide protection
against use of the verification process for purposes other than those specified in law. The Commission shares the civil
liberties concerns of many in this country that the process for verifying employment authorization not become the basis
for a national identity system. We believe the same system could be used, without damage to civil liberties, for verifying
eligibility to receive public benefits. However, no one should be required to carry a card, should one be used, or present
it for routine identification purposes. There must also be significant penalties for inappropriate demands for the
identification.
Third, the verification system should protect the privacy of the information included in the registry. The Commission is
aware of the proliferation of databases and of reported abuses of privacy by both government and private agencies. The
verification process should contain explicit provisions for protecting privacy and the computer system should
incorporate appropriate safeguards.
A final word on the verification process--to be effective, the computerized registry will draw on data from the INS and
the Social Security Administration. A prime prerequisite of this system is the integrity of those data systems. Both
agencies will need to improve their own records, speed up the entry of new data into their own systems and transfer of
the necessary information to the jointly maintained registry, and ensure that the information remains accurate and
accessible. INS has already requested funding to undertake these improvements in its recordkeeping. If Congress is
serious about curbing unlawful immigration, it is essential that the funds be provided to carry out this initiative. The
Commission is working with SSA and INS to get cost estimates for instituting the proposed registry and will report its
findings in September.
Antidiscrimination Efforts
The Commission believes that adopting a more secure, simpler verification process for determining work
authorization--and, in particular, one where employers will no longer have to make any determination as to
immigration status--is the best defense against discrimination.
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The current verification process creates discriminatory behavior among employers even in cases where
no discrimination is intended or in which there is an explicit effort to avoid illegal conduct. In particular, employers ask
for different or additional documentation from those who appear to be foreign-looking or
-sounding. The abuse of documentation requirements is harmful in and of itself and also masks more egregious
discriminatory actions.
The Commission encourages the Office of Special Counsel for Immigration Related Unfair Employment Practices to
undertake targeted investigations to document discriminatory actions and provide relief for the citizens and legal
immigrants who find themselves victims of discrimination based on national origins or citizenship status. We believe
there is a public responsibility to provide effective redress for those who experience discrimination resulting from
immigration law. During the transition period to a new verification system, in particular, OSC should be proactive in
identifying discriminatory practices, finding ways to prevent their occurrences to the extent possible and seeking
penalties against those employers who do discriminate. Further, the Commission recommends that additional studies be
undertaken to determine the effectiveness of the new verification process in reducing discriminatory behavior.
Enforcement of Employer Sanctions and Labor Standards
The Commission believes that reduction in illegal immigration requires vigorous and complementary enforcement of
employer sanctions and labor standards.
Neither employer sanctions nor labor standards enforcement has received sufficient priority. Both have suffered loss of
resources during the past few years. Even within existing budget, however, a better targeting of resources could improve
enforcement.
The Commission recommends that INS target its employer sanctions resources on the investigation and prosecution of
likely violators of the provisions against knowing hire of illegal aliens and seek the full use of current penalties against
them. When the new verification process takes hold, INS also should eliminate investigation of paperwork violations in
order to concentrate more effectively on businesses that knowingly hire unauthorized aliens or fail to verify work
authorization.
The Commission supports an increase in labor standards enforcement efforts in industries with large numbers of illegal
aliens. Deterring unlawful immigration is a key ingredient in protecting U.S. workers. The presence of large numbers of
unauthorized aliens in certain industries renders enforcement of labor standards, such as wage and hour and child labor
provisions, all the more difficult because unauthorized workers are afraid to demand better working conditions or report
infractions and businesses can bypass the hiring of workers who would be more cognizant of their rights.
A Memorandum of Understanding was signed last September between the Labor Department and the INS setting out a
division of responsibility for investigation of employer sanctions violations. The Commission urges the Attorney
General and the Secretary of Labor to review the current division of responsibilities between the Justice and Labor
Departments in the enforcement of employer sanctions and labor standards and make needed changes if the new MOU
does not provide the coordination needed.
The Commission also supports establishment of national and local taskforces to promote greater coordination in
enforcement of labor standards, employer sanctions, and antidiscrimination provisions.
The Commission further recommends that educational efforts by the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Office
of Special Counsel, and the Department of Labor regarding employer sanctions, antidiscrimination provisions, and labor
standards be coordinated and continuing, sending a single message about the rights and responsibilities of workers and
employers.
III. Making Benefits Policy Consistent with the Objectives of Immigration
Policy
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Eligibility for Benefits
Immigrant eligibility for public benefits has become a major focus of debate in the United States. The Commission
believes that decisions about eligibility should support the objectives of our immigration policy: to deter unlawful
immigration and to support lawful immigration and eventual citizenship. Using these objectives as a measure of benefit
policy, we have come to the following conclusions:
Illegal aliens should not be eligible for any services or assistance except those made available on an emergency basis
or for similar compelling reasons.
Benefits policies should send the same message as immigration policies. Aliens should not have entered the U.S.
unlawfully and, if they did, should not receive public-funded aid except in very unusual circumstances: where there is
emergent need for specific assistance; where there is a public health, safety or welfare interest (such as immunizations,
child nutrition programs and school lunch programs); and where their eligibility is constitutionally protected. The
verification system recommended by the Commission should be used to determine eligibility for public benefits as well
as work authorization.
Legal permanent residents should continue to be eligible for needs-tested assistance programs.
The U.S. admits legal immigrants with the expectation that they will reside permanently in the United States as
productive residents. U.S. immigration law bars the entry of those who are likely to be a public charge. It also contains
provisions for the deportation of individuals who become public charges within five years unless they require aid for
reasons that developed after entry, such as an unexpected illness or injuries sustained due to a serious accident. The
Commission believes that these provisions should be made more effective. At the same time, we also recognize that
circumstances may arise after entry which create a pressing need for public help. The Commission is not prepared to lift
the safety net out from under individuals who, we hope, will or have become integral parts of our civic culture. We
recommend against any broad, categorical denial of such protection to legal immigrants on the basis of their alienage.
However, the Commission strongly endorses initiatives to ensure that sponsors are financially responsible for the
immigrants they bring to this country. In particular, the Commission believes that the Affidavits of Support signed by
sponsors should be legally enforceable.
Mechanisms should be developed that would permit public aid offices to recover support from sponsors who abandon
their financial responsibility. Should these initiatives prove successful, deeming provisions may no longer be needed
since sponsors will be required to provide actual support or repay the costs of assistance provided to those they sponsor.
The Commission recommends that the eligibility of aliens for public benefits and work authorization be defined in
the Immigration and Nationality Act. The Commission would further require that every alien who is permitted to
remain in the country on a temporary or permanent basis through legislation, court order, or administrative order be
classified as to his or her eligibility for benefits and authorization to work.
The Commission believes that benefit eligibility determinations are complicated by the myriad statuses now afforded to
individuals within this country. While the rights of lawful permanent residents, refugees, and asylees have been spelled
out in immigration and benefit laws, the Executive Branch, Congress, and the courts have created various other statuses
that may or may not denote benefit eligibility. The INA should specify categories of aliens by their work and benefit
eligibility, such as: those eligible for work and needs-tested benefits; those eligible for work and only those benefits that
accrue from employment; and those eligible for neither. Every alien should then be assigned to one of these categories.
Impact Aid
The Commission recommends a short-term authorization of financial aid to offset at least a portion of certain
identifiable costs to states and localities resulting from unlawful immigration.
Difficulties in enforcing immigration law have created fiscal impacts that would not have occurred had enforcement
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strategies been more effective. The ineffective enforcement has been due, in some measure, to a lack of political will on
the part of decisionmakers, including officials in states now heavily affected by illegal immigration.
The Commission believes that the federal government has a responsibility to help mitigate the fiscal costs of unlawful
immigration, particularly through renewed efforts to reduce unlawful immigration. We recommend a short-term
authorization of financial aid to states until such time as the enforcement measures take effect, contingent on the
following conditions: better data and methods to measure the net fiscal impact of illegal immigration and reimbursement
of only identifiable costs; a mechanism designed to ensure that governments do not expect or become dependent on this
interim measure as a continuing source of funding; and a requirement that state and local governments cooperate with
federal authorities to enforce the immigration laws of the United States.
IV. Facilitating Identification and Deportation of Criminal Aliens
An effective procedure for prompt and permanent removal of aliens ordered deported is an essential part of a credible
deterrence policy. If people unauthorized to enter believe that they can remain indefinitely once having reached the
interior of the nation, they may be more likely to come. The Commission is reviewing the full range of issues raised by
U.S. exclusion and deportation procedures and plans to issue a separate report on this subject in FY 1995. For the
present, we are limiting our specific recommendations to the removal of criminal aliens who represent the most serious
threat to public safety.
The top priority of interior enforcement strategies should be the removal of deportable criminal aliens from the U.S.
in such a way that the potential for their return to the U.S. will be minimized.
The Commission supports the Institutional Hearing Process [IHP] as an effective mechanism to ensure that deportable
criminal aliens are identified and receive final orders of deportation while still serving their sentences. The IHP is cost-
effective in that criminal aliens can be deported directly from state and federal prisons, alleviating INS' need to detain
them until deportation proceedings take place. The Commission commends the negotiations taking place between
federal immigration authorities and state correctional departments to enhance the efficiency of the IHP. Resources
should be increased for investigations to identify criminal aliens and for the hearing process itself.
The Commission is concerned, however, about the ease with which deported criminal aliens can effect a reentry into the
United States, particularly those who are returned to the Mexican border communities. In the case of Mexico, deported
criminal aliens who have served their sentences should be repatriated to the interior of the country, rather than simply to
the border, to lessen the likelihood of their return. The Commission also supports the use of bilateral treaties
encouraging the transfer of criminal aliens to serve sentences in their own countries; the Department of State should
monitor cases to be certain that sentences are served.
The Commission recommends that the federal government assume responsibility of the costs of incarcerating illegal
aliens through reimbursement, by transferring the illegal aliens to federal facilities, and/or by negotiating with
foreign governments to accept and incarcerate their nationals who are criminal illegal aliens.
Enhanced federal responsibility in this area will serve two purposes: to help mitigate the costs incurred by states and
localities resulting from unlawful immigration; and to help facilitate the prompt deportation of illegal aliens who have
committed criminal acts in the United States.
V. Increasing Capacity to Respond More Effectively to Emergency
Movements of People
The Commission believes that effective immigration policy requires the capacity to respond effectively and humanely
to immigration emergencies, a capacity not now in place.
Since 1980, the United States has received hundreds of thousands of people who left their own countries or entered this
country under emergency circumstances. The exodus of Haitians is only the most recent example. Emergencies can
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overwhelm resources and create massive problems that remain long after the emergency is over.
The Commission held an expert consultation in Miami in which we heard many concerns about U.S. policy. Since then,
a number of new policy directives have been issued. New asylum regulations, the establishment of safe havens in the
region, new regulations for the Immigration Emergency Fund are three important developments in this area. The
Commission plans to assess these efforts as well as other policies required to enhance U.S. capabilities in responding to
immigration emergencies. We will issue a separate report during FY 1995 which will include discussion of contingency
planning, refugee processing, asylum procedures, temporary protected status, aid to communities experiencing
emergency arrivals of aliens, and other related issues.
VI. Addressing Unauthorized Migration at the Source
The Commission firmly believes that greater attention must be paid to the causes of migration in countries of origin
as part of a strategy to deter unauthorized migration to the U.S.
Much as we support an enhanced enforcement effort by the United States, the Commission believes that unauthorized
immigration will not be curbed by unilateral U.S. action alone. Effective deterrence of unlawful immigration must get to
the root causes of these movements. Getting to these causes will require cooperation with other countries. While the
U.S. clearly retains the sovereign right to protect our borders, migration is by definition an international phenomenon
and international actions are needed to address it.
The Commission recommends that the United States give priority in its foreign policy and international economic policy
towards long-term reduction in the causes of unauthorized migration to the U.S. The Commission also recommends
adoption of near-term strategies targeted at reducing migration pressures in selected communities with high emigration
rates.
In addition to these efforts, the Commission supports an enhancement of intelligence-gathering capacities to improve
early warning of unauthorized migration. While the root causes of migration are readily discernible, it is harder to
predict what specific factors will precipitate actual movements into the United States. Particularly with regard to
immigration emergencies, intelligence is needed as well to assess the potential size and duration of the emergency, the
mode of entry, the location to which migrants will come, and other characteristics of the emergency.
VII. Improving Data
Improved policy development and implementation require better data. Throughout the Commission's own inquiry, we
have found it difficult to assess the effects of immigration policy and immigration itself because of inadequacies in the
data. The Commission is working with the InterAgency Working Group on Immigration Statistics to develop specific
recommendations to improve data collection. These recommendations will be detailed in our September report.
Looking Beyond 1994
As the members of the Committee know, the Commission is at a mid-point in its work. Our longer-term agenda is to
assess and make recommendations about the implementation and impact of the Immigration Act of 1990. The
Commission has already begun a systematic fact-finding process to measure the economic, social, demographic, and
foreign policy effects of immigration. We considered whether to make recommendations in our September 1994 report
about the legal immigration system, including the numbers and criteria for admission. We have decided not to do so at
this time. The data needed to assess the full ramifications of current legal immigration policy are not available. The
Immigration Act of 1990 was not implemented until 1992, meaning that we have only two years worth of data and little
experience with its impact to use in determining its effects. An important new aspect of the law--the Diversity Program-
-has not even at this time been implemented.
The Commission will issue a progress report on legal immigration as part of its September report to Congress. We will
continue to examine its effects during 1995. Should the Commission determine that any changes in legal immigration
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policy are in order, we will report our recommendations expeditiously.
I would be pleased to answer any questions you may have.
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Mr. Chairman, Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for providing me the opportunity to testify this afternoon on
the recommendations of the U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform. The Commission was established by the
Immigration Act of 1990 to assess the implementation and impact of U.S. immigration policy. The Commission will
present its first report to Congress on September 30, 1994. That report will focus primarily on steps needed to restore
credibility to U.S. immigration policy and its enforcement.
While our mandate does not extend to the broad range of issues that this Committee is considering regarding welfare
reform, there is an overlap in one area: immigrant eligibility for public benefits. I am pleased to share our preliminary
findings and recommendations on this issue in the hopes that they will help inform your debate on welfare reform.
I would first like to say a few words about the Commission itself. We are a bipartisan group composed of nine members.
I was appointed to the Commission by President Clinton. My eight colleagues were appointed by the Democratic and
Republican leadership of the two houses of Congress.
Our work has not been easy. Distinguishing fact from fiction has been almost impossible, because of what has become a
highly emotional debate on immigration. We have heard contradictory testimony, shaky statistics, and a great deal of
honest confusion regarding the impacts of immigration. Nevertheless, we have tried throughout to engage in what we
believe is a systematic, nonpartisan effort to reach conclusions drawn from analysis of the best data available. The
recommendations that I present today have been adopted unanimously.
The Commission believes that legal immigration has been and can continue to be a strength of this country. Most legal
immigrants are the spouses, children, parents, or siblings of a U.S. citizen or long-term permanent resident. A smaller
number are sponsored by businesses that need their skills and talents. We take an affirmative decision to admit these
individuals. It is with the expectation and desire that they will be integrated immediately into our social community and,
eventually, through naturalization, into the political community as well.
The Commission believes that a clear and consistent policy on eligibility for public benefits is key to a credible
immigration and welfare policy. The United States has the sovereign authority to make distinctions as to the rights and
responsibilities of the various persons residing in its territory. We believe that distinctions regarding eligibility for
public benefits should be consistent with the objectives of our immigration policy-to support legal immigration in the
national interest and to deter unlawful entries.
As far as legal immigrants are concerned, this logic has brought the Commission to a strong and, as I mentioned,
unanimous conclusion: legal permanent residents should continue to be eligible for needs-tested assistance programs.
U.S. law already bars the entry of those who are likely to become a public charge. We recognize, however, that
circumstances may arise after entry which create a pressing need for public help-unexpected illness, injuries sustained
due to a serious accident, loss of employment, a death in the family. The Commission is not prepared to lift the safety
net out from under individuals who, we hope, will become integral parts of our social community. We, therefore,
strongly recommend against any broad, categorical denial of eligibility for public benefits to legal immigrants on the
basis of their alienage.
At the same time, the Commission strongly endorses initiatives to ensure that sponsors are financially responsible for
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the immigrants they bring to this country. If an immigrant cannot show that he or she has financial resources or a job in
the U.S., the immigrant's sponsor must demonstrate a capacity and intention to support the new arrival. This is done
through an affidavit of support. At present, this affidavit is a morally-binding document. The Commission believes that
the affidavits of support signed by sponsors should be legally enforceable, with contingencies made if the sponsor's
financial circumstances change significantly for reasons that developed after the immigrant's entry-for example, if the
sponsor sustains a serious injury that prevents him or her from working. Mechanisms should be developed that would
ensure that sponsors provide the support that they have promised.
While the Commission does not reject the concept of deeming, we do not believe deeming alone is the best way to
ensure sponsor responsibility. We heard testimony that deeming can merely shift costs from one level of government to
another. The immigrant is ineligible for federal programs, but he or she may retain eligibility for state and local benefits.
Even if the federal government extends to states the authority to deem, a number of state constitutions would appear to
preclude that action. Alternately, deeming leaves the immigrant whose sponsor abdicates responsibility with no
financial resources at all. A legally-binding affidavit of support helps address both of these problems.
The Commission also recommends changes in immigration law to address more effectively violations of our public
charge provisions. As I stated, when new circumstances arise after entry, we must maintain the safety net. However,
when immigrants become dependent on public programs within the first five years after entry for reasons that existed
before entry, they are legally deportable. We must have a greater capacity to enforce our law in this regard. At present,
to prove deportability, the government must show that 1) the immigrant received public assistance, 2) the government
billed the immigrant for these services pursuant to a specific statute, and 3) the immigrant failed to repay the funds. This
standard is inappropriate given the way that public benefit programs work. The Commission recommends instead that
deportability on the grounds of public charge be measured by sustained use of the public benefits and not on the basis of
a government request for repayment of the aid.
The Commission believes that benefit eligibility determinations are complicated by the myriad statuses now afforded to
individuals within this country. While the rights of lawful permanent residents, refugees, and asylees have been spelled
out in immigration and benefit laws, the Executive Branch, Congress, and the courts have created various other statuses
that may or may not denote benefit eligibility. The INA should specify categories of aliens by their work and benefit
eligibility, such as: those eligible for work and needs-tested benefits; those eligible for work and only those benefits that
accrue from employment; and those eligible for no benefits except those provided on an emergency basis or for
compelling public health, safety, and welfare grounds. Every alien should then be assigned to one of these categories.
Let me add a word here about the Commission's recommendations regarding the eligibility of illegal aliens for public
benefits. If an alien is in the U.S. unlawfully, he or she should not receive publicly-funded aid except in very unusual
circumstances: where there is emergent need for specific assistance, such as emergency health care; where there is a
public health, safety or welfare interest (such as immunizations, programs to prevent the spread of communicable
diseases, child nutrition programs and school lunch programs); and where their eligibility is constitutionally protected.
Why this distinction between the eligibility of legal immigrants and illegal aliens? Illegal aliens have no right to be in
this country. They are not part of our social community. There is no intention that they integrate. As human beings, they
have certain rights-we certainly should not turn them away in a medical emergency. As a nation, it is in our interest to
provide a limited range of other services- immmunizations and treatment of communicable diseases certainly fall into
that category. But, if illegal aliens require other aid, it should rightly be provided in their own countries.
One last observation. We have heard arguments that the safety net should be for citizens only, that we cannot afford to
do more.
I believe firmly that citizenship in this country is something to be cherished and protected. I want all immigrants to
become citizens. I want them to seek citizenship because it is the key to full participation in our political community-to
know first hand and understand the American form of democracy. I want unnecessary barriers to naturalization-and
there are many of them-to be removed. However, I do not want immigrants to seek citizenship because it is the only
route to our safety nets. To me, that would be a debasement of our notions of citizenship.
From my perspective, the safety net provided by welfare programs should be for those members of our social
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community who are most in need. It would be far better if no one needed welfare. In deciding who should receive this
help, I, for one, do not want to protect some Americans at the expense of others. That course of action is not consistent
with the principles of equal protection under the law. Nor does it help us achieve that all too elusive goal-a united
country.
I would be happy to answer any questions you may have.
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Mr. Chairman, members of the Subcommittee, thank you for providing this opportunity to testify today about the
Commission's recommendations to deter the employment of unauthorized workers. As the members of this Committee
know, the Commission was established under the Immigration Act of 1990 and mandated to report to Congress on the
implementation and impact of U.S. immigration policy. We will submit our first report tomorrow. I welcome the
opportunity to return to this room to testify on the full range of recommendations included in the report. For today, I will
limit my remarks to the Commission's recommendations on worksite issues.
But before getting into our specific recommendations in this area, let me set them in context. The Commission is
convinced that immigration can be managed more effectively. We also believe we can do it in a manner that is
consistent with our traditions, civil rights, and civil liberties. As a nation committed to immigration and the rule of law,
it is our obligation to find solutions to our current immigration problems. And, the principal problem we face today
regarding immigration is the unauthorized entry of hundreds of thousands of illegal aliens each year.
Unlawful immigration will not be curbed unless we have comprehensive strategies that will prevent the entry of those
with no right to be here and remove those who somehow make it past our best efforts at border management. At the
same time, we must better support our capacity to facilitate the legal entry of those whose admission is in our national
interest.
Key to effective deterrence is a reduction in the job magnet. Employment continues to be the principal reason illegal
aliens come to this country. As long as U.S. businesses benefit from the hiring of unauthorized workers, control of
unlawful immigration will be impossible. The Commission believes that both employer sanctions and enhanced labor
standards enforcement are essential components of a strategy to reduce employment opportunities for illegal aliens.
The Commission has found major flaws in the current application of employer sanctions. They have not deterred
unlawful immigration, but they have caused discrimination. At each of our hearings, we heard about how easy it is to
thwart the intent of the law. For $25, any illegal alien can purchase a counterfeit drivers license and social security card.
For a bit more, they can buy a counterfeit green card. With these documents, they can get a job in almost any business in
this country. At the same time, there is discrimination against foreign-looking or -sounding citizens and legal
immigrants. Employers are confused by the requirements and feel themselves between the proverbial rock and a hard
place: if they accept documents on their face, they may be hiring illegal aliens; if they ask for additional documentation
without sufficient cause, they will be discriminating.
But, are these problems inherent to employer sanctions? We think not. The problem is with a faulty verification
procedure.
The Commission's recommendations to improve the verification procedure have drawn more attention than any others in
our report. Unfortunately, they have also been misrepresented as a national ID card. What the Commission has
recommended is a measured approach to the development of a new system for verifying that individuals are authorized
to work in the United States-that is all. We believe the most promising option for alleviating the fraud and
discrimination found in current verification procedures is a computerized registry based on the social security number.
We urge the President carefully to phase in and evaluate pilot programs to test this option, something that can be done
under current statutory authority. This Commission, along with others, will carefully monitor the pilots during the next
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three years to see how they meet our requirements for reliability, cost-effectiveness, and protection of civil rights and
civil liberties. Should the results prove to be as promising as we hope and expect, we recommend that they form the
basis for implementation of a national verification system.
Before I go into any details about this recommendation, let me say something to those who have already expressed
concerns about this approach. This country has a problem. It is real. It is immediate. Simply put, if we cannot
demagnetize our economy for illegal aliens who come here to seek jobs, we cannot control illegal immigration. If we
cannot control illegal immigration, we cannot sustain our national interest in legal immigration. Those who come here
illegally, and those who hire them, will destroy the credibility of our immigration policies and their implementation. In
the course of that, I fear, they will destroy our commitment to immigration itself.
For immigration to continue to serve our national interest, it must be lawful. There are people who argue that some
illegal aliens contribute to our community because they may work, pay taxes, send their children to our schools, and in
all respects except one, obey the law. Let me be clear: that is not enough.
This is a nation governed by the rule of law. It applies to all. It is as illegal knowingly to hire someone who is breaking
the law as it is illegal to work under false pretences. These recommendations are not just for the four million illegal
aliens in our midst-an arguably small number given the size of the U.S. workforce. They are aimed, as well, at restoring
credibility to our overall immigration policy, commitment to fair labor standards, respect for civil and human rights, and
integrity of our social security system.
Some of those who agree with our assessment as to the weaknesses in employer sanctions reject our proposal for change
in the verification system. Some call instead for the repeal of employer sanctions. This is the critical issue. If employer
sanctions are repealed, it will be legal for employers knowingly to hire those who are breaking the law. This will
seriously undermine efforts to prevent illegal migration. It will seriously erode labor standards. Thousands of Americans
will be subject to discimination, exploitation, and denial of their rights. The Commission has considered and rejected
this option.
Others call for more modest change-reduction in the number of documents used, requirements that all citizens present
one set of documents and all aliens present another, and similar proposals. These ideas are variations on the current I-9
process. But the I-9 process does not do what the law intended-deter the employment of illegal aliens. And what it does
do, we do not want-overburden businesses with paperwork and provide a convenient excuse, if not actually motivate,
discrimination against Americans who happen to look or sound foreign. The Commission examined these and dozens of
other options for reforming the I-9 process and rejected them as well. Under each of them, either fraud continued or
discrimination increased.
If repeal of employer sanctions is not an option, and if reform of the I-9 does not appear workable, what then are we to
do?
In a nutshell, the Commission believes that we can best address the twin flaws in employer sanctions by treating
everyone the same, whether citizen or alien. Illegal aliens cannot hide from the law by claiming to be authorized
workers; citizens will not face discrimination from those who mistakenly believe them to be illegal aliens. The key to
what the Commission sees as the promising option is the social security number. All workers must already provide a
social security number upon taking employment. The verification process that the Commission is looking at adds a step
to this existing requirement: checking that the social security number is valid and has been issued to someone authorized
to work in the United States.
The Commission urges the President immediately to initiate pilot programs testing the proposed computerized
verification system. We would like to see the system tested in the five states with the highest levels of illegal
immigration as well as in some less affected places. The pilots will permit testing of various approaches to using the
proposed verification system. In particular, the pilots should determine the best way for employers to access the
verification system to validate the accuracy of information given by workers. We have received conflicting testimony
about the best way to check the applicant's identity. We have heard proposals for a more secure social security card, a
counterfeit-resistant driver's license, and a telephone verification system that does not rely on any document. Several
different options could be tested simultaneously in different states. The pilots present an opportunity to determine the
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most cost-effective, fraud-resistant, and nondiscriminatory method available.
Experts note that under any of these systems, the computer system could have a built-in process for identifying likely
fraud. For example, if the same social security number was used too often or in too many locations, the computer system
would record the incidence. The employer would be informed that the employee must reconfirm the information in the
database. The authorized worker would benefit from learning that others were using his or her social security number.
The unauthorized worker could not reconfirm the information and, therefore, would not be able to continue in that
employment. The process also would permit estimates of likely fraud for use in determining the efficacy of the
verification system.
In designing our recommendation, the Commission considered six principal issues.
The first issue is fraud. We must reduce not only the presence of counterfeit documents, but also the incentive to
produce them. The Commission's proposal is to test a system that does not depend on any particular document-indeed,
which may not depend on any document at all. All documents can be counterfeited. But it is infinitely more difficult to
counterfeit the information that would be in the computer registry. An employee might show a counterfeit drivers
license with a fraudulent social security number, but if that number does not exist or belongs to someone else, the
computer registry is the most promising way to identify it.
The second is discrimination. As I mentioned, the best way to fight discrimination is to treat everyone exactly the same.
Employers would no longer be required to care about a worker's immigration status. The only relevant question would
be-"What is your name and social security number?"-a question every American employee has been asked for decades.
There would be no singling out of any ethnic group for additional documentation, as happens now with the I-9 process,
no going to one database if the employee is an alien-as happens under the current INS Telephone Verification pilot
program-and another system if he or she is a citizen. No bigot will be able to claim employer sanctions as an excuse for
discrimination.
The third is privacy. The Commission is aware of the proliferation of databases and the potential for the invasion of
privacy by both government and private agencies. The computer registry will be drawn primarily from an existing
database, the Social Security computer system. Given the scope of the registry, it is essential to build in explicit
provisions for protecting privacy. These safeguards should be made by law, not just regulation. The resultant computer
system should incorporate appropriate technical safeguards regarding authorized users' access to individual information.
In particular, safeguards must ensure that information about specific individuals-other than the limited information to be
provided as a part of the verification process itself-cannot be obtained from the database.
The fourth is civil liberties. Since previewing our recommendations in August, we have heard concerns that the
computer registry will result in an infringement on personal liberties. The Commission takes this very seriously indeed.
We recommend that appropriate, ironclad safeguards be built into the system from Day One to ensure that the
verification system will be used for very limited purposes and those purposes alone-to verify work authorization and
eligibility for public benefits. We also have heard concerns that some day in the future the registry will be perverted for
other purposes. Let me say that I have more faith in the American political process. I expect and sincerely hope that all
institutions concerned with preserving the Constitution will monitor closely the implementation not only of the pilot
programs, but of any national system that may result from them. If they demonstrate that fears about civil liberties have
been realized, I will be the first to testify before this body for the repeal of the verification process. And, if I am no
longer here, I have every faith that others will take up the banner.
The fifth is the accuracy of the information used. The computerized registry will draw on data from the INS and the
Social Security Administration. A prime prerequisite of this system is the integrity of those data systems. Of course for
reasons completely separate from this registry, we would encourage that integrity. Why would we tolerate a situation
where a government agency cannot answer basic questions for those it serves? No one paying into the Social Security
System should need worry whether someone else is fraudulently using his or her number. No immigrant should suffer
because INS cannot find his or her file.
Both agencies will need to improve their own records, speed up the entry of new data into their own systems and the
transfer of the necessary information to the jointly maintained registry, and ensure that the information remains accurate
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and accessible. The Commission recognizes that mistakes will happen, particularly during the early phase-in period of
the pilot programs. We must have protections for workers who might otherwise lose jobs because of "false negatives"
and for employers who might hire illegal aliens because of "false positives."
The sixth is cost. Informal estimates by the Social Security Administration indicate that this proposal is no budget
breaker. The cost of design and development of the combined SSA/INS database is estimated at $4 million over a two-
year period. Annual cost of maintaining and operating the verification system is estimated at about $32 million. This
figure includes the cost of the computer registry, the automated system for checking social security numbers against it,
operator costs for calls that cannot be handled automatically, and telephone lines for an 800-number to be used by
employers.
Correcting errors will require the largest financial input. Discrepancies referred to SSA for resolution will cost
approximately $122 million initially, with an ongoing cost of $30 million. The cost of resolving discrepencies in the
INS database will be additional to these funds. For the most part, these funds should be spent even if there were no
proposal for a computer registry. Otherwise, we would be saying that it is all right to have discrepencies in our Social
Security and INS databases. For the integrity of both of these systems, we need to ensure that the data they already
collect are accurate and accessible.
You asked me here today to testify about the Commission's recommendation on verification, but I would be remiss if I
did not at least briefly address the Commission's other worksite proposals. First, we call for enhancements in the
enforcement of labor standards. While we do not believe that labor standards alone will curb illegal immigration, we do
strongly support enhanced labor standards enforcement as a necessary complement to employer sanctions. As for
employer sanctions themselves, once changes are made in the verification system, higher priority should be given in
INS to investigation of the knowing hire of illegal aliens. And, should the pilot programs prove effective, we would
hope that this body would make some major changes in employer sanctions penalties to remove the ones for paperwork
violations and enhance those for knowing hire and failure to verify a social security number. In our report, we also make
recommendations regarding the coordination of labor standards and employer sanctions-recommendations that I won't
discuss today but call to your attention.
Before finishing this testimony, l want to say a bit more about the issue of discrimination. As I mentioned, the
Commission believes that the best defense against discrimination is adoption of a more secure, simpler verification
process for determining work authorization. The current verification process creates discriminatory behavior among
employers even in cases where no discrimination is intended or in which there is an explicit effort to avoid illegal
conduct.
Even with this change in verification, however, discrimination on national origins and citizenship bases will not
disappear. The Commission firmly believes there is a public responsibility to provide effective redress for those who are
the victims of unfair employment practices. I hope you will pay as much attention to our recommendations on
discrimination as you do to our recommendations on verification itself. The Commission urges the Office of Special
Counsel for Immigration-Related Unfair Employment Practices to be far more aggressive than it has been in the past.
OSC should be proactive in finding ways to prevent the occurrence of these unfair employment practices, to the extent
possible, and seeking penalties against those employers who do discriminate.
I would be pleased to answer any questions that you have.
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My name is Lawrence H. Fuchs. I am Meyer and Walter Jaffe Professor of American Civilization and Politics at
Brandeis University. I have spent most of my professional life studying the history and policy of immigration. From
1979 to 1981, I was the Executive Director of the Select Commission on Immigration Reform and currently, I am Vice
Chair of the U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform.
I believe that there are three basic options with regard to reforming the benefits eligibility system for lawful permanent
resident aliens.
The first is to turn the matter over to the states.
The second is for Congress to categorically deny such benefits.
The third, unanimously adopted by the Congressionally-appointed bipartisan Commission on Immigration Reform, is to
make the affidavits of sponsors of immigrants enforceable for the period in which sponsor income has been deemed
available to immigrants to keep them from becoming public charges.
If you turn the responsibility over to the states with the expectation that each will find its own policy, you may create a
serous constitutional problem. A unanimous Supreme Court ruled in Graham v. Richardson in 1971 that any state law
that distinguishes between permanent resident aliens and citizens with respect to public assistance is in violation of the
Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment equal protection clause. The Court ruled emphatically that it was impermissible
for states to make welfare classifications based on legal alienage for fiscal reasons.
Possibly, the Congress can make constitutionally permissible what the states cannot do on their own, although that is not
certain.
Whatever the constitutional disposition of such a case might be, it would, in my opinion, be bad policy for either the
Congress or the states to make what the Court called an invidious distinction, one which it found to be subject to strict
constitutional scrutiny.
Immigrants come to the United States as close relatives of citizens and resident aliens already here and because of their
needed skills or other economic assets. If the numbers or categories are wrong, if they are not in our national interest,
we should change them. The Commission on Immigration Reform is looking intensely at such questions now. But
members of this bipartisan commission, including both strong conservatives and liberals, are unanimous in
recommending against categorical distinctions between permanent resident aliens and citizens with regard to benefits
under discussion here. To do so would be to cut at the heart of what makes the United States different from any other
country in the world.
We correctly expect of legal immigrants that the vast majority of them will work hard, save, and invest in their children.
Like citizens, they pay taxes and are subject to compulsory service in the armed forces. Many of them actually
volunteer. We expect them to add to our language resources and help us to compete in a global economy. Their children
provide us with a highly disproportionate number of valedictorians. And most legal permanent resident aliens are
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devoted to ideals of freedom, opportunity, and personal and family responsibility.
Well, some will say, "Let them become citizens." Not so easy! The average wait for an INS interview is now seven to
ten months. In San Diego, an immigrant who applies for naturalization will be scheduled for an interview about 270
days later. Once approved, the wait to be naturalized varies greatly: ninety days in New York; more than a year in San
Diego.
There are long waiting lists almost everywhere for adults to be admitted to English language classes. In New York, the
waiting list is often as long as a year, sometimes two. The Riverside Church runs a lottery each month, and those who
don't make it must sign up again for the following month.
About 5 percent of those who take the citizenship exam fail, but may never get that far because they are afraid to take it.
That is especially true for older persons, many of whom are English language deficient. Persons over fifty-five can take
the test in their native language, but they must have been in the U.S. for at least fifteen years.
In Chicago, we learned of a seventy-one-year-old Polish woman who broke down in sobs when she failed the
citizenship test for the second time. For many elders, the humiliation of admitting that they may not remember or that
they are suffering some impairment or disability is a huge obstacle to applying for and taking the exam. Do we want to
say to this woman, if she should suddenly become disabled, that the public assistance is not for her because she is a
legal immigrant? That was the situation of one of the plaintiffs in the Graham v. Richardson case.
Do we want to tell a twelve-year-old orphan that she must live on the streets because, as an immigrant, she does not
qualify for the program of foster care and adoption assistance under Title IV of the Social Security Act? She'd be in a
real Catch-22; she wouldn't qualify for help because she's a legal immigrant, but she can't naturalize because she is
underage.
Do we really want to say to a legal immigrant woman who has been beaten by her husband that she must go to a shelter
for battered women and be separated from her children because she is not eligible for AFDC, in whatever form it
emerges? There are many instances of battered women, permanent resident aliens, who, with their children, were saved
by being on AFDC temporarily, and who now are productive members of society.
Do we want to take SSI benefits away from legal immigrants, say a blind seventy-year-old man who collects no
retirement benefits? More than three-fourths of elderly legal immigrants receiving SSI do not receive social security
benefits, compared to one-third of elderly native-born recipients. We are not going to say to such persons: "Go back to
where you came from."
There are other programs that would not be available to legal permanent residents under some of the legislation
contemplated that I think you do not wish to eliminate. For example, you may have seen a story on Wednesday
regarding this year's Westinghouse Science Prize winners, a hugely, disproportionate number of whom are immigrants
or the children of immigrants. The story featured one brilliant fifteen-year-old who, if he had finished just out of the
running, would not be eligible for scholarship held under Title IV of the 1965 Higher Education Act. What a loss to the
rest of us!
Just as we should be clear in our policy against any broad, categorical denial of public benefits to legal immigrants, so
we should be clear that sponsors are to be held financially responsible for the immigrants they bring to this country
during the deeming period.
The Commission on Immigration Reform has made several recommendations as to how to do this and is now working
on refining them. Benefit eligibility is complicated by the many legal statuses afforded to individuals within this
country. Thus, statutory categories should be specified regarding their eligibility for work and benefits. Such categories
must include those not authorized to work and not eligible for the benefits we are discussing here. A bright line should
be drawn between illegal immigrants and those we have admitted to participate in our communities and work places as a
matter of national public policy.
In summary, I hope you will not rush into legislation you will almost certainly regret-legislation that could amount to a
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wounding, not just of immigrants, but also of their families, communities, and this beautiful nation of ours.
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Mr. Chairman, members of the Subcommittee, let me express my gratitude to you for the opportunity to report to you on
the progress of the work of the bipartisan Commission on Immigration Reform.
In our First Interim Report to Congress, U.S. Immigration Policy: Restoring Credibility, presented to Congress
September 30, 1994, this Commission undertook to recommend a comprehensive strategy for controlling illegal
immigration. The comprehensive approach we outlined has eight parts.
First, we set forth principles. We are a nation of immigrants committed to the rule of law. The Commission believes that
legal immigration has strengthened the country and that it continues to do so. We as a Commission denounce the
hostility that seems to be developing toward all immigrants.
To make sense about the national interest in immigration, it is necessary to make distinctions between those who obey
the law, and those who violate it. Therefore, we disagree, also, with those who label our efforts to control illegal
immigration as somehow inherently anti-immigrant. Unlawful immigration is unacceptable.
The second part of our strategy is worksite enforcement. You will hear testimony today about visa overstayers. You will
hear that roughly one-half of the nation's illegal alien problem results from visitors who entered legally but who do not
leave when their time is up. Let me tell you in three simple words why that is: they get jobs.
We believe that employer sanctions can work, but only with a reliable system for verifying authorization to work.
Employers want to obey the law, but they are caught now between a rock and a hard place. The current system is based
on documents. An employer must either accept those documents, knowing that they might be forged, and thus live with
the vulnerability to employer sanctions for hiring someone presenting false identification. Or, an employer may choose
to ask particular workers for more documentation, which is discrimination.
The Commission has recommended a test of what we regard as the most promising option: electronic validation using a
computerized registry based on the social security number. This is the only approach to deterring illegal immigration
that does not ignore the half of the problem, the visa overstayer problem you are investigating today. We are pleased
with the prompt, bipartisan support that this highly visible recommendation has received, and we look forward to real
results from pilot projects before our final report in 1997.
Third in our recommmendations for a comprehensive strategy is making eligibility for public benefits consistent with
our immigration policy. Decisions about eligibility should support our immigration objectives. Accordingly, the
Commission recommended against eligibility for illegal aliens except in most unusual circumstances.
For legal immigrants, we recommended making abuse of the public charge provision grounds for deportation. The
affidavit of support that sponsors sign should be a legally-binding contract. Moral obligations work well enough in
church, but the law requires a contract.
But the Commission also recommended that legal permanent residents should continue to be eligible for means-tested
programs and against any broad, categorical denial of eligibility for public benefits based on alienage for those who
obey our laws. It is important to see a lack of citizenship as something more than "the funding mechanism" for welfare
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reform. It gets to a fundamental issue for defining the national interest in legal immigration-the relationship between the
decision to come here as an immigrant and the decision to naturalize to become a citizen.
Citizenship and naturalization should be more central to the process of immigration. There are many barriers to
naturalizing in law and practice, and they should be removed. But it is a debasement of the concept of citizenship to
make it the route to welfare.
We on the Commission believe strongly that it is in the national interest for immigrants to become citizens for the right
reasons, not the wrong ones. We want immigrants to be motivated to naturalize in order to vote, to be fully participating
members of our polity-to become Americans. We don't want to motivate lawabiding aliens to naturalize just so that they
can get food stamps, health care, job training, or their homes tested for lead.
Fourth, deportation is crucial. Credibility in immigration policy can be summed up in one sentence: those who should
get in, get in; those who should be kept out, are kept out; and those who should not be here will be required to leave.
The top priorities for detention and removal, of course, are criminal aliens. But for the system to be credible, people
actually have to be deported at the end of the process. The Commission will have additional recommendations on this
crucial matter later this year.
Fifth, emergency management. Migration emergencies such as we have seen recently with Haiti and Cuba do recur, and
we must be prepared for them. Again, we will have detailed recommendations on migration emergencies.
Sixth, reliable data. The current debate over the economic impact of immigration is marked by shaky statistics, flawed
assumptions, and an amazing range of contradictory conclusions from what ought to be commonly-accepted methods.
Rather than attempt to choose sides in this discussion, the Commission has contracted with the National Academy of
Sciences to analyze the methods used for evaluating immigration data, to cut through this fog. We will share their
interim results with you as we receive them.
Seventh, much as we support enhanced enforcement by this country, we must face the fact that unilateral action on the
part of the United States will never be enough to curb illegal immigration. Immigrants come here illegally from source
countries where conditions prevail that encourage or even compel them to leave. Attacking the root causes of illegal
migration is essential and will require international cooperation.
As a case in point, this Commission is the lead agency for the U.S. government in developing the U.S-Mexico
Binational Study to analyze the causes of migration across our border with Mexico. Perhaps we can even come to some
agreement, not only on the analysis, but also on the policy prescriptions necessary.
Finally, the Commission recommends better border management. Far more can and should be done to meet the twin
goals of border management: deterring illegal crossings while facilitating legal ones. But we have to recognize both
goals.
The Commission on Immigration Reform endorsed a border crossing fee in principle as a user fee. It should not go into
the general treasury. It should be used to avoid the kind of counterproductive backups which happen all the time in
border towns. Many people who are authorized to cross the border legally simply tire of waiting in line and cross
illegally to save time. This is a waste of resources for the Border Patrol, which frequently apprehends such people. We
applaud the efforts of innovative Border Patrol leaders, such as Silvestre Reyes with Operation Hold the Line in El Paso,
and we must do our part, as well.
A border crossing fee, properly applied, would benefit the border towns immensely. It would be a kind of NAFTA fund,
used along both borders, to ensure that legal crossings are convenient and secure. It is to fund the future prosperity of
border towns like El Paso, Laredo, Nogales, and San Diego that depend so much on crossborder trade.
So that is our eight-point strategy for dealing with illegal immigration in a comprehensive, systematic way. The
Commission made all of these recommendations unanimously, by consensus. We are nine Commissioners, Republicans
and Democrats, a diverse group. We might have been expected to simply throw up our hands at the difficulty of the task
Congress mandated for us. But we put aside rhetoric. We determined that we would look for answers-and not excuses.
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And our work is not done.
I must leave here shortly, Mr. Chairman, to return to my colleagues just around the corner here, who are engaged in the
second day of consultations on legal immigration reform. The Commission is well along in its consideration of the
national interest in legal immigration, of the qualities that we seek in immigrants, of the limits. Our first report
represented a hard-won, bipartisan consensus on emotionally-tough, intellectually-complex issues.
We ask that you give us the chance to try to reach such a bipartisan consensus on legal immigration reform.
Bipartisanship ought to be more common. There is a time and a place for partisan battles, to be sure. But immigration,
like foreign policy, ought to be a place where the national interest comes first, last, and always.
Immigration is far too important to who we are as a nation to become a wedge issue in Presidential politics. We have
seen that kind of thing happen before, and it is not productive. I, for one, wish that we would do away with all the
hyphenation and just be Americans, together.
I will be glad to answer any questions you may have.
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Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, on behalf of Professor Barbara Jordan, our Chair, and my fellow
members of the U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform, I want to thank you for this opportunity to testify. This
bipartisan Commission recognizes and deeply appreciates the support that we have received from Congress and this
Subcommittee in particular.
In our first report to Congress last fall, U.S. Immigration Policy: Restoring Credibility, we sought to recommend a
comprehensive strategy. We chose to focus much of that report on measures to control illegal immigration because
growing frustration about it undermines our first commitment to legal immigration in the national interest.
Worksite enforcement, the subject of today's hearing, is particularly important to restoring the credibility of our
commitment to the national interest in immigration. The Commission's recommendations for reducing the pull of the
employment magnet are crucial to success in deterring illegal immigration.
The Commission's recommendations in this critical area fall into two categories: one, developing and implementing a
better system to verify work authorization at the worksite; two, the need to couple worksite verification with enhanced
enforcement of wage and hour and other labor standards, including provisions to protect workers from discrimination.
Let me sum up the Commission's reasons for proposing that we develop a better system for worksite verification.
Reducing the employment magnet is the linchpin of a comprehensive strategy to reduce illegal immigration. Illegal
aliens are here for jobs. That is the attraction. So the only effective way to deter illegal immigration must include the
worksite.
Better border enforcement is necessary, but not sufficient. You heard testimony last Friday that visa overstayers make
up fully one-half of the influx of illegal aliens, 150,000 out of 300,000 who take up permanent residence here illegally
every year, on top of an illegal population that exceeds 4 million already. No amount of border enforcement can solve
that half of the problem-the people who enter legally and then do not leave when they should.
We simply must develop a better system for verifying work authorization. That is central to effective enforcement of
employer sanctions.
The system we have now, the I-9 process, is doubly-flawed. It does not do what it was supposed to do, namely deter the
employment of illegal aliens. What it does do, we do not want-namely, burden businesses with paperwork, while
creating abundant opportunities for fraud and forgeries. It may even provide an excuse for, if it does not actually
provoke, discrimination against workers who happen to look or sound foreign.
Honest employers are caught between the proverbial rock and a hard place. Because the system is based on documents,
employers are placed in a position of making judgments many do not feel qualified to make.
Identifying forgeries is difficult, even for trained professionals. If an employer accepts false documents presented by an
unauthorized worker, that employer is vulnerable to employer sanctions for having hired someone under false pretences,
regardless of the fact that they may well have been fooled themselves. Yet, if an employer chooses to doubt particular
documents and asks for more from some workers and not from others, that is discrimination.
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The Commission believes that we must develop a better system of worksite verification and that the way to do it is
immediately to test the most promising option. After examining a wide range of alternatives, the Commission concluded
that the most promising option for secure, nondiscriminatory verification is a computerized registry based on the social
security number.
For decades, all workers have been required to provide employers with their social security number. Depending on the
results of pilot projects that are now being designed, the cumbersome I-9 process, with its dozens of documents and
blizzard of paper, could be replaced by a single electronic step to validate information every worker must already
provide.
The Commission examined the Telephone Verification System, called TVS, which the INS has been testing. We are
aware that the INS will expand this system, first from 9 to 200 sites, and eventually to 1,000 sites. We support this INS
effort-but only as an interim measure. It is not the solution.
The fatal flaw in the TVS system is that it ultimately depends on self-attestation. Workers are asked whether they are
citizens or aliens. It is simply not sound law enforcement to rely on lawbreakers to tell the truth.
The Commission also looked at the feasibility and effectiveness of reducing the number of documents used in
verification. Again, we support such efforts as interim measures. But the fatal flaw here is the vulnerability of all
documents to counterfeiting. We heard expert testimony that any document, even the most tamper-proof ones, can be
forged so well that only experts can identify the fakes. Employers cannot be expected to identify counterfeit documents.
The Commission believes electronic validation of the social security number is the most promising option because it
holds great potential for accomplishing the following:
Reduction in the potential for fraud. Using a computerized registry, rather than relying on documents, guards
against counterfeits;
Reduction in the potential for discrimination. All workers must present the same information to be validated;
Reduction in the time, resources, and paperwork spent by employers in complying with IRCA. INS
employees who now chase paper could be redirected to chase down those who knowingly hire illegal workers.
The Commission did not try to micromanage the Executive branch's implementation of this recommendation in
advance. We deliberately did not spell out precisely how the software of the registry would be designed, although we
did specify that just six pieces of information seem necessary: name; social security number; place and date of birth;
mother's maiden name; and status code. Nor did we limit the innovation that might be applied in pilot projects to test the
registry. But we did speak to some of the most important aspects.
First, hunt where the ducks are. The Commission recommends that pilot projects be undertaken in the five high-impact
states-California, Texas, Florida, New York, and Illinois-because that is where the bulk of the illegal alien problem is.
We also recommend that, in time, the pilots should be extended to several less-affected states. But we did not
recommend that the registry be tested throughout all of the five states immediately, nor even in all of any one of the
states. Pilot projects should start small. Before going to the next phase, we should have results to guide us.
Second, there must be objective, systematic evaluation of the pilot programs. This Commission expects to have
meaningful results from the initial phase of pilot testing by 1997. We will incorporate these results in our final report to
Congress, so that we can make an informed recommendation on whether that system should be implemented
nationwide, with particular attention to civil liberties and privacy concerns. The features of pilot programs should
include:
A means by which employers will access the verification system to validate the accuracy of information
given by workers. We received conflicting testimony about the best way to ascertain that a new hire is who he or
she claims to be. Some believe that the tamper-resistant driver's licenses now being issued by many states can do
the job; others strongly advocate testing a more secure social security card.
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But it is also possible that electronic validation through a telephone system would require no document at all.
Every ATM system uses a PIN number to protect our money. We should test to see if personal information, such
as the mother's maiden name and date of birth, that is already part of the social security database, can serve the
same function for worksite verification.
Measures to ensure the accuracy of the necessary data. Improvements must be made in both the INS and
Social Security Administration databases to ensure that employers have timely and reliable access to what they
need. Frankly, no one can be opposed to improving the reliability of the data in these agencies. There is no
protection of liberty in government error.
Measures to ensure against discrimination. One key to the Commission's recommendation is that employers
would no longer have to ascertain whether a worker is a citizen or an alien, native-born or an immigrant. All
workers would have to present the same information to be validated.
Measures to protect civil liberties. Explicit protections should be devised to ensure that the registry is used only
for its intended purposes. The Commission believes that electronically validating the social security number could
be used to ascertain eligibility for public benefits, without damage to civil liberties, because everyone receiving
public assistance must already present a social security number, just as they do for work. But the registry is not to
be used for routine identification purposes, and there must be penalties for inappropriate use of the verification
process. The Commission's unanimous, unequivocal view is that no one should be required to carry a document
and produce it on demand to prove their right to be here.
Measures to protect privacy. Explicit provisions also must be built into the system to safeguard individual
privacy. The information contained in the registry will be minimal, given its limited purpose. But the Commission
is aware that while access to any one piece of information may not be intrusive, in combination with other
information it can lead to privacy violations.
Estimates of the start-up time and financial and other costs. The Social Security Administration made
preliminary estimates for the Commission of its cost for pilot projects: $4 million over the first two years for
design and development; and annual costs of maintenance and operation of $32 million. Discrepancies referred to
the Social Security Administration were estimated to cost $122 million initially and $30 million per year
thereafter. So the total cost of the registry over five years, according to the Social Security Administration, would
be approximately $300 million.
By way of comparison, the Urban Institute estimates that illegal aliens cost seven states more than $2.1 billion a
year. Spending $300 million over five years to save $2 billion each year is a sound investment.
But the INS cost must be added to the SSA estimate. The Clinton Administration's latest budget request calls for
$28.3 million for verification system pilots, although this also includes the expanded TVS program. The bulk of
the INS cost, however, will be cleaning up their own data, which should be done regardless of the pilot projects to
improve worksite verification.
Specification of the rights, responsibilities, and impact on individual workers and employers. In particular,
the Commission recommendation for false negatives is that no one-no one-should be fired if their employer does
not get a validation code from the registry after hiring. It is entirely possible that a new hire has merely given their
social security number wrong. There is no one who has a greater incentive to correct errors, whether they are at
the INS or the Social Security Administration, than a legitimate worker who has just learned from the registry that
there is a problem. Speaking as someone who pays into the social security system, I want to be sure that the
number I have been using is correct-and has not been misappropriated by an illegal alien.
A plan for phasing in the system. Pilot projects should test various methods for phasing in improvements in
worksite verification, according to the test results.
Evaluating the results of pilot programs with these criteria must include objective measures and procedures to determine
whether current problems related to fraud, discrimination, and excessive paperwork requirements for employers are
effectively overcome, without imposing undue costs on the government, employers, or employees. The evaluation
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should pay particular attention to the effectiveness of the measures used to protect civil liberties and privacy.
The Commission also recommends reducing the fraudulent access to so-called "breeder documents," particularly birth
certificates, that can be used to establish an identity in this country. We recommend these steps:
Standardized application form for birth certificates;
Interstate and intrastate matching of birth and death records;
Only certified copies of birth certificates issued by states should be accepted by federal agencies;
Standard design and paperstock for all certified copies of birth certificates to reduce counterfeiting;
Encouraging states to computerize birth records depositories.
The Commission also recommends imposition of greater penalties on those producing or selling fraudulent documents.
RICO provisions to facilitate racketeering investigations also should cover conspiracy to produce and sell fraudulent
documents.
Let me also summarize the Commission's recommendations regarding labor standards and discrimination. Vigorous
enforcement of labor standards and enforcement against knowing hire of unauthorized workers are an integral part of
the strategy to reduce illegal immigration. Labor standards and employer sanctions should be seen as mutually
enforcing.
The Commission believes that enforcement of employer sanctions, wage/hour, child labor, and other labor standards can
be an effective tool in reducing employment of unauthorized workers. But we found that current enforcement efforts are
inadequate.
The Commission specifically recommends:
Increased staff and resources for the enforcement of labor standards to complement employer sanctions
enforcement.
Vigorous enforcement, increased staff and resources, and full use of current penalties against those who
knowingly hire unauthorized workers. We believe that the new verification system we have recommended can
reduce substantially the inadvertent hiring of unauthorized workers. If the pilot programs bear this out, Congress
should discontinue penalties for paperwork violations and evaluate the need for increased penalties against
violators and businesses that knowingly hire or fail to verify work authorization for all employees.
Targetting of investigations to industries that have a history of using illegal alien labor.
Enhanced enforcement efforts targeted at farm labor and other contractors.
Application of employer sanctions to the Federal government. Recently the Congress, to its credit, voted to apply
to itself the laws that it applies to the nation. At a minimum, the President should issue an Executive Order
requiring federal agencies to abide by the procedures required of other employers.
We are particularly concerned that the current level of coordination between the INS and the Department of Labor is
insufficient. The Commission has urged the Attorney General and the Secretary of Labor to review the current division
of responsibilities between the Departments of Justice and Labor in the enforcement of employer sanctions and labor
standards.
Enhanced coordination to promote cooperation among all of the agencies responsible for worksite enforcement is
critical. Strategies to promote coordination at both the headquarters and field operations level would include:
Establishment of a taskforce in Washington, DC to review and set policy;
Local taskforces of worksite investigators to coordinate field operations; and
Continued joint training for worksite investigators from all applicable agencies.
Enhanced employer sanctions and labor standards enforcement should be coordinated with improvements regarding
enforcment of antidiscrimination provisions. The Commission believes that an improved verification process is the best
defense against discrimination. Nevertheless, some improvements can be made in the interim, to reduce immigration-
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related discrimination.
The Commission recommends that the Office of Special Counsel initiate more proactive strategies to identify and
combat immigration-related discrimination at the worksite. OSC should target resources on independent investigations
and on programs to assess the incidence and prevalence of unfair employment practices related to immigration.
Finally, there must be an education component. Thousands of new businesses begin operation each year; many more
new workers enter the labor force annually. The Commission recommends that the educational efforts of the responsible
federal agencies be coordinated, and continued. The INS and the Department of Labor must communicate a single
message to all employers and employees. The Commission also recommends the development of new strategies,
including the enhanced use of technology, to inform employers and workers of their rights and responsibilities under the
law.
Those are the Commission's recommendations on worksite enforcement. They are a part of the comprehensive approach
to immigration reform that this Commission is developing. As you know, the Commission is well along in the next
phase of its task, considering the national interest in legal immigration, including categories, priorities, and limits.
The key to our work so far has been that, through intense discussions, we have managed to arrive at a bipartisan
consensus. We hope to continue that record in a systematic evaluation of what our immigration policy should be in the
twenty-first century. In that effort, we have appreciated this Subcommittee's support and consideration of our work.
I will be glad to answer any questions.
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Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, on behalf of Professor Barbara Jordan, our Chair, and my fellow
members of the U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform, I want to thank you for this opportunity to testify.
In our first report to Congress last fall, U.S. Immigration Policy: Restoring Credibility, we sought to recommend a
comprehensive strategy to control illegal immigration. Growing frustration about it undermines our first commitment to
legal immigration in the national interest.
We simply must develop a better system for verifying work authorization. Reducing the employment magnet is the
linchpin of a comprehensive strategy to reduce illegal immigration. Illegal aliens are here for jobs. That is the attraction.
So the only effective way to deter illegal immigration must include the worksite. The reliability of government
information is critical to this effort.
The system we have now, the I-9 process, is doubly-flawed. It does not do what it was supposed to do, namely deter the
employment of illegal aliens. What it does do, we do not want-namely, burden businesses with paperwork, while
creating abundant opportunities for fraud and forgeries. It may even provide an excuse for, if it does not actually
provoke, discrimination against workers who happen to look or sound foreign.
At the root of these problems is the proliferation of counterfeit documents. During our investigations, the Commission
learned that illegal aliens can now purchase counterfeit driver's licenses and social security cards for $25. A green card
is slightly more expensive. Moreover, we also learned that counterfeits of any document-even the most tamper-resistant-
would soon be on the black market. These cards could easily pass a visual check, particularly by employers who are not
trained to spot counterfeits.
Honest employers are caught between the proverbial rock and a hard place. Because the system is based on documents,
employers are placed in a position of making judgments many do not feel qualified to make.
Identifying forgeries is difficult, even for trained professionals. If an employer accepts false documents presented by an
unauthorized worker, that employer is vulnerable to employer sanctions for having hired someone under false pretenses,
regardless of the fact that they may well have been fooled themselves. Yet, if an employer chooses to doubt particular
documents and asks for more from some workers and not from others, that is discrimination.
The Commission believes that the way to develop a better system of worksite verification is immediately to test the
most promising option. After examining a wide range of alternatives, the Commission concluded that the most
promising option for secure, nondiscriminatory verification is a computerized registry based on the social security
number.
For decades, all workers have been required to provide employers with their social security number. Depending on the
results of pilot projects that are now being designed, the cumbersome I-9 process, with its dozens of documents and
blizzard of paper, could be replaced by a single electronic step to validate information every worker must already
provide.
The Commission also looked at the feasibility and effectiveness of reducing the number of documents used in
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verification. Again, we support such efforts as interim measures. But the fatal flaw here is the vulnerability of all
documents to counterfeiting. We heard expert testimony that any document, even the most tamper-proof ones, can be
forged so well that only experts can identify the fakes. Employers cannot be expected to identify counterfeit documents.
The Commission believes electronic validation of the Social Security Number is the most promising option because it
holds great potential for accomplishing the following:
Reduction in the potential for fraud. Using a computerized registry, rather than relying on documents, guards
against counterfeits;
Reduction in the potential for discrimination. All workers must present the same information to be validated;
Reduction in the time, resources and paperwork spent by employers in complying with IRCA. INS
employees who now chase paper could be redirected to chase down those who knowingly hire illegal workers.
The Commission did not try to micromanage the Executive branch's implementation of this recommendation in
advance. We deliberately did not spell out precisely how the software of the registry would be designed, although we
did specify that just six pieces of information seem necessary: name; social security number; place and date of birth;
mother's maiden name; and status code. Nor did we limit the innovation that might be applied in pilot projects to test the
registry.
There must be objective, systematic evaluation of the pilot programs. This Commission expects to have meaningful
results from the initial phase of pilot testing by 1997. We will incorporate these results in our final report to Congress,
so that we can make an informed recommendation on whether that system should be implemented nationwide, with
particular attention to civil liberties and privacy concerns. The features of pilot programs should include:
A means by which employers will access the verification system to validate the accuracy of information
given by workers. We received conflicting testimony about the best way to ascertain that a new hire is who he or
she claims to be. Some believe that the tamper-resistant driver's licenses now being issued by many states can do
the job; others strongly advocate testing a more secure social security card.
But it is also possible that electronic validation through a telephone system would require no document at all.
Every ATM system uses a PIN number to protect our money. We should test to see if personal information, such
as the mother's maiden name and date of birth, that is already part of the social security database, can serve the
same function for worksite verification.
Measures to ensure the accuracy of the necessary data. Improvements must be made in both the INS and
Social Security Administration databases to ensure that employers have timely and reliable access to what they
need. Frankly, no one can be opposed to improving the reliability of the data in these agencies. There is no
protection of liberty in government error.
Measures to ensure against discrimination. One key to the Commission's recommendation is that employers
would no longer have to ascertain whether a worker is a citizen or an alien, native-born or an immigrant. All
workers would have to present the same information to be validated.
Measures to protect civil liberties. Explicit protections should be devised to ensure that the registry is used only
for its intended purposes. The Commission believes that electronically validating the social security number could
be used to ascertain eligibility for public benefits, without damage to civil liberties, because everyone receiving
public assistance must already present a social security number, just as they do for work. But the registry is not to
be used for routine identification purposes, and there must be penalties for inappropriate use of the verification
process. The Commission's unanimous, unequivocal view is that no one should be required to carry a document
and produce it on demand to prove their right to be here.
Measures to protect privacy. Explicit provisions also must be built into the system to safeguard individual
privacy. The information contained in the registry will be minimal, given its limited purpose. But the Commission
is aware that, while access to any one piece of information may not be intrusive, in combination with other
information it can lead to privacy violations.
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Estimates of the start-up time and financial and other costs. The Social Security Administration made
preliminary estimates for the Commission of its cost for pilot projects: $4 million over the first two years for
design and development; and annual costs of maintenance and operation of $32 million. Discrepancies referred to
the Social Security Administration were estimated to cost $122 million initially and $30 million per year
thereafter. So the total cost of the registry over five years, according to the Social Security Administration, would
be approximately $300 million.
By way of comparison, the Urban Institute estimates that illegal aliens cost seven states more than $2.1 billion a
year. Spending $300 million over five years to save $2 billion each year is a sound investment.
But the INS cost must be added to the SSA estimate. The Clinton Administration's latest budget request calls for
$28.3 million for verification systems pilots, although this also includes other programs. The bulk of the INS cost,
however, will be cleaning up their own data, which should be done regardless of the pilot projects to improve
worksite verification.
Specification of the rights, responsibilities, and impact on individual workers and employers. In particular,
the Commission recommendation for false negatives is that no one-no one-should be fired if their employer does
not get a validation code from the registry after hiring. It is entirely possible that a new hire has merely given their
social security number wrong. There is no one who has a greater incentive to correct errors, whether they are at
the INS or the Social Security Administration, than a legitimate worker who has just learned from the registry that
there is a problem. Speaking as someone who pays into the social security system, I want to be sure that the
number I have been using is correct-and has not been misappropriated by an illegal alien.
A plan for phasing in the system. Pilot projects should test various methods for phasing in improvements in
worksite verification, according to the test results.
Evaluating the results of pilot programs with these criteria must include objective measures and procedures to determine
whether current problems related to fraud, discrimination, and excessive paperwork requirements for employers are
effectively overcome, without imposing undue costs on the government, employers, or employees. The evaluation
should pay particular attention to the effectiveness of the measures used to protect civil liberties and privacy.
While we on the Commission are not the computer experts, and never pretended to be, we do recognize "Garbage In,
Garbage Out." Clearly, people who obtain real documents through false pretenses pose a problem. This is true, even
though the Social Security Administration does a face-to-face interview and document check on every adult who seeks a
social security number, since nowadays most children receive numbers shortly after birth.
Accordingly, the Commission also recommends reducing the fraudulent access to so-called "breeder documents,"
particularly birth certificates, that can be used to establish an identity in this country. We recommend these steps:
Standardized application form for birth certificates;
Interstate and intrastate matching of birth and death records;
Only certified copies of birth certificates issued by states should be accepted by federal agencies;
Standard design and paperstock for all certified copies of birth certificates to reduce counterfeiting;
Encouraging states to computerize birth records depositories.
The Commission also recommends imposition of greater penalties on those producing or selling fraudulent documents.
RICO provisions to facilitate racketeering investigations also should cover conspiracy to produce and sell fraudulent
documents.
The Commission's recommendations regarding worksite verification are an important part, but only a part, of the
comprehensive approach to immigration reform that this Commission is developing. As you know, the Commission is
well along in the next phase of its task, considering the national interest in legal immigration, including categories,
priorities, and limits.
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The key to our work so far has been that, through intense discussions, we have managed to arrive at a bipartisan
consensus. We hope to continue that record in a systematic evaluation of what our immigration policy should be in the
twenty-first century. In that effort, we appreciate this Subcommittee's consideration of our work.
I will be glad to answer any questions.
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Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, on behalf of Professor Barbara Jordan, our Chair, and the members
of the U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform, I want to thank you for this opportunity to testify.
In our first report to Congress last fall, U.S. Immigration Policy: Restoring Credibility, the Commission sought to
recommend a comprehensive strategy. We chose to focus much of that report on measures to control illegal
immigration, because growing frustration about it undermines our first commitment to legal immigration in the national
interest.
S.269, introduced by the Majority Leader on behalf of Senator Simpson, tracks the Commission recommendations
closely in many areas that are critical to a comprehensive approach-worksite verification, increasing penalties for alien
smuggling and document fraud, border management, and bringing eligibility for public assistance into line with the
goals of our immigration policy.
The Commissioners deeply appreciate the support which this Subcommittee has provided, on a bipartisan basis, to the
Commission. Professor Barbara Jordan, our Chair, not only regretted that she could not be here personally today, she
instructed me to offer the Commission's assistance to the Subcommittee in any way we can be helpful as you move
forward with this legislation.
Let me sum up the Commission's reasons for proposing that we develop a better system for worksite verification.
Reducing the employment magnet is the linchpin of a comprehensive strategy to reduce illegal immigration. Illegal
aliens are here for jobs. That is the attraction. So the only effective way to deter illegal immigration must include the
worksite.
Better border enforcement is necessary, but not sufficient. Visa overstayers make up fully one-half of the influx of
illegal aliens, 150,000 out of 300,000 who take up permanent residence here illegally every year, on top of an illegal
population that exceeds 4 million already. No amount of border enforcement can solve that half of the problem-the
people who enter legally and then do not leave when they should.
We simply must develop a better system for verifying work authorization. That is central to effective enforcement of
employer sanctions.
The system we have now, the I-9 process, is doubly-flawed. It does not do what it was supposed to do, namely deter the
employment of illegal aliens. What it does do, we do not want-namely, burden businesses with paperwork, while
creating abundant opportunities for fraud and forgeries. It may even provide an excuse for, if it does not actually
provoke, discrimination against workers who happen to look or sound foreign.
Honest employers are caught between the proverbial rock and a hard place. Because the system is based on documents,
employers are placed in a position of making judgments many do not feel qualified to make.
Identifying forgeries is difficult, even for trained professionals. If an employer accepts false documents presented by an
unauthorized worker, that employer is vulnerable to employer sanctions for having hired someone under false pretences,
regardless of the fact that they may well have been fooled themselves. Yet, if an employer chooses to doubt particular
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documents and asks for more from some workers and not from others, that is discrimination.
The Commission believes that we must develop a better system of worksite verification and that the way to do it is
through pilot testing. After examining a wide range of alternatives, the Commission concluded that the most promising
option for secure, nondiscriminatory verification is a computerized registry based on the social security number.
For decades, all workers have been required to provide employers with their social security number. Depending on the
results of pilot projects that are now being designed, the cumbersome I-9 process, with its dozens of documents and
blizzard of paper, could be replaced by a single electronic step to validate information every worker must already
provide.
The Commission examined the Telephone Verification System, called TVS, which the INS has been testing. We are
aware that the INS will expand this system, first from 9 to 200 sites, and eventually to 1,000 sites. We support this INS
effort-but only as an interim measure. It is not the solution.
The fatal flaw in the TVS system is that it ultimately depends on self-attestation. Workers are asked whether they are
citizens or aliens. It is simply not sound law enforcement to rely on lawbreakers to tell the truth.
The Commission also looked at the feasibility and effectiveness of reducing the number of documents used in
verification. Again, we support such efforts as interim measures. But the fatal flaw here is the vulnerability of all
documents to counterfeiting. We heard expert testimony that any document, even the most tamper-proof ones, can be
forged so well that only experts can identify the fakes. Employers cannot be expected to identify counterfeit documents.
The Commission believes electronic validation of the social security number is the most promising option because it
holds great potential for accomplishing the following:
Reduction in the potential for fraud. Using a computerized registry, rather than relying on documents, guards
against counterfeits;
Reduction in the potential for discrimination. All workers must present the same information to be validated;
Reduction in the time, resources, and paperwork spent by employers in complying with IRCA. INS
employees who now chase paper could be redirected to chase down those who knowingly hire illegal workers.
The Commission did not try to micromanage implementation of this recommendation in advance. We deliberately did
not spell out precisely how the software of the registry would be designed, although we did specify that just six pieces
of information seem necessary: name; social security number; place and date of birth; mother's maiden name; and status
code. Nor did we limit the innovation that might be applied in pilot projects to test the registry. But we did speak to
some of the most important aspects.
First, focus on those areas with the largest numbers of illegal aliens. The Commission recommends that pilot projects be
undertaken in the five high-impact states-California, Texas, Florida, New York, and Illinois. We also recommend that,
in time, the pilots should be extended to several less-affected states. But we did not recommend that the registry be
tested throughout all of the five states immediately, nor even in all of any one of the states. Pilot projects should start
small. Before going to the next phase, we should have results to guide us.
Second, there must be objective, systematic evaluation of the pilot programs. We hope that this Committee will add its
voice to this recommendation. The Commission expects to have meaningful results from the initial phase of pilot testing
by 1997. We will incorporate these results in our final report to Congress, so that we can make an informed
recommendation on whether that system should be implemented nationwide, with particular attention to civil liberties
and privacy concerns.
The features of pilot programs should include:
A means by which employers will access the verification system to validate the accuracy of information
given by workers. We received conflicting testimony about the best way to ascertain that a new hire is who he or
she claims to be. Some believe that the tamper-resistant driver's licenses now being issued by many states can do
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the job; others strongly advocate testing a more secure social security card.
But it is also possible that electronic validation through a telephone system would require no document at all.
Every ATM system uses a PIN number to protect our money. We should test to see if personal information, such
as the mother's maiden name and date of birth, that is already part of the social security database, can serve the
same function for worksite verification.
Measures to ensure the accuracy of the necessary data. Improvements must be made in both the INS and
Social Security Administration databases to ensure that employers have timely and reliable access to what they
need. Frankly, no one can be opposed to improving the reliability of the data in these agencies. There is no
protection of liberty in government error.
Measures to ensure against discrimination. One key to the Commission's recommendation is that employers
would no longer have to ascertain whether a worker is a citizen or an alien, native-born or an immigrant. All
workers would have to present the same information to be validated.
Measures to protect civil liberties. Explicit protections should be devised to ensure that the registry is used only
for its intended purposes. The Commission believes that electronically validating the social security number could
be used to ascertain eligibility for public benefits without damage to civil liberties, because everyone receiving
public assistance must already present a social security number, just as they do for work. But the registry is not to
be used for routine identification purposes, and there must be penalties for inappropriate use of the verification
process. The Commission's unanimous, unequivocal view is that no one should be required to carry a document
and produce it on demand to prove their right to be here.
Measures to protect privacy. Explicit provisions must also be built into thesystem to safeguard individual
privacy. The information contained in the registry will be minimal, given its limited purpose. But the Commission
is aware that, while access to any one piece of information may not be intrusive, in combination with other
information it can lead to privacy violations.
Estimates of the start-up time and financial and other costs. The Social Security Administration made
preliminary estimates for the Commission of its cost for pilot projects: $4 million over the first two years for
design and development; and annual costs of maintenance and operation of $32 million. Discrepancies referred to
the Social Security Administration were estimated to cost $122 million initially and $30 million per year
thereafter. So the total cost of the registry over five years, according to the Social Security Administration, would
be approximately $300 million.
By way of comparison, the Urban Institute estimates that illegal aliens cost seven states more than $2.1 billion a
year. Spending $300 million over five years to save $2 billion each year is a sound investment.
But the INS cost must be added to the SSA estimate. The Clinton Administration's latest budget request calls for
$28.3 million for verification system pilots, although this also includes the expanded TVS program. The bulk of
the INS cost, however, will be cleaning up their own data, which should be done regardless of the pilot projects to
improve worksite verification.
Specification of the rights, responsibilities, and impact on individual workers and employers. In particular,
the Commission recommendation for false negatives is that no one-no one-should be fired if their employer does
not get a validation code from the registry after hiring. It is entirely possible that a new hire has merely given their
social security number wrong. There is no one who has a greater incentive to correct errors, whether they are at
the INS or the Social Security Administration, than a legitimate worker who has just learned from the registry that
there is a problem. Speaking as someone who pays into the social security system, I want to be sure that the
number I have been using is correct-and has not been misappropriated by an illegal alien.
A plan for phasing in the system. Pilot projects should test various methods for phasing in improvements in
worksite verification, according to the test results.
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An evaluation of pilot program results with these criteria must include objective measures and procedures to determine
whether current problems related to fraud, discrimination, and excessive paperwork requirements for employers are
effectively overcome, without imposing undue costs on the government, employers, or employees. The evaluation
should pay particular attention to the effectiveness of the measures used to protect civil liberties and privacy.
The Commission also recommends reducing the fraudulent access to so-called "breeder documents," particularly birth
certificates, that can be used to establish an identity in this country. We recommend these steps:
A standardized application form for birth certificates;
Interstate and intrastate matching of birth and death records;
Only certified copies of birth certificates issued by states should be accepted by federal agencies;
Standard design and paperstock for all certified copies of birth certificates to reduce counterfeiting;
Encouraging states to computerize birth records depositories.
The Commission further recommends imposition of greater penalties on those producing or selling fraudulent
documents. RICO provisions to facilitate racketeering investigations also should cover conspiracy to produce and sell
fraudulent documents.
Those are the Commission's recommendations on worksite verification.
Let me add one more note about worksite enforcement. While improved verification is essential, there are interim steps
that can be taken to reduce the magnet that jobs present for illegal aliens. The Commission recommends:
Enhanced resources for investigation of labor standards violations;
Greater coordination between the Department of Labor and INS in enforcement of employer sanctions and labor
standards;
More targeted enforcement of employer sanctions on industries with a history of illegal alien labor; and
More proactive enforcement of antidiscrimination laws.
Together, these and other strategies recommended by the Commission should help make jobs attractive to U.S. workers,
while identifying and penalizing employers who knowingly hire illegal aliens.
As you know, the Commission is well along in the next phase of its task, considering the national interest in legal
immigration, including categories, priorities, and limits. The key to our work so far has been that, through intense
discussions, we have managed to arrive at a bipartisan consensus. We hope to continue that record in a systematic
evaluation of what our immigration policy should be in the twenty-first century. In that effort, we have appreciated this
Subcommittee's support and consideration of our work.
I will be glad to answer any questions.
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On behalf of Professor Barbara Jordan, our Chair, and the Members of the U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform, I
want to thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today.
First, let me explain the role of the Commission on Immigration Reform. It is a bipartisan body made up of eight
Commissioners appointed by the Congress. Two Commissioners are appointed by the respective leadership of both
parties in the House and the Senate, and the Chair is appointed by the President. We are a Congressional Commission.
Our mandate from the Congress in the Immigration Act of 1990 charges the Commissioners to make a comprehensive
analysis of immigration policy and to make specific recommendations for reform.
In the Commission's first interim report, U.S. Immigration Policy: Restoring Credibility, issued last September, the
Commission recommended a comprehensive strategy for controlling illegal immigration. The Commission has been
gratified that many of these recommendations have been incorporated in Senator Simpson's bill, S. 269, the Immigrant
Control and Financial Responsibility Act of 1995. The Commission's recommendations also have received significant
support from the Chairman of the House Subcommittee, Lamar Smith, and the Chair of the House Taskforce on
Immigration, Elton Gallegly, as well as from the President in the State of the Union address.
The Commission is pleased that this Committee has taken up the SSI issue with respect to immigrants. Immigrants have
become an important percentage of SSI recipients, one which is large and growing.
It would appear that the disproportionate use of benefit programs by the foreign-born is confined largely to
Supplemental Security Income program for the aged, blind, and disabled. This is not too surprising when one considers
eligibility criteria for the main source of income for the elderly, the social security program. Social security requires
beneficiaries or the spouses of beneficiaries to have worked for forty quarters, which is ten years. It is much more likely
that native-born Americans as compared with immigrants, will meet the work-quarter requirement. Most, though not all,
social security recipients would be income ineligible for SSI. By contrast, needy elderly who do not receive social
security generally qualify for SSI.
This is even more apparent when examining the utilization rates for foreign-born by period of entry. Older persons who
entered in recent time periods are more likely to be receiving public assistance income than are those who entered while
still in their working years. Those who were fifty-five years or older at the time of entry are the least likely to qualify for
social security even if they work for a period of time after arrival. Only 4.2 percent of foreign-born persons who
immigrated in the 1980s received social security income in 1989, compared to 29 percent of the foreign-born persons
who entered before 1980.
The foreign-born utilization of SSI is confirmed by administrative data. SSI program data reveal that approximately 25
percent of elderly SSI recipients are foreign-born. Overall, 10.6 percent of SSI recipients are foreign-born. This
proportion has risen steeply since 1982, the first year that statistics were available, when 3.3 percent of SSI recipients
were foreign-born. The number of aliens receiving aged benefits increased from 92,00 in 1982 to 373,000 in 1992. The
number of blind and disabled aliens increased from 92,000 in 1982 to 228,500 in 1992.
The apparent increase in the proportion of immigrants receiving SSI may be due, in part, to the recent arrival of an
increasing number of older immigrants. Nearly 12 percent (416,000) of the foreign-born residents who were sixty years
or older in 1990 entered during the 1980s. They had not earned sufficient social security benefits to be self-supporting.
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The number of immigrants sixty years or older in 1980 who entered during the 1970s was only 262,000, just 7 percent
of the sixty years and older foreign-born population. More data needs to be gathered, of course, to determine the extent
to which this explains the increase in alien participation in the SSI program.
The intersection of immigration policy and public benefits policy is a complex topic that episodically captures national
attention, both among policymakers and the general public. In times of great labor force needs and abundant
opportunity, there tends to be little attention to the domestic context of immigration. In times of slow or uncertain
growth, restricted budgets, and reduced opportunity, sensitivity to domestic impact is heightened.
Now, with reform efforts underway on several major domestic policies, the effect of immigration-particularly illegal
immigration-has been questioned. Immigration policy is viewed as yet another area ripe for reform. In this context, the
Commission has examined closely the existing relationship between immigration and public benefit policies and their
impact. The primary cause of concern to both the public and to the Commission is the lack of effective enforcement at
our borders and the resulting presence of many aliens who have entered illegally. The Commission found that
inconsistencies in immigration and benefits policy undermine the credibility of both.
The Commission believes that decisions on benefits eligibility should be consistent with and support the objectives of
immigration policy. Legal immigrants enter the United States under U.S. law because their admission is considered to
be in the national interest. The Immigration and Nationality Act delineates several categories of admission, most of
them defined by the immigrant's connection to a U.S. resident or employers. Even in the category most characterized by
humanitarian rather than strict national interest-refugee admissions-priority is given to individuals facing persecution
because of their ties to the U.S. government, a U.S. resident, or a U.S. company. The Commission believes that benefits
policy should reaffirm that the nation considers legal immigration to be in the national interest. Both the immigrants
themselves and the broader society have responsibilities toward ensuring that immigrants are, and continue to be,
productive members of our social community who, if they need help, can benefit from the established safety nets.
The Commission recommends against any broad, categorical denial of public benefits to legal immigrants. No federal
benefit program currently denies eligibility on the basis of alienage to legal immigrants. In some needs-based public
assistance programs, such as SSI, AFDC, and Food Stamps, as a means of enforcing the public charge provision for
exclusion and deportation, current law requires that program eligibility workers "deem" sponsor income as available to
immigrants in determining financial responsibility.
In other social insurance programs, such as social security and Medicare, an immigrant becomes eligible on the same
basis as citizens-through sufficient payroll contributions to the trust funds. There is a five-year residency requirement
for enrollment for elderly immigrants who have not contributed sufficiently to the Medicare trust funds.
A considerable amount of public debate has focussed on the issues of eligibility of legal immigrants for public
assistance programs. Indeed, during the past year a number of proposals for curtailing immigrant eligibility have been
made. While some measures would affect all legal immigrants, others are aimed more specifically at individuals coming
into the country for family reunification purposes. The proposals range from making all legal immigrants ineligible for
all federal assistance programs until such time as they naturalize, to extending for some federal programs the time
period during which a sponsor's income is counted or "deemed" available to determine need.
So what do we do about this? The Commission believes the following principles should guide policy on the benefits
eligibility.
The safety net provided by needs-tested programs should be available to those whom we have affirmatively
accepted as legal immigrants into our communities. The U.S. admits immigrants on the basis that they will not be a
public charge. However, circumstances may arise after an immigrant's entry that create a pressing need for public help-
unexpected illness, injuries sustained due to a serious accident, loss of employment, a death in the family. Under such
circumstances, legal immigrants should be eligible for public benefits if they meet other eligibility criteria. We are not
prepared to remove the safety net from under individuals who, we hope, will become full members of our polity.
A policy to categorically deny legal immigrants access to such safety nets based solely on alienage would lead to gross
inequities between very similar individuals and undermine our immigration goals to reunite families and quickly
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integrate immigrants into American society. For example, while two children in the same family may be equally poor,
one may be a legal immigrant and, under proposals to deny benefits to legal immigrants, would be ineligible for
assistance, while the other may be a citizen-by virtue of being born after the family arrives in the U.S.-and eligible for
assistance.
The inequities for the legal immigrant child grow if eligibility is linked to citizenship, rather than a specified time, since
the child may not naturalize, by law, until he or she is eighteen years of age. The only route to citizenship prior to that
age is through the naturalization of his or her parent. If there were a categorical denial of eligibility to all legal
immigrants and the parent is unable or unwilling to naturalize, the child would suffer the consequences of a parental
action that he or she cannot remedy.
Sponsors should be held financially responsible for the immigrants that they bring to this country. In particular,
the Commission recommends making affidavits of support signed by sponsors legally binding for a specific period of
time and the development of mechanisms to enforce sponsors pledges of financial responsibility.
Affidavits of support are one means to ensure the Consular Officer that the alien will be supported in the United States
and will not become a public charge. In accordance with Board of Immigration Appeals [BIA] rulings, the signatory
sponsor's ability to provide the promised support must be given due consideration in determining whether to exclude a
person as likely to become a public charge. Some courts, however, have held that such affidavits of support impose only
a moral-and not a legal-obligation on the signatory sponsor.
Thus, as affidavits are not legally enforceable, assurance that the alien will not become a public charge has relied
primarily on the "deeming rules" applied by the statutory requirements that apply to sponsored immigrants in three
federal means-tested entitlement programs-AFDC, SSI and Food Stamps. The deeming rules apply only to sponsored
immigrants and are not used if a sponsored immigrant becomes blind or disabled after entry into the U.S., if an
immigrant's sponsor has died, or if a sponsor's income and resources are depleted unexpectedly after the immigrant's
entry. Also, refugees are statutorily exempt from deeming rules since their entry is based on humanitarian
considerations rather than on family unity.
In 1993, the sponsor deeming period for SSI was temporarily extended to five years after admission. This change,
authorized for a period of two fiscal years, resulted in savings that financed an extension of the Emergency
Unemployment Compensation program. This use of immigrant eligibility revisions for budgetary advantage is a
precedent that has opened the door to further revisions to immigrant eligibility in the current debate on welfare reform.
This extension of the deeming period for SSI resulted in part from the increased attention to the public charge issue and
in part to data showing a rapid increase in SSI utilization by immigrants, many of whom are elderly and sponsored by
their families. For example, in 1993, immigrants represented about 12 percent of the total SSI caseload and about 28
percent of the aged caseload, compared to 3 percent and 6 percent, respectively, in 1982. About 25 percent of all
immigrants receiving SSI are legal immigrants who are not likely to have sponsors-primarily refugees, but also asylees,
parolees, and others. The remaining 75 percent are legal permanent residents who are likely to have sponsors. One-third
of these began to receive SSI in the year immediately following the end of the sponsor deeming period.
These data can be interpreted in various ways. Some believe that these elderly immigrants, sponsored by their families,
have always intend to apply for SSI benefits as soon as the deeming restrictions are removed. They argue that, at the
time of entry, these elderly individuals have no intention of being self-supporting and that their sponsoring relatives
have no intention of honoring their sponsorship role beyond the deeming period, creating precisely the situation the
public charge provision is supposed to prevent.
On the other hand, no laws have been broken and the data do not imply that there is any specific fraudulent activity
occurring. Sponsors and their elderly immigrant relatives are merely following the rules of program eligibility as they
have evolved over the years.
The one conclusion that can be unequivocally drawn from the data is that the deeming policies have generally been
effective in preventing sponsored immigrants from receiving federal welfare benefits during the deeming period.
However, under federal welfare benefit programs, the deeming rules apply even if immigrant sponsors are not actually
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providing financial support to the immigrant they have sponsored. As the affidavit of support has been judicially
interpreted as a document that is not legally binding, there is currently no legal procedure to compel sponsors actually to
provide such support. It is possible that a sponsor may refuse to provide financial support to the immigrant but, due to
the sponsors income and resources, the immigrant also may be ineligible for federal welfare benefits as a result of the
deeming rules. The immigrant, may, however, be eligible for state and local assistance programs as these programs
generally do not take into account sponsor's income in determining eligibility for benefits.
There are no data to indicate the prevalence of such sponsor abandonment of immigrants. Some experts argue that such
cases are relatively rare, particularly in situations where the sponsor is a close relative of the immigrant, such as a son or
daughter of an elderly immigrant. Some states and localities complain, however, that sponsored immigrants utilize their
programs while awaiting the end of the deeming period for federal programs. Making the affidavit of support a legally-
binding document is necessary to close this loophole in the current sponsor deeming policies.
A legally-enforceable affidavit of support is a necessary complement to deeming policies. Deeming is used not only for
immigrants, but for others as well, to ensure that the income and resources of legally-liable individuals are taken into
account when determining an applicant's eligibility for benefits. For example, under the SSI program, there are both
spouse-to-spouse and parent-to-child deeming policies, in addition to the sponsor-to-alien deeming policy. Making the
affidavit legally binding would establish the legal, financial relationship between sponsors and immigrants. Deeming
policies would continue to allow benefit programs to take this relationship into account when determining a sponsored
immigrant's level of financial need as part of the eligibility determination process. In defining the sponsor's
responsibility, special consideration should be give to the issue of medical care.
It is likely that making the affidavit of support legally binding will serve primarily as an effective deterrent to sponsors.
There is reason to assume that most citizens and legal permanent residents will voluntarily comply with such a legally-
binding affidavit. But to be fully credible, mechanisms must be developed to enforce such a new legal requirement.
Consideration should be given to the particular enforcement mechanisms developed to actually enforce the affidavit, so
as to avoid unnecessarily complex and costly new regulations or bureaucracies. Federal, state, and local governments
should be allowed to consider the sponsor/immigrant relationship on the same legal basis as current parent/child and
spouse/spouse relationships and to hold sponsors to the same standards of financial responsibility with regard to the
immigrant as are currently applied to spouses and parents of children. If an immigrant claims that a sponsor is not
honoring his or her financial obligation, courts could render judgments of support on behalf of the immigrant and
initiative procedures to ensure that support. Also the INS and the Department of State should review their policies to
determine if immigration-related sanctions should be applied against sponsors who do not abide by their responsibilities.
Finally, making the affidavit of support legally binding also should provide states the authority to ensure that sponsors
do not shift their financial responsibility to state and local public assistance programs. As some courts have determined
that states cannot implement the same type of deeming programs for their public assistance programs as the federal
government now does for its programs, this is an important protection.
Abuse of the public charge provision should be grounds for deportation. A serious effort should be made to
enhance and enforce the public charge provisions in immigration law to ensure that legal immigrants do not require
public assistance and to provide clear procedures for deporting individuals who become public charges within five years
after entry for reasons that existed prior to entry. In particular, the Commission recommends that deportation apply to
sustained use of public benefits.
Specific provisions within U.S. immigration law are designed to ensure that those person seeking admission to this
country will contribute to it, not merely take advantage of its resources and the generosity of its people. For example,
U.S. immigration law currently bars the entry of those who are likely to be a public charge and contains provision for
the deportation of individuals who become public charges within five years-unless they require aid for reasons that
developed after entry. Effective enforcement of these provision helps minimize the number of legal immigrants who
need or depend on public assistance.
These are the basic Commission recommendations that would apply to a discussion of SSI and immigrants. I will be
glad to answer any questions.
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Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, thank you for providing this opportunity to testify today. I am Barbara
Jordan, the Chair of the Commission on Immigration Reform. I am accompanied by the Commission's Executive
Director, Susan Martin.
Before I begin my formal testimony, I must commend this committee on its use of new technology to bring the work of
the Congress closer to the American people. As you will hear later in my testimony, the Commission shares your belief
that the federal government must tap new technologies in order to make the work of government efficient and in touch
with the demands of the American public.
The Commission on Immigration Reform was created by the Immigration Act of 1990. We are a fully bipartisan body.
In addition to the Chair, we have eight members who were appointed by the majority and minority leadership in each
house of Congress.
The Commission's mandate is to examine and make recommendations to this Congress on the implementation and
impact of U.S. immigration policy. We are required to make interim reports as issues arise and a final report in
September 1997. The Commission issued its first interim report in September 1994. In calendar year 1995, we intend to
issue three reports with interim recommendations on a range of issues from legal immigration numbers and categories to
the handling of migration emergencies and the removal of deportable aliens from the United States. In addition, we
continue to pursue our long-term agenda to assess the economic, social, demographic and other impacts of immigration
on the United States.
This morning I would like to describe briefly the recommendations the Commission already has made in the hopes that
they will be useful to this committee in setting FY 1995 appropriations not only for the Commission, but also for other
immigration-related agencies. I will then turn to our plans for this fiscal year and our request for next year's
appropriations.
The Commission's 1994 report to Congress was entitled U.S. Immigration Policy: Restoring Credibility. The title is
telling of our recommendations. The Commission believes it is essential to control illegal immigration if we are to have
a credible immigration policy. We believe legal immigration is in the national interest, but see illegal immigration as a
threat both to our long tradition of immigration and to our commitment to the rule of law.
The Commission recommends a comprehensive, seven-point strategy to restore credibility. Let me tell you that the
strategy is neither cheap nor painless. There are no quick fixes to our immigration problems; there are no inexpensive
solutions. For too long we have neglected immigration as a public policy issue and now must pay for the consequences.
Four points in our report call for special attention. First, we need improved border management. The Commission calls
for a strategy of prevention of illegal entry and facilitation of legal ones in the national interest. The concept is simpler,
of course, than its achievement. The Commission was highly impressed with the border operations in El Paso that aim to
prevent illegal entry. It is far better to deter illegal immigration than to play the cat and mouse game that results from
apprehensions followed by return followed by re-entry. To accomplish a true deterrence strategy will require additional
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personnel as well as a strategic use of technology and equipment. We will also require new measures of effectiveness
because apprehensions alone cannot measure success in preventing illegal entries. Our goal should be zero
apprehensions-not because aliens get past the Border Patrol but because they are prevented entry in the first place.
While we tighten our control over illegal entry, we must also reduce the long waiting times at our ports of entry. It is
ridiculous that people with legitimate border crossing cards feel it is more convenient to cross illegally than go through
our ports of entry. But that is the case. Our own delegation waited for one and one-half hours to cross from Juarez into
El Paso-and this wasn't even at rush hour. In an age of NAFTA, we must do a better job of handling the legitimate
border travel. The Commission supports the development of a land border user fee whose resources would be used to
open more lanes, add more inspectors and, if necessary, more ports of entry to speed this traffic.
Our second set of recommendations would reduce the magnet that jobs currently present for illegal immigration. We
have concluded that illegal immigrants come primarily for employment. The Commission believes that we need to
enhance our enforcement of both employer sanctions and labor standards. But, to make employer sanctions work, we
must improve the means by which employers verify the work authorization of new employees. The Commission
believes the most promising option is a computerized system for determining if a social security number is valid and has
been issued to someone authorized to work in the United States. We are pleased that the Administration has endorsed
our recommendations in this area, and we look forward to working with INS and the Social Security Administration on
the design of pilot programs that will phase in and test this new verification approach. I urge this committee to provide
the funding needed to develop the computerized system and implement the pilot programs.
Third, the Commission urges greater consistency in our immigration and benefits policies. We believe that illegal aliens
should be eligible for no public benefits other than those of an emergency nature, in the public health and safety interest,
and constitutionally protected. On the other hand, we urge the Congress to retain for legal immigrants eligibility for our
safety net programs. The United States screens legal immigrants to determine if they will become public charges, but
unforeseen circumstances-deaths, illnesses-occur. The Commission does not want to see individuals whom we have
invited to enter become vulnerable when such situations arise. On the other hand, the Commission strongly supports
efforts to make our public charge provisions work. We do not want the U.S. taxpayer to bear a burden when there is a
sponsor in this country who has pledged to provide support for an immigrant. The affidavits of support signed by
sponsors should be legally binding, and the provisions for deportation of those who do become a public charge-for
reasons known prior to entry-should be strengthened.
The Commission also made recommendations regarding impact aid for states and localities experiencing the fiscal
effects of illegal immigration. We believe the federal government has a responsibility in this area. The first
responsibility is to control illegal entries; the second is to help states and localities with their fiscal problems. However,
we are skeptical of some of the data used to calculate these fiscal impacts. At present, the Commission believes that the
data to support reimbursement of criminal justice costs are sound and we urge immediate reimbursement of these costs.
We are not prepared to make such a recommendation regarding medical and education costs. We also urge that any
impact aid provided require appropriate cooperation by states and localities in the enforcement of immigration policy.
Our fourth area concerns the removal of criminal aliens. The Commission supports enhancement of the Institutional
Hearing Program that permits the federal government to obtain a deportation order while criminal aliens are still serving
their sentences. Once the sentence is over, it is far easier and less expensive to remove the alien after an IHP proceeding.
The Commission also recommends further negotiation of bilateral treaties that will permit deportation of criminal aliens
to serve their sentences in their home countries.
The Commission has provided copies of our full report to the committee so I will not go into details on the other
recommendations. Let me turn my attention to this year's work. The Commission is currently at work on three reports
while engaging in research needed to answer the longer-term questions in our legislative mandate. Our budget
justification spells out these reports in some detail so let me emphasize our work in only one of these areas: legal
immigration.
At the request of the House and Senate Judiciary Committees, the Commission has accelerated its examination of the
legal immigration system in order to make recommendations by June 1. Last week, we spent a day of Executive Session
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debating basic principles to underlie our legal immigration policies. We discussed the national interest in family
reunification, employment-based immigration, and diversity, refugee, and humanitarian admissions and we set out the
objectives that each of us wants from legal immigration. During the next two months, we turn our attention to the
numbers and criteria for admission that fulfill these objectives, the procedures we use to determine the admissibility of
individuals applying for permanent and temporary admission, and other similar issues.
We are also looking at naturalization and the civic integration of newcomers to the United States. I, for one, would like
to see all eligible immigrants become U.S. citizens-and become citizens for the right reasons, not to receive some
federal benefit but to be fully participating members of our polity. Right now, there are too many barriers to
naturalization. In some districts, it can take two years to complete the process. We plan to have recommendations to
improve this situation.
Now, for FY 1996. We have requested an increase in appropriations for next fiscal year because we see a significant
increase in our work. We expect and support major administrative and legislative action this year on immigration
reform. The Commission feels an obligation to monitor the implementation of these initiatives so that we can give an
independent assessment to the Congress of their effectiveness in reducing illegal immigration.
In addition to these assessments, the Commission will also turn its attention to structural issues in the implementation of
U.S. immigration policy. Having made interim recommendations on improvements we urge regarding both legal and
illegal immigration, the Commission will examine the adequacy of the structures we have in place to implement such
policy. In our 1994 report, we already raised a number of questions regarding implementation and coordination of
policy. For example, we have concerns about our border management apparatus, the coordination between the INS and
the Department of Labor in worksite investigations, and the infrastructure to support effective enforcement and service
delivery. These and other similar issues will be the focus of our attention in the next fiscal year. The Commission also
will continue its assessment of the labor market, fiscal, social, and demographic impacts of immigration, as required by
our statutory mandate. We already have begun two major, two-year research initiatives that will provide cutting-edge
information on these issues. One is an expert panel at the National Academy of Sciences to assess the literature on the
demographic, labor market, and fiscal effects of immigration, to undertake new research to fill gaps in current
understanding, and to report to the Commission on their conclusions regarding the short-term and long-term
implications of immigration for U.S. society. The second is a binational study with Mexico that should provide new
information on the scale, characteristics, and impact of the largest single source of both legal and illegal immigration to
this country. This binational study will permit data collection in both countries, providing answers to questions that
cannot be examined adequately with data from the U.S. alone.
I thank you again for this opportunity to discuss the work and recommendations of the Commission on Immigration
Reform. I also want to state for the record our commitment to work with this Committee as you address the very
challenging issues arising in the appropriation of funds to improve implementation of immigration policy. We are the
creation of Congress and offer ourselves as a resource to help you in your work. Dr. Martin and I would be pleased to
answer questions.
Last update August 15, 1996
Testimony of Barbara Jordan
033095.html[6/13/17, 3:07:57 PM]
Testimony of Barbara Jordan
Chair, U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform
Before the U.S. House of Representatives
Committee on the Judiciary
Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims
March 30, 1995
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, on behalf of my fellow members of the U.S. Commission on
Immigration Reform, I want to thank you for this opportunity to testify. This bipartisan Commission recognizes and
deeply appreciates the support which we have received from Congress, and this Subcommittee in particular.
In our first report to Congress last fall, U.S. Immigration Policy: Restoring Credibility, we sought to recommend a
comprehensive strategy. We chose to focus much of that report on measures to control illegal immigration because
growing frustration about it undermines our first commitment to legal immigration in the national interest.
Let me sum up the Commission's reasons for proposing that we develop a better system for worksite verification.
Reducing the employment magnet is the linchpin of a comprehensive strategy to reduce illegal immigration. Illegal
aliens are here for jobs. That is the attraction. So the only effective way to deter illegal immigration must include the
worksite.
A better system for verifying work authorization is central to the effective enforcement of employer sanctions. The
current system of verification is doubly flawed: it is too susceptible to fraud, particularly through the counterfeiting of
documents; and it can lead to increased discrimination against foreign-looking and foreign-sounding authorized
workers.
IRCA stipulates that all employers are required to verify all employees' identity and authorization to work. Employers
are responsible for examining documentation establishing identity and employment eligibility and ensuring that the
documents presented reasonably "appear" to be genuine and relate to the individual. This information is documented on
the Employment Eligibility Verification Form [I-9 Form]. Under these verification provisions, employees can use a
combination of more than twenty-nine different documents to prove identity and work eligibility.
The current process of employment verification has not functioned as the law intended to deter the hiring of
undocumented aliens. The system may be thwarted easily by fraud. Widespread counterfeiting of documents that can be
used for verification of identity and employment authorization has been reported since IRCA's implementation.
Moreover, it is relatively easy to obtain genuine documents, such as birth certificates or drivers licenses, by fraudulent
means. The ease of obtaining fraudulent employment eligibility documents has resulted in their increased use to satisfy
I-9 requirements. The General Accounting Office [GAO] documented that 39 percent of unauthorized workers
identified by INS investigators during a six-month period in 1987-1988 used proven or suspected counterfeit
documentation to obtain employment. Other studies confirm similar levels of fraud. Because numerous documents-
many of which may be unfamiliar to any given employer-may be shown to verify employment authorization, employers
may have difficulty in determining if these documents meet the verification test, that is, that they "reasonably appear on
their face to be genuine and to relate to the person presenting them."
Employer sanctions also have created problems for employees, who, if they are foreign-looking or foreign-sounding,
may find themselves subject to unfair immigration-related employment practices. A number of government and private
studies, including the Congressionally-mandated GAO study of discrimination, have documented practices that put a
greater burden on foreign-sounding and foreignlooking applicants for employment. These include employer demands
that such employees provide additional or different documentation, or that employers selectively use Form I-9 for
presumed aliens but not for U.S. citizens.
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Although it remains a matter of controversy whether these practices represent widespread discrimination caused by
IRCA, the evidence appears consistent that even some well-meaning employers are confused by the requirements under
IRCA and, as a result, violate the terms of the law. While the completion of a Form I-9 is a good faith defense against
allegations of knowing hire of illegal aliens, in some cases, employers may be found to have constructive knowledge of
the illegal status of their worker if they do not follow up on anomalies uncovered in the I-9 process. If they press for
additional documentation because they think they have reason to believe an employee is an unauthorized worker (for
example, the document does not appear to be the same as the one reproduced in the INS Handbook) and their reasoning
is faulty, they may violate the antidiscrimination provisions of IRCA.
In explaining their concerns about the current verification process, employers also cite what they consider to be
excessive administrative and paperwork requirements. As a recent addition to tax records and other compliance and
recordkeeping requirements, the I-9 is seen by employers as one more paperwork burden. Oftentimes employers
photocopy all documents presented to satisfy the I-9 process as evidence to avoid a knowing hire challenge-a formidable
increase to their paperwork volume. Further, the technical complexity of the requirement places significant demands on
the employer in the form of compliance instructions, training of staff, and contact time with candidates for employment.
The sheer number of documents available for use in verification presents challenges for effective implementation of
employer sanctions. Some efforts are underway to correct this situation. INS has proposed regulatory changes that
would reduce the number of documents to be used for verifying work authorization for aliens. In addition, voter
registration cards will be eliminated from the list as they generally do not contain a photograph needed to verify
identity. The Commission believes that these efforts will not solve the problems inherent in the current verification
process for several reasons. Reducing the long list of documents by a few documents would still leave too many
documents for effective verification; it also would be unlikely to reassure employers sufficiently about the security of
the system and may even add to employer confusion and lead to a potential increase in differential treatment.
Counterfeiting or the fraudulent use of documents still would continue.
The Commission reviewed options that would reduce the number of acceptable documents even more stringently. The
proposals that all aliens use an INS-issued document and all citizens present one of a limited number of documents,
such as a passport, birth certificate, social security card, and/or driver's license, still contain a basic flaw: the employee
would still have to self-identify as an alien or citizen. Such proposals would continue to permit considerable amounts of
fraud if illegal aliens declare themselves to be citizens and present counterfeited documents. They potentially also would
permit perpetuation or increase of current levels of differential treatment if employers question whether foreign-looking
or -sounding citizens are citizens and require an INS-issued document.
Recognizing the problems inherent in strategies to reduce documentation but not to change the overall system of
verification, the Commission set a number of criteria by which it measured the potential impacts of more comprehensive
reform.
First, a new system would have to be potentially more reliable and less susceptible to unfair immigration- related
employment practices than the present one. Any solution would have to take into account that most documents now can
be counterfeited within a relatively short time and for a cost that would be recoverable from the sale of the counterfeit
documents. Employers generally do not have sufficient expertise to recognize counterfeit documents and, therefore,
require a simple, effective means of validating the information presented by new workers. Moreover, the new system
would need to apply not only to aliens, but also to U.S. citizens; otherwise, problems of fraud could continue (illegal
aliens could claim to be U.S. citizens) and/or unfair immigration-related employment practices may increase (employers
could set different documentation standards for all foreign-looking and -sounding individuals).
Second, the new system would have to meet civil liberties and privacy standards. The new verification process should
provide protection against use of the system for purposes other than those specified in law. The verification system
should protect the privacy of the information to be used in verifying work authorization.
Third, the system would have to lessen the time, resources, and paperwork spent by employers in verifying work
authorization. The Commission is persuaded that the current I-9 process requires excessive commitment of time and
resources because of the complexity of the verification process. Any new system should be simple to use and require as
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little paperwork as possible for employers. It also should be simple in overall design, so that enforcement may focus on
substantive violations and not become preoccupied with paperwork violations rather than knowing hire of unauthorized
workers.
Fourth, the new system would have to be as cost-effective as possible. Given that illegal aliens represent at most a very
small portion of the total U.S. labor force, the Commission does not think it appropriate to recommend strategies with
costs out of proportion to the problem to be solved. To improve verification without undue costs is possible, we believe,
if a new verification system builds to the extent possible on the existing responsibilities, capabilities, and data systems
of federal agencies rather than if it were to create new mechanisms that would be used only for verification of
immigration-related work authorization.
Fifth, more effective verification likely would require a companion initiative for improvements in the integrity of the
underlying or "breeder documents" (such as birth certificates) used to establish identity in this country. Birth certificates
are easily counterfeited or easily obtained through counterfeit means. Since counterfeiting operations have become
multimillion dollar businesses, meaningful penalties would be needed to deter the counterfeiting of documents. New
enforcement measures, commensurate with the scale of these operations, are needed to identify and destroy the
counterfeiting rings.
The Commission believes that the most promising option for secure, nondiscriminatory verification is a computerized
registry using data provided by the Social Security Administration [SSA] and the Immigration and Naturalization
Service [INS].
Having assessed dozens of options for verification of work authorization, the Commission believes that the proposed
computerized registry best meets the criteria described above. As envisioned by the Commission, the computerized
registry would be used to verify that a social security number is valid and has been issued to the individual who is being
hired. This database would be created and updated from SSA and INS files, but not connected to either. From SSA
would come a limited set of data: name; social security number; and several other identifiers, such as date of birth and
mother's maiden name. From INS would come information about the immigration status of lawfully-admitted
immigrants, nonimmigrants, and other aliens permitted to remain temporarily or permanently in the United States. The
INS data would also contain information about the duration of work authorization for aliens granted temporary
employment permits.
The Commission believes the key to this process is the social security number. For decades, all workers have been
required to provide employers with their social security number. The computerized registry would add only one step to
this existing requirement: an employer check that the social security number is valid and has been issued to someone
authorized to work in the United States.
Most citizens obtain a social security number before age eighteen, and the majority obtain it immediately after birth
because it is required if a parent requests a tax exemption for a child. SSA has programs with all but four states to issue
social security numbers at birth to U.S. citizens. According to SSA, among the forty-six states that participate in the
Enumeration at Birth system, 85 percent of the parents of newborns elect to participate.
SSA already has taken steps to make it more difficult for unauthorized aliens to obtain social security numbers by
requiring any individual over age eighteen who requests a social security number to have a face-to-face interview. SSA
checks immigration status before issuing the social security card to anyone who did not receive a social security number
as a child because they immigrated to this country. SSA also keeps information that designates whether the alien has full
work authorization or is temporarily authorized to work with permission of INS. SSA will give social security numbers
to individuals not authorized to work if needed to open up bank accounts or for other reasons not related to work, but the
social security cards issued to these individuals clearly state that they are ineligible for employment.
Under the proposed verification system, the employer would not ask individuals if they are citizens or aliens. Instead,
the individuals would be asked for a name and social security number. This information could then be verified with the
computerized registry. The employer would be given a confirmation number if the information given by the employee
matches the database information. This verification number would be kept by the employer and could be used as an
affirmative defense if the employer is accused of knowingly hiring an illegal alien. If, for any reason, a match is not
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found within the system, the employer would receive acknowledgement that the verification process was carried out but
that, as confirmation could not be made within the system, the employee should check with the local social security
office to correct the problem. It would not be necessary-or possible-for the inquiry to give to the employer information
about the reason why a match was not effected.
Also under this approach, in situations where the worker has temporary authorization to work, the employer could be
told the individual has work authorization but to reverify as of a particular date when the eligibility expires. By the time
of reverification, the information would be updated to include the individual's current employment eligibility status. The
computer registry also could verify that an alien granted authorization to work for a specific employer, for example,
under certain nonimmigrant visas, did not obtain employment elsewhere. Some of the costs of the new system may be
offset by savings if the computer system allows extension of work eligibility to be done through updating of the
database rather than through issuance of a new INS employment authorization document [EAD].
The Commission believes a computerized registry based on the social security number is the most promising option for
verification because it holds great potential for accomplishing the following:
Reduction in the potential for fraud. Using a computerized registry rather than only an identification card
guards against counterfeiting of documents. It provides more reliable information about work authorization.
Reduction in the potential for discrimination based on national origin and citizenship status, as well as
inappropriate demands for specific or additional documents, given that employers will not be required to ascertain
whether a worker is a citizen or an immigrant and will have no reason to reject documents believed to be
counterfeit. The only relevant question will be: "What is your social security number?"
Reduction in the time, resources, and paperwork spent by employers in complying with the Immigration
Reform and Control Act of 1986 and corresponding redirection of enforcement activities from paperwork
violations to knowing hire of unauthorized workers. Through use of this system, employer confusion will be
greatly reduced as employers will not need to rely on faulty documents.
The Commission recommends that the President immediately initiate and evaluate pilot programs using the proposed
computerized verification system in the five states with the highest levels of illegal immigration as well as several less
affected states. We are pleased that the President's immigration initiative and FY 1996 budget includes funding to begin
the pilot programs.
A pilot program will: permit the testing of various approaches to using the proposed verification system; provide needed
information about the advantages, disadvantages, and costs of the various approaches; develop and evaluate measures to
protect civil rights and civil liberties; and ensure that any potential obstacles, such as the quality of the data used in the
registry, are addressed prior to national implementation. Assuming the results are positive, Congress should pass the
necessary statutory authorities to support more effective verification.
The Commission recommends that these projects be undertaken in the high impact states because that is where the bulk
of the illegal alien problem is. We did not recommend that the pilots be undertaken throughout all of the five states
immediately. Pilot projects should start small. At each step, we should have results to determine what to do next.
The pilot program should incorporate a number of features:
A means by which employers will access the verification system to validate the accuracy of information given
by workers. We have received conflicting testimony about the best way to check the applicant's identity. We
have heard proposals for a more secure social security card, a counterfeit-resistant driver's license, and a
telephone verification system that does not rely on any document. Several different options could be tested
simultaneously in different states. The pilot program presents an opportunity to determine the most cost-effective,
fraud-resistant, and nondiscriminatory method available.
Counterfeit-resistant driver's license or state-issued identification documents. An almost universal identification
document is the driver's license or identity document issued by Departments of Motor Vehicles [DMVs]. These
documents are obtained in most states with a birth certificate, social security number, driver's license from another
state, or other documents. During the past few years, there has been significant progress in increasing the security
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of these documents, pointing to further improvements that could be made. In the issuance of drivers' licenses,
states are typically using secure paperstock, lamination, and other security features with a four to five year cycle
for license replacement. Several states are issuing licenses made of hard plastic with a magnetic stripe. Alteration
of the card is difficult and an operation for mass producing of replicates would be very expensive. The use of a
smart-card chip and a biometrics identifier on the license is currently being explored through the Department of
Transportation. Digital imaging, a new technology currently used for Virginia drivers' licenses, allows for
automated capture, display, and comparison of current and previously recorded signatures and photographs.
Employers would not be required to assess the validity of the drivers' licenses, however. The computer registry
would tell an employer if the name and social security number on a license are valid. In this way, even a very
good counterfeit would not pass muster.
Social security cards. Existing social security cards cannot serve as effective identifiers of the holders of those
cards. While currently issued cards are more resistant to counterfeiting than earlier versions, many easily
counterfeited cards remain in circulation. There are forty-four versions (twenty-six original and eighteen
replacement) of the social security card. As of June 1993, 63 percent of the total number of active card holders
had been issued the new counterfeit-resistant card, still leaving a substantial number of valid older documents in
use. (There is no way of knowing how many counterfeit cards are currently in use or how many illegal aliens may
have obtained valid social security numbers through fraudulent means.) Even the new cards have problems as
identifiers; these cards do not have any identifying information other than the individual's name. A number of
proposals have been put forth in Congress and elsewhere for the development and reissuance of a more
counterfeit- resistant social security card. Even apart from the immigration-related reasons for a more secure
social security card, arguments in favor of reissuance point to the need for greater integrity in the social security
system itself. Critics of these proposals point out the cost and inconvenience to the public of a requirement for
reissuance of the social security card. Further, if a photograph is used on the new issuance, it will be necessary for
cards to be reissued periodically. SSA estimates the initial cost would be in the range of $2.5 billion. The pilot
program would provide an opportunity to determine the cost-effectiveness of proposals to reissue the social
security card.
Telephone verification. Some experts testified that a stand-alone telephone verification system could work to
verify identity if workers are asked for information that they alone know. Many credit card and bank companies
use a Personal Identification Number [PIN] to verify identity. Under this proposal, employers would enter
individuals' social security numbers and workers would enter a PIN that only they knew. Alternatively, or in
conjunction with the PIN, employees could provide a set of identifying information: for example, name, social
security number, mother's maiden name, and date of birth. The pilot would test whether a telephone verification
process that requires no documentation affords sufficient protections against fraud and discrimination.
Experts note that under any of these systems, the computer system could have a built-in process for logging and
auditing inquiries to identify likely fraud. For example, if the same social security number was used too often or
in too many locations, the computer system would record the incidence. The system then could inform the
employer that the employee must reconfirm the information in the database. The authorized worker would benefit
from learning that others were using his or her social security number. The social security number might then be
canceled and the authorized worker issued a new number. The unauthorized worker could not reconfirm the
information and, therefore, would not be able to continue in that employment. The process would also permit
estimates of likely fraud to use in determining the efficacy of the verification system.
Measures to ensure the accuracy of and access to the specific data needed to ensure that employers have
timely and reliable information when seeking verification of work authorization. Improvements to the Social
Security Administration and INS databases must be made to ensure that these data are available. Both the INS and
SSA are already improving their data systems.
Both houses of Congress already have earmarked funds in the INS FY 1995 appropriation to enable the agency to
undertake such needed reforms. INS currently is completing the process of combining several databases into one
integrated system. Nonimmigrant and refugee data are now integrated into the Alien Status Verification Index
[ASVI] database, that is used in the benefits verification process, the System for Alien Verification of Eligibility
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[SAVE], and the Telephone Verification System [TVS] pilot for employment eligibility verification. In FY 1995,
the INS information systems division will almost double its budget, from $110 million to $200 million, to
improve the infrastructure of the data systems.
The Commission welcomes these steps and encourages INS and SSA to take seriously their responsibility to have
accurate, accessible data fully protective of privacy. Even with these improvements in the source data for the
computerized registry, procedures must be developed to ensure timely and accurate extraction as well as updating
and correcting the needed data. The Commission encourages INS and SSA to cooperate in this endeavor as the
proposed registry would be built upon and-once implemented-would support the primary missions of both those
agencies. Each agency has a vested interest in ensuring that its data are accurate, even apart from their common
interest in ensuring that unauthorized workers do not obtain jobs. It is unacceptable that neither agency's records
currently can provide needed information quickly. Resources requested and used for employment and benefit
authorization purposes can be seen largely as enhancing or parallel to the resource needs of the larger mission of
these agencies.
Measures to ensure against discrimination and disparate treatment of foreign-looking or -sounding persons. The
Commission believes that the least discriminatory system would have the same requirements for citizens and
aliens alike. To reduce the potential for discrimination and increase the security of the system, the Commission
also believes that employers should not be required to ascertain immigration status in the process of verifying
authorization for employment. Their only requirement should be to check the social security number presented by
the employee against the registry and record an authorization number to demonstrate that they have done so.
Measures to protect civil liberties. It is essential that explicit protections be devised against use of the database-
and any card or any other means used to gain access to it-for purposes other than those specified in law. The uses
to be made of the verification system must be specified clearly. We believe the worksite verification system could
be used, without damage to civil liberties, for verifying eligibility to receive public benefits. However, it should
be stipulated that no one should be required to carry a card, if one is used, or to present it for routine identification
purposes. Also, there should be penalties for inappropriate use of the verification process. Putting these provisions
in law, rather than regulation, would make it more difficult to change them later in a manner that would evade
protection of civil liberties.
Measures to protect the privacy of the information included in the database. The Commission is aware of the
proliferation of databases and the potential for the invasion of privacy by both government and private agencies.
The computer registry recommended by the Commission will be drawn from an existing national database, the
Social Security Administration computer system. Given the scope of the registry, it is essential to build in explicit
provisions for protecting privacy. As with other aspects of our recommendations related to civil liberties, these
safeguards should be made by law, not just regulation. The resultant computer system should incorporate
appropriate technical safeguards regarding authorized users' access to individual information. In establishing
privacy safeguards, it is important to take into account that, while access to any one piece of information may not
be intrusive, in combination with other information such access may violate privacy. In particular, safeguards
must ensure that information about specific individuals-other than the limited information to be provided as a part
of the verification process itself-cannot be obtained from the database. To create a viable system, institutions and
individuals with expertise in privacy matters should be involved in the development and assessment of the pilots.
For example, the Computer System Security and Privacy Advisory Board created by the Computer Security Act
of 1987 to identify and advise on security and privacy safeguard issues relating to federal computer systems
should be involved in this process.
Estimates of the start-up time and financial and other costs of developing, implementing, and maintaining a
national system in such a manner that verification is reliable. The establishment of the proposed computer registry
is the top priority during the pilot process and the key to the effectiveness of the process. While the record
structure is simple, ensuring the quality of the source data is essential. Updating the information in a timely way is
another basic, but very important, requirement. The database would contain only one-half dozen data elements
(name, social security number, date of birth, place of birth, mother's maiden name, immigration status code, for
example), and therefore would be quite straightforward from a programming viewpoint. However, ensuring that
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these elements are complete and correct for all records will require significant start-up costs in making the
necessary improvements to existing databases, particularly for INS.
Informal estimates by the Social Security Administration indicate that the cost of design and development of the
combined SSA/INS database is $4 million over a two-year period. Annual cost of maintaining and operating the
verification system is estimated at about $32 million. This figure maintains the computer registry itself, the costs
of operating the automated system for checking social security numbers against it, operator costs for calls that
cannot be handled automatically, and telephone lines for an 800-number to be used by employers.
Correcting errors in the INS and SSA databases will require the largest financial input. Discrepancies referred to
SSA for resolution will cost approximately $122 million initially with an annual cost of $30 million. The cost of
resolving discrepancies in the INS database will be additional. INS is already taking steps to improve its
recordkeeping, but under the current plan, these improvements will take several years to accomplish. Additional
appropriations will be needed to speed that process and ensure that accurate information will be available in a
timely manner. Correcting discrepancies in the existing SSA and INS databases would be good investments, even
if the computer registry were not at issue.
Specification of the rights, responsibilities, and impact on individual workers and employers. The pilot
program will need to determine a number of important issues related to the rights, responsibilities, and impact
upon the users of the verification system. These include, for example, what individuals must do, how long it will
take for newly authorized workers to get on the system and to correct inaccurate data, and what will be required of
employers and at what expense.
Provisions also must be developed to protect both workers from denial of employment and employers from
penalties in cases where the information provided by the computer registry may be missing or inaccurate.
Even with major improvements in the reliability of the data, the pilot programs will require mechanisms for
timely manual secondary verification and an appeal when there is no match. Experience with existing databases,
such as SAVE, indicate a sufficiently high error rate to merit further review. If the error rate is too high, the result
may be discrimination against employees who come up as false negatives. To deter such discrimination,
employers could be required to retain in employment those individuals until the employment authorization is
confirmed (as in the current law, verification is a post-hire process). The current pilot project on telephone
verification [TVS] has this provision.
A plan for phasing in of the system. The Commission recognizes that the proposed verification system will
result in financial costs. The system should be phased in to lessen the immediate fiscal impact. The pilot programs
should test various phase-in procedures. Given the required levels of accuracy, reliability, and convenience
required, the evaluation should help measure the cost of phasing in the system nationally.
The Commission recommends evaluation of the pilot programs to assess the effectiveness of the verification system.
The evaluation should include objective measures and procedures to determine whether current problems related to
fraud, discrimination, and excessive paperwork requirements for employers are effectively overcome without imposing
undue costs on the government, employers, or employees. The evaluation should pay particular attention to the
effectiveness of the measures used to protect civil liberties and privacy. In carrying out the various components of the
evaluation, study designs should be capable not only of identifying the degree to which the pilot alternatives achieve
defined goals, but also of identifying why certain outcomes have occurred. In particular, the evaluation should assess the
extent to which any identified strengths and weaknesses in the pilot programs are attributable to the computerized
registry itself and/or the mechanisms used to access it. This information is essential to determining if the computerized
registry should be maintained as a cost-effective mechanism for verification and, if so, what means of access should be
used nationally.
The Commission supports INS efforts to improve its Telephone Verification System/SAVE [TVS/SAVE] database-but
only as an interim measure.
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The improvements are essential for improving the data needed for the new, more effective verification process. The
Commission is aware of the inadequacies of the current INS data that would be used in the proposed system. The
Commission does not endorse the TVS/SAVE program as a long-term solution to the verification problem because use
of TVS/SAVE requires the inadequate mechanism of self attestation by workers as to their citizenship or alienage, thus
making it easy for aliens fraudulently to claim U.S. citizenship. It also imposes requirements on legal immigrants that do
not apply to citizens. Nevertheless, improvements in this database as well as the Social Security Administration
database are essential to the development of a more secure, less potentially discriminatory verification system.
The current Telephone Verification System builds on the ASVI database that was established for the SAVE program.
SAVE was designed for verification of legal status as it pertains to eligibility for federal assistance programs.
The following information is contained in the ASVI database: alien identification number; verification number; last
name; first name; and an employment eligibility statement. The time-consuming aspect of the ASVI database is that
often the system, for any number of reasons (e.g., files are not updated, there is a systems error, or the number provided
is not functioning) cannot provide a response to A-number queries. When this happens the system refers the case for
secondary verification. In FY 1994, (September - July) there was a 17 percent secondary referral rate for the SAVE
system. A study of Phase I of the TVS pilot reported a 28 percent secondary referral rate. INS is already in the process
of improving its system and is working to upgrade the ASVI database and reduce the need for secondary verifications.
The Commission endorses INS initiatives to improve the SAVE/ASVI system as this step is necessary before a more
secure system can be achieved.
Those are the Commission's recommendations on verification of work authorization. They are part of a comprehensive
approach to immigration reform which this Commission proposes. I will be glad to answer any questions.
Last update August 15, 1996
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Thank you for the opportunity to testify today on the work of the Commission on Immigration Reform as it relates to
legal immigration reform. As you know, the Commission is mandated to examine and report on the impact of legal
immigration on the U.S. economy, labor force, social relations, demography, natural resources, foreign policy, and
national security. We have underway a number of research projects designed to provide a systematic analysis of these
effects of immigration policy. In addition, the Commission undertakes site visits, field hearings, and expert
consultations better to inform us of the strengths and weaknesses of U.S. immigration policy.
In the Commission's 1994 report to Congress, we provided a preliminary picture of legal immigration under the
Immigration Act of 1990. The Commission now is considering options to improve legal immigration policies. The
Commissioners plan to complete their deliberations by the end of this month. Barbara Jordan, the Commission's Chair,
instructed me to tell you that she would be pleased to testify as soon thereafter as is convenient for you.
Today, I will present a brief profile of recent legal immigration, based on our 1994 report as updated by more recent
statistics on FY 1994 admissions. I also will describe the process that the Commission has been following in developing
the interim recommendations that will be available in June and touch briefly on the issues that the Commission is
considering.
The legal immigration provisions of the Immigration Act of 1990 [IMMACT, P.L. 101-649] attempted to balance a
number of competing interests by (1) encouraging overall limits on legal immigration through establishment of annual
numerical targets for total immigration, (2) permitting continued reunification of close family members with a
guaranteed minimum for family preference visas if there are increases in the number of immediate relatives of U.S.
citizens seeking entry, (3) meeting present and future labor market needs by increasing the proportion admitted for
employment-based reasons, giving higher priority to the entry of professionals and highly-skilled persons, and retaining
a procedure for helping to ensure that foreign workers do not adversely affect employment opportunities for U.S.
workers, (4) providing greater national origin diversity by offering new opportunities for migration from countries that
have not recently experienced much emigration to the United States, and (5) establishing a timely and more efficient
naturalization process.
IMMACT Effects On Imigration Levels
To accomplish these objectives, Congress significantly revised the INA. A note, however, about the statistics available
to judge its effects: the principal provisions of IMMACT were not implemented until 1992 and immigrant admissions in
1992 were primarily from the pre-IMMACT backlog. Only the 1993 and 1994 admissions are reflective of the new
policies on family and employment-based immigration. The Diversity Program did not go into effect until this fiscal
year. The following analysis, therefore, must be considered preliminary.
Legal Immigration
Immigrants fall into two major categories: those whose numbers are subject to annual statutory limits and those whose
numerical limits can change each year (primarily refugees) or who have no numerical limits at all. Overall admissions of
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legal immigrants averaged about 640,000 annually during the five-year period prior to the implementation of IMMACT.
These numbers include all immigrants, whether admitted within or outside any statutory limits. As the attached Table
shows, overall admissions since IMMACT, just over 800,000 in FY 1992 and about 880,000 in FY 1993, dropped in FY
1994 to 798,394. (These numbers do not include adjustments to permanent resident status of the 2.7 million illegal
aliens legalized under IRCA.)
Statutory Cap
IMMACT established a flexible worldwide level of 700,000 family-based, employment-based, and diversity
immigration visas for FYs 1992-1994. In FY 1995, the worldwide level reduces to 675,000. Separate ceilings were set
for each of these immigrant categories, and, as described below, subceilings were created within each category.
The total admissions under the statutory cap were about 662,000 in FY 1994.
Family-Sponsored Immigration. Concerned that a worldwide limit on family-sponsored immigration had a potential
to disrupt family reunification, Congress established an overall cap that could be pierced if the number of immediate
relatives of U.S. citizens, for whom there are no numerical limits, exceeded expectations. IMMACT established a
minimum floor of 226,000 per year for numerically-limited, family-sponsored preferences to ensure that these visas
would continue to be available. Should the number of unrestricted immediate relatives exceed 239,000 (465,000 less
226,000) in FYs 1992-1994 or 254,000 (480,000 less 226,000) after FY 1994, the family- sponsored cap would be
pierced. Under the flexible cap, the number of spouses, minor children, and parents of U.S. citizens admitted in the
previous year is subtracted from the overall numbers available for family sponsorship, and (as of FY 1994) the number
of unused employment-based visas from the previous year is added to the total. In no event, however, can the remaining
family-based visas be less than 226,000.
The family numbers were less than 500,000 in FY 1994. More specifically, the family numbers are divided as follows:
Immediate Relatives of U.S. Citizens. There are no numerical limits on the admission of the spouses and
minor children of U.S. citizens or the parents of U.S. citizens. The number of immediate relatives entering
in FY 1994 showed a modest decline from previous levels, mostly attributed to a drop in the number of
parents of U.S. citizens who entered. The total number of immediate family was just under 250,000.
Unmarried Adult Children of U.S. Citizens (FB-1). The FB-1 limit is 23,400 visas, plus any unused
numbers from the siblings of U.S. citizens (FB-4) category, a reduction from the previous limit of 54,000
because Congress recognized that this category has always been underutilized (averaging 11,000 in the
second half of the 1980s) and annual increases have been low. In FY 1994, about 13,000 immigrants
entered in this category.
Despite the worldwide low usage, waiting lists for FB-1 visas have existed for certain countries due to per-
country limits, which are prorated among the various preferences. Prior to the implementation of IMMACT,
some 29,000 Filipino applicants were on the waiting list, and those who had applied six years before were
being admitted. Some 52,000 Filipino and 4,000 Mexican applicants now are on the waiting list. Mexicans
who have been waiting for one year and Filipinos who have waited nine years are being admitted. This wait
for unmarried Filipino adult children of U.S. citizens is considerably longer than the current five-year wait
for unmarried adult children of permanent residents. IMMACT has thus exacerbated the backlog, which
will continue to grow, as only 1,600 Filipino applicants will become eligible for admission in this category
annually. While the real wait for new applicants cannot be predicted with certainty due to changing factors
over time, even if the maximum number of Filipinos receive visas every year, it will take more than thirty
years to admit the current 52,000 on the waiting list.
Spouses, Minor Children, and Unmarried Adult Children of Permanent Residents (FB-2A and 2B) and
Legalization Dependents. IMMACT increased the family second preference allotment from 70,200, plus
any unused first preference numbers, to at least 114,200 visas, plus unused FB-1 numbers. In FY 1994,
115,000 immigrants were admitted in FB-2A and 2B. An additional 34,000 spouses and minor children of
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legalization petitioners also entered in FY 1994.
One objective of IMMACT was the reduction in the waiting period for reunifying spouses and children of
permanent residents, particularly those from countries with significant backlogs. Prior to IMMACT,
applicants from most countries were admitted after about two years. For applicants from a few nations, the
waiting period was far longer. The elimination of the per-country limits for a proportion of the FB-2 visas
was adopted with the purpose of reducing the waits for such groups. IMMACT accomplished that goal: it
equalized the FB-2 waiting time for Mexican, Filipino, and Dominican spouses and children with the
worldwide one.
The waiting list for the FB-2 category, however, remains very large and is increasing annually. As of
January 1995, it was some 1.6 million, composed largely, but not exclusively, of the spouses and children
of legalized aliens. Demand for 2A visas for spouses and children of legalized aliens appears to have
peaked, but the relatives of other legal permanent residents are behind them on the waiting list.
Of the FB-2 backlog, more than 1.1 million are in the 2A category, some 850,000 of whom are spouses and
children of legalization immigrants. 2A applicants from all countries who have waited about three years are
being admitted. While the actual 2A wait for new applicants is not known, it would take at least ten years at
the expected FY 1994 usage of 2A visas (about 95,000) to work through the more than one million waiting
applicants. The wait may be reduced if large numbers of those who legalized under IRCA naturalize and
their spouses and minor children enter under the exempt immediate relative category.
The 2B visas are now available for applicants who have been waiting about four and one-half years. The
real wait for a new 2B applicant is estimated at more than fifteen years if the 28,500 limit were reached
each year, unless naturalization rates increase significantly. Should the petitioner become a citizen, the 2B
beneficiaries would be transferred to the first preference category (unmarried sons and daughters of U.S.
citizens), thereby increasing that backlog, particularly for Mexico.
Married Children of U.S. Citizens (FB-3). The annual visa limit was lowered from 27,000 to 23,400 (plus
any unused FB-2 visas) by IMMACT, which was about the average for this category in the latter part of the
1980s. In FY 1994, about 22,000 immigrants entered in this preference.
About 250,000 applicants are waiting for a visa in this category. Prior to IMMACT, visas were available for
applicants who had waited about one year, with the exception of those from Mexico and the Philippines,
where visas were available for those who had waited about eight and nine years, respectively. Visas are
now available for those who have waited about two years from most countries. Those from Mexico and the
Philippines who have waited about eight and eleven years, respectively, now have visas available to them.
Siblings of U.S. Citizens (FB-4). IMMACT essentially maintained the 65,000 visas in this category (adding
any unused FB-3 visas). About 62,000 immigrants were admitted in FY 1994.
There are more than 1.6 million FB-4 registrants. Prior to IMMACT, visas were available for applicants
who had waited nine years from most countries; now they are available for those who have waited ten. The
longest wait is for those from the Philippines: visas were available for those who had waited fourteen years
prior to IMMACT; currently they are available for those who have waited eighteen years. While for certain
nationalities the wait continues to grow in this category, the numbers added each year to the backlog are
decreasing, perhaps due to the very extensive waiting period. Nevertheless, it is estimated that a new
applicant from the Philippines would not reach the top of the list until 43 years after approval of a petition.
Employment-Based Immigration. IMMACT extensively revised the employment-based categories and numbers to
emphasize skill and, for the first time, include immigrant investors. Prior to IMMACT, 54,000 visas were available
annually for occupation-based immigration, not including the special immigrants now admitted under the employment-
based categories. IMMACT allows up to 140,000 employment-based visas to be issued each year to applicants and their
spouses and children.
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Employment-based immigration rose from an annual average of 58,000 in FY 198791 to 147,000 in FY 1993 (the latter
includes unused FY 1992 employment-based numbers) and then fell to 123,000 in FY 1994. These numbers are
deceptive, however, since they includes some 27,000 and 21,000, respectively, who adjusted status under the Chinese
Student Protection Act [CSPA]. The economic recession may have led employers to petition for fewer immigrant
workers than the number possible under the new employment ceilings. Of the 100,000 FY 1994 admissions that actually
involved immigrants coming to work and their dependents, about 42,000 were the principal workers.
The employment-based numbers break down as follows:
Priority Workers (EB-1). Approximately 40,040 visas (plus unused EB-4 and EB-5 visas) are available
annually for priority workers with extraordinary ability in the sciences, arts, education, business, or athletics
and for outstanding professors and researchers and certain multinational executives and managers. Some
21,000 priority workers and their dependents were admitted in FY 1994. Of these, 8,000 were the actual
workers, with a majority of these being multinational executives and managers.
Professionals with Advanced Degrees (EB-2). About 40,040 visas (plus unused EB-1 visas) are available
annually for professionals with advanced degrees or persons of exceptional ability in the sciences, arts, or
business. Some 14,400 EB-2 workers and dependents were admitted in FY 1994; the number of principal
workers was about 6,700. FY 1994 numbers appear to be an accurate reflection of current demand (lower
than in FY 1992-1993), as both the FYs 1992 and 1993 EB-2 figures included a significant number of pre-
IMMACT third preference applicants and their dependents who had been waiting for available visas. Visas
are immediately available for EB-2 workers from all countries. Prior to IMMACT, visas were available for
professionals and highly-skilled immigrants (former third preference) who had waited about one and one-
half years, except for the Philippines, where visas were available for applicants who had waited for sixteen
years.
Skilled Workers, Professionals with Baccalaureate Degrees, and Unskilled Workers (EB-3). About 40,040
visas (plus unused EB-2 visas) are available annually to EB-3 applicants. A maximum of 10,000 of these is
allotted to unskilled workers. "Unskilled" jobs are considered to be those requiring less than two years of
training or experience. Some 77,000 skilled workers, professionals, unskilled workers, and their dependents
were admitted in FY 1994. The 77,000 included about 21,000 Chinese Student Protection Act visas. The
actual number of skilled workers and professionals was about 18,000; unskilled workers numbered some
4,100.
Prior to IMMACT, visas were available for skilled and unskilled workers (former sixth preference) who
had waited about four years, though visas were unavailable at times for applicants from mainland China and
India and were available for applicants from the Philippines who had waited about five years. Visas now
are available for skilled workers from most countries, though backlogs exist for about 5,000 mainland
Chinese and almost 8,000 Filipinos-for Chinese who have waited almost 2 years and for Filipinos who have
waited one year.
The only worldwide wait for employment visas now is for unskilled workers, some 79,000 of whom make
up the waiting list. Unskilled worker visas now are available for those who have waited five and one-half
years, regardless of nationality. Given the large waiting list, if 10,000 unskilled workers were admitted
annually, it would take several years to work through the current list. The waiting list total in this category
dropped by about 15,000 in the past year, perhaps in part because the long wait for a visa discouraged new
applicants.
Special Immigrants (EB-4). IMMACT placed the formerly numerically-exempt category of Special
Immigrants in the numerically-limited employment-based categories. The EB-4 category is a catchall for a
variety of different groups, including ministers of religion, religious workers other than ministers, certain
former U.S. government workers, and certain juvenile court dependents. About 10,400 special immigrants
and dependents were admitted in FY 1994. The actual number of principals was about 4,600.
Investors (EB-5). IMMACT created a new category for employment-creating investors and set the limit at
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9,940 annually, of which 3,000 are reserved for new commercial enterprises in targeted employment areas.
About 600 investors and dependents were admitted in FY 1993 and 444 in FY 1994.
A number of explanations have been offered about why the entry of investors is substantially below the
anticipated level. Some experts believe that U.S. tax laws are largely responsible for the relatively small
show of interest; unlike some other countries, the U.S. taxes all of an investor's worldwide income if an
investor obtains permanent residence. Others have argued that the job-creation requirements of the original
law were unrealistic. In 1992, Congress enacted legislation to create a pilot program designed to take into
account the indirect creation of jobs. The pilot program began October 1, 1993. So far, no one has been
admitted in the EB-4 category under the pilot program. INA provisions offer another reason for low EB-4
admissions: investors enter under a conditional status, and the final rules to remove the conditions were not
issued until April 1994. Investors may have been unwilling to begin a process until they knew the
conditions they must meet to obtain permanent status.
Diversity Immigration (DV-1). The Diversity Immigrant provisions contained in IMMACT aim to increase national
diversity in the immigrant population by widening access to immigration to individuals from underrepresented countries
who have neither family nor job ties to the United States. This permanent diversity program began in October 1994. It
will provide 55,000 visas to nationals of a country that has sent fewer than 50,000 legal immigrants to the United States
over the previous five years. Each applicant must have a high school education or its equivalent or two years of work
experience in an occupation that requires at least two years of training or experience. In FY 1995, the numbers are to be
apportioned as follows: 20,200 to Africa; 6,850 to Asia; 24,550 to Europe; 8 to North America; 2,600 to South America;
and 800 to Oceania. No single country may receive more than 7 percent (3,850) of the numbers available worldwide.
As a transition toward the permanent program, Congress allocated 40,000 visas in each of three years (FYs 1992-1994)
for persons from countries "adversely affected" by the 1965 Amendments to the INA, which removed national origins as
the principal determinant of U.S. immigration policy. In FY 1994, 41,000 immigrants entered under the transitional
diversity visas.
Immigrants outside the Statutory Cap
As the Table shows, some 136,000 immigrants not subject to a numerical cap were admitted to the U.S. in FY 1994.
Refugees. IMMACT made no changes in the refugee admissions program and the Refugee Act of 1980 continues to
govern. Prior to the beginning of each fiscal year, the President, in consultation with Congress, reviews the worldwide
refugee situation, determines the number of refugees in need of resettlement who are of special humanitarian concern to
the U.S., and establishes the authorized number of admissions for that fiscal year. Such refugees are initially admitted
under conditional status. In FY 1994, 115,000 of these refugees adjusted to permanent residents.
Asylees. The Refugee Act of 1980 established the statutory basis for granting asylum to refugees who present
themselves in the U.S. or at a port of entry, rather than overseas as in the refugee admissions program. There are no
legal limits on the number of individuals who may be granted asylum in the U.S. in a fiscal year. Asylees who have
been in the U.S. for at least one year after being granted asylum are eligible to become permanent residents. Although
asylee adjustments are exempt from the worldwide annual limits, the law places a ceiling on the number of asylees who
may adjust to lawful permanent resident status each year. IMMACT increased the ceiling from 5,000 to 10,000,
including dependents. Some 12,000 asylees and their dependents became permanent residents in FY 1993. This number
included some asylees and their dependents eligible for and awaiting adjustment prior to IMMACT who were permitted
to adjust under the new law without being subject to the annual limit. There is no current wait for asylees adjusting
status, and some 6,000 asylees and their dependents adjusted in FY 1994.
Parolees. Special provisions have allowed for the entry of Indochinese and Soviets who were paroled into the U.S.
between August 15, 1988 and September 30, 1992, after being denied refugee status. These parolees can adjust to
permanent resident status one year after their admission to the U.S. The numbers are variable. About 5,000 parolees
adjusted status in FY 1991, 14,000 in FY 1992, and 16,000 in FY 1993. About 8,000 parolees adjusted in FY 1994.
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Amerasians. Special provisions also have applied in recent years to the entry of Amerasians born in Vietnam between
January 1, 1962 and January 1, 1976 and fathered by a U.S. citizen. Eligible Amerasians are issued permanent resident
visas for entry. Some 11,000 Amerasians were admitted in FY 1993. These numbers include accompanying family
members and guardians. Some 3,000 were admitted in FY 1994.
Other Immigrants. Immigrants can enter under a number of other categories, including categories for Cuban/Haitian
entrants, registered nurses, and individuals granted suspension of deportation. (An alien otherwise deportable is eligible
to adjust status under the discretionary suspension of deportation if that person has been in the U.S. for at least seven
years, is of good moral character, and his deportation would result in extreme hardship.)
Characteristics of Legal Immigrants
IMMACT has not significantly changed the characteristics of the immigrants entering the United States, which is not
surprising given the relatively short period IMMACT has been in effect. The categories of immigration revised or added
by IMMACT accounted for less than 30 percent of the annual number of immigrants admitted in fiscal year 1992
(employment-based preferences-maximum of 140,000; legalization dependents-maximum of 55,000; and the
transitional diversity program-maximum of 40,000). Most immigration continues to be based on family reunification;
thus the new immigrant pool primarily reflects the characteristics of the recent immigrant pool and is not likely to
change in the immediate future.
The Commission is midway through an analysis of the characteristics of immigrants entering in FY 1994. Our
September report provided data on the characteristics of legal immigrants through FY 1993, as gathered by the U.S.
Immigration and Naturalization Service. Data on legal admissions are summarized for those who arrived during the
1980s, the two-year period immediately before IMMACT took effect (FYs 1990-1991), and the two-year period after
IMMACT took effect (FYs 1992-1993). Aliens granted permanent resident status under the provisions of IRCA are
treated separately. Their characteristics are pertinent to understanding future immigration trends because their relatives
account for a large share of the family backlog.
Places of Origin. Asia and North America, principally Mexico, continued to be the two largest source regions of legal
immigrants, with 41.7 and 30.7 percent of the total immigrants admitted during FYs 1992-1993, respectively. The
percentage admitted from these two regions declined slightly from 72.9 in FYs 1990-1991 to 72.4 in 1992-1993. The
increases in the overall limits under IMMACT, however, have allowed for increased numbers of immigrants from all the
regions of the world. North America and, especially Mexico, had the largest average annual increase between the two
two-year periods (68,022 or 36 percent increase), while Oceania had the smallest increase (472 or 11 percent increase).
The countries with the largest increases in the number of immigrants admitted between 1990-1991 and 1992-1993 were
primarily countries that were major sources during the 1980s: Mexico; Mainland China; Vietnam; and the Dominican
Republic. Other countries had large increases, both in terms of numbers and percent: Poland; El Salvador; the United
Kingdom; Ireland; and Japan.
The elimination of the per-country limit for 75 percent of the FB-2A spouses and children of permanent residents
allowed for increased immigration from countries with large backlogs, such as Mexico and the Dominican Republic.
Mexican immigration also increased due to the temporary category added under IMMACT allowing for the immigration
of spouses and children of legalization dependents-nearly three-quarters of all legalization dependents were born in
Mexico and El Salvador.
The country with the largest increase in employment-based immigration was Mainland China, which increased from an
average of 2,585 a year before IMMACT to 24,800 after IMMACT. More than one-half of the increase was due to the
Chinese Student Protection Act, which allowed certain Chinese persons in the United States to adjust status under the
EB-3 category. Other countries with a large average annual increase in employment-based immigration after IMMACT
were: India; the Philippines; Canada; the United Kingdom; and Taiwan. Immigrants from El Salvador, who previously
had been the largest group entering under the old 6th preference, declined an average of 800 over the two, two-year
periods, a decline largely due to the reduction in the number of visas available for unskilled workers.
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Of the 120,000 transitional diversity visas issued in FYs 1992-1994, 40 percent were legislated to go to natives of
Ireland. During the first two years of the program, Ireland accounted for 33.1 percent of the arrivals, second to Poland
with 35.9 percent. The number of Irish immigrants entering the United States did not reach 40 percent because of a lack
of demand. The transitional diversity program was largely responsible for the significant increases in immigration from
these two countries. Other countries accounting for a large number of diversity immigrants during FYs 1992-1993 were
the United Kingdom (8.6 percent) and Japan (8.3).
Age and Gender. The median age of immigrants admitted in FY 1992 and FY 1993 was twenty-eight years, no
different than immigrants admitted in FYs 1990-1991, and only a slight increase (from twenty-seven) for immigrants
admitted during FYs 1982-1989. Even though the median ages did not change significantly between the two-year
periods beginning in 1990 and 1992, the data indicate a long-term trend towards a more even distribution of immigrants
by age. Although the largest number of entering immigrants are typically in their twenties, recently the percentage of
immigrants who enter in their twenties has declined and the percentage of immigrants who enter in their forties and
fifties has increased. It is difficult to draw any conclusions from these data on the impact of IMMACT, as the change
appears to predate IMMACT. IRCA immigrants were much older than other immigrants at their time of adjustment;
however, many have been in the United States for more than ten years and, thus, were younger at the time of their entry.
Nearly 54 percent of the immigrants admitted in FYs 1992 and 1993 were female. By contrast, during the 1980s, men
and women were equally represented. The trend toward more women admitted as legal immigrants began prior to
IMMACT. It is likely to be reinforced, however, by the entry of the family members of aliens legalized under IRCA.
Very high proportions of young adult legalized aliens were men, many of whom already have petitioned for their wives
and children.
Intended Residence. Immigration follows much the same pattern as in the 1980s regarding intended residence.
Approximately 70 percent of the immigrants intend to live in the six states of California (28.7 percent), New York
(17.2), Texas (7.1), Florida (6.5), New Jersey (5.7), and Illinois (4.7). Many immigrants settle in large urban areas; more
than 25 percent intend to live either in New York City or Los Angeles. Other metropolitan areas with significant
immigrant arrivals are Chicago, Miami, Washington, DC, and San Francisco.
The patterns of residence of the IRCA immigrants is different than other legal immigrants. Although the top six states
are the same for IRCA immigrants as for other immigrants, IRCA immigrants are more concentrated. More than 85
percent of IRCA immigrants live in the top six states and more than 50 percent live in California. The family members
of the legalized aliens who immigrate in the future should further increase the proportion of legal immigrants residing in
California and Texas.
Occupation. The increase in the employment-based preference limit from approximately 54,000 in 1991 to 140,000 in
1992 could have the most impact on the occupational characteristics of new immigrants. Beyond increasing overall
admissions, IMMACT reduced the number of unskilled immigrants and their family members from 27,000 to 10,000,
while raising the number of highly-skilled immigrants allowed to enter from 27,000 to approximately 110,000.
The reported occupations of immigrants of working age changed only slightly after IMMACT. (All but about 6 percent
of adult immigrants report an occupation or report that they are homemakers, students, unemployed, or retired. What is
reported may be either their last job in their home country or, if entering under the employment-based preferences or
adjusting in the U.S., the job they are or will be performing in the United States.) The percentage of immigrants who
reported they were professionals or executives increased from 15.0 percent in the two-year period before IMMACT to
17.0 percent after IMMACT. Every other occupation group declined, except for operators, fabricators, and laborers,
which increased from 9.2 to 9.7 percent. The shift in occupational characteristics is consistent for both males and
females.
Issues to Be Considered
The Commission is now engaged in a systematic examination of the effects of legal immigration in order to develop
interim recommendations this year and longer-term recommendations in our final report to Congress. Among the areas
under review are:
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Family Reunification. U.S. immigration policy is based mainly on family reunification. The Commission's mandate
includes an explicit requirement to assess the impact that the establishment of a national level of immigration has upon
the availability and priority of family preference visas, including examination of: the role of family reunification in the
integration of new immigrants into U.S. society; the effects of IMMACT on the numbers of individuals admitted for
family reunification; the effects of IMMACT on the waiting period for family-sponsored preferences; the effects of
different family reunification policies on future demand for visas; the extent to which extended waiting periods for the
admission of spouses and children contribute to unlawful immigration; the priority to be given to the admission of
individuals of different family ties (that is, spouses, minor children, adult children, siblings); and other issues. The
Commission is paying particularly close attention to the effects of legalization on family admissions and backlogs.
Impact on labor needs, employment and other economic conditions in the United States. Both the long and short-
term effects of immigration on the labor market need to be understood in formulating sound policy. The evolving
international context of the U.S. economy must be a part of this analysis along with the U.S. economic restructuring that
has led to more U.S. workers finding different kinds and amounts of employment in service-as opposed to
manufacturing-industries. More specifically, the Commission is examining: the characteristics of immigrants and
nonimmigrants (hereinafter "migrants") entering the U.S. under different categories as they relate to U.S. labor market
considerations-education, skill level, occupation, employment experience, etc.; having entered, their labor force
participation rate, employment, wages/income and job mobility experience by different categories of immigration; the
impact of migrants in different categories on the labor force participation rate, employment, and earnings of domestic
workers (by race, ethnicity, citizenship); the impact of migrants in different categories on the working conditions and
benefits of domestic workers; the effects of migrants on specific industries; the extent to which migrants admitted under
different employment-based provisions continue to work in the jobs for which they were admitted or in jobs in similar
occupations or industries; the type and impact of entrepreneurial activities in which migrants engage; and the impact of
various immigrant categories on the generation of jobs for U.S. workers.
The Commission has sought preliminary data on these issues for our interim report. For our final report, we have
contracted with the National Academy of Sciences to form an expert panel that will include labor economists,
sociologists, demographers, and others concerned with changing labor force and economic effects of immigration.
Social and Civic Incorporation. Immigrants historically have brought to the United States different cultural, religious,
and political backgrounds. Over the last few decades, our new immigrant population has shifted from predominantly
European to largely Asian and Latin American. Unlike earlier periods of immigration, admissions are not dominated by
a small number of countries. At the turn of the century, the top five source countries accounted for 75 percent of new
legal arrivals. During the 1990s, the top fifteen countries account for fewer than 70 percent. These top sending countries
include such diverse nations (in terms of economic status, political systems, religious backgrounds, and racial makeup)
as Mexico, China, Philippines, Vietnam, the former Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom. The Commission inquires
about the effects of our immigrant population on social and community relations, as well as the effects of American life
on immigrants. Further the Commission is looking at the civic integration of immigrants, including participation in
local, state, and national political affairs, development of political constituencies, and other manifestations of civic
involvement. The Commission plans to issue recommendations on naturalization as part of its interim report in June.
Refugee and Humanitarian Issues. There are well over 20 million refugees and at least another 25 million internally-
displaced people who have fled from violence and persecution but have not crossed an international border. The U.S.
plays an important role in refugee affairs as the principal donor to international refugee programs, a principal supporter
of durable solutions to refugee crises, and a major receiver of refugees for resettlement. The Refugee Act of 1980
adopted the international definition of refugees, rejecting the earlier U.S. definition that specified that refugees were
individuals fleeing Communist countries. Yet, refugees from (former) communist countries continue to account for the
vast majority of those admitted to the U.S. as refugees. The Commission is examining questions about: what role
refugee resettlement should play in the post-Cold War era; what factors should replace Cold War criteria in deciding
who should be given priority for resettlement; and what size program makes sense in light of these changing standards
and of the continued numbers of refugees in need of the assistance and protection that the U.S. has traditionally
provided. The Commission is examining these issues in conjunction with its analyses of the U.S. capacity to respond to
migration emergencies headed directly for the United States.
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CIR Activities Related to Legal Immigration Reform
To date, the Commission has held expert consultations on family-based admissions, employment-based admissions,
refugee resettlement and other humanitarian admissions, and the demographic effects of immigration policy. We have
held field hearings and consultations on legal immigration policy in: Chicago, Illinois, with a particular focus on
naturalization; Lowell, Massachusetts, looking especially at the effects of immigration on a small city; New York, New
York, with its heterogeneous immigrant population; Central Texas, with particular focus on immigration in high-tech
industries; and Phoenix, Arizona, with a particular focus on land use and other effects of increased population.
The Commission continues to undertake research aimed at clarifying the effects of legal immigration on U.S. society
and economy. We have testified to you previously that the Commission is not satisfied with the reliability of
immigration data. As noted above, the Commission is working with the National Academy of Sciences to establish an
expert panel that will present its conclusions on the demographic, labor market, fiscal, and other economic effects of
immigration. The panel will include a wide range of expertise not only on the literature directly related to the effects of
immigration, but also on the various areas in which immigration's impact is felt, so that we can get beyond disputes
about data that ought to be matters of fact.
The Commissioners have engaged in extensive discussions about the national interests to be served by immigration, the
extent to which current policies serve these national interests, the extent to which immigration benefits or harms the
already-resident U.S. population, and the advantages and disadvantages of various options to correct problems identified
through this process. As in the Commission's 1994 report to Congress, the aim of this year's recommendations is to
suggest ways that U.S. immigration policy may best meet high standards of credibility in its formulation and its
implementation.
As I stated at the outset of this testimony, Professor Jordan looks forward to sharing the Commission's recommendations
with you next month. In the meantime, I would be pleased to answer questions you may have about the data presented in
our 1994 report or our activities in preparation for our forthcoming recommendations.
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Thank you for providing this opportunity to present the Commission on Immigration Reform's interim recommendations
on legal immigration reform. This Commission was mandated by the Immigration Act of 1990 to examine and make
recommendations regarding the implementation and impact of U.S. immigration policy.
In fulfilling this mandate, the Commission has held public hearings and consultations in Los Angeles, Miami, El Paso,
Chicago, Lowell, New York, Austin, San Juan, and Phoenix. During the site visits, the Commission visited service
agencies, community groups, and others with interest in immigration. We met with university-based researchers in these
areas in order to be better informed of the cutting-edge research available on the local effects of immigration.
The Commissioners also held expert consultations on the national-level labor market impacts of immigration, the
demographic effects, and the fiscal impacts on federal, state, and local programs. In addition, we held public meetings
on the various parts of our legal immigration system, with separate sessions with practitioners familiar with family-
based immigration, employment-based immigration, and refugee admissions. We undertook systematic analysis of the
available research on such topics as the economic and social characteristics of recent immigrants, the impact of
immigration on federal, state, and local benefit programs, the economic adaptation of immigrants, and the demographic
and environmental effects of immigration. The Commission also commissioned research that modeled likely future
demand for immigrant admissions. This research continues in preparation for our final report to Congress in 1997, but
our work to date provides useful perspectives for interim recommendations.
Foremost, the Commission concludes that a properly regulated system of legal immigration is in the national interest of
the United States. Such a system enhances the benefits of immigration while protecting against potential harms.
Immigrants often create new businesses and other employment-generating activities and, in this manner, promote the
renewal of city neighborhoods and commercial districts. Immigrants also can strengthen America's economic and
political ties with other nations and, thereby, enhance our ability to compete in a global economy and provide leadership
in international and humanitarian affairs. Properly regulated immigration further strengthens American scientific,
literary, artistic, and other cultural resources. It promotes family values and ties that are important components of good
schools and strong communities. At a time of troubling ethnic strife in many parts of the world, an effective American
immigration policy can demonstrate to other countries that religious and ethnic diversity are compatible with national
civic unity in a democratic and free society.
Legal immigration, however, has costs, as well as benefits. Immigrants with relatively low education and skills may
compete for jobs and public services with the most vulnerable of Americans, particularly those who are unemployed or
underemployed. Jobs generated by immigrant businesses do not always address this problem. Concentrated and/or rapid
entry of immigrants into a locality may impose immediate net costs, particularly in education, where expenditures are
required to meet the additional and special needs of newcomers. Concentration of new immigrants can exacerbate
tensions among ethnic groups. Certain legal immigrant populations may impose other costs: refugees often have special
needs for health and other services, making resettlement significantly more costly than overseas solutions to refugee
problems; elderly new immigrants are more likely to draw upon public services than elderly native-born Americans or
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immigrants who came to the United States at a younger age.
The Commission supports the basic framework of current immigration policy-family unification, employment-based
immigration, and refugee admissions. We considered alternative frameworks, particularly a point system, but rejected
these approaches. We believe that a system that relies on formulas and bureaucratic procedures for determining which
immigrants meet the formula is not as effective in protecting the national interest as one that relies on the judgment of
American families and employers within a framework that protects U.S. workers from unfair competition.
At the same time, the Commission is convinced that our current immigration system must undergo major reform to
ensure that admissions continue to serve our national interests. Hence, the Commission recommends a significant
redefinition of priorities and a reallocation of existing admission numbers to fulfill more effectively the objectives of our
immigration system.
In developing our recommendations, the Commission was guided by the following principles:
1) Clear goals and priorities must define our immigration policy;
2) Effective policy means enforcement of immigration limits;
3) Regular periodic review is needed to ensure flexibility to adjust to changing circumstances in the United
States;
4) Immigration policy should be comprehensible and its implementation efficient;
5) Sponsors are responsible for ensuring that immigrants do not become burdens on the American taxpayer;
6) Immigration policy must protect U.S. workers against unfair competition from foreign workers, with an
appropriately higher level of protection to the most vulnerable in our society;
7) Both temporary and permanent admissions categories must be seen as integral parts of a cohesive
immigration policy;
8) A sound immigration policy supports Americanization, by which we mean the sharing of such American
values as the belief in liberty, democracy, and equal opportunity;
9) Fundamental immigration reform, as proposed by the Commission, requires a period of transition to get
from the present system to the new one.
Following these principles:
The Commission recommends a tripartite immigration policy that permits the entry of nuclear family members,
professional and skilled workers, and refugees, with additional steps to address the continued aftereffects of the
1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act that provided legal status to formerly illegal aliens. We propose a core
immigration admissions level of 550,000 per year, to be divided as follows:
Nuclear family immigration 400,000
Skill-based immigration 100,000
Refugees 50,000
The Commission further recommends that Congress authorize 150,000 visas annually for the admission of the
spouses and minor children of legal permanent residents who have been awaiting entry until such time that the
backlog is eliminated.
The Commission recommends that admission levels be authorized by Congress for a specified time period (e.g.,
three to five years) in order to ensure regular periodic review and, if needed, change by Congress.
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More specifically, the Commission recommends changes in the components of U.S. immigration policy, including
family-based immigration, skills-based immigration, and refugee resettlement. The Commission also addresses issues
related to Americanization of new immigrants, with a particular focus on naturalization.
Nuclear Family Immigration
Immigration supports the national interest by promoting strong and intact nuclear families-that is, the basic social unit
consisting of parents and their dependent children living in one household. Immigration contributes to this national
interest by permitting the entry of close family members of U.S. citizens and permanent residents who otherwise may be
separated for years. Immigration policy also can contribute to the strength of U.S. families by ensuring that immigrants
receive any needed financial support from their own relatives and, thus, impose no financial burdens upon the taxpaying
public.
The Commission recommends:
A prioritization of family relationships to determine who will be admitted through family-based immigration,
with admission numbers going to those who are of the highest priority. Only to the extent that visas are available
after the demand in higher priorities is met should visas be made available to lower priority categories. Following this
reasoning, the Commission makes further recommendations.
Spouses and minor children of U.S. citizens should continue to be admitted as the first priority. Also to be
admitted under this priority are the small number of adult children dependent on U.S. citizen parents because of a
mental or physical disability. This policy permits the expeditious entry of the closest family members while
reinforcing the notion that citizenship confers additional benefits on those who become fully participating
members of our polity.
Parents of U.S. citizens should be admitted as the second priority. However, the Commission is mindful of the
potential negative impacts that the entry of parents may pose for the U.S. taxpayer if these individuals utilize
Supplemental Security Income, Medicaid, and similar programs. Therefore, the Commission believes that
continued admission of parents should be contingent on a legally-enforceable affidavit of support. The affidavit
should ensure that parents who are unable to work enough quarters to become eligible for Social Security or
Medicare do not become a burden to taxpayers through use of SSI, Medicaid, or equivalent state and local
services. Further, the Commission recommends that affidavit signers (petitioners and/or coguarantors) should
provide: verifiable assurance that they indeed have the capacity to provide what may be a lifetime of financial
support to the parent immigrants; and verifiable assurance of the purchase of what may be lifetime health
coverage for the parent immigrants (obtained either privately or through buying into Medicare, which the
government should make available at an actuarially fair price).
Third priority should be allocated to spouses, minor children, and adult dependent children (as above) of legal
permanent residents [LPRs].
The Commission further recommends sufficient additional numbers, on an interim basis, to eliminate the
backlog in the category for admission of spouses and minor children of LPRs. We believe that this backlog, which
results primarily from the Immigration Reform and Control Act, can be cleared without creating another waiting list. By
the end of this fiscal year, 824,000 spouses and minor children of aliens legalized under IRCA will be waiting for visas.
The number of new applications has fallen to only a handful for this group. However, since the filing of applications by
the legalization beneficiaries, a backlog of 279,000 (or about 80,000 per year) spouses and minor children of other LPRs
has developed. Under our current system, it would take more than a decade to clear the backlog, even with substantial
naturalization. In the meantime, when an LPR sponsors a spouse and/or minor child, that individual goes to the end of
the waiting list of 1.1 million.
Priority for clearance of the backlog should go first to the spouses and minor children of LPRs who themselves entered
lawfully under the regular immigration preferences. Only afterwards should expedited admission be offered to the
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spouses and minor children of LPRs who entered under one of the legalization provisions of the Immigration Reform
and Control Act.
The Commission recommends this separate treatment of the family members of those who became permanent residents
through regular immigration and those who legalized under the IRCA because:
The circumstances are different for the two sets of spouses and minor children. Many of the families of the
immigrants who legalized under IRCA are in the United States and, under the Family Unity provisions of the
Immigration Act of 1990, have a quasi-legal status that permits their continued presence and work authorization.
Many of the families of the other legal immigrants are separated, with their spouses and/or minor child(ren) living
outside of the United States.
As of December 31, 1995, most legalized aliens will be eligible to naturalize. As citizens, they will be able to
expedite the admission of their spouses and minor children without the additional visas earmarked for LPRs.
The legalized already have received special treatment in obtaining amnesty. To further reward their earlier illegal
entry by giving equal or higher priority to the entry of their relatives sends the wrong message at a time in which
the U.S. must obtain greater control over unauthorized entry.
The addition of 150,000 visas will permit the elimination of the regular LPR beneficiary backlog within three years and
the legalization beneficiary backlog in five to eight years. Thereafter, the entry of all spouses and minor children of
LPRs should be possible within a year of application under the proposed 400,000 admissions ceiling on family-based
immigration.
The Commission recommends elimination of other family-based admission categories, including:
Adult, unmarried sons and daughters of U.S. citizens;
Adult, married sons and daughters of U.S. citizens;
Adult unmarried sons and daughters of legal permanent residents, and;
Siblings of U.S. citizens.
The Commission acknowledges that many individuals in these categories have contributed to U.S. society.
Nevertheless, it is necessary at this time to emphasize the reunification of nuclear families. The elimination of these
categories should take place one year after the date that legislation is enacted to accomplish this purpose. In this way,
the plans of U.S. families that are on the verge of reunifying with their foreign siblings and adult children will not be
unfairly disrupted. The Commission recommends elimination of these categories for several reasons.
The numbers now used to admit these individuals in more extended family relationships could be used instead to
reduce the waiting time for closer family members without raising the overall levels of immigration.
Elimination of these preferences will remove extraordinary backlogs that now undermine the credibility of our
policy. Credible immigration policy should not give false hopes to applicants. An individual now applying under
the sibling category, for example, could not expect to enter the U.S. legally for more than a decade.
Unless there is a compelling national interest to do otherwise, immigrants should be chosen on the basis of the
skills they contribute to the U.S. economy. The Commission believes that admission of nuclear family members
and refugees provide such a compelling national interest, even if they are low-skilled. Reunification of adult
children and siblings of adult citizens solely because of their family relationship is not as compelling.
The Commission recommends amendment of Section 201(c) of the Immigration and Naturalization Act [INA] to
provide that otherwise unused immigrant visa numbers for a fiscal year be made available to people who have a
priority date that would entitle them to processing in that year but who were not issued visas. Given the large
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backlog of spouses and minor children, all efforts should be made to ensure their expeditious entry by fully utilizing
authorized visas. Under current policy, visas unused because of administrative delay or personal reasons are lost.
Allowing such unused visas to be made available to otherwise eligible immigrants after the end of that fiscal year
ensures that all the visas allocated for family-sponsored immigrants would be used and charged to the given fiscal year.
The new fiscal year visa numbers would not reflect an increase in visas allocated over the annual worldwide limit for
family-based immigration.
For example, if 400,000 visas were allocated for family-sponsored immigrant in FY 1997, and during that year only
390,000 visas were issued because 10,000 immigrants were delayed beyond the end of the fiscal year, the remaining
10,000 visas could be issued to the delayed or other eligible aliens during the next fiscal year but would count toward
the original year. Under the proposed amendment, the Department of State could charge to FY 1997 all visas allocated
in that year even though the visas themselves might not be issued in FY 1997. As the recommendation affects only
aliens already entitled to a visa, annual number limitations would not be exceeded.
The Commission further recommends that the INA be amended to address better the aging-out problem of
certain aliens. One unfortunate side effect of waiting lists is the aging-out of aliens while awaiting their already
approved petition. This issue, which arises particularly in the case of the minor children of legal permanent residents,
will become even more of a problem with the elimination of admission opportunities for adult children. For example,
the minor child of a legalized alien may have been granted Family Unity status with the understanding that eventually a
visa would be available. Under current law, a child who has aged-out would rarely be deported but is no longer eligible
for permanent residence as a minor child. A provision stating that a person entitled to status at the time a petition is
approved shall continue to be entitled to that status, regardless of his or her age, would allow such applicants to retain
their eligibility for immigrant visas.
Skill-Based Immigration
Immigration can support the national interest by bringing to the U.S. individuals whose skills would benefit our society.
It also can help U.S. businesses compete in the global economy. This national interest in the competitiveness of business
must be balanced by an equally compelling national interest in developing a U.S. workforce that has the skills necessary
to compete in the global economy. Immigration policy can contribute to this national interest by:
Focusing on the admission of highly-skilled individuals;
Giving employers access to a global labor market when they cannot identify U.S. workers with knowledge and
expertise required for a specific job or when they demonstrate a labor shortage that cannot be filled through short-
term training programs;
Helping companies conducting business, both in the United States and internationally, reassign personnel as
needed to maintain their competitiveness;
Encouraging entrepreneurial activities and other investment in the United States aimed at creation of jobs;
Providing a means of ensuring that U.S. workers are not displaced or otherwise adversely affected by the entry of
foreign workers; and
Providing incentives or penalties to help ensure that employers in the U.S. engage in serious recruitment of
American workers (for example, national rather than local recruitment where appropriate) and contribute
significantly to the training of the domestic U.S. workforce.
The Commission recommends that the preferences for the admission of skill-based immigrants be
reorganized to establish two categories: those subject to a labor market test, which we would expect to be
the norm; and those who, for significant and specific policy reasons, should be exempt from such a labor
market test. Labor market-testing requires a demonstration that a business has a bona fide need for the skills of a
foreign worker and cannot find a qualified U.S. worker or one who could be readily trained for the intended job.
Exempt workers should include those individuals whose entry will generate economic growth and who hold no
potential for undermining the employment prospects and remuneration of U.S. workers. The following individuals
should be exempt:
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Individuals at the very top of their chosen field whose extraordinary ability in the sciences, arts, education,
business, and athletics is demonstrated by sustained national or international acclaim and whose
achievements have been recognized through extensive documentation, or individuals who have
demonstrated the potential for extraordinary achievement in their chosen field through extensive
documentation, including receipt of international prizes and the testimony of appropriate experts;
Managers and executives of international businesses. Greater safeguards must be put in place to ensure that
only bona fide international businesses benefit from this policy;
Entrepreneurs whose active investment in new commercial enterprises generate a significant number of jobs
for American workers in the United States;
A limited number of individuals ordained by a religious denomination and other religious workers who
have carried on the religious vocation abroad during the two years immediately preceding the application
for admission and who are members of a religious denomination having a bona fide nonprofit, religious
organization in the United States that sponsors them.
Labor market-tested foreign workers permitted to immigrate to the United States under these categories should
include only those who have attained a baccalaureate or higher academic degree or those who are needed to fill
jobs that require a high level of specific skills above the entry or journeyman level. Categories that would require
a test of the domestic labor market include:
Professionals with advanced degrees, including professors and researchers who do not meet the definition
of "extraordinary;"
Professionals with baccalaureate degrees and skilled workers with a minimum of five years of specialized
work experience, whose admission should be scrutinized strictly to ensure that they will have no adverse
effect on similarly qualified U.S. workers.
The Commission recommends the elimination of the admission of unskilled workers. Unless there is another
compelling interest, such as in the entry of nuclear families and refugees, it is not in the national interest to admit
unskilled workers, especially when the U.S. economy is showing difficulty in absorbing disadvantaged workers
and efforts towards welfare reform indicate that many unskilled Americans will be entering the labor force.
The Commission is not satisfied with current labor certification procedures because they are neither timely
enough to meet the needs of employers with a bona fide interest in hiring a foreign worker nor effective in
protecting the interests of U.S. workers. We seek to replace a failed and expensive regulatory system with one that
is market-driven. (The cost to the federal government was about $70 million in 1992.)
The Commission recommends replacing the labor certification procedure with the following more timely
and effective labor market test:
n To demonstrate the bona fide need for a foreign worker and to increase competitiveness of U.S. workers, an
employer should be required to pay a substantial fee, that is, make a substantial financial investment into a
certified private sector initiative dedicated to increasing the competitiveness of U.S. workers, for example through
education and training. Employers seeking to hire foreign workers already incur substantial financial costs and
face lengthy processing delays. Under the Commission's proposal, the fee would go towards developing a well-
trained U.S. workforce rather than supporting costly bureaucratic processes. To ensure that the employer, and not
the foreign worker, pays the fee, penalties should be imposed upon violators.
Employers should demonstrate that they have engaged in appropriate attempts to find a qualified U.S.
worker using normal company recruitment procedures that meet industry-wide standards and offering
wages that are at least 5 percent above the prevailing wage.
The resulting permanent resident status so obtained should be conditional for a two-year period.
Conditional status would be removed at the end of that period if the foreign worker is still employed by the
same employer at the same or higher level and if the employer demonstrates that the attested wage has been
paid. The law should specify conditions under which the foreign worker could obtain a waiver of the two-
year requirement. For example, it could be waived in situations where unanticipated circumstances, such as
Testimony of Barbara Jordon, June 28, 1995
062895.html[6/13/17, 3:08:00 PM]
layoffs or business failure occur or where an employer's unfair labor practices would render the foreign
worker subject to abuse. To prevent both fraud and abuse against workers, penalties should be authorized.
To provide greater flexibility and allow for market adjustments, the Commission recommends that skill-
based visas not used in a fiscal year be carried over to the next year's skill-based numbers. In this way, skill-
based visas unused during a downturn in the economy would be readily available if business improves and there
is greater need for skilled foreign workers.
Refugee Resettlement
The Commission strongly affirms that the United States should continue its commitment to resettle
refugees as one of several elements of humanitarian protection for the persecuted. Refugee admissions fulfill
a humanitarian commitment to provide protection and assistance to those who otherwise would be persecuted or
endangered. The Commission recommends that, on an interim basis:
The U.S. should allocate 50,000 admission numbers each year to the entry of refugees from overseas;
Other than in emergency situations, any refugee admissions in excess of the 50,000 admission level could
occur only with more active participation by Congress than occurs in the current consultation process;
In the case of an emergency, the President may authorize the admission of additional refugees upon
certification of the emergency circumstances necessitating such action. The Congress may prevent the
emergency admissions only with a two-house veto of the Presidential action.
Allocating a set number of refugee admissions, with provisions to exceed this number in case of an emergency or
other changed circumstances, ensures a continued U.S. commitment to resettlement, particularly following the
expected closure of the current refugee programs in Southeast Asia and, possibly, the former Soviet Union. These
two programs account for almost 80 percent of current resettlement (about 87,000 out of 112,000 admissions in
FY 1994).
Reform of the current consultation process is needed to ensure Congressional oversight of decisions made to
exceed the 50,000 limit. Current consultations are often pro forma and occur very late in the planning process. As
discussed below, the Commission will provide recommendations on mechanisms for decisionmaking on numbers
in a forthcoming report.
The U.S. should take leadership in generating international responses to refugee crises, with particular
focus on international burdensharing and regional solutions. Future policies also must take into account the
relative weight to be given resettlement versus the other avenues open to the United States to help protect and
assist refugees worldwide, including support for repatriation of refugees to their homelands when conditions
permit.
The Commission recommends a thorough assessment of the criteria used to admit refugees for resettlement
and the procedures for their admission. The contexts for making future policy regarding refugee resettlement
are in flux. The refugee resettlement program must be revamped to meet the needs of a post-Cold War world, in
which extreme nationalism and ethnic conflicts continue to produce massive population displacements while
resolution of other conflicts is permitting large-scale voluntary repatriation. Resettlement criteria should take into
account the protection of refugees who otherwise would be endangered in a country of origin or asylum and who
would have no other alternatives.
The Commission is reviewing a variety of issues related to refugee resettlement, including: the priority system; in-
country refugee processing; country-specific legislation; procedural issues; Congressional and Executive branch
roles, including the consultation process; the role of international organizations; parole authority; and domestic
assistance, including the role of the state and local organizations (e.g., nongovernmental organizations and
voluntary agencies).
The Commission also is engaged in a thorough review of issues related to immigration emergencies. Specific
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recommendations on this subject-which may include modification of the above interim recommendations on
refugee resettlement-will be included in a Commission report planned for the end of 1995.
Nonimmigrant Admissions
The Commission believes that both permanent and temporary (nonimmigrant) admissions must be
considered as part of an integrated immigration system. Although we are deferring specific recommendations
on most nonimmigrant issues until we have completed a comprehensive review, we do note two areas of
particular interest.
Temporary Workers and Foreign Students. The Commission intends to examine in depth the nonimmigrant
temporary worker and foreign student systems and their relationships to permanent immigration. In
particular, we will be looking at ways to simplify and achieve greater coordination in these systems and to make
recommendations as a result of this study. A high percentage of applicants for permanent skill-based admission
are already in this country on temporary work or student visas. Businesses that intend to petition for permanent
visas for new hires frequently obtain temporary visas first because of long delays in processing. In addition, a
significant number of individuals admitted for temporary study or work seek permanent jobs during their stay. As
noted above, these categories of temporary admission must be seen as integral parts of a coherent legal
immigration policy. The Commission will address these specific issues in a later report.
Agriculture Guestworker Program. The Commission believes that an agriculture guestworker program,
sometimes referred to as a revisiting of the "bracero agreement," is not in the national interest and
unanimously and strongly agrees that such a program would be a grievous mistake.
First, the Commission is highly skeptical of the need for an agricultural guestworker program at this time or in the
near future. Proponents of such a program have failed to demonstrate that a labor shortage is about to occur or that
there are no means other than a guestworker program available to agricultural producers to obtain sufficient
employees in their industry.
Guestworker programs effectively expand rural poverty. Moreover, guestworker programs are predicated on
limitations on the freedom of those who are invited to enter and work. Experience has shown that such limitations
are incompatible with the values of democratic societies. For that very reason, "temporary" guestworkers tend to
become permanent residents, de facto or even de jure. The ongoing inconsistency between the stated intent of a
guestworker program and the actual consequences cannot be ignored by policymakers who seek credibility in a
reformed system.
Americanization
The United States is one of the most successful multiethnic nations in history. It has united immigrants and their
descendants from all over the world around a commitment to democratic ideals and constitutional principles.
Those ideals and principles have been embraced by persons from an extraordinary variety of religious and ethnic
backgrounds, partly because they permit and protect religious and cultural diversity within a framework of
national political unity.
Cultural and religious diversity does not pose a threat to the national interest as long as public policies ensure
civic unity. Such policies should help newcomers learn to speak, read, and write English effectively. They should
strengthen civic education in the teaching of American history for all Americans. They should lead to the
vigorous enforcement of laws against hate crimes and of laws to deter and to punish discrimination. Of course,
such policies should encourage the naturalization of immigrants as the path to full civic participation.
At the same time, immigration to the United States should be understood as a privilege, not a right. Immigration
carries with it obligations to embrace the common core of the American civic culture, to seek to become able to
communicate-to the extent possible-in English with other citizens and residents, and to adapt to fundamental
constitutional principles and democratic institutions.
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In its further deliberations, the Commission will consider other public policies that are believed by some to
encourage ethnocentrism in the name of multiculturalism or to promote political separatism in the name of civil
rights. It will review whether bilingual education and affirmative action as applied to immigrants and their
children promote, rather than detract from, civic unity. Now that immigrants come from more than 160 nations
and many more ethnic groups, it is extremely important that public policies facilitate, not inhibit, the
Americanization of newcomers.
Naturalization is the most visible manifestation of civic incorporation. At present, there is greater interest in
naturalization than there is a capacity to act upon this interest. Large backlogs must be overcome so that the
nation can benefit from the growing commitment of immigrants to become American citizens.
The Commission strongly recommends that INS adopt and implement as a strategic goal the reduction of
processing time and backlogs for naturalization while maintaining rigorous standards in processing
applications. The Commission also urges Congress to appropriate sufficient resources to support the
implementation of this strategic goal. Applicants for naturalization pay a fee designed to cover the costs of the
application process. The fees go into an account dedicated to use for examinations. The Commission believes that
naturalization applicants have the right to receive the timely service that their fee represents. Naturalization fees
should not subsidize other activities. Nor should an efficient naturalization procedure require a reallocation of
resources from other priority functions. If the current fee is not adequate to cover the full costs of timely
naturalization, it should be increased appropriately.
Further, the Commission urges INS to:
Set a standard reasonable time frame for processing naturalization applications. The time frame should
permit timely review of applications without lowering the standards for civics and English language
knowledge or compromising the required background checks. The INS also should improve process and
policies, as well as allocation of resources, to establish a level of efficiency that can withstand fluctuations
in volume.
Continue to recruit national and community-based organizations, both public and private, as well as
employers, to assist in facilitating smooth operation of the processing of naturalization applications. These
organizations have proved very helpful in prior partnerships with INS in: overseeing proper completion of
applications; taking security check fingerprints; serving as testing sites for the required English and civics
examinations; briefing applicants on procedures; providing less intimidating final interview sites; and
reviewing files before interviews to make certain that examiners need spend time only on substantive
interview issues.
Ensure that there are adequate numbers of personnel to complete naturalization processing efficiently. To
reduce waiting periods in districts with backlogs, INS should reassign personnel and, where appropriate,
designate examiners who will do naturalization interviews exclusively. In instances where an interview can
be waived, INS should permit naturalization applications to be filed, reviewed, and approved at one of its
four regional service centers
Carefully scrutinize the naturalization applications of all Special Agricultural Workers [SAW] to assure
their original SAW status was properly granted. Reports of widespread fraud in this program require such
special attention to applications for U.S. citizenship by SAW legalization beneficiaries.
The Commission urges both the public and private sectors to assist legal immigrants in their preparation
for naturalization. The Commission urges private industry, churches, community groups, and individual
volunteers to redouble their efforts to provide English language instruction and civics education to immigrants.
The current increased interest in naturalization presents an opportunity to use instruction in English, U.S. history,
and civics to help immigrants participate more fully in the life of the community. Private sector initiatives would
fill current gaps in such services. These programs also would benefit the providers, particularly businesses, who
would gain from a workforce better able to communicate in English.
The Commission supports targeted outreach programs aimed at informing eligible immigrants about the
requirements for naturalization. Outreach programs are critical to civic incorporation. They encourage immigrants
Testimony of Barbara Jordon, June 28, 1995
062895.html[6/13/17, 3:08:00 PM]
to want to become citizens and help ensure awareness of opportunity and equitable access to information about
naturalization.
Last update August 15, 1996
Testimony of Richard M. Estrada, December 7, 1995
120795.html[6/13/17, 3:08:02 PM]
Testimony of Richard M. Estrada 
Commissioner, U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform
Before the U.S. House of Representatives
Committee on the Judiciary
Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims
December 7, 1995
Agricultural Guestworker Programs
Mr. Chairman:
The following points represent a summary of my formal written testimony:
Reviving or expanding agricultural guestworker programs would fly in the face of evidence of high employment
in the agricultural labor sector;
The external costs of foreign agricultural labor, including social service costs, represent a taxpayer-funded labor
subsidy to employers;
Agricultural guestworker programs have few or no protections for guestworkers;
Agricultural guestworker programs are labeled "temporary" but contain no mechanisms to ensure the return of
guestworkers;
Agricultural guestworker programs have historically promoted illegal immigration instead of reducing it;
Reviving or expanding agricultural guestworker programs is risky in the context of current external costs, such as
social services, and the likelihood that such costs will increase at the local and state level in the context of
devolution.
In the face of such evidence my testimony concludes that reviving or expanding agricultural guestworker programs is
not in the national interest of the United States.
Mr. Chairman, thank you kindly for the opportunity to testify before you today. I am honored to have been invited. My
name is Richard M. Estrada. I am a native of New Mexico, currently based in Dallas, Texas.
I hold the title of associate editor of the editorial page of The Dallas Morning News. I am also a columnist under
contract to The Washington Post Writers Group. In addition, I am a member of the U.S. Commission on Immigration
Reform, a nine-member bipartisan panel appointed by Congress. A political independent, I happen to have been
appointed by the Senate Republican leadership.
Also for the record, I would like to note that in 1986 and 1987 I worked for the Center for Immigration Studies and the
Federation for American Immigration Reform. The following testimony is based on years of personal interest in and
professional investigation into the issue.
My most recent fact-finding trip occurred last month when I traveled to the state where the question of foreign
agricultural labor is most prominent, California. There I met with some of those who most fervently support, as well as
those who most fervently oppose, the revival or expansion of agricultural guestworker programs. I sincerely hope the
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facts and viewpoints I present here today will be of some use to you and your colleagues as you craft immigration-
related policy in this area.
The Commission on Immigration Reform has already strongly recommended against the revival of an agricultural
guestworker program, such as the one that occurred under the terms of the so-called Bracero Agreement in effect from
1942 to December 31, 1964.
The internal deliberations of the Commission have not always been studies in harmony. But it may interest you to know
that on no issue has there been greater agreement than on this one. Simply stated, the Commission, which substantially
represents a very broad spectrum of views and opinions on immigration, does not consider a revived agricultural
guestworker program to be in the national interest. If I may, I would now like to give you my reasons as to why this is
so.
Free vs. Unfree Labor
I oppose new or expanded agricultural guestworker programs because they represent "unfree" labor.
Doubtless, some will immediately object to the use of this term because all the workers in question would presumably
come to America willingly. Despite uncertainty about the circumstances under which guest laborers in such programs
are selected, let us concede for the sake of argument that all guestworkers do in fact come willingly.
One must still insist that the absence of slavery does not imply the presence of freedom. As commonly understood, the
term free labor also implies that an individual can sell his or her labor on the open market to whomever will contract for
it. It is in this regard that guestworker programs are, by definition, unfree labor arrangements or, at the very least, not
totally free labor arrangements.
To be specific, the agricultural guestworker is explicitly obligated not to sell his or her labor anywhere else but to the
agricultural employer who sponsors entry. Employers tend to prize guestworkers for their abilities, true. But they also
value them because they have no options and are, therefore, more malleable. (Employers tend to prefer the term
"disciplined.")
This basic characteristic is the ugly underbelly of any and all agricultural guestworker programs: the foreign worker is
virtually indentured to the agricultural employer, with an important exception. Unlike indentured servitude as practiced
in America in the eighteenth century, the guestworker has no expectation based in the legal provisions of his or her entry
that he or she will be able to become a free laborer in America.
In addition, guestworker programs tend to have no worker protections. When it come to housing and health care,
uneducated and often illiterate guestworkers, who often do not speak English and who have little or no disposable
income, are left to fend for themselves. There are thousands of such people roaming the agriculture-based communities
of America today. Reasonable and honorable people may disagree about guestworker programs in general, but the
specific practice of providing no meaningful worker protections in this manner is unacceptable. It is wrong. It is
immoral.
Finally, Congress should consider that the "Bracero" guestworker program was implemented in 1942 under extremely
unusual conditions. With millions of native-born rural workers suddenly called off to war, turning to foreign labor
through a temporary guestworker program was justified. Even so, the fact that it took more than twenty years to end the
Bracero program, long after the end of the Second World War, should give Congress pause about reintroducing it.
Cheap, unskilled foreign labor has proven to be an opiate to agricultural employers. Congress should dispense it
sparingly, if at all.
"Needs" of Growers and Consumers
A serious analysis of the agricultural guestworker issue must of course weigh the arguments of those who are lobbying
for an expansion in the supply of agricultural guestworkers. In particular, fruit and vegetable growers routinely maintain
that a sizable and replenishable foreign agricultural labor supply is imperative, not only for their own economic survival,
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but also for the benefit of the American consumer at large.
In promoting their demands, growers routinely raise worst-case scenarios. They invoke the specter of produce rotting in
the fields as a direct result of an insufficient labor supply. They also allege that, absent whatever levels of foreign labor
they may demand at any given time, consumers will be obligated to pay sky-high prices for their fruits and vegetables.
Such arguments possess elements of truth. Common sense says that having too few workers may indeed result in an
inability to pick an entire crop, especially within the limited window of opportunity that some, but not all, growers have.
And, should the crop yield be insufficient to meet consumer demand, the most basic law of economics says that the
greater the demand, the greater the price of the produce will tend to be.
Still, these arguments must be placed in context. The first thing to note about them is their absolute or extreme nature.
Virtually no one other than agricultural employers is implying that any labor shortage at all is occurring or is about to
occur. Anyone who reviews the historical record will find that allegations of actual or impending labor shortages have
been common in this debate but that actual labor shortages have been rare.
Consider the unfounded scare about shortages of apple pickers in Washington state in 1987 or the enormous oversupply
of labor that obtains in California normally, as proved by unemployment figures in agricultural regions of the state.
I recently heard testimony from growers in Fresno about what they termed a very serious labor shortage in the early fall
of 1990. However, a review of economic data pertaining to the raisin industry at the time found that at the height of the
alleged shortage, they offered a piece rate increase of a few pennies, at best. This during a time in which the value of the
California raisin industry was in dramatic ascent.
Indeed, one often gets the feeling that when growers say they can't find workers, they fail to complete the sentence.
What they really mean is that they can't find workers at the extremely low wages and working conditions they offer.
Aside from wages and working conditions, Congress would be well advised to study the issue of living conditions. In
many cases, agricultural employers are hiring workers who live in the worst conditions imaginable. Lest anyone think I
am exaggerating, consider the case of Mexican agricultural workers in northern San Diego County, California. For
years, this region has seen agricultural workers literally live in holes in the ground that have been lined with plastic.
These are popularly called "spider holes."
Around Fresno, to the north, they have been known to live in cars or in the most primitive tin and cardboard shacks.
This represents no improvement over the situation in Texas some twenty years ago when rural laborers were found to be
living in chicken coops. In contrast, the rural unincorporated subdivisions of the Mexican border are castles. The
colonias are unincorporated rural subdivisions lacking services and featuring the worst public health menace in
America.
In a situation where workers routinely endure such deprivation, California agricultural experts say that projected labor
shortages have proven to be largely mythical. The number of people currently residing in the United Sates who want to
work is simply too great. Once again, when considering the contrary arguments of growers, Congress should ask itself
fundamental questions about wages and working conditions.
One of the most renowned agricultural economists in the world, Professor Philip Martin of the University of California
at Davis, says that contrary to grower arguments, U.S. agribusiness has consistently experienced a labor oversupply. He
does not see a shortage on the horizon.
As for the "need" of consumers for cheap fruits and vegetables, one might also allege a "need" for inexpensive but high
quality automobiles. But having a "need" does not automatically imply that the nation should expand the supply of
unskilled foreign labor supply in order to meet that need. Field labor is but a small percentage of the retail price.
Again, the question is not so much whether consumers will be deprived of fruits and vegetables, but what price the free
market will oblige them to pay. Even then, it is not as if the demand for fruits and vegetables is inelastic. People will
forgo or buy less of what they cannot afford. Strawberries are not essential to human survival.
Testimony of Richard M. Estrada, December 7, 1995
120795.html[6/13/17, 3:08:02 PM]
In America, products are supposed to be offered for sale in a free market. There is no God-given right to cheap and
exploitable foreign labor, and there is no God-given right to cheap fruits and vegetables. Yet such an assumption is
inherent in many of the arguments made by argibusiness.
Later in my comments, I will consider the factor of "external" costs related to foreign agricultural labor. Such costs raise
a legitimate question as to whether the constant replenishment of the agricultural labor supply represents a de facto labor
market subsidy to growers that is being unwittingly paid for by all taxpayers.
Arguments about skyrocketing prices for produce should be carefully analyzed against the historical record. In the years
leading up to the termination of the U.S.-Mexico agricultural guestworker accord, or Bracero Program, at the end of
1964, growers routinely argued that a lack of labor would cause the price of tomatoes to skyrocket. Instead, the price
fell.
Why? Because the sudden decline in the volume of available agricultural labor promoted the development and
availability of something that growers often refuse to discuss openly--the introduction of mechanization in the tomato
industry. Mechanization not only staved off the economic ruination that agribusiness had warned against, it also
increased efficiency and productivity and actually led to a drop in prices.
Congress may wish to note that within the last two months, Florida sugar cane growers have finally decided to
mechanize because of world competition on the global sugar market. Sadly, this is occurring some thirty years after
Edward R. Murrow's famous expose of brutal working conditions in Florida agriculture in the celebrated documentary,
"Harvest of Shame."
Now, it is true that not all categories of produce lend themselves to mechanization. But the basic point is that a blind
acceptance of demands for additional foreign agricultural labor will help ensure that such alternatives never materialize.
It will actually promote the continuation of a labor intensive system. If Congress is concerned with the nation's
increased economic efficiency and productivity, it may wish to ponder what a continued blind reliance on labor
intensiveness in agriculture implies for the country over time.
There is no reason to question the sincerity of agricultural employers when they talk about the possible ruination of their
enterprises. And they are doubtless concerned that American consumers will not be blessed with the fruits--and
vegetables--of their labor, or that of their guestworkers.
However, I would suggest that if Congress is to examine the full range of factors, it must consider a fundamental point
of economics that agricultural employers almost never volunteer: To wit, the greater the number of workers there are
vying for a particular job, the lower the wages and working conditions agricultural employers will be obliged to offer.
Congress has considered these issues before. Some, if not all, of you will remember that a landmark legislative
compromise occurred less than a decade ago in the context of the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act, also
known as the Simpson-Rodino bill. At the time, agricultural interests said they would be satisfied by an expansion in the
number of agricultural workers through a Special Agricultural Workers provision. Nearly 1.1 million formerly illegal
aliens purporting to be agricultural workers were granted legal status in a program saturated with fraud.
Keep in mind that the main point of the 1986 act was to implement an employer sanctions mechanism that would allow
the United States to control illegal immigration. After having agreed to the legislation because of the legalization of
agricultural workers, agribusiness is, in effect, now coming back to repudiate the compromise of 1986 and ask for still
more foreign agricultural labor.
The difference is that this time around they do not want such labor to be afforded the opportunity to legalize. This time
they do not want totally free labor. This time they want guestworkers.
According to testimony I heard from agribusiness and its representatives in California last month, the new request is
predicated on the assumption that loopholes in the employer sanctions law of 1986 may actually be plugged by
Congress in the near future. They referred specifically to the expected passage and implementation of a worker
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verification system.
If that happens, agribusiness fears a decline in its labor supply. In this regard, Congress should know that a
representative of the Western Grower-Shipper Vegetable Association publicly stated last year that illegal aliens
comprise 50 percent of the work force of the Santa Maria Valley in Santa Barbara County, California. This is not
necessarily evidence that only alien workers are available, but rather that the growers are hiring large numbers of aliens.
Congress should take careful note of what this new argument is really saying. In effect, growers are claiming that while
agribusiness is not knowingly hiring illegal aliens--an act that is illegal under the 1986 legislation--they are nonetheless
fearful that if the law is actually enforced, agribusiness will have fewer illegal aliens to hire.
I have no specific evidence to justify the assertion that agricultural employers are knowingly hiring illegally aliens as
defined under IRCA, and I will not make that charge here. Yet, whatever defense they may raise in the context of the
confusion over work eligibility documents--the factor cited as the main drawback to effective employer sanctions
enforcement--that cannot be permitted to cloud the fact that the growers are fundamentally opposed to the spirit of the
1986 act, which, to repeat, is the reduction and control of illegal immigration.
Agribusiness now says we should forget about the compromise of 1986 and revive the so-called Bracero Agreement or
expand the H-2A program. Before Congress acquiesces in such a request, it may wish to weigh the growers' assertions
against powerful evidence from many agricultural areas that unemployment is high in rural labor sectors. That certainly
was the message I recently heard during a visit to Fresno.
Moreover, labor economists point out that California agribusiness in particular does not want so much a stable supply of
labor, but rather a dependable system of constantly disposable and replenishable labor. Foreign labor is best for their
needs precisely because it represents a never-ending pool and because the constant replacement of such labor ensures
that the entire workforce will, in the classic phraseology of those who are familiar with the bottom line of illegal or
legally admitted but not totally free labor, "work hard and scared."
Those who doubt this should inquire about the labor made legally available to growers by Congress a decade ago.
Reports emanating from California note that formerly illegal aliens who were legalized under the 1986 Special
Agricultural Workers provision are today deeply concerned that they are about to be displaced by a new agricultural
guestworker program or the expansion of an existing one. They fear being tossed aside as the next victims of what might
be called the Dixie Cup system of labor replenishment.
In my opinion, they are right to be afraid. Longtime observers know that the constant replacement and replenishment of
labor is the Holy Grail of the agribusiness labor system.
In passing, I should also note the important side issues of unemployment benefits and Social Security taxes. Illegal
aliens are not eligible for unemployment benefits, which, in the case of unemployed legal workers, are charged against
an account for which the individual employer is responsible. Citizens and legal residents are eligible for such benefits.
In effect, agricultural employers end up paying around 4 percent less for those workers who are not eligible for
unemployment benefits than for those workers who are.
By itself, that may be a compelling reason for agricultural employers to promote a constant supply of labor that is not
eligible for the benefit made available to legal residents. More dramatic still is the factor of Social Security taxes. Hiring
foreign workers for whom Social Security taxes are not paid represents nearly a 15 percent wage premium right off the
bat. No matter how hard a citizen of the United States may work in the fields, these factors represent two strikes against
his or her employment in the agricultural sector.
Congress should consider such points the next time it hears that illegal aliens and guestworkers do jobs Americans won't
do. Still, to focus only on the costs of labor in the fields would be to miss one of the most important facets of the entire
issue. Congress would be well advised to weigh other real-world costs, as well.
External Costs
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On November 15, about three weeks ago, I was present at a hearing of the U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform in
Fresno. The hearing dealt with the issue of agriculture and foreign workers. That hearing only underscored a point that
has been made time and again throughout the Southwest and West, in particular. Illegal immigration and legalized
illegal aliens represent costs for the nation that go far beyond the cost of their labor.
In Fresno, I heard the testimony of Mayor Jim Patterson, who complained that the residents of his agriculture-based city
are currently paying what he calls "a large immigration tax." Mayor Patterson specifically blamed this unwritten and
unlegislated tax on the federal government.
Specifically, he complained about Congress' failure to control the borders. He pointed to specific areas in which his city
will no longer be receiving funding from the federal government because of congressional reforms. He also linked the
growing social and budgetary impact of massive legal and illegal immigration to the unprecedented ballot initiative to
deny public benefits to illegal aliens, known as Proposition 187. At the same time, however, he expressed support for an
agricultural guestworker program.
Both he and all other elected officeholders interested in this public policy issue, including Congress, may wish to ask
themselves if we as a society can have it both ways. In other words, can we lament the consequences of the expansion of
the low-skill, low-wage labor supply and then turn around and lobby for the admission of still more of that labor?
It may make political sense in areas and states where agriculture is a powerful industry, but does it stand the test of
common sense? Does it make budgetary sense? Is it in the national interest?
In truth, a gamut of publicly-funded costs must be considered by policymakers who seek to ascertain the impact of
legislating an expansion of foreign agricultural labor. Assuming for the sake of argument that the workers in question
and their families do not access the welfare system, policymakers should consider costs relating to basic services, such
as running water and waste water, street maintenance, police and fire services, public health services, publicly-funded
housing, the administration of justice, food and shelter for prisoners, public education, heightened unemployment and
underemployment, and the consequent utilization of unemployment and other benefits by displaced citizens and other
legal residents.
In Fresno alone, huge increases in waste water flows have obligated the city to build a $200 million expansion to the
city's waste water treatment facility. After investigating the heightened demand, city authorities routinely found
examples of families with ten, twelve, and even fifteen children, and a total of twenty or thirty people living in one- or
two-bedroom apartments, according to Mayor Patterson.
Also, Congress should consider that just because it is difficult to put a price tag on a concept, such as the dilution of
quality of life stemming from overcrowding, that does not mean that such a price is not being paid.
When one takes into consideration the gamut of costs that U.S. citizens and legal residents are paying as a direct result
of the large-scale presence of foreign agricultural workers, illegal and legal, the residents of an individual community,
such as Fresno, are not the only ones who are being impacted. Other agriculture-based communities, the citizens of
California as a whole, and the citizens of the United Sates also pay for such costs to one extent or another.
Agricultural work is by definition seasonal. Yet, regardless of theory, the fact remains that even after the harvest season
is over, the agricultural laborers often remain. Congress should fully understand the implications of too easily
acquiescing in demands for massive influxes of additional foreign agricultural labor, ex ante--that is, before there is
evidence of need--instead of ex post.
Regardless of whether inexpensive alien agricultural labor helps keep the costs of fruits and vegetables down for
consumers, it must be weighed against the costs that are external to the economic activity in agriculture itself. When the
gamut of associated public costs are taken into consideration, such additional costs can only be perceived, in my
opinion, as a labor market subsidy paid for by the public to the agricultural employers. I have not ventured to estimate
the size of that subsidy. But surely it is in the hundreds of millions of dollars.
Agribusiness routinely talks about the high quality of its produce. At that real-world price, it had better be very good
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indeed. Whatever else one may say about this situation, I consider it to be fundamentally antithetical to the principles of
a free market. When the economics of agricultural labor is weighed in its totality, there is reason to ask whether
agribusiness today is privatizing the profit while commonizing the cost.
Social Consequences
For about a quarter century now, the United States has been experiencing what immigration experts have called the
Fourth Wave of American Immigration. In 1965, Congress reintroduced mass immigration after a hiatus of some forty
years.
All evidence indicates that it did not understand the consequences of the new policy. Indeed, the history of modern U.S.
immigration policy is the history of dealing with the unintended consequences of each new policy shift.
The current wave of immigration is the first one to occur in America's postindustrial era. Similarly, it is the first one to
occur since the creation of the modern American welfare state. Both these facts have enormous consequences for our
society.
This is not the place to explore the factors related to socioeconomic polarization in the United States today. Suffice it to
say that labor experts routinely note that the prospects of upward mobility in the country today are not what they once
were. Prospects are best for people with relatively high levels of skills and education and, logically, they are worse for
people with few or no skills and little or no education.
More to the point, the jobs being created today are in the higher end, not the lower end. Simultaneously, immigration
today accounts for about 40 percent of labor force growth and about 40 percent of population growth. Against this
backdrop, Congress should ask itself whether expanding the supply of low-skill and often uneducated labor is advisable.
The proponents of a revived agricultural guestworker system or of the expansion of an existing program such as H-2A
will likely argue that such observations are irrelevant to their case. After all, they say, the introduction of low-skill labor
they are calling for is "temporary." Moreover, the proponents of such programs have also suggested that the revival of
"Bracero" or the expansion of H-2A will in fact serve to diminish the pressures of illegal immigration.
To be sure, seasonal cross-border migration by young male agricultural laborers does exist. At the same time, however,
it is also true that all guestworker programs have seen the refusal of substantial numbers of workers to return to their
homelands. Many have either resettled their families in the United States or have established families here after having
arrived.
The growers may call it "temporary" labor. Congress may call it "temporary" labor. But that does not mean that a
substantial portion of that labor will in fact turn out to be anything other than permanent. In fact, this is the clear and
consistent record of the Bracero Program and indeed of all "temporary" worker programs in Western countries.
As for the possibility that expanding the number of agricultural guestworkers will reduce illegal immigration, the
historical record simply does not bear this out. Contrary to the recently published Pollyannish opinions of Professor
Julian Simon and others, history indicates that the Bracero Program actually paved the way for higher levels of illegal
immigration and dug the channels deeper.
Professor Simon has attempted to buttress his argument by citing examples of very low levels of illegal immigration in
the 1950s. Yet, for whatever reason, he has refused to acknowledge the year 1954, in which more than one million
apprehensions of illegal aliens occurred. More to the point, during the 22 years of the Bracero Program, when
approximately 4.6 million braceros were admitted into the United States, no fewer than 5.3 million apprehensions of
illegal aliens took place. [See accompanying table.]
Congress may judge for itself whether the Bracero Program reduced illegal immigration in the past. As for the future, it
may wish to consider this question in the context of the current economic turmoil in the largest source of illegal alien
agricultural labor to this country, Mexico.
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If history is any guide, substantial numbers of temporary guestworkers will in fact become permanent members of our
society. Sometimes, this may even occur regardless of their own initial intent. Such vagaries will only increase the
difficulty of assimilating low-wage, low-skill Americans of all backgrounds into the social and economic mainstream.
Given that the coincidence of race and poverty is one of the most challenging issues facing the United States today,
Congress may wish to consider the long-term consequences of importing more unskilled labor.
Consider the following example: Recently, the tri-counties of Ventura, Santa Barbara, and San Luis Obispo in
California were granted a Job Training Partnership Act grant of $511,605 to retrain farmworkers. One local expert
whom I have interviewed told me that the application stated in part: "Since IRCA was passed in 1986 the ranks of
farmworkers have dramatically increased. . . . The population eligible to receive these benefits (unemployment
insurance) is estimated to exceed 76,500 workers" in the three counties cited.
The cost of retraining all 76,500 farmworkers in just three counties would be a staggering $466 million. Yet, the
Department of Labor has only $82 million available nationwide to retrain farmworkers throughout the United States.
I am not here to argue for greater appropriations for job training programs. But I am suggesting that Congress consider
the real-world costs of expanding the agricultural labor supply in terms of such factors as heightened unemployment and
the heightened demand for social services. Without entering into the debate over devolution, I would suggest that
Congress also consider this factor.
American Values
As Congress considers reviving or expanding guestworker programs, it may wish to ask itself a number of basic
questions. Here are a few for your consideration:
If a guestworker is tied by law to one employer, what is the range of limitations on the freedom of that guestworker?
What happens if the agricultural guestworker wishes to leave the agricultural sector and work elsewhere in the U.S.
economy? What happens if the guestworker falls in love and wishes to marry a legal resident? What happens if a
guestworker should become the parent of a child born on U.S. soil, even if the guestworker is single?
Who, exactly, is responsible for ensuring that such guestworkers do not go into other labor sectors? What, exactly, is the
penalty for failure to comply with any such responsibility? Who, exactly, is to oversee the enforcement of any such
rules, regulations, and law? Exactly what resources will Congress afford those given that mission?
A failure to carefully answer these and many other questions would, I believe, represent a failure on the part of
Congress to ensure truth in advertising. That is to say, if Congress proposes to legislate a temporary guestworker
arrangement, then Congress, in my view, has the responsibility to ensure that it is temporary. The litmus test for any
guestworker program is whether that program contains mechanisms to ensure the return of the guestworker.
If, upon due consideration, Congress wishes to grant full and permanent legal status to foreigners willing to work in
agriculture, then Congress should do that. But to promise one thing, while failing to ensure that the promise is kept, will
only intensify the already deep frustration felt by the American people over an immigration system most of them
consider to be in shambles, according to poll after poll.
Finally, when the United States went to war in the Persian Gulf a few years ago, we as a nation were hugely
embarrassed when, upon liberating Kuwait, we discovered that country's exploitative guestworker system. In Kuwait,
guestworkers were seen as being good enough to do the dirty work of their hosts, but not good enough to become full
members of the polity. Indeed, they were often treated with a disdain that recalled some of the worst features of
nineteenth century American slavery.
Filipino domestic servants, for example, were found to have no legal rights whatsoever, their passports were found to
have been seized upon admission, they represented unfree labor tied explicitly to their employers, and they were often
subjected to physical and even sexual abuse. All of these excesses are exactly the kinds of things Americans have been
trying to erase from their nation for decades.
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But the plain fact of the matter is that agricultural guestworker programs are themselves affronts to human dignity and
freedom to one degree or another. In no western liberal democracy has such a program been successful. All of them
have experienced troubling consequences. Congress may wish to consider the droll observation of one European
observer of the guestworker experience: "We wanted workers, but we got people instead."
I commend you for studying this complicated and challenging issue. I fully realize the pressures you face. I wish you
Godspeed. But please allow me to help you make up your mind one way or the other by taking a clear stand in my
testimony here today: I cannot and will not recommend the Kuwait model of guest labor for the United States.
Thank you again for your courtesies and for inviting me to testify.
Apprehensions During the
Bracero Years
Year Apprehensions
1942 11,784
1943 11,175
1944 31,174
1945 69,164
1946 99,591
1947 193,657
1948 192,779
1949 288,253
1950 468,339
1951 509,040
1952 543,535
1953 885,587
1954* 1,089,583
1955 254,096
1956 87,696
1957 59,918
1958 53,474
1959 45,336
1960 70,684
1961 88,823
1962 92,758
1963 88,712
1964 86,597
*Operation "Wetback"
Total of 5.3 million apprehensions during the 22-year period, while approximately 4.6 million braceros were admitted.
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Birthright Citizenship
Good morning. I am Barbara Jordan, and I am pleased to have this opportunity to testify on such an important matter. I
am here in a dual capacity. I was once a member of the House Judiciary Committee, and I have studied the Constitution.
Presently, I teach political values and ethics at the LBJ School of the University of Texas. I hope I can bring some
education and experience to bear before you today.
I am also Chair of the bipartisan Commission on Immigration Reform. As you know, our Commission has been deeply
engaged in debate regarding our national interest in sound immigration policy--in solving problems, completing
unfinished business, and avoiding future error. We have issued two reports to date, making recommendations for
specific reforms to Congress. Our first report recommended a comprehensive strategy for deterring illegal immigration.
It is called U.S. Immigration Policy: Restoring Credibility, and I will have more to say about it in a moment.
Our second report is called Legal Immigration: Setting Priorities, which we presented to Congress this spring. We on
this Commission have been gratified that our work has helped this Subcommittee in preparing legislation to advance the
national interest in immigration policy. We are a Congressional commission, and it is our job to serve you.
But this Commission has not made recommendations on the matter before you today. As a bipartisan Congressional
panel, we have not addressed the 14th Amendment's application to immigration. But, personally I would like to do so
now--briefly.
There are profound problems, as I see it, in the Constitutional amendments before this Subcommittee. By making the
immigration status of the mother the key to an American-born child's citizenship, for example, one of these amendments
would require that the federal government disown its obligations to citizen children. Consider the case of a citizen father
married to a foreign mother. If the child is born abroad, the child is automatically made a U.S. citizen upon petition. If
the child is born while the mother is in the United States, perhaps by overstaying a tourist visa from Thanksgiving to
Christmas, neither the father's citizenship nor the birth on U.S. soil of an American child provides that child American
citizenship. In fact, the father's natural right to pass on his citizenship to the child is denied. He must ask the government
to bless his child.
But it is not the practical problems, profound as they are, on which I wish to focus. It is the principle.
There are three ways to become an American--by choice, through naturalization; by blood, through having an American
parent; and by birth in the United States. It is also true that most nations do not have these three methods. The simplest
contrast is Germany. With very few exceptions, you can only be a German if your ancestors were German. There are
hundreds of thousands of second and third generations of people, born in Germany, knowing no other nation, who are
not German, who will never be German. Congress should think again whether you wish to make the United States more
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like Germany.
De Tocqueville wrote of America that, "The government of a democracy brings the notion of political rights to the level
of the humblest citizens." And that is what we are talking about: citizenship. It is a beautiful word. It is an American
word. The modern concept of citizenship is largely an American invention. It has Greek and Roman roots, to be sure.
But we grew in the soil of the United States the modern concept of citizenship that so much of the world has adopted at
last.
With all due respect to my Republican colleagues, the true "conservative revolution" happened in 1776. The Founders,
you will recall, originally fought only to claim as colonists their rights as Englishmen. It was when King and Parliament
denied those rights that they took the revolutionary step of asserting that these rights were not granted to them as
subjects from the Crown, but that "We hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created equal, that they are
endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights." This idea--the American idea--is that governments do not
grant rights. We are born with them.
I would be the last person to claim that our nation is perfect. But we have a kind of perfection in us because our
founding principle is universal: that we are all created equal regardless of race, religion, or national ancestry. When the
Declaration of Independence was written, when the Constitution was adopted, when the Bill of Rights was added to it,
they all applied almost exclusively to white men of Anglo-Saxon descent who owned property on the East Coast. They
did not apply to me. I am female. I am black. But these self-evident principles apply to me now as they apply to
everyone in this room.
To deny birthright citizenship would derail this engine of American liberty. Progress in America is not an accident. It
was immigration that drove us down the track toward a broader and more truthful vision of ourselves. It was
immigration that taught us that, in this country, it does not matter where you came from, or who your parents were.
What counts is who you are. The 14th Amendment to the Constitution says, in part: "All persons born or naturalized in
the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State in which they
reside."
This was originally a statute, the Civil Rights Act of 1866. Its authors knew that, as a statute, it was vulnerable to being
overturned by future lawmakers. That, they determined, must not happen. We must not forget the history of the 14th
Amendment, or the context in which it was passed. We had fought a bloody civil war. And now, three amendments to
the Constitution were adopted--to end slavery; to provide equal protection of the laws; and to guarantee the right to vote.
I do not believe it is possible to amend the Constitution, or alter the meaning of its words, by statute. In this case, any
attempt would have significant negative consequences. For example, H.R. 1363 would specify that certain children of
illegal aliens are "not subject to the jurisdiction of the United States." Do we really want to give these individuals
immunity from federal prosecution for criminal acts? I am not sure how we could prosecute someone not subject to our
jurisdiction.
So, if the Congress wishes to deny birthright citizenship to children of illegal aliens, it must follow the intentionally
arduous path of a Constitutional amendment. I hope that you will not take this step.
A constitutional amendment requires a supermajority vote in both the House and the Senate and the ratification of two-
thirds of the state legislatures, presently thirty-eight states. Even if--which I oppose --it was sound policy to so amend
the Constitution, it will take time. It will take resources. It will divide the country on the most profound level--the
question of who we are as a people and who says so.
Let me go beyond my personal views here, to speak as the Chair of the U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform. Do
not let debate on birthright citizenship distract you from the urgent business of controlling illegal immigration, which is
essential to the credibility of our commitment to the national interest in legal immigration.
Ably led by your Subcommittee Chair, Lamar Smith and the ranking minority member, John Bryant, you have an
opportunity in this Congress to take significant steps to deter illegal immigration and promote lawful immigration in the
national interest. You have labored in this Subcommittee to produce a bill, H.R. 2202, which takes some of the prudent,
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measured steps recommended by this bipartisan Commission to do what needs to be done. The comprehensive strategy
this Commission recommended last year to deter illegal immigration has seven parts:
1) Better border management;
2) Development of a better system for worksite verification;
3) Benefits eligibility consistent with the goals of immigration policy;
4) Deportation of illegal aliens;
5) Emergency management;
6) Reliable data;
7) Attacking the root causes of unlawful migration in the sending countries.
There is no one who knows better than those who serve on this Commission how hard it has been to advocate these
tough choices. But we believe that they are necessary and that through your actions as legislators valuable progress in
all of these areas is within reach.
Please do not be distracted from these real measures to attack illegal immigration through the Constitutional amendment
process. There are far better ways to deal with illegal immigration than to cut the Constitutional baby with a sword and
say, "This half is a citizen, and that half is not."
There will be those who will try to deny reality when the whole House faces this issue shortly. But the vast majority of
illegal aliens do not come to America to bear children, although it does happen. In three years and dozens of hearings,
consultations, and expert discussions, no one has ever reported to the Commission that the vast majority of births to
illegal aliens are anything more than a reflection of the large numbers of illegal aliens who are here. The reason most
illegal aliens come to our country boils down to three words: They get jobs.
There will be a vote on the House floor on retaining the provision to test worksite verification that the Judiciary
Committee approved in H.R. 2202. There will be those who claim that it is not worth testing the system you have
endorsed. There are also those who whisper in these hallways that illegal immigration isn't so bad, so long as they will
work hard for low pay, so long as they do the dirty jobs that Americans supposedly won't do, so long as their children
aren't to become Americans.
Caution: There are nations in the world that have tried this, and we are not like them. We are not a nation that is
permanently divided into "us", and "them." You heard last week from my colleague on the Commission, Richard
Estrada, who gave as his view that the United States must not follow the Kuwait model, where citizens are the
privileged elite and foreigners do the dirty work. I agree.
The Commission on Immigration Reform has outlined a comprehensive strategy to deter illegal immigration--including
the development and testing of a reliable system for worksite verification that protects our civil liberties.
I believe that treating us all alike is the appropriate way to attack illegal immigration. I will be delighted to answer any
questions.
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On behalf of the Members of the U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform, I want to thank you for the opportunity to
testify before you today.
First, I would like to say a brief word about our Chair, the late Professor Barbara Jordan. Professor Jordan accepted
appointment as Chair because she believed that debate about immigration policy and reform of its problem areas were
necessary if we were to retain our strong tradition as a nation of immigrants committed to the rule of law. I know that
she was very proud of the work of the Commission and grateful to the members of this Subcommittee, in particular, for
the support you have given the Commission, as well as for the many courtesies you showed her as Chair. We hope that
the rest of the Commission's work in fulfilling the mandate of the 1990 Act, with a series of interim reports before the
final report on September 30, 1997, will live up to the high standard she has set for us.
The Commission is pleased that this Committee continues to examine the eligibility of immigrants for public benefits,
with particular attention to the Supplementary Security Income program. The Commission strongly recommends that
legal immigrants continue to retain eligibility for the safety net provided by needs-tested public programs, but further
recommends a tightening of provisions to ensure that immigrants do not become public charges.
That immigrant utilization of SSI is growing is confirmed by administrative data. Rather than go into detail on the data
itself, which I do in my written testimony and which others have done today, let me briefly note the Commission's
recommendations along with their reasoning.
The Commission believes the following principles should guide policy on benefits eligibility for SSI.
Legal Immigrants
First: The safety net provided by needs-tested programs should be available to those whom we affirmatively have
accepted as legal immigrants into our communities. The U.S. admits immigrants on the basis that they will not be a
public charge. However, circumstances may arise after an immigrant's entry that create a pressing need for public help--
unexpected illness, injuries sustained due to a serious accident, loss of employment, a death in the family. Under such
circumstances, legal immigrants should be eligible for public benefits if they meet other eligibility criteria. We are not
prepared to remove the safety net from under individuals who, we hope, will become full members of our polity.
A policy that categorically denies legal immigrants access to such safety nets based solely on alienage would lead to
gross inequities between very similar individuals and undermine our immigration goals to reunite families and to
integrate immigrants into American society quickly. For example, posit a family whose income is below poverty level
with two children, one a legal immigrant who becomes disabled after entry, the other a healthy U.S. citizen born after
the family immigrated. Under proposals to deny benefits to legal immigrants, the disabled child would be ineligible for
assistance, while the healthy U.S. citizen child would be eligible for assistance if the family met income requirements.
The inequities for the legal immigrant child grow if eligibility is linked to citizenship, rather than a specified time, as the
child by law may not naturalize until he or she is eighteen years of age. The only route to citizenship prior to that age is
through the naturalization of his or her parent. If there were a categorical denial of eligibility to all legal immigrants and
the parent was unable or unwilling to naturalize, the child would suffer the consequences of a parental action that he or
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she could not remedy.
Second: Sponsors should be held financially responsible for the immigrants whom they bring to this country. In
particular, the Commission recommends making affidavits of support signed by sponsors legally binding for a specific
period of time and the development of mechanisms to enforce sponsors' pledges of financial responsibility.
Affidavits of support are one means to ensure the Consular Officer that the alien will be supported in the United States
and will not become a public charge. In accordance with Board of Immigration Appeals [BIA] rulings, the signatory
sponsor's ability to provide the promised support must be given due consideration in determining whether to exclude a
person as likely to become a public charge. Some courts, however, have held that such affidavits of support impose only
a moral--and not a legal--obligation on the signatory sponsor.
It is important to note that the affidavit of support becomes a condition of entry only when the Consular Officer finds
that the intending immigrant is likely to become a public charge. In other words, if the sponsor did not promise to
provide support, the immigrant would not be allowed to enter the United States. We believe this promise should have
greater force in law to ensure that the responsibilities are upheld.
The affidavit should ensure that parents who are unable to work enough quarters to become eligible for Social Security
or Medicare do not become a burden to taxpayers through use of SSI, Medicaid, or equivalent state and local assistance.
Further, the Commission recommends that affidavit signers (petitioners and, if necessary, coguarantors) should provide:
Verifiable assurance that they indeed have the capacity to provide what may be a lifetime of financial support to
the parent immigrants; and
Verifiable assurance of the purchase of what may be lifetime health coverage for the parent immigrants (obtained
either privately or through buying into Medicare, which the government should make available at an actuarially
fair price).
Requiring such a commitment from sponsors should not be confused with a bar on eligibility for the immigrant before
or after naturalization. As I stated, the Commission recommends against categorical denial of eligibility on the basis of
alienage. Legal immigrants and citizens should be treated alike as far as their eligibility is concerned. If a sponsor is no
longer able to provide support, the needy immigrant should have recourse to public benefits. If the sponsor abandons his
or her responsibility, the needy immigrant should have recourse to public benefits. All efforts should be made, however,
to enforce the sponsor's legal responsibility to repay the public coffers and resume support as quickly as possible.
The distinction between eligibility and financial responsibility is an important one that affects not only immigrants but
citizens as well. For example, a U.S. citizen child may be eligible to receive public benefits if he or she meets income
criteria, but the child's eligibility does not dissolve his or her parent from the financial responsibility to provide support
to the child. Similarly, a U.S. citizen spouse retains eligibility for benefits, but that does not absolve his or her spouse
from financial responsibilities.
The equivalent relationship in immigration policy is the affidavit of support signed by sponsors of new immigrants. Just
as a parent's responsibility for a child is irrespective of the child's citizenship, the sponsor's responsibility for a parent
whose entry is conditioned on a contractual arrangement specified in the affidavit is irrespective of future naturalization.
The Commission further recommends that entry be contingent on verifiable assurance of the purchase of health
insurance, again for the lifetime of the parent or until the parent becomes eligible for Medicare on the basis of his or her
work history. Without such a health insurance requirement, parents are likely to access taxpayer-financed health
programs such as Medicaid or general assistance. We recognize that such a requirement may be prohibitively expensive
for many families, particularly if the parent is over the age of sixty-five. The current private health care market generally
lacks affordable health plans covering doctor, hospital, and long-term care services for elderly individuals. Moreover,
most private long-term care policies are limited in both duration and extent of coverage. Therefore, we recommend that
the government establish an option that would allow sponsored parents age sixty-five or older to purchase Medicare
(parts A and B) at an actuarially fair price, which we understand would be about $4,000 to $5,000 per year. On top of
that, the parent or sponsor also would have to show purchase of a long-term care policy that would offset some or all of
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the costs that might otherwise accrue to Medicaid.
The Commission does not intend a legally binding affidavit of support to be a punitive measure towards either the
sponsor who attempts to meet the requirements in good faith or the immigrant who may be financially abandoned by the
sponsor. If the sponsor becomes financially incapable of providing support because of changed circumstances (the
sponsor's illness or accident, for example), the requirements of the affidavit would be removed until the sponsor was
able to resume them. If the immigrant is abandoned, however, the legally-binding affidavit permits the immigrant to
obtain help while the efforts are made to enforce the sponsor's responsibility.
This recommendation permits the continued entry of parents because it would assure that they would not be excludable
as public charges who pose a burden to U.S. taxpayers. It also protects sponsored spouses and children by enforcing
affidavits signed on their behalf and ensuring that assistance is available to them if the sponsoring parent or spouse is
unable or unwilling to provide support. Finally, it protects the taxpayer. As Professor Jordan said in a speech last
summer:
"[E]ven nuclear family reunification is not without obligations on the part of those who benefit from
immigration. The Commission believes that those who sponsor new immigrants have responsibility for
ensuring that their relatives do not become a burden on taxpayers. You and I should not have to pay for
someone else's family reunification."
Developing effective enforcement mechanisms related to the affidavit is critical to the success of this recommendation
in order to avoid creating any future incentives to abuse or defraud the system. A number of options may be appropriate,
including a role for the Department of Justice in investigating alleged abdications of responsibility that lead to use of
public benefits. Federal, state, and local programs providing cash and medical assistance could be required to report to
the Department of Justice the receipt of benefits by any sponsored immigrant. This approach would establish affidavit
enforcement activities within the primary law enforcement agency and avoid placing additional enforcement burdens on
health and social service programs. Alternatively, the enforcement could be undertaken by the Department of Health
and Human Services or the Social Security Administration. In any case, communication among these agencies would be
essential.
Third: Abuse of the public charge provision should be grounds for deportation. A serious effort should be made to
enhance and enforce the public charge provisions in immigration law to ensure that legal immigrants do not require
public assistance and to provide clear procedures for deporting individuals who become public charges within five years
after entry for reasons that existed prior to entry. In particular, the Commission recommends that deportation apply to
sustained use of public benefits.
Specific provisions within U.S. immigration law are designed to ensure that those persons seeking admission to this
country will contribute to it, not merely take advantage of its resources and the generosity of its people. For example
U.S. immigration law currently bars the entry of those who are likely to be public charges and contains provision for the
deportation of individuals who become public charges within five years--unless they require aid for reasons that
developed after entry. Effective enforcement of these provisions helps minimize the number of legal immigrants who
need or depend on public assistance.
Refugees
Let me conclude with a few words about refugees and their eligibility for SSI. The Commission currently is undertaking
a full examination of the domestic assistance program for refugees resettled in the United States. My remarks here are
more personal, based on fifteen years of work on refugee issues, rather than on behalf of the Commission. The high rate
of welfare dependency has been a concern to all of us who have interest in maintaining a strong U.S. commitment to
refugee admissions. Certainly, many refugees become economically self-sufficient and important contributors to our
economy and broader society. However, a significant proportion of refugees continue to receive public assistance many
years after their entry. Some refugees clearly need significant levels and periods of assistance. It is unreasonable to
assume that an elderly, seriously traumatized refugee will become self-supporting. Barring that person from eligibility
for SSI after a specified period undermines the humanitarian nature of our original decision to admit him or her. But,
many more refugees are dependent on public programs, including SSI, than can be explained by the presence of this
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relatively small number of seriously disabled victims of persecution.
Welfare reform provides an opportunity to revisit the refugee assistance program. So, too, does the expected change in
the number and composition of refugee admissions once resettlement has wound down in the two major, Cold War-
related programs for admission of refugees from the former Soviet Union and Southeast Asia. I hope that the Congress
will give the Commission time to finish our investigation and consultations with the Executive Branch, private
resettlement agencies, state governments, and others before adopting changes in SSI or AFDC policy that could have
significant ramifications for refugee resettlement.
I will be glad to answer any questions.
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Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, I want to thank you for inviting me to testify here today, and I also want to
welcome you--those of you who are not Californians--to the State of California. I know that Randy Cunningham agrees
with me that it is a good thing when committees of the Congress come back to the rest of the nation to see the effects of
the policies which you enact in our behalf. It is especially fitting that you are here in San Diego to examine immigration
policies. We all hope that you learn something while you are here, and all of us Californians will be glad to help you in
that endeavor.
My name is Harold Ezell. I am President of the Ezell Group, which is an international financial and business consulting
firm based in Newport Beach. Years ago, I founded a chain of restaurants, so I have considerable real-world business
experience. Based in part on that experience, President Ronald Reagan appointed me to be Western Regional
Commissioner for the INS. While I was Western Commissioner, we implemented the Immigration Reform and Control
Act, including both the amnesty provisions and sanctions on employers who knowingly hire illegal aliens.
I left the INS after the Reagan administration to return to the private sector--gratefully--but I have stayed active in the
immigration debate. In 1992, the House Republican Leadership appointed me to serve on the U.S. Commission on
Immigration Reform, which is a bipartisan Congressional advisory commission. It is important to hear that word
"bipartisan," because immigration isn't a partisan political issue. All of the Commission's recommendations have been
unanimous, or with only one dissenter. This from a nine-member Commission with Reagan Republicans and Tip O'Neill
Democrats on it, who don't agree on anything--except on how important it is to preserve our heritage as a nation of
immigrants dedicated to the rule of law.
The American people are fed up with illegal immigration. It is against the law, and I would remind you that every one of
us who has served in public office takes an oath to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. If thefederal government
was doing its job to stop illegal immigration, there would never have been a need for Prop 187, which was supported by
an overwhelming majority of California voters, nearly 60 percent.
I am speaking here in my capacity as a member of the Commission on Immigration Reform. In our first report to
Congress in September 1994, entitled U.S. Immigration Policy: Restoring Credibility, we sought to recommend a
comprehensive strategy to faithfully execute the laws against illegal immigration. We chose to focus much of that report
on controlling illegal immigration.
Now, let me be clear about this: illegal aliens do come here and use welfare and other public benefits programs. They do
send their kids to our schools, and have babies in our hospitals. Those are very serious matters, and they impose costs on
the taxpayer. But I am here to tell you, that the reason most illegal aliens come here can be summed up in three little
words: They get jobs.
Reducing the employment magnet has to be the linchpin of a comprehensive strategy to reduce illegal immigration. Jobs
are the attraction. So the only effective way to deter illegal immigration must include the worksite.
Better border enforcement is necessary, but not sufficient. In this San Diego Sector alone, apprehensions in fiscal 1995
were more than 524,000. You can police the border, you can certainly manage it better, but border enforcement has its
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limits.
Visa overstayers make up fully half of the influx of illegal aliens who take up permanent residence here illegally every
year. That is 150,000 out of 300,000 new illegal aliens who remain here permanently every year, on top of an illegal
population that is already close to 5 million. No amount of border enforcement can solve that half of the problem--the
people who enter legally, and then do not leave when they should.
We simply must develop a better system for verifying work authorization. That is central to effective enforcement of
employer sanctions.
The I-9 process we have now is doubly-flawed. It does not do what it was supposed to do, namely deter the employment
of illegal aliens. What it does do, we do not want--namely, make businesses do paperwork, while creating all kinds of
opportunities for fraud and forgeries. It may even provide an excuse for, if it does not actually provoke, discrimination
against workers who happen to look or sound foreign.
Honest employers are caught between the proverbial rock and a hard place. Because the system is based on documents,
employers are placed in a position of making judgments many do not feel qualified to make.
If an employer accepts false documents presented by an unauthorized worker, that employer is vulnerable to employer
sanctions for having hired someone under false pretences, regardless of the fact that they may well have been fooled
themselves. Yet if an employer chooses to doubt particular documents, and asks for more from some workers and not
from others, that is discrimination.
The Commission believes that the way to develop a better system of worksite verification is immediately to test the
most promising option. After examining a wide range of alternatives, the Commission concluded that the most
promising option for secure, nondiscriminatory verification is a computerized registry based on the Social Security
Number.
For decades, all workers have been required to provide employers with their Social Security Number. We want to
replace the I-9, this paper chase that doesn't do anybody any good, with a single electronic step to validate information
every worker must already provide.
The Commission believes electronic validation of the Social Security Number is the most promising option because it
holds great potential for accomplishing the following:
Reduction in the potential for fraud. Using a computerized registry, rather than relying on documents, guards
against counterfeits.
Reduction in the potential for discrimination. All workers must present the same information to be validated.
Reduction in the time, resources and paperwork spent by employers in complying with IRCA. INS
employees who now chase paper could be redirected to chase down those who knowingly hire illegal workers.
The Commission believes that the computer registry will be preferable to other ways of addressing the problems in the
current system. I recently looked at the Telephone Verification System, called TVS, which the INS has been testing.
The INS is expanding this test, first from 9 to 200 sites, and eventually to 1,000 sites. I have seen ther system in place
and working. It is very effective and accurate. Now, you should look at what the businesses that have used TVS say.
They like it. They find that it works. We support this INS effort--but only as an interim measure. It is not the solution.
But it shows the way to a solution.
The fatal flaw in the TVS system is that it ultimately depends on self-attestation. Workers are asked whether they are
citizens or aliens. It is simply not sound law enforcement to rely on lawbreakers to tell the truth.
But the reaction from the real business that have used it shows that we can develop a better system for worksite
verification. When you get back to Washington, don't be snowed by the inside-the-Beltway types who are going to try to
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sell you a line about how this is some scheme to take away our liberties and impose costs on the taxpayer. What they
want is to let employers hire illegal aliens--and that undermines our liberties and imposes huge costs on the taxpayer.
The Commission also looked at the feasibility and effectiveness of reducing the number of documents used in
verification. Again, we support such efforts as interim measures. But the fatal flaw here is the vulnerability of all
documents to counterfeiting. We heard expert testimony that any document, even the most tamper-proof ones, can be
forged so well that only experts can identify the fakes. Employers cannot be expected to identify counterfeit documents.
The Commission recognizes that the computer registry cannot and should not be implemented nationally without
substantial testing.
The Commission recommends that pilot projects be undertaken in the five highimpact states--California, Texas, Florida,
New York and Illinois--because that is where the bulk of the illegal alien problem is. We also recommend that, in time,
the pilots should be extended to several less-affected states. But we did not recommend that the registry be tested
throughout all of the five states immediately, nor even in all of any one of the states. Pilot projects should start small. At
each step, we should have results to determine what to do next.
Second, there must be objective, systematic evaluation of the pilot programs. This Commission expects to have
meaningful results from the initial phase of pilot testing by 1997. We will incorporate these results in our final report to
Congress. We intend to make an informed recommendation on whether that system should be implemented nationwide,
with particular attention to civil liberties and privacy concerns. The features of pilot programs should include:
A means by which employers will access the verification system to validate the accuracy of information
given by workers. We received conflicting testimony about the best way to ascertain that a new hire is who he or
she claims to be. Some believe that the tamper-resistant driver's licenses now being issued by many states can do
the job; others strongly advocate testing a more secure Social Security card.
But it is also possible that electronic validation through a telephone system would require no document at all.
Every ATM system uses a PIN number to protect our money. We should test to see if personal information, such
as the mother's maiden name and date of birth, that is already part of the Social Security database, can serve the
same function for worksite verification.
Measures to ensure the accuracy of the necessary data. Improvements must be made in both the INS and
Social Security Administration databases to ensure that employers have timely and reliable access to what they
need. Frankly, no one can be opposed to improving the reliability of the data in these agencies. There is no
protection of liberty in government error.
Measures to ensure against discrimination. One key to the Commission's recommendation is that employers
would no longer have to ascertain whether a worker is a citizen or an alien, native-born or an immigrant. All
workers would have to present the same information to be validated.
Measures to protect civil liberties. Explicit protections should be devised to ensure that the registry is only used
for its intended purposes. The Commission believes that electronically validating the Social Security Number
could be used to ascertain eligibility for public benefits, without damage to civil liberties, because everyone
receiving public assistance must already present a Social Security Number just as they do for work. But the
registry is not to be used for routine identification purposes, and there must be penalties for inappropriate use of
the verification process. The Commission's unanimous, unequivocal view is that no one should be required to
carry a document and produce it on demand to prove their right to be here.
Measures to protect privacy. Explicit provisions also must be built into the system to safeguard individual
privacy. The information contained in the registry will be minimal, given its limited purpose. But the Commission
is aware that while access to any one piece of information may not be intrusive, in combination with other
information, it can lead to privacy violations.
Estimates of the start-up time and financial and other costs. The Social Security Administration made
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preliminary estimates for the Commission of its cost for pilot projects: $4 million over the first two years for
design and development; and annual costs of maintenance and operation of $32 million. Discrepancies referred to
the Social Security Administration were estimated to cost $122 million initially, and $30 million per year
thereafter. So the total cost of the registry over five years, according to the Social Security Administration, would
be approximately $300 million.
By way of comparison, the Urban Institute estimates that illegal aliens cost seven states more than $2.1 billion a
year. Spending $300 million over five years to save $2 billion each year is a sound investment.
But the INS cost must be added to the SSA estimate. The Clinton Administration's latest budget request calls for
$28.3 million for verification systems pilots, although this also includes the expanded TVS program. The bulk of
the INS cost, however, will be cleaning up their own data, which should be done regardless of the pilot projects to
improve worksite verification.
Specification of the rights, responsibilities and impact on individual workers and employers. In particular,
the Commission recommendation for false negatives is that no one--no one--should be fired if their employer does
not get a validation code from the registry after hiring. It is entirely possible that a new hire has merely given their
Social Security Number wrong. There is no one who has a greater incentive to correct errors, whether they are at
the INS or the Social Security Administration, than a legitimate worker who has just learned from the registry that
there is a problem. Such problems should be corrected, anyway. I pay into the Social Security system. I want to be
sure that the number I have been using is correct. I do not want it misappropriated by an illegal alien.
A plan for phasing-in the system. Pilot projects should test various methods for phasing in improvements in
worksite verification, according to the test results.
Objective measures and procedures must be included to determine whether current problems related to fraud,
discrimination and excessive paperwork requirements for employers are effectively overcome without imposing undue
costs on the government, employers, or employees. The evaluation should pay particular attention to the effectiveness of
the measures used to protect civil liberties and privacy.
The Commission also recommends reducing the fraudulent access to so-called "breeder documents," particularly birth
certificates, that can be used to establish an identity in this country. We recommend these steps:
Standardized application form for birth certificates;
Interstate and intrastate matching of birth and death records;
Only certified copies of birth certificates issued by states should be accepted by federal agencies;
Standard design and paperstock for all certified copies of birth certificates to reduce counterfeiting;
Encouraging states to computerize birth records depositories.
The Commission also recommends imposition of greater penalties on those producing or selling fraudulent documents.
RICO provisions to facilitate racketeering investigations also should cover conspiracy to produce and sell fraudulent
documents.
Those are the Commission's recommendations on worksite verification. They are a part of a comprehensive approach to
immigration reform that this Commission is developing. As you know, the Commission has also made
recommendations on the national interest in legal immigration to deliver promptly on our top priorities of skilled
immigration and uniting nuclear families.
The key to our work so far has been that, through intense discussions and study, we have managed to arrive at a
bipartisan consensus. We hope to continue that record in a systematic evaluation of what our immigration policy should
be in the twentyfirst century. In that effort, we appreciated this Committee's important role in Congressional
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consideration of our work.
I will be glad to answer any questions.
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I would like to thank the Subcommittee for inviting the Commission to testify today. As you know, we are a bipartisan
Commission. There are now eight members, evenly divided between those appointed by the Republican and Democratic
leaderships of the House and the Senate. The Congress has mandated that this Commission examine some of the most
contentious issues on the national agenda, and we have tried to do that in a serious, objective, and professional way.
Our recommendations on illegal immigration were unanimous: nine to zero. Those on legal immigration reform were
unanimous-less-one: eight to one. It is in that spirit that I would like to focus my own remarks, not only as a member of
the Commission, but also as a professional demographer.
The Commission believes that properly-regulated legal immigration serves our national interests in many ways, and it
supports the basic framework of current immigration policy based on family unification, employment, and refugee
resettlement. But we are convinced that the current legal immigration system is not properly regulated and that it
requires major reform to ensure that actual admissions continue to serve our national interest.
At any level of immigration, there are costs as well as benefits. This is particularly true because immigration does not
impact uniformly on the nation. The bulk of immigration affects just a handful of states and, in many of those states, it
affects particular communities and regions most strongly. And, like many things, much of the costs tend to be
immediate while the benefits may take many years or decades.
So it is necessary to strike a balance. We believe that the way to serve the national interest best is first to set priorities--
and I know how politically difficult this can be--and then to implement policies that effectively deliver on these
priorities.
We did not conclude that the national interest requires substantial immediate cuts in legal immigration. Nor did we see
any imperative for increasing legal immigration. The priorities should drive the numbers, not the reverse. As you will
hear from my colleague Larry Fuchs in a moment, we believe that the current system simply does not deliver on the
nation's top immigration priorities.
We all know that current U.S. immigration law essentially provides both U.S. citizens and recent immigrants with an
entitlement to apply for immigrant visas for their foreign family members. Unhappily, this system fails the basic test of
truth in advertising. For there is an enormous disparity between the entitlement to apply and the right to receive. The
result is truly enormous backlogs.
As you know, this disparity was greatly exacerbated by the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act that, due to
widespread fraud, ended up legalizing far more illegal aliens than promised (nearly three million). All of these millions
of legalized illegal aliens rapidly became entitled to petition for immigrant visas for their family members, in turn
producing a skyrocketing backlog of such applications. But it is simply false to argue (as some advocates have done
without the slightest embarrassment) that the existence of backlogs is a one-time phenomenon that can be managed
without establishing some clear priorities. As you will shortly hear in some detail, unless substantial reforms are
implemented by you in the Congress, we can expect very sizeable backlogs to continue--indeed to grow substantially,
and indefinitely, into the foreseeable future.
Testimony of Michael S. Teitelbaum, May 16, 1996
051696.html[6/13/17, 3:08:07 PM]
Along with these growing backlogs, we can also expect to see significant increases in the numbers of legal immigrants
actually admitted through the remainder of this century. After the turn of the next century, these much higher
admissions numbers seem likely to begin to taper down, but to levels that will still be higher than at present. And it's
only fair to tell you that this projection of long-term downturn is far less firm than that of the earlier upturn; as in all
projections, the further out one goes, the less seriously one should take them.
Overall, I don't find fault with the INS' revised projections of what will happen if the Congress declines to reset
immigration priorities. You should expect increased admissions of legal immigrants, up more than 200,000 from the
720,000 recorded in 1995, to about 950,000 two years later (I've allowed a constant 100,000 visas for refugee and
asylum admissions, which for some reason are not included in the INS projections), and then tapering downward to
levels averaging about 820,000 in the out-years. To paraphrase Mark Twain, news of declining trends in legal
immigration has been greatly exaggerated.
What is most important is that, despite these significant increases in the overall level of legal immigration, current
policies will also succeed in producing ever-increasing petitions for immigration visas that are unlikely to be available.
This policy-by-inaction will produce two highly undesirable results: more separated nuclear families; and continuing
and substantial increases in the already unacceptably large and long waiting lists for brothers and sisters, which now
stretch out to time scales beyond all acceptability.
The Commission concluded that neither a major increase nor a major decrease in total immigration numbers is needed
during the next several years. Over the coming decade, the U.S. can sustain current levels of immigration, that is, about
700,000 per year, without damage or undue costs to our economy or our society. What we determined, however, was
that we need to have a major reprioritization of our admission categories.
That is exactly what the Commission recommended--a transfer of visas now used to admit adult children, siblings and
"diversity" immigrants into a backlog clearance program to admit more expeditiously those we considered to be the
highest priority--spouses and minor children. Once priorities were so reset, and the now-large backlogs in highest
priority categories were eliminated, immigration would fall back to the levels we saw only a decade ago, before passage
of the 1986 and 1990 immigration acts--about 550,000 admissions per year--and new backlogs would not be created.
We recommended further that Congress re-assess immigration levels and priorities every three to five years to allow
sensible adjustments as conditions change.
Let me add one personal note. The press stories I have seen suggest that some Members of Congress were angrily
surprised to learn late last month that the INS had all along been projecting that the recent declines in legal immigration
it was then actively reporting would be quite temporary and soon would reverse themselves into substantial increases. I
expect that some of the journalists and editors (at the Washington Post and the Los Angeles Times, for example) who
published naive stories about a declining trend in legal immigration--some seemingly based upon the INS press release
of March 28, 1996 headlined "U.S. Legal Immigration Down 10.4 Percent in 1995"--may also feel a bit snookered.
The truth is that data on immigration, and the factors that affect them, are very complicated and nuanced critters.
Moreover, as a demographer, I know how difficult it is to do intelligent demographic projections and how sensitive
these are to choices that must be made about key assumptions. Immigration projections are demographic projections
"with bells on," i.e., subject to further uncertainties, such as future trends in naturalization and rates of petitioning by
relatives and employers.
For these reasons, I think it would be helpful to the Congress to have some independent means for assessing both
current immigration data and alternative projections of future immigration levels and patterns, much the way the
Congressional Budget Office provides an independent assessment of budget issues.
I am not sure of what would be the optimal location of such an independent, analytical capacity, which need not be at all
large (a single part-time analyst with sophistication would be quite sufficient). It could be in the Congressional Research
Service, or in the Congressional Budget Office itself. I do not think it should be a Commission, which has a limited life,
nor do I think this sort of scholarly, objective analysis is the sort of thing on which Congressional committees can be
expected to devote their very limited in-house staff resources.
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But clearly, it is important to plan future immigration policy based on some general knowledge of what current patterns
of immigration actually are and what different factors mean for future admissions, including the impact of naturalization
on demand for visas in all family-based categories. It would be a very great disservice to the nation if immigration data
were to become a matter for dispute or suspicion between the parties or between the Executive and Legislative branches.
Perhaps the surest way to avoid that is for Congress to have its own independent source of such expertise.
Thank you for your kind attention.
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I appreciate your asking both the Republican and the Democrat-appointed vice chairs of the Commission to testify
today. Although it is impossible in a democracy to keep partisanship wholly out of any major issue in a national debate,
we on the Commission, under Barbara Jordan's leadership, have striven to do just that, and I believe we have succeeded.
You have asked us to testify on recent projections for the levels of legal immigration in the next several years. The
revised projections that were announced by the INS a few weeks ago are consistent with the basic calculations that this
Commission used in making our recommendations on the priorities for legal immigration in June of last year. In a
moment, our Executive Director, Susan Martin, will explain the details of the informal projections on which the
Commission based our discussions, with particular emphasis on the backlogs for spouses and minor children of legal
permanent residents and for the brothers and sisters of U.S. citizens.
The important question to ask about these projections for future immigration is: Do they show that we are delivering on
our priorities for legal immigration?
There are two points to be made about the subject of priorities.
First, it is clearly in the national interest--as a matter of priority--to re-unify nuclear families in their new homes in this
country as quickly as possible. It is clearly not in the national interest to keep immigrants in the United States separated
from their spouses and minor children. You will hear from Susan Martin's testimony that, without the legal immigration
reforms recommended by the Commission, the separation of nuclear families will become a lasting feature of U.S.
immigration policy.
Second, as long as our system for legal immigration fails to recognize human nature--that the relationship between
spouses and minor children is felt to be closer, and more important, than the relationship between more extended family
members--we will encourage illegal immigration.
Indeed, many of the opponents of legal immigration reform in both the House and Senate argued that most of these
spouses and minor children are already in the United States. That is true. Some are here illegally. They could have
remained separated from husbands, wives, and small children outside the U.S. That would have complied with the law,
but it also would have defied human realities. They chose to disobey the law to keep their immediate families together.
Moreover, we should not ignore the rest of the problem. There are more than 300,000 spouses and young children
separated by U.S. law, a number that will increase substantially over the next several years unless we take action. They
obey the law and so cannot enter the United States as a whole family. Those who are from countries such as India,
Korea, and Taiwan cannot even obtain a visitor's visa because of their pending application as immigrants. I hope that
this Committee will meet with members of the organization called Professionals for Spousal Reunification. This
Commission did, and heard from them about the lengthy separations of husbands and wives living abroad that are
imposed by this failure to implement priorities in U.S. law, a failure that serves no national interest whatsoever.
None of this is to say that brothers and sisters and their spouses and children or adult children, whether married or
unmarried, are not part of the family. Nor do we say that they are not capable of making important contributions to the
U.S. as immigrants. But this is a question of priorities. It is more a question of priorities than of numbers.
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As my colleague Michael Teitelbaum just said, the Commission recommended that legal immigration at a level of about
700,000 over the next five to eight years is in the national interest, as long as priorities are established and implemented.
The one dissenter to our Commission consensus argued that we could accomplish these goals at current levels or by
increasing levels of legal immigration, provided that the siblings and adult children wait longer. But the Commission
disagreed by a vote of eight to one.
So as you debate the impact of higher levels of legal immigration, please bear in mind the Commission's view that the
critical question is: What are our priorities for legal immigration? It is our view as a Commission that those priorities
should dictate the numbers to a considerable extent.
Thank you.
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In my testimony, I try to provide a framework for examining the evolution of the essential characteristics of American
nationality and citizenship. I will make a few specific recommendations and general comments on strengthening the
meaning of citizenship.
There are usually three qualities that make up a sense of nationhood: a founding myth that explains the origins and
purpose of the nation; a compelling narrative that tells a story about the core values that emanate from that myth and the
heroes and heroines of that story; and finally, rituals that remind the people of that story, embodying the myth, its
values, its heroes and heroines, and symbols.
Founding myths, accounting for the origins of a nation and explaining its destiny, usually are tribal (based on genealogy
or blood) as with the Abraham story in the Old Testament (God told Abraham to create a new nation) or the tale of
Theseus, the mythical Athenian king who defeated the horrible Minotaur of Crete and united twelve small independent
states of Attica, making Athens the capital of the new state. The foundation of Rome was attributed to Romulus, son of
Mars, the god of war, who, after having been raised with his brother Remus by a she-wolf, conquered the Sabines and
built a new city on the Tiber River on the spot where their lives had been saved. Japan, according to its traditional
founding myth, was established because a favorite descendent of the Sun Goddess created the Japanese islands and
became the first Emperor, from whom all emperors are descended.
Early in its history, spokesmen for the new American nation explained that the U.S. was created as a nation in which
individual liberty, opportunity, and reward for individual achievement would prosper. This powerful new myth provided
an ideological rationalization for the selfish interest early settlers had in recruiting European immigrants to claim the
land, fight Indians, and later to work in the mines and factories. It became the founding myth of a new political culture,
uniting white Americans from different religious and national backgrounds, and later others who were not white, in a
sense of shared American nationhood. Belief in the myth motivated Americans to create new political institutions and
practices that Alexis de Tocqueville, an early nineteenth century French visitor, saw as encouraging a patriotism that
grew "by the exercise of civil rights." What he called the "patriotism of a republic" was based on the premise that it is
possible to interest men and women in the welfare of their country by making them participants in its government and
by so doing to enlist their enthusiastic loyalty to a national community. Here, the feeling of "we-ness" that is usually
based on similar physical characteristics, language, or religion (or a combination of them) was replaced by a belief in
the myth itself and the values, heroes and heroines, symbols and rituals revolving around the idea of freedom. It was this
civic culture that replaced a more tribal culture as a basis of nationhood and appeared to teach men and women to work
together with those "who otherwise would have always lived apart."
They myth and its values were embodied in a narrative, beginning with the American Revolution. The narrative tells of
the struggle to enlarge freedom for an increasing number of persons regardless of their national origin, color, or religion.
It recalls the Civil War, the Second World War against Nazism, the civil rights revolution of the 1960s and 1970s, the
continuing immigrant saga, and the successful defense of freedom and democracy against the Soviet Union and its
totalitarian system of government.
This American story about the struggle for freedom-freedom sought, freedom thwarted, freedom won, and freedom
enlarged-includes oppression, exploitation, and terrible harm against those whom the insiders thought of as outsiders.
But the main story line is clear: a long-term expansion of freedom-a continual rebirth of freedom (to use Lincoln's
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words), although often interrupted. That sense of continuing renewal is reflected in part in the slogans of the twentieth
century activist presidents, such as "The New Freedom" (Wilson), "The New Deal" (Franklin D. Roosevelt), "The Fair
Deal" (Truman), "The New Frontier" (Kennedy), "The Great Society" (Johnson), and "The New Beginning" (Reagan).
The American story relies heavily on texts that are often treated as though they are sacred: the Declaration of
Independence; the Constitution, and especially its Bill of Rights and Fourteenth Amendment; Lincoln's Gettysburg
Address and Second Inaugural Address; and Martin Luther King's "I have a dream" speech.
The preamble to the Constitution calls upon Americans to "form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure
domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of
Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity. . . ." More than any other nation, Americans have emphasized liberty as its
central value. Liberty was grounded in what they called the equality of every person under God, a belief asserted in the
Declaration of Independence:
We hold these truth to be self evident, that all men [and women] are created equal, that they are endowed by their
Creator with certain unalienable rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness.
By emphasizing equal rights in a nation that authorized slavery, the founders introduced a profound moral ambiguity
that some argue has not yet been entirely resolved. The idea of equality became as compelling as that of liberty in
American political discourse, but its meaning is less clear. Liberty meant freedom from government interference to the
founders and still retains essentially that meaning. But what does equality mean? Does it mean social equality, equality
under the laws, equality of opportunity, equality of condition-or some combination of them? Equality, in all its many
meanings, took on great significance in the rhetoric of public live and social discourse and even in family life in
America.
The American narrative is also about the tension between the values of liberty and quality. Much of the debate in
American domestic politics is about society's obligation to promote equality of opportunity for those who are born to
inherently unequal conditions. Those who are suspicious about public policies that attempt to do that point out that
equality of opportunity implies the opportunity to compete with and rise about others and to be rewarded for one's
successful efforts. The opposite view holds that without government intervention, equality of opportunity can have little
meaning for those born to economically or otherwise disadvantaged circumstances. However, much Americans differ in
the debate as to how they should promote equality of opportunity, most of them deeply cherish equality of opportunity
as an American value.
In recent years, the political debate has focused increasingly on the role of government in providing equality of
opportunity through policies that give particular recognition to the claims of members of groups who have suffered (and
many say continue to suffer) restricted opportunity because they are women, African-Americans, or members of other
designated minority groups. The very fact that disadvantage is presumed to be a condition that inheres in membership in
such groups regardless of one's individual circumstances (health, wealth, education of parents, family situation) has
given new meaning to the question of the relationship of the pluribus to the unum. Group membership has become an
increasingly powerful way of defining individual identity, and public policies now go beyond equality under the law in
recognizing gender, color, and national origin as a basis for what is usually called affirmative action regardless of
individual circumstances. In addition, some members of groups designated as disadvantaged claim a status of inherited
victimization that deepens their sense of grievance against the political and economic system that they see as dominated
by white males. As a result, much of the current debate about multiculturalism revolves around their insistence on
having their separateness acknowledged and affirmed in public policy generally, including education. Some, including
even white males, reject the idea of a common culture, even a common political culture, as long as members of certain
groups cannot show aggregate (group) results in economic, educational, and political attainment equal to that of white
males.
Others see in this view of American life a danger to the value of liberty itself. They ask what freedom means if not the
freedom to assert one's individuality regardless of inherited group status. What does it mean unless one is free to cross
group boundaries regardless of one's color or inherited religion or nationality? What, they ask, will happen under the
strains of increasing diversity if those who live, work, and vote in this country begin to think of themselves first and
foremost as members of separate groups and not as Americans?
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My own view is more optimistic than these questions imply. I agree with those who believe that the tension between the
claims of the pluribus and the requirements of the unum can be resolved in a nation that values both liberty and equality,
but only if we pay at least as much attention to the requirements of the unum as to the histories, sensibilities, and claims
of the pluribus.
I think that serious scholars of this subject of Americanization are in virtually unanimous agreement that civic virtue and
good citizenship in the United States has nothing to do with race or ethnicity, despite the burgeoning claims of
polemicists to the contrary. That conclusion is demonstrated overwhelmingly by the evidence during these past 250
years. To argue that whites or Anglo-Americans have been more devoted to principles of liberty and justice for all flies
in the face of the facts.
American values are accessible to anyone, regardless of race, religion, or ancestral background, precisely because our
most important principle is the equal protection of the laws for all, regardless of race, religion, or national origin. That is
the genius of the system, which must be protected and nourished.
A robust idea of American citizenship depends on a widespread understanding and appreciation-and even celebration-of
the American constitutional system, its symbols and rituals, its heroes and heroines.
I believe there are several things that can be done to encourage that robust sense of citizenship for native-born and
naturalized citizens. Here are six of them:
First, an all-out commitment to the renewal of American civic education in our schools and communities;
Second, a steady modification and ultimate abandonment of the dangerous notion of group rights as embodied in
the harder forms of affirmative action, including abandonment by the year 2010 of the current racial categories in
the U.S. census;
Third, an all-out commitment to use the best pedagogic methods available to make certain that no one graduates
from eighth grade without being able to speak, read, and write English effectively;
Fourth, an expanded commitment for English language training for adults who need and want it;
Fifth, a change in our naturalization oath and naturalization requirements, making the oath simpler and more
appropriate, and making the requirements more meaningful;
Sixth, a stronger commitment than ever to making equality of the laws and equality of opportunity real for the
poorest and otherwise most vulnerable of our citizens.
What do I mean by a commitment to civic education? I believe the Secretary of Education should call a conference of
state educational leaders to examine the possibility of developing a common core civic curriculum. I don't mean
curriculum just for one grade level in a civics course, although that could and should be a part of it. I mean that our
schools should teach the essential of American history and constitutional principles repeatedly at different grade levels
in appropriate ways. I also mean that the Pledge of Allegiance should be recited and discussed. What does the goal of
liberty and justice for all mean? What do we mean by majority rule and individual rights?
I mean putting the pictures of George Washington, Abraham Lincoln, and Franklin Delano Roosevelt back on the
schoolroom walls and teaching how their roles in the Revolution, the Civil War, and World War II relate to the
Declaration of Independence, Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, and FDR's Four Freedoms in the American search to
expand the meaning of liberty and justice for all.
I mean a curriculum that nourishes civic virtue in action by including community service, as a number of schools now
do. I mean a curriculum that encourages all Americans, not just those in the schools, to think about the meaning of
Independence Day, Thanksgiving, Memorial Day, and Martin Luther King's birthday. And whatever happened to "I Am
An American Day?" Lets bring it back. What a wonderful occasion for naturalization ceremonies, community service,
and local competition for young essayists to say what being an American means to them.
Throughout most of American history, Independence Day, July 4th, was the most important national holiday. Different
ethnic groups often combined their celebration of American independence and the and the values of American life in
their own particular way. In the 1880s in Worcester, Massachusetts, the Ancient Order of the Hibernians, an Irish
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nationalist society, held a picnic on July 4th in which the exuberance of the Irish served both as a preservation of Irish
customs and a defense of American freedoms. Independence Day in Worcester in the 1890s attracted a large proportion
of the Swedish-American population, who began with services at one of eight Swedish Protestant churches and ended at
the picnic with patriotic speeches, sometimes in Swedish. All the ethnic groups of Worcester used Independence Day as
an opportunity to express their own ethnic identity even as they celebrated American freedoms.
As new immigrant-ethnic groups claimed an American identity for themselves, a great many Anglo-Saxon Protestants,
particularly in New England, thought of Independence Day as their special holiday. When President Ulysses S. Grant
and key members of his cabinet joined the centennial celebration of the beginning of the American revolution at
Concord and Lexington, Massachusetts, on April 19, 1875, they listened to speeches made only by illustrious Anglo-
Americans, including some of the great poets of New England. The master of ceremonies of the festive day in
Lexington reminded the audience that all of the foreign heroes at Lexington and Concord had English names.
Then the Anglo-Americans, especially in New England, thought of themselves as the charter members of the Republic.
Americans from other backgrounds were relative newcomers, and persons of color were still treated essentially as
outsiders by those who held governmental and economic power, despite the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth
Amendments to the Constitution. A few years after the centennial, their position as outsiders would be more sharply
defined. Blacks in the south would be subjugated, for the most part, to a segregated rural working class-sharecroppers,
for the most part. Chinese laborers would be excluded from immigrating to the United States, and an Act was passed in
1887 by the Congress to break up native American Indian lands and assimilate the Indians.
One hundred years later, the bicentennial of the Revolution was celebrated by emphasizing American diversity. That
was also true of the centennial of the Statue of Liberty, the bicentennial of the Constitution, and the celebration of the
restoration of Ellis Island. Ethnicity had become central to the American story-to the way Americans looked at
themselves and presented themselves to the world. On the mall of the nation's capital on July 4th, 1983, the National
Symphony was conducted by a Russian refugee, Mstlav Rostropovich, who played the distinctive American music of
Jewish-American composers George Gerswhin and Aaron Copeland. Arias from Porgy and Bess were sung by the great
American black singer, Leontyne Price. "A Lincoln Portrait" was narrated by the black American baseball player Willie
Stargell. Newcomer Americans from at least two dozen Asian, African, and Latin American countries tapped and
drummed to "The Star and Stripes Forever," composed by the Portuguese-American, John Philp Sousa.
The Fourth of July emphasizes national independence and personal freedom. Thanksgiving, which has become the other
major holiday of America's civic culture, also offers an opportunity for celebrating e pluribus unum. The theme of
Thanksgiving, proclaimed by George Washington in 1789 and again by President Lincoln in 1863 as a national holiday
memorializing the 1621 feast of thanks given by Pilgrims (who did not call themselves Pilgrims or wear tall hats or
black suits with wide collars or eat turkey) at Plymouth, still retained a more or less religious appreciation of the
benefits of freedom and opportunity in the U.S. But in the 1970s and 1980s, Thanksgiving became another occasion for
the celebration of ethnic diversity. In 1976, The New York Times told of an Italian family who ate a Thanksgiving
dinner as they imagined Columbus might have had. A Russian-American family featured a Russian dessert made from
cranberries; a Chinese-American family ate Peking duck instead of turkey; and an Austrian-American family feasted on
braised turkey and white beans. A Boston Globe story in 1985 told of Cambodians, Vietnamese, and Laotians
celebrating Thanksgiving at a feast sponsored by the Jewish Vocational Service. There, the refugee families ate fiery
nuk chau sauce and cha gio egg rolls along with their roast turkey, cranberry sauce, and pumpkin pie.
By 1986, a writer for The New York Times concluded that "as an American holiday, Thanksgiving's universality must
lie in its ability to welcome succeeding generation of immigrant to these shores." She wrote of Haitians, Barbadians,
Jamaicans, Panamanians, and Trinidadians sitting down with family members for dinners that merged the culinary
traditions of their homeland cultures with those of the more traditional Thanksgiving. "For me," reported one second-
generation American of West Indian background, "Thanksgiving is a mixing of the black-American traditions with the
Caribbean."
A civic education curriculum does not denigrate ethnic and religious diversity in the United States. Far from it. It honors
it and even celebrates it. But it would not permit, as now occurs in many universities and some high schools, the
encouragement of ethnocentrism in the name of multiculturalism.
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I will skip a discussion my second point-the question of group rights as I have written about it extensively elsewhere.
There has been a tendency in American public discourse to speak of group rights as though they were civil rights. Civil
rights apply to individuals. We have no place in our constitutional system for group rights, except for native American
Indians and possibly ethnic Hawaiians, Aleuts, and Eskimos.
The importance of English seems self-evident. The more linguistically capable Americans are, the better. But English is
a must for anyone to participate substantially in the national political community or the enter the competition for
opportunities in a vast continental and global economy. English is an important sign of national identity. My immigrant,
orphan, illiterate grandmother could not write English or any other language until the day she died, and she was a
magnificent human being who raised eight dedicated, patriotic Americans. But her limited knowledge of English
restricted her chances-she never held any job except that of maid-and cut her off from many aspects of American life.
We need a national volunteer effort not just to teach children English, as called for by President Clinton, but also to
expand English teaching resources for adult immigrants and refugees.
The next recommendation-improving the naturalization test-is one I have not written or testified about before. The
present naturalization oath includes archaic language that takes away from its meaning. It reads:
I hereby declare, on oath, that I absolutely and entirely renounce and abjure all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign
prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty, of whom or which I have heretofore been a subject or citizen; that I will support
and defend the Constitution and laws of the United States of America against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I
will bear truth and allegiance to the same; that I will bear arms on behalf of the United States when required by the law;
that I will perform noncombattant service in the armed forces of the United States when required by the law; that I will
perform work of national importance under civilian direction when required by the law; and that I take this obligation
freely without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; so help me God.
It is amazing that the oath has held up as long as it has. But surely we can do something about such archaic language as
"abjure" and "fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate." One possibility would be:
I, (name), take this solemn oath (or "make this solemn affirmation) freely and without mental reservation or purpose of
evasion. My allegiance is to the United States of America above any other nation. I promise to support and honor the
Constitution and laws of my new country and their principles of liberty and justice for all. I pledge to defend them by
force of arms, noncombatant military service, or civilian work of national importance if necessary.
One might suspect that I am in favor of making naturalization easier by recommending a change in language. That is not
the case. I want the naturalization oath to be understood. I am concerned about any tendency to reduce further the civic
education and English language requirements for naturalization. There is considerable evidence that the naturalization
ceremony, when done with dignity, stimulates feelings of patriotic loyalty for newcomer citizens around basic values of
liberty and equality of opportunity. Newspaper accounts of naturalization swearing-in ceremonies repeatedly tell of the
enthusiasm with which these new citizens embrace them. A Russian-Jewish refugee from Kiev, who was one of ninety-
seven immigrants from twenty-eight countries sworn in as U.S. citizens at the Monticello home of Thomas Jefferson,
told a television reporter after his naturalization ceremony: "I believe the most important thing that brought me to this
country is the dream about the future of my kids, to grow them in a free country, to be independent, to be whatever they
want. . . . The United States. My land of opportunity." Another immigrant, this one from Vietnam, told a reporter after
the same ceremony: ". . . this is the best place . . . this is the best opportunity, in America." In El Paso, Texas, a new
Trinidadian-American said: "We feel there are more opportunities here for us and our family . . ."
Freedom to work and make a living is one of the inducements to become an American citizen. But the speeches made
by those who preside over naturalization ceremonies usually stress the importance of other freedoms. At many
ceremonies, naturalized citizens are given a copy of the Bill of Rights. And many new citizens respond. A newly-
naturalized, Cuban-American told reporters that becoming an American is the greatest thing "because here we can have
what everyone should have, and that means our human rights. In short, freedom."
We need to mobilize volunteer resources to support the naturalization work of the INS. I believe the presidential
leadership, with presidential leadership, with the cooperation of governors, mayors, civic and service organizations,
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universities, corporations, and labor unions, we can process naturalization expeditiously without demeaning its
significance. Panels of distinguished Americans from various walks of life can be enlisted as accredited volunteers to
participate in managing naturalization ceremonies.
I also believe we should consider requiring a variety of standardized written civics and history tests in English for
passing of the naturalization exam. This would cut down the time used in oral interviews and elevate the significance of
passing the exam by making standards more uniform. Exceptions could be made for compassionate reasons, as they are
now.
I will conclude by saying that if people living in poverty had heard my remarks up to this point, they would be likely to
think them utterly irrelevant to their own lives. Jacob Riis examined the relationship of civic virtue and citizenship to
poverty in 1902 in his book The Battle with the Slum. He wrote that where the slum flourishes unchallenged in the
cities, "citizen virtue," as a he called it, is starved. It is not enough, he wrote, to repeat that all men are created equal.
So let us remember that citizenship does not flourish in mean streets where unemployment, drive-by shootings and
crack cocaine are widespread. Nor is civic virtue helped by a hostile reception to immigrants. It does nothing to cultivate
a robust ideal of citizenship to categorically deny safety net welfare benefits to legal immigrants who need them through
no fault of their own or of their sponsors. Nor will civic virtue be promoted by denial of a public school education to the
children illegal aliens or by the modification of birthright citizenship.
Why do we care so much about citizenship in U.S.? I think it is because we were the first nation to say that citizenship is
not a question of complying with the wishes of the sovereign or a matter of blood. It is entirely voluntary. No
government can force it on you or take it away unless you lied to get it. It is a matter of our free will. That revolutionary
idea is at the heart of our experiment in self government. We believe that ordinary women and men, regardless of their
ancestry, can make a democratic republic work. This is not just an abstract issue: too much blood has been spilt in order
to make this idea a reality to everyone born in this country, regardless of race, ancestry, religion, or economic
circumstances.
Some of my friends are extremely worried about the fact that our constitutional system permits dual citizenship. I urge
them to keep in mind that loyalty cannot be compelled. The loyalty of subjects may be compelled, but not that of totally
free citizens. The power to win loyalty in this culture of voluntary citizenship has been demonstrated many times in
American history. Witness the extraordinary record of Japanese-Americans in the 442nd regimental combat team in
World War II. Note the story of Sergeant Jimmy Lopez, one of the American hostages held by Iran in 1980, who wrote
on the wall where he was imprisoned: "Viva el rojo, blanco e azul!" (Long live the red, white, and blue). Tell your
grandchildren the story of Guy Gabald�n a Mexican-American who won the silver star in the Second World War.
Raised in East Los Angles by a Japanese-American family who taught him to speak Japanese fluently, he won the medal
for persuading one thousand Japanese soldiers to surrender during the battle for the island of Saipan.
These stories illustrate the strength of our civic culture. But they do not mean we can be complacent. The civil culture
must be nourished. Attention must be paid. And Senator Simpson, you should be congratulated for doing just that.
Last update December 19, 1996
1997 USCIR Report to Congress - Executive Summary - Introduction
becoming/intro.html[6/13/17, 3:08:11 PM]
Becoming an American: 
Immigration and 
Immigrant Policy
INTRODUCTION
Immigration and immigrant policy is about immigrants, their families and the rest of us. It is about the meaning of
American nationality and the foundation of national unity. It is about uniting persons from all over the world in a
common civic culture.
The process of becoming an American is most simply called "Americanization," which must always be a two-way
street. All Americans, not just immigrants, should understand the importance of our shared civic culture to our national
community. This final report of the U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform makes recommendations to further the
goals of Americanization by setting out immigrant policies to help orient immigrants and their new communities, to
improve educational programs that help immigrants and their children learn English and civics, and to reinforce the
integrity of the naturalization process through which immigrants become U.S. citizens.
This report also makes recommendations regarding immigration policy. It reiterates the conclusions we reached in three
interim reports-on unlawful migration, legal immigration, and refugee and asylum policy-and makes additional
recommendations for reforming immigration policies. Further, in this report, the Commission recommends ways to
improve the structure and management of the federal agencies responsible for achieving the goals of immigration
policy. It is our hope that this final report Becoming An American: Immigration and Immigrant Policy, along with our
three interim reports, constitutes a full response to the work assigned the Commission by Congress: to assess the
national interest in immigration and report how it can best be achieved. 
MANDATE AND METHODS
Public Law 101-649, the Immigration Act of 1990, established this Commission to review and evaluate the impact of
immigration policy. More specifically, the Commission must report on the impact of immigration on: the need for labor
and skills; employment and other economic conditions; social, demographic, and environmental impact of immigration;
and impact of immigrants on the foreign policy and national security interests of the United States. The Commission
engaged in a wide variety of fact-finding activities to fulfill this mandate. Site visits were conducted throughout the
United States. Commission members visited immigrant and refugee communities in California, Texas, Florida, New
York, Massachusetts, Illinois, Arizona, Washington, Kansas, Virginia, Washington, DC, Puerto Rico and the
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands. We also visited such major source countries as Mexico, the
Dominican Republic, Cuba, Haiti, and the Philippines. To increase our understanding of international refugee policy
issues, we visited Bosnia, Croatia, Germany, and Kenya, and we consulted with Geneva-based officials from the U.N.
High Commission for Refugees and the International Organization for Migration. We held more than forty public
hearings, consultations with government and private sector officials, and expert roundtable discussions. 
IMMIGRATION TODAY
1
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The effects of immigration are numerous, complex, and varied.  Immigrants contribute in many ways to the United
States: to its vibrant and diverse communities; to its lively and participatory democracy; to its vital intellectual and
cultural life, to its renowned job-creating entrepreneurship and marketplaces; and to its family values and hard-work
ethic. However, there are costs as well as benefits from today's immigration. Those workers most at risk in our
restructuring economy low-skilled workers in production and service jobs are those who directly compete with today's
low-skilled immigrants. Further, immigration presents special challenges to certain states and local communities that
disproportionately bear the fiscal and other costs of incorporating newcomers.
Properly-regulated immigration and immigrant policy serves the national interest by ensuring the entry of those who
will contribute most to our society and helping lawful newcomers adjust to life in the United States. It must give due
consideration to shifting economic realities. A well-regulated system sets priorities for admission; facilitates nuclear
family reunification; gives U.S. employers access to a global labor market while ensuring that U.S. workers are not
displaced or otherwise adversely affected; and fulfills our commitment to resettle refugees as one of several elements of
humanitarian protection of the persecuted.
1  Please see the full report for a more detailed discussion of the economic, social, demographic, foreign policy, and national security implications
for U.S. immigration. 
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AMERICANIZATION AND INTEGRATION OF IMMIGRANTS
A DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND VALUES
Immigration to the United States has created one of the world's most successful multiethnic nations. We believe these
truths constitute the distinctive characteristics of American nationality:
American unity depends upon a widely-held belief in the principles and values embodied in the American
Constitution and their fulfillment in practice: equal protection and justice under the law; freedom of speech and
religion; and representative government;
Lawfully admitted newcomers of any ancestral nationality� without regard to race, ethnicity, or religion�truly
become Americans when they give allegiance to these principles and values;
Ethnic and religious diversity based on personal freedom is compatible with national unity; and
The nation is strengthened when those who live in it communicate effectively with each other in English, even as
many persons retain or acquire the ability to communicate in other languages.
As long as we live by these principles and help newcomers to learn and practice them, we will continue to be a nation
that benefits from substantial but well-regulated immigration. We must pay attention to our core values, as we have tried
to do in our recommendations throughout this report. Then, we will continue to realize the lofty goal of E Pluribus
Unum.2 
AMERICANIZATION
The Commission reiterates its call for the Americanization of new immigrants, that is the cultivation of a shared
commitment to the American values of liberty, democracy and equal opportunity.  The United States has fought for
the principles of individual rights and equal protection under the law, notions that now apply to all our residents. We
have long recognized that immigrants are entitled to the full protection of our Constitution and laws. And, the U.S. has
the sovereign right to impose obligations on immigrants.
In our 1995 report to Congress, the Commission called for a new commitment to Americanization. In a public speech
that same year, Barbara Jordan, our late chair, noted: "That word earned a bad reputation when it was stolen by racists
and xenophobes in the 1920s. But it is our word, and we are taking it back." Americanization is the process of
integration by which immigrants become part of our communities and by which our communities and the nation learn
from and adapt to their presence. Americanization means the civic incorporation of immigrants, that is the cultivation of
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a shared commitment to the American values of liberty, democracy, and equal opportunity.
The Commission proposes that the principles of Americanization be made more explicit through the covenant between
immigrant and nation. Immigrants become part of us, and we grow and become all the stronger for having embraced
them. In this spirit, the Commission sees the covenant as:
Voluntary. Immigration to the United States �a benefit to both citizens and immigrants� is not an entitlement
and Americanization cannot be forced.
Mutual and Reciprocal. Immigration presents mutual obligations. Immigrants must accept the obligations we
impose�to obey our laws, to pay taxes, to respect other cultures and ethnic groups. At the same time, citizens
incur obligations to provide an environment in which newcomers can become fully participating members of our
society.
Individual, Not Collective. The United States is a nation founded on the proposition that each individual is born
with certain rights and that the purpose of government is to secure these rights. The United States admits
immigrants as individuals (or individual members of families). As long as the United States continues to
emphasize the rights of individuals over those of groups, we need not fear that the diversity brought by
immigration will lead to ethnic division or disunity.
To help achieve full integration of newcomers, the Commission calls upon federal, state, and local governments to
provide renewed leadership and resources to a program to promote Americanization that requires:
Developing capacities to orient both newcomers and receiving communities;
Educating newcomers in English language skills and our core civic values; and
Revisiting the meaning and conferral of citizenship to ensure the integrity of the naturalization process.
ORIENTATION
The Commission recommends that the federal, state, and local governments take an active role in helping newcomers
become self-reliant: orienting immigrants and receiving communities as to their mutual rights and responsibilities,
providing information they need for successful integration, and encouraging the development of local capacities to
mediate when divisions occur between groups. Information and orientation should be provided both to immigrants and
to their receiving communities.
The Commission believes the federal government should help immigrants and local communities by:
Giving orientation materials to legal immigrants upon admission that include, but are not limited to: a welcoming
greeting; a brief discussion of U.S. history, law, and principles of U.S. democracy; tools to help the immigrant
locate and use services for which they are eligible; and other immigration-related information and documents. All
immigrants would receive the same materials. The packets would be available in English and other dominant
immigrant languages.
Encouraging state governments to establish information clearinghouses in major immigrant receiving
communities. The Commission recommends that the federal government provide modest incentive grants to states
to encourage them to establish and maintain local resources that would provide information to immigrants and
local communities.
Promoting public/private partnerships to orient and assist immigrants in adapting to life in the United States.
While the federal government makes the decisions about how many and which immigrants will be admitted to the
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United States, the actual process of integration takes place in local communities. Local government, schools,
businesses, charities, foundations, religious institutions, ethnic associations, and other groups play important roles
in the Americanization process.
EDUCATION
Education is the principal tool of Americanization. Local educational institutions have the primary responsibility for
educating immigrants. However, there is a federal role in promoting and funding English language acquisition and other
academic and civic orientation for both immigrant children and adults.
The Commission urges a renewed commitment to the education of immigrant children. The number of school-aged
children of immigrants is growing and expected to increase dramatically. These children, mostly young, speak more
than 150 different languages; many have difficulty communicating in English. They are enrolled in public schools as
well as in secular and religious private schools throughout the country. And, in addition to the problems other students
have, they face particular problems in gaining an education� often because of language difficulties.
The Commission emphasizes that rapid acquisition of English should be the paramount goal of any immigrant
language instruction program. English is the most critical of basic skills for successful integration. English can be
taught to children in many ways. Effective programs share certain common characteristics. Based on a review of these
programs, the Commission emphasizes the need for public and private educational programs to:
Conduct regular evaluations of students' English competence and their ability to apply it to academic subjects.
Such evaluations will ensure placement of immigrant children into regular English-speaking classes as soon as
they are prepared. Regular evaluation also will highlight strengths and weaknesses in educational programs and
provide insight on improvements that are needed to ensure timely English acquisition.
Collect and analyze data on immigrant students, including their linguistic and academic performance and the
efficacy of the instructional methods used in programs for immigrant children.
Include appropriate grade-level instruction in other academic disciplines. Coordination with teachers, curricula,
and instruction outside of English acquisition will promote students' mastery of regular subject matter while they
expeditiously learn English.
Involve parents of immigrant students in their schooling. A characteristic of many of the most successful language
acquisition programs is the active involvement of parents in the education of their children.
The Commission encourages programs that are responsive to the needs of immigrant children and an orientation to
United States school systems and the community,such as we have seen in "newcomer schools." Newcomer schools
must not isolate immigrant newcomers. Instead, they must be transitional and actively promote the timely integration of
students into mainstream schools.
The Commission recommends the revival and emphasis on instruction of all kindergarten through grade twelve
students in the common civic culture that is essential to citizenship. An understanding of the history of the United
States and the principles and practices of our government are an essential for all students, immigrants and natives alike.
Americanization requires a renewed emphasis on the common core of civic culture that unites individuals from many
ethnic and racial groups.
The Commission emphasizes the urgent need to recruit, train, and provide support to teachers who work with
immigrant students. There is a disturbing shortage of qualified teachers for children with limited English proficiency, of
teacher training programs for producing such teachers, and of other support for effective English acquisition instruction.
The Commission supports immigrant education funding that is based on a more accurate assessment of the impact of
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immigration on school systems and that is adequate to alleviate these impacts. There are costs and responsibilities for
language acquisition and immigrant education programs that are not now being met. We urge the federal government to
do its fair share in meeting this challenge. The long-term costs of failure in terms of dropouts and poorly educated adults
will be far larger for the nation and local communities than the costs of such programs. More specifically, we urge the
federal government to:
Provide flexibility in federal funding for the teaching of English to immigrant students to achieve maximum local
choice of instructional model.The federal government should not mandate any one mode of instruction (e.g.,
bilingual education, English as a second language programs, immersion).
Make funding contingent on performance outcomes�that is, English language acquisition and mastery of regular
academic subject matter by students served in these programs. School systems receiving funds because of large
numbers of children with limited English proficiency and immigrant children should be held to rigorous
performance standards. Federal and state funding incentives should promote�not impede�expeditious
placement in regular, English-speaking classes.
The Commission urges the federal, state, and local governments and private institutions to enhance educational
opportunities for adult immigrants. Education for basic skills and literacy in English is the major vehicle that integrates
adult immigrants into American society and participation in its civic activities. Literate adults are more likely to
participate in the workforce and twice as likely to participate in our democracy. Literate adults foster literacy in their
children, and parents' educational levels positively affect their children's academic performance.
Adult education is severely underfunded. Available resources are inadequate to meet the demand for adult immigrant
education, particularly for English proficiency and job skills. In recognition of the benefits they receive from
immigration, the Commission urges leaders from businesses and corporations to participate in skills training, English
instruction, and civics education programs for immigrants. Religious schools and institutions, charities, foundations,
community organizations, public and private schools, colleges and universities also can contribute resources, facilities,
and expertise. 
NATURALIZATION
Naturalization is the most important act that a legal immigrant undertakes in the process of becoming an American.
Taking this step confers upon the immigrant all the rights and responsibilities of civic and political participation that the
United States has to offer (except to become President). The naturalization process must be credible, and it must be
accorded the formality and ceremony appropriate to its importance.
The Commission believes that the current legal requirements for naturalization are appropriate, but improvements
are needed in the means used to measure whether an applicant meets these requirements. With regard to the specific
legal requirements, the Commission supports:
Maintaining requirements that legal immigrants must reside in the United States for five years (three years for
spouses of U.S. citizens and Lawful Permanent Residents [LPRs] who serve in the military) before naturalizing.
We believe five years is adequate for immigrants to embrace, understand, and demonstrate their knowledge of the
principles of American democracy.
Improving the mechanisms used to demonstrate knowledge of U.S. history, civics, and English competence. The
Commission believes that the tests used in naturalization should seek to determine if applicants have a meaningful
knowledge of U.S. history and civics and are able to communicate in English. The tests should be standardized
and aim to evaluate a common core of information to be understood by all new citizens.
Expediting swearing-in ceremonies while maintaining their solemnity and dignity. In districts where the federal
court has exercised sole jurisdiction to conduct the swearing-in ceremonies, long delays often result from crowded
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court calendars. The Commission recommends that Congress restore the Executive Branch's sole jurisdiction for
naturalization to reduce this waiting time. The Executive Branch should continue to work with federal judges as
well as other qualified institutions, such as state courts and Immigration Judges, to ensure that swearing-in
ceremonies are consistently conducted in a timely, efficient, and dignified manner.
Revising the naturalization oath to make it comprehensible, solemn, and meaningful. The current oath is not easy
to comprehend. We believe it is not widely understood by new citizens. Its wording includes dated language,
archaic form, and convoluted grammar. The Commission proposes the following revision of the oath as capturing
the essence of naturalization.
Solemnly, freely, and 
without any mental reservation, 
I, [name] hereby renounce under oath 
[or upon affirmation] 
all former political allegiances. 
My sole political fidelity 
and allegiance from this day forward 
is to the United States of America. 
I pledge to support and respect 
its Constitution and laws. 
Where and if lawfully required, 
I further commit myself to defend them against all enemies, 
foreign and domestic, either by military or civilian service. 
This I do solemnly swear [or affirm].
The Commission calls for urgently needed reforms to increase the efficiency and integrity of the naturalization
process. The vast majority of applicants for naturalization are law-abiding immigrants who contribute to our society.
The value of Americanization is eroded whenever unnecessary obstacles prevent eligible immigrants from becoming
citizens. Its value also is undermined when the process permits the abuse of our laws by naturalizing applicants who are
not entitled to citizenship.
Recognizing steps already are underway to reengineer the naturalization process, the Commission supports the
following approaches:
Instituting efficiencies without sacrificing quality controls. In the Commission's 1995 report to Congress, we
recommended that the Immigration and Naturalization Service [INS] and the Congress take steps to expedite the
processing of naturalization applications while maintaining rigorous standards. Two years later, the naturalization
process still takes too long, and previous efforts to expedite processing resulted in serious violations of the
integrity of the system. Instituting a system that is both credible and efficient remains a pressing need.
Improving the integrity and processing of fingerprints. The Commission believes that only service providers
under direct control of the federal government should be authorized to take fingerprints. If the federal government
does not take fingerprints itself but instead contracts with service providers, it must screen and monitor such
providers rigorously for their capacity, capability, and integrity. Failure to meet standards would mean the
contract would be terminated.
Contracting with a single English and civics testing service. The Commission recommends that the federal
government contract with one national and respected testing service to develop and administer the English and
civics tests to naturalization applicants. Having one organization under contract should help the government
substantially improve its oversight. Moreover, contracting with a highly-respected and nationally-recognized
testing service will help ensure a high-quality product.
Increasing professionalism. While many naturalization staff are highly professional in carrying out their duties,
reports from district offices, congressional hearings, and complaints from naturalization applicants demonstrate
continued dissatisfaction with the quality of naturalization services. Recruitment and training of longer-term staff
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assigned to adjudicating applications and overseeing quality control would help overcome some of these
problems.
Improving automation. The Commission is encouraged by plans to develop linkages among data sources related
to naturalization. The Commission recommends continued funding for an up-to-date, advanced, electronic
automation system for information entry and recordkeeping.
Establishing clear fee-waiver guidelines and implementing them consistently. Under current law, the Attorney
General is authorized to grant fee waivers to naturalization applicants. The Commission has received accounts of
legitimate requests being denied. Clear guidelines and consistent implementation are needed to ensure that bona
fide requests are granted, while guarding against abuse.
2  Our national motto, E Pluribus Unum, �from many, one,� was originally conceived to denote the union of the thirteen states into one nation.
Throughout our history, E Pluribus Unum has also come to mean the vital unity of our national community founded on individual freedom and the
diversity that flows from it. 
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Becoming an American: 
Immigration and 
Immigrant Policy
FRAMEWORK FOR IMMIGRATION POLICY
In our previous reports, the Commission defined a credible immigration policy "by a simple yardstick: people who
should get in do get in, people who should not get in are kept out; and people who are judged deportable are required to
leave."  By these measures, we have made substantial, but incomplete, progress. What follows are the Commission's
recommendations for comprehensive reform to achieve more fully a credible framework for immigration policy. 
LEGAL PERMANENT ADMISSIONS
The Commission reiterates its support for a properly-regulated system for admitting lawful permanent residents.3
Research and analyses conducted since the issuance of the Commission's report on legal immigration support our view
that a properly-regulated system of legal permanent admissions serves the national interest. The Commission urges
reforms in our legal immigration system to enhance the benefits accruing from the entry of newcomers while guarding
against harms, particularly to the most vulnerable of U.S. residents�those who are themselves unskilled and living in
poverty. More specifically, the Commission reiterates its support for:
A significant redefinition of priorities and reallocation of existing admission numbers to fulfill more
effectively the objectives of our immigration policy. The current framework for legal immigration�family,
skills, and humanitarian admissions�makes sense. However, the statutory and regulatory priorities and
procedures for admissions do not adequately support the stated intentions of legal immigration�to reunify
families, to provide employers an opportunity to recruit foreign workers to meet labor needs, and to respond to
humanitarian crises around the world. During the two years since our report on legal immigration, the problems in
the legal admission system have not been solved. Indeed, some of them have worsened.
Current immigration levels should be sustained for the next several years while the U.S. revamps its legal
immigration system and shifts the priorities for admission away from the extended family and toward the nuclear
family and away from the unskilled and toward the higher-skilled immigrant. Thereafter, modest reductions in
levels of immigration �to about 550,000 per year, comparable to those of the 1980s� will result from the
changed priority system. The Commission continues to believe that legal admission numbers should be authorized
by Congress for a specified time (e.g., three to five years) to ensure regular, periodic review and, if needed,
change by Congress. This review should consider the adequacy of admission numbers for accomplishing
priorities. 
Family-based admissions that give priority to nuclear family members�spouses and minor children of U.S.
citizens, parents of U.S. citizens, and spouses and minor children of lawful permanent residents�and
include a backlog clearance program to permit the most expeditious entry of the spouses and minor
children of LPRs.  The Commission recommends allocation of 550,000 family-based admission numbers each
year until the large backlog of spouses and minor children is cleared. Numbers going to lower priority categories
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(e.g., adult children, siblings, and diversity immigrants), should be transferred to the nuclear family categories.
Thereafter Congress should set sufficient admission numbers to permit all spouses and minor children to enter
expeditiously.
Since the Commission first reported its findings on legal admission, the problems associated with family-based
admissions have grown. In 1995, the wait between application and admission of the spouses and minor children of
LPRs was approximately three years. It is now more than four and one-half years and still growing. Moreover,
various statutory changes made in 1996 make it all the more important that Congress take specific action to clear
the backlog quickly to regularize the status of the spouses and minor children of legal permanent residents in the
United States. In an effort to deter illegal migration, Congress expanded the bases and number of grounds upon
which persons may be denied legal status because of a previous illegal entry or overstay of a visa. An unknown,
but believed to be large, number of spouses and minor children of LPRs awaiting legal status are unlawfully
present in the United States. While the Commission does not condone their illegal presence, we are cognizant of
the great difficulties posed by the long waiting period for a family second preference visa. 
Skill-based admissions policies that enhance opportunities for the entry of highly-skilled immigrants,
particularly those with advanced degrees, and eliminate the category for admission of unskilled workers.  
The Commission continues to recommend that immigrants be chosen on the basis of the skills they contribute to
the U.S. economy. Only if there is a compelling national interest�such as nuclear family reunification or
humanitarian admissions�should immigrants be admitted without regard to the economic contributions they can
make.
Research shows that education plays a major role in determining the impacts of immigration. Immigration of
unskilled immigrants comes at a cost to unskilled U.S. workers, particularly established immigrants for whom
new immigrants are economic substitutes. Further, the difference in estimated lifetime fiscal effects of immigrants
by education is striking: using the same methodology to estimate net costs and benefits, immigrants with a high
school education or more are found to be net contributors while those without a high school degree continue to be
net costs to taxpayers throughout their lifetime.4
The Commission also continues to recommend changes in the procedures used in testing the labor market impact
of employment-based admissions. Rather than use the lengthy, costly, and bureaucratic labor certification system,
the Commission recommends using market forces as a labor market test. To ensure a level playing field for U.S.
workers, employers would attest to having taken appropriate steps to recruit U.S. workers, paying the prevailing
wage, and complying with other labor standards. Businesses recruiting foreign workers also would be required to
make significant financial investments in certified private sector initiatives dedicated to improving the
competitiveness of U.S. workers. These payments should be set at a per worker amount sufficient to ensure there
is no financial incentive to hire a foreign worker over a qualified U.S. worker. 
Refugee admissions based on human rights and humanitarian considerations, as one of several elements of
U.S. leadership in assisting and protecting the world's persecuted.5   Since its very beginnings, the United
States has been a place of refuge. The Commission believes continued admission of refugees sustains our
humanitarian commitment to provide safety to the persecuted, enables the U.S. to pursue foreign policy interests
in promoting human rights, and encourages international efforts to resettle persons requiring rescue or durable
solutions. The Commission also urges the federal government to continue to support international assistance and
protection for the majority of the world's refugees for whom resettlement is neither appropriate nor practical.
The Commission continues to recommend against denying benefits to legal immigrants solely because they are
noncitizens.  The Commission believes that the denial of safety net programs to immigrants solely because they are
noncitizens is not in the national interest. In our 1994 and 1995 reports, the Commission argued that Congress should
address the most significant uses of public benefit programs �particularly, elderly immigrants using Supplementary
Security Income� by requiring sponsors to assume full financial responsibility for newly-arriving immigrants who
otherwise would be excluded on public charge grounds. In particular, the Commission argued that sponsors of parents
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who would likely become public charges assume the responsibility for the lifetimes of the immigrants (or until they
became eligible for Social Security on the basis of work quarters). We also argued that sponsors of spouses and children
should assume responsibility for the duration of the familial relationship or a time-specified period. We continue to
believe that this targeted approach makes greater sense than a blanket denial of eligibility for public services based
solely on a person's alienage. 
LIMITED DURATION ADMISSIONS
Persons come to the United States for limited duration stays for several principal purposes: representation of a foreign
government or other foreign entities; work; study; and short-term visits for commercial or personal purposes, such as
tourism and family visits. These individuals are statutorily referred to as "nonimmigrants." In this report, however, we
refer to "limited duration admissions [LDAs]," a term that better captures the nature of their admission: When the
original admission expires, the alien must either leave the country or meet the criteria for a new LDA or permanent
residence.
For the most part LDAs help enhance our scientific, cultural, educational, and economic strength. However, the
admission of LDAs is not without costs and, as explained below, certain reforms are needed to make the system even
more advantageous for the United States than it now is.
The Commission believes LDA policy should rest on the following principles:
Clear goals and priorities;
Systematic and comprehensible organization of LDA categories;
Timeliness, efficiency, and flexibility in its implementation;
Compliance with the conditions for entry and exit (and effective mechanisms to monitor and enforce this
compliance);
Credible and realistic policies governing transition from LDA to permanent immigration status;
Protection of U.S. workers from unfair competition and of foreign workers from exploitation and abuse; and
Appropriate attention to LDA provisions in trade negotiations to ensure future immigration reforms are not
unknowingly foreclosed.
The Commission recommends a reorganization of the visa categories for limited duration stays in the United States
to make them more coherent and understandable. The Commission recommends that the current proliferation of visa
categories be restructured into five broad groups: official representatives; foreign workers; students; short-term visitors;
and transitional family members. This reorganization reflects such shared characteristics of different visa categories as
entry for like reasons, similarity in testing for eligibility, and similar duration of stay in the United States.
The definitions and objectives of the five limited duration visa classifications would be:6
Official representatives are diplomats, representatives of or to international organizations, representatives of
NATO or NATO forces, and their accompanying family members. The objective of this category is to permit the
United States to admit temporarily individuals who represent their governments or international organizations.
Short-term visitors come to the United States for commercial or personal purposes. In 1995 alone, millions of
inbound visitors from other countries spent $76 billion on travel to and in the United States (on U.S. flag carriers,
lodging, food, gifts, and entertainment).
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Foreign workers are those who are coming to perform necessary services for prescribed periods of time, at the
expiration of which they must either return to their home countries or, if an employer or family member petitions
successfully, adjust to permanent residence. This category would serve the labor needs demonstrated by U.S.
businesses, with appropriate provisions to protect U.S. workers from unfair competition.
Students are persons who are in the United States for the purpose of acquiring either academic or practical
knowledge of a subject matter. This category has four major goals: to provide foreign nationals with opportunities
to obtain knowledge they can take back to their home countries; to give U.S. schools access to a global pool of
talented students; to permit the sharing of U.S. values and institutions with individuals from other countries; and
to enhance the education of U.S. students by exposing them to foreign students and their cultures.
Transitional family members include fiancé(e)s of U.S. citizens. These individuals differ from other LDAs
because they are processed for immigrant status, although they do not receive such status until they marry in the
U.S. and adjust. The Commission believes another category of transitional family members should be added:
spouses of U.S. citizens whose weddings occur overseas but who subsequently come to the U.S. to reside.
Short-Term Visitors
The Commission recommends that the current visa waiver pilot program for short-term business and tourist visits be
made permanent upon the implementation of an entry-exit control system capable of measuring overstay rates. A
permanent visa waiver system requires appropriate provisions to expand the number of participating countries and clear
and timely means for removing those countries that fail to meet the high standards reserved for this privilege. Congress
should extend the pilot three years while the control system is implemented.
Foreign Workers
Each year, more foreign workers enter the United States as LDAs for temporary work than enter as skill-based
immigrants. In FY 1996, the Department of State issued almost 278,000 limited duration worker visas, including those
for spouses and children. By contrast, only 118,000 immigrant visa issuances and domestic adjustments of status in
worker categories were recorded in FY 1996, far less than the legislated limit of 140,000.
The Commission recommends that the limited duration admission classification for foreign workers include three
principal categories: those who, for significant and specific policy reasons, should be exempt by law from labor market
protection standards; those whose admission is governed by treaty obligations; and those whose admission must adhere
to specified labor market protection standards. Under this recommendation, LDA worker categories are organized
around the same principles that guide permanent worker categories. Accordingly, the Commission proposes different
subcategories with labor market protection standards commensurate with the risks to U.S. workers we believe are posed
by the foreign workers.
Those exempt by law from labor market protection standards because their admission will generate
substantial economic growth and/or significantly enhance U.S. intellectual and cultural strength and pose little
potential for undermining the employment prospects and remuneration of U.S. workers. These include:
Individuals of extraordinary ability in the sciences, arts, education, business, or athletics, demonstrated through
sustained national or international acclaim and recognized for extraordinary achievements in their field of
expertise.
Managers and executives of international businesses. The global competitiveness of U.S. businesses is enhanced
by the capacity of multinational corporations to move their senior staff around the world as needed.
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Professors, researchers and scholars whose salary or other compensation is paid by their home government,
home institution, or the U.S. government in a special program for foreign professors, researchers, and scholars.
Religious workers, including ministers of religion and professionals and other workers employed by religious
nonprofit organizations in the U.S. to perform religious vocations and religious occupations.
Members of the foreign media admitted under reciprocal agreements. The U.S. benefits from the presence of
members of the foreign media who help people in their countries understand events in the United States. Just as
we would not want our media to be overly regulated by labor policies of foreign governments, the United States
extends the same courtesy to foreign journalists working in the U.S. 
Foreign workers whose admission is subject to treaty obligations. This includes treaty traders, treaty investors,
and other workers entering under specific treaties between the U.S. and the foreign nation of which the alien is a
citizen or national. Under the provisions of NAFTA, for example, Canadian professionals are not subject to
numerical limits or labor market testing; Mexican professionals continue to be subject to labor market tests, but
will be exempt from numerical limits in 2003.
Foreign workers subject by law to labor market protection standards. These are principally:
Professionals and other workers who are sought by employers because of their highly-specialized skills or
knowledge and/or extensive experience. Included in this category are employees of international businesses who
have specialized knowledge but are not managers or executives.
Trainees admitted to the United States for practical, on-the-job training in a variety of occupations. Trainees work
in U.S. institutions as an integral part of their training program.
Artists, musicians, entertainers, athletes, fashion models, and participants in international cultural groups that
share the history, culture, and traditions of their country.
Lesser-skilled and unskilled workers coming for seasonal or other short-term employment. Such worker programs
warrant strict review, as described below. The Commission remains opposed to implementation of a large-scale
program for temporary admission of lesser-skilled and unskilled workers.
The Commission recommends that the labor market tests used in admitting temporary workers in this category be
commensurate with the skill level and experience of the worker.
Employers requesting the admission of temporary workers with highly-specialized skills or extensive
experience should meet specific requirements. Admission should be contingent on an attestation that:
The employer will pay the greater of actual or prevailing wage and fringe benefits paid to other employees with
similar experience and qualifications for the specific employment in question. Actual wage rates should be
defined in a simple and straightforward manner.
The employer has posted notice of the hire, informed coworkers at the principal place of business at which the
LDA worker is employed, and provided a copy of the attestation to the LDA worker.
The employer has paid a reasonable user fee that will be dedicated to facilitating the processing of applications
and the costs of auditing compliance with all requirements.
There is no strike or lockout in the course of a labor dispute involving the occupational classification at the place
of employment.
The employer has not dismissed, except for cause, or otherwise displaced workers in the specific job for which
the alien worker is hired during the previous six months. Further, the employer will not displace or lay off, except
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for cause, U.S. workers in the specific job during the ninety-day period following the filing of an application or
the ninety-day periods preceding or following the filing of any visa petition supported by the application.
The employer will provide working conditions for such temporary workers that are comparable to those provided
to similarly situated U.S. workers. 
Certain at-risk employers of skilled workers (described below) should be required to attest to having taken
significant steps�for example, recruitment or training�to employ U.S. workers in the jobs for which they are
recruiting foreign workers. We do not recommend, however, that current labor certification processes be used to
document significant efforts to recruit. These procedures are costly, time consuming, and ultimately ineffective in
protecting highly-skilled U.S. workers.
Employers requesting the admission of lesser-skilled workers should be required to meet a stricter labor
market protection test. Such employers should continue to be required to demonstrate that they have sought, but
were unable to find, sufficient American workers prepared to work under favorable wages, benefits, and working
conditions. They also should be required to specify the plans they are taking to recruit and retain U.S. workers, as
well as their plans to reduce dependence on foreign labor through hiring of U.S. workers or other means.
Employers should continue to be required to pay the highest of prevailing, minimum, or adverse wage rates,
provide return transportation, and offer decent housing, health care, and other benefits appropriate for seasonal
employees.
The Commission recommends that categories of employers who are at special risk of violating labor market
protection standards �regardless of the education, skill, or experience level of its employees� be required to obtain
regular, independently-conducted audits of their compliance with the attestations made about labor market
protection standards, with the results of such audit being submitted for Department of Labor review.  Certain
businesses, as described below, pose greater risk than others of displacing U.S. workers and/or exploiting foreign
workers. The risk factors that should be considered in determining whether regular audit requirements must apply
include:
The employer's extensive use of temporary foreign workers. Extensive use can be defined by the percentage of
the employer's workforce that is comprised of LDA workers. It also can be measured by the duration and
frequency of the employer's use of temporary foreign workers.
The employer's history of employing temporary foreign workers. Those employers with a history of serious
violations of regular labor market protection standards or of specific labor standards related to the employment of
LDA workers should be considered as at risk for future violations.
The employer's status as a job contracting or employment agency providing temporary foreign labor to
other employers. Risk of labor violations increases as responsibility is divided between a primary and secondary
employer.
To ensure adequate protection of labor market standards, such employers should be required to submit an independent
audit of their compliance with all statements attested to in their application. The independent audits should be done by
recognized accounting firms that have the demonstrated capacity to determine, for example, that wages and fringe
benefits were provided as promised in the attestation and conformed to the actual or prevailing wages and fringe
benefits provided to similarly situated U.S. workers.
The Commission recommends enhanced monitoring of and enforcement against fraudulent applications and
postadmission violations of labor market protection standards. To function effectively, both the exempt and
nonexempt temporary worker programs must provide expeditious access to needed labor. The Commission's
recommendations build on the current system of employer attestations that receive expeditious preapproval review but
are subject to postapproval enforcement actions against violators. More specifically, the Commission recommends:
Allocating increased staff and resources to the agencies responsible for adjudicating applications for
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admission and monitoring and taking appropriate enforcement action against fraudulent applications and
violations of labor market protection standards. Increased costs required for more efficient adjudication of
applications can be covered by applicant fees. However, additional costs incurred for more effective
investigations of compliance with labor market standards will require appropriated funds.
Barring the use of LDA workers by any employer who has been found to have committed willful and
serious labor standards violations with respect to the employment of LDA workers. Further, upon the
recommendation of any federal, state, or local tax agency, barring the use of LDA workers by any
employer who has been found to have committed willful and serious payroll tax violations with respect to
LDA workers. The law currently provides for such debarment for failure to meet labor condition attestation
provisions or misrepresentation of material facts on the application. Implementation of this recommendation
would enable penalties to be assessed for serious labor standards violations that are not also violations of the
attestations.
Developing an enforcement strategy to reduce evasion of the LDA labor market protection standards
through contractors. U.S. businesses' growth in contracting-out functions has raised questions of employment
relationships and ultimate liability for employment-related violations, including those related to temporary foreign
workers. A uniform policy for dealing with these situations is desirable for the enforcement agencies involved, as
well as for employers, contractors, and workers.
CURBING UNLAWFUL MIGRATION
In its first interim report to Congress , the Commission recommended a comprehensive strategy to curb unlawful
migration into the United States through prevention and removal.7   Despite the additional resources, new policies, and
often innovative strategies adopted during the past few years, illegal migration continues to be a problem. The
Commission continues to believe that unlawful immigration can be curtailed consistent with our traditions, civil rights,
and civil liberties. As a nation committed to the rule of law, our immigration policies must conform to the highest
standards of integrity and efficiency in the enforcement of the law.  We must also respect due process.
Deterrence Strategies
The Commission reiterates its 1994 recommendations supporting a comprehensive strategy to deter illegal migration.
More specifically, the Commission continues to support implementation of the following deterrence strategies:
An effective border management policy that accomplishes the twin goals of preventing illegal entries and
facilitating legal ones. New resources for additional Border Patrol officers, inspectors, and operational support,
combined with such new strategies as operations "Hold the Line," "Gatekeeper," and "Safeguard," have improved
significantly the management of the border where they are deployed. The very success of these new efforts
demonstrates that to gain full control, the same level of resources and prevention strategies must be deployed at
all points on the border where significant violations of U.S. immigration law are likely to occur.
Reducing the employment magnet is the linchpin of a comprehensive strategy to deter unlawful migration.
Economic opportunity and the prospect of employment remain the most important draw for illegal migration to
this country. Strategies to deter unlawful entries and visa overstays require both a reliable process for verifying
authorization to work and an enforcement capacity to ensure that employers adhere to all immigration-related
labor standards. The Commission supports implementation of pilot programs to test what we believe is the most
promising option for verifying work authorization: a computerized registry based on the social security number.8
Restricting eligibility of illegal aliens for publicly-funded services or assistance, except those made available
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on an emergency basis or for similar compelling reasons to protect public health and safety or to conform
to constitutional requirements. Although public benefit programs do not appear to be a major magnet for illegal
migrants, it is important that U.S. benefit eligibility policies send the same message as immigration policy: Illegal
aliens should not be here and, therefore, should not receive assistance, except in unusual circumstances. The
Commission recommended drawing a line between illegal aliens and lawfully resident legal immigrants with
regard to benefits eligibility, in part to reinforce this message. We continue to believe that this demarcation
between legal and illegal aliens makes sense. The Commission urges the Congress to reconsider the changes in
welfare policy enacted in 1996 that blur the distinctions between legal and illegal aliens by treating them similarly
for the purposes of many public benefit programs.
Strategies for addressing the causes of unlawful migration in source countries. An effective strategy to curb
unauthorized movements includes cooperative efforts with source countries to address the push factors that cause
people to seek new lives in the United States. The Commission continues to urge the United States government to
give priority in its foreign policy and international economic policy to long-term reduction in the causes of
unauthorized migration.
Mechanisms to respond in a timely, effective, and humane manner to migration emergencies. A credible
immigration policy requires the ability to respond effectively and humanely to migration emergencies in which
large numbers of people seek entry into the United States. These emergencies generally include bona fide
refugees, other individuals with need for protection, and persons seeking a better economic life in the U.S. Failure
to act appropriately and in a timely manner to determine who should be admitted and who should be returned can
have profound humanitarian consequences. Further, an uncontrolled emergency can overwhelm resources and
create serious problems that far outlast the emergency.9
Removals
A credible immigration system requires the effective and timely removal of aliens who can be determined through
constitutionally-sound procedures to have no right to remain in the United States. If unlawful aliens believe that they
can remain indefinitely once they are within our national borders, there will be increased incentives to try to enter or
remain illegally.
Our current removal system does not work. Hundreds of thousands of aliens with final removal orders remain in the
U.S. The system's ineffectiveness results from a fragmented, uncoordinated approach, rather than flawed legal
procedures. The Executive Branch does not have the capacity, resources, or strategy to detain aliens likely to abscond,
to monitor the whereabouts of released aliens, or to remove them.
The Commission urges immediate reforms to improve management of the removal system and ensure that aliens with
final orders of deportation, exclusion, or removal are indeed removed from the United States. Establishing a more
effective removal system requires changes in the management of the removal process. More specifically, the
Commission recommends:
Establishing priorities and numerical targets for the removal of criminal and noncriminal aliens. The
Commission encourages headquarters, regional, and local immigration enforcement officials to set these priorities
and numerical goals.
Local oversight and accountability for the development and implementation of plans to coordinate
apprehensions, detention, hearings, removal, and the prevention of reentry. With guidance on priorities, local
managers in charge of the removal system would be responsible for allocation of resources to ensure that aliens in
the prioritized categories are placed in the system and ultimately removed. Local managers also would be
responsible and accountable for identifying effective deterrents that reduce the likelihood that removed aliens
would attempt to reenter the U.S.
1997 USCIR Report to Congress - Executive Summary - A Credible Framework of Immigration Policy
becoming/framework.html[6/13/17, 3:08:14 PM]
Continued attention to improved means for identifying and removing criminal aliens with a final order of
deportation. The Commission reiterates the importance of removing criminal aliens as a top priority. Our
recommendation regarding the importance of removing noncriminal aliens with final orders is not intended to
shift the attention of the removal system away from this priority. Rather, both criminal and noncriminal aliens
must be removed to protect public safety (in the case of criminals) and to send a deterrent message (to all who
have no permission to be here).
Legal rights and representation. The Executive Branch should be authorized to develop, provide, and fund
programs and services that educate aliens about their legal rights and immigration proceedings. Such programs
also should encourage and facilitate legal representation where to do so would be beneficial to the system and the
administration of justice. Particular attention should be focused on aliens in detention where release or removal
can be expedited through such representation. Under this approach, the alien would not have a right to appointed
counsel, but the government could fund services to address some of the barriers to representation.
Prosecutorial discretion to determine whether to proceed with cases. Guidelines on the use of prosecutorial
discretion should be developed, local Trial Attorneys trained, support staff provided, and discretion exercised with
the goal of establishing a more efficient and rational hearing system. Trial attorneys should focus their efforts on
trying cases that are likely to result in the removal of the alien upon completion of the proceedings.
Strategic use of detention and release decisions. Detention space, always in limited supply, is in greater demand
as the government has focused more on the removal of criminal aliens and as Congress mandates more categories
to be detained. Detention needs to be used more strategically if removals are to be accomplished. Alternatives to
detention should be developed so that detention space is used efficiently and effectively. The Commission fully
supports the three-year pilot program, created with and implemented by the Vera Institute, to help define effective
alternatives to detention for specific populations.
Improved detention conditions and monitoring. Detention cannot be used effectively unless the conditions of
detention are humane and detainees are free from physical abuse and harassment by guards. We have no doubt
that appropriate criteria for all facilities can be promulgated, based on sound governmental judgment and
consultation with concerned nongovernmental organizations. But most importantly, a system to monitor facilities
on a regular basis must be developed. Inspections must occur more than once annually.
Further, the Commission recommends that the Department of Justice consider placing administrative
responsibility for operating detention centers with the Bureau of Prisons or U.S. Marshals Service. An
immigration enforcement agency should not be shouldered with such a significant responsibility that is not part of
its fundamental mission or expertise. 
Improved data systems. Current data systems are unable to link an apprehension to its final disposition (e.g.,
removal, adjustment of status). This significantly limits the use of apprehension and removal data for analytical
purposes. The Commission urges development of data systems that link apprehensions and removals and provide
statistics on individuals.
The redesigned removal system should be managed initially by a Last-In-First-Out [LIFO] strategy to
demonstrate the credibility of the system. Once a coherent system is organized and appropriate resources are
assigned to removing deportable aliens�not simply to put aliens through proceedings �removals should proceed
in a Last-In-First-Out mode. In this way, the government can send a credible deterrent message to failed asylum
seekers, visa overstayers, users of counterfeit documents, and unauthorized workers, that their presence in the
United States will not be tolerated. Such a well-organized system can establish control over the current caseload
and quickly prioritize the backlog for enforcement purposes. The deterrent effect of LIFO has been shown in the
asylum system where new procedures were adopted in a LIFO mode.
The Commission urges Congress to clarify that the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of
1996 [IIRIRA] and the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 [AEDPA] do not apply retroactively to
cases pending when the new policies and procedures went into effect. As a matter of policy, the Commission believes
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that retroactive application of new immigration laws undermines the effectiveness and credibility of the immigration
system. Applying newly-enacted laws or rules in an immigration proceeding that has already commenced results in
inefficiency in the administration of the immigration laws. It also can raise troubling issues of fairness. Finally, it invites
confusion, adds uncertainty, and fosters a lack of trust and confidence in the rule of law.
3  For a full explanation of the Commission�s recommendations see Legal Immigration: Setting Priorities, 1995. See Appendix for summary of
Commissioner Leiden�s dissenting statement. 
4  National Research Council. 1997. The New Americans: Economic, Demographic, and Fiscal Effects of Immigration. Washington, DC: National
Academy Press. 
5  For a full explanation of the Commission�s refugee-related recommendations, see U.S. Refugee Policy: Taking Leadership, 1997. 
6  The current system includes the J visa for cultural exchange, which is used for a variety of purposes, ranging from short-term visits to study and
work. The workers include scholars and researchers, camp counselors, au pairs, and various others. Some work activities under the J visa
demonstrate a clear cultural or education exchange; other work activities appear only tangentially related to the program�s original purposes.
Protection of U.S. workers by labor market tests and standards should apply to the latter group in the same manner as similarly situated temporary
workers in other LDA categories. The Department of State should assess how better to fulfill the purpose of the Mutual Educational and Cultural
Exchange Act of 1961 [Fulbright-Hays Act]. Such an analysis is particularly timely in light of the merger now being implemented between the
Department of State and the United States Information Agency, which is responsible for administering the J visa. 
7  For a full explanation of the Commission�s recommendations see: U.S. Immigration Policy: Restoring Credibility, 1994. 
8  The Concurring Statement of Commissioners Leiden and Merced can be found in the Commission�s 1994 report. 
9  For a fuller discussion of the Commission�s recommendation on mass migration emergencies, see U.S. Refugee Policy: Taking Leadership,
1997. 
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ACHIEVING IMMIGRATION POLICY GOALS
INTRODUCTION
Restoring credibility and setting priorities �themes at the center of the Commission's policy recommendations on
illegal and legal immigration, respectively� will not come to pass unless the government is structured to deliver on
these policies. An effective immigration system requires both credible policy and sound management. Good
management cannot overcome bad policy. Poor structures, lack of professionalism, poor planning, and failure to set
priorities will foil even the best policies.
Until relatively recently, the agencies responsible for implementing immigration policy were underfunded, understaffed,
and neglected. During the past few years, however, massive increases in resources and personnel, combined with
significant political attention to immigration issues, have provided new opportunities to address long-standing problems.
A recent General Accounting Office [GAO] report documented improvements�including, for example, a more
strategic approach to the formulation of immigration enforcement programs. The Commission has seen progress in
many management areas�for example, more effective border management, increased numbers of criminal alien
removals, and asylum reform that has deterred abusive claims while protecting bona fide refugees. Nevertheless,
problems remain in the operation of the U.S. immigration and naturalization system. Further improvements must be
made if it is to function smoothly and effectively, anticipating and addressing, rather than reacting to, problems. 
STRUCTURAL REFORM
The Commission recommends fundamental restructuring of responsibilities within the federal government to support
more effective management of the core functions of the immigration system: border and interior enforcement;
enforcement of immigration-related employment standards; adjudication of immigration and naturalization applications;
and consolidation of administrative appeals.   The immigration system is one of the most complicated in the federal
government bureaucracy. In some cases, one agency has multiple, and sometimes conflicting, operational
responsibilities. In other cases, multiple agencies have responsibility for elements of the same functions.  Both situations
create problems.
Mission Overload. Some of the agencies that implement the immigration laws have so many responsibilities that they
have proved unable to manage all of them effectively. Between Congressional mandates and administrative
determinations, these agencies must give equal weight to more priorities than any one agency can handle. Such a system
is set up for failure and, with such failure, further loss of public confidence in the immigration system.
No one agency is likely to have the capacity to accomplish all of the goals of immigration policy equally well.
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Immigration law enforcement requires staffing, training, resources, and a work culture that differs from what is required
for effective adjudication of benefits or labor standards regulation of U.S. businesses.
Diffusion of Responsibilities Among Agencies. Responsibility for many immigration functions are spread across
numerous agencies within single departments or between departments. For example, responsibility for making decisions
on skill-based immigrant and LDA applications is dispersed among the Department of Labor [DOL], the Department of
Justice's [DOJ] Immigration and Naturalization Service [INS], and the Department of State [DOS]. Responsibility for
investigating employer compliance with immigration-related labor standards is shared by INS and DOL.
The Commission considered a range of ways to reorganize roles and responsibilities, including proposals to establish a
Cabinet-level Department of Immigration Affairs. After examining the full range of options, the Commission concludes
that a clear division of responsibility among existing federal agencies, with appropriate consolidation of functions, will
improve management of the federal immigration system. As discussed below, the Commission recommends a
restructuring of the immigration system's four principal operations as follows:10
1. Immigration enforcement at the border and in the interior of the United States in a Bureau for Immigration
Enforcement at the Department of Justice;
2. Adjudication of eligibility for immigration-related applications (immigrant, limited duration admission
asylum, refugee, and naturalization) in the Department of State under the jurisdiction of an Undersecretary for
Citizenship, Immigration, and Refugee Admissions;
3. Enforcement of immigration-related employment standards in the Department of Labor; and
4. Appeals of administrative decisions including hearings on removal, in an independent body, the Agency for
Immigration Review.
The Commission believes this streamlining and reconfiguring of responsibilities will help ensure: coherence and
consistency in immigration-related law enforcement; a supportive environment for adjudication of applications for
immigration, refugee, and citizenship services; rigorous enforcement of immigration-related labor standards to protect
U.S. workers; and fair and impartial review of immigration decisions.
Bureau for Immigration Enforcement (DOJ)
The Commission recommends placing all responsibility for enforcing United States immigration laws to deter future
illegal entry and remove illegal aliens in a Bureau for Immigration Enforcement at the Department of Justice.  The
Commission believes that the importance and complexity of the enforcement function within the U.S. immigration
system necessitate the establishment of a higher-level, single-focus agency within the DOJ. The Commission further
recommends that the newly configured agency have the prominence and visibility that the Federal Bureau of
Investigation [FBI] currently enjoys within the DOJ structure. The Director of the Bureau would be appointed for a set
term (e.g., five years). The agency would be responsible for planning, implementing, managing, and evaluating all U.S.
immigration enforcement activities both within the United States and overseas.
The Commission recommends the following distribution of responsibilities within the Bureau for Immigration
Enforcement.
Uniformed Enforcement Officers. The Commission recommends merger of the INS Inspectors, Border Patrol, and
detention officers into one unit, the Immigration Uniformed Service Branch. Its officers would be trained for duties at
land, sea, and air ports of entry, between land ports on the border, and in the interior where uniformed officers are
needed for enforcement.
Investigators. The Commission believes investigations will be a key part of the new agency's responsibility.
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Investigators are the main agents responsible for identifying and apprehending people who are illegally residing or
working in the United States, for deterring smuggling operations, for building a case against those who are not deterred,
and for identifying, apprehending, and carrying out the removal of aliens with final enforceable orders of removal.
Intelligence. The Bureau will require an Intelligence Division to provide strategic assessments, training and expertise
on fraud, information about smuggling networks, and tactical support to uniformed officers or investigators.
Assets Forfeiture Unit. As with the other DOJ enforcement agencies, the Bureau will have an Assets Forfeiture unit.
Pre- and Post-Trial "Probation" Officers. "Probation" functions are not now performed consistently or effectively,
but the Commission believes this function is essential to more strategic use of detention space. As it is unlikely that all
potentially deportable aliens could or should be detained awaiting removal, the Commission believes more attention
should be given to supervised release programs and to sophisticated methods for tracking the whereabouts of those not
detained.
Trial Attorneys/Prosecutors. The Commission believes that the Trial Attorneys, who in effect are the Government's
immigration prosecutors, should be vested with, and should utilize, an important tool possessed by their criminal
counterparts: prosecutorial discretion.
Field Offices. The new agency would implement its programs through a series of field offices that are structured to
address comprehensively the immigration enforcement challenges of the particular locality. As the location of these
offices should be driven by enforcement priorities, they are likely to be in different places than current district offices.
Regional Offices could be retained for administrative and managerial oversight of these dispersed and diverse field
offices. 
Citizenship, Immigration, and Refugee Admissions (DOS)
The Commission recommends that all citizenship and immigration benefits adjudications be consolidated in the
Department of State, and that an Undersecretary for Citizenship, Immigration, and Refugee Admissions be created to
manage these activities.  At present, three separate agencies�the INS, the Department of State, and the Department of
Labor�play broad roles in adjudicating applications for legal immigration, limited duration admissions, refugee
admissions, asylum, and/or citizenship. The Commission believes a more streamlined and accountable adjudication
process, involving fewer agencies but greater safeguards, will result in faster and better determinations of these benefits.
As in the current system, these services would be funded through fees paid by applicants and retained by the benefits
offices for delivery of the services.
The Commission considered the advantages and disadvantages of consolidating responsibility in the Department of
Justice and in the Department of State, the two agencies that already have the most significant immigration, refugee, and
citizenship duties. Bearing in mind the dual problems the Commission identified in the current structures�mission
overload and fragmentation of responsibility, we concluded that consolidation in the Department of State makes greater
sense than creation of a new, separate benefits agency within the Department of Justice.
Taking responsibility for immigration and citizenship services out of the Department of Justice sends the right message,
that legal immigration and naturalization are not principally law enforcement problems; they are opportunities for the
nation as long as the services are properly regulated. Further, the Department of Justice does not have the capacity
internationally to take on the many duties of the Department of State. The Department of State, however, already has a
domestic presence and an adjudication capability. It issues one-half million immigrant visas and six million
nonimmigrant visas each year. DOS also provides a full range of citizenship services both domestically (issuance of
almost 6 million passports annually) and abroad (e.g., citizenship determinations and registration of births of U.S.
citizens overseas). Indeed, DOS has devoted a major share of its personnel and its capital and operating resources to
these adjudicatory functions at embassies and consulates in more than two hundred countries and in passport offices in
fifteen U.S. cities.
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Consolidating responsibility requires some changes in the way the Department of State administers its immigration
responsibilities, which we believe will strengthen the adjudication function. Because immigration has both foreign and
domestic policy import, the Department of State will need to develop mechanisms for consultation with groups
representing a broad range of views and interests regarding immigration. Such consultations already occur in the refugee
program. The Department of State also will need to change its historic position on review of consular decisions. At
present, decisions made at INS and the Department of Labor on many immigrant and LDA applications may be
appealed, but no appeal is available on consular decisions. The Commission believes that immigrant and certain limited
duration admission visas with a U.S. petitioner should be subject to independent administrative appeal (see below).
The Undersecretary, who would have direct access to the Secretary of State, would be responsible for domestic and
overseas immigration, citizenship, and refugee functions. These include adjudication of applications for naturalization,
determinations of citizenship overseas, all immigrant and limited duration admission petitions, work authorizations and
other related permits, and adjustments of status. It also would have responsibility for refugee status determinations
abroad and asylum claims at home. Overseas citizenship services would continue to be provided by consular officers
abroad. The agency would have enhanced capacity to detect, deter, and combat fraud and abuse among those applying
for benefits.
Within the Office of the Undersecretary would be a unit responsible both for formulating and assessing immigration
policy as well as reviewing and commenting on the immigration-related effects of foreign policy decisions. This policy
capacity would be new for the Department of State, but it is in keeping with the important role that migration now plays
in international relations.
The Undersecretary would have three principal operating bureaus:
A Bureau of Immigration Affairs would focus on the immigration process, as noted above, as well as on LDA
processing. In addition to its existing overseas work, the Immigration Affairs Bureau would be responsible for domestic
adjudication/examination functions, including work authorization, adjustment of status, domestic interviewing, and the
issuance of appropriate documentation (e.g., green cards). The Immigration Affairs Bureau also would staff immigration
information and adjudication offices in areas with immigrant concentrations.
A Bureau of Refugee Admissions and Asylum Affairs would assure an appropriate level of independence from
routine immigration issues and processes. It would combine the present Bureau for Population, Refugees and Migration
[PRM] responsibilities for overseas refugee admissions, the refugee and asylum offices of the INS, and the DOS asylum
office in the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor. This would integrate the key governmental offices in one
of our most important and historic international activities.
A Bureau of Citizenship and Passport Affairs would be responsible for naturalization, other determinations of
citizenship, and issuance of passports. Local offices performing some citizenship functions, such as overseas travel
information, passport and naturalization applications, testing and interviews, could be located with local immigration
services.
Overseas citizen services would continue to be handled within the newly consolidated organization. These services
include: responding to inquiries as to the welfare or whereabouts of U.S. citizens; assisting when U.S. citizens die, are
arrested, or experience other emergencies abroad; providing notarial services; and making citizenship determinations
and issuing passports abroad.
Quality Assurance Offices would oversee records management, monitoring procedures, fraud investigations, and
internal review. At present, monitoring of the quality of decisions made on applications for immigration and citizenship
benefits receives insufficient attention. The Commission believes that quality decisions require some form of internal
supervisory review for applicants who believe their cases have been wrongly decided. This type of review helps an
agency monitor consistency and identify problems in adjudication and offers a means of correcting errors. A staff
responsible for and dedicated to ensuring the quality of decisions taken on applications for immigration and citizenship
should address some of the weaknesses in the current system, such as those recently identified in the naturalization
process.
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With respect to the domestic field structure for implementing these programs, the Regional Service Centers [RSCs] and
National Visa Center [NVC] would continue to be the locus of most adjudication. The physical plants are excellent and
the locally-hired staffs are trained and in place. At this time, information is passed from the RSCs to the NVC when the
applicant for admission is overseas. Overseas interviews would continue to take place at embassies and consulates.
A range of other interviews would take place domestically. Ideally, to avoid long lines and waits for service, there
would be smaller offices in more locations that the current INS district offices. The Commission recommends against
locating these offices with the enforcement offices discussed above. Asking individuals requesting benefits or
information to go to an enforcement agency sends the wrong message about the U.S. view of legal immigration. 
Immigration-Related Employment Standards (DOL)
The Commission recommends that all responsibility for enforcement of immigration-related standards for employers
be consolidated in the Department of Labor. These activities include enforcing compliance with requirements to verify
work authorization and attestations made regarding conditions for the legal hire of temporary and permanent foreign
workers. The Commission believes that as this is an issue of labor standards, the Department of Labor is the best
equipped federal agency to regulate and investigate employer compliance with standards intended to protect U.S.
workers. The hiring of unauthorized workers and the failure of employers to comply with the commitments they make
(e.g., to pay prevailing wages, to have recruited U.S. workers) in obtaining legal permission to hire temporary and
permanent foreign workers are violations of such labor standards. Enforcement of compliance with these requirements
currently lies within the responsibility of both INS and DOL. Under consolidation, the DOL Employment Standards
Administration's [ESA] Wage and Hour Division [WH] and Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs [OFCCP]
would perform these functions in conjunction with their other worksite labor standards activities.
Sanctions Against Employers Who Fail to Verify Work Authorization. The Commission believes all worksite
investigations to ascertain employers' compliance with employment eligibility verification requirements should be
conducted by DOL. DOL already conducts many of these investigations. However, under this recommendation, DOL
also would assess penalties if employers fail to verify the employment eligibility of persons being hired. DOL would not
be required to prove that an employer knowingly hired an illegal worker, just that the employer hired a worker without
verification of his or her authorization to work. With implementation of the Commission's proposal for a more effective
verification process, this function will be critical to deterring the employment of unauthorized workers.11
Enforcement of Skill-Based Immigrant and Limited Duration Admissions Requirements. The Commission
believes an expedited process is needed for the admission of both temporary and permanent foreign workers, as
discussed earlier in this report, as long as adequate safeguards are in place to protect the wages and working conditions
of U.S. workers. To prevent abuse of an expedited system, an effective postadmission enforcement scheme is necessary.
DOL's other worksite enforcement responsibilities place it in the best position to monitor employers' compliance with
the attestations submitted in the admissions process. DOL investigators are experienced in examining employment
records and interviewing employees. Penalties should be established for violations of the conditions to which the
employer has attested, including payment of the appropriate wages and benefits, terms and conditions of employment,
or any misrepresentation or material omissions in the attestation. Such penalties should include both the assessment of
significant administrative fines as well as barring egregious or repeat violators from petitioning for the admission of
permanent or temporary workers. 
Agency for Immigration Review
The Commission recommends that administrative review of all immigration-related decisions be consolidated and be
considered by a newly-created independent agency, the Agency for Immigration Review, within the Executive
1997 USCIR Report to Congress - Executive Summary - Achieving Immigration Policy Goals
becoming/goals., 3:08:15 PM]
Branch. The Commission believes that a system of formal administrative review of immigration-related
decisions�following internal supervisory review within the initial adjudicating body�is indispensable to the integrity
and operation of the immigration system. Such review guards against incorrect and arbitrary decisions and promotes
fairness, accountability, legal integrity, uniform legal interpretations, and consistency in the application of the law both
in individual cases and across the system as a whole.
The review function works best when it is well insulated from the initial adjudicatory function and when it is conducted
by decisionmakers entrusted with the highest degree of independence. Not only is independence in decisionmaking the
hallmark of meaningful and effective review, it is also critical to the reality and the perception of fair and impartial
review.
Hence, the Commission recommends that the review function be conducted by a newly-created independent reviewing
agency in the Executive Branch. To ensure that the new reviewing agency is independent and will exist permanently
across Administrations, we believe it should be statutorily created. It would incorporate the activities now performed by
several existing review bodies, including the DOJ Executive Office for Immigration Review, the INS Administrative
Appeals Office, the DOL Board of Alien Labor Certification Appeals, and the DOS Board of Appellate Review. It also
would have some new responsibilities.
This reviewing agency would be headed by a Director, a presidential appointee, who would coordinate the overall work
of the agency, but would have no say in the substantive decisions reached on cases considered by any division or
component within the agency.
There would be a trial division headed by a Chief Immigration Judge, appointed by the Director. The Chief Judge would
oversee a corps of Immigration Judges sitting in immigration courts located around the country. The Immigration
Judges would hear every type of case presently falling within the jurisdiction of the now-sitting Immigration Judges.
The reviewing agency also would consider appeals of decisions by the benefits adjudication agency, using staff with
legal training. Although the benefits adjudication agency will handle a wide range of applications�from tourist visas to
naturalization and the issuance of passports�not all determinations will be appealable, as is the case under current law.
We envision that those matters that are appealable under current law would remain appealable. The only difference is
that the appeal would be lodged with and considered by the new independent Agency for Immigration Review rather
than by the various reviewing offices and Boards presently located among the several Departments. The administrative
appeals agency also would consider appeals from certain visa denials and visa revocations by consular officers. Under
current law, such decisions are not subject to formal administrative or judicial review. The Commission believes that
consular decisions denying or revoking visas in specified visa categories�i.e., all immigrant visas and those LDA
categories where there is a petitioner in the United States who is seeking the admission of the visa applicant�should be
subject to formal administrative review. The visa applicant would have no right to appeal an adverse determination.
Instead, standing to appeal a visa denial or revocation would lie only with United States petitioners, whether U.S.
citizens, lawful permanent residents, or employers.
An appellate Board would sit over the trial and administrative appeals divisions of the new independent Agency for
Immigration Review. This appellate Board would be the highest administrative tribunal in the land on questions and
interpretations of immigration law. It would designate selected decisions as precedents for publication and distribution
to the public at large. Its decisions would be binding on all officers of the Executive Branch. To ensure the greatest
degree of independence, decisions by the Board would be subject to reversal or modification only as a result of judicial
review by the federal courts or through congressional action. Neither the Director of the reviewing agency nor any other
agency or Department head could alter, modify, or reverse a decision by the appellate Board. 
MANAGEMENT REFORM
The Commission urges the federal government to make needed reforms to improve management of the immigration
system. While the Commission-recommended structural changes will help improve implementation of U.S. policy,
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certain management reforms also must be adopted if the restructured agencies responsible for immigration matters are to
be effective in performing their functions. Structural reforms will not by themselves solve some of the management
problems that have persisted in the immigration agencies.
More specifically, the Commission recommends:
Setting More Manageable and Fully-Funded Priorities. The Commission urges Congress and the Executive
Branch to establish and then appropriately fund a more manageable set of immigration-related priorities. More
manageable means fewer objectives, but also a set of more integrated priorities, more realistically-achievable
short-term and long-term goals, and greater numerical specificity on expected annual outcomes to which agencies
could be held accountable.
Developing More Fully the Capacity for Policy Development, Planning, Monitoring, and Evaluation. Each
department with immigration-related responsibilities needs to perform a wide range of policy functions, including,
but not limited to, long-range and strategic policy planning, interagency policy integration, policy review, policy
coordination, priority setting, data collection and analysis, budget formulation, decisionmaking, and
accountability. The Domestic Policy Council and the National Security Council in the White House can also play
an important role in coordinating policy development across departments.
Improving Systems of Accountability. Staff who are responsible for immigration programs should be held
accountable for the results of their activities. Systems should be developed to reward or sanction managers and
staff on the basis of their performance.
Recruiting and Training Managers. The Commission believes enhancements must be made in the recruitment
and training of managers. As immigration-related agencies grow and mandated responsibilities increase or evolve,
closer attention should be paid to improving the skills and managerial capacity of immigration staff at all levels to
ensure more efficient and effective use of allocated resources.
Strengthening Customer Service Orientation. The Commission urges increased attention to instilling a
customer-service ethic in staff, particularly those responsible for adjudication of applications for benefits.
Using Fees for Immigration Services More Effectively. The Commission supports the imposition of user fees,
but emphasizes: (1) that the fees should reflect true costs; (2) that the agencies collecting the fees should retain
them and use them to cover the costs of those services for which the fees are levied; (3) that those paying fees
should expect to be treated to timely and courteous service; and (4) that maximum flexibility should be given to
agencies to expand or contract their response expeditiously as applications increase or decrease.
The Commission reiterates its 1994 recommendations concerning the need for improvements in immigration data
collection, coordination, analysis, and dissemination. Although some progress has been made, much more needs to be
done to collect data that will inform responsible immigration policymaking. The Commission believes that each agency
involved in immigration must establish a system and develop a strategy for the collection, interagency coordination,
analysis, dissemination, and use of reliable data.
Further, the Commission urges the federal government to support continuing research and analysis on the
implementation and impact of immigration policy. In particular, the federal government should support data collection
and analysis in the following areas: longitudinal surveys on the experiences and impact of immigrants; on the
experiences and impact of foreign students and foreign workers admitted for limited duration stays; and on the patterns
and impacts of unlawful migration. 
10See Appendix for Commissioner Leiden�s concurring statement. 
11At present, DOL investigates employer compliance with the requirement to check documentation and fill out the I-9 form, while INS does this
paperwork review and investigations of knowing hire of illegal aliens. The latter investigations are hampered, however, by the absence of an
effective verification process and proliferation of fraudulent documents. 
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CONCLUSION
This report concludes the work of the U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform. Together with our three interim
reports, this final set of recommendations provides a framework for immigration and immigrant policy to serve our
national interests today and in the years to come. The report outlines reforms that will enhance the benefits of legal
immigration while mitigating potential harms, curb unlawful migration to this country, and structure and manage our
immigration system to achieve all these goals. Most importantly, this report renews our call for a strong commitment to
Americanization, the process by which immigrants become part of our community and we learn and adapt to their
presence. Becoming an American is the theme of this report. Living up to American values and ideals is the challenge
for us all. 
Return to Table of Contents
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INTRODUCTION
Immigration and immigrant policy is about immigrants, their fami-
lies and the rest of us.  It is about the meaning of American nation-
ality and the foundation of national unity.  It is about uniting per-
sons from all over the world in a common civic culture.
The process of becoming an American is most simply called “Ameri-
canization,” which must always be a two-way street.  All Ameri-
cans, not just immigrants, should understand the importance of our
shared civic culture to our national community.  This final report of
the U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform makes recommenda-
tions to further the goals of Americanization by setting out immi-
grant policies to help orient immigrants and their new communities,
to improve educational programs that help immigrants and their
children learn English and civics, and to reinforce the integrity of
the naturalization process through which immigrants become U.S.
citizens.
This report also makes recommendations regarding immigration
policy.  It reiterates and updates the conclusions we reached in three
interim reports—on unlawful migration, legal immigration, and
refugee and asylum policy—and makes additional recommendations
for reforming immigration policies.  Further, in this report, the
Commission recommends ways to improve the structure and man-
agement of the federal agencies responsible for achieving the goals
of immigration policy.    It is our hope that this final report  Becom-
ing An American: Immigration and Immigrant Policy, along with our
three interim reports, constitutes a full response to the work as-
signed the Commission by Congress: to assess the national interest
in immigration and report how it can best be achieved.
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MANDATE AND METHODS
Public Law 101-649, the Immigration Act of 1990 [IMMACT], estab-
lished this Commission to review and evaluate the impact of immi-
gration policy.  More specifically, the Commission must report on
immigration’s impact on: the need for labor and skills; employment
and other aspects of the economy; social, demographic, and envi-
ronmental conditions; and the foreign policy and national security
interests of the United States.  The Commission engaged in a wide
variety of fact-finding activities to fulfill this mandate.  Site visits
were conducted throughout the United States.  Commission mem-
bers visited immigrant and refugee communities in California, Texas,
Florida, New York, Massachusetts, Illinois, Arizona, Washington,
Kansas, Virginia, Washington, DC, Puerto Rico and the Common-
wealth of the Northern Mariana Islands.  Some Commission and
staff members also visited such major source countries as Mexico,
the Dominican Republic, Cuba, Haiti, and the Philippines.  To in-
crease our understanding of  international refugee policy issues,
members and staff of the Commission visited Bosnia, Croatia, Ger-
many, and Kenya, and consulted with Geneva-based officials from
the U.N. High Commission for Refugees and the International Or-
ganization for Migration.  We held more than forty public hearings,
consultations with government and private sector officials, and ex-
pert roundtable discussions.
TODAYS IMMIGRANTS
The effects of immigration are numerous, complex, and varied. Im-
migrants contribute in many ways to the United States: to its vi-
brant and diverse communities; to its lively and participatory de-
mocracy; to its vital intellectual and cultural life; to its renowned
job-creating entrepreneurship and marketplaces; and to its family
values and hard-work ethic.  However, there are costs as well as
benefits from today’s immigration.  Those workers most at risk in
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Category of Admission 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
TOTAL 810,635 880,014 798,394 716,194 909,959
SUBJECT TO THE NUMERICAL CAP 655,541 719,701 662,029 593,234 771,604
FAMILY-BASED IMMIGRANTS 502,995 539,209 497,682 460,653 595,540
Immediate Relatives of U.S. citizens 235,484 255,059 249,764 220,360 350,192
Spouses and children 170,720 192,631 193,394 171,978 283,592
Parents 64,764 62,428 56,370 48,382 66,600
Children born abroad to alien residents 2,116 2,030 1,883 1,894 1,658
Family-sponsored immigrants 213,123 226,776 211,961 238,122 293,751
Unmarried sons/daughters of U.S. citizens 12,486 12,819 13,181 15,182 20,885
Spouses and children of LPRs 90,486 98,604 88,673 110,960 145,990
Sons and daughters of LPRs 27,761 29,704 26,327 33,575 36,559
Married sons/daughters of U.S. citizens 22,195 23,385 22,191 20,876 25,420
Siblings of U.S. citizens 60,195 62,264 61,589 57,529 64,897
Legalization dependents 52,272 55,344 34,074 277 184
EMPLOYMENT-BASED IMMIGRANTS 116,198 147,012 123,291 85,336 117,346
Priority workers 5,456 21,114 21,053 17,339 27,469
Professionals w/ adv. deg. or of advanced ability 58,401 29,468 14,432 10,475 18,436
Skilled, professionals, other workers, (CSPA) 47,568 87,689 76,956 50,245 62,674
Skilled, professionals, other workers 47,568 60,774 55,659 46,032 62,273
Chinese Student Protection Act (CSPA) X 26,915 21,297 4,213 401
Special immigrants 4,063 8,158 10,406 6,737 7,831
Investors 59 583 444 540 936
Professionals or highly skilled (Old 3rd) 340 X X X X
Needed skilled or unskilled workers (Old 6th) 311 X X X X
DIVERSITY PROGRAMS 36,348 33,480 41,056 47,245 58,718
Diversity permanent X X X 40,301 58,174
Diversity transition 33,911 33,468 41,056 6,994 544
Nationals of adversely affected countries 1,557 10 X X X
Natives of underrepresented countries 880 2 X X X
NOT SUBJECT TO THE NUMERICAL CAP 155,094 160,313 136,365 122,960 138,323
Amerasians 17,253 11,116 2,822 939 954
Cuban/Haitian Entrants 99 62 47 42 29
Parolees, Soviet and Indochinese 13,661 15,772 8,253 3,120 2,283
Refugees and Asylees 117,037 127,343 121,434 114,632 128,367
Refugee adjustments 106,379 115,539 115,451 106,795 118,345
 Asylee adjustments 10,658 11,804 5,983 7,837 10,022
Registered Nurses and their families 3,572 2,178 304 69 16
Registry, entered prior to 1/1/72 1,293 938 667 466 356
Other 2,179 2,904 2,838 3,692 6,318
Note: X = Not Applicable.  Excludes persons granted LPR status under the provisions of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986.
Source: Immigration and Naturalization Service, Statistics Division.
Immigrant Admissions by Major Category:
FYs 1992-1996
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our restructuring economy—low-skilled workers in production and
service jobs—are those who directly compete with today’s low-skilled
immigrants.  Further, immigration presents special challenges to cer-
tain states and local communities that disproportionately bear the
fiscal and other costs of incorporating newcomers.
Characteristics of Immigrants
In FY 1996 (the last year for which data are available), more than
900,000 immigrants came to the United States from 206 nations, for
a variety of reasons and with a diverse set of personal characteris-
tics.  Not surprisingly, the characteristics of immigrants from differ-
ent sending countries vary, as do their effects on the U.S.  There are
also differences between immigrants admitted under different classes
of admission.  These differences generally reflect the statutory pro-
visions that guide admissions.  [See Appendix for description of
IMMACT’s more specific provisions and its effects.]
Places of Origin.  Asia and North America (i.e., Mexico, Canada,
the Caribbean, and Central America) remain the sending regions
with the largest share of immigrants.  Mexico remains the largest
sending country and its share of total legal immigrants to the U.S.
increased from an average of 12 percent in the 1980s to more than
13 percent in FY 1994 and up to 18 percent in FY 1996.  The effects
of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 [IRCA], which
resulted in the legalization of about two million formerly illegal
Mexican residents, explains this trend.  Even though the special
admission category for the spouses of legalized aliens’ dependents
has been discontinued, Mexico benefits from the IMMACT’s removal
of per- country limits on the numerically limited spouse and chil-
dren class of admission (FB-2A).
IMMACT established a transitional and a permanent “diversity”
category for countries whose admission numbers were adversely
1996
Top Ten
Countries of
Origin of
Legal
Immigrants
Mexico 159,731
Philippines 55,778
India 44,781
Vietnam 42,006
Mainland China 41,662
Dominican Republic 39,516
Cuba 26,415
Ukraine 21,051
Russia 19,646
Jamaica 19,029
Source: INS FY 1996
Public Use Admissions Data.
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affected by the Immigration Act of 1965.    The transitional program
was in effect from FY 1992 to 1994, but unused visas were carried
over through FY 1996.  The permanent program went into effect in
FY 1995.  European countries benefitted the most from the transi-
tional program, which mandated that as many as 40 percent of the
visas could go to nationals of Ireland.  Actual Irish admissions
reached only 35 percent, with Polish immigrants accounting for an
even larger share (38 percent).  Under the permanent diversity pro-
gram, 42 percent of the immigrants came from European countries
and 35 percent came from Africa.  The effect on African admissions
is particularly noteworthy as Africans account for less than 1 per-
cent of immigrants in other admission categories.
Origins of Diversity Immigrants
versus All Other* Immigrants
*Other includes immigrants in family, employment, and humanitarian-based
categories of admission.
Source: INS Public Use Admissions Data.
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Intended U.S. Destinations.  Immigrants in FY 1996 continue to
select just a few states as their destinations.  About two-thirds in-
tend to reside in California, New York, Texas, Florida, and New
Jersey.  One-quarter of admissions are to California alone with an-
other one-seventh to New York.  New York City retains its place as
the pre-eminent immigrant city with 15 percent of immigrants in-
tending to go there.  About 7 percent of immigrants intend to go to
Los Angeles, and Miami and Chicago are in third place with about
4.5 percent each of the total.  There has been little change in these
leading destinations since IMMACT.  However, some new destina-
tions have emerged in recent years.  For example, during the past
decade, such midwestern and southern states as Mississippi, Ne-
braska, Kansas, Georgia and North Carolina saw more than a dou-
bling of the number of immigrants intending to reside there.  Al-
though the numbers are significantly smaller than the more tradi-
tional destinations, absorbing more new immigrants can be a chal-
lenge for these newer destinations that often do not have the immi-
gration-related infrastructure of the traditional receiving communi-
ties.
Age.  Immigrants in FY 1996 remain young, with the largest propor-
tion being in their later teens or twenties.  A little more than one-
fifth are children 15 years of age or younger, and another one-fifth
are 45 years or older.  More than one-half of family-based immi-
grants are younger than 30 years of age, reflecting the predominance
of spouses and children.  Because of beneficiaries, employment-
based immigrants have just as many minor dependents age 15 years
and younger as other groups, but more than two-fifths of these
employment-based immigrants themselves are 30-44 years, the ex-
perienced and highly productive working ages.  Diversity immi-
grants have a similar, yet somewhat younger, age distribution than
other classes of admission.  In contrast, and in large part due to
those admitted as refugees from the former Soviet Union, humani-
tarian admissions tend to be somewhat older than other immigrants.
1996:
Top Ten
Intended States
of Residence
of Legal
Immigrants
California 199,221
New York 153,731
Texas 82,229
Florida 79,067
New Jersey 63,162
Illinois 42,154
Massachusetts 23,017
Virginia 21,329
Maryland 20,683
Washington 18,718
Source: INS FY 1996
Public Use Admissions Data.
Top Ten
Intended
Metro Areas
of Residence
of Legal
Immigrants
New York 133,168
Los Angeles 64,285
Miami 41,527
Chicago 39,989
Washington DC 34,327
Houston 21,387
Boston 18,726
San Diego 18,226
San Francisco 18,171
Newark 17,939
Source:
http:/www.ins.usdoj.gov/
stats/annual/fy96/997.html
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Gender.  Females were 54 percent of admissions in FY 1996.  There
had been an essentially even balance of men and women during the
decade of the 1980s.  The increased share of females in the 1990s
parallels the historical tendency toward more female immigrants
throughout much of the post-World War II period.  It also reflects
the admission of the spouses of legalized aliens who were predomi-
nantly male.  In FY 1996, family-based admissions were predomi-
nantly female (57 percent) and employment-based admissions (in-
cluding beneficiaries) were evenly balanced by gender.   Diversity
(45 percent female) and humanitarian (48 percent female) admis-
sions, in contrast, had more male immigrants.  That a slight majority
of  FY 1996 humanitarian admissions were male is somewhat sur-
prising given that worldwide refugee populations are dispropor-
tionately female.
English ability.  The Immigration and Naturalization Service [INS]
admissions data do not include information on English language
ability (or education, as discussed below).  The following analysis
draws instead on preliminary data from the New Immigrant Survey
[NIS],1 which studied a sample of immigrants admitted in FY 1996.
The NIS is a pilot study designed to test the feasibility of a longi-
Age Groups of 1996 Legal Immigrants
(Principals and Derivative Beneficiaries)
GROUP  ALL  FAMILY EMPLOYMENT DIVERSITY HUMANITARIAN
15 yrs. & younger 22%   23%     20%   22%     20%
16 through 29 yrs. 31%   34%     23%   33%     27%
30 through 44 yrs. 27%   23%     44%   34%     24%
45 through 60 yrs. 15%   14%     12%   10%     21%
65 years & older  5%    5%      0%    1%      8%
Source: INS FY 1996 Public Use Admissions Data.
1 Jasso, G.;  Massey, D.S.;   Rosenzweig, M.R.;  Smith,  J.P.  1997.  The New
Immigrant Survey [NIS] Pilot Study: Preliminary Results.  Paper presented
at the Joint Meeting of the Public Health Conference on Records and
Statistics and the Data Users Conference, Washington, DC. (July.)
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English Language Proficiency among
New Adult Immigrants  (18 years and
older): 1996
Source: Jasso, G.; et al. 1997.  New Immigrant Survey Pilot Study.
tudinal immigrant survey.  Although the data are not yet published,
analysis indicates that it offers promise of providing certain infor-
mation about immigrants that has not previously been available.
The NIS, using the same measure as the U.S. Census, reports on the
English language proficiency of adult legal immigrants who are 18
years and older.  The initial results show that employment-based
immigrants report the greatest English ability—70 percent of em-
ployment-based admissions report speaking at least fairly well and
less than 10 percent speak very little or no English (the remainder
report an “average” speaking ability).  About 37 percent of family-
based admissions report speaking English at least fairly well and an
almost equal proportion report speaking little or no English.  The
diversity immigrants tend to report even less English ability, despite
the requirement that they have at least a high school education.  The
humanitarian admissions trail the furthest behind in reported En-
glish language ability.  Only 16 percent report speaking English at
least fairly well, while more than 50 percent report speaking little or
no English.
PERCENT
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Education.  The years of schooling completed by immigrants is
perhaps one of the most critical measures of skill level.  The NIS
provides our first indicators of years of education of adult legal
immigrants at the time of their admission.  As found in studies of
foreign-born residents, the immigrants surveyed by the NIS tend to
cluster at the higher or lower ends of the educational spectrum and
differ significantly in their educational attainment by class of admis-
sion.  Fully 46 percent of employment-based admissions have com-
pleted four years of college or a graduate degree.  This figure in-
cludes principals and beneficiaries, making it likely that well-edu-
cated employment-based immigrants tend to have well-educated
spouses.  In contrast, just 17 percent of family-based immigrants 25
years and older have completed a college-level education while 42
percent have less than a high school education.
Diversity immigrants are required to have a high school education
or two years of skilled work experience.  The NIS data show that
diversity immigrants tend to be better educated than family-based,
Educational Attainment
of Legal Immigrants
(25 years and older): 1996
Source: Jasso, G.; et al. 1997.  New Immigrant Survey Pilot Study.
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2   The U.S. Current Population Survey [CPS] permits us to compare directly
to the native-born, but the foreign-born data do not distinguish by
admission status.  The CPS data also include illegal aliens who have
extremely low levels of education in the foreign-born category.  See: Fix,
M.;  Passel, J.S.  1994. Immigration and Immigrants: Setting the Record
Straight.  Washington, DC: The Urban Institute.  These figures for the
diversity class of admission correspond to data on education collected
by the U.S. Department of State for diversity immigrants only.
but not as well educated as employment-based immigrants.  About
14 percent have not completed high school.  They may be either
principals who meet the work but not the education requirement or
the spouses of the principals. Twenty-two percent of diversity immi-
grants have completed college or done graduate-level education,
about the same proportion as among U.S. natives.2
The humanitarian classes of admission are less well educated than
the employment-based, but are better educated than family admis-
sions.  The large number of relatively well-educated persons admit-
ted as refugees from the Soviet Union may partly explain this find-
ing.  About 21 percent have less than a high school education, while
about 19 percent have college or higher degrees.
Occupation.  Ultimately, the English and educational skills that im-
migrants have are reflected in their occupations.  The INS admis-
sions data, which we use here, have only crude occupational clas-
sifications.  It imperfectly captures the difference between immi-
grants who adjust into legal permanent resident [LPR] status after
working in a U.S. job for several years and those who report an
occupation upon admission that tells us more about what the immi-
grant did at home than what they will do here.
Sixty-five percent of all immigrants in FY 1996 reported no occupa-
tion or being a “homemaker,” reflecting the fact that children, par-
ents, and spouses are a large share of all admissions and most do
not work at the time of entry.
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Major Occupational Category
by Admission Class: 1996
Source: INS Public Use Admissions Data.
Nevertheless, occupational status faithfully reflects the legal require-
ments of the admission class—the proportion of all immigrants not
reporting an occupation is greater among family and humanitarian
admissions, about 70 percent of all immigrants in each category.  By
way of comparison, only about one-half of all employment and
diversity admissions have no reported occupation.3  The skills which
immigrants bring to the United States are reflected in their type of
occupations.  Family and humanitarian immigrants are primarily
blue-collar workers.  In contrast, employment-based and permanent
diversity immigrants are predominantly white-collar workers.  These
broad differences between the major classes of admission have
changed only slightly over the past three decades.
IMMACT has had an effect on occupational distribution within these
broad categories.  To gauge its effects, a research paper prepared for
3 The initial results from the NIS pilot show that about 40 percent of adult
nonexempt family immigrants are not employed.  Alternatively, more
than 95 percent of employment-based principals are employed.  The INS
admission figures for “no occupation” include children and persons who
are unemployed, retired, or for whom no information is given.
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the Commission calculated simple linear projections for all of the
admission categories now subject to the worldwide ceiling on ad-
missions.  Data from FY 1972-1991 were analyzed and the trends
identified, then projected forward to FY 1996.  This analysis, there-
fore, paints a “what-if” picture of what today’s immigration might
have looked like if past trends had continued unaffected by IMMACT
[see table above].
The actual total number of admissions under the worldwide ceiling
in FY 1996 was 720,314 which—compared to the projected figure of
FY 1996 Regular Admissions by Occupation:
Predicted and Actual
OCCUPATION PREDICTED ACTUAL       EXCESS OF
    (WITHOUT IMMACT)    (WITH IMMACT)        ACTUAL
         OVER
      PREDICTED
WHITE-COLLAR WORKERS
Professional, Technical, and Kindred
Health Professionals   10,244  18.986  85%
Other Professionals    9,231  19,477 111%
Technical & Specialty   22,115  33,117  50%
Executives   20,283  30,702  51%
Sales   12,943  13,002   0%
Administrative Support   19,437  19,807   2%
BLUE-COLLAR WORKERS
Precision Production   21,028  20,116  -4%
Operators, Fabricators, & Laborers   37,702  53,936  43%
FARMING, FORESTRY, AND FISHING              12,251  12,588   3%
SERVICE   48,180  51,797   8%
TOTAL WITH OCCUPATION  165,234            221,731  34%
TOTAL WITHOUT OCCUPATION  261,694 498,583  91%
GRAND TOTAL  426,928 730,314  69%
Note: Predicted numbers in FY 1996 are based on linear projections (from the years
between 1972 and 1991), and are kept within numerical limits on nonexempt
categories.  Humanitarian admissions are not included.
Source: Greenwood, M.;  Ziel, F.A.  1997.  The Impact of the Immigration Act of 1990 on
U.S. Immigration.  Washington, DC: U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform.
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426,929—was 69 percent greater than would have been expected
without IMMACT.  Admissions were greater than the projected fig-
ure because IMMACT increased numerically-limited family, employ-
ment, and diversity admissions.  The numerically-exempt admis-
sions for the immediate relatives of U.S. citizens would have grown
between 1992 and 1996 even without IMMACT.  This analysis does
not include humanitarian admissions.
Of immigrants who reported an occupation, the actual admissions
in FY 1996 were 221,731 which—compared to the projected figure of
165,234—was 34 percent greater than would have been expected if
IMMACT had not gone into effect.  By contrast, nonworking immi-
grants experienced a 91 percent increase of actual over projected.
This finding is not surprising as FY 1996 family admissions were
significantly higher than would have been permissible under previ-
ous law.  In part this was because IMMACT permitted unused FY
1995 employment-based numbers to be transferred to the FY 1996
family categories.  In combination with a growth in immediate rela-
tives (including those who would normally have been admitted in
FY 1995 but were caught in processing delays), the additional visas
meant more spouses and minor children entered.  These immigrants
are the least likely to be employed.
As might be anticipated, IMMACT’s new emphasis on admitting
highly-educated and skilled persons led to growth in professional
occupations among those who reported an occupation.  As stated
above, there was an overall 34 percent increase in persons reporting
an occupation.  This increase was not evenly distributed, however.
The number of health professionals, for example, was projected to
be 10,244, but at 18,985 was 85 percent greater.  The number of
executives also shows a higher than expected increase.  Interest-
ingly, projections not shown here indicate that within the employ-
ment-based category, family members (beneficiaries) of the princi-
pals show the greatest growth in professional occupations.  This
suggests that when principals with more skills are admitted, they
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bring with them spouses who are, likewise, more skilled than in the
past.  Further, projections not shown here indicate that the skill
requirement for permanent diversity immigrants makes for more
highly-skilled admissions from eligible countries.  In short, IMMACT
increased both the numbers of more skilled admissions and their
share of immigrants admitted.
Most nonprofessional white-collar and blue-collar occupations show
very little or no growth over what might have occurred without
IMMACT.  The one notable exception is a greater-than-expected
increase in the number of “Operators, Fabricators, and Laborers.”
There were 53,936 admissions in these occupations compared to the
37,702 that were projected.  As the employment-based access for
persons with these occupations is highly limited, it appears that
much of this increase is attributable to family-based admissions.  It
is unclear from the data, however, why this pattern has emerged.
Earnings.  According to the NIS survey, the median earnings of all
male immigrants admitted in 1996 was $15,600 and for women was
$11,960, lower than the median earnings for natives.  Compared to
the earnings in their last country of residence, male immigrants
experienced a 59 percent increase and women a 45 increase in earn-
ings upon admission to the United States.  Differences in earnings
are, as should be expected, substantial by admission class.  Many
employment-based immigrants earn a median income of $36,400 on
the date of their admission to LPR status, while the sibling or spouse
of an LPR earns $11,750 and the spouse of a citizen earns $18,200.
4 National Research Council.  (Smith, J.P.;  Edmonston, B.  eds.).  1997.
The New Americans: Economic, Demographic, and Fiscal Effects of Immigration.
Washington, DC: National Academy Press.
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Effects on the Economy
An independent evaluation of immigration by a panel of eminent
social scientists at the National Research Council [NRC], sponsored
by the Commission,4 found that immigration has a positive eco-
nomic impact on the national level.  However, the NRC panel’s
findings confirm the by now commonplace conclusion that there are
tangible costs to certain sectors of the labor market and certain
communities.  This reinforces the Commission’s conclusions on the
need for a well-regulated system of immigrant admissions, as well
as the need for attention to means of improving integration and
reducing friction between newcomers and established residents.
The NRC panel estimates that immigrants may add $1-10 billion
directly to the national economy each year, a small but positive
amount in a $7.6 trillion economy.  Many consumers, business
owners, and investors benefit from the immigrant labor force.  Re-
cent newcomers may be willing to work for lower wages than other
U.S. workers, although, with the exception of many immigrants
with less than a high school education, most immigrants tend to
earn as much as natives after a decade.  Many others in the economy
benefit, particularly those who do work that is complementary to
that performed by immigrants.  Immigrants provide the labor that
has kept viable entire segments of certain labor-intensive industries,
such as garment and shoemaking.  Many immigrant entrepreneurs
expand trade with foreign countries from which they come, and the
language and cultural expertise of many immigrant employees are
valuable to U.S. companies doing business abroad.
Immigrants also contribute to the economic revitalization of the com-
munities in which they live.  As middle-class natives have left the
5 Muller, T.  1993.  Immigrants and the American City.  New York: New York
University Press.  Winnick, L.  1990.  New People in Old Neighborhoods:
The Role of New Immigrants in Rejuvenating New York’s Communities.  New
York: Russell Sage Foundation.
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inner cities, immigrant newcomers have settled, established busi-
nesses, bought homes, and otherwise invested in these areas.  Gate-
way cities, such as New York and Los Angeles, have benefitted
particularly from this urban renewal.  At the same time, these cities
face new challenges related to immigration.  Growing immigrant
communities require local school systems (some of which may have
otherwise faced declining enrollments) to provide sufficient class-
room space and teachers.  They must also develop programs to
teach children who are without English skills or prior education.
Overcrowded housing, drug trafficking, gang violence, sweatshops,
and public health problems also may be found in many of these
inner-city communities.5
Immigration particularly affects certain U.S. workers.  The NRC
panel finds that workers with less than twelve years of education
are the most adversely affected by low-skilled immigrant workers.
Immigrants may have reduced substantially the wages of high school
dropouts, who are about one-tenth of the workforce, by 5 percent
nationwide.  This is a sizable impact on a group that was already
poorly paid before the loss in real earnings it experienced over the
past two decades.  Most often it is the foreign-born worker, particu-
larly in labor markets with large numbers of immigrants who expe-
rience the greatest competition.6   While the education and skill level
of most U.S. workers differs significantly from those of most immi-
grants (and therefore they are not competing for the same jobs), the
new arrivals are often direct substitutes for immigrants who arrived
a short time before them.7
6 Greenwood, M.;  Tienda, M.  1997.  U.S. Impacts of Mexican Immigration.
Team Report to Mexico/United States Binational Study on Migration.
Greenwood, J.;  Hunt, G.L.  1995.  Economic Effects of Immigrants on
Native and Foreign-Born Workers: Complementarity, Sustitutability, and
Other Channels of Influence.  Southern Economic Journal.  61:4 1096.
7 Waldinger, R.  1996.  Still the Promised City?  African Americans and New
Immigrants in Postindustrial New York.  Cambridge: Harvard University
Press.  Waldinger, R.;  Bozorgmehr, M.  1996.  Ethnic Los Angeles.  New
York: Russell Sage Foundation.
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The evidence on the impact of immigration on native-born minori-
ties nationwide is less clear.  The NRC concluded that in the aggre-
gate, the economic opportunities of African Americans are not re-
duced by immigration because African Americans and immigrants
tend to be in different labor markets and reside in different cities.
Other research finds small, adverse effects on African Americans.8
These effects are found most strongly when low-skilled minority
workers compete with low-skilled immigrant workers in the same
industries and the same geographic areas.
The fiscal effects of immigration also are complicated.  Generally,
the impacts on the federal government are favorable compared to
those on state and local governments.  Most studies show that at the
federal level, the foreign-born pay more in taxes than they receive
in services.  When spread across all taxpayers, this characteristic
represents a very small, but positive, benefit.  At the local level,
however, immigrants often represent a net fiscal cost, in some cases
a substantial one.  Research on the resident illegal alien population
finds the clearest examples of fiscal costs to states and localities.9  In
general, much of the negative effect is related to school costs that
are considerable because of the larger size of many immigrant fami-
lies.  Although funds spent on education may be considered an
investment, not just a fiscal burden, the payoff is not realized for
many years.
8 Hamermesh, D.S.;  Bean, F.D. (eds.)  1998 forthcoming.  Help or
Hinderance?  Immigration and Its Economic Implications for African Americans.
New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
9 Taylor, E.;  Martin, P.;  Fix, M.  1997.  Poverty Amidst Prosperity: Immigration
and the Changing Face of Rural California.  Washington, DC: The Urban
Institute Press.  U.S. General Accounting Office.  1995.  Illegal Aliens:
National Cost Estimates Vary Widely.  Washington, DC. 6.  Clark, R.;  Passel,
J.S.;  Zimmermann, W.N.;  Fix, M.E.  1994.  Fiscal Impacts of Undocumented
Aliens: Selected Estimates for Seven States.  Washington, DC: The Urban
Institute Press.
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Education affects fiscal impacts in a second way.  Ultimately, the
economic success and fiscal contributions of immigrants are deter-
mined by their educational level.  The NRC panel found that immi-
grants who complete high school and beyond generally represent a
more favorable balance of fiscal costs and contributions than do
those with little or no education.  Even over their lifetimes, immi-
grants without education are unlikely to contribute sufficient tax
revenues to offset their use of services.  Both groups of immigrants
tend to use public services in a similar fashion, particularly as re-
lated to the schooling of their children, but the more educated im-
migrants tend to earn more and pay higher taxes.
Educational differences also explain why certain states and localities
are more adversely affected by immigration than are others.  Cali-
fornia immigrants represent a sizeable tax burden (estimated at al-
most $1,200 per native-headed family per year) while New Jersey
immigrants represent a more modest tax burden (estimated to be
$232 per native-headed family per year).  The difference can be
explained largely by the differences in the average educational level
of the immigrants residing in these states.10
English language ability also affects the economic success and fiscal
impacts of immigrants.  In the 1990 Census, 47 percent of the for-
eign-born more than 5 years of age reported not speaking English
“very well.”  Individuals with poor English language skills tend to
be confined to the lowest levels of the U.S. job market.  By contrast,
ability in spoken English markedly improves immigrants’ earnings,
especially for Hispanic and Asian adult immigrants.11  English read-
10 See: Espenshade, T.  1997.  Keys to Successful Immigration: Implications of
the New Jersey Experience.  Washington, DC: The Urban Institute Press.
11 Chiswick, B.R. (ed.).  1992.  Immigration, Language, and Ethnicity.
Washington, DC: The AEI Press.  229-96.
12 Rivera-Batiz, F.L.  1992.  English Language Proficiency and the Earnings
of Young Immigrants in the U.S. Labor Market.  Policy Studies Review
11:165-75.
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ing comprehension also has been found to improve the earnings of
young immigrant adults.12
Population Growth and
Natural Resources
In recent years there have been about 800,000 legal admissions and
an additional estimated 200,000 to 300,000 unauthorized entries, but
the net annual increase of the foreign-born population is about 700,000
each year due to return migration and mortality.13  In 1996, the for-
eign-born population was 24.6 million, 9.3 percent of the U.S. popu-
lation.  Recent arrivals make up a large share of the resident foreign-
born population; about 28 percent arrived after 1990, and an addi-
tional 35 percent during the 1980s.
It is estimated that international migration makes up somewhere
between one-quarter and one-third of net annual population increase.
Given current demographic trends and noting that much can hap-
pen to alter long-range forecasts, the U.S. Census Bureau projects
the population to increase by 50 percent between 1995 and 2050.
Immigration is likely to become a larger proportion of the net in-
crease.14
The NRC report also presented estimates of population growth.  It
found that without immigration since 1950, the U.S. population would
have been 14 percent smaller than its 1995 size of 263 million.  The
NRC projected the population to the year 2050 after making certain
assumptions about mortality, fertility, and rates of group inter-mar-
13 National Research Council.  1997.  The New Americans: Economic,
Demographic and Fiscal Effects on Immigration.  Washington, DC:
National Academy Press.
14 U.S. Bureau of the Census.  1996. Current Population Reports.  (Feb.).
Edmonston, B.;  Passel, J.S.  (eds.).  1994.  Immigration and Ethnicity: The
Integration of American’s Newest Arrivals.  Washington, DC: The Urban
Institute Press.
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riage.  According to the projection based on these assumptions, the
U.S. population would increase by 124 million persons to 387 mil-
lion, with immigration responsible for two-thirds (82 million) of the
increase.  Of this 82 million, 45 million are immigrants and an ad-
ditional 37 million increase is due to their higher assumed fertility.
Immigration affects the age structure as well as the overall popula-
tion.  The NRC panel projected that under current immigration
policy, kindergarten through grade eight school enrollment in 2050
would be 17 percent higher than it was in 1995.  High school enroll-
ment would rise from 14.0 million in 1995 to 20.3 million in 2050.
Immigration also has small effects on the proportion of the popula-
tion that is elderly.  No matter which immigration policies are
adopted, according to the NRC, the number of persons aged 65
years and older will double between 1995 and 2050.  However, the
proportion of older people in the total population will be somewhat
smaller with immigration.
The NRC panel’s projection of the ethnic distribution of the U.S.
population in 2050 shows the Hispanic population increasing from
10 to 25 percent and the Asian population from 3 to 8 percent of the
population.  These projections are dependent on today’s rates of
group intermarriage and how persons report their ethnicity.  It may
be that, like children of immigrants who arrived in the last century,
descendents of today’s immigrants will choose to report their
ethnicity as being different from that of their parents, and that today’s
ethnic categories will not accurately describe tomorrow’s popula-
tions.
What broader implications do these growth figures have?  Some
analysts argue that high immigration levels mean an abundant sup-
ply of youthful workers who will be a substantial spur to the
economy.  From this perspective, population growth is an engine for
technological progress and the means to solve environmental prob-
lems, effectively spawning change out of necessity.  Proponents of
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this view argue that human resourcefulness has dealt with popula-
tion growth in the past and the solutions often have left us better
off.  Adding more people may “cause us more problems, but at the
same time there will be more people to solve these problems.”15
Others are concerned about the negative consequences of popula-
tion growth, particularly on the environment, infrastructure, and
services.16 They see population growth as imposing pressures on our
natural resources and quality of life, raising special concerns in the
arid regions of the southwest or sites of industries relocating to the
south central states.17  Those concerned argue that our future well-
being depends upon both conservation, and stabilizing population
growth.18
This debate primarily concerns total U.S. population growth, which
is strongly influenced by immigration.  Still, there is little or no
information about whether immigrants have differential impacts dis-
tinct from the population increase they produce on the U.S. environ-
ment.19
The Commission did find that rapid inflows of immigrants can pose
difficulties for those who must plan for community growth.  Schools
sometimes receive large numbers of new immigrant students that
had not been planned for.  Housing and infrastructure development
15 Simon, J.  1994.  More People, Greater Wealth, More Resources, Healthier
Environment.  Economic Affairs (April) 22-29.
16 Beck, R.  1994.  Re-Charting America’s Future: Responses to Arguments
Against Stabilizing U.S. Population and Limiting Immigration.  Petoskey,
MI: The Social Contract Press.
17 U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform.  1995.  Mesa, Arizona U.S.
Commission on Immigration Reform roundtable.U.S. Commission on
Immigration Reform 1997.  Site visit to Garden City, Kansas.
18 Abernethy, V.  1994.  Population Politics.  New York: Insight Press.
19 Kraly, E.P.  1995.  U.S. Immigration and the Environment: Scientific Research
and Analytic Issues.  Washington, DC: U.S. Commission on Immigration
Reform.
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may not be adequate in affected urban and rural communities.20
New immigrant destinations, sometimes to areas that have not had
new immigrants for a century or more, can put particular stress on
communities that have experienced rapid growth in the past de-
cade.
Foreign Policy and
National Security Interests
Immigration matters frequently are intertwined with foreign policy
and national security.  Today, migration and refugee issues are mat-
ters of high international politics engaging the heads of state in-
volved in defense, internal security, and external relations.21  Inter-
national migration intersects with foreign policy in two principal
ways.  The U.N. Security Council has acknowledged that migration
can pose threats to international peace and security through eco-
nomic or social instability or humanitarian disasters.  Migration can
also build positive relations with other countries and thereby pro-
mote national security.  As a consequence, migration itself requires
bilateral and international attention to help address the causes and
consequences of movements of people.
During the Cold War, a foreign policy priority was the destabilizing
of Communist regimes.  Refugee policy was often a tool to achieve
that strategic goal, for instance, by encouraging the flow of migrants
from Eastern Europe or Cuba.  Elsewhere, political, economic, and
military involvement in Southeast Asia and the Dominican Republic
had significant migration consequences, as large numbers of South-
east Asians and Dominicans ended up as refugees and immigrants
20 Taylor, E.;  Martin, P.;  Fix, M.  1997.  Poverty Amidst Prosperity: Immigration
and the Changing Face of Rural California.  Washington, DC: The Urban
Institute Press.
21 Weiner, M.  1992.  Security, Stability, and International Migration.
International Security 17:3 (Winter) 91-126.
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to the U.S.  These foreign policy priorities generally have had sig-
nificant immigration consequences years later.
Alternatively, immigration concerns sometimes have played a sig-
nificant role in U.S. foreign policy, especially when mass move-
ments to the U.S. are feared.  A stated rationale for U.S. Central-
American policy in the 1980s was to prevent a mass movement that
would occur if anti-American Marxist dictatorships were established
in Central America.  One of the explicit reasons for the military
intervention in Haiti in 1994 was to restrain the flow of migrants
onto U.S. shores.  And, although the U.S. does not officially main-
tain relations with Cuba, migration concerns gained priority over
diplomatic ones leading to negotiations on the Cuban Migration
Agreement and to a reversal of policy regarding the interdiction of
Cuban migrants.
Some observers believe that environmental causes now rival eco-
nomic and political instability as a major source of forced migration
throughout the world.  There are estimates that as many as one-
hundred million people may be displaced, in part, because of deg-
radation of land and natural resources.  “That will increase the
pressure to migrate to places like the United States.”22  The perva-
sive deterioration of Mexico’s rural drylands may contribute to
between 700,000 and 900,000 people a year leaving rural areas.23
Environmental degradation in Mexico, Haiti, and Central America
also are believed to have migration consequences for the U.S.  Often
environmental problems intersect with other causes.  One researcher
argues that migrants from Haiti may be considered “environmental
refugees” because the root causes of their migrations are land deg-
22 Schwartz, M.L.; Notini, J.  1994.  Desertification and Migration: Mexico and
the United States.  Washington, DC: U.S. Commission on Immigration
Reform.
23 National Heritage Institute.  1997.  Environmental Degradation and Migration:
The U.S./Mexico Case Study.  Report prepared for the U.S. Commission
on Immigration Reform.
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radation and the Haitian government’s unwillingness to act in the
interest of the general population.”24
Stabilizing economic growth and democracy may be an effective
means of reducing migration pressures.  The Commission for the
Study of International Migration and Cooperative Economic Devel-
opment25 concluded that, over the long run of a generation or more,
trade and investment are likely to reduce migration pressures.  Sup-
porters of the North American Free Trade Agreement [NAFTA]
argued that NAFTA-related development eventually will reduce
unauthorized Mexican migration.  The U.S. has provided the rein-
stalled democratically-elected government of Haiti with a great deal
of rehabilitation assistance that should aid the stability of that coun-
try.
CONCLUSION
Properly-regulated immigration and immigrant policy serves the
national interest by ensuring the entry of those who will contribute
most to our society and helping lawful newcomers adjust to life in
the United States.   It must give due consideration to shifting eco-
nomic realities.  A well-regulated system sets priorities for admis-
sion; facilitates nuclear family reunification; gives employers access
to a global labor market while protecting U.S. workers; helps to
generate jobs and economic growth; and fulfills our commitment to
resettle refugees as one of several elements of humanitarian protec-
tion of the persecuted.
24 Catanese, A. 1990/91.  Haiti’s Refugees: Political, Economic, Environmental.
(Paper 17).  San Francisco: Natural Heritage Institute; Indianapolis:
Universities Field Staff International.
25 The Commission for the Study of International Migration and Cooperative
Economic Development.  1990.  Unauthorized Migration: An Economic
Development Response.  Washington, DC.
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AMERICANIZATION
AND INTEGRATION
OF IMMIGRANTS
A DECLARATION OF
PRINCIPLES AND VALUES
Immigration to the United States has created one of the world’s
most successful multiethnic nations.  We believe these truths consti-
tute the distinctive characteristics of American nationality:
n American unity depends upon a widely-held belief in the
principles and values embodied in the American Constitu-
tion and their fulfillment in practice: equal protection and
justice under the law; freedom of speech and religion; and
representative government;
n Lawfully-admitted newcomers of any ancestral nationality—
without regard to race, ethnicity, or religion—truly become
Americans when they give allegiance to these principles and
values;
n Ethnic and religious diversity based on personal freedom is
compatible with national unity; and
n The nation is strengthened when those who live in it com-
municate effectively with each other in English, even as many
persons retain or acquire the ability to communicate in other
languages.
As long as we live by these principles and help newcomers to learn
and practice them, we will continue to be a nation that benefits from
substantial but well-regulated immigration.  We must pay attention
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to our core values, as we have tried to do in our recommendations
throughout this report.  Then, we will continue to realize the lofty
goal of E Pluribus Unum.1
AMERICANIZATION
The Commission reiterates its call for the Americanization of new
immigrants, that is the cultivation of a shared commitment to the
American values of liberty, democracy and equal opportunity.  The
U.S. has fought for the principles of individual rights and equal
protection under the law, notions that now apply to all our resi-
dents.  We have long recognized that immigrants are entitled to the
full protection of our Constitution and laws.  The U.S. also has the
sovereign right to impose appropriate obligations on immigrants.
In our 1995 report to Congress, the Commission called for a new
commitment to Americanization.  In a public speech that same year,
Barbara Jordan, our late chair, noted: “That word earned a bad
reputation when it was stolen by racists and xenophobes in the
1920s.  But it is our word, and we are taking it back.”  American-
ization is the process of integration by which immigrants become
part of our communities and by which our communities and the
nation learn from and adapt to their presence.
This process enhances our unity by focusing on what is important,
through acknowledging that the many real differences among us as
individuals do not alter our essential character as a nation.
1 Our national motto, E Pluribus Unum, “from many, one,” was originally
conceived to denote the union of the thirteen states into one nation.
Throughout our history, E Pluribus Unum also has come to mean the
vital unity of our national community founded on individual freedom
and the diversity that flows from it.
The Commission
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Americanization
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This Americanization process depends on a set of expectations that
the United States, which chooses to invite legal immigrants, legiti-
mately has of newcomers.  It applies equally to the expectations
immigrants legitimately have of their new home.
The Commission proposes that the principles of Americanization be
made more explicit through the covenant between immigrant and
citizens.  These principles are not mere abstractions.  They can form
a covenant between ourselves and immigrant newcomers.  As Presi-
dent Johnson eloquently stated in 1965:
They came here—the exile and the stranger. . . . They made
a covenant with this land.  Conceived in justice, written in
liberty, bound in union, it was meant one day to inspire the
hopes of all mankind; and it binds us still.  If we keep its
terms, we shall flourish.
We have not always abided by its terms, but the ideal of a covenant
between immigrant and nation still captures the essence of Ameri-
canization.  Immigrants become part of us, and we grow and be-
come the stronger for having embraced them.  In this spirit,
the Commission sees the covenant between immigrants and
ourselves as:
Voluntary.  Immigration to the United States—a benefit to
both citizens and immigrants—is not an entitlement and
Americanization cannot be forced.  We as a nation choose to
admit immigrants because we find lawful immigration serves
our interests in many ways.  Likewise, no one requires
immigrants to come here or to become citizens; they choose to
come and, if they naturalize, they choose to become a part of
our polity.
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Mutual and reciprocal.  Immigration presents mutual
obligations.  Immigrants must accept the obligations we
impose—to obey our laws, to pay taxes, to respect other
cultures and ethnic groups.  At the same time, citizens incur
obligations to provide an environment in which newcomers
can become fully participating members of our society.  We
must not exclude them from our community nor bar them
from the polity after admission.  This obligation to immigrants
by no means excuses us from our obligations to our own
disadvantaged populations.  To the extent that immigration
poses undue burdens on our communities, our citizenry, or
immigrants themselves, we have an obligation to recognize
and address them.
Thus the United States assumes an obligation to those it admits,
as immigrants assume an obligation to this country they chose.
Having affirmatively admitted the newcomer, the federal
government necessarily extends civic and societal rights.
Unfortunately recent legislative changes effectively have
excluded immigrants from the public safety net until such
time as they become naturalized citizens.  This Commission
previously recommended against such action.  We believe it is
likely that these changes will lead to greater problems both for
immigrants and for the communities in which they live.
Legislation that leads immigrants to seek citizenship to protect
eligibility for social benefits, rather than out of commitment to
our polity, provides the wrong incentive.  The effect is not to
exalt citizenship, but to diminish it.
Individual, not collective.  The United States is a nation
founded on the proposition that each individual is born with
certain rights and that the purpose of government is to secure
these rights.  The United States admits immigrants as
individuals (or individual members of families).  As long as
the United States continues to emphasize the rights of
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individuals over those of groups, we need not fear that the
diversity brought by immigration will lead to ethnic division
or disunity.  Of course, the right to assemble and join with
others is a fundamental right of all Americans, immigrants
included.  However, unlike other countries, including those
from which many immigrants come, rights in the United States
are not defined by ethnicity, religion, or membership in any
group; nor can immigrants be denied rights because they are
members of a particular ethnic, religious, or political group.
The Commission believes that the federal government should take
the lead and invite states and local governments and the private
sector to join in promoting Americanization.  For example, “I Am an
American Day” was once widely celebrated in public schools and
local communities.  Recent immigration legislation mandates natu-
ralization ceremonies on the 4th of July.  While the federal govern-
ment cannot and should not be the sole instrument of Americaniza-
tion, it can provide important leadership in supporting the imple-
mentation of programs designed to promote full integration of new-
comers.
To help achieve full integration of newcomers, the Commission calls
upon federal, state, and local governments to provide renewed lead-
ership and resources to a program to promote Americanization that
requires:
n Developing capacities to orient both newcomers and receiv-
ing communities;
n Educating newcomers in English language skills and our
core civic values; and
n Revisiting the meaning and conferral of citizenship to en-
sure the integrity of the naturalization process.
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ORIENTATION
The Commission recommends that the federal, state, and local  gov-
ernments take an active role in helping newcomers become self-
reliant: orienting immigrants and receiving communities as to their
mutual rights and responsibilities, providing information they need
for successful integration, and encouraging the development of local
capacities to mediate when divisions occur between groups.  Infor-
mation and orientation must be provided both to immigrants and to
their receiving communities.  The experience of “newcomer schools”
is that providing coordinated information and advice on life in the
United States accelerates the integration of newcomers, which, in
turn, decreases the negative impacts on communities.  Information
on expected impacts and successful programs can help localities
foster immigrant integration and mediate differences to avoid com-
munity conflicts.
More specifically, to integrate into American society, immigrants
need information on their legal rights and obligations, on American
core civic beliefs, on how to access services, and on immigration-
related requirements.  Communities require information on the
numbers and characteristics of immigrants arriving in their midst,
the eligibility of newcomers for various services, the legal responsi-
bilities of state and local government agencies, and similar matters.
The Commission believes the federal government should help im-
migrants and local communities by:
n Giving orientation materials to legal immigrants upon ad-
mission that include, but are not limited to: a welcoming
greeting; a brief discussion of U.S. history, law, and prin-
ciples of U.S. democracy; tools to help the immigrant locate
and use services for which they are eligible; and other im-
migration-related information and documents.  All immi-
grants would receive the same materials.  The packets would
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Example of a
Welcoming Statement
Congratulations on your decision to immigrate to the United
States of America.  Best wishes for a successful settlement in
your new home.  This is a proud country of individual freedom,
opportunity, and diversity with a long tradition of immigration.
Finding success and opportunity in the United States can be
difficult.  We realize that immigrants face many challenges as
they become self-reliant, such as learning a new language and
adjusting to new circumstances.  The U.S. has learned from its
tradition of immigration that patience, tolerance, and adaptabil-
ity are required from each and every one of us.
Basic American principles that you are asked to embrace in-
clude: a commitment to serve the best interests of the United
States and the community in which you live; knowledge of and
respect for our laws and democratic institutions; respect for
freedom of speech and religion; and a commitment not to
discriminate against others on the basis of nationality, race,
sex, or religion.  The excerpts from the U.S. history and law
section of your orientation packet should serve to illustrate the
meaning of these important principles.
We the people of the United States welcome you.
be available in English and the main immigrant languages.
It is not the Commission’s intent to prescribe all parts of an
orientation packet but, rather, to suggest the most impor-
tant information and key resources that should be included.
Welcoming statement.  The Welcoming Statement would
congratulate immigrants on their decision to become per-
manent residents of the United States.  It also would sum-
marize the basic principles that all Americans embrace.
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Example of Documents on the Founding Principles
On July 4, 1776, the Continental Congress adopted a Declaration drafted by Thomas Jefferson that
defined the commitment of a new nation to the principles of liberty and justice for all:
We hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created equal, that they are endowed
by their Creator with certain unalienable rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the
Pursuit of Happiness—That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men,
deriving their just Powers from the Consent of the Governed. . . .
The greatest contradiction in the new nation’s founding was the institution of human
slavery, which ended only after a bloody civil war (1860-1864).  After the decisive battle at
Gettysburg, in 1863, Abraham Lincoln dedicated the cemetery, ending with these words:
[W]e here highly resolve that these dead shall not have died in vain—that this nation, under
God, shall have a new birth of freedom—and that government of the people, by the people, for
the people, shall not perish from the earth.
After the Civil War, the effort to live up to the promises of the founding principles
intensified.  In 1872, Susan B. Anthony was arrested for attempting to vote in a Presidential
election.  Her speech on the rights of women was an important step toward gaining women the
vote:
The preamble of the federal Constitution says . . . It was we, the people; not we, the white male
citizens; nor yet we, the male citizens; but we, the whole people, who formed the Union.  And
we formed it, not to give the blessings of liberty, but to secure them; not the half of ourselves
and our posterity; but to the whole people —women as well as men.
Way into the twentieth century, the founding principles continue to challenge Americans.  In 1963,
the Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. led a peaceful March on Washington, and spoke on the
steps of the Lincoln Memorial in the cause of civil rights.
When the architects of our republic wrote the magnificent words of the Constitution and the
Declaration of Independence, they were signing a promissory note to which every American was
to fall heir.  This note was a promise that all men would be guaranteed the unalienable rights
of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness . . .
 I have a dream that one day this nation will rise up and live out the true meaning of its creed:
“We hold these truths to be self-evident; that all men are created equal. . . . I have a dream that
my four little children will one day live in a nation where they will not be judged by the color
of their skin but by the content of their character . . .  And if America is to be a great nation
this must become true.
U.S. COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION REFORM
1 9 9 7
RECOMMENDATIONS
- 33 -
U.S. history, law, and principles of democracy.  This would
include a brief history of the United States and of the prin-
ciples listed in the welcoming statement, followed by ex-
cerpts from relevant historical documents.  It would stress
that American civic culture is based on a trust in ordinary
people’s ability to govern themselves through their elected
representatives who are then accountable to the people, on
the right of all members of the polity to participate in public
life as equals, and on the freedom of individual members of
the community to differ from each other in religion and
other private matters.
Tools for settlement.  This section would emphasize the
development of self-reliance.  It would include general in-
formation and checklists to aid immigrants in finding and
using services in their community that may help them in
developing economic independence.
Example of Tools for Settlement
What to expect upon immigration: information to orient newcomers on
federal policies and services, such as a pre-/ post-arrival checklist on
admissions, information for those adjusting status on new rights and
responsibilities as permanent residents, reminder to register for military
service if necessary, the role of government agencies and service
providers; consumer protection and tax policies;
How to secure basic needs: information on housing, employment,
education and language training, health, transportation, police and fire
protection, managing finances, and cultural adjustment;
Finding assistance and advice: telephone numbers for the local
information clearinghouses, government agencies; documents listing
weight and measurement conversions, U.S. holidays, instructions in
using the telephone and postal systems; a U.S. map;
Getting involved in the community:  listings of  community organizations
(e.g., civic, sports, arts) and volunteer opportunities.
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Immigration information and documents. This section
would provide necessary immigration forms, information
on naturalization, and a card for non-English-speaking im-
migrants to indicate their need for an interpreter.
n Encouraging state governments to establish information
clearinghouses in major immigrant receiving communi-
ties. The Commission recommends that the federal govern-
ment provide modest incentive grants to states to encourage
them to establish and maintain local resources that would
provide information to immigrants and local communities.
For example, local information clearinghouses could pro-
vide information to immigrants on rights and responsibili-
ties,  naturalization, education and training, and the world
of work.  They could have materials available on tenant law
and  renter/landlord rights and responsibilities.  They could
spell out how U.S. family law (regarding marriage and pro-
hibiting spouse and child abuse, polygamy, and female geni-
tal mutilation, etc.) may differ from other cultures.  They
could provide information on public life (driving, insurance,
hunting/fishing licences, law enforcement, consumer pro-
tection, etc.).  They could also provide information to local
public and private organizations about immigrants, e.g.,
documentation, culture/background, eligibility status for
programs, work authorization verification.
The resource centers could develop, translate and dissemi-
nate materials; foster partnerships among immigrant inter-
est groups, ethnic churches, and service providers (advisory
boards, taskforces, planning boards, coalitions); and develop
volunteer networks in immigrant communities to help newly-
arriving immigrants.  These efforts could help reduce com-
munity tensions arising from immigration by providing ac-
curate information and helping communities find ways to
mediate these tensions.  The resource centers could also
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provide information on model programs implemented by
businesses, service agencies, and others.
The Office of Refugee Resettlement in the Department of
Health and Human Services, which already provides fund-
ing for refugee services, could administer this grant pro-
gram.  Each state receiving funds would designate the local
structure through which the funding would be administered
as part of its application for funds.  Some states are likely
to designate the state refugee coordinator’s office, but oth-
ers may designate the state education department.  States
had similar flexibility when they received funds under the
State Legalization Impact Assistance Grant [SLIAG] program.
These already-existing structures could easily integrate the
proposed services with only modest financial increments.
Based on its consultations, the Commission believes that an
annual appropriation of $30-35 million would cover devel-
opment of orientation materials and underwrite services in
forty to fifty targeted communities.  The monies should be
administered flexibly, not as a formula to each state.  Tar-
geted areas should include those with historically signifi-
cant numbers of immigrants as well as communities expe-
riencing a sudden growth in immigrant arrivals. (In Garden
City, Kansas, for example, the Commission observed how
the arrival of new meatpacking plants changed the popula-
tion from one with few foreign-born residents a decade ago
to one with a sizeable immigrant component today.)
n Promoting public/private partnerships to orient and assist
immigrants in adapting to life in the United States. The
Commission previously has called for a renewed public/
private partnership in the Americanization of immigrants.
While the federal government makes the decisions about
how many and which immigrants will be admitted to the
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United States, the actual process of integration takes place
in local communities.  Local government, schools, businesses,
religious institutions, ethnic associations, and other groups
play important roles in the Americanization process.
The Commission urges the federal government to assemble
leaders from the public and private sectors at the federal,
state, and local levels to discuss ways to invigorate a public/
private partnership to promote Americanization.  The partici-
pants should include representatives of state and local edu-
cational systems, businesses, labor, local governments, and
community organizations.  The meeting would address ways
to enhance resources for instruction in English language ac-
quisition, civic understanding, and workplace skills.  The
federal grant program described above also could help pro-
mote more coordinated efforts at the local level by establish-
ing advisory structures representing the various public and
private institutions with interest in immigration matters.
EDUCATION
Education is the principal tool of Americanization.  Local educa-
tional institutions have the primary responsibility for educating
immigrants. However, there is a federal role in promoting and fund-
ing English language acquisition and other academic programs for
both immigrant children and adults.
The Commission urges a renewed commitment to the education of
immigrant children.  The number of school-aged children of immi-
grants is growing and expected to increase dramatically.  These
children, mostly young, speak more than 150 different languages;
many have difficulty communicating in English.  They are enrolled
in public schools as well as in secular and religious private schools
through the country.
The Fannie Mae Foun-
dation built a model public/
private initiative with
c o m m u n i t y - b a s e d
organizations, public offi-
cials, and lenders to
facilitate  home ownership
and naturalization for
immigrants.
Project Vida in El Paso
provides medical services
to the Latino border
community.  Funded by the
Presbyterian Church and
public/private grants and
contracts, Vida developed
“one-stop shopping” for
primary health care,
education, housing, and
other social services.  It built
20 affordable rental units;
and helped to generate an
increase in local
elementary school reading
scores.
U.S. COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION REFORM
1 9 9 7
RECOMMENDATIONS
- 37 -
The Commission
urges a renewed
commitment
to the education
of immigrant
children.
In addition to the problems other students have, immigrant children
face particular problems in gaining an education—often because of
language difficulties.  The 1990 Census shows that 87 percent of
immigrant children attended high school as compared to 93 percent
of natives.  More than one-fourth of Mexican immigrant youth be-
tween ages 15 and 17 were not in school in 1990.  While some
dropped out, others never “dropped in” to school in the first place.
Immigrant children often come from countries with customs, tradi-
tions, and social and governmental structures that differ from those
they encounter in the U.S.; some have little or no formal education
and no understanding of the American school system; some arrive
with personal experiences of trauma and war; many older children
come from countries where school ends at a younger age; many ex-
perience lengthy delays in being mainstreamed into regular English-
speaking classes; and some do not receive appropriate-level instruc-
tion in other academic subjects while they are learning English.
Immigrant children also bring strengths to American society.  For
example, their native-language skills contribute to building the fu-
ture multilingual workforce needed in a global economy; sharing of
their cultural heritage will promote the sensitivity of that workforce
as it interacts in a worldwide marketplace.  Many immigrant chil-
dren who enroll in school and then remain to graduate do well
academically.  These immigrant children are more likely than na-
tives to prepare for, attend, and complete college.2  The key, how-
ever, is helping them achieve sufficient English proficiency to be
able to participate.
The Commission emphasizes that rapid acquisition of English should
be the paramount goal of any immigrant language instruction pro-
2 Venez, G.;  Abrahamse, A.  1996.  How Immigrants Fare in U.S. Education.
Santa Monica: RAND.  Rumbaut, R.G.;  Cornelius, W.A.  1995.  California’s
Immigrant Children: Theory, Research, and Implications for Educational Policy.
San Diego: Center for U.S. Mexican Studies.
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gram.  English is the most critical of basic skills for successful inte-
gration.  English can be taught to children in many ways.  Effective
programs share certain common characteristics.  Based on a review
of these programs, the Commission emphasizes the need to:
n Conduct regular evaluations of students’ English compe-
tence and their ability to apply it to academic subjects.
Such evaluations will ensure placement of immigrant chil-
dren into regular English-speaking classes as soon as they
are prepared.  Regular evaluation also will highlight strengths
and weaknesses in educational programs and provide in-
sight on improvements that are needed to ensure timely
English acquisition.
n Collect and analyze data regularly on students, their lin-
guistic and academic performance, and the method of in-
struction.  Presently, federal, state, and local governments
fail to collect and analyze adequate, uniform, data on bilin-
gual and other forms of English instruction.  Such failure
hinders overall evaluation and the responsible allocation of
government funds.  A 1997 National Research Council re-
port3 pointed out the need for new systems to support data
collection and research in this area.  The NRC recommended
establishment of a new Department of Education Advisory
Committee on Research on English-Language Learners, urged
the National Center for Education Statistics to take the lead
in collecting data on students and programs, and recom-
mended that the Office of Bilingual Education and Minority
Language Affairs take the lead in developing and evaluating
programs to enhance teacher development.
3 National Research Council (August, D;  Hakuta, K. eds.).  1997.  Improving
Schooling for Language-Minority Children: A Research Agenda.  Washington,
DC: National Academy Press.
The Commission
emphasizes that
rapid acquisition
of English
should be
the paramount
goal of any
immigrant
language
instruction
program.
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n Include appropriate grade-level instruction in other aca-
demic disciplines.  Coordination with teachers, curricula,
and instruction outside of English acquisition will promote
students’ mastery of regular subject matter while they learn
English.
n Involve parents of immigrant students in their schooling.
A characteristic of many of the most successful language
acquisition programs is the active involvement of parents in
the education of their children.  Such “family literacy” models
include programs that promote frequent parent-teacher con-
ferences and that also encourage non-English-speaking par-
ents to enroll in English as a Second Language [ESL] pro-
grams.  Some of the adult programs are offered at the local
school in the evenings.
The Commission encourages programs that are responsive to the
needs of immigrant children and an orientation to United States
school systems and the community, such as we have seen in “new-
comer schools.”  Newcomer schools must not isolate immigrant
newcomers.  Instead, they must be transitional and actively pro-
mote the timely integration of students into mainstream schools.
Successful programs recognize the special needs of immigrant chil-
dren, particularly refugees.  They share information among resettle-
ment programs and school administrators and among English ac-
quisition and regular classroom teachers.  Along with English and
other academic subjects, newcomer schools teach basic school sur-
vival and living skills (such as how the local transportation system
works and how to shop for food) and develop intercultural commu-
nications.  Some also provide access to a wide range of support
services, such as health screenings and immunizations.
The Commission recommends the revival and emphasis on instruc-
tion of all kindergarten through grade twelve students in the com-
mon civic culture that is essential to citizenship.  An understanding
Seattle’s Sharples Center
teaches refugee students
with limited or no English
proficiency in grades six
through twelve.  They are
grouped by English
language ability, not age.
Because of high demand,
they usually can stay for
only six months or less.
The program focuses on
preventing subsequent low
academic perfor-mance
and also pre-venting the
high dropout rates that
occur when students with
limited English proficiency
are mainstreamed too
soon.
The Commission
encourages
programs that
are responsive to
immigrant children’s
needs and
an orientation
to United States
school systems
and the community.
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of the history of the United States and the principles and practices
of our government are essential for all students, immigrants and
natives alike.  Americanization requires a renewed emphasis on the
common core of civic culture that unites individuals from many
ethnic and racial groups.  Civics instruction teaches students both
the responsibilities and the rights of United States citizenship.  Civ-
ics education also can help immigrant students turning eighteen to
prepare for naturalization.  The Commission recommends that local
school boards institute civics programs that:
n Teach that the U.S. is united by the constitutional principles
of individual rights and equal justice under the law;
n Restore the emphasis on such traditional American leaders
as Washington, Jefferson, and Lincoln, who defined the
American promise of liberty and equality for all, and incor-
porate other heroes and heroines, such as Sojourner Truth,
Susan B. Anthony, Martin Luther King, Jr., Franklin Roosevelt,
and Barbara Jordan, who expanded their promise to all
Americans;
n Stress the importance of civic holidays and of American
symbols and rituals, for example, the flag and the Pledge of
Allegiance.
Civics instruction in public schools should be rooted in the Decla-
ration of Independence, the Constitution—particularly the Preamble,
the Bill of Rights, and the Fourteenth Amendment.  Emphasizing
the ideals in these documents is in no way a distortion of U.S.
history.  Instruction in the history of the United States, as a unique
engine of human liberty notwithstanding its faults, is an indispens-
able foundation for solid civics training for all Americans.
The Commission emphasizes the urgent need to recruit, train, and
provide support to teachers who work with immigrant students.
The Commission
recommends
the revival
and emphasis
on instruction
of all kindergarten
through grade
twelve students
in the common
civic culture
that is essential
to citizenship.
San Francisco’s New-
comer High School was
the nation’s first high
school devoted entirely to
immigrants.  Students with
less than six years of
education and/or poor
English skills may attend
for up to a year of intensive
instruction based on their
English ability rather than
on their age.  Before they
are mainstreamed,
students are taken to see
their new school and meet
their new teachers.
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There is a disturbing shortage of qualified teachers for children with
limited English proficiency, of teacher training programs for pro-
ducing such teachers, and of other support for effective English
acquisition instruction.  More than 50 percent of  teachers in current
bilingual education programs have no formal education in teaching
students with limited English skills.  Teachers are often unprepared
and untrained in understanding how the cultural background and
experiences of immigrant children may affect their ability to learn.
They need to understand that while many students quickly acquire
skill in using and understanding English in social situations, acquir-
ing academic proficiency in English takes longer.
All teachers of immigrant students—those who teach English and
those who teach other academic subjects—need training to develop
the most effective tools for imparting knowledge to students with
limited English proficiency.  Teachers also need help in understand-
ing how best to involve immigrant parents who may themselves be
limited in their command of English.  Schools that have been effec-
tive in involving immigrant parents in their children’s education
tend to be more effective in retaining and educating students. To
promote such involvement, teachers must be sensitive to differences
in language and culture that may impede an immigrant parent’s
ability to participate in school activities.
The Commission supports immigrant education funding that is based
on a more accurate assessment of the impact of immigration on
school systems and that is adequate to alleviate these impacts.
Urban and rural schools often require federal assistance when con-
fronted with large numbers of immigrant students.  Current federal
support comes through several unrelated funding streams: some is
geared to particular instructional models; some is directed to ad-
dress impacts of large numbers of new arrivals; however, most comes
indirectly through monies targeted to schools with economically
disadvantaged children who are performing poorly.
The Commission
emphasizes
the urgent need
to recruit, train,
and provide
support to
teachers who
work with
immigrant
students.
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There are costs and responsibilities for language acquisition and
immigrant education programs that are not now being met.  We
urge the federal government to do its fair share in meeting this
challenge.  The long-run costs of failure in terms of dropouts and
poorly-educated adults will be far larger for the nation and local
communities than the costs of such programs.
More specifically, we urge the federal government to:
n Provide flexibility in federal funding for the teaching of
English to immigrant students to achieve maximum local
choice of instructional model.  The federal government
should not mandate any one mode of instruction (e.g., bilin-
gual education, English as a Second Language programs,
immersion).  Research indicates that no one pedagogical
model for English instruction works more effectively than
any other.  What makes for success are: the commitment
of the local school system to educate its English learners;
well-trained teachers who are adept at English language in-
struction; involvement of parents; frequent evaluation of stu-
dent language acquisition; and a plan for timely placements
in mainstream programs.
n Make funding contingent on performance outcomes—that
is, English language acquisition and mastery of regular
academic subject matter by students served in these pro-
grams.  School systems receiving funds because of large
numbers of children with limited English proficiency and
immigrant children should be held to rigorous performance
standards. Incentives should promote—not impede—expe-
ditious placement in regular, English-speaking, classes.
The Commission urges the federal, state, and local governments and
private institutions to enhance educational opportunities for adult
Washington, DC’s public
Bell Multicultural High
School offers secondary
and adult day/evening
intensive English classes,
vocational programs,
career development,
dropout prevention, tech-
nical preparation, and
comprehensive math and
science. Bell students have
high attendance rates, high
advanced placement exam
scores, and high rates of
continuing on to higher
education. Last year
counselors assisted more
than 30 students to
become citizens.  Many
staff are both immigrant
and multilingual and, thus,
can both empathize with
students’ transitions
and suppor t Bell’s
strong native language-
maintenance program.
The Commission
supports
immigrant
education
funding that is
based on
a more accurate
assessment
of the impact
of immigration
on school systems
and that is
adequate
to alleviate
these impacts.
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immigrants.  Education for basic skills and literacy in English is the
major vehicle that integrates adult immigrants into American soci-
ety and participation in its civic activities.  Literate adults are more
likely to participate in the workforce and twice as likely to partici-
pate in our democracy.  Literate adults foster literacy in their chil-
dren, and parents’ educational levels positively affect their children’s
academic performance.
According to the 1990 Census, a total of 5.8 million adults reported
that they speak English “not well” or “not at all.”  This number
continues to grow because of the entry of non-English-speaking
immigrants.  Researchers estimate that 600,000 adults with only lim-
ited or no English now enter the United States each year.  Immi-
grants who are illiterate even in their native language or who have
only a few years of schooling consequently are confined to employ-
ment in dead-end jobs.
Adult education is severely underfunded.  Available resources are
inadequate to meet the demand for adult immigrant education,
particularly for English proficiency and job skills.  Enrollment in
adult English as a Second Language classes increased 183 percent
from 1980 to 1990; neither classes nor funding have kept pace with
demand.  In Massachusetts, a state widely recognized for its excel-
lent adult education programs, an estimated 11,000 of the 16,000 on
the waiting list for adult basic education are waiting for ESL ser-
vices.
Three principal problems impede the capacity to expand opportuni-
ties for adult education.  First, funding to subsidize courses is lim-
ited.  Many adult immigrants are willing and able to pay some
tuition for courses, expecting a positive return on this investment.
However, given average income levels of uneducated, unskilled
immigrants, they are unlikely to be able to cover the total costs of
adult education courses.
The Commission
urges the federal,
state and local
governments and
private institutions
to enhance
educational
opportunities
for adult
immigrants.
The Carlos Rosario Adult
and Career Center in
Washington DC.  was for 25
years the only DC public
school teaching English to
adult foreigners, gradua-
ting classes as large as 650
students. Closed  due to
funding constraints, it
reopened with private
funding in a church in
Chinatown.  Courses are
offered in computer use,
nursing assistance, and
GED.
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Second, teacher training programs are limited, resulting in short-
ages in the number of qualified teachers.  For example, in Massa-
chusetts, there are only two training programs for teachers of ESL
to adults and no Masters-level program for teachers of adult basic
education.  Many schools utilize volunteers to serve as tutors, but
there is an insufficient number of trained teachers to provide guid-
ance to these volunteer aides.
The third impediment relates to the general quality of adult educa-
tion programs.  The General Accounting Office [GAO] reported in
1995 that adult education and literacy programs funded by the U.S.
Department of Education  have no defined objectives, valid assess-
ment instruments, or accurate program data.
In the early part of the twentieth century, state departments of
education and local school boards played an active role in the
Americanization of immigrants.  They committed resources to adult
education in evening and weekend classes because they recognized
the importance of economic and civic incorporation into their com-
munities.  Similarly, many turn-of-the-century businesses partici-
pated in the Americanization movement, recognizing the benefits to
their operations accruing from a literate, educated workforce.
There has been a shift away from this once widely-held public per-
ception of immigrant adult education as a local responsibility, with
its  local community- and school-based programs.  The source of
funding is federal and state (as compared to  kindergarten through
grade twelve education that is financed primarily through local taxes).
While many local school districts continue to provide classrooms
and other resources, others do not.  In this setting of excess demand
for adult education, volunteers and low-cost options do exist.  Ac-
cess to relatively inexpensive classroom space often is a major im-
pediment to program implementation.  But—even though publicly-
owned classroom space is often available and unused during evening
and weekend hours—such limitations persist.
The Resources Occupa-
tional Training Program in
Brooklyn, New York, a
nonprofit adult vocational
training program, operates
as an affiliate of the
Catholic Migration Office of
the Diocese of Brook-lyn.
Launched in 1994 with
seed money from an Italian
businessman, it trains and
places 98 percent of its
immigrant students in well-
paying jobs without
government assistance.
Responding to requests
from its limited English-
speaking employees, the
United Electric Control
Corporation in Watertown,
Massachusetts in 1992
launched  an educational
and vocational skills training
program.  Em-ployees are
given time off from work to
take courses in a program
that is so successful that it
led to the formation of a
consortium of Boston area
high-technology companies
to provide the same
services.  In this case, the
program was given a jump
start by a federal workplace
literacy program grant.
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In recognition of the benefits they receive from immigration, the
Commission urges leaders from businesses and corporations to
participate in skills training, English instruction, and civics educa-
tion programs for immigrants.  Religious schools and institutions,
charities, foundations, community organizations, public and private
schools, colleges and universities also can contribute resources, fa-
cilities, and expertise. All of these sectors benefit from having skilled,
English-speaking workers and residents.  For example, local school
systems could open schools after hours to community groups pro-
viding English instruction on a volunteer basis, and businesses could
provide employees the opportunity for such classes at the jobsite.
Such public/private partnerships can contribute in many ways to a
greater range of educational opportunities for immigrants.
NATURALIZATION
Naturalization is the most important act that a legal immigrant un-
dertakes in the process of becoming an American.  Taking this step
confers upon the immigrant all the rights and responsibilities of
civic and political participation that the United States has to offer
(except becoming President).  The Commission reiterates its belief
that no action should be taken that detracts from the appeal of
citizenship as an opportunity to become a member of the polity.
The naturalization process must be credible, and it must be ac-
corded the formality and ceremony appropriate to its importance.
The Commission believes that the current legal requirements for
naturalization are appropriate, but improvements are needed in the
means used to measure that an applicant meets these requirements.
To naturalize, legal immigrants must meet certain threshold require-
ments; these have remained remarkably consistent throughout our
history.  At present, to naturalize, a legal permanent residents must
reside in the United States for five years (three years for spouses of
The  Boeing Company and
the International Associa-
tion of Machinists provide
training and skills develop-
ment to current and laid-off
workers that includes En-
glish as a Second Lan-
guage and professional
English development.
Boeing also provided in-
kind production services
for a community-based or-
ganization naturalization
video series in eight lan-
guages.
Maid Bess, a contract ap-
parel business in Salem,
Virginia  provides free on-
site English  instruction to
its refugee employees with
the help of a local refugee
resettlement agency.
Among its more than 400
employees, 17  national and
ethnic groups are repre-
sented.  On its  annual “In-
ternational Day,” all  employ-
ees are encour-aged to
dress in the traditional cos-
tume of their native country
or that of  their ancestors.
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U.S. citizens and legal permanent residents who serve in the mili-
tary); demonstrate the ability to read, write, speak, and understand
English; pass a U.S. history and civics exam; be of good moral
character; and take an oath of allegiance.
With regard to the specific legal requirements, the Commission sup-
ports:
n Maintaining requirements that legal immigrants must re-
side in the United States for five years (three years for
spouses of U.S. citizens and Lawful Permanent Residents
who serve in the military) before naturalizing.  We believe
five years is adequate for immigrants to embrace, under-
stand, and demonstrate their knowledge of the principles of
American democracy.
n Improving the mechanisms used to demonstrate knowl-
edge of U.S. history, civics, and English competence.  The
Commission believes that the tests used in naturalization
should seek to determine if applicants have a meaningful
knowledge of U.S. history and civics and are able to com-
municate in English. The current tests do not adequately
assess such understanding or abilities.  The civics test, for
example, relies on memorization of discrete facts rather than
on substantive understanding of the basic concepts of civic
participation.
INS district offices vary significantly from each other in the
methods by which they administer the test and in the thresh-
old number of correct answers needed for passage.  In some
cases, examiners scale the tests to the perceived educational
abilities of applicants. The lack of uniform standards gov-
erning whether an applicant has satisfactorily fulfilled the
The Commission
believes that
the current legal
requirements
for naturalization
are appropriate
but improvements
are needed
in the means
used to measure
that an applicant
meets these
requirements.
The nonprofit Arlington
Community Foundation in
Virginia funds and
organizes grassroots
programs to assist immi-
grants in their transition to
American society.  It spon-
sors local community
organizations, festivals,
and focus groups to identify
and address sources of
tension be-tween longtime
residents and newcomers.
It    also supports local
initiatives to assist
immigrant entre-preneurs
and parents of school-age
children to understand how
American institutions work.
In 1995, it founded the
Washington Partnership for
New Americans to
encourage naturalization.
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requirements is disturbing.  Such inconsistencies pose un-
due confusion for qualified legal residents and undermine
public confidence in  the naturalization process.
The Commission believes the tests should be standardized
and aim to evaluate a common core of information to be
understood by all new citizens.  The U.S. history and civics
test should assess whether applicants understand the basic
principles of U.S. government: for example, what it means
to have freedom of speech or the freedom to assemble.  The
English test should accurately and fairly measure an
immigrant’s ability to speak, read, and write; the current
practice of dictating English sentences for applicants to write
is not an effective means of testing English proficiency.
INS is now undertaking a full review of its interview and
testing criteria, including the content and format of the
English and civics portions of the test.  The Commission
encourages officials responsible for naturalization to consult
and enlist the assistance of professional educators, peda-
gogical experts, and standardized test providers in the de-
velopment of new history/civics and English standards and
tests.  Consideration should be given to separating the En-
glish reading, writing, and comprehension components from
the personal interview.  Often, applicants are nervous about
making a mistake during the interview and demonstrate
less English proficiency than they may have.  This separa-
tion also would work to the advantage of those responsible
for adjudicating applications as interviews would be reserved
for applicants who had fulfilled the English and civics re-
quirements, sparing scheduling and interviewing of unquali-
fied applicants.
The Arlington County,
Virginia,  Wilson Center
provides education and
training for immigrants
using federal refugee
program funds for
language and employ-
ment services.  It offers
citizenship and English as
a Second Language
classes (focusing on child
rearing and family
violence).  As the school
registration center for
foreign-born children, it can
readily inform immi-grants
of its services.
The American Telephone
and Telegraph Company in
India Hill, Illinois, learned
the lengthy naturalization
process was of major
concern for its employees.
It worked with the Chicago
INS office to distribute
naturalization applications
and study guides to
employees and provided
space for officials to
conduct interviews and
naturalization ceremonies.
A total of 400  employees
and their family members
became citizens.
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These new standards will be meaningful only if applied eq-
uitably and there is a much greater capacity to monitor the
agencies that give the tests.  [See below.]
A more predictable and standardized testing process also
must include consistent and rational exemptions for elderly
legal permanent residents. At present English language ex-
emptions are granted to legal permanent residents aged 50
years or older who have lived in the United States at least
twenty years and to those 55 years of age who have resided
in the U.S. for at least fifteen years.   Special consideration
on the civics component is given to naturalization appli-
cants aged 65 or older who have resided in the U.S. for at
least twenty years.  The Commission supports these exemp-
tions.  However, it makes little sense to confer such exemp-
tions on long-term legal residents, yet not on more recent
elderly legal residents who have had less time to acquire
English proficiency.  The Commission calls for a thorough
review of the current testing exemptions and urges the
Congress to consider additional, narrowly-tailored exemp-
tions to the English requirement for qualified elderly immi-
grants who have resided in the U.S. for fewer years than
required by the current exemptions.
n Expediting swearing-in ceremonies while maintaining their
solemnity and dignity. Approved applicants must take an
oath of allegiance before U.S. citizenship is conferred upon
them.  Generally, the oath is administered in public ceremo-
nies by federal judges.  Most such ceremonies are solemn
and dignified public affirmations of a mutual obligation that
new Americans and their adopted country make to each
other.  However, in districts where the federal court has
exercised sole jurisdiction to conduct the swearing-in cer-
The Voter Education
Registration and Action
Program of the New
England Literacy Re-
source Center in Boston,
Massachusetts  promotes
adult literacy so that its
students can take  in-
formed action on issues
that concern them.  The
Center is supported by
National Institute for
Literacy grants under the
1991 National Literacy Act.
In the November 1996
election, 467 out of 550 of
the program’s adult
learners —85%—
participated.
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emonies, long delays often result from crowded court calen-
dars.
The Commission believes a more expeditious approach to
the swearing-in ceremony should be adopted.  Timely cer-
emonies need not sacrifice the ceremonial and traditional
aspects of the ceremony that the Commission strongly be-
lieves are essential.  The Commission believes the solemnity
and pomp of the current judicial ceremonies should be
maintained and could be enhanced by the inclusion of dis-
tinguished speakers.  However, would-be citizens who have
passed all requirements for naturalization should not be
denied timely citizenship because of processing delays in
scheduling swearing-in ceremonies.
Until 1990, the federal judiciary had sole jurisdiction to confer
citizenship on an approved naturalization applicant. The Im-
migration Act of 1990, however, transferred authority to
confer citizenship to the INS.  Within one year, the Judicial
Naturalization Amendments of 1991 reinstated the judiciary,
albeit in a somewhat modified role.  Consequently, judges
who choose to exercise sole jurisdiction are granted forty-
five days from notification of eligible applicants in which to
perform swearing-in ceremonies.  Despite the changes insti-
tuted by the 1991 Amendments, immigrants typically wait
considerably longer to be sworn in as new citizens.
Such delays can have significant consequences for legal resi-
dents; they are unable to apply for particular jobs, travel
abroad, vote, or receive certain benefits such as Food Stamps
and Supplementary Security Income [SSI].  The Commission
is concerned that as the number of newly-approved citizen-
ship applicants increases, along with an increasing caseload
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for the federal judiciary, the federal courts’ capacity to per-
form timely ceremonies may be further hampered.
The Commission recommends that to reduce this waiting
time Congress restore the Executive Branch’s sole jurisdic-
tion for naturalization.  The Executive Branch should con-
tinue to work with federal judges as well as other qualified
institutions and personnel, such as state courts or Immigra-
tion Judges, to ensure that swearing-in ceremonies are con-
sistently conducted in a timely, efficient, and dignified man-
ner.  Eminent persons who would add dignity to the cer-
emony could be invited to participate as well.   Standards
of conduct should be developed for all such participants to
assure, for example, that all remarks are free of partisan
politics.
n Revising the naturalization oath to make it comprehen-
sible, solemn, and meaningful.  Taking the oath is a critical
legal step in becoming a naturalized citizen.  Its words con-
vey  the core meaning of becoming an American citizen.
Thus, it is imperative that it be understandable by all who
take it.  We recommend that those naturalizing be given a
written copy of the oath that they can read during the swear-
ing-in and that they can keep as a meaningful memento.
The current oath is not easy to comprehend. We believe it is
not widely understood by new citizens.  Its wording in-
cludes dated language, archaic form, and convoluted gram-
mar.  Although the 1952 statute does not prescribe any
particular wording, it does require that the oath contain five
elements: (1) support for the Constitution; (2) renunciation
of prior allegiance; (3) defense of the Constitution against all
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The Commission
calls for
urgently needed
reforms
to increase
the efficiency
and integrity
of the
naturalization
process.
enemies, foreign and domestic; (4) true faith and allegiance;
and (5) a commitment to bear arms or perform noncomba-
tant service when required.
The Commission  proposes the following revision of the
oath as capturing the essence of naturalization.
Solemnly, freely, and
without any mental reservation,
I, [name] hereby renounce under oath
[or upon affirmation]
all former political allegiances.
My sole political fidelity
and allegiance from this day forward
is to the United States of America.
I pledge to support and respect
its Constitution and laws.
Where and if lawfully required,
I further commit myself to defend them against all
enemies, foreign and domestic, either by military or
civilian service.
This I do solemnly swear [or affirm],
So help me God.4
The Commission calls for urgently needed reforms to increase the
efficiency and integrity of the naturalization process.  The vast
majority of applicants for naturalization are law-abiding immigrants
who contribute to our society.  The value of Americanization is
eroded whenever unnecessary obstacles prevent eligible immigrants
from becoming citizens.  Its value also is undermined when the
4 As is the case under current regulations, when applicants, by reason of
religious training and belief or for other reasons of good conscience,
cannot swear an oath, they may substitute “solemnly affirm” and delete
“so help me God.”
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process permits the abuse of our laws by naturalizing applicants
who are not entitled to citizenship.  For the process of Americaniza-
tion to succeed, it must provide fair and timely service to legal
residents applying for citizenship.  It must also earn the trust and
confidence of the general public.
In August 1995, the INS launched an initiative to address many of
the most serious impediments to naturalization, including a backlog
in excess of 300,000 persons and processing times that in larger
cities approached four years.  Consequently, the Service hired more
than 1,000 new personnel, opened several additional branch offices,
and established direct mail centers.
While these new resources resulted in record numbers of naturaliza-
tions, improprieties in granting citizenship to criminal aliens and
fraud in the testing process undermined the goals of the program.
It is fair to conclude that the new program revealed many of the
structural and managerial weaknesses of the overall naturalization
process.  Subsequent Congressional hearings and independent in-
vestigations demonstrate that many of the most serious problems
preceded the new initiative and were exacerbated by the increasing
number of applications.
The Department of Justice [DOJ] has launched a variety of new
initiatives to reengineer naturalization.  DOJ named a Director for
Naturalization Operations charged with overseeing management and
reform of the naturalization program, including quality assurance
and field operations.  DOJ also contracted with Coopers and Lybrand
to conduct a two-year review of the implementation and adminis-
tration of the INS naturalization program.
Recognizing steps already are underway to reengineer the natural-
ization process, the Commission supports the following approaches:
U.S. COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION REFORM
1 9 9 7
RECOMMENDATIONS
- 53 -
n Instituting efficiencies without sacrificing quality controls.
In the Commission’s 1995 report to Congress, we recom-
mended that the Immigration and Naturalization Service
and the Congress take steps to expedite the processing of
naturalization applications while maintaining rigorous stan-
dards.  Two years later, the naturalization process still takes
too long, and previous efforts to expedite processing re-
sulted in serious violation of the integrity of the system.
Because of failures in processing that resulted in the natural-
ization of ineligible applicants, new procedures subsequently
were adopted to reduce inadvertent naturalization of crimi-
nal aliens.  These new procedures, while not foolproof in
barring criminals from naturalizing, have led to processing
delays.  At the same time, adequate staffing remains a prob-
lem.  Congress has authorized reprogramming of funds to
hire additional staff, but the Committees permitted tempo-
rary hires for most of the new positions even though the
number of applications remain large.  An entirely temporary
workforce with short contracts lends instability to a process
that already has problems.  Instituting a system that has
sufficient continuity of personnel and that is both credible
and efficient therefore remains a pressing need.
n Improving the integrity and processing of fingerprints.  Be-
fore applicants for naturalization can receive citizenship, they
must submit fingerprints for FBI review to determine if the
applicants have any disqualifying criminal background.
Problems that delay thousands of applications have been
identified in the operation of private agencies taking the
fingerprints of applicants for citizenship. These problems
include smudged prints and failure of applicants to sign or
properly complete forms.  Further, no mechanism now ex-
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ists to verify accurately that the individual submitting the
prints is the person whose prints are on the application.
To improve this process, the INS placed restrictions on who
may qualify to offer fingerprint services.  INS now  accepts
only fingerprints provided by Designated Fingerprint Ser-
vices [DFS] trained and authorized by INS. These include
local law enforcement agencies, nonprofit agencies, and fin-
gerprint convenience stores.  These restrictions may improve
the quality of the prints, but  do nothing to ensure that
fingerprint services  consistently and competently verify the
identity of individuals whose prints are submitted.  While
law enforcement agencies have a vested interest in preserv-
ing the quality of fingerprints, they have heavy workloads
and do not always give high priority to naturalization re-
quests. Nonprofit, community-based organizations appear
to take clear fingerprints, but there are questions about their
competence to assess the validity of identity documents.
The Commission believes than only service providers under
direct control of the federal government should be autho-
rized to take fingerprints.  If the federal government does
not take fingerprints itself but instead contracts with service
providers, it must screen and monitor such providers rigor-
ously for their capacity, capability, and integrity.  Failure to
meet standards would result in termination of the contract.
n Contracting with a single English and civics testing ser-
vice. The Commission urges a fundamental restructuring of
the policies and procedures with which private agencies test
naturalization applicants for their knowledge of English and
civics.
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A 1991 regulation authorized the INS to recognize the re-
sults of private for-profit and nonprofit testing services.  The
rationale was that private testing of civics and English would
help to adjudicate citizenship applicants more expeditiously.
By 1994, six organizations had been authorized by the INS
to administer the citizenship exam.
Congressional hearings during the fall of 1996 revealed dis-
turbing weaknesses in the use of private testers that under-
mined the integrity of the citizenship test.  In response to
reports that private, for-profit testing services were engag-
ing in price gouging, cheating, and fraud, INS investigated
three sites.  In April and May of 1996, INS made some
changes to improve testing site oversight   Local INS offices
were directed to conduct unannounced inspections of citi-
zenship-testing affiliate locations if the office did not already
have an inspection plan in place.  The congressional hear-
ings revealed that private testers continued to be inadequately
supervised or disciplined by either INS or their parent com-
pany.
The Commission recommends that the federal government
contract with one national and respected testing service to
develop and give the English and civics tests to naturaliza-
tion applicants.  Having one organization under contract
should help the government substantially improve its over-
sight.  Moreover, continuity with a highly-respected and
nationally-recognized testing service will help ensure a high
quality product.
n Increasing professionalism.  While many naturalization staff
are highly professional in carrying out their duties, reports
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from district offices, congressional hearings, and complaints
from naturalization applicants demonstrate continued dis-
satisfaction with the quality of naturalization services.  The
Commission believes that a culture of customer-oriented
service must be developed.
Recent audits point to very high levels of noncompliance
with established practices and excessive error rates even in
such basic tasks as filling in the proper names and identify-
ing numbers on forms.  Mistakes pose two serious problems
for the naturalization process.  First, legitimate applicants
for naturalization face unnecessary delays while clerical and
other mistakes are corrected.  Second, ineligible applicants,
including felons, may be able to obtain citizenship through
administrative error.  While INS must pursue denaturaliza-
tion of such improperly naturalized citizens vigorously within
legal limits, it is difficult to reverse grants of citizenship
once made.  Recruitment and training of longer-term staff
assigned to adjudicating applications and overseeing qual-
ity control would help overcome some of these problems.
n Improving automation.  According to the INS, the number
of naturalization applicants projected for fiscal year 1997
and each of the following few years will exceed 1.8 million.
As more and more immigrants apply for naturalization and
choose to become part of the American polity, there is a
greater need for efficient and accurate recordkeeping.  Cur-
rent systems are inadequate to meet such a demand for
service.  Both the INS and FBI rely on paper rather than
electronic files, which is inefficient and subject to permanent
loss or misplacement of documents.  The inability of INS to
provide accurate data on the number of recently-naturalized
citizens who had undergone full background investigations
is a particularly glaring example of the present system’s
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vulnerabilities.  The costs to applicants and to INS credibil-
ity are significant.  The Commission is encouraged by plans
to develop linkages among data sources related to natural-
ization. The Commission recommends continued funding
for an up-to-date, advanced, electronic automation system
for information entry and recordkeeping.
n Establishing clear fee and other waiver guidelines and
implementing them consistently.  Under current law, the
Attorney General is authorized to grant fee waivers to natu-
ralization applicants.  The Commission has received accounts
of legitimate requests being denied.  The prospective in-
crease in naturalization fees may precipitate more fee waiver
requests or perhaps discourage applicants.  Clear guidelines
and consistent implementation are needed to ensure that
bona fide requests are granted, while guarding against abuse.
The 1994 Immigration and Nationality Technical Corrections
Act provided exceptions to the English proficiency and civ-
ics requirements for naturalization for persons with physi-
cal or developmental disabilities or with mental impairments.
After extensive consideration and opportunities for public
comment, the INS published its final rule in March 1997.
The new rule emphasizes medically determinable standards
that promote integrity and fairness.  Further, the new rule
does not confer a blanket exemption.  Hence, judging whether
an applicant’s disability would bestow a disability waiver is
inherently complex.
The Commission believes that rigorous and equitable inter-
pretation of the new rule will require that adjudicators are
properly trained.  Further, implementation must be strictly
monitored to ensure that exceptions allowed by law are made
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available to otherwise qualified legal residents.  Finally, to
ensure that the qualifications and procedures are understood
and adhered to, the Commission recommends a thorough
public education effort.
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A CREDIBLE FRAMEWORK
FOR IMMIGRATION POLICY
In our previous reports, the Commission defined a credible immi-
gration policy “by a simple yardstick: people who should get in do
get in, people who should not get in are kept out; and people who
are judged deportable are required to leave.”  By these measures,
the U.S. has made substantial, but incomplete, progress. What fol-
lows are the Commission’s recommendations for comprehensive re-
form to achieve more fully a credible framework for immigration
policy.
LEGAL PERMANENT ADMISSIONS
The Commission reiterates its support for a properly-regulated system for
admitting legal permanent residents.1  Research and analyses con-
ducted since the issuance of the Commission’s report on legal im-
migration support our view that a properly regulated system of
legal permanent admissions serves the national interest.  We reiter-
ate that such a system enhances the national benefits while protect-
ing against potential harms.
This position is supported by a recent report we commissioned from
the National Research Council on the impacts of immigration.2  The
panel concluded that “immigration produces net economic gains for
domestic residents” in the form of increased productivity and re-
duced consumer prices.  The benefits go well beyond economic
ones, however.  The panel also identified social and cultural gains
The Commission
reiterates its support
for a properly-
regulated
system for
admitting legal
permanent
residents.
1 For  a full explanation of the Commission’s recommendations see Legal
Immigration: Setting Priorities, 1995.  See Appendix for summary of
Commissioner Leiden’s dissenting statement.
2 National Research Council.  (J.P. Smith, B. Edmonston, eds.).  1997.  The
New Americans: Economic, Demographic, and Fiscal Effects of Immigration.
Washington, DC: National Academy Press.  62.
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resulting from immigration, particularly through the entry of highly-
talented immigrants who choose to live and contribute to the United
States.  The report continues: “Even when the economy as a whole
gains, however, there may be losers as well as gainers among dif-
ferent groups of U.S. residents.”  The principal “gainers” are the
immigrants themselves, owners of capital, higher-skilled workers
who are complements to most immigrants (who are themselves
lower-skilled) and consumers.  The principal “losers” are the low-
skilled workers who compete with immigrants and whose wages
fall as a result.  On a fiscal basis, the panel found national-level net
contributions of tax revenues resulting from immigration, but the
panel also identified significant net fiscal costs to the taxpayers of
states with large number of immigrants.  These high fiscal impacts
are due, particularly, to the presence of sizeable numbers of lesser-
skilled immigrants whose tax payments, even over a lifetime, are
insufficient to cover their use of services.
The Commission urges reforms in our legal immigration system to
enhance  the benefits accruing from the entry of newcomers while
guarding against harms, particularly to the most vulnerable of U.S.
residents—those who are themselves unskilled and living in pov-
erty.  More specifically, the Commission reiterates its support for:
n A significant redefinition of priorities and reallocation of
existing admission numbers to fulfill more effectively the
objectives of our immigration policy.  The Commission’s
more specific recommendations on priorities and procedures
for admission stem not only from the above analysis of the
effects of immigration but also from our review of the work-
ings of the admission system.  We argued in our 1995 report
that the current framework for legal immigration—family,
skills, and humanitarian admissions—makes sense.  How-
ever, the statutory and regulatory priorities and procedures
for admissions do not support the stated intentions of legal
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immigration—to reunify families, to provide employers an
opportunity to recruit foreign workers to meet labor needs,
and to respond to humanitarian crises around the world.
During the two years since our report on legal immigration,
the problems in the legal admission system have not been
solved.  Indeed, some of them have worsened as is dis-
cussed below.
We believe current immigration levels should be sustained
for the next several years while the U.S. revamps its legal
immigration system and shifts the priorities for admissions
away from extended family and toward nuclear family and
away from unskilled and toward higher skilled immigrants.
Thereafter, modest reductions in levels of immigration—to
about 550,000 per year, comparable to those of the 1980s—
will result from the changing priority system.
The Commission continues to believe that legal admission
numbers should be authorized by Congress for a specified
time (e.g., three to five years) to ensure regular, periodic
review and, if needed, change by Congress.  This review
should consider the adequacy of admission numbers for
accomplishing priorities.  It also should consider the eco-
nomic and other domestic needs and capacities of the United
States to absorb newcomers.
n Family-based admissions that give priority to nuclear fam-
ily members—spouses and minor children of U.S. citi-
zens, parents of U.S. citizens, and spouses and minor
children of legal permanent residents—and include a back-
log clearance program to permit the most expeditious en-
try of the spouses and minor children of LPRs.
The Commission recommends allocation of 550,000 family-
based admission numbers each year until the large backlog
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of spouses and minor children is cleared.  The backlog, which
numbers more than 1 million persons, consists of the nuclear
family members of legal immigrants who married after the
U.S. spouse became a permanent resident, as well as spouses
and minor children of aliens legalized under IRCA (most of
whom are now eligible to naturalize).  Numbers going to
lower priority categories (e.g., adult children, siblings, and
diversity immigrants), should be transferred to the nuclear
family categories.  Thereafter Congress should set sufficient
admission numbers to permit all spouses and minor chil-
dren of citizens and LPRs to enter expeditiously.
Since the Commission first reported its findings on legal
admissions, the problems associated with family-based ad-
missions have grown.  In 1995, the wait between application
and admission of the spouses and minor children of LPRs
was about three years.  It is now more than four years and
still growing.3
Various statutory changes enacted in 1996 make it all the
more important that Congress take specific action to clear
the backlog quickly to regularize the status of the spouses
and minor children of legal permanent residents in the United
States.  In an effort to deter illegal migration, Congress ex-
panded the bases and number of grounds upon which per-
sons may be denied legal status because of a previous illegal
entry or overstay of a visa.  Most important, a person un-
3 It appears that the priority date (i.e., the cut-off date by which an
approved petition must have been filed) has moved forward as much as
it has only because of delays in processing applications for adjustment
of status within the United States.  When it became clear that INS could
not keep up with the adjustment backlog, the Department of State moved
up the priority date to continue processing visas overseas.  As many of
the adjustment applications are still to be processed, it is likely that there
will be very little movement on the priority date during the next several
months.
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lawfully present for more than six months will be inadmis-
sible for three years, and those unlawfully present for more
than one year will be inadmissible for ten years.4  If Con-
gress decides not to renew the provision [known as Section
245(i)] that permits these individuals to adjust status within
the United States, they will be unable to become legal immi-
grants even if they meet all other admission criteria.
An unknown, but believed to be large, number of spouses
and minor children awaiting legal status are unlawfully
present in the United States.  While the Commission does
not condone their illegal presence, we are cognizant of the
great difficulties posed by the four-or-more-year waiting
period for a family second-preference visa.  U.S. immigra-
tion policy should not force legal immigrants to choose
between family responsibilities and vows and their contin-
ued presence in the United States. The Commission believes
no spouse or minor child should have to wait more than
one year to be reunited with their U.S. petitioner.
The Commission is also concerned with the impact on nuclear
family reunification of the provisions adopted in the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of
1996 [IIRIRA] to address perceived abuses in the use of
parole.  We agree that parole should be used only in excep-
tional circumstances and that Congress should be involved
more directly in decisions to parole large numbers of indi-
viduals for permanent residence.  We further recognize the
validity of efforts to count long-term parolees against world-
wide numerical ceilings.  However, we do not agree with
4 IIRIRA permits the Attorney General to provide a waiver for spouses
and minor children if there is an extreme hardship to the U.S. petitioner.
Although standards have not been set for implementing this provision,
mere separation from family members generally has not counted as an
“extreme hardship” in applying other provisions where extreme hardship
is a ground for relief.
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the IIRIRA provisions that count parolees against family-
based admission numbers.  Moreover, the language of IIRIRA
requires the counting of those admitted with the intention
that they reside permanently and those who are paroled for
short stays but who are not known to have left one year
later.  For the first time in U.S. law, persons illegally in the
U.S. would be counted against legal admission ceilings.  This
creates a conflict between policies.  Moreover, inadequacies
in current entry-exit controls mean that some parolees who
leave the country will be determined to have remained and
will also be counted against the legal admissions ceiling.
Because the parole numbers are deducted from the family
preferences, the new provisions hold the potential for delay-
ing still further the already unacceptable delays in admis-
sion of nuclear family members.
The Commission believes that the national interest in the
entry of nuclear family members outweighs that of more
extended family members.  We recognize that others dis-
agree; they argue that the bonds to adult children and adult
siblings can be as strong as the bond between spouses and
with minor children.  They also point to the valuable assis-
tance provided by many extended families in setting up and
running businesses and providing child care and other sup-
portive services.  Whatever the cultural and economic val-
ues attached to each family relationship, however, the far
stronger responsibilities to one’s spouse and minor children
are well established in the U.S.  We continue to believe that
our family reunification system will remain seriously flawed
until the spouses and minor children of LPRs are treated as
a priority.
An end to extended visa categories is justified even apart
from the large nuclear family backlog.  The Commission
pointed out in its 1995 report that the extraordinarily large
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waiting list for siblings of U.S. citizens, and to a lesser ex-
tent, adult children undermines the integrity of the legal
immigration system.
The backlog for siblings of adult U.S. citizens has stabilized
during the past two years, but at a very large level.  In
January, 1995, there were 1.6 million on the waiting list; as
of January 1997, the waiting list was 1.5 million.  Except for
oversubscribed countries, siblings who applied ten years ago
are now eligible to enter.  Admissions from the Philippines
are of those who applied almost twenty years ago.  These
extended waiting periods mean that most siblings enter well
into their working lives, limiting the time during which they
can make a contribution to the U.S. economy.  More than
one-half of all the siblings and their spouses admitted in FY
1996 were above the age of 45.  In other immigration catego-
ries, most principals are in their twenties or thirties.
The backlog for adult children is growing.  In January 1995,
there were about 70,000 unmarried sons and daughters of
citizens, 500,000 unmarried sons and daughters of LPRs,
and 260,000 married sons and daughters of citizens in the
backlog.  As of January 1997, the unmarried backlog had
grown to more than 90,000 and 575,000, respectively, and
the married children backlog is more than 310,000.
A particular concern is the “aging out” of children who were
minors at the time of application, but who turned 21 years of
age while awaiting their green cards.  The Commission pro-
posed in our 1995 report that the Immigration and National-
ity Act [INA]  be amended so that “a person entitled to status
at the time a petition is approved shall continue to be entitled
to that status regardless of his or her age.”
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n Skill-based admissions policies that enhance opportuni-
ties for the entry of highly-skilled immigrants, particu-
larly those with advanced degrees, and eliminate the cat-
egory for admission of unskilled workers. The Commis-
sion continues to recommend that immigrants be chosen on
the basis of the skills they contribute to the U.S. economy.
Only if there is a compelling national interest—such as
nuclear family reunification or humanitarian admissions—
should immigrants be admitted without regard to the eco-
nomic contributions they can make.  The reunification of
adult children and siblings of adult citizens solely because
of family relationship is not as compelling.
A number of the NRC report’s findings argue for increasing
the proportion of immigrants who are highly-skilled and
educated so as to maximize fiscal contributions, minimize
fiscal impacts, and protect the economic opportunities of
unskilled U.S. workers.  The NRC research shows that edu-
cation plays a major role in determining the impacts of
immigration.  Immigration of unskilled immigrants comes
at a cost to unskilled U.S. workers, particularly established
immigrants for whom new immigrants are economic substi-
tutes.  Further, the difference in estimated fiscal effects of
immigrants by education is striking: using the same meth-
odology to estimate net costs and benefits, immigrants with
a high school education or more are likely to be net con-
tributors while those without a high school degree are likely
to be net costs to taxpayers.
Shifting priorities to higher skilled employment-based im-
migrants will have a beneficial multiplier effect.  The highly-
skilled are, in effect, new seed immigrants who will petition
for admission of their family members.  The educational
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level of the spouses and children of highly-educated per-
sons tends to be in the same range.  Hence, our society
benefits not only from the entry of highly-skilled immigrants
themselves, but also from the entry of their family.
The Commission’s framework for legal skill-based admis-
sions includes two broad categories.  The first category would
cover individuals who are exempt from labor market tests
because their entry will generate economic growth and/or
significantly enhance U.S. intellectual and cultural strength
without undermining the employment prospects and remu-
neration of U.S. workers: aliens with extraordinary ability,
multinational executives and managers, entrepreneurs, and
ministers and religious workers.  The second category cov-
ers individuals subject to labor market tests, including pro-
fessionals with advanced degrees, professionals with bacca-
laureate degrees, and skilled workers with specialized work
experience.
In our 1995 report, the Commission recommended alloca-
tion of 100,000 admission slots to skill-based immigrants.
That number represented an increase of about 10 percent
over actual usage of these visas, but a decline from the
statutory ceiling of 130,000 admission numbers (i.e., 140,000
minus the 10,000 allocated to lesser skilled workers).  We
further recommended that unused skill-based admissions
carry over to the following year’s skill-based admissions.
The trend in admission of skill-based immigrants supports
our 1995 recommendations, but also indicates the great need
to monitor and revise admission numbers as needed.  In FY
1995, 85,000 employment-based immigrants were admitted,
including 7,900 unskilled workers.  This number was artifi-
cially low, however, because of INS delays in adjudicating
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applications for adjustment of status.  In FY 1996, admis-
sions totaled 117,000, including 12,000 unskilled workers.
The 100,000 skilled admission numbers recommended by
the Commission would have been sufficient to cover the
period 1994-1996 (with the carry-over provision).  However,
if the FY 1996 spike turns out to be real (rather than an
artifact of the adjustment of status delays of FY 1995), the
number of employment-based visas may need to be revised.
The Commission also continues to recommend changes in
the procedures used in testing the labor market impact of
employment-based admissions.  Rather than use the lengthy,
costly, and ineffectual labor certification system, the Com-
mission recommends using market forces as a labor market
test.  To ensure a level playing field for U.S. workers, em-
ployers would attest to having used normal company r e -
cruiting procedures that meet industry-wide standards, pay-
ing the prevailing wage, and complying with other labor
standards.  Businesses recruiting foreign workers also would
be required to make significant financial investments in cer-
tified private sector initiatives dedicated to improving the
competitiveness of U.S. workers.    These payments should
be set at a per-worker amount sufficient to ensure there is
no financial incentive to hire a foreign worker over a quali-
fied U.S. worker.   Labor certification continues to be a time-
consuming, unproductive way to protect U.S. workers from
unfair competition from immigrant workers.  The Depart-
ment of Labor has tried to institute reforms that have stream-
lined the process for certain applications.  The result, how-
ever, has been to slow down even further other applications
that do not meet the streamlining requirements.
n Refugee admissions based on human rights and humani-
tarian considerations, as one of several elements of U.S.
U.S. COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION REFORM
1 9 9 7
RECOMMENDATIONS
- 70 -
5 For a full explanation of the Commission’s refugee-related
recommendations, see U.S. Refugee Policy: Taking Leadership, 1997.
leadership in assisting and protecting the world’s perse-
cuted.5  Since its very beginnings, the United States has been
a place of refuge.  Today, when millions of refugees are
displaced because of persecution, human rights violations,
or warfare, U.S. leadership in responding to refugee crises
is critical.  The Commission believes continued admission of
refugees sustains our humanitarian commitment to provide
safety to the persecuted, enables the U.S. to pursue foreign
policy interests in promoting human rights, and encourages
international efforts to resettle persons requiring rescue or
durable solutions.  The Commission also urges the federal
government to continue to support international assistance
and protection for the majority of the world’s refugees for
whom resettlement is neither appropriate nor practical.
Admissions to the U.S. should be seen within the context of
broader U.S. interests in protecting and assisting refugees
worldwide.  The Commission believes a comprehensive U.S.
refugee policy should be coordinated by an office within the
National Security Council [NSC] to serve as the White House
focal point for domestic and international refugee and re-
lated humanitarian issues: to care for and protect refugees
overseas; to resettle the few for whom U.S. resettlement is
the only or best option and provide sensible transitional
assistance to them; to operate an effective system for pro-
tecting bona fide asylum seekers in the U.S. while deterring
those who are not; and to adopt a humane and effective
plan to respond to mass migration emergencies.
The admission of refugees should be divided into two broad
priority groups with numbers allocated accordingly.  The
first priority would be for refugees who are in urgent need
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of rescue and refugees who are the immediate relatives of
persons already living legally in the United States.  The
second priority would include refugees whose admission is
of special humanitarian interest to the United States but
who are not in imminent danger where they currently re-
side.  Admission numbers would be sufficient each year to
guarantee entry to all bona fide applicants within the first
priority and an agreed-upon number for the second priority
Family members and close household members who are
dependent on the principal applicant for financial or physi-
cal security should also be included among admissions within
this priority system.
The United States should set annual numerical targets—but
not a statutory limit—for future refugee admissions.  The
Commission recommends an improved consultation process
that will help ensure that admission numbers and alloca-
tions meet U.S. national and international interests.  The
annual consultations should be strengthened by considering
projections of admission levels and priorities for at least two
years beyond the fiscal year under immediate consideration.
Input should be solicited from a wide range of human rights
and humanitarian organizations with knowledge of condi-
tions precipitating the need for resettlement.
The United States also should use an active, inclusive pro-
cess for  identifying and making decisions regarding the
admissibility of applicants for resettlement, conferring with
a broad set of agencies in identifying possible candidates for
resettlement.  The U.S. government should confer with a
broader set of agencies in identifying possible candidates
for resettlement, including international and local human
rights organizations, relief agencies providing assistance to
refugees, and host governments.
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The Commission further believes changes are needed to make
the  administrative processes for admission more flexible
and streamlined in determinations of eligibility in order to
respond quickly to refugee crises.  Also, refugees should be
admitted with LPR status except in cases where there has
been inadequate opportunity prior to admission for the
admitting officer to thoroughly review the case(s).
The Commission supports a continuing program of assis-
tance to refugees after entry.  The current array of assistance
and services that characterize the resettlement program
should be maintained, but with increased attention to ser-
vices that prepare refugees for rapid economic self-suffi-
ciency and civic participation.  In addition, the federal, state,
and local agencies involved in resettlement should develop
a national plan for streamlining the program to address the
complexity of the funding process and reporting require-
ments, the overlap of programs and responsibilities, and the
lack of clear accountability for the outcomes of the program.
The current public/private partnership in the domestic re-
settlement program should be continued, but for a three-
year trial period their division of responsibility should be
more explicit, with (1) the public sector assuming responsi-
bility for refugees eligible for the publicly funded public
assistance programs and (2) the private sector being respon-
sible for a limited duration program for refugees not eligible
for the mainstream public programs.
The mechanisms by which the refugee program is funded
should be strengthened through changes to the Refugee Act:
(1) to specify a minimum time period of special refugee cash
and medical assistance provided to refugees not eligible for
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families [TANF] or Supple-
mental Security Income [SSI]; (2) to permit the appropria-
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tion of “no year” money for the cash and medical assistance
portion of the Office of Refugee Resettlement [ORR] budget;
(3) to broaden the consultation process to ensure greater
consistency between admission decisions and appropriation
of funds to support refugee assistance and services;  and (4)
to establish a domestic emergency fund.
The Commission continues to recommend against denying benefits
to legal immigrants solely because they are noncitizens.  The Com-
mission believes that the denial of safety net programs to immi-
grants solely because they are noncitizens is not in the national
interest.  In previous reports, the Commission argued that Congress
should address the most significant uses of public benefit programs
—particularly, elderly immigrants using Supplementary Security
Income—by requiring sponsors to assume full financial responsibil-
ity for newly-arriving immigrants who otherwise would be excluded
on public charge grounds.  In particular, the Commission argued
that sponsors of parents who would likely become public charges
assume the responsibility for the lifetimes of the immigrants (or
until they became eligible for Social Security on the basis of work
quarters).  We also argued that sponsors of spouses and children
should assume responsibility for the duration of the familial rela-
tionship or a time-specified period.  We continue to believe that this
targeted approach makes greater sense than a blanket denial of eli-
gibility for public services solely on the basis of a person’s alienage.
Basing eligibility for assistance on citizenship debases citizenship.
We encourage immigrants to become citizens in order to participate
fully in the civic life of the country.  We do not want immigrants to
become citizens solely because the alternative is the serious eco-
nomic hardship that may result if benefits are lost or unavailable.  In
some cases, categorical denial of eligibility to legal aliens under-
mines the very purpose of our immigration policy.  For example, the
United States admits refugees, as noted above, to provide protection
against the dangerous situations they encounter in their home coun-
The Commission
continues to
recommend
against denying
benefits to
legal immigrants
solely because
they are
noncitizens.
U.S. COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION REFORM
1 9 9 7
RECOMMENDATIONS
- 74 -
tries and first-asylum countries.  Some of the most vulnerable refu-
gees requiring such protection are the elderly and disabled who will
have the greatest difficulty meeting our naturalization standards.
This is not to deny that elderly and disabled immigrants pose a cost
to U.S. taxpayers.  The NRC report confirms this fact.  By contrast,
however, immigrants who come during their prime working years
generally do not pose a net cost to the taxpayer over their lifetime.
Most of the fiscal impact related to the presence of immigrants
comes in the area of education, which can be seen as both a cost and
an investment as education has long-term benefits to the United
States both in a more skilled workforce and in higher income and
resulting tax payments.
The Congress did not accept the Commission’s recommendations to
preserve the safety net.  Some eligibility for elderly and disabled
immigrants receiving Supplementary Security Income lost as of the
enactment of the welfare reform legislation has been restored as a
result of budget negotiations.  Eligibility for food stamps and other
programs designed for the working poor were not restored, how-
ever.  And, future immigrants will be ineligible for SSI even if they
become disabled after entry and have no other means of support.
The Congress did adopt, but in a modified version, the Commission’s
recommendation for binding affidavits of support.  The 1996 legis-
lation framed the requirement in two ways that differ from the
Commission’s recommendations.  First, the legally-binding affida-
vit, with its more rigorous requirements regarding the income of
sponsors, applies to some persons who are not likely to be public
charges but not to others who are likely to require assistance.  The
affidavits apply to all family-based immigrants, not just to those
who are likely to be public charges.  By contrast, the new affidavit
will not be used for other admission categories (for example, diver-
sity immigrants) even if an immigrant is likely to be a public charge.
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Second, under the new legislation, the same time periods and re-
quirements apply to everyone who signs an affidavit.  The affidavits
are in force until the immigrant works forty quarters or becomes a
U.S. citizen.  The Commission believes the period of responsibility
should be geared instead to the family relationship and likely period
during which the immigrant may require assistance.  For example,
the sponsors of an elderly parent would be required to assume a
longer (even an indefinite) period of support if the parent is of an
age that makes it unlikely that he or she would become self-support-
ing.  The responsibility for a spouse, however, would be for a time-
limited period or for the duration of the marriage, whichever is
longer.  Under the new law, the responsibility of petitioners of
younger immigrants is so open-ended that it does not provide a
realistic or fair set of obligations.  For example, if a U.S. citizen
marries a foreign student with a professional degree and a job offer,
the U.S. citizen must now take on a open-ended obligation to the
foreign student, an obligation that carries on even if the marriage
ends in divorce.  If the immigrant spouse chooses not to work (and
therefore doesn’t meet the forty quarters requirement) and not to
naturalize, the citizen remains responsible for his or her financial
support (at 125 percent of the poverty level) indefinitely.  The law
has no “good cause” exception.
To conclude, the Commission’s recommendations on legal admis-
sions are as relevant today as they were in 1995.  The Commission
urges the Congress to take the measures needed to reform our legal
immigration policies so it best serves the national interest in a well-
regulated immigration system.
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LIMITED DURATION ADMISSIONS
Persons come to the United States for limited duration stays for
several principal purposes: representation of a foreign government
or other foreign entities; work; study; and short-term visits for com-
mercial or personal purposes, such as tourism or family visits.  These
individuals are statutorily referred to as “nonimmigrants.”  In this
report, however, we refer to “limited duration admissions [LDAs]”,
a term that better captures the nature of their admission. When the
original admission expires, the alien must either leave the country
or meet the criteria for a new LDA or permanent residence.  The
term “nonimmigrants” is misleading as some LDAs entering the
United States are really in transition to permanent residence, and
other LDAs enter for temporary stays and become permanent resi-
dents based on marriage or skills.6
The benefits of a well-regulated system of LDAs are palpable.  LDAs
represent a considerable boon to the U.S. economy.  The tourism
and travel industry (domestic and international) is the second larg-
est employer in the United States and generates 6 percent of the
nation’s Gross Domestic Product [GDP].  International tourism pro-
vides a net trade surplus (dollars international visitors spend here
minus dollars U.S. visitors spend outside the U.S.) of $18 billion.
Worldwide, the U.S. earned the most from international visitors—
more than $64 billion.
Foreign students and workers often enrich the cultural, social, and
scientific life of the United States.  Our universities gain access to
many talented students worldwide, thus maintaining the global com-
petitiveness of the U.S. system of higher education.  Foreign stu-
dents give U.S. students the opportunity to learn about foreign
6 Certain LDA categories, such as those for fiancé(e)s, intracompany
transferees, and specialty workers provide explicit bridges to permanent
immigration.
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Limited Duration Admissions
and Visa Issuances
Class of Admission
All classes*
Foreign government officials (& families) (A)
Temporary visitors for business and pleasure (B1, B2)
Transit aliens (C)
Treaty traders and investors (& families) (E)
Students (F1, M1)
Students’ spouses/children (F2, M2)
Representatives (& families) to international organizations (G)
Temporary workers and trainees
Specialty occupations (H-1B)
Performing services unavailable (H2)
Agricultural workers (H-2A)
Unskilled workers (H-2B)
Workers with extraordinary ability (O1, O2)
Internationally recognized athletes or entertainers (P1, P2, P3)
Exchange & religious workers (Q1, R1)
Spouses/children of temporary workers and trainees (H4, O3, P4, R2)
Exchange visitors (J1)
Spouses/children of exchange visitors (J2)
Intracompany transferees (L1)
Spouses/children of transferees (L2)
Sources: Admissions: U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service statistical division.  Visa Issuances: U.S.
Department of State.  1996.  Report of the Visa Office, 1996.  Washington, DC: DOS, Bureau of Consular
Affairs.
*Categories may not equal total because of omitted categories (e.g., fiancé(e)s of U.S. citizens,
overlapping Canadian Free Trade Agreement professionals, unknown, NATO officials and profession-
als, and foreign media).
Admissions
(Entries)
                    1996
24,842,503
118,157
22,880,270
325,538
138,568
426,903
32,485
79,528
227,440
144,458
23,980
9,635
14,345
9,289
33,633
11,048
53,572
215,475
41,250
140,457
73,305
Visa
Issuances
              1996
6,237,870
78,078
4,947,899
186,556
29,909
247,432
21,518
30,258
81,531
58,327
23,204
11,004
12,200
4,359
23,885
5,946
38,496
171,164
33,068
32,098
37,617
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societies and cultures and, on returning home—often to positions of
leadership—share their exposure to our democratic values, constitu-
tional principles, and economic system.  Foreign workers give em-
ployers timely access to a global labor market when they cannot
identify or quickly train U.S. workers with knowledge and expertise
required for a specific job.  These worker programs also help com-
panies conducting business both in the U.S. and internationally to
reassign personnel as needed to maintain their competitiveness.  As
economies become increasingly integrated, companies are attracting
more and more U.S. workers abroad as well.
Yet, LDAs pose problems for U.S. society under two principal cir-
cumstances: when the aliens fail to depart at the end of their legal
stay; and when they present unfair competition to U.S. workers.
The first problem is an enforcement one.  Although overstayers
represent a minute portion of the LDAs admitted each year, they are
a significant part of the illegal immigration problem.  The Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service estimates that as many as 40 percent
of the illegal aliens currently in the country originally entered with
LDAs, many as short-term visitors.  An equally pressing problem is
the current inability to track the continued presence and where-
abouts of many longer-term LDAs, particularly foreign students,
after their arrival in the United States.  This lack of capacity to
monitor their presence exacerbates the problems of overstay and
other violations of their legal status.
The second issue arising in limited duration admissions relates to
the criteria for admission of foreign workers and the procedures
used to determine their impact on U.S. workers.  A proper balance
must be struck in the LDA system between enhancing the produc-
tivity and global competitiveness of the U.S. economy through ac-
cess to foreign workers and protecting U.S. workers against unfair
competition.
The availability of foreign workers may create a dependency on
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them.  It has been well-documented that reliance on foreign workers
in low-wage, low-skill occupations, such as farm work, creates dis-
incentives for employers to improve pay and working conditions for
American workers.  When employers fail to recruit domestically or
to pay wages that meet industry-wide standards, the resulting de-
pendence—even on professionals—may adversely affect both U.S.
workers in that occupation and U.S. companies that adhere to ap-
propriate labor standards.  For many of the foreign workers, even
wages and working conditions that are very poor by U.S. standards
are much better than those available at home.   In a few egregious
cases, businesses have hired temporary foreign workers after laying
off their own domestic workforce.
The Immigration Act of 1990 imposed numerical limits on two em-
ployment categories where such dependence was feared: H-1B (spe-
cialty workers) is capped at 65,000 per year, and H-2B (unskilled
workers) is capped at 66,000 per year.  While the H-2B category is
far from its numerical limits, the statutory cap on annual H-1B ad-
missions was reached for the first time in FY 1997.  INS announced
in August 1997 the formation of a waiting list because approved
workers would be ineligible to enter until the start of the next fiscal
year.  If the trend in applications continues, the cap is likely to be
reached even earlier in FY 1998.  Hence, employers petitioning late
in the year would be required to wait for the admission of approved
workers.
The current business users of the H-1B tend to fall into two distinct
categories.  One group of employers is clearly unlikely to become
dependent on foreign workers but potentially is adversely affected
by the numerical limits.  These employers tend to hire relatively few
foreign workers (for example, measured as a proportion of their
overall workforce).  Generally, they have identified specific foreign
workers whose specialized skills are needed.  Often, the company
has done extensive recruitment in the United States and has been
unable to find qualified workers with the specific skills they seek.
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Because foreign workers represent a relatively small proportion of
their workforce, there is little risk that foreign hires will cause either
job displacement or wage depression for U.S. workers.
A second group of employers includes companies that make exten-
sive use of H-1B professionals (again, as measured by proportion of
their workforce).  Sometimes, they seek approval in the same appli-
cation for a large number of foreign workers who share minimal
professional qualifications.  But even within this more dependent
group, there is variation in the risk posed by the importation of
foreign workers to U.S. workers.  Some employers recruit domesti-
cally or take other steps to employ U.S. workers, but they are unable
to find sufficient professionals to fill their needs.  Other employers
recruit exclusively overseas and make no effort to employ qualified
U.S. workers.  They may utilize the H-1B workers in their own
operations or contract the foreign workers to other employers.
Under current law, the numerical limits, and now required waiting
time, pertain equally to the employer who has few foreign workers
and the employer who has only foreign workers.  Similarly, the
same provisions apply to the employer who has recruited exten-
sively within the United States and been unable to find a worker
with the needed specialized skills and to the employer who does no
domestic
recruitment.
The recommendations presented in this report seek to maximize the
potential benefits for the U.S. economy and society resulting from
the admission of LDAs while minimizing the potential negative
effects.  They build on—and in some cases reinforce—the
Commission’s previous recommendations for reforming the perma-
nent legal immigration system.  The overarching goal is to maintain
the advantages that accrue to American society from entry of LDAs
while protecting the legitimate interests of American workers and
businesses from unfair competition.
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Principles for a Properly-
Regulated System
The Commission believes that LDA policy should rest on the follow-
ing principles:
n Clear goals and priorities.  LDA policy should clearly dif-
ferentiate the goals of each set of visa categories, with pro-
cedures that reflect the requirements of each type of visa
and subsequent admission.  With more than forty different
LDA visas provided for under current law, as discussed
below, it is often difficult to identify how the goals of one
category differ from those of others.
n Systematic and comprehensible organization of LDA cat-
egories.  The statutory definitions, criteria, and procedures
for visas and admission have developed in an ad hoc fash-
ion.  There is now accumulation of more than forty different
LDA visas (subsumed under nineteen alphabetical headings),
including overlapping categories for students, workers, and
other visitors, as well as additional visas added to address
the concerns of specific interest groups.  Simplification of
the system would enable businesses, educators, persons with
LDAs, government officials, and the general public to un-
derstand more clearly the requirements for visa application
and admission and the responsibilities of the persons with
LDAs and their sponsors.  Administration of the LDA sys-
tem could be simplified, with attendant reduction in cost
and confusion.
n Timeliness, efficiency, and flexibility in implementation.
LDA policy should be implemented in a timely and efficient
way with sufficient flexibility in law and regulations to re-
spond to such domestic considerations as changes in the
economy and our educational systems.  Because of the time-
limited nature of the stay, it is imperative that the system
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allow admissions decisions to be made expeditiously while
retaining a capacity to identify unqualified or fraudulent
applications.  Similarly, the provisions to protect U.S. work-
ers must allow for timely and efficient mechanisms to inves-
tigate complaints and impose appropriate sanctions.  While
a good part of the LDA system now functions in a timely
way, the diffusion of responsibility in foreign worker catego-
ries reduces the potential efficiency of that part of the sys-
tem.  The Commission’s structural reform recommendations,
discussed below, will help address certain
inefficiencies.
n Compliance with conditions for entry and exit and effec-
tive mechanisms to monitor and enforce this compliance.
The LDA system should be designed to allow for greater
compliance, monitoring, and enforcement.  Policies should
specify clearly the conditions of entry and the penalties for
noncompliance.  It is the responsibility of the government,
with the cooperation of the private sector where appropri-
ate, to record, track, and report on those entering for limited
duration stays.  Americans expect that aliens will respect
and observe the conditions of their temporary admission,
including departure at the end of their lawful stay, and that
they will be subject to government enforcement if they fail
to comply with the conditions of their admission or if they
overstay.  Their sponsors (generally, businesses and schools)
also bear responsibility for complying with all relevant re-
quirements.  Penalties for noncompliance must be commen-
surate with the offense.  The current system does not yet
have exit controls in place.  In sum, the LDA system should
meet a “truth-in-advertising” test.
n Credible and realistic policies regarding transition from
LDA to permanent immigrant status.  Realistic policies
should continue to differentiate between LDAs who will
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remain only temporarily and those who become permanent.
For example, LDAs should continue to be able to transition
to immigrant status as expeditiously as possible if they enter
bona fide marriages with U.S. citizens or meet the justifiably
high education, skill standards, and prescribed labor market
tests of the permanent skill-based immigration categories.
n Protection of workers from unfair competition and of for-
eign workers from exploitation and abuse.  LDA worker
categories present special challenges in ensuring that U.S.
workers are protected from unfair competition while legiti-
mate foreign workers are protected from exploitation.   Any
system of LDA admissions must include protections for both
U.S. and foreign workers, protections that are commensu-
rate with the risk of unfair competition or abuse that the
specific category presents.  For example, lesser-skilled work-
ers (whether American or foreign) who are newly entering
the workforce and whose skills are easily replaced are gen-
erally more vulnerable—both to displacement and exploita-
tion—than are more highly-skilled, specialized workers.
Businesses that contract out their foreign workers to other
businesses pose a greater risk for labor market violations
because of the greater diffusion of employer responsibility.
Also, employees of firms whose workforces consist prima-
rily of temporary foreign workers, particularly from low-
wage countries, are more vulnerable to exploitation; these
foreign workers may be used to displace American workers
because of their fear that any complaint about wages and
working conditions might lead to deportation.
n Appropriate attention to limited duration admission poli-
cies in trade negotiations.  Important policy decisions on
admission of temporary workers occurred during negotia-
tions on the North American Free Trade Agreement [NAFTA]
and the General Agreement on Trade in Services [GATS].
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Some are concerned that these treaty obligations restrict the
capacity to reform our LDA policies by locking current
immigration law into place or establishing minimum require-
ments to which changes in immigration law must adhere.
In the future, both the Administration, in negotiating trade
agreements, and the Congress, in passing enabling legisla-
tion, should assess more carefully the long-term ramifica-
tions of trade negotiations for immigration policy.  The aim
should be to ensure that options for future immigration
reform are not unknowingly foreclosed.
The following recommendations aim at maximizing the potential
benefits accruing from admission of LDAs while minimizing the
potential harmful effects.
Framework
The Commission recommends a reorganization of the visa catego-
ries for limited duration stays in the United States to make them
more coherent and understandable.  The Commission recommends
that the current proliferation of visa categories be restructured into
five broad groups: official representatives; short-term visitors; for-
eign workers; students; and transitional family members.  Subcat-
7 The current system includes the J visa for cultural exchange, which is
used for a variety of purposes, ranging from short-term visits to study
and work.  The workers include scholars and researchers, camp
counselors, au pairs, and various others. Some work activities under the
J visa demonstrate a clear cultural or education exchange; other work
activities appear only tangentially related to the program’s original
purposes.  Protection of U.S. workers by labor market tests and standards
should apply to the latter group in the same manner as similarly situated
temporary workers in other LDA categories.  The Department of State
should assess how better to fulfill the purpose of the Mutual Educational
and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961 [Fulbright-Hays Act].  Such an analysis
is particularly timely in light of the merger now being implemented
between the Department of State and the United States Information
Agency, which is responsible for administering the J visa.
The Commission
recommends a
reorganization of the
visa categories for
limited duration
stays in the United
States to make them
more coherent and
understandable.
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egories of these groups may be appropriate in some cases.  This
reorganization reflects such shared characteristics of different visa
categories as entry for like reasons, similarity in testing for eligibil-
ity, and similar duration of stay in the United States.
The definitions and objectives of the five limited duration admission
groups would be:7
n Official representatives are diplomats, representatives of or
to international organizations, representatives of NATO or
NATO forces, and their accompanying family members.  The
objective of this category is to permit the United States to
admit temporarily individuals who represent their govern-
ments or international organizations.  The presence of offi-
cial representatives in the United States is based on reci-
procity; the United States expects similar treatment for its
own persons in similar capacities abroad.  Under current
law, these individuals are admitted under the A and G vi-
sas.  For the most part, members of these groups are admit-
ted to the United States for the duration of their status as
official representatives.
n Short-term visitors come to the United States for commer-
cial or personal purposes.  In 1995 alone, an estimated 43.5
million inbound visitors from other countries spent $76 bil-
lion on travel to and in the United States (on U.S. flag car-
riers, lodging, food, gifts, and entertainment).8 This sup-
ports the U.S. national interest in encouraging tourism and
business exchange.  The majority of short-term visitors enter
the United States under the visa waiver program, which is
available for nationals of countries demonstrating little visa
8 The 43.5 million visitors include the admission entries of individuals
from countries where a visa or visa waiver is required as well as those
from Canada (no visa, visa waiver, or border crossing card required) and
Mexico (border crossing card required).
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abuse.  (For these nationalities, visas are required for all
other purposes).   “Nonwaiver” nationalities must possess a
B visa for tourism or business, or a C visa  for transit.
Some short-term visitors also enter with the J visa if they are
sponsored by the U.S. Information Agency [USIA] or other
U.S. government agency.   Short-term visitors generally have
little or no effect on the U.S. labor market as they are se-
verely limited in what they can do in the United States.
Under current law, waiver visitors are admitted for ninety
days, with no option for extension; visitors admitted with B
visas are normally authorized a six-month stay, with flex-
ibility to apply for another six months.  Those in transit with
C visas are given up to twenty-nine days’ stay.  The majority
of visitors by their own volition stay for very short periods.
This category also includes informants/witnesses (current S
classification) whose temporary entry is in the U.S. national
interest because their knowledge is needed for criminal pros-
ecutions.
n Foreign workers are those who are coming to perform nec-
essary services for prescribed periods of time, at the expira-
tion of which they must either return to their home coun-
tries or, if an employer or family member petitions success-
fully, adjust to permanent residence.  This category would
serve the labor needs demonstrated by U.S. businesses with
appropriate provisions to protect U.S. workers from unfair
competition.  Under current law, numerous types of foreign
workers are admissible under the D visa for crewmembers,
E visa for treaty traders and investors, H visa for “specialty
workers” and other temporary workers, I visa for foreign
journalists, L visa for intracompany transferees, O visa for
aliens of extraordinary ability, P visa for performers and
entertainers, Q visa for participants in cultural exchange
programs, and R visa for religious workers.  In addition,
certain other workers enter under the TN provisions created
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by NAFTA.  There is a second, parallel system under which
other workers enter with J visas because they are sponsored
by an institution approved by the U.S. Information Agency
to engage in cultural exchange.  Some of these J workers are
paid by their own governments or home institutions whereas
others receive compensation from the U.S. institutions and
businesses employing them.  Also included as foreign work-
ers are trainees, that is, individuals receiving on-the-job train-
ing by working in U.S. institutions.  The present multiplicity
of LDA work categories could be rationalized and made to
parallel similar immigrant visa categories.  [See below for
specific recommendations regarding foreign workers.]
n Students are persons who are in the United States for the
purpose of acquiring either academic or practical knowl-
edge of a subject matter.  This category has four major goals:
to  provide foreign nationals with opportunities to obtain
knowledge they can take back to their home countries; to
give U.S. schools access to a global pool of talented stu-
dents;  to permit the sharing of U.S. values and institutions
with individuals from other countries; and to enhance the
education of U.S. students by exposing them to foreign stu-
dents and  cultures.  Students now enter under at least three
visa categories: F visa for academic students; J visa, also for
academic students (but generally including those whose
education is paid by their own government or the U.S. gov-
ernment rather than themselves); and M visas for vocational
students.
n Transitional family members include fiancé(e)s of U.S. citi-
zens.  These individuals differ from other LDAs because
they are processed for immigrant status, although they do
not receive such status until they marry in the U.S. and
adjust.  The Commission believes another category of tran-
sitional family members should be added: spouses of U.S.
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citizens whose weddings occur overseas but who subse-
quently come to the U.S. to reside.  At present, a U.S. citizen
cannot petition for the admission of a spouse until after the
marriage.  Months often pass before the foreign spouse can
come to the U.S.  Under the Commission’s plan, the newly-
wed should be permitted to enter the U.S. under a transi-
tional family visa and then complete the paperwork for le-
gal permanent resident status.
Short-Term Visitors
The Commission recommends that the current visa waiver pilot program
for short-term business and tourist visits be made permanent upon the
implementation of an entry-exit control system capable of measuring over-
stays.  A permanent visa waiver system requires appropriate provi-
sions to expand the number of participating countries  and clear and
timely means for removing those countries that fail to meet the high
standards reserved for this privilege.  Congress should extend the
pilot three years while the control system is implemented.
Most observers recognize that the waiver has been a positive factor
in increased tourism and trade and in less processing time for many
travelers at ports of entry.  More than one-half of the short-term
visitors from waivered nationalities come to the U.S. under the
waiver, and INS reports little overstay or other immigration viola-
tions from these visitors.  The Department of State [DOS] has been
able to reallocate its relatively high-cost overseas resources to areas
that need greater attention, such as increased antifraud efforts, cop-
ing with the Diversity Visa workload, and staffing new posts in the
former Soviet Union.  A key factor in the success of the waiver
program is the electronic sharing of “watch list” data of persons
ineligible for visas between the Department of State and INS on an
almost immediate basis.  Being able to screen visitors arriving with-
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out visas at ports of entry serves the fundamental purpose of ensur-
ing that statutorily ineligible aliens are not admitted to the United
States.
Foreign Workers
Each year, more foreign workers enter the United States as LDAs
for temporary work than enter as skill-based immigrants.  In FY
1996, the Department of State issued almost 278,000 limited dura-
tion worker visas, including those for spouses and children.  (Other
LDA workers who changed status within the United States are not
reflected in these statistics.  Also not considered are LDA foreign
students working in the United States during their course of study
or as part of their practical training, or researchers entering under
J visa programs.)   By contrast, only 117,000 immigrant visa issu-
ances and domestic adjustments of status in worker categories were
recorded in FY 1996, far less than the legislated limit of 140,000.
The Commission recommends that the limited duration admission classi-
fication for foreign workers include three principal categories: those who,
for significant and specific policy reasons, should be exempt by law from
labor market protection standards; those whose admission is governed by
treaty obligations; and those whose admission must adhere to specified
labor market protection standards.  Under this recommendation, LDA
worker categories would be organized around the same principles
that guide permanent worker categories.  LDA workers would be
subject to rigorous tests of their impact on the labor market unless
they are exempt from these tests because their admission will gen-
erate substantial economic growth and/or significantly enhance U.S.
intellectual and cultural strength and pose little potential for under-
mining the employment prospects and remuneration of U.S. work-
ers.
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Within the labor market protection standards group, criteria for ad-
mission are consistent with the potential adverse effect of given
categories of workers.  The Commission believes adverse impact is
broadly related to educational and skill level of the affected work-
ers.  Although there sometimes is an adverse effect from even the
most highly-skilled and experienced foreign workers, the benefits of
such workers are usually large to American society as a whole.
They are likely to enhance the U.S. national interest through the
generation of economic activity, including the creation of jobs.  In
general, the higher the levels of education and skill required in a
given occupation, the more likely U.S. workers will be able to com-
pete successfully with workers from abroad.  Even at the very high-
est levels of skill and education, however, this generalization fits
some high-skill occupations, but not others.
Entry-level professionals and lesser-skilled workers pose somewhat
greater risk of displacing U.S. workers because their work can more
likely substitute for that of U.S. workers.  If they accept lower wages
and benefits or poorer working conditions, they present unfair com-
petition to U.S. workers and their employers may gain an unfair
advantage over other U.S. employers.  Similarly, unskilled foreign
workers present the greatest potential for adverse impact because
they are competing with some of the most vulnerable of American
workers.  Accordingly, the Commission proposes different sub-cat-
egories with labor market protection standards commensurate with
the risks we believe are posed by the workers.
n Those exempt by law from labor market protection stan-
dards because their admission will generate substantial eco-
nomic growth and/or significantly enhance U.S. intellectual
and cultural strength and pose little potential for undermin-
ing the employment prospects and remuneration of U.S.
workers.  These include:
U.S. COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION REFORM
1 9 9 7
RECOMMENDATIONS
- 91 -
Individuals of extraordinary ability in the sciences, arts, educa-
tion, business, or athletics, demonstrated through sustained
national or international acclaim and recognized for extraor-
dinary achievements in their field of expertise.  These indi-
viduals now enter under the O visa.  This category is com-
parable to the first priority in our permanent resident sys-
tem.  The U.S. national interest is well served by entry of
individuals at the very top of their chosen fields who can
contribute during their temporary stay to U.S. economic
growth and intellectual and cultural strength.
Managers and executives of international businesses (current
L visa), also comparable to the first priority in the legal
permanent resident system.  The global competitiveness of
U.S. businesses is enhanced by the capacity of multinational
corporations to move their senior staff around the world as
needed.  Often, there is only temporary need for a transfer,
although permanent relocation may later be required.
Under current law, the person with a LDA visa must have
been employed by the firm, corporation, affiliate or subsid-
iary continuously for one year within the three years pre-
ceding the application for admission.  As discussed below,
the Commission believes greater safeguards must be in place
to ensure that only bona fide international businesses benefit
from this policy.
Professors, researchers and scholars whose salary or other com-
pensation is paid by their home government, home institu-
tion, or the U.S. government in a special program for for-
eign professors, researchers, and scholars.  Each year, pro-
fessors, researchers, and scholars enter the United States on
sabbatical from their own universities or research institutes,
often with a J visa.  Also in this category are foreign mem-
bers of research teams cofunded by the United States and
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other countries.  These individuals present substantial ben-
efits to the United States in the expertise and resources they
bring, and they pose no threat of displacement of U.S. re-
searchers as their salaries are from foreign sources or they
enter under a U.S. government-funded program, such as the
Fulbright Program, whose resources are earmarked through
an appropriation process for foreign researchers and schol-
ars.
Religious workers, including ministers of religion and profes-
sionals and other workers employed by religious nonprofit
organizations in the U.S. to perform religious vocations and
religious occupations. Under current law, religious workers
must have had at least two years’ prior membership in the
religious organization (current R visa).
Members of the foreign media admitted under reciprocal agree-
ments (current I visa).  The U.S. benefits from the presence
of members of the foreign media who help people in their
countries understand events in the United States.  Just as we
would not want our media to be overly regulated by labor
policies of foreign governments, the United States extends
the same courtesy to foreign journalists working in the U.S.
n Foreign workers whose admission is subject to treaty ob-
ligations. This includes treaty traders, treaty investors, and
other workers entering under specific treaties between the
U.S. and the foreign nation of which the alien is a citizen or
national.  Under the provisions of NAFTA, for example,
Canadian professionals are not subject to numerical limits
or labor market testing; Mexican professionals continue to
be subject to labor market tests, but will be exempt from
numerical limits in 2003.
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n Foreign workers subject by law to labor market protection
standards. These are principally:
Professionals and other workers who are sought by employers
because of their highly-specialized skills or knowledge and/
or extensive experience.  Included in this category are employ-
ees of international businesses who have specialized knowl-
edge (now admitted under the L visa) and professionals
(now covered by the H-1B visa).  A diverse range of indi-
viduals may be admitted in this category, including, but not
limited to, university faculty and researchers with advanced
degrees, accountants and lawyers with specialized knowl-
edge of the tax and legal codes of other countries, and elec-
trical engineers and software systems engineers with spe-
cialized knowledge needed for systems design.  This cat-
egory would also cover highly-skilled workers without pro-
fessional degrees if they have substantial experience in their
occupation.  This category includes as well aliens now ad-
mitted under the H-1B visa who have a bachelor’s degree
but little specialized expertise or experience.
Trainees admitted to the United States for practical, on-the-
job training in a variety of occupations.  They now enter
through the H-3 visa, practical training arrangements under
the F visa, and the J visa provisions pertaining to physicians
seeking graduate medical education and to some research-
ers with J visas engaged in post-doctoral studies.  All of
these groups have in common work in U.S. institutions as
part of a training program.  They are paid U.S. wages and,
in many cases, are not readily distinguished from U.S. resi-
dents in the same type of on-the-job training activities.
Institutions petitioning for  foreign workers as trainees would
be required to demonstrate that the principal purpose of the
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program is training by showing a significant educational
component to the work experience.  Trainees would be paid
the actual wages provided to U.S. trainees in similar pro-
grams.  The trainees would be admitted for the specified
duration of the training program.  For example, a foreign
physician admitted for graduate medical education would
be admitted for the period of the specific residency pro-
gram.
Artists, musicians, entertainers, athletes, fashion models, and par-
ticipants in international cultural groups that share the history,
culture, and traditions of their country.  This category in-
cludes aliens now admitted under the P visa and Q visa, as
well as fashion models admitted under H-1B visa, and ath-
letes, musicians and other performers admitted under the
H-2B visa.
Lesser-skilled and unskilled workers coming for seasonal or other
short-term employment.  Such worker programs warrant
strict review, as described below.  This category includes
aliens now admitted with H-2A and H-2B visas.  Requests
for admission of unskilled and lesser-skilled workers should
be met with heightened scrutiny.  Temporary worker pro-
grams for lesser-skilled agricultural workers exert particu-
larly harmful effects on the United States.  The Commission
remains opposed to implementation of a large-scale pro-
gram for temporary admission of lesser-skilled and unskilled
workers along the lines of the bracero program.  Having
examined the issue further during our consultations on LDA
issues, we reaffirm our belief that a new guestworker pro-
gram would be a grievous mistake.
Historically, guestworker programs have depressed the
wages and working conditions of U.S. workers.  Of particu-
lar concern is competition with unskilled American work-
U.S. COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION REFORM
1 9 9 7
RECOMMENDATIONS
- 95 -
ers, including recent immigrants who may have originally
entered to perform the needed labor but who can be dis-
placed by newly entering guestworkers.  Foreign
guestworkers often are more exploitable than lawful U.S.
workers, particularly when an employer threatens deporta-
tion if the workers complain about wages or working con-
ditions.  The presence of large numbers of guestworkers in
particular localities—such as rural counties with agricultural
interests—presents substantial costs for housing, health care,
social services, schooling, and basic infrastructure that are
borne by the broader community and even by the federal
government rather than by the employers who benefit from
the inexpensive labor.
Despite the claims of their supporters, guestworker programs
also fail to reduce unauthorized migration.  To the contrary,
research consistently shows that they tend to encourage and
exacerbate illegal movements by setting up labor recruit-
ment and family networks that persist long after the
guestworker programs end.  Moreover, guestworkers them-
selves often remain permanently and illegally in the country
in violation of the conditions of their admission.
If new initiatives to reduce illegal migration were at some
point to create real labor shortages in agriculture or other
low-skill occupations, employers could request foreign work-
ers through the LDA provisions that the Commission pro-
poses for the admission of unskilled workers.
The Commission recommends that the labor market tests used in
admitting temporary workers in this category be commensurate with
the skill level and experience of the worker.
n Employers requesting the admission of temporary work-
ers with highly-specialized skills or extensive experience
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should meet specific requirements.  Admission should be
contingent on an attestation that:
The employer will pay the greater of actual  or prevailing wage
and fringe benefits paid by the employer to other employees
with similar experience and qualifications for the specific
employment in question.  Actual wage rates should be de-
fined in a simple and straightforward manner.  By this rec-
ommendation, we do not intend a complicated, bureaucrati-
cally-defined wage analysis.  Rather, businesses should be
able to use their own compensation systems to determine
appropriate wages and benefits for the individual foreign
worker hired.  The entry of a small number of highly-skilled
foreign workers should have minimal effect on these wage
scales, which will be determined by the majority of U.S.
workers employed by the business.  In the absence of a
company-wide system that ensures equitable compensation
for similarly situated workers, the employer would be re-
quired to attest to paying prevailing wages for that job cat-
egory,  wages that are typical of the enterprise or nonprofit
company.  [See below for recommendations for at-risk em-
ployers with a significant proportion of foreign workers.]
The employer has posted notice of the hire, informed coworkers
at the principal place of business at which the LDA worker
is employed and provided a copy of the attestation to the
LDA worker employed.
The employer has paid a reasonable user fee that will be dedi-
cated to facilitating the processing of applications and the
costs of auditing compliance with all requirements.  Cur-
rently no fees are collected by the Department of Labor
[DOL]  for either processing or monitoring purposes.  In
effect, this requires taxpayers to subsidize these programs.
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To ensure that the employer, and not the foreign worker,
pays the user fee, penalties should be imposed upon viola-
tors.
There is no strike or lockout in the course of a labor dispute
involving the occupational classification at the place of em-
ployment.
The employer has not dismissed, except for cause, or otherwise
displaced workers in the specific job for which the alien is
hired during the previous six months.  Further, the em-
ployer will not displace or lay off, except for cause, U.S.
workers in the specific job during the ninety-day period
following the filing of an application or the ninety-day pe-
riods preceding or following the filing of any visa petition
supported by the application.
The employer will provide working conditions for such tempo-
rary workers that are comparable to those provided to simi-
larly situated U.S. workers.
n Certain at-risk employers of skilled workers [described
below] should be required to attest to having taken signifi-
cant steps—for example, recruitment or training—to em-
ploy U.S. workers in the jobs for which they are recruiting
foreign workers.  The Commission is aware that some com-
panies now petitioning for H-1B workers recruit exclusively
in foreign countries.  The Commission believes that U.S.
recruitment or hiring efforts will help ensure that qualified
U.S. citizens and permanent residents have access to these
jobs.  We do not recommend, however, that current labor
certification processes be used to document significant ef-
forts to recruit.  These procedures are costly, time consum-
ing, and ultimately ineffective in protecting highly-skilled
U.S. workers.
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Under the now expired H-1A visa program for the admis-
sion of LDA registered nurses, several alternative steps were
described as meeting the requirement of timely and signifi-
cant steps to employ U.S. workers.  These alternativesi n -
clude: operating a training program for such workers at the
facility (or providing participation in a training program
elsewhere); providing career development programs and
other methods of facilitating workers to become qualified;
paying qualified workers at a rate higher than currently
paid to other similarly employed workers in the geographic
area; and providing reasonable opportunities for meaning-
ful salary advancement.  Examples of other steps that might
qualify as meeting the timely and significant requirement
include monetary incentives, special perquisites, work sched-
ule options, and other training options.
n Employers requesting the admission of lesser-skilled work-
ers should be required to meet a stricter labor market pro-
tection test.  Such employers should continue to be required
to demonstrate that they have sought, but were unable to
find, sufficient American workers prepared to work under
favorable wages, benefits, and working conditions.  They
also should be required to specify the steps they are taking
to recruit and retain U.S. workers, as well as their plans to
reduce dependence on foreign labor through hiring of U.S.
workers or other means. (For example, sugar cane growers
in southern Florida who had petitioned for foreign workers
had success in reducing their dependence on H-2A workers
through mechanization.)  Employers should continue to be
required to pay the highest of prevailing, minimum, or
adverse wage rates, provide return transportation, and offer
decent housing, health care, and other benefits appropriate
for seasonal employees.
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The Commission recommends that categories of employers who are at special
risk of violating labor market protection standards—regardless of the edu-
cation, skill, or experience level of its employees—be required to obtain
regular independently-conducted audits of their compliance with the attes-
tations made about labor market protection standards, with the results of
such audit being submitted for Department of Labor review.  Certain
businesses, as described below, pose greater risk than others of dis-
placing U.S. workers and/or exploiting foreign workers.  The risk
factors that should be considered in determining whether stricter
protection standards must apply include:
n The employer’s extensive use of temporary foreign work-
ers.  Extensive use can be defined by the percentage of the
employer’s workforce that is comprised of LDA workers.  It
also can be measured by the duration and frequency of the
employer’s use of temporary foreign workers.
n The employer’s history of employing temporary foreign
workers.  Those employers with a history of serious viola-
tions of regular labor market protection standards or spe-
cific labor standards related to the employment of LDA
workers should be considered as at risk for future viola-
tions.
n The employer’s status as a job contracting or employment
agency providing temporary foreign labor to other employ-
ers.  Risk of labor violations increases as responsibility is
divided between a primary and secondary employer.
To ensure adequate protection of labor market standards, such em-
ployers should be required to submit an independent audit of their
compliance with all statements attested in their application.  The
independent audits should be done by recognized accounting firms
that have the demonstrated capacity to determine, for example, that
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wages and fringe benefits were provided as promised in the attes-
tation and conformed to the actual or prevailing wages and fringe
benefits provided to similarly situated U.S. workers.
The Commission recommends enhanced monitoring of and enforcement
against fraudulent applications and postadmission violations of labor market
protection standards.  To function effectively, both the exempt and
nonexempt temporary worker programs must provide expeditious
access to needed labor.  The Commission’s recommendations build
on the current system of employer attestations that receive expedi-
tious preapproval review but are subject to postapproval enforce-
ment actions against violators.  To ensure adequate safeguards for
U.S. workers, the government agencies responsible for processing
applications and enforcing the law must have adequate capacity to
identify and act quickly against fraudulent applicants and to moni-
tor postapproval violations of the terms under which foreign work-
ers enter.  More specifically, the Commission recommends:
n Allocating increased staff and resources to the agencies re-
sponsible for adjudicating applications for admission and
monitoring and taking appropriate enforcement action
against fraudulent applicants and violators of labor market
protection standards.  These agencies require additional re-
sources to investigate potential fraud among applicants for
temporary worker visas as well as violations of the labor
market protection standards.   Enhancing this capability has
significant resource implications, especially if, as the Com-
mission also recommends, such antifraud investigations are
undertaken in a manner that does not delay visa adjudication
and issuance.  Increased costs required for more efficient ad-
judication of applications can be covered by applicant fees.
However, additional costs incurred for more effective inves-
tigations of compliance with labor market standards will re-
quire appropriated funds.
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Sufficient funds should be appropriated to provide the ad-
ditional resources needed for adequate enforcement by the
Department of Labor.  These resources should be targeted at
employers and contractors at special risk of violating labor
market protection standards.  Targeting these employers
makes the most sense both in terms of economical use of
resources and in protection of workers.
The Department of State also must have the capacity to
make a proper investigation of cases in which fraud is sus-
pected.  This capacity is particularly needed in applications
for admission of LDAs in exempt categories to ensure that
use of these categories does not become a means of evading
labor market protection standards. For example, the visa for
intracompany transfers has been abused by persons setting
up sham corporations.  To comply with appropriate require-
ments for timely decisions, the government must have the
resources to investigate suspected fraud.
n Barring the use of LDA workers by any employer who has
been found to have committed willful and serious labor
standards violations with respect to the employment of
LDA workers.  Further, upon the recommendation of any
federal, state, or local tax agency, barring the use of LDA
workers by any employer who has been found to have
committed willful and serious payroll tax violations with
respect to LDA workers.  The law currently provides for
such debarment for failure to meet labor condition attesta-
tion provisions or misrepresentation of material facts on the
application.  Implementation of this recommendation would
enable penalties to be assessed for serious labor standards
violations that are not also violations of the attestations.
This would address an issue that has come to the attention
of the Commission: the knowing misclassification of some
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LDA workers as independent contractors, with subsequent
failure to pay payroll taxes or other legally-required deduc-
tions to the appropriate governmental agency.
n Developing an enforcement strategy to reduce evasion of
the LDA labor market protection standards through use of
contractors.  U.S. businesses’ growth in contracting-out func-
tions has raised questions of employment relationships and
ultimate liability for employment-related violations, includ-
ing those related to temporary foreign workers.  A uniform
policy for dealing with these situations is desirable for the
enforcement agencies involved, as well as for employers,
contractors, and workers.
Conclusion
Limited duration admissions are an important part of immigration
policy because they are linked closely to the  admission of legal
permanent immigrants and to our policies for deterring unlawful
migration.  This report seeks to treat limited duration admission
policy in a comprehensive fashion, building on the recommenda-
tions made by the Commission on other aspects of immigration
policy.  The opportunities presented by the admission of limited
duration admissions are significant.  With the type of regulation
recommended herein, the United States will be able to continue to
benefit from these admissions while mitigating potential harmful
effects, particularly on vulnerable U.S. populations.
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CURBING UNLAWFUL MIGRATION
In its first interim report to Congress this Commission recommended
a comprehensive strategy to curb unlawful migration into the United
States through prevention and removal.9  That report focused on
deterrence—steps that could prevent illegal entry and unauthorized
work.  The Commission found that curbing unlawful immigration
required: (1) better border management; (2) more effective deter-
rence of the employment of unauthorized workers; (3) a more con-
sistent benefits eligibility policy; (4) cooperative efforts with source
countries;  (5) improved data collection and analysis; (6) mecha-
nisms to address migration emergencies; (7) and an improved ca-
pacity to remove deportable aliens.  The Commission presented
detailed recommendations on the first five elements of this strategy
(border, worksite, benefits, source country, and data).  Our report on
refugee policy  detailed more specific recommendations on the sixth,
migration emergencies.10  This final report provides more detailed
recommendations on the seventh, removals.
Since 1994, the immigration system as a whole has undergone al-
most unprecedented change.  As Congress, the public, and the Ad-
ministration focused more keenly on immigration, the financial re-
sources available to INS grew from $1.5 billion in FY 1994 to a
projected $3.6 billion in FY 1998.  During the same period, INS
staffing is expected to rise 65 percent, from 17,000 in FY 1994 to
more than 28,000 in FY 1998.  Once in 1994,11 and  three times in
1996,12 enactment of major legislation made substantive and sub-
stantial changes in laws affecting illegal migration.  Many of these
statutory and administrative actions sought to implement the
Commission’s 1994 recommendations.
9 U.S. Immigration Policy: Restoring Credibility, 1994.
10 U.S. Refugee Policy: Taking Leadership, 1997.
11 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994.
12 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 [AEDPA], Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 [IIRIRA],
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996.
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Deterrence Strategies
The Commission reiterates its 1994 recommendations supporting a com-
prehensive strategy to deter illegal migration.   Despite the additional
resources, new policies, and often innovative strategies adopted
during the past few years, illegal migration continues to be a prob-
lem.  In October 1996, INS released its latest estimates of the illegal
alien population in the United States: some 5 million undocumented
migrants reside in the United States, a number growing by approxi-
mately 275,000 annually; 41 percent of these are nonimmigrant over-
stays; the remaining 59 percent probably entered illegally and with-
out inspection.
The Commission continues to believe that unlawful immigration
can be controlled consistent with our traditions, civil rights, and
civil liberties.  As a nation committed to the rule of law, our immi-
gration policies must conform to the highest standards of integrity
and efficiency in the enforcement of the law.  We must also respect
due process.  The Commission believes that the comprehensive strat-
egy we outlined in 1994 continues to hold the best promise for
reducing levels of illegal migration.  These policies,  combined with
the structural and management recommendations detailed later in
this report, can restore the credibility of our immigration system by
both deterring illegal entry and facilitating legal crossings.  The
Commission emphasizes, however, that no one part of this strategy
will, on its own, solve the problem of unauthorized migration.
More specifically, the Commission continues to support implemen-
tation of the following deterrence strategies:
n An effective border management policy that  accomplishes
the twin goals of preventing illegal entries and facilitating
legal ones.  Increased resources for additional Border Patrol
officers, inspectors, and operational support, combined with
The Commission
reiterates
its 1994
recommendations
supporting a
comprehensive
strategy
to deter
illegal
migration.
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such new strategies as operations “Hold the Line,”
“Gatekeeper,” and “Safeguard,” have improved significantly
the management of the border where they are deployed.
The very success of these new efforts demonstrates that to
gain full control, the same level of resources and prevention
strategies must be deployed at all points along the border
where significant violations of U.S. immigration law are likely
to occur.
Implementing effective prevention strategies.  In 1994, “Opera-
tion Hold the Line” in El Paso, Texas successfully challenged
outmoded border control concepts.  This effort then served
as the model for efforts to control other parts of the border,
particularly in the San Diego area.  The result, “Operation
Gatekeeper,” utilizing a strategy described as “Prevention
through Deterrence,” began on October 1, 1994, and included
the commitment of significant new resources and the imple-
mentation of innovative new strategies.
Phase I (1994) of the plan had the greatest impact on the
area around Imperial Beach in San Diego County.  For many
years this area accounted for approximately 25 percent of
illegal crossings across the southwest border.  Utilization of
new equipment led to apprehension of greater numbers,
and use of new techniques cracked down on alien smug-
gling rings.  Reinforcement of interior checkpoints helped
capture those who made it illegally across the border.
Phase II (begun in June 1995) consisted mainly of reinforcing
nearby ports of entry seen as the next likely route for aliens
whose illegal entry was disrupted by “Operation
Gatekeeper.”  INS placed additional service inspectors  at
the border, constructed fencing at strategic locations, installed
a fingerprint identification system , and added increased
lighting at ports of entry.
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Phase III (begun in 1996) is designed to extend control over
increasing sections of the southwest border as additional
staff and equipment become available.  The San Diego Bor-
der Patrol Sector now has almost 2,000 agents working along
the border.
Where these new initiatives have been instituted, the num-
ber of people seeking to cross is significantly reduced.  On
Commission site visits, residents of El Paso and Imperial
Beach, the main beneficiaries to date of the new enforce-
ment efforts, cited reduction in vagrancy and petty crime as
evidence of reduced illegal crossings through their commu-
nities.  Preliminary research data reveal that it now takes
longer and costs more to enter the United States illegally.
Illegal migrants now must now cross through tougher ter-
rain and need the assistance of smugglers.  Migrant smug-
gling increasingly is becoming specialized and
professionalized.
The 1997 Binational Study, Migration Between Mexico and the
United States, reports that a systematic survey of border cross-
ers indicates fewer actual crossers but longer periods of stay
in the United States.  Thus, it appears that while new border
initiatives may deter some movements, they do not fully
reduce either levels or impacts of illegal migration.  In other
words, border control is a necessary, but not sufficient, re-
sponse to illegal migration.
Evidence also shows that in response to the new initiatives
migrants have shifted their entry patterns.  For example, as
Imperial Beach and its neighboring communities came un-
der control, the numbers of illegal entries rose in eastern
San Diego county, the Imperial Valley, Arizona, and south
Texas.  As the Commission noted in 1994, the immigration
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system must have the capacity to prevent entry across the
southern border.  Mobile, rapid response teams initially can
help plug holes along the border, but eventually, a preven-
tion capacity must be established in every likely crossing
area.
Protecting human rights.  Effective border management is not
without its human toll, increased violence along the border,
as well as deaths resulting from exposure to extreme weather
in mountain and desert areas.  Both border crossers and
Border Patrol agents have been victims of this heightened
violence.
Since the implementation of the border initiatives, incidents
of violence against the Border Patrol have increased.  Inci-
dents of rock-throwing, a hazard to Border Patrol agents for
years, have risen.  Agents now face random gunfire from
south of the border.  Beginning in May of 1997, six reported
sniper shootings in the San Diego sector were directed at
Border Patrol agents.  Sustained efforts to protect agents
from such violence must be at the top of the policy agenda.
Efforts also must continue to warn potential illegal border
crossers—while they are still in their countries of origin—of
the increased physical dangers and legal consequences of
trying to cross illegally.  In particular aliens must be warned
of  the pitfalls of using smugglers, some of whom abandon
border crossers and otherwise abuse them.
Site visits in Mexico demonstrate that already widespread
knowledge exists about the new difficulties in entering the
United States illegally; misinformation continues to abound
as well.  Residents  in new sending regions such as Oaxaca,
traditional sending regions such as Jalisco, and border cross-
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ing points such as Tijuana, all spoke of the additional costs
and dangers encountered in attempting to cross the border
illegally.
The Commission continues to support efforts to monitor
and reduce human rights violations and potentially violent
confrontations between government personnel and those be-
lieved to be seeking illegal entry into the United States.  The
INS formed a Citizens’ Advisory Panel [CAP] that met pe-
riodically from February 1994 through February 1997, a year
beyond its original expiration date.  During that time, the
CAP discussed ways and means for averting potential hu-
man rights abuses and outright violence by INS employees
against aliens.  As a result, INS adopted a formal complaint
procedure for reporting alleged abuses by government em-
ployees to their supervisors and for INS to respond to those
complaints.  At its February 1997 meeting, the CAP decided
to disband in its present form.  Discussions are now under-
way on how best to retain the CAP input in the INS
decisionmaking processes, in delivering feedback for train-
ing and supervising INS border personnel, and in respond-
ing to complaints made against employees.
Improving ports of entry.  Additional pressure on ports of
entry also accompany enhanced border control.  The vari-
ous initiatives already undertaken provide guidance for other
border sites.  In San Diego, “Operation Gatekeeper II” in-
cluded enhanced resources for inspectors to identify indi-
viduals entering with fraudulent documents or as impos-
tors.  A Port Court was established to place these persons
into formal exclusion proceedings.  Presiding Immigration
Judges made clear to those receiving exclusion orders that
they would face criminal penalties if they were apprehended
attempting to reenter within one year.  To ensure that word
went out that these were not idle threats, the U.S. Attorney
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pledged to prosecute these cases.  A relatively small number
of persons were apprehended attempting reentry after re-
ceiving an exclusion order at the Port Court.
This process has changed somewhat under the new expe-
dited removal procedures mandated by the Illegal Immigra-
tion Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, which
took effect on April 1, 1997.  Under the new procedures, an
alien arriving at a port of entry with fraudulent documents
or without documents is referred to secondary inspection,
where he or she is advised about expedited removal.13  If the
alien does not indicate a fear of persecution or an intent to
apply for asylum, the alien is fingerprinted, photographed
and detained until removal, which in San Diego typically
takes two processing days.  The alien’s identity is recorded
in the INS IDENT database for immediate and future deter-
mination of repeated attempts at unlawful reentry.   An
immigration officer's determination to remove an alien un-
der the expedited procedures is not subject to administra-
tive or judicial review, except under only very narrow cir-
cumstances.
Immigration officials in San Diego report a significant in-
crease in removals as a result of the new expedited removal
provisions.  These gains in the capacity to remove at the
border are no doubt desirable goals for an immigration
enforcement agency.  However, a more reliable determinant
13 IIRIRA permits the Attorney General to apply the expedited removal
provisions to aliens in the U.S. who have not been admitted or paroled
[EWIs] and who have not shown to the satisfaction of the immigration
officer that they have been continuously present in the U.S. for the two-
year period immediately preceding the date of the determination of
inadmissibility.  At present, the Attorney General has elected not to apply
these provisions to EWIs, although she has reserved through regulation,
the option to apply the expedited removal provisions at any time, to any
alien specified in that section.
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of the extent to which a law actually deters the conduct it
seeks to address is the recidivism rate.   Thus, the effective
communication of the consequences attached to the removal
of an alien as a result of the new provisions is a key ingre-
dient of the efficacy of our immigration laws.  Without such
public education, certain individuals are likely to be unde-
terred by the type of sanction exacted under the new expe-
dited removal procedures.
Although reliable data on reentry is not yet available, the
San Diego district reports an apparent increase in recidi-
vism following implementation of the new law.  It appears
that an order issued by an immigration inspector does not
have the psychological force of an order issued by an Immi-
gration Judge.  What is gained in expediting by the new
statutory process may be lost in increased recidivism.
To counter this trend, the San Diego district has instituted
a three-strike system that corresponds with the changes man-
dated by the new law.  This system was established with the
cooperation of the INS, the Executive Office for Immigra-
tion Review [EOIR], and the U.S. Attorney's Office in re-
sponse to reports of apparent recidivism among aliens turned
away by the expedited removal process.  The first strike
occurs once the INS inspector issues an expedited removal
order to the alien that carries a penalty of inadmissibility for
up to twenty years in some cases and permanently if the
offense involves the use of a fraudulent document.
The second strike—appearance before an Immigration Judge
in Port Court—occurs once the alien is apprehended after
having been removed for a previous immigration or crimi-
nal violation.  This step provides a critical link to deter-
rence: personal communication of the consequences of vio-
lating an immigration law.  At the hearing, the Immigration
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Judge advises the alien of the administrative sanction result-
ing from the attempted illegal reentry after expedited re-
moval (i.e., a bar to admission for some period) and also of
the certainty of felony prosecution if the alien attempts re-
entry during that period.  The presence of an Immigration
Judge is considered a vital component to the credibility of
the San Diego district’s border enforcement.  The clear,
unequivocal notice of the penalty aliens are likely to incur at
the third step, coupled with the prospect of time spent in
prison, is predicted to have more of a deterrent effect than
simply turning aliens away without providing adequate
notice of the consequences of their conduct.
The third strike involves felony prosecution by the U.S.
Attorney's office under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) for illegal reentry
following deportation, exclusion, or removal or under §
1326(b) for illegal reentry by certain criminal aliens who
likewise have been previously removed.  The penalties for
a conviction under these sections of Title 8 range from sen-
tences of not more than two years to not more than twenty
years and/or a fine.
The INS and the Border Patrol are in the process of linking
the IDENT system to all sectors along the southwest U.S.-
Mexican border.  This is especially important in light of the
apparent shift in border movements to the east.  Moreover,
proper coordination of this system with various other law
enforcement agencies to identify criminal aliens and other
immigration violators may enhance the cooperation between
those agencies and heighten enforcement along the border.
For example, within the constraints of privacy limitations,
data on criminal aliens entered into the IDENT system and
furnished to the U.S. Attorney’s Office would allow that
office more readily to identify and prepare the criminal alien
cases it intends to prosecute under the § 1326 provisions.
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San Diego also is a laboratory for initiatives to facilitate
legal entries while guarding against the abuses referenced
above.  The Commission urged in its 1994 report that port
of entry operations be improved to reduce long waiting times
for legal crossings.  We learned in El Paso that some illegal
crossers had legal authority to enter, but because of the long
waits,  chose to use unauthorized avenues to enter.  San
Diego, along with several northern border sites, has been
experimenting with a Dedicated Commuter Lane [DCL] to
speed legitimate border traffic.  This concept combines
upfront screening of the applicant for a commuter pass and
use of technology to ensure that the crosser is indeed the
person who previously was screened.  Another innovation
in San Diego is a new working relationship between INS
inspections and the Customs Service to open all traffic lanes
and to improve the division of responsibility: INS currently
runs the port for pedestrian crossing and Customs for cargo
inspections.  Responsibility for inspections at the vehicle
lanes still is shared by INS and Customs.
Reducing visa overstay and abuse.  Visa overstay and abuse of
visas and Border Crossing Cards [BCCs], particularly through
unauthorized work, continue to challenge effective border
management.  Most of those entering with visas and BCCs
come for legitimate purposes, abide by the terms of their
entry, and leave when required.  Out of the millions of aliens
who are inspected each year, only a very small proportion
(about 150,000 per year) overstay for significant periods.
Any efforts to reduce abuse must also consider the wide-
spread benefits that accrue from most visa and BCC hold-
ers.  A number of policy changes could help ease legal entry
while reducing abuse.  The Commission previously recom-
mended, and Congress and the Administration have taken
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action for, the development of new entry-exit controls for
persons entering with visas, reissuance of Border Crossing
Cards to give them greater integrity, and providing signifi-
cant new resources for inspections.
Monitoring and evaluating new initiatives.  The various in-
tended and unintended consequences of the new resources,
policies, and initiatives in and between ports of entry make
clear the need for careful monitoring.  The Commission
reiterates its 1994 recommendation that a systematic assess-
ment of the effectiveness of new border strategies be under-
taken by internal and external evaluators.  IIRIRA mandates
a General Accounting Office five-year evaluation of border
management.  This study should be underwritten with suf-
ficient resources and expertise to ensure that Congress and
the Executive Branch gain an independent view of the new
policies’ effectiveness.
n Reducing the employment magnet is the linchpin of a
comprehensive strategy to deter unlawful immigration.
Economic opportunity and the prospect of employment re-
main the most important draw for illegal migration to this
country.   Strategies to deter unlawful entries and visa over-
stays require both a reliable process for verifying authoriza-
tion to work and an enforcement capacity to ensure that
employers adhere to all immigration-related labor standards.
The Commission continues to believe the following areas of
worksite regulation and enforcement require improvement:
Employment authorization verification system.  In our 1994 re-
port, the Commission concluded that the single most impor-
tant step that could be taken to reduce unlawful migration
was development of a more effective system for verifying
work authorization.
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A large majority of employers will comply with the law, and
they will not knowingly hire illegal aliens.  However, the
widespread availability of fraudulent documents makes it
easy for illegal aliens to obtain jobs because employers gen-
erally have no way of determining if the workers are autho-
rized or not.  The minority of employers who knowingly
hire illegal aliens, often to exploit their labor, find protection
from sanctions by going through the motions of compliance
while accepting counterfeit documents.  The absence of a
secure verification process also heightens the potential for
discrimination against legally-authorized, foreign-looking or
-sounding workers because employers fear that they may be
inadvertently hiring illegal aliens.
The Commission concluded that the most promising option
for verifying work authorization is a computerized registry
based on the social security number; it unanimously recom-
mended that such a system be tested not only for its effec-
tiveness in deterring the employment of illegal aliens, but
also for its protections against discrimination and infringe-
ments on civil liberties and privacy.14  The Commission urged
the Administration “to initiate and evaluate pilot programs
using the proposed, social security-based computerized veri-
fication system in at least five states with the highest levels
of illegal immigration . . .”  In the interim, we recommended
that INS should continue to implement pilot programs al-
ready underway that permit employers to verify the work
authorization of these newly-hired workers who attest to
being aliens.  The existing pilot, since expanded, was a good
mechanism through which INS could develop the data and
other systems that would be needed in the more extensive
pilots envisioned by the Commission.  They continued to
14 The Concurring Statement of Commissioners Leiden and Merced can be
found in the Commission’s 1994 report.
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have a fatal flaw, however, in that an illegal alien could
attest to being a U.S. citizen and thereby escape verification
by INS.
The Commission’s recommendation for a verification pilot
that involved both citizens and aliens was incorporated in
modified form in IIRIRA.15  Congress mandated that the
Attorney General establish a pilot confirmation system us-
ing a telephone line or other electronic media.  The Com-
missioner of Social Security was mandated to establish a
reliable, secure method to verify the social security number
provided by a new hire as part of the employment confir-
mation process.  Pilot programs testing the new confirma-
tion process were to be implemented in, at a minimum, five
of the seven states with the highest estimated illegal alien
population.  Participation in the pilot programs is to be
voluntary for most employers.  The legislation mandated
participation by federal agencies and the Congress.  Compa-
nies violating employer sanctions provisions can also be
required to participate.  The Attorney General is to report
on the pilot programs after three and four years of opera-
tion.
The first of these pilot projects was to begin not later than
one year from enactment of IIRIRA, or about August 1997.
The first pilot project, starting in Chicago, began in late
August.  Called the “Joint Employment Verification Project”
[JEVP], the pilot involves INS and the Social Security Ad-
ministration.  The verification pilot will test many of the
requirements of the “Basic Pilot Program” mandated in §
403(a) of IIRIRA.
15 IIRIRA, Title IV—Enforcement of Restrictions Against Employment,
Subtitle A: Pilot Programs for Employment Eligibility Confirmation,
sections 401-405.
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The JEVP will have prospective new employees fill out the
current INS Form I-9, submit identification documents listed
in the legislation, and include a photograph.  Employers
will then contact the Social Security Administration [SSA]
through a touch-tone telephone (being developed under a
contract with ATT) that will electronically verify identity
and authorization/nonauthorization to work using the
employee’s social security number.  If either of these is not
confirmed, the prospective employee must be notified. The
employee may then withdraw or contest this tentative
nonconfirmation. In this case, the prospective employee has
ten days in which to provide additional or corrected infor-
mation to the employer.  If this still does not produce con-
firmation of employment authorization, the employee will
be told to contact SSA [for citizens] or INS [for noncitizens]
to correct their record(s) and/or their status.  During this
confirmation process, employees cannot be terminated.  If
still unconfirmed at the end of the process, the employee
then may be terminated.  As mandated by IIRIRA, INS plans
to expand implementation of the JEVP into five additional
states by the end of September 1997.
In addition, IIRIRA mandates two other pilot projects, a
“citizen attestation pilot project” and a “machine readable
document pilot project.”  INS currently is formulating these
additional pilot projects.  The “citizen attestation pilot
project” will be similar to the INS’ current Employment
Verification Program, while the “machine readable docu-
ment pilot project” is a variation of the JEVP and the “Basic
Pilot Project.”
The current pilot programs are a useful step in improving
verification, but they do not fully solve the problems we
have identified.  The Commission reiterates its support for
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pilot-testing approaches that do not require employers to
use the current I-9 procedure.  The I-9 is flawed in several
ways.  First it is a document system, which is prone to
counterfeiting.  Second, it requires employees to specify if
they are citizens or aliens.  This latter requirement increases
the potential for discrimination based on alienage or pre-
sumed alienage.  Third, it presents an added paperwork
burden for employers who must keep the I-9 file.  The cur-
rent pilot programs help address the first problem by pro-
viding for telephone or computer verification of information
provided in the I-9.  It does not address the second or third
problems, however.
A system based on verification of an employee’s social se-
curity number, with a match to records on work authoriza-
tion for aliens, eliminates any determinations by the em-
ployer and can be implemented electronically, thus eliminat-
ing the need for work authorization documents.  The Com-
mission recognizes that the data systems are not yet in place
for this preferred process to work.  The federal government
does not have the capacity to match social security numbers
with INS work authorization data without some of the in-
formation captured on the I-9.  Congress should provide
sufficient time, resources, and authorities to permit devel-
opment of this capability.
The Commission urges the Administration and Congress to
monitor closely and evaluate the effects of these various
pilot programs.  As discussed in our earlier report, the evalu-
ation should assess their effects in reducing fraud, reducing
the potential for discrimination, reducing emplyers’ time,
resources, and amount of paperwork, and protecting pri-
vacy and civil liberties.  The evaluation should be carried
out by nationally-respected outside evaluators.  It should be
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conceived as a continuing evaluation whose results are used
in modifying and improving the pilots as they are imple-
mented.
Counterfeit documents.  The Commission recommended ac-
tion to reduce the availability of counterfeit documents and
the fraudulent access to so-called “breeder documents,” par-
ticularly birth certificates used to establish identity.  The
Commission is pleased to note progress in the development
of new and more tamper-proof basic documents that could
serve as verification documents until a general, nationwide
verification system is fully in place.   The Commission also
believes that the federal government should develop a pack-
age of incentives and disincentives to encourage states and
other localities to develop standards for issuing birth and
death certificates and drivers’ licenses.  The Commission is
pleased to note that its 1994 recommendation for imposing
additional penalties on those producing and selling counter-
feit documents was adopted in the IIRIRA.
Antidiscrimination strategies.  In its 1994 report, the Commis-
sion expressed its concern regarding the discrimination that
occurs against citizens and noncitizens as a result of the
current employer sanctions system.  To address this issue,
the Commission recommended development of a new veri-
fication process to deter immigration-related discrimination.
We also urged more proactive strategies to identify and com-
bat immigration-related discrimination at the workplace, as
well as a new study to document the nature and extent of
the problem.  Revisiting this issue three years later, the Com-
mission finds that there have been a number of changes that
are relevant to the Commission’s recommendations.
First, the Office of Special Counsel [OSC] for unfair immi-
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gration-related employment practices, formerly housed as
an independent agency within the Department of Justice,
has been incorporated into the DOJ’s Civil Rights Division.
This organizational change seems to have been well received
within the Department as both the Division and OSC focus
on protecting the rights of immigrants and racial and ethnic
minorities.
The number of OSC staff, however, has decreased from thirty-
six to about twenty-five since FY 1994.  This downward
trend harms OSC’s ability to take the proactive role that the
Commission recommended (e.g. increasing independent,
targeted investigations and beginning testing programs).  The
Commission urges attention to this matter, as well as to the
long delay in confirming a Special Counsel to head the of-
fice.
A significant portion of OSC’s efforts have been directed
toward the education of employees and employers, and we
support these efforts.  OSC has awarded 114 grants totaling
$2.09 million since FY 1990 and contracted out for a five-
year national public affairs/communications strategy.  Its
attorneys and staff have made 1,000 presentations in the last
ten years, and its grantees have averaged 1,700 presenta-
tions per year.  OSC also has coordinated its educational
efforts with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion, INS, and DOL and has Memoranda of Understanding
with these and other agencies.
Despite this apparent coordination, however, OSC has not
been involved in designing and monitoring the verification
pilot programs.  Reducing immigration-related employment
discrimination against foreign-looking or -sounding persons
was a key goal of the Commission’s proposed verification
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system.  OSC should play a role in monitoring the verifica-
tion pilots to see if the discrimination is indeed reduced as
predicted.
The Commission also reiterates its recommendation for a
methodologically-sound study to document the nature and
extent of unfair immigration-related employment practices
that have occurred since the General Accounting Office’s
1990 report. Only through such a study can it be determined
whether employer sanctions-related discrimination has in-
creased or decreased and how the pilot programs compare
with the current situation on this indicator.
In 1996, IIRIRA changed the INA by requiring that an intent
to discriminate must be proven for an employer to be found
guilty of violating IRCA’s antidiscrimination procedures with
respect to document requests.  Some believe that the intent
standard will be a difficult one to prove and that it provides
the employer with a loophole.  The actual effect of this pro-
vision will be known only as OSC implements the statutory
change and should be monitored.
Labor standards enforcement.  Protecting authorized workers
from employment abuses and substandard conditions and
practices remains an essential ingredient of a strategy to
combat illegal migration.  Employers who hire illegal aliens
tend to violate other labor standards and vice versa.  Re-
cently uncovered examples of exploitation of illegal aliens,
including indentured servitude, highlight the necessity of
enhanced labor standards enforcement.  The Commission
recommended in our 1994 report the allocation of increased
staff and resources to the Department of Labor for the en-
forcement of wage and hour and other labor standards.  We
continue to believe that these additional resources are nec-
essary, and the Commission continues to urge Congress to
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authorize and fund additional labor standards investigators
whose work should target industries hiring significant num-
bers of illegal aliens.  As described more fully later in this
report, we believe that the Department of Labor should have
full capacity and authority to sanction employers who fail to
verify work authorization as part of the agency’s duties in
enforcing labor standards.
n Restricting eligibility of illegal aliens for publicly-funded
services or assistance except those made available on an
emergency basis or for similar compelling reasons to pro-
tect public health and safety or to conform to constitu-
tional requirements.  Although public benefit programs do
not appear to be a major magnet for illegal migrants, it is
important that U.S. benefit eligibility policies send the same
message as immigration policy: Illegal aliens should not be
here and, therefore, should not receive public assistance ex-
cept in unusual circumstances.  The Commission recom-
mended drawing a line between illegal aliens and lawfully-
resident immigrants with regard to benefits eligibility, in
part to reinforce this message.  Immigrants are welcome in
the country and, therefore, should be eligible for our basic
safety nets;  illegal aliens are not welcome and should not
receive our assistance.  We continue to believe that this
demarcation between legal and illegal aliens makes sense.
The Commission urges the Congress to reconsider the
changes in welfare policy enacted in 1996 that blur the dis-
tinctions between legal and illegal aliens by treating them
similarly for the purposes of many public benefit programs.
n Strategies for addressing the causes of unlawful migration
in source countries.  An effective strategy to curb unautho-
rized movements includes cooperative efforts with source
countries to address the push factors that cause people to
seek new lives in the United States. The Commission contin-
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ues to urge the United States government to give priority in
its foreign policy and international economic policy to long-
term reduction in the causes of unauthorized migration.  The
United States can take many unilateral steps to improve its
immigration policies, but U.S. policies alone will not stop
unauthorized migration.
Recognizing the complex motivations behind unlawful move-
ments, the Commission advocated the following possible
interventions, many of which have indeed occurred.  They
include: arrangements to facilitate trade and investment in
sending countries; support for human rights and democracy
building; peacekeeping operations; humanitarian assistance
in countries of origin and first asylum; deployment of hu-
man rights monitors; human rights training for government
officials in potential sending countries; humane treatment of
citizens and minorities; and reconstruction programs after
civil wars and civil conflicts.  In its 1997 report on refugee
policy, the Commission recommended that the U.S. govern-
ment continue demonstrating leadership in international re-
sponses to refugee and related humanitarian crises, includ-
ing concerted diplomatic and other efforts to prevent the
emergencies from occurring.
To focus greater attention on the causes of migration, the
Commission recommends development of immigration im-
pact analyses of foreign policy and trade decisions with po-
tential migrant sending countries. The Commission also calls
for adoption of focused strategies for communities produc-
ing large numbers of U.S.-bound migrants and strengthened
intelligence gathering to improve early warning of large
unauthorized movements.  Other efforts to reduce the pres-
sures of migration from the sending countries would be
helpful, such as programs to arrest environmental damage
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throughout the hemisphere, to restore the environment in
such areas as Haiti and Mexico, to improve rural develop-
ment and agricultural productivity, particularly in those areas
where land is becoming marginalized and unlikely to sus-
tain the local population without an intervention strategy,
and to address other environmental problems such as clear-
ing land mines in rural Central America.
Given its proximity to the United States and its number of
migrants, the Commission believes increased coordination
with Mexico is essential to address problems related to
migration. The Commission notes with satisfaction the ef-
forts being conducted jointly by the government of Mexico
and the United States to improve coordination strategies
and actions on their respective sides of the border and en-
courages the continuation of such important dialogues.  In
particular, the Commission recognizes the work of the Bina-
tional Study on Migration Between Mexico and the United
States, the Working Group on Migration and Consular Af-
fairs, the various cross-border liaison groups established
along the border, and efforts between the two countries to
coordinate antismuggling efforts, regulate the movements
of people across land borders, deter third-country nationals
transiting Mexico en route to the U.S., curtail auto theft and
train cargo theft, reduce border violence, and enhance cross-
border law enforcement cooperation.
The Commission also notes that action has taken place at
the regional level; annual discussions have been convened
involving the U.S., Mexico, and Central American countries.
Further, the U.S. has held direct discussions with other coun-
tries in the region, such as Cuba, with whom it signed an
agreement to curb unauthorized migration of its native
population.
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Despite that program, the need remains for forward looking
consultative mechanisms between the U.S. and other coun-
tries.  These should focus on exploring future policies and
their migration implications as well as developing various
policy scenarios and options for addressing unauthorized
migration.  Joint data collection and analysis also would be
useful in resolving some of the disagreements surrounding
migration, for example joint solutions to address the eco-
nomic and social costs of the migration.
n Mechanisms to respond in a timely, effective, and humane
manner to migration emergencies.  A credible immigration
policy requires the ability to respond effectively and hu-
manely to migration emergencies in which large numbers of
people seek entry into the United States.  These emergencies
generally include bona fide refugees, other individuals in need
of protection, and persons seeking a better economic life in
the U.S.  Failure to act appropriately and in a timely manner
to determine who should be admitted and who should be
returned can have profound humanitarian consequences.
Further, an uncontrolled emergency can overwhelm resources
and create serious problems that far outlast the emergency.16
Leadership.  Past experiences demonstrate that leadership and
a chain of command must be established quickly during an
unfolding mass migration emergency to ensure an effective
response.  The proposed National Security Council focal
point for refugee issues should assume these responsibilities
because of the political nature of the decisions, the need for
high Executive Branch access, and the need for credibility
that derives from sufficient authority and government expe-
rience.
16 For a fuller discussion of the Commission’s recommendation on mass
migration emergencies, see U.S. Refugee Policy: Taking Leadership, 1997.
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Regional advance preparation.  Mass migrations are likely to
continue within this hemisphere. To respond effectively and
humanely to future crises, the U.S. and its regional partners
need a plan for a regional temporary protection system.
This plan should identify sites, prepare protection guide-
lines and processing procedures at the primary protection
sites and other locations, and create a funding proposal that
clarifies financial responsibilities and accounts for marginal
additional costs.  It also should include measures to avert
and resolve crises and develop plans for implementing du-
rable solutions.
Domestic advance preparation.  The U.S. must also finalize its
own federal contingency planning for migration emergen-
cies that has been under development during the past de-
cade (with review and revision as needed).  The presence of
a such a contingency plan identifying various scenarios,
policy responses, and appropriate steps for implementing
them can help avoid both dangerous and costly ad hoc
decisionmaking and disruption of normal operations.  An
effective and viable emergency response, however, requires
that the agencies have sufficient resources and authorities to
carry out their responsibilities. Thus, as part of this process,
the U.S. must develop a realistic financing strategy and
mechanisms to trigger allocation of funds.
Increased coordination among federal agencies involved in
emergency responses—as well as with state and local agen-
cies—also is necessary to ensure that the appropriate par-
ticipants are identified and involved in the discussions and
that as many decisions and responsibilities as possible are
agreed upon prior to emergency situations.  This would
facilitate emergency responses by reducing the reluctance of
state and local government to be involved, by clarifying
lines of authority, and by increasing trust between the par-
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ties.  If they had the statutory authority to allow them to
respond rapidly and efficiently, agencies with operational
responsibility for mass migration emergencies could be more
effective. This operational responsibility must include the
authority to assign tasks to other agencies as needed.
Removals
A credible immigration system requires the effective and timely
removal of aliens determined through constitutionally-sound proce-
dures to have no right to remain in the United States.  As the
Commission stated in its 1994 Report, if unlawful aliens believe that
they can remain indefinitely once they are within our national bor-
ders, there will be increased incentives to try to enter or remain
illegally.
Our current removal system does not work.  Hundreds of thou-
sands of aliens with final removal orders remain in the U.S.  The
system’s ineffectiveness results from a fragmented, uncoordinated
approach, rather than flawed legal procedures.  The Executive Branch
does not have the capacity, resources, or strategy to detain aliens
likely to abscond, to monitor the whereabouts of released aliens, or
to remove them.
A large number of aliens—more than 250,000 in the past eight years—
have been issued removal orders but have never been removed.17
[See chart: Comparison of Removal Orders and Actual Removals.]
In studying how the current system produces such a large number
of unexecuted final removal orders, the Commission finds that the
removal process is neither conceived of nor managed as an inte-
grated system.
17 Prior to IIRIRA, such orders were referred to as “deportation” and
“exclusion” orders.
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18 See, e.g., GAO Testimony, “Criminal Aliens: INS’ Efforts to Identify and
Remove Imprisoned Aliens Need to Be Improved,” before the Immigration
and Claims Subcommittee, Committee on the Judiciary, House of
Representatives, July 15, 1997.
The Commission urges immediate reforms to improve management of the
removal system and to ensure that aliens with final orders of deportation,
exclusion, or removal are indeed removed from the United States.
In its 1994 report, the Commission recommended that the top en-
forcement priority should be the removal of criminal aliens from the
U.S. in such a way that their potential return to the U.S. will be
minimized.  The INS has made considerable progress recently in
removing larger numbers of criminal aliens.  This year, INS is on
track to remove 70 percent more criminal aliens than were removed
in FY 1993.  Despite these advances, the actual number of criminal
alien removals still lags behind the total number who should be
deported from this country.18
INS has been able to increase the number of criminal alien removals
by detaining previously incarcerated aliens after they complete serv-
ing their sentences, through conclusion of their proceedings, and
removal can be effected.  More significantly, INS and the Executive
Office for Immigration Review developed the Institutional Hearing
Program [IHP] through which removal hearings are held in the pris-
ons.  When final orders are issued in this setting, criminal aliens can
be deported directly from state or federal prisons, alleviating INS’
need to detain them during deportation proceedings.  The Commis-
sion recommended enhanced use of the IHP in its 1994 report.  As
the recent GAO testimony cited above indicates, improvements are
still needed to ensure that INS identifies and deports all removable
criminal aliens.
Further, while the INS has increased criminal alien removals over
the last several years, noncriminal alien removals remained static
The Commission
urges immediate
reforms to improve
management of the
removal system
and to ensure
that aliens with
final orders of
deportation,
exclusion, or
removal
are indeed
removed from
the United States.
U.S. COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION REFORM
1 9 9 7
RECOMMENDATIONS
- 129 -
until 1996, as the chart comparing removal orders and actual orders
indicates.  The recent increase in noncriminal removals may be some-
what related to increased detention space and resources authorized
by Congress.  However, much of the increase appears localized,
suggesting that other forces are at work.  As the chart further shows,
removals from the San Diego District represent much of the increase
and are related directly to the establishment of a Port Court in
1995.19
Even with these increased removals, the system needs significant
improvements before it can be regarded as credible, that is able to
deport most of the aliens with final orders of removal.  To achieve
this goal will require a new approach to correct a fundamental flaw—
the fragmentation in the current conception and management of the
removal system.  Each part of the system—Investigations, Trial
Attorneys, and Detention and Deportation—acts independently,
impeding the total system’s efficiency and leaving no one account-
able for growing numbers of unexecuted final orders of removal.
The system starts with INS investigations of potential immigration
law violations.  When investigators find such violations, they issue
notices placing aliens in removal proceedings.  At that point, the
investigators are finished with their assigned tasks; they are never
connected to the results of their work—whether the alien was ulti-
mately ordered removed and actually deported.  Nor is their perfor-
mance evaluated in connection with actual removals or with the
priority that policymakers place on the removal of particular catego-
19 When “Operation Gatekeeper” changed the patterns of how aliens
attempted to enter the U.S. illegally and resulted in a significant increase
in the number of aliens trying to cross with false documents at the port
of entry, the U.S. Attorney worked with INS and EOIR to establish a
more expeditious removal process for aliens apprehended at ports of
entry.  Previously, such aliens were simply turned back to Mexico; under
the new system, they were placed in exclusion proceedings at the newly
created Port Court.  The aliens were detained for a few days, and the
exclusion proceedings were expeditious because they were uncontested.
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ries of aliens.  Investigators do not, as a matter of practice, distin-
guish among priorities when initiating the formal removal process;
both the worst violators and those who may have good claims for
relief are placed in the same costly and time-consuming proceed-
ings.
Once the proceedings have commenced, the INS Trial Attorney is
responsible for the case.  The volume of cases for each Trial Attor-
ney is very large; yet, again there is no considered prioritization
about which cases to proceed against and which not.  Key
policymakers do not provide guidance to Trial Attorneys about
prioritizing cases, and, even if such guidance were provided, Trial
Attorneys say that they are not given sufficient time to review cases
to determine whether a case is worth pursuing.  Again, there is no
connection to the ultimate aim of the system—removing those who
should be deported.
The system suffers further because many aliens are unrepresented
and thus do not receive advice on whether to go forward because
they have a chance of being granted relief.  As the Commission
learned in studying the results of the Florence Representation Project
[see below], the removal process works much more efficiently when
aliens receive advice of counsel.  Those with weak cases generally
do not pursue relief through proceedings if they understand from
counsel that they will be wasting their time.  As the late Chief
Immigration Judge Robie  pointed out, representation generally makes
the court system work more efficiently.  For example, Immigration
Judges often grant continuances to unrepresented aliens to give them
time to obtain counsel.  In certain types of cases (particularly asy-
lum claims), some judges are hesitant to proceed in the absence of
representation.  When a final order of removal is issued, another
INS office, Detention and Deportation, takes responsibility for the
case.  This office is charged with managing detention space and
effecting removal.  The reality is that there will never be enough
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space to detain everyone who should be removed.  Nonetheless, no
plan has been devised to pursue alternatives.  The only experiment
the INS has launched is the Vera Appearance Assistance Program
that plans to test the utility of supervised release on various limited
populations [as discussed below].  Unfortunately, due to internal
INS problems, that pilot may not gain access to one of the main
groups it should test—asylum seekers who meet the credible fear
standard.  No strategy has been devised for determining when, after
the first hearing on the merits, detention is advisable because the
likelihood of absconding is higher.  Notices ordering removable aliens
to report for deportation, known as “run” letters, continue to be
issued at a 90+ percent no-show rate.  No strategy has been devel-
oped for picking up aliens with final orders even when there is a
recent address.
Establishing a more effective removal system requires changes in
the management of the removal process.  More specifically, the Com-
mission recommends:
n Establishing priorities and numerical targets for the re-
moval of criminal and noncriminal aliens.  The Commis-
sion encourages headquarters, regional, and local immigra-
tion enforcement officials to set these priorities and numeri-
cal goals.  Based on the above analysis of removal orders
and actual removals, it appears that beyond the very high-
est removal priority—convicted criminals—targeted priori-
ties of particular categories generally have not been devel-
oped at the national and local levels.  Nor has INS devel-
oped numerical targets for the removal of specific categories
of noncriminal aliens.  This absence of prioritization and
performance measures generally precludes serious consid-
eration of what strategies, resources, and training will be
needed to effect the desired removals.
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Establishing removal of criminal aliens as a priority and
setting numerical targets helped identify such new strate-
gies as the IHP.   The same process can work with regard to
other categories of aliens, as can be seen in San Diego.  Aliens
who attempted to enter there with fraudulent documents
were singled out as a priority for removal with an exclusion
order.  Formerly, those presenting fraudulent documents were
permitted simply to withdraw their application for admis-
sion with no penalty.  Setting the priority to remove aliens
attempting reentry led to the decision to increase Inspection
staff, establish a Port Court, identify additional detention
space, and gain a commitment from the U.S. Attorney to
prosecute those who attempted reentry after exclusion.
Failed asylum seekers [as the Commission recommended in
our June 1997 Refugee Report], visa overstayers, unautho-
rized workers in targeted industries, and those who use
false documents are categories that require attention if our
removal system is to become credible and deter abuse.
Setting priorities and numerical targets will help the gov-
ernment manage what is potentially a huge caseload of re-
movable aliens.
n Local oversight and accountability for the development
and implementation of plans to coordinate  apprehensions,
detention, hearings, removal, and the prevention of reen-
try.  With guidance on priorities, local managers in charge
of the removal system would be responsible for allocation of
resources to ensure that aliens in the prioritized categories
are placed in the process and ultimately removed.  Local
managers also would be responsible and accountable for
identifying effective deterrents to reduce the likelihood that
removed aliens would attempt to reenter the U.S. Managers
need to redesign the system so that resources are balanced
from beginning to end.  Right now, the system is lopsided
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and disconnected.  The front end (Investigations) drives the
system, and the back end (actual removals) is neglected.
That imbalance can be corrected if the local offices develop
plans to coordinate apprehensions, detention, hearings, and
the removal process in ways that target the particular priori-
ties in different districts.  As discussed above, the San Diego
district has had some success in focusing on aliens trying to
enter with false documents.  After identifying this priority,
the U.S. Attorney coordinated the key federal government
actors to ensure that these aliens were placed into proceed-
ings, either returned to Mexico or detained for several days
awaiting the hearing, promptly removed after the issuance
of a final order, and prosecuted if they reentered.
As discussed above, the local INS Trial Attorneys, who are
part of the General Counsel’s Office, currently do not play
a significant role in driving the removal system.  The Com-
mission believes Trial Attorney offices should function in
the same manner that U.S. and District Attorney Offices do.
Those offices determine which cases they will prosecute;
and these determinations guide detectives as to which cases
they bring to the U.S. or District Attorney for prosecution.
Congress should provide sufficient resources to support such
initiatives.  Based on the policy guidance and plans devel-
oped by headquarters, regional and local offices, the chief
Trial Attorneys [now called District Counsel] should make
it clear to investigators which cases they will pursue in pro-
ceedings and which cases they will not.  Investigators should
then target these priority cases.  Local heads of Immigration
Enforcement Offices should be held accountable for the plan-
ning and implementation of this reconceived removal sys-
tem.  To ensure such accountability, these local officials should
have authority over both the prosecutorial and police func-
tions.
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n Continued attention to improved means for identifying
and removing criminal aliens with a final order of depor-
tation.  The Commission reiterates the importance of re-
moving criminal aliens as a top priority.  Our recommenda-
tion regarding the importance of removing noncriminal aliens
with final orders is not intended to shift the attention of the
removal system away from this priority.  Rather, both crimi-
nal and noncriminal aliens must be removed to protect public
safety (in the case of criminals) and to send a deterrent
message to all who have no permission to be here.
To improve the effectiveness of the criminal removal sys-
tem, criminal aliens must be identified as early in the pro-
cess as possible.  The local jail pilot project mandated by §
329 of IIRIRA should be used to help determine how early
in the criminal process identification should occur.  The De-
partment of Justice and the state and local criminal justice
agencies should develop uniform means of identification,
and the data systems of these agencies should be linked to
identify more effectively criminal aliens who should be re-
moved.
With respect to the Institutional Hearing Program, the GAO
found that the INS (1) failed to identify many removable
criminal aliens and initiate IHP proceedings for them before
they were released from prison, and (2) did not complete
the IHP by the time of prison release for the majority of
criminal aliens it did identify.  GAO recommended improved
data systems to track the IHP status of each foreign-born
inmate and the development of a workload analysis model
to identify the IHP resources needed in any period to achieve
overall program goals.  The Commission believes that the
development of uniform means of such identification and
linked data also will help the program achieve its goals.
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The Commission urges the Department of Justice to attend
carefully to actual removals in two additional ways.  First,
we have heard serious complaints from foreign authorities
that they are not being notified that the U.S. is returning a
criminal alien.  DOJ must develop an improved notification
process so that appropriate authorities in the countries to
which criminal aliens are being returned can plan for such
returns and take these individuals into custody if necessary.
Second, we also have learned that many criminal aliens are
being returned unescorted.  For public safety reasons, crimi-
nal aliens should be returned by escort.
n Legal rights and representation.  The Executive Branch
should be authorized to develop, provide, and fund pro-
grams and services to educate aliens about their legal rights
and immigration proceedings.  Such programs also should
encourage and facilitate legal representation where to do so
would be beneficial to the system and the administration of
justice.  Particular attention should be focused on aliens in
detention where release or removal can be expedited through
such representation.  The alien would not have a right to
appointed counsel, but the government could fund services
to address some of the barriers to representation.
Under the provisions of § 292 of the Immigration and Na-
tionality Act, an alien placed in proceedings is guaranteed
the privilege of being represented by an attorney or other
qualified legal representative, but at no expense to the gov-
ernment.  Under this system, the alien is provided with a
list of local attorneys and accredited organizations practic-
ing immigration law who might be able to provide legal
representation.  Studies have shown that the vast majority
of aliens in proceedings before Immigration Judges are not
represented by counsel.  This is accounted for by several
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factors including the lack of English proficiency on the part
of aliens, a lack of understanding of the legal process and of
their legal rights, the lack of funds to hire an attorney, and
an inability to find someone available and willing to repre-
sent them.  Securing the services of an attorney or otherwise
qualified legal representative presents a particular challenge
for detained aliens whose freedom is constrained, who have
limited phone privileges, and who find themselves situated
in locales not readily served by or accessible to the legal
community.
Experience demonstrates that when aliens are represented
in proceedings, cases move more efficiently, economically,
and expeditiously through the system.  Indeed, represented
aliens with little or no chance of prevailing can be more
readily weeded out of the system.  Aliens who have legal
representation are much more likely to appear at their hear-
ings than  unrepresented aliens.  Fewer continuances are
needed or granted in the case of represented aliens.   Hear-
ings take less time.  Issues presented for decision by the
immigration courts and on appeal are more readily nar-
rowed.   Applications for relief are better prepared and
presented in immigration court.  Appeals are more cogently
presented and are supported by legal briefs.  Simply put,
when aliens in proceedings or on appeal have legal repre-
sentation, the system works better.
The Commission visited the Florence Immigration and Refu-
gee Rights Project in Florence, Arizona, a  project that dem-
onstrates the advantages of programs designed to educate
aliens about their rights and that provides a triage system to
secure representation for those with a likely avenue for
relief.  The Project screens detainees for eligibility for immi-
gration benefits and relief from deportation, exclusion, or
removal, informs aliens about their rights, and directly rep-
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resents as many as it can handle, with the overflow referred
out to pro bono attorneys.  The Project has been recognized
for its success and assistance in moving cases through the
system while affording due process.  An evaluation of the
Project found that aliens with representation had a better
opportunity to become aware of their rights and legal op-
tions.  Many inside and out of government believe that the
Florence Project reduces alien detention time, expedites re-
moval by decreasing necessary immigration court time, and
increases court efficiency.  Representation also decreases anxi-
ety and behavioral problems among detainees.
The Commission believes that programs like the Florence
Project should be facilitated and encouraged.  Moreover, the
Commission believes that the Executive Branch should be
granted the authority to develop, provide, and fund other
programs and services that inform aliens about their rights
and the proceedings in which they are placed and to other-
wise facilitate legal representation where to do so is a ben-
efit to the system.  Under this approach, the alien would not
have a right to appointed counsel, but the government could
fund ancillary services, such as rights presentations, inter-
preters, transportation, attorney/client meeting places, and
training to address some of the barriers to increased legal
representation.
n Prosecutorial discretion to determine whether to proceed
with cases.  Guidelines on the use of prosecutorial discre-
tion should be developed; local Trial Attorneys should be
trained to exercise discretion and support staff should be
provided to ensure that Trial Attorneys have the time needed
to screen cases prior to hearings.  Discretion should be ex-
ercised with the goal of establishing a more efficient and
rational hearing system.
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In addition to targeting priority cases, the District and U.S.
Attorneys decide which of those cases to prosecute based
on an assessment of the strength of each case.  In contrast,
by and large, the INS prosecutes all cases that appear to
involve violations of law.  The Commission is concerned
about the cost of litigating every case, both in terms of the
credibility of the system and expenditure of public funds.
We have recommended setting priorities as a strategy to
establish credibility and to send a deterrent message.  Here
we urge the development of a system based on a sensible
goal: prosecution of those who actually will be removed.
To establish a removal system that operates efficiently by
prosecuting appropriate cases and settling those, for example,
where relief is likely to be established, guidelines should be
developed and issued by the General Counsel.  Trial Attor-
neys should be trained to create and apply these guidelines
nationwide.  Finally, Trial Attorneys need time to screen
cases prior to a removal hearing and to determine whether
the alien has a strong claim for relief.  To free up their time,
support staff should be provided to handle the clerical work
that currently burdens the Trial Attorneys.  By wisely apply-
ing their discretion, the Trial Attorneys could then focus
their attention on immigration court cases that are likely to
result in the removal of the alien upon completion of the
proceedings.  This “out-of-court” approach also would as-
sist the Immigration Judges and the private immigration bar
by reducing the amount of time all parties spend in immi-
gration court.
n Strategic use of detention and release decisions.  Deten-
tion space, always in limited supply, is in greater demand as
the government has focused more on the removal of crimi-
nal aliens and as Congress mandates more categories to be
detained.  IIRIRA requires the Attorney General to detain all
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aliens found inadmissible or deportable on criminal or ter-
rorist grounds.  The criminal grounds include convictions
for certain crimes now categorized as “aggravated felonies”
for which a sentence of one year imprisonment or more may
be imposed.  Congress enacted these changes knowing that
current detention space and personnel were insufficient to
execute such expanded detention requirements and allowed
the Attorney General to waive these requirements for two
one-year periods while developing the capacity to handle
these developments.  The Attorney General notified the
Judiciary Committees of the insufficiencies for the first year.
IIRIRA also requires the detention of asylum seekers during
the credible fear determination process.
Detention needs to be used more strategically if the govern-
ment is going to target and remove designated categories of
aliens determined to be priorities in particular locales.  If it
appears that asylum abuse is getting out of hand in one
locality, for example, detention space would be needed to
ensure that failed asylum seekers are removed.
Alternatives to detention should be developed so that de-
tention space is used efficiently and effectively.  In 1997, INS
initiated a three-year pilot program, created with and imple-
mented by the Vera Institute of Justice, that may help define
effective alternatives to detention for specific populations.
The Vera Assistance Appearance Program aims to develop
and validate with formal research a supervision program
that will increase both appearances at immigration court
proceedings and compliance with the legal process among
those not detained, while ensuring efficient use of detention
space.  The program thus aims to address important re-
moval problems: The Executive Branch can detain only a
fraction of individuals in removal proceedings; those who
are not detained often do not appear in court and rarely
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comply with removal orders.  The pilot will free up valuable
detention space by keeping out of detention aliens who may
eventually be granted relief.  If the Vera pilot demonstrates
the utility of supervised release, an assessment of chances
for relief and community ties or supervision would assist
the Department of Justice in determining more precisely
when detention is needed in each case to ensure that aliens
who ultimately receive no relief do not abscond.  It is hoped
that the pilot will  provide insight into the use of reporting
mechanisms as well as the role of community organizations
who take responsibility for maintaining contact with and
reminding those released of their responsibilities to the
immigration court.
The Commission considers the Vera pilot of great impor-
tance to the development of an effective removal system.
INS officials at headquarters and in the  local offices should
work together to see that this pilot serves as a valid test of
detention alternatives.  In particular, the pilot should be
permitted access to those asylum seekers who meet the “cred-
ible fear” test for two reasons.  First, detaining individuals
who have met an initial threshold demonstrating their like-
lihood of obtaining asylum is not a good use of scarce de-
tention resources.  As the Commission stated in its Refugee
Report, “credible fear” is an appropriate standard for deter-
mining who will be released from detention; it is not appro-
priate for determining who will gain access to an asylum
hearing, except under exceptional circumstances.  Second,
asylum seekers who have met the credible fear test
will enable the pilot to test the utility of supervised release
and make recommendations on the role of community ties
and sponsors.
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Additional alternatives should be developed to address lo-
cal situations.  For example, in border communities, aliens
with pending cases could be permitted to return to Mexico
and come to Port Court for their hearing in lieu of deten-
tion, as occurs in San Diego.  The aliens in such proceedings
are told the consequence of their failure to appear—that
they will be found excludable in absentia and criminally
prosecuted if they attempt to reenter.
n Improved detention conditions and monitoring.  Over the
past two decades, INS has taken on significant responsibili-
ties in detaining aliens.  INS detains a broad range of aliens
of both genders, from criminals to asylum seekers.  While
short detention periods typically are contemplated for those
awaiting removal hearings, the results often are otherwise.
The INS has also become the long-term jailer for a signifi-
cant number of removable aliens from Cuba, Vietnam, and
other nations.   INS currently operates nine Service Process-
ing Centers and, like the U.S. Marshals, contracts bed space
with many state and local jails.  In recent years, Congress
has increased significantly resources for detention space: total
available beds per day totaled 8,600 in 1996; INS is close to
reaching its goal of 12,000 by October 1997.
Serious problems have occurred, the most prominent in 1995
when the ESMOR Contract Facility in Elizabeth, New Jersey,
was shut down following an incident in which detainees
voiced complaints of physical abuse, stealing, and harass-
ment by guards.  INS’ own investigation of the facility un-
covered serious management problems.  More regularly, com-
plaints regarding local jails have included human rights
abuses, overcrowding, poor nourishment, mixing of women
U.S. COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION REFORM
1 9 9 7
RECOMMENDATIONS
- 142 -
and juveniles with men and of asylum seekers with crimi-
nals, and lack of access to health care, counsel, family, and
recreation.
Detention cannot be used effectively unless and until the
conditions of detention are humane and detainees are free
from physical abuse and harassment by guards.  We have
no doubt that appropriate criteria for all facilities can be
promulgated, based on sound governmental judgment and
consultation with concerned nongovernmental organizations.
But most importantly, a system to monitor facilities and
publish findings on a regular basis must be developed.  In-
spections must occur more than once annually.
Further, the Commission recommends that the Department
of Justice consider placing administrative responsibility for
operating detention centers with the Bureau of Prisons or
U.S. Marshals Service.  An immigration enforcement agency
should not be shouldered with such a significant responsi-
bility that is not part of its mission or expertise.
n Improved data systems.  The Commission recommends that
data systems link apprehensions and removals.  Current
data systems are unable to link an apprehension to its final
disposition (e.g., removal, adjustment of status).  In addi-
tion, INS statistics relate to events, not individuals.  This
significantly limits the use of apprehension and removal data
for analytical purposes.  The Commission urges develop-
ment of data systems that link apprehensions and removals
and provide statistics on individuals.  This would foster a
better understanding of apprehension as a removal tool and
provide better information on recidivism.
n The redesigned removal system should be managed ini-
tially by a Last-In-First-Out [LIFO] strategy to demonstrate
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The Commission
urges Congress
to clarify that
IIRIRA and
AEDPA do not
apply retroactively
to cases pending
when the new
policies and
procedures went
into effect.
the credibility of the system.   Once a coherent system is
organized and appropriate resources are assigned to  re-
moving deportable aliens—not simply to put  aliens through
proceedings—removals should proceed in a Last-In-First-
Out mode.  In this way, the government can send a credible
deterrent message to failed asylum seekers, visa overstayers,
users of counterfeit documents, and unauthorized workers,
that their presence in the United States will not be tolerated.
The LIFO model has worked successfully in the affirmative
asylum system, allowing the government to demonstrate
control over the current caseload and to quickly establish
priorities for dealing with the backlog for enforcement pur-
poses.  It can provide both the measure of success for the
removal system as well as convey the proper deterrent mes-
sage.
The Commission urges Congress to clarify that the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 and
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 do not
apply retroactively to cases pending when the new policies and
procedures went into effect.  As a matter of policy, the Commission
believes that retroactive application of new immigration laws un-
dermines the effectiveness and credibility of the immigration sys-
tem.  Applying newly-enacted laws or rules in an immigration pro-
ceeding that is pending results in inefficiency in the administration
of the immigration laws.  It also can raise troubling issues of fair-
ness.
There is no uniform effective date for the Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 in its entirety.
Instead, and to the extent it has spoken on the matter, Congress  has
imposed several different effective dates depending on the provi-
sions involved.  Most of the new removal provisions became
effective on April 1, 1997.  The fact that a statutory provision takes
effect upon enactment or upon a future date certain, does not re-
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20 The analytical model for determining statutory retroactivity, set forth by
the Supreme Court of the United States in Langraf v. U.S.I. Film Products,
Inc., 511 U.S. 244 (1994), is aptly encapsulated in the following excerpt
from Immigration Law and Procedure, Gordon and Mailman, Chapter 61,
Special Alert, SPA61-1, 2 (1997):
[T]he first step is to determine whether Congress expressly defined
the statute’s proper reach.  The language of the statute must be
examined to determine whether it manifests an intent to apply to
cases or conduct that arose before the law’s enactment.  For the
statute to apply retroactively, there must be an “unambiguous
directive” or an “express command” from Congress that it intended
such application.  In the absence of such an unambiguous directive,
it must be determined whether the new statute “attaches new legal
consequences to events completed before its enactment” or “would
impair rights a party possessed when he acted, increase a party’s
liability for past conduct or impose new duties with respect to
transactions already completed.”  If the statute has this effect, it
should not apply retroactively.
solve the issue of whether the provision applies to cases already
pending.  When new statutory provisions are applied to such cat-
egories of cases, it is generically considered a “retroactive” applica-
tion of the law.20
Although retroactive application of new statutory requirements by
Congress is legally permissible (subject to certain constitutional con-
straints), it does not constitute sound public policy.  Ours is a sys-
tem governed by the rule of law.   In our view, retroactively chang-
ing the applicable rules once a legal proceeding has commenced not
only is manifestly unfair, but also invites confusion, adds uncer-
tainty, and fosters a lack of trust and confidence in the rule of law.
We are concerned as well that retroactively applying new statutory
provisions results in inefficiency and simply does not make good
sense given the current realities of administering the immigration
laws.  As fully discussed earlier in this report, hundreds of thou-
sands of outstanding administratively final orders of deportation
remained unexecuted long before the enactment of either IIRIRA or
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AEDPA.  Clearly, the system has had little problem in establishing
sufficient grounds for deportation and exclusion under prior law.
Moreover, although relief from deportation and exclusion under prior
law was available, the number of granted applications was propor-
tionally very small compared to the number of aliens in proceed-
ings.   The problem, then, has not been in ordering the deportation
or exclusion of immigration violators, or in granting relief in a rela-
tively small percentage of cases.  The problem has been in actually
removing aliens who have been found to be deportable, excludable,
or removable following the conclusion of their proceedings.
As noted above, the system is not yet removing anything approach-
ing 100 percent of the existing detained or nondetained criminal
alien population for whom an administratively final order of depor-
tation or exclusion already has been entered or who are otherwise
deportable or excludable under prior law based on their criminal
conduct.  Moreover, the system has failed to remove significant
numbers of noncriminal aliens against whom orders of deportation
or exclusion have been outstanding for several years.  Although
retroactive application of the 1996 legislation will both significantly
increase the  numbers of removable aliens and decrease the num-
bers of aliens who might have otherwise qualified for existing relief,
the system does not have the  capacity actually to remove these
added numbers of individuals.  The resulting situation serves only
to further erode the effectiveness and credibility of the immigration
system as a whole.
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ACHIEVING IMMIGRATION
POLICY GOALS
INTRODUCTION
Restoring credibility and setting priorities—themes at the center of
the Commission’s policy recommendations on illegal and legal im-
migration, respectively—will not come to pass unless the govern-
ment is structured to deliver on these policies.  An effective immi-
gration system requires both credible policy and sound manage-
ment.  Good management cannot overcome bad policy.  Poor struc-
tures, lack of professionalism, poor planning, and failure to set pri-
orities will foil even the best policies.
Until relatively recently, the agencies responsible for implementing
immigration policy were underfunded, understaffed, and neglected.
During the past few years, however, massive increases in resources
and personnel, combined with significant political attention to im-
migration issues, have provided new opportunities to address long-
standing problems.  A recent General Accounting Office report docu-
mented improvements—including, for example, a more strategic ap-
proach to the formulation of immigration enforcement programs—
but concluded that management problems remain.  Further change
is required if the overall U.S. immigration system is to function
smoothly and effectively, anticipating and addressing, rather than
reacting to, problems.
STRUCTURAL REFORM
The Commission recommends fundamental restructuring of responsibilities
within the federal government to support more effective management of the
core functions of the immigration system: border and interior enforcement;
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enforcement of immigration-related employment standards; adjudication of
immigration and naturalization applications; and appeals of administra-
tive decisions.  The immigration system is one of the most compli-
cated in the federal government bureaucracy.  In some cases, one
agency has multiple, and sometimes conflicting, operational respon-
sibilities.  In other cases, multiple agencies have responsibility for
elements of the same functions.  Both situations create problems.
Mission overload.  Some of the agencies that implement the immigra-
tion laws have so many responsibilities that they have proved un-
able to manage all of them effectively.  Between congressional man-
dates and administrative determinations, these agencies must give
equal weight to more priorities than any one agency can handle.
Such a system is set up for failure, and, with such failure, further
loss of public confidence in the immigration system.
No one agency is likely to have the capacity to accomplish all of the
goals of immigration policy equally well.  Immigration law enforce-
ment requires staffing, training, resources, and a work culture that
differs from what is required for effective adjudication of benefits or
labor standards regulation of U.S. businesses.  While some argue
that enforcement and benefits are complementary functions, we agree
with the Commission for the Study of International Migration and
Cooperative Economic Development [Asencio Commission, after its
Chair] that placing incompatible service and enforcement functions
within one agency creates problems: competition for resources; lack
of coordination and cooperation; and personnel practices that both
encourage transfer between enforcement and service positions and
create confusion regarding mission and responsibilities.   Combining
responsibility for enforcement and benefits also blurs the distinction
between illegal migration and legal admissions.  As a matter of
public policy, it is important to maintain a bright line between these
two forms of entry.  We believe the Asencio Commission was correct
in contending that separating enforcement and benefits functions
The Commission
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restructuring
of responsibilities
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federal government
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effective
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of the core
functions of the
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will lead to cost efficiencies, more effective enforcement, and im-
proved service to the public.
Diffusion of responsibilities among agencies.  Responsibility for many
immigration functions are spread across numerous agencies within
single departments or between departments.  This fragmentation of
responsibility is most clear in relationship to the adjudication of
applications for admission as a legal permanent resident: responsi-
bility for making decisions on skill-based immigrant and LDA ap-
plications is dispersed among the Department of Labor, the Depart-
ment of Justice’s Immigration and Naturalization Service and the
Department of State.  Responsibility for investigating employer com-
pliance with immigration-related labor standards is shared by INS
and DOL.  Additionally, the United States Information Agency has
responsibility for determining who will enter with a J visa, under
which some exchange visitors work in this country.  USIA also must
sign off on requests for waivers of the two-year home residency
required of some J visa holders before they can adjust their status
to other nonimmigrant or immigrant categories.
A second area in which responsibility is diffused and activities are
redundant is worksite enforcement.  Both INS and DOL conduct
investigations to determine if employers have violated the employ-
ment eligibility verification requirement.  Sanctions may be imposed
by INS against employers who knowingly hire unauthorized work-
ers.  The DOJ Office of Special Counsel has related responsibilities
in determining if employers are engaging in immigration-related
unfair employment practices.
Fragmentation of responsibility leads to conflicting messages from
the various agencies, unnecessary delays in adjudication, and, when
more than one agency must adjudicate the same request, redundan-
cies in actual implementation.
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Current
U.S. Immigration System
DEPARTMENT
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Immigration &
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Refugees & Migration
Board of Appellate
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Training Administration
Board of Alien Labor
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IMMIGRATION
33
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3 3
APPEALS
3
3
3
3
3
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FUNCTION IMMIGRATION
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*For a limited set of nationality- and citizenship-related matters.
3
3
The Commission considered a range of ways to reorganize roles and
responsibilities, including proposals to establish a Cabinet-level
Department of Immigration Affairs or an independent agency along
the lines of the Environmental Protection Agency.  We believe a new
department or independent agency is neither practical nor desir-
able, particularly in the context of current interest in streamlining
government operations, not creating sizeable, new entities.
After examining the full range of options, the Commission con-
BENEFITS
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cludes that a clear division of responsibility among existing federal
agencies, with appropriate consolidation of functions, will improve
management of the federal immigration system. As discussed be-
low, the Commission recommends a restructuring of the immigration’s
four principal operations as follows:1
1. Immigration enforcement at the border and in the interior of
the U.S in a new Bureau for Immigration Enforcement at the
Department of Justice;
2. Adjudication of eligibility for immigration-related
applications (immigrant, limited duration admission,
asylum, refugee, and naturalization) in the Department of
State under the jurisdiction of a new Undersecretary for
Citizenship, Immigration, and Refugee Admissions;
Proposed
U.S. Immigration System
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Immigration
Enforcement
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3
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3
3
3
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FUNCTION
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ENFORCEMENT
IMMIGRATION The Commission
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immigration system:
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3. Enforcement of
immigration-related
employment
standards in
the Department
of Labor; and
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administrative
decisions in an
independent review
agency.
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3. Enforcement of immigration-related employment standards
in the Department of Labor; and
4. Appeals of administrative decisions, including exclusion,
deportation, and removal hearings, in an independent agency,
the Agency for Immigration Review.
The Commission believes this streamlining and reconfiguring of
responsibilities will help ensure: coherence and consistency in immi-
gration-related law enforcement; a supportive environment for ad-
judication of applications for immigration, refugee, and citizenship
services; rigorous enforcement of immigration-related labor stan-
dards to protect U.S. workers; and fair and impartial review of
immigration decisions.
Bureau for Immigration
Enforcement (DOJ)
The Commission recommends placing all responsibility for enforcing United
States immigration laws to deter future illegal entry and remove illegal
aliens in a Bureau for Immigration Enforcement in the Department
of Justice.  The Commission believes that the importance and com-
plexity of the enforcement function within the U.S. immigration
system necessitate the establishment of a higher-level, single-focus
agency within the DOJ.  The Commission further recommends that
the newly configured agency have the prominence and visibility
that the Federal Bureau of Investigation [FBI] currently enjoys within
the DOJ structure. The Director of the Bureau for Immigration En-
forcement would be appointed for a set term (e.g., five years).  The
agency would be responsible for planning, implementing, managing
and evaluating all U.S. immigration enforcement activities both within
the United States and overseas.
1 See Appendix for Commissioner Leiden’s concurring statement.
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The new agency’s responsibilities would include many functions
currently performed by the INS: inspections and admissions at air,
land, and sea ports of entry and at pre-inspection facilities overseas;
border management and control between ports of entry; apprehen-
sion and prosecution and removal of illegal residents and workers;
oversight of pre- and post-trial/hearing release; identification and
prosecution of document fraud; identification, deterrence, and pros-
ecution of alien smuggling gangs; and other domestic and overseas
deterrence activities.
The Commission believes that the current U.S. immigration system
structure diffuses and confuses potential for a more concerted focus
on central functions and activities.  Enforcement objectives some-
times conflict with service goals and vice versa.  Often, both compete
for limited operational resources and for the time and attention of
those responsible for planning, administering, and managing these
programs.
The Commission is particularly concerned that although the current
removal system produces more than 100,000 final removal orders
each year, the system does not have the corresponding capability to
remove the individuals subject to those orders.  The Commission
believes that it is critical to the credibility of the removal sector of
the enforcement system that the agency be held accountable for
setting realistic numerical priorities and producing specific outcomes.
Upper-level management must be responsible for effecting an inte-
grated system such that the agency apprehends, detains, and pro-
ceeds against those aliens it prioritizes for removal, and ultimately
removes all those being issued final orders of removal.
To establish such an integrated system, the Commission recommends
that the new enforcement agency have a more traditional law en-
forcement model structure and that it focus on police activities, pre-
and post-trial probation services, and prosecution.  Agency person-
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nel should be upgraded to receive pay and benefits commensurate
with those provided to other Department of Justice law enforcement
agents.  At present INS personnel performing the same functions as
FBI or Drug Enforcement Agency [DEA]  personnel are often at a
lower-pay grade.
The police function would be carried out by uniformed services, such
as Inspectors and Border Patrol Agents, and investigators who would
conduct investigations and collect intelligence at the border and in
the interior to deter smuggling, facilitate removals, and accomplish
other similar goals. The Commission suggests turning over most
detention responsibility to the U.S. Marshals Service and/or the
Bureau of Prisons.
As in other law enforcement operations, particularly those in which
more people are put into proceedings than can either be accommo-
dated in detention or actually removed, there is a need for pre- and
post-trial/hearing screening and/or supervised release on probation or
bond.  In the immigration context, these could be available, for
example, to asylum-seekers who are deemed by an Asylum Officer
to have demonstrated a credible fear of persecution, to those who
have accepted voluntary departure and posted bond, or to those
unlikely (because of close family members or other strong commu-
nity ties) to abscond pending completion of their hearings or sen-
tences.
To ensure a high expectation of individuals actually being removed
from the U.S. within a certain time, the Commission believes that
Trial Attorneys should have greater discretion to set priorities for
apprehension and prosecution and to determine which cases are
pursued for removal proceedings.
The Commission recommends the following distribution of respon-
sibilities within the Bureau for Immigration Enforcement.
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Uniformed enforcement officers.  The Commission recommends
merger of the INS Inspectors, Border Patrol, and detention officers
into one unit, the Immigration Uniformed Service Branch.  Its offic-
ers would be trained for duties at land, sea, and air ports of entry,
between land ports on the border, and in the interior where uni-
formed officers are needed for enforcement.  The unit would be
accountable for both the facilitation of legal traffic at the ports of
entry and the enforcement against illegal entry.  It also would be
responsible for moving detainees from apprehension sites to deten-
tion facilities and to hearing sites, as well as for escort duty during
removals.  After appropriate training, most of the officers perform-
ing these various functions could be transferred interchangeably,
and opportunity for job mobility would exist across lines not now
possible.  As stated above, grade level and pay should be upgraded
as needed to be commensurate with the law enforcement activities
the officers will perform.
Unlike the current practice in which the Border Patrol reports to
Sector Chiefs and Inspectors report to District Directors, all uni-
formed officers within a particular geographic area would be under
the authority of a single, integrated immigration enforcement man-
ager.
Investigators.  The Commission believes investigations will be a key
part of the new agency’s responsibility.  Investigators are the main
agents responsible for identifying and apprehending people who are
illegally residing or working in the United States, for deterring smug-
gling operations, for building a case against those who are not de-
terred, and for identifying, apprehending, and carrying out the re-
moval of aliens with final orders of removal.
Only some 2,900 employees, out of an INS staff of more than 25,000,
work on these many investigative tasks.  A similar number work in
INS Detention and Deportation.  Most of these Deportation Officers
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could—given additional on-the-job training and supervision con-
duct investigations.  Deportation Officers now deal almost exclu-
sively with docket control and management paperwork that could
be done by lower level support staff, freeing the Deportation Offic-
ers for field work.
INS Investigators primarily work the front end of the removals pro-
cess: identifying and arresting those who are illegally residing or
working in the U.S.  Little attention is given to the removal process
as a whole, for ensuring availability of adequate detention space,
allocating ample Trial Attorney and Immigration Judge time, effect-
ing transfer to airports, and achieving physical removal.  The sys-
tem is bogged down with increasing numbers of aliens who are
apprehended, charged with an immigration violation, put into pro-
ceedings, released due to lack of detention space or other prerequi-
sites for effective timely processing, never appear at their hearings,
or are never deported after a final order of removal is issued.  The
failure of careful planning and integration of the process means
many of those who are apprehended are never removed.  According
to some observers, the INS’ compartmentalized program planning,
budgeting, and implementation procedures blunt attempts to inte-
grate these functions more fully into a seamless and effective pro-
cess.
“Removal Officers” in the new Bureau for Immigration Enforce-
ment, who would integrate the functions of Investigators and De-
portation Officers in apprehensions and removals, would enable the
immigration system to deliver better on its commitment to actually
remove those who are issued final orders.  Managers would then
have the flexibility to shift resources among various investigations
activities as needed to produce a smooth-flowing process that en-
sures timely removal.  As dsicussed above, grade and pay should be
commensurate with the often dangerous law enforcement duties
performed by investigators.
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Intelligence.  The Bureau for Immigration Enforcement will require
an Intelligence Division to provide strategic assessments, training
and expertise on fraud, information about smuggling networks, and
tactical support to uniformed officers or investigators.  It would act
as a liaison with other federal law enforcement agencies and share
information and intelligence.  The Intelligence division would be
one of the smallest in the agency with an anticipated staff of about
100 employees.
Assets Forfeiture Unit.  As with the other DOJ enforcement agen-
cies, the Bureau would have an Assets Forfeiture Unit.  Statutory
authority for Assets Forfeiture activities is a useful addition to the
range of strategies and sanctions available to the U.S. law enforce-
ment community.  Augmented authorities in the 1996 immigration
legislation increased both its usefulness and the potential for misuse
or abuse.  In order to be aggressive in using these new authorities
and equally aggressive and proactive in ensuring against misuse/
abuse, DOJ agencies established assets forfeiture units under the
general guidance of the DOJ Assets Forfeiture Unit.  Each agency,
including FBI, DEA, and INS, has its own unit.  These units, usually
highly-placed within the agency, are the focal points for agency-
wide  asset-related policy implementation, field staff training, and
field operations monitoring.  They assist the agency’s field staff in
case development, monitor use of assets forfeiture funds, and over-
see use of these sanctions to guard against abuse.
Pre- and post-trial “Probation” Officers.  “Probation” functions are
not now performed consistently or effectively in the immigration
system, but the Commission believes these functions are essential to
more strategic use of detention space.  District Directors and Immi-
gration Judges determine the release (either on personal recogni-
zance or on bond) of apprehended aliens from detention.  Often,
release relates more to lack of detention space than to the likelihood
that  aliens will appear at  their proceedings or assessment of aliens’
danger to the community.  Some aliens are given the option to
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depart voluntarily, but there is little tracking of whether they actu-
ally leave the country.  As it is unlikely that all potentially deport-
able aliens could or should be detained awaiting removal, the Com-
mission believes more attention should be given to supervised re-
lease programs and to sophisticated methods for tracking the where-
abouts of those not detained.
Pilot programs, such as the Vera Institute Appearance Assistance
Program discussed above, could be expanded into more areas if
successful.  INS requested this three-year project in the New York
area.  It studies reporting requirements and the effectiveness of com-
munity sponsors in supervising the release of aliens who meet cer-
tain criteria regarding community ties, relief from removal, and public
safety.  The program aims to free up valuable detention space for
aliens without legal remedies who are likely to abscond, while keep-
ing those who might receive relief out of detention.
Trial Attorneys/Prosecutors.  INS has nearly 800 staff involved in
immigration-related legal proceedings, such as offering legalopinions
and advice and representing the government’s interests in proceed-
ings before Immigration Judges and on appeal.
The Commission believes that the Trial Attorneys, who, in effect, are
the Government’s immigration prosecutors, should be vested with,
and should utilize, an important tool possessed by their criminal coun-
terparts: prosecutorial discretion.  Under the current system, the
Trial Attorneys do not as a practice use discretion in determining
which cases to pursue.  The INS does not sufficiently prioritize or
target cases; instead it acts as if it had the means to prosecute each
and every case effectively.  Cases go forward, even when an alien
will, or is likely to, prevail on an application for relief or when there
is no realistic belief that the alien will ever be removed from the
country.  Discretion exercised at the beginning of the process and at
every step would target the use of scarce resources better and con-
tribute to a more effective and credible system.  Central office lead-
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ership would be required to set appropriate priorities and provide
guidance to the Trial Attorneys as to the proper use of discretion.
Greater sharing of information between the Trial Attorneys, aliens,
and their counsels would facilitate smoother and more expeditious
movement through the system and fewer Freedom of Information
Act requests.  Greater use of stipulations and pretrial conferences
(with sanctions resulting when attorneys are not prepared), would
narrow the disputed issues needing court resolution and time.
Field Offices.  The new enforcement agency would implement its
programs through a series of field offices structured to address com-
prehensively the immigration enforcement challenges of the particu-
lar locality  As the location of these offices should be driven by
enforcement priorities, they would likely be located in different places
than current district offices.  Regional Offices could be retained for
administrative and managerial oversight of these dispersed and
diverse field offices.  The field office inspections officers at ports of
entry would both facilitate the admission of legal limited duration
admissions and immigrants and the identification of illegal entrants.
Border Patrol stations along the border and at checkpoints along
major interior transportation corridors would facilitate enforcement
activities.  Appropriate field offices also would investigate and pros-
ecute cases and contribute to detection and destruction of smug-
gling rings.
Current INS Regional Offices could be retained for administrative
and managerial oversight of these dispersed and diverse field of-
fices.  Most existing district offices and suboffices could be incorpo-
rated into the new agency; they also could supervise and administer
the Border Patrol.  [Until the mid-1950s, Border Patrol units worked
out of and reported to INS District Offices.]  The INS overseas
enforcement presence could be retained and expanded by the new
enforcement agency.
U.S. COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION REFORM
1 9 9 7
RECOMMENDATIONS
- 161 -
The Commission
recommends that
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benefits
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in the Department
of State, and that
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for Citizenship,
Immigration, and
Refugee Admissions
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to manage
these activities.
Citizenship, Immigration, and
Refugee Admissions (DOS)
The Commission recommends that all citizenship and immigration benefits
adjudications be consolidated in the Department of State, and that an
Undersecretary for Citizenship, Immigration, and Refugee Admissions be
created to manage these activities.  At present, three separate agen-
cies—the INS, the Department of State, and the Department of
Labor—play broad roles adjudicating applications for  legal immi-
gration, limited duration admission, refugee admission, asylum, and/
or citizenship.  In addition, the Department of Health and Human
Services plays an ancillary role in setting requirements regarding
health standards for new arrivals, and the United States Information
Agency has a major role in exchange visitor programs.
The Commission believes a more streamlined and accountable ad-
judication process, involving fewer agencies but greater safeguards,
would result in faster and better determinations of these benefits.
Consolidation of responsibility in one department would permit a
reengineering of the adjudication process to make it more efficient
and timely.
In considering which department should be responsible for adjudi-
cating citizenship and immigration benefits, the Commission con-
sidered each agency’s current role and overall mission.  Immigra-
tion has been a stepchild in each of the major departments with
current responsibilities.  The Department of State’s primary role is
the conduct of foreign relations, and immigration issues have been
subsumed within its consular functions of protection and welfare of
American citizens abroad.  The Department of Justice tends to view
immigration as an enforcement matter, and it is not well suited to
oversee an agency that also adjudicates applications for benefits.
The Department of Labor is concerned primarily with the labor
market impact of immigration.  The Department of Health and
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Human Services plays an important role in setting and implement-
ing domestic refugee policy, but it has a very narrow, largely health-
related involvement in overall immigration policy.
Recognizing the drawbacks inherent in choosing any of these loca-
tions, the Commission nevertheless concluded that the Department
of State has the greatest capacity to undertake the additional work
entailed in a consolidated system.
Taking responsibility for immigration and citizenship services out of
the Department of Justice sends the right message, that legal immi-
gration and naturalization are not principally law enforcement prob-
lems; they are opportunities for the nation as long as the services are
properly regulated. Further, the Department of Justice does not have
the capacity internationally to take on the many duties of the De-
partment of State.  The Department of State, however, already has
a domestic presence and an adjudicatory capability.  It issues one-
half million immigrant visas and six million nonimmigrant visas
each year.  DOS also provides a full range of citizenship services
both domestically (issuance of almost six million passports annu-
ally) and abroad (e.g., citizenship determinations and registration of
births of U.S. citizens overseas).  Indeed, DOS has devoted a major
share of its personnel and its capital and operating resources to
these adjudicatory functions at embassies and consulates in more
than two hundred countries and in passport offices in fifteen U.S.
cities.  In addition, the National Visa Center in New Hampshire
processes and forwards to overseas posts three-quarters of a million
immigrant cases.
Consolidating responsibility requires some changes in the way the
Department of State administers its immigration responsibilities,
which we believe would strengthen the adjudication function.  This
increase in domestic responsibilities may raise concern over possible
decrease in attention and focus on the Department of State’s tradi-
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tional mandate in foreign affairs, as well as more practical caution
regarding the well-known difficulties in managing the domestic
aspects of immigration.   Some observers also may be concerned
that DOS might not give sufficient consideration to the domestic
impact of immigration.  To counter this perception (and some un-
derlying reality), the Department of State would need to develop
mechanisms for consultation with domestic groups representing a
broad range of views and interests regarding immigration.
The Department of State also will need to change its historic posi-
tion on review of consular decisions.  At present, decisions made at
INS and the Department of Labor on many immigrant and LDA
applications may be appealed, but no appeal is available on consu-
lar decisions.  The Commission believes that immigrant and certain
limited duration admission visas with a U.S. petitioner should be
subject to independent administrative review [see below].  The De-
partment of State also would have to prepare its own bureaucracy
to take on these new functions.  A need for a renewed emphasis on
training for the management of large and interrelated offices and
processes will be matched by the need for superior personnel man-
agement and leadership.  These highly-regarded management skills
would be an ideal attraction for those Foreign Service officers who
shy away from consular assignments abroad, perceiving them as
unwanted digressions from the classic diplomatic career path.
The new organization would be responsible for naturalization and
determination of citizenship, adjudication of all immigrant and lim-
ited duration admission petitions, work authorizations and other
related permits, and adjustments of status.  It also would have re-
sponsibility for refugee status determinations abroad and asylum
claims at home.  Overseas citizenship services would continue to be
provided by consular officers abroad and in Washington.  Policy
and program development for all immigration activities would be
incorporated into the new organization, which also would have
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enhanced capacity to detect, deter, and combat fraud and abuse
among those applying for benefits.
With consolidation, the Department of State would have sole re-
sponsibility for processing immigrants—from the filing of the peti-
tion in the United States and subsequent visa issuance abroad, to
the production of the green card and  work authorization in the
U.S., and ultimately, to naturalization.  Issuance of a passport to the
newly-naturalized citizen would complete this almost seamless pro-
cess of immigration benefits adjudications.  Consolidation of these
steps would permit greater operational flexibility (e.g., one-stop ad-
judication of petitions and forwarding to posts abroad, streamlined
processing for work-related visas), greater flexibility in use of per-
sonnel (e.g., the examination function could span visa petitions and
passports), and, as discussed below, greatly enhanced antifraud
capabilities.
The consolidation of these functions in DOS would, of course, be a
major undertaking for a relatively small department already charged
with absorbing the United States Information Agency and the Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency.  The Department of State must
be given the resources to fulfill such new responsibilities.  The ap-
proximately five thousand INS and Department of Labor staff cur-
rently involved in immigration applications adjudications would
likely be transferred to DOS.  Many employees would remain in or
near their present locations and their functions would not apprecia-
bly change.
This recommendation envisions creation of an Undersecretary who
would have direct access to the Secretary of State and who would
be responsible for domestic and overseas immigration, citizenship,
and refugee functions.
Within the Office of the Undersecretary would be a unit responsible
both for formulating and assessing immigration policy as well as
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reviewing and commenting on the immigration-related effects of
foreign policy decisions.  This policy capacity would be new for the
Department of State, but it is in keeping with the important role that
migration now plays in international relations.
The Undersecretary would have three principal operating bureaus:
A Bureau of Immigration Affairs [IA] would focus on the immigra-
tion process, as noted above, as well as on LDA processing.  IA’s
expanded responsibilities would be based on those currently as-
signed to the Visa Office and the National Visa Center.  In addition
to its existing overseas work, the Bureau of Immigration Affairs
would be responsible for domestic adjudication/examination func-
tions, including work authorization, adjustment of status, domestic
interviewing, and the issuance of appropriate documentation (e.g.,
green cards).  The Bureau of Immigration Affairs also would staff
immigration information and adjudication offices in areas with im-
migrant concentrations.  Related INS legal and regulatory staffs in
Washington also would transfer to the IA Bureau, as would DOL
functions regarding employment-based entry.  In short, the IA Bu-
reau would assess—in the U.S. and abroad—applications for all
immigration-related benefits now performed by INS, DOL, DOS,
and USIA.
Importantly, the employment verification system outlined in previ-
ous Commission recommendations also would be under the Depart-
ment of State’s control, although it would likely contract out the
actual operation of that system.  Another important part of its do-
mestic presence would be the staffing of immigration information
offices in areas of major immigrant concentrations.
A Bureau of Refugee Admissions and Asylum Affairs would as-
sure an appropriate level of independence from routine immigration
issues and processes.  It would combine the present Bureau for
Population, Refugees and Migration [PRM] responsibilities for over-
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seas refugee admissions, the refugee and asylum offices of the INS,
and the DOS asylum office in the Bureau of Democracy, Human
Rights and Labor.2 This would integrate the key governmental play-
ers in one of our most important and historic international activities.
In this vein, the direct line of authority to the Secretary of State
through the new Undersecretary underlines the key policy advan-
tage for global refugee issues.
A Bureau of Citizenship and Passport Affairs would be respon-
sible for naturalization, other determinations of citizenship, and is-
suance of passports.  Local offices performing some citizenship func-
tions, such as overseas travel information, passport and naturaliza-
tion applications, testing and interviews, could be located at the
new or expanded immigration offices noted below.
Overseas citizen services would continue to be handled within the
new consolidated organization, utilizing the DOS substantial do-
mestic and overseas staff.  These services include: responding to
inquiries as to the welfare or whereabouts of U.S. citizens; assisting
when U.S. citizens die, are arrested, or experience other emergen-
cies abroad; providing notarial services; and making citizenship
determinations and issuing passports abroad.  In some countries
experiencing instability, an increasingly important activity is orga-
nizing Americans living or working in those areas into networks for
efficient communication of information and warnings.
Quality Assurance Offices would oversee records management,
monitoring procedures, fraud investigations, and internal review.
At present, monitoring of the quality of decisions made on applica-
2 The Commission makes no recommendation regarding the management
or organization of the overseas refugee and humanitarian assistance
programs operated by PRM and the USAID Bureau for Humanitarian
Response.  These functions could remain within the Undersecretary for
Global Affairs or be brought under the new Undersecretary for
Citizenship, Immigration, and Refugee Admissions.
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tions for immigration and citizenship benefits receives insufficient
attention.  INS enforcement officials now have the responsibility to
investigate allegations of fraud in immigration and naturalization
benefits programs, but monitoring the adjudications process is a
low priority in an office that is also responsible for identifying and
removing criminal aliens, breaking up smuggling and counterfeiting
rings, and performing similar police work.  A staff responsible for
and dedicated to ensuring the quality of decisions taken on appli-
cations for immigration and citizenship should address some of the
weaknesses, such as those recently identified in the naturalization
process.
Some adjudication decisions now are reviewed by a separate ad-
ministrative unit within the agency conferring benefits; others are
not.  The Commission believes that quality decisions require some
form of supervisory review for applicants who believe their cases
have been wrongly decided.  This type of review helps an agency
monitor consistency and identify problems in adjudication and of-
fers a means of correcting errors.  At present, DOS has procedures
for some internal supervisory review of consular decisions, but it
has had no need for procedures to review refusals of applications at
earlier stages of adjudication.  With expanded responsibilities, DOS
will need to develop a comprehensive internal review process that
ensures that errors are corrected with minimal disruption to the
applicant and the agency.
Quality assurance requires good records.  The accrued personal
records of each immigrant must be accurate, up-to-date, and retriev-
able at each adjudicative stage: (1) petition/immigrant visa; (2) alien
resident/green card; (3) naturalization; and (4) passport. The cre-
ation and maintenance of the alien filing system (“A” files) should
be reviewed to assure its maximum utility in the adjudicative flow
noted above.  The absolute need for good immigration records can-
not be overstated.
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Standardized and flexible records management and the consolida-
tion of domestic and overseas adjudication functions will greatly
enhance antifraud capabilities.  At present, fraud often is not discov-
ered until after a government agency has given the case one or more
approvals and the alien appears for his or her visa.  The resources
are not now in place for adequate review of questionable petitions,
and communications between overseas posts and domestic agencies
are not adequate.  Even when they receive information from over-
seas posts about likely fraud, the domestic agencies generally do not
follow up with further investigation.  Consolidation within the
Department of State would overcome poor coordination and com-
munication and permit more antifraud efforts at the beginning of
the process, where they are most effective.  A fraudulent entry pre-
vented, a work permit not issued to an unauthorized person, or an
ineligible alien prevented from naturalization—these are far more
preferable to trying to rescind a benefit granted in error.
With respect to the domestic field structure for implementing these
programs, The Regional Service Centers and National Visa Center
would continue to be the location of most adjudication.  The physi-
cal plants are excellent and the locally-hired staffs are trained and
in place.  At this time, information is passed from the RSCs to the
NVC when the applicant for admission is overseas.  Eventually,
however, the functions of the Service Centers and the Visa Center
might be consolidated.  Overseas interviews would continue to take
place at embassies and consulates.
A range of other interviews would take place domestically.  The
Department of State already operates fifteen passport offices through-
out the United States, many in areas of high immigrant settlement.
These offices, however, are not set up for high volume interviewing.
New offices, designed specifically with immigrant services in mind,
would be needed.  Ideally, to avoid long lines and waits for service,
there would be smaller offices in more locations than the current
INS district offices.  The Commission recommends against locating
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these offices with the enforcement offices discussed above.  Asking
individuals requesting benefits or information to go to an enforce-
ment agency sends the wrong message about the U.S. view of legal
immigration.
Immigration-Related
Employment Standards (DOL)
The Commission recommends that all responsibility for enforcement
of immigration-related standards for employers be consolidated in
the Department of Labor.  These activities include enforcing compli-
ance with requirements to verify work authorization and attesta-
tions made regarding conditions for legal hire of temporary and
permanent foreign workers.  The Commission believes that as this
is an issue of labor standards, the Department of Labor is the best
equipped federal agency to regulate and investigate employer compli-
ance with standards intended to protect U.S. workers.  The hiring of
unauthorized workers and the failure of employers to comply with
the commitments they make (e.g., to pay prevailing wages, to have
recruited U.S. workers) in obtaining legal permission to hire tempo-
rary and permanent foreign workers are violations of such labor
standards.  Responsibility for enforcing compliance with these re-
quirements currently lies within both INS and DOL.  Under consoli-
dation, the DOL Employment Standards Administration’s [ESA],
Wage and Hour Division [WH] and Office of Federal Contract  Com-
pliance Programs [OFCCP] would perform these functions in con-
junction with their other worksite labor standards activities.
These increased immigration-related responsibilities would require
increased DOL staff and resources.  In addition to performing all
worksite inspections, DOL would assume new employer sanctions
responsibilities.  Specifically, the Commission makes the following
recommendations regarding the DOL role in regulating the worksite
to ensure the protection of U.S. workers.
The Commission
recommends
that all
responsibility for
enforcement of
immigration-related
standards
for employers
be consolidated
in the Department
of Labor.
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Sanctions against employers who fail to verify work authoriza-
tion.  Among its provisions that address the problem of unautho-
rized immigration, the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986
made it unlawful for an employer knowingly to hire any alien not
authorized to work in the U.S.  IRCA requires all employers to
check the identity and work eligibility documents of all workers
hired.  Upon hiring, employees must sign an I-9 Form certifying
eligibility to work and that the documents they present to the em-
ployer are genuine.  The employer then signs the form, indicates
which documents were presented, and attests that they appear to be
genuine and to relate to the individual who was hired.  IRCA estab-
lished penalties both for employers failing to comply with this pro-
cess and for employers knowingly hiring unauthorized aliens.  Pilot
testing of a more rigorous verification process recommended in the
Commission’s 1994 report and adopted in large part in the immi-
grant legislation passed in 1996 addresses verification problems aris-
ing from the widespread use of fraudulent documents by illegal
aliens.
The Commission believes all worksite investigations to ascertain
employers’ compliance with employment eligibility verification re-
quirements should be conducted by the Department of Labor.  Al-
though DOL already conducts many of these investigations, under
this recommendation, DOL also would assess penalties if employers
fail to verify the employment eligibility of persons being hired.  DOL
would not be required to prove that an employer knowingly hired
an illegal worker, just that the employer hired a worker without
verification of his or her authorization to work. With implementa-
tion of the Commission’s proposal for a more effective verification
process, this function will be critical to deterring the employment of
unauthorized workers.
At present, INS has the principal responsibility for employers sanc-
tions enforcement, including: investigations and prosecution of
“knowing hires” of illegal aliens and paperwork violations; worksite
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raids that apprehend and remove illegal aliens; and development
and maintenance of employee eligibility verification programs de-
signed to help employers determine which individuals are autho-
rized to work in the United States.  DOL also reviews employer
compliance with the employer sanctions verification processes in
the course of its on-site visits to workplaces and as part of regular
labor standards enforcement activities.  DOL Wage and Hour and
OFCCP personnel inspect the I-9 Forms on file and notify INS of the
results of such inspections.  DOL also is authorized to issue warning
notices to employers when deficiencies are found in an employer’s
verification process.  In practice, however, DOL has rarely issued
such  warnings.
Although INS and DOL jointly enforce the employer sanctions pro-
visions, INS has the primary responsibility, including assessing civil
penalties and initiating legal action.  A Memorandum of Under-
standing between DOL and INS retains for INS the responsibility for
promulgating employer sanctions program policy.
Consolidating verification enforcement at DOL gives responsibility
to an agency with extensive experience regulating business compli-
ance with labor standards, an expertise largely lacking at INS.  It
also permits a relatively high level of enforcement activity, as DOL
completes far more employer visits than INS.  The number of em-
ployer sanctions cases completed by INS has decreased sharply from
14,311 in 1990 to 5,211 in FY 1996, of which 90 percent were cases
in which the agency had some reason to believe a violation oc-
curred.3  Over the past several years, the number of Wage and Hour
on-site investigations also has decreased substantially but is still
well above the INS level.  The DOL reduction results largely from
3 The lowered activity, nevertheless, represents more targeted and effective
enforcement.  The number of arrests during this same period increased
more than 50 percent.  In 1,024 cases the employers were fined; warnings
were issued in 669 cases; $4,853,288 was collected in fines; and 13,848
undocumented workers were arrested.
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a greatly expanded use of expedited investigations in the form of
employer self-audits and conciliations in place of on-site investiga-
tions.  For example, Wage and Hour conducted  more than 42,000
on-site investigations and corresponding I-9 inspections in FY 1990,
but less than 23,000 in FY 1996.  OFCCP conducts some 4,000 on-site
inspections each year.  In FY 1996, approximately 70 percent of
Wage and Hour investigations were complaint-driven; the remain-
ing 30 percent were directed or targeted.  Wage and Hour devotes
the equivalent of twenty-one full-time employees to I-9 inspections,
OFCCP the equivalent of eight.
The Commission recognizes DOL concern that from the begining its
assumption of an employer sanctions enforcement role created a
potential conflict with its broader mission of protecting the wages
and working conditions of workers.  Its inspectors worry that work-
ers’ fears that such employer sanction actions might result in INS
apprehension and deportation could have a “chilling effect” on those
workers who might—and should—come forward to report work-
place abuses.  For this reason, DOL has been extremely wary of
crossing the hard-to-distinguish line where sanctions-related activi-
ties might effectively frustrate its ability to protect deserving work-
ers.
The Commission believes that DOL participation in verifying that
only authorized workers are hired should be seen as integral to its
mission of protecting U.S. workers.  DOL has an essential interest in
reducing illegal migration as those employers who hire illegal aliens
are more likely to violate the minimum labor standards that DOL is
charged with enforcing.  A reduction in levels of illegal migration
could well be the most effective tool available to enhance protec-
tions for legally authorized workers.  The primary responsibility of
DOL is protecting American workers, and transfer of employer sanc-
tions enforcement to DOL represents the best option for raising the
level of enforcement to a point that presents a real deterrent to the
employment of undocumented workers.
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Enforcement of skill-based immigrant and limited duration admis-
sions requirements.  In our 1995 report to Congress, the Commis-
sion urged adoption of streamlined procedures for the admission of
skilled foreign workers whom U.S. businesses wish to hire.  We
continue to believe that an expedited process is needed for the
admission of both temporary and permanent foreign workers, as
discussed earlier in this report, as long as adequate safeguards are
in place to protect the wages and working conditions of U.S. work-
ers.  To prevent abuse of an expedited system, an effective
postadmissions enforcement scheme is necessary.
Upon adoption of an expedited process for the admission of both
immigrant and temporary workers, DOL should be given responsi-
bility and resources for enhanced monitoring of employers’ fulfill-
ment of the attestation terms they filed to bring in workers.  As
discussed above, decisions on who will be admitted under the vari-
ous skill-based admission categories would be made by the Depart-
ment of State.
DOL’s other worksite enforcement responsibilities place it in the
best position to monitor employers’ compliance with the attesta-
tions submitted in the admissions process.  DOL investigators are
experienced in examining employment records and interviewing em-
ployees.  Penalties should be established for violations of the condi-
tions to which the employer has attested, including payment of the
appropriate wages and benefits, terms and conditions of employ-
ment, or any misrepresentation or material omissions in the attesta-
tion.  Such penalties should include both the assessment of admin-
istrative fines as well as barring egregious or repeat violators from
petitioning for the admission of permanent or temporary workers.
When DOL has concluded that an employer is an egregious or re-
peat violator, and any subsequent administrative appeal has been
decided, it would notify the DOS Bureau of Immigration Affairs of
such findings, with a recommendation about barring the employer
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The Commission
recommends that
administrative
review of all
immigration-related
decisions
be consolidated
and be considered
by a newly-created
independent agency,
the Agency for
Immigration
Review, within the
Executive Branch.
from petitioning for the admission of foreign workers for temporary
or permanent employment.  The Bureau of Immigration Affairs would
then determine if such a debarment is to be made and would notify
the employer of its decision.  The employer would have the option
of appealing such a decision.
Agency for Immigration Review
The Commission recommends that administrative review of all immigra-
tion-related decisions be consolidated and be considered by a newly-created
independent agency, the Agency for Immigration Review, within the Ex-
ecutive Branch.
The Commission believes that a system of formal administrative
review of immigration-related decisions—following internal super-
visory review within the initial adjudicating agency—is indispens-
able to the integrity and operation of the immigration system.  Such
review guards against incorrect and arbitrary decisions and pro-
motes fairness, accountability, legal integrity, uniform legal interpre-
tations, and consistency in the application of  the law in individual
cases and across the system as a whole.
Experience teaches that the review function works best when it is
well insulated from the initial adjudicatory function and when it is
conducted by decisionmakers entrusted with the highest degree of
independence.  Not only is independence in decisionmaking the
hallmark of meaningful and effective review, it is also critical to the
reality and the perception of fair and impartial review.
To the extent that administrative review of immigration-related
decisions is authorized under current law, such review is conducted
by several Boards and units located in the Departments of Justice,
Labor, and State.  For example, within the Department of Justice,
the Executive Office for Immigration Review, a separate agency es-
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tablished by regulation in 1983, oversees the system of immigration
courts, as well as the Board of Immigration Appeals [BIA].  The
BIA, a fifteen-member panel appointed by  the Attorney General,
has nationwide jurisdiction over a wide range of cases, including
decisions of Immigration Judges in exclusion, deportation, and re-
moval proceedings, and requests for relief made in those proceed-
ings.  In addition, the BIA adjudicates appeals in several other cat-
egories of cases, such as bond determinations, fines, rescission of
adjustment of status, and certain family-based visa petitions.
Supplementing their normal hearing docket, Immigration Judges
now conduct the final review of the “credible fear” of persecution
determinations made in the admission/inspection process, as well
as determinations that an alien seeking admission is not currently a
lawful permanent resident, refugee, or asylee as he or she claims.
The Office of the Chief Administrative Hearing Officer [OCAHO]
also is housed in EOIR and is responsible for administering the
hearing process issues arising under the employer sanctions, anti-
discrimination, and document fraud provisions of the Immigration
and Nationality Act.
Within the Immigration and Naturalization Service there is an Ad-
ministrative Appeals Office [AAO], whose component parts include
the Administrative Appeals Unit [AAU] and the Legalization Ap-
peals Unit [LAU].  Unlike the BIA, the AAO does not have a
decisionmaking board.  Rather, the Chief of the Unit reviews and
signs off on decisions prepared by individual examiners.  AAO has
appellate jurisdiction over petitions and applications in no fewer
than thirty-nine subject areas, among which are decisions relating to
the breaching of bonds, employment-based visa petitions, adjust-
ment of status for Indochinese refugees, petitions for Amerasian
children,  fiancé(e)s, orphans, temporary workers, permission to
reapply for admission after deportation or exclusion, reentry permit
waivers for certain grounds of excludability, certification of schools
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for acceptance of foreign students, applications for refugee travel
documents, claims to acquisition of citizenship abroad, applications
to preserve residence abroad for naturalization purposes, various
applications for certain certificates of naturalization, and applica-
tions for temporary or permanent resident status under the regular
legalization, Special Agricultural Worker or Replenishment Agricul-
tural Worker programs, and corresponding waivers of inadmissibil-
ity.
Appeals of denials of naturalization applications, however, are not
considered by the AAO.  Instead, review of such decisions occurs at
the INS district office level and is conducted by an officer of equal
or higher grade as the initial adjudicator.  (If the initial decision
denying the naturalization application is sustained, the alien may
challenge the decision in federal district court, the court having
jurisdiction over the ultimate swearing-in of successful naturaliza-
tion applicants.)
In the Office of the Legal Adviser in the Department of State, there
is a Board of Appellate Review [BAR] vested with jurisdiction to
hear, in part, appeals of determinations of loss of nationality or
expatriation, and denials, revocations, restrictions, or invalidations
of passports.
In the Department of Labor, the Board of Alien Labor Certification
Appeals [BALCA], created by regulation in 1987, hears appeals of
denials of applications for labor certification.
When considering the appellate review function in its totality, it
becomes apparent that responsibility for reviewing enforcement-re-
lated decisions rests primarily with the individual components of
EOIR, while responsibility for reviewing benefit adjudication deci-
sions is spread across several offices and agencies including the BIA,
AAO, INS district offices, BALCA, and, for a more limited set of
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nationality- and citizenship-related issues, the BAR at DOS.  Fur-
ther, Immigration Judges and the BIA have the authority to provide
certain forms of relief during deportation, exclusion, and removal
hearings that can result in lawful permanent resident status for aliens.
Inasmuch as the underlying benefits and enforcement functions per-
formed by the immigration system are themselves dispersed among
several Departments, it is not surprising to find that formal admin-
istrative review of decisions made in the context of performing  those
functions is likewise dispersed.  However, in light of our recommen-
dations that responsibility for the enforcement of the immigration
laws be placed with a new Bureau for Immigration Enforcement in
the Department of Justice and that all citizenship and immigration
benefits adjudications be removed from the Department of Justice
and instead be consolidated in the Department of State, we find that
a corresponding change in the placement of responsibility for the
review function is in order.
Even with the assignment of the benefits adjudication function to
DOS and the enforcement function to DOJ, interrelationships will
exist between eligibility for benefits and enforcement actions.  In-
deed, eligibility for an immigration benefit may be an avenue to
relief from deportation, exclusion, or removal while certain immi-
gration violations may present barriers to attaining legal status.  For
example, favorable disposition of a petition or application by the
benefits agency may collaterally resolve a deportation or removal
issue.  Aliens in enforcement proceedings may be eligible for certain
forms of relief involving the same types of legal questions arising in
the context of benefits adjudication outside of proceedings—or aliens
in proceedings may be foreclosed from eligibility for a benefit ap-
plied for outside of proceedings.  Ultimately, however, there is a
need for a uniform administrative interpretation of what the law is
and how it should be applied, regardless of whether the questions
arise when adjudicating an application for a benefit or resolving an
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enforcement action.  These considerations lead us to conclude that
administrative review of all presently reviewable immigration-re-
lated decisions should be consolidated.
In deciding where the review function could best be performed, the
Commission considered a number of options, including separate
reviewing bodies for enforcement actions within DOJ and forbenefit
determinations within DOS, placing responsibility for review en-
tirely with EOIR, and creation of an Article I Immigration Court.
Placing the review function in its entirety with EOIR was an attrac-
tive option, particularly given EOIR’s success in both insulating the
review function and achieving independence of decisionmaking since
its inception in 1983.  At the same time, EOIR remains located in the
Department of Justice, ultimately and predominantly a law enforce-
ment agency.   Further, existing procedures permit the Attorney
General to reverse or modify any decision reached by the BIA.  The
Commission, as well as other commentators, find this practice trou-
bling because, at a minimum, it compromises the appearance of
independent decisionmaking, injects into a quasi-judicial appellate
process the possibility of  intervention by the highest ranking law
enforcement official in the land, and, generally, can undermine the
BIA’s autonomy and stature.  In the end, the Commission decided
the EOIR option was unworkable because of the inherent difficulty
of a reviewing agency in one Department rendering decisions in
cases initially decided by another Department.
Instead, the Commission was persuaded by the arguments that the
review function should be completely independent of the underly-
ing enforcement and benefits adjudication functions and that the
reviewing officials should not be beholden to the head of any De-
partment.  Although the desired independence could be attained by
establishing an Article I Immigration Court, such a court would be
part of the Judicial, rather than the Executive Branch.  The overall
operation of the immigration system requires flexibility and coordi-
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nation of function, including the review function, by the various
agencies in the Executive Branch.  Given this reality, the Commis-
sion concluded that the review function should be conducted by a
newly-created independent reviewing agency in the Executive Branch.
To ensure that the new reviewing agency is independent and will
exist permanently across Administrations, we believe it should be
statutorily created.  It would incorporate the activities now per-
formed by several existing review bodies and offices, including the
DOJ Executive Office for Immigration Review, the INS Administra-
tive Appeals Office and district offices (naturalization), the DOL
Board of Alien Labor Certification Appeals, and the limited set of
nationality and citizenship-related matters presently considered by
the DOS Board of Appellate Review.  The Agency for Immigration
Review also would have additional responsibilities.
Creating any decisional system or tribunal requires attention to sev-
eral guiding principles.  First, no system can work effectively if the
personnel who form the base of the decisional pyramid are insuffi-
cient in number or deficient in skills and integrity to do the job.
Second, the base of any such structure cannot be expanded either in
number of its personnel or in extent of its jurisdiction beyond the
capacity of the next level above to review and decide the outcome.
This must be achieved within a reasonable period and with a rea-
sonable expenditure of resources.  Finally, the apex of any decisional
pyramid should be relatively small.  With these considerations in
mind, the Commission proposes the following organization for the
new independent Agency for Immigration Review.
This new reviewing agency would be headed by a Director, a presi-
dential appointee, who would coordinate the overall work of the
agency, but who would have no say in the substantive decisions
reached on cases considered by any division or component within
the agency.  There would be a trial division headed by a Chief
Immigration Judge, appointed by the Director.  The Chief Judge
would oversee a corps of Immigration Judges sitting in immigration
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courts located around the country.4  The Immigration Judges would
hear every type of case presently falling within the jurisdiction of
the now sitting Immigration Judges.
The new reviewing agency also would consider appeals of decisions
by the benefits adjudication agency, using staff with legal training.
Although the benefits adjudication agency will handle a wide range
of applications—from tourist visas to naturalization and the issu-
ance of passports—not all determinations will be appealable, as is
the case under current law.  We envision that those matters that are
appealable under current law would remain appealable.  The only
difference is that the appeal would be lodged with and considered
by the new independent Agency for Immigration Review rather
than by the various reviewing offices and Boards presently located
among the several Departments.
The administrative appeals division also would consider appeals
from certain visa denials and visa revocations by consular officers.
Under current law, such decisions are not subject to formal admin-
istrative or judicial review.
When a visa is denied, important interests are at stake.  To be sure,
the visa applicant is adversely affected—but more importantly at
stake are the interests of the United States citizens, lawful perma-
nent residents, employers, and businesses who have petitioned the
admission of the applicant or who otherwise have an interest in
having the applicant present in the United States.  Given the lack of
formal administrative and judicial review of consular decisions, these
individuals are left with little or no recourse.
4 Admittedly, currently sitting Immigration Judges perform the classic
review function only to a very limited degree—for the most part they
serve as initial decisionmakers in cases where aliens are placed in
proceedings.  Notwithstanding this circumstance, however, experience
teaches that Immigration Judges should find their home in the same
agency as the appellate reviewing Board, not the enforcement agency
that is initiating the proceedings against the alien.
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The Commission believes that consular decisions denying or revok-
ing visas in specified visa categories, including, all immigrant visas
and those LDA categories where there is a petitioner in the United
States who is seeking the admission of the visa applicant, should be
subject to formal administrative review.  The visa applicant would
have no right to appeal an adverse determination.  Instead, standing
to appeal a visa denial or revocation would lie only with United
States petitioners, whether U.S. citizens, lawful permanent residents,
or employers.
An appellate Board would sit over the trial and administrative
appeals divisions of the new independent Agency for Immigration
Review.  This appellate Board would be the highest administrative
tribunal in the land on questions and interpretations of immigration
law.  It would designate selected decisions as precedents for publi-
cation and distribution to the public at large.  Its decisions would
be binding on all officers of the Executive Branch.  To ensure the
greatest degree of  independence, decisions by the Board would be
subject to reversal or modification only as a result of judicial review
by the federal courts or through congressional action.  Neither the
Director of the reviewing agency nor any other agency or Depart-
ment head could alter, modify, or reverse a decision by the appellate
Board.
The appellate Board would be headed a Chairman.  Both the Chair
and Vice Chair would be appointed by the President for staggered
terms of at least ten years.  The appellate Board would have as
many Members, who would be appointed by the Chair, as needed
to decide appeals in a timely manner.  It would consider appeals
from the categories of cases presently falling within the BIA’s juris-
diction, subject to the above-noted  modifications.  In addition, the
appellate Board could entertain appeals from decisions of the ad-
ministrative appeals division in cases in which a novel or significant
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The Commission
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federal
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legal issue were presented, or in any other case in which it was
deemed necessary or appropriate.
The Office of the Chief Administrative Hearing Officer, presently
housed in EOIR, would operate as a separate component in the
Agency for Immigration Review and would perform the same work
as is presently being conducted. Of course, the precise organiza-
tional arrangements and divisional jurisdictions could be subject to
future modification following a comprehensive review by the Agency
for Immigration Review of the types and volume of cases received.
However, to meet the challenges presented by consolidation of all
immigration-related appeals in one place, and to perform its critical
mission of correctly and expeditiously resolving appeals, the new
reviewing agency must be given sufficient resources and staffing.
MANAGEMENT REFORM
The Commission urges the federal government to make needed re-
forms to improve management of the immigration system.  While
the Commission-recommended structural changes will help improve
implementation of U.S. policy, certain management reforms must
also be adopted if the agencies responsible for immigration matters
are to be effective in performing their functions.  Structural reforms
will not by themselves solve some of the management problems that
have persisted across Administrations in the immigration agencies.
More specifically, the Commission recommends:
 n Setting more manageable and fully-funded priorities.  The
Commission urges Congress and the Executive Branch to
establish and then appropriately fund a more manageable
set of immigration-related priorities.  By this we mean es-
tablishing fewer objectives, but also setting more integrated
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priorities, more realistically-achievable short-term and long-
term goals, and greater numerical specificity on expected
annual outcomes to which agencies should be held account-
able.
The processes by which both Congress and the Executive
Branch plan and allocate resources constrain the develop-
ment of a more manageable set of priorities.  Currently,
most immigration priorities result from Legislative/Execu-
tive interaction through a multiyear budget process.  Gov-
ernment budgeting cycles are lengthy and complex. Agen-
cies must work simultaneously with the budgets and report-
ing cycles of four fiscal years.5  Congressional action, mean-
while, consists of the doubly bifurcated processes of autho-
rization, followed by separate appropriations in the House
of Representatives and the Senate, and then by resolution in
conference.
Executive Branch departments seldom identify adequately
how much money they need to accomplish the entirety of a
specified goal.  Nor do they do a good job of scaling back
or increasing objectives depending on the resources appro-
priated.  Within the Legislative Branch, there is little coor-
dination among congressional committees to ensure a con-
gruence of agreed-upon priority expectations and resources
actually allocated to do the job.  Consequently, transparency
and accountability are not built into the system.  For ex-
ample, Congress is not held accountable for adding new
priorities without appropriating resources to accomplish all
of the specified tasks.  Federal agencies are neither directly
nor easily held accountable for their performance in achiev-
ing or not achieving agreed-upon results.
The Commission urges Congress and the Executive Branch
to refrain from overpromising what the federal government
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can accomplish in implementing immigration policy.  For
example, rather than defining the removal of all deportable
and inadmissible aliens as the priority for removal, a goal
that is presently not achievable, the federal government could
define removal priorities in terms of specified numbers  and
categories of aliens (e.g., criminal aliens) and in terms of
certain strategies.   For example, a “last in, first out” strat-
egy would remove everyone who newly enters the removal
system before removing persons whose cases have been
pending in backlogs for some time.  This priority-setting
process worked well in reforming the asylum process and
could be replicated in other areas.
Priority setting must be accompanied by sufficient resources
to undertake the top objectives.  In the case of removals, it
should include resources for Investigations, Trial Attorneys,
Immigration Judges, the BIA Detention and Deportation Of-
ficers, Department of State liaisons with host countries, and
such needs as vehicles, equipment, training, and support.
The priority should identify the problem completely and
clearly and map out which part of that problem will be
solved in which of several years of the priority.  And then
Congress should agree and the Executive Branch should be
held accountable.
n Developing more fully the capacity for policy develop-
ment, planning, monitoring, and evaluation.  In general,
5 For example, for the second quarter [January-March] of FY 1997, federal
agencies were:
n For FY 1996, completing ’96 year-end statistics and reports;
n For FY 1997, continuing work on implementing ’97 goals and priorities;
n For FY 1998, finalizing the President’s February FY 1998 Budget
Submission to the Congress and explaining/defending it at
congressional committee hearings;
n For FY 1999, developing the ’99 budget initiatives, priorities, and
strategies to be submitted to OMB under the “Spring Plan” planning
process.
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the current immigration system suffers from an inability to
develop, sustain, and clearly articulate long-term and short-
term policymaking except in times of crisis.  Often this has
led to bad policymaking, poorly developed programs, inad-
equate policy coordination across departmental lines, and
almost nonexistent program assessment and evaluation of
outcomes.  None of the main Executive Branch departments
has developed a broad-based immigration policymaking
capacity.
The most developed policymaking and coordination unit in
the immigration system exists in the INS Office of Policy
and Planning [OPP].  However,  a majority of its eighty-five
people and its $5 million personnel budget are related to
statistics and other nonpolicymaking activities.  Moreover,
while it is important for the principal agency responsible for
immigration enforcement to have its own policy and plan-
ning capability, OPP is not necessarily well positioned to
advise the Department of Justice about immigration-related
policy issues affecting other DOJ agencies.  Further, under
the Commission’s proposed restructuring, it would make no
sense for the agency responsible for enforcement to have
lead responsibility for formulating policies related to legal
immigration and naturalization or enforcement of immigra-
tion-related labor standards.
Each department with immigration-related responsibilities
needs to perform a wide range of policy functions, includ-
ing, but not limited to, long-range and strategic policy plan-
ning, interagency policy integration, policy review, policy
coordination, priority setting, data collection and analysis,
budget formulation, decisionmaking, and accountability.  The
Domestic Policy Council and the National Security Council,
both situated in the White House can also play an important
role in coordinating policy development across departments.
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Informed policymaking requires systematic review of cur-
rent policies and programs (which themselves should be
informed by reliable and timely statistical information),
development of a range of options, and analysis of the ad-
vantages and disadvantages (including costs and timeframes)
of each.  Further, immigration policy affects, and is affected
by, a wide range of other issues of interest to the depart-
ments.  For example, the DOL overall labor policy is af-
fected by immigration as the foreign-born represent a large
proportion of the growth in the labor force.  As a proportion
of the unskilled workforce, immigrants represent an even
larger proportion and potential impact.  Similarly, interna-
tional migration and the foreign policy and national security
interests of the United States are strongly connected.
The immigration-related policymaking capacities at the de-
partmental level in Justice, State, and Labor tend to be ad
hoc and understaffed.  For example, the Office of the Deputy
Attorney General [DAG] has two and one-half to three at-
torneys working on immigration-related policy and program
coordination.  These staff serve as a clearinghouse through
which immigration-related concerns and policy matters pass
from the responsible agencies (e.g., INS, EOIR, Office of
Special Counsel for Immigration-Related Unfair Employment
Practices, Office of Immigration Litigation) through the DAG
to the Attorney General.  Given the wide range of policy
issues requiring department-level attention, these staff have
an all but unmanageable policy portfolio.  Much of their
time is spent on routine oversight punctuated by crisis man-
agement, with little time left for long-range policy develop-
ment or planning.  The Commission believes more sustained
and timely attention to immigration policy issues within
and across departments will help improve both the formu-
lation and implementation of programs.
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Interagency coordination of immigration policymaking also
is particularly important.  The Domestic Policy Council [DPC]
already plays such a role.  The Commission recommends
strengthening the DPC’s capacity to provide policy guid-
ance, particularly when immigration matters affect or are
affected by other domestic interests.  Designation of a senior
focal point for immigration policy in the DPC would en-
hance its ability to coordinate policy development.  This role
would be complementary to the enhanced role the Commis-
sion recommended for the National Security Council with
regard to refugee issues.  The DPC and the NSC would
coordinate closely when migration issues relate to U.S. for-
eign policy and national security interests.
More specifically, the DPC should be mandated and staffed
to: oversee federal immigration policy development across
departmental and agency lines; monitor the execution and
impact of new legislation, policies and programs; resolve
differences within the Executive Branch, focusing on those
that impede the capacity of the federal government to de-
liver a single, coherent message about immigration policy
and priorities; serve as a forum for discussion of new ideas;
coordinate liaison with and the input of advocates and other
nongovernmental agencies concerned with federal immigra-
tion decisionmaking; and relay the resulting recommenda-
tions to Congress and the President.
n Improving systems of accountability.  The Commission
believes strongly that staff who are responsible for immigra-
tion programs should be held accountable for the results of
their activities.  Systems should be developed to reward or
sanction managers and staff on the basis of their perfor-
mance.  This requires the development of performance
measures that relate to expected outcomes.  For example,
the Commission earlier recommended rewarding Border Pa-
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trol staff for their effectiveness in deterring illegal migration
rather than their prowess at apprehending illegal aliens.
Similarly, managers responsible for adjudication of benefits
should be rewarded if they lessen processing time for the
approval of applications and, simultaneously, improve their
detection of fraudulent cases.  By contrast, managers who
fail to meet recognized operating standards should be held
accountable and be sanctioned for their noncompliance.
Systems to reward innovation or sanction managers and
staff on the basis of their performance also need to be devel-
oped.  Too often, staff who try new approaches not only are
not rewarded for their initiative, they are sanctioned by their
colleagues and supervisors.
n Recruiting and training managers.  The Commission be-
lieves improvements must be made in the recruitment and
training of managers.  As immigration-related agencies grow
and mandated responsibilities increase or evolve, closer at-
tention should be paid to improving the skills and manage-
rial capacity of immigration staff at all levels to ensure more
efficient and effective use of resources allocated.
Since 1993, the immigration system has been undergoing a
tremendous infusion of new resources and, since 1996, sig-
nificantly augmented statutory mandates.  Either change
would seriously burden even the best-run agencies of the
federal government.  Such infusions of new resources to
INS and to several other agencies burden agency adminis-
trative and management systems.  INS has not added a
sufficient number of experienced, proven managers to help
the agency address the many challenges it faces.
Agencies must be able to rapidly recruit, select, train, de-
ploy, and then support new staff—and they must sustain
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this expansionist capacity over several fiscal years.  Most of
the new staff added are entry-level, necessitating on-the-job
training, mentoring, and close supervision before they can
be considered fully functional in their jobs.
As new staff are added, new supervisors are needed—and
they too need supervisory and management training to be
successful.  Supervisors usually are drawn from the ranks of
the operational staff, and with increased operational respon-
sibilities, they often are unable to be freed soon enough or
long enough to attend supervisory training in a timely fash-
ion.
In addition, major changes in the immigration statutes passed
in 1996 necessitate the redrafting and repromulgation of hun-
dreds of sections of law and regulations, hundreds of new
or revised forms, and training and retraining of staff just to
implement these profound changes.  Agencies should con-
sider new ways in which staff are trained to do their work:
e.g., training in management by objectives, in accountability,
in managerial and supervisory skills.  For some agencies,
the skill levels—and agency cultures—are not yet adequate
to be successful in fulfilling present and expected future
increased managerial and supervisory responsibilities. Both
additional supervisors and new skills are urgently needed.
The infusion of new skills and culture can come from two
sources: (1) in-house training and retraining of existing staff;
and (2) the addition—from outside the agencies themselves—
of new middle- and upper-level management staff possess-
ing those skills and the ability to apply them quickly to the
immigration settings.  These two sources need not be mutu-
ally exclusive; some of both may be required.
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One promising recent development is the INS’ new “compe-
tency-based” assessment process for Border Patrol officer
promotions to supervisor.  The Border Patrol is the single
immigration agency receiving the greatest number of new
staff over the coming next several years.  The objective is to
test Border Patrol officers to predict more accurately their
potential for success as future supervisors.  According to
INS, the main focus of the system is assessment of “thinking
skills . . . the way supervisors and managers must think and
react on a daily basis.”6  More than 1,000 Border Patrol
officers have been tested, another 1,000 will be by the end
of summer 1997, and testing of all remaining eligible Border
Patrol Officers will be completed by the end of 1997.
n Strengthening customer service orientation.  The Commis-
sion urges increased attention to instilling a customer-ser-
vice ethic in staff, particularly those responsible for adjudi-
cation of applications for benefits.  Repeatedly, but most
recurringly regarding INS, the public complains of a lack of
service from both their dollar and from the personnel charged
with serving them.  The horror stories are too common.
Most individuals coming into contact with the immigration
system have paid a fee—whether indirectly (such as at air-
ports and the inspections users fees tacked onto their ticket
prices) or directly (such as through the submission of a fee
with their application for a benefit). They expect and should
receive service that is customer-friendly and timely.  Appli-
6 The system is based on four assessments:
1. Decisionmaking Situational Assessment, measures thinking skills such
as reasoning, decisionmaking, and problemsolving;
2. In-basket Job Simulation, measures administrative skills, such as
planning/organizing and managing/organizing information;
3. Managerial Writing Skills Exercise, measures written communication
skills; and
4. Past Achievement Record, measures personal qualities, such as
leadership and flexibility.
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cants should be treated courteously, records should be lo-
cated with ease, and accurate information should be pro-
vided in a professional manner.
The absence of a separate career track for benefits adjudica-
tors hampers efforts to attract and retain the best federal
employees to these tasks.  The structural reforms we recom-
mend should help address this problem.  Currently, many
of those promoted into management positions within INS
moved along the enforcement career track.  Its higher-paid
designations frequently make them eligible for such promo-
tions before those who spend their careers in benefits adju-
dication.  Benefits adjudication personnel should have a
career track that promotes the best performers into posi-
tions of management and leadership and provides all em-
ployees with appropriate incentives as well as models worth
emulating.
The primary currency of service is information—informa-
tion that should be both accurate and timely.  Daily, in many
locations throughout the U.S., people seeking forms, infor-
mation, status checks, and interview appointments, and
reporting a change of address, requesting a copy of a form
in their file, or requesting or extending employment autho-
rization create long lines around local INS offices.
Immigration customers should not have to stand hours in a
line to get information.  Immigration processes should be
reengineered to ensure that information is easily available at
several locations and through several electronic means and,
when given, is accurate.  Several ways to improve access to
forms and information, many electronic, already are in de-
velopment.  Forms increasingly are available on Information
Kiosks located in high volume immigration centers; soon
they will be available over the Internet.  The website devel-
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oped by the Department of State’s Bureau of Consular Af-
fairs makes available pertinent information on conditions
throughout the world.
Customer-service personnel should be both initially well-
trained and periodically tested to ensure they remain cur-
rent with the latest changes and interpretations of policy.  In
addition, there should be a formal quality assurance pro-
gram.  For customer service representatives working on the
lines at district field offices or answering questions on the
telephone, quality assurance of their work should include
the possibility for supervisors to monitor the correctness
and manner of delivery of the service given.
n Using fees for immigration services more effectively.  The
Commission supports the imposition of users fees, but
emphasizes that: (1) the fees should reflect true costs; (2) the
agencies collecting the fees should retain and use them to
cover the costs of those services for which the fees are lev-
ied; (3) those paying fees should expect timely and courte-
ous service; and (4) agencies should have maximum flexibil-
ity  to expand or contract their response expeditiously as
applications increase or decrease.
The current situation has a number of weaknesses.  First,
some programs are now undercharging (or not charging)
fees while others reportedly are overcharging.  INS is now
reviewing its fees to determine where adjustments should
be made.  Second, some fees go into the General Treasury
while others are held by the agencies collecting them and
used for the function for which they were collected.  Third,
agencies do not have effective systems for accurately antici-
pating the volume of applications, forecasting their fee re-
ceipts, and requesting appropriate levels of funding from
fee accounts to meet demand.  Fourth, when there is an
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The Commission
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unforeseeable increase in the number of applications, there
is a significant lag time before an agency is able to use the
increased fee revenue to expand its service capacity.  For
example, it took several months to develop a reprogram-
ming request and then obtain permission for a reprogram-
ming of funds when naturalization and section 245(i) adjust-
ment applications increased significantly.  This delay resulted
in a growing backlog of persons awaiting service.  Provid-
ing more flexibility would require agreement from the con-
gressional appropriations committees that they need not ap-
prove the reprogramming of fees when the need for addi-
tional resources is related solely to an increase in the vol-
ume of applications.
IMPROVED DATA AND ANALYSIS
The Commission reiterates its 1994 recommendations7 regarding the need
for improvements in immigration data collection, coordination, analysis,
and dissemination.  Although progress has been made, much more
needs to be done.  Reliable and timely data are crucial to the effec-
tive enforcement of immigration law.  They are the basis for the
effective implementation of ongoing and new programs.  And, ulti-
mately, they are the only means of assessing results achieved and
reaching the conclusions necessary for responsible policymaking.
Data problems throughout the immigration system have long been
evident.  The Panel on Immigration Statistics of the National Re-
search Council concluded in 1985 that the “story” about immigrant
data was “one of neglect.”8  Despite increases in congressional fund-
ing and some notable improvements at the INS, the available data
remain incomplete—a problem that exists to some degree in each
agency involved in the immigration system.
7 U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform.  1994.  U.S. Immigration Policy:
Restoring Credibility.  Washington, DC.  179-86.
U.S. COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION REFORM
1 9 9 7
RECOMMENDATIONS
- 194 -
The Commission believes there is a pressing need for improvements
in immigration data collection, standardization, intra- and inter-
agency linkages, timely dissemination, rigorous analysis, and use in
policymaking.  The Commission urges the federal government to
support continuing research and evaluation on all aspects of immi-
gration.  Further, the Commission urges the Congress to insist upon
the organizational structures needed to create and maintain high-
quality statistical data.
The statistical function must be given high priority and sufficient
institutional control and authority.  Quality data do not evolve as a
by-product of disjointed administrative data-gathering responsibili-
ties.  Quality data ultimately require a statistical system that can
satisfy policy-relevant and management information needs through
an integrated, centrally-coordinated approach.9
In recent years Congress has addressed the statistical problem by
requiring improvements in specific arenas—primarily through auto-
mation—and by appropriating increased funding.  These steps are
encouraging and the Administration appears to have embarked suc-
cessfully on some programs for automated data collection.  The INS
already has established separate systems for data collection and
retrieval for its core enforcement and benefits functions.10  Under
the Commission’s proposals it is essential that the statistical systems
under DOJ enforcement and DOS benefits retain an automated and
integrated design.  However, statistical systems cannot be improved
simply by automating data collection.
As the Panel on Immigrant Statistics concluded, it would be naive
8 Levine, D. B.;  Hill, K.;  Warren. R.  (eds.).  1985.  Immigration Statistics:
A Story of Neglect. Washington, DC: National Academy Press.
9 Norwood, J. L.  1995.  Organizing to Count: Change in the Federal Statistical
System. Washington, DC: The Urban Institute Press.
10 However, there still remain more than one dozen separate data collection
systems that often suffer from various internal deficiencies and remain
to be integrated into larger core systems.
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to assume that automation will solve the problems that have been
evident for too long a time in statistical operations.11  The Panel
cited an agency-wide lack of understanding and commitment to
high-quality data and the need for the development and acceptance
of appropriate standards as the primary causes of today’s inad-
equate state of affairs.  It is necessary to change priorities from data
collection solely for individual division administrative purposes to
the production of data for integrated enforcement, benefits, quality
control, and analytic uses.
Congress also has been critical of the way in which data has been
disseminated.  In the context of congressional debate, sporadic re-
lease of data has the potential for politicizing statistics.  Regular and
scheduled release of statistics, preferably monthly, can go a long
way toward depoliticizing data and focusing attention on unbiased
analysis.  The Department of Labor’s Bureau of Labor Statistics,
with an autonomous and scheduled release of data, offers one model
for the dissemination of data with no relation to the policy calendar.
The Commission believes each agency with immigration responsi-
bilities should have a statistical office charged with final authority
over data coordination, agency-wide definitions and systems inte-
gration, quality monitoring, research and analysis, and regular dis-
semination.  Data collection and analysis must be a priority and be
reflected in the statistical branch’s organizational placement.  Only
sufficiently high placement and authority can ensure that its mission
is successfully discharged.
Interagency cooperation and coordination of agencies that produce
or use immigration data can enhance the data’s timeliness and value
significantly.  Cooperation also can lead to significant gains in the
11 Levine, D. B.;  Hill, K.;  Warren. R.  (eds.).  1985.  Immigration Statistics:
A Story of Neglect. Washington, DC: National Academy Press.  See also:
Morris, M.D.  1985.  Immigration—The Beleaguered Bureaucracy. Washington,
DC: Brookings Institution.
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use of scarce resources—be they funding, staff, time, or public tol-
erance.  Such coordination must insure monitoring of progress, ad-
herence to standards, common definitions, timeliness in publication,
and full disclosure of methods, methodology, procedures, and prob-
lems.  Only then will significant improvements occur.
Consideration should be given to the creation of a permanent taskforce
on immigration statistics that would coordinate interagency efforts
to improve all aspects of the statistical system.  Various ad hoc and
temporary governmental working groups have tackled a part of, or
the whole of, the data collection system.12  A formally-charged
taskforce would craft the basis for interagency agreements and pos-
sible statutory and regulatory changes.  To be effective, the taskforce
would require appropriate institutional support.  It would marshal
interagency collaboration on data whenever feasible, especially on
definitional issues and on what information is collected.  The taskforce
should conduct an exhaustive review of the data collected in each
agency, identify overlap or potential interagency data linkages, evalu-
ate technical and computer needs, propose standard definitions, and
make recommendations.
Information Needs
Little can be done to make significant advances in our understand-
ing of immigration without improvements in data and targeted re-
search.  Policymaking is particularly hampered by lack of knowl-
edge from detailed surveys and longitudinal studies in three areas:
the experiences and impacts of immigrants; the experiences and
impacts of foreign students and foreign workers admitted for lim-
ited duration stays; and the patterns and impacts of unlawful mi-
12 The INS has convened an Interagency Working Group on Immigration
Statistics that has reviewed various data problems.  It has had a significant
impact on Administration funding for an immigration component in the
Current Population Survey, the preeminent U.S. source of data on national
trends and on the U.S. labor force.  It also made significant contributions
to ultimate Administration support for the New Immigrant Survey.
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gration.  There is a seemingly inexhaustible range of options for
collecting data and, especially, topic areas needing research.13  Ex-
amples of pressing analytic data needs are discussed below.
Legal Permanent Admissions
The gap between questions about legal immigration and the data
needed for answers is greater than in almost any other area of public
policy.  It is not now possible to address fully pressing policy ques-
tions about the changing skill makeup of newly admitted immi-
grants over time, the transitions between temporary and permanent
residence status, the effects of today’s immigration on future de-
mand through family reunification, and the success and impact of
immigrants in the U.S. economy.
To answer such questions, policymakers have a crucial need for
both data on detailed classes of admission and the capacity to track
changes over time.  Recently, the Administration funded the collec-
tion of data on immigrants in the monthly Current Population Sur-
vey.  However, these and other survey data neither collect detailed
information about status nor distinguish between legal and illegal
foreign residents, much less between the various temporary or per-
manent admission statuses.
The INS yearly admissions data are the most immediate source of
information on immigrant entry class.  Yet, the data serve primarily
as a minimalist administrative count of individuals.  Identifying
family units would make it possible to evaluate admissions as they
really are: the immigration not of individuals but of families.  The
quality and type of data gathered on labor force status depends on
definitions that do not conform with modern concepts.  Including
information about immigrant sponsors would go far to increase our
13  Edmonston, B. (ed.).  1996.  Statistics on U.S. Immigration: An Assessment
of Data Needs for Future Research. Washington, DC: National Academy
Press.
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ability to make reliable forecasts about the numbers and skill com-
position of tomorrow's immigrants.
The New Immigrant Survey discussed in the introduction to this
report demonstrates the policy value of expanded data on new
admissions.  For the first time we have an accurate picture of edu-
cation and English ability, as well as the capability for studying
transitions from temporary to permanent status, the characteristics
of sponsors, and the financial well-being of new entrants.  Designed
as a pilot, the NIS should be seriously evaluated for its costs and for
its value as a model for a longitudinal survey.14  Experts agree that
only a longitudinal survey ultimately can answer Congress’ most
pressing questions.15
Finally, it is essential to improve our knowledge of newly natural-
izing citizens.  In the past few years there have been dramatic in-
creases in the numbers of persons naturalizing, but little is known
about the individual circumstances under which residents choose to
naturalize.  Only more detailed knowledge about such things as
eligibility and motivations will yield indicators to forecast the num-
ber of future applications.  Accurate forecasts are needed to meet
demand and to organize processing integrity.
14 A longitudinal survey would, among other things, help address serious
deficiencies due to “lost data sources.”  In the 1950s, the U.S. discontinued
collecting data on persons leaving permanently.  Without accurate
emigration data, demographic estimates of the size and growth of the
foreign population are imprecise exercises.  In the 1980s, the “Alien
Address” database was discontinued.  Knowing the size of the legal
population makes it possible to get significantly more precise estimates
of the size and location of illegal residents.
15 Levine, D. B.;  Hill, K.;  Warren. R.  (eds.).  1985.  Immigration Statistics:
A Story of Neglect. Washington, DC: National Academy Press.  Edmonston,
B. (ed.).  1996.  Statistics on U.S. Immigration: An Assessment of Data Needs
for Future Research. Washington, DC: National Academy Press.   National
Research Council.  (J.P. Smith, B. Edmonston, eds.).  1997.  The New
Americans: Economic, Demographic, and Fiscal Effects of Immigration.
Washington, DC: National Academy Press.
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Limited Duration Admissions
There exists remarkably little comprehensive or policy-relevant
knowledge or research on the administration of the LDA system or
its impact on the U.S. economy.16  Problems in the LDA data system
are even more pervasive than in the legal permanent system.
The Commission believes that improvements in data collection and
analysis of LDAs and the impact of these admissions should be
considered an urgent priority.  The INS has made significant efforts
to improve its data and has directed funds toward new computer
systems.  The Commission urges the Congress to support continued
innovation in data collection and storage retrieval.  As in our last
report, the Commission suggests that building upon existing admin-
istrative recordkeeping will be most cost-effective.
Improved data and new research efforts are especially critical as
there is remarkably little known about the number, characteristics,
and impact of LDA workers and foreign students.  For example,
important basic information is lacking on LDA workers—their geo-
graphic location in the U.S., occupations, or labor-market effects.
Longitudinal data and analysis are needed regarding the transition
of LDA workers to immigrant status—directly or through other tem-
porary categories.  Likewise, little is known about the total popula-
tion and characteristics of foreign students, their geographic distri-
bution,  academic status, duration of stay, employment activities, or
change and adjustment of legal status.
There is a critical need to continue and extend improvements in
departure data—one of the more crucial components of the entire
immigrant information system.  Precise exit information is neces-
sary to track duration of stay, compliance with visa regulations, and
overstays.  Further, the utility of current data could be meaningfully
16 Lowell, B.L. (ed.).  1996.  Temporary Migrants in the United States.
Washington, DC: U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform.
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extended, for example, by collecting accurate information on in-
tended destination.  The Commission endorses continued emphasis
on the improvement and introduction of electronic/paperless mecha-
nisms for the collection of departure data.
Unauthorized Migration
The measurement and study of illegal aliens—a clandestine popula-
tion—always has been fraught with difficulties.  Ironically, a focus
on estimates of this population may well have produced more ac-
curate numbers than official figures on legal residents.  Yet, if our
research knowledge of legal immigrants is circumscribed, and re-
search on LDAs nearly nonexistent, the analysis of the illegal popu-
lation, while extensive, suffers from combinations of problems.
At a rudimentary level, there is a need to know more about the
number of illegal aliens who entered without inspection [EWI] in
contrast to temporary admittees who overstay the time permitted
on their LDA visa.17  In terms of enforcement efforts the distinction
is important, but there is an unknown range of error in current
estimates.  What proportion fall into each type?  Improvements in
existing databases are sorely needed along with research into inno-
vative and reliable means of estimating each population.
Much could be gained from knowing about the varied means by
which EWIs and LDA overstayers come to the United States and the
length of their stay.  If, for example, LDA overstayers had shorter
durations of residence in illegal status, then their proportion of the
total illegal population is, in a sense, more “fluid.”  At a more
critical extreme, subpopulations of highly mobile and circular mi-
17 U.S. General Accounting Office.  1995.  Illegal Immigration: INS Overstay
Estimation Methods Need Improvement.  GAO/PEMD-95-20. Washington,
DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.
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grants may stay for only short periods in the United States.  These
highly mobile individuals would not be fully captured in standard
estimates of the illegal population.18
18 There are few reliable estimates of the highly-mobile, illegal
subpopulation, nevertheless, ad hoc estimates increasingly are heard.  A
correct estimate of this population should adjust for its average, or “person
year,” size.  For example, if 100 illegal workers spent one-half year
working in the United States, they would earn the yearly wages of 50
workers.  See Heer, D.M.  1990.  Undocumented Mexicans in the United
States.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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CONCLUSION
This report concludes the work of the U.S. Commission on Immi-
gration Reform.  Together with our three interim reports, this final
set of recommendations provides a framework for immigration and
immigrant policy to serve our national interests today and in the
years to come.  The report outlines reforms that will enhance the
benefits of legal immigration while mitigating potential harms, curb
unlawful migration to this country, and structure and manage our
immigration system to achieve all these goals.  Most importantly,
this report renews our call for a strong commitment to American-
ization, the process by which immigrants become part of our com-
munity and we learn and adapt to their presence.  Becoming an
American is the theme of this report.  Living up to American values
and ideals is the challenge for us all.
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APPENDIX A
IMMACT: PROVISIONS
AND EFFECTS
The Immigration Act of 1990 [IMMACT] attempted to balance a
number of competing interests.  First, it established annual overall
limits on total legal immigration, but allowed those limits to be
“pierced” in response to changing levels of nuclear family applica-
tions and humanitarian admissions.  Second, it created a guaranteed
minimum number of visas for close family members if there are
increases in the number of immediate relatives of U.S. citizens seek-
ing entry.  Third, it increased the number of persons admitted for
employment reasons, with higher priority given to professionals and
highly-skilled persons.  Fourth, it created a  diversity  class of ad-
missions for persons from nations that have not recently sent many
immigrants to the United States.
IMMACT legislated a worldwide level of 675,000 family-based,
employment-based, and diversity immigration admissions per year.1
This ceiling may be pierced if immediate relative applications ex-
ceed expectations and does not include refugee, asylum, or other
humanitarian admissions.  The worldwide pierceable ceiling repre-
sented an increase of about 40 percent in the permitted number of
admissions compared to previously legislated levels.  Prior to
IMMACT, immediate relatives (who entered without regard to nu-
merical limits) averaged about 210,000 per year, and numerically-
limited categories were set at 270,000.  Humanitarian-based admis-
sions were set outside of regular immigration ceilings, as they con-
1 A transition worldwide level of 700,000 admissions was in effect during
FY 1992-1994.  Many admissions during the first two years were from
the pre-IMMACT backlog and do not necessarily reflect the aims of the
new legislation.
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tinue to be under IMMACT.  Most of IMMACT’s legal immigration
provisions went into effect in FY 1992, with the permanent diversity
program beginning in FY 1995.
More specifically, IMMACT contained the following provisions af-
fecting immigration numbers and immigrant characteristics.
Family-based admissions.  IMMACT established a worldwide limit
of 480,000 family-based admissions.  Immediate relatives—includ-
ing spouses, minor children, and parents of U.S. citizens—continue
to enter without regard to numerical limits.  Their actual admission
numbers are subtracted from the worldwide limit to determine how
many other family members (i.e., adult unmarried children of U.S.
citizens, spouses and minor children of legal permanent residents,
married children of U.S. citizens, and siblings of adult U.S. citizens)
will be permitted to enter the following year.   IMMACT set a
minimum floor of 226,000 numerically-limited family immigrants.
In addition, unused employment visas are transferred to the next
year’s family admissions.
The actual number of admission slots available and used each year
varies.  During the past five years, annual family admissions have
been as low as 460,653 in FY 1995 and as high as 595,540 in FY 1996.2
Variation can be seen in both the immediate relative and the nu-
merically-limited categories.
2   Processing problems explain some of the below average numbers for FY
1995 and above average ones for FY 1996.  Higher demand for adjustment
of status within the United States followed enactment of § 245(i) that
permits those not in lawful status to pay a penalty to obtain their legal
immigration status in the U.S.  INS was not prepared for the large
increase in applications, resulting in an adjustment backlog.  Some of
those who normally would have received their green card in FY 1995
had to wait until FY 1996.  In the meantime, the large number of unused
FY 1995 employment-based admissions were transferred to the family
categories for FY 1996.
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One goal of IMMACT was to reduce waiting times, particularly for
the spouses and minor children of legal permanent residents (FB-2A
Preference).  Recognizing that the 2.7 million aliens who were given
LPR status by the Immigration Reform and Control Act would pe-
tition for their immediate families, IMMACT provided three years
of additional visas for spouses and minor children of legalized aliens.
Because per-country limits sometimes create admission backlogs for
affected nationalities, it also required that 75 percent of the FB-2A
numbers would be exempt from per-country limits.
The family categories have attracted far more applicants than there
are admission visas and, hence, large backlogs have developed.  The
total backlog of family applicants stood at 3.5 million at the start of
FY 1997, essentially unchanged from FY 1996.  About one million
individuals are awaiting legal admission under FB-2A.  As projected
by the Commission in its 1995 report, the numbers on the FB-2A
waiting list have declined slightly from the prior year.3  However,
the waiting time until admission has continued to grow since
IMMACT.  From an already long wait of just less than two and one-
half years in FY 1992, the waiting time in the backlog has continued
to increase each year until, at the time of this report, it is almost four
and one-half years.  The priority date for admission advances little
each month, meaning longer and longer waits for new applicants.
Anticipation of such trends led the Commission to recommend in its
1995 report a series of changes to the numerically-limited family
categories, but no congressional action was taken. The Commission
3  Much of the initial rapid increase in the spouse and children of the LPR
backlog was due to IRCA legalization.  Now most of those family
members already have made their applications and, indeed, new applicant
numbers have declined steadily since 1992.  Even so, there were still
82,521 new applicants entering the backlog in 1996.  In most years, about
90,000 admission slots are available for FB-2A, meaning that the waiting
list will experience only modest decreases in the future.
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has projected that waiting times could reach as long as ten years for
applicants at the end of the waiting line.4
Employment-based admissions.  IMMACT extensively revised the
employment-based categories and numbers.  The legislation empha-
sized the admission of high-skilled persons and added a new cat-
egory for investors.  IMMACT allows up to 140,000 employment-
based admissions each year, up from an annual limit of 54,000 un-
der previous statute.  Covered under these numbers are the princi-
pal applicants, as well as their spouses and minor children (both
referred to as beneficiaries).  The numbers are distributed over sev-
eral categories, generally reflecting educational and skill level.
IMMACT also placed a cap of 10,000 admissions on lesser-skilled
admissions.
Employment-based admissions increased significantly under
IMMACT, but they have not approached the annual ceiling of 140,000
(except when the Chinese Student Protection Act of 1992 [CSPA]
permitted Chinese who had entered the U.S. before Tiananmen
Square to become permanent residents under the employment cat-
egory).  Subtracting out the onetime admissions under CSPA, skilled
and unskilled employment-based admissions have gone from about
100,000 in FY 1994 to 81,000 in FY 1995 and back up to 117,000 in
FY 1996.  The increase in FY 1996 appears to reflect a catchup from
4  In principle, the recent surge in the naturalization of potential sponsors
could reduce the backlog and waiting time of spouses and children of
LPRs.  Sponsors who have naturalized can petition for the admission of
their spouses and minor children under the unlimited citizen reunification
category, thus effectively moving them out of the queue.  However, this
process will not decrease the backlog in an expeditious fashion.  Even
assuming rather high rates of naturalization, the Commission projections
also show that it will take at least another decade before today’s backlog
can be reduced to acceptable numbers.  Surprisingly, early indications
are that the large volume of naturalizations since 1995 have not resulted
in increases of relatives of U.S. citizens in the family preference total.
(DOS Bureau of Consular Affairs. 1997. Visa Bulletin 73:7 A7.)
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administrative processing delays in the previous year.  The most
notable increase through this period has been in the first preference,
particularly in the subcategory for executives and managers of mul-
tinational corporations.5  The first preference had fewer than 5,500
admissions in IMMACT’s first year of implementation but now has
more than 25,000 admissions.
In terms of the backlog of employment-based visas, the category of
unskilled workers (EB-3B preference) remains heavily oversubscribed
as of FY 1997, with nearly a seven-year wait for admission for all
nations.  Otherwise, only India is oversubscribed with nearly a two-
year wait for admission for employment professionals with advanced
degrees (EB-2) and skilled workers (EB-3A).  Employment-based
admissions must be closely monitored to know whether or not they
reach their limit in the future and whether per-country limits im-
pede timely entry of the highly-specialized workers who are genu-
inely needed by U.S. business.
Diversity admissions.  The diversity immigrant provisions in
IMMACT seek to increase national diversity in the immigrant popu-
lation by widening access for immigrants from underrepresented
countries whose citizens have neither strong family nor job ties to
the United States.  The permanent program began in October 1994.
It provides 55,000 admission slots per year to nationals of countries
that have sent fewer than 50,000 legal immigrants to this country
over the previous five years.  Each applicant must have a high
school education or its equivalent or two years of work experience
in an occupation requiring at least two years of training or experi-
ence.  Persons eligible to enter are chosen by lottery.  In FY 1996,
some eight million applications were received by the Department of
State.
5 Multinational corporations include U.S.-based companies with overseas
operations and large and small foreign businesses that establish U.S.
offices, subsidiaries, or affiliates.
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About 40,000 diversity immigrants entered in FY 1995 and 58,000 in
FY 1996.  As with other admission categories, the FY 1995 numbers
are misleading because of the delays in processing adjustments of
status.  Unlike other categories, however, the diversity program
does not permit a waiting list of unprocessed applicants who will be
interviewed the following year.
Refugee and other humanitarian admissions.  Various categories
of people may obtain LPR status outside of the worldwide pierceable
ceiling.  The largest groups are refugees admitted from overseas as
part of the refugee resettlement program and asylees granted asy-
lum domestically.  After one year, refugees and asylees become
eligible to adjust to LPR status.  They are counted when the adjust-
ment occurs.  Other humanitarian-based admissions include
Amerasians, parolees permitted to adjust status under special leg-
islation, and individuals granted suspension of deportation.  The
total numbers admitted under these categories vary depending
largely on the annual refugee admission levels determined through
Presidential-Congressional consultation.  All humanitarian admis-
sions reached a high in FY 1994 of 160,000 and dropped modestly
to 123,000 and 138,000 in FYs 1995 and 1996, respectively.
Future trends.  As indicated, the year-to-year admissions under
IMMACT have followed an up-and-down course.  Future trends are
difficult to project.  A number of factors may increase future admis-
sion levels.  Given the pace with which immigrants are naturalizing,
growth in the number of immediate relatives may occur as newly
naturalized citizens petition for their families.  While LPRs may
petition for spouses and minor children, until naturalization, they
may not petition for the admission of a parent.  It is also unlikely
that the numerically-limited family preferences will be
undersubscribed in the foreseeable future.  Continuing backlogs
ensure that available family quotas, as well as any unused employ-
ment numbers transferred to the family categories, will be filled.
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At the same time, new provisions adopted in the recent welfare
reform (The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Recon-
ciliation Act of 1996) and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immi-
grant Responsibility Act of 1996 may dampen future admissions
despite the lengthy waiting lists.  In particular, IIRIRA requires all
family members to be sponsored by a U.S. petitioner whose income
meets at least 125 percent of the poverty level.  Sponsors must sign
legally-binding affidavits under which they pledge to provide any
financial support needed by the new immigrants.  In addition, the
welfare reform legislation bars noncitizens from most income trans-
fer programs.  Some U.S. family members may be unwilling or
unable to take on these new financial responsibilities for new immi-
grants.
U.S. COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION REFORM
1 9 9 7
A P P E N D I X
- 222 -
APPENDIX B
STATEMENT OF COMMISSIONER
WARREN R. LEIDEN
While I agree with most of the findings and recommendations of the
Commission majority, there are two subjects of major recommenda-
tions on which I am moved to make separate statements —one in
dissent (Legal Permanent Admissions) and one in concurrence (Struc-
tural Reform).
Legal Permanent Admissions
Legal immigration needs reform of priorities and allocations, but
current levels of legal immigration are in the national interest.
Virtually all the research and analysis received by the Commission
indicated that the current levels of legal immigration continue to
provide a net positive benefit to America in a multitude of ways.
Whatever interest is examined—economic, social, political, scien-
tific, or cultural—the current levels of legal immigration are found
to benefit each of these aspects of American life.  The current levels
of legal immigration that were established by the Immigration Act
of 1990 have served this country well.  And, after the current one-
time increase that is the result of the 1986 legalization program, the
overall number of legal immigrant admissions can be expected to
moderate and decrease.
The current overall levels of legal immigration should be main-
tained until there is another opportunity for review in three to five
years.
The majority recommends a one-quarter reduction in legal immigra-
tion from current levels, but not now, rather in five to eight years.
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This reduction comes at the expense of thousands of American fami-
lies who have been patiently waiting for legal reunification with
their close relatives overseas.  It is accomplished by eliminating
three of four family preference categories and simply shutting the
door on thousands of sons, daughters, and siblings of U.S. citizens.
There is no convincing argument for this drastic reduction in legal
immigration now or years from now.  Current levels of legal immi-
gration clearly serve the national interest and can better do so if
priorities and allocations are reformed.
Prioritize family-based admissions without eliminating family re-
unification.  Spouses and minor children of U.S. citizens and lawful
permanent residents [LPRs] and parents of U.S. citizens should re-
ceive the highest priority for immigration, but this can be accom-
plished without eliminating the immigrant categories for adult sons
and daughters or siblings of U.S. citizens.
The family preference categories should be reordered, placing the
spouses and minor children of LPRs at the top, with a “spilldown”
of unused visas going to the remaining family categories.  This
approach would ensure the quickest reduction in the shameful back-
log of spouses and minor children of LPRs, without sacrificing the
family unification of those sons and daughters who simply turned
21 years old.  The majority, by its determination to reduce legal
immigration, is forced to call for the elimination of sons and daugh-
ters preference categories.  It is wholly unnecessary to impose this
hardship when simple priority setting can accomplish the same end.
The backlog of spouses and children of LPRs has already begun to
decrease, and there are fewer new applicants than there are indi-
viduals being accorded immigrant status under the “second prefer-
ence category.”  This indicates, as predicted, that the current back-
logs can be reduced and that a new stable level of family immigra-
tion can be achieved once the one-time “echo” of the legalization
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program has been processed.  The small increases in the family
preference categories for sons and daughters can be quickly made
up once the top preference category is current.
Preserve employment-based immigration levels and reform labor
market tests without penalizing employers.  I dissent from the
majority's recommendation to reduce employment-based immigra-
tion by almost 30 percent to only 100,000 admissions per year (in-
cluding spouses and children).  This level was already exceeded in
FY 1996, when employment based legal immigration reached 117,000.
Moreover, the continued growth of the international economy prom-
ises to increase employment-based legal immigration up to at least
the current level of 140,000 admissions per year.  The majority’s
recommendation to cut annual employment based admissions down
to 100,000 per year would result in immediate backlogs, which would
recreate precisely the situation that the Immigration Act of 1990 was
enacted to cure.
Proposals that would result in the immediate creation of new back-
logs are clearly wrong.  The employment-based immigration ceiling
should be kept at the current level, with review in three to five
years.
New requirements and procedures need to be developed to replace
the labor certification process to test the bona fides of the petitioning
employer’s need and to avoid adverse effect on similar U.S. work-
ers.  I dissent from the majority’s recommendation that the solution
is that such employers be required to pay a “substantial fee” or tax
for the privilege of sponsoring international personnel.
The “substantial fee” approach simply does not address the real
issues.  It substitutes a penalty on certain employers for an honest
assessment of what is beneficial to the national interest and what is
practical in an environment of heightened international competition.
The majority wants to label the imposition of fees to be a use of
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“market forces,” but it is obvious that government-imposed tariffs
and fees are the complete opposite of market forces.  For the gov-
ernment to charge a substantial, arbitrarily-set fee that will be used
for purposes other than expense of adjudication and processing the
application would be more like a tax, the antithesis of market forces.
The majority would not only impose a penalty fee but would also
require such employers to meet subjective tests of eligibility, such as
whether it took “appropriate steps to recruit U.S. workers.”  It is
hard to imagine that this proposal would not result in a new bu-
reaucracy sitting in judgment on employers’ compliance with new
regulations and requirements.
The majority’s proposal will serve more to penalize U.S. employers
who petition for international personnel than to prevent adverse
effect.  Unfortunately, a proper analysis of these issues and  more
thoughtful recommendations remain to be done.
Structural Reform
Restructure the federal immigration responsibilities to separate
the adjudications function from the enforcement function but keep
them in the Department of Justice along with the appeals func-
tion.  The federal responsibilities to conduct immigration enforce-
ment, both at the border and inside the U.S., and to adjudicate
immigration and naturalization applications and petitions have not
been managed adequately.
Although it has received substantial increases in appropriations for
staff, equipment, and other resources, the enforcement function con-
tinues to suffer from a lack of strategic coordination.  While impor-
tant improvements have been made in enforcement at the border,
coordination with interior enforcement is tactical at best and often
exists in form only.  Interior enforcement is led and managed by
officials who have been charged with too many other responsibilities.
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At most levels of the INS, inadequate attention is given to the glar-
ing imbalances in staff and resource allocations to the sequential
steps of the enforcement process so that the consequences of appre-
hension are neither swift nor certain.  Distracted and overloaded
management also increases the risk of error and misconduct by its
subordinate staff.  Simply put, there is not a single, focused, na-
tional chain of command to pursue an integrated national enforce-
ment strategy, and the immigration function and the nation suffer
as a result.
Similarly on the adjudications side, huge increases in fee account
receipts have not resulted in proportional improvements in accu-
racy or efficiency.  Managers at the local, regional, and national
levels have not been adequately concentrated on their adjudications
responsibilities in immigration and naturalization.  The economies
of scale and additional resources provided by the substantial caseload
(and therefore revenue) increases have not been converted into
improvements, rather there is the appearance that there is just too
much to do.
The lack of success in enforcement and adjudications is not simply
for want of trying.  The immigration agencies are served by many
talented and determined staff and managers.  The current adminis-
tration of the Immigration and Naturalization Service has made
impressive strides forward on a number of fronts and its accom-
plishments are historic.
If, despite huge increases in funding and dedicated staff and lead-
ership, the federal government still has not achieved adequate man-
agement of its immigration responsibilities, it is inescapable that
something else must be done in order to arrive at a successful equa-
tion.  Based on the information, interviews, and analyses the com-
mission has reviewed over the past several years, it becomes an
inescapable conclusion that the primary immigration functions need
to be separated and restructured.
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Separation of the enforcement and adjudications functions is the
only solution to the current overload of responsibilities competing
for attention that is obvious at every level of the INS.  Separation of
the functions would permit the establishment of unified, focused
chains of command and operations at every level.  Separation of
enforcement from adjudications would allow each function to have
a clear mission and to set clear goals on by which performance
could be judged and accountability enforced.  Separate functions
would benefit greatly from the ability to gear hiring, training, pro-
motions, and discipline to a clear mission.
At present, with its combined missions, the INS is often in internal
contradiction, and its personnel, trained primarily in one mission or
the other, are asked to crisscross from positions calling for one type
of expertise and then the other.  The most telling evidence of the
value of separating the enforcement and adjudications functions
comes the recent history of INS itself.  The two most successful
examples of INS adjudications programs, the 1986 Legalization pro-
gram and the creation of an independent corps of asylum officers in
1990, are both instances where adjudications programs were con-
sciously and deliberately kept separate and insulated from the en-
forcement mission of the INS.  These practical, real world examples
conclusively make the case for separation of enforcement from ad-
judications.
Of course, separation and restructuring of the immigration func-
tions is not a panacea in and of itself.  The combined missions are
far from the only problem confronting the agencies, and the sepa-
ration of the functions should be seen only as providing a necessary
foundation from which real, lasting solutions can be hammered out
to the many substantive challenges confronting the government.  The
substantive problems of operations and policy remain the funda-
mental issues of concern; structural changes provide means to better
accomplishing these ends.
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The benefits of restructuring can be gained with far less disruption,
at less cost, and with greater chance of success if it is accomplished
within the Department of Justice. The two main functions of the
INS—enforcement and adjudications—should be separated into two
different agencies within the Department of Justice, with separate
leadership. This would also permit the insertion of a senior level
office in the Department of Justice to coordinate and lead the sepa-
rate functional agencies.
The creation of the Executive Office for Immigration Review [EOIR],
which separated the immigration hearings and appeals function from
the rest of INS in 1983, is a good model for this restructuring.  Like
the EOIR, each agency should have its separate mission, career paths,
training, and management, while still benefiting from policy and
strategic coordination at senior department level.
The Department of Justice is the proper place for the immigration
enforcement function and it is the proper place for the adjudications
function.  The Department of Justice has long experience with and
is the preeminent repository of expertise in both the immigration
enforcement and adjudications functions.  The Department of Jus-
tice epitomizes the values of due process and the rule of law, which
are especially important in achieving effective enforcement and fair,
accurate adjudications for a well-regulated, highly-selective legal
immigration system.  The division of these two immigration func-
tions, within the Department of Justice, would be far less disruptive
to either responsibility at a time when both adjudications workloads
and the need for enforcement activities are at record levels.
In contrast, transferring the adjudications function to the Depart-
ment of State would require it to integrate into its organization large
operations programs with which it has little familiarity.  Any de-
partment other than Justice would have to undertake the absorption
of new missions, expertise, and institutional values with which it
has little experience.
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Keeping both functions within the Department of Justice would be
far less costly than the transfer of all adjudications activities to the
Department of State or another department.  The personnel, train-
ing, facilities, and management are already fully part of and inte-
grated into Department of Justice.  Separation of enforcement and
adjudications within the Department of Justice raises mostly issues
of management and structure, rather the basic re-creation of a sub-
stantial institution in an entirely new setting.
Moreover, keeping adjudications within Justice would not require
the proposed creation of an entirely new independent agency for
immigration review in place of EOIR.  There are substantive argu-
ments on both sides of this issue, and it is one that should be de-
cided on the basis of merit, not mandated simply due to interde-
partmental restructuring.
As in all cases of organizational change, some predictable disrup-
tion and added expense are justifiable if the outcome is most likely
to be an improvement.  However, the consequences of the proposed
transfer of all adjudications functions to the Department of State are
far from certain.  Unlike the Department of Justice, the Department
of State would be undertaking a entirely different mission with which
it has had little experience or interest.  Historically, immigration
and consular matters have received tertiary attention and status at
the Department of State.  It is a gamble to think that these long-
standing attitudes will change for the better.  While some argue that
the Department of State could and should adopt an entirely new
mission in the post-Cold War era, beginning this debate by making
the massive implantation of the entire federal immigration adjudi-
cations function puts the horse before the cart and is a great risk to
take.
The Department of State has not had experience with the large
volume of substantive adjudications that heretofore have been done
by the Department of Justice.  Moreover, elementary concepts of
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legal process, including administrative and judicial review, prece-
dent decisions, and the right to counsel, have been vigorously re-
sisted by the Department of State throughout its history of consular
affairs.  The Department of State has energetically fought all at-
tempts in litigation and in legislation to make individual consular
decisions subject to any review within the Department of State itself
or by the federal courts.  It is difficult for anyone familiar with this
history to conceive that these Department of State traditions would
soon give way to modern legal concepts and the consistency and
accuracy that is their goal.
In contrast, the Department of Justice has the experience and the
expertise.  It needs only the restructuring and separation of enforce-
ment from adjudications, with dedicated leadership and manage-
ment for each, to have the best chance of success, at less cost and
with less disruption of the fundamental immigration responsibili-
ties.
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